

people to wild indignation about Spain and in particular about the need of supplying arms to the Valencia party in the war : that is the sort of thing that made Coriolanus exclaim :

“ Behold, the heavens do ope,
The gods look down, and this unnatural scene
They laugh at.”

An immense amount of thought is devoted to such incidental problems as the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain, German designs in Central Europe, Italian designs in the Mediterranean ; but the real problem that embraces them all, how to rescue the world from its political obsession, seems hardly to be considered at all. Yet the apparently destructive expedient of ridiculing the political pundits, of reducing the whole political graft to absurdity, seems to be the only practical and in the end constructive thing for the sensible people to do. The charge that such a device would be merely destructive hardly lies. Is it merely destructive, when a house is on fire, to destroy the fire by water ? If some human agency could only inspire the human race, instead of always saying “ The Government ought to do something about it,” to say “ The Government ought to stop doing things,” and if the same agency could turn men’s minds into other channels, religious, philosophical, or what not, then much of the madness at present afflicting mankind might be allayed.

It may be that there is something in the blood of man to make of politics an unconquerable perversity. The theory of civilisation is that it helps mankind in its material circumstance. In practice, can any serious person confidently maintain that on balance civilisation has done good to mankind ? Measure the brute beast against civilised man : and see if the contrast is as clear as it ought to be. Man has his religion, in its various forms. He trains himself still to believe in the deity he in his conduct defies. Considered dispassionately, and as it were in a remote detachment, what does the whole organisation of international diplomacy amount to ? The embassies, the foreign offices, with their war offices, admiralities, and air forces : what are they but an incredible machinery for the periodic mass destruction of human beings and property ? The brute beast could not do it. Because he is denied the power to formulate in words the dictates of his intellect, he is saved from the artificial evils that are inflicted by the

human intellect upon the less fortunate human race. Civilisation, in so far as it rests upon the uncurbed machinations of the human brain, is a terrifying thing. What is to curb it ? To answer that question is to solve one of the mysteries of life on earth.

(2) PALESTINE

Another commission of inquiry has made a report on the problems of Palestine. Those problems are so typical of what is normally presented to that form of human perversity we know as international diplomacy, that is to say, they are so wholly insoluble, that a certain paradoxical comfort may be derived from the contemplation of them.

Arthur Balfour, that historic monument of human ingenuity and finesse, made his tantalising declaration on behalf of the British Government on November 2nd, 1917, thus : “ His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.”

Could any conundrum be more flatly unanswerable ? Palestine is a small country, of some 9,000 square miles, only slightly larger than Wales, part of a big area traditionally inhabited by a proud Arab race, but as Sir George Adam Smith put it in his *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, a country that “ has never belonged to one nation and probably never will.” The Turkish Revolution of 1908 did not carry out its initial promise of full equality for the Moslems, Jews and Christians of Palestine. The policy radiating from Constantinople was one of increasing Ottomanisation leading to increasing resistance from the Arabs of Syria and Palestine : a resistance which had the effect of inducing the Turkish Government to pass the vilayet laws of 1913 and 1914. Those laws granted a real measure of local government, but their effect could not be tested because of the outbreak of war.

Concurrently the Jewish element in Palestine was increasing by leaps and bounds. The creation of the Zionist Organisation in 1897 had given a new momentum to the movement for the

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return of the Jews to Palestine. Between 1880 and the outbreak of the Great War the Jewish population of Palestine had increased five-fold. When the war broke out there were nearly 90,000 Jews out of a total population of 700,000. In the early years of the war the country became wholly disorganised and demoralised. When General Allenby conquered it in 1917 and entered Jerusalem on December 11th of that year, the military administration he set up had to begin by an emergency organisation of food supplies by military transport.

It was five weeks before Lord Allenby entered Jerusalem that Mr. Balfour made the historic declaration that was destined to lead to twenty years of appalling muddle. The Allied Powers endorsed it. It was incorporated in the Treaty of Sèvres, which further provided that the country should be administered by a League of Nations mandate. Until the League mandate was constituted and put into force the country was administered on British initiative without any legally constituted government. Hebrew was added to Arabic and English as an official language.

As long ago as the spring of 1920, before the mandate was constituted, there were Arab nationalist demonstrations against the Jews, and on April 4th and 5th of that year riots took place in Jerusalem. That was one reason why on July 1st, 1920, a civil government was set up with Sir Herbert Samuel as the first high commissioner. The riots, however, continued. November 2nd, 1921, the fourth anniversary of the Balfour declaration, was made the occasion of a ceremonial outbreak in Palestine, which had been preceded by riots in Jaffa.

Mr. Winston Churchill, Colonial Secretary, thought it wise even at that early date to emphasise the dual nature of the purpose in Palestine. He made a public statement to the effect that it was not the purpose to create a wholly Jewish Palestine, nor to subordinate the Arab population, language, or culture to the Jewish. He reiterated the idea of a Jewish home in Palestine, as distinct from the idea of Palestine as the home of the Jews, in these words: "The nationality to be acquired by all citizens of Palestine, whether Jews or non-Jews, whether for purposes of internal law or international status would be Palestinian and nothing else. But in order that the Jewish community should have the best prospect of free development, it is essential that it should know that it is in

Palestine as a right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish national home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed." The Palestine Arab delegation, which was the official mouthpiece in London of the Arabs, refused to accept that statement as satisfactory to the Arabs.

The League of Nations mandate came into operation in 1923, the British Government thereupon in name transforming the administration into that of the mandate. Palestine was now launched upon a troubled, unending conflict between Arabs and Jews, characterised periodically by open terrorism, made worse by the greatly increased rate of Jewish immigration into the country that resulted from the German and other persecution of the Jews in Europe. In 1936 it became clear beyond any doubt that the Balfourian notion of a vague Jewish home within Palestine was unpractical.

A Royal Commission, chairmaned by Lord Peel and constituted by Sir Horace Rumbold, Sir Laurie Hammond, Sir Morris Carter, Sir Harold Morris and Professor Coupland as its other members, was sent out to investigate on the spot the lines of a possible solution. They spent the winter in Palestine and issued their report textually on July 8th last, a summary having been broadcast from Jerusalem the day before. It was greeted by indignant and impartial protest by both Jews and Arabs, by which fact perhaps there was established at any rate its own quality of impartiality.

In their report the commissioners made the premise that Jewish and Arab aspirations in Palestine had been proved to be irreconcilable. The solution they offered, therefore, was that of a partition of the country. The mandate, they suggested, should be replaced by a treaty relationship between an Arab sovereign State, a Jewish sovereign State, and the British Government. The Jewish State would stretch along the littoral, broadening in the north to include Nazareth. The Arab State would add a part of Palestine to Transjordan. The British Government would become a permanent mandatory "as a sacred trust of civilisation" over the sacred places. There should be a corridor, including Jerusalem and Bethlehem, giving access to the sea at Jaffa. The "sacred" mandate should extend over Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee. The report made an impressive appeal, suggesting that "the inestimable boon of peace" was worth a sacrifice on both

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sides; and neatly hinting that "the quarrel which the mandate started could be ended with its termination."

As if to prove the truth of that diagnosis, both Jewish and Arab spokesmen promptly formulated their reactions to the commission's proposals. Even before the report itself was published, the first unofficial forecasts of what it contained led to a statement, published in the *Observer* of June 27th, of representative opinion on both sides. The Arab statement ran thus: "The Arabs demand a national government with the termination of the Mandatory rule, and the substitution of a treaty between Great Britain and Palestine such as was granted to Iraq. They demand the cessation of Jewish immigration, owing to the economic chaos to which the country has been reduced by the arrival of 400,000 alien immigrants. The Arabs are suffering in agricultural regions, in the professions, now flooded with Jewish competitors, in trade and in labour. Palestine is a small country about the size of Wales, unable to absorb such a quantity of immigrants. The Arabs are against partition. The country, which was once part of Syria, should be reunited to Syria, and should maintain its integrity. The Arabs fought for the Allies in the Great War on the understanding that they would gain the independence of their land when peace was declared. Even before the war they were planning to get rid of Turkish rule. Provided they acquire what they have been struggling for since 1914, there is no reason why peace should not once more descend on the land."

The Jewish statement ran thus: "The Zionists cannot now accept any policy which restricts the scope of the Jewish National Home. Their record in Palestine since the Mandate is one which is unique in the modern world. They have converted a barren waste wilderness, capable of supporting a population of under half a million, into a flourishing agricultural and industrial country which now supports a population of over a million and a quarter, and is capable of absorbing many more. Moreover, the benefits that the Jews have introduced are enjoyed not only by them alone, but also by the native Arab population. The level of real wages, for instance, among the Arabs is three times as high as that of the neighbouring Arab countries; their standard of life has vastly improved; the extent of malaria has enormously decreased, and there has been a conspicuous decline in their death and infant mortality rates. But British policy in Palestine ought to take

account of Jewish persecution in the rest of the world. To close the gates of Palestine to Jewish immigration would not only be a breach of a solemn pledge, but would also be morally unjustifiable. There is no innate hostility on the part of the Arabs towards the Jews. Such hostility is confined to a handful of Arab agitators, whose main interest is feathering their own political nests. An extension of the territory available for the Jewish National Home and the sanction of unrestricted Jewish immigration is the only solution capable of benefiting Jews, Arabs, and Great Britain."

The British Government set a prompt example to Jews and Arabs by accepting the commission's proposals simultaneously with the publication of the report, and by issuing a strongly worded statement pleading for its acceptance by Jews and Arabs. The following sentences are quoted from that statement. ". . . His Majesty's Government and their predecessors, since the obligations of the Mandate were accepted, have taken the view, which the tenor of the Mandate itself implies, that their obligations to Arabs and Jews respectively were not incompatible, on the assumption that in the process of time the two races would so adjust their national aspirations as to render possible the establishment of a single commonwealth under a unitary government. . . . In the light of experience and of the arguments adduced by the Commission they are driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock. . . . In supporting a solution of the Palestine problem by means of partition, His Majesty's Government are much impressed by the advantages which it offers both to the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs would obtain their national independence, and thus be enabled to co-operate on an equal footing with the Arabs of neighbouring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress. They would be finally delivered from all fear of Jewish domination, and from the anxiety which they have expressed lest their Holy Places should ever come under Jewish control. The Arab State would receive financial assistance on a substantial scale, both from His Majesty's Government and from the Jewish State. On the other hand,

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THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

THE well-known words in which Gardiner described Cromwell as the greatest because the most typical Englishman of all time might be applied (with substantial adjustments) in the present-day world to the late Prime Minister, for he undoubtedly embodies in his personality all those generous human instincts which are typical of the Englishman at his best. There is no need, however, to add to the many eulogies paid to this distinguished statesman, if only because they run a considerable danger of being overdone. One has begun to wonder whose Coronation it really was we attended, and whether amongst other things to be conferred upon Lord Baldwin the title of H.R.H. will be included. His exit has been splendid, happy in its timing, but it is only right to call to mind the circumstances in which the date was fixed at the beginning of last year. Lord Baldwin's stock had fallen after the amazing Hoare-Laval incident to an unprecedentedly low level. He patently lost grip, and it was in those circumstances that he decided to quit public life after the Coronation. Subsequent events, such as his handling of the Abdication, lifted him to an unprecedentedly high level. Let us leave him there amidst the admiration and affection of the country.

It is early days to judge of the position the new Prime Minister is to occupy in the public estimation, but one definite advantage may be anticipated ; whatever the policy of the Government is, it will be clearly expressed, logically and consistently carried out. It is perhaps better to have a known bad policy than a reputed good policy that is actually bad. His predecessor's statements were dressed up in such a halo of goodwill and general amiability that it was frequently overlooked that in practice an entirely different policy was being pursued. We shall now have a clear road ahead, possibly in the wrong direction, but there will at least be no blaze of sunshine—or fog—to obstruct progress. In considering the exchange of power to a Prime Minister with drive and initiative it is interesting to bear in mind that since the war

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partition would secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and relieve it from any possibility of its being subjected in the future to Arab rule. It would convert the Jewish National Home into a Jewish State with full control over immigration. Its nationals would acquire a status similar to that enjoyed by the nationals of other countries. The Jews would at last cease to live a 'minority life,' and the primary object of Zionism would thus be attained. Under the proposed treaties the rights of minorities in both States would be strictly guaranteed. Above all, fear and suspicion would be replaced by a sense of confidence and security, and both peoples would obtain, in the words of the Commission, 'the inestimable boon of peace.'"

Whether or not by the time this paper sees the light, the initial resentment of Arabs and Jews has been modified, and some prospect emerges that the commission's proposals may be made the basis for an attempted new start in the adventure of enabling Jews and Arabs to live amicably in their country, what is certainly established is that the statement issued by the British Government on July 8th, 1937, finally exploded the subtle and lighthearted theory enshrined in the same Government's statement of November 2nd, 1917. Thus in twenty years the whirligig of time proves in one particular example the vanity of human affairs in their political aspect.

(3) THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

September is normally the month when Geneva resounds with the polyglot idealisms. The annual Assembly, preceded by the Council, has in the past seventeen years offered a spectacle of encouragement and almost of hope to those who have tried to make of international diplomacy an instrument of peace rather than of war. It is one of the readiest protests of the human spirit to resent those whose criticisms are destructive. To despair is to refuse help in the common cause and in the always pressing need of improving the human lot. Of course, it is said, the League of Nations was a difficult enterprise. It could succeed only by the collective faith of peoples in the mass. Those who help to strengthen such faith are doing their bit. Those who scoff are doing a deeper harm than they know.

Yet such protests themselves ignore a simple truth. If war be the product of politics, is it necessarily the best or the only way of avoiding war to attempt it by political means? The greatest war (so far) known to history led to the establishment of this still existent, though clearly moribund, League of Nations. It has in practice been proved ineffective in its purpose. Why? To argue that it would have been effective if the United States had taken part in it, if Japan and Italy had remained faithful to it, if Germany and Russia on being admitted to it, had become useful members of it: to argue in that way is surely to beg the question. The forces that constituted the League of Nations in 1919 were political forces. True, the motive derived from an almost universal reaction against the senselessness, and worse, of war as a political method. But even such a motive was destined to be proved incapable of inducing common sense in political work. The remorse, in fact, did not ring true. The words of Prometheus, unbound, ought to have been the spirit in which the League of Nations was founded:

"I speak in grief,
Not exultation, for I hate no more,
As then ere misery made me wise."

But that was not the spirit of Geneva. Both Germany and Russia in a spirit of stupid vindictiveness, were deliberately excluded at the outset from participation in a political organisation whose whole theory was remorse over international strife and a regenerate determination to substitute co-operation and peace for division and war among the nations. The door was shut against two of the European Great Powers. How could such a start lead to success? On every hand, nearly twenty years after the last great war came to an end, we see the still rampant political antagonisms that led to it. The beginning of wisdom is the recognition of what is rotten down to bedrock. Then and not till then can the retreat from politics begin.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

August 12th, 1937.

there have been only two Prime Ministers, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Neville Chamberlain, who can be said to have possessed these qualities. Suggestions are made that the Government is bound to suffer in public support by reason of the colder nature of its leader, but there was the same change-over when Mr. Asquith succeeded Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and the reserved nature of the former did not prevent him from gaining the full confidence and support of a substantial majority of the nation.

Mr. Chamberlain was unfortunate in having to make his first speech in connection with the withdrawal of the N.D.C. He had been submitted to overwhelming pressure, both public and private, from his own supporters, and in view of the fact that there was practically no sentiment in the House of Commons in favour of his plan, he really had no alternative but to withdraw it. He did this as adroitly as circumstances would permit, but it was an unhappy opening and he was ill at ease. His private disappointment must have been great. Probably the permanent effect will not be great provided that no other blunder is made, but the incident has undoubtedly caused many of his followers to wonder how it could come about that one whom they had regarded as the safest of guides should make such a bad error of judgment.

The debate was one of two particular occasions this session when the pressure of parliamentary opinion has forced the Government to change its policy. In this instance it came from all sides. If the Opposition had supported the Prime Minister in maintaining the N.D.C. in some form it would have been much more difficult for him to withdraw it, as an impression would have been created that he had surrendered to the resistance of rich men who did not wish to be taxed. It remains to be seen whether the Opposition were wise in associating themselves with a city movement which was very much overdone. The tax was certainly a radical measure and, whatever its demerits in machinery, did boldly stamp the present as an abnormal quasi-war period.

The other earlier occasion of surrender was after the two debates on the question of the instructions to be given with regard to the protection the Navy was to afford to British ships carrying food to Bilbao. It appeared that the Government had been too ready to accept the statements of General Franco as to the dangers of the position there, and to put

undue pressure on these vessels not to proceed. Both the Oppositions strongly protested against what seemed to be the surrender in the face of rebel threats of British rights on the high seas. At the end of the first debate, in which feeling ran high, it appeared from the Foreign Secretary's statement that ample protection would be given, but a further debate was necessary before the practice of the Admiralty was altered to carry this into effect. Both these incidents are interesting and satisfactory as examples of the power of public opinion, with sense and reason behind it, acting either through the Opposition or through Parliament as a whole, to compel the Government to change the direction of its policy.

To turn to the changes that have taken place in the Government: they were carried through with remarkable celerity, typical of the businesslike efficiency expected of the Prime Minister. Sir John Simon, as the leading member of the allied and associated Parties in the Government, could hardly be refused the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer if he desired it, and he did desire it. His high intellectual attainments will enable him to grapple easily with the requirements of this position, particularly now that his path has been eased by the sudden decease of that unwanted child christened N.D.C. The really interesting point consequent on his holding the second office in the Government is whether in any circumstances it will enable him to attain the first when the present occupant retires. No doubt Sir John would very properly desire to occupy the Premiership, and on paper could make a strong claim that as there had been a Labour Prime Minister and two Conservative Prime Ministers in the National Government, the time had come for a Liberal. But unless an unexpectedly favourable breeze is blowing, it is not probable that his ambition will be realised. The Conservative predominance is too overwhelming, and Sir John is hardly *persona grata* with all.

The key to the transference of Sir Samuel Hoare from his important work at the Admiralty to the comparatively quiet waters of the Home Office lies in the fact that this senior Secretaryship of State is favourable ground for further advancement, and at the moment no one seems to have more chance of succeeding Mr. Chamberlain in due course than this able, conscientious, hard-working, if uninspiring, statesman.

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GERMAN UNIVERSITIES UNDER NAZI RULE.*

That the German universities, so long the glory of the country, have been trampled underfoot by the uncivilised men who seized power in 1933 is known to and lamented by us all. But what has actually happened? How many dismissals have occurred in each? What system has replaced the theory and practice of academic freedom, of procuring the best available scholar for the vacant post? What effect has the Nazi revolution had on the students themselves? These questions are answered in Mr. Hartshorne's excellent little book, based on personal experience as well as on careful study of documentary material. It should be read not only by those who are primarily interested in education, but by all students of the mentality of the Third Reich. For every Dictator aims above all at the conversion of the rising generation in the shortest possible time to his own peculiar philosophy. The most vivid pages in the volume record the author's impressions of the celebration of the "Day of National Glory" at the University of Berlin on January 30th, 1936, the third anniversary of the accession of Hitler to power. The mass meeting, we are told, has never been brought to such perfection

* *The German Universities and National Socialism.* By E. Y. Hartshorne, jun. Allen & Unwin. 6s.

as a political instrument as in Nazi Germany. No one can visualise such an orgy of patriotic emotion without a heightened realisation of its explosive possibilities.

The dismissals from the teaching staff differ widely in the different Universities, and the author estimates the total loss of "non-Aryan" and other innocent victims of racial and political intolerance as somewhere between 15 and 21 per cent. But, as he reminds us, the lot of many of those who remain is painful in the extreme. "Uncertain of the duration of his appointment and even of his salary; continually on his guard before non-intellectual critics; competing with glamorous, quasi-militaristic extra-curricular appeals for the interest of his students; lecturing before rows of brown-shirts; flanked in his seminars and informal discussion groups by zealous young Nazi teachers; in his free time called upon to participate in official functions, and to read official papers and periodicals; harassed by the thought of his banished and often expatriated colleagues and masters; disgusted at the habit of compromise and self-deception practised by others and even forced upon himself; fearful or cynical with regard to the future, the University teacher lives a truly unenviable existence; in a *Universitas Litterarum* which has lost its respect for Letters, a veritable caricature of the old *civitas academica*, in which scholarly seclusiveness is decried as a political sin, and in which the worthy old German 'calling' of science, *Wissenschaft als Beruf*, has well-nigh lost its meaning."

In his closing chapter the young American scholar attempts a final estimate of the momentous change. Science as a whole, he declares, has lost. "A second conclusion stands out scarcely less clearly: Germany has gained something." In his laudable effort to be fair he sets forth ten entries on the credit side. The number of students has been reduced, a reform which will reduce unemployment in the academic professions. Student riots, the result of political differences, have ceased. There are fewer well-to-do loafers. The emphasis on one's duty to the community and the state stimulates youthful idealism in many cases. Physical fitness is seriously cultivated. Sleepy institutions have been woken up, and many a doddering teacher has been stirred to bring new life into his lectures or writing. The Universities are envisaged, as never before, as training grounds for the nation's leaders. Yet when all these advances have been impartially noted, the hideous

It is a curious commentary on his all too well remembered tenure of the Foreign Office, but political memories are short, and his record at the India Office clearly showed that he is capable of statesmanship at the highest level.

This leaves the highly competent Sir Kingsley Wood at the Ministry of Health. He deserved advancement.

At the Foreign Office Mr. Eden remains, and should remain, because in spite of all disappointments he is by far the best of all possible alternatives. His belief in the League of Nations is fundamentally sincere, and it is to be deeply regretted that circumstances have made him the author of its decline. Our foreign policy has never recovered from the Abyssinian betrayal, when it was made as clear to the world as to the British people that the Government were not prepared to back words by deeds or to carry out our international obligations under the Covenant. This fatal attitude has vitiated every subsequent event, and has been the fundamental cause of the failure of non-intervention in Spain.

As Germany and Italy have had it made clear to them that we are most unlikely to go beyond diplomatic pressure, they have not hesitated to intervene actively in defiance of all decency on behalf of the rebels. Mr. Eden's efforts at conciliation have been well-intentioned and strenuous, but they cannot be effective when dealing with people who believe in the use of force. How easily the whole situation could be altered is well shown by the immediate reaction of Germany to the French intimation that German troops would not be permitted to land in Spanish Morocco. If similar firmness had been used throughout with regard to the maintenance of a genuine non-intervention policy, the whole position would have been transformed. It may be that with a new Prime Minister, who is a realist, and who has indicated that he believes as an ultimate ideal in an International Police Force, a firmer and more resolute policy will be pursued. The flaw in the Government's rearmament programme is not that it is not required but that neither the people of this country nor any other know in what circumstances it will be used. Apart from definite obligations to France and Belgium, the Government have made it clear that no prior decision can be given as to what they might do in any other part of the world. No policy could be more fatal. It makes

the collective system non-existent, and is a temptation to dictators to aggression.

Mr. Malcolm MacDonald continues at the Dominions Office, where he has been quietly but very effectively carrying out the considerable duties that have fallen to him in connection with reconciling the varied views and interests of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Such work necessarily does not come much before the public, but it should be acknowledged. It is so easy in the British Empire to do the right thing in the wrong way, and to ruffle up the feelings of Ministers at the other end of the earth, particularly in connection with the Abdication and Coronation. This he has succeeded in avoiding.

No Minister has a more difficult task in front of him than the Colonial Secretary, who is now awaiting the Report of the Palestine Commission. The seeds of the present deplorable situation had been sown before Mr. Ormsby-Gore took office, and he cannot be held personally responsible for the highly dangerous position. It remains true, however, that in Palestine, as in foreign affairs generally, the Government have failed to make it clear that they will at all costs maintain order. The weakness and bad judgment of the past few years have created a situation which makes it very difficult to revert to the general principles on which the Mandate was intended to work. The Arab opposition to the Jewish national home has not been based on any real genuine body of feeling amongst that race as a whole. It is the work of a limited number of Arab landowners, who will lose their privileged position as Jewish development proceeds. The Jews have behaved with the utmost restraint under most trying conditions, and it will be a shameful betrayal if any settlement is proposed which deprives them of the hopes and promises that were held out at the time of the Balfour Declaration. The right policy is surely the firm maintenance of order at all costs, but it may be that things have gone so far that this must be combined with a proposal for the partition of Palestine. Everything depends in this case on the area and political conditions. Mr. Ormsby-Gore brings to his office profound knowledge of the subject, and an impetuous enthusiasm for liberty. From a parliamentary point of view, if he could impose some check on the impetuosity his work would be more effective.

reality remains. "All the fine, free play of the human intellect is submerged under the dull, stupefying vapour of ideological conformity."

Many a German exile exclaims in the bitterness of his heart that the old Germany which he and we used to love is dead. It is far too soon to give way to such pessimism. The political tradition of the country is authoritarian, the intellectual tradition critical and creative. The land of Bismarck and Frederick the Great is also the home of Lessing, Goethe and Kant. The liberalism of Weimar may not return in its old shape, for nations like individuals are continually weaving new patterns of life. But moods change, and the instinct of political and spiritual self-determination will reassert itself. How soon a great and gifted people will tire of this heavy-handed regimentation none can foretell.

G. P. G.

WHAT IS AHEAD OF US?*

The names of the six prophets who here predict the future of Capitalism, of Soviet Communism, of Dictatorships and of Economic Nationalism, will rightly command the attention of all those concerned with the critical position of the world to-day. Mr. Cole, in a temperate and well-argued opening chapter, shows grounds for holding that the collapse of Capitalism from economic causes in the democratic countries is by no means imminent. By concessions and adjustments they can hold their control of the business system, provided that Fascist States stand aloof. But Mr. Cole argues, and here is supported by Sir Arthur Salter and Mr. Wickham Steed, that Fascism is driven by political necessity to an interfering and aggressive policy. For Fascism and Nazism live upon prestige. Hitler came to power and keeps it on condition of maintaining an appeal to the pride of the German people, damaged in the Great War and the Bad Peace, and demanding a forcible display of recovery.

Mr. Wickham Steed considers war can only be averted by a firm rally of the peace forces in the democratic nations. Hitler, the danger-man, would not dare to move if he were sure he had to meet the combined hostility of Britain, France, Russia, Scandinavia and America. Even if America were left

* George Allen & Unwin. 5s. net.

out, the risk would be too great, hence the present effort to get Britain to detach France from Russia.

But Mr. P. M. S. Blackett argues that, though Hitler plays astutely with the democratic fear of Bolshevism, suggesting that he should have a free hand in the East, a war with Russia, necessarily protracted, would not suit his quick game. Several of the prophets pin their faith in peace upon a strong determined policy from the Left in this country and France, demanding an effective Popular Front. Mr. Blackett holds that "a united working class" is essential, and that "Just as the military power of the U.S.S.R. is an essential part of any effective international anti-Nazi policy, so also is the aid of the Communist Party an essential basis of an effective internal progressive policy" (p. 108). The relation between the internal class conflict and the international situation is of course in some measure an economic struggle, but the writers here do not overstress the element of economic causation. Pride and prestige play an even greater part than property in the war situation.

Mr. Sidney Webb deals with the future of Soviet Communism by painting a roseate picture of the success of Russia in the economic and political fields. The Communist Party dominates by virtue of "its unique Vocation of Leadership," the people generally respond to the demand for public service in the place of private profit, the individual citizen possesses more liberty than elsewhere if liberty is interpreted in terms of opportunity. "Western critics find it hard to approve the angry condemnation to death of successive blocks of 'traitors' even after public trial, and the incomprehensible 'confessions' of the accused. A philosophic comment is that any hard-fought and successful revolution leaves all parties in the new community state bound in a certain pattern of behaviour formed in the revolutionary struggle" (p. 130).

J. A. HOBSON.

THE BASES OF THEISM.

Professor Dawes Hicks has published his Hibbert Lectures under the title *The Philosophical Bases of Theism*,* and in so

* *The Philosophical Bases of Theism*. By G. Dawes Hicks. George Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d. net.

The transference of Mr. Duff Cooper from the War Office to the Admiralty has confounded the commentators. This able and progressive-minded man has not had a good press. It must be thought that the change is, to some extent, consequential on the movements of Sir Samuel Hoare; there is a theory, too, that you can dragoon a general but not an admiral.

Mr. Hore-Belisha's eminently successful work at the Ministry of Transport clearly marked him out for advancement. He can be relied upon to apply his abilities with gay enthusiasm to the task of making up the deficiency in recruits.

Much speculation has been devoted to the future of Sir Thomas Inskip, and some have suggested that the highest honours may lie in wait for this modest, moderate, well-meaning man. It may be so, but the chances are against it. The excellent work he may have done in the Co-ordination of Defence does not alter the fact that very much more might be done and on a wider scale by a more forceful personality, and it cannot be denied that in Mr. Churchill we have the statesman who is more fitted than anyone else to carry this through. But he is too able, too dangerous, too much of a genius for the more pedestrian personalities with whom he would be associated. He was, however, until the events of November, steering a steady course towards the Treasury Bench. Then all his innate lack of balance was exposed to daylight by the Abdication, and the part he played in it was a determining factor in his present position in the desert. His inclusion in the Government at some later stage must not be ruled out, and might prove very useful.

Lord De La Warr has been advanced to the office of Lord Privy Seal to complete the National Labour quota. It remains to be seen what work in particular will be allocated to him, but he is an attractive personality, and his ability should assist the Government. No change is required at the India Office, where Lord Zetland is carrying out the arduous task of putting into effect the New Constitution. Here again great tact, judgment and understanding are required if the co-operation of the Congress Party is to be obtained in making the Constitution function. There is an obvious desire of both sides that this should be done, and it should not pass the wit of the persons concerned to find a means. The positions of

Mr. Walter Elliot, Lord Swinton and Mr. Morrison remain unchanged. They have not been too long in their present offices and are all showing aptitude and ability. Mr. Morrison shows particular promise, and time is on his side.

The changes at the Board of Trade are important because negotiation of a Trade Agreement with the United States is of vital consequence to the peace and prosperity of the world. Mr. Oliver Stanley has a great opportunity. After his unfortunate experience at the Ministry of Labour he has been a competent administrator at the Board of Education, even if his Education Act was uninspiring, and he brings a receptive mind to the great problems before him. The same could not be said of his predecessor, and it is remarkable that the greatest obstacle to a progressive trade policy and general lowering of tariff barriers lay in the one-time free trader, Mr. Runciman. Highly accomplished and widely experienced as he is, he has obviously for some time been bored to death with his office—perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that he was President of the Board of Trade before the war.

Mr. Ernest Brown has been a success at the Ministry of Labour. At one time it seemed inconceivable that the Government could produce means test regulations that would not create great resentment and opposition throughout the country, but Mr. Brown has produced a scheme that appears to be working with the minimum of friction consistent with the Government's declared policy of maintaining the means test.

Dr. Leslie Burgin has undoubtedly earned his admission to the Cabinet as Minister of Transport. He has been a most effective Under-Secretary to the Board of Trade, more competent, indeed, than his Minister, as has been the case with other juniors. Sir Philip Sassoon's long tenure at the Air Ministry has at last been brought to a close, and his appointment as First Commissioner of Works has brought him to a position where his gifts and tastes will be shown to better advantage than anywhere else. The appointment of Lord Winterton as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was a wise tactical move. One of the oldest Members of the House with Ministerial experience behind him and a highly provocative style, he was accustomed on occasion to tell the Government just what he thought of them in public. In future this can only be done in private.

doing has made a valuable contribution to thought accessible to a wider circle than that of those who were privileged to hear the Lectures. The eight Lectures deal, in succession, with Religion and Philosophy, Man's Place in Nature, Religious Experience, The Cosmological Argument, The Teleological Argument, Values and the Moral Argument, Pantheism and Theism.

It is evident from these titles that the author is travelling a well-worn road, and that there is little scope for originality in regard to the main issues that are raised. Yet the volume is valuable and timely, for the treatment is marked throughout by such insight, clarity and acuteness as make it a distinctive contribution to the elucidation of the great themes with which it deals. Old and in the main familiar reasoning is presented with a freshness that is the result of independent thinking and of easy mastery of the most recent phases of philosophical thought. The book is, therefore, an admirable guide to those who are beginning to study the grounds of Theistic belief and enables such to appreciate their strength as confronting alike Naturalism, Agnosticism, and Pantheism. Not the least merit of the work consists in the keen detection and the lucid exposure of looseness of thought, whether it be found in the upholders or in the opponents of Theism.

In the course of his exposition, Professor Hicks calls attention to the most outstanding thinkers, both ancient and modern. His summing-up is always luminous and concise; his tone and temper showing throughout the calm urbanity of one who is so sure of his own conclusions that he can deal considerately with those from whom he differs. In particular, mention may be made of his treatment of Schleiermacher and Otto, of Martineau and Professor A. E. Taylor. In each case appreciation and criticism are harmoniously united. The title of the volume clearly defines the range and limitation of the Lectures. The author is concerned to show the rational grounds upon which it is believed that the universe as it is known requires for its explanation the existence of a Supreme and Conscious Mind—that the reasonableness, which is assumed to be universal both by science and in practical life, depends upon a rational and conscious source. Not the least of the merits of the argument is that at every point, and especially in dealing with religious experience, Professor Hicks

insists upon the presence and supreme influence of reason and thought, as against the over-emphasis of feeling, erroneously supposed to be independent of intellectual elements, which, in fact, impregnate and constitute it. This insistence upon the rationality of religious faith is particularly valuable at the present time. The style of the writing is so clear and transparent as to make it easy and pleasurable reading for those who shrink from the obscurity of many philosophical treatises.

J. S. L.

EPITAPH ON SMYRNA.

Mr. Pallis makes his contribution* to the vast literature, Greek and other, on the Greek part in the Great War and the subsequent adventure in Asia Minor. He himself was one of the first officers to take service with the revolutionary government set up by Veniselos, and had occupied a post in the Greek Administration in Macedonia when the break took place between Veniselos and Constantine (September 1916). But he is broadminded about his own past. As he looks back his passions are calmer. "I am quite prepared," he writes (p. ix), "to admit that those of my compatriots—and they were extremely numerous, perhaps even the majority—who took the other view, were, with few exceptions, actuated by equally patriotic motives in wanting Greece to remain neutral."

In recounting the history of Greece from 1915 to the climax (August 1922) of the destruction of Smyrna and the resultant execution of the Prime Minister, Mr. Gounaris, the author makes this confession, fifteen years after the event: "On one important issue of Veniselos's policy—the occupation of the Smyrna enclave—I have been led, in the light of subsequent events and the evidence which has become available since the war, thanks to the publication of numerous memoirs and official documents, somewhat to modify my original opinion concerning the soundness of that portion of the great Cretan's political programme" (p. xii).

Those who have lived through this rotten period of the world's history find it hard to be patient with those who write history in the conventional patriotic strain. The Great War,

* *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and After.* By A. A. Pallis. Methuen. 10s. 6d. net.

The Law Officers are both doing well. The Attorney-General—a man of unusual ability and attainments—is well above the average for this office and he has developed a happy manner in debate. He is ably seconded by Sir Terence O'Connor. A number of changes have taken place in the Whips' Office during the last month. The duties are arduous and not performed in the blaze of publicity. Some have received their due reward with new names or additions to old designations. Some are tired of the work and have voluntarily given it up. Others have done so involuntarily. The changes that have taken place amongst Under-Secretaries are largely in order to give them experience of different departments, so that in due course when some of them are selected for Cabinet office they will have had experience in as many different branches of administration as possible. Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd remains as Under-Secretary at the Home Office. No change could be contemplated here with the Report Stage of the Factories Bill still to be taken and a new Secretary of State. Mr. Lloyd has won golden opinions by his part in the conduct of this measure of 158 clauses in Committee. His manner has been admirable and he has shown sympathy and understanding. He should go far. Lord Cranborne, a former member of the League of Nations Union Executive Committee, is doing well at the Foreign Office, with which he has such close hereditary associations, and it is eminently desirable that he should remain connected with the work and represent Great Britain from time to time at the League of Nations. Captain Crookshank remains at the Mines Department, where he has carried out his difficult duties with a calm detachment, efficiency and tact. The Board of Trade has two admirable officers in Captain Euan Wallace and R. S. Hudson, both of them worthy of better things before long. Together with the President they should form a sympathetic trio in dealing with the world trade problems now before us.

Thus the long-decided change has taken place, and Mr. Chamberlain, who for so long has really been the power behind the throne and has given the Government such direction as it possessed, will have an opportunity on his own responsibility to show the country what Chamberlain leadership, denied to his brother and father, means. The changes made have been perhaps fewer than was expected, and it may be that further reconstruction will take place when

the end of the session gives greater freedom. There are weak spots. It is difficult to find any Minister with all the talents; all are well intentioned. Some have good manners, some bad; some are hard-working, others are easy-going; many interests, ambitions and party sections have to be appeased. Seeing that the change has taken place in mid-session, with an Imperial Conference actually sitting, probably as good a start has been made as was possible.

The circumstances of the year have tended to help the Government. The Coronation has created a sense of general self-congratulation. Many people have come without realising it to associate the Ministry with all the pageantry of the celebrations and the personality of Lord Baldwin has helped. So has good trade. The unchallenged progress of rearmament has played its part and the fact that the whole rearmament scheme would have been unnecessary and that reductions of taxation instead of additions could have been effected had a different foreign policy been pursued during the last few years is overlooked in the general drift to disaster amid a blaze of colour and in an atmosphere of fatalism.

Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the Opposition and the inability of the Left Parties to co-operate in any form of grouping has emphasised what is the truth, that there is at this moment no alternative Government. The Labour Party are working hard and doing their best. They have now a good array of Front Bench speakers. Mr. Attlee's speeches are sincere and well-reasoned, but as a possible Government his party do not make an impressive showing. There is too much deference and forbearance to the Treasury Bench. A return to the vigorous criticism of pre-war days would not be amiss. The country shows no inclination to entrust to them the destinies of the nation. The Liberal Opposition, led with great ability and dash by Sir Archibald Sinclair, conscious that it represents a large body of opinion in the country as a whole, is as active as its small numbers permit. It is generally recognised to have a higher percentage of competent parliamentarians and fewer passengers than any other party in the House.

There are only four Members whom the House makes a point of filling up to hear. These are, the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Winston Churchill and Sir Stafford Cripps. Sir Stafford may be an *enfant terrible*, his judgment

not only for Greece but for all of us, was in its diplomatic aspect the very ecstasy of nonsense ; and in its human aspect a wholly stupid and meaningless exhibition of mass murder. Yet it was conducted with all the cheap catchwords about king and country, glory, heroism, and what not. And the same indignant people who, between 1914 and 1918, wrote and spoke of Germany as the anti-Christ and who were prepared to pay and did pay for *la victoire intégrale*, are now clamouring for it to be fought all over again. The Greek case is merely typical of the rest.

By far the best thing in the book before us, though the author himself obviously would not agree, is the dedication : To the common people of Greece and to the rank and file of the Greek Army who, during ten years of arduous struggles for the emancipation of their brethren in Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor, gave freely of their blood and treasure, and whose sacrifices were largely rendered vain through the faults and dissensions of their leaders.

G. G.

GERALD OF WALES.*

We have had to wait curiously long for the autobiographical writings of Gerald of Wales to be made generally accessible. For his figure, as it emerges from the Itinerary through Wales (published in Everyman's Library), is one that must make every reader eager to know him better, and his vivacious narratives, which till now had to be sought in the ponderous volumes of the Rolls Series, cried out for translation.

To the directly autobiographical *De Rebus a se gestis* Professor Butler has added the autobiographical fragments that had a way of creeping in into all Gerald wrote, so that we may follow him from his childhood at Manorbier so charmingly described, when the sand-castles he built with his brothers foreshadowed his future in being not castles but abbeys and churches, to his last years, when he traces a final self-portrait that comes as a farewell : " So Giraldus ran the course that was ordained for him, nor in his day was he a sluggard or a coward. But now that others run and follow the court and pile up vain vexations, let him take his rest and in his humble

* *The Autobiography of Giraldus Cambrensis*, edited and translated by H. E. Butler, with an Introductory Chapter by C. H. Williams. Jonathan Cape, 1958.

habitation indulge his love of books and in the corners of churches weep for his sins. . . ." It should be noted, however, that the book from which this passage comes is entitled *Invectiones*, and that Gerald had yet to write his *Speculum Ecclesiæ* (for which Professor Butler suggests the sub-title " Scenes from Clerical Life or The Legend of Bad Clergymen "), as wicked and humorous as any of his earlier works.

During his youth, the twelfth-century renaissance was at its height ; it was an age rendered articulate by grasp of literary expression in a Latin which, though not classical, has its own magnificence, so that personalities reveal themselves with a rare completeness. It was the age of the wandering scholars, when all Christendom was one province. Gerald himself may be accounted of their number. He was about thirty when he went to Paris a second time, to triumph in the Schools as before, and he would have proceeded to the equally famous University of Bologna (though suggesting that it had little to teach him), had he not been harassed, like the rest of the tribe, by his creditors, from whom he was saved only by miraculous intervention. It was an age of great Churchmen, and again he must be numbered among these (St. Thomas of Canterbury was his ideal and model). Norman-Welsh, as fiercely Welsh as his cousins the Geraldines were soon to become fiercely Irish, he was also unmistakably a scion of a fighting stock. " Many and great wars," said a Welsh Prince, " have we Welshmen waged with England, but none so great and fierce as his who fought the King of England and the Archbishop and withstood the might of the whole clergy and people of England, for the honour of Wales."

The story of that epic struggle for the recognition of metropolitan status to the See of St. David's is here consecutive and complete ; there is real grandeur in it, and the pathos of failure, but nothing could be more entertaining than its telling. " Neither a sluggard nor a coward. . . ." Gerald was engagingly ready to dissert on his own merits—witness the question in the dialogue of *De iure et statu Memevensis Ecclesiæ* : " Why would not the Chapter of St. David's accept such a good and great man as Giraldus to be their Bishop ? " But here at least we may well feel he has made an under-statement.

BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER.

may seem unaccountable, and he may come out with some remarkable statements, but he is a speaker of first-rate ability, with a singularly clear mind, and the House likes to hear such people, whatever their views.

With regard to the future, time alone can show the change for good or ill in the Government's fortune which the resignation of the late Prime Minister has brought about. Mr. Chamberlain has a great opportunity of proving that his mind is not limited by the horizon of the Birmingham City Council, as some allege, and that he is capable in his own way of developing a programme of achievement both at home and abroad that can be clearly understood and followed by the electors. This certainly is not what happened under his predecessor, where success was personal. The new Government must depend upon political achievement. If this success comes, then the National Government will remain in office for a long time to come. Even if the success fails to arrive, the disordered state of the Opposition Parties can be trusted to keep the Government in at any rate by a sufficient majority.

GEOFFREY MANDER.

A CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE POLICY.

THE purpose of this article* is to outline a peace programme capable of immediate and practical application. The Socialist, the Pacifist and the Christian betray their ideals, if they offer nothing to a world in transition except the unrelenting programme of their respective Utopias. The following proposals are deliberately designed to meet two needs simultaneously. They seek to provide a policy which would satisfy the urgent requirements of the European situation. They attempt to unite in common action all sections of the Peace Movement, even though divergences may become necessary at a later stage.

I think it cannot be denied that just when the issue of peace or war now hangs in the balance, the Peace Movement is drifting further and further out of touch with public opinion. There are thirty-two million electors in this country. I fear that the Peace Movement is losing contact with probably over twenty million of those electors. The reach of our appeal is being narrowed almost month by month, as we pile confusion upon confusion by a multitude of conflicting policies. The Sanctionist is believed by the public to desire to make all wars into world wars; the Pacifist appears to offer no hope until after the next war has destroyed civilisation. Some of us in our distress take refuge in spiritual and intellectual retreats, which may give us personal comfort, but which we know—if we are honest—can have little bearing upon the immediate situation. We shirk that most formidable of all disciplines: a willingness to adapt the practical expression of our ultimate ideals month by month to meet an ever-changing position. Some of us cling tenaciously to policies—such as the rigid application of sanctions—which were relevant to the situation a year or two ago, but which now need to be reconsidered from the point of view both of the politics of Europe and the state of public opinion. Others amongst us sometimes harden our hearts and incline to juggle with the dogma of Pacifism as the early Christians described by Gibbon.

Meantime over twenty million of our fellow citizens watch our controversies, and pass by on the other side. We should beware lest we carelessly squander this new asset of public

* This article is based upon a speech delivered to the National Peace Congress, May 28th, 1937.

COMMONWEALTH AND NATIONALITY.*

The evolution of the British Commonwealth has been examined afresh in two important books by Professor W. K. Hancock and Professor R. MacGregor Dawson. The former has contributed an extensive study of post-war developments in the first volume of his *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, which is issued under the auspices of Chatham House. It deals not only with the emergence of the Dominions as individual national states, but also discusses at length problems of nationality in those parts of the Empire which have yet to achieve Dominion status. While the work contains some prolixity and repetition needless to the argument, it does embody a very valuable attempt to ascertain in a series of close factual studies the ideas and tendencies behind events. How far have the oft-proclaimed ideals of self-determination and unity, individual destiny and a common purpose, equality in race and creed, been resolved in fact? Equality is, of course, axiomatic of the Commonwealth, and Professor Hancock goes further to show that the aim of British policy since the middle of the nineteenth century has been to heal communal divisions and to inculcate a local patriotism, which grows into a national consciousness, as exemplified in Canada and South Africa. This too, he contends, in the course of a long examination of the Irish problem, was ultimately the purpose of British policy in Ireland, only to be frustrated by the recalcitrance of Ulster. A somewhat similar argument in respect of Palestine is not invalidated by the partition scheme, proposed since this was written. Professor Hancock also discusses at length developments in Ceylon and Kenya and the constitutional regressions in Malta and Newfoundland; but rather oddly he has postponed his account of nationalism in India to his second volume dealing with economic questions. Indian emigration to South Africa and Kenya, however, enables him to examine at length the practice and theory of racial equality.

The steady move of the Dominions towards individual nationalism, after a short period of tentative centralisation during and immediately after the Great War, is well known

* (1) *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*. Vol. I, *Problems of Nationality, 1918-1936*. By W. K. Hancock. Oxford University Press. 25s. net. (2) *The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936*. By Robert MacGregor Dawson. Oxford University Press. 21s. net.

and has been restated with lucidity and concision by Professor Dawson in *The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936*. Opinions may differ as to the interpretation of particular events, and it is noticeable that Professor Dawson places strong emphasis, in the process of decentralisation, upon the British Government's treatment of the Dominions in the Chanak incident, the Lausanne Treaty and the Reparations Conference of 1924. A large portion of this volume contains a new selection of documents, speeches and press articles indicative both of formal change and the march of opinion. Legal unity has been reduced to a minimum and even the symbol of the Throne, as Professor Hancock points out, can be employed to "support a theory and programme of separation" in the divisibility of the Crown, as argued by General Hertzog. Unity must rest on some basis of common policy; and Professor Dawson argues that in foreign affairs inequality of function has "tended to rob equality of status of some of its significance," and that the Dominions are still largely dependent on British diplomacy and in practice they would follow Britain into war, as in 1914. It is difficult to accept this view in the light of the Chanak incident and the temper of Dominion nationalism. While the prime responsibility in defence and foreign affairs rests, by consent, on Great Britain, the Dominions reserve their co-operation as they may determine. Professor Hancock is surely right in arguing that without common responsibility there can be no common cause. It is a factor which flows naturally from equal status, but which as yet the Dominions have been slow to appreciate. Sooner or later the choice between that or complete independence will be demanded by events.

THE MARCH OFFENSIVE.*

The first volume in the official *History of the Great War*, which deals with military operations on the Western Front in 1918 concluded with the appointment of Foch on March 26th to co-ordinate the action of the Allied forces. The new volume* continues the account of the great March offensive by the Germans until its conclusion before Amiens on April 5th, and describes the subsequent attacks, particularly the Lys offensive towards Hazebrouck, begun on April 9th; the

* Macmillan. 12s. 6d. net; separate case containing 26 maps, 5s. 6d. net.

opinion. Never were the electors more eager to understand, better informed, more alert and more poignantly anxious to save themselves from war. And yet we must take note of the fact that this same public is passing through a most dangerous phase of emotion—that of disillusionment and disappointment. They have seen created in their lifetime what no previous generation of mankind has witnessed—a world organisation to promote justice and security. That institution has been allowed to crumble almost to pieces before their eyes; and we in the Peace Movement must beware lest we ourselves feed this emotion of despair with too much retrospective emphasis on past mistakes or with too bitter an exposure of lost opportunities. Despair leads to frustration and impotence. This does not cause men to hearken to wise counsel; it may drive them to seek the false security of dictatorship.

The Peace Movement inherits a political situation in Europe which is not of its making, but which none the less constitutes a fact. It is made more dangerous by an armaments race of terrific proportions. The time factor, especially in the eyes of this anxious and bewildered public, is of prime importance. They ask, what policy is proposed in existing circumstances? Although it seems probable that the Dictatorships of Europe have passed their zenith, the issue of peace or war may be determined in the course of the next year or two. I cannot therefore believe that it is sufficient to propound some ultimate philosophy either of Pacifism or in favour of the abolition of National Sovereignty, and to call it the immediate solution of our present dangers. By that I do not mean that these ultimate philosophies are unsound or even inappropriate. Indeed, if only there were some Government of a great nation now ready to submit these far-reaching propositions, and able because of its authority as a Government to commend them, they would in my judgment be responded to by public opinion, and go far to remedying the troubles of the contemporary world and to unlocking the road to peace. But I know that within the terms of the time factor, and taking account of the nature of the Governments available in each country, these proposals will not be made, and that therefore the public will not support them. I admit that to be a fact and will not hide my head in the sand. We shall not be able to restrain anxious men and women from supporting reactionary policies by telling them that we hope the world

will have become Pacifist in some remote future. We shall only thereby cause them to resort to measures in the meantime which may either wipe out civilisation or make it harder than ever for us to persuade the world to adopt Pacifism. Our duty is therefore to advocate some proposal to prevent war and restore peace in the next two or three years, even though we continue to advocate our ultimate philosophies.

Every one of us, however convinced of the righteousness of Pacifism, and however disposed to take an almost malicious pleasure in pointing out that collective security is in these days neither collective nor secure, must face the fact that, if we tear up the League Covenant, we shall be left during the next few critical years with a Europe whose every Government will insist upon retaining armed force and national sovereignty. Deprived of the League Covenant, they would resort to armed alliances and divide Europe into defensive pacts of many varieties. Since force would therefore still remain, and remain in its most deadly form, I personally consider it to be almost a crime against civilisation that Pacifists should refuse to concede the nobility of the effort that many countries throughout the world are making to ensure that this force, while it continues, may be organised under some procedure of law and be restrained by a process of third-party judgment. I believe it would be fatal for Pacifists, who cannot yet convince the world of the merits of Pacifism, to make the starting-point of an immediate peace programme the tearing up of the League Covenant. I equally believe it would be a mistake to insist upon the rigid application of forcible sanctions in every contingency under the present broken circumstances in which the League has to work. We need to retain what Sir John Fischer Williams describes as "the unamended and reasonably interpreted Covenant of the League." Until the world becomes Pacifist, I believe we should pay homage to those who prefer the risk of collective force to that of anarchic force. The first risk could at least have some chance of preventing war: the latter risk will make war certain. I am sure that the principles of the Covenant should not be surrendered, even though they should not be rigidly applied.

There is a further argument that none of us can evade. During the next few critical years each nation will insist upon retaining national armaments. If there is no collective policy governing their use, each nation will increase its armaments

failure of which led to the final abandonment by Ludendorff of the whole German effort on April 30th. At this point the narrative appropriately closes. The detailed story of these critical days has been compiled with great care by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, with the particular assistance of Major-General H. R. Davies and Lieut.-Colonel R. G. B. Maxwell-Hyslop. With the help of numerous sketches and a case of large-scale maps prepared by Major A. F. Becke, the whole intricate course of operations can be studied. But probably most readers will regard this work, like the other volumes in the *History*, as a book of reference for the elucidation of particular events. They will be gratified, for example, to have General Edmonds' vindication of Sir Hubert Gough and the Fifth Army. They resisted the enemy's efforts "with such success that his progress was gradually slowed down and time was gained to bring up reinforcements, so that the great German plan of annihilating the British army in a single offensive failed and had to be abandoned." General Edmonds points out that the removal of General Gough was under consideration as early as March 5th, before the attack commenced.

In the course of some general reflections, General Edmonds attributes in large measure the initial difficulties of the British armies to the blunders of the War Cabinet. He argues that at a critical moment when the German offensive was in preparation, it directed the reorganisation of the British forces, and ordered them to take over a longer front without providing due reinforcements. Haig was thus prevented by lack of means from launching any offensive "as the proper reply to the German menace." In meeting the offensive, General Edmonds points out that no adequate preparations were made for a deep withdrawal and that the troops had received little training in defence "and none in retreat." "On the subject of retirement there was neither a manual nor a doctrine." He is also highly critical of the staff work in directing operations. At first, far behind the lines, the headquarters lost touch with, and appreciation of, the rapidly changing situations of open warfare. Of the latter the junior staff officers, with little training, had no experience. Overworked seniors have stated that many "could not write a comprehensible field message, far less a practical operation order." Moreover, in addition there remained difficulties of allied co-operation, not wholly

solved by Foch's appointment. Under all these conditions General Edmonds can well give the highest praise to the valour and tenacity of the British troops.

THE AGE OF WALPOLE.*

The historical labours of Professor Wolfgang Michael are second to none in importance for the understanding of the opening decades of the eighteenth century, which he groups around the outstanding figure of Sir Robert Walpole. It is gratifying to the author, as it is to his many readers, to note that the publication of the last of his five volumes is announced for 1938. The fourth volume takes into account the different aspects of our national history. The opening book discusses the position of Lords and Commons, and due stress is laid on the aristocratic character of the Commons quite as much as that of the Lords. At the same time the author brings out with proper emphasis the truly national character of Parliament. True, the members of the Lower House came from a rigidly confined class, but that class was far more representative of the whole country than is often imagined. He next turns his attention to the opposition, not only in Parliament but in literature, and he is notably strong in his appreciation of the parts played by Swift and Bolingbroke. With his natural love of research we expected to find that every available document had been consulted, and beyond question that has been done. A far harder test is to ascertain how far he could grasp the extraordinary position attained by the formidable Dean of St. Patrick's. On the whole he is quite fair to him, and it is by no means easy for a foreigner to appreciate the precise weight to be attached to *Gulliver's Travels*. No doubt there are remarks not quite put as one of ourselves would put them on Swift and Bolingbroke, yet this is all to the good, for it is increasingly difficult to find out new facts. He perceives that the great days of them both lay in the past, and he leaves us with the feeling of complete confidence in his exploration of the prominent parts they had taken in the fates of their respective lands.

If the Irishman or the Scotsman reads with care the pages allotted to the history of Ireland and Scotland he will soon find

* *Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*. By W. Michael. Vierter Bande das Zeitalter Walpoles. Verlag für Staatswissenschaften u. Geschichte G.m.b.H., Berlin.

in competition. And thus there will be no means left to us of restraining the race, which itself is more than ever a contributory factor making for war. If we could remove force from the hands of every nation by Pacifism, we might be able to remove sanctions from the League Covenant. But if arms remain in the world, our only hope is that the League shall provide a collective method of law for their regulation, limitation, supervision, and even, if necessary, for their use.

Some critics, who wish force eliminated from the League, argue that the Abyssinian catastrophe proved that the whole system of collective force is inherently unsound and unworkable. This is surely a false conclusion built on a false premise. The Abyssinian *débâcle* does not prove that the collective system is unworkable, but only that it was unworked. The failure to use it did not arise from the inherent nature of the Covenant. Historians will see, better than we, that it was partly due to a series of quite fortuitous circumstances—that a certain individual M. Laval was French Prime Minister instead of M. Blum; that the British Foreign Minister was Sir Samuel Hoare, not Mr. Arthur Henderson or Lord Cecil; that this first major test of the system caught us in the consequences of an unjust Versailles Treaty; that Article XI was not used at the right moment, before the storm had overwhelmed those unwilling pilots—Hoare, Laval and their predecessor Simon. No substantial errors were revealed in the League Covenant. Therefore to say that this incident condemns the whole method of the League is as misguided as it would have been to abandon the system of Parliamentary Government within seventeen years after the First Parliament was called together eight centuries ago by Simon de Montfort.

Nor, indeed, would it be wise to tear up the Covenant in order to meet the present outlook of certain Dominions; to persuade Germany to return to membership; or above all to bring America in. The perils of an unregulated armaments race in Europe would still remain, even were America to become a member of the League as a discussion society, if there was no collective policy governing the use of European armaments. So vital do I believe this argument to be that I prefer that the United States of America should become associated with the League, as it certainly can be, by an increasing number of *ad hoc* methods, than that the Covenant should be torn up, leaving the huddled states of Europe armed

to the teeth with no collective policy for the use and supervision of those arms. Co-operation with America; economically and politically, should be the very keystone of immediate British policy. But Britain is part of the geography of Europe and America is not. Equally fatal would it be at this preliminary stage to emasculate the Covenant in order to induce the co-operation of Germany, with whom we have yet to see whether it is possible to negotiate a peace settlement. Thus, as I think, the principle of the League Covenant, including a collective peace policy governing the use of force, remains unassailable as the only hope of preventing war so long as Europe remains armed.

I pass from a consideration of principle to examine the degree to which it is wise to press forward its exact application in the broken circumstances of Europe. It is at this point that I oppose the dogmatic outlook of the Sanctionist just as I have previously criticised my fellow Pacifists. They may provoke nations to abandon the principle by demanding that it should be too rigidly applied. I submit that those who believe in the principle of collective force make a profound mistake when they insist that what is now needed is more and more declarations by Britain—declarations often made in isolation from any attempt to negotiate a new peace settlement—committing this country to use force under the Covenant in order to meet every contingency in Europe. An even greater danger arises, when Sanctionists go to the length of advocating what might easily amount to a League within the League.

What, then, is the programme which could rebuild the League, restore the peace of Europe and rally most sections of the Peace Movement? Its object will be to provide a revised Peace Settlement for Europe, which could replace the Versailles Régime. To achieve this we must not seek to revise the Covenant. We should remember the mistake America made when she attempted to tidy up in precise written form the elusive constitution of Britain. We should leave the text of the Covenant alone, and select rather those of its functions to which life ought long ago to have been given for the sake of European peace.

Our first task is to rebuild the League as an instrument of co-operation, to see whether we can manage to fill the empty chairs at the League table. Ever since 1919 the nations have thought of it too much in terms of law—making law, protecting

that the author is every whit as much at home in their native land as he is in England. One can sometimes judge a book better by its secondary than by its primary matter, and judged by this test the volume emerges with success. Thanks to his patient labours there are new facts in all his volumes. There is ample room for his learned book which, by telling the story of Walpole's England as a whole, in the light of all the manuscript and other evidence now available, will avoid the tendency, on the one hand to episodic treatment, on the other to parochialism of outlook. The first, by restricting the range of inquiry, serves to furnish the raw material of history rather than a contribution to history regarded as a science. The second, precluding a deep and wide survey, accepts surface eddies as adequate causes of the drifting of the craft upon the peaceful sea at home and the stormy sea abroad, and ignores, or discerns but imperfectly, the under-currents whose reality and persistence often provide the only clue to seeming aberrations of policy at Westminster or Paris, Madrid or Vienna. These dangers have been successfully avoided by Professor Michael, who relates his tale in close connection with European history, and the last quality to be attributed to such a good European is parochialism of outlook.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The Framework of France,* by H. G. Daniels, records the impressions and reflections of the *Times* Correspondent in Paris from 1926 to 1936. It is neither a history nor an encyclopædia, but a thoughtful analysis of some of the main features and problems of post-war France. The only bias to which he confesses is in favour of democratic government, and without such an attitude he would be unable to understand one of the most democratic communities in the world. Though the French, like other peoples, have occasionally been subjected to autocratic rule, they have always shaken it off, and there is no reason to fear its return. Mr. Daniels never lets himself go, and he avoids superlatives, but the whole work breathes a genuine sympathy with the great nation he knows so well. Two of the most instructive chapters are on Alsace-Lorraine and on the colonial empire. The former freely admits the errors made after

* Nisbet. 15s.

the recovery of the provinces by politicians obsessed by the fetish of centralisation and uniformity. The ungrudging recognition of regional differences is the beginning of wisdom in any country which is not altogether homogeneous, and it is apparently a very difficult lesson to learn. Of equal interest is the chapter on population, which is full of valuable statistics and which raises questions of the highest significance not only for France but for the world. For if the cause of political and intellectual freedom is to triumph or even to survive, the free nations must not decline to a point which would enthrone a group of ruthless autocrats as the arbiters of Europe. However much the reader may know about our nearest neighbour, he will be glad to enrich his knowledge from the stores of information and observation provided in these cool and carefully considered pages.

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The latest addition to the *Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought*, edited by Dr. Coulton, is Mr. R. F. Bennett's volume, *The Early Dominicans*.* The author won the Hulsean Prize in 1934 for an essay on the subject, and has since engaged in research upon it abroad. The result is a work of fine scholarship, which, while primarily intended for students, and assuming a certain acquaintance with thirteenth-century history and that of the Order, may be read with interest by all. Some parts, e.g. that dealing with the Constitution, are necessarily technical, but others strike a more human note. As is natural in a study of the Preaching Friars, three chapters are devoted to their sermons and those who heard them, the manner of their delivery, the choice of subjects, and the homely *exempla*, or anecdotes, which pointed their moral. Others deal with the relations of the Order with the Universities (a topic of the first importance), with the secular clergy, and the Inquisition. The office of Inquisitor, it is shown, was not exclusively held, or, indeed, coveted, by Dominicans in this period. Mr. Bennett has studied the Franciscan movement also, and discusses its similarities to and contrasts with the Dominican. Though denying the probability of the alleged personal influence of St. Francis on St. Dominic, he considers that the latter's adoption, about 1220, of a Rule of stricter poverty was due to the example of the Minors; the extreme *usus pauper*, however, was never extolled or practised by his followers, for whom theological study, as a weapon in defence of the Church, always held the first place. Mr. Bennett deprecates the perpetual comparison of St. Dominic with St. Francis, and points out that Loyola would furnish a better parallel. Space forbids the mention of other interesting questions treated in this valuable book; here and there a critic might possibly disagree with the author's attitude or conclusions, but he would be rash to contest his facts, amply documented as they are in his footnote references.

* Cambridge University Press. 1937. 10s. 6d.

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law. We need now to think of it as the centre of organic co-operating activity; conferring advantages upon its members, and calling out the method of mutual service—in other words as a Peace Maker, not merely as a Law Maker.

This is no easy task in the mood of suspicion and bitterness now unhappily engendered. There is Russia with her Communism, Germany with her Nazism, Britain and France with their Democracy. Over us all the armaments race surges—thus limiting the time available for making peace. Therefore we cannot wait, as some would have us do, to lay down preliminary conditions, insisting that all these differing European nations must first accept or agree upon a common code of domestic political morality. It is better to have a nation, whose system of government we distrust, arguing with us at the conference table than from a distance behind a barricade of machine-guns. It is especially imperative that the democratic countries should reveal the strength of their tolerance, and cease from being grudging to Germany or suspicious of Russia. All must share the common responsibility for the situation which has developed between 1919 and 1937. If we still doubt each other's *bona fides*, we shall be in a far stronger position to unmask the villain and encircle him with economic power and with the authority of world opinion—including above all the opinion of watchful America—if we have first offered to remedy grievances and shown ourselves willing to negotiate a just and equal settlement. This is now our supreme task. We shall thereby lose nothing; gain much in the end; and, finally, be in a far stronger moral position to act, if necessary, in company with those nations of like mind with ourselves. If public opinion is to be rallied to protect international law with the same certainty as domestic law or national safety, the law must first be just so that we may be unashamed.

True, the circumstances for inaugurating such a policy are to-day almost desperate. Europe is taut with anger, and not a few of the Chancelleries are inspired by cruelties we thought had been left far behind in history. But it is still not too late. It is true that we cannot get an unarmed world, cannot get disarmament by example, cannot abolish national sovereignty. Indeed, if some crisis should be forced upon existing Governments in the armed Europe in which we live, I fear that we may have to witness, during this transition period, pacts established under the League principle and many other

devices which some of us may deplore. But we could advocate a short-distance programme, which is valuable in itself in existing circumstances, which does not involve disloyalty to our ultimate philosophies, and which can rebuild the League and complete its membership.

The following is a bald catalogue of suggestions, deliberately confined to the subject of what should be right procedure. It is not an outline of a Peace settlement.

1. In the first stages of any new Peace initiative, the Governments should not attempt to define too rigorously the principles governing, still less any of the details of, a new settlement. They should concern themselves with the procedure of negotiations rather than with the clauses of the new Peace Treaty. They should break away from the conventional diplomatic view that a peace settlement should only be negotiated after a war. The occasion to discuss a peace treaty is in time of peace.

2. The consequence of this view is that they should give up the practice that has been applied during the last few years of opening up peace negotiations only as they arise out of some isolated crisis or some explosive breach of law, such as the occupation of the Rhineland by Germany. You cannot find the road to a general peace settlement by snatching feverishly at each crisis, for that will cause each side to approach the other in the wrong mood, either inspired by reproach and fear or by resentment and anger. On the other hand every advantage should be taken of any circumstance leading to co-operation, such as the Spanish Non-intervention Committee.

3. The first stage in the offer to negotiate must be comprehensive in character. The Governments must desist from their traditional belief that the most expedient procedure is to select some one subject or some dangerous geographical area, and try to solve one difficulty, proceeding then to the next. Illustrations of this wrong technique have been the attempts to discuss Access to Raw Materials in isolation from the subject of Colonies and Mandates. The time factor, with the race of armaments in full swing, will not afford opportunity for this elongated process. All subjects—especially in the case of discussions with Germany—must find their inclusion in one common Agenda—Colonies; territorial readjustments; economic co-operation; the removal of trade restrictions; access to raw material; migration; the cessation of the

*We or They** is a significant study of the world situation by a distinguished American publicist, Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the director of the Council of Foreign Relations, whose personal views on the rôle of the United States in international affairs will be read with particular interest. This little book contains at once an indictment of dictatorship and an attack upon the American policy of complete isolation. He stresses the fundamental and irreconcilable antagonism between democratic and dictatorial systems. At every point of contact they clash and "intercommunication across the abyss has become almost impossible." He takes an extremely pessimistic view as to the possibility of normal friendly intercourse. Tyrannical government is inherently and inevitably aggressive and "we should be under no illusions that a live-and-let-live relationship between democracies and dictatorships can last indefinitely." In these premises, solidarity of all liberal states is essential in order to warn off attack, or, if it comes, to struggle victoriously. Mr. Armstrong then argues forcibly that it is to America's advantage to co-operate. "We must be alert to favour in every way possible our friends and resist in every possible our enemies." It is idle to pretend that the United States can remain unaffected by the fate of Europe. Isolation encourages the dictators and may well leave America alone to defend her interests. The theory of absolute neutrality contains the makings of its own frustration. In short, active co-operation with the European democracies is sound insurance for American security.

The latest publication of the Wayfarer Series† is on the Baltic States: *Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*. The book is out in time for this year's holiday makers and seems well to fulfil its threefold purpose. Mr. E. C. Davies, the author, depicts the Baltic states as indeed the land of milk and honey for, without a thought of slimming, we can get all we want in a really good and delightfully prepared meal for a sum that is equivalent to sixpence! Food, he tells us, is always so good that it becomes quite a part of the enjoyment of a Baltic holiday. The inhabitants of these provinces are good looking, especially the women; they still wear their national costumes in various parts and there are charming illustrations of these costumes in the book. We read of the varied architecture; Russian and Swedish fortresses side by side, Dutch buildings and Baroque treasures everywhere, remote monasteries, modern cities. The tiny islands, too, each furnished with a characteristically interesting church. The best and cheapest way to travel there is by sea, though it is two days longer than the overland route via Germany. Going by boat there is the splendid silhouette of Tallinn (Estonia) to marvel at, no other so lovely unless it be that of Rhodes. The Baltic Riviera (Latvia), rich in pine woods and "to

* Macmillan, 3s. 6d. net.

† Methuen, London. 7s. 6d.

pebble-free sands, add a laughing, blue-green sea flecked with lazy, sun-kissed waves" and you have a picture that is a good invitation to a bathe both in sea and sun. These sun-kissed shores become for those who enjoy their delights a deeper joy in their message of the possibilities of hope and peace, for they have emerged, not only from the horrors of the World War, but also from the aftermath thereof in the shape of the 'Red Terror. Because so much was destroyed, this part of Latvia can now boast of up-to-date hotels and pensions built with characteristic courage by the Letts. It has been done, too, without the usual ugliness of the present-day bathing resort. Riga, both old and new, so lovely architecturally, so full of historical association and infinite interest, is famous also for the Brethren's Cemetery, a Latvian war shrine.

The last part of the book is devoted to Lithuania with its vast forests, its lakes, its miraculous dunes so fascinating in summer and a fairy-like dream of beauty in winter. Mr. E. C. Davies interlaces his descriptions with historical information, explaining the varied character of a land surrounded by countries such as Russia, Poland, Scandinavia, Finland and Germany, and yet open to the glorious sea. The book will do much towards making the Baltic country more popular for a pleasant holiday. In most parts of the country as many as from four to six languages are spoken, but as English is the first foreign language taught in the schools we English will soon feel ourselves at home in this otherwise rather remote country.

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Vagrant in Summer.* Miss Nina Murdoch again provides a very happy holiday for those of us who stay at home and read. Her sojourn in Salzburg can be shared by us all for she enjoys it so much and dwells so lovingly on all the nooks and corners and old buildings, on the Austrian people and their charm, on the histories and legends of this ancient town, the pleasant *Bräustübl*, the marionette theatre, the market, the church interiors, the hotel garden. Is it the difficulty of language that seems to suggest not quite such bliss in the Italian Tyrol? Merano, Bolzano, Chiusi. "Call a place by its Italian name to an old South Tyrolean inhabitant and you will quite likely be told he is not aware of the existence of such a street or house or locality, any more than the Italian population will recognise the original German names." The soreness of feeling is only lightly touched upon.

The book opens with a chapter on Gibraltar, over which the authoress clammers and makes many discoveries. She gets into touch with everyone, soldiers, guards, Spaniards, and even the Mediterranean inhabitants scornfully referred to as "rock scorpions" by the English community. Her final delight is in Portugal, a land of corn and wine, of warmth and sunshine, of rich production, colour, order and beauty. Coimbra, the

* Harrap. 8s. 6d.

activities of revolutionary Internationals across frontiers, parallel with the International of sovereign states working through the League; and finally, the consideration of the League Covenant itself. Governments and public opinion might bring themselves to the point of favourably considering mandate and colonial readjustments, if they were satisfied that these were to be part of a general and final settlement, whereas they would not consider them as isolated bargains.

4. This need for a comprehensive approach to the Agenda requires, in the first instance, some method not unlike that used by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points which led up to the Armistice. In other words, we want a Map of Peace spread before the world.

5. Maybe this should take the form in 1937 of a preliminary declaration by Great Britain at the Council or Assembly of the League.

6. This declaration should be followed by an invitation to all nations to engage in diplomatic exchanges or to appoint representatives to join in drafting the Agenda of negotiation. The assistance of America and the neutral States in the preparation of this Agenda would be of the first importance, and would not involve America in organic membership of the League structure.

7. The preliminary declaration and the consequent Agenda must for the first time since the Treaty of Versailles start from the standpoint of absolute equality of status between all nations. It would naturally provide for the consideration of the means whereby the Covenant should be re-subscribed without being especially associated, as at present, with any treaty such as that of Versailles.

8. The declaration and the invitation should make clear that Britain desires to withhold from the Agenda no item or grievance which any nation may wish to include, whether such grievance is felt to be justifiable or otherwise.

9. No preliminary conditions should be insisted upon that the settlement would have to include a charter of rights for minorities, even though the democratic nations may intend to insist that this shall ultimately be considered.

10. In an armed world, and in the presence of an arms race, a demand should be included that during some agreed period, in order to allow opportunity for the negotiations, and without prejudice to the provisions of the League Covenant and

the Pact of Paris, all participants should bind themselves not to break the truce by forcible means, direct or indirect, and should guarantee their pledge. If any nation declined to join in this guarantee, it could not legitimately object if the other States insisted upon taking such a step together—the door always being left open to all participants.

11. Following the preliminary declaration and the invitation, the first stage in the negotiations might take the form of setting up Fact Finding Commissions, which should work simultaneously on each of the main items raised. They should be manned, in the first instance, more by experts than by diplomats. Their business would be to ascertain the facts governing the claims, especially with regard to such questions as economic co-operation; access to raw materials; movements of population; colonies and mandates; territorial revision. The help of countries such as America would be of immense value in these Commissions.

12. Emotion and prestige are involved as much as facts. Consequently the reports of these Commissions should then be referred for the consideration of the States concerned, so that instructions could be given to their accredited representatives, who would finally meet in a World Conference to negotiate a new and just Peace Settlement based upon the facts elicited.

13. Britain should contribute to this Agenda the opinion that all signatories of the New Settlement should become members of the League on the basis of absolute equality of rights and obligations; that trade barriers should be lowered and positive economic co-operation fostered, especially under the ægis of the League; that the Conference for the reduction, limitation and international supervision of armaments with equality for all comparable States should be resumed and shared in by all signatories; that machinery should be set up under Article XI of the Covenant so that steps could in future be taken to forestall a crisis threatening war.

14. Similarly, we must be prepared for the fact that some nations will insist that, when the new Peace Settlement is at last ready for signature, it should be guaranteed by all signatories. This would once again raise the whole question of collective security. But it would have emerged at the end of the Peace negotiations, when the settlement to be guaranteed was accepted by all signatories as being just. The Covenant

university town and Oporto, the seaport, provide as interesting and charming memories as any. Much of the prosperity is put down to the successful dictatorship of General Carmona.

All this, of course, was before the Spanish Civil War.

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Library Co-operation in the British Isles,* by Colonel Luxmoore Newcombe, is the fourth volume in the Practical Library Handbooks series. The author, as Principal Executive Officer and Librarian of the National Central Library, is particularly well suited for the task of explaining the subject to the general public as well as to librarians. The need for co-operation among libraries has been recognised for a great number of years, but the realisation of an organised scheme is of comparatively recent date. In 1916 Dr. Albert Mansbridge founded the Central Library for Students (which grew into the National Central Library), and in so doing began the present system of national co-operation. To-day the National Central Library, together with the great network of Outlier and Regional libraries, the University libraries and the system of international library loans, does work of immense value to scholars and students alike. Colonel Newcombe's excellent little book describes in detail the work of the National Central Library, the Outlier libraries, the Regional library systems, the University libraries inter-lending system, international library loans, and union catalogues. He discusses the difficulties as well as the success of co-operation, and also considers future developments. The book has a good bibliography, and should be of real interest and value to all serious readers.

* Allen & Unwin. 5s. net.

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INDIA: LOOKING FORWARD.

ONE autumn afternoon, close on thirty years ago, I was walking down the Mall at Simla with the late Mr. G. K. Gokhale. The Morley-Minto reforms (or, as we preferred to call them in India, the Minto-Morley reforms) had just been announced, and Gokhale was greatly excited over a measure of advance in India's political life for which he had long laboured. In answer to some question about the future, he suddenly turned to me and said: "From this beginning, if my people will only use their opportunities carefully and well, they will have self-government in fifty years." Besides being a great patriot, Gokhale was also a very wise man; and his prophecy does not sound so startling to-day as it did at the time. Indeed, it is interesting to speculate how the advance might have developed if Gokhale's condition had been fulfilled and Indian leaders had used their opportunities differently. In 1909 the Minto-Morley reforms came into operation, in an atmosphere of general goodwill. Twelve years later, in 1921, the second big forward move was made in the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme. Just before its inception, the atmosphere had gravely worsened, and the scheme never had a fair trial. If it had been wisely used and sympathetically worked, there is no reason why, in another twelve years, the project of the Simon Commission should not have been taken as the third step; so that, within half the time which Gokhale allowed it, India would have been fully halfway along the road to self-government.

There is nothing to be gained, however, by moralising over lost opportunities; and despite them, we are—and we may legitimately take credit for the fact—not substantially behind Gokhale's time-table. For within the last few weeks the third momentous stage has been reached, and the great provinces of India have become, in a very effective sense, self-governing in their own spheres. The boycott of the provincial cabinets by Congress (or advanced Nationalist) party had been raised, and in the six provinces where it had necessitated the formation of makeshift ministries, the leaders of the majorities in their

would have meantime remained in existence, available for use by those members of the League who were prepared to apply it according to their geographical position and military circumstances, as suggested in Annex F of the Locarno Treaty.

Here, then, is the baldest outline of a programme for the procedure which might lead to a settlement. It takes account of the actual position in contemporary Europe, dominated, as it is, by existing governments; it could unite the Peace Movement; and would arouse an eager response in the heart of a bewildered public opinion. It is founded upon a belief that by far the most realistic contribution which can now be made to unravelling the tangled and dangerous condition of a broken Europe is the letting loose of the spirit of understanding and conciliation. It thinks of the League as a centre of social organisation rather than of power. Should this effort fail, it will not have worsened the situation in Europe. Should it succeed, it might prove that many of the dangers we anticipate are not dangers at all.

A final word about our own country. One of the most tragic features of the age in which we live is the revival of cruelties and evil standards, both of conduct and statecraft, which we had imagined were buried in a forgotten age in history. It follows that a special responsibility must rest upon that nation, which by coincidence and good fortune has been able to shed those cruelties earlier than many of her sister countries. Britain has in past centuries displayed the evil characteristics of power-politics and tyranny. But I believe it is true that we are now a People which esteems mercy and liberty more highly than does any other Great Power. To proclaim this as our opinion of ourselves, when we cannot deny either the history of our own past or even many incidents of the more immediate present, would provoke resentment and scorn amongst those nations that we seek to influence. But none the less, British love of liberty and humaneness is, I believe, a fact, and one over which we should rejoice. Since, then, it is not expedient to declare our virtue to others, we should at least admit it with so much pride amongst ourselves, that we accept the obligations of leadership at a time when the world needs the qualities of mercy, sympathy and charity more than all else.

ALLEN OF HURTWOOD.

THE EUROPEAN WAR IN SPAIN.

EVER since the Spanish civil war broke out in mid-July 1936, I have thought, said and written that before it was over the larger issue of peace or war in Europe would be decided. During the past eleven months nothing has happened to change my view. For this reason I have paid less heed to the ups and downs of the strife in Spain than to its international aspects. Disastrous though the conflict might in any event have been for the Spanish people, it could never have taken on by itself the significance and the gravity lent to it by the foreign intrigues which preceded and the foreign intervention that has accompanied it.

It may be long before we know the full story of these foreign intrigues. There is documentary evidence that Nazi propagandist activities began in Spain soon after Hitler's advent to power in Germany (January 30th, 1933), and that even before then Nazi agents were in contact with the Spanish reactionary press. It may be confidently assumed that the Spanish Communists were likewise in touch with Moscow, and that Russian support of them was not entirely platonic. In 1934 and 1935 the comings and goings of Nazi and Communist agents suggested that something might be afoot; and it may fairly be supposed that the Vatican knew what the Catholic Hierarchy in Spain was doing. But it was not until the sweeping victory of the Left in the Spanish general election of February 1936 that the latent conflict began to take a definite form; and even then the form it took was to be influenced by events outside Spain.

Chief among these events were the Italo-Abyssinian war and its consequences. The Hoare-Laval proposals discredited Great Britain and estranged British feeling from France. British Ministers appeared to quail before Italian threats in the Mediterranean. In March 1936 Hitler, profiting by the Anglo-French estrangement, tore up the Locarno Treaty and occupied the demilitarised Rhineland zone. The moment was felt to be favourable to a Nazi-Fascist adventure in Spain which was timed for the late summer. By accident it began earlier. The Madrid Fascists murdered a policeman on the evening of July 12th and, on the morrow, the police murdered the Spanish Fascist leader, Calvo Sotelo. Thereupon the Spanish conspirators, whose general designs were known in Berlin,

various legislatures are now taking over the administration. The impasse, while it lasted, was due partly to a legacy of silly braggadocio as to how the new constitution must be smashed, and partly to the indomitable Oriental instinct for bargaining in the hope of still further concessions. Mixed with these causes were the woeful mistrust and suspicion which have dogged all our efforts to prepare India for political manhood. The blame is not, it must be admitted, all on one side; we have been just as distrustful of the good faith of many Indian leaders as they have been of ours, and the charge of exploitation in the past is not always easy to rebut. But slogans in India have a tendency to degenerate into parrot-cries. The doctrine, assiduously preached by Mr. Jawahir Lal Nehru, that the new constitution is only a device for preserving the vested interests of British officials and capitalists, has surely lost any truth it ever contained. It has also outlived its usefulness, as the more sensible Nationalists have come to realise.

Whatever be the influences which ended the deadlock, the situation is now clear; in several of the chief provinces, Indian politicians whom we have hitherto known only as violent anti-government agitators are firmly established in the seats of power. How are they going to use their power? To this question no one can be insensible who has helped to build up British India, or who is concerned for her welfare or her relations with the British Commonwealth. The best answer of course is that which will be given in time by the deeds of the new ministers. But their deeds will in some measure—in a larger measure than we often imagine—be influenced by what is expected of them. If British opinion generally, and not only its more pessimistic sections, is convinced that nothing but disaster can ever come out of the new régime, then disaster is quite a probable issue. If on the other hand we believe—and show our belief by all reasonable co-operation and tolerance—that Indian ministers will make good, it is at least probable that they will do so. Distrust has begotten nothing but distrust in the past; it is time to try whether confidence is capable of begetting confidence.

Congressmen who have accepted ministerial office are popularly credited with having to make a choice between two alternatives, and two only; either, as a writer in last month's *Round Table* puts it, "to wreck the constitution and return

to the political wilderness, or to work the Act in order to prove that its limitations are such as to prevent the expression of Indian aspirations." If these are the only options—and on that point there is a good deal more to be said—the second at least need not disturb us. There has never been any claim that the Act of 1935 is final: it is a milestone from which further advance will be measured. The solemnly declared policy of the British Parliament is "the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." That development is obviously far from complete; whatever be the precise meaning of Dominion status, we all know its general import, and Dominion status is what Lord Halifax, when he was Viceroy, told India to work for. The proper way to work for it is within the frame of the new constitution; and if ministers of the Congress faith adopt this method, they will be doing nothing more or less than patriotic men have habitually done in those Dominions which have already achieved full self-government.

Far more serious is the other suggested alternative. Officially, the Congress has been consistently and vehemently iconoclastic. The new constitution must be destroyed root and branch, by any means and at all costs. A Constituent Assembly must be convened to frame another scheme of government, based upon the people's will. The whole conception of a federation with the States and a central federal government must go; the Princes must be told to mind their own business and democratise their own domains without delay. All this, and more like it, figured in the election addresses last year. Are these menaces now going to be translated into action? An answer which finds favour with some observers is that, by taking office, the Congress has, so to speak, estopped itself from pursuing a policy of wrecking; that the mere fact of holding portfolios is a tacit acceptance of the existing constitution. There is some force in this, but not too much. The logical dilemma is one from which the subtle Indian mind would have no difficulty in escaping; the question of sabotage from within has been too often canvassed to cause any real embarrassment about reviving it now if so desired.

Are there, however, only the two alternatives which our pessimists ascribe to the new ministers? Is there not a third?

Rome, the Vatican and Lisbon, decided on swift action. Their revolt began in Morocco during the night of July 17th-18th, and speedily spread throughout Spain. Italian military aircraft arrived at once in Spanish Morocco to help General Franco.

Whether the British Government was aware of the plot is not publicly known. It may have been taken by surprise. At all events it was hardly in a mood to pursue a valiant policy. Its loss of prestige in the Abyssinian tragedy was too recent. Besides, its instinct had long been to avoid responsibilities, to "go to earth" and to let things take their course. So, as it had done in the case of Abyssinia, it began by putting an embargo upon the export of arms and munitions from this country to Spain, although it had recognised the Spanish Government and had accepted the Spanish Ambassador at the Court of St. James's. The effect of the embargo was indirectly to help the insurgents against the legally established Government. As the beginning of a policy of non-intervention these tactics were neither shrewd nor just. From the outset they handicapped British efforts to secure a valid non-intervention agreement, for they deprived Great Britain of the power to put pressure upon interventionist States. We ought to have said, "Either an effective embargo all round, or we shall not close our markets for war material to the Spanish Government!" As I have written elsewhere, British behaviour was as though a lion should bite off its paws and break its teeth by way of impressing hyenas with the peacefulness of its intentions. The long-drawn-out palavers in the Non-Intervention Committee—while Italy and Germany poured arms and troops into Spain—were the result.

There was every reason for a firm and sound British policy of non-intervention. There was no reason for our Government to tie both the hands of this country behind its back in order to impress others with the excellence of its example. Abroad everybody understood that vital British interests might be at stake and that a Nazi-Fascist victory would imperil British maritime communications. On the other hand the prestige of two truculent dictatorial systems was seen to be involved. Neither Mussolini nor Hitler could easily stomach the failure of their joint enterprise, lest successful Spanish resistance encourage the Italian and German peoples to throw off the Fascist and the Nazi yoke. The Spanish struggle was felt to be a European war in Spain.

In a certain degree, though perhaps not to precisely the same extent, the prestige of the Moscow Comintern (or Communist International) was likewise engaged; for it was still an open question how far the Comintern and the Soviet Russian Government were identical. Great Britain was under no obligation to help either the "anti-Reds" or the "Reds" to triumph. Nevertheless her interests were less likely to be threatened by a victory of the lawful Spanish Government than by an insurgent success which could only be bought at the price of a virtual Italo-German protectorate over Spain that might seriously compromise the British strategic position in the Mediterranean and the Eastern Atlantic. Besides British national security would be weakened were France exposed to eventual military pressure on three fronts.

We are not entitled to suppose that our National Government and its military and naval advisers lost sight of these things. We are entitled to regret that in no phase of the Spanish war have the principles of our policy—if any—been adequately explained in Parliament or to the people, and that foreign countries should have been left to draw their own conclusions—mainly unfavourable and possibly mistaken—from the ambiguity of our official behaviour. Assurances that we shall in any event insist upon the territorial integrity of Spain and her possessions, and that in the long run the feelings of the Spanish people will be kindlier towards those countries which have not intervened in their struggle, can hardly do duty for frank and educative statements to the British democracy by responsible Ministers who, while loudly protesting their devotion to democratic institutions, seem to think that healthy democracies are best kept in the dark.

Nor was it or is it enough stoutly to refuse to join either of the "ideological fronts" in Europe. To judge by the speeches of the late Prime Minister and of Mr. Anthony Eden we have an "ideological" liberal-democratic "front" of our own. If so, it would have been well to make clear our disapproval and resentment of the attempt to rivet by foreign violence anti-democratic rule upon the Spanish nation. If this had been done in unmistakable terms the outside world would have understood and might have been comforted. To-day it is not comforted. Nor is it persuaded that we have any intelligible and well-thought-out policy. Just as critical observers at home have been driven to conclude that our policy is one of

Is it not conceivable that they should, on taking office, turn their minds to making a success of it, as the first and most effective evidence of their fitness for the responsibility with which they have not hitherto been entrusted? There are several important considerations which encourage the hope that this course may be adopted. The first is a purely practical consideration. Most of us who have had dealings with the more prominent members of the Congress party will admit that they include men of marked business capacity; get them off the platform and away from politics, and their minds move, in the conduct of the ordinary extra-domestic affairs of life, on very much the same lines as our own. Men of that stamp find a special attraction in the organisation of a big going concern; and the governing of a province is not so dissimilar, except in size, from any other well-managed business. There will be an instinctive draw to the actual machinery, the handling of its levers, the calculation of its output; and in the actual study of its complexities the old preconceived prejudices against it will tend to change into an interest in its efficiency. To this tendency there will be two potent auxiliaries. With one of them we are very familiar in our own land. How often has a new minister marched into his office in Whitehall, sworn to destroy its complacency and its red-tape, to upset its policy and uproot its traditions. How rapidly has his fire abated when he is brought up against the realities of the administration, and under the steadying influence of the permanent staff. It will not be very different in India. The Indian Civil Service has had plenty of calumny and abuse, but it has always been staunch to its job and it has seen India through many troubles in the past; its loyalty to the new régime will be a powerful factor in getting ministers interested (as well as instructed) in their work.

A second impulse in the same direction will be the new local patriotism which provincial autonomy is sure to engender. Hitherto the best brains among Indian politicians have been attracted to the central rather than the provincial spheres. There is already evidence that this tendency is being reversed. The levelling force of all-India demonstrations, with English as the only common language, will diminish. The individual characteristics of different provinces will gain in proportion, and rivalry—let us hope in good works—will develop. A healthy competition between the educational system of Madras

and Bengal, or between the sanitary services of the Punjab and Bombay, will make for the discouragement of revolutionary aspirations.

This leads to another set of considerations. Few of us are without a streak of idealism somewhere, and the Congress is no exception; the ideal of social service has always had a place on its programme. Officialdom has at times been sceptical of its sincerity in this respect, and a little scornful of its methods when they were not marked by efficiency. A bevy of young members of the Servants of India Society would descend upon a famine camp, to be told that they were only in the way; quite recently some attempts at relief in the earthquake area in Behar were the cause of similar unpleasantness. But the sentiment, planted by Gokhale and fervently nurtured by Mr. Gandhi, has been growing steadily. In the Congress propaganda, as in Nehru's autobiography, it has been extended into the realm of pure theory, but its sincerity can no longer be called in question. The opportunities for giving practical effect to it which ministers will now enjoy should help to strengthen their anchorage. After all these years of political controversy, India is showing signs of being tired of theorising, and it will expect the new governments to come down to realities and to put into practice their declared ideals of improvement in the condition of the people.

Arguments practical and sentimental thus combine to render it unlikely that the worst will happen, in the shape of a deliberate assault upon the constitution. This forecast may turn out to be wrong, for an epidemic of insanity is afflicting the nations of the world to-day; but it is what we have a right to expect, for it would be impossible to conceive anything more sterile, or more damaging to both the welfare and the fair name of India, than the destruction of all the work and goodwill that is embodied in the Act of 1935. The Congress deserved their victories at the polls last spring. They had worked long and hard; they had organised with ability; many of their members had suffered much and sacrificed much for the cause. The task they have now undertaken calls for even higher qualities of heart and head. The British, by the labour of nearly two centuries, built up a structure of peace and security, of law and orderly government, which the new administration will be required by world opinion to maintain in its integrity. But more than that will be required; Indian

hand-to-mouth and of "hope for the best," so critical observers abroad have been convinced that at heart the British Government favours the Spanish insurgents. Otherwise, these observers argue, would Great Britain run the risk of leaving the Italians in permanent possession of Majorca, and of allowing the Germans to get a foothold in Spanish Morocco and Spanish territory in West Africa, rather than contribute in any way to a "Red" triumph? I, personally, think these arguments inadequate. But I know what is being thought and said abroad and how dangerous are the misconceptions which our tactics have fostered.

The roots of this European struggle in Spain lie deep, far deeper than our tongue-tied, semi-official press or our official spokesmen seem yet to have realised. Some of these roots may be "ideological." Others reach down and out into the underlying purposes of German and Italian policies. The "Rome-Berlin axis" and the so-called "anti-Bolshevist front" are their visible growths; while the repeated assertions that neither Fascist Italy nor Nazi Germany could tolerate the existence of a "Red" Government in Spain indicate the bearings of the "Rome-Berlin axis" upon the Spanish struggle.

The ultimate purpose of the "Rome-Berlin axis" is to gain for Italy control of the Mediterranean, and to enable her to threaten the communications between France and French North Africa, while Germany secures control of the Baltic and extends Nazi sway throughout Central and South-Eastern Europe on the old pan-German lines. Of this "axis" the weakest point is in the middle. Germany and Italy may not yet be fully agreed upon the allotment of Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia to the German or the Italian zone of influence, though they are probably agreed that Central Europe would be healthier, and safer for their "ideologies," if so noxious a democratic plague-spot as the Czechoslovak Republic could be radically disinfected. Here the new technique of aggression evolved in Spain may be especially serviceable. By fomenting a revolt within a country and then sending "volunteers" and arms to help the insurgents is a method that promises to allay some old-fashioned prejudices, to facilitate "non-intervention," and thus to circumvent the new-fangled doctrine of "collective security." The application of this method to Czechoslovakia was warmly advocated

by go-ahead German Nazis at Hitler's "Brown House" in Munich not long ago. It was postponed because of the possibility that a rising of Herr Henlein's partisans, followed by an influx of Nazi "volunteers," might bring on the general European war for which the German Reichswehr says it is not yet ready. Meanwhile German and Italian diplomacy are doing their best to isolate Czechoslovakia by detaching Yugoslavia from the Little Entente, by debauching Roumania, and by persuading the British Government to declare itself "disinterested" in what may happen in Central or South-Eastern Europe. When Czechoslovakia has been disposed of, the oil, corn and timber of Roumania can more easily be appropriated and Russia be enveloped on the south-west.

In these schemes Russia holds the key position. Despite Nazi declamations against Bolshevism I am not convinced that direct attack upon Russia forms an essential part of German aims. Rather is it hoped to reach a politico-economic and military arrangement between Nazi Germany and a Russia decreasingly Communist—if the Franco-Soviet Pact can be enfeebled or destroyed. Then, with an Italy satisfied in the Mediterranean, and perhaps in the Balkans, and a Germany controlling the resources of the Danubian Basin, France and Great Britain could be called to account. They might yield "for the sake of peace" or they might fight. In any case the odds would be heavily against them.

It is essential to the success of this far-reaching plan that Great Britain and, if possible, France should be induced to disinterest themselves in Central and South-Eastern Europe. A "New Locarno" might serve to reassure them on the score of their own present security; for neither Great Britain nor France could be so foolish as to imperil a "New Locarno" by pedantic insistence upon the withdrawal of Italian and German "volunteers" from Spain! In this respect progress is already encouraging. General von Blomberg is understood to have made "an excellent impression" in London during his visit at the time of the Coronation. He, whose double-dyed brown shirt was carefully hidden under his soldier's tunic, is the sort of German whom British Ministers and soldiers think a good fellow. They probably took him for the kind of man General von Schleicher was, forgetting that other leading officers of the German Reichswehr have never quite understood his behaviour when the former Reichswehr Minister and

statesmen will have to grapple with problems which the British, as people of an alien race, could not dare to handle. They are entitled to all our sympathy, and to any help for which they may call upon us.

The range of problems in India to-day is indeed immense. She is facing all the outstanding political and economic issues of the West, as well as those which are peculiar to herself. Is she, for example, to become a Communist State, or to stay in her present economic bondage? Ten years ago such a question would have been unthinkable, so foreign is the Socialist conception to India's whole philosophy of life; to-day it is being hotly debated. Mr. Jawahir Lal Nehru set the fashion with a ranting, tearing denunciation of all capitalists, Indian or alien, and all landlords. His own creed professes to be Leninism, pure and unadulterated; and few of his followers go the whole way with him. But Socialism in some form is rapidly gaining theoretical adherents, and the inner councils of the Congress are said to be sharply divided upon the issue. Though it has not yet come within the orbit of provincial administration, its repercussions have begun in threats of labour troubles of a kind wholly unfamiliar to Indian experience. At mass meetings of mill-hands in Calcutta in August they chanted a song with the refrain (translated):

The rich man's dog lives in luxury while the workers' children starve;

The workers' watchword is to die fighting for bread;

The labourers have beat the drum and hoisted the flag;

and the flag they carried was emblazoned with the hammer and sickle. If this is the first shot in a class war between capital and labour, the new ministers will have their hands full.

Graver still are the repercussions starting among the peasantry in certain provinces. The No-rent campaign which formed part of Mr. Gandhi's civil disobedience movement is expanding into a general attack upon landlordism. Like all other classes of mankind, there are good and bad landlords in Northern India; some of them are their tenants' best friends and protectors; a good many of them might well be exterminated; and a more liberal agrarian policy is much to be desired. That, however, is not the point at the moment; the immediate anxiety is a widespread disaffection among a

credulous peasantry, fomented by Socialist preachers and capable of boiling up into a state of anarchy to which there would be no parallel since the Mutiny of 1857. It is not easy to overrate the potential seriousness of the situation.

The racial or religious problem—so much harder for the Indian administrator than for the unconcerned Briton—is too well known to call for discussion. A new phase, however, promises to be fertile in trouble; it is the growing antagonism between the old school of brahmanical orthodoxy and the radical wing of advanced Hinduism, which would raise the age of consent, open temples to the untouchables, and perpetrate other similar reforms. In its influence on educational policy, the *odium theologicum* is not unknown in England; its devastation will be far wider in India. Another controversy in which orthodox and advanced opinion, both Hindu and Muslim, will shortly be at grips relates to Women's Rights. Who in his senses would have imagined, twenty years ago, the possibility of birth control as a topic for discussion by Indian women? Still more fantastic would have been the idea of an Indian lady holding cabinet rank; and yet there she is, in the United Provinces. No human foresight can speculate in what direction the movement for emancipation will spread; all that can be said is that its guidance, unless there is corresponding activity in female education, will be a task of extreme delicacy.

When we turn to progress generally, and more particularly to progress in what the Congress is fond of calling the "nation-building" services, we find ourselves immediately in the most intractable of all the labours which await the new ministers—Finance. It is the one branch of the reforms scheme on which the British Government and Parliament have been less than candid; it was slurred over, with expressions of vague optimism, by the Joint Committee and during the passing of the Act. We have had, it is true, a certificate from Sir Otto Niemeyer that the provinces, given certain subsidies from the central exchequer, are solvent. That, however, does not tell the whole story; and Sir Otto's award is being as roundly (and as undeservedly) abused as all previous attempts at a fair allocation of the Indian revenues between the central and the provincial budgets. The hard fact is that the resources of the Indian exchequer cannot now meet, and will not, until India has had her industrial revolution, be

Chancellor von Schleicher, was "cleaned up" by Herr Hitler on June 30th, 1934. However this may be, General von Blomberg went from London to Rome, where the impression he made on Mussolini is reported to have been even better than the impression he made in London. Did he tell his British hosts of his impending journey?

If British Ministers, soldiers and sailors, ever forget that the ultimate enemy of Nazi Germany is Great Britain, even more than France, they will betray the most vital interests of the British people and of the British Commonwealth. And the reasons for this fundamental enmity are not only political or even economic. They are also strongly "ideological." One day last month a well-known German liberal summed them up before a British audience in the phrase: "These Nazis hate you (British) with an almost metaphysical hatred because you recognise and pay the Leader of the Opposition instead of killing him." Those who understand the totalitarian ideology and its implications had no need to be told this. It is self-evident. Not Bolshevism, and especially not the kind of Russian National Socialism with which Germany could come to terms, is the worst foe of German Nazism. Its deepest animosity is excited by representative democratic institutions and by the liberal outlook. Liberal institutions and a liberal outlook are relativity in practice; Nazism and Fascism are political and social embodiments of the absolute.

A very enlightening work, recently published in Berlin with high Nazi approval, brings out this hatred of liberal democracy in a new way. So up-to-date is this work that it serves to explain and to justify a deed as dire as the German bombardment of Almeria in reprisal for the—advertent or inadvertent—bombing of the *Deutschland* by Spanish Government airmen. The author of this work is one E. H. Brockhoff, hitherto a star of unknown magnitude in the German juridical firmament. It is entitled *International Law Against Bolshevism*, and is published by the Nazi "Institute for the Scientific Study of the Soviet Union." Herr Brockhoff hails Adolf Hitler as the founder, in theory and practice, of a "New International Law," that is, of a new anti-Bolshevist and anti-democratic doctrine of legality. Though the Soviet Union forms what Herr Brockhoff calls the "anti-State," and comprises "all conceivable breaches of the law of nations," the real root of the evil, the "foundation of this

Red conception of the world" is to be found in those States which grant and guarantee democratic freedom. The pillars of Bolshevism, Herr Brockhoff avers, are the individual democratic States with their parliamentary constitutions.

Therefore not only must Russian Bolshevism be internationally outlawed, but all States which, by their detestable liberal and democratic institutions, nourish Bolshevism. Against such States, he says (page 238), all means of defence are legal. There can be no such thing as an illegal act or criminal behaviour towards the Bolshevist criminals. They must be outlaws and outcasts in the same way as all who make pacts or arrangements with them.

This is the "New International Law" in whose name "liberal passivity and pacifism" must be suppressed and replaced "by the folk-activity of a positive jurisprudence." What "positive jurisprudence" may mean Herr Brockhoff has explained in the *National Socialist Review* for March 1937, in which he develops the doctrine set forth in his book. Three examples of it are the violation of the Locarno Treaty, the rupture of diplomatic relations between Uruguay and Moscow, and the recognition of the Spanish insurgent Government. As soon as the "Soviet criminals" made their pact with France, the Locarno Treaty had to be torn up, because the presence of those criminals anywhere destroys all legal considerations. And, as Herr Brockhoff explains in the chapter of his book on Spain, "a juridical distinction must be drawn as regards intervention and neutrality, now and in future, between fighters for national freedom and Bolshevist destroyers of the law of nations." The case of Spain shows "that all former concepts of neutrality are inadequate and mean nothing more whatever."

From the anti-State quality of the Soviet Union it follows that the Bolshevist character of this union must be destroyed, that every form of support given to it is an international crime, and therefore juridically null and void, and that by recognising and admitting as an equal this "total enemy of State and law" the League of Nations has forfeited its own legal right to exist. It serves only the aims of "Red Imperialism" by helping to crush with its sanctions the defensive measures of other States. The weightiest document of the "New International Law," Herr Brockhoff declares to be Herr von Ribbentrop's Russo-Japanese treaty with its

ever able to meet, more than a fraction of the expenditure which the Indian patriot wants to incur. Even if all landlords were abolished, even if the military budget were cut in half and every British soldier withdrawn from the country, this would still be true. Mr. P. R. Srinavas, writing for the *Financial Times* in August, puts the case with a naive directness: "for the present," he says, "there is no reason for alarm, though the situation is bristling with apparently insoluble problems." The crux is that taxation is already high for a country where wealth is badly distributed, and new taxes are hard to find; so that the provinces have little elasticity in their own resources, and it will be increasingly difficult for the central government to help them. The import tariff is so effectively protective that excise duties are being imposed to prevent the revenue from sagging. Revenue from intoxicants will disappear, if the Congress demand for prohibition prevails; and a material easing of the burden upon land is another plank in the Congress platform. Estate duties present peculiar difficulties under the Hindu family system; and taxation of agricultural incomes (at present exempt), though affording some temporary help, will prove a wasting asset, inasmuch as it will prevent capital from going back into the land, where it is desperately badly needed. The prospects, therefore, of providing at any early date the funds for ambitious projects, such as universal primary education, pure water supplies and other equally desirable purposes, are bleak in the extreme; and many a promise of the impending millennium will have to be withdrawn. That is a political gymnastic with which we are not unfamiliar nearer home; but it will be a trying experience for the prentice hands in India.

In taking a forward view of the Indian situation, it is not easy to avoid a certain feeling of dismay at the vastness of the responsibilities which are being shouldered by comparatively inexperienced administrators; but the occasion is one for charity rather than pessimism. It is no longer a question of whether we did wisely or unwisely in handing over those responsibilities; the question now is, how we can best help Indians to carry them for the greater good of the country and the welfare of its people. We can at any rate strive for a closer understanding of the Indian point of view than we have always displayed in the past; we can send our very best men to the posts in India where Britishers will still be

employed; and we can improve our social relations with Indians—a minor courtesy of which the importance cannot ever be exaggerated.

In the foregoing, no forecast has been made for the central federation. At the moment the position is somewhat obscure. The Princes are in considerable measure losing the first flush of their enthusiasm for the federal idea, and are exchanging it for the uncongenial job of deciding how far they are prepared to part with their old powers and privileges. Hardly less painful for many of them is the pressure which is being applied from outside to transform themselves from autocrats into constitutional rulers; for the malaise of British India is spreading rapidly into the States, and the picturesque old order is doomed. All that can be said at present is that the establishment of the federal government will take considerably longer than was anticipated, and that the peculiar makeshift character of the central government in the interval will impose a serious strain on the Viceroy and his counsellors.

MESTON.

provision for common action against the Communist International.

Doubtless these fulminations would cease to apply to a Russia that should evolve in the direction of National Socialism. They would not for that reason lose their force as expressions of totalitarian doctrine against liberal democracy, the "parent of Bolshevism." This is the true "ideological" conflict in the world to-day. And the importance of the Spanish struggle consists partly in the circumstance that it has provided an experimental field both for German weapons (as at Guernica and Almeria) and for the efficacy of the "New International Law." With some exceptions the weapons have worked well; and there has been tacit acquiescence in the claim that there is no such thing as illegal or criminal behaviour towards "Bolshevists" or those who resist despotism. To suppress such people is not unlawful. It is neither murder nor assassination. It is a legal act of execution. On this point Italian Fascism is in accord with German Nazism. The late Professor Carlo Rosselli who, with his comparatively innocent brother, was done to death near Bagnolles de l'Orne last month, was clearly subject to this salutary justice. For the crime of assisting the veteran Italian Socialist leader, Filippo Turati, to escape from Italy after the fatal "humiliation" of Matteotti in 1924, Carlo Rosselli had been condemned first to penal servitude and then to confinement on an island. With criminal audacity he and others escaped. Thereafter he opposed in word and deed the totalitarian righteousness of Fascism, and crowned his infamy by leading the anti-Fascist Italian brigade against the forces of General Franco and the defenders of Spanish national freedom. Unluckily he got off with only a wound in the leg and could go to Bagnolles de l'Orne for treatment. Yet, even there, the long arm of the New International Law reached him and purged the world of his delinquent presence.

Soon or late the British Government or, failing the Government, the British people, will have to decide whether this country and the British Commonwealth uphold the principles of English Common Law in the international sphere or tolerate those of the New International Law. One fundamental principle of English Common Law is non-neutrality in the presence of crime. Hitherto our National Government has evaded this issue. For reasons which would have been those

of prudence had its policy been firm and wise from the outset, it penalised the lawful Spanish Government and made not a few concessions to Nazi-Fascist practice. It may continue on this course. It may make, or have made, further concessions in order to bring back Germany and Italy into its leaky international control scheme. But unless it is luckier in future than it has hitherto been, unless something happens to alter the trend of events, it will one day be compelled to have a firm purpose and to dare to make it known.

What this purpose should be is plain enough. What it should not be is also plain. This country ought without delay to tell all whom it may concern that British policy will be directed against the war-method of dealing with the affairs of nations, and that any country that may have recourse to the method of war must not count upon British indifference or neutrality. Within this framework precise regional obligations may be entered into. But such limited obligations must not be taken to imply indifference or "disinterestedness" towards the fate of other regions. Still less ought room to be left for any supposition that assaults upon the freedom of nations which uphold representative democratic institutions can leave the British people unmoved.

Were such a policy as this to be proclaimed, before the sands have run out in Spain and elsewhere, there might yet be a chance to save the world and ourselves from devastating war. Otherwise the European war in Spain may end by bringing on a "Spanish" war in Europe.

WICKHAM STEED.

JAPAN'S NEW WAR.

WHEN trouble began in North China on July 7th, everybody, expressing the hope that it would soon be patched up, said, on the strength of the declarations on both sides, that neither Government wanted war. However, preparations went on, and as nothing but complete submission would satisfy Japan, and as General Chiang Kai-shek declared that China could not possibly submit to such terms, there was no interruption on either side of the preparations and prosecution of war. The quarrel is a very old one between China and Japan, and those predisposed in favour of Japan have often dwelt on Japan's need for expansion, owing to the rapid increase of her own population. These advocates of Japanese expansion are found in greatest abundance in Australia and California, and their generosity in giving to Japan whatever she wants on the Asiatic mainland is inspired by the fear that she might some day be trying to force an entry to the Great Open Spaces. In the Japanese official declarations regarding the war now being waged, the common prosperity of China and Japan is mentioned as one of the things that Japan aims at, but nothing is said about Japan's million a year increase and the need for more breathing space. Japan could make out a case for it, but she would have to show that because the countries which have room to spare will neither admit Japanese nor buy Japanese goods, she was turning to China, who has a population problem of her own and cannot afford to buy much more than she buys already. That, however, would be much nearer the truth than the feeble excuses regarding China's persistent anti-Japonism and her provocations to Japan.

There can be no doubt that from 1915 onwards there has been a militarist dream in Japan of conquering all China. Hideyoshi, the sixteenth-century Oriental Napoleon, is magnified, and his megalomaniac dream of annexing China to Japan has become the serious ambition of the Japanese soldier. If England at a great distance and in spite of many difficulties can hold India, it should be easy for Japan to hold China. It is not often necessary to introduce this comparison, but it is brought in when difficulties are talked about. And it is argued that, as in India, the disappearance of corrupt native governments would bring a positive sense of relief and a willing

loyalty to Japan. It is true that hitherto neither the Koreans nor the Formosans have shown any gratitude whatever, in spite of an improvement in economic conditions; and it has been reported that Manchukuo troops have struck a blow for freedom by breaking out into mutiny after nearly six years of the independence that Japan brought to them. But though the Japanese military men are so exasperating in their requirements wherever they rule that even the Japanese civilians can hardly put up with them, they are thoroughly convinced of their talents as pacificators.

Japan, however, was checked in 1915, when she presented the Twenty-one Demands, the acceptance of which would have reduced China to vassalage, and still further checked in 1922, when at Washington she had to forgo part of what she had gained in 1915. But Manchuria was always in the foreground of her desires. She had constantly reminded herself that she had expended "blood and treasure" in saving Manchuria from Russia; she assumed a "special position," and one of her many annoyances was that, though she did much as she liked in Manchuria, she could not import coal and iron thence except on equal terms with other imports of the same commodities. Then Manchuria became the "granary of Asia," "Japan's lifeline," and other fanciful names of the same sort, though, as a matter of fact, Japan exports rice and wheat flour to Manchuria in increasing quantities, not to speak of oranges and other foodstuffs, and imports no cereals—unless the word be so comprehensive as to include soya beans.

But there were rich undeveloped lands in Manchuria, and though the last thing the Japanese farmer wanted to do was to develop them, the dream continued. Owing to poverty and over-population in the North of China, extensive emigration to Manchuria took place, amounting to a million a year—a rate at which the population of Japan could have been kept stable, or even lessened, as a large proportion of the emigrants would have been of childbearing age. This mass movement was regarded with mixed feelings by the empire-builders. On the one hand they boasted of it as proof of the virtues of Japanese influence in Manchuria; on the other, the more Manchuria was settled by the Chinese, the more remote became the chances that the Japanese would ever till the Manchurian soil; and there was the danger that a thickly

THE CHANGING AMERICAN SOUTH.

IN a continent of incessant and spectacular change the American South bears all the marks of a momentous transition. One might, indeed, contend that the prodigious development of the Middle and Far West, which our generation has looked upon, and rightly, as a major wonder of the world, is a less surprising phenomenon than the emergence of the New South. The contours of the Middle West, after all, have long been familiar. The industrial expansion of Cleveland and Detroit, of Chicago and St. Louis, had the appearance of an inevitable momentum, while California and Oregon look out upon the ocean of a mighty future. The Southern States, on the contrary, moved during a tragic half-century to the slowest rhythm and appeared to be cut off from the main currents of American life. At the opening of the present century there was little in the South upon which an observer in Georgia or the Carolinas, in Louisiana or Oklahoma, would have been tempted to base a forecast of industrial or cultural revival. Yet the changes have come, and come in some sections with great rapidity. The New South is a product of forces that have been operating with increasing weight for little more than a quarter of a century. The results make a remarkable spectacle to-day and offer a fascinating field for social study.

There are fourteen Southern States and eleven of them formed the Confederacy of 1861. Outside America a notion still prevails that the South is a single geographical region and the home of a clearly defined Anglo-Saxon social order. It is commonly assumed, also, that the Southern people speak their American English with a uniform pronunciation and cadence. Such notions embody a curious, not to say fantastic, misconception. The South is a sub-continent, comprising some 30 per cent. of the area of the Republic. Between Tennessee and Louisiana, between South Carolina and Texas, there lies a vast and most diversified region. It would not be easy to indicate with any approach to completeness the contrasts in life and habit of which, let us say, a Virginian is made aware whenever he finds himself in Oklahoma or the Mississippi Delta. He would probably, in some districts, have almost as much difficulty with the language as a New Yorker. The spoken English of the South is of almost unlimited variety,

and why should it not be? The South contains about one-third of the total population of the United States, and present-day statistics of fecundity suggest that the main reservoir of population lies decidedly below the Mason and Dixon line. I mean, of course, white population. The Negroes now number nearly 12 millions, and $9\frac{1}{2}$ millions of them live in the Southern States.

The Old South was not only agricultural: it was dependent, as few portions of the earth's surface have been, upon a limited range of staple crops—cotton, tobacco, sugar-cane, rice, corn (maize); and for a century and a half the Southern States which counted in the affairs of the nation were identified with the empire of cotton. It is a primary commonplace of American history that the invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney in 1794 went far to settle the destiny of the Union. It wedded the South, as one writer remarks, to the black slave with the hoe and the little mule pulling the bull-tongue plough. Cotton made history, and re-made it. In all the cotton States the plant was and still is the symbol of an unbeatable hope, or a perpetual gamble; and the old-fashioned—or what is sometimes called the professional—Southerner could not envisage his home region as it might be if deprived of this vital and over-mastering interest. Cotton, as everybody says, is still king; but to-day the planter, the share-cropper, and the mill-owner alike are conscious of certain more than possible perils, either one of which at any moment could assume a menacing shape. The perfecting of a mechanical cotton-picker is believed to be near at hand. If or when this is achieved, the economic basis of the cotton States may be transformed in a few months, with results to the Negro population which nobody could foresee. Or a device may be discovered for the chemical processing of rayon out of the whole stalk. Cotton, for all its apparent stability, has always been a huge speculation. A technological advance might bring a revolutionary change of scene. In the meantime the agricultural purposes of the national Government make a subject of passionate debate, and so does the many-sided problem of the Southern farmer since the launching of the Roosevelt policy of crop restriction and the lavish payment of farm bonuses through the Federal Department of Agriculture. Before the end of the Roosevelt Administration we shall have authoritative reports upon the whole range of

settled Manchuria might look with more favour on Russia than on Japan, though a large and industrious population would be an excellent market for Japanese goods, and would be able to furnish food-grains in return—for the country was potentially a “granary,” though it was rather premature to give it that description.

For years the Japanese had sought by all sorts of fallacious arguments to prove that Manchuria was not an integral part of China, and when Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang accepted office from the Nanking Government, hoisted its flag, and declared his allegiance to it, he sealed his own fate. The “unsettled issues” between Japan and Manchuria were listed, soon amounting to some hundreds, and then came the alleged railway outrage, and the seizure of Manchuria. As if to emphasise the aggression, there was the attack on Shanghai shortly after. This was so meekly acquiesced in by the Powers that further steps were almost certain.

But the resistance of the Chinese had been more obstinate than ever before. The Chinese showed that they could be as good soldiers as anybody when they were keen on their job, which they never had been before. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek saw that for the salvation of China there were two things needful, national solidarity and training in arms. These two ends he sedulously followed, and when he succeeded in coming to terms with the peasant revolt officially styled the Communist-bandits, as well as in the difficult task of allying Canton with Nanking, it was spoken of in Japan as though it were a flagrant piece of double-crossing. Japanese officers had been striving to create autonomous provinces in North China, and now that they saw their plans for detaching North China from the Nanking Government frustrated, they decided that it was time to strike. This they did in July, in the immediate neighbourhood of Peking, and they announced the intention of regarding this as a local incident. Most critics abroad applauded this idea, thinking it a good thing that hostilities should not spread. But settling it as a local incident meant ignoring all Nanking’s authority in the North, and this Chiang Kai-shek refused to countenance.

So again the Japanese struck at Shanghai, knowing that if they waited longer the Chinese might increase in solidarity, in armed strength, and even in financial power. It was a golden opportunity. Russia might possibly be glad of a

foreign diversion in order to turn people’s attention from domestic troubles—but that is a very dangerous expedient unless victory is certain in a very short space of time—and feeling between Russia and Germany was tense at the moment. Britain was sore perplexed over the Spanish trouble and the threat to her security in the Mediterranean. The United States was in the midst of President Roosevelt’s great effort to create a new economic system, and could not be bothered with foreign distractions. Such an opportunity could hardly occur again, and Japan chose it to strike a blow for the establishment of her dominance in China, and, as her Minister for War has expressed it, to break all fighting spirit in the Chinese army.

At the time of the detachment of Manchukuo from China, General Araki, as Minister for War, expatiated on the profit that would accrue to Japan from the adventure. Man is an economic animal, and no political movement is completely satisfactory unless, besides glory, protection, and the rest, there is also an economic profit. There was a rush to invest money in Manchuria, until Mr. Takahashi got alarmed and had a serious quarrel with the military men about it.

The favourite fancy of the militarists was that Japan would, with Manchukuo, form a self-sufficing economic unit. They believed that with Manchurian coal, iron, and shale oil, timber, cattle and agricultural products, Japan could get along quite well without the rest of the world; and very likely she could—but it would involve the scrapping on a very large scale of Japan’s existing industrial equipment. A lot of her ships would be no longer required; her silk production is far greater than her own empire and Manchukuo could consume; so is her manufacture of cotton and rayon. But it cannot be denied that in these days, when statesmen are concerned about the balance of trade, when over-production is a bugbear, and tariff walls grow higher, the idea of a self-sufficient empire is not without its attractions. British economists dally with it, and so do Americans and Russians. They find almost insuperable obstacles to the realisation of any such dream, however, so it was inevitable that the much smaller unit of Japan-plus-Manchuria should fail to show even the beginnings of self-sufficiency. Japan could not wait. A slow process of forcing Japan and Manchuria to supply each other with all requirements might be feasible, but the greatest

Government activity. An astounding record, certainly, it will be. There can be no reasonable doubt that it will reveal an improved condition of affairs through the South generally; but whether in doing so it will demonstrate that the turning away from the traditional reliance upon the single crop has been carried very far is another matter. It is said that in a certain city of Alabama there is to be seen a monument to the boll-weevil, in ironic tribute to that affrighting pest for his service in converting the Southern planter to diversified farming. The fact may be so, but better than the boll-weevil for this purpose should be the industry and intelligence of the institutions of agricultural research which have recently become of high practical value in most of the States.

One of the greatest difficulties confronting the South after the Civil War was the abundant lack of communications. The rebuilding and extension of the railroads was a painfully slow business. Southern lines could not provide an attractive field for Northern capital, and during the later years of the nineteenth century the cities were not growing quickly enough to act as a stimulus to railroad enterprise. Mechanical road transport began before these adverse conditions were overcome, and as a consequence road development has been a major influence in the making of the new South. Roughly speaking, the old road conditions remained unaltered through the first decade of motoring, and even past the stage during which the Ford car was conquering every section of the American continent. The decisive change began not more than fifteen years ago. The urgent need of modern roads brought a sudden expansion of Government activity, and with it the first important breach in the Southern devotion to *laissez-faire*. North Carolina, a State which has gone ahead in twenty years along many courses, was a notable pioneer in this enterprise. The highways of Florida were an obvious early result of the transformation of the State into a rich man's paradise, and the effect upon the adjacent regions was soon visible. One or two energetic Governors realised the force of the demand, and they applied the petrol tax to the road fund of their States, with excellent results all round. Nor is it possible to deny that Huey P. Long of Louisiana achieved the most striking measure of success in the shortest time, by constructing something like 3,000 miles of highways: a system,

as his critics pointed out, going far beyond the existing needs of Louisiana; a system, too, as his more outspoken enemies declared, which through the contractors yielded tribute to the Governor on every mile of concrete surface. In defence of Huey Long it could be argued that Louisiana had to have the roads and would soon enough be making full use of them; further, that they comprised a valuable public asset, and acted as a direct incentive to the officials of contiguous States, who were not willing that motorists from all over the country should point to Louisiana as evidence that a Southern dictatorship could obtain better results for the public service than an Administration of orthodox American type. To cross the border of this State may still, in 1937, be to spring from flawless concrete to the sand and gravel tracks of a past age, but this contrast will not long remain. The future manifestly belongs to road transport. The railroads in the South generally look like being reserved for long-distance travel.

All writers on the new South lay emphasis upon the astonishing facts of a generation of industrial expansion. The southward drift of manufacture, especially of textiles, is an outstanding American fact. There are well-defined causes for this movement. Nearness to the raw material must be mentioned first, but almost equally strong has been the pull of other influences, such as lower labour costs and the absence of restrictive labour laws like those in which the initiative was taken long ago by Massachusetts, the pioneer textile State. Then again, there is the undeniable advantage to the employer of a homogeneous working population, which makes a great contrast to the polyglot proletariat of New England and New Jersey with its bent towards radical unionism. Hitherto the Southern operatives, coming largely from mountain folk, have been difficult material for the union organisers and easy subjects for paternalism. The mill towns of Massachusetts and Rhode Island on the one hand, and those of North Carolina and Tennessee on the other, belong to areas and periods that have little in common with each other. The best of the Southern examples are good, with tolerable housing and an unspoilt Anglo-Saxon community; but contrariwise, the worst of them are terrible, while recurring labour conflicts disclose in one district after another a condition of industrial serfdom such as Americans cannot contemplate without grave misgiving. In view of the lateness of its

attraction in self-sufficiency is the ability to make war even though trade may be cut off. Perhaps this will some day turn out to be an illusion, but for the present it is the soldier-politician's chief desire to be able to stand a siege for as long as may be required.

The shortcomings of the quasi-annexation of Manchuria as a means of creating a self-contained economic and military unit were soon apparent, and eyes were turned on North China. Less than a hundred years ago, the missionary travellers Huc and Gabet found Manchuria very productive of cotton; but the enthusiasm with which the question of growing cotton in the newly formed State of Manchukuo was taken up suddenly seemed to peter out. It was very much easier to get it from India, and the agreement whereunder Japan had to buy raw cotton from India if she wanted to sell India her textiles stood in the way for the present. It was suggested that North China was a better field for cotton than Manchuria, and also possessed mineral wealth of better quality than Manchuria could show. So penetration into North China was very vigorously prosecuted, with, in due course, the organisation of "special trade," which meant the defiance of the Chinese Customs and the collection of a much smaller import duty on Japanese goods entering Tientsin. This revenue paid for the gang that levied it and also for autonomous political councils created by the Japanese for promoting their interests in the name of local independence.

However, there was not sufficient appreciation in North China of the sincerity of Japan's intentions, and there flared up on July 7th this year one of those military encounters which light the flames of war. The sequence of events was so much like that of 1931-2—a great grab in the north followed by a terrific blow at Shanghai—that it seemed to be the repetition of a formula for aggression. In both cases the ostensible reasons for the attack on Shanghai were similar. In 1932 Shanghai presumed to interpose with a boycott of Japanese goods in defiance of Japan's reasonable desire to settle the Manchurian question on the basis of Manchuria being quite different from China and not subject to the Nanking Government. But these big questions do not explode by themselves. They must have a detonator, and in 1932 the killing of a couple of Japanese priests who were defiantly making a noisy procession served.

On the present occasion there was a similar difference of opinion as to the bounds of the authority of Nanking. A trifling business about a missing soldier became the basis for a charge that the Chinese had refused to act upon an alleged undertaking, that any official of whom the Japanese army disapproved should be removed; and this led to some artillery work and the occupation of Peking, and the announcement that the affair would be settled locally—that is to say, that Nanking was not to pretend to any authority henceforth over any part of North China. Nanking refused, and to punish this insolence there must be another blow farther south; and as it was not convenient to strike direct at Nanking (though it was bombed from the air within a few days) Shanghai was selected again for punishment. Again a detonator was required—and found. A Japanese officer visited the Hungjao aerodrome, and marched in, ignoring the sentry's challenge. The sentry had no option but to shoot. The immediate response was death and devastation. The Chinese proposed a joint inquiry into the affair, but it was brusquely refused. Later, when the Japanese shot the British Ambassador, in circumstances that afforded no justification whatever, they required time for an inquiry, abused the British consent by prolonging it unreasonably, and finally wriggled out of the responsibility with subterfuges that insulted the intelligence.

There have been many instances of wars being begun by some trifling occurrence. There was always some larger cause behind. In this case the larger cause is as inadequate as the proximate one—it consists in a charge that the Chinese have failed to understand that all their chastisements at the hands of the Japanese have been for their good, and have hated the Japanese instead of loving them. When we look behind this for an adequate cause, all we can find is greed and ambition.

In the Imperial Diet the civilian Premier has vied with the Defence Ministers in breathing out threatenings and slaughter. China is to be beaten to her knees and all the fighting spirit of her soldiers destroyed; and, in the affair of the shooting of the British Ambassador, the Minister for the Navy is content to declare that he cannot imagine the Japanese navy attacking civilians, though the spokesman for Admiral Hasegawa, in command at Shanghai, has said that if the Chinese do not show the proper submissiveness that should

development, the South obviously has an opportunity of avoiding the worst evils of industrialism, from which New England and the Middle West suffer to the last degree. Yet the hopes for any such escape are altogether illusory. The horrors of a condemned system are all there and are in no way hidden. Such places as Gastonia and Elizabethtown tell a tale of the grimmest sort, while at no great distance over the mountains the coalfields of Kentucky, drawing upon a reserve of mountain stock, whose families trace a clear descent from early English settlers, are forced to endure the hardships of an industrial despotism upon which hitherto no federal New Deal has been able to make any impression. A discouraging aspect of this problem is the feebleness of the counteracting social agencies. There is so far no strong force of public opinion in the new South. The burden of effort and ethical stimulus would therefore seem to be thrust chiefly upon the men and women who are responsible for the institutions of higher education, and upon these, increasingly, the community life must depend.

No attempt is ever made to disguise the defects of education in the South. The ruin of the Civil War alone is sufficient to account for this, and needless to say, there must be added the incalculable social consequences that are inseparable from the Negro, enslaved and freed. Several of the States still carry a load of illiteracy among the poor Whites; and although in the relatively prosperous years before 1930 the local governments were catching up, the five years of heavy depression meant a grievous setback. A generous Federal Government is to-day pouring out money upon school projects as upon many others; but no traveller through the South in these days will be in need of assurance that it is in the field of technical and college education that energy is mostly being expended and positive results displayed.

I am able, as it happens, to speak upon this subject in the light of a recent and unusually pleasant experience. Having accepted an invitation from the Institute of International Education, New York City (Dr. Stephen P. Duggan), I visited eighteen colleges and universities in the Deep South, delivering addresses upon British and international affairs. There was an agreeable variety in these institutions. The smallest were denominational, Methodist or Baptist. At the opposite end of the scale were State universities, impressive

in size and equipment; in quality none were superior to those which could look back to a fine original endowment. I was warned before starting that I could not expect to meet the interested audiences that the Northern and Western colleges provided as a matter of course. The warning was mistaken. No speaker could wish for a better hearing than these students accord to a visiting lecturer, and if some of the questions asked, in public and private, disclosed wide spaces of ignorance concerning England and Europe, why need we be surprised? What degree of knowledge upon American affairs, or Asiatic, would a speaker look for in an English audience of undergraduates? The main point is that the interest is there, and that a larger and larger number of students are demanding and receiving instruction in world movements, as in the history of government, the play of economic forces, and the possible agencies for keeping the peace.

Present-day America is admittedly faced with a multiple difficulty in respect of its system of higher education. College in the United States implies for the young business or professional man and woman a social cachet, and in far too many cases it implies little else. The South has caught the college fever, as the North and West caught it long ago; and in a full political democracy, dowered with the egalitarian tradition of America, it is of course difficult to apply selective tests. The theory is that every lad and girl is entitled to the advantage of a college course if the family can cope with the financial obligation, and in the South generally the adoption of the theory, amid existing conditions of economic recovery, yields a plentiful crop of awkward consequences. School preparation for college is admittedly very imperfect. This is true even—or perhaps especially—in English. There is a common complaint that a distressingly large number of first-year students are so poor in the handling of the mother tongue that they have to be put through an elementary course no stiffer than should be suited to a child of English-speaking parents in his early teens. This being so, it is not surprising that the mortality among freshmen is high. The percentage of students who are sent home or voluntarily drop out at the end of the first year is represented by a figure which in England would seem far-fetched, and in Scotland would be unimaginable. There, nevertheless, is the eagerness for

follow the attacks made on their military men, the navy will have to take steps against civilians—so such action is not so unimaginable after all. Besides, the greater part of the bombing and shelling has been directed from the beginning against the defenceless civil population of unfortified areas.

The question has been discussed of the Northern Provinces added to Manchukuo and the Japanese Empire forming an economic unit, and some scepticism of the effectiveness of the prescription has been expressed. It is evidently the intention of the Japanese Government to destroy the Government of China so as to prevent the growth of a strong and independent State. In the North the weakness of China has been made an excuse for attacking her, on the ground that a weak State as a neighbour is always dangerous, as it will conspire with some stronger State against Japan. Now that China has been showing signs of strength, she is to be crushed because that also threatens Japan.

And what of the future? There are some who make easy prophecies of the bankruptcy of Japan as a result of her military excesses. But the might of China, which Japan is crushing, is still very much in the bud, and presents no very difficult military problem—though the Chinese have shown in Manchuria that they can be very troublesome as guerilla fighters. If we may expect history to repeat itself, we shall see an easy victory for the Japanese, and another large slice detached from Nanking—perhaps an abolition of Nanking itself as a political capital, and a Government established in Canton, which will learn to look to Japan to help in the task of making Hongkong useless. On Christmas Day in 1932 a military communiqué was published in Tokyo stating that the Japanese army was determined to extirpate the Kuomintang, whose relation to the Nanking Government is similar to that of the Communist party to the Government in Moscow. That will probably be done, though it will leave something smaller but more radical in its place.

The special hostility shown to the Chinese Customs service and the successful detachment of the Manchurian ports from its functioning suggests another line of possible development. At Tientsin, Japanese goods have established a special position for themselves—the “special trade” run by gangsters with the help of the Japanese army. The selection of Shanghai as the place of attack is inspired at least in part by the fact

that this will do the greatest injury to foreign trade. Anti-Japanese feelings will not prevent the Chinese from buying in the cheapest market, and the Japanese will be invincibly the cheapest goods if they get as easy entry as at Tientsin. The capture of Customs launches at Canton by the Japanese navy and their bombardment at Ningpo indicate a particular interest in the Chinese Customs; and among the possibilities of the settlement is this: that the Japanese will undertake responsibility of the Chinese Customs and will guarantee the payments due on the loans that are secured on the Customs. If it be sufficiently plainly shown that nobody else will stand much chance in China and that the Japanese will permit no duties to be charged on their goods, and so have it in their power to ruin the Customs as a revenue-producing organisation, then the bondholders will be on Japan's side. She can get away with it if she only has the nerve, and just now she seems to baulk at nothing.

There are ways in which Japan could be brought to reason. If the British Empire, America and Russia agreed not to supply any petroleum or cotton, and to close their ports to Japanese ships, this would pull her up short in her wild career; but the producers of these commodities would raise such an outcry about being made to bear the burden that this is hardly practicable. As for the financial factor, the military men care nothing for that. They would like Japan, with her economic unit complete, to go into seclusion again and cultivate a greater Japonism than has been.

A. MORGAN YOUNG,
Late Editor *The Japan Chronicle*.

college, and there are the colleges—a most noteworthy feature of a region commonly described as backward. I note, without comment, two particular points in this connection. The first is the continued social power of the churches in all the Southern States. Every denomination makes itself, to a considerable extent, responsible for higher education within its own community; and this accounts not only for the large number of denominational colleges, but also for the activity of the separate church organisations on the campus of every State college and institution. The students nominally associated with a church (and that means the immense majority) are watched over, and as far as possible shepherded into the denominational students' centre. And the Southern churches, it is hardly necessary to add, are rigorously fundamentalist in doctrine. The second point is related to the question of equipment and its value. Not a few of the Southern colleges are still struggling with a vexatious legacy of bad buildings and impoverished fittings. But in many cases, and I think in nearly all the State institutions, the "set-up" may be described as excellent. The buildings often approach the highest level of convenience and efficiency, and even of comeliness—in college halls, library, gymnasium, and dormitories. And let us not forget that the large majority of the students who enjoy these surroundings have come from meagre homes in rural areas or little towns.

The old South was almost wholly rural; the existing South is still overwhelmingly a country of small towns and cities of very moderate compass. The past quarter of a century, however, has witnessed a remarkable expansion of many larger centres. Memphis, Atlanta, Dallas, Birmingham, Houston, are conspicuous examples. Birmingham and Atlanta possess special advantages of situation. The environs of the latter are hardly surpassed by those of any inland city. Richmond is a modern capital. New Orleans must always retain its unique character. Houston, Texas, is an unusual instance of seaport, commercial city, and academic centre in combination; and I should cite as especially characteristic the swift advance of such a city as Shreveport, Louisiana. It is favourably placed on the great river; it is an agricultural centre; it has an airport of the finest, and it adjoins one of the richest oilfields in the world. There is nothing to be wondered at in the enterprise of a city so obviously marked for success: Shreveport

had to bound ahead. But for the Englishman who thinks of the hard resistance of our own towns to change, it is a searching experience to be taken over these progressive cities of a region which the rest of America thinks of as not yet awakened. Any recent traveller through the South could name a dozen such, with from 25,000 to 50,000 people, able to show a range of new schools, technical institutes, hospitals, civic buildings and parks fine enough to make the English visitor envious. It is a poor American town, indeed, whose leading citizens have not learned the virtue of civic spending, lacking, I should say, in one matter only—playing-fields and open-air community centres. The youth of the South are watchers of games instead of players. No fact strikes the English visitor more than this in the college towns, where football in the autumn is an oppressive tyranny of which college presidents and professors make continual moan. I can think of no addition to the amenities of a normal American city, especially in the South, which could compare in value and attractiveness with the park of rest and culture, as described by M. André Gide in his challenging estimate of Soviet Russia. The American of the South is friendly, gregarious, pleasure-loving; the coming generation should be variously and thoroughly athletic. Yet the paradox here is that one cannot imagine a park of rest and culture in Birmingham, Alabama, or Memphis, Tennessee, and still less perhaps in Savannah, Georgia.

"The South remains an invalid in the family of States." So wrote one of the contributors to a valuable co-operative survey of Southern life and problems.* The statement, made just at the opening of the Roosevelt epoch, is doubtless still true, notwithstanding the evidences of an advance which within a few years may well impress the whole world. The great industrial expansion, backed by the South's amazing resources of hydro-electric power (the Tennessee Valley Administration stands among the marvels of our age), has already produced in more than half the Southern States the conditions of all-round social change. The newest South is an integral part of modern America, while the southward drift of ownership (land and capital) and the vast interests of travel and recreation are creating a fresh

* *Culture in the South*. Edited by W. T. Couch. University of North Carolina Press. 1934.

BRITAIN AND ITALY.

AT last the time seems to have arrived when Britain and Italy can meet to discuss their respective interests, with a view to reaching a definite understanding to their mutual benefit. During the last two years conditions have been inappropriate for any attempt to reach a *rapprochement*, and there has been little result from the general agreement of January this year. The Spanish civil war has been held up as the great obstacle to better relations, and in some quarters the whole blame has been put on Italy. In reality the Spanish imbroglio would never have produced a crisis endangering the peace of Europe were it not for the suspicion and mistrust with which Britain and Italy viewed one another at the time. Each was apprehensive of the intentions of the other in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. But that was at a period when feelings of different kinds were running high on both sides, and the most futile newspaper polemics were in full blast. Now, fortunately, calm has succeeded the storm, and the realities of British-Italian relations have emerged from this quagmire of hallucinations and "phobias."

That this should take place sooner or later was a foregone conclusion, as the political relations between the two countries are based on nothing less than geographical facts, which neither dictator nor democracy can change. Our relations with certain countries have been predestined, and with these countries we cannot afford to be on unfriendly terms any more than they can be on unfriendly terms with us. The two most obvious cases in point are France and Italy. France is our neighbour across the Channel, and for this reason alone Anglo-French relations must be cordial unless we or the French want trouble. Similarly, Italy is our neighbour in the Mediterranean through which pass our main lines of communication with the East. For this reason alone friendship with Italy is essential if we want peace for our people and tranquillity for our trade. For the same reason British friendship is just as important to Italy. Whether we like the French or Italians and *vice-versa*, or whether we approve of each other's form of government or method of policy, has nothing to do with the case in point. International affairs deal with the material interests of nations, in the adjustment or non-adjustment of which sentiment plays no part. Sentiment can only be useful when adjustment

of mutual interests has been brought about, and has reached a definite state of maturity. Any attempt to introduce the sentimental factor in judging a situation, or in trying to reconcile differences, can only lead to dangerous mistakes.

A strange aspect of the British-Italian quarrel is that, with the psychological differences removed, there is practically nothing left. British and Italian interests are complementary, if they are not identical, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. Yet Italy has been suspicious that Britain wants everything her own way in that area, while Britain has feared further expansion as a part of Italian policy. But once these "phobias" have been removed, it will be obvious that the interests of each country can best be served by mutual co-operation.

Before examining British and Italian interests respectively, and the directions in which mutual co-operation can be beneficial to the interests of each country and to peace in general, it is as well to realise some of the divergencies of outlook that make for misunderstanding, and some of the circumstances in which these divergencies become apparent. In the first place, Britain is a northern country with a cold, damp climate; her people are Anglo-Saxon in race, chiefly Protestant in religion, and the majority are occupied in industry. Italy, on the other hand, enjoys a pleasant, sunny and drier climate; her people are Latin in race, almost entirely Catholic in religion, and the majority are occupied in agriculture. With these four fundamental differences there must be a great divergence of outlook towards many aspects of life. While the Italian is inclined to suspect the cool and measured utterances of British speakers, the Briton often fails to make allowance for the natural exuberance of the Italian orator. The subject-matter of political speeches, and the objects for which they are made, are too often misunderstood in the other country and even at times wrongly translated. Not only are there many pitfalls in the translation of Italian into English and *vice-versa*, but the general impression conveyed to the reader after translation often differs widely from that intended by the speaker for the original audience. And to this must be added incorrect reporting by newspaper correspondents and incomplete publication of speeches by newspapers. With two temperaments so different from one

geographical distribution of the national wealth. One very important consequence of this multiple movement—the ending of one-party rule—is plainly inevitable, although the extreme slowness of the process continues to confound the political soothsayers. The solid Democratic South cannot be much longer maintained; and as it breaks, the emergence of a new party system will make the South as a whole once again the balancing weight in the Union.

Nothing, we may be sure, will avail to prevent this transformation, political and social, upon a great scale; and, as all thoughtful Southerners recognise, the immense readjustments that are already coming into view cannot be attempted or approached without a full confrontation of that apparently insoluble racial dilemma which was and is and will continue to be the unique difficulty of the American South. The conditions surrounding the Negro problem vary with every succeeding generation. They are now immensely different from what they were twenty years ago, because of the coloured people's progress in education and economic strength, not to mention that singular influence of Afro-America in literature and the arts which the social historian will need to examine as a feature of our time. No European can journey through the South and compare his present-day experiences with his first impressions at any earlier time without registering a conviction that circumstances are much improved and that the forces making for racial enmity have been greatly diminished. The essentials of the problem, however, would seem to be almost as they were on the morrow of emancipation seventy years ago, and the impartial student of this most baffling puzzle is driven to take refuge in a dogma of social faith. How, I wonder, can we escape the conclusion arrived at by one of the best of Southern writers on this subject, Mr. W. T. Couch,* namely, that the conception of social economy in terms of cheap and servile labour, and the system which gives effect to that conception, must be changed before the genius of the Southern people, white and black, can find its full expression?

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

* *Culture in the South*, p. 477.

ENGLISH CHARACTER.*

THE English have a deep sense of the substance of character in men and women, and for weakness and pretence an uncommonly sharp eye. They like to ruminate on character: their literature in prose and verse demonstrates this taste, but not more than do conversation and comment among the average of them. They gossip, but not in the vulgar sense, for they survey their fellows in the hope of finding the solid truth about them, if there is any, and they are stimulated in the survey by anything that stirs the sentiment of reality. This bias holds not only in peaceful moments, but even in private and public strife, as in the Duke of Wellington's curiously detached remark on Napoleon: "The man is no gentleman."

Books, journals and talk are engrossed with the character of men and women more, perhaps, than in most countries. But though the English take each other's measure enterprisingly and commit each other to paper both in life and at death—they compose obituaries with zest and point—they are the last to theorise on English character. In generalisation of any kind they are hesitating, their minds poising readiest on the individual, and besides, they are a shy people, and, as men go, they are inarticulate. They display themselves better in action than in speech, and in speech only indirectly. Self-expression in the strict sense is not a major need or even a characteristic need of the English: for most of them lack the special temperament or the admixture of blood that makes the need. They are no actors, except in so far as deep, solid and earnest natures wear their hearts elsewhere than on their sleeves. They do not so much conceal as fail to display: and where concealment might be policy, they often lack art and restraint. Defoe wrote of them in *The True Born Englishman*:

In close intrigue their faculty's but weak,
For generally whate'er they know they speak,
And often their own counsels undermine
By mere infirmity without design:

* An address to the Anglo-German Fellowship in Berlin, April 8th, 1937, by the Principal of University College, Exeter.

another it is natural that the same event should produce entirely different reactions.

Also, what happens in one country is apt to be judged in the other according to conditions very different from those actually prevailing where the event occurred. For example, a Bishop of the Church of England can express from the pulpit his own personal political convictions, which are accepted as such by his hearers. But, when a report of his sermon reaches Italy, his words are regarded by most people as being inspired by a higher authority. The average Italian knows that his own Catholic Bishop cannot express political views without the approval of the Holy See, and he takes the utterance of the English Bishop as of much greater significance than is really the case. Similarly the Italian, who has a Press controlled by the Government, finds it hard to believe that British newspapers are independent of such influence. He has possibly heard of occasions when the Foreign Office has asked newspaper editors to avoid publishing material detrimental to a certain line of policy, and wonders why unfriendly articles continue to appear when the British Government professes a policy of friendship. He does not realise that such requests would become ineffective unless reserved for special occasions. In the same way the British reader, or even visitor to Italy, is naturally apt to judge what he reads, sees or hears according to the standards to which he is accustomed. He too often fails to make allowance for the ways of a people differing from himself in so many important respects.

Moreover, he finds it difficult to appreciate that what may seem almost trivial to him may be vital to an Italian, while it almost "shocks" him to see the Italians deal lightly with what seem to him to be serious matters. Apart altogether from the different forms of government favoured by the British and Italian races respectively, there is a marked contrast in sense of values, partly due to the thoroughly Catholic nature of the Italian people. Not only are most Italians good Catholics, but Italy has now succeeded Spain and Austria-Hungary as the champion of the Catholic Church in Europe. As the Italian Government closely co-operates in many questions with the Holy See, it naturally follows that Italians attach the utmost importance to issues that do not concern non-Catholics like ourselves. In a sense, therefore, Italian policy should be regarded as "Catholic Christian"

as well as "Italian," just as Soviet policy should be judged on its "Russian" as well as its "Communist" basis. There is also the Latin love of logic, which appeals little to the British mind; but this should not hamper our relations with Italy any more than our relations with France. There is, however, one factor of the greatest importance to the future of British-Italian relations. We in this country must realise that Italy is now a Great Power in every sense of the term, and is no longer a nation that will conveniently fall into line with the wishes of a stronger Britain. She is now an equal, seeking friendship with us on terms of equality and willing to consort with us in world affairs. In this policy lie her best interests, provided that this basis of absolute equality is preserved.

Let us now examine the respective interests of the two countries, the first of which is the maintenance of European peace. While there are few who dispute the statement that Britain is working for peace as the basis of her foreign policy, there are still many who distrust Italy in this respect. Yet it stands to reason that Italy needs peace for protective purposes in Europe, while she develops her new Empire in Africa. This reason alone is sufficient to convince anyone who has seen what is being done in Italian East Africa; but, apart from this, Italian security in Europe relies on a maintenance of equilibrium in Austria and the Danube basin. Italy has as much to gain by peace as she has to lose by war.

In the Mediterranean, British and Italian interests are chiefly concerned with communications, although other considerations have to be taken into account. On the British side, there is the imperial route to India and the Far East *via* Gibraltar, Malta and the Suez Canal by sea, and *via* Marseilles, Brindisi, Athens and Alexandria by air. On the Italian side, there are communications with Libya, and the East African route to Massawa and Mogadishu, ports for Abyssinia; also the Rome-Addis Abeba air route *via* Benghazi, Egypt and the Sudan. There are three outlets—Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and the Straits—two of which are controlled by Britain and one by Turkey. With regard to the last-named outlet, let it be remembered that this is the general route between the Black Sea and Western Europe, which connects Russia's ports in the south with Leningrad and those in the north. Although Britain has an alternative route *via* the Cape, the value of the Red Sea route to India is immense, especially as

From whence, the learned say, it doth proceed
That English treasons never can succeed,
For they're so open-hearted you may know
Their own most secret thoughts and others, too.

Their self-expression, to resume, is oddly objective in their practical bearing to occasions, ideas and persons. The reaction has little of the theoretical or doctrinaire in it, but comes straight from sentiment and instinct, and not from these in their purity and simplicity but mostly tinged with a sort of conscientiousness: a sudden intrusive rectitude wells up. It is not a penurious or a fidgety conscience, but one that asks broad plain questions, probing hopefully for what is manly and humane. The organs of this conscientiousness are to be encountered at many vantage points in men of a useful moral inquisitiveness—not to call it censoriousness—in business life, for example, in the professions, in the police, and of course in schools, but also in the man in the street. None of the old public schools would be true to type without such men. Most of the colleges of the two old universities harbour a dozen or two of an integrity that can be felt, uncomfortable and challenging men but salutary. Thus English self-expression seems to some observers to be self-righteousness, or strongly flavoured with it. Preoccupied with questions of right and wrong the English certainly are, and downright, too, when they put their judgments into words. It is inevitable that self-righteousness should be charged against them. It is inevitable, too, that for similar reasons a more palpable fault should be charged against them. They have been called perfidious. And why? Because they perplex the prophets. “How will the English act?” is a foolish question. They are not a nation of stage figures moving by formulæ, nor can they be ticketed off in neat psychological terms. No one knows how they will act, not even themselves, till the occasion and the need confront them. Their action will then respond to the full concreteness of the situation, and it will be ruled by two things—their interest, to be sure, and their instinct for what is right. Will and conscience are in odd alliance in them. It is an alliance easy for the satirist or the cynic and in general for the men of temperament to make fun of. But it is formidable, and it is sincere.

I have been a long time telling you that the English say little outright about themselves. They resign themselves to

being studied by others, and the Scotch, naturally, have much to say about them. They have had for many generations, for instance, an unrivalled system—if system it can be called—of manly and citizenly education and culture in the old public schools and the two old universities. In any other country this education would inspire a whole army of theorists and expositors. But all this they have hardly yet begun to describe or philosophise. Some nations harp on their strong points. Here is one that takes them for granted and talks of something else. There is an old rhyme:

I count him wise and right well taught
Who can bear a horn and blow it not.

But the English are not always wise and well taught. There have been times, for instance, when they boasted of their Constitution. That boast is now silent: the growing complication of their affairs has somewhat confused them about the Constitution. But they came well out of the King crisis a few months ago, bidding farewell to King Edward with immense sorrow and disappointment, but also with conviction and despatch, and all according to the strict rule of the Constitution. Will and conscience went hand in hand, and constitutionality triumphed. Presently they may be boasting again about the Constitution.

But let me come closer to the English. “They are a people,” said an acute and laborious American critic, the best critic of their better qualities that they have ever had, Emerson, “of mixture and surprise.” They are mixed of many races, an old blending now well matured: the elements were different enough to be distinctive and like enough to make a good cross. From this mixing has derived the manifold efflorescence of English effort and culture. It is less to the point to trace specific gifts or qualities to racial sources than to recognise the sheer power and the stamina that underlie them. From a strong rich soil Nature throws up from time to time all her marvels. Gifts, graces and achievements are rooted in good nerves. But physiology is not everything: a high degree of freedom and security, as these things go, has helped Nature to fruit richly. Their domestic security the English owe to geography, common sense, and good method. Their sense, perhaps, is the master-key to an understanding of them. It is difficult to convey in words, but I must try. Their sense is

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it now runs parallel to the air route *via* Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. This is now more than ever a vital link in the whole British imperial system, and British tonnage tops the list in the Suez Canal returns. But now that Italy has secured an East African Empire, her tonnage comes second on the list in the Canal, which is the only practicable line of communications with her Red Sea possessions. While Italy controls no outlet from the sea by which she is enclosed, she largely depends on her ex-Mediterranean trade. Eighty-six per cent. of Italy's trade is sea-borne, of which 70 per cent. passes through the Straits of Gibraltar, 17 per cent. through the Suez Canal, and 13 per cent. through the Dardanelles. In 1934 the total trade by these three outlets amounted approximately to 17 million tons. Similarly, Italy's communications with her East African possessions are under the control of others, as also her shipping connections with America, South Africa and the Far East. Hence, complete freedom of action throughout the Mediterranean and Red Seas is vital to Italy.

Hitherto British interests in the Mediterranean have been protected by the Royal Navy based on Gibraltar and Malta, with British troops and aircraft in Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt and Palestine. Italy, on the other hand, has her naval, military and air forces distributed between the mother country, Libya, the island of Pantelleria, Rhodes, and the island of Leros in the Dodecanese. As Italy holds the central part of the Mediterranean—between Sicily and Tripoli—with her fortified island of Pantelleria, Britain holds Malta at the point where the Gibraltar-Suez and Italy-Tripoli communications cross each other. Britain and Italy can therefore become grave dangers to one another at this point of transit intersection. Pantelleria is geographically the Italian counterpart of Malta, just as farther east Cyprus is the British counterpart of Rhodes and the Dodecanese. Although Cyprus has hitherto played an insignificant part in the British defensive scheme, it is likely to assume importance in the future owing to the new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rhodes is of special importance to Italy as a half-way house to Smyrna and Alexandretta, and on account of Italy's important trade with Turkey. The island also flanks the route to the Straits.

Apart from the question of communications, British interests in the Mediterranean are as follows. A friendly and

passive Spain is most desirable for the safety of Gibraltar. French friendship is needed because of Algeria and Tunis, with the French fortified base at Bizerta. From this point to Sicily is the narrowest part of the Mediterranean, and this is one of the reasons why Britain must also be on good terms with Italy. Farther east a friendly Greece is needed on the Ægean as an approach to the Straits, and for the same reason a friendly Turkey. But it is also important from the British standpoint that Turkey's *status quo* should be preserved, partly because of the Straits and partly on account of British interests in Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, and the oil pipeline from the Iraq coalfields to Haifa. Lastly, British interests in Egypt are vital owing to the Suez Canal, but there is no longer any British responsibility for foreigners or minorities in that country.

Italian interests, as far as communications are concerned, are almost identical with ours in principle if not in actual detail. In other respects they are chiefly concerned with Italian supremacy in the Adriatic and commercial interests in Turkey, Egypt and the Levant. Besides having probably the largest foreign community in Egypt (there has been no census since 1927), Italy has an extensive service of steamships in the Eastern Mediterranean, and pursues a policy of eastern economic penetration. In the Adriatic there is no conflict between British and Italian policy provided that tranquillity is preserved; nor is there any British objection to Italian economic penetration eastward or in Egypt as long as political forces are not brought into play. In view of her newly acquired East African possessions, it is obvious that Italy will want a place on the Board of the Suez Canal Company, to which she is entitled under the terms of the Concession and Statutes as one of the countries "principally interested."

As Britain has no desire to extend her interests, the only possible source of conflict lies in Italy wanting to establish spheres of influence clashing with existing British interests. But the Italians have not been so sure that Britain has no aggressive designs as far as they are concerned, nor has Britain been satisfied as to Italy's intentions. The January agreement, by which each nation agreed to recognise and respect the rights and interests of the other, was too general in terms to dissipate the suspicion on both sides. Each nation

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two-handed : one hand holds the elements in the foreground of the mind, and the other holds just as firmly and immediately the elements of the background. Again, it is synoptic or philosophical, holding the door open for the other party to put his case, for the other side of the matter to present itself. It assures fair play to persons, and a hearing to all arguments. It is on guard against partiality in whatever form. It is on guard against those factors in mind that help the partial judgment to prevail, such as haste and heat. Its sense of time puts it on guard against the momentary phase. On the moral side it is a control, patient but hopeful, and on the intellectual it is a striving after the wholeness of matters. It is a sort of philosophical inhibition. In some types philosophy is a form of self-expression : in the English it is a complex that corrects the naivety of the natural promptings.

Their love of liberty is a passion inborn, as cool a passion and as unbending as ever breathed. No Englishman abroad but thinks that liberty lies behind him. No Englishman can be abroad long without realising that mankind acquiesces in any régime, mild or strict, even the strictest, upon a condition : it must give at least as much freedom as it takes. Of compromise about liberty there is no end. Sometimes the conviction of liberty in general, the sentiment of enlargement, and sometimes this particular liberty or that is preferred. Gratify the sense of relief and new hope, and you may freely reshuffle the compromise. Mankind is easily disposed to contentment : in the endlessness of compromising it forgets to be pedantic. I am an Englishman, in the land of a dictatorship, and I reflect. I ask myself : "With what do dictators buy their power ?" and I answer, "With this and that, but also with freedom." The dictatorships have arisen in a paroxysm of some sort of liberation. They have emancipated their peoples from great evils. They have given the vigour and the aspirations of youth an opportunity. The wise dictatorship, I reflect, will not forget the passion of its birth.

I quote some words of an ancient poet, John Barbour, in 1395,

Oh, Freedom is a noble thing :
Freedom makes man to have liking.

Liking is everything : the key of action and character. What are the notes of civilised life but inventiveness, imaginativeness,

diversity of tastes and efforts, individualisation carried to the farthest point, and all going on in the comfort of mutual goodwill ? What is civilisation but the diverse shapes and ways of life, sought for the love of them, backed up by conviction, each a man's own creation, made by his force, smiled on by others ?

But let me at last come closer to the English, and hazard some characterisations of them. They are strenuous, robust and boisterous, and between-times they are very lazy. In idleness they deteriorate far less than most men. They are strict about a good balance between work and rest. They are great sleepers. Among the highly placed they especially value the repute of laziness itself, as in Mr. Baldwin, being sure that he will take time to think, and that he will have strength in reserve. The nation loves play, but adds to it something of the spirit and the method of work : and it likes its work all the better if it can bring a touch of sport into it. Thus work is lightened and play is steadied, and this is what English sportsmanship really means. It makes the best of both those worlds. The English are laborious and jovial, too : men of force and of humour. They are pugnacious and merciful. They have a strong warm core of the friendly and family sentiments, and slide easily into them when it would least be expected. As when Nelson, the greatest of the admirals, dying in his crowning victory, said "Kiss me, Hardy," to his brother officer. As when, too, George V at his Coronation, observing his eldest son stumble on the steps of the throne, went down himself and caught him up, and kissed him, and set him to rights. Englishmen are good fathers, and not bad mothers. England, as countries go, is a man's country : and yet the emancipation of women has gone as far there as in most countries. The English have sought worldly powers, but often to an accompaniment of sceptical questionings and warnings among themselves. The national egoism which foreigners can see so clearly has usually provoked reaction in the nation's own heart.

Puritanism still lives in England, though Cavalier and Roundhead are dead these three hundred years. It is the English paradox to live abundantly, and yet to be haunted by the vanity of life, by stirrings of self-mortification. The English succeed in combining plenitude and penitentialism. With many of them ease and enjoyments will always be

continued to suspect the other of aiming at supremacy in the Mediterranean, and the circumstances of the conflict in Spain made matters worse. Situated as she is in a land-locked sea, and almost surrounded by water, Italy naturally attaches vital importance to her outlets. Her chief concern in Spain is that Gibraltar should not in any circumstances come under the control of a Spanish government hostile to Italy, especially in view of Russia's influence there and her access to the Mediterranean through the Straits. With the Communist danger in Greece and the future of Turkey uncertain, the position in Spain completes an ugly picture in the eyes of the Italians; and they do not think that Britain takes this Russian threat sufficiently seriously. This is one of the points calling for settlement during the present negotiations, and it looks as if a solution could be found in a system of mutual guarantee between the three great Mediterranean Powers—Britain, France and Italy—by which the free passage of the Mediterranean and its outlets would be safeguarded against any interference. The time has surely come when these vital points in world communications should cease to be controlled by any one nation. In the Mediterranean there is room for Britain, France and Italy to pursue their respective activities without suspecting each other of evil intent. Co-operation is in the interests of all, while strife must involve all in incalculable damage without benefiting anyone. The same applies to the Red Sea, where both Britain and Italy are opposed to the establishment of any European Power on the eastern shore. The reports that Italy has designs in this direction are as empty as those that she has designs on Egypt or the Sudan.

We now come to the benefits to be derived from British-Italian co-operation. Assuming that fundamentally the greatest obstacle to European appeasement is the continual feud between France and Germany, it follows that Britain and Italy practically hold in their hands the destinies of the future. While Britain is on terms of close friendship with France, Italy has established what is known as the "Rome-Berlin axis." If a British-Italian *rapprochement* can be brought about, a bridge will have been built between what may be regarded as two opposing camps; and a foundation will have been laid for bringing together the four great Powers with a view to maintaining peace by a practical recognition

of mutual interests. Also, the effect of regularising British-Italian relations would have wide ramifications in Central Europe and the Near East, where differences between the great Powers have disturbing repercussions.

With the free passage of the Mediterranean guaranteed, and the rights and interests of Britain and Italy more closely defined than in the January agreement, there would only remain the question of British-Italian co-operation in Africa. Here a beginning has already been made by a mutual agreement for Italian transit through British Somaliland, but there remains the larger question of transit through Port Sudan and the Nile to Western Abyssinia. In this vast area of great agricultural wealth there are four natural transit routes between Abyssinia and the Sudan, the full opening up of which would greatly benefit the Italians and bring considerable revenue to the Sudan. As the Egyptians are fully alive to the opportunity of making good use of the new situation, an understanding between Britain and Italy is all that is now necessary to prepare the way for co-operation on these lines. There are many other ways in which Britain and Italy can help one another in Africa; while, as in Europe and in the Mediterranean, any form of strife would here also be disastrous to both countries. The present situation in the Far East shows how impotent is Europe when divided against herself; yet the facility with which the Italians have sent a battalion of Savoy Grenadiers from Addis Abeba to Shanghai shows what valuable friends they can now become. While the naval, military and air power of Italy can be a grave challenge to Britain in some of the most vulnerable parts of her Empire, that of a friendly Italy can be a great additional source of strength in the struggle to maintain the peace of the world.

There is, therefore, every reason why Britain and Italy should arrange on practical lines a partnership to bring additional security and greater prosperity to both nations. By so doing they would be rendering a valuable service to the interests of peace. But in an upset world neither nation must allow itself to be sidetracked by the actions and influences of those who profess peace and are ingeniously working for war.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

suspect. Open austerities have ceased, but in clerical households, believe me, comfortable chairs are very rare.

England is a land of antinomies. Thesis calls forth antithesis. The antithesis seems sometimes rather less than English. It is English in this sense, however, that in no other country, perhaps, could it have appeared, and having appeared, it becomes current, it is accepted, and it enters, curiously, into the tradition. Thus in the capacious English basket all is gathered up, and nothing is lost. That is often the method of English reform. The new good thing takes its stand alongside the old bad thing—if it was bad—not as executioner, but as younger brother. It is an English maxim that without a strong conservative party there can be no progress. English civilisation thus grows not by replacements but by agglomeration. And this is very philosophical: for the English doubt whether the new thing can be quite so good as to blot out wholly the goodness in the old. To the English, who dislike logic, opposites are acceptable, somewhat in the manner of Hegel.

The antitheses appear not only in the State but within families. Centrifugal forces are, of course, the bane of all families, and the ruin of many: but in English families the energies of mutation, of variability, are exceptionally strong, to say the least of it. I have heard tell of a distinguished Victorian household in which one brother became a Monsignor, another became a Mussulman, and the third remained a good Liberal and Protestant. Or take the case of Lady Hester Stanhope, a close relative of the great William Pitt, who migrated to the Near East, lived as a Moslem, and became a great figure in her new home. The antithesis appears sometimes within a single life. Take the case of Colonel Lawrence of Arabia, first a scholar and archæologist, then a figure in diplomacy, war and literature, and then again a private in the Air Force. From the life of the highest circles of intelligence he reverted to the instinctive life of those who work with the hand.

The English intellect is powerful, and is finely served by its own instincts, but the English distrust logic. They distrust clever men, and yet are zealous in the use of them. Great cleverness they distrust as being exhibitionism, or exhibitionism with a purpose. They make good use of specialists up to a point: beyond this point they subject them to the control of laymen and amateurs.

The soul of the English is indeed double. Take our history. Realists and idealists chase each other down its pages. The English soul swings from pole to pole, now in self-assertion, and again in a measure of self-effacement. From opposite to opposite it travels: and though very few Englishmen read Hegel, the Hegelian dialectic seems to live in the vagaries and the vicissitudes of English politics, wherever else it may live. The English do and undo, and yet get forward thereby. For three years they fought the Boers, and eight years later left them masters of the country under the forms of constitutional government. Magnanimity never ran a heavier risk, or won a richer stake. They entered India as traders, became conquerors, held the land by force, and now by slow cautious piecemeal ways they are doing for India what they did for South Africa in 1910. They are imperialists one day, and quietists the next. They are certainly double. If they are mad—and it is often said so—there is a method in their madness; and sometimes it is Hegel's method. Their doubleness stares out, of course, from their party system, from the cult of alternation, from the very furniture of the House of Commons, which is built for two parties. Face to face they sit, and the weaker party is still the King's Opposition, and only its own faults can save it from being the next Government.

It is a common remark, and I think a true one, that the English think much about death: though the fear of death obsesses them as little as any men. They adjust character and conduct in this rather than emotion. In the robust vigour of living they remember after a manner their coming end. Death with them is a familiar cue, a pointer to sense and humanity. It is their curious *μηδὲν ἄγαν*. Whatever discipline death can lend to life, and whatever dignity, that they prize. The Burial Service of the Anglican Church, fortifying, lofty and remorseless, answers their feeling, and their funerals are worth study. Let me quote from Sir Walter Raleigh's *History of the World* an invocation:

"O eloquent, just and mighty death! whom none could advise, thou hast persuaded: what none hath dared, thou hast done: and whom all the world hath flattered, thou only hath cast out of the world and despised. Thou hast drawn together all the far-stretched greatness, all the pride, cruelty and ambition of men, and covered it all over with these two narrow words, *hic jacet*."

CATALONIAN CHRONICLE.

IF Catalonia, having suppressed the Army revolt of July 19th, 1936, in no more than forty-eight hours, has since been enjoying the advantages of remoteness from the battle-front of the Spanish Civil War and something like normal conditions of life, it has also had harder words spoken about it by its friends than any other region in the Valencia Government's slowly diminishing territory. The principal charge brought against it is that it has remained aloof from the war and made insufficient contributions to the anti-Fascist campaigns. Until reliable figures become available, this cannot be definitely disproved, but all the probabilities are against its being accurate. In the first place, history reveals the Catalonians as a people with an intense love of liberty and an intense loyalty to those with whom they collaborate in a common cause. In the second place, it seems most likely that, if the insurgents push eastwards from Madrid, Valencia will prove more vulnerable than Barcelona, and that the latter city, which twice in its history has suffered long sieges, will be the scene of the Popular Front Government's last stand: it would therefore seem a wise policy for the Catalonians to accumulate the largest possible quantity of war material there and to keep an effective defence force rather than to use up its energies at this stage in the war, especially in expeditions which have little likelihood of success. Catalonians, who have always been much more practical than Castilians, can probably be trusted to plan wisely without their aid.

But, quite apart from this, the facts hardly suggest that Catalonia has failed to play its part in the struggle. Only three days after General Goded's surrender in Barcelona, Catalonian militiamen in large numbers were entraining for the Aragonese front, in the hope of taking Huesca and Saragossa at an early date. Four days more, and they had captured Caspe and were pressing towards Huesca. That their Aragonese campaign has borne no fruit is due at least in part to the subsequent calls made upon Catalonian forces for the defence of Madrid. In Barcelona itself, meanwhile, a large automobile factory had in forty-eight hours been turned into a munitions factory, and within a few weeks every kind of concern capable of manufacturing war material was doing

so. Men were working sixty hours a week and in their spare time were drilling voluntarily for defence purposes: by the middle of February the numbers to be seen training nightly in the Plaça de Catalunya and the Rambles alone were estimated at fifteen thousand. The accredited representative in England of the Anarcho-Syndicalist Unions claims that during the autumn of 1936 various offers of these Unions to organise or aid the defence of Madrid were refused by the Popular Front Government.* It is certain that Madrid owes much to the Catalonian Anarcho-Syndicalist leader Durruti, who early in November left the Aragonese front, where for three months he had been directing operations, and led to the defence of the capital no fewer than 15,000 men belonging to the International Brigade, falling in action on November 20th. The great Catalonian recruiting movement of February 1937 must have thrown tens of thousands more men into the struggle, and the inauguration of instruction camps in March put this movement on a more substantial basis. Throughout the spring and summer, appeals were broadcast through press and radio, and both headlines and posters drummed into the people such slogans as:

The Catalonian front is Madrid!

To-day's watchword: Help Madrid! Help Madrid!

Men, arms and provisions: for Madrid!

During the winter and spring, again, refugees, both from Castile and from the country around Málaga flocked into Catalonia, where food was relatively plentiful, until at the end of June, according to figures supplied by the Catalan Home Minister, Sr. Sbert, 350,000 refugees were actually in Catalonia and provision was being made for 200,000 more, while in the civil hospitals of Catalonia there were 1,943 non-Catalonians to 1,764 Catalonians, and in sanatoria, 355 to 238.† In the following month, it was officially announced that Catalonia had sent to Madrid 2,000,000 pesetas in money and as much again in kind, and that a further 1,000,000 pesetas had been deposited for the same purpose in the Bank of Spain. Much of this was contributed voluntarily by working men, who had begun to raise funds as early as the preceding October.

It seems likely, then, that when the full story of the Civil

* *Manchester Guardian*, April 28th, 1937. † *Vanguardia*, July 15th, 1937.

Only a stout heart, only a strong grip on life, could endure to be called to account by death not once for all at the end, but all the way along. It is not exactly a companionable thought, but neither is it without profit.

Whether the sureness of instinct in the English or the creative force of intelligence is to be rated the higher, the one more obvious but the other indubitable, need not be debated. The balance between intelligence and instinct is at any rate peculiarly happy. It has been said of the English that they have "a certain gravitation towards truth." Their minds are intuitive rather than analytic. Some men only know a thing when they have exhausted the detail of parts, elements and relations—a useful and necessary type. Even then, perhaps, they know rather than understand. Others leap to conclusions, surer of a thing as a whole than of its parts, and understand long before they know. Of laborious exploration of detail the English are impatient: they rely rather on a premonitory sense of shape, trend, meaning, and the truth. They go by presentiments, and fare thus fairly well. They are averse, they will tell you, to philosophy: and yet their groping search for the totality or unity of a matter is more philosophical than the preoccupation of some other enquirers with the partial, the trivial, the infinitesimal—more philosophical and more illuminating. And life, as the English never forget—though as a people they are long-lived—is short.

But I must return to the English instinct. The lover of liberty must love and trust his fellow men, with whom he must share the liberty he claims for himself. Liberty draws man to man. It disposes them to meet on the level: and the Englishman reaches out in his contacts for the comfort of equality. This I say, despite appearances to the contrary. Inequalities there are, but the English heart, which harbours many and manifold things, would fain ignore them, at least for the moment, at least in the matter in hand, at least with the individual in question. This friendly stroke, the equal contact of a brief moment, has value, of course, beyond the moment. It has the value of a bias that makes for ease, assimilation, cohesion and national oneness. But England is double, as I do not forget, her character ranging from the morose to the mellow, and her history from the harmonious

to its opposite. For her ill moods listen to Defoe's account of them:

Easily set together by the ears,
And full of causeless jealousies and fears,
Apt to revolt and willing to rebel,
And never are contented when they're well.

And every grace but charity they have,
This makes them so ill-natured and uncivil
That all men think an Englishman the devil.

and again,

That vain ill-natured thing, an Englishman.

The self-criticism of the English is certainly severe: it is a favourite form of self-expression among them. Defoe was much read in his own day. And even our own times have justified him. The period of politics before the Great War was contentious and rancorous to a degree. "Those unbelievably bitter days," Mr. Baldwin called them a few weeks ago. But the air has cleared. Never in my lifetime—I touch wood—has England been so harmonious and so contented in herself as now, and long may she be so. Though nothing lasts for ever; no, not even evils.

JOHN MURRAY.

War comes to be written, the part played in it by Catalonia will not be of less importance than that of any other region.

A more serious indictment against Catalonia is that, by their internal conflicts, the parties and unions whose representatives constitute the Government of the Generalitat are gravely jeopardising the unity of the Popular Front. This it is impossible to deny, though it would appear less reprehensible if its causes were explained more fully than space here allows. It is attributable not so much to the character of the Catalan people as to the fact that for decades before the war, and for a variety of reasons, Anarcho-Syndicalism had established its chief Spanish stronghold in Barcelona and was recruited heavily from the great numbers of southerners, chiefly Murcians, who since 1917 had been pouring into that city in search of work. As soon as the proletarian revolution was declared under cover of resistance to Fascism, the Anarcho-Syndicalists on the one hand, and, on the other, Socialists and Communists, together with the smaller parties allied to them, began to struggle for power both with each other and with the Esquerra, or Republican Left. With their disputes, attempts at collaboration, secret councils, vendettas and assassinations, Catalonians of the middle classes had very little to do. Powerless to stop them or intervene in them, they could only look on at them in dismay.

"After six years of the Republic," declared the organ of the all-Catalan party *Estat Català*, on the occasion of the sixth anniversary celebrations last April, "the problem of Catalonia's freedom remains unsolved.

The ultra-revolutionaries in Catalonia, the directors-in-chief of Anarchism, Communism and Socialism, are nearly all foreigners; their principal offices are held by Castilians, who talk Castilian in Catalonia and despise our own language. They are out for the dissolution of Catalanian unity—new Lerrouxists invading us from the south and west.

What can Catalonia do against them?"*

In describing, last May, some of the vicissitudes of its struggle during the spring, ending with the quarrel in March between the Unified Socialists and the Marxists, I ventured the prophecy that further crises would certainly occur before the summer.† The words were hardly in print when the Anarchists in Barcelona rose in open revolt against the

* *Diari de Barcelona*, April 13th, 1937. † CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May 1937.

Generalitat Government and there ensued a civil war within the ranks of the Popular Front such as may safely be predicted as inevitable on a much larger scale if General Franco should be defeated. "Unity between Syndicalists and Socialists is the unanimous aspiration of the entire proletariat of our country," the Syndicalist newspaper *Solidaridad Obrera* had asserted in a leading article on March 10th: "Not a single voice has been raised against its accomplishment." But a month later, one of the foremost Socialists resident in Catalonia, Roldán Cortada, had been murdered, and Socialists, accusing Anarchists of the crime, were demanding vengeance. On the day after the funeral, a leading Anarchist was assassinated. By May, passions were at their highest, when an attempt by the Catalanian Government to drive armed Anarcho-Syndicalist bands from the Telephone Building, of which they had taken possession, led to street fighting which recalled that of July 19th in its intensity.

A new Government of four (representing Esquerra, Socialists, Syndicalists and Tenant Farmers) took command, but this only precipitated a fresh quarrel—between the C.N.T. and its would-be masters, the F.A.I.—the former giving the latter an hour to disband and disarm and the latter defiantly retaliating, first by ordering the Government to dissolve its shock troops and next by murdering the Socialist member of the new Cabinet. Only after an entire week of barricades and machine-gun fire was the Central Government of the Republic able to step in and end the revolution. A battleship and two destroyers, reinforcements of five thousand shock police fresh from the Jarama and the assumption of supreme control by General Pozas changed the situation entirely. The official casualty list reported 200 as dead and 400 as wounded; unofficial estimates multiply the number of killed by from five to seven.

The chief outcome of the revolt was the making of a new attempt by the Generalitat Government to suppress terrorism, for in its previous attempts to disarm non-combatants, to dissolve unofficial patrols of the Unions and to establish a unified system of order it was from the F.A.I. that it had chiefly met with opposition. The decree of disarmament and dissolution was issued on June 5th. It seems to have had some success. Soon Barcelona was once again wearing its normal appearance. "The porters and the taxis, the gorgeous

DOGMATIC DIFFERENCES AT THE EDINBURGH CONFERENCE ON FAITH AND ORDER.

OWING to our local conditions, we in England are inclined to think that the divisions among the churches are mainly due to differences of convictions and practices regarding Church, Ministry and Sacraments; and the Lausanne Conference of 1927 confirmed that impression. Agreement on the Church's Message to the World—the Gospel—was easily reached, and the report cordially received. On the subjects of Order serious and crucial differences emerged. That result was due to the dominance of the Anglo-American influence. At the Conference in Edinburgh it is probable that Continental Protestantism will assert itself as it did not at Lausanne. The discussion of the Reports on *The Word and the Church* and *Grace* will afford an occasion for the expression of dogmatic differences. I use the word dogmatic, not in the secondary sense of assertive or aggressive, but in the primary of doctrine authoritatively formulated in the creeds or the confessions which the separated churches hold, often polemically against one another. There has been a theological reaction on the Continent to Calvinism or Lutheranism. I use the word reaction in a neutral sense of a return to the older ways without now offering a judgment for or against. In the German Church Controversy the differences of the two main types of Protestantism are being emphasised.

One of the disappointments which I experienced in reading the volume entitled *Convictions*, and containing a selection of the replies from the churches to the Lausanne Reports, was the tendency disclosed to “stay put” (may the Americanism be forgiven!) as regards the historical differences, and little (if any) inclination to welcome and to use the agreements as a motive and a reason for attempting to reconcile the antagonisms. In view of the situation in Edinburgh, as I envisage it, I am attempting the difficult, and some may even think the presumptuous, task of surveying some of the dogmatic differences within Protestantism to discover if there are no indications in our knowledge and understanding in these matters of how a reconciliation might be effected. As the Roman Catholic Church consistently with its claim to be *the*

Church has uncompromisingly refused to be represented, and as the Orthodox Churches by their common declaration at Lausanne declined to discuss any of the Reports, after the first already mentioned, because they must “stay put” where the œcumenical Councils left them, I shall not concern myself with the “Catholic” dogmatic differences, but only the “Protestant.”

At the Reformation Luther and Calvin were agreed as to the sole authority of the Holy Scriptures, and rejected the claim for “tradition” advanced by the Roman Catholic defenders. Since their day the literary and historical criticism of the Bible makes it impossible for any modern scholar or thinker to assign to the whole Bible the dogmatic authority which they did. While the intrinsic value in morals and religion remains, the Bible cannot be treated as a text-book of revealed ethics and theology; but under the Spirit's guidance a discrimination must be exercised in regard to the kernel of divine revelation and the necessary protective husk of human religion. From their treatment of the Holy Scriptures one may conjecture that the spiritual genius of these men would not only have saved them from the extravagances as regards verbal inspiration of later Protestant scholasticism, but would even have led them to welcome this modern scholarship, had it been on their intellectual horizon. Within this agreement a difference in the use of the Scriptures by Luther and by Calvin may be noted. Modern Lutheranism boasts that it discovered the Gospel in the Holy Scriptures as Calvinism did not, and that discovery enabled it to interpret the Scriptures more in accordance with the divine intention. Luther's contemptuous reference to the Epistle of St. James shows that he valued the Scriptures supremely as the record of the revelation of divine grace in Christ for man's salvation; and this was his standard of judgment. Calvin recognised the authority of the whole Bible as disclosing the will of God for man, the law for human life, individual and corporate. As an expositor he showed great sobriety of judgment. He rested the authority not on any external credentials, but on the inward witness of the Spirit, itself a selective principle, which, if he were alive to-day, would probably lead him to a more restricted use of the Bible. Before carrying this survey further two general considerations bearing on our acceptance to-day of these dogmatic differences appear relevant.

posters, the gay flags and streamers and the abundance of things that are needed so desperately elsewhere,"* made it difficult to believe that this was the largest city in a country engaged in civil war. In June, Barcelona actually held its annual Book Fair, with all the attendant lectures, meetings and concerts. The same month saw the holding of an international conference of authors in the city. At the end of June was introduced another measure in the programme of social reform; the municipalisation of all dwelling-places (flats and apartments as well as houses) throughout Catalonia; in July the Generalitat decreed the confiscation of all estates and country houses owned by persons who had directly or indirectly aided the rebellion of the previous July. For a short time it seemed as though differences had been forgotten, and the fall of Bilbao, followed by a ceremonial visit to Barcelona of President Aguirre, concentrated attention upon the common danger.

But June was not far advanced when dissensions among the parties and unions began once more. At the beginning of the month, the U.G.T. refused to join in a C.N.T. demonstration of a quite harmless, though ineffective kind against "international Fascism." At the end of the month, the C.N.T. precipitated a new and wholly unexpected Government crisis. It was on June 29th that the May Cabinet of four gave place to one intended to be permanent, in which the Esquerra, Anarcho-Syndicalists and Socialists had three portfolios each, the Tenant Farmers had that of agriculture and Dr. Pere Bosch Gimpera, the famous archaeologist and Rector of Barcelona University, was given a place without portfolio. It was a strong Cabinet, composed principally of experienced men, and President Companys proposed to strengthen it still further by reserving to himself the executive functions which the Constitution gives him.

The Anarcho-Syndicalists, however, were dissatisfied. When everything was thought to be settled, they sprang an unwelcome surprise on the President, objecting to the inclusion of a Minister not only having no portfolio but representing no party or union, and threatening to withdraw unless he resigned immediately. Except that the threat was an open one, published in the press, the situation was not at all

* The impressions of a correspondent in the *Manchester Guardian* (June 26th, 1937) headed "Barcelona (in May)."

unlike that which had faced President Azaña in July 1936 and from which he had thought it best to retreat.

Not so President Companys. Dictated to for long months by extremists, prevented by them (it is said) during the winter from crossing his own frontier, he had come at last to the end of his powers of endurance. During the negotiations of the past few days he had spoken freely and openly of resignation. These continual attempts of the Syndicalists to overrule his decisions must now stop. So he met the ultimatum with another. Either the Syndicalist Ministers must come in on his terms or remain outside. He gave them "a few hours" to make up their mind, and then, as they remained inflexible, handed out their portfolios to the Esquerra and Socialist Ministers, giving Dr. Bosch Gimpera that of Justice and reminding his hearers, in a broadcast speech of machine-gun decisiveness, that the new Minister was no non-party man but belonged to *Acció Catalana*.

"I am President of the Generalitat," he declared; "I have assumed the position of Prime Minister, and now an attempt is made to deprive me of the right to choose my Cabinet. . . ."

"*Prou*, Catalonians: enough of all this. The new Government is as follows. . . ."

For days Catalonia awaited the Anarcho-Syndicalist reaction. It failed to appear. All that did appear was a justificatory statement by the local confederation of the C.N.T., ending with these significant words:

"For the moment, nothing more."

Precisely. That is the position in Catalonia—and in Red Spain as a whole: courage never failing but victory only a dream, and the Popular Front rent by such schisms that nothing but knowledge of what its disruption must mean can be holding it together. Internal conflicts go on almost continuously. Only a few days before the Companys-C.N.T. crisis a sensation was caused in Barcelona by the arrest of the entire executive of the P.O.U.M. on suspicion of being concerned in a plot. Among them was Andrés Nin, not long previously Catalan Minister of Justice. Soon afterwards Nin was reported to have escaped from prison but early in August it was stated that he had been kidnapped and murdered. And—"for the moment, nothing more."

E. ALLISON PEERS.

First of all, if the basis of the use of the Scriptures for doctrinal definitions has been altered; if the modern scholar or thinker cannot use the Scriptures just as Calvin or Luther did, are we not entitled to ask whether finality can be claimed for these dogmatic differences, due to a different apprehension of the meaning of the Holy Scriptures? Have they not become anachronisms; and are we not under obligation to go to the Holy Scriptures for ourselves, and may we not hope to discover that the differences are not absolute but relative, and tolerable within one Christian community? Again, while we may still refuse with the Reformers to accept "tradition" as lending support to later developments in the Church in the way in which Roman Catholicism appeals to it, yet our scholarship compels us to admit that "tradition" lies behind the writings in the Old and the New Testament, and that there has been a presence and activity of God's Holy Spirit throughout the history of the Christian Church, which we shall gratefully recognise, in exercising a discriminating judgment on all later developments. The inward witness of the Spirit has a place in this respect also, even as the Reformers admitted it in regard to the authority of the Holy Scriptures. If the Spirit is still leading the Church into all truth, if, as I believe, we can understand the Scriptures even better than the Reformers because, though they were greater men than any of us can claim to be, we possess a knowledge which they did not have, we can, to-day, while remaining in appreciation and gratitude debtors to the Reformers, refuse to be their slaves, and can free ourselves from their dogmatic differences which still divide.

Assigning an authority to the Old Testament such as we regard as inconsistent with the conviction of the progressiveness of the divine revelation to its consummation in the Incarnation, Calvinism relapsed into a *legalism*, of which Lutheranism displayed less. Here Luther seems to me to stand nearer St. Paul than does Calvin. On the other hand this legalism offered a moral discipline, individual and corporate, which Lutheranism lacked. Troeltsch has shown the *dualism* inherent in Lutheranism, in which the Christian man is in his own inner life under grace, but in his outer in the world among men falls under laws of nature and society, to which as of divine appointment he must submit. Calvinism carries an impulse to the change of society in accordance with

the law of God, as disclosed in the Scriptures which Lutheranism lacks; and history illustrates that difference. Can we find a synthesis beyond these antitheses? So far as the Christian, crucified unto sin and raised to newness of life in Christ, is under grace, the love of Christ constraining him, he is free, he is no longer under law. In so far, however, as the sin which remains in him is still dominant, he does remain under law, its prohibitions, rebukes, restraints, and penalties. Anarchy is not the alternative to consecration.

Just as Calvin's acceptance of the formal principle of theology—the authority of the Holy Scriptures—was modified, as has just been indicated, so was his adherence to the material principle of justification by faith. He conjoined with the axiom *sola gratia sola fide*, "by grace alone through faith alone," the axiom *solī deo gloria*, "to God alone glory"; and his conception of the *gloria* seems to me to lessen the content of the *gratia*. One may say that for Luther God was Saviour, and Saviour alone; he knew God in Christ and His Cross only; in Calvin's theology, with a wider philosophical background the revelation of God in Christ is not solely determinative. While we cannot restrict the Gospel as Luther does to the doctrine of justification by faith, he seems to be right as against Calvin in using the Gospel as the key to the interpretation of the Scriptures, not of course as neglecting or ignoring the strictly historical exegesis, but as making the revelation of God in Christ the standard of a judgment of divine truth relative to the reality of God and of human thought, relative to the actuality of man, in the Holy Scriptures. It is this conviction of God's glory as the sole motive of the divine purpose and action, which leads Calvin to assert the dual predestination of some to eternal life, and others to eternal death; the one exhibits the glory of God's grace, the other the glory of His righteousness. Luther insists on the first as affording the believer the unshakable assurance of his salvation, but not on the second. In Calvin's dual predestination there is an inherent contradiction of the truth of justification by faith alone; along with the manifest condition of salvation—man's faith, there is the secret condition—God's election. The contradiction is removed by asserting that God grants this saving faith only to the elect, and withholds it from the non-elect. "The assurance of faith," the consciousness of having it, is the evidence of election.

GERMANY AS SHE IS.

(i) ECONOMICS

THE main characteristic of the economic position of Germany to-day is her shortage of food and raw materials. Both are easily discernible and cannot be concealed. The food shortage, which was felt already in the winter 1935-6, is due to the fact that she cannot live from the products of her own soil, and that the importation of food, and more especially of fodder, has been curtailed on account of a shortage of foreign exchange. One remembers Goering's slogan, "Guns instead of butter." This shortage has led to restrictions, but nowhere to any real distress: it is, however, no passing phenomenon, but a permanent condition. The Government tries to hide the truth, by keeping first one and then another district short, and then delivering more plentiful supplies of butter, eggs or meat. At first people were taken in by this device, but now in good weeks they know that lean weeks lie ahead, and those who can, lay in stocks of provisions. But naturally such provisions are consumed more rapidly from being handy in the house, and so this system, introduced to keep up people's spirits, really leads to a greater shortage. Meanwhile, the real shortage is becoming more acute: stocks of rice, cocoa and other foodstuffs are becoming smaller—cornflour, for example, is almost unobtainable. Last winter the situation became suddenly worse when it was discovered that there was a definite shortage of the various cereals used for bread, partly due to a poor harvest, and partly to lack of fodder; as oil cakes and maize could not be imported, grain which would normally have been marketed was fed to the cattle. Since January, Germany has had to buy foreign grain to the tune of about three million tons. The foreign investments of her nationals taken over by the Reichsbank were liquidated, and the proceeds used as payment, but these reserves are now exhausted.

The harvest this year was very bad, even below that of 1936, partly due to poor weather conditions, and partly to the fact that not all the land was under cultivation. On the small-scale farms there is a shortage of labour, due to the attraction (as in England) of shorter hours and higher wages in the towns. Another reason for the shortage of labour in small-scale farms in Germany is the new heritage law (*Erbhofrecht*), according to

which only the eldest son is entitled to the estate. As there is no heritage for the other children of the family, they migrate to the towns. This leads to the dissolution of concentrated farm labour so peculiar to small-scale farming. The cattle farmer is decreasing his stocks on account of the difficulty of obtaining labour and fodder. According to a new government decree he has to give up all his corn to the Government and is not allowed to feed his stock with corn. It is true he has been promised maize, but from experience he has become sceptical. In this respect big breeders have been hardest hit as cereals are indispensable to them. The Government is already considering the shooting of game to help with the meat shortage, and also incidentally to counteract the damage caused by game. These measures will not be of great value, and the shortage of live stock will have its effect on the harvest yield. Fertilisers alone will not remedy this, as even natural saltpetre contains organic matter which is not present in the synthetic saltpetre. There is nothing to replace the natural manure. No wonder the self-same farmer who helped the Nazis to power with his ballot paper is to-day one of the most discontented.

Farmers are controlled as never before, and are told what to sow and what not to sow: they are forced to deliver up all their products to the party organisations, who pay them less for milk, for example, than they got formerly when they sold directly to the dealers. To make the control absolute, "Farm Cards" have just been introduced on which the acreage, size of herds, etc., have to be filled in. Thus the illegal withholding of products becomes ever more difficult, and passive resistance is the only remaining weapon. The farmer looks upon this system, which deprives him of all liberty, as pure communism, and is ready to sabotage it when he can.

Let us come back to economics and figures. The grain this time will have to be paid for from the ordinary receipts of foreign exchange, and so much foreign exchange will not be available for the purchase of raw material. But there is already a serious shortage of raw material, which dates back several years, and which is now becoming acute and even making itself felt in industries hitherto well supplied. There is not only a shortage of metals such as copper, chrome and nickel, and an insufficient supply of wool and cotton, but there is also a great lack of iron and wood. There is plenty of

Hypocrites, however, have claimed it ; saints have been kept in fear and doubt about its possession. Calvin confesses it to be a "terrible" doctrine, and it may be dismissed to the limbo of the tragic mistakes which great and good men make. As regards the doctrine of election, as Luther held it, must we not recognise that Calvin is more logical, for if God elects to save, He must leave unelected the unsaved ? Is it not our wisdom to leave the secret counsels of God out of our theology, and content ourselves with what is manifest ; the universal invitation "whosoever will," offers a greater certainty of individual salvation for every believer than any individual assurance of being elect could give. We can maintain both axioms. We shall not dare to speak of God's glory, the perfection of His nature, character, purpose, as being manifest in His grace alone, but surely salvation, redemption from sin, reconciliation to God, is that work of God in which He delights, while judgment is His strange work, the inevitable reaction of His perfection to the refusal and the rejection of His grace.

However necessary St. Paul's insistence on justification by faith was against Pharisaic legalism, or the insistence of the Reformers upon it over against the perversions of the Catholic Church, we may now ask whether the phrase is not inadequate to express the whole range of salvation in Christ. God's grace sanctifies and glorifies as well as justifies ; forgiveness brings holiness and blessedness. Grace alone saves ; but in its whole effect in man. Faith as belief in a legal acquittal is not a sufficient or an efficient faith. St. Paul himself has to remove the misunderstanding of Romans i-v by Romans vi-viii. Faith as union with Christ in death to sin and life unto God is alone sufficient and efficient. Adhering to the central conviction of the Reformers we are carried by Christian experience from the beginning beyond the inadequacy of their dogmatic formula.

Luther's own theology is not adequately expressed in the phrase justification by faith. For him too faith was so intimate a relation to God in Christ. For him more than Calvin was the conception of God transformed by the coming of God to man as man—the Incarnation. The description of God as altogether the Other of man can be fitted into a Calvinistic but not a Lutheran Christology. Into the details of the Christology it is not necessary to enter ; but a few comments

may be made. The Lutheran guiding principle is *finitum capax infiniti*, and the Calvinistic *finitum non capax infiniti*. By the communication of divine attributes to the humanity of Jesus it is deified ; the heresy of Monophysitism is repeated in the Lutheran Christology. Neither God nor man is changed in the Incarnation, and so the Calvinistic Christology tends to the heresy of Nestorianism. Neither does give a satisfactory presentation of the historical personality of Our Lord. If we start not from the ecclesiastical dogma—the formula of Chalcedon, but from the facts in the evangelical record, we need a third principle *infinitum capax finiti* ; God in His condescension can so limit Himself as to become man under human conditions, and yet in so doing come and give Himself as very God in true manhood unto and for men. The human nature is not absorbed into the divine, as in Lutheran Christology, nor are the human and divine natures juxtaposed without being fully united as in the Calvinistic ; the flesh does not cease to be flesh, nor continue alongside of the Word, but the Word becomes flesh, and ceases not to be the Word of God. The divine *kenosis* (self-limitation) is the human *plerosis* (self-fulfilment) ; the imperfect human personality is perfected in the personal union with the perfect God. What the evangelical records demand, and the conception of Christ in the New Testament, essential to faith in Him as Divine Saviour and Lord, the Word or the Son Incarnate, does not forbid, is not a compromise of the two Protestant Christologies, but an advance beyond them, a synthesis of the Lutheran zeal for the assertion of the Godhead, and of the Calvinistic zeal for the preservation of the manhood.

It is this difference in Christology which explains the difference in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. Rigid Lutherans and Calvinists will not hold communion together with the one Lord at His Table because they conceive His Presence with them there differently. For the Lutheran Christ is corporeally present in, with, and under the elements ; the bread and wine are not changed into the body and blood of Christ, in their substance, but not accidents (a scholastic distinction) as in the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, but His corporeal presence accompanies and is conveyed by them (consubstantiation). For the Calvinist there is the spiritual presence, and a relation to the body localised in heaven is mediated by the Holy Spirit. Calvin

went as far beyond Zwingli to meet Luther as his conception of body allowed him. Is this distinction one which can be made intelligible and credible to most Christians, who are not metaphysicians to-day? We may assume with Paul in his teaching in I Corinthians xv, that the body of the Risen Lord is not the natural body but the spiritual. In the records of the appearances that body is represented as not subject to the conditions of the natural body; it is visible or invisible at will, and can pass through closed doors. Without claiming that the records allow us to form a consistent and positive conception of the spiritual body from which we should be entitled to draw inferences about ubiquity, yet they do negative inferences about localisation from what we know the natural body to be. Metaphysical conjectures do not justify theological affirmations or denials. What the spiritual body of the Risen Lord may be, how He is related in His continued life to the omnipresence of God we do not know; and reverence should forbid idle speculation. Christ is not divided; He is not spirit without body nor body without spirit. The whole Christ is present wherever and whenever His presence is experienced not by sense, but in faith. So immediately is He, the Mediator between God and man, related to God, that in His presence for faith God, the whole God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is present. Thus surely we can reach a synthesis of all that is true for faith in each of the doctrines, by leaving their metaphysical differences behind us.

If we could apprehend always the presence of the whole Christ and the whole God in Him, and experience the guidance of the Holy Spirit, should we not be ready to confess that many dogmatic differences of the past which are still allowed to divide are due to a use of the Scriptures which is not justified by our modern knowledge and understanding of them, and to the formulation of their assumed contents in metaphysics which our modern thinking has left behind, and also as ready to advance to such doctrinal statements of the common faith of all the saints as would preserve the Word of God in the Holy Scriptures in words intelligible to informed and thoughtful minds to-day? It is such a hope which has made me bold to risk this venture in reconciliation.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

LAW AND LIFE IN THE THIRD REICH.

TO understand the new spirit in the realm of law and the significance of the new legal regulations, we must realise that every item is based on the racial myth, on terrorism, and on the idea of the totalitarian state. We shall not consider the ill-treatment of so-called enemies of the state, such as Jews, communists, socialists and pacifists, but deal with the legal position of the citizen acknowledged by the Nazi government. He can trust nobody, and he is surrounded by spies waiting for the opportunity to denounce him and to earn the reward. It would for instance not be necessary to express disapproval of praise of some National Socialist view expressed by your maid or the concierge of your block of flats. Your silence in such circumstances or the raising of a questioning eyebrow might suffice to land you in a concentration camp, or, according to the new penal code, even in jail. The judges are instructed "that it is their duty, not to protect the individual against arbitrary treatment, but to take as basis of their sentence what should be the 'spirit of the nation'" (*Volksgeist*, a convenient term invented by the Nazi government), which in itself can only be inferred from the statements of the leader and the party programme.

It is further essential, in order to judge the laws quoted below, to learn the directions given for the interpretation of these laws, this latter being of greater importance than the laws themselves, which are sometimes not much altered. Typical of this is the view of Professor Medicus, in the *Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts*, concerning the Weimar constitution which is still nominally in force. "We must make a clear distinction between the 'letter' of this constitution still in existence, and the altered spirit of the law which now demands an interpretation of the legal regulations according to National Socialist views of the world, though these have been taken over unchanged from the early times." To give an example of what is meant by the "*Volksgeist*," or as it is more often expressed, "the healthy feeling of the people." The film *Elisabeth*, in which Elisabeth Bergner played the main rôle, was passed by the censor, as it had been produced in England and otherwise there was a danger that the English producing society would no longer accept German films; but when the first performance started it was interrupted by cries and

evidence to prove this : barracks, military bakehouses, even concrete buildings cannot be finished as the necessary iron girders cannot be supplied. Manufacturers accepting orders for machinery must allow themselves many months for delivery and always make the contract contingent upon "obtaining raw material." There is a similar shortage of wood. Huge quantities are required in the paper industry and the mines ; new, especially military, buildings make large demands, and now enormous amounts are absorbed by the cellulose industry in its manufacture of new artificial textiles. Soft pine wood was first made use of ; when the supply of this ran short spruce and even beech were used. The rayon fibre industry can produce 200,000 kg. of fibre per day, supplying only one-sixth of the demand, but requiring for this production up to three times the quantity of wood. So it is no wonder that the same Nazi Government which two years ago passed the strictest forestry laws, and punished a man with imprisonment if he cut down a single tree more than was permitted, to-day officially orders 150 per cent. more to be cut, and in certain circumstances will sanction even more. Wherever you go in Germany you will see trees being cut down to a tremendous extent.

Meanwhile, the demand for good spinning fibre grows. Even if you share the view that after a little more experimentation these substitutes will be as good as the original material, the problem still remains of finding sufficient raw material to produce the quantities needed. Further practical proof of the lack of raw materials is to be seen in half-finished buildings and cut-down woods. One of the worst is not generally recognised ; firms, especially those working metals, are so irregularly supplied with raw materials that they can no longer plan properly, but are continually forced to interrupt their work. This raises overhead charges and lowers profits. One of the most important industrialists in the Ruhr published a report in which he estimated that over one and a half million workers in his industry were idle through lack of raw material, and he said that this state of affairs was becoming more than the industry could stand. He was right from his point of view.

This report dates from April. In the meantime the conditions have become more acute due to the shortage of raw materials, which causes difficulty in the prompt replacement

of accessories for machines. In the case of complicated machinery the enforced idleness of one machine may cause the stoppage of the whole works. This may continue for days, and in certain cases even for weeks or months.

National Socialist circles pin their hopes to the general world economic expansion and the consequent demand for German exports. In truth at the Leipzig Spring Fair there was an unusually large number of foreign visitors ; they were on the look-out for goods unobtainable elsewhere. They gave big orders, but even if deliveries can be made—which according to the accounts one hears on all sides is very doubtful—the position is such to-day that the price of raw materials in Germany has risen out of all proportion to the price of the finished article. The imported raw material cannot be replaced by the proceeds of the sale. So here again Nazi Germany is living on capital.

(ii) POLITICS

For a long time Hitler's achievements in the realm of foreign policy were his best propaganda material : the Saar, rearmament, and the militarisation of the Rhineland, these latter achieved by one-sided simple action and no negotiation. Did not this prove that the foreign policy of the Republic was all wrong ? To-day, people in all walks of life are regarding the whole situation far more critically. British rearmament has made a deep impression, not only as a military measure in reply to a rearmed Germany, but also as a reply to the whole National Socialist outlook, so that even Nazis themselves are beginning to be anxious. No one trusts the friendship with Poland. They know from experience during the last war that Polish soldiers cannot be induced to co-operate with Germans. The partnership with Italy is regarded equally sceptically. They remember the broken treaty of 1914. They have a low opinion of the fighting qualities of Italian soldiers, despite the victory in Abyssinia and despite the fact that they know little of the reverses suffered by the Italians in Spain.

Yet a large number of people do know quite well what is going on, less from the newspapers than from the wireless. They listen to Strasbourg, to Prague, to U.S.S.R., and now, above all, to the pirate short-wave station. Just because it is democratic in outlook and not communistic, people listen to

whistling, so that it could not go on. The next day the newspapers wrote that the "healthy feeling of the people" had refused this product of an art foreign to the German spirit (*artfremder Geist*). But was it really the people who had refused it? One of the musicians engaged at the cinema, a party member and S.A. man, told me that he and some groups of S.A. men had been commanded to interrupt the performance. The audience as a whole, as far as I could see, appreciated highly this valuable film and were much disgusted by the interruption. The film was never seen again, as it offended "the spirit of the nation."

In nearly all German law periodicals and in the official law introductions this slogan of "Healthy feeling of the nation" is used to interpret the import of law. It is noticeable how many such vague terms have been introduced such as "spirit or feeling of the people," a device to obtain legal support for terroristic doctrines which are invented to replace the fixed concepts of ethical values still active in the consciousness of the people. As another example of the use of such vague terms we might quote Lothar Schoene who says in the *Archiv* above mentioned: "The National Socialist State has nothing in common with the liberal bourgeois state, but is a 'real' state" (*wirklicher Staat*). What could he mean? The use of such terms is exceedingly dangerous, giving power without restrictions either from written or common law to the legislators, thus making the Fuehrer and his party omnipotent. This is doubly dangerous in states ruled by the principle of dictatorship, where the legislative and executive power are one and the same after the abolition of parliamentary control. Thus the judge in pronouncing sentence is bound to follow the party interpretation of the law, even in cases which were formerly left to his own discretion. In other words: "the judge has no longer to decide according to the law but according to the interpretation given to the law by the National Socialist Government."

It is impossible to give the positive meaning of all the new expressions in the Nazi terminology. Even a well-known German jurist (Hofacker) had the courage to admit that "up to now no fixed concept of law has been evolved, merely decorative expressions incapable of forming a basis upon which new legislation can be built up," in spite of the fact that 1,352 new decrees were promulgated prior to 1937. So we have to

confine ourselves to negative statement. We find everywhere the fight against Roman law, though until now no real substitute for it has been found as far as civil law is concerned. A decree dated October 27th, 1933, even issues as vague regulations as all the others, saying "that the civil law is the private matter of two individuals, and that the judge has only to settle the case according to the law, belongs to the spiritual concepts of a past time." The main fight is against democratic and liberal ideas. The most significant of those have been abrogated. What for instance about equality before the law?

According to the new legislation (*Reichsbuergergesetz*) there are two classes of citizens: "those who have merely German nationality, i.e. those who merely live in the state as 'earning elements,' and those who are 'real' citizens, i.e. those who are of German blood and prove by their actions that they are able and willing to serve the German Reich and people faithfully." These latter are called "*Reichsbuerger*"; they alone possess full political rights, granted them by an official certificate, the decision of their qualities being left to the Nazi authorities. Hence, those only enjoy the protection of the law who are of Nordic race, are members of the Labour Front, and subscribe to the "traditional national values" (another vague term).

What do they understand by "traditional national values"? We may learn that best from the laws themselves. Let us look at the newly published book of Guertner, an official introduction to the new penal code, and at Pfundtner-Neubert's introductory commentaries to every new promulgated law. What does the new law say for instance about religion? I will not refer again to the well-known facts, the inflicting of mental and physical tortures on those who defend their "traditional" belief; I will only quote from the new law concerning blasphemy. "The term blasphemy has now been extended to include all attacks upon the newer religious conceptions (such as the worship of the nordic gods)." Is it not a bit too thorough to go back to heathenish times in order to search for tradition? There are other decrees which are meant to bring the "traditional" church under the absolute control of the State. The decree dated September 24th, 1935, establishes the protective régime (*Schutzherrschaft*) of the State granting it the right of a trustee. That of October 3rd, 1935, establishes a board of government over the church (*Reichskirchenausschuss*), which has the right of appointing

it regularly. These means of getting information are used, even by National Socialists, who do not altogether trust their own newspapers, especially where foreign countries are concerned. Foreign policy in particular is criticised in National Socialist circles. They fail to understand how they can get on surrounded by enemies, and such Nazis as write or speak publicly on these questions desire friendship with Russia as a protection against the Western Powers. This is an old policy dating back to Bismarck, and one actively followed by Republican statesmen. It is therefore significant that the army leaders still apparently believe in it, or else it would have been impossible for active officers publicly to endorse it, as has frequently happened. The Government itself tried a few months ago to get into closer touch with Russia. Rumours to this effect reached other countries and led to Press discussions. At the beginning of April the Press received orders to avoid all attacks upon Russia—which was naturally done. But apparently Russia turned a cold shoulder, for in his May Day speech Hitler again spoke of the “Jew-ridden Russian Government.” These deprecating remarks suggest that he received a rebuff.

Something else is causing even graver anxiety. It is rumoured that the real strength of the German army is very much less than is commonly imagined. Speak with anyone in touch with army circles and they will tell you that the army cannot be ready to fight for another five or six years. If you ask why, they answer that experience in Spain has shown that the German tanks and aeroplanes have not stood up to the work demanded of them, and that the training of the men who must use these complicated machines is quite inadequate. If you talk to people, you even get the impression that military circles are anxious to have these facts known. Perhaps they hope to score a point off their Nazi rival Goering by criticising his aeroplanes, but, more seriously, probably because the officers—as a class—are anxious to avoid a too early war before they themselves are fully prepared. Should another war be lost, the blame would be laid at their door very much more emphatically than in 1918.

In other directions the army leaders feel insecure. They realise the shortage of food and raw materials; they have no illusions about the real feelings of the people—they have repeatedly approached men in close touch with former trade

union officials to hear what labour was really saying and thinking and have told them—political outlaws though they were—that they could not make war with the people disunited. Only because the army feels itself insecure does it advocate a policy of neutrality. On the other hand, the politicians mistrust the army, otherwise they would not form special S.S. companies as a protection against untoward eventualities at home. Whether these S.S. men can be relied upon in a crisis is another question. Their enthusiasm also has worn thin; even members of Hitler's personal guard are sick of the constant drill and barrack life; they are asking what sort of future lies before them, and are trying to get back to ordinary civilian life. It is becoming increasingly difficult to recruit these companies.

If you take all these items together—and I have unimpeachable evidence for their truth—they point to an overwhelming feeling of insecurity both on the part of rulers and ruled. This anxiety on the part of the ruled is the more surprising when you remember that in 1933 the big industrialists were the loudest in declaring that a totalitarian State would bring peace and stability into industry. Just the reverse has happened. To-day these same industrialists are only too anxious to get rid of this Government, partly on account of its interference with industry, the lack of raw materials it has brought about, its foreign and financial policies, but above all for the all-pervading corruption, cases of which are reported daily. It is of course forbidden to say that some of the accused are Nazis, but it is common knowledge that mayors and farmers' leaders must be Nazis. Thus even leading industrialists, people who were loudest in their denunciations of the “talking shop,” are now beginning to recognise the necessity for a freely elected active Parliament. They are beginning to recognise that under the Republic officials at least remained honest, but that an excess of power inevitably leads to abuses.

Similar developments are to be seen in the Church controversy. The first leaders of the Confessional Church were National Socialists; the same men are in part still leaders of the Church, but they are Nazis no longer. Experience of the struggle in its various phases has taught them that a State laying claim to “totality,” destroying on principle whatever other forces may exist within it, is incompatible with a living

and dismissing the officials. A still stronger concentration of State supervision is established by decrees of January 15th, 1936, November 26th, 1936, November 28th, 1936. One, dated October 26th, 1935, says that the minorities of the church have also the right of making use of the church buildings. One of January 8th, 1936, says: When dismissing priests it is essential to base sentence, not only on their conduct as church officials but their national views have also to be taken in account. Similarly the disparagement of the military spirit, an objection against the Horst Wessel Lied, an attack on the memory of Schlageter, any praise of the Christian virtues as superior to warlike instincts, are proofs of lack of approval of the national traditional values.

Those differences established between citizen and citizen, what about equality of legal treatment of those who have been acknowledged as worthy members of the State? Besides the instructions for judges and the establishment of new laws, which leave the other class of citizens without legal protection, a great number of new courts have been established, called honour courts. All of these have political aims, except the boards for discharging insolvent farmers. They are meant to judge every profession according to its own honour court and code, like the guilds in the Middle Ages. The peasants for instance are privileged to a high degree. Until the end of 1936 there were 120 decrees in favour of the agricultural class including the inheritance law; but these laws are a two-edged sword, creating a new agricultural proletariat. The eldest son is the only heir and has thus to support the whole family, even if the court does not guarantee the necessary income. Thus the younger children become slaves of their brother, as they are not allowed to seek for work in the cities. On the other hand the prohibition of mortgage protects the peasant in cases of former debts, but makes it impossible for him to get new credits. The prices of agricultural products are fixed and even high; but imported fodder and manure are still more expensive, and the want of foreign currency has forced the government to lay hands upon the standing crop. Consequently the position of the peasant has not been much improved.

Another highly protected class is that of the big industrialists, but only of the very big ones. Let us see what the "equality" prescribes in their case. The maxim: the good of the whole before the good of the individual (*Gemeinnutz*

geht vor Eigennutz) may be called the National Socialist principle; at any rate we read it in every newspaper and hear it in every speech. The new penal code realises that the big industrialists do not offer the necessary guarantees that they will act upon that principle. Nevertheless it is difficult and not in the interest of the State to restrict them because (1) it is very difficult to prove punishable deeds; (2) economic life has its own laws; (3) a big industrialist must not be hindered by fear of being responsible to a criminal judge for his acts. This same spirit of equality is shown by the regulation dealing with retail businesses, which prohibits the opening of new shops. Only big concerns such as department stores, one-price shops and branch offices of multiple stores are still permitted, though the Nazi programme promised the suppression of the latter to help the starving middle class.

The largest class in every state and the one which the Nazis chiefly flattered before coming to power is that of the workers and small employees. How did they fulfil their promises here? All existing organisations have been dissolved and the members have been forced to join the "German Labour Front," which has its separate jurisdiction. There are also "Trustees of Labour" nominated by the government, and having the final decision concerning all the troubles between employers and employees.

Only one remnant of democratic voting power survives, the so-called *Vertrauensrat*, elected by the employees of a factory and formerly meant to foster their interests. But even here the spirit has changed. Free voting is as impossible as at public elections. And according to the law the idea underlying the legislation for national labour is:

1. making less rigid the wage scales,
2. removal of the right to strike,
3. the right of the State to interfere with the regulations governing social and economic welfare,
4. the new *Vertrauensrat* rests upon the leader principle, the owner of the factory having the final decision, or, as the commentary on the decree says, "making the employer again the 'master of the house.'"

The average wage being equal in purchasing power to £2 a week (wages have fallen about 30 per cent.), minus 30 per cent. for taxes and so-called voluntary contributions for social purposes, food prices of some essential victuals are about

Church. The Church struggle is affecting ever wider sections of the population, and is turning into opponents many previous adherents. A large number of evangelical pastors believed for a long time that a peaceful settlement with the Government could be made; they believe so no longer. Niemöller, their finest brain but also a fighter, was the first to recognise this clearly and speak out boldly. It was Otto Dibelius who formulated it most concisely and effectively in his letter to Kerrl. So the Opposition gathers strength; and the Catholic Church is united on this issue.

Labour, though superficially quiet, is seething under the surface. The great majority of the workers have neither given up their former convictions nor their trade union ideas. They are hiding them because the worker is more spied upon than any other class, and should he because of his political views be suspected he will lose his job without hope of obtaining another, or the possibility of obtaining unemployment assistance. The present armaments boom has brought about a certain shortage of skilled labour, which the workers are turning to their advantage in defending themselves against a lowering of their standards. They do not declare an official strike, but just cease work in a particular department. These stoppages, in which a number of Nazis have sometimes taken part, have met with success in various parts of the country. Thus this section of the workers again becomes conscious of its power.

Workers as a whole are becoming more and more aware of the contrast between their actual wages and the rising cost of living. Added to this, the shortage of raw material, especially metals, is often the cause of piece-workers' loss of hours and is often responsible for a reduction of as much as 20 per cent. in wages. As for other industries, such as textiles, shoes, etc., short time has been general for a long while. Increasing economic difficulties caused by the lack of foreign currency are likely to accelerate this development, because the lack of raw material cannot be hidden from the workers in the factory. They are already aware of the shortage of food-stuffs. In this connection it is interesting to note that the views of the workers have developed in the last few years in two directions. It has become obvious to them that the employers pocket huge profits, and consequently they have become more radical in the economic struggle. No new government

will be able to avoid the nationalisation of mines and heavy industries. The militancy of the workers will increase with the continuance of the present régime in Germany. Thus the Hitler régime will not be a bulwark against Bolshevism, rather the reverse.

It is in the interest not only of Germany but of the whole world that the Nazi system should be broken up as soon as possible. Yes, but what is to follow? Bolshevism? Certainly not. The mass of the people is heartily sick of a system run by arbitrary force. They want to breathe, to live quietly, not always to be afraid of secret police and the concentration camp. They are longing for justice and freedom, and recognise that co-operation and a free public opinion alone can bring them these blessings. The psychological premises for a State run by force are missing. This is especially true of the working class, including the communist workers, who in Germany to-day are no longer interested in the dictatorship of the working class. Among the German communists living abroad there are only a few who have realised this, and they are up against the theorising majority.

Many Nazis still look upon the home front as being quite safe, but they are men out of touch with the real feelings of the people. Other critics will tell you that there is certainly some opposition, but it is not dangerous. They should remember that in the spring of 1918 those who predicted the early fall of the monarchy were regarded as mad. But in November it happened—an analogy often heard in Germany.

Others again say that the shortage of raw material and food is not sufficiently acute to cause trouble: there must first be a real food shortage and wholesale dismissals on account of lack of raw materials. These men are right. The last straw is not yet on the camel's back. But they are only partly right. A general hopelessness has already set in. You hear on all sides from the opposition, from people politically indifferent, from Nazis themselves, the words "It can't go on," "we are not progressing," "everything is getting worse," and sometimes even, "As long as this system lasts no improvement is possible." From my own knowledge of the political and industrial outlook, I am sure that the sufferings of the present critical year will become more and more apparent. Any spark will then be enough to set the whole country ablaze.

OBSERVER.

25 per cent. higher, rents similar to London. Thus the total diminution of the workers' and employees' income amounts to about 50 or 60 per cent.

The unemployed get about 7s. a week. Formerly they got between 15s. and 25s., and now they get it only for six weeks. Then they have to turn to Public Assistance, when they are no longer listed as unemployed. Those forced to work in one of the Labour Camps, called voluntary but compulsory since June 26th, 1935, get 2½d. a day. Any complaint or criticism is forbidden, the complainer being stigmatised as a State enemy. There is even a risk of imprisonment, according to the chapter of the new penal code called "attacks on the *Arbeitskraft*" (working strength) of the nation. Typical of the new ideology is the fact that in place of the older "Right to work" the expression "Duty to work" has been substituted. Courts have always existed in which the judge arbitrated in cases of dissension between employer and employee as to the correct reading of the contract. According to the new law the judge has to interpret the contract in the sense of the workers' loyalty to the employer. Thus the Reich, externally one and indivisible, is actually divided into many sections, granting to nearly every class a different form of justice, leading to complete supervision of the professional and private life of the individual.

Next let us examine the main principles laid down in the explanatory part of the new penal code, which, we shall find, complete the work of enslavement.

1. The foundation of the penal law is the German people's conception of right and wrong as inherent in the healthy feeling of the people.
2. A person is punishable who commits a crime which the law declares to be punishable, or WHICH INFRINGES THE UNDERLYING IDEA FOR WHICH THE LAW WAS FRAMED, OR CONTRAVENES THE HEALTHY FEELING OF THE PEOPLE. That means that there is punishment even where there is no law. If you consider that the judges are bound to give judgment according to this feeling, and that the Fuehrer and his party are the sole exponents of what this feeling should be, the intention is clear.
3. To incur guilt the culprit must be conscious of doing wrong. But on the part of the delinquent a point of view incompatible with the healthy feeling of the people, i.e. the National Socialist view, is not to be taken into consideration. Consequently a political delinquent has not the right to defend himself.

The definition of high treason, which has always been a very ticklish question, has now become even vaguer than before. Particularly novel is the introduction to the paragraph on high treason, when expressing hostility to the party comes into question. Incitement to high treason, even if it did not lead to any action, and the impulse to a revolutionary feeling suffice to make the law work. The incitement may for instance be the glorification of revolutionary facts in history.

Also new is the introduction of the term *Volksverrat*, i.e. attacks on the ideal values of the nation such as : honour, piety, etc., for instance spreading of horrors (*Luegenhetze*), import of books, periodicals, records, drawings or paintings from foreign countries. Striking is the fact that he who denounces a comrade, even if he has participated in an illegal or forbidden act, will not only be free from punishment but will receive a reward. Germans living abroad are particularly considered under this paragraph.

Let us glance at the organisation of the "People's Court" (*Volksgerichtshof*), the supreme court for high treason, and all the cases to which they want to give a political aspect, which is always possible owing to the vagueness of the new legal terms. In April 1936 it was changed into an ordinary court. Now it is the highest court besides the *Reichsgericht*, having taken over all political matters formerly belonging to the latter. The president, the president of the senate, and the councils are appointed for life by the government. The members are appointed for five years also by the government. The president has the right to refuse witnesses for the accused individual and to forbid him legal assistance. He may even forbid him personal defence, on the excuse that discussions concerning the moral principles of the nation are not allowed. That means that sometimes the accused is informed of his sentence without even knowing his crime.

To the jurisdiction of this court also belong all offences against the military forces. The importance attached to the different degrees of crime we may see by their order : first honour, then power and liberty, and last the safety of the nation. It is of paramount importance for the Nazis to preserve the warlike spirit of the nation (*geistige Wehrbereitschaft*). The undermining of this ideal leads to severe punishment. The whole new penal code, in fact, with its long list of punishable offences, rests on a novel principle. For it places attempts on the same level as the accomplished fact. JURIST.

CATHOLICITY, CONSTRUCTIVE AND CORRECTIVE.

TWO Conferences have recently been held which may fairly claim to be called Œcumenical, for the representatives who composed them came from every part of the world, men of all races were included in them, and the Christian Churches of the world, except the Roman Catholic, gave official recognition to them. The Orthodox, Anglican, and Protestant Churches, through their representatives, had all taken part in the preparations for the Conferences, though the German Protestant State Churches were, almost at the last moment, forbidden to attend them. The first of the Conferences met at Oxford during the latter part of July, and had for its subject "Church, Community and State." The second was held at Edinburgh during the first half of August to consider "Faith and Order," under certain leading heads.

Both these Conferences were brought about as the result of long and careful preparations, by means of which, not only was the programme fixed, but a large measure of preliminary agreement, especially in the case of Edinburgh, had been attained in advance. All the representatives met with full knowledge of the subjects that were to be discussed, and had been furnished with Introductory Reports in regard to them that were the fruit of prolonged deliberations by the best qualified thinkers and scholars whose services were attainable. It is necessary to lay stress upon this prolonged and careful preparation so that due weight may be given to the Official Reports that will shortly be published, and, above all, in order that the public may be made fully aware of the strength of conviction and purpose which has animated, not only the Conferences themselves, but the Churches which have given official support to them.

The Oxford Conference marked a further stage in the progress of the great undertaking that was launched at Stockholm in 1925, under the presidency of the late Archbishop of Upsala, Dr. Söderblom, and has been known as the Conference on "Life and Work." The Edinburgh Conference is the result of the movement initiated by the Christian Churches of the United States in 1913, which led to the Lausanne Conference in 1927. Both movements have owed much to

the impetus and inspiration given by the World Missionary Conference, held in 1910 at Edinburgh, which has also brought into being the World Missionary Council which exists to promote common counsel and co-operation throughout the Mission fields of the world, with the twofold object of securing concerted action, instead of competition and overlapping, and, above all, of bringing about such responsibility and autonomy in the Missionary Churches of the world as may enable them to realise their own indigenous Christian life, freed from the imposition of merely Western ideas and ideals from without. We are thus confronted by a great and concerted world movement of Christianity, sponsored by the Churches themselves, and not the mere products of groups of independent and adventurous leaders. Such a movement carries within it ample guarantees that it is not fitful and transient, but that it inaugurates an abiding purpose to substitute true Catholicity for ecclesiastical and sectarian rivalries, the fruit of which will be a steady growth of mutual understanding and of fellowship both in faith and service. A measure of general agreement has been reached already which may well astonish those of an older generation. The immediate task is to give such precision as is practicable and essential to these agreements and so to implement them that they may form a sure foundation for further progress in unity, communion and world-wide service. The very least that can be hoped for is that such Catholic community and communion may be attained as will enable the Churches, as one Body, to concentrate upon common apprehension of the Faith and common service to mankind in a critical age, the needs of which demand the wholehearted devotion and the equally wholehearted fellowship of all Christian people, if the spiritual values for which they stand may be preserved for themselves and become, by the blessing of God, effectual for the salvation of mankind.

The sense of crisis, and, indeed, of peril, has been dominant in both Conferences, and particularly, perhaps, at Oxford. The word "disintegration" constantly recurred in the Reports that were discussed at Oxford. It was applied to every sphere of life at the present time—to faith, morals, economics, social order, and international relations. The use of the term is somewhat ambiguous and may have an unduly depressing effect. That changes are, at present, taking

CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.

FOR some time past, but especially since the failure of the League of Nations over the Abyssinian conflict, there has been a vague but growing feeling that the crisis in international relations is due to something more than the vicissitudes and temporary tensions in the relations between different states. It is dimly realised that the basis of what limited order and system law and custom have evolved in the relations between the members of the "family of nations" is badly shattered. The symptoms are manifold and obvious. The collapse of the League is only the most universal one. Four-power pacts, gentlemen's agreements, non-aggression pacts are almost as soon forgotten as they are signed. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly difficult to use the established notions of international law even as a common basis of discussion. While in Spain a war is fought which is, internationally, not recognised as such, a non-intervention pact stipulates obligations for other states which go even beyond the customary duties of neutrality in war. Some of the parties to that pact recognise the rebels as the only legitimate government, which is incompatible. Volunteers come to both sides, but one finds that their position in international law is different according to whether they are exiles, citizens of totalitarian or of liberal-democratic states. The very distinction between war and peace, one of the foundations of modern international relations, and one clearly established in the Hague Conventions, is obliterated when independent countries like China and Abyssinia are invaded without war being declared or assumed in the behaviour of the invader.

The politician may perhaps be excused for not attempting to analyse the causes of such symptoms, in the urgency of the daily problems. But is this not an opportunity for the student of international affairs not to confine himself to the analysis of past events, but to help in seeking to detect essential lines of development, and to clear the way by distinguishing relevant from irrelevant facts and phenomena? Traditional notions and ways of thinking are often obstacles where the social basis changes, and in the present crisis the unconscious fear of uncomfortable conclusions may also have a deterrent

effect. Hegel may have been right or wrong in limiting the philosopher's task to the *ex post facto* interpretation of events; but the student of social sciences, whether sociologist, economist or lawyer, ought not to adopt that attitude.

What then, if one considers the structure of international society, are the factors primarily responsible for this more than temporary crisis? Some brief remarks on the historical development of the present "family of nations" will help us. Medieval Europe was held together by two forces, the spiritual authority of the Church and the social pyramid of feudalism. When these forces weakened, the sovereign nation took their place. The present "family of nations" developed as a community of sovereign nations, which gradually, and particularly with the increase of trade, evolved a code of conduct in their mutual intercourse. The ties which held the new nations together were less strong than those of medieval Europe. Behind the walls of national sovereignty they developed their own national morality and customs; the principles of "Christian morality," alleged to be the basis of their intercourse, were always more a pious ideal than a reality. The new European civilisation became the real criterion, and the standard of civilisation was chiefly measured in terms of state organisation. If a state had some unity of territory, population and government, and at least such fundamental institutions as an army, a regular administration of justice—it should be so described rather than as a modern system of law—and certain standard methods of diplomatic intercourse, it could and did become a member of the "family of nations," never a very harmonious and peaceful family, but one the members of which had certain common forms of state life and organisation, and, to a limited extent, common cultural and social conceptions.

From the end of the nineteenth century onwards a more definite conception of political life, liberal democracy, gradually came to be accepted as the recognised standard, even if not all nations became democratic. An attempt to stem the growth of international democracy was the Holy Alliance of the monarchies which had defeated Napoleon, an alliance interesting for the sociology of international relations, because of its clear realisation of the necessity of a common political and social outlook as a basis of international co-operation. The basis of the Holy Alliance was a theocratic

place over the whole world and in respect of all human relations that are unparalleled in the previous history of mankind alike in their range, their complexity and their simultaneity, is obvious. It is equally apparent that these changes are fraught with many and great dangers that affect vitally and at every point Christian faith, principles and values. These dangers are equally serious for the common life and civilisation of mankind, menacing the peace of the world by the inordinate emphasis on sectional interests, national, political and economic—and, therefore, destroying that sense of wholeness and community which is essential to the progress of the world. For Christians it is manifest that these dangers are largely due to the disregard of Christian values and influence. They would be mitigated, if not altogether removed, by the wholehearted and Catholic renewal of Christian life and its effective application throughout the entire range of human life. There is, therefore, an urgent call to repentance on the part of the Christian Church, for the “unhappy divisions,” the half-heartedness and the indecision, which have prevented it from fulfilling its God-given mission in proclaiming and applying the Christian Faith to the common life of mankind in all its manifold concerns.

Yet “disintegration” may be part of the process of the development of human life. Its dangers may be overcome by the vital energies that, because they are transcendent in God, are immanently given to man. In many respects the larger vision and more faithful application of Christian faith would themselves be a cause of disintegration in order to the fuller realisation of human, and therefore of Christian, life. The immense problem set, therefore, to Christian insight and reflection, exercised in Catholic fellowship, is so to distinguish, moderate and guide that what is vital may be quickened and directed, while what is pathological may be diagnosed, and, by the help of God, eliminated from the momentous changes that are taking place. Like the human process as a whole, the Christian life itself is not static, but dynamic. It has resources of life and thought, of wisdom and service, which have not as yet been fully realised or even revealed. Hence the Oxford Conference, equally with that of Edinburgh, is, in every respect, timely. Both have been born, not of despondency and fear, but of confidence and hope. The justification of confidence and the fulfilment of hope depend

fundamentally on Divine Guidance, but subordinately upon Catholicity of spirit, upon clear thinking, and upon resolute acting out of the consequences of common faith, illuminated by wisdom and fulfilled by love.

The subjects discussed at the Conferences were introduced by a series of Reports, which had been prepared by expert Committees. The programme at Oxford was preceded and introduced by an important book by Dr. Visser 't Hooft and Dr. J. H. Oldham entitled *The Church and its Function in Society* (George Allen & Unwin, 8s. 6d. net), which is to be followed by a series of publications, dealing in succession with the Christian Understanding of Man, The Kingdom of God and History, The Christian Faith and Common Life, Church and Community, Church, Community and State in relation to Education, and The Universal Church and the World of Nations. All these topics were dealt with at the Conference. In particular, the attitude of the Christian Church to the economic order and to war was debated and naturally gave rise to differences of opinion. It was inevitable that critics should detect a “nebulous form of Socialism” in regard to economics, for Christians must needs endeavour to bring the entire sphere of economics into subordination to the fully developed social life of men. To this end, a greater measure of equality must be sought, with increased opportunities for all, if the ideal of the full development of personalities in community is to be attained. Yet the Christian emphasis on the worth and, therefore, upon the freedom of the individual because of the supreme relationship of the individual, as well as of the Church, to God, must preclude any possibility of the universal Church identifying itself with any secularist ideology, still more from the imposition of any such ideology by political means that would sacrifice spiritual freedom to the autocracy of the State. Above all, the Christian Church must stand for the supremacy of God, as “the Father of our spirits,” over the collective life of man, and for the eternal significance of spiritual values, which transcend the limits of any conceivable terrestrial order. The Church, whatever its attitude to the secular order may be, must always be mindful of the authoritative declaration, “My Kingdom is not of this world.” The order must, for it, subserve the values, not the other way about.

It is indeed impossible that complete theoretic agreement

and thoroughly anti-democratic monarchy. It failed in the end, because it vainly tried to obstruct the trend of the time and to preserve outworn political ideas.

The principal features of this new society of nations, influenced as it was by conceptions both of liberalism and of constitutional democracy, were the following :

1. As regards the sphere of state life, in peace and war, the activities and responsibilities of the states were limited to the military, constitutional and administrative side. Trade and economic life in general were the citizen's private concern. In wars neutral states must not give military aid ; but their subjects might trade with the belligerents, although at their own risk, and subject to limitations the extent of which was a matter of continuous conflict and compromise between belligerents and neutrals.

2. As regards the standard of conduct to which the states had to conform in matters of international responsibility, it was largely based on certain principles of constitutional democracy, mainly the separation of powers and, in particular, an independent judiciary, or certain inviolable rights of the person, like life and liberty, and the inviolability of private property.

Apart from these minimum requirements tolerance prevailed, on the whole, in the relations between members of the "family of nations." It did not affect membership of that "family" how a state conducted its political, religious, social and cultural affairs. Each state counted as a unit in the international field. This was the real meaning of that principle of "equality of nations" which never, even in theory, pretended that all nations were equal in power and influence. Notable exceptions to this tolerance regarding the internal life of a state were the recognition of Bulgaria, Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro in 1878 by the Great Powers, to which was attached the condition of their not discriminating against their religious minorities, and the imposition of similar conditions on Poland in 1919.

The League of Nations, it must be remembered, was originally conceived as a league of democratic nations ; based on this community of outlook and ideals, it was to be the decisive step towards a closer organisation of these nations, a permanent superstructure instead of the previous schemes of partial arbitration and conciliation, although still far from a real international government.

Whether constitutional democracy was by itself a sufficiently strong basis for the League is perhaps open to doubt ; under the constitutional cover, social, economic and other forces had pushed the life of the various democratic peoples in different directions. But certainly democracy stood for a limited community of outlook, and that of human as well as of social values. But the war had created or unchained forces which in some states swept away the values and forms of democracy. The League was infected with these germs of decay from the beginning, although their destructive power was not immediately felt.

It should now be easier to see why the modern totalitarian state can hardly fall in with an international community based on these premises. As regards first the separation of spheres between state and individual, totalitarian states developed into a permanent system that which the Great War had prepared in times of emergency. The war had increasingly identified state and civilian, both in the relations between the belligerents and in their relations to the neutral states. After the United States had entered the war, neutral trade came almost to a standstill, as far as the belligerents could control it. Civilian enemy property was destroyed in the war, and German private property seized by the Treaty of Versailles. Now, in peace time, the totalitarian states, communist and fascist, proceeded to control almost every sphere of their citizens' lives. No citizen of Germany, Italy or Russia can to-day serve abroad, or even speak or write on cultural subjects, without the state willing or authorising it. In the economic sphere, the state capitalism of fascist states and the state socialism of socialist or communist states may have very different effects on the life of the people. Seen from an international angle the state controls and supervises the activities of its citizens in either case and thereby eliminates the time-honoured distinction between the state's governing function and the individual's trade.

Secondly, the totalitarian states have almost entirely abolished the standard values of the existing "democratic" international community. The judiciary has become a branch of the executive. Life, liberty and property (nowhere actually quite free from state interference) are no longer recognised as sacrosanct and definitely subject, in theory and practice, to state interest, the limits of which are not assessed

shall be reached by all Christians, under existing conditions, in regard to the immense range of subjects that were opened up at Oxford. To a large extent, *solvitur ambulando* must be the watchword of the Church. Situations must be faced and dealt with as they arise, according to the light that may be vouchsafed to prophetic individuals, and to such spiritual movements as may result from the growing illumination and influence of the Spirit of Christ. Only as the result of this process can Christian thought and action advance towards theoretic agreements, and even these must be open to revision as the evolution of society proceeds.

Meanwhile, the association brought about at Oxford involves, as Professor Ernest Barker has admirably said, a common and continuing purpose "which permanently unites a number of individuals as the common content of their minds and the common intention of their wills." To this end the establishment of catholicity, to the supersession of sectarianism, is requisite if the Oxford Conference is to be a momentous step forward to its attainment. Such catholicity will be at once constructive and corrective. The fulfilment of Christian life, both for the Church and for individuals, cannot be isolated from the common life of mankind. The spiritual must be developed, not merely in the ecclesiastical, but in the entire range of the human. It must be corrective and redemptive, for though the spiritual life, as Christians apprehend it, is *in* the world, yet it is not *of* the world. It must concentrate its energy and influence upon the realisation and manifestation of life in God through Christ so as to bring the assertion and influence of the Divine to the reinforcement, correction and completion of the human. In order that this mission may be prepared for and carried on, it is well that the Oxford Conference is to be followed up, not merely by the publication of Reports, but by the formation of a universal Christian council, the functions of which will be to seek a common mind in respect of the actual situation, as it presents itself to the Christian consciousness, to inform the constituent Churches in regard to it, and to take such action as may be called for, from time to time, insofar as a common mind or a common intention can be reached.

The Edinburgh Conference on Faith and Order was concerned to forward the Reunion of the Christian Church. It, therefore, dealt with a more concentrated and organic problem

than did Oxford. The subjects that were considered were The Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, The Church of Christ and the Word of God, The Ministry and the Sacraments, and The Church's Unity in Life and Worship. A comprehensive syllabus for each of these subjects had been prepared beforehand, but the most notable of the Reports was that on The Ministry and Sacraments, as to which a very remarkable measure of agreement had been reached for submission to the Conference. This most important result had been reached owing to the practical temper that prevailed throughout the discussions. The two inter-related subjects were successfully cleared from the excessive definitions and the doubtful metaphysics which have burdened the past, and accentuated differences of interpretation to the division of the Churches so that spiritual community has been wellnigh destroyed by intellectual divergencies and by materialist intrusions. When cleared of such overgrowth, and of controversial negations, the agreements that are found to exist already and that are within reach if truly Catholic unity of faith and life are really sought after are surprising and most welcome. It would indeed be a fatal mistake if the way of Reunion were to be obstructed by reviving the controversies of the past in order to solve them by accentuating points of view which have passed and then to attempt the hopeless task of harmonising them by mere ratiocination. The profundity of the Faith goes hand in hand with its simplicity, and the Commission on the Ministry and the Sacraments has happily recognised this truth. What is needed for Reunion is not analysis or synthesis, but a synoptic vision, which shall promote true Catholicity, even if this should involve the admission at many points "that except in opinion" the Churches are "not greatly disagreeing." In regard to Reunion the most important requisite is to secure that the *élan vital*, which is to be found in the existing Churches, is not reduced to a pale uniformity, that the positive contributions of the independent traditions which are still alive shall be preserved, and that Reunion shall, therefore, enrich the united Church and not impoverish it.

At its close the Edinburgh Conference unanimously approved an affirmation of unity, declaring that this unity is "of heart and spirit," and that it is unity "in faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word of God," and "in allegiance to Him as Head of the Church, and as King of

by an independent judiciary but by the executive itself. The right of private property, indeed, has never had the same uncontested claim to be a standard international value as life and liberty, and in the twentieth century it is certainly less sacred than in the nineteenth, in state practice and in the public opinion of all nations. As regards the attitude to life and liberty, the various brands of totalitarian states cannot simply be identified. They may develop in different directions, a matter of the greatest importance for the standard values on which a new international community may be based.

Thirdly, the new totalitarian states are definitely intolerant as regards the internal structure of other states, although perhaps not all to the same extent. No longer do they recognise the equality of nations, which applies the test of a certain minimum amount of state organisation. The world, to them, is divided into right and wrong, black and white. In the Spanish struggle this attitude pierces the thin layer of diplomatic convention which still scantily disguises it in the relations between the Great Powers themselves.

There is, lastly, one aspect of the matter where the mere opposition of totalitarian and non-totalitarian states is not sufficient, but a particular social and political creed directly influences the international order. It comes in with the attitude, the *Weltanschauung*, regarding an international society as embracing part or the whole of humanity, and as being something greater and higher than the nation. The attitude of the "democratic" society of nations was by no means clearly positive towards such an ideal; national sovereignty was too much in the way; the state still remained ultimately judge in its own cause. But the trend towards the formation of a more fully organised international society, notably in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, culminating in the League of Nations, was clearly visible. Any such ideal is emphatically rejected by the fascist Powers. The nation to them is the ultimate goal, endowed with mystical and religious attributes. Mankind means nothing worth working and fighting for. This, indeed, as latest history shows, is not equivalent to disinterestedness in international affairs. But the fascist international, so active with regard to Spain, is an international of a special kind. It is partly a tactical alliance to serve nationalist purposes of the partners which temporarily run parallel, partly an alliance of

intolerance against any form of political government actively opposed to the fascist outlook. The aim, however, is nationalist to the core. It is to increase the power and glory of German or Italian fascism. A fascist world state would be a contradiction in terms. Socialist and communist theory, on the other hand, was certainly international in its origin, and aims at a world order. But world order and the unity of mankind were to be attained through international action of the working class. The strict class theory does not, in fact, leave room for co-operation with states where the working class does not govern. Socialist practice, however, has long given up this strict theory, and communist Russia has apparently done the same. How far the change has gone will best be judged in the light of practical actions, such as active participation in schemes of international control, jurisdiction, etc.

The general position can be thus summarised: Fascism cannot accept international aims, wherever they collide with national ones. Socialist and communist doctrines have no objection to the supremacy of international over national society; but, short of world revolution, they can only participate in the construction of a modern international society if they modify the dogma of class dictatorship and substitute for it the more modest postulate of a certain homogeneity in essential questions of social and political life. The representatives of socialism in practically every country seem to have taken this step, whilst the attitude of communism is not yet finally determined, but inclines in the same direction. This implies that, to the same extent, the intolerance characteristic of totalitarian states would have to be given up.

Is it possible to ignore these fundamental facts and to continue to act, think and speak as if a community still existed which has, in fact, been deprived of its principal foundations? All attempts to do so seem to be based on two assumptions: 1. That the desire for peace, or rather the aversion to war, is a sufficient basis for co-operation. 2. That new institutions and organisations, like international tribunals, armies, etc., could provide a remedy. These assumptions were not wholly incorrect as long as there were still some other ties between the nations thus to be knitted together. They lose their force where the gap becomes as deep as we have seen. Against these assumptions two plain truths must be emphasised:

Kings and Lord of Lords." The Conference further declared that this unity "must be embodied in a way that will make it manifest to the world, though we do not yet clearly see what outward form it should take." In view both of this certainty and this uncertainty, the Conference called upon Christians of all communions to consider patiently occasions of disunion that they may be overcome, to be ready to learn from those who differ from them, to seek the removal of such obstacles to the furtherance of the Gospel in the non-Christian world as arise from the divisions of the Church, and constantly to pray for that unity which is our Lord's Will for His Church. The Archbishop of Canterbury had already summed up the results of the Oxford Conference, and prefaced the proceedings at Edinburgh by declaring, in his sermon in St. Paul's Cathedral, that "certainly those who had once seen the vision of what the Catholic Church was meant to be and might be in the world could never be disobedient to that heavenly vision. Surely the way of prizing and increasing the unity which now existed, of deepening the experience of it in spiritual fellowship and in common action might be a surer road towards the goal of visible unity than the way of formal negotiation between Churches." The wisdom of this counsel is manifest. The Conferences have brought about a new fellowship between all who took part in them, a fellowship springing not from tolerant good feeling, but from mutual understanding. This community of thought and purpose must be followed up by the Churches themselves, so that the results that have been reached by leaders may be fully shared by the whole body of the communions they represented. In this way, in this way alone, and in this way effectually the scandal of divisions will be removed, and the meaning of the Gospel unitedly set forth. One spirit, one mind, one way, is the order by which the unity that *is* may be consummated in the union that *is to be*.

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

TRADE UNION EXPERIMENTS IN FRANCE.

EVER since the "stay-in" strikes in France in the early summer of last year it has been asserted from time to time that France was on the verge of revolution. During the strikes the wildest stories were published in the press of various countries. There was talk of rioting, violence, and even of murder. Many of these stories were spread by French people on the right in politics to damage the People's Front Government which had come into office on June 1st, 1936. I was told last year by an American friend staying in Switzerland that a French Count and Countess staying in the same hotel had said that in the place where they lived in France a factory had been taken by storm and the owner of it had been murdered. The story turned out to be a pure invention. I was in Paris at the time of the "stay-in" strikes and I have never seen strikes more orderly. The strikers, enthusiastic as they were, were perfectly good-tempered and there was no violence of any sort. The strikes had no revolutionary aims—they were strikes to obtain better conditions of labour and nothing else—but it is quite true that the method of the "stay-in" strike might be very useful in the event of a revolutionary movement. The movement of last year may turn out to have been a dress rehearsal.

Now, on the other hand, the conditions in France have, in my opinion, become revolutionary, and a revolutionary—or at least unconstitutional—movement is possible in the near future. It will not, if it comes, be made by the Socialist or Communist Party, but by the C.G.T. (Confédération Générale du Travail)—the French trade union federation. Last year's strikes gave an enormous impetus to the French trade union movement. Applications for membership poured in in such numbers that the trade union officials could not cope with them. In certain industries the trade union membership was increased tenfold in a few weeks. The increase has gone on steadily and the trade unions affiliated with the C.G.T. have now more than 5,000,000 members—a larger membership than in England or in any other country except Soviet Russia. The organised workers are thus about 12 per cent. of the whole French population and represent with their families a much larger proportion. In 1914 the membership of the trade

1. Peace, nationally or internationally, must and can only spring from a harmonious social order. Temporary absence of war may follow from mutual fear or lack of preparedness, and, within these limits, even be embodied in agreements. But ultimately the underlying tension will sweep them away. And is not this kind of peace an anæmic and meagre ideal?

2. Institutions and forms of organisation must follow, not precede, the establishment of a society. But a society, national or international, can only arise on the basis of certain social bonds; as the history of confederations, federal states and unitary states shows, the firmness of the organisation increases with the intensity of the social bonds. When mankind agrees on the essential elements of social life, even a world state will be possible.

What are, finally, the prospects for the formation of a new international society? That will depend on whether and to what extent agreement can be reached on these foundations on which international intercourse used to rest, and which have collapsed. As regards the measure of state control, it is suggested that development seems to go in the direction of totalitarian systems. Not only has state interference increased everywhere; in recent international conflicts, notably in the Spanish conflict, the democratic states, like the United States, Britain and France, have adjusted or are prepared to adjust their legislation so as to exclude private trade in arms and to ban private volunteering, thereby increasing the sphere of state responsibility. The attitude towards some fundamental social and human values, mainly to life, liberty and property, will be the decisive test. Here every nation must take its stand, and international co-operation of a lasting kind can only be built on far-reaching agreement on these essential values. And this is a good thing. Times of profound crisis bring out what is too easily forgotten, under the thick layer of schemes, institutions and organisations: that these are not ends in themselves, but that they are all means to regulate human life, and that all political units, from tribe to world state, are based on a community of outlook with regard to some essential human values. The problem, how to shape life and men, is behind it all, and this problem must be put afresh from time to time in the course of history.

W. FRIEDMANN.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE BOY-ACTOR ON SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS.

SHAKESPEARE'S heroines have become for us such a recognised embodiment of womanhood and girlhood that we are apt to give no thought to the urchin, towse-headed and grimy-handed off duty, whose task it was to present first to the world these flowers not of his sex.

It is a commonplace of the theatre how much the virtue of plays depends on the quality of the audience, and Elizabethan audiences, on whose discerning favour, after all, the long sequence of Shakespeare's plays depended, must have been competent judges. If Shakespeare himself had had reasons to be greatly dissatisfied with the feminine impersonation of his boys, he could easily have written more plays like *Julius Cæsar* in which there is scarcely any feminine interest at all: this he did not do: from Viola, and Titania, and Katherine, to Perdita, Miranda and Imogen, Shakespeare worked unceasingly to portray women. Confidence in the ability of the boy-actor does not however require underlining from internal evidence. It may be firmly based upon a knowledge, not of Elizabethan boys, but of boys of any century.

The mistake made by all who do not flourish in boys' company is to suppose that they differ in kind from their elders, that they are a breed apart who must be addressed in a special style, hearty, patronising, hortatory, or facetious. In reality they are only their elders before Time has somewhat curbed the restlessness of their energy, before convention and the artificial manners of society have restrained them from saying aloud what we all think, and before the income-tax collector has knocked a large slice of poetry out of their souls.

On the other hand, no boy, from the nature of things, can enter into emotions and passions which are beyond and alien to his experience, and still less into those belonging to the other sex. It is clear, therefore, that the boy-actor can bring to the interpretation of a Shakespearean rôle what we may call the objective poetic qualities, but will lack those subjective qualities which Sarah Bernhardt would bring to the playing of Tosca, or Mrs. Patrick Campbell to the playing of Hedda Gabler. That Shakespeare took this fact into account, and that his plays were influenced by it to a marked degree, is patent as soon as we consider the relative nature of the male and female parts.

unions affiliated with the C.G.T. was considerably less than one million and they were much less strongly organised than now. The C.G.T. has become the strongest force in France.

The C.G.T. is not and never has been connected with any political party, although, of course, many of its members belong to one, usually the Socialist or the Communist Party. Before the war it had an economic theory of its own, which was known as syndicalism—*syndicat* is the French word for trade union. Syndicalism is fundamentally opposed to the totalitarian State, to any form of State Socialism or State Capitalism, and indeed to the political State itself. It is not Marxist but derives from Proudhon, Saint-Simon, and to a certain extent from Bakunin, the great adversary of Marx. It believes in the public ownership of land and natural monopolies, but holds that the labour of the community should be organised by the trade unions, not by the State or by the Government. With Saint-Simon, syndicalists wished to substitute the administration of things for the government of men and, with Proudhon, they believe that in the future the workshop will take the place of the Government. They are libertarian and anti-parliamentarist.

From the first, French trade unions, unlike English and German trade unions, were revolutionary in their character. They aimed not merely at improving the condition of the workers immediately, but also at a radical change in the whole economic system. The C.G.T. was founded in 1895 but it was not until 1906, at an annual congress held at Amiens, that by an overwhelming majority it definitely repudiated parliamentary methods, adopted the syndicalist theory and approved of the general strike as the method of achieving the social revolution. From that date until the war there was a bitter conflict between the C.G.T. and the Socialist Party.

A sharp division of opinion about the war split both the Socialist Party and the C.G.T. in two. In 1920, at the Tours Congress, the majority of the Socialist Party voted for affiliation to the Third International and became the Communist Party. There was a similar split in the C.G.T., which led to the formation of a second trade union federation, called the C.G.T.U., which professed to carry on the revolutionary syndicalism of the pre-war C.G.T., but was in fact dominated by the Communist Party. The old C.G.T. became "reformist" and abandoned revolutionary methods. In 1936 the two

federations were once more united under the old title and it was this that began the revival of trade unionism in France.

Although a great many of the officials of the C.G.T. and of the local trade union secretaries belong to the Communist Party, the C.G.T. has during the last twelve months been gradually returning to pre-war syndicalism. Even many former leaders of the C.G.T.U. are steadily becoming more and more Syndicalist and less and less Communist. The truth is that most of them never really were Marxists and rallied to the Communist Party because it was revolutionary and the C.G.T. had become "reformist." Léon Jouhaux, who is still General Secretary of the C.G.T. as he was before the war, is once more the revolutionary Jouhaux whom I knew a quarter of a century ago.

In my opinion, syndicalism is much more suited to the French temperament than Marxist Socialism, or, as it is now usually called, Communism. Perhaps, as regards their ultimate ideals, there is less difference between the Marxists and the Syndicalists than they think, but they differ profoundly about the methods of attaining their ideals. The French would never accept a system of State Capitalism, such as at present exists in Soviet Russia, however much they might be told that it was only a transition stage. The totalitarian State in any form is detestable to Frenchmen. In any case, the revival in France of anti-parliamentarism of the Left and revolutionary syndicalism has become very marked recently and seems likely to have important consequences. It would not surprise me if the Socialist and Communist Parties were ultimately swamped by the C.G.T.

There is at present in the Socialist and Communist Parties a movement in favour of uniting them in a single party, which seems likely to succeed in the near future. There are practical difficulties in the way of reunion, such as the question whether the unified party should be affiliated to the Second or the Third International. Presumably it would be affiliated to the Third, but in that case it would certainly be unwilling to take orders from Moscow. Indeed, the French Communist Party shows an increasing tendency towards independence, and it may be that one of the reasons why the Communist leaders are in favour of an amalgamation of the Socialist and Communist Parties is that they wish to be in a stronger position in regard to Moscow. The wholesale "purge" now going

Whenever Shakespeare raises his female creations to the stature of the male, making them protagonists like Cleopatra and Lady Macbeth, they certainly lay no claim to the title of "heroine." His women of secondary importance, Isabella with her savage purity, Beatrice of the biting tongue, Volumnia with her perverted mania for honour, Portia who is not content to trick Shylock, but must break him too, Hermione cold as the statue she impersonates, although they possess majestic qualities are scarcely heroines without alloy. Even in his gallery of feminine miniatures, where there is least reason to mix any grey with the white, Shakespeare is never content to shirk the human problem by fashioning plaster saints. Cordelia is obstinate, Desdemona untruthful, Ophelia weak-witted. Surely the difference which Ruskin felt between the male and female characters is not really one of good and evil but, except in two cases, of a greater and less elaboration. When, as in the case of Cleopatra or Lady Macbeth, Shakespeare was prepared to follow the complexities of a great female soul through fire and flood, up to heaven and down to hell, as he so often does with his male giants, he draws no line between the mixed ingredients to be found in the hearts of either sex. Why he should only so rarely have drawn women on the same scale as men, is surely due to the inevitable limitations of the boy-actor.

Would anyone be prepared to lay hand on heart and swear belief that, if Shakespeare had had Mrs. Siddons, Dame Ellen Terry, or Miss Edith Evans in his company, he would have written three of the greatest plays in the world and included in them no greater female rôles than Desdemona and Emilia, Goneril, Regan, and Cordelia, Ophelia and the Queen of Denmark? This is not to disparage the boy-actors but to

That the boy-actor is not unconnected with the healthy normality of love in Shakespeare seems manifest. It would of course be easily possible to over-stress the case. It is true that the Elizabethan age, like all great ages of vitality in the world's history, was fundamentally a healthy age apart from any influence of boy-actors, and that Shakespeare's sanity was such that if he were to reappear among us and write a film scenario to-day, with all the alluring sirens of Hollywood at his disposal, he would still probably produce an undemoralised masterpiece. Nevertheless I do not think that we shall be wrong in recognising that those tendencies of the author of the Sonnets towards morbidity and sentimentality were effectively checked when it came to sending Cesario a-wooing. It would take a pretty rascally dramatist to set boys studying the part of the Country Wife, Mrs. Alving, or Mrs. Warren, and Shakespeare is the last dramatist whom one can imagine wishing to qualify for the mill-stone.

Everything points, on the contrary, to Shakespeare's reverence for youth. An exquisite scene is that in *Julius Cæsar* where Brutus, troubled with foreboding before Philippi, seeks from his boy attendant the consolation of music :

BRUTUS : Good boy
Canst thou hold up thy heavy eyes awhile,
And touch thy instrument a strain or two ?
LUCIUS : Ay, my Lord, an't please you.

on in Russia has done great harm to Stalin's reputation in France, where its real motives are as little known as they are elsewhere.

An amalgamated Socialist-Communist Party might be better able to come to terms with the C.G.T. than the two existing parties, but, even if that be so, the amalgamation is not likely to come in time to prevent a breach with the C.G.T. The immediate cause of the great revival of revolutionary Syndicalism and anti-parliamentarism is the failure of the People's Front, for it has failed and it can hardly hold together much longer. And the ultimate cause of the failure was the foreign policy of the People's Front Government, or rather its lack of any policy of its own and its subservience to the British Foreign Office and to a reactionary British Government. Léon Blum's capitulation to the British Government on August 8th, 1936, on the question of Spain was deeply resented by nine-tenths of his followers, and now that the disastrous consequences of the capitulation are evident the resentment is deeper than ever.

In the last days of July 1936 Léon Blum had decided to give every facility to the Spanish Government for obtaining war material in France. A letter that he wrote to the Spanish Embassy in Paris, giving full particulars of what he was prepared to do, came into the hands of the Italian Government, no doubt by the treachery of somebody in the Spanish Embassy favourable to Franco, and was published by the Italian press some months later. Among other things Pierre Cot, the French Air Minister, had authorised the French airplane manufacturers to sell to the Spanish Government all the airplanes ready for delivery to the French army.

On August 2nd, 1936, the French Government decided under British pressure to propose to the other Governments a policy of "non-intervention" in Spain, but it was clearly indicated that the French Government would not put an embargo on exports of war material to Spain unless and until all other Governments did the same. The British Foreign Office got wind of the arrangements made by Léon Blum with the Spanish Government and between August 2nd and August 8th Sir George Clerk, who was then British Ambassador to Paris, called on Yvon Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, and informed him that if, by reason of the delivery of French war material to the Spanish Government, France

got into trouble with Germany, the British Government would not regard a German attack on France as an unprovoked aggression and the Treaty of Locarno would therefore not come into operation. This was in reality mere bluff. The British Government will always go to the aid of France if that country is attacked by Germany because it will never run the risk of allowing the French channel ports to be in German hands.

Léon Blum no doubt knew that it was bluff, but the three leading Radical Ministers—Delbos, Edmond Daladier, Minister of War, and Camille Chautemps, the present Prime Minister, threatened to resign unless the French Government immediately put an embargo on the export of all war material to Spain. At a ministerial Council held on August 8th, 1936, the matter was discussed. The Cabinet was divided on the question, but finally Blum gave way to the Radicals and the embargo demanded by them was decided on.

Before the Ministerial Council was held, the C.G.T. brought strong pressure on Blum to stand firm even if the Radical Ministers carried out their threat of resignation and even if it meant the break-up of the People's Front. The view of the C.G.T. was that, if Blum stood firm, and if the Radical Ministers resigned, the Radical Party would split in two and Blum would retain a diminished majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In any case, the C.G.T. held that it was better to take the risk than to betray the Spanish Government under British pressure. The Communist Party at first supported the C.G.T. in this action, but backed out at the last moment for reasons of internal politics and also, perhaps, under pressure from Moscow, anxious not to risk the disruption of the People's Front. This action on the part of the Communists is resented by the C.G.T. to this day. The result was that the French Government put on an embargo and stopped the export of war material to Spain while the German and Italian Governments discussed the question of "non-intervention" for a month before they agreed to it, and meanwhile poured into Spain war material and even troops for Franco. As everybody knows the "non-intervention" agreement was never observed by Germany or Italy after they had signed it. This is what is so deeply resented by the French workmen.

Had Blum stuck to his original policy in regard to Spain, he could have induced the French workmen to allow the

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BRUTUS : It does, my boy :
 I trouble thee too much, but thou art willing.
 LUCIUS : It is my duty, Sir.

The elements of beauty in this incident shine with a spiritual flame in the darkness of Philippi. The simple loyalty of the boy, untroubled by the problem of the Ides of March, "It is my duty, Sir," the protective consideration of Brutus, who did not hesitate to stab Cæsar *pro bono publico*, but has not the heart to wake his slumbering knave. In a wider sense of the word than we are accustomed to use it, this is a love scene : a love scene in the sense that Shelley understood love, and Saint Joan, and St. Augustine, and Christ, something capable of wider application than the romantic interest between man and woman, which however much idealised must always have an element of selfishness, the love which takes to its heart all creatures of the world : the woman taken in adultery, hunted hares, exhausted servants, and prefers their welfare to its own.

King Lear, the epitome of tyrannical egotism, refuses to find protection in the hovel upon the heath until his Fool has entered.

KENT : Good my lord, enter here. . . .

LEAR (*to the Fool*) : In, boy ; go first.

. . . Nay, get thee in. I'll pray, and then I'll sleep.

These boys in Shakespeare have a sublime and totally unconscious knack of bringing out the best in men. They raise, as it were, all the fine instincts which prompt a lover to give, and none of those which prompt him to look for return.

It is interesting to notice that precisely the same highly spiritual effect produced by Shakespeare's boys is also produced by his heroines. One of the most heart-rending dialogues in world-literature is that between Desdemona and Emilia, as Desdemona prepares for what is to be Othello's last coming. The intensity of the pathos is Desdemona's sexless innocence : one spark of selfish feminine intuition would have saved her from pleading intemperately for Cassio, one stroke of feminine guile would have extricated her from the predicament of the handkerchief : as it is, she puzzles over her situation with child-like ignorance and child-like purity, and the boy-actor has to interpret nothing beyond his ken.

The same simplicity is apparent in Ophelia's passive submission to Hamlet's scorn, in Cordelia's unquestioning forgiveness of her father's gross injustice, in Perdita's readiness to

give up Florizel if her shepherd's estate will mar his fortune, in Miranda's acceptance of Prospero's restrictions on her courtship by Ferdinand : again and again the young Shakespearean heroine is more like a flower—beautiful, pure, aspiring—than a woman of exacting flesh and blood.

It is true, of course, that Shakespeare's women, as opposed to his maidens, Volumnia, the Queen of Denmark, Lady Macbeth, Katharine, Mistress Quickly, Cleopatra, are not conspicuous for submissive natures ; yet here again in a different respect the influence of the boy-actor on the characters may be observed. In no play is the feminine influence more prominent than in *Macbeth*. How is it, then, that *Macbeth*, in spite of the considerable difficulty of the language, makes so strong an appeal to boys ? Clearly because the feminine influence is not bound up with nosegays and moonlight, but with witches' cauldrons and bleeding daggers. Here is a woman's fortune that a boy can understand, can appreciate, and so—the important point—can interpret.

Lady Macbeth lives in the same world as Sherlock Holmes and Edgar Wallace, a world of passions, evil but not morbid, of base deeds but sure retribution, of darkness which gives opportunity not for the kisses of the lover but for the knife of the murderer, of sins which are atrocious rather than shameful. True, she is a married woman, but there is nothing complicated in her estate. Compared with the position of Nora in Ibsen's *Doll's House*, there is nothing in Lady Macbeth's attitude towards her Lord which any boy cannot understand. If a bizarre experience is wanted for a great scene, no one could have been chosen more likely to be within the scope of the boy-player than sleep-walking. Many boys have sleep-walked, or have seen a sister sleep-walk, in their time. It is a contingency for which all preparatory school masters must look out.

It is true that the simple story of *Macbeth* is bathed in poetry, the tones of which reverberate to very distant hills, but it is noticeable that almost all such poetry is uttered by Macbeth and not by Lady Macbeth. The figure of Lady Macbeth is so titanic that it may not always be remembered that her language is extremely simple :

Sleep [says Macbeth], that knits up the ravell'd sleeve of care,
 The death of each day's life, sore labour's bath,

Government to go more slowly in the application of the 40-hour week and other social measures. As it was, he was obliged to push those measures too quickly in the hope of allaying the discontent caused by the Spanish policy of the Government. The incompetence of Vincent Auriol, the Minister of Finance, did the rest and the People's Front Government succumbed to the attack of the great financial interests. The Government that has succeeded it is not really a People's Front Government, but a coalition of Right-Wing Radicals and Right-Wing Socialists to which the inclusion of Léon Blum, Pierre Cot, and one or two others gives a delusive People's Front appearance.

The Spanish policy was only the first of the many blunders in foreign policy made by the Blum Government, thanks to its subservience to England. After a year of office, that Government has left France in a worse position than she has ever been in for half a century. Nearly all her Eastern friends and Allies have been alienated and France has almost ceased to count as a factor in European politics. This, too, is now recognised by an increasing number of French workmen, but it is the betrayal of Republican Spain that rankles most and the downfall of the Blum Government really dates from that betrayal. The last straw has been the acceptance by the French Government of Anthony Eden's disingenuous plan for aiding Franco. By agreeing to the recognition of belligerent rights to Franco in any circumstances and by keeping the French frontier with Spain closed the Socialist Ministers have defied a resolution unanimously adopted by the National Congress of the Socialist Party held in Marseilles in July, which resolution all the Socialist Ministers supported.

The consequence of all this is that a rapidly increasing number of French workmen say that they are disgusted with all the political parties and all the politicians, that there must be something demoralising in the parliamentary system and that the only hope is in the C.G.T. and in "direct action." "We will have Chautemps out in October by hook or by crook": that is what one hears on every side. Léon Blum's influence, once so great, has been seriously impaired, and he and his group have only a small majority on the newly elected national executive of the Socialist Party.

The formation by the C.G.T. of a non-parliamentary Government is seriously contemplated. A Government

composed wholly or partly of persons not members of parliament would not in itself be unconstitutional. The French Constitution does not require Ministers to be members of the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies and, although there has never yet been a French Prime Minister who was not either a Senator or a Deputy, there have often been other Ministers who were neither. Would the President of the Republic, however, consent to ask Léon Jouhaux, for instance, to form a Cabinet and, if he did consent, would such a Cabinet obtain a majority in the Chamber of Deputies? The answer to both these questions is doubtful, but the Syndicalists say that they would do without the consent of the President of the Republic and the approval of the Chamber, if necessary. That would mean something very like a revolution, for a Government existing in such conditions would clearly be unconstitutional.

I do not say that this will happen, for I do not know whether it will happen or not. But I do say that it is at least possible. If it happens, the British Government and the British Foreign Office will be indirectly responsible, for the ultimate cause will have been the pressure brought by the British Government and the British Foreign Office on Léon Blum and his colleagues in the Cabinet of the People's Front to adopt a policy detested by nine-tenths of their supporters. Naturally, those who weakly yielded to British pressure will be directly responsible.

ROBERT DELL.

Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course,
Chief nourisher in life's feast,—

LADY MACBETH: What do you mean?

Such is an extreme example, and taken by itself would mean little, but again and again in the play Lady Macbeth follows one of Macbeth's ornate orations with just such simple language as would come with no incongruous effect from a young speaker. Although we are accustomed to think of this husband and wife as two equal protagonists, it is a fact that all the great speeches, "If it were done when 'tis done," the dagger speech, "To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow," fall to Macbeth. In the only scene where Lady Macbeth holds the stage alone for any length of time she is talking with the childish inconsequence of a sleep-walker.

The case of Cleopatra is even more interesting, for here Shakespeare seems to have set himself and the boy-actor an impossible task. How could any boy be expected to portray the feline qualities of the most prodigious and elaborate courtesan of history? What could Shakespeare do to help his young friend without lessening the effectiveness of the portrait which he had set himself to make? From the very start the dramatist seems alive to, and coping with, the problem. Before Cleopatra appears we are told by Philo exactly what to think of her and what effect she has upon Antony; these things are not left to speak for themselves either from her appearance or her words.

Look, where they come:

continues Philo, lecturing to the audience, as it were, upon the two great subjects of the play,

Take but good note, and you shall see in him
The triple pillar of the world transform'd
Into a strumpet's fool: behold and see.

The situation now demands that the protagonists should say something expressive of the condition in which they have been described, but their infatuation is just such a passion as Shakespeare never seeks to elaborate. The conversation, nevertheless, opens promisingly for the enthusiast for Sheik-drama.

CLEOPATRA: If it be love indeed, tell me how much.

ANTONY: There's beggary in love that can be reckon'd.

CLEOPATRA: I'll set a bourn how far to be beloved.

ANTONY: Then must thou needs find out new heaven, new earth.

Here indeed we seem in for a play "For Adults only." But: *Enter an Attendant*, and base hopes are dashed.

ATTENDANT: News, my good lord, from Rome.

ANTONY: Grates me: the sum.

The prurient audience are also grated, but the boy Cleopatra is saved, who, instead of having to pursue a subject which would so soon take him, we hope, out of his depth, is able to break off and rail against Antony; to display the moods of irritation, indignation, and contempt, which, while they may be regrettable in the young, are not unnatural:

Nay, hear then, Antony:

Fulvia perchance is angry; or who knows
If the scarce-bearded Cæsar have not sent
His powerful mandate to you, "Do this, or this,
Take in that kingdom, and enfranchise that,
Perform't, or else we damn thee".

Is it a chance that only once again during this Act do Antony and Cleopatra meet upon the stage, and then only in a scene of chiding, not of love?

CLEOPATRA: What says the married woman? You may go:
Would she had never given you leave to come.

In Act II they do not meet at all; in Act III they meet twice, when it is Antony's turn to chide Cleopatra, who in the sea-battle against Octavius has fled, and lured the infatuated Antony after her. When the battle is over, the scales fall from his eyes and he is alive to his shame:

O, whither hast thou led me, Egypt? See
How I convey my shame out of thine eyes
By looking back what I have left behind
Stroy'd in dishonour.

In the second meeting the sight of Cleopatra allowing Cæsar's emissary to kiss her hand throws Antony into a paroxysm of indignation and he overwhelms her with vituperation. In Act IV, after the defeat of Actium, the lovers meet only for Antony to bewail that they should ever have met at all:

This foul Egyptian hath betrayed me. . . .

CLEOPATRA: Why is my lord enraged against his love?

ANTONY: Vanish, or I shall give thee thy deserving,
And blemish Cæsar's triumph.

THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE.

SOME fifty years ago Dr. T. J. Lawrence, Deputy-Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge, delivered in the course of his duties a most able and suggestive lecture under the above title. It was ultimately published in a small volume which has long been out of print and is now very difficult of access.* It seems to the present writer, who was privileged to enjoy Dr. Lawrence's friendship, so extremely relevant to the current League of Nations controversy that he ventures to recapitulate its argument with such additions as the great events of the last half-century make necessary.

The theme of Dr. Lawrence's lecture is the close analogy between the process by means of which peace has been attained within the limits of the national state, and the process by means of which it is being sought within the international sphere. The methods universally and successfully employed by national governments to suppress private war are described in detail, and are taken as illustrative of the methods which are being employed, and must increasingly be employed, to suppress the pest of public war.

The evolution of peace in the domestic sphere is traced by Dr. Lawrence through four successive phases, as follows: First, in primitive barbaric society private conflict is unrestrained. Every man does that which is right in his own eyes; he attacks his neighbour if he thinks that his neighbour is weak; if he is himself attacked his defence depends entirely upon himself, or upon such voluntary helpers as he can persuade to assist him. War is chronic, and it is "marked by the unrestricted indulgence of man's fiercest passions: conquered enemies are enslaved, tortured, or even eaten." Examples of such ferocious blood-feuds are not unknown among savage tribes in Central Africa and among the Pacific Islands even to-day. They are described by Hobbes, in his *Leviathan*, as at one time universal; and, as he well says, in such conditions the life of the belligerent individual tends to be "solitary, nasty, brutish, and short."

A second stage is reached when community of some sort is formed—whether hunting pack, or pastoral tribe, or agricultural clan, or incipient state. The formation of community

is the first great step from savagery towards civilisation. Within the limits of the community private war must, if the community is to survive, be restricted and if possible altogether suppressed. For community implies co-operation for some common purpose, e.g. the chase, or cattle-rearing, or cultivation, or (above all) defence. For a long time community is too weak, and the habit of private war too strong, to permit of the strict enforcement of internal peace. Hence regulation—growing in rigour as community becomes stronger—is all that can be attained. Thus, as Dr. Lawrence tells us, "Alfred allowed the death of a murdered man to be avenged by his kindred; but they were to seek the slayer in his house, and were to surround it for seven days before they made their attack." Similarly, in twelfth-century Germany, "the Emperor Frederick I reserved to every one the right to do justice to himself, provided he gave three days' notice to his adversary."

The third stage in the evolution of domestic peace is reached when the community provides some sort of public redress as an alternative to private vengeance. The legal systems of many states contain interesting traces of the condition of things that prevailed when an aggrieved party could choose whether he would take the law into his own hands, or would ask the public authority to procure redress for him. "For a long time," says Dr. Lawrence, "the process before the tribunals was regarded rather as an alternative to the blood feud than as a substitute for it." This view is confirmed by the late Sir Frederick Pollock, who remarks that "all jurisdiction was voluntary in its beginning."* A remarkable example of this rather startling truth is furnished in the last chapter of Sir Henry Maine's classic *Ancient Law*, where he observes that "in the original administration of justice the proceedings were a close imitation of the series of acts which were likely to be gone through in private life by persons who were disputing, but who afterwards suffered their quarrel to be appeased. The magistrate carefully simulated the demeanour of a private arbitrator casually called in." The detailed illustration which Sir Henry Maine gives in support of his thesis—derived from the Roman *Legis Actio Sacramenti*—is impressive in its suggestiveness.

* *Cambridge Modern History*. Vol. II, page 726.

* *Essays on some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law*. Cambridge, Deighton Bell & Co., 1884. (Second edition revised 1885.)

In the last scene of this Act Antony's body, with life almost extinct, is borne to Cleopatra's monument, and for the last time they are face to face. Any full-blooded display of sentiment is hardly likely at such a moment: "Die where thou hast lived," says Cleopatra, as Antony is heaved aloft to rest in her arms and against her bosom. Thus we are only shown the lovers in one another's embrace in the presence of the chilliest of all chaperones, Death.

Quicken with kissing: had my lips that power,
Thus would I wear them out.

But they have not the power, and the boy-actor need force no further caresses.

In Cleopatra's own regal and sumptuous death there is this saving grace for the boy who must attempt one of the supremely poetic scenes of drama, that the Queen's end is quiet. There is no passionate treading of the stage, no preliminary fainting fits, no floods of tears, no tearing of the bosom, beating of the breast, such as would give envied scope to a *prima donna*, but is wholly alien to a boy's temperament. Instead, seated motionless upon the throne, the Queen experiences an almost luxurious euthanasia, and utters those famous words which, like quiet passages of great music, would lose effect by excessive tone or over-emphasis:

Give me my robe, put on my crown; I have
Immortal longings in me: now no more
The juice of Egypt's grape shall moist this lip:
Yare, yare, good Iras; quick. Methinks I hear
Antony call; I see him rouse himself
To praise my noble act; I hear him mock
The luck of Cæsar, which the gods give men
To excuse their after wrath. Husband, I come:
I am fire and air; my other elements
I give to baser life. . . .

The simplicity of Lady Macbeth's language is repeated in these lines in which one of the world's supreme poetic effects is wrought out of monosyllables and diction not beyond the grasp of a child. And the tranquillity, unaffectedness, clearness, with which the words must be spoken, so as to hush and hold and thrill the theatre, all lie within the power of a boy.

It is an historical fact of almost startling significance that, with the disappearance of the boy-actor, poetic drama in

England came to an end, and there has been no revival. At the Restoration our drama grew up, became adult, and it has never quite presented fairies or murders or battles or kings, or women, with the same unaffected spontaneity again. The nature, qualities, and position of women in Shakespeare are, so to say, taken for granted, so that all the time there is can be devoted to setting them in motion in an interesting story. In the prose drama, which has held the field since the Restoration, women have invariably been analysed, shown in this perplexing light and that, afflicted by this disease of civilisation, caught in that predicament of society: Lady Windermere's fan is responsible for a whole drama, Lydia Languish, Mrs. Tanqueray, Candida, discuss their position until we know not whether to applaud themselves or their critics. But the clear-cut characters of Juliet and Imogen and Regan are gone for ever from the boards, along with poetic speech and the boys trained to speak it.

Was it not perhaps a significant thing that the roof of the Elizabethan theatre was open to the sky, and that ever since our theatres have been closed? It seems as though Elizabethan drama derived from the elements under which it was played something of their majesty and health, which men lose so soon as they shut themselves up in houses, and have eyes only for the drawing-room intrigue and the bedroom scandal. Our dramatists and our flowing actresses have said for us since the Restoration a great many clever things about women which had not been said before. But they have never again exhibited them on the grand scale on which Shakespeare created them and his boys interpreted them. Poetic drama and the boy-actor disappeared together. Was it merely a coincidence? I do not think it was.

GUY BOAS.

This third stage—the stage of voluntary arbitration—is transitional and brief. The tribunals, once established, tend to prevail and to eliminate the alternative of continued private redress. For one thing, the justice provided by the court is likely to be much more sure and equitable than that which the aggrieved individual tries to snatch for himself. Hence the disputant with a good case prefers it. For another thing, the public authority which sets up the tribunal becomes increasingly unwilling to tolerate the disturbance of the public peace caused by private war. Hence the fourth and last stage is reached in which private war (e.g. duelling) is entirely prohibited, and the public peace is enforced against all the would-be breakers thereof. Government, through its courts and its police, becomes supreme in the land. No doubt, even in the best-ordered state, lurking criminals and even defiant gangsters exist and cause trouble. But the whole force of society—the police, the army, the private citizen—is united against them, and so long as the state retains its integrity their shrift is short. Speaking broadly, we may say that private war was suppressed in England before the end of the fifteenth century; in Spain during the sixteenth; in France and Germany during the seventeenth; in Scotland it lingered among the Highlands until well on into the eighteenth.

When, fifty years ago, Dr. Lawrence delivered his lecture, international society, along the same lines of evolution as those just sketched, seemed to have reached the third stage of the progress from anarchy towards world-government, authoritative justice, and universal peace. Arbitration was in the air as an agreed alternative to war; and on all sides powerful influences were active, tending to make arbitrament increasingly common and imperative. "In recent times," says Dr. Lawrence, "arbitration has come to be regarded as a practical alternative to war, just as a trial before a law court was regarded of old as an alternative to a family feud." He supports his statement by giving statistics showing (1) the increase in the number of actual cases of arbitration during the nineteenth century,* (2) the still greater increase in the number of arbitration-treaties concluded between leading states. During the thirty years that followed the publication

* *The Alabama Case* (Great Britain and U.S.A.), 1871-3, was of course the most important.

of his book (1884-1914) the figures were still more impressive. Outstanding cases of the peaceful settlement of acrimonious disputes by means of arbitration were the Behring Seas Fisheries dispute of 1892, and the Venezuelan Boundary dispute of 1895-9. In 1899, moreover, the permanent Hague Tribunal was established, and during the first fifteen years of its operation it succeeded in settling no fewer than fourteen international controversies, any one of which in earlier days might have led to war. As to arbitration treaties, their number was legion. In 1903 an Anglo-French treaty was concluded: it was limited in scope, it is true, to "such questions as do not involve the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the two contracting parties." But, even so, it was incalculably valuable, and it prepared the way for the settlement of century-old matters of conflict between the two countries, and for the conclusion of the Anglo-French entente, in 1904. It formed, moreover, a model upon which no fewer than 162 other arbitration treaties were framed during the next ten years. Again in 1914, after long negotiation, an Anglo-American arbitration treaty was concluded, and this also served as a basis for the conclusion of some thirty others by the United States authorities. Indeed, in that cardinal year 1914 there were actually 194 arbitration treaties in force.

In 1914, then, the era of perpetual peace, the era in which international controversies would be settled by human reason and not by brute force, seemed to be coming within sight. The third stage of the great evolutionary process appeared to be well advanced; the fourth and final stage of the universal reign of law began to frame itself in the pacific imagination. The evolutionary process, indeed, had been rapid—perhaps unduly rapid. Until quite modern times warfare had been practically unrestricted. It horrifies us to read, for example, that in 1441 Charles VII of France—the King crowned through the agency of Joan of Arc—"exposed English prisoners to the people of Paris, chained together like dogs, and then threw bound into the Seine those among them who were too poor to redeem themselves from captivity." In the ferocious Anglo-Spanish wars of the next century little or no quarter was given. But the limits of ferocity were not reached until even the callous conscience of Christendom was shocked by the atrocities perpetrated during the

WHY DO BIRDS SING?

THERE are many aspects of bird-life which appeal, but the most universal is undoubtedly song. There are many people who are quite unable to distinguish one species from another; many to whom birds mean nothing at all. But I doubt if there is one to whom the song of a bird has not at some time meant something. It is the very fact that this appeal is so universal that has made modern ornithologists inquire into the reason why birds sing. Unfortunately, I think. The old-time ornithologist had at least this one aspect of bird-life free from problems. He could enjoy. The modern ornithologist dare not accept the old, simple and beautiful belief that birds sing from pure joy. That belief is too anthropomorphic. We are compelled to find some scientific reason. And because we probe for reasons we lose that intense pleasure that was undoubtedly our predecessors'.

In this search for a scientific solution the ornithological world is divided into two camps—the one materialistic, the other generous. The popular theory is the biological. This links up song with the territory theory, and its champion is Mr. E. M. Nicholson. Briefly this theory may be stated thus: Song is a series of notes of a specific recognisable type, simple or complex, used by the male during the breeding season as an expression of independence and sovereignty in the territory which he has acquired. Outside the territory the male does not sing. If he does, then the song is of the type termed sub-song. But song has, apart from the expression of independence and sovereignty, further biological justifications. It serves to attract in spring the wandering female to the male. The males arrive first and are followed by the unpaired females. Since almost all singing birds are small and of inconspicuous plumage, the song assists in the quick pairing of the sexes. Furthermore it is a warning, telling those males who have not secured territory that a particular piece of land is occupied. If he does not sing, he will be driven out of his territory and may not find a mate. Song is not, therefore, an expression of emotion; it is a definite obligation. And so it has become, by the process of natural selection, more simple and emphatic as a protection against exhaustion.

Two obvious errors were immediately seen and have been explained away. Firstly, song is not confined to the breeding

season. It was Mr. Eliot Howard who said that "in contrast to the call notes, the majority of which can be heard throughout the year, the song is restricted to one season, and that one the season of reproduction." This is demonstrably untrue. There is no season of the year in which a certain amount of song is not uttered. Notably robins, wrens and thrushes sing outside the breeding season. This is explained by the fact that these birds hold territory throughout the year. Secondly, the wandering female being attracted to the singing male suggested that the best singer was selected as a mate. Mr. Eliot Howard, however, proved this idea to be incorrect, at least in the cases of the reed bunting and yellow bunting; and the idea has now, I believe, been altogether discarded.

But the theory remains. At first sight it is eminently well-founded. But the more one examines it the more one is forced to the conclusion that it is neither accurate nor sufficiently embracing. The first flaw lies in the statement that the male's song is an expression of sovereignty, is used to warn off other males. If this was so we should not see in spring the numerous fights we do see. The only defence of territory is beak and claw. Watch the male singing. You may think he is proclaiming his independence. You cannot decide that he is warning off other males. He is too enrapt in his own performance. The standard example given in support of this theory is that of the grasshopper warbler. Mr. Nicholson, pacing the distance from a singing cock, found the sound audible at four hundred and seventy yards in one direction and five hundred and fifty in the other. He says: "Here was a little, insignificant, sombre bird of no particular colour, sitting hidden in a tuft of bramble which would hardly have sheltered a rabbit, and yet projecting its unmistakable specific identity and message for well over a quarter of a mile." Now if you watch a grasshopper warbler singing you must realise that he is oblivious of everything else. Body, mind, soul, spirit, everything is absorbed in that shrill metallic reel. I cannot believe that the sound has any hypnotic influence over other grasshopper warblers. He was unaware of Mr. Nicholson (who must have come right up to him). Could he have been aware of an encroaching male, say one hundred yards away?

One might be forced to believe in this "warn-off" theory if the males never sang away from their territories. But they do. On the spring migration warblers sing loudly in places

Thirty Years' War of the seventeenth century in Germany. The European monarchies at that time were in "the state of nature" in respect of one another. They acknowledged no common authority; they recognised no code of law or custom; they regarded themselves as free from all restraints whether conventional or moral. Indeed, when Hobbes sought to illustrate by analogy the condition of primitive man before the formation of community, he chose as an exact parallel the condition of the sovereign national states of his own day. They were, he says, "in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another."

The horrors of seventeenth-century warfare and the general anarchy of international society compelled the outraged conscience of the publicists of the day to seek a remedy. Led by the great Hugo Grotius, and followed by a long and noble line of eminent jurists, they formulated a code of International Law—and particularly "Laws of War"—which, without attempting to question the rights of states to settle their quarrels by fighting, if so they chose, imposed all sorts of limits upon their modes of declaring, waging, and concluding wars. Thus, during the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it came to be generally recognised that warfare should be restricted to the armed forces of the belligerent states and should affect the civilian populations as little as possible; hence, that open towns should not be bombarded; that hospitals and hospital ships should be exempt from injury; that no poisons or poison gases should be employed; that no wanton devastation should take place; that prisoners of war should be treated humanely, and where possible should be released on parole; that neutrals should suffer the minimum of molestation, and so on. This was the second stage in the evolution of international peace—the stage in which the private vengeance was regulated by the "laws of nature and of nations," that is to say, by international morality and custom.

The third stage, as we have seen, consisted of the provision of courts of arbitration as alternatives to the anarchic and barbaric arbitrament of war. What of the fourth and final stage, namely, the establishment of a supreme international authority capable of prohibiting war and enforcing international justice? Dr. Lawrence envisaged this as coming

into being in the form of what he called the Primacy of the Great Powers, which in his day consisted of Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France and Italy. (America he looked upon as belonging to a world apart.) He pointed out how this Primacy of the great European Powers came into existence during the Napoleonic wars (1814-15), and how the Quadruple Allies of Chaumont and Vienna were subsequently reinforced by the addition of France (1818) and Italy (1867). He further illustrated the manner in which, during the seventy years 1815-84, the Great Powers had exercised their primacy; how they had secured the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece; how they had achieved the separation of Belgium from Holland; how they had again and again intervened decisively in the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, and so on. He expressed the confident hope that the beneficent operation of this "Vicinate of Europe," steadily growing in prestige and power, would accomplish the elimination of war and the inauguration of the reign of universal justice. "The human race," he says, "will in time outgrow war; and I think we may even now discern the general outline of the process. Perpetual peace will come as the result of a gradual evolution; and some idea of the nature and direction of the causes at work to produce it may be gathered from an historical consideration of the slow disappearance of private war, which was once far more common than public war is now, or has been among civilised states for many ages." He envisages the dawn of halcyon days. "In time," he prophesies, "by the slow and gradual operation of forces which are already in existence, war will be entirely abolished. Our descendants in the far future will look back upon it with the same mixture of wonder and contempt with which we look back upon the blood-feuds of our remote ancestors."

It is to be feared that the "far future" of Dr. Lawrence's day appears to be a still farther future to most of those who look round upon the world of the present time. For, first, the process of peaceful evolution which Dr. Lawrence described was interrupted in 1914 by the greatest and most general war ever known among men; secondly, this war was waged by its German initiators with a complete disregard of all the mitigations introduced into warfare by two centuries of international jurists, so that mankind was thrown back

where they have no intention of nesting. I once had a garden on a migration route. Every spring I heard the songs of warblers who would not nest in the garden, nor in the immediate vicinity. The same tree would provide a concert platform for some six or seven species. Moreover, some migrants travel in parties. You may hear six or more willow-warblers singing in the same small copse, and there will be none the following day. And on the return migration in autumn you may hear their song, to a lesser extent. Here is no relation between song and territory. It is, however, true that once these birds have settled down they do not sing much away from their territory. But I am not convinced that there is, even then, any connection in the *bird's mind* between his song and his territory. To say that birds never sing away from the territory is quite untrue. I have seen dippers fly past each other on the stream, settle and sing, and repeat the performance. And one could go on giving similar examples. Mr. Nicholson says that such extra-territorial songs differ greatly from territorial songs: are, in fact, sub-songs. I have never been able to detect the smallest difference. If the bird sings he sings as loudly, continuously and aggressively. To my ear there is no reason why these songs should not be given the status of what is called "true song."

There remains the other biological function of song—the attraction of wandering females. The old axiom was that birds of bright plumage have poor songs; and that few birds of even medium size could be considered songsters. Mr. Nicholson even goes as far as to maintain that, with the exception of birds living in colonies, song is the expedient needed by inconspicuous birds to compensate for being inconspicuous. He says: "In the breeding season the search of the hens for a mate, and the necessity which many birds feel of reserving against trespassers sufficient territory to secure the food supply of their young, makes it a real advantage to the cock to be able to make his presence widely known, and if he is too small or too quietly coloured to be able to attract attention automatically, as hawks do, he must use sound. That sound need not necessarily be vocal; it is arguable that the bleating snipe and the drumming woodpecker possess a song in the strictest sense. On the other hand, the hawfinch, bullfinch, shrike, kingfisher, and all our wagtails and crows have either very feeble songs or none at all; it seems safe to

suggest that, being conspicuous in colour and habits, they do not feel the need for it. The spotted flycatcher, 'conspicuous in its way of life, but by no means so in its plumage, bears this supposition out; another confirmation comes from the owls, which cannot see each other easily, compared with the diurnal hawks." It may be true that song in the case of certain species is used to attract wandering females. (I do not think it true of a single species. Mates are found easily by birds which have no regular song. And where the species is plentiful such an aid as song appears superfluous.) But it cannot by any stretch of the imagination be maintained that it is one of the chief functions of song. Mr. Nicholson's argument is sound only so long as it is not scrutinised. It seems strange that owls, which have no difficulty in picking voles from the hedgerows and mice from the stubble, should be unable to see their own kind. The spotted flycatcher, while of inconspicuous plumage and with little song, is no more conspicuous in habit than the chaffinch. On the other hand, the pied flycatcher is not only conspicuous in plumage and habit, but has a most distinctive song. And why should the chaffinch, which is in every way a conspicuous bird, have so loud and distinctive a song? If another example be needed there is the golden oriole—not an English resident, but is the theory confined to England?—which is thoroughly conspicuous in every way. Moreover, many species pair for life, whilst many pair before the winter flocks have broken up.

It is evident that the edifice raised by the territory theorists has not been built on sound foundations. They deal with song only so far as the passerine birds are concerned. Indeed they narrow song down still further: *they confine it to a section of the passerine birds in their territories*. They have conceived a theory and taken song to clothe it.

Then what of Mr. W. K. Richmond, who may be regarded as the leader of the other school? He starts from the biological basis: "As most birds sing only in the breeding season it is valid to believe that song was originally connected directly with breeding. It may also be taken as scientifically proved that the increase of song with the arrival of spring is physically connected with the growth of the sex organs of the male, and the dying away of song with their subsidence. . . . It is also true to say that birds sing when their energies are at their highest, and when their energy is being used in other directions,

(temporarily at any rate) into the condition of primitive barbarism from which it had so painfully emerged; and, thirdly, all subsequent efforts to rehabilitate the Concert of Europe and the reign of law have proved abortive. Hence the human race is once more faced, in an immensely aggravated form, with the same problem as faced Grotius three hundred years ago. The problem is immensely aggravated, because, on the one hand, it is much less easy to localise war now than it was in the seventeenth century, and, on the other hand, the weapons of combat to-day are so appallingly more deadly than those of Grotius's day that war is an immeasurably greater calamity now than it was then. A general European war to-day, waged with aircraft and poison gas, would devastate the Continent and would exterminate half its population.

How is it that the cause of peace has met with so grave a set-back within the last half-century? It is, of course, fundamentally because—for reasons which we are not now concerned to consider—the “Concert of Europe,” on which the hope of the world depended, became split up into two antagonistic groups. The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy (completed 1882) came to be faced by the Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Great Britain (completed 1907). Hence, on the one hand, the promising “Primacy of the Great Powers” came to an end, and in place of a single magistral body declaring international justice and maintaining European peace, there took shape two hostile bodies which by their rivalries and intrigues aggravated rather than composed all the quarrels that broke out among the minor powers of the Continent. Hence, too, on the other hand, these two antagonistic groups began to arm themselves on an increasingly gigantic scale in preparation for the great conflict which eventually flared up in 1914.

When the war was over a strenuous effort was made by the victors to re-create on a new and vast scale the International Authority necessary to secure justice and maintain peace. Thus the League of Nations came into being, and, in 1920, began to function. From the first it did, and it has during the seventeen years of its operation continued to do (though at extravagant expense), much useful work of a minor character. It has, for example, settled some three dozen petty disputes, several of which, but for its intervention,

would certainly have led to war. But it has wholly failed in the three major crises with which it has been called upon to deal. It failed to save China from Japanese aggression in 1932; it failed to save Abyssinia from Italian conquest in 1935; and it failed to prevent Germany from re-occupying and re-militarising the Rhenish provinces in 1936. It has thus shown itself incapable of performing the two great tasks for which it was instituted, namely, securing justice and maintaining peace. Hence the world is once again thrown back into the race for armaments and into a feverish preparation for war.

Why has the League of Nations failed and broken down? First and foremost, of course, because America, its main creator, has refused to join it; because Japan and Germany have left it; and because Italy, although nominally remaining a member, has defied and betrayed it. It has become but half a League, and a half that ominously resembles in its constitution the Triple Entente of 1907-14, with an appendage of satellites. Secondly, it has failed because its policy has been too much determined by the votes of its minor members who have little or no responsibility for the carrying out of its resolutions. Thirdly, it has failed because its major members—Great Britain, France and Russia—have not been prepared, at the time of the three great crises, to fulfil their obligations under Article XVI of the Covenant—the Article which says that “should any member of the League resort to war in disregard to its covenants . . . it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake,” etc. The failure in the Sino-Japanese dispute was primarily due to Great Britain's hesitation to risk a naval war in the Pacific; that in the case of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict was primarily due to the refusal of France to impose effective “sanctions” upon Italy. As a consequence, the dream of “collective security” is shattered: we are back in the “international anarchy” of 1907-14.

What is the remedy? Of the urgent need of a remedy there can be no question. Everyone realises that another general war would involve the total destruction of Western civilisation. Our papers, our magazines, our recent books, are full of discussions of this cardinal theme. Some authorities advocate the elimination of the sanctionist clauses from the

as in the feeding of the young, or when they are moulting, they cease to sing. Another factor is the presence of favourable conditions. Thus, if they are deprived of food, or if there is a sudden and violent drop in temperature, their singing is affected, and if unfavourable conditions continue it eventually stops. Such is the ardour of the singing bird in spring, however, that I have heard black-caps and garden warblers singing uninterruptedly when there was snow on the ground." He would not deny song to the sandpiper or the starling. And he realises that song has many different aspects. As an example he gives the case of a redstart: "I have seen a redstart sing in the assertive overbearing manner described by the theorists; every movement of the bird and the harsh emphatic manner in which it sang suggested the vilest of bad temper. But in the same afternoon I have seen the same bird in a calmer state of mind, warbling softly and contentedly in a self-absorbed manner." He goes on to point out that birds will sing when suddenly injured or at the point of death. So he arrives at the conclusion that song is expression. Birds sing not because of any obligation put upon them by natural selection, but simply as an outlet for immense energy. "They must sing or burst." Song is their safety-valve. Song, in Mr. Richmond's view, is the emotional expression of the bird's life.

In these days of scientific and pseudo-scientific exposition, such a solution may seem old-fashioned. (Though it is worthy of note that one modern, Monsieur Delamain, in his interpretation of bird-song has done no more than restate the old belief.) It must not, because of that, be discarded. Mr. Richmond is an eminently competent and very observant ornithologist. His solution to the problem is, I think, nearer the truth than that put forward by the supporters of the territory theory. It may even be that he has found the whole and correct answer to the question.

Does it not appear that our definitions are too narrow? Moreover, while we hasten to give definitions, we are not at all clear in our own minds as to what we mean by song. The thrush "sings," but the crow "croaks." Yet the crow has a wonderfully developed syrinx and a very large vocabulary. Apparently we term "song" only those sounds that fall pleasantly on our ears. The territory theorists go farther and deny that song (no matter how tuneful the sound may be)

occurs at all outside the territory. Such tuneful sounds are classified as "sub-song"; the untuneful are ignored. None of this allows for all those multitudinous sounds which Mr. E. W. Hendy has so aptly described as the "small talk of birds." And why do we attempt to confine song to the males alone?

What then is bird-song? It is essential to realise at the outset that this problem of song is not one problem but many. It might be divided into three main divisions; the origin, the growth and the functions of song, each in itself a distinct problem. Mr. Morris, in his book on bird song, uses three further divisions—spring, autumn and winter song. We might have difficulty in distinguishing between the three: but, despite this, I am of the opinion that many more categories could be fashioned, such as, to mention but two, pre-coition song and song for the delectation of the brooding female. And while it is impossible to deal with so diverse a subject within the span of a single essay, we shall, if we do not realise the diversity, lose all sight of the problem in a maze of contradictions.

Song is a vast phenomenon. Professor Newton said: "It seems impossible to draw any but an arbitrary line between the deep booming of the emeu, the harsh cry of the guillemot . . . the plaintive cry of the lapwing, the melodious whistle of the widgeon, 'the cock's shrill clarion,' the hoot of the owl, the solemn chime of the bellbird, the whip-cracking of the manakin, the chaffinch's joyous burst, or the hoarse croak of the raven." Brehm, too, though from a particular angle, expressed the same realisation: "Dominated by love the jay sings, whistles and murmurs, the magpie chatters, the croaking raven transforms its rough sounds into gentle soft notes, the usually silent grebe lets its voice be heard, the diver sings its wild yet tuneful ocean song, the bittern dips its bill under water that the only cry at its command may become a deep far-sounding booming." There must be something to unify all this. That unity is provided by sex. But we should be falling into a grave error if we put down all bird-song as an elaborate sex-talk. The facts indicate that song passes far beyond the mere expression of sex. For we know that a great many birds have a second singing after the urge of sex has died for the year. And we do not know that our migrant nesting birds do not sing when in their winter homes.

League Covenant and the reduction of the League itself to a merely advisory body. That policy leaves the problems of the securing of international justice and the maintenance of peace entirely unsolved. We should be back where we were in 1899 when the Hague Tribunal was set up. Others urge the strengthening of the sanctions and the increasing of the obligations of the members of the League. That policy is impossible, so long as America, Japan, Germany, and (virtually) Italy, remain outside the League.

Hence, in the opinion of the present writer, while the weakened and humiliated League is left alone to recover its prestige as best it may, and to perform such modest tasks as it can still effectively fulfil, the energies of all statesmen of goodwill should be concentrated upon the task of reviving the Concert of Europe, and restoring that "Primacy of the Great Powers" which appeared to Dr. Lawrence to be the true goal of the evolution of peace. That great task involves the healing of the schism that now divides Germany and Italy from France and Russia, and the uniting of them all in the support of law, the observance of treaties, the reduction of armaments, the administration of justice, and the establishment of peace. Upon Great Britain, which stands between the rival groups, the burden of reconciliation and re-unification mainly rests.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

THE CENTENARY OF ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE.

NOW that just over a century has elapsed since the birth of Algernon Charles Swinburne, on April 5th, 1837, it is due to the memory of a great poet that expression should be given calmly to the reason why his work ought to be read again now and why selections of it should be treated as treasures of permanent value. The task will be best undertaken by those who were undergraduates of Oxford over sixty-five years ago and can understand what the nature of the literary and artistic production—the æsthetic movement—of that time, which is associated with the names of Walter Pater, Swinburne, D. G. Rossetti and William Morris, really was. At the same time the influence of Ruskin also was at its fullest power. In the Oxford of our day his inaugural lectures as Slade Professor made an impression on young men who heard them in the crowded Sheldonian Theatre which will never be effaced. What they then learned from him about art and politics (in the widest sense) before his powers began to fail, should remain permanently a guide for them in life, and even when he seems extravagant there is wisdom in what he said which should be a "possession for ever."

In estimating Swinburne the first thing to do is to note that often there is a lack of restraint that makes us desire to let alone a large portion, it may perhaps be the greater portion, of what he has written. It is this that leads him so often to a kind of verbosity which impairs much of his work. At the same time it is freedom from restraint that makes his best work so supremely good. We may get rid of the kind of criticism still common which may be seen in some writers who prowling about to collect references to questions of sex and discourse on what they called the "fleshy school." We shall let all that alone for those "who like that kind of thing," and think of what Swinburne and others produced on subjects in which their knowledge and intense feeling made their work often of outstanding merit.

Two subjects of Swinburne's poetry in which he is supreme are, first, the sea, and second, children. Has any

Song, which originated as an expression of sex-desire, has evolved into language. To comprehend bird-song we must first realise that what we at present term song is in fact the language, the speech of birds. And this speech has, naturally, as many facets as has the life of a bird. Our ears are not attuned to all the many gradations of a single outburst. The language of birds, says Professor Garstang, "is always expressive of feelings rather than of things or thoughts, and is ultimately connected with conduct, so that the alarm note of the mother will stop the cheeping of her chicks within the egg-shell. We may distinguish it as a language of momentary emotions, including notes for calling, greeting, caution, surprise, alarm, defiance and encouragement, but for little or nothing else." One cannot doubt this if one watches birds. Their language is an outlet for all the emotions. Each bird personality expresses itself in its own way. Thus John Burroughs wrote: "The type of the lark's song is the grass, where the bird makes its home, abounding, multitudinous, the notes nearly all alike, and all in the same key, but rapid, swarming, prodigal, showering down as thick and fast as drops of rain in a summer shower." Emotion in all beings, human or otherwise, tends to be accompanied by motion. The internal emotions of the bird expressed in speech are accompanied by dancing, fluttering and soaring. As Wordsworth said: "And then my heart with pleasure fills and dances with the daffodils." This speech is the expression of the emotional excitement that is the bird.

The extent to which this power of speech is developed differs greatly from one species to another, even from one bird of a species to another. But it covers everything from the caw of the rook to what Professor Garstang terms "the regions of pure music" achieved by the thrush family. And the language of each species is understood clearly only by that species. Think for the moment of the call notes and alarm cries. These in related species are often very similar. And the alarm note of one bird is understood by birds of many different species. (The blackbird will warn a whole hedgerow; the jay a whole wood: the redshank all the birds of marsh and salting.) But the "songs," even of related species, are never alike. Evidently the "song" has a special recognitional value. And if you still doubt that song is really language or speech, think for the moment of the late summer sight of yellow-hammers

perched at intervals along a hedgerow. Each "sings" in turn. Those not "singing" cock their heads and listen. It is such a common sight that its significance is overlooked. There is, here, no attempt at warning nor any assertion of independence. It has frequently been suggested that these birds are indulging in competition. If that were so it would postulate an appreciation of the technique of song which has been proved to be absent in the female, and for the presence of which in the male we have no shadow of proof. Is it any the more anthropomorphic to suggest that these cocks are conversing? I think not. What we call song is speech.

Then do birds sing as we understand song? Do they sing from the pure joy of living? Of course they do. The territory theorists call it "sub-song." I have watched a blackbird shouting his heart out from a branch, and a little later watched and listened to the same bird on the same branch singing softly to himself, beautifully and with a wonderful mastery. There has never since that day been any doubt in my mind as to what is true song. Remember Mr. Richmond's redstart. Listen to a chaffinch, sitting on a fence and warbling to himself: to a starling on a chimney pot: to a linnet or a thrush. One can have no doubt. Indeed I would not deny song to any bird. Is not one of the most beautiful of all songs that of the red-backed shrike to whom we are accustomed to deny song?

"Sub-song" is true song. Divorced from speech, territory, hunger, labour. Divorced from everything save pleasure. That is song.

BRIAN VESEY-FITZGERALD.

poet ever written more beautifully on children than in his lines—

Of such is the Kingdom of Heaven ;
No sign that ever was given
To faithful or faithless eyes
Showed ever beyond clouds riven
So clear a paradise.
Earth's creeds may be seventy times seven
And blood has defiled each creed.

If of such be the Kingdom of Heaven
It must be Heaven indeed.

Or take the poem called *Herse*. Could there be a more perfect description of an infant child than in the line "Clenched hands and curled up feet"? Examples might be multiplied indefinitely. Why not collect them instead of harping perpetually on matters connected with sex, picking out what can be thought to be of unpleasant character in a mass of verse? As regards the sea—no one has ever written more beautifully or with fuller knowledge. That glorious poem on Loch Torridon and the joy of the swimmer exulting in his battle to the open sea has no equal for those who revel in the sea.

And scarce had I sprung to the sea
When the dawn and the water were wedded
the hills and the sky set free,
The chain of the night was broken : the waves
that embraced me and smiled
And flickered and fawned in the sunlight, alive,
unafraid, undefiled,
Were sweeter to swim in than air, though
fulfilled with the mounting morn,
Could be for the birds whose triumph rejoiced
that a day was born.
The kingdom of westward waters wherein when
we swam we knew
That the waves which we clove were boundless,
the wind on our brows that blew
Had swept no land and no lake, and had warred
not on town or tree
But came on us hard out of heaven
and alive with the soul of the sea.

The best of all his sea poems may be quoted at length as it is not now readily accessible. It appeared in the *English*

Illustrated long ago. The title, *The Casquettes*, refers to those bare rocks in the Channel Islands.

From the depths of the waters that lighten and darken
With change everlasting of life and of death,
Where hardly by noon if the lulled ear hearken
It hears the sea's as a tired child's breath,
Where hardly by night if an eye dare scan it
The storm lets shipwreck be seen and heard
As the reefs to the waves and the foam to the granite
Respond one merciless word.

Sheer seen and far, in the sea's live heaven,
A sea-mew's flight from the wild sweet land,
White-plumed with foam, if the wind wake, seven
Black helms as of warriors that stir not stand.
From the depths that abide and the waves that environ
Seven rocks rear heads that the midnight masks ;
And the strokes of the swords of the storm are as iron
On the steel of the wave-worn casques.

Here, walled in with the wild waste water,
Grew the grace of a girl's lone life,
The sea's and the sea-wind's foster-daughter
And peace was hers in the main mid strife.
For her were the rocks clothed round with thunder,
And the crests of them carved by the storm-smith's craft ;
For her was the mid storm rent in sunder
As with passion that wailed and laughed.

What an anthology could be compiled from the poems only which relate to the Cornish coast and the islands : *Kynance Cove*, that vocal rock, *In Guernsey*, *The Caves of Sark*, *In the Salt Marshes*, and many more. Other gems of Swinburne's poetry may be found in his verses on flowers. That on the sundew is a good example—others might be culled and remembered.

We who met in our college rooms in Oxford more than sixty years ago may well prefer the poems of Swinburne, Rossetti and William Morris and the careful prose of Pater of Brazenose, whom we used to see on our walks near Oxford, to the modern free verse. With what relief we turn from the modern work in art and poetry which is praised to-day by those who have an unnatural craving for anything which is ugly or unintelligible. Free verse and "Surrealism," whatever

RUSSIA'S RECENT MINING AND METALLURGICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

SOVIET planners have for some years past been engaged in the formidable task of transforming a vast, backward, agricultural territory into a first-rate industrial power. Any country ambitious of industrial advance must for preference possess (or have easy and uninterrupted access to) the tonnage minerals rather than those measured in pounds or ounces. Has Russia the basic minerals essential for building up an industrial civilisation, and if so, what progress has she made in matters mining and metallurgical? These questions are best answered by surveying the geographic distribution of Russia's mineral riches, study of important groups of minerals—fuel minerals (and power resources), iron and ferro-alloy minerals, precious metals and leading non-ferrous and non-metallic minerals (potash, phosphates and sulphur), and regional location of mining and metallurgical industries.

The 1930 session of the Communist Congress decreed that the pace of the geological surveying "must considerably exceed the tempos of development of other industries in order that the material basis of the latter may be ready on time." When retrenchment and axeing of scientific departments were the order of the day the world over, the budget appropriations for Russian Geological Survey work amounted to no less than 400 to 500 million roubles between 1929 and 1933. In 1932 alone there were more than 150 geophysical parties searching for hidden minerals in Soviet Russia. The year 1933 marked the overhauling and decentralisation of activities, the Gold Mining Division was placed in charge of A. P. Serebrovski and the Base Metal Section was headed by A. S. Shakhmourlov. Prospectors and technicians began to be treated as privileged persons. Whereas seventeen years ago only 10 per cent. of the area of the Soviet territory had been geologically explored, the area so studied totalled no less than 45 per cent. at the beginning of 1936.

The Soviet geological and prospecting parties deserve the highest commendation for the determination and energy with which they have pushed forward their work against overwhelming odds. The very high speed of execution has, not unnaturally, had the effect of here and there lowering exacting scientific requirements. In their enthusiasm the

Soviet scientists have, when dealing with mineral prospects, on occasion, used terms like "proven" and "probable" where the more cautious American and British geologists and mining engineers would have preferred the terms "probable" and "possible." Even so, the possibilities of the nation's potential mineral wealth can to-day be better appreciated.

Russia's mineral riches lie in far-flung localities. From Moscow the apatite deposits of the Kola peninsula are nearly 1,400 miles north; the varied minerals of the Urals, over 1,000 miles east; the productive oilwells, 1,500 miles south; the non-ferrous minerals of Kazakstan, 2,000 miles east and south and the 1,400-mile coal-to-iron haul from the Kuznetsk to the Urals must be by rail (there being no chain of lakes as in North America). Most of the mineral deposits are found in the steppes and mountainous parts on the periphery of the vast plain in two zones, the Northern Zone, forming a semi-circle within European Russia, embracing the lake district to the north-west, the southern Donetz Basin and the eastern Urals, and the Outer Zone formed by the Caucasus, the boundary mountains in Asiatic Russia, namely, those of Eastern Siberia and the Altai. The location of the deposits is unfavourable in relation to historic centres of population and manufacturing industry. Seventy-five per cent. of the territory and over that amount of the mineral wealth lie in the Asiatic part of Soviet Russia. The vast Siberian plain is covered for the most part by glacial deposits towards the north and loess in the south and lacks suitable road-building materials, entailing an enormous initial outlay on all forms of inland transport.

Russia, like the United States, is rich in both coal and petroleum. She ranks third in the extent of her coal reserves among the various countries of the world—the reserves were computed in 1934 to amount to 1,200,000 million tons (a six-fold increase over that of 1913), many new deposits having been located at Karaganda, Kazakstan, Eastern Siberia and Pechora River Basin. The Soviet production of coal and lignite increased from 16.52 million metric tons in 1925 to 108.9 million tons in 1935. The output of coal rose from 14 to 81 million metric tons in European Russia and from 2.1 to 27.9 million tons in Asiatic Russia during the same period, indicating the rapid industrialisation of Asiatic Russia in the intervening years. Manufactured coke for metallurgical

that name covers, are utterly opposed to the feeling of those who look in poetry for the fullest expression of the truth about the things they know and care for—for the sea with all that it means, and for young children and for flowers. On these subjects is there anything in literature equal to Swinburne at his best? Only—it would be better if he were not so profuse and had not given way to the intoxication of his own verbosity, but had more frequently pruned with care.

Results of Swinburne's lack of restraint, "letting himself go" when the subject demands it, are finely seen in some of his utterances on political events. After the Franco-Prussian War, for instance, what he says of France in *Songs Before Sunrise* gives the best expression of what many at the time felt most strongly.

Who is this that rises red with wounds and splend—
All her breast and brow made beautiful with scars,

In her eyes the light and fire of long pain ended.
In her lips a song as of the morning stars.

Although our sympathies at the beginning of the Franco-German War were with the Germans and German victories were welcomed, after Sedan and the deposition of Napoleon III, a rapid change of feeling took place. The dramatic flight of Gambetta and his action in raising troops, any successes of Chanzy on the Loire, and the attempts of Faidherbe or of Bourbaki to resist the invaders, awakened enthusiasm for France. Then when terms of peace were dictated by the Germans at Versailles, our sympathy was entirely with Thiers in his efforts to mitigate the severity of the conquerors. Swinburne's *Songs Before Sunrise* must be remembered as a splendid expression of a feeling which was very general among young Oxford men of the time.

It is impossible to speak duly of Swinburne's work without referring to the Pre-Raphaelite movement and to his association with Rossetti and with William Morris. At the time when the frescoes in the Union were even then fading (but, I am told, have been successfully restored recently), warm discussions arose among the undergraduates of the day who had disliked Robert Buchanan's brutal attack in 1871 on the "fleshly school." We did admire, for example, the work

of D. G. Rossetti—such poems as the *Blessed Damsel*, especially the beautiful picture:

Her seemed she scarce had been a day
One of God's choristers:
The wonder was not yet quite gone
From that still look of hers;
Albeit, to them she left, her day
Had counted as ten years.

The *Burden of Nineveh* also made a specially strong appeal to some. So did the work of William Morris in the *Life and Death of Jason* and the *Earthly Paradise*. The opening lines of that poem can always be pointed to as among the poetic gems of the last century:

Of life and death I have no power to sing.
So with this earthly paradise it is
If ye will read aright and pardon me
Who strive to build a shadowy isle of bliss
Midmost the beating of the steely sea
Where tossed about all hearts of men must be,
Whose ravening monsters mighty men shall slay
Not this poor singer of an empty day.

Yet the obsession of Buchanan's talk on the "fleshly school" seemed to have seized on many undergraduates even with regard to Morris. I believe that it was in the rooms occupied by the brothers Asquith in Balliol, where some of us used to meet, that an undergraduate alleged, like many others, to be the cleverest man in the college, walked about denouncing the "whole school," and Morris in particular as the "purveyor of the subtlest poison of them all." To those who had the privilege of meeting Morris much later and hearing something of his industrial work and socialist activities, such an utterance must sound incredible.

It would be a useful task, in recalling the Swinburne Centenary, to select and reprint together first his own poems on the sea, on children, on flowers, on the hopes for France, and some others, then D. G. Rossetti's and Morris's best. From Burne-Jones, Madox Brown and others of the Pre-Raphaelites, the illustrations could be chosen, and the whole volume would be a valued permanent treasure for all who care for good art or literature and a relief from the ugly and

industries mounted up from 1.35 to 16 million metric tons between 1925 and 1935. In recent years there have been noteworthy advances in mechanisation of mining, exploitation of local deposits to obviate long-distance hauling of supplies and augmenting the output in the Kuznetsk basin—the source of supply for the Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk steelworks—as well as in the Karaganda and Bureya fields.

Russia is second only to the United States as a petroleum producer. Her total production of crude petroleum from the start of the industry up to January 1st, 1936, amounted to 2,206,000,000 metric tons and her “proven” reserves stood at the beginning of last year at 2,830,000,000 metric tons. The output of crude petroleum during 1936 was 192 million barrels. Unlike the United States, where the unrestricted enjoyment of “Capture Law” is resulting in colossal waste of natural power, the nationalisation of the U.S.S.R. fields conduces to the maximum recovery of oil and the conservation of the life of the fields (the same result is achieved in Iran and Iraq by the “unit” system of management).

Opening of lower horizons has assured the Baku oil reserves for many years, new fields have been found in the old districts of Grozny and Maikop, and new oil-yielding regions in Central Asia, on the Volga, in the Urals and in Western Siberia. The Central Oil Administration is introducing the “thermic” method with a view to win as far as possible the whole of the oil contained in the strata, as with the usual methods of working only 25 to 30 per cent., and at best 50 per cent., of the underground oil is extracted. The country has also oil-shale deposits; oil-shale is mined at present at Gdow, the production for 1936 is estimated at 300,000 tons. Her oil-shale reserves are estimated at 55,000 million metric tons.

Russia's power output has increased from 2,925,000,000 kilowatt-hours in 1925 to 32,000,000,000 in 1936, the country ranking as the third—after the United States and Germany—largest power producer in the world. One need only allude to two gigantic power schemes now under construction: the “metalliferous” Altai will soon have a large supply of cheap power from a plant that is being built at Ust-Kamenogorsk on the Irtysh River to develop 960,000 k.w., twice the output of the Dneproges plant, and the Trans-Ural Transmission Line of 220,000 volts, 700 miles long, will supply electrical energy to regions rich in minerals, namely, the northern districts of

the Sverdlovsk area. The first section, Magnitogorsk-Zlatovsk, of 100 miles is nearing completion. Plans have now been approved for the construction of a canal to connect the Rivers Don and Volga, a scheme comparable in its magnitude with the cutting of the Panama Canal. As a result of the raising of the Upper Don the difference between its level and that of the Volga will be 236 feet, the waters released from one river to the other being harnessed to drive the turbines of electric power stations. The project envisages the erection of three power stations with a total capacity of 580,000 k.w.

Recent survey work by Soviet geologists has revealed that Russia possesses iron ores adequate, if not ample, for her expanding domestic requirements. Russia is the leading producer of manganese in the world, her chromite reserves are substantial though a good deal of the ore is low-grade. She has recently struck some promising nickel deposits. She is singularly deficient in tungsten and molybdenum and she has no known deposits of either cobalt or vanadium of economic value. Estimates of Russia's iron ore reserves amount to 10,612 million metric tons, of limonite, magnetite and hematite. These do not include enormous ferruginous-quartzite masses with 35–50 per cent. of iron. Siberia's share of the total is nearly 1,250 million tons. Her iron deposits are, however, awkwardly situated with regard to coking coal. Thus the rich magnetite masses of the Urals must in the main get their coking coal from the Kuznetsk basin, a distance of some 1,400 miles, and to a minor extent from the Karaganda field at a distance of 700 miles. And iron ore found near Kuznetsk needs to be supplemented by shipments from the Urals, which constitute the return freight for coal carried west. Notwithstanding this handicap, the Soviet iron and steel industry has registered remarkable progress in recent years. Expenditure on heavy industries totalled 7,000,000,000 roubles in 1935, the programme including the construction of a locomotive building plant with capacity for producing 450 full-sized locomotives annually, a car shop to turn out 50,000 open freight cars and 5,000 cars of other types in the Kuznetsk district.

The first completed blast furnace of the Azov Steel Works turned out 270,300 tons of pig iron in 1934 and it is planned to produce a substantial tonnage of rails at Azovstahl before the end of the year. Errors of construction delayed output

unintelligible stuff of which so much is put before the public at the present time.

Of course, no attempt is here made to give an account of all that is of great permanent value in Swinburne's work. No express reference has been made, for example, to great poems such as *Atalanta in Calydon* and *Erectheus*, where classical influence is strongest. That task must be left to others. But those only who were young men sixty-five or more years ago, especially in Oxford, can quite understand what the work associated with the names of Swinburne, Rossetti and Morris—with Ruskin and Pater, and with the Pre-Raphaelite artists, really meant. It is well to have the evidence of the one or two of them who are still living—before it is too late.

ALFRED HOPKINSON.

THE NEW MOVEMENT IN CHINA : KWANGSI PROVINCE.

KWANGSI has no fine physical resources. There is, perhaps, more waste land there than anywhere else in China. A considerable section of the province is hilly if not mountainous and the soil is apparently bitter and not adapted to the growth of rice or other foodstuffs. The province is thinly peopled, the population being less than fourteen millions. But the government of Kwangsi has organised institutions which play an effective part in the reconstruction work of the whole country. The civil governor, Chairman Huang, and two military men, Marshal Li and Marshal Pei, have worked harmoniously together for six years and have given the province such peace and good order that it is possible to traverse the country from north to south or east to west without the slightest fear of attack from bandits, brigands or any lawless folk.

The administration is on definitely militaristic lines, and that is strange when the tradition of China is to despise the soldier. The profession of arms in Europe was sanctified and elevated into something noble and worthy when the Crusades took place and the Church blessed the sword in the righteous cause for which it was to be used. But China has had no sanctification of her arms, for there religion is not a dominant force. The soldier has never been accepted socially. He was illiterate and cruel, an outcast and a brigand when he was not enrolled in the ordinary ranks of the army; at best he was a regrettable necessity. An old Chinese saying was that good iron is not made into nails neither is a good son turned into a soldier; the soldier was a destructive and not a creative agent, and for that reason he was feared and hated. But in Kwangsi province to-day we have a situation which reverses that idea. Huang, Li and Pei have achieved the impossible: they have defied tradition and asserted that the soldier can rejuvenate ancient China. They have claimed that the work of social reconstruction, the development of educational facilities as well as the defence of the State are within the sphere of the soldier's activities and that only by the infusion of the military spirit into these schemes can the languor, inertia and lethargy of old China be overcome: and moreover they have established centres where these schemes

at the famous Zaporozphe Steel Works. The sheet mill at this plant is expected eventually to produce annually 700,000 tons of automobile body sheets employing over 30,000 hands. Production of steel tubing is being speeded up. On February 1st last the Stalin Iron and Steel Plant at Magnitogorsk completed its fifth year of production. During that period it has produced 5 million tons of pig iron, 2.6 million tons of steel, and 2 million tons of rolled metal and more than 18 million tons of ore have been raised from the Magnitogorsk mine. The estimated output of iron and steel in the U.S.S.R. for 1937 is 16 million tons of pig iron, 20 million tons of steel, and 15.5 million tons of rolled metal, as against 14.5 millions, 16.3 millions, and 12.4 millions respectively in 1936.

The Caucasian manganese ore deposits are the largest in the world, and Russia's reserves of manganese ore are reckoned at 640 million metric tons. Nikopol, the chief producing centre of manganese, is connected with the Dneiper hydro-electric plant. The new concentration plant set up at Chiaturi started work late in 1935, and a second plant is under construction. Nikopol has reserves of 398 million tons of ore. Near Labino and Maikop Russian geologists claim recently to have discovered a deposit containing some 33 million tons of ore. The Urals are estimated to contain 795,000 tons of high-grade and 2,707,000 tons of lean ore. Russian manganese ore production has mounted up from 1,254,000 tons in 1913 to 2,377,000 tons in 1935. Russia has become the second largest producer of chromite in the world. Her exports have declined due to rising domestic demand. Reserves are reported to be extensive (round about 15 million tons), but the ores generally are low-grade. The region adjoining Khalilov in Bashkir has recently been leading in chromite production. The production of the ore has risen five-fold since 1913.

Russian nickel deposits occur near Orsk and Aktubinsj in the Urals, and in 1934 a refinery was completed at Ufalei with a plant capable of producing 3,000 tons of ferronickel. Last year a plant with a production capacity of 500 tons of metal was under construction at Orsk, to commence operations in 1937. Smaller plants adjoining the ore deposits are being erected at the Kola peninsula and in the Norlisk district, Siberia. Wolfram deposits are found in Rudney, Altai, in quartz veins, but the quantity available is not known. The

Agarak area in the Caucasus is estimated to contain some 25,000 tons of molybdenum awaiting development.

Communist Russia is furnishing the capitalist countries of the world with a considerable addition to their monetary base. The Soviet gold production has increased eleven-fold in twelve years—from 693,000 fine ounces in 1925 to 7,356,000 fine ounces in 1936, and the continuance of the present plans for development is expected to bring production up to the 1935 level (about 10.7 million fine ounces) of South Africa by 1940. This spectacular increase is in part due to the intensive exploitation of the placer deposits, old and new, in Siberia. But there is little doubt that Russia is rich in auriferous veins as well. Thirty-five years back a well-known American statistician and mining engineer, C. W. Purlington, after a detailed examination of the Siberian fields, wrote: "I regard it not an unsafe prediction to estimate the Siberian annual output at \$200,000,000 for a period of at least thirty years provided American machinery and gold-mining methods are installed throughout the territory now occupied by the Russian and Siberian prospectors." Auriferous areas of potential importance lie in the mountain ranges of the Mongolian border and along the Manchurian boundary (the Balay gold mine and the Darasun mines). The Lena (Eastern Siberia) and Aldan (Yakutia) fields between them accounted for 60 per cent. of the 1935 output. The railroad completed in the last quarter of 1936 branching from the trans-Siberian railway at Taishet, 400 miles west of Irkutsk and extending north-east beyond Lake Baikal and joining the trans-Siberian railway at Khabarovsk, runs close to important gold-fields, and as such should facilitate their mechanisation and further stimulate gold production. In the Urals near Sverdlovsk, preparatory work is well under way on a gold property which promises to be the largest mine in the Soviet Union. Gold veins have also been located in the Schoria mountains where previously only placer deposits were known. Placers have been found widely distributed in the Upper Amur Region.

The Soviet silver supply is apparently ample for domestic requirements as many of the precious and base metal properties carry silver. The Russian silver production rose from 300,000 fine ounces in 1930 to 1,322,000 fine ounces in 1934. Though Canada led the world in the production of platinum and allied metals in 1935, Russia is still responsible for more

are being worked out with tremendous energy. The soldier saint may not exist in Kwangsi, but the soldier social reformer does; and while China will never yield allegiance to the soldier, she will gladly respect and even revere the soldier who will bring about improved social conditions.

The centre where training for service to the province is carried on is the National Foundation Militia School in Nanning. Here there is accommodation for two thousand students, who stay a minimum period of six months but may stay for as long as two years if their educational attainments are low. The set purpose of the authorities is to abolish illiteracy throughout the province by the year 1939, and this institution is designed to equip the teachers who will achieve that object. There is no suggestion whatever of the black coat and white collar here, for all are in uniform and under strict discipline. There are endless dormitories with the beds in two tiers as in ships. A single blanket, a hard board, a towel, a tin mug, and a tooth brush seem to be the only possessions of the students. They parade at 6.30 a.m. for military drill and then proceed to lessons on military training, the fundamentals in arithmetic, reading, and writing, and afterwards to the open fields for lessons in the best methods of practical farming and the rearing of animals, especially pigs and chickens. There are two meals a day, but if the student has pocket-money he may supplement these, though for most youths the food provided is adequate. The students look healthy and vigorous and are keyed up with the knowledge that the independence and security of the province and of China lies in their hands. The whole is a kind of standing camp run on the most Spartan lines, devoted to the creation of the soldier citizen.

When these youths have been drilled in the fundamentals of education they are sent back to the villages, and there they have the onerous duty of reorganising village life in its three-fold aspects, or as the government says, in self-defence, self-government, and self-sufficiency. This means the creation of a militia, the establishment of a school, and the organisation of social services. The young man has therefore a full-time job for which the salary is extremely small. The old tradition whereby the village greybeard or the oldest inhabitant had the chief control is gone. The young man is backed by the central authority and is at the end of a telephone of which

one has been installed in each of the 24,000 villages in the province. The free school is not only for the children who must attend in order to learn the characters, but also for the adults who do not know how to read.

Then the formation of co-operatives, about which the young man has learned in his school in Nanning, is part of his work. The rates of interest are high in China because the farmer has nothing to give as a pledge except his word of honour that he will repay when the next harvest is reaped; and where there is misrule and uncertainty in addition to the possibility of failure of crops because of bad weather conditions, the risks of non-repayment are very high and the rate of interest corresponds with them. The idea here in Kwangsi is to get rid of the extortionate interest that is charged—3 to 4 per cent. per month—when farmers are compelled to seek advances in order to carry them over to the next harvest. In several villages there are stores of rice which belong to the village as a whole and to which farmers have contributed from their surpluses. This reserve is used partly to relieve the distress arising when bad harvests occur and partly for the raising of loans which can now be on a purely commercial basis with a solid guarantee of repayment. At Si Hoi, near Wuming, an experiment is being carried out which resembles communism, though it is not called by that name. It was not possible to find out whether expropriation had taken place, but there was definitely a rearrangement of the farming land. Instead of small separate plots for rice, vegetables, timber, fruit and cattle, the whole was taken together and divided up into one area for rice, another for vegetables, another for timber, and so on, and the whole had become communal property. Here again was the barn for the storage of the surplus grain.

Another feature of ordinary village life is the levy on farmers' time for work in making roads which link up the village with the nearest main road. Anyone may be called upon to do this, for it is regarded as work of national importance. It is, of course, based on the German idea of the labour camp to which students from the secondary schools are sent to render public service before proceeding further in their studies. In Kwangsi everyone is called upon—the cook-boy, the dispenser in the hospital, the school teacher and the soldiers in the army. At the present moment a new road between Kweilin and Wuchow is under construction and will

than a third of the world's output of this group of metals, a position she owes to her Uralian deposits.

Russia is to-day better able to produce substantial tonnages of base metals from domestic sources. Recent discoveries have raised her copper reserves to 9.4 million tons of metal. The copper mines are in the Ural and Caucasus mountains and the steppes of Kazakstan and Siberia. With railroads reaching many of the largest mines, their mechanisation marching apace and the setting up of additional smelters, Russia's copper production is expected to total 150,000 tons this year. The leading lead deposits of the Soviet Union are found in the Ridder district west of the Altai mountains, at Achesai and Kara-Kan-Sai to the north-west of Turkestan and north of Vladivostok in the Maritime Province. Her lead output has increased five-fold between 1930 and 1936, and reserves of lead in terms of metal amount to over 9 million tons. The completion last year of additional power, milling and smelting facilities at Ridder should add materially to the Union's lead production in the near future. Zinc ores are associated with lead minerals and Russia produced 99,000 tons of spelter last year. Cadmium, a by-product from the electrolytic smelting of zinc ores, is highly valued by the Soviets as an excellent substitute for tin, since Russia has no known workable tin deposits. The country's bauxite deposits occur in the Urals and the Ukraine territory, and readily available reserves of the mineral are reckoned at 8.9 million tons. Russian aluminium production increased eight-fold between 1933 and 1936. Soviet technicians are planning to utilise the extensive nepheline deposits of the Kola-Kandalaksha region for the manufacture of aluminium.

Of late extremely rich and valuable beds of potash salts have been located at Salikamsk, Churtan, and in the environs of Orenburg, Kirghiz Republic. With an output of 150,000 tons of K_2O in 1935, Russia was the fourth leading potash producer in the world. Her apatite deposits are found in the Kola Peninsula and she has sulphur reserves to the extent of 14 million tons. To complete the picture, Soviet Russia has substantial reserves of asbestos and magnesite, while mercury, antimony, bismuth and many minerals of the rare group await development.

"Russia suffers from distances," and the geographical distribution of her minerals—particularly the relation between

her iron ores and coking coal—is not all that could be desired, entailing an enormous outlay in transport charges. The Soviet planners are up against formidable obstacles imposed by factors of physical and economic geography. It is then not surprising that the authorities have very wisely decided to divide the territory on a regional basis, making each "natural" region as self-sufficient as possible to reduce the burden of transport charges and to strengthen the strategic and defence needs. Thus lignite and peat will furnish Moscow and its environs with power; peat and local water-power will do similar service to Leningrad. Power developments in the Urals, Caucasus and Altai regions have already been noticed. The development of all areas situated beyond the 62° N. latitude—nearly two-thirds of the Soviet territory—has been entrusted to the Central Administration of the Northern Sea Route Company under the chairmanship of the heroic explorer and scientist, Professor Otto Schmidt. Realising that without aviation the scheme of industrialising and opening transport routes in the Soviet Arctic would be impossible, the Soviets are pushing forward projects for navigating the whole arctic route under all conditions. The timber port of Igarka, the industrial town of Nordvykstroy and the meteorological station at Port Dickson are all humming with activity to-day. Other new industrial towns are Kirovsk, well within the arctic circle with 40,000 people, and Magnitanya, south Urals, with 170,000 inhabitants.

With the approach of the Third Five-Year Plan the activities of the Russian Academy of Sciences will undergo a decided change. It will actively assist the State Planning Committee in the drawing-up of the new Plan. The problems it is determined to solve relate to the development of geological, geochemical and geophysical methods of prospecting for useful minerals, especially tin, rare metals and petroleum; unification of the electric power system throughout the U.S.S.R. with high voltage transmission; rationalisation and extension of the use of natural gas and by-product gas from industrial plants; development of telemechanics (long-distance control of machinery) and extension of automatic processes in industry through application of theoretical physics.

Russia then ranks as the third greatest power in the world, coming after the United States and the British Commonwealth reckoned as a unit, on the strength of her mineral

be completed before the end of the year. The labourers on this work are the soldiers in Marshal Li's army.

In all villages more hygienic conditions have to be adopted and a livelier interest in public affairs must be aroused. It is no longer necessary to beat a gong and summon the villagers to hear the words spoken by the magistrate. The government messages are posted in simple language on the walls for all to read. There is a village meeting once every month in which the plans for the next month are discussed and the work to be done is explained. This provides the village leader—not elder—with an opportunity for urging his team forward and spurring them on to greater effort.

Another interesting educational centre about thirty miles from Nanning is the military training school at Wuming. Junior Middle School boys who wish to proceed to higher studies may go straight here: the period of training therefore falls about the sixteenth year of the student's age. Here again as at the Foundation Militia School at Nanning the life is Spartan in the extreme, for it is designed to keep the educated classes in touch with the stern realities and necessities of rural life. The whole is under the control of a genial and energetic person, General Fung, who sees to it that military discipline is strictly enforced. While the major portion of the time is devoted to military exercises and a study of military technique, there are other lessons too, especially those dealing with civics and the re-creation of the national spirit, and there are dramatic performances designed to promote loyalty and co-operation. The numbers here are not so large as in the school at Nanning, but the educational standard is higher and more uniform since all the students have had continuous schooling up to their present age. Everyone, of course, is in uniform and is familiar with the bugle calls and military routine generally.

Higher education is reserved for those who are willing to qualify as soldiers and who will be ready when the time comes to play a part in the defence of the nation instead of merely urging others, by telegrams and speeches, to do so for them. Students who do not undertake the particular Wuming training must still devote twenty hours a week in the first half of the year in their Senior Middle School to military training, and after that, as in their earlier schooldays, three to four hours a week. By the time the youth has passed through this

ordeal he is familiar with all the details of a soldier's life. The final test applied to the Wuming students on the completion of their course is the march back to Nanning, a distance of thirty miles, in one day. With their certificate of proficiency they may present themselves to the Senior Middle School and later the University for admission: without it, unless they have obtained a medical certificate—a thing that is extremely difficult to get and is given only in cases of tuberculosis and suchlike—they can get no farther.

No schools are free from military control, and on every staff there is a large proportion of military officers whose duty it is to see that the military work is done completely and efficiently. In one Senior Middle school, for example, there were eighty persons on the staff, of whom twenty were military representatives, twenty on the administrative side, and six for the political propaganda, that is for the teaching of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles and the general subject of civics.

The University at Wuchow is typical of University life and of the spirit of Kwangsi generally. It stands in a spacious compound, and like all Chinese universities it is residential, though the accommodation for sleeping is on Spartan lines. There is no yielding anywhere in this province to the allurements of ease, comfort or luxury, for the first demand is for learning, and as not enough money is available everything else must be sacrificed. The two faculties in this city university are engineering and pure science with some reference to agriculture. The shops and laboratories are well equipped and the keynote of education here, as elsewhere in Kwangsi, is the application of science to industry, agriculture and warfare. Pictures of gas masks and anti-gas methods already adorn the walls of one of the science rooms. Higher education of the old type which had no reference to the practical or material issues of life, but which dealt with literature, the humanities and ethics, has no place in this scheme of work. Wuchow knows nothing of it. Bessemer and Darwin are far more important names than Confucius and Mencius. The old idea of education as a process which unfitted a person for the social stratum in which he was born and elevated him into the aristocracy of letters, thereby excusing him from all future effort in the realm of industry, commerce, or agriculture, is a thing of the past. The literati with their long coats and anæmic faces have given place to the soldier student dressed

resources (actual and potential). She will, in the first instance, utilise to the full her local resources for internal development, and her base metals are not likely to compete for a place in the world markets for some years to come. Soviet Russia is the only power in the world with a rapidly increasing population and improving standard of life. While half Europe is under the grip of Fascist dictators, Stalin, Russia's supreme dictator, is inaugurating a constitution embodying principles which look startlingly liberal. If economic history teaches one lesson, it is that a country with an increasing population and a rising standard of life like Russia will come to the rescue of nations looking for outside markets in a world in which international trade has become almost stationary. Such recovery as there has been from the depression has been mainly local and internal due to building boom and expenditure on defence equipment, and the population, in the Occident at any rate, is actually showing signs of decline.

V. S. SWAMINATHAN.

WHY NOT OUR OWN PHYSICAL CULTURE ?

IT is not often that practically the whole public, M.P.s and all, genuinely and heartily endorse the policy of the Government. But this is certainly the case with the recent decision to make a grant of more than £2,000,000 in the cause of vigorous health. The wonderful results of physical drills and health-culture in Germany and elsewhere have helped, at last, to stir up England to do something in the right direction.

The attitude of politicians and others has changed. I shall never forget an interview that I had, before the Great War, with Lord Balfour (then Mr. A. J. Balfour). I had been on the Continent to represent England, with the late Mr. Macdonald Smith (inventor of the "Full Contraction" System), on an International Committee of Physical Education. This came to nothing; but it gave me an insight into the benefits that exercises, even if far from ideal or even attractive, could bring to the fitness and the appearance of hundreds of thousands of people. I urged upon Mr. Balfour the vital importance of the right kind—or kinds—of physical culture and exercises for the nation in general. The influence of exercise on mental and social as well as physical well-being seemed to be a sealed subject to him. I can recall only one reason he gave for refusing the idea, and that was all the satisfaction I could obtain: it was that he could get his golf!

Since that time, various individuals and institutions have worked enthusiastically and persistently. We have been told a part of the aims of those who will try to make Britain fitter. Games-players, a Swedish gymnastic teacher, a Morris dancer, organisers of institutions, are being called in to manage the scheme, which will be financed to quite a sensible extent by the Government. The plans include, rightly, swimming-pools, gymnasia, playing-fields and facilities for some games, and non-compulsory exercises. Those who are considering the problems will naturally ask a number of questions. Here are a few:

1. What provision will there be for simple, interesting, inexpensive games like "hand-ball" (or fives), adapted indoor cricket and football and hockey (splendid sport and exercise), especially under cover in cities, and by the right sort of artificial light; so

in grey cotton uniform, devoted to games and drill and experimental work on the model farm, in the engineering workshops or in the science laboratories.

Nemesis has overtaken the student body in the province of Kwangsi—instead of frequent strikes, boycott of teachers, freedom from punishment and chastisement, a rigid discipline is enforced. The student has to be as familiar with the rifle and the spade as with the brush for writing, and instead of education lifting him into the realm of the privileged parasite, it insists upon him sharing in the everyday work of the world or, at least, being practically acquainted with its problems. Instead of the students being the masters of the situation as has frequently happened in the past, largely because they have been used by outside persons, or because of sheer incompetence on the part of the administration, they are, in Kwangsi, subjected to a discipline which has no parallel elsewhere. The punishments for breaking rules are first of all a warning, secondly a form of pack drill, thirdly confinement in a room for a day or more, and lastly expulsion.

The training, then, is severe, but the rewards are fairly high since the government can absorb practically all the products of the senior schools into their service as their need for educated men is great. The new officials are all young men: even the magistrates of such important centres as Yang So, Wat Lo, Luchow, Nanning and Kweilin were not more than thirty to thirty-five years old. While the young man might well complain of his drastic training, he does not do so for he recognises that it is the price one pays for a government post, and because he believes that only by such training can his country be saved.

All the government officials on the administrative side must adopt the simple grey uniform and the military cap, and over the left pocket wear a badge which shows the name, function, and grade of the wearer. The women employees are dressed in exactly the same fashion—trousers, tunic, and military cap, all complete—but they are distinguishable from the men by a double row of buttons on the tunic instead of a single one as worn by the men. Any attempt on the part of the women at personal adornment is severely discouraged by the government. The hair is cut fairly short and cosmetics are strictly forbidden, since the duty of the woman is to concentrate all her energies, mental and physical, on her work

and not on her own person. She must seek distinction by raising the standard of efficiency in her department and not clamour for the attention of others to her personal charms, for in the sphere of government work such things are at a great discount. The more they forget themselves and remember only their work, the more they commend themselves to the authorities, which aim at perfecting the machinery of government and not at enhancing the prestige of the individual servant.

Here is a vigorous youth movement which bears all the impress of the German character; here is a new form of religion, a dedication of oneself to the service of the State—as in Russia—and a suppression of the individual's claim to a separate private life, for not only must the servant conform to the regulations by day but he must refrain from indulgence by night, for his business is to set a good example. Gambling and carousing are strictly forbidden to these officials in Kwangsi and the penalties for disobedience are severe and generally effective, for in a poverty-stricken province a good post is not easily obtained when one has been cashiered, and with recalcitrant servants even more severe measures than loss of position are sometimes taken. The trinity in power, Chairman Huang, Marshal Li, and Marshal Pei, are themselves convinced of the need for reform in social life, and through the military power they control they supply the sanctions for the application of the new principles. But the officials are not so much slaves of a régime which they hate as people who are voluntarily seeking to create a new China and are ready to submit to a discipline which they earnestly believe will lead to a revival of the national spirit and thereby to the salvation of the country.

One of the agencies used in this campaign for social reconstruction, educational development, and national defence is intense anti-Japanese propaganda. It is an important part of the activities of the schools. It is a recognised feature in the work of the political groups that are attached to educational institutions and to the army. It is continuous and is driven home by picture-posters, by huge characters painted on the walls of every village, and through the reading books which the students use. Officials are sent round in summer vacations to explain to the country folk the policy of the government and the need for continued effort in face of the insults which

that in bad weather, and when it is dark, the millions may get recreation considerably more health-giving than their present kinds?

2. What will be the fundamental principles of the physical training that is offered? Will people be told—or encouraged—to turn out their toes as they stand and walk; practise the rib-expansion kind of breathing, chiefly or solely, instead of the full breathing, including the lower kinds; ignore the relaxing of the muscles that are not required for any given movement; train the two sides of the body together, as a rule, and not master more independent control? Or will they be offered the best general principles which will appeal to intelligent, thoughtful, and impartial persons who are not “pledged” to any one “System”?
3. If there is a sort of Physical Fitness “Cabinet,” will it listen wisely to various criticisms and suggestions of improvements: will it also invite and genuinely welcome whatever ideas are offered by those who have had experience and success outside the stereotyped grooves?

The idea of a Physical Fitness “Cabinet,” and a physical “House of Commons” which shall be really in touch with the millions, is surely worth considering. There might be a “Hansard” published weekly, and freely criticised. I should insist also that the right women be included; fortunately, the present chosen representatives do include the more numerous sex.

My own experiences in physical exercises began more than sixty years ago, when I was at school on Hampstead Heath. That was the period of simple games, which I enjoyed: and of playground drill, which I detested almost as much as I detested my lessons on the piano. We had a typical sergeant who shouted out his dull commands.

I would turn aside for a moment to say that the word “jerks” has done immense harm. I wish it could be made illegal except in reference to really jerky movements, as in throwing a stone. I suppose it was invented by someone who heard a drill-sergeant giving his orders in the usual snappy way. But, as applying to the best exercises for girls and women and, I would say, the vast majority of the best exercises of every kind, including the rhythmical and the various “swings” (as in golf), it is a thoroughly bad word. As a rule, movements for females and the elderly should not be jerky. How could the word be stretched to include really full

breathing, swimming, muscular relaxing, and other kinds of good physical culture?

At my next schools came more games, and a little gymnasium work, which I never liked. Then still more games at Cambridge, and plenty of walking and some running. No one, so far, had taught me how to stand, how to breathe deeply, how to relax my muscles, how to play games: I had just picked up an isolated hint here and there. It seems to me disgraceful that this should have been so, considering the large sums paid for my education. Almost all that I learnt about the most vital physical matters, I had to teach myself. I invented some exercises for certain ball-games, and thanks to them I found myself, rather late in the day, beginning to play a little better, and I won some matches here and in America.

Then, about twenty-five years ago, I was asked to edit and practically to write a twelve-part monthly magazine, the *Physical Educator*, long out of print. In this copiously illustrated work, which I loved doing, I had to review various “systems” up to date: such as the Swedish, the Military, Sandow’s, and the then unsystematic British games and athletics. Still later on I made as thorough a study as I could of different new and old systems, and tried to embody the most important features in my own little physical schools, where I had some original models of the lungs and breathing, the feet, the internal organs, the spine, and so on. The schools no longer exist, but they taught me a great deal.

I was forced to several conclusions. First, that physical culture, like true education in general, should not be taken and imitated slavishly from one nation by another, as at one time the “authorities” swallowed a certain Continental drill, but should be specially devised for every nation, and for various “groups” in every nation, not only by the experts who had been trained in some one system, but also by open-minded seekers after all kinds of healthy truth. Secondly, after having studied all sorts of elaborations and intricacies, I was led to the delightful verdict that there were plenty of simple and easy things which anyone could understand. Perhaps this can be made clearer and more convincing—for it is of vital importance—if we take an illustration from dietetics. Dietetics used to be such a simple affair: first, so much bulk (by sheer weight); then, later on, so much body-building protein (no matter in what form); then so many calories, the supposed

have been heaped upon the Chinese people. In addition to the ordinary speeches, pamphlets, and slogans written prominently on village walls there is a special dramatic section which prepares plays dealing with this important subject for acting in every organisation in connection with the training of soldiers and the schools.

This consolidates the people by uniting them against a common foe whose aggression in Manchuria and in North China is resented most fiercely. There is nothing secret about it, for it is part of the considered and published policy of the provincial government to recover what China has lost, and this can only be done by describing the methods by which the Japanese have taken these possessions from her. It is used to justify the excessive claims which are made upon the people for service and sacrifice and is exactly similar to that which to-day is made in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia. The State in Kwangsi for the first time has come to be far more important than the individual or the family, and frantic steps are being taken to enforce this principle.

Education no longer aims at the creation of a privileged aristocracy of letters but at the raising of the living standards and at the strengthening of the State. The old learning aimed at refinement, gentility, æsthetic development and individual superiority, while the new seeks to create the citizen efficient and practical, alert and vigorous, and, above all, willing to march in step. This emerges naturally from what has gone before. It is a reaction which has gathered momentum as the revolution has proceeded. The incompetence of the Manchus, the corruption and depredations of the war lords—of whom Kwangsi has had her share—the growing sense of helplessness in face of foreign aggression, the determination that these things shall cease—these are the forces behind the new movement. It is no longer a virtue to maintain the *status quo*. The old is dying—let it die, says Young China. Change need not be associated with decay.

LANCELOT FORSTER.

THE PALESTINIAN CO-OPERATIVE SETTLEMENTS.

IN the present Jewish colonisation in Palestine of the countryside there are two interesting types of settlement, called *moshav* (individual) and *kvutza* (communal). The former co-operative as far as work is concerned, in, for example, buying implements and selling produce; the latter co-operative in every way, in work and in social life.

The *kvutza* are thus the more interesting as a type of life non-existent in the same organised form elsewhere. In the *kvutza* there is what may be termed a group life. While the *moshav* settlements are supposed to be an expression of individual life for those who are not able to subdue their personality to the common development of the group, it can often be observed that there is an outward difference in the people who live in a *moshav* to those who live in a *kvutza*. The communal spirit, although not really developing a complete collective character (so far), does seem to influence those who live that life. They live with an elated expression on their faces: many have a particular light in the eyes, which at times turns to an intense, hard glitter when things are going wrong. In the towns it is easy to pick them out from the townspeople. This light has been described as happiness and also as hysteria. It is neither of these, but an expression of their constant endeavour to keep an optimistic attitude of mind despite all disadvantages. That is what in Palestine is spoken of as the spirit of the people in the colonies.

It is necessary. In 1935 over 61,000 Jewish immigrants entered the country. This brought the Jewish population up to some 400,000, out of a total population of about 1,350,000. With a registered unemployment figure still about 4,000, not to speak of the low standard of life that obtains by necessity in the colonies, it is difficult for an observer to see what good results would come from a greater influx of Jewish refugees under the present system. It is to be noted that two-thirds of the Jewish immigrants go to the towns.

Some Jews in the towns will tell you that it is necessary to create a Jewish proletariat so that the new Hebrew civilisation has its own workpeople, and cannot further be accused of exploiting the labour of others. This is a distinctly different

units of fat and heat and energy, no matter in what form, especially from fats, starches and sugars; then the protein *and* calories, and a little fibre (misleadingly called "roughage"); and some flavour, to stimulate the saliva and the gastric juice; and some vitamins; and some crude ideas about salts of lime, iron, potash, etc.

Even at this stage it was beginning to be rather complicated. But what does it seem to be to-day? Instead of just one factor, protein, we have at least eighteen "amino-acids," several of which are said to be essential; instead of just one sort of "fat," we have several sorts; we have fibres that irritate, as well as fibres that help; we have an array of vitamins (I believe our present orthodox list is only a start!) And as to the salts, instead of the old three or four, there are many—including, of course, iodine! And quite apart from the items as single factors, there is the matter of their balance and proportion.

How hopeless it all seems to the busy searcher for fitness through diet! But notice, in relief, to what clear and feasible conclusions we are being led to-day—conclusions which were, for the most part, arrived at by "cranks" long ago, cranks who could not prove their truths theoretically and scientifically. A meal of good cheese with finely ground wholemeal bread (not too new), and some such salad-material as well-cleaned watercress or lettuce, or celery (with its young tops)—what does the most elaborately and meticulously exacting science tell us is missing? I should be glad to hear! From the apparently exhaustive analytical list of requisites to the finished easy result may seem like the leap over a hopelessly wide gulf. But there it is! So with physical training. I am absolutely certain that half a dozen exercises, which almost anyone could do gently and often, and could do in imagination, would be a basic and a balanced "meal" in physical culture, corresponding to a good sample meal in diet: not, indeed, suiting everyone everywhere all through life, but a comparatively safe commencement and "stand-by."

I hope I may be forgiven for another personal experience. I wish to show that I am not merely theorising; nor am I assuming that those who have control of the scheme will be easy to convince and influence. It seems to me important for the directors to realise a little of what has happened in the past. For similar mistakes are likely to occur. (Little though

I learnt from the Classics, at least Thucydides taught me this!) I was instrumental in forming the National Society for Physical Education. I helped to induce all sorts of great men to back it up. I have no list with me, but I mention from memory among those who have (alas!) passed over, Lord Alverstone, the Bishop of Ripon, A. G. Steel, Lord Darnley, and Sir Edward Grey. It looked like being a great success. My desire, above all things, was to keep it as British as possible. But unfortunately it adopted a Continental system which has always seemed to me conspicuously un-British, though safe and well-graded and easy to teach and learn. It is to be hoped that the controllers of the new Scheme will get all the good they can from the Swedes, who have contributed several useful ideas; but that there will be no such "blind-folded" adoption of the system as has already proceeded to a great extent in this country. The organisers should be capable of forming right judgments and selections when once the different data and evidence have been supplied and considered.

To go back to the first question which the Government scheme should raise—as to the facilities for healthy games, especially in wet weather and in the evenings in cities, some sort of hand-fives, or bat-fives, very cheap popular games if played with the right kind of india-rubber ball and a small plain bat, are among the finest examples of such play. These games belong to many of the excellent Men's Clubs in America, and are very popular as well as inexpensive. Many years ago I interested that splendid man, Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice, in a scheme for utilising old and disused buildings in cities. Our idea was to adapt the buildings and rooms, provided they had solid floors: to give them equipment for washing, dressing, simple catering, the best lighting and warming, gymnasium with a gallery for a running-track (as in some American Clubs), rooms for simple games of different kinds, bowls, baths, reading-room, library, and so forth. Unfortunately he passed over before we could work out the plans fully, and—incredible though it sounds—I have not found anyone to take his place in backing up the simple, inexpensive plan, except one or two excellent men, who, however, neither had, nor could command, money. Trade is flourishing just now. But there are still some large vacant buildings in cities, buildings ideal for this purpose. Such

interpretation of the *Histadruth* ideal of self-labour to that which is found in the co-operative colonies. *Histadruth Haovdim* (the General Federation of Jewish Labour) has a membership of over 86,000. It enrolls only those "who live by the work of their hands without exploiting the labour of others," and wishes to organise all the communal, economic and cultural activities of the Jewish working class of Palestine "in order to build up in Palestine a Jewish community based upon labour." This Federation deals not only with the working welfare of the people, but also aids in developing their knowledge and culture; it has a special section that sends out lecturers to aid in the instruction of the people. This is usually Hebrew language, history and literature, dramatics, but also music and other arts. A working knowledge of Hebrew is obligatory in all colonies.

That it should be necessary to create a proletariat to perform obnoxious but essential tasks is not a happy thought, and actually the Labour supporters have no intention if they can avoid it that the country shall fall into the trap of excessive wage differentiation. Here it might be noted that a large number of the manual working inhabitants of the colonies are the students, the professors, the scientists, the lawyers, the teachers of the European lands whence they came. Their proportion is from 40 per cent. to 60 per cent. in all settlements. Whether the Labour ideal will triumph in the future is not easy to say. Already there are decisive splits in the groups, some tending Left, some Right; Revisionists, who deny the Arab problem, but who seek to establish a self-supporting State along what may be described as Fascist lines; the Labour Party already mentioned; the Poali Zion of Marxist views, who are estimated to have a following of no more than 1 per cent. of the total workers in Palestine. Thus again changes develop and personal urges disguised as public good commence to make themselves felt.

There are at the present time upwards of 40 *kvutzoth* in the country, and more in process of formation. They vary in size, and vary in type, theoretically. For a stranger they are very much alike, and the first stay in one for a European travelled person with some experience of European farms will be something approaching a shock. They are divided by their outlook into three separate groups, but actually are mostly in favour of uniting; these groups are *Kibbutz Hameuchad*,

Haever Kvutzoth and *Kibbutz Haartzi*. The first is in favour of big communal groups, the protagonist of which is Ain Harod, founded fifteen years ago in the Emek Jesreel, and now having 700 souls living in it. In its ideal there is the basis of fulfilling all needs of the community; *kvutzoth* of this type are therefore not solely occupied with farming. In all *kibbutzim* members may be working outside the community, in a town or at some reclamation work, and the money that is earned goes to the upkeep and development of the group, for no member is allowed to earn money for himself. The kinds of work may be the running of a tree nursery, as at Ain Harod, the making of simple furniture, as at Delhamiya in the Jordan Valley, the provision of a bus service, maintaining a workers' restaurant in a neighbouring town. The farm is, however, the mainstay in the *kvutzoth* as with the other settlements. And in those described as a closed group, the *Kvutzoth Haever*, the members work only a farm, vegetables and citrus, while limiting the number of members to 150 or less. Daganian, the earliest communal settlement, founded twenty-seven years back, is of this type.

In the Jordan valley, considerably below sea level, in a sub-tropical climate, are situated south of the Lake of Tiberias a number of *kvutzoth*. On the shore of the lake is the Arab town of Samakh, and within two miles lies Daganian already mentioned, and the adjoining Daganian B. Higher up on a rise are the Kinnereths, a Jewish village and a *kvutza*. Further south lie Beit, Sera, Afikim, Delhamiya and Gesher, close to the Rutenberg Power Station. It is to be noted that the Jewish settlements are scattered practically all over Palestine, and are not confined especially to one area, but are mainly in the valleys and plains. They are in close proximity to Arab villages; they are surrounded by barbed wire, and many of them, during this last winter, were preparing to further fortify with sand-bags and cement out-posts that were considered vulnerable spots of attack. Everyone was sure that after the citrus harvest there would be a further period of hostilities. As it will be recalled from last January onwards isolated sporadic highway robberies and murders have occurred, although no widespread violence has been again attempted. The average Jew blamed the Government, giving, for example, the reason why these criminals have been seldom apprehended as that of employing Arabs in the lower ranks

buildings could, of course, also be utilised for physical exercises, lectures and talks, health-clubs, food and cookery lessons, and other aids to fitness.

As to the second question: "What are the principles?" There is no space to do more than hint at what they should be. We, as a nation, enjoy games, sport, etc. A solid foundation for British physical culture could include one of the finest movements in the world, an adapted lawn tennis service, done with the left hand after the right has performed, and done sometimes without apparatus: the exercise for walking and running (as in George's famous *Hundred Up*); the imitation of a fencing lunge, without apparatus. These three, with (for many) a little "shadow boxing," and a little foot-drill for certain games, will serve as mere examples. They need to be altered in order to come nearer to scientific physical culture, and to be practised in a special way. They are not only health-giving and pleasant to look at: they are also interesting, and have within them something of the Soul of Play.

I would state here at once, not merely in order to conciliate those who are against military training, but in the cause of truth, and as my genuine opinion based on experience and observation, that military drill in its present forms in different countries is very far from the best physical culture, even simply or mainly for most military purposes. I know it will be said that such drills have done immense good, as regards the appearance, the carriage, the chest-development, the strength, the endurance, the general standard of health, the self-control, the self-respect, and so on, of those who have been trained by military drill in Germany, Italy, Russia, and many other countries. Granted a vast improvement; granted that the drills are better than some other drills and exercises, and far better than no training at all. Yet simply from the point of view of really scientific physical culture with various aims and ideals, the military drills are very far from perfect.

Our nation has freely given to the world some precious gifts, not all of which have been unmitigated blessings; certain games, the play spirit, and approaches towards democracy and freedom, are among our contributions to civilisation. We now have a unique opportunity of a further gift, that of interesting and sporting physical culture, not dull-ly disciplinarian, not aggressively military, not oppressively hygienic, not infallibly safe, not finally best for all; but better than the rest.

EUSTACE MILES.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

67573

THE FURTHER COURSE OF "NON-INTERVENTION" IN SPAIN.

THE attempt of the non-Spanish Powers to dissuade each other from interfering in the Spanish civil war has never run smoothly. So negative a form of enterprise obviously could not run smoothly. Why should the Powers need to organise themselves for the only purpose of not doing anything in Spain? The explanation was that a general antithesis of ideological causes was exemplified, or was supposed to be exemplified, in the Spanish conflict, and that in fact the non-Spanish Powers were intervening. The real problem, therefore, was one of extrication. It needs only a slight exercise of the imagination to recognise the delicacy and danger of such a problem.

The troubled story unfolded by the international attempt to organise an actual scheme of non-intervention has been told in these pages up to the point when in the last week of April the old Basque town, Guernica, was destroyed by bombs fired from what were alleged to be exclusively German aeroplanes by exclusively German pilots. The ramifications of international unrest produced by that event were such as might have been foretold. It was not merely that the British Press launched into bitter criticism of Germany and the German Press of Britain; the professional lines of international diplomacy became almost equally embittered. The Valencia Government having demanded an international inquiry into the bombing of Guernica, and Mr. Eden on May 6th having warm-heartedly but perhaps incautiously welcomed the demand, it followed almost inevitably that the London Non-Intervention Committee should consider some sort of action.

On May 7th, therefore, Lord Plymouth, chairman of the committee, proposed from the chair that as a means to what was oddly described as the "humanisation" of the war in Spain, the Powers represented on the committee should agree on the academic thesis that any further bombing in Spain ought to be abandoned. Inasmuch as the German and Italian interventionist forces happened to possess more aeroplanes than the Russian interventionists, it did not surprise the other delegates in the committee that the Russian delegate wholeheartedly supported the thesis that bombing was deplorable.

of the police force, men who were fearful of giving away a fellow subject.

In disputes on this, and other important issues, Arab and Jewish objections are relatively similar, but leaving little hope of unified action while each party fears the domination of the other. The Jew is often contemptuous of the Arab. The Arabs talk of the "Bolshevist Jewish outlook": this speaks for itself. In most cases it must be admitted the Arabs have not, in Palestine, the able spokesmen, linguistically and otherwise, that have the Jews. And to this has to be added the physical aspect of the young Hebrews as evidenced in Palestine; the average fine physique, handsome countenance, though of greatly variable types, making a challenge to those who have feared unity of aim and outlook in members of the Jewish Faith; the strong national and class influence still existent: may be Russian, Polish, Yugoslavian or German; the higher material standard of the German emigrants, both young and old, their serious but perhaps less agile minds; the blonde curly-haired Palestinian-born children—as blonde as "Aryans," as is humorously remarked. And further has to be considered the apparent contradictions of the national home versus the religious home. The country settlers and the majority of the town settlers are not orthodox, nor even accept summarily their religion. Then why should they claim Palestine as a home? Here it seems that they step back several generations, forced, as they state, by the countries against them and the ever-present possibility of other countries being against them in the future. The reasoning showing in this wise that the European nationals have all a country to back them up, with all the background of an old culture. Yet the vision of a future Hebrew nation with a recently formed Army, Navy and Air Force, haggling with other Powers of the 1980 League of Nations Council Assembly, is scarcely encouraging. In this way the Jews in struggles to maintain a place in the sun appear to lose the superior wits they seem to possess.

A very fair view of the life of a settlement may be gained from a visit to one of those in the Jordan Valley, another in the Emek Jesreel, or Plains of Esdraelon, and one in Judea.

Afikim, not far from Daganian, is a recently formed colony of 200 people. It started as a working group of Russian origin—Hashomer Hazair—performing what agricultural

tasks they could and living in tents, offshoots from Kinnereth. Four years ago they received their present land. To-day they are considered an advanced group, already having paid the first year's interest on the foundation loan advanced by Keren Hayesod. Seen from the main road the colony has an impressive air of a new white cluster of modern factory buildings. A white glittering mass. In the centre stands the water tower dominating the view. One-storey oblong white houses stand separate from one another, and close to the water tower, two small low buildings apart. These are the douche rooms and lavatories for the whole settlement, save for the children's house which has its own inside the building. Having entered through the barbed wire gate, a collection of wood huts of various shapes, usually termed barracks in Palestine, can be seen, denoting that it is as yet incomplete. There is a wood hut for laundry, which has, however, an electric boiler and rinser; a small hut for the shoe-repairer who sits most of the day surrounded by a motley collection of well-worn boots and shoes; a number of small huts divided into small rooms, hot in summer and not waterproof in winter; and far across the sea of earth a huge building for dining-room and kitchen.

The meal times are not a sight for even the slightly fastidious to experience with calmness. The principle of self-labour and co-operation is practised, and consequently the cooking and washing up and drying is shared out by a number of men and women (mainly women) over a period of weeks or months; this all to the good. The preparation and cooking of food being a specialist task, it has been found necessary that the time which each one works at this task is longer than was first intended. And in this case the cook, formerly a teacher of mediæval history, has been at her task for a spell of over six months, and is likely to remain so while she is in the colony, no other person having the ability to undertake the task. One might reflect on whether her present work, for which she has only the knowledge gained in her home, contents her being as did the work she left in her American town; she came to aid in the building up of Hebrew Palestine.

In the dining-room there are long trestle tables covered with white oil cloth, and much-scrubbed whitewood forms to sit on, a gramophone, a set of shelves containing Hebrew journals and a few other publications. Along one wall is

But when at a later meeting of the committee (May 26th) it was suggested that the process of humanisation should be extended so that other means of war beyond the mere bombing by aeroplane be included in the proposed condemnation, the Russian delegate somewhat changed his tactics and declared that he must seek instructions from Moscow before agreeing to so new a suggestion. He moreover did state as his own private opinion that a generalised scheme of humanisation might not be as "effective" as the restricted scheme exclusively aimed against bombing from the air.

Yet it happened in May that chance did provide an opportunity for a more determined attempt at extricating the foreign forces fighting in Spain. In diplomacy the saving of faces is one of the major considerations. The Germans and Italians were fighting in Spain, because they featured the issue as a struggle between what they alleged to be the fascist or nazi principles that constituted General Franco's motive and what they alleged to be the bolshevik or Russian principles of Señor Caballero. It obviously might enable the Italian and the German faces to be saved and their troops to be withdrawn if the struggle in Spain could after all be represented to be, not an ideological thing at all, as between fascist and communist principles, but a purely Spanish struggle between one set of politicians and another. The opportunity was provided by the fact that on May 4th the Barcelona Anarchists broke into open revolt against the Catalan Government. After three days of chaos the Valencia Government intervened and succeeded in imposing order under a new Catalan Provisional Government.

But exactly a fortnight after the first outbreak, namely on May 18th, this particular complication within the major complication of Spanish affairs led to an ironic result. Señor Caballero, who had been the leader of the several Red factions in Spain since last summer, was overthrown by his old enemy Señor Prieto. The irony consisted in this, that in the old Primo de Rivera days Señor Prieto had been the extremist and Señor Caballero the moderate among the forces of the Left. As Señor Caballero was driven more and more to the Left under the exigencies of his war with General Franco, Señor Prieto manœuvred into the position formerly held by Señor Caballero. In short he stole his thunder (if such a phrase be

applicable to the moderate nature of what he stole) and beat him on his own former ground.

From the point of view of the London Non-Intervention Committee, however, the importance of that event was that it gave the opportunity of suggesting to Germany and Italy that they might withdraw from Spain under the pretext that the former ideological outline had been blurred: for it was the anarchist, communist or extreme Left faction of the "Red" forces that had now been suppressed in the Valencia cause. The titular head of the new Prieto Government was Dr. Negrin, who had been Finance Minister in the old Cabinet; but Señor Caballero was dropped. Señor Prieto took the portfolio of Defence. For the rest, the Cabinet was made up of two Communists, three Socialists, two Republicans, one Catalan and one Basque.

Even the British Government's apparently innocuous and even humane services in helping to evacuate the non-combatant old men, women and children from the Basque war zone led to deep resentment at Salamanca. The Franco authorities, while admitting the humanitarian motive, on May 10th addressed a Note to the British Government to point out the possibly important precedent—particularly important to a maritime Power such as Great Britain—thereby established by the British navy, and liable to be quoted in any future case of blockade. The Franco authorities repeated an offer they had made to create a neutral safety zone for such refugees, and alleged that the evacuation constituted a violation of the blockade for the reason that the ships engaged in it were protected by a naval squadron. The argument was unfair because the British Government had correctly informed the Basque Government that it must provide its own ships up to the three-mile limit, while promising British naval protection on the high seas.

Yet the really practical thing was that rightly or wrongly General Franco did regard the matter as a form of British intervention, and he did use it as a means of inflaming opinion against Great Britain. He wrote: "By failing to recognise the blockade, by abuse of the protection given to ships which attempt to force it, and by masking or rendering difficult artillery action, British ships hamper the activity of our national squadrons against the merchant ships which enter within the three-mile limit. This situation was the cause of

tacked up a copy of the daily bulletin giving the news of the Settlement ; prices obtained for crops, expenditure on stock and food ; a literary sketch or the like. A bare floor. An empty space at the end for dancing. That is all. As in all the communal settlements, the average expenditure on food per day for each adult is four piastres, about tenpence. Meat is eaten two or three times a week. Butter is given once a day when plentiful, although some difficulty is usually found in supplying enough milk and butter for *Tenuva*, the co-operative distributing organisation, so as to keep the home market in hand. The main diet is vegetables, which here are plentiful and good, and cereals, which are imported.

Several girls act as cleaners and waitresses, a job which they retain for several weeks at a spell. On the oil-cloth covered tables are placed jars containing spoons, forks, cups. Jars of paper serviettes, an aluminium bowl for the leavings of the plates, a huge bowl of hot soup or rice, and a bowl of vegetables. The midday meal usually consists of a cereal or vegetable soup, a fried or baked vegetable, such as egg-plant with potatoes and another vegetable—grapefruits in the autumn and winter seasons. Tea consists of tea without milk, and bread and jam, or occasionally honey. Before the rains, which come towards the end of November, the food is consumed while hundreds of flies walk over the eaters and just fail to fall into the soup but dance on the tomato jam. The people seem so insensitive to them that they do not even bother to brush them off their bodies. Personal comfort is always subordinated to the main task of the community, but as was indicated at the opening of this article there are variations in details.

In most communal settlements the stock and fowls are housed as well, relatively, as are the humans. One family, which is counted as a couple, is allotted one room ; for the unwed no more than three persons to one room is the rule, but with frequent visitors, temporary workers and so forth, that number is often exceeded. Men and women may share the same sleeping quarters on the sensible principle of equality and from friendly choice. The wood huts or cement houses contain from four to twelve rooms, from twelve to fifteen feet square, each room entered from the open. The cement houses are planned more elaborately, are of two-storeys, and the upper storey is reached by an outer staircase, having a

balcony which forms a covered terrace for the lower floor. The furniture consists of beds, a wardrobe, more often a hanging shelf with curtains, small table, stools. All except the beds are made by the settlers. The rooms are cleaned by the occupants in them. New workers do not become permanent members until they have lived in a settlement for one test year in preparation for acceptance by the other members. This was an old principle so as to achieve a united group life, admitting only those who really gave by their work and personality something to all materially and spiritually. It is not so strongly adhered to since the vast number of new immigrants, but at the meeting for considering the acceptance of members, objections are always listened to.

In the summer and autumn the working day starts at 5.30, an interval of an hour or half-hour for breakfast, meal at midday and work again until 3.30 or 4. In the settlement of Afikim, last autumn a shift system had to be in operation ; there were armed guards out all night ; cows to be milked at 2.30 in the morning so as to get the milk to Daganian dairy in time for the butter-making and distribution to Haifa.

While it has been stated that there is great similarity between the colonies, it is now necessary to show the variation in detail. If Afikim in building has the impression of a budding farm-factory placed on what was sterile land, there are others that come to the mind of the visitor. First Girat Brenner : untidy, an open *kvutza* in Judea of over 600 souls, now receiving a number of young Germans, and already having some sixty elderly relations left with little resources, built on a hillside with the orange groves and extensive vegetable gardens down the hill, ten years old, but not yet complete. So far there is the semblance of two not handsome village streets, two rows of one-storey cement houses. The elderly relations do not work on the farm, or otherwise, so have time to cultivate little gardens attached, rose bushes, small trees and many plants flourishing. But with it all Brenner is not yet a very pleasant place. Temporary living huts made up of the furniture crates brought by the fleeing German immigrants in 1933 and 1934 abound ; more than twenty tents make an artistic picture down one side of the hill if viewed from a distance and in the right perspective. Overflowing dustbins, grapefruit skins and unused iron bedsteads litter the place here and there. Yet Brenner has attractions

the loss of the *España*, which has caused justifiable grief among the inhabitants of our territory and has alienated them from the British nation. . . . While order reigns in Nationalist Spain, in the 'Red' zone anarchy reigns to such a point that the diplomatists accredited to the 'Reds' do not live in their territory. This makes even more painful the fact that Great Britain maintains official relations with 'Red' Spain, while making more difficult—to the advantage of the 'Reds'—the action of Nationalist Spain."

There were those indeed in British naval circles who did recognise the possible difficulty. It raised the question whether by merely not granting belligerent rights or by merely refusing to recognise a blockade any navy of the future might be allowed to help, whether innocently or not, in thwarting the purpose of a blockading Power.

As one muddle followed another, stultifying all progress by the Non-Intervention Committee, the British Government as on former occasions decided to take the weary initiative. In the third week of May that Government suggested the possibility that a truce might be arranged in Spain. The suggestion was due, not to any desire to mediate between the parties, but to a technical difficulty that faced the special subcommittee of the Non-Intervention Committee which was considering the question of the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain. That subcommittee was appointed on April 15th to draw up a proposed scheme of withdrawal. In the event of such a scheme being agreed, it was thought by the British Government that a contingent agreement to suspend operations might save valuable time. The British Government, therefore, made inquiries through the diplomatic channels of the French, German, Italian, Portuguese and Russian governments, to discover whether they would agree to approach the two sides in Spain with a proposal for the suspension of operations for the exclusive purpose of allowing all foreign troops to be withdrawn.

Only France answered "yes" to the proposal. None the less the Non-Intervention Committee doggedly pursued the attempt started last December to formulate a scheme for the withdrawal of the volunteers. On May 26th the technical committee submitted to the main committee a draft proposal to that end; but all that happened was that the proposal was passed on to the twenty-seven governments represented on the committee.

Next, without warning, a first-rate incident was staged in Spanish waters themselves. On May 29th the German "pocket" battleship *Deutschland* was bombed at Iviza in the Balearic Islands by aeroplanes serving with the Spanish Reds. Whether the actual aeroplanes were Russian, as was commonly supposed, has not been proved, nor was it the important thing. Berlin at once announced that "measures" would be taken, and would be communicated to the Non-Intervention Committee. On May 31st Germany and Italy seceded both from the committee and from their supervisory duties in Spanish waters until guarantees should be given against the recurrence of such an incident. On that day German warships, as a reprisal, shelled the port of Almeria, causing casualties, according to Valencia estimates, of nineteen killed and fifty-five wounded. The casualties to the *Deutschland* had been twenty men killed and seventy-three wounded. Berlin promptly announced that the retaliatory action was closed.

Throughout the following week the diplomatic channels between London, Paris, Berlin and Rome were busily employed in the spirit of a crisis. As had happened in former such cases, the British Government decided to take an initiative. On June 3rd telegrams were sent from London to the other three capitals, making a proposal. In it three suggestions were made: one, that the system of safety zones, to be respected by the two sides in Spain, be extended; two, that the two sides in Spain be invited to give a pledge against any bombing of foreign ships; three, that, in the event of the pledge being broken, the admirals of the supervisory fleets should consult on the spot about action to be taken.

The incident will stand a little closer examination as illustrating the sort of way in which diplomatic complications in practice develop. The Valencia Government on May 29th made this announcement: "At five o'clock this afternoon two aeroplanes left their base for a reconnaissance flight over the Balearic Islands. As they passed over Iviza a man-of-war anchored 200 yards from the mole opened a heavy anti-aircraft artillery fire against our aeroplanes, which had committed no hostile act whatever either against the ship or against the town. The aeroplanes replied to the attack by dropping twelve bombs, four of which fell on board the said vessel and exploded. Apparently, according to wireless

that other communal settlements have not got—it has a quite considerable library, containing a number of works on agriculture, art and so forth. Several small reading rooms, pianos and gramophones. And the elements of a fine orchestra composed from settlers and those of neighbouring *kvutzoth*, who gave a performance of Handel's *Judas Maccabeus* on the anniversary of the foundation of Histadruth that for depth of tone and harmonic handling could have put many professional orchestras in the shade. As it happened there was more than one performer who had trained as a professional musician; now they were all farm or manual workers first and workers in other arts in their spare time.

This settlement was founded in 1927, established by loans from Keren Hayesod and Nir, in all amounting to £14,360. The sums expended on the foundation of these colonies are relatively small; it is to be noted that all the money came through voluntary contributions from Jews all over the world, and for the most part from the *less* rich. A number of the settlements are in debt to the Workers' Bank for short-term loans; that to the Bank an interest of 7 per cent. to 9 per cent has to be paid is a further drain on their resources. When one thinks that in the communal and *moshav* settlements expenditure per individual in the year does not exceed £50, it hardly seems right that such varying standards of living have been encouraged in the towns.

The Royal Commission has found partition of Palestine the only solution possible; an attempt at a just solution considering the present situation, but seeming to allow of openings for further disputes. And in reality not allowing a complete solving of the Jewish problem along lines envisaged by the Zionists, nor giving the freedom desired by the Arabs. While for Jews still in Europe suffering under antagonisms grown stronger during economic depression the plan has little to offer. Whereas were there in being a public scheme similar in principle to the Jewish Agency, but concerned with the development of little-populated areas of richer lands than Palestine, notably parts of Africa, Australia, New Zealand and South America, on non-Nationalist lines (from the European standpoint) it might be possible to ease tension, not only in Jewish circles, but also among the "have-not" countries.

ENIL LECHAY.

BORSTAL EXPERIMENTS.

THE British Prison Commissioners are carrying out many experiments which are being carefully studied by all interested in the problem of punishment and reform. Two of the most promising experiments now being tried out are conducted at the two latest Borstal Institutions, Lowdham Grange in Nottinghamshire and North Sea Camp at Freiston near Boston in Lincolnshire. At neither Institution is a Borstal boy confined by locks, bars or bolts. In both places he can escape with some ease if he so wishes, but only a comparatively few take the opportunity, mainly because they have been put on their honour, and partly no doubt because the game is hardly worth the candle, as public opinion is strongly opposed to escapes which are rarely, if ever, successful.

There is, however, a considerable difference in the outward appearance of the two Institutions. Lowdham Grange is on a hillside in Nottinghamshire. Around an old farmhouse spacious and solidly constructed buildings have been erected by the boys themselves, acting of course under experienced foremen. The various Houses, the public hall, and the offices, are equal in design and convenience to the latest buildings of our Public Schools. At North Sea Camp, eighty-six boys and their Housemasters live on the shores of the Wash in wooden huts, and conditions are harder owing to the climate and the task of reclaiming the adjacent salt marshes from the sea.

Only boys who have been carefully selected, following conviction, are sent to either Lowdham or North Sea Camp. While they are gathered together at the collecting centre, which for the whole of England and Wales is in a wing at Wormwood Scrubs Prison, the greatest care is given in examining the past history of every lad. His health, both physical and mental, is studied, and various individuals, including the Governor, the Deputy-Governor, the Medical Officer of the Prison, the Chaplain, and the Lady Visitor, report. On these reports a Prison Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner decides where the boy will serve his sentence. There are now seven Borstal Institutions for lads, and the decision to which of them any particular lad shall be sent depends upon a number of factors, including degree of criminality, health, age and aptitude for industrial training. If the case is one which seems suitable for training under the conditions of comparative

messages which were intercepted, the ship attacked, which was set on fire, was the German warship *Admiral Scheer*. As is known, foreign warships charged with the service of control are obliged to exercise their vigilance at a minimum distance of ten miles from the coast. The *Admiral Scheer*, as has been said, was in the Bay itself and near the mole. Moreover the control of the Island of Iviza, according to the decision of the Non-Intervention Committee, belongs to the French squadron and consequently the German cruiser had no lawful mission to accomplish at the place, where she was within Spanish territorial waters."

The German version issued on the following day ran thus: "After Red aircraft had attacked with bombs the English, German, and Italian ships lying in the harbour of Majorca a few days ago, killing six officers on board the Italian ship, the German vessels were forbidden to remain any longer in that harbour. On May 29th, 1937, the armoured vessel *Deutschland* lay in the roadstead of Iviza. The ship belongs to the forces designated for the international sea control. Nevertheless between six and seven o'clock bombs were suddenly dropped on the battleship by two aeroplanes of the Red Valencia Government. The crew were in the unprotected mess quarters forward. One of the Red bombs fell in the middle of the seamen's mess, as happened recently in the ward-room of the Italian ship. Twenty dead and seventy-three wounded are the result of this criminal assault. A second bomb hit the deck, but caused little damage. The ship, which was fully cleared for action, proceeded to Gibraltar to land the wounded. The ship did not fire at the aeroplane. The Valencia Government having been warned twice by the German Government and the Non-Intervention Committee not to make further attacks on the vessels engaged in the international control service, this fresh criminal attack on a German ship compels the German Government to take measures, which they will communicate without delay to the Non-Intervention Committee."

That statement had been preceded by a somewhat excited day of activity on the part of the German politicians. Herr Hitler was in Munich, where he was engaged to open an agricultural show. The news of the bombing of the *Deutschland* reached him at midday. He at once held a consultation with Baron von Neurath, who happened to be with him. At two-thirty Admiral Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the

Navy, arrived in a special aeroplane and interviewed the Führer at length. At four o'clock Herr Hitler flew from Munich to Berlin, taking with him Baron von Neurath and Admiral Raeder. General Göring, Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, was at Weimar, but reached Berlin at eight p.m. in a special aeroplane. At eight-thirty Herr Hitler held a consultation in the Chancellor's room with his assembled henchmen, who now also included Field-Marshal von Blomberg, the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Solemn music was relayed on the wireless as the names of the *Deutschland* dead were announced. The official statement quoted above was issued at about ten-thirty.

The use of aeroplanes in German diplomacy does not necessarily or always imply hustle or fuss. When a German delegation came to London for the 1935 Naval Conference the entire staff, typists included, travelled by air. Whenever Herr von Ribbentrop returns to Berlin he travels by air. The reason is paradoxically concerned with budgetary "economies." Although the actual cost of travel by air is greater than by train, the Government saves the whole railway cost by a ruling that the Air Force must provide transit for official missions and the Air Force has to bear the cost out of the appropriation made globally to it.

The immediate diplomatic activity that followed the bombing of the *Deutschland* showed how bitter and how easily roused were the passions that had been let loose from Spain. On May 31st Herr von Ribbentrop addressed a long Note to the Non-Intervention Committee. After a detailed account of the attack itself, the Note stated that this particular attack on the *Deutschland* was merely the final link in a chain of similar events. It quoted the case of German vessels of the International Sea Control—at the beginning of April the armoured ship *Graf Spee*, and on May 11th the cruiser *Leipzig*—which had been threatened by men-of-war of the Valencia authorities, and recalled that on May 24th the above-mentioned attack took place on British, German and Italian ships of the International Sea Control by aeroplanes of the Valencia authorities, in the course of which six Italian officers were killed. On these occasions, it said, urgent warnings were issued by the Non-Intervention Committee and by the German Government.

"I am instructed by my Government," the Note went on,

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freedom of the new institutions at Lowdham Grange or the North Sea Camp, the lad is invited to sign the following promise:

"Because of the trust put in me, I promise on my honour to do my best to keep up the good name of Lowdham Grange (or North Sea Camp)."

They are more cut off at North Sea Camp than working on the land or laying bricks or learning other trades at Lowdham Grange. The visitor to the Camp passes through a part of England which is little known. He has to cross a flat land, reminiscent of Holland, with potato fields stretching on either side and in the distance the stump of Boston Church. Boston itself is one of the most independent and self-contained and isolated towns in England. It is surrounded by very fertile land which is intersected with dykes. If an ex-serviceman were blindfolded, suddenly set down from an aeroplane on the dyke close to the latest Borstal Institution, and the bandage removed from his eyes, he might well guess that he was standing on a road in Flanders, with the town of Furnes behind and the North Sea in front. He might imagine that the clock of time had been turned back and that the wooden huts containing the dining hall, kitchen, offices and work-room, were those of some rest-camp outside Ypres.

In such a land, snuggling close under the bank built by the Romans during the time of the conquest of Britain, is the North Sea Camp. I visited it one winter day when the Fens looked particularly bleak. The east wind carried with it a chill as if from Siberia, and roads and paths were inches deep in rich mud. Even on such a day the lads were walking about in open shirts and shorts, and appeared to take no heed of the snow which was beginning to fall. They all looked as fit and hard as prize-fighters. As we passed through one of the huts we heard sounds of community singing, and looking into a recreation room saw there fifteen boys with their own House-master, cheerily practising songs for a concert. In the main hall another party of boys were rehearsing *Macbeth*, under the direction of an enthusiastic dramatic producer who was giving up his Sunday afternoon for the sake of the lads. He had come at his own expense all the way from Boston.

It must not be imagined, however, that it is all play and no work. My visit was paid on a Sunday afternoon, but on weekdays every boy, unless in the sanatorium, has to be out

of bed and doing physical exercises at 6 a.m. If it is not actually snowing or hailing or raining they perform physical jerks in the dark in the open, but if the weather is particularly unfavourable they are allowed to carry on indoors. They have to make their beds, clean up and have breakfast.

Work starts at 8 a.m. and lasts till 12, and recommences at 1 p.m., continuing until 5 p.m. The lads in Lincolnshire have a piece of work to do which is worth doing. Before the War the Prison Commission thought of utilising adult prisoners on the work of reclaiming part of the salt marshes on the shores of the Wash. One of the most perplexing problems in prison life is how to reduce the hours of solitary confinement to the minimum and provide reasonable employment without competing unduly with industries outside. Land reclamation has obvious advantages. To take adult prisoners to the shores of the Wash would, however, involve the construction of a prison camp, and the plan was shelved on the outbreak of war. It was revived in 1934 when 450 acres of salt marsh were acquired by the Prison Commissioners. A party of lads were sent in 1935 to build a camp, which would not be a prison, and where they would live while they toiled to add to this country several hundreds of acres of extremely fertile market-garden land.

By July 1936 huts with double walls, roofs of asbestos and matchboarding, had been erected by the lads under skilled direction, and there was a surplus of labour available to go down to the edge of the Wash, about 600 yards away from the Camp, and to start on the construction of a bank. This is to-day the principal occupation. Silt has to be used on which grass may grow and thereby consolidate the bank, so that it may not be altogether washed away, when the spring tides sweep in over the marshes. It must be severe, and at times very unpleasant work. The boys wear an especially devised kind of shooting boot, which will keep out the wet, as they squelch in the mud; they have to carry their materials on sledges, which they drag over the marsh from the Camp to the sea. Already one of the big creeks has been dammed, and it is hoped that by about the year 1942 the first large area, some 600 acres in extent, will have been reclaimed and become fertile market-garden land. There is reason to hope that the enterprise will show a commercial return, but of far more importance than the actual financial value of winning back land from the sea, is the winning back of lost character.

"to state the following on their behalf: (1) The German Government will cease to take part in the control schemes, as well as in the discussions of the Non-Intervention Committee, as long as they have not received sure guarantees against the recurrence of such events. The German Government will, of course, themselves decide on the steps which are to be taken in reply to this incredibly malicious attack. They have also issued orders to their men-of-war during this state of affairs to repel by fire any onset of Spanish aircraft or men-of-war. (2) In retaliation for the criminal assault of Red bombing aeroplanes of the Valencia authorities on the *Deutschland* while at anchor, German vessels this morning shelled the fortified port of Almeria. After the harbour works had been destroyed and the hostile batteries silenced, the act of retaliation was terminated."

At still greater length Señor del Vayo, representative of the Valencia Government on the League Council, lodged an *apologia* with the Secretary-General at Geneva (May 31st). After a long historical preamble the following facts were alleged: "(1) Early on Saturday, May 29th, the Commander of the German Squadron in the Mediterranean, Rear-Admiral von Feschel, sent the Military Command of the Republic at Valencia a telegram stating that if aircraft belonging to the Republic flew, as had already occurred, over German vessels 'carrying out their duty in the zone of supervision,' he had given orders for adequate measures to be taken. . . . In reply, the Minister of Defence immediately informed the Admiral that if supervision were exercised at the distance laid down by the conditions of the Non-Intervention Committee, the warships would be wholly free from all danger from the Republican air force and fleet. 'But,' he added, 'this guarantee cannot be given if these ships incautiously and without justification enter roadsteads or ports which are well-known centres of insurgent activity. . . .' (2) During the afternoon of the same day, two aeroplanes sent by the Republican military authorities on reconnaissance above the rebel centre of Iviza were fired on by a German warship anchored in the port. The orders given by the German Admiral during the morning had, therefore, been executed. The Spanish aeroplanes retaliated by bombing the aggressor vessel."

What caused a certain apprehension in London and in Paris was the fact that although the incident was represented by

the German Government as having been "closed" by the shelling of Almeria, yet the German naval forces in Spanish waters were promptly reinforced. On June 1st, the cruiser *Leipzig* and on the following day four German submarines (U28, U33, U34 and U35) left for those waters.

It was in those circumstances that the British Government on June 3rd proposed to Germany, France and Italy that extended safety zones, the abandonment of all bombing, and a system of consultation on the spot might give satisfaction and future security to Germany. It was understood that the French Government was prepared to go farther than the British Government in giving satisfaction to Germany, but it did not at once appear in what exact direction that government was prepared to go farther. Indeed there was felt to be as much difficulty in Paris as in London about sanctioning the shelling of open towns as a method of achieving the collective security of the supervisory navies in Spanish waters. So far as London opinion was concerned, a sharp distinction was made between measures of self-defence in case of attack (such as have, for example, been taken by British ships) and measures of what may perhaps be called cold-blooded subsequent reprisal. The recent Italian example in which the bombing of the *Barletta* at Palma with casualties of six killed was merely reported to the Non-Intervention Committee instead of being directly punished by reprisal, was regarded as the wiser course. There was the further consideration, on which particular emphasis was laid in London, that the real problem on hand was not merely to restore the position that held before the bombing of the *Deutschland*, by the return of Germany and Italy to the Non-Intervention Committee and to their patrol duties in Spanish waters, but to effect the evacuation of the foreign volunteers from Spain.

The answers of the French, German and Italian governments to the British proposals of June 3rd were received in London on June 5th. They were not published, but it became known that the French Government, while agreeing with the general proposals, in its turn suggested that the naval control system itself might be reorganised to admit of some more collective system of security, such as might be achieved by the patrolling of all the Spanish coasts by a mixed international fleet instead of by the several national fleets operating in the separate zones that had been allotted to them. The

No one can visit the Camp, especially in winter time, without feeling that the members of the staff and particularly the Housemasters, who feed with the boys and sleep in the dormitories, must be inspired with something of the spirit of a St. Martin. A man would not undertake such work except for an ideal of service for the community. Although the members of the staff are extremely reluctant to refer to this aspect of the experiment, without their self-sacrifice it would of course be impossible to accomplish any lasting reform.

The officers are particularly busy in the evening, when for two hours a number of classes are held. Newcomers go through refresher courses in reading, writing and arithmetic, as the majority have forgotten much of their school learning. These courses are varied according to the mental equipment of each lad. In time as old school lessons are relearned and minds which may have become rusty work again, they attend lectures and discussions. They learn about moral standards and character, about social economics and current affairs. From the doctor they learn about elementary hygiene; from artist friends in Boston architectural and freehand drawing and water-colour painting; from visiting musicians music and singing. There are classes as well in wood-carving, cabinet-making, clay-modelling, pottery, metal-work, boat-building, gardening, biology, and some go to bakery, electrical and engineering classes in Boston. Every lad before he leaves the Camp is given instructions in rough boot-repairing, in case he may find himself out of work and be able to mend his own boots and those of his family.

Their leisure is filled, not only with practical instruction, but with a limited amount of recreation. Wages are paid weekly in amounts which vary from 4d. to 1s. Out of these a boy pays for his amusements. He can subscribe to football, cricket and running clubs; or he can go with the cycling club to various centres in Lincolnshire, or in the evening he can attend concerts and cinema shows. The payment of wages and the grading of the boys so that they may progress in their training help them to forsake the old man and prepare for a new life out of the shadow of the Police Court.

The average period in the Camp is fifteen months, and the normal lad during this time passes through three Grades. First there is the Beginners' Grade, then the Training Grade, and then finally the Leavers' Grade. The badge of those who

are training themselves is a ship's wheel of silver thread on a green background, worn on the pocket of the jacket. This symbolises the fact that he is steering his own course. In this Grade he carries out such daily duties as washing, cleaning his teeth, physical training and laundry work on his own initiative. The whole object of the training is that he should return to the world without his self-confidence and independence being unduly weakened by constant supervision. Too many a young man in the past after a few months in prison has failed to resist the temptations of this world, and has fallen again and again, until in time he has degenerated into an "old lag." At North Sea Camp, at Lowdham Grange, as indeed at all the Borstal Institutions, the real hope is reform in the widest sense of the word—the return of the boy after completing his sentence, physically and mentally strengthened, with moral standards to guide him and spiritually revived. Although figures at this early stage are apt to be misleading, it is encouraging that out of fifty of the Camp boys who have returned to civilian life, only one up to the present has been reconvicted; presumably the others are making good.

It is difficult in words to convey to the reader the spirit of North Sea Camp, for if the rigours of the climate, the simplicity of the fare, the hard toil, the constant strain on body and mind, the distance from home and relations are over-emphasised, the picture becomes too sombre. On the other hand, if the writer describes the football and cricket matches, the sing-songs, the voyages in the Sea Scout boats across the Wash to the Norfolk coast, the friendliness of constant visitors, the weekly visits to church, the Camp prayers just before bedtime, the joy of the piano and wireless, the occasional weekend walks and camps, life may appear to be too rosy.

Judging from conversations with the boys, at first they feel the conditions are severe, and after a time chafe at the comparative monotony. The motto at Lowdham is the word "stickability," which is painted up in certain dining-rooms and speaks for itself. The motto at North Sea Camp is simply "Stick It." This is a slogan to help the lads not only when they are finding their enforced daily round harsh and dull, but also in the future when they are free. One of the chief difficulties to-day is to find suitable jobs. The public can help to make these experiments permanent reforms by welcoming the lads back to civil life.

B. S. TOWNROE.

French suggestion was based upon what had for some time been known as the policy strongly advocated by Russia. The German and Italian governments, while accepting the British proposal that in agreement with the two sides in Spain the safety zones in Spanish waters should be extended and that the belligerents should undertake to exclude those zones from their operations, were understood to insist on the right and freedom of unilateral action in case of attack. There was perhaps some slight irony in so heated a discussion about the need of a system of collective security against unprovoked aggression, when the protagonists of the cause were none other than Germany and Italy.

When this paper was written the British, French, German and Italian governments were in close consultation about a possible compromise between the British and French distaste for immediate "sanctions" to be carried out on the spot, and the German and Italian claim to full freedom of action in the "sanctionary" sense. The irony of things sometimes turns a full circle.

THE BERLIN-ROME AXIS.

One of the major European consequences of the conflict in Spain has been what may be called an ideological *rapprochement* between Germany and Italy. It has for many months been a commonplace of German thought that the alleged London-Paris axis had inevitably produced the counter-axis of Berlin and Rome. It has been an Italian commonplace that the criticism roused by the Abyssinian affair and the attempted sanctions of the League of Nations had forged a link of sympathy and common interest between Italy and Germany. A feature of the past few weeks has been a greatly increased frequency in the exchange of Italian and German courtesies. On May 4th, for example, Count Ciano, entertaining Baron von Neurath at a banquet in Rome, spoke of the "profound feelings of friendship and the solid bonds indissolubly uniting Nazi Germany with Fascist Italy," and declared that "Germany and Italy intend to follow this policy in a true and sincere spirit of peace, desirous as we are of collaborating with all the other Powers, convinced, as we are, that there are no difficulties or obstacles to such collaboration that cannot be overcome if there is the goodwill to reach an

understanding and that mutual comprehension of the reciprocal exigencies of life of which Italy and Germany have been able to give a happy and complete example in their relations..." Baron von Neurath answered in the like strain, laying particular emphasis, however, upon his belief that "the difficulties now standing in the way of a confident collaboration between all peoples must and can be dissipated." When Baron von Neurath left Rome on May 5th he had also conversed with Signor Mussolini with the result that "the strict parallelism of interests and the identity of purposes of the two countries" was enshrined in a public statement, as was also the "will to a wider collaboration with the other Powers." In actual phraseology, no advance was thereby made on the joint statement issued in Berlin six months earlier, namely on October 25th, resulting from the visit of Count Ciano to Herr Hitler. At that time the formula used was that the conversations had been conducted "in an atmosphere of friendly cordiality" and that "to the satisfaction of both parties there has been established a concurrence of views and the intention of the two governments to devote their joint activities to the promotion of general peace and reconstruction. The two governments have decided to remain in touch for the accomplishment of these aims."

But the reiteration of visits and public statements had its cumulative effect. On May 13th for example, Count Ciano, speaking in the Chamber on the Foreign Office Estimates, gave a long dissertation to illustrate the community of German and Italian policies. Those policies, he said, had developed on parallel lines on such questions as the Western Pact, the security of Belgium, the problem of Austria and the Danube basin, the stand against Bolshevism and the war in Spain. But he still denied the existence of a German-Italian bloc. On June 2nd Field-Marshal von Blomberg arrived in Rome. Two days later Signor Gayda in the *Giornale d'Italia* wrote of a "defensive understanding" between Germany and Italy and extolled its value as "a protective force for the whole of European civilisation." That statement, made, as was well known, from official inspiration, was construed by French and British comment in a spirit of exaggerated, if natural, apprehension. The words "military pact" were roundly used in such comment. Yet the word "pact" was never used in the original disclosure, and it was known from

A SON OF NAPOLEON AT ELBA.

"THE Prince Imperial and the Empress landed here last night!"

As the news spread from village to village the whole Elban population was thrilled with excitement. To Napoleon's guard and faithful courtiers it called up memories of the glorious past. Even those islanders who pretended to be immune from the Corsican's seduction and complained of his "tyranny" and "avarice" were filled with curiosity and unreasonable elation. The thought that the Emperor's son was in their midst was sufficient to turn all heads.

Two days previously Napoleon had abandoned his sun-baked "palace" at Porto Ferrajo to seek cooler air on the heights of Marciana, where his campaigning tent had been set up under the chestnut trees. At twilight on September 1st, 1814, an English ship dropped anchor before San Giovanni with two ladies, an officer and a child on board. The port commissioner requested that they come ashore for the usual interrogation, but the ladies excused themselves on the score of sea-sickness. When he became insistent, the officer went ashore and asked to see the Commander of the Guard. A few minutes later the passengers were allowed to land without formalities, their identity remaining a secret.

Meanwhile the ship's crew told everybody they met that the Empress and her son had arrived. From the moment the child embarked at Genoa they had noticed his remarkable likeness to the King of Rome. From crude prints on tavern walls or popular medallions, they knew by heart the smiling face of the lovely blond boy, the cherished "Hope of France," looking so angelical in his little military uniform or in civilian clothes with a wide muslin collar. Their distinguished little passenger had the same regular features, curly fair hair and sweet girlish smile; yet by an amusing contrast had the air of a little man, plucky and dignified. Besides, these sailors had all heard of the King of Rome's famous sayings and several times during the voyage the little boy had made similar heroic or obstinate remarks. Finally, his mother had referred to him as the "Emperor's son," so they must be the Empress Marie-Louise and the King of Rome. The other young woman would be a lady-in-waiting and the officer in his brilliant uniform must be Prince Eugène de Beauharnais.

On hearing the news, Dr. Foureau set out at once for Marciana. When Napoleon sent for him the boy was sitting on his father's knee. "What do you think of him?" asked the Emperor. "Sire," replied the doctor, "I find the little King has grown very much." Napoleon started to laugh, but became serious again on seeing tears in the mother's averted eyes. Turning towards the lady, who had hitherto remained unnoticed, Dr. Foureau recognised the visitor from Genoa. She was not Marie-Louise, but Marie Walewska, and the boy was Napoleon's natural son: Alexander Colonna Walewski.

Marie Walewska, *née* Laczynska, was a pious and romantic young Polish lady imbued with fervent and mystical patriotism. Her mother, an impoverished widow with six children, hoped that Marie's beauty would enable her to make an advantageous marriage. She refused a rich Russian suitor, but allowed herself to be united to Count Anastase Walewski, a wealthy Polish aristocrat, aged seventy. With her elderly husband Marie lived a retired life propitious to sentimental exaltation. The birth of a son in 1806 strengthened her patriotic ardour and crystallised the dream of a native land where her child could live happy and free. When the French Emperor was preparing to fight the Russians, this dream seemed likely to come true. Timid by nature, without ambition or coquetry although full of zeal and enthusiasm, she conceived a crazy admiration for Napoleon. When he arrived in Warsaw in January 1807, Marie Walewska was barely eighteen. She was not very tall, but built on elegant lines; dazzlingly fair with large blue eyes and all the expressive charm of the Slavonic race. She was all the more alluring because she seemed unconscious of her beauty.

Prince Poniatowski was then urging all handsome Polish women to the conquest of the Emperor, but Marie's simplicity was more potent than the artifices of the coquettes. Perhaps also her sincere admiration for Napoleon enhanced the radiant beauty of her eyes. Or was it that the Corsican was affected "by the slight air of melancholy that pervaded her person," which, according to his valet, Constant, "made her still more seductive"? In any event, Napoleon paid no attention to the lovely women brought to his notice and was attracted by Marie alone, telling her so without delay. At first, the conqueror's caprice filled his young admirer with horror, but her patriotic fervour overcame all scruples. The Emperor wrote

assurances given through the diplomatic channels that neither Germany nor Italy had any intention of concluding any form of alliance that was directed against any third party, still less against Great Britain. Indeed the signs were not lacking that German diplomacy had espoused the cause of a closer understanding with Great Britain, and the new British Government of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, which came into office on May 28th, had decided to encourage Germany's new hope. Hence it was that suggestions began to be heard as to the possibility of renewed conversations about the proposed Western Pact.

What immediately emerged was that German policy was too much concerned about an understanding with Great Britain to commit itself to any precise form of alliance with Italy, and that the new British Government was a little more disposed to explore the possibility of an Anglo-German understanding than had been its predecessor. It has to be confessed that what may be called the League of Nations spirit in its sanctionist aspect has in the past year or two tended to emphasise the differences rather than the sympathy between British feeling on the one hand and German and Italian feeling on the other. The fact has also to be faced that the "Big Four" of the new British Cabinet were Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Anthony Eden, and that two of those four—Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Samuel Hoare—had in the recent past nailed their colours firmly to the anti-sanctionist mast. It would be improper to suggest that Mr. Neville Chamberlain's famous phrase about "midsummer madness" and his publicly expressed total sympathy with Sir Samuel Hoare in regarding the incomplete Geneva system of collective security as a danger rather than a safeguard of the peace had the effect within the new British Cabinet of restricting the personal influence of Mr. Anthony Eden. But human nature being what it is there can be no doubt that the Chamberlain-Hoare combination had at any rate the effect of encouraging Mr. Eden in whatever impulses he had towards blurring the line of demarcation that had been drawn in Europe by the sanctionist controversy. Nor can there be much doubt that one of the practical manifestations of the change, subtle as it might be, was the attempt at an improved *Stimmung* as between Great Britain and Germany.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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HOLLAND HOUSE.

Lord Ilchester deserves congratulations on the completion of a task he set himself many years ago. The owner of the most historic house in London, next to Lambeth Palace, has told the story of more than three centuries, the larger part recording the fortunes of his own family. He alone of living men could have done it, for he alone has perused every document in the vast collection under his roof. The first volume ends with the death of George III in 1820,* and the second will appear in the autumn. Readers of his earlier works, particularly of his full-length biography of Henry Fox, first Lord Holland, are aware that he is a trained historian as well as the guardian of priceless artistic treasures. The book is full of information and the stage is crowded with familiar figures, but he moves quietly among the throng, bringing the actors back to life with a portrait or a letter, an anecdote or a phrase. It will be particularly welcome to Kensingtonians who daily feast their eyes on a masterpiece of Jacobean architecture set amidst peaceful trees and lawns.

The story opens with the building of Cope Castle by John Thorpe in 1605, the visit of James I, the marriage of Sir Walter Cope's daughter to Henry Rich, Earl of Holland, his

* *The Home of the Hollands, 1605-1820.* By the Earl of Ilchester. John Murray. 18s.

to her: "Oh come to me. Come! All your wishes shall be fulfilled. Your native land will be dearer to me when you have taken pity on my poor heart." Persuaded by Poniatowski, already treated as a sovereign by her relatives, deserted by old Anastase, who took himself off to Rome after Eylau, she gave way to Napoleon in the hope of obtaining the restoration of Poland.

Now if Poniatowski wished to make use of Napoleon against the Russians, Napoleon's aim was to make use of the great Polish families against the Czar, and Poland to him was merely the means to an end. Caught in the double mesh of this net of intrigues, Marie Walewska was the victim of baffled ambitions. Nevertheless, her sacrifice eventually brought compensation, because her early aversion changed to devoted attachment. She fell in love with the man himself and when the hope of freeing Poland melted away, her infatuation for the impossible liberator only became more intense. Marie was beautiful, calm, reposeful, and Napoleon loved her as he had never loved before. His caprice changed into passion and very soon he could not bear to be separated from her. At Finckenstein he provided her with an apartment adjoining his headquarters and they took their meals together. Constant, who waited on them singlehanded, liked to listen to their conversation, "always amiable, alert and eager" on the part of the Emperor; "tender, fond and melancholy" on the part of Countess Walewska. When Napoleon was out she passed her time in reading or in watching from a window the parades and marches in the castle courtyard which he often commanded in person. The Emperor was charmed with her smooth and equable character and cherished her more and more.

After Wagram, when he installed himself in the Schoenbrunn Palace, he provided her with a pretty house in the suburbs of Vienna. Every evening Constant went discreetly to fetch the beautiful Countess "in a closed carriage without armorial bearings, assisted by a single man-servant without livery," and brought her by a secret door to the Emperor's presence.* It was at one of these interviews that Napoleon learned with delight that Marie was about to become a mother. It has been said that this undoubted proof of paternity influenced him to repudiate Josephine; not in order to marry

* Constant, *Mémoires*, vol. iii, p. 270 seq.

the Countess Walewska, whatever his secret wish may have been, but for reasons of State. When trying to persuade his brother Lucien also to repudiate his wife, Napoleon referred to his own case with Marie Walewska: "She is a charming woman, an angel, whose soul is as beautiful as her face." Adding: "You laugh to see me in love. As a matter of fact I am, but I subordinate my sentiments to policy which demands that I marry a princess; although I should prefer to crown my mistress."*

Like Louis XIV, the Emperor wished to legitimise his child so that if it were a boy he would be heir to the Empire. However, his counsellors reminded him that on the death of that King, parliament had cancelled the decrees in favour of legitimised children, so he gave up the idea. Marie returned to her Polish *château*, where on May 10th, 1810—a month after the Emperor's marriage to Marie-Louise—she gave birth to a son who was christened Florian-Alexander-Joseph. For baptismal purposes the name of the father was recorded as Count Anastase Walewski. At the time of his birth a terrible storm burst over the district and the infant's first cries were drowned in the noise of thunder. The superstitious household took it for a sign that the boy's life would be tumultuous and splendid. The rumour spread that Napoleon had promised to make this boy the first king of liberated Poland. Son of an Emperor, promised a throne, he seemed marked out for a great destiny.

In September 1810, owing to differences with her husband, Marie left Poland with baby Alexander and returned to the house in Paris, No. 2 rue du Houssaye, that the Emperor had bought for her. She was soon surrounded by numerous compatriots who were reminding the world rather noisily that Poland was still crushed but unresigned. Napoleon gave them ostensible marks of his favour, while talking Polish politics a bit too often, perhaps, to be entirely sincere. Countess Walewska lived happily, unconcerned with amusements, theatres or social functions, and wrote notes daily to Napoleon. She confided to Constant her deep love for the Emperor. "All my thoughts," she said, "all my inspirations come from him and return to him. He is my horizon, my future, and my life." Napoleon went to see her whenever possible, or else she glided furtively into the Tuileries, sometimes with little Alexander.

* Jung, *Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires*, vol. iii, p. 105.

championship of the Royalist cause, and his execution soon after the death of Charles I. After this tragic incident the story of the Rich family is uneventful, and the chief happening of interest to our time is the marriage of Addison to the widowed Countess of Warwick and Holland. The reader would gladly have learned more about the first century and a quarter of Holland House, but the author hastens forward to its lease, followed by its purchase by Henry Fox, first Lord Holland in a new line. Of this able but thick-skinned politician, his avarice and his corrupting methods, Lord Ilchester writes with proper severity. The Paymastership brought him wealth, a considerable part of which was dissipated by the boundless extravagance of his sons. The elder is a shadow, for he died six months after his father. Of the younger, Charles James Fox, we can never know enough; but we naturally hear more of him in the early days of dissipation and Parliamentary fame than of the later years when he had sown his wild oats and become the honoured father of English Liberalism.

The hero of this fascinating volume is the third Earl, who, aided by his formidable wife, made Holland House the greatest centre of political and literary society that England has ever known. Byron's friend Hobhouse described him as the most delightful man alive, and so said all his friends. "Lord Holland, as he always is, delightful," wrote the widow of Charles James Fox after a dinner party, where Sydney Smith was among the guests. The host's kindness of heart, modesty, charm and tact were as much admired as his wide intellectual interests. Had he possessed more ambition, his place in our political history would have been higher, for he was a good speaker as well as a man of courage and unflinching fidelity to principle. So wide were his sympathies that he wrote to Grey in 1814: "I cannot but hate Buonaparte, but I cannot but admire him," and during the fallen Emperor's last years little presents reached St. Helena from Holland House. The hostess had her admirers, but she was not to everybody's taste. "I do not well know how dinners and evenings could be more pleasant," wrote Ticknor, the American scholar. "There was no alloy but Lady Holland, whom I did not like; but I should have been very foolish if I had suffered that to prevent my enjoyment, when to avoid it I had only to talk to somebody else." The greatest time was still to come when the Reform era brought the Whigs to office

and Lord Holland into the Cabinet. Of the last twenty years of that brilliant salon we shall hear in the second volume.

To turn over the pages of the index is to get a bird's-eye view of the great army of men and women whose memories haunt Holland House. Many of them are now merely names, but not a few are numbered among the immortals. The most arresting document in a volume packed with new material is Byron's letter to Lord Holland dated February 23rd, 1816, which throws fresh light on the vexed question of his marriage and completely exonerates his wife. "I can attach no blame to *her*. Where there is wrong, it may be fairly divided between her relatives and myself, and where there is right she has the monopoly. . . . In short they are violent and I am stubborn. . . . They think to drive me by menacing with legal measures. Let them go into court, they shall be met there. . . . They cannot be more anxious for investigation than myself."

G. P. G.

* * * * *

THE HUMAN NEEDS OF LABOUR.*

When Mr. Seebohm Rowntree published in 1918 his book on *Poverty in York* the data for forming an accurate judgment on the food necessary to supply the minimum needs of the average family were not available. It is true that various estimates had been made of a satisfactory dietary, but at that time little was known of the subject of vitamins and mineral salts, while insufficient stress had been laid on the value of protective foods. Bio-chemists and physiologists have now enabled us to remedy this lack of knowledge in the past. Previous conclusions have also to some extent been affected by changes in the size of the average family and by better provision for physical fitness. In Mr. Rowntree's new book, *The Human Needs of Labour*, he gives us something much more than a revised edition. In studying and investigating the budgets of 2,875 families in York he has now given us a standard by which we can measure the minimum needs of a family consisting of a man, his wife and three children. This standard makes it possible to assess the wage necessary for physical efficiency. It must however be remembered that this wage is a *minimum* wage, and in a recent letter to *The*

* By B. Seebohm Rowntree. Longmans. 2s. 6d. net.

Constant let them in by the dark staircase, for it was necessary to avoid arousing the suspicions of the Empress. One night in January 1813, the boy was awakened from his sleep, dressed, and taken to his mother. Two men were with her in her salon. The one who took him on his knee and kissed him had a most unusual face, and the child received such a vivid impression that he kept the memory of it all his life. It was the Emperor.

Amid the increasing difficulties of the French campaign Napoleon did not forget his son's interests. On August 5th, 1812, he had decreed that his personal estates in the Kingdom of Naples be settled on Alexander Walewski, conferring on him at the same time the title of Count of the Empire. The proceeds of this heritage amounted to 169,516 francs, but Napoleon feared that Murat might confiscate this property. Therefore he prepared a second heritage of 50,000 francs income, carefully detailed as was his wont: 30,000 francs from canal shares and 20,000 from current account. He wrote to his treasurer, M. de la Bouillerie, on February 8th, 1814: "I have received your letter concerning young Walewski. I leave you a free hand; do what is proper. The child interests me specially and afterwards the mother."

During the night of April 4th-5th, at Fontainebleau, the vanquished Emperor granted a secret interview to Marie Walewska. She waited in an adjoining room until nearly daybreak, but he had fallen into a kind of stupor and was oblivious of his surroundings. When he awoke to realities he asked Constant to show the Countess in, but she had left an hour earlier in abject despair. Napoleon was much upset and said to his valet: "Poor woman, she will feel humiliated. If you see her, Constant, tell her how really sorry I am. But," he added, grasping his forehead, "I have so much on my mind."*

He wrote to Countess Walewska from Elba on April 16th: "When you have settled your affairs, if you care to visit Lucca or Pisa I should be pleased to see you as well as your son, for whom my affection is unchanged." So, early in August, Marie's brother went to Elba with a letter in which she asked Napoleon's permission to pay him a visit. He consented on condition that the journey and interview were kept secret. What he really had in mind at the time, however, is

* Constant, *Mémoires*, t. vi, p. 92.

manifest from a letter to General Bertrand, dated Porto Ferrajo, August 9th, 1814: "Colonel Laczynski, who is leaving to-day for Leghorn, will go from there to Aix to carry a letter from me to the Empress. Write to Meneval that I expect the Empress at the end of August and wish her to bring my son."* A Leghorn bulletin of early September records that General Bertrand had just ordered seven thousand coloured lanterns. "It is believed on the island that they are for a grand illumination to celebrate the arrival of the Grand Duchess Marie-Louise." But at the appointed time the Empress did not appear, and it was Marie Walewska, with her brother, sister and son, who embarked at Genoa for Elba.

During the previous week, accompanied by an orderly officer, the Emperor had walked several times round the island and climbed to the highest peaks to scan the horizon. This officer was in the pay of Mariotti, French Consul at Leghorn, who kept his government informed of all Napoleon's doings and sayings. From this spy's reports we learn the smallest details of events. On August 31st, the Emperor "wished to climb Mount Campana (the highest peak in the island), although it was pointed out that only goats and goat-herds had so far attempted that feat. On reaching the summit, he rested his telescope on the officer's shoulder and searched the sea anxiously. As night fell, he hurried back to the Hermitage, telling his orderly to ride at once to the Porto Ferrajo stables with orders to prepare a four-horse carriage and three saddle-horses and wait on the road near the Saint-Jean beach for further orders from Marshal Bertrand."

A little later, the Emperor mounted his white charger and started off in the direction of Porto Ferrajo, followed by a small escort of lancers and mamelukes. Baron Larrey records that Madame Mère timidly asked her son if he were going to meet Marie-Louise and the King of Rome, whom public rumour already announced. "But on receiving a negative reply, she guessed at once the name of the supposed Empress. The lady's visit might please the Emperor, but it hurt the dignity of his mother, who withdrew without comment."

Napoleon met the Polish family at the Procchio hill, halfway between San Giovanni and Marciana. He dismounted

* *Correspondance de Napoleon Ier*, xxvii, p. 477, vol. xxxv, 1936.

Times Mr. Rowntree emphasises this point. His estimate of 53s. per week as the minimum wage for the town and 41s. for the country is a bare minimum, somewhat severe and exiguous, but sufficient with great care on the part of the housewife for the maintenance of physical efficiency. Such a wage, however, allows for scarcely any margin, merely a few shillings for holidays, beer and tobacco, amusements, travelling other than fares to and from work or indeed any contingencies or emergencies. We all know, for example, that Sir John Orr and other experts, whose authority has not been questioned, consider that at least a pint of milk is required for children per day. If there are three children it will easily be seen, at the present price of milk, that this lessens the amount that should be spent for the food of two adults.

Mr. Rowntree takes the British Medical Association figures and uses them to measure the quantities of protein and the calories of food energy that are required by all persons engaged in industry; and using these figures his analysis shows that if minimum rates of pay are fixed on such a basis and regarding the number of dependent children as three, that there would still be something like 18 per cent. of all children belonging to families for which no adequate provision was made. For one or two years the number of dependent children would be in excess of three per family. Here then we have a yardstick for measuring industrial efficiency and we can hardly doubt the impartiality of the author who is himself a large employer of labour.

This new study makes it clear that there are many industries which do not provide a sufficient living wage. Notwithstanding all that the Trade Boards have done to raise the standard of living in many industries, it is still true to say that if the first charge on industry should be a wage which is adequate, there are many industries that fail to reach and to maintain this standard. Sir John Orr in a recent broadcast maintained that the deficiency must somehow or other be remedied either by the employer raising wages or by further help from the State and the local authority. He would like to see every child ensured a proper supply of milk as a *sine qua non* of physical efficiency and he suggests that we should gradually create a sound public opinion making possible the necessary changes in dietary especially for the working classes. Mr. Rowntree hopes that during the next

five years industries may put their house in order and believes that inefficient industries unable to pay a decent wage will no doubt in the end be superseded. Meanwhile it would be as well for the country once more to consider the advisability of some system of family allowances available for all families whose earnings fall below a certain figure.

PERCY ALDEN.

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THE EARLY STUARTS.*

The latest volume to be published in the Oxford History of England is a very able contribution by Mr. Godfrey Davies on *The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660*. Like its predecessors, the work is a comprehensive survey, covering the whole national life, although, of course, the great political and religious developments are most prominent. The author has incorporated the results of much research, but it is noticeable how little can be added to the conclusions of Gardiner and Firth. Of the former's great History, Mr. Godfrey Davies points out that "even after the lapse of fifty years, it is difficult to add substantially to, or to make more than minor corrections of, this narrative." The author's debt is evident in these pages which are written with clarity and impartiality. The period has been the subject of so much distorted interpretation and sensational writing that it is a great relief to find a sound, if solid, narrative which aims primarily to present the facts. The great difficulty is of omission and compression while retaining a true sense of proportion. This has been well accomplished, although inevitably not every reader will be entirely satisfied. Some, for instance, may regret that in an age when political and religious speculations were so important only a few sentences should be devoted to Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Harrington's *Oceana*, or that the great Presbyterian Baxter should remain unnoticed, or that Selden's *Table Talk* should receive no discussion in the text. Others, perhaps, may feel that the account of the events leading to the outbreak of the Civil War after Charles' attempted arrest of the five Members in January 1642 is too condensed. While the Nineteen Propositions passed in June represented

* (1) *The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660*. By Godfrey Davies. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. net. (2) *Oliver Cromwell*. By Ernest Barker. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d. net.

and took a seat in the carriage in silence. It was a clear moonlight night, but the bad state of the roads soon made it impossible to proceed. Everyone had to get out and ride. According to the spy's report: "The child was placed in the care of his mother, who was the first to mount; then the Emperor requested his orderly (i.e. the narrator) to walk beside this unknown lady's horse and lead it by the bridle. . . . About a mile from the Hermitage the Emperor galloped ahead so as to arrive in time to welcome the party. When the lady with the child had dismounted they accompanied him into the tent." During her stay the unknown lady did not leave the tent, but the Emperor reappeared twice to give rapid orders. The little boy came out often with one or the other of the guardsmen.*

Young Alexander was not in the least intimidated at seeing his father again. In notes made towards the end of his life he relates how he recognised immediately, in the blue and white uniform, the night visitor of the rue du Houssaye. At the age of four he was precocious and alert and, although restless and playful, had his mother's sweet affectionate disposition and innate graciousness. Napoleon noticed in his son many traits of the Bonapartes, as well as their round heads and olive complexions.

Under the eye of his aunt, Alexander plucked flowers and played with the Emperor's companions, who watched him with kindly interest. He willingly left all his games when allowed to come into his father's tent. He climbed at once on Napoleon's knees and amused him by his mischievous tricks and ready answers. The Emperor asked him the question all fathers ask their sons: "What will you be when you grow up?" To which the child replied: "I shall make war like Napoleon." "Are you fond of Napoleon?" "Oh, yes!" "And why?" "Because he is my Papa and Mamma told me to love him."

The Emperor wished his son to dine with them in the tent. Marie protested, fearing that Alexander's fidgeting might annoy his father. But Napoleon insisted, remarking that he had been a little devil himself as a boy. "I used to kick Joseph and make him do my lessons for me. If punished with a diet of dry bread, I exchanged it with the shepherds for chestnut bread or made my nurse give me a cake." The boy

soon started to fidget. "Aren't you afraid of being whipped?" asked the Emperor. "You had better take care; I was whipped once and never forgot it." He then related how he and his sister Pauline had once made fun of their grandmother and had received well-merited punishment. Whereupon the boy replied indignantly: "But I never make fun of Mamma." The Emperor was amused and kissed him affectionately, saying: "Well answered."

The Emperor's affection for Alexander did not make him forget the King of Rome, Marie-Louise or the Empire. His thoughts were mainly centred on his throne, and Marie-Louise became dearer to him since he had lost her in losing it. As though fearing his mistress might start another subject, or perhaps because only one subject interested him, Napoleon talked a great deal and always of the same things: "What were the Empress and the King of Rome doing? What was happening in France?" Marie Walewska gave ample details of the general feeling of deception that had followed the return of the Bourbons, but said nothing about Marie-Louise's rumoured conduct. In spite of her remorse as a pious woman, her futile sacrifice and the sufferings of her still captive country, she had been happy in Napoleon's love. Her affection had the same exaltation as her patriotism; so she brought up her boy in the dual loyalties of Poland and the Emperor. She had come to Elba, just as at Fontainebleau, to offer her life to her beloved, and found courage to beg the favour of remaining with him. But Napoleon, by retaining his former mistress and her son, did not wish to give Marie-Louise a pretext for not rejoining him, so his only answer was a shrug of the shoulders.

Marie then became painfully aware that he no longer cared for her as formerly. At one time she had been everything to him and after being so tenderly cherished the realisation of her solitude and abandonment was extremely bitter. She resolved to leave Elba the same evening. The Emperor did not try to retain her, but forced her to accept a draft for 61,000 francs to defray the expenses of her journey.

It was now necessary for her to proceed to Naples, because the second heritage made by Napoleon in his son's favour had not become effective and the first one was in Murat's hands. Appeal must be made to him. At Porto Ferrajo it

* Archives des Aff. Étr.—Mémoires et Documents, 1800, pp. 103-4.

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Parliament's final demands, "the issue was fairly joined," as Dr. J. R. Tanner has pointed out, when the Militia Ordinance, passed in March and appointing Parliamentary nominees to lead the militia, was rejected by Charles in May. This important stage is not dealt with by Mr. Godfrey Davies. He stresses the lack of support enjoyed by the King, in spite of the increasing danger to the Church. As late as September 1642 he was only "saved from an unconditional surrender by a gross error" of Parliament which, in calling for the surrender of delinquents, forced would-be neutrals to the King's side in their own defence.

Mr. Godfrey Davies is not concerned with elaborate pen-portraits of the outstanding personalities. Their characters are made to appear from the general course of the narrative and in comments which are at once succinct and judicial. He treats Charles I as consistent from first to last in his claims to absolute rule and responsibility to God alone. But in striving to maintain his position, he could exercise the utmost duplicity and bad faith, well exemplified in his negotiations during the Civil War. The author acknowledges the complete sincerity of Cromwell. In striving to secure for the small minority of Independents "their civil liberties as men, and their spiritual liberties as Christians," he had fought monarch, church and presbytery and assumed despotic power. This paradox or dualism in the outlook of Cromwell and the Puritans is discussed at some length by Professor Barker in a monograph, part of which was recently delivered as a lecture before a German audience. Under Cromwell, he writes, there was "a brief summer of religious liberty," albeit both Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism were excluded. In political and civil liberty he also believed, but subject always to the supreme necessity for the Reformation of Manners as enjoined by God.

Here the cause of Independency and the theory of the Free Church twists round, as it were, in the hands of its authors. It loses its edge of freedom: it begins to show a stern and sharp edge of compulsion, as of the "sword of the Lord and of Gideon."

If in effect limitation of outlook and contemporary circumstances forbade any general freedom, Cromwell yet represented those ideals of the primacy of religious liberty and of a State based on free discussion which outshone in the subsequent development of English nonconformity. Professor

Barker proceeds to discuss the comparison often made in Germany of Cromwell with Hitler. While all revolutionary periods enjoy certain similarities, as in the sense of regeneration, expansive ardour and insistence on unity, the Puritan and National Socialist revolutions are fundamentally apart in their spiritual foundations. Cromwell's position was founded in religion, in the need for a people of God, united by personal faith in Christ, so that Puritan nationalism "runs easily and naturally into internationalism." To the Protector and his followers there could be no physical exclusiveness, no faith based on race or blood. Their belief was radically opposed to any form of pantheism, to the conception of a universally immanent God incarnate in a whole people, itself identified in the person of a leader. Moreover, they never identified religious with political uniformity.

In the course of his work Mr. Godfrey Davies devotes much attention to foreign policy, emigration and American colonisation. In a valuable contribution on social and economic conditions he touches on the difficult problem of enclosures during the period. He has to reconcile the prevailing discontent with his own estimate, from an examination of statistical evidence, that "less than 3 per cent. of the total area of England was inclosed by 1607," or at the most 5 per cent. He accounts for much of the distress by concluding that the Midland Counties "where the bulk of the inclosed land was situated" suffered in Stuart times an enclosure of between 8 and 9 per cent. Since "they were the great wheat-growing areas" and "the object in view was for the most part to transform arable land into pasture," the consequences were serious. Mr. Godfrey Davies' general estimates are open to serious dispute and may be compared usefully with the conclusions of Mr. J. N. L. Baker, published in 1936 in his article in *Historical Geography of England before 1800*.

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ARMAMENTS AND THE COST.*

As a study in human folly and its penalties no two books could be more depressing than these. As exponents of their

* *Armaments: the Race and the Crisis*. By Francis W. Hirst. Cobden-Sanderson. 5s. net. *Europe in Arms*. By B. H. Liddell Hart. Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d. net.

was still believed that the Emperor's guests were Marie-Louise and the King of Rome, so to avoid any demonstration in their honour Napoleon requested the Walewskis to embark at Porto Longone. At nine p.m. on September 3rd General Bertrand arrived at the Hermitage and gave orders for the road leading down to the beach to be cleared of all prying persons and passers-by. The Countess and her sister, leading little Alexander by the hand, came out of the tent followed by the Emperor. They mounted their horses and started off slowly in the direction of the sea. The moonlight was clear, the air cool but calm. The villagers had hidden behind the trees and bushes along the roadside. "But they were soon chased away by the soldiers and the party advanced in dead silence." About a mile from Marciana beach the Emperor took leave of his visitors. He raised his son in his arms, saying aloud: "Goodbye, dear child of my heart," then returned up the mountain path followed by a groom and a few lancers. A little later the orderly "found His Majesty seated on a tree-trunk with his night telescope in his hand. As soon as he was noticed, Napoleon dismissed him and remained alone."*

The Emperor had scarcely returned to his tent when a violent tempest arose. Feeling anxious for the safety of the travellers, he gave orders to an officer—was it the spy?—to ride down to the quay and prevent the Walewskis from putting to sea. But the officer lost time in taking shelter and reached Porto Longone after the visitors had sailed. Marie Walewska's visit to the prisoner at Elba thus ended in a dramatic departure in a storm. She left behind her a persistent legend. Like her arrival, her sudden and mysterious departure confirmed the belief that it was the Empress and the King of Rome who had spent two days in the ridiculous domain of the fallen Emperor.

Mariotti sent report after report to his government. He knew the real name of the visitor, but all during September noted that "many people still believe this and Napoleon seems to have wished them to do so because of the measures taken when the lady came and left. However, he tried to stop the rumour and forbade people to say it was the Empress, which seemed in the eyes of all one proof the more."* On September 22nd the Prefect of Toulon reported to the Minister of Marine: "According to information collected in Corsica, it seems

* *Arch. des Aff. étr.—Mémoires et documents*, 1800, p. 104-5

certain . . . that early this month the Grand Duchess Marie-Louise landed at Elba with her son. Her Illustrious Highness remained only two days with her husband."* Finally, a report from Elba, dated September 12th, affirms that "everyone is still convinced that the Empress Marie-Louise came here at the end of August, but it is forbidden to talk about it."†

The beautiful Countess reached Naples after some delay. On September 12th Murat had confiscated all the grants made by Napoleon in his kingdom. She pleaded successfully the cause of her son and Murat made an exception in his case, the endowment being renewed by decree on November 30th. At Murat's court little Alexander was spoiled by everybody and loaded with toys, while his mother was likewise the centre of much attention. It was known that she had seen the Emperor and rumours ran wild, especially about her knowledge of his plans and the message she was said to have brought Murat.

In March 1815 she attended a ball given by Count de Mosbourg at which the King, Queen and Court were present. During a quadrille the host received a message which he communicated to Murat, who left at once with the Queen. Next morning it was learned that Napoleon had escaped from Elba. Marie left Naples immediately with her boy and during the voyage their ship was chased by a privateer. Alexander never forgot that dramatic pursuit, the racket on the ship, and his mother's relief when the pirate sails disappeared on the horizon. In Paris, he saw his father again in the blue and white uniform that had already impressed him. After a time Napoleon announced his approaching campaign and asked the boy to come along with him. When his mother protested, Napoleon replied: "Very well, Madam, I shall take him by force!" In 1867 Walewski said that "these words still rang in his ears."

Weeks slipped by. After Waterloo, Marie went to Malmaison with her children. Alexander soon forgot the details of that last heartbreaking farewell, but all his life retained the memory of the Emperor's face bent over to kiss him. He thought he saw a tear on his father's cheek. Once more Marie offered to follow Napoleon into exile, but in the pain of defeat he repulsed all devotion and again refused. "Even despair

* *Archives de la Marine*, BB3, 415, pp. 202, 203.

† *Archives des Aff. étr.—Mémoires et Documents*, 1800, p. 168.

subject no two authors could be found more competent or more qualified to express a view.

Mr. Hirst's book, as necessarily follows from so realistic, well-informed and distinguished a mind, gives the whole body of fact about present armaments and their cost in money, together with the historical comparative background. He recalls what European armaments were in the period 1815-60; from the Cobden Treaty with France to the Tsar's proposals for disarmament; from the Boer War to the Great War (1899-1914) from the Great War to the Disarmament Conference; and during the present armaments race which began in 1934. He then analyses the present stage of armament in Great Britain and the British Empire, in Germany, France, Italy, Russia and the lesser European countries, as well as in Japan, the United States and South America. He analyses the corresponding naval competition, and assesses the effect of armaments on unemployment.

It is a deeply depressing book, but one which emphatically ought to have been written, especially by Mr. Hirst. What Mr. Neville Chamberlain early this year referred to as "the incredible folly of civilisation" is here set out in all its ugly and terrifying detail. Even before the then unprecedented destruction of the last great war has been eliminated from memory or its practical effects are fully measured, the world is preparing for a still greater destruction. The British Government, last to be driven into the race, is engaged upon the largest and most expensive programme of military, naval and air armament that has ever been undertaken by any country in the world in time of peace. And the logic of it all is an inevitable commensurate war, unless some miracle of human luck can rescue civilisation from itself.

The particular service that Mr. Hirst performs for us is that he enables the inexpert or the otherwise busy man or woman to understand quickly the essential facts of this monstrous circumstance. His book is a masterpiece of compression, containing only 171 pages, and is published at a cheap price. It may be (and this part Mr. Hirst brings out with great clarity) that the very magnitude of the present danger may itself prevent the actual war. Indeed, Mr. Hirst suggests the possibility that the very weight of the present preparation for war may crush the nations before the war itself can crush them. Russia, Italy, Germany, France,

Poland—how can those countries go on at this pace? Shortage of food and raw materials, rising prices, governmental interference with normal trade by such means as exchange restrictions, subsidies, quotas, tariffs, egregious taxation or confiscation, budget deficits, inability to borrow at reasonable rates, etc.; all these things may, Mr. Hirst suggests, precipitate "a crash in the near future."

Captain Liddell Hart's service is of a somewhat different, not less depressing, but equally essential, kind. He is an authority on war—odd as the accomplishment appears to be in a man with so great a gift of sympathy and gentleness. He too gives many of the appalling present facts about armaments throughout the world. What is more, he analyses, as few men would be so qualified to analyse, the practical factors, strategical and tactical, that would have to be faced in a new great war. He includes a chapter which penetrates the obscurity about the military facts of the recent war in Abyssinia. He ends with a typically well-written, imaginative and in places humorous, answer to the question, would another war end civilisation? He reaches the consoling conclusion that "a sense of the ridiculous may bring the warring peoples to their senses before they can renew the war-effort," after another war has produced "the collapse of the attack before the collapse of civilisation."

The odd thing, however, is that Captain Liddell Hart apparently does not see that war is itself the very essence of civilisation. Can civilisation destroy itself? And would it necessarily be a bad thing if it could and did?

G. G.

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A HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS.

Pieter Geyl, for many years Professor of Dutch History and Institutions in the University of London, now Professor of Modern History at Utrecht, is the leading authority on the history of the Netherlands. He is writing the *Geschiedenes van de Nederlandsche Stam*, and we are fortunate in having an English translation of this very important work.* The first volume was entitled *The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1559-1609*.

* The translation has been produced, in collaboration with the author, by S. T. Bindoff. Williams & Norgate Ltd., Great Russell Street, London. 12s. 6d.

itself, which softens other men, was hard and glacial in him.”*

Soon afterwards Marie crossed the frontier and settled in Belgium with her two sons. At Liège she met General Philip d’Ornano, who, after a time, made her an offer of marriage. She was quite free, her husband being dead and her lover having forsaken her. Still young and beautiful, although heartbroken from the cruel separation that had ended eight years of ardent love, she felt the need of a quiet life. The handsome General’s offer was accepted and her boys knew the protective influence of a father’s house. After the marriage they lived in a lovely country house near Liège where, on June 9th, 1917, Marie gave birth to another son, Rodolphe-Auguste d’Ornano. She never felt any real affection for this child, lavishing all her motherly love on Alexander, whom she worshipped and spoiled. He also adored his mother, so sweet and lovely in her soft-shaded gowns of “levantine lilac, white tulle with acacia stripes or shaded blue and white taffetas.” She sang to her children songs of Poland which conjured up visions of the unhappy fatherland, Russian cruelty and melancholy plains stretching afar under grey skies.

General d’Ornano eventually received permission to return to France, so Marie travelled to Paris alone with her young infant. When her husband and sons joined her they found her seriously ill. She died on December 15th, 1817, in the house that Napoleon had given her. Alexander never forgot the distress of the household on that occasion or the shrill lamentations of the servants. Marie was buried in Père-Lachaise cemetery, where an epitaph merely states that she was the Countess d’Ornano.

A whole nation was deeply interested in the fate of a “lovely blond boy” then at the Schoenbrunn Palace, who had been for an instant Napoleon II, Emperor of the French. No one gave a thought to little Count Walewski, imperial bastard, whom his father nearly recognised, and who might perhaps have sat on the throne of Poland. Of this royal destiny nothing was left to him but the bitter glory of having once, at Elba, been mistaken for the King of Rome and the dangerous prestige of being Napoleon’s son.†

PHILIPPE POIRSON.

* Lamartine, *Histoire de la Restauration*, vol. i, p. 379.

† Translated by O. F. Abbott, by permission of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

FARCE OR TRAGEDY?

CLOUDS as black as any that had been seen on the general diplomatic horizon since the armistice of November 11th, 1918, suddenly took shape in the second week of September. It was the deliberate view of many earnest people that no former post-war clouds had been so black. This time, they thought, there was no mistaking the urgent nature of what was threatened. The danger was so clear that some of the most experienced people were chilled into the sort of spurious calm that is produced by a deep foreboding.

As if by the working of a mocking fate every single thing east and west seemed to have gone wrong at the same time. Yet the really unpleasant thought was that not fate at all, but a human perversity so crude as to be surprising even when so many bizarre things are happening, had precipitated the unnecessary misgiving. It may be that the British Government is one of the blind instruments of fate. But not on any other hypothesis can fate be held responsible for the particular gaffe here referred to. The bare facts presented to the world in September 1937 were that by a cumulative disregard of caution and a persisting atrophy of the sense of consequence British foreign policy had simultaneously stabilised Japan, Germany, Italy and Franco Spain in positions where a deal with Great Britain was so difficult as to be nearly impossible.

Within a few short weeks British policy thwarted Signor Mussolini’s new offer of an understanding and by the same token put a barrier between Germany and Great Britain (for the Rome-Berlin axis was a fact of impregnable strength), antagonised Japan by a Note of which any schoolboy would be ashamed, and gave the like treatment to General Franco in Spain. What matters only in diplomacy is that there should be no war, or if there must be war, that one should have the best available allies. In 1914-18 Great Britain had all the allies. Out of seven Great Powers in the world, six were on one side: the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States. On the other side stood the one remaining Great Power, Germany. And Germany nearly

The second, *The Netherlands Divided*, covers the period 1609-48 and can be read independently.

The title of the original is in itself a programme of the author's historical convictions. In view of the great importance of the Netherlands in European history the gist of his opinion should be known not only to scholars, but to all educated citizens of Europe. According to him the cleavage running right across the Dutch-speaking area of the Netherlands is not due to any difference in national character between "Flemings" and "Hollanders," but is simply the result of the military and political situation at the end of the rebellion. This accidental frontier in no way divides a Catholic from a Calvinist population. There were many Roman Catholics in the northern and many Protestants in the southern provinces. The Counter-Reformation, of course, destroyed Southern Protestantism, while Catholicism in the north could be preserved to our days. The divergence in religion, which caused a totally different political and cultural feeling in the two parts, was not the source but the result of the historical split. The thesis is supported by a great variety of details in the new volume. It will be most interesting to learn his interpretation of the breakdown of the reunion in the nineteenth century. For every scholar occupied with the problem of Belgium Professor Geyl's suggestions on the development of the Latin words Belgium, Belgica, Belga are most useful. These words in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries covered the Netherlands as a whole. Much later the Latin terms were revived in the Austrian Netherlands and used in a limited sense for new political purposes. The author was lucky enough to find a letter of 1640 in which the plan of a division of the Southern Netherlands and of the reunion of all Dutch-speaking people is discussed. Some few lines show the idea: "The Walloons have always been French before; let them be French still and let those who speak Dutch join and unite with us who speak Dutch . . ." (page 113).

In dealing with the development of a comparatively small nation an author may well indicate the possibilities of universal history. For such an approach the Netherlands of the sixteenth century provide a wonderful opportunity. The greatest names of Netherlandish civilisation belonged to that period: Hugo Grotius, the poet Vondel, the painters Rembrandt, Frans Hals, Rubens and van Dyck. Vondel was a

Roman Catholic; Frans Hals was born in Mecheln in the province of Brabant; there were academic schools of painting in the ceremonious pure Italian taste at Utrecht, Amsterdam, and Haarlem. Thus may be easily seen to what an extent the cultural unity of the Netherlands in the Baroque period was unbroken. A point which will probably be new even to many experts is the development of Calvinism in the north. There were many uncalvinistic tendencies representing the old Burgundian tradition; a romantic literature, a philosophy rooted in humanism, a genuine delight in all realities of life. It was not so easy to consolidate the strict Calvinist supremacy. Finally Professor Geyl's vivid portrait of Netherlandish culture has been completed by a skilful presentation of the colonial achievements in the East and West Indies, and by an admirable analysis of social life.

VEIT VALENTIN.

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MOTHER TO A CARDINAL.*

Giuliano de' Medici, son of the Magnificent Lorenzo, fills one niche in the chill sacristy of their family church at Florence; his natural son, Ippolito, fantastically arrayed, looks out with dark, inscrutable eyes from Titian's canvas in the Pitti. But of Ippolito's mother not even the name is known. Mrs. Hicks Beach has imagined and revealed her in this remarkable narrative, her supposed memoirs, chronicling almost from day to day her own history and that of her son, in a vivid setting of the life of the time. She is a lady in the cultured ducal circle at Urbino, whence the scene shifts to Rome, Florence and various country seats, following the vicissitudes of the House of Medici. A second Pope of their name (Clement VII) is on the throne, determined to re-establish their domination in Florence. Apart from the child Caterina, afterwards to be Queen of France, the elder branch of the family in the male descent was represented by two illegitimate youths, of whom the Pope favoured the repulsive Alessandro, reputed by many to be his own son. The other, the Ippolito of our narrative, had been early created a Cardinal to remove him as a rival for the lordship of Florence, but, after Clement's death, his good looks, fair promises, and

* *A Cardinal of the Medici*. By Mrs. Hicks Beach. Cambridge University Press. 1937. 15s.

beat the six single-handed, despite the fact that when the war started the British navy commanded the seas and British wealth commanded the markets. To-day there is no British army, navy or air force worth mentioning in comparison with the potential combination of enemy Great Powers, the British Government, alone of all governments in the world, having disarmed in the faith of the League of Nations or in the hope—entertained in some quarters—that the League of Nations would fight Great Britain's wars.

It was only last year that Great Britain started to rearm. If war came now Gibraltar might be at the mercy of Franco Spain, the Mediterranean might be dominated by Italy, British communications through the Suez Canal might be endangered; Malta could hardly be held; neither Singapore nor Hong Kong would be safe against Japanese domination in Far Eastern waters. By a course of diplomacy mainly characterised by its contempt of practical consequences, Great Britain, disarmed as she was, made enemies of Germany, Italy, Franco Spain, Portugal and Japan at the same time. The United States is not available as an ally. Out of the six Great Powers which in 1918 had contributed to the common victory, there remain on Great Britain's side only Russia and France.

The British navy simply could not undertake the three simultaneous enterprises of (1) defending the food of Great Britain herself against a German blockade; (2) defending British communications through Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal against Franco Spain and Italy; and (3) defending British interests in the Far East against Japan. It might conceivably perform any single one of those duties, although the Mediterranean communications are indispensable to any Far Eastern enterprise, and therefore even the hypothesis of a single enterprise in the Far East presupposes a quiescent Italy. To face the three enterprises together would be something like a madman's impulse. Yet British foreign policy at the same time has antagonised each of the three key Powers: Germany in the North Sea, Italy in the Mediterranean and Japan in the Far East. Surely the only practical object should be at almost any cost to avoid war? And is it not obvious that the only way of avoiding war with Germany, Italy and Japan is to cultivate

good relations with Germany, Italy and Japan; to make a deal with them while there is still time?

(1) THE INCIDENT OF THE WOUNDED AMBASSADOR.

On August 26th, the British Ambassador to China, Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, was travelling with his staff from Nanking to Shanghai, when his car was attacked from the air. He was badly wounded. On the face of it such a thing created something like a diplomatic emergency. In a matter of such a kind the personal aspect has to be ignored. Indignation over the personal suffering of a human being has to be severely divorced from the public issues. In juridical theory Sir Hughe was carrying out his duty in the friendly country to which he was accredited. Ambassadors are given immunity even from the laws of the country in which they are stationed. Their persons are so to speak sacrosanct, or at any rate extra-territorial. By the same juridical theory there was no state of war between China and Japan. Japanese airmen therefore by the book had no business to be dropping bombs on Chinese territory, whether on Chinese subjects or British ambassadors. What therefore was to be done? The British Government obviously could not simply ignore the incident.

But if the British Foreign Office had used its common sense instead of its indignant moral sense it would have reflected that (1) despite the fact that war had not been declared by Japan upon China an actual state of war between the two countries did exist and the Japanese forces were at that time engaged in operations in the Shanghai district, (2) that in the military sense the Japanese airmen were carrying out orders from superior officers in preventing communication between Nanking and Shanghai, (3) that the minute Union Jack flown on the car was invisible from the height at which aeroplanes normally fly, and even from the height of 200 yards to which aeroplanes may stoop, (4) that it was a clear device for Chinese cars to display the British flag in trying to enter Shanghai, just as nearly every ship that attempts to reach Valencia or Barcelona with supplies flies the British flag, (5) that the attack on the British Ambassador's car was clearly an "accident" in the sense that it could not have been an object of Japanese

ambition might have secured it to him had he not suddenly succumbed to a mysterious illness; the popular belief was that Alessandro had him poisoned.

Mrs. Hicks Beach has achieved a notable success. The framework on which she builds, unlike that of some historical romancers, is solidly reliable, and she is evidently steeped in knowledge of her period, as her scholarly notes show. She can describe incidents dramatically—for example, the defiance by Clarice Strozzi, herself a Medici, of Cardinal Passerini and the base-born pair; she sketches characters with delicate skill, and has some lovely descriptions of scenery. The passages in which little Caterina figures are specially fresh and charming. We think there is perhaps a too erudite attempt to include every contemporary name of note, a too elaborate piecing together of the mosaic. The style is pleasantly maintained, neither archaic nor precious, and with only an occasional slip into modernity. While the paper and type are worthy of a University Press production, the proof-reading emphatically is not; proper names are constantly mis-spelt, e.g. Nausacaa, Livorna, Cornoro, Giberti, Magnia, Vitterino, to take a few at random. San Annunziata should also be corrected in a second edition.

E. G. S.

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THE LEGACY OF INDIA.

The Legacy of India, edited by G. T. Garratt, with an Introduction by the Marquess of Zetland,* is distinctly a book to read. It brings us back to the true India behind the politics. As Mr. H. G. Rawlinson says, after tracing the early contacts between India and Greece and Rome in his fascinating chapter on India in European Literature and Thought,

As time goes on it will be increasingly realised that a knowledge of the history and culture of India is essential to the foundation of a proper understanding of the origin and growth of Western civilisation.

There are two chapters on Language and Literature; Indian Art and Archæology and Muslim Architecture are dealt with respectively by K. de B. Codrington and Martin S. Briggs, with some charming illustrations. More difficult is S. N. das Gupta's contribution on Philosophy. Caste and

* Oxford University Press. 10s.

the Structure of Society, Buddhism, Hinduism, the Cultural Influences of Islam, present a many-sided picture of ancient Indian thought. There is a study of Music in which a rather difficult account of time, tune, scale, mode, is preceded by a delightful paragraph comparing English, Irish, French, and other European folk-song each with its characteristics, and relating the Indian to it.

In India the plains and hills seem to contrast. In the plains we hear the Irish fancy, chiefly rhythmical; an ultra-smoothness which creeps from note to note scarcely risking a leap of any kind and, like the French, with a short compass thoroughly well explored, lugubrious, not unlike the Russian. . . . In the hills it is more cheerful; the steps become leaps, the rhythm is accented . . . it is pure singing, revelling in the sound.

There is a surprising chapter on Science in which "a large amount of Indian influence on early Arabic mathematics, astronomy and medicine during the late eighth and early ninth centuries" is indicated; but "rarely can we prove specific borrowing at definite dates and have to content ourselves with possibilities." The Indian system of medicine, of course, is in present-day use.

The editor, Mr. G. T. Garratt, in a final chapter on Indo-British Civilisation, discusses the effect of the British occupation and "the poverty of the harvest from this hybrid civilisation." He says: "The charge, so frequently made from nationalist platforms, that the British deliberately destroyed a flourishing Indian civilisation, will not bear examination." But "the real charge against British rule" is that "the new rulers failed lamentably to achieve a 'union of Hindu and European learning,' or to give any scope to the technical skill and knowledge inherent amongst the people." His summing up of the situation is interesting, pessimistic. Lord Zetland in his Introduction, commenting on Mr. Garratt's conclusions, says:

The legacy of India is not static, it is an organism growing in richness and content, and for generations yet unborn it may well be that the contribution made to it by the British people may prove to have been an incalculable one. . . . Purity and efficiency of administration; the equality of all men in the eyes of the law; these together with ideals of liberty and of the sovereignty of the people expressing itself through representative institutions have been sown by Englishmen upon Indian soil.

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military tactics to kill a British Ambassador, (6) that the wise object of British diplomacy would therefore be to obtain honourable amends with a minimum of emotion and a minimum of danger. Now it happened that on the very day following the attack on the British Ambassador's car, the Japanese Ambassador in London, Mr. Yoshida, called at the Foreign Office and saw Mr. Eden. He expressed his Government's deep regret over the unfortunate incident, gave an assurance that his Government was taking immediate steps to launch an exhaustive enquiry into the incident, and expressed the hope that Sir Hughe would speedily recover from his wounds.

Now war is anyhow an ugly thing. Accidents will happen. They may lead to a greater or smaller degree of danger according as they are handled. In this case the British Government had no desire or intention of going to war with Japan. What it therefore essentially needed was satisfaction in the sense of Japanese redress to British national pride. The visit of the Japanese Ambassador, with a little wisdom and imagination on the part of the British Foreign Office, could have been featured as constituting precisely the honourable amends that were wanted. The incident could have been acknowledged to be an accident, as shocking to Japanese as to British feeling, and the Japanese Government had expressed its regret. What more? The incident could have been closed.

But the Foreign Office decided to do nothing of the kind. It instituted an immediate and thorough enquiry into the affair. It allowed it to be known that Mr. Yoshida's visit did not affect the British Government's right and intention of making a direct communication to the Japanese Government. The minutest details of the incident were investigated and checked for that purpose.

The British Note was duly presented by Mr. Dodds, British Chargé d'Affaires, to the Japanese Government on August 29th, three days after the incident took place, and two days after the Japanese Ambassador had expressed regret. The document was of such stuff as makes the angels weep. At great length it demanded a formal apology, the punishment of the culprits, and an assurance that such a thing would never happen again. If the British Government's object had been to force a war with Japan, after the manner

of the famous ultimatum to Serbia in 1914, the Note could hardly have been improved—except that Japan and every other Power knew that there was no sting in the tail of the British Note. A formal apology in writing and in answer to a strongly worded demand for an apology is a vastly different thing from a spontaneous expression of regret. It would almost imply culpability. Moreover the three days' delay, and the accompanying guesses, not discouraged from Whitehall, about the nature of the demands, including an indemnity, to be made by Great Britain upon Japan, had had the usual effect of cultivating bad blood. Secondly, how could the Japanese Government punish officers for carrying out what from the officers' point of view, and barring accidents, was their duty? Thirdly, how could the Japanese Government promise that such a thing should not happen again, except by asking the British Ambassador not to travel in a *de facto* war area without first giving notice to the Japanese military—a request which out of the hypothesis could not be entertained by the British Government?

The British Note first of all laboured the point that the "plea" (yet no such plea had been made) of "accident" could not be entertained. Even if the car had displayed no flag at all, it said, there was no excuse for the attack. Even the diplomatic status of the victim was represented to be beside the argument. "The real issue [said the Note] is that they [the victims] were non-combatants." The Note gave a detailed account of the incident itself, giving the actual size ("approximately 18 in. by 12 in. in size on the rear side of the car, projecting above the roof") of the flag flown from the car, specifying the bullet as a "nickel steel bullet," giving medical details of the injury incurred. His Majesty's Government recorded its "deep distress and concern" and made "emphatic protest and request the fullest measure of redress." There followed a lecture about international law and non-combatants. The actual demands made were thus expressed: "(1) A formal apology, to be conveyed by the Japanese Government to His Majesty's Government; (2) Suitable punishment of those responsible for the attack; (3) An assurance by the Japanese authorities that the necessary measures will be taken to prevent the recurrence of incidents of such a character."

Yet the Note was not without its comic relief. It contained

But caste is the formidable "barrier in the way of that intimate intercourse between the Hindu and other peoples out of which alone some new forms of civilisation could be expected to emerge." In the middle period India lost interest in arts and crafts and science and gave herself up to meditation. Below the surface "still lie the deep waters of the spiritual life of her peoples." "The whole genius of a people from the simple-minded peasant to the subtle-minded metaphysician has been devoted with infinite resource to the attainment of a single end." The "sign of this immense religious fervour is to be found in the religious architecture, painting and sculpture which stand as milestones upon India's age-long quest after God; for an appreciation of the inward and spiritual grace which is of the essence of it" the reader is referred to Sir S. Radhakrishnan's chapter on Hinduism.

E. M. B.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

In *The Doom of the Hapsburgs** Mr. Wickham Steed briefly narrates the history of a dynasty and discusses the causes of its collapse. Illustrating his theme from his storehouse of Vienna memories, he exhibits a system too rigid and unimaginative to survive a serious shock. As early as 1910 Masaryk agreed that there was no hope for the Dual Monarchy, and the famous Professor added: "One must now look to the future of the Hapsburg peoples." The Hapsburgs, like the Romanoffs, brought their doom on themselves, and our author sheds no tears over their grave. The Monarchy, he reminds us, exploded from within, and the peace treaties merely ratified the action taken before the war was at an end.

Germany's New Religion† contains a full statement of the nature and aims of the German Faith Movement by Wilhelm Hauer, its founder, followed by presentations of orthodox Christianity by Karl Heim and Karl Adam from a Protestant and Catholic standpoint. The three Tübingen Professors put their respective cases well, for they are all able teachers and scholars. Hauer contends that Christianity is an alien element and therefore totally unsuitable for German hearts and minds. In its place, he argues, must arise a German faith, springing from the needs and traditions of the people. An ardent Nazi, he desires

* Arrowsmith. 2s. 6d.

† Allen & Unwin. 5s.

a religious revolution corresponding to and completing the political revolution of 1933. A brief but instructive Introduction by the Translators describes the issues at stake and the career of the combatants. However little English readers may care for the new paganism, we should at any rate know what is going on beyond the North Sea.

Eastern Carpathian Studies: Roumania,* is a summary of the studies undertaken by members of the Le Play Society in an almost unknown corner of Europe. "Here is a little book without a dull page," writes Lord Meston, President of the Society, in a Foreword. A great deal of valuable information is provided about the country, its climate, its vegetation, its peoples, its history, its economic life. Politics are avoided, but readers of this admirable little monograph will be in a position to study political problems confronting Roumania more intelligently than the ordinary newspaper reader or even the casual visitor to Bucharest. The numerous and excellent plans and illustrations help us to visualise the life and occupations of an interesting people.

Mr. Waldman calls his book† a family biography, and it is this standpoint, consistently maintained, which gives it its distinctive value in the literature describing his period, that of the St. Bartholomew and the League. We watch the astute Queen-Mother, early widowed, spinning the web of her ambitious designs for the children whom she adored, yet in whose lives she was such a sinister influence; thwarted again and again by the evil heredity tainting their stock. Remorselessly she removes opponents from their path, and goads the frenzied Charles to consent to the great Massacre. The disappointment of her hopes, and those of the nation, in the brilliant but neurotic d'Anjou (Henri III), makes a tragic episode. When his deliberately planned assassination of the people's idol, the young Duc de Guise, is followed by his own murder, the blood-streaked clouds that have so long overshadowed the House of Valois finally enshroud it. Mr. Waldman's portrayal of Catherine is a masterpiece, and scarcely less vivid is that of the other characters—of her sons, melancholy, passionate, feeble in mind or body, who for a brief space reigned successively; of her daughter, the lovely, treacherous Margot, and her husband, Henry of Navarre (with his very different mother!). The ugly d'Alençon, who never came to the throne, has figured so prominently in lives of Queen Elizabeth that it is piquant to see him from the French point of view. Behind them all, we have glimpses of a faction-torn, warring France, and seething Paris. The tale is told with vigour and imagination, and the reproductions of portraits, several of them by Clouet, deserve close study.

* Le Play Society, 58 Gordon Square, W.C.1.

† *Biography of a Family: Catherine de Medici and her Children*. By Milton Waldman. Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. 16s.

this crisp sentence: "The fact that in the present case no actual state of war has been declared or expressly recognised by either party to exist emphasises the inexcusable nature of what occurred." Of course when the ice is thin and a man falls through it the inexcusable nature of what occurs is emphasised if there is no notice-board giving warning of the state of the ice. But the practical fact is the state of the ice. Neither a notice-board in the case of the ice nor a declaration of war in the case of actual war makes any practical difference to anything. The British Foreign Office *knew* that Japan and China were at war, although the formality of declaring war, such as we knew it before 1914, had been abandoned. It even looks likely that history has seen the end of declarations of war. No war was declared between Italy and Abyssinia. No war has been declared in Spain, though every Great Power in Europe is engaged in it. Japan has been engaged in war with China for several years. It is four years since she wrested Manchuria from China. She has been engaged ever since in the military subjugation of China.

What is really interesting in the solemn reprimand of the British Foreign Office is the light it throws on the complacent detachment from realities that is bred in governmental institutions, and the mischief that is thereby done to international relations. Does it matter whether Mr. Anthony Eden or any other member of the British Government is horrified at Japanese policy in the Far East? What matters is that he should keep his country out of war, especially when his country is not in a position to engage in war.

For more than a week the Japanese Government left the British Note unanswered, but contrived to inspire the belief that of course no member of the Japanese race could ever be guilty of inhumanity, that the Tokyo authorities were themselves engaged in investigating the affair of August 26th, and that of course they were sorry that a British Ambassador had wandered into a war zone with deplorable consequences. On September 6th the Foreign Office in London received from Tokyo an "interim" reply to its Note of August 29th, the contents of which had not been published when this paper was written, but of which the essential irony consisted in its "interim" character.

(2) THE STRANGE CASE OF THE NYON CONFERENCE.

The repercussions of the war in Spain have produced many oddities in the diplomatic practice of the contemporary European Governments, but none as odd as the conference which began at Nyon on September 10th. During the previous month some fifty ships of various nationality—German, Italian, Danish, French, British—had been attacked by bombs from the air or torpedoes from under the sea. On the night of August 31st something like a climax was reached when the British destroyer *Havock* was attacked presumably by an unknown submarine because the weapon used was assumed to be a torpedo, although such a weapon could equally well have been launched by the type of motor launch recently bought (and put into use) by the Valencia Government from the Russian Government. The *Havock* was cruising midway between Alicante and Valencia when the torpedo passed within a few feet of her. An immediate counter-attack was made by depth charges. It was the second attack that had been made on the same British destroyer. She was bombed from the air in February. Despite a wide search for the assailant of August 31st, no clue emerged even of the identity or the nature of the aggressor.

The odd thing that happened was that on September 1st, M. Roger Cambon, French Chargé d'Affaires in London, called upon Mr. Anthony Eden, and conveyed a message from the French Government. That government suggested that a conference of the "Mediterranean" Powers be held to concert measures of common defence against such acts of "piracy" as had victimised the *Havock*. Two days later, on September 3rd, Mr. Eden informed M. Cambon that the British Government accepted that suggestion. Thereupon the French Government undertook to send out invitations to the "Mediterranean" Powers to attend the proposed conference. Within a few days all the raw passions of European diplomacy were ablaze. It happened that the Council of the League of Nations was due to meet at Geneva on the following Friday, September 10th. The whisper was at once unloosed that France intended the conference to take place at Geneva, merely of course as a matter of convenience, because so many of the delegates would be

*Anno XIII** contains the English translation of Marshal de Bono's book which reveals with remarkable candour the Italian preparations for the Abyssinian campaign and proves beyond all doubt the responsibility of Italy for the war. It appears from his account, which receives the commendation of Signor Mussolini himself in an Introduction, that the possibility of hostilities was first mooted in 1932, and that by the autumn of 1933 a military campaign was definitely contemplated. Moreover, in the Duce's opinion, "the matter would have to be settled no later than 1936." Knowledge of the scheme was at first confined to Signor Mussolini and Marshal de Bono, at that time Minister for the Colonies, and then gradually diffused as plans and preparations were quietly set in motion in 1934. In December of that year, secret "Directions and Plan of Action for the solution of the Italo-Abyssinian question" provided for 60,000-100,000 Italian and 60,000 native troops to be "ready in Eritrea by October 1935." In a despatch on February 26th, 1935, the Duce increased the potential forces to 300,000 men, and made the significant comment: "In case the Negus should have no intention of attacking us we ourselves must take the initiative." As is apparent from Marshal de Bono's account, the likelihood of the Emperor commencing offensive hostilities was known to be negligible. The latter was admittedly in a state of unpreparedness and studiously careful to avoid a *casus belli*. Although the Marshal complains of Abyssinian provocation, he admits that satisfaction for "incidents" had always been obtained after peremptory demands. Moreover, Italian intrigue and propaganda were constantly at work, inciting disaffection. These striking admissions and revelations appear almost incidentally in a work which is primarily concerned to show how the author accomplished the immense practical task of military preparation and directed the first stages of the campaign before his own recall in favour of Marshal Badoglio.

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Mr. L. R. McColvin has written a book of general rather than technical interest in *Libraries and the Public*.† He discusses the aims and problems of library service and gives a brief survey of library administration. There is no doubt that the library services play an important rôle in modern life; yet in spite of their recognised need, too many are still starved of funds and their progress hampered. All local authorities should realise their responsibilities in this direction, and one of the aims of this book is to make clear the work and needs of public library service. The appendices comparing English and American libraries are particularly interesting from more than one point of view. The book is the third volume of "The Practical Library Handbooks Series," and is especially recommended to those interested in public services.

* Cresset Press. 12s. 6d. net.

† Allen & Unwin. 5s. net.

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SANCTIONS.

I

"SANCTIONS" has been defined by Professor Gilbert Murray as "fence" or barrier, but in the sense accepted in League of Nations discussions is best translated by the word "reprisal." The fact that "sanctions" may not be employed until *after* an aggression shows how much more accurately "reprisal" represents the true meaning. A fence or barrier is only useful before a break-through. The habitual use of that "reprisal" would alter the feeling of England towards the policy "sanctions" now covers. No one, I think, will be found bold enough to advocate or support a campaign of reprisals (which would differ when of a military character only in degree from that of Almeria), though perhaps preening their consciences when urging sanctions which were only economic fences.

In 1931 twenty-seven persons, Foreign or deputed Ministers of their respective States, put their signatures to a published document which declared that "it is plain that economic recovery is being hindered by lack of confidence in the future due to wide-spread anxiety . . . concerning the possibility of international war. We are resolutely determined to use the machinery of the League to prevent any recourse to violence." At that time the League was at the height of its reputation and influence, its discussions and decisions were of vital interest to Governments throughout the world. The League looked on, during 1934 and the first six months of 1935, without a quiver of protective emotion at obvious Italian preparation of military violence against Abyssinia. The last four months of 1935 they spent in considering and organising economic violence against Italy. The Italians who thought they had a material candle worth fighting for, and who were eventually stung to sacrificial pitch by the imposition of sanctions (reprisals), were completely successful in attaining their military objective. The economic sanctions of the League failed to stop aggression, though they had made it more difficult and more expensive.

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attending both meetings. Next the rumours obtained currency that Russia was to be invited to the conference. The question was: What is a Mediterranean Power? Geographically the Powers qualified for such a description were Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, Italy, France and Spain. Great Britain was qualified because of her Mediterranean interests. The hubbub can well be imagined. Spain, for instance. Was "Spain" to be invited to the conference? In the eyes of France, who was the inviting Power, "Spain" meant the Valencia Government. In the eyes of Italy, who was not the inviting Power, Spain meant the Franco Government. But it was obvious to any office boy in any capital that Italy could not be invited to sit at the same table with a delegate of the Valencia "Reds," there being a virtual state of war (though no war had been declared) between Rome and Valencia. And why Russia? Because the Black Sea leads into the Mediterranean, and in any event Russia would be concerned in any measures that might be taken about the security of shipping in the Mediterranean. Then why not Germany, whose ships the *Deutschland* and the *Leipzig* had been the victims of attack in the Mediterranean?

Throughout the day September 4th, the whole of Europe in its diplomatic aspect was consumed by the sort of intrigue and by-play that are the fascination but the despair of those who know what goes on behind the scenes. France had undertaken to send out the invitations. But it was known, and where not known was soon made clear, that French diplomacy has at its disposal an experienced finesse which almost subconsciously plays more than one game at once, and in particular the game nearest to its heart. In this case what was nearest the heart of the Quai d'Orsay was to parade the strength of the Paris-Moscow axis, for the mortification of the Rome-Berlin axis, and if possible to take the opportunity of parading it as a London-Paris-Moscow axis. During September 4th therefore the French diplomatic channel, having obtained Mr. Eden's acceptance the day before of the French plan, was subtly suggesting to the British Foreign Office that the invitations should not be sent out unless and until France and Great Britain were agreed on all the details about place of meeting and constitution of the conference. Geneva? The British Foreign Office objected that Italian collaboration in the conference was essential to its success,

that indeed if Italy failed to attend, it would hardly be worth holding the conference at all. Italian opinion concurrently suggested that Signor Mussolini, other things being equal, was anxious to attend the conference, indeed was disposed to claim that the conference could hardly be held unless Italy did participate in it. It was even put about from Rome that Italian broadmindedness would be prepared to distinguish between Geneva as a town and Geneva as the seat of the League of Nations, provided the distinction were equally respected by the other parties. But it was hinted both in Rome and in Berlin that if Germany were not also invited to the conference substance might be given to the suspicion that the *arrière pensée* of the Quai d'Orsay was to reconstitute the London Non-Intervention Committee without the participation of Germany and that an indirect attack was thus being engineered by Paris upon the Berlin-Rome axis. While Berlin and Rome were reacting in such a sense, Paris was suggesting to London that the Black Sea Powers, Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria, ought to be invited for the geographic reason that the Mediterranean constituted the only outlet from the Black Sea.

Moscow meanwhile was intensifying its propaganda to the effect that the torpedoes that had done the latest mischief off the coast of Spain were undoubtedly Italian torpedoes and that the practical business of the conference would be to put Italy into the dock. Opinion in Rome was making the counter-suggestion that the torpedoes had been launched by the Russian motor boats recently bought by the Valencia Government, those boats having been especially constructed for the purpose of launching torpedoes. The Italian suggestion was fortified by the consideration that the "Red" cause in Spain was now universally recognised to be hopeless, and that the blow to Russian prestige could not be repaired. It could be only sidetracked by a deliberate provocation of other mischief. It was a day of allegation and counter-allegation, of intrigue and counter-intrigue such as has been the curse of Europe for many years. The upshot was that the British Foreign Office insisted that Germany and Russia be both or neither invited to the conference. Mr. Neville Chamberlain had personally intervened to make that condition. France of course at once accepted the condition, for it was the main purpose of French diplomacy to implicate

In view of the supposed propriety of reverting to this weapon should aggression again occur, it is well to record that economic violence failed partly through treachery, partly through an incomplete encirclement of the aggressor, partly through the incomplete circle of the League. It was made absolutely clear, moreover, that aggression on one side, and sanction (or reprisal) on the other, is an affair of the Great Powers alone. None of the smaller nations, who believe, and rightly, that Geneva is their only harbour of refuge, were capable of leading a crusade against aggression, or of inspiring in their fellows confidence as to the success of any such crusade. Owing, therefore, to the unready state of Great Britain, to the hesitation of France, to the geographical relativity of Russia, the application of sanctions petered gradually out. Nothing now remains of them save an unsavoury memory of personal and national intrigue and bribery, and certain words and phrases in the Covenant of the League. Yet Italy was an almost ideal country and government on which to try out the possibility of imposing sanctions on an aggressor. She was strong enough to make aggression a possibility for herself: as well as a very serious issue to all Member States joining in sanctions. She was not strong enough to retaliate by a counter general attack. Her land frontier was vulnerable, of a total medium length, adjacent to those of two of her chief boycotters. Her sea frontier was lengthy, and her principal opponent was the strongest of the European naval powers to whom the lines of communication between herself and her enemy were ideally open. She was vulnerably deficient in materials essential to the livelihood and power and trade of her people. No better chance of exhibiting the possibility, the usefulness, the compulsive force, the wisdom of sanctions was ever offered—yet sanctions are dead, and my suggestion is that they had better be buried.

There are two schools of thought in England on this as on every other political issue. There is much and most skilful and most honest propaganda on behalf of sanctionists who are chiefly voiced by Lord Cecil, Professor Gilbert Murray, Sir A. Zimmermann and, chiefly from an additional angle, Lord Davies. Any opinion held, any word spoken by Lord Cecil on the policy, on the principles, on the uses of the League is to be treated with the greatest respect and given the uttermost

consideration. But the judgment of any man is fallible, and I am convinced in this matter of sanctions that his zeal for peace, even at the price of strife, has betrayed his judgment. He resembles that eminent agriculturist who cried "This farm shall pay no matter what it costs me."

On the side of abolition are to be found the signatories of a letter to *The Times* on April 14th last. The signatories, amongst whom are found Mr. Lansbury, Lord Lothian, Fischer Williams, Lord Arnold, Lord Hardinge, are of all creeds, classes and convictions. They declare that "the sanctionist system will increase the probability of war, turn every local war into a world war, and in the end destroy the League." Informed and authoritative opinion seems equally divided between the two views.

Since the conduct of immediate political issues depends on the consideration of facts which have arisen or must arise, and not on the acceptance of theories however brilliantly presented, I briefly record the necessary outstanding events. The League, during its lifetime, has been called on to consider six major cases of international disputes, while nine serious differences have been settled by the Hague Court. Three of the League cases were decided before the Council by the methods of argument and persuasion. In two others (the Chaco, and the China-Japanese quarrels) direct war between the disputants became the arbiter. Only in one case, that of Italy and Abyssinia, was aggression met by sanctions, and then sanctions failed. It is obvious that sanctions, reprisals *after* aggression, imposed by and from Europe were not possible in the South American and China cases. Sir A. Zimmermann, a year ago, considered that naval demonstrations would have been of use in the Mediterranean to keep Italy out of Abyssinia. Either such displays cause no fear in the aggressor, or they mean that British Members of Parliament and French Deputies will have to say to their electors, parents of youth, "Give us your child's health and life, that with them we may prevent Japan invading China, or if you do not approve of that at least we may stop Bolivia sending peasants to die needlessly in the swamps of the Chaco." Remembering the proper hesitation of Parliament and the electorate in 1914—what other reply but a negative will the English people give in 1937? Is there, moreover, any reason to think that for the interests of China or Paraguay France is more bellicose or

Great Britain in the enterprise. It was indeed now easy for the Quai d'Orsay to suggest that as Great Britain had in effect laid down three major conditions, namely that the conference should be held near, but not at, Geneva, that "Spain" be not invited, and that Germany be invited if Russia were invited, it was fair and even obvious that the invitations should be sent out in the joint names of the British and the French Governments. London of course agreed.

The invitations were duly sent out on September 5th to ten Governments, namely the Egyptian, Turkish, Russian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Yugoslav, Italian, Albanian and German, the two inviting Powers themselves making up a total of twelve proposed participants. The place of meeting was fixed for Nyon, a small village on the shore of Lake Geneva, some thirteen miles from Geneva itself. It was proposed that the conference should begin on September 10th.

As can be well imagined by those who are familiar with European relationships, the apple-cart was no sooner set up than upset. Russia lost no time. Those who had imagined that it was no part of Russia's object to contemplate a harmonious settlement of this particular problem, if she could help it, were given immediate grist for their mill. Within twenty-four hours of receiving the Anglo-French invitation (which of course she accepted) she sent a strongly worded Note to the Italian Government directly accusing that government of responsibility for sinking two Russian ships in the Eastern Mediterranean. Finding no doubt that the British Note to Japan of August 29th was the very model of what mischievous diplomatic Notes should be, and perhaps also in the mistaken Russian way believing that imitation might by flattery encourage British goodwill and thus still further serve to cement the postulated London-Paris-Moscow axis, the Russian Government in its Note demanded of the Italian Government the punishment of those responsible for the crime and the payment of an indemnity. Italian opinion, also in its way, at once boiled over in indignant protest. The Italian Government of course sent an immediate answer to Moscow repudiating the alleged responsibility and rejecting the Russian demands *in toto*. The immediate result—is it possible to doubt that such was the result encompassed by Moscow?—was the torpedoing of the Nyon Conference itself. The Berlin-Rome axis was

stimulated into boisterous antagonism to Russia. All the old shibboleths about the communist danger to Europe and about the Nazi German and Fascist Italian rôle of thwarting it were brought into play. The German and Italian Governments consulted with each other whether they should accept the Anglo-French invitation. The result was a foregone conclusion, but Russia left nothing to chance. On September 7th, while the actual consultation was taking place between Berlin and Rome, the Russian Government sent in its acceptance of the Nyon invitation, but in the very Note making the acceptance insisted on the "recognition of the intolerable nature of the attacks by Italian warships against commercial ships." The Note went still further by demanding to know why Germany had been invited to the conference, and demanded by contrast that "Spain" (that is, Valencia) be invited. Mr. Neville Chamberlain returned from his holiday on that melancholy day to attend a British Cabinet meeting, whose main business was to decide what the British Government was to do about the inferno that had been created by the Anglo-French invitation.

On September 8th the German Government duly refused the invitation to the conference and suggested that the question of the attacks made on shipping in the Mediterranean be referred to the Non-Intervention Committee in London, and adding the comment that the Nyon Conference was bound to be a failure because "Spain" (that is Franco Spain) had not been invited. The Italian Government's answer to the invitation was not delivered till the day after the German answer was delivered. That delay gave the Russian Government another opportunity of driving a nail into the coffin. On September 8th a second Russian Note to Italy was delivered in Rome. It merely stated that the Italian answer to the first Note was "unsatisfactory" and reiterated the original accusations. Collectively the diplomats of Europe in our day are about equal in constructiveness to the gangsters of the New York underworld, but not nearly as amusing.

The Italian refusal of the Anglo-French invitation was delivered on September 9th. It echoed the German argument that the matter in hand should properly be referred to the London Non-Intervention Committee and left no doubt that no Italian delegate would willingly sit in any conference

more enthusiastic than Great Britain? It is possible, as the Spanish Civil War shows us, for Dictators to send troops to fight for ideas, but even the Dictator is prudent to conceal the destination of his cannon fodder, and withhold from them the facts of the struggle which they are sent to decide.

All countries know the impossibility of limiting warfare when once started. Every class, every interest, every country, every continent may be engulfed in a few days in a horrible struggle for existence. No one anywhere is going to respond to an appeal which may involve them in such a struggle unless they are persuaded that national existence is at stake. The use of words such as moral courage, or patriotism or national honour are indeed out of place when employed in criticism of inaction based on knowledge of the fact that when a high wind is blowing the fire must spread. It seems, moreover, to be assumed that in any conflict between aggression and sanctions, the latter will assuredly win—and that no provision need be made against the defeat of united virtue. No consideration even is given to such a contingency. Yet defeat is certainly not impossible—is it certainly not improbable? If it is neither impossible nor wholly improbable, it is indeed necessary to consider the work involved in “repressing aggression, if necessary, by military sanctions.” No preparatory step can in practice be taken to organise a League Army until the aggressor has got his own invading forces well under way, which means in days of aviation the immediate seizure or destruction of strategical positions. After delays caused by obtaining agreement as to the actual commission of aggression there will be further delay in discussion as to the kind of economic sanctions to be enforced, and yet further delay as to the extension of economic sanctions into military.

Recalling the length of time wasted in discussing the Saar and other similar problems it is not too much to say that before the League, in the last resort, had embarked on a military sanctions campaign six months at least would have passed. Then and only then could international commanders and staffs be discussed and settled: number, size, and nature of the contingent from each Government; the rendezvous for the central force, the utilisation of differing calibres of guns, types of rifles, of aeroplanes and of ammunitions, the disposal of the various armies and other kindred questions, be handled by conferences of officers ill equipped as linguists,

and amenable to national and personal jealousies. Meanwhile the aggressor, a single unified force prepared in advance for his enterprise, would be unopposed in his aggression and have consolidated his victory. Many Governments combined to resist the Italian advance. I know of no country which has proposed to reconquer Abyssinia. So would it be in Europe. There are only five or six potential “aggressors”—looked at from every angle of Europe. Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, Poland, alone seem able to qualify as such. All the smaller Powers can be terrified and coerced by the thunder of Olympus. It is the giants for whom the lightning is reserved. If one of these greater Powers had determined on the hazard of aggression and was not immediately attacked by one of its personal rivals single-handed, and defeated, the aggressor would have succeeded in his enterprise long before the cumbrous machinery of the League had created an international army capable of enforcing its belated decrees. The creation of an international police is much approved in some quarters. Presumably they would be employed to prevent petty disturbances on international frontiers. I do not remember that these have occurred often enough to justify the annual cost of maintaining, and in time of need transporting to the scene of action, such troops. If, however, the international police are to be sent against an aggressor of the calibre (say) of Poland, it means the maintenance of a force of ten to fifteen divisions always ready to move. For the League could not dare to run the risk of defeat. The whole subject is thrashed out in Lord Davies’ *Problem of the Twentieth Century*, wherein his head has supplied the arguments, and his heart has recorded a verdict. It is needless to point out how any military or police reverse would further discredit the League, enforce a scramble to seek favour with the victor by deserting Geneva, and the peace by goodwill which we all desire would be even more unattainable than it seems to be to-day.

I cannot understand why Lord Cecil and his followers are so loath to banish officially that phantom of violence which it is as impossible as it is undesirable to recall to life. There seems to be no reason for retaining it in, and so many for excising it from the Covenant. The mention or the implication of force in the Covenant kept the United States out of the League, and caused the universality of the League, which was the foundation stone of the whole edifice, to be broken

with a Russian delegate. It was not even hard for Italy and Germany to react as Russia had hoped that they should react. Albania did not even answer the invitation, thereby showing a realistic appreciation of its true value, and sacrificing even courtesy to the realism.

What was Great Britain to do? With the bulldog tenacity for which in better causes the British character is famous, Mr. Anthony Eden determined to see it through. He flew to Paris on September 9th, dined with M. Chautemps, the French Prime Minister, and M. Delbos, the Foreign Minister, that evening, and travelled with them to Nyon during the night. He as the representative of the British Government was duly and solemnly present at the opening of the conference in the village hall of Nyon on September 10th. The three Great Powers, Russia, France and Great Britain, stood shoulder to shoulder, the embodiment of a Moscow-Paris-London axis, in the company of the other participating Powers: Greece, Turkey, Rumania, Jugoslavia (whose very attendance was a surprise, though it meant little), Egypt, and Bulgaria. Mr. Eden in his time has made many journeys abroad in the service of his country. No journey of his has caused a deeper sense of regret to those of his countrymen who combine common sense with their pride than that forlorn pilgrimage to the village hall of Nyon, there to launch a plan for the security of shipping in the Mediterranean in circumstances where neither Italy nor Germany were even present to hear it and where therefore the plan could not be worth the air with which it was spoken. Yet on September 11th a plan was indeed adopted, the main point in it being that the British and French navies should exercise general control of the Mediterranean with the particular power of treating as pirates and sinking all submarines not conforming to the 1936 rules for "humanising" submarine warfare. British ships engaged in such an enterprise in the Mediterranean would have less excuse and more power for mischief than any bull in a china shop. Russia it is true was not assigned a part in the patrol duties and absent Italy was offered a small part; but those were merely palliative elements in what appeared to be a mischievous enterprise.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.*

Professor Seton-Watson describes his latest and largest work as the first full and connected narrative of modern British policy by a single writer. The time, he adds, was long overdue for a general survey, embodying the results of recent scholarship. This ambitious task has been carried out with great power and skill. The admirable bibliography reveals an acquaintance with printed authorities in several languages, which few living scholars can rival and none can surpass. In certain portions of his narrative, such as the Eastern question, the Homeric conflict of Disraeli and Gladstone in the seventies, and the closing decades of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he is an acknowledged master. He makes tangled diplomatic situations intelligible, and he never hesitates to pass judgment on the men, movements and events which pass before our eyes. For young students the chief value of this massive volume of seven hundred pages lies in the guidance it affords through the labyrinth of modern history. For experts its main interest is to be found in the author's views on controversial issues.

That the author stands above the battle in the sense that there is no crude national or party bias need hardly be said.

* R. W. Seton-Watson: *Britain in Europe, 1789-1814*. Cambridge University Press. 30s.

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at the outset. It was the possibility of ultimate coercion by her friends in the League which led France to a refusal of her own disarmament at a time when Germany was relatively disarmed. Great Britain then was disarming, and Italy had declared a readiness to disarm to the lowest point that any other country would reduce armaments. That after the Pact of Paris for the renunciation of violence as a national policy had been signed by all nations, there should remain an international obligation to use violence to punish violence seems an indefensible anomaly. To remove that anomaly seems to be the first logical step towards international reduction of armaments. As long as it is an obligation under the Covenant that each State Member can be called on by the Council to furnish a military contingent, that State member seems justified in possessing a force adequate to the duty it may be asked to undertake on behalf of the League.

If the view which I put forward as to potential aggressors is correct, the force adequate for the duty must be large. But the obligation being withdrawn, the justification ceases simultaneously. The first step, though a very short one, would have been taken towards disarmament. The place of the League in public estimation before the Italian experiment in sanctions was undoubtedly low. Geneva was looked on as a workshop for the production of theories, rather than as an operating theatre where political cures were effected. The adoption and enforcement of sanctions changed this estimate into one correspondingly too favourable. Since their failure Geneva has fallen again too low. The successful discussion by the League of the Sandjak of Alexandretta dispute is a timely illustration of the value of international intervention by discussion, and the possibility of solution (even *in extremis*) of embittered disputes. France and Turkey were near to a rupture of diplomatic relations if nothing worse when the reference to Geneva showed that a satisfactory solution was feasible at the hands of counsellors friendly to both disputants. How often during the Great War must not the Austrian Government have regretted they did not yield to Lord Grey's demand for a European Conference on the Serajevo murder! If Geneva and its Council had then existed Governments would have been so habituated to conference that no sense of weakness, such as Austria felt or feigned, could have been implied by an acceptance of Lord Grey's invitation.

Collective security is the aim of the world, and to most people in England collective reduction of armaments is the most permanent way of obtaining security. If there are no offensive arms, there will be no temptation to use them in offence. To procure a general assent to the common reduction of armaments, a general belief in the sanctity of agreements and treaties and pledges has to be created. That seems to me to be the most difficult task of all. There can be no sense of security until there is an atmosphere of mutual trust. I do not see how faith can be born from fear, nor can it grow in a climate of suspicion. It is impossible to suggest cast-iron remedies for the stifling of resentment, for the banishment of ambition, for the mitigation of fear. On the whole the English have profited from dealing with emergencies when they arise. Since the League cannot provide against aggression until all are agreed that it has occurred, since no nation can be compelled to take any share in repression of the aggressor, since the League circle of disapproval and compulsion is incomplete and will remain so while sanctions (whether as "fences" or as "reprisals") continue, let us accept as facts these obstacles to the ultimate employment of violence.

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

II

I remember, as an undergraduate, being told that no one over forty—or at least, spiritually over forty—understood the idea of Evolution; much the same might be said about the idea of the League of Nations. Yet the idea was simple. Instead of leaving Europe, or the world, divided into two or more armed and mutually hostile alliances, the League was to be one great alliance to protect all its members alike against war. Only when that protection is assured and the fear of war removed, can nations be expected to reduce their armaments and to consider in a reasonable spirit any mutual concessions which may be needed. Of course the League is much more than that, but I think that was the root idea.

Every British government has accepted the principle. Every House of Commons has had an immense majority in

But he has his standpoint like the rest of us. Entirely unimpressed by recent attacks on nationalism and democracy, he professes a robust faith in the favoured ideals of the nineteenth century. That our statesmen pursued first the interests of their country, as they understood them, is taken for granted. But what did they contribute to the great cause of national self-determination? That is a consideration which is never left out of sight, and the answer to the question goes far to determine the verdict. Thus he is for Canning when he champions Greece, for Lord John Russell when he encourages Cavour, for Gladstone when he fosters the aspirations of the Balkan races. Even Napoleon III gets a pat on the back for his services to the cause of nationality. Measured by the same yardstick Clarendon and Disraeli fall into a lower rank.

While reminding us of the two governing principles of our foreign policy through the centuries, the Balance of Power and supremacy at sea, Professor Seton-Watson makes no attempt to exhibit a neater pattern than is justified by the facts. No empire, he tells us, was ever formed in a more casual and haphazard manner than the British—a phrase reminding us of Secley's famous aphorism that we conquered half the world in a fit of absence of mind. Over and over again we changed our course, sometimes to the surprise and annoyance of our friends. "Perhaps the real secret of foreign misunderstanding is the hesitation which time after time asserted itself and led to Britain's temporary withdrawal, thereby deranging every balance and every calculation—a hesitation probably due to the vague feeling that Britain is in Europe, and yet not of it. The desire for isolation, the knowledge that it is impossible—these are the two holes between which the needle of the British compass continues to waver."

After a prologue briefly sketching the story of our policy to the downfall of Napoleon the author gets into his stride with Castlereagh, to whose great qualities he does full justice. In proposing periodical meetings of the Sovereigns or Ministers of the Powers by whom Napoleon was overthrown he planted the seed of the League of Nations, and it was not his fault that the system of what has been called Diplomacy by Conference broke down within a decade of Waterloo. "Close and constant personal contact between the statesmen of Europe" is his chief legacy; and though harmony cannot be guaranteed by that or any other method,

it is still the most hopeful way of keeping the peace. Till Professor Alison Phillips and Professor Webster restored Castlereagh to his rightful place in our history it was generally believed that he and his successor looked out on the world through completely different spectacles. We can now see, as our author puts it, that the difference was far more of method and temperament than of principle. "Both recognised isolation to be an utterly unattainable aim for a country with such world-wide interests as Britain." Castlereagh naturally desired to keep alive for the purpose of peace the grand alliance which he had helped to create for the purpose of war. Canning, coming to power when the life had gone out of it, stressed the importance of growth and national self-determination. Periods in which stabilisation is the watchword usually follow great struggles, but they rarely last long. The atmospheric change was sensed by Metternich, the arbiter of the Restoration era, who liked and trusted Castlereagh as much as he feared and detested Canning.

Though there is no hero in the story, one figure stands out in particularly bold relief. Professor Seton-Watson ranks with the critics rather than the admirers of Palmerston, but no one can ignore the man who with brief intervals moulded our policy from 1830 till his death in 1865. On hearing of the revolutionary change of dynasty in France in 1830 he exclaimed: The reign of Metternich is over! It was not true, but he spent himself in trying to make it so. Our author distinguishes sharply between his principles, which he approves, and his methods, which he repeatedly condemns. Palmerston desired nations to live their own life and unfree communities to obtain their freedom. He also believed that constitutional government was the best system, though he never wished England to go beyond the rule of the middle class inaugurated by the Reform Bill of 1832. Thus broadly speaking he was the champion of nationalism and democracy. But his faults of temperament often led him to do the right thing in the wrong way. He displayed utter indifference to the susceptibilities of other nations. His language was habitually reckless and sometimes virulently abusive. He is seen at his best in the creation of Belgium, at his worst in the Spanish marriages, the bullying of Greece, the Chinese war of 1857, the insubordination which compelled the Queen and Lord

support of it. But of course there has always been a sub-conscious feeling of antagonism to the new thing, openly expressed in the more lowbrow newspapers and secretly nursed in various influential circles whose thoughts and ambitions ran naturally in older paths. The recent betrayal of Abyssinia by the League Powers, and the apparent unreadiness of governments to fulfil their obligations have, naturally enough, not only disheartened many supporters of the League, but also encouraged its old enemies to renew their attacks. These have taken the form lately of a series of letters in *The Times* and elsewhere, urging the removal of all "sanctions against war," or at any rate all collective sanctions. What the writers really want is often hard to see. Their positive views are so extraordinarily diverse. Some few are ultra-pacifist; some merely frightened of Germany; some are for militarism and the old diplomacy; some again, influenced very justly by a feeling that in the Peace Treaty and afterwards Germany had not been given "a fair deal," are anxious at almost any cost to please her now.

The mistakes some of them have made are surprising. People as well informed as Sir Alfred Hopkinson and Dr. Jacks polemise against the League's supposed claim to "impose its decisions by force." The Covenant has lain before them for eighteen years, and they still imagine that it contains such a claim! They talk of "sanctions" as if "sanctions" were a kind of punishment imposed upon a nation because it had been wicked. They are really, of course, as the derivation implies, a "fence" or "barrier" for preventing war. Again, the letters in *The Times* were headed "Conciliation or Force," as if the two were alternatives, or as if the League did not spend more than nine-tenths of its time and energy on co-operation, conciliation and the consideration of just claims, and only contemplated the use of force to protect the innocent when all other means should have failed.

But, I fear, in the minds of some of these writers misapprehension goes deeper than mere ignorance of the Covenant. They can see that war is a nuisance and wish to keep out of it; but they cannot see that aggressive war is a crime. They still think it right and proper that a strong nation, wishing for something it has not got, should take it by waging war on a weaker nation, and then put up statues in its market place to commemorate a glorious conquest. For them the

business of the rest of the world is to "limit the area" of the war, which is done by seeing that the weaker nation does not give too much trouble. Keep it without allies and without arms, and the business will soon be over. They welcome Germany's proposed bilateral pacts of non-aggression, by which nation A, wishing to attack B, obtains promises from C, D, E, etc., that they will not interfere while it does so. This is a profound misunderstanding indeed. It is that well-known false realism which fails to recognise one of the strongest and most formidable of realities, the human conscience.

The pure Pacifists stand quite apart from the rest. I respect them, but I think they are doing the cause of Peace great harm by joining in the campaign of the League's enemies. What are the League "sanctions" to which they object? They are, as stated in the Covenant, a refusal to co-operate with a war-maker. International co-operation is the watchword of the League; co-operation between nations for all lawful purposes. But if once a nation, member of the League or no, refusing arbitration, conciliation or any means of peaceful settlement, deliberately resorts to war to gain its ends, then, by Article XVI, all members of the League consider that a crime is being committed against the whole international community and refuse to give any help, any supplies, any diplomatic countenance to the criminal. Is this contrary to the Christian principles of the pacifist? The simplest issue was the selling of oil to Mussolini to enable him to bomb the Abyssinians from the air. By the Covenant nations were bound not to supply him. The ordinary anti-sanctionists say, "How unfriendly, how unprofitable, how dangerous! For if he is not able to conquer Abyssinia without oil supplies, he may take on Great Britain as well!" I am not surprised at some of them. There are people who like to see strong warlike well-prepared armies battering weak nations to bits. But I am amazed that any thoughtful Pacifist can think it an act of peace to sell Mussolini the oil, and an offence against peace to refuse it. The more emphatically the Pacifists oppose military sanctions, the more stoutly ought they to support the simple Sanction of Non-Co-operation with evil. If fully prepared and announced beforehand it would be a strong deterrent. The United States is already bound by law not to supply any belligerent with the means of war; if it were clear that the whole League, including the British Empire, France, Russia,

John Russell to dismiss him from the Foreign Office in 1857. He was in fact the bull in the European china shop, and he exulted in the noise of broken crockery. "Of his methods and tactics no real defence can be offered, and to-day they deserve the close study of all statesmen and diplomatists as the very model of what should be avoided." Yet the author takes leave of the old warrior with some generous words. "He sought to promote constitutional and free government and so to avert revolution by timely concession; and his attitude undoubtedly contributed to the consolidation of the internal situation in Great Britain and the remarkable contrast which it offered in 1848 to almost every continental country. He was from the first alive to the significance of the new national currents in Europe." That he was also a child of the eighteenth century, that is of the pre-nationalist era, was shown by his belief that Turkey could reform herself. This conviction, which was never shared by Aberdeen, made him a better leader for the purpose of winning the Crimean War, in so far as we speak of victory in that muddled enterprise.

When Palmerston and Russell had gone Disraeli and Gladstone fill the stage. Professor Seton-Watson recently devoted a stout volume to their conflict in the seventies about the Near East, and gave his verdict in the favour of the latter on the ground that he championed the Balkan races in their struggle for liberty. He has no illusions about Turkey, and Disraeli is rightly blamed for wishing to sacrifice the budding life of the Christian subjects of the Sultan to his dread of Russian hegemony. The laurels of the Congress of Berlin, from which he brought back "Peace with honour," faded long ago, for there is little left of a settlement which had no elements of finality. His best work was not in the east of Europe, but in the west, where he steadily pursued the aim of friendship with France. Gladstone, on the other hand, receives well-merited praise, not only as the friend of oppressed or struggling nationalities, but for his formulations of the principles on which British policy should be conducted. The full account of the Don Pacifico debate of 1850—the most memorable discussion of fundamentals in our Parliamentary history—is one of the most useful features of the book, and Gladstone's speech is recognised as the wisest of all. More precise and therefore more useful is the less-known declaration at West Calder during the Midlothian campaign in 1880, when he

summarised the task of our statesmen under six heads. In the author's view they still correspond with modern requirements, forming the half-way house between Castlereagh's first efforts at international co-operation and the more august doctrine of a League of Nations which we are half-heartedly endeavouring to operate.

Two long chapters sketch the thirty-six years which divide the Congress of Berlin from the outbreak of the world war, and pronounce judgments on all the major issues and actors of the time. The Kaiser is described as an irresponsible child armed to the teeth. The greatness of Salisbury is recognised and Grey is treated with sympathetic respect. In the author's opinion he could not have declined the military conversations to which the French invited us in 1906, and though he failed to keep the peace he "failed with honour."

ANATOLE FRANCE.

In the literary world Anatole France was almost a demigod through the closing decade of the last century and the opening of this. Later his prestige fell so rapidly that after his death in 1924 the university students of Paris were said to have organised a mock lying-in-state in order that they might spit upon the effigy of his corpse. This story, probably untrue, is merely interesting as showing the violence of the reaction against France, which had been gathering some years before his death and which is now only beginning to decline. All through this revolt against the Master there have been critics who believed that a day would dawn when France would enter into the ranks of the enduring French classics. Professor Dargan is one of these. His compendious, well-documented volume of more than 700 pages, provided with an excellent bibliography, may be regarded as a sign of the counter-revolution. The result of ten years' research in the collections of Paris and La Béchellerie, his book is at once a biographical and psychological study and a synthesis of a quarter of a century of Francian criticism. It contains also illuminating photographs, themselves portraying Anatole's remarkable versatility, maps of the Paris he knew,

* *Anatole France*. By Edwin Preston Dargan. New York, Toronto. Oxford University Press. £1 1s.

China and the Little Entente as well as the smaller states were firm to refuse supplies, I think even the most ambitious war-maker would think twice and thrice before he started a war with such a handicap against him.

The trouble is that, strong though this sanction may be as a deterrent, if once the war breaks out it is slow in action. Paris or London or Berlin might be bombed to ruins before the economic sanctions began to have any effect. Here, then, the pure Pacifists must retire to their tents, and the League proceed without their help to do its best to stop the war and protect the victim. The general principle at present accepted is given in Appendix F to the Treaty of Locarno. All members of the League must "co-operate loyally and effectively"; the boycott will be set up, but the actual fighting will be done by those considered for military and geographical reasons most suitable, who will, as a matter of fact, be also those most directly interested. The great danger to peace in this matter is the uncertainty whether, in the general intense hatred of war, governments may not shrink from entering upon any war whatever, short of an actual invasion of their own frontiers. It was that uncertainty that brought about the war of 1914; for, if Germany had known beforehand what enemies her aggression would bring down upon her, it seems almost certain that she would not have made the war. She would have agreed to a conference. Such at least is the opinion of practically all historians.

This is the reason and the justification for Regional Pacts. If it could really be made sure that an attack on France would bring to her aid Great Britain and Russia and France's other allies; an attack on Great Britain or Czechoslovakia or Denmark the same; and, let us add, an attack on Germany by any power a similar group of allies to defend Germany; one could be fairly sure of peace in Europe and could begin to make effective plans for disarmament and reform. Uncertainty is the great source of danger, and almost any price is worth paying to remove it. Let us not forget the lesson of 1914. Then it was not "sanctions," it was not the League, that turned a local conflict into a world war. It was the absence of any League, or any prearranged sanctions.

That, then, is the League method. First, co-operation, conciliation, arbitration of differences in all its forms. Next, if all these efforts for peace fail, a collective refusal of supplies

or "comfort" to the war-maker, coupled with the clear statement that, if his aggression continues, it will be met by the collective force of many great nations backed by the moral and economic support of the whole League.

What is the alternative which these writers offer? Suppose all sanctions were abolished, what should we find? First, every nation in Europe would be in terror. The League had offered protection to the innocent; that protection would now be gone. The only protection would be in arms and allies. Each nation would continue to arm up to the limit possible; would collect all the allies it could, and consequently drive those who feared it into a counter-alliance. No grievance would be redressed which involved even the slightest sacrifice of military power. Then, as the pressure of the armament burden became intolerable, would arise the question, as inevitable as it is fatal, whether it were not better to choose a good moment and strike first. We should be back in the position of 1914 but worse. A resentful and ambitious Germany, anxiously afraid of Russia; a madly ambitious Italy claiming the empire of the Mediterranean and the Moslem world and naturally afraid of Britain; France in terror of a new German attack; Britain vulnerable and unprotected.

The anti-sanctionists seem to imagine that the removal of sanctions would be an act of appeasement. Whom would it appease? It would give notice to Germany and Italy—whom it is specially intended to conciliate—that they may make any war they like and the League will offer no objection; but at the same time it would tell Poland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, Russia and France, that war might be let loose upon one or other of them at any moment, and the League would give them no help. It would tell Germany herself that, whereas under the League system she would be as much protected as France, now she was left open to her terrified and fairly numerous enemies. I have seen many crazy plans for promoting peace, but never one crazier than this.

"But," they will say, "it might bring America back to the League." In the first place, the co-operation of America in refusing supplies to a war-maker is already assured; and as for America joining a watered-down League, most of those with any knowledge of American opinion have given up that expectation long ago. An effective League, a successful and clearly honest League, might conceivably have some

which so strongly influenced his development, and a specimen of his graceful and delicate handwriting.

In these pages material hitherto unused or only partially used throws new light on Anatole's methods, life and thought: for example his articles contributed to *l'Univers Illustré*, the original draft for *Thaïs*, now in a private collection, and his divorce decree. The scope of this book is nominally limited to the first fifty of Anatole's eighty years. Which would seem at a first glance to be disappointing. Why stop at 1896? True this was the year when France took his seat among the Immortals and Mme Arman de Caillavet achieved her final triumph. Not a highly important event in itself, especially in the light of Anatole's subsequent attitude towards the Academy, however strenuously his friend may have worked and made him work to accomplish it. But Mr. Dargan regards it as marking the end of a period when the development of France was nearly complete and when the stage was set for his future evolution. All students of his life and thought agree that during the nineties there came a turning-point, *le grand virage*, when France in *Thaïs* (1890) publicly threw down the gauntlet against orthodoxy, when in politics he was obviously veering towards the left, becoming more humanitarian, beginning to take an interest in socialism, when in philosophy he was growing increasingly sceptical, bolder in thought, more aggressive in manner. Earlier he had been conservative, even militarist and chauvinist, in politics, in religion certainly not anti-clerical. In the nineties also Mr. Dargan perceives a lowering of the standard of moral values and the beginning of a tendency towards nihilism. In the earlier period, comparatively serene in *la cité des livres*, he had been inclined to keep out of controversy, religious and political. In the nineties he began to come out from his book-room on to the balcony, whence he looked down upon and later flung himself into the struggle being waged in the market-place. Of this change in Anatole's attitude towards life, *l'Affaire Dreyfus* has generally been regarded as the great motive power. Mr. Dargan finds it in Anatole's "marital shipwreck."

The limitation of this volume is not as disappointing as it looks. There are references to studies and research which were to culminate years later in notable works, for example *Les Dieux ont Soif* and *La Vie de Jeanne d'Arc*. On the

purely biographical side there are glances forward. For instance Anatole's association in the eighties with the publishing house of Lemerre for which he wrote the prefaces afterwards published in *Le Génie Latin*, leads to the description of a lawsuit in 1911 in which Anatole's future political arch-enemy, Poincaré, acted as his counsel. *Poincaré c'est la guerre* the Socialist France was to say in 1913.

The task of sifting fact from fiction in the work of a mind at once so fanciful and so egotistic as Anatole's is extremely difficult. *Vous vous racontez toujours* said M. Giraud on welcoming him to the Academy. The process is to follow the threads of such early influences as the Noah's Ark of his boyhood, the stones of Paris, the book-boxes of the quays (it was France who first introduced *les quais* into French literature). This process dispels certain legends: that Charles Maurras, for example, always his public enemy and his private admirer, had once been his secretary, that the story of Mme Bergeret's elopement in *Le Mannequin d'Osier* is autobiographical; and it throws grave doubt, alas! on the reality of that attractive character, *Gran'maman Nozière*, the Voltairean grandmother.

One autobiographical problem, the extent of Mme Arman de Caillavet's influence on her friend and of the part she played in his life is difficult to solve partly on account of the destruction after her death of a large part of their correspondence. There is no doubt, however, that she became the organiser of his life. France, helpless in the petty affairs of the daily round, was one of those men who must always have a woman to look after him. This may have been the fault of his mother, who spoiled her only child. But left to himself he couldn't catch a train or take a railway ticket. I saw him in London, when calling on the wife of the Prime Minister, stand in the hall of No. 10 Downing Street, shame-faced like a penitent schoolboy, looking at his ungloved hands. "*Je les ai oubliés*," he murmured. Mme Arman would have seen that those gloves were not forgotten. It was her aim to turn the scholar and bookman into *un homme du monde*. She made him the lion of her salon in the Avenue Hoche, of which Mr. Dargan gives a lively description, and she became "the champion of his literary fortune . . . a coach and a publicity manager rolled in one." But Mr. Dargan is careful not to overstress her influence. In Anatole's

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attractions ; but a League which expressly allowed its members to defy the Kellogg Pact, no.

"But at least," they say, "it would bring Germany back and make Italy feel happy." A naive argument indeed! "The League was meant to prevent war, but we now find that Germany and Italy wish to make war. Let the League give up its ill-advised attempt to protect anyone from those two powers, and they will be pleased and come back!" Do let us think clearly. The League is based on a new conception of national sovereignty and national duty: the belief that nations owe duties one to another, that they form a society, that it is wrong for any nation, merely because it is strong, to insist on being judge in its own cause. Germany and Italy, under their present governments, entirely reject this conception, and cling to the old conception—not merely pre-League, but pre-Christian, and for that matter pre-Æschylean—of absolute sovereignty, which makes each nation the absolute judge of its own actions and duties, and guarantees to each, as its special badge of rank and honour, an unlimited right of war. To abolish sanctions would be to concede that right, and the first condition of any honest League membership is its renunciation.

"At any rate," they will say, "your League system has failed. It does not do what it professes to do, and no one can trust it. Look at Manchuria, Abyssinia and Spain." Some of them indeed will hardly care to say this. They took in all three cases the side of the aggressor. They helped to cause the failure, and it is not for them to talk of peace. But the rest have a real case. Our answer is: the League failed, peace was broken, hideous cruelties were committed and this country in particular was dragged through bitter humiliation, because the principal governments did not fulfil their engagements or show ordinary reasonable foresight. Take the Abyssinian case as typical. For details I would refer the reader to the account in Professor Toynbee's Annual Survey, published by Chatham House.

In 1932 General de Bono broached his plan for the illegal and treacherous attack on Abyssinia; in 1933 Mussolini agreed to it. In the course of 1933 the French and British foreign offices seem to have had knowledge of it. In December 1934 Mussolini asked the British Foreign Office if we "had any interests in Abyssinia." In April 1935 representatives of the

three governments of Britain, France and Italy met at Stresa to "form a common front" by clearing away all differences of policy that might exist between them. And during all those years Laval supported Mussolini's plan; Sir John Simon and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald said not a single word to the League Council, gave no hint of warning to Mussolini while he was not yet committed to his fatal act, and there was still time to deter him. The situation was allowed to grow worse and more difficult, though we learn from General De Bono's book that even at the last he had orders to stop if Great Britain insisted. But Great Britain did not insist.

No doubt it will be pleaded that the Abyssinians were "only black people"; that Laval had already given the Italians 4,000 square miles of French territory in Africa, and could not be expected to bother about territory that was not French; that Italy had a capital position—now happily forfeited—for exercising blackmail on France and Germany alternately. Still, without further comment, I think we have a right to expect that both this country and France will usually conduct their League policy with more firmness, vigilance and good faith than that. If not, neither sanctions nor absence of sanctions will save us.

Either of two lessons can be drawn from the Abyssinian disaster and its consequences: that our present western civilisation, being destitute both of honour and courage, cannot defend itself and is not worth defending; or else that, warned by this disaster, it should try to do better next time. We must remember that all was not failure. The League did succeed in passing a unanimous condemnation on the aggressor, and an almost unanimous act of sacrifice in imposing—clumsily and too late and imperfectly—economic sanctions against him. The smaller nations, including Rumania, the great oil-producer, were anxious to impose the oil sanction, too, the one which would really have been effective. The material for a bolder and more honest policy is there if the leaders of the League are ready to use it.

Of course, we have erred in the past by not giving Germany a fair deal; by all means let us repair that error by every concession that is reasonable, by remedying every grievance that can be substantiated. But not by giving her *carte blanche* to destroy any nation she likes as long as, for the time being, she lets us alone.

GILBERT MURRAY.

virage to the left it probably counted for little. One cannot be sure whether that conversion may not have been achieved partly because of his contempt for the society into which she introduced him. At least we are certain of the gross exaggerations both of Anatole's statement that "without her he would have done nothing" and of hers that she wrote a considerable part of his works. She probably contributed a few pages, one certainly: and she no doubt increased his productivity. Those afternoons at work under her supervision in the library at the Avenue Hoche, described by Brousson, despite the general unreliability of that witness, are not wholly fictitious. Mr. Dargan concludes from the letters which have been preserved and published that "by an infusion of her will power, no less than by the constant and detailed interest which she professed in all his writings, Mme Arman was truly his Minerva." How far *Le Lys Rouge*, which she undoubtedly inspired, reflects the height of their passion can hardly be decided in the absence of the suppressed letters.

For one who has frequently been regarded as by no means industrious the literary output of France was very considerable. Novelist, scholar, critic, philosopher, student of science, he was above all master of a style, which has been described as "a rich wine ripened on an ancient soil," as "the most alluring mode of expression in contemporary fiction," as "having preserved the French language." By temperament, no doubt, he was rather a scholar than a novelist. Mr. Dargan shows him with marvellous lightness of touch, irony and Gallic wit, surveying all centuries, airing thoroughly the stuffy house of thought. He convinces us that the incoherences and contradictions of this *Don Juan des idées et des sentiments* result largely from his way of thinking, setting one thing against another.

France was not ashamed of being called a sceptic. On this subject Mr. Dargan quotes an interesting passage written by France himself in 1908. "Sceptic. Yes, they still call me a sceptic; and what they intend as an insult I consider a compliment. All the masters of French thought—Rabelais, Montaigne, Molière, Voltaire, Renan, have been sceptics. And I am their humble pupil. They were often the most constructive and courageous of men. They denied only negative values. They attacked whatever hinders intelligence

and free will. . . . And after much meditation concerning human misery . . . they were possessed by pity and fraternal love."

A friend of Anatole's, one of the honorary secretaries of *La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, told me that never had she appealed to him in vain to take up his pen on behalf of any victim of injustice. Mr. Dargan may perceive a lowering of France's scale of values after 1896, yet he admits that throughout this latter period "he stood on the whole and despite all cynicism for enlightenment, for liberalism and particularly for social justice."

WINIFRED STEPHENS WHALE.

BRITAIN FACES GERMANY.*

This is a small but important and timely book. The author, long a member of the staff of *The Times* both in London and Berlin, knows the troubled history of post-war Europe better than most of our publicists, and he combines extensive knowledge with independent views. His problem is that which confronts us all—how to get out of what he calls our appalling situation. His analysis is clear and his proposals, whether we accept them or not, are precise. The faults committed by the victorious allies, and above all by France, are mainly responsible for the overthrow of democracy in Germany and for the coming of men to power with whom it is very difficult and disagreeable to deal. Post-war Germany, as he tersely declares, is the child of Versailles and of penury. Locarno was as good a piece of statesmanship as Versailles was bad, but it came too late and it was not followed up. Moreover, its principal author passed away before his work was done. "If Stresemann had lived and had retained his hold upon his countrymen, it is as certain as anything unprovable can be that the Disarmament Conference would have achieved success, at least in Europe." Even after the coming of the Nazis there was a chance of settlement; but it was thrown away, so our author believes, by the errors of Sir John Simon and Barthou. Mr. Kennedy, however, has no illusions about Hitlerism, which he describes in its present form as a manifestation of the Hun spirit. Yet the discontent of a rearmed and formidable nation is such a danger to the peace of the world that

* By A. L. Kennedy. Cape. 5s.

RECOVERY IN FRANCE.

AFTER Blum and Auriol, Chautemps and Bonnet. After Chautemps and Bonnet, who, and what?

Those of us who have a long and intimate knowledge of French politics can never despair of the future of France. The country possesses a resilience which is amazing. It may appear to abandon itself completely—to have no reactions when it is most seriously misgoverned or menaced—and yet, at the critical moment, there is always a surprising effort of national redressing. Common sense comes into its own again.

From the beginning of the Blum "*expérience*," it was apparent to all judicious observers that failure was inevitable. Before many months were over, responsible French statesmen were predicting disaster, but were not really opposing. Nevertheless, the incredible combination of Communists, who do not in the least disguise their revolutionary purpose, of Socialists, who are more opportunist but whose doctrines are not dissimilar from those of the extremists, and of Radicals, who are essentially bourgeois and the most convinced supporters of the capitalist system, continued in being for a whole year, and the so-called Front Populaire, composed of these heterogeneous elements, survived the rudest shocks of reality.

Strange as the Parliamentary alliance was, precarious, paradoxical, theoretically impossible, nobody wished to take the responsibility of being the first to break it. For it was not so much Parliament, which is now becoming a rubber-stamp, as the Confédération Générale du Travail that mattered. The proletariat had become conscious of itself. It had been told by demagogues that it was its turn to govern, that it had been oppressed and that now it should be master. It believed that there was scarcely any limit to the benefits it would receive. The stay-in strikes were merely a foretaste of the coming change of ownership. The rich were to be dispossessed and the poor were to be enriched. The workers, who were thus dictators, are a minority of the nation, though the trade union organisations, under the impulse of the Front Populaire, increased their membership, it is claimed, from about a million to probably five million. Not all the workers were willing members; it was easier to pay a

subscription than to be at loggerheads with the syndicalist leaders, who were rapidly becoming all-powerful. These leaders composed a "Ministry of the Masses" which made political pronouncements and expected the Government to obey. Quite frankly, the Front Populaire stood for class government—and it chose for its symbol the Clenched Fist. This salutation, a sign of hatred, was directed against much that was traditionally French. Even children were infected, as was shown in at least one lamentable incident, by the unhappy epidemic of political controversy.

Now it was surely obvious that the terrible problems which faced France in the middle of 1936 could not be solved by a policy of division which fanatically ranged Frenchmen into two implacable camps. Certainly the Blum Government did not create the problems, and it would be highly improper to place the responsibility for their existence on the Front Populaire. The financiers, the employers, and all the previous governments, had displayed a culpable indifference and blindness to the elementary wants of the workers; they had been warned that serious reforms were necessary in the social and economic domains, but they had gone on succeeding each other, at short intervals, most of them leaving France a little lower than they found her. Something had to be done—and that something has still to be done to improve the lot of the worker—but it is not by increasing French disunion, and by tipping the scales to the other side, that the régime will be saved or the worker genuinely benefited.

The extraordinary lack of understanding of the situation in England has been particularly disturbing. Doubtless the British Government and Press have been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by consideration of international policy. Right to the very end, the leading London newspapers were assuring their readers that the French Government was the strongest for many years. It was, in fact, after the first few months, the weakest. If it remained in power, it was because the word was passed round that it would be better in the long run to let the experiment reach its appointed end. If it were interrupted before it was plain for all to see that it could not fulfil its promises, then its premature overthrow would provide it with an *alibi*. When it attained the month of June, foreseen by political prophets as the ultimate date, it was not really overthrown by the Senate—it was merely

something must be done. He proposes colonial concessions in West Africa, and considers our rearmament programme a good start for new negotiations. "But we must be ready to face war if Hitler will not accept a just and honourable settlement." The difficulty is that what might seem sufficient to us might well appear radically insufficient to the other side.

COLONIES.*

The high standard displayed by Chatham House in its publications on contemporary questions is more than maintained in its recent Report on the colonial problem. The work has been produced by a study group of distinguished experts under the chairmanship of Mr. Harold Nicolson, and deals as comprehensively with most aspects of the problem as a single volume allows. Its object is to set out fairly and objectively the main facts of the question and the trend of events; and as such it should serve adequately "as a guide to the general reader and as a convenient work of reference for the specialist." While the Report is not intended to reach finite conclusions, approve policies or resolve controversies, it is certainly animated by the basic principles of justice towards non-colonial Powers and towards the subject races. They provide the core to a work which has to sift so many claims, vested interests and policies which are frequently divergent or conflicting.

The facts relating to the claim for colonies based on the need for raw materials are fairly well known and are here discussed in some detail. Colonial production of raw materials is extremely small, some 3 per cent. of the world total. Of the six products, coal, iron, oil, cotton, rubber and copper, described by Dr. Goebbels as the "basic materials of modern industrialism," only rubber approaches a colonial monopoly, principally in Malaya and Netherlands India. It is significant that the former's most important customer is not the metropolitan country but the United States. While territorial control is not by itself a test of access, it may well affect the degree of exploitation. The Report fairly points out that though certain African territories are only small producers

* *The Colonial Problem*. A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press (issued under the auspices of the Institute). 21s. net.

"in very few African countries has there been any effective geological survey to indicate potential capacity." Herr Hitler has most recently rested his colonial demands upon the food shortage of Germany which cannot remain dependent upon the caprice of harvests. But, as the survey points out, only an infinitesimal proportion of cereals grown in colonial areas are available for export; on the other hand, tropical products, such as tea, coffee, cocoa and non-animal fats, "have become practically indispensable in the European dietary." The Report concludes with the generally accepted view that the chief difficulty is not of supply but of payment in foreign currencies, due to exchange restrictions and fundamentally to the decline in international trade.

The Report stresses the importance of the "open door" to colonial markets in satisfying the genuine grievances of all non-colonial Powers. An analysis of the position in B. mandates leads to the conclusion that the "open door" is there well maintained. While some advantages, as in public works contracts, accrue inevitably to the mandatory, "the territories under B. mandate appear to offer reasonably equal opportunities over a considerable area of business activity." It is noticeable that in the British Cameroons almost all the plantations are controlled from Germany, which supplies 68.5 per cent. of the mandate's imports and receives 80 per cent. of its exports. The extension to all colonies of the mandatory system is a possible solution, but, as is pointed out, the practical difficulties of transfer are immense and the "open door" can be as well approached through international agreements. It is suggested that reconsideration of the Congo Basin Treaties, which has been due since 1932, provides an opportunity for extending and widening its provisions. For Great Britain and the Netherlands the "open door" involves "relatively small concessions"; but for the other colonial Powers it means the abandonment of high tariffs. Apart from these difficulties, it is doubtful, as the survey shows, whether the "open door" will satisfy the "Have-not" countries. At bottom their demand is for exclusive markets, for production within their own currency areas; and over all hovers the imponderable factor of prestige attached to territorial ownership.

In its absorption over the international aspect, the public is inclined to overlook the native communities themselves,

given the *coup de grâce* by the Senate. A *mystique* had been created before and during last year's election which, it was thought, might be dangerous to smash. The threat that the workers would go into the streets, would declare a general strike, would, in a word, revolt, was repeated in the public meetings of the Left. A few months ago these threats had some substance. Therefore, it was argued, the Blum Government should be allowed to exist until there was general disappointment. When the workers were sufficiently disillusioned, when the public was thoroughly alarmed, when bankruptcy was veritably in sight, then the Government would be glad to disappear quietly. This was the burden of many political conversations. M. Blum himself, in inextricable difficulties, seemed relieved when he was refused "full powers," and was the first to ask his followers not to do anything rash, but to bow to the Constitution.

The Radicals could, of course, have brought down the Government at any time by simply withdrawing their Ministers. But their tactics were to refrain from whatever might lay them open to the charge of breaking the Front Populaire. It may be asked why the Radical Ministers, on any principle of ministerial solidarity, do not incur full blame for the consequences of the year of Socialist leadership. The answer is that, in France, the finest distinctions are drawn, and it was only necessary for Radical Ministers (notably M. Daladier) to express certain apprehensions from time to time, in order to be regarded as dissociated from the Government's general policy, while remaining in the Government. On the Left M. Blum's position was rendered untenable by the Communists, who, with the Syndicalists, were his worst enemies. They did not purport to share responsibilities—they had no Ministers in the Government—and they could safely push the Government farther than it wished to go, taking all the credit for whatever was profitable to the workers, while leaving the discredit of whatever was detrimental to the workers, such as the high cost of living, to the Socialists. Even when the workers were most unruly and unreasonable, it was difficult for the Socialists to resist them. In point of fact, the Government was often obliged to refrain from governing—that is to say, to avoid a clash it had to sanction illegal activities. On one occasion its police did—at Clichy—come into collision with the Communists; there were

casualties; and an attempt was made to turn the anger of the workers against the Government. On the whole, the Government had too much authority over its presumed "enemies," and not enough over its professed "friends."

Deprived of freedom of movement, as he was, one may well wonder why a man as intelligent as M. Léon Blum should have consented to form a Cabinet which could hardly advance the cause of Socialism and might discredit it. Ironically, after his resignation, he affirmed in his defence that he had preserved social peace. It cannot be doubted that he rendered a service to France by a skilful application of the brakes. His manœuvring on this *terrain* commends itself to the Radicals and even to the Right. After passions had been aroused and illusions fostered, a Government which dreamed of taking severe measures for the enforcement of strict legality and undemonstrative order would have incurred the bitterest resentment. It is even possible to conceive a grave civil conflict as a result of a mishandling of the masses. A Government of the Right, or a Government of the Radicals, might have been unable to contain and control the excited mob. M. Blum, precisely because he is a Socialist, and was ready to clench and flourish a dilettante fist in feverish meetings, moderated the pace, and gave time for the passions to burn themselves out. In this respect, therefore, he may be said to have rendered a good service to France, though it is a service to which he himself can make only the most discreet reference. It was M. Blum who, last March, appealed for a "pause," and it was M. Blum who pleaded for Socialist co-operation with M. Chautemps, in a sincere attempt to rebuild the broken fiscal machine.

Joseph Barthélemy, last February, in the *Revue de Paris*, wrote an article which deserves the most earnest attention of students of politics, since it shows the inevitable results of fanatical political passions in the social domain. As a Liberal he deplores the disappearance of liberty. Everywhere there is a tendency to employ violence and to take arbitrary decisions, and it does not matter whether it is called Communism or Fascism or no name at all. France has not escaped. It must not, however, be supposed that the Front Populaire initiated the policy of suppressing public meetings which, in the opinion of the authorities, might provoke disturbances. Surely it is entering on a slippery slope to forbid meetings

whose interests are treated in this survey as "the vital aspect" of the whole problem. The Report points to a "general advance" in the approach to native government. "Naked exploitation is abjured" and there is a general acceptance of the idea of trusteeship, implicit in the mandatory theory. The survey critically examines such questions as native justice, education, health, conditions of labour, development of resources and communications, and points to the need for more extensive international co-operation. It pleads in particular for the adoption of common principles in colonial policy. Apart from the fact that local conditions must always influence the course of native development, there are fundamental divergencies of principle among the colonial Powers which are hardly reconcilable. There are for example the questions of direct and indirect rule, and of the interpretation of the Dual Mandate principle. Above all are the contrasting British and French goals of political development, autonomy and assimilation. But, as the survey shows, co-operation can achieve much in the spheres of material and social welfare.

MORRIS AND YEATS AND THE EARLY SAGA LITERATURE.*

The scope of Miss Dorothy M. Hoare's book, *The Works of Morris and of Yeats in relation to Early Saga Literature*, is far wider than its title would imply. If it were entitled, *The Works of Morris and Yeats and their relation to Early Saga Literature*, she might get many more readers from among the literature loving public who would be liable to shun the narrower, specialised subject-matter to be expected from the present title of the book. Miss Hoare, in her introductory chapter, has an arresting way of characterising the Icelandic Sagas which will induce many who have not yet done so to read them, a good thing in itself.

The next chapters discuss the poetical works of Morris rather as a whole. Many of the poems are submitted to a careful critical analysis and there is no restriction at all to a treatment of the sagas. Referring finally to these, however, Miss Hoare proves clearly how Morris loses the inspiration and vitality of the sagas by his stilted and medieval wording,

* Cambridge University Press, 1937. 6s.

by his own particular vision of the whole. The book then proceeds to give a concise view of the Irish literary movement, touching on the works of Synge, Lady Gregory and the others. While naturally paying more attention to the early Yeats and his manner of dreamlike writing which brings him into a definite line of comparison with Morris, it does decidedly offer a great deal more and much that is good literary criticism.

One chapter discusses James Stephens in his more direct interpretation of the old Irish saga. It is the conclusion of the book that deserves its title, as it examines fully how both Morris and Yeats were attracted strongly by the fascination of the old sagas and why. Also why both used them in a similar manner. They did not immerse themselves, their particular personalities, their ambitions, both subjective and objective, in the perfect atmosphere of the old saga in order to reproduce as nearly as possible the works they were interpreting. But, instead, they reflected their own personalities and especial aims, even their own style and rhythm in these sagas, thus transforming them as completely as did Pope his *Homer*. Miss Hoare's explanation of the charm exercised in both Morris and Yeats by the old traditional sagas is the desire of both poets to escape from the harshness of reality, seeing a realisation of their own Utopian dreams as put forth in the Icelandic and Irish sagas respectively.

Miss Hoare has a clear and very simple way of writing, her book is short and to the point and should appeal to a wide circle of readers who, ordinarily, might fight shy of that type of reading, fearing its possible scientific outlook which in this book is not in any way attempted.

I. K.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw has composed in *Prelude to 1937** a short sketch of British and world affairs from the advent of the National Government in 1931 up to the abdication, prefaced by a short historical introduction. It is valuable to have a connected account of the events during these momentous years, and their interpretation by a most

* Murray. 5s. net.

because rival political factions declare their intention of creating disorder. The Communists, Syndicalists, and Socialists themselves organised monster demonstrations in an orgy of parades and speeches, but they put pressure on the authorities to forbid manifestations of their opponents even in private grounds. It is likewise to be regretted that the epithet of "Fascist" was fastened on multitudes of Frenchmen for no better reason than that they wore collars and ties, or went to church on Sundays, and regarded sympathetically the formation of such political organisations as those of Jacques Doriot and Colonel de la Rocque. Again it should be made clear that it was before the Blum Government came to power that the dissolution of these and similar associations was demanded. It may properly be suggested that some of the "Leagues" behaved foolishly, and that by laying stress on an almost military discipline, they provided an excuse for the Left. But the truth is that there has never yet been a "Fascist" menace in France—though it is, of course, possible that in certain circumstances Fascism will develop. The danger of Communism (though I consider it has reached its high-water mark) has always been greater than the danger of Fascism.

The right to work is still more important than the right of reunion. Yet not only have there been hundreds of strikes of an illegal character, with occupation of workshops (this movement had begun when M. Blum formed his Cabinet), but workers who did not belong to the syndicates were gravely molested. It was this struggle for the control of employment by the syndicates instead of the contractors, which was one of the causes of delay of the construction of the Paris exhibition, throwing its schedule months behind, and jeopardising its success and the good repute of France in the eyes of foreign visitors. Nor were decisions given under the arbitration law of last year respected if they did not satisfy the workers. Although it was negotiated last year by the Confédération Générale du Travail and approved by the Communist party it did not put an end to stay-in strikes, often for trivial motives.

At present it would seem that comparative calm is restored; agitation has largely died down; and the change-over from the Blum Government to the Chautemps Government, despite all the preliminary rhodomontade, was effected quietly.

The fact is that the *mystique* of 1936 has vanished. The Front Populaire, despite the re-shuffling of the personnel of the Government by M. Chautemps, holds together rather precariously. It may, for aught I dare predict to the contrary, have definitely broken up before these comments are printed. It will not have escaped notice that M. Chautemps speaks of the "Front Republicain" rather than the "Front Populaire"—a significant *nuance*. The Socialists were included in the new Radical Cabinet, and agreed to support that Cabinet, partly in order to elude condemnation, and partly in accordance with the French political principle that one good turn deserves another. M. Blum took M. Chautemps into his Ministry; therefore M. Chautemps should take M. Blum into his Ministry. But this arrangement may be temporary. There is an increasing desire on the part of the Radicals to turn away from their compromising friends, and the Socialists, once the shock of their defeat is safely past, might prefer to go into opposition, and later denounce somebody or other for a failure which was inherent in their policy. The question of a fusion of Communists and Socialists in a single party is discussed, and there are signs of its early consummation. In that event, the Radicals will be obliged to join up with the Centre and Right.

Did the workers, one may ask, not obtain substantial advantages during the year? The doubt that arises is whether the advantages are not too substantial—whether they can be digested. Take the forty-hour week—or rather the five-day week of eight hours a day. There is nothing magical about the figures forty, or eight and five. Unless we first consider the practical outcome, there is no reason why we should not say thirty, or twenty, or even ten. It is excellent to reduce the hours of labour. The only point to consider is whether a specified working week is feasible, having regard to economic conditions, and the customs of the rest of the world. This point has not been given the attention it deserves in France. The British, rightly or wrongly, consistently oppose the forty-hour week at the International Labour Office in Geneva. It is not generally accepted. French manufacturers therefore found their costs of production greatly increased precisely when their trade abroad had fallen to its lowest levels, and the franc was held to be too dear. They are handicapped by this and other reforms and

distinguished historian. Professor Hearnshaw writes with great vigour, and the almost dogmatic assurance in his writing admits of few half-tones and no doubts. His views are strongly expressed as when he describes the new Indian constitution as "an inexpressibly dangerous experiment" or denounces the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935 as "a most amazing manifestation of political ineptitude." He attributes to Germany, Italy and Japan policies of the most extensive aggression. Upon Russia he is hardly less severe; and he sees in the Spanish conflict the simple issues of Fascism versus Communism. The author stresses the eclipse of the League after the Abyssinian war, ascribing its "disastrous failure" to the silence of Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon at Stresa and particularly to M. Laval's veto upon "any sanctions likely to be effective." To secure international tranquillity and temperance he argues the necessity for an invincible British Empire, an alliance between the great democracies and "a firm repression of debilitating disorder." He denounces the strike-weapon in a dispute, however justifiable, as anti-democratic and comprehensively deplores the "peculiar malignity" of the recent strikes in this country as well as in France and America. He attacks Pacifism and incidentally is sarcastic on the Peace Ballot. Yet Professor Hearnshaw is not reactionary when he looks forwards ultimately to the re-establishment of an effective Court of International Justice and a reconstituted League. While it is inevitable that some of the author's views will receive emphatic dissent, his book should be widely read and much of it receive general acceptance.

In the seventh volume of his well-known *History of the English Novel*,* Dr. Ernest A. Baker concluded with the works of Dickens and Thackeray, and now in his new volume he turns to "romanticism in the English novel." It opens naturally with the Brontës and goes on to deal in particular with Mrs. Gaskell, Kingsley, George Eliot and Meredith. Dr. Baker analyses each in turn, discussing their theoretical approach to fiction and the characteristics and contents of their works. The reader will certainly appreciate, if he does not always agree with, Dr. Baker's views and conclusions. He may well approve, for example, of his comparison of Jane Austen and Mrs. Gaskell and profit from his stout defence, or rather explanation, of the genius of Meredith who "idealized upon the real" and whose novels might "with a little license, be described as a synthesis of Richardson and Fielding." In much of this book, Dr. Baker is, of course, treading well-trodden, and often disputed, ground. Perhaps the chief value, and purpose, of this work is that it enables the reader to view these great authors as a whole, to appreciate their affinities and disparities, their relation to the Romantic movement and their general place in the history of English literature.

* Witherby. 16s. net.

Before his death in 1932, the late Mr. Paul Cohen-Portheim had published in 1930 in Berlin a remarkable sketch of Paris which has now been translated into English by Mr. Alan Harris in *The Spirit of Paris*.* This little volume is in many ways a guide by a brilliant impressionist writer, and the visitor to the city will be glad of its assistance in appreciating the "sights" and characteristics of Paris and in his search for Parisian "life." As the author points out, the old centres of amusement, such as Montmartre, have lost their spontaneity and adopt an artistic verisimilitude for the express attraction of foreigners. The visitor and all those who know Paris, if only by repute, will appreciate most in this sketch Mr. Cohen-Portheim's attempt to portray all the motley hues of Parisian life in a living whole; this "vast city of indescribable manifoldness which yet forms a unity." As the great magnet of culture it draws to itself and sifts all the varied aspects of human life and art and living. Paris, he concludes, "is the only place where European culture is still supreme." In this cosmopolis "there is the possibility of a fusion from which a new world-culture will emerge." An outstanding feature of the book is the collection of 134 photographs by French photographers which illustrate in a remarkable degree the subject of the work.

Mr. Joseph Baker's useful and opportune work on *The Law of Political Uniforms, Public Meetings and Private Armies*† will be appreciated alike by lawyers, organisers of public meetings, and all who are alive to the vital issues of public order and freedom of speech and action. The law has been recently supplemented by the Public Order Act, 1936, which prohibits political uniforms and quasi-military organisations and vests in the police extensive powers for the control of political processions. These far-reaching provisions are discussed with care and lucidity by the author, although there are questions, such as the definition of political uniforms, which can be settled only by legal decision. Mr. Baker also considers at length the general law relating to public meetings, rights of assembly, unlawful associations, breaches of the peace, rights of speech and other analogous questions. If on some points the law remains somewhat uncertain, several important questions have been recently resolved, as the author shows, in legal decisions which recognise the right of the police, when apprehensive of a breach of the peace, to prohibit the holding of a public meeting in a public place or to be present when the meeting is to be held on private property.

The history of *His Majesty's Bodyguard of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms*‡ by one of their number, Brigadier-General Harvey Kearsley, will be enjoyed particularly by those interested in the history of the army and in the growth of royal ceremonial. This exhaustive

* Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

† H. A. Just & Co. 7s. 6d. net.

‡ John Murray. 21s. net.

wonder whether they will not be compelled to close down. It may prove that some of the gifts of the Front Populaire to the workers are poisoned, and indeed the workers begin to suspect them, for their prosperity is conditional on general prosperity. With the two devaluations in a single year, which have reduced the franc by, let us say, fifty per cent., and the consequent rise in the cost of living, what becomes of the poor fifteen per cent. increase of workers' wages? Besides, it is necessary to proceed to a mental re-education before introducing radical changes. In the United States short hours implied quickened production. In France they have so far been misunderstood as an invitation to idleness. All who are acquainted with factory life in France are aware of a serious slackening in French industry. We are far from the once-vaunted gospel of work!

The cost to the State and to the honest investor of the unhappy conduct of finances ever since the war, though it recently reached its climax, is incalculable. The Front Populaire came in firmly pledged to maintain the parity of the franc. It denied that the franc was overvalued in relation to world prices. But while it was opposed to devaluation, it was likewise opposed to deflation. It spent freely without making a sufficient attempt to balance the budget. In addition to the ordinary civil expenditure the Socialists—who used to vote as a matter of principle against military expenditure—were compelled to embark on intensive rearmament. When, despite the pledges, in September 1936 the Vincent Auriol franc was substituted for the Poincaré franc, everybody agreed that the operation was unavoidable, and did not blame the Blum Government, which had the help of the United States and Great Britain. Yet we must recall that before the war the franc contained 322 milligrammes of gold. When M. Poincaré was called in 1926 to save the franc he managed in fact to save only 65.5 milligrammes of gold. M. Vincent Auriol cut it down to 43.49 milligrammes of gold. That was bad enough, but what was infinitely worse was the widespread impression that the franc was doomed to further depreciation. In the United States, in England, in Switzerland, in Holland, in Belgium, devaluation had been successfully carried out. It had reduced debts and readjusted costs and stimulated trade. Gold poured back into these countries, because those who had naturally tried to save their capital by

exporting it under the menace of devaluation, were convinced that the worst was over. How is it that in France alone devaluation brought not the slightest return of confidence? Despite the "pause" proclaimed by M. Blum, wild speeches by his associates in the Front Populaire continually frightened the Frenchman. He considered that his money was still unsafe at home. Especially imprudent were the projects of exchange control, of the beginning of autarchy, of financial dictatorship. The three per cent. rente actually fell below sixty per cent.—that is to say, 60 francs Auriol, as against 100 pre-war gold francs. The four-and-a-half per cent. loan of March this year, whose interest is guaranteed at the rate of the pound or dollar, hovered around ninety. The gold in the Banque de France descended rapidly, and the "war chest" which it had always been agreed to guard intact was now in peril. The Treasury was empty, and there appeared to be no means of legitimately meeting the heavy demands on it. The position was desperate, though few people knew just how desperate until the Senate declined, after a year's "*expérience*," to give a free hand to M. Vincent Auriol; and M. Chautemps, taking the place of M. Blum, appealed to M. Georges Bonnet, a capable orthodox financial expert, to return from the United States, where he was fulfilling a special Ambassadorial mission, as Finance Minister.

M. Bonnet immediately did the ablest thing—he told the truth. He revealed that less than twenty million francs were in hand to meet the month-end requirements of June which amounted to 400 million francs. The estimated deficit on the Ordinary Budget this year is seven and a half milliards, to which is to be added eight and a half milliards of the Extraordinary Budget, and nine milliards advances to public bodies. Further, over six milliard francs' worth of bonds mature before the end of the year, and the British loan of over four milliards is due to be repaid. Altogether, something like 35 milliards has to be found. It was also disclosed that the stocks of gold had fallen from 3,636 tons in June 1936 to 2,504 tons in June 1937. The Equalisation Fund had no more gold at its disposal with which to support the franc, having lost nearly eight milliards in the month of June. In face of these results—which it is disingenuous to attribute to speculation, though speculators have doubtless availed themselves of the conditions—there was nothing for it but

account is derived largely from official records and a historical summary prepared by Lord Foley, who as Captain of the Corps for nearly twenty-six years intermittently between 1833 and 1869 restored much of its prestige as "the Nearest Guard" to the Sovereign. The Corps was originally formed in 1509 by Henry VIII as a Band of fifty Squires or Pensioners. In 1670 their numbers were reduced to forty, and in 1834 they received their existing name. They attended the King constantly as his bodyguard, on and off the field of battle, as for instance with Charles I during the Civil War. As late as 1848 the Corps was summoned to active service, to protect St. James's Palace from the Chartist rioters. Fortunately, perhaps, the day passed off quietly, for only three of the Gentlemen-at-Arms had had any military experience at all. The Corps has, however, recovered its military character, its members being drawn from officers of "long or meritorious service." Upon all great ceremonial occasions, the King is closely attended by his Bodyguard of Gentlemen-at-Arms, who add to the dignity of the occasion by their superb military bearing and precision.

In his latest book, *Commonwealth or Anarchy*,* Sir John Marriott has contributed a valuable historical outline of peace projects propounded since the sixteenth century. He begins with Sully's *Grand Dessein*, and his discussion of the later more important ideas and plans includes those of the Abbé Saint-Pierre, Grotius, William Penn, Bentham, Kant and Cobden, set against their appropriate historical backgrounds. The volume contains a useful sketch of the peace movements and the growth of arbitration during the nineteenth century, although the celebrated scheme of William Ladd, the American, for an international equity tribunal might well have been included. Moreover, in any account which is concerned with the history of arbitration, the great, if short-lived, experiment of the Central American Court of Justice, 1907-17, with its compulsory jurisdiction in all disputes between the five republics in Central America deserves some attention. Sir John very properly gives much space to the Holy Alliance and the League of Nations. His summary of the Covenant and his interpretation of the post-war period will be read with much interest. But primarily this book is intended as an objective study which will be appreciated widely as a historical sketch of the great problem of peaceful change.

It is a genuine pleasure to welcome an edition of *The Torchbearers* in a single cheap, well-printed and tastefully bound volume.† For the epic of Alfred Noyes cannot be too widely read, both for its outstanding poetical merits and for its magnificent theme. To trace the progress of our knowledge of the universe was a somewhat hazardous venture for a man whose life-work has been in other fields. But the difficulties were overcome, and all of us—expert and layman alike—are deep in his debt.

* Philip Allan & Co. Ltd. 5s. net.

† Sheed & Ward. 7s. 6d.

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NOVEMBER 1937.

AMERICA, BRITAIN AND THE FAR EAST.

IT is often said that the most hopeful field of Anglo-American co-operation lies in the Far East. This opinion is based upon the fact that the United States Government will undertake no political obligations in Europe but have always taken a more positive attitude to problems arising in the Far East than to those of any other part of the world except their own continent. Moreover, there has been a general similarity of purpose, though by no means an identity of interests, between Britain and America in the Western Pacific Ocean which found expression in the Washington Treaties of 1922. Recent experience has shown, however, that when we pass from the general to the particular the path of Anglo-American co-operation in Far Eastern affairs is by no means smooth. And when the question is raised by the war in China to-day whether these two Powers have a common purpose which enables them to pursue a common policy, it cannot receive a confident answer.

There is a certain sense in which a common purpose exists. Both America and Britain are devoted to peace, and there is practically no conceivable circumstance in which they could gain anything desirable by war. In the conditions of the contemporary world they uphold very nearly identical ideals of government, for they represent and maintain the principle of democracy against the challenge of the new autocracies of Fascism and National Socialism. Specifically in the Far East they have both made the Open Door a cardinal point in policy, though there have been occasions in which British action may have seemed to Americans to depart from the strict interpretation of this doctrine. And in framing their altered policies to meet the new era of the Chinese Revolution they have followed lines which, if not identical, were at least so closely parallel as to justify the belief that they could co-operate in such problems as Chinese Tariff Reform and extra-territoriality. In principle, they are equally and deeply committed to the maintenance of Chinese territorial integrity and sovereign independence. Thus so far as China, taken

to raise the State's borrowings from the Bank to meet the most pressing needs, to create a floating franc with no fixed gold content, to effect the most drastic economies, to forbid any further unnecessary expenditure, to impose fresh taxation both direct and indirect. In short, France must now pay for the success of the Socialists and Communists in the 1936 elections. There are to be no more costly social reforms until France has recovered. An effort is to be made to keep down prices, but these efforts have generally been unsuccessful in the past, and the tendency will necessarily be upwards.

That there will be a redressing I do not doubt. It is to be trusted that at last the lesson has been learned that a nation cannot permit the domination of a class—whether it be that of turbulent workers, of complacent bourgeois, of egotistic capitalists—without sooner or later coming to grief. After the war French finances should have been at once put in order, but the cheerful cry was raised that the “Boches” would pay. When M. Poincaré endeavoured to reduce the debt by taxation, he became unpopular. When M. Laval endeavoured to reduce expenditure, he was thrust out of office. Parliament has neglected its primary duty of rigidly controlling finances, and a policy of facility has been followed. It has been followed for at least twenty years. France somehow persuaded herself that more can be produced by working less, that the State can spend more without asking more from the taxpayer. It is to be hoped that these illusions have now been thoroughly exploded. France cannot afford to deceive herself any more. Paul Reynaud, who has been by far the most perspicacious deputy in the present Chamber, points out that to suggest that the rich can be made to pay is an absurdity, for the deficit of the Treasury is superior to the income of the so-called rich. The hour of the “*grande pénitence*,” long ago predicted by M. Caillaux, has at last sounded. The precarious pleasures of prodigality are finished. It is to be hoped that the Socialist Congress, which is meeting as I write, will have the wisdom to see that to disregard the plain laws of capitalism, and to run capitalism badly and at a loss, has nothing to do with Socialism as such, and will not in the least help their cause.

The latest speech of M. Paul Reynaud has been praised in France according to its merits, and as he sums up the case for a complete change of method it is desirable to glance at a

“*requisitoire*” that was applauded even on the Left. The tragic result of the false doctrine that the more you spend the richer you become, is that all who have saved a little money (and that means the bulk of the French people, including many workers), rentiers who are living on fixed income in francs, functionaries, and wage-earners, have once more suffered by the further reduction of the franc. A mere change in financial direction, though necessary, will itself only give a respite of a few months, and those months must be devoted to the solution of the real French problem. That problem is to raise the output, to lower the cost of production, and to prevent the rise of prices which have put France out of economic step with the rest of the world. In the past year, to give a single illustration, the German production of coal has increased by over fourteen per cent., while that of France has diminished by eleven per cent., and French imports of foreign coal have increased. The deficit on the railways has doubled in a year. Next year, says M. Reynaud, it will be necessary to borrow another fifty milliard francs. It is grotesque to explain these facts as the consequence of “speculation.”

Assuming that the Front Populaire by methods of constraint had been able to bring back to France the fifty milliards of francs that have been expatriated for prudential reasons, in what way would that help? With them in the Treasury, it might have carried on just a year longer. That is all. The situation would not have improved—unless there was the miracle which the Front Populaire has always expected. Moreover, to coerce capital which has fled the country, there must be control of purchases abroad, especially of raw materials, and control of the export trade. Happily, France has chosen, with Great Britain and the United States, a policy of relative liberty, not of economic coercion.

Those of us who have faith in the possibilities of democracy look to France for an adequate reaction against the errors of the past. I am convinced that France will surmount the crisis; it is imperatively necessary she should do so, for not only the social peace of France, but the peace of Europe, may depend on a speedy French recovery.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

alone, is concerned there appears to be not only the basis of a common policy, but also the fact of common action. But when the field of our inquiry is widened to include the past and present relations of the two English-speaking Powers to Japan, or to estimate the probable policy of America throughout the whole of the Far East including the Philippine Islands, certain marked differences arise. When the Washington Treaties were signed in 1923, a new era seemed to have opened; and so well did Mr. Hughes and Lord Balfour understand one another that it could be said, too optimistically as the event has proved, that Britain and America had taken an effective first step on the road of a new co-operation. But during the past fifteen years much has happened to reveal those marked differences just referred to.

The Philippine question, for instance, has passed into the new phase of "independence." We do not, in fact, know the ultimate form of American policy in these islands. All we do know is that the American people have endeavoured to discharge their political obligations in the Archipelago by granting a measure of self-government which is called independence, but which still leaves unanswered the crucial question of America's responsibility for the defence, and her control over the foreign policy, of the Philippines. As at present revealed, the purpose of America might be interpreted as her evacuation of the Western Pacific; but the final decision will not be made till 1945; and, meanwhile, there are certain considerations of which the American Government is aware and of which they will not lose sight as they approach their final choice. The present policy of Philippine domestic home rule is already a partial withdrawal of American power, and, if continued, will create a vacuum in a region where great pressure surrounds it and will actually seek to fill it. It is obvious that the experiment of Filipino self-government can have little chance of undisturbed success unless the integrity of the Islands is protected from the impact of this pressure. By what guarantee will this integrity be maintained? By an American pledge? Or by the paper protection of an international agreement? The history of the world since 1914 forbids us to rely on the latter and therefore the former is the only effective guarantee, in the absence of which Japan will take an active part in deciding the fate of the Philippines. By extending her trade in them, by exacting

special concessions, by tariff agreements and by actual participation in Philippine enterprises, she will raise a structure of Japanese interest of the same kind as she erected for herself, first in Korea and then in Manchuria. In this process the moment will arise when Japanese vested interests will conflict with Filipino domestic policy and Japan will then claim that they are being imperilled by political interference or by the incapacity of the Philippine Government to protect legitimate foreign rights. A case for intervention will be sedulously prepared, and once these forces are set in motion we shall witness a development of the same process which transformed Manchuria into Manchukuo.

These are perhaps mere speculations, but they are inherent in the present situation and are therefore neither idle nor irrelevant. Moreover, it may well prove that the generous mind of America will convince itself that the Philippines ought to be completely "set free," and the Naval Staff may advise the Administration that the retention of naval bases at Manila or elsewhere is a liability which can only be justified by the strongest political considerations which override mere naval prudence. Nineteen hundred and forty-five will show the answer; but in considering the nature of the American stake in the whole of the Far East in 1937 the future of the Philippines is too large a factor to be omitted from the account.

The next factor, later in time but greater in importance, is the new interpretation of American neutrality. The Neutrality Act of 1937 is America's way of keeping out of war. Its effect on foreign belligerents is to keep the American supply of many vital materials—but not of munitions—open to the Power that commands the sea and possesses the assets in America to barter in exchange for those commodities. *Rebus sic stantibus* it would operate to the benefit of Great Britain in a European war, assuming always our command of the sea; and in the present crisis in the Far East, if and when it can be described as "war" in a Presidential proclamation, it would favour Japan. The President has so far refrained from recognising it as "legal" war, for if he were to do so, he would have to put the machinery of neutrality into operation with serious disadvantage to China. It has thus drawn a sharp distinction between the Abyssinian War and the Sino-Japanese conflict, and in doing so has followed the example of many of his predecessors who have almost

A LETTER FROM PALESTINE.

WRITING only a few days after the publication of the Royal Commission's Report it is not easy to assess with any precision the effect which it has produced on the two sections of the Palestinian population, still less to say whether it offers the permanent solution of the Arab-Jewish controversy which the Commissioners hope for. Palestine has received a shock, and the shock has had a salutary effect. That is as much as one can safely assert for the moment.

That the shock was so severe is rather surprising. The idea of partition had been made familiar by repeated forecasts in the newspapers, all of which foreshadowed a division of the country into independent Arab and Jewish zones by a frontier running roughly north-east and south-west, and the maintenance of a restricted British mandate to cover the Holy Places and possibly Haifa. A few days before the publication of the Report, by what was clearly a leakage at the source, the partition proposed was defined with convincing accuracy in the Jewish press, and the Arab newspapers reproduced the details. Nevertheless, when the appearance of the Report confirmed these prognostications both Arabs and Jews were considerably staggered, which shows that no hypothesis, however confidently advanced, carries quite the same weight as the reality.

One effect of the Report had certainly been reckoned with. It had been generally assumed that whatever the Royal Commission recommended it would not completely satisfy either Arabs or Jews, and the rumours of partition seemed to confirm this belief. Broadly speaking, no Arab or Jew wants to see the country divided. Each regards the whole of it as his by birthright. Residents in Palestine, therefore, and no doubt the authorities also, had visualised the repercussion in terms of demonstrations, strikes, and possibly disorders. The Jews could be counted on to exercise as usual greater discipline and restraint than the Arabs, but the Revisionists, whose demand is for unrestricted immigration and the inclusion of Transjordan in the scope of the National Home, might have been expected to show their disgust at the frustration of their hopes in a fairly violent manner. On the Arab side prompt hostile demonstrations in the towns,

accompanied by a general stoppage of business and closing of shops, seemed the most likely reaction, to be followed if successful by an attempt to spread the movement of protest to the country districts, as happened last year. Both the police and the military were prepared to cope with such disorder as might be expected. The troops were kept standing by, and a squadron of the R.A.F. was held ready in Egypt in case of need.

Up to the time of writing these precautions have proved entirely superfluous. The country remains calm. There has not been a single demonstration; on the surface not even any attempt to agitate public opinion. Newspaper comment, though in no case, either Arab or Jewish, does it approve of the Report, has been unusually restrained. Speeches in the mosques have been moderate in tone. One has a distinct impression that a pause has been given to terrorism, at any rate for the moment. In a word the country appears sobered and temporarily purged of the passions which have been distracting it for years.

In a great measure this is probably due to the weighty character of the Report and its drastic proposals. No Arab or Jew contests the great competence and authority of the Commissioners, the honesty of their intentions, or the painstaking nature of their investigations. All these qualities are apparent in the Report, and its solid argumentation and convincing pleading have made a strong intellectual appeal, which is felt particularly by the Jews. An Arab or Jew may be appalled or depressed by its sweeping proposals (as indeed many are), but he cannot fail to regard them with respect. Some Jews have been deeply moved by the evident understanding and sympathy shown by the Commissioners for Zionist ideals. Arabs too pay a tribute to their correct appreciation of Arab feelings and aspirations.

This effect alone, however, would not have sufficed to curb the terrorists and those who direct or inspire them, and it is known that dispositions had been actually taken in some Arab quarters to stir up trouble. The reason why they have so far not gone beyond the initial stage is no doubt that the instigators felt that they would not be successful. The first consideration which they had to face was that the mass of the Arab population, both *fellahs* and townsmen, is in no mood at present to support another campaign of violence.

invariably emphasised the positive interest of the United States in the Far East in contrast with their reluctance to take part in European affairs. On what is this positive interest based? It has its foundations in sentiment, in considerations of high policy, and in the growing American need of foreign markets. The sentiment is well known, and of two kinds. There is first of all the vague but real feeling that the Pacific is the ocean of America's opportunity by contrast with the Atlantic which was the path of America's flight from Europe. Americans have long thought of the Pacific, not perhaps as *mare nostrum*, but as the arena of their activity in the twentieth century. Thus nothing in the Pacific could be alien to them. In the second place the active American missionary crusade in China has forged a bond of sympathy between the Chinese and themselves which the most hard-boiled Secretary of State cannot ignore. At all times American policy is influenced by this sentiment, and since in a Sino-Japanese quarrel American public opinion instinctively takes sides with China, the American Government is rarely free to adopt a "realistic" view, and must make its action appear to support the Chinese cause. And, finally, the great exporting interests of the United States will probably tend to throw their influence in the same scale, in proportion as they realise, or suspect, that every area which falls under Japanese control is likely to be an area closed to their enterprise. There is a good deal of sympathy for Japan in certain quarters of America, and the objective study of the whole Far Eastern problem in recent years has to some extent corrected the almost exclusively pro-Chinese perspective of former times. Thus a valuable approach to objectivity has been made. None the less China can always count on an immediate American response to any appeal, and in the present conflict Americans are with China in the proportion of ten to one.

Now, it is not necessary, in the pages of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, to examine the factors in the British attitude to Far Eastern questions. They are at once more numerous and complex than those which govern American opinion; but the decisive difference between the British and American estimates of the place which the Far East should take in their respective policies lies in the relative importance of their Far Eastern interests when compared with the total

sum of their respective interests in the world as a whole. Great Britain must of necessity weigh the claims of obligation and interest in the Far East against the more vital things that may be at stake elsewhere, and consequently her freedom of action is certain to be less large in that region than may seem ideally desirable. This is a factor in the equation which is often under-valued by those who hope to find in Anglo-American co-operation the instrument of an enduring solution of the problem of the Far East. I am one of those who believe that far-sighted co-operation between Britain and the United States would have prevented many international difficulties from arising in the past, and that it could even now bring some of the problems of our time nearer solution. It is desirable on every ground of material and ideal interest. And it must be regarded as the appropriate political result of a deep-seated community of feeling. Hence it must be the endeavour of those who hold this conviction to remove every removable obstacle from the path of common action, and, at the same time, to make sure that when these two people undertake an obligation they clearly realise the nature of the obligation assumed. Too often in the past have men said that because Anglo-American co-operation was ideal, therefore it was practicable. Recent experience has proved that this was false logic which ignored hard facts.

In applying this realistic measure of practicability to the prospects of Anglo-American action in the present crisis, the mind naturally turns to examine the experience of 1931. In my opinion the British and American Governments, acting early and wisely, might have changed the course of events immediately after the Mukden incident of September 19th. Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, apparently thought otherwise, for, in his belief that *any* action at that time would have played into the hands of the military party, he decided that no step in the direction of intervention should be taken because it would embarrass Baron Shidehara, in whom "lay the best chance of a successful solution." Now, the last thing I wish to do just now is to revive the recrimination which darkened the sky between London and Washington during and after the Manchurian crisis, and therefore I confine myself to one or two reflections on the light which that earlier crisis throws on the problem of to-day. And, first of all, I would ask my readers to study Mr. Stimson's

The long struggle last summer put a great strain on their patience and on their pockets, and they want liberty to work for a while in peace. The *fellabeen* are just harvesting the best durra and barley crop they have seen for years and do not want to be disturbed from their labours. The second consideration was that the Army is ready to take over, a fact of which the Arabs are well aware. The British Government has said quite plainly that at the first sign of serious disorder the country will come under martial law, and the Arabs do not believe that in such conditions they would have the easy run for their money that they had last year. It is commonly believed that one of the first steps of the G.O.C. would be to arrest and deport the Mufti. This belief no doubt helped the Higher Arab Committee to decide to refer to the rulers of the other Arab countries for advice before pronouncing formally on the Royal Commission's proposals. This at least will allow them to gain time.

Meanwhile all opinions publicly expressed on the Report in the newspapers or elsewhere by Jews as well as Arabs register disappointment, horror and dismay. These utterances have to be discounted to a great extent, for it must be realised that at present no recognised spokesman of the Arab cause can afford to approve of the Report for fear of being damned as a traitor, and the same applies only to a slightly less extent to the Jews. It is not easy to guess, however, exactly how far the professed dismay is cancelled by a sense of the obvious advantages which the Report's recommendations offer to both sides, nor how far it is feigned with the object of impressing on the Englishman how deeply the Arabs (alternatively the Jews) feel themselves hurt by the "surgical operation" intended. The British Government has only accepted the solution advanced by the Commissioners in principle. It may be assumed that it is prepared to allow a good deal of latitude in settling the details, notably in the actual demarcation of the frontier. Hence one can be sure that both Jews and Arabs are preparing themselves for a good round of oriental bargaining, and according to tradition are decrying the goods offered in the hope of lowering the price they will have to pay.

Each side has about an equal number of glaring drawbacks to find in the partition scheme. Neither, as has been already noted, can abide the idea of partition. Apart from that, complaint is loud among the Arabs against the following points :

1. Approximately 300,000 Arabs are to be left in the Jewish State, and only 1,250 Jews in the Arab State.

2. The whole of Galilee, which according to official statistics is about 87 per cent. Arab, is to be given to the Jews.

3. The Holy Places, which, as the Arabs remark, were under Moslem control for centuries without Christian or Jewish shrines or worshippers suffering the slightest harm or indignity, are to be placed under British guardianship in order to justify a British *enclave*, the real purpose of which is alleged to be wholly strategic.

4. The Jews get Haifa, the most important port in the country, and half Arab in population.

5. Jaffa, though left to the Arabs, is to be cut off from the Arab State and embedded in the British zone, which will also include the Arab towns of Ramle and Lydda.

6. Thus Arab access to the sea is made indirect and precarious.

7. The Jewish State blocks the direct route to the neighbouring Arab State of Syria.

The principal Jewish objections are as follows :

1. The Jewish State loses its capital, Jerusalem, in which all Zionist aspirations centre. ("Zionism without Zion.")

2. Only one-fifth of the territory of Palestine, and that already well colonised, is left to the National Home.

3. The empty spaces of Southern Palestine, of little use to the Arabs, but capable of being fertilised with Jewish capital, are denied to Jewry.

4. The most important Jewish industrial enterprises, the Dead Sea potash works, and the Jordan Power Station, together with some of the oldest-established Jewish colonies in the Upper Jordan valley, are left in the Arab State.

5. The Jewish State is to be burdened by having to pay a substantial subsidy to the Arab State.

6. Jewish sovereignty is to be restricted for an unstated period by the imposition of British control over Haifa and the towns of Galilee.

It is fairly easy to detect in these two catalogues some at least of the points which have been registered mainly for bargaining purposes. The Arab complaint about difficulty of access to the sea and to Syria lacks substance. Communications to Jaffa through the British zone will be quite unhampered and provision has also been made for the passage of

book, *The Far Eastern Crisis* (Harper's, 1936). I have my own reasons for doubting whether Mr. Stimson appreciated all the factors in the situation, either when he was directing American policy from day to day five years ago, or when he was writing his book. But I have no doubt at all that the book itself is so to speak the *locus classicus* for those who seek to understand the problem of Anglo-American relations in any crisis, and certainly in the Far East. The first moral which arises from 1931-2 is that when Powers engage in new responsibilities, such as were laid on them by the Washington Treaties, they must know what they are doing and what the successful operation of their treaties will require of them in the future. It has often been said that a treaty begins to decay as soon as the signatures are dry. That was true of past treaties which appeared to assume that the factor of change would not make them rapidly obsolescent. But, in principle at all events, it was not true of the Washington Treaties, because they were designed as instruments for the control of the changing circumstances of Japanese expansion and Chinese Nationalism in the Far East. Doubtless there is only a limited sense in which any "scrap of paper" can control human forces; but within the limits in which the engagements of the Washington Treaties were supposed to operate, there was an area of effective action. But neither Government made any serious attempt to study in advance the action required, and when the Manchurian crisis broke out they were taken unawares. Largely through this lack of preparation, they found themselves out of step, and their supporters on each side of the Atlantic sought to fasten the blame on the other side in a manner which increased the psychological difficulty of co-operation which was already great enough.

In the present conflict the part which the United States or Great Britain, or both together, can play is limited by certain plain facts. The part which they could play if those limitations were removed is equally plain. They could hamstring Japan by cutting off oil and refusing to buy silk, but before they had done so, they would have brought nearer that very conflagration which it is their declared purpose to avert. No one knows better than I do the weakness that lies at the root of the Japanese economic structure, but even giants with feet of clay are not to be laid low by the sling of economic sanctions without a struggle, and it is improbable that

economic restraints could be applied to Japan without provoking repercussions far beyond the immediate theatre of the present conflict. Taking all the factors into account we must conclude that there is very little chance of an official boycott being enforced against Japan either by Britain or by America, and an unofficial boycott, though it may be the natural expression of popular anger with Japan, cannot do more than inflame Japanese feeling without any compensating advantage of a practical kind. To these conclusions one is reluctantly but finally driven, and once accepted, they confine the probable or possible action of Britain and America to narrow limits. Effective intervention, of any kind, must in the last resort rely on power; and once it is realised that the American Neutrality Act restricts American action, while the preoccupation with the critical state of Europe even more rigidly confines British action, the power which either or both of them can deploy in the Far East is too small to provide effective backing for a policy of active intervention. Neither party in the Far East is blind to this truth. It gives Japan a comparatively free hand, and compels China to rely on her own resources. The Chinese have been well aware of it for some time past, and the resistance which they now offer to Japan is due to their conviction that they can neither afford to yield voluntarily to Japanese aggression, nor can they look to Geneva or to the Western Powers to fight their battles for them.

This is a melancholy and disheartening conclusion; but it is better to face it betimes than to cherish illusions which are certain to fail us. In the immediate future, therefore, there is little prospect of positive action, either in the form of mediation or of more drastic intervention, to stop the war between China and Japan. As for the future beyond the present autumn, the scope of this article does not give room for much discussion, nor am I disposed to prophesy. But it is clear that the Japanese General Staff will strain every nerve to reach an early decision, knowing full well that they will be seriously embarrassed for lack of vital supplies which they can only purchase abroad, and for the purchase of which they will be hard put to it to find the necessary foreign exchange. Should that situation arise, the British and American Governments might find that they possessed the means of putting private and effective pressure on Japan,

Arab goods through Haifa in bond. The communications to Syria east of the Sea of Galilee are likewise quite adequate. The Jews have always vaunted their readiness to assist the Arabs financially, so that their resentment at the proposed subsidy carries no weight, nor will the relegation beyond the Jewish borders of the two industrial plants mentioned be felt really deeply. On the other hand the loss of Jerusalem is a cruel blow to both Jews and Arabs. It is hard to say which of them feels it most, but probably the Jews. Apart from this the things which matter most are to the Arabs the loss of Galilee, and particularly of a town so closely linked with the glories of Arab history as Acre; to the Jews the squeezing of the National Home into what seems to them a mere corner of the Promised Land.

These are the points which nourish and will continue to nourish such opposition as is felt to the scheme on either side. On the other hand, judging by private conversations, there certainly is appreciation of those advantages which, as the Commissioners evidently calculated, will eventually outweigh in the minds of both Jews and Arabs the sacrifices which they are asked to make. These are, first and foremost, the attainment for each of national sovereignty, the goal to which each has always eagerly aspired. Further, to the Arabs release within their own territory of the fear of being swamped by the Jews; to the Jews the certainty of being able to settle another two millions or so of their race in the National Home without let or hindrance. There are other advantages of a less obvious and certain nature to be gleaned from the scheme on both sides. It is impossible to estimate at present how far the *pros* weigh against the *cons*, but I suspect that they count for a good deal in the counsels of the leaders and in the heart of hearts of many individuals. On their gradual appreciation at their full worth depends the acceptance of the plan of settlement by both sides. If one side or the other rejects the plan and refuses to enter into the proposed treaty arrangements the British Government will presumably have to fall back on the "palliatives" recommended in the earlier part of the Report.

Jewish acceptance or rejection of the plan will depend less on the feelings of the Palestinian Zionist community than on the vote of this year's Zionist Congress, which meets in Zürich on August 3rd under the chairmanship of Dr. Chaim

Weizmann. Here the issue will be fought out by delegates from every country in which the Jewish Diaspora is found. Some idea of how the parties will be ranged in this debate can already be gleaned, for the views of every section of world Jewry are reflected in Palestine. The representatives of the countries where the Jewish community is subjected to the greatest strain, such as Poland, Rumania and Germany, appear likely to stand for the Commission's scheme on the ground that it offers a chance of settling a million or so of Jews in Palestine in a comparatively short time, thus greatly relieving the pressure in these countries. The Jews of the Western European countries, and particularly of the U.S.A., seem likely to oppose it, partly on idealistic, partly on practical grounds. They are strongly opposed to any partition of Palestine and argue that there is no sense in trying to establish a Jewish State in such a trifling area. They also cling to the idea that co-operation with the Arabs is still feasible. Since the American Jews contribute the largest share of the funds to finance the National Home the weight they carry in Zionist councils is always considerable. On broad lines it looks as if it would be a fight between East and West. Dr. Weizmann is expected to throw his influence on the side of acceptance.

The process of determining the final Arab attitude towards the scheme will be lengthier and more complicated. Resolute opposition may be expected from the Mufti, whose office and authority would be inevitably eclipsed under partition. The Mufti commands the machinery which exists for agitation in the *imams* of the mosques, whose religious office to some extent shields them from interference by the authorities. He also possesses the predominant influence over the organisation of town and village committees, which was set up to carry on resistance to the Government last year. But he will have to be very discreet in making use of both these instruments, for at the slightest sign of organised agitation the authorities may be expected to act. His hope must lie in the resentment of the Arabs of the North at being subjected to Jewish dominion. The *fellabeen* of Galilee have been described by the Royal Commission as "less amenable to political incitement than those of Samaria and Judæa." This soft impeachment might by skilful insinuation be represented as a reproach of which the Galileans would feel compelled to rid

and it could probably be used to good effect. But what is more urgently required is to remove the impression, created in the Japanese mind by the attitudes of the State Department and the Foreign Office during the Manchurian crisis, that there is a wide divergence between London and Washington which prevents them from seeing eye to eye, so that they will not, or cannot, find common ground. I doubt whether this can be immediately achieved by any political approach, for reasons too obvious to demand restatement here. A more hopeful prospect is opened in the economic field, for Mr. Eden's speech at Geneva and the repeated declarations of Mr. Cordell Hull show that both Governments are aware of the desirability of a trade agreement between Britain and America. An Anglo-American trade treaty is certainly desirable, and the manner in which the British Government have approached the problems involved in it, even if cautious and aware of the difficulties to be overcome, shows the importance which British opinion is now beginning to attach to it. Once the public mind and the Cabinet are fully seized of the far-reaching political effect of an economic agreement between the two English-speaking democracies, the pace of preparation for it may be quickened. And in the aspect of its political meaning, there can be little doubt, if proof can be shown that Britain and America can and will co-operate in the promotion of an economic end, that the significance of such a *rapprochement* would be appreciated in Tokyo.

A. F. WHYTE.

CAN AGGRESSOR STATES BE CHECKED?

TOWARDS the end of his memoirs Mr. Lloyd George puts the question, "Could the Great War have been prevented?", and answers by saying in effect "Yes, if Germany had known beforehand that she would have to face the forces, which finally entered the field against her." If, that is, Germany could have foreseen that the general policy she was pursuing would in the end confront her with insuperable obstacles, she would not have followed that policy and there would have been no war. It might be put in somewhat different form thus: Had we, the Allies, been able to say beforehand that we would do, what ultimately we did, we should not have had to do it.

This does not cover the whole of the truth, as we shall see presently, but it is nevertheless one of the profoundest lessons of the Great War, an aspect of the problem of war prevention most commonly overlooked, and one which has a very direct bearing upon the present situation of the world. For these reasons it deserves a little elaboration.

A nation, in pursuit of what it sincerely regards as its legitimate interests and its just rights, finds itself in conflict with others. Certain preliminary questions are thereupon presented. Have those others the power to resist? Will they use that power for resistance? If the answer to the first question is in the negative, any nation honestly convinced that it has justice on its side will disregard the objection of those not strong enough to make their objection felt. As the trustee of its people a government is perhaps under a moral obligation to protect, first, the interests in its charge, particularly where, as in such a case as the one indicated, they can be protected without war; where, that is, the superiority of one side is so great that war by the weaker would be obviously futile.

Where, however, the power of resistance exists, but it is uncertain whether or at what point the power will be used, there is an obvious temptation to bluff, to threaten, to gamble on the prospect that the more resolute rather than the more powerful will carry the day. Even where a nation in the imagined circumstances, pursuing what it believes to be its interests, is offered arbitration or some form of third-party judgment, it may feel impelled to hold out. Why should a nation which has a reasonable chance of compelling agreement

themselves by rising in revolt. The Mufti must hope that the embers of resentment will smoulder slowly until they suddenly leap into flame. Once the flame was kindled repression would not be of much use, for the movement would at once gain the sympathy of every Arab in the country, and would make it exceedingly difficult for any Arab politician to agree to the terms of partition. Galilee and the plain of Acre will have to be very carefully watched.

If, however, agitation can be prevented there is a fair chance that the attractions of belonging to an independent state with considerable possibilities, and the opportunities which it presents for many an ambitious *effendi* to hold high office and gain influence and distinction in government service, will eventually swing the Arabs of Palestine towards acceptance of the scheme. The secession from the Higher Arab Committee of the National Defence Party under the leadership of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, ex-Mayor of Jerusalem, was the beginning of the movement, and there are signs that it is gaining adherents.

CHRISTOPHER LUMBY.

Jerusalem. July.

THE IRISH ELECTIONS AND PLEBISCITE

AS readers of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW know, two distinct questions were recently submitted to the Irish electorate: Whether in effect Mr. de Valera should have a fresh lease of power and whether the draft Constitution, previously approved by a majority of the Dáil, should become law. To both questions the electorate said "yes"; though to neither so decisively as Mr. de Valera's supporters had hoped. Both Fianna Fáil, the Government Party, and Mr. Cosgrave's Fine Gail lost some seats formerly held, as did the Independents; while Labour has improved its position both positively and still more relatively. Whereas before the dissolution the Fianna Fáil deputies numbered 77, they now number 69. Fine Gail is similarly reduced from 53 to 48, and the Independent group from 12 to 8; while official Labour has increased its total from 8 to 13. In interpreting these figures, however, it must be borne in mind that 6 University seats had in the interval been abolished and the total membership of the Dáil reduced from 153 to 138. The election campaign was singularly free from disorder and also, so far as I can learn, from attempts at intimidation. The more intransigent Republicans took no active part in the business, although it seems probable that support was quietly given to Fianna Fáil and Labour candidates.

The most obvious consequence of the poll is that it leaves Mr. de Valera once more as in 1932 and to a less extent ever since, dependent upon Labour. People have begun to talk of the formation of a Coalition Government and, alternatively, of another general election. The latter would be both very unpopular and unlikely to yield materially different results. For the plain fact is that the two chief parties are pretty evenly balanced, the first preference votes given to Fianna Fáil amounting to 599,524, those given to Fine Gail to 461,258, to which last figure may fairly be added most of the 131,488 given to Independent candidates. Once an Irishman has chosen his side (which like other people he sometimes does for trivial enough reasons) he is very unlikely to leave it, his leaders say or do what they may. We have preserved the spirit of the clan; and, as previously we swore by Carson or Redmond, so now we cry "Up de Valera!" or "Up Cosgrave!"

to its own view of its rights expose those rights to the risks, uncertainties, of third-party judgment; or undergo the exasperations of discussion, negotiation, compromise? To anyone in a fiduciary position such an argument has an especial appeal. But note that the retreat of one of two disputing parties before the threats of the other, lessens hope of establishing any principle of third-party judgment or law. If powerful litigants could always compel less powerful to surrender law could never be established. Further, it is pretty certain that where the potentially more powerful disputant has been receding before bluff, it will make a stand at the point where it realises that further retreat will make future resistance impossible. At that point a potentially more powerful state will fight—and its rival be more likely to fight than if resistance had come at an earlier juncture. Retreat will not have added to the chances of peace.

What light does experience throw on this point? Does it give us any guide as to the kind of interest which will lead a state to risk war or go to war? Among the motives which dragged nearly the whole world into the Great War was there a dominant or a common one? Can the experience of 1914 help us now? To-day we find it commonly asserted as an almost obvious truth that the tensions of our times are due to the inequities of the Versailles Treaty, to the psychosis which it has produced in the vanquished, and that appeasement and peace lie in the direction of the revision of that instrument.

Now, revision is indispensable. And if such measures as the return of the German colonies could appreciably advance us along the road of appeasement, such concessions should be made. But if we ignore the fact that the defects of the Treaty are irrelevant to the main problem, we shall end by making revision itself useless. Certain facts in that connection are sufficiently obvious. It is not the psychosis of defeat which explains Italian aggression; nor that of Japan. It would come nearer the truth to say of Italy and Japan that their spirit of aggression has grown on easy victories. It was just after Mussolini had announced to the world that his conquest of Abyssinia placed Italy in the ranks of the satisfied powers, that he began his interventions in Spain, creating thus an even graver situation than the attack on Abyssinia had created.

But the gravest warning of all on this point is in the war of

1914. Germany was not then suffering from the injustices of Versailles. She was living in a Europe which had been largely created by herself at Versailles forty-two years before. And if now we could so radically revise the existing peace treaties to Germany's advantage as to restore her to the position she occupied in 1914, giving her back, not only all her colonies, but all the European territory she then possessed, we know by the tragic experience of the war that even that impossible degree of revision would not of itself ensure peace, since when she had that territory and those resources, war came. And if we take the view that the guilt was not mainly Germany's, but largely that of Russia or Britain or France, then the point becomes more significant still, for it would prove that the possession of immense imperial territories like those of the satisfied states is no preventive of war.

If we are to reach the core of the matter we must recognise that the absence of specific grievances does not ensure peace. In 1914 Germany had no specific grievance, save one which is precisely the grievance neither side recognised as the real cause of the war. Mr. Winston Churchill among others has declared that not for years had Anglo-German relations been so free from unresolved differences (e.g. Morocco, Bagdad Railway) as they were in the early part of 1914. Yet war came. Why?

When we speak of remedying grievances we usually overlook the supremest grievance of all: defencelessness, the risk that a nation may find itself so inferior in power to another as to be compelled, in any dispute arising, to accept the other's interested judgment. For a nation to be manifestly weaker than another is to be unable to defend its rights as against the claims of that other.

And here the prime dilemma of the international anarchy presents itself. If effective defence depends upon being stronger than any who might challenge our power, what becomes of the defence of the weaker? We and our Allies felt, in 1914, that if Germany was victorious we should be deprived of the means of defence. Germany felt that if the power of the Slav world under Russian leadership continued to grow, *her* means of defence would be gone. There arose a situation in which if she made herself secure we were threatened; if we made ourselves secure she was threatened—by a threat which in her view the Treaty of Versailles fulfilled. The right

without much thought of the policies they severally represent. It is this that explains the long predominance as well as the sudden fall and extinction of Irish political parties. A great catastrophe or wholly unforeseen event—the famine, the divorce proceedings, the World War—was needed to destroy the authority of O'Connell, of Parnell, of Redmond. And since there is at this time no sign of any such cause of disruption, I conclude that Mr. de Valera is safe for another term of office, provided he can (as I think he will) come to terms with the Labour Party. That Labour will give up its present commanding position and risk ultimate loss of independent existence by entering into any coalition is most improbable. Both it and Fianna Fáil have indeed been proclaiming loudly that no exterior influence will be allowed to divert it from its own objectives. But for all that I see no reason to think that Labour will not continue to lend its parliamentary support to Mr. de Valera, who may thus be enabled to rival Mr. Cosgrave's record of ten years' continuous tenure of the leadership of the Dáil.

With the ballot paper containing the names of candidates each elector received another on which to record his opinion of the draft Constitution. In this plebiscite, out of an electorate numbering 1,771,147, 686,042 voted for the draft, 528,296 against it; over half a million abstained, while 116,196 were held to have spoiled their voting papers. Some of these are reported as having placed crosses impartially against the words "Yes" and "No"; but whether in a natural attempt to express their feeling that part of the Constitution was excellent and other parts not so good, or in sheer bewilderment, who shall say? Some bewilderment was indeed excusable; for I suppose not one in a thousand had much notion of what the Constitution contained. One cannot but respect Mr. de Valera for having submitted the matter to the free vote of the Irish people, instead of relying, as he might quite easily have done, upon his majority in the last Dáil. Yet of all possible questions this was surely the least apt for a plebiscite. The draft Constitution lies before me as I write in the shape of a stout pamphlet of some 100 closely printed pages. Much of it is formal and unexceptionable; much merely restates existing provisions; but nearly every one of its sixty-three articles, subdivided into I know not how many sub-clauses, must be read carefully if one is to

understand the purport. Nor will the most careful reading always suffice, since constitutional lawyers already dispute the interpretation of many vital phrases.

For my part I shall not pretend to have really mastered the whole, nor does the space at my disposal permit me to mention more than a few outstanding features. The Preamble is notable for affirming in a particularly solemn and striking fashion the Christian character of the State and the autochthonous origin of the new Constitution. "In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, We, the people of Eire . . . do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution."

Immediately following are eleven articles devoted to general propositions or declarations. Of these the first asserts the "inalienable, indefeasible and sovereign right" of the Irish nation "to choose its own form of government, to determine its relations with other nations, and to develop its own life, political, economic and cultural, in accordance with its own genius and traditions." Others claim for the State ownership in all natural resources, royalties and franchises, "subject to estates and interests for the time being lawfully vested in any person or body," and affirm that "the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and territorial seas," while restricting the operation of Irish legislation to the existing area of the Free State "pending the re-integration of the national territory."

Five articles are grouped under the titles "Directive Principles of Social Policy" and "Fundamental Rights." These are of particular interest, inasmuch as we shall hardly be wrong in taking them to embody Mr. de Valera's personal conception of a State founded upon the principle of Pope Leo XIII's famous Encyclical and on the general lines of what is commonly, if not perhaps accurately, described as Christian Socialism. The State is to endeavour to secure that all citizens may "through their occupations find means of making reasonable provision for their domestic needs"; that the ownership and control of national resources and essential commodities shall be so distributed as to subserve the common good; that the use of credit shall be similarly directed; that "the strength and health of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children shall not be

for which ultimately both sides fought was the right to have any defence at all; that right for which Germany now recreates her power and arms and her alliances. But if she succeeds in establishing preponderance, we shall be threatened by some German equivalent of Versailles, which will not be an improvement in point of equity upon the Allied one. Both sides seek to make their own defence secure by killing that of the other.

Sir Edward Grey himself indicated (after the event) the qualification which must be made then to the answer Mr. Lloyd George gives to his own question quoted at the beginning of this article. If Germany's fears of Russia were sincere (which they might have been without being well founded) the prime factor of prevention, psychology being taken into account, the thing which would have served most perhaps to preserve the peace, would have been an assurance from Britain and France that if Russia wantonly attacked Germany or mobilised prematurely without the authority of the Allies, Allied support of Russia would have been withdrawn; and aid even given to Germany in her own defence.

Only by some such principle of mutual defence can the old dilemma be avoided. But a series of strange confusions cause us to ignore these two main lessons of the war—the lesson that if force is to deter aggression, prevent force being used that is, the potential aggressor must know beforehand that it *will* be used (otherwise it cannot possibly deter), and the other lesson that any method by which our defence automatically cancels the other fellow's must fail; that our force must support some system under which he may enjoy the same security we demand for ourselves.

But by some perversity the introduction of this element of mutuality, by which alone our arms can be deprived of their menacing quality, is often condemned, even by protagonists of large armaments, on the ground, as one critic puts it, that it indicates "a belief in war as a means of avoiding war"; or, as another puts it, as an attempt to "secure peace by threatening to go to war."

But this is precisely what we do under the old method, and in the most sinister fashion. What does the existence of an army or a navy mean? It means that we are ready to go to war; that we are in a position to fight, and we trust that the material evidence of the fact will "deter aggression."

Increased armament is urged on the ground that the clearer is the evidence of our capacity to fight effectively the less will be the likelihood of our having to do it. We hope to secure peace by threatening war against those who attack us. "Do certain things which we in our good judgment deem aggressive and we shall go to war." We "secure peace by threatening war."

What the critics of pre-commitment really mean is that this threat to wage war if attacked will be most effective if we refuse to indicate beforehand what we mean by "attack"; that it is better to leave that until the crisis actually arises. We are to repeat, that is to say, the self-same error which, in the terms of Mr. Lloyd George's warning, rendered Allied power in 1914 impotent to deter aggression. That the Allies possessed adequate force the event of victory proved; but the force failed in its peace-preserving function because most of those who were ultimately drawn in from motives of defence could not see, *in time*, just how their defence was involved. It was only when German victory threatened, after three years of war, that, for instance, the United States saw what German victory would mean for her. Had the realisation which war produced been possible in peace time, by anticipation, war would have been avoided. It would seem that a situation must develop to the point where it is too late for power to have deterrent effect before a nation will take the necessary decisions. That was certainly the case in the Great War. Potential aggressors may gamble on the likelihood that those whose defensive position is threatened will hesitate to make the necessary decisions until defence is out of the question. We may act too late to save peace, to say nothing of the Empire.

The effects of bad policy are not nullified by good intention. We rejected the American offer of co-operation in resistance to Japan in 1931 because we desired to "conciliate" Japan, and avoid anything which might make for the extension of the war. Japan was not conciliated and the war was extended. So with Italy. Because in 1935 we were determined (and in effect proclaimed) that we would do nothing that might lead to war with Italy, and effective economic sanctions might mean war, we refrained from so managing the sanctions as to make them effective. Again our purpose was to avoid war, conciliate Italy and prevent the formation of a German-Italian alliance. Italy became less conciliatory than ever, the

abused, and that citizens shall not be forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their sex, age or strength."

"All citizens," Article 40 declares, "shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law"; while Article 41 "recognises the Family as the natural, primary and fundamental unit group of society" and as "the primary and natural educator of the child"—principles in pleasant contrast with those so violently asserted and enforced by certain Continental dictatorships. The Irish State accordingly binds itself not to oblige parents "in violation of their conscience and lawful preference to send their children to schools established by the State, or to any particular type of school designated by the State," and in the provision of State aid not to discriminate between schools under the management of different religious denominations. Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, "subject to public order and morality," guaranteed to every citizen; and the State, while recognising "the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens," guarantees not to endow any religion, or to "impose any disabilities, or make any discrimination, on the ground of religious profession, belief or status."

Inasmuch as "man, in virtue of his rational being, has the natural right, antecedent to positive law, to the private ownership of external goods," the State "guarantees to pass no law attempting to abolish the right of private ownership or the general right to transfer, bequeath, and inherit property"; though it may regulate the exercise of these rights in accordance with the "principles of social justice" and with "the exigencies of the common good."

I have dwelt at some length upon these articles because they seem to me, both in the contrast the phraseology offers with British legal texts and as marking the generally accepted trend of Irish domestic policy, the most significant and permanently important part of the document. The remainder appears to contain little that is not either a restatement of existing law or the formal ratification of changes for which earlier events had prepared us. Unlike the Constitution of 1922 there is no mention of King, Treaty or Commonwealth; though certain words in Article 29 hint at possible association

with other groups or leagues of nations in matters of common concern. Thus Mr. de Valera has certainly made good his boast that, should a republic be declared to-morrow, not a comma in it would have to be changed. The Governor-General has already disappeared; and in his place there is to be a President of Ireland elected for seven years by direct popular vote. It would appear that the President is to enjoy greater discretionary power than his predecessor the Governor-General—as much perhaps as the President of the French Republic, but certainly much less than the President of the United States. But in the exercise of this discretion he is, generally speaking, to be advised by a Council of State of which, among others, the Head of the Government, the Chief Justice and the President of the High Court are to be *ex-officio* members. The head of the Government will in future be described not as President of the Executive Council, but as *Taviseach*, and is to be assisted by a lieutenant, nominated by him, the *Tánaiste*.

An agreeable feature of the Constitution is the restoration of a bicameral legislature. The resurrected Senate is to have sixty members, eleven nominated by the *Taviseach* and forty-nine elected, of whom six by the Universities and the remainder in a manner to be henceforth determined from panels of candidates formed upon a vocational basis. The Senate may initiate and amend Bills other than Money Bills, and, when unable to agree with the Chamber, will normally have the power to delay the enactment of legislation for a period which, if my interpretation of the section be correct, may run to 270 days from the day upon which the Bill in question is sent up by the *Dáil*. Thus it will no longer be possible, as it now is, for Irish citizens to wake up any morning to discover from their newspapers that some revolutionary proposal has the day before been introduced and passed through all stages in the *Dáil*, and, having automatically received the signature of the Chairman of that body, has already become law. The Referendum, somewhat hastily abolished by Mr. Cosgrave's Ministry in 1927, is also restored; the President, on receipt of a Petition in the form prescribed, being required, after consulting the Council of State, to decide whether in the case of any Bill "deemed to have been passed by both Houses" the will of the people ought in this manner to be ascertained; and every proposal for the amendment of the Constitution

Rome-Berlin axis was firmly forged, and Italy went from the invasion of Abyssinia to the invasion of Spain.

That under the policy of retreat and recession things have got steadily worse there can be no question. But it may be argued the worst has not happened: this country has not been involved in war. The situation has however been worsening so rapidly, and the danger of war is admittedly so much greater than it was only a few years since that the conclusion that we have come to reminds one a little of the story of the workman who, falling from the top floor of an American forty storey building, remarked in passing observers on the tenth floor, "All right so far." The remark could have been made with truth at any of the forty floors—except the ground floor. When do we reach ground? The public now seems to be asking that question.

What is the position as to ultimate power? On the one side we have the British Empire, the United States, Russia, and China all having a common interest in resisting Japan's aggressive expansions. How great are the interests—commercial, political, military—which unite or should unite those powers whose combined resources and population exceed those of all the rest of the world put together. Mr. Stimson and, during this last year or so, a good many other writers have made clear. On the other side is Japan, whose iron production is half that of Belgium, whose maximum coal production is one-seventh and consumption one-fifth of Britain's; whose capacity to obtain essential materials is dependent upon her sales to precisely the countries whose interests she challenges, that is China, the United States, India, Great Britain and the Dominions.

Japanese writers themselves in describing their relations with the United States have avowed that if it came to a struggle with the United States, Japan would be hopelessly beaten. But in 1931 it was not a question of Japan's facing merely the United States. Had Mr. Stimson's offer to the British Government in 1931 been accepted *and made the most of*, Japan would have faced not merely the country whose power would of itself be too much for her, but that power *plus* Britain, *plus* India, *plus* Australia, *plus* New Zealand, *plus* Canada, *plus* Russia, and *plus* China. Was this potential power, economic, naval, military, inadequate to restrain Japan? The question really means this: If it became clear

to Japanese statesmen that by following the line of policy followed since 1931 they would eventually bring that power into action against them, face, finally that is, insuperable obstacles, making their ultimate aim irrealisable, would they continue along that line? Note that the totalitarians themselves show by their conduct that they do not intend to challenge our power at any point where they are certain it would be used.

All those states talk of the need for expansion. But the really desirable territory for the purpose is not the territory which the totalitarian states are now engaged in conquering or claiming. Malta, or Tunis or Algeria or Kenya or the Cape would, for instance, serve Italy's purpose infinitely better than Abyssinia. Why, if Britain is not in a position to resist, did not Italy choose the better instead of the worse territory? Because the Duce knew that in fact Britain was not powerless to resist; that if her own territory were attacked she would manage to make sanctions effective even though they were only the sanctions of one state; that the day he fired a gun at Malta or landed a soldier in Kenya the sanction would be instant and automatic, and that we should not discuss for six months as to whether oil ought to be withheld. Had it been clear, therefore, that Britain would defend the Covenant with precisely the same energy that she would defend the Cape, the Covenant would have been as secure *without war* as is British territory from the attacks of Italy or Japan.

It is not, therefore, a question of ultimate power, but the will to use it for a given purpose. We, like others, do not regard the defence of the Covenant as vital, but do so regard the defence of territory. We regard the defence of the Seychelles Islands as infinitely more important than the defence of the law which might abolish war from the world and give us real security. If these quite worthless islands were attacked we should fight to the last man and ship to defend them; but for the law of peace we ought not, we are commonly told, to risk a single ship.

It is not true to say that since such happens to be the accepted scale of values among nations it is academic or irrelevant to discuss it. If ultimate material power really were on the side of Italy, Japan and Germany, then our moral attitude, our views as to what is worth defending and what not would have no importance. We should not be able to

must, after the lapse of three years from the date upon which the first President takes office, be submitted to Referendum.

Quite obviously, there are some things here which old-fashioned persons like myself find not at all to their taste—notably the omission (already mentioned) of all reference to Crown and Commonwealth. But “even in this matter,” to use a characteristic phrase of Mr. Gladstone, “I find many relative consolations.” The acceptance of the Constitution removes the last excuse for the existence of extra-constitutional factions, such as that of the extreme Republicans or that headed by Mr. de Valera himself from 1923 to 1927. No one can now pretend that any part of our machinery of government has been forced upon us by external power.

A long-cherished objective having been thus achieved, one may reasonably hope that more cordial relations will gradually be established between our nearest neighbours and ourselves. From the unhappy entanglement over Land Annuity and other payments I confess I see no issue, unless both parties can at length be brought to an agreed scheme of arbitration. Still less do I see any hope of ending Partition, for everything that has been done during the past five years has widened the gulf between North and South; and until some understanding is reached in that capital matter, Dublin and Westminster, whenever they sup together, will use long spoons. But this does not mean that all co-operation is excluded. Rightly or wrongly (and on no point has the Fianna Fáil administration been more severely attacked in Ireland) the present Government of the Free State has followed the British lead both in the Abyssinian and the Spanish business; and in the papers which published the final results of the General Election there appeared also the news of the double crossing of the Atlantic to and from the new airport on the Shannon, established and maintained by the Irish taxpayer in collaboration with Imperial Airways and the competent authorities in the United States of America. In this event one may surely see a symbol of those forces which, despite so many causes of resentment and disagreement, are always working to bring together the people of these two motherlands as those also who, sprung from the blood of both, inhabit the great continent called in the Gaelic tongue the New Island.

HUGH A. LAW.

INDEPENDENT EGYPT.

FOR the first time in her modern history Egypt stands to-day acknowledged by the world as an independent state and her young King, who attains his majority this month, will assume his high responsibilities under auspices vouchsafed to none of his predecessors. The realisation of Egyptian national aspirations has been unexpected, alike in the rapidity and in the completeness of the achievement. Eighteen months ago the prospect of a settlement of the relations between Britain and Egypt and of the disappearance, with the willing assent of the Powers, of the privileged position of foreigners appeared as remote as ever.

The British and Egyptian Governments still seemed irreconcilable over the military clauses and the Sudan, both stumbling-blocks in the six abortive post-war attempts to solve the Anglo-Egyptian problem. The Powers still opposed the surrender of foreign privileges, without guarantees unacceptable to Egypt as merely replacing one form of “Capitulation” by another.* Yet, within five months of the death of King Fuad (March 28th, 1936), a Treaty of Alliance settling all controversial points between Britain and Egypt had been signed. Another nine months and the twelve Capitulatory Powers had approved a Convention abolishing the Capitulations† and merging the Mixed in the national jurisdiction after a transition period. Eighteen days later (May 26th, 1937) came what the Egyptian people regarded as the crowning act in the recognition of their country as an independent sovereign state—Egypt’s admission to the League of Nations.

For this sweeping and rapid transformation Italian policy in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea is entirely responsible. Nothing could have brought home to both Britain and Egypt in more striking degree the dangers of the situation and the expediency of meeting one another’s needs—needs which in

* The “Capitulations” were the agreements under which foreigners residing in the Ottoman Dominions enjoyed special privileges. They were so called because these privileges were grouped in “Capitula” or headings.

† The earliest Capitulations now abolished were granted in 1535 to France, in 1540 to Italy (Venice), in 1580 to England, and in 1612 to Holland. The other Capitulatory Powers are Belgium, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.

defend anything. The issue would be closed. But since plainly the preponderant material forces of the world are held by Russia, China, Britain, the United States, France and Holland, their view as to the ends for which the resources should be used become all important. And the scale of value is obviously changing.

To what actual policy do these considerations point? Imagine that the great "Have" states—Britain, France, the United States, adding for this purpose Holland and the Scandinavian nations—decided to form a low tariff group, and one in which colonial possessions were reciprocally opened to one another on a basis of complete equality. (Britain would extend her economic empire by the acceptance of that offer which has in fact come from more than one foreign state: "We will grant you all the preferences your dominions grant if you will give us the preference you give them.") Colonies would no longer be "possessions." Agreements about tariffs would of course facilitate monetary stabilisation and exchange controls. Now the advantage of low tariffs, easier economic access to such huge areas, would be an obvious attraction to any country wrestling with economic difficulties, such as those connected with finding the means of paying for its necessary raw materials.

But enjoyment of such obvious advantages would depend upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. It would be a political as well as an economic club. Defence arrangements, for instance, would be co-operative and collective; defensive resources would be pooled; and defence operate on the principle that an attack on one would be regarded as an attack on all. The right to such defence would however in its turn be conditional upon the agreement by each member of the Confederation that, in the event of disputes arising he would refrain from attempting to impose his own judgment by force upon another, that he would either accept third-party judgment or allow the difference to remain in view of the fact that organs of peaceful change would be developed by the Confederation. On these terms, membership with all its advantages, including complete access to existing empires on terms equal to those enjoyed by the "owners," and an improved defensive position, would be open to all.

The political and the economic hang together. Behind so much of the economic self-sufficiency, the maintenance of

closed empires, is the desire to be strong for defence. To ask a state to weaken itself materially on behalf of peace and at the same time refuse it aid if it is attacked as the result of complying with the demand, is neither realism nor equity. The situation would be that while the road of war, conquest as the way out of national difficulties, would be made infinitely more risky for the dynamic states, would in fact be closed, the road of peaceful remedy would be opened wider and be much more attractive.

But, it will be said, meantime the conquest goes on; war is not stopped either in Spain or in China. Neither war is going to end rapidly. Perhaps we have only the opening chapters of the Chinese war. For none of the dynamic states is conquest so simple a business as might have been expected. Serious misgivings must have arisen in the minds of the German and Italian rulers in respect of the Spanish, and Japanese rulers in respect of the Chinese policy. The creation of such a combination as that described above would intensify those misgivings and though at the outset no action, either economic or military, might be taken, the potentiality of future action by a combination of such resources would certainly compel reflection. The knowledge that such forces could be used in the future may have an effect upon present and immediate conduct. In any case it is our only hope.

NORMAN ANGELL.

reality are identical—than the massing of Italian troops on the Egypto-Libyan frontier and the prearranged invasion of Ethiopia. Like the British decision to rearm, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is the direct result of Mussolini's "venture in colonisation," while the Montreux Convention settling the Capitulations question is but the logical consequence of both.

Until the Treaty was signed the internal régime and international relations of Egypt were regulated by the Declaration of February 28th, 1922. This abolished the Protectorate proclaimed in December 1914 and recognised Egypt as an independent sovereign state, subject to Britain's reservation, for her own absolute discretion, of four questions—the safeguarding of Imperial communications, the protection of foreign interests, the defence of Egypt against aggression from without, and the Sudan. This Declaration established in reality a veiled Protectorate. Foreign enterprise had become such an integral part of Egyptian life that no branch of Egyptian activity could be regarded as not affecting a foreign interest. The internal autonomy conferred on Egypt thus became limited by Britain's power to intervene at any time in defence of some Imperial or foreign interest.

Moreover, Egypt's fiscal, legislative and judicial powers were circumscribed by the operation of the Capitulations and the Mixed Tribunals. The Capitulations exempted foreigners from taxation unless unanimously accepted by the Powers, from arrest or domiciliary search without the consent of their Consuls, and from local jurisdictions. Their existence undoubtedly occasioned a higher standard of administration than would otherwise have been the case—to the advantage of both Egyptians and foreigners—and has definitely protected the indigenous population from arbitrary taxation and made Egypt one of the lowest-taxed countries on the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, by creating an *imperium in imperio* as regards the position of foreigners, they have unquestionably constituted an encroachment on the sovereignty of the country. One can, therefore, understand that their continued existence became anathema to the more nationalist elements.

The Mixed Tribunals are in a different category for, although deriving from the Capitulations, they are an integral part of the Egyptian judicial machinery, delivering

judgments in the name of the sovereign. They owe their creation to the liberal interpretation which Egypt, owing to the keenness for foreign co-operation, has given to Capitulatory privilege. By the middle of the nineteenth century such abuses had crept in that, on the proposal of Nubar Pasha—"the one statesman Egypt has known since the days of Joseph"—the assent of the Powers was sought to a system of mixed courts "to protect the Government and ensure justice to the people in their dealings with foreigners." In 1875 there were established the "Tribunaux de la Réforme," known as the Mixed Tribunals, on which all Capitulatory Powers and Egypt were represented and each bench of which had a majority of foreign judges.

The Mixed Tribunals deal with civil and commercial matters between foreigners and Egyptians and between foreigners of different nationality, and with all real estate actions, except between Egyptians. The Consular Courts retained jurisdiction only in criminal matters where a foreigner was defendant and in civil, commercial and personal status matters between foreigners of the same nationality. All legislation, except fiscal, had to receive the assent of the Mixed Courts for application to foreigners. "Next to the Roman Church the most successful international institution in history," the Mixed Tribunals have played a decisive part in the development of modern Egypt. Egyptians may yet rue the day when they insisted on the disintegration of an organisation which, in the words of the man whom they hail as "the maker of independent Egypt," Saad Zaghlul Pasha, is the keystone of the arch of the country's economic edifice.

For Britain the outstanding feature of the Treaty is that she at last secures a legal justification for keeping troops on Egyptian soil. Concentrated in the Suez Canal zone, where the Egyptian Government will create all necessary barracks and amenities, the garrison, thanks to strategic roads and railway extensions which Egypt is to provide, will be more mobile than it has ever been before. The Alliance gives Britain a right of re-entry and, in time of war, all facilities on Egyptian soil.

To Egypt the Treaty is important because the "Army of Occupation" and the remaining "Adviserships," both offensive to national dignity, disappear; the presence of a

MASARYK.

Living he was the land, and dead,
His soul shall be her soul!

WHEN Kipling wrote these lines on the burial of Cecil Rhodes in April 1902, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was a lonely and unpopular professor of philosophy in the Czech University of Prague. Among politicians outside Austria his name was scarcely known; and even in Austria it was linked with fading memories of fierce political and moral controversy. But to young Slav students from many lands it was dear. In 1909, when Masaryk's opposition to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary had brought him once more into disfavour with the political authorities of the Hapsburg Monarchy, the foremost liberal writer of German Austria, Hermann Bahr, could say of him after a journey through Dalmatia and inquiry into what seemed the miracle of reconciliation between the Serb and the Croat sections of the Southern Slav race:

It is remarkable that, when one inquires into this reconciliation and looks for the intermediaries who brought it about, one comes across, almost invariably, a pupil of Masaryk. It is nearly always somebody who, as a young man, once went to Prague, sat in his class-room and, awakened by him, returned home to proclaim the gospel of concord. Masaryk's pupils have united the Serbs and Croats of Dalmatia and are now bringing that distracted province to have faith in the future—so strong is the influence of the lonely Slovak in Prague who seems to some a mixture of Tolstoy and Walt Whitman, to others a heretic, to others again an ascetic, and to all an enthusiast.

One of these pupils was Edward Beneš who, from 1903 onwards, came constantly under Masaryk's personal influence and was guided and helped by him. My own acquaintance with Masaryk began in May 1907, when the first Austrian Parliament to be elected by universal suffrage—the first, too, that showed numerically a non-German majority—met in Vienna. Herr Wilhelm Singer, editor of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, introduced me to him and asked me, as correspondent of *The Times*, to press Masaryk to accept election to the Presidency of the new Chamber of Deputies. Singer thought that the choice of an Austrian Slovak of liberal and democratic antecedents to be Speaker of the new Chamber would

make a good impression abroad and would soften the spirit of faction which might otherwise impede or wreck the constructive work which, he hoped, the new universal suffrage parliament would be able to do.

As a foreigner it was not my business to meddle in Austrian affairs, even to the extent of urging Masaryk to accept so honourable and influential an office. I said this to Singer in Masaryk's presence, and saw at once that he understood and appreciated my scruples. He declined the offer, and from that moment he treated me as a friend. The better I came to know him the more warmly did I return his friendship; and I cannot remember any meeting or talk with him during the remaining six years of my stay in Austria-Hungary that was not marked by complete reciprocal confidence.

He was not a man of many words. What he said he had thought through from premiss to conclusion. All his convictions were settled. One example of his quality, taken from later years, will suffice. It was during the war, when he was in London, working unobtrusively at Hampstead. On July 6th, 1915—the fourth centenary of the martyrdom of John Hus, Wyclif's disciple, leader and saint of the purest Reformation Europe had known—Masaryk had declared war upon the House of Hapsburg in the name of Hus from the Hall of the Reformation at Geneva, the very Hall that was afterwards to be the first meeting-place of the League Assembly. As a reprisal Dr. Alice Masaryk, his eldest daughter, had been arrested and condemned to death in Austria. One morning the news came that she was to be executed—unless her father should return home and give himself up. On that morning Masaryk came to see me about some aspect of his work abroad. As I rose to greet him and offered haltingly what poor sympathy a friend can give at such a moment, he checked me and said simply: "When a man does what I am doing he must count beforehand the cost to himself and to those whom he loves. I counted the cost. I must go on." Dr. Alice Masaryk was saved by a powerful movement among the women of the United States—her mother was of American birth—and, thanks to American influence, escaped the hangman. But the quality her father showed that day was—albeit in loftier degree and at higher tension—the same quality I had detected in him from the beginning of our friendship. In him saint and hero were organically blended.

British garrison becomes a matter for agreement between the Kings of England and Egypt; she has the right to create a modern army to be trained by a British mission and equipped like the British Army, and the embargo is removed on relations with, and the stationing of Egyptian troops in, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a double disability which has rankled in the Egyptian mind ever since its introduction after the assassination of the Sirdar in November 1924.

At Montreux, where for the first time in history Egypt met the Powers on equal terms, she secured the complete abolition of the Capitulations, the transfer of consular jurisdiction over foreigners to the Mixed Tribunals, her liberty to legislate and the cession, at the end of twelve years, of the entire mixed jurisdiction to the national courts. Any Power can, however, choose whether or not to retain with its Consular Courts the personal status matters of its subjects. But as no Consular Court can be maintained after the transition period, this will entail the transfer at that date of all foreign personal status matters to the Native Courts.

Were Egyptian nationals subject to the same jurisdiction in this respect there could be no reasonable objection to such a course. The personal status of Egyptians is, however, reserved for special religious courts and all attempts to unify these special jurisdictions under the Native Courts have so far failed. It would therefore seem but reasonable that until national personal status matters are subject to the national courts foreigners shall be left to their own Consular Courts in this respect.

During the transition period the principle of foreign majorities on the benches will be maintained in the Court of Appeal, where twelve out of a total of twenty counsellors will be foreigners, including the President. In the lower courts, however, Egyptians will fill all vacancies, but the Egyptian Government undertake that the proportion of foreign judges shall never fall below one-third of the total. The continued application is thus assured of the principles of mixed jurisprudence, which have been the guarantee on which £450,000,000 foreign capital has come into the country. On the other hand the Egyptianisation of the lower courts will provide a nucleus of Egyptians, trained in intricate mixed procedure and jurisprudence, to reinforce the Native Courts when these eventually absorb the Mixed Jurisdiction. The

transition period affords ample time for foreign capitalists either to prepare for the new judicial régime, which will come into operation in 1949, or else to arrange for the withdrawal of their investments.

The Egyptian Government has undertaken that no embargo is to be placed on the re-export of foreign capital, that the Mixed Tribunals shall continue in jurisdiction over all Egyptian Limited Liability Companies with foreign interests already incorporated, with the exception of those whose statutes stipulate for the national jurisdiction, as well as over all bankruptcies with a foreign interest, and also that no Government or municipal contract shall compel acceptance of the national jurisdiction. It was further agreed that during the transition period legislation, to which foreigners would be subject, would not be incompatible with the principles generally adopted in modern legislation and, particularly with regard to legislation of a fiscal character, that it would not discriminate against foreigners, the Egyptian Government adding the assurance that this limitation to the transition period did not imply any intention to adopt a different policy after that period.

The continuation of the activities of the very important educational, charitable and medical institutions established by Britain, the United States, France, Italy and Holland was officially assured while further guarantees were afforded the foreign communities by the agreement that the Procureur Général, in whom will vest the administration of the penal jurisdiction over foreigners, would continue to be a foreigner with a foreign deputy enjoying full powers with regard to the conditions of detention of foreigners, whether in prisons, asylums or elsewhere, of domiciliary search, etc., special provision being made for deportation, extradition and commutation and execution of capital sentences.

The legal definition, for the purposes of the Convention, of what is a foreigner, proved a delicate matter. Here, religious, political and racial considerations brought about the only serious clash the conference experienced. The nationals of all the Powers signatory to the Convention will naturally come within the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals as also those of Austria, Germany and Hungary (pre-war Capitulatory countries),* Switzerland, which has always been treated as

* Who lost their Capitulations by the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.

How came it that he, the leader of what must have been quite the smallest group in the group-ridden Parliament of Austria, the Czech "Realists," should have stood forth as the leader of the whole Czechoslovak people when the hour of destiny struck? His visible political following was as meagre as his moral ascendancy was great. In their heart of hearts his people knew that he stood for the things they believed in and for hopes they secretly cherished. But moral ascendancy is not always a pledge of political ability. A dreamer may command admiration, and even love, without binding those who share his dreams to follow him blindly when his path might lead to exile or the gallows. So Masaryk made up his mind to "take the plunge," as he called it, in the autumn of 1914, and escaped into (then) neutral Italy, with the assured backing of only a few devoted men and women, not all of whom knew precisely what he meant to do.

In a way, and almost inadvertently, I was responsible for his "taking the plunge" when he did and how he did. I can only suppose that he trusted my judgment more than I trusted it myself. We had been through some tight places together. During the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-9—which, on account of the blundering way it was brought on by Aehrenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, both of us thought likely to be the beginning of the end of the Hapsburg Monarchy and the prelude to a great European war—Masaryk and I had been in close touch with each other. We had taken the same view of the famous, or infamous, Austro-Hungarian forgeries that led to the Friedjung trial of December 1909; and Masaryk had consulted me, a year later, before deciding to accept the proposal of the Serbian Government to hand over to him the originals of the forgeries when the forger had been apprehended and had confessed. Six months earlier, in the summer of 1910, he had asked me point-blank whether I saw any hope for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; and he agreed with my negative answer, adding only: "Now we must work to save the Hapsburg peoples."

In December 1912 he told me of an important conversation he had just had with the Serbian Prime Minister, Pashitch, and of the offer he had been authorised to make to Count Berchtold, Aehrenthal's successor, for a thorough-going Austro-Serbian understanding. Then, after telling me that Berchtold had contemptuously rejected the offer with the

fatuous remark: "They say these Serbians are very cruel people," Masaryk let himself go upon Austrian stupidity with a vigour of language that was startling in a man of his self-control. In the spring of 1913 he confided to me some highly important information about the dangerous physical and mental condition of the Austro-Hungarian Heir-Apparent, Archduke Francis Ferdinand; and with Masaryk's approval I passed this information on to the Editor of *The Times* and to the British Foreign Office. In the light of it what looked like the deliberate failure of the Austro-Hungarian authorities to give adequate police protection to Francis Ferdinand and his Consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg, on the occasion of their visit to Sarajevo at the end of June 1914, became less inexplicable.

Between mid-July 1913—when I left Vienna at the end of the second Balkan war—and the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914, I saw nothing of Masaryk and heard little from him. But I knew at once how his mind was working when, early in September 1914, a strange-looking creature, unwashed and unshaven, knocked at my door in London and said he had a message from "the Professor." Disconcerting in its simplicity (and delivered with a strong American accent by a Czech citizen of the United States who had just travelled five days and nights from Prague), the message ran: "Our boys don't want to fight the Russians. When they try to go over, the Russians shoot at them. Tell Mr. Steed to stop it."

Ways and means "to stop it" had to be thought out. I thought them out and, as the event proved, they worked. Meanwhile a message had to be sent back to Masaryk. The London Czechs found me a trustworthy messenger who learned by heart what I taught him to say. Part of it was that, in the opinion of Lord Kitchener and of Lord Northcliffe, the war would last at least three years. In his book, *The Making of a State*, Masaryk afterwards wrote:

Towards the end of September (1914) Mr. Kosák, one of our fellow-countrymen living in England, brought me news from Mr. Steed. This news, which I supplemented soon afterwards by a personal meeting with political friends in Holland, was highly important for me and very serious.

It was that, in the opinion of Lord Kitchener, the war would last at least three or four years. For me this question was very weighty, since the character of the work I meant to do abroad depended largely upon the duration of the war.

such, and Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (former portions of Capitulatory States). But it was the question of "protected" subjects, mostly former subjects of the Ottoman Dominions and coreligionists of the Egyptians, which caused the controversy. Egypt's objection to the practice, followed by some Powers since earlier times, of granting protection to Egyptian subjects, often for services rendered by them or their families, received complete satisfaction. Henceforward no Egyptian national can be protected by any foreign Power.

In the case of non-Egyptians a compromise was reached satisfying the susceptibilities of all parties. Foreign subjects belonging to one of the religions for which special personal status courts exist will continue to be judged by these courts in such matters but may decide for either Mixed or Native jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. Syrian, Lebanese, Palestinian and Transjordanian subjects, although now subjects of Mandatory Powers, will, as former Ottoman subjects, continue to be amenable to the national jurisdiction in civil and penal matters. Subjects of other Mandated Territories will be treated like the subjects of their respective Mandatories.

To sum up, in neither the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty nor the Montreux Convention has there been any sacrifice of any essential Imperial or foreign interest. The settlement embodies all that could reasonably be asked of a country whose independent sovereign status had been recognised; and Egypt has received all the consideration which her readiness throughout to recognise realities entitled her to expect.

Egypt's first obligation now is to provide funds for the implementation of the Treaty of Alliance. The reorganisation of the army on the basis of a division equipped with the most modern appliances will cost every penny of £6,000,000. The endowment of the country with adequate air-defence will require a million or so in capital outlay, and the roads, bridges and railway extensions another £3,000,000. To this must be added barrack accommodation for the troops on the Canal, the cost of which has not yet even been estimated. Furthermore the annual maintenance expense is certain to prove very heavy. Egypt will find that independence is no cheap matter. The necessary money will be forthcoming, but the question will be how to raise it without prejudicing economic

development of the country which is dependent on low taxation. Possibly the best means for providing the capital required will be a public loan so as to spread the burden as wide as possible. With a revenue of thirty-six millions and a reserve of about the same figure this should not be difficult.

The next obligation is to create the efficient administration rendered essential by the assumption of full responsibility for the protection of foreigners and the guarantee of no discriminatory treatment. Here the difficulty is that the material the schools are turning out is most inadequately equipped both in knowledge and character, whether for administrative, technical or commercial employment, and a serious problem of unemployment threatens. A radical change in educational policy is imperative both to reduce the quantity which annually emerges from the various colleges, and to improve the quality of those from whom must be recruited the administrators, industrialists and business men of the future.

Although the obligation to employ foreigners in key positions disappears, Egypt will still need foreign assistance. There are many important directions in which Egyptian experience will require expert advice. Egypt would do well to make use of her new liberty to call on those outside, who could assist her invaluablely in preparing to meet the great responsibilities she has now assumed towards the world. Without such foreign assistance and a radical change in educational policy Egypt will not be able to fulfil her obligations. But, above all, Egypt needs a period of political tranquillity to permit her leaders to concentrate on the work of implementation instead of, as in the past, dissipating their time and energies in combating political intrigues. It is in this respect that the change in sovereign will probably be most perceptible.

The late King Fuad was an extremely able ruler. Thanks to him Egypt made remarkable social, cultural and economic progress. The astutest politician in the land, he had a knowledge of affairs and a comprehension of the character and psychology of his people, which made him a factor with whom it was always prudent to reckon. His death was sadly premature, for he left as heir a son, barely sixteen years of age, whose education had been much neglected and whose acquaintance with the world was practically nil. A few months before his

Masaryk meant that if the war had been likely to last only a few months there would have been no time for him to persuade the Allied Governments of the importance of the Czechoslovak cause. In three years he might hope to do it. Among the "political friends" whom he was able to meet during a rapid trip to Holland was Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson, whom Masaryk trusted as he trusted me; and he gave Seton-Watson a memorandum for Sir Edward Grey that would have been of high value had the British Foreign Office then understood the position as Masaryk understood it. At all events it was the beginning of Masaryk's work abroad for the liberation of his people.

In mid-April 1915, when the framework of an international Czechoslovak organisation had been set up at Geneva, Masaryk came for a short visit to London and, in the following autumn, established himself there. Dr. Burrows, the Principal of King's College, Seton-Watson, Mr. (now Sir) Frederick Whyte and I helped him as much as we could. But it was he who really convinced British and Allied statesmen of his own extraordinary worth. Mr. Asquith, Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Bryce were deeply impressed by him; and he gained the trust and affection even of Lord Northcliffe in a single interview. What he did and how he worked are now matters of history. Those who wish to know cannot do better than read his *The Making of a State*, which is, in effect, his political testament. The turning-point came in the spring of 1917 when his friend, Professor Milyoukoff, Foreign Minister in the provisional Russian Government, invited him to go to Russia as counsellor and guide. The British authorities helped him to go; and I did not see him again until he landed in England at the end of November 1918 to be received in London with the honours due to the President-Designate of the Allied Czechoslovak Republic.

Meanwhile, amid infinite difficulties, he had created a Czechoslovak national army in Russia out of the tens of thousands of Czech and Slovak prisoners of war who had gone over to the Russians. His wish was to bring his army back to Western Europe so that it might fight on the Allied side together with the Czechoslovak legions which Dr. Beneš and General Stefánik had organised in France and Italy. (The British Czechs had insisted on enlisting in the British army and had been drafted into various fighting units.) The

outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution thwarted Masaryk's wish. So he resolved to bring his army back to the West by way of Siberia, and preceded it across Siberia to Japan, and thence to the United States in the hope of organising transport for it from Vladivostok to Europe. Before this could be done the Armistice was concluded and the War had come to an end. But the fact that the "lonely Slovak" professor of Prague had created and successfully commanded an army totalling some 90,000 men weighed heavily with the Allied Governments when they decided, in August 1918, to grant recognition to the Provisional Czechoslovak Government—consisting of Masaryk, Beneš and Stefánik—as "trustee" for the future Government of Czechoslovakia. I supplied the comforting word "trustee." Dr. Beneš was thus enabled to attend the meeting of the Allied and Associated representatives in Paris on November 4th, when the conditions of the Armistice with Germany were worked out and agreed upon.

On his way through the United States Masaryk was received as the national saviour by the numerous Czechoslovak colonies in America whose members had throughout supplied the funds for his work. Therefore he reached Washington as the popularly accredited spokesman of his people in the United States—a fact which President Wilson could not ignore. Besides, Wilson and Masaryk had much in common. Masaryk was in no hurry to meet the President; but when he met him the Czechoslovak cause was as good as won. And though Masaryk was always reticent on this point, I have never doubted that it was his deep knowledge of Austria-Hungary, and of the true dynamics of the European situation, that led President Wilson in October 1918 to reject the Austro-Hungarian offer for a separate peace and thus to leave the Hapsburg Monarchy to explode from within. A curiously indulgent smile would flit across Masaryk's lips in later years when he heard or read that sundry British public men were deploring the "wickedness of the Versailles Treaty in breaking up Austria-Hungary" and "Balkanising" Central Europe. He would say only in a quiet tone: "Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence at Philadelphia, October 14th, 1918; its acceptance by the United States, October 18th, 1918; proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic at Prague, October 28th, 1918; armistice in Central and South-Eastern Europe, November 3rd, 1918; armistice in the West, November 11th, 1918;

father's death Prince Faruk was sent to England to prepare for a course of education on English lines. Scarcely had he settled down to his new life than he had to return to Egypt to accomplish the various duties which succession to a throne imposes, even on a minor. A Regency Council has since then dealt with the affairs of state. But although advantage has been taken of the few months remaining of his minority to extend his knowledge, the young King comes of age unfairly handicapped for his responsible duties.

King Fuad was a great realist and he would certainly have turned his face against any policy calculated to impede the work which the Treaty and the Convention lay upon his country. His son, a charming young man with all his father's intellectual curiosity, will surely make good in time. But for the moment, a most vital moment in Egypt's history, he is so inexperienced in the world and in men that there is a danger that, unless he is carefully guided, he may become the unconscious tool of self-seeking politicians.

The key to the situation lies clearly in the hands of the political leaders. If they place their country's interests first all will be well. If they seek only personal or party interests, a catastrophe may well result. The ideal arrangement would, of course, be a political truce. For this a precedent exists in the "united front" which signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. But as a political observer tritely remarked, the parties were only "united in front." All the personal jealousy and animosity, which have obstructed Egypt's progress in the past, still lurked in the background. Repeatedly the front line was threatened and the relations to-day between the minority leaders and the Wafd* and between the minority leaders themselves make any *entente* improbable, if not impossible.

Chastened by a six-year sojourn in the political wilderness, the Wafd has displayed recently such practical good sense that, now that it has achieved the summit of the national aspirations, the sundering of Egypt's international fetters, it is scarcely likely to provoke a situation which might make it impossible for it to fulfil the obligations for the execution of which it has assumed no slight personal responsibility. On

* The Wafd is the party founded under Saad Zaghlul Pasha after the Armistice to fight for Egyptian Independence. It returned to office in the spring of 1936 with an overwhelming majority.

the other hand the minority parties have no advantage to gain from leaving the Wafd to work out its own salvation. Under normal conditions such a course would probably mean a turn of the tide in favour of the opposition. But the present opposition knows it has no real following in the country and that the Wafd has such a hold on the imagination of the masses that a free election must always give it the majority.

In these circumstances there is a wholesome fear that certain minority leaders may be tempted to try and provoke, by working through the Palace, a situation entailing another suspension of parliamentary life. No national interest would to-day justify a *coup d'état*. But it would be the only hope for some to regain the office they so covet. There is, however, one factor to steady the situation—British influence. Britain can no longer intervene to prevent a crisis which she apprehends. But as an ally Britain can advise. It was British advice which helped Egypt to reach the agreement at Montreux, a fact which Egyptians gratefully acknowledge. In the coming months British counsel, judiciously offered, and accepted in the spirit in which it is offered, may well be the factor to keep the Egyptian ship of state on an even keel and enable Egypt, while fulfilling her obligations, to continue along the path of prosperous development, which all who signed the Montreux Convention sincerely desire to see her take.

ARTHUR MERTON.

July 1937.

Versailles Treaty, June 28th, 1919: *Ante hoc, ergo propter hoc!*"

If Masaryk did not suffer fools gladly he treated them with patience and toleration as long as he thought them foolish in good faith. When he thought their folly a mask for knavery his scorn of them could be withering. His patience was the fruit of deep thought nourished by a universal culture which he had spent a lifetime in acquiring. He knew that no human mind can grasp more than some facets of many-sided Truth; and he was ever tolerant of those who saw facets which his own eyes could not see or which he thought unessential. The very strength of his own convictions made him tolerant of the convictions of others. Better than any man I have ever met he understood that toleration is a strong thing, not a weak; that it is relativity in practice; that the weak are they who seek or take refuge in some absolute dogma or political or social nostrum and, in the name of it, dictate to or break the heads of whomsoever may differ from them. "Truth prevails" was his motto. He who grasps more aspects of Truth—and grasps them more firmly—than others, will see his judgment borne out by events. The universe works on a reasonable plan, however little we may be able to perceive its deep reasonableness. Some may call the rules of its working "Providence"; some may call them "God"; whatever we call them "there's a Divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will." This, in substance, was Masaryk's faith. Love of his fellow men, or what he called "humaneness," suffused it. The one thing he could not tolerate was arbitrary intolerance. To be strong in the service of Truth, and to do the strong thing gently, was his invariable method. And he believed in democracy with all the force of his passionate belief in the goodness and the gradual perfectibility of human nature.

In these latter days, when some of the fools Masaryk tolerated and some of those whom he scorned decry democracy as an outworn system of government and extol intolerant dictatorship with the glibness of weak minds in search of a master, it is good to read again the final chapter of his *Making of a State* upon "Democracy and Humanity." Though it is addressed primarily to his own people it has wider applications.

"Chauvinism," he wrote, "that is to say, political, religious, racial or class intolerance has, as history proves, wrought the

downfall of all States. . . . We shall solve our own problem aright if we comprehend that the more humane we are the more national we shall be. The relationship between the nation and mankind, between nationality and internationality, between nationalism and humaneness of feeling is not that mankind as a whole and internationalism and humaneness are something apart from, against or above the nation and nationality, but that nations are the natural organs of mankind. . . . Love of one's own nation does not entail non-love of other nations. . . . Our position is not solely that our State must be democratic; it cannot be undemocratic. . . . In the past our democratic aims were negative, a negation of Austrian absolutism. Now they must be positive. Self-government is self-control. What we took as our ideal must become reality—and it will not be easy."

And again :

The ideal is Jesus, not Cæsar. I say it is our task to make realities of the religion and the ethics of Jesus, of His pure and immaculate religion of humanity. . . . Modern man is no longer satisfied with the religion that the State dictates for political reasons. Therefore we need Jesus, not Cæsar. . . . Though an ethical minimum, the law, as the embodiment of public life, carries great weight by reason of its definitiveness and practical adequacy. In practice, the State approaches the ethical maximum—the ideal—through the ethical minimum—the law; and human evolution brings the minimum ever nearer to the ideal. Justice is the arithmetic of love.

Such was the man who freed his people from bondage, founded their State and strove to guide their feet into paths of righteousness. He believed his work would endure. At a moment when it may seem to be endangered, because its very existence challenges intolerant systems and ideals of government, he has passed from his people's midst, leaving them (as they may well feel) bereft of their greatest leader yet enriching them by the example of a noble life greatly lived and of the unassailable moral strength of selflessness. Upon them now falls the task of proving themselves—for their own sakes and for that of Europe—worthy of having been led by him. I think they will not fail. We for our part should have a care lest we fail them, for the cause they are defending is, in very truth, the cause of the British Commonwealth itself.

WICKHAM STEED.

A GENEROUS NUTRITION POLICY.

WHAT is this Generous Nutrition Policy about which we have heard so much lately? Whom will it benefit? Who will pay for it? How will effect be given to it? What repercussions will it have upon other things? Those are some of the questions which must be considered. A policy with such a name has a very attractive sound. Nobody is going to say that anybody ought to be under-nourished. We have it on the authority of the Potato Marketing Board that about one person in four is living on or below the borderline of poverty. That is a dreadful state of affairs and it will perhaps come as a shock to those who were under the impression that the present Government has brought us to a state of abounding prosperity. One remedy will at once suggest itself to many people, viz. let the State make a grant out of the public funds, that is to say out of the pockets of the people, so that the things required may be bought and given away for nothing or for very little. It seems very simple and easy and very generous and noble. Perhaps if all other means fail something on those lines may have to be done. But need we quite jump at it like that? Of course there is wealth enough in the country to do it if we like, whether it is necessary or not, and some people would regard it as rather petty to consider the cost. It seems so much grander to splash the money about. But there are so many things which we should like to do, all of which involve the consumption of wealth. The general standard of life depends upon two things: first, the total quantity of wealth which the country possesses, and secondly, the distribution of that wealth. If part of the wealth is consumed wastefully or unnecessarily there will be so much the less for distribution. If therefore that unhappy quarter of the population can obtain some portion at least of the things which it needs so badly without the consumption of wealth which is already in our possession, so much more will remain available to provide further and additional advantages.

With these preliminary reflections, I propose to examine some of the steps which have been taken in the last few years to deal with the very urgent necessities of that unfortunate quarter of the population to which I have referred.

The word "nutrition" at once suggests milk. What has

been done to enable the children of the very poor to obtain the milk of which they are in such urgent need? Anybody unacquainted with the theories which prevail to-day would have supposed that Government interference, if it took place at all, would have been directed first to cheapening the cost of production with a view to cheapening the price and secondly to such a freeing of the channels of trade as would have enabled the unhappy quarter of the population to earn for themselves the means of satisfying their needs. Yet the opposite policy has been pursued. If any farmer can produce milk and sell it profitably at a price lower than his big trade competitors think fit, he must not do so. He will be committing a criminal offence. That is the effect of the Agricultural Marketing Act passed by the last Socialist Government and of the Milk Marketing Scheme authorised by the Conservative Government. Everybody who is concerned with the under-nourishment of the poor should realise that fact. As the recent report of the Reorganisation Committee says, "The result (of the Marketing Schemes) has been to increase the level of prices payable for liquid milk by consumers." It is now established that the average cost of producing milk is 9½d. a gallon but it is also established that some farmers can produce it at a cost of 6d. a gallon. That may be due to personal efficiency, favourable location, superiority of soil or several other reasons but the fact is beyond question. 9½d. being the *average* according to the Report of April 2nd, 1936, of the Government Committee of Investigation, clearly large numbers of farmers can produce at a substantially lower cost. Yet the fixed price is based upon the necessity of a profit at a production cost of 9½d. It is obvious that the man who can produce at 6d. can sell at a price 3½d. lower than the man who can only produce at 9½d. and so in proportion. Yet the Socialists and Conservatives between them have made it a criminal offence for him to do so!

The same thing applies to potatoes. The Potato Board limits the number of acres which any grower may plant. If he plants more than the Board thinks fit he can be fined by the big growers of whom it consists. The Board ordains that no potatoes of less than a specified size may be sold for human consumption (you may provide cheap food for pigs but not for human beings). Those to whom every penny is important may prefer a small potato at a low price but that does not

THE PROTECTORATE DILEMMA.

A SOLUTION

THE British nation is drifting towards a very dangerous impasse in Africa—and does not realise it! The Southern States of America are awakening to their peril, namely, that unless something is done about the position of 10,000,000 of her negro subjects lowest down in the human scale, their poverty and degradation will drag white civilisation down the precipice. That was one of the main lessons learned during a recent tour of 3,000 miles in the cotton fields of the South. The peril in Africa itself is similar, and arises mainly from the same cause—a slave mentality. Physically the slave shackles were struck off the negroes south of the Dixie line, and slavery abolished for the natives under British control south of the Equator in Africa nearly a century ago, but the slave spirit remains, and unless the British nation awakens to its own peril, large areas of Africa will hurtle back to the year 1833—the year prior to emancipation.

General Hertzog's demand for the transfer to South Africa of the three Protectorates, comprising as they do an area of nearly 300,000 square miles, and occupied by about 775,000 people, is, whether he recognises it or not, a claim to spread the South African "Colour Bar" policy across the Limpopo. Once that is done, nothing can prevent that native policy infecting every area right up to Kenya, and bringing under its malevolent sway altogether more than 10,000,000 natives, all of whom owe their allegiance and at present give their loyalty and affection to the British Crown. It would be a grave matter to spurn that affection and shatter that loyalty.

At the moment there is deadlock: is the way out some form of mandate? At first sight the mandatory way out appears to have several objections, but on closer examination many of these give place to clear and substantial advantages.

But first, what is the kernel of the issue? It is Colour Bar helotry *versus* British citizenship. General Hertzog's Government has officially stated, and with deliberate emphasis, that its native policy is "No equality in Church or State between white and black." Nothing could be more diametrically opposed to British fundamental policy, which may be described as "No inequality in Church or State between white and black." But there is a second cleavage in policy almost as vital. It is a

fixed principle of British colonial policy that the power to govern should be exercised primarily for the good of the governed. Mr. Pirow, in a broadcast last March upon the control of native policy northwards, said that "unless a man can base his attitude towards the natives on the idea that the needs of white civilisation must be considered first at all times and under all circumstances, the idea of a great permanent white population in Central African States will be but a fancy." To abandon the time-worn and twofold British policy, which is in fact, as the late Sir Charles Bruce has pointed out, the "Broad Stone of Empire," and to agree to surrender territory to Colour Bar policy and then place it and its inhabitants under a selfish control, would be suicidal for an Empire which, after all, is predominantly a coloured one.

It is inconceivable that any responsible British statesman should believe that the British Government could surrender two such bulwarks of the Empire; indeed, General Smuts has himself warned South Africa against the dangers of a Colour Bar policy even south of the Limpopo in language which should leave no doubt in the mind of anybody as to the suicidal danger of such a step; speaking on the proposed Colour Bar Bill, he said:

A year ago I warned the Union Government that the effects of their policy would not stop in South Africa but would provoke a world's conflict. An extension of the colour bar at this moment, when the Prime Minister is on the point of bringing forward a new native policy, would be disastrous . . . Native opinion is largely in revolt. The natives are seething with discontent all over South Africa. . . . It is not only the natives who are making difficulties. There is no doubt that when the Asiatic Bill is passed then the trouble will begin. We know it is coming. The Asiatic Bill must lead to the gravest troubles of administration. I knew that in 1924. . . . It is inevitable. In these circumstances the Colour Bar Bill, gratuitously produced here, is a firebrand flung into a haystack.*

It is but elemental common sense to ask whether the native policy which would be adopted in the Protectorates in the event of transfer would be the British policy hitherto pursued, or whether it would be a complete reversal of that policy. It is the more essential that this question should be

* *The Anatomy of African Misery.* By Lord Olivier.

matter to the Board whose object is to keep potatoes off the market in order that prices may be as high as possible. If people cannot afford the price which the Board can maintain they must do without potatoes. The Board has many methods of keeping up the price but one other deserves special mention. It has an income derived chiefly from a levy on acreage of about £146,000 a year. After spending about £23,000 on Head Office salaries, wages and travelling expenses; about £25,000 on Regional Offices, salaries, wages and travelling expenses and about £13,000 on the remuneration and expenses of its members, it has managed to accumulate during its not very long life a reserve fund of about £100,000. At the last annual meeting of potato growers the Chairman of the Board said that it is proposed in future to buy or offer to buy potatoes which were not capable of finding a market at a bare economic price so as to prevent what he called undue depression: or in other words to prevent the price falling to a level at which the poorest of the poor can afford to buy. There was a time when such a course would have been odious in the sight of all men. Now, with the assistance and approval of the Government and the Conservative and Labour parties, it seems that a semi-public Board may accumulate great funds by means of a compulsory levy for that purpose and openly boast of its prospects of achieving such designs.

It is hardly necessary to examine further instances of price raising. Methods differ a little but the result is the same. Bacon and boots, shirts and coats, pots and pans, houses and everything else which we want cost more than they need if this Government had abstained from interference. But if the cost of home-produced food is too high our own farmers must not be altogether blamed for that. A large part of the cost of producing milk, meat and bacon is represented by the price of feeding stuffs and artificial manures. The protectionist policy of the Government keeps up those prices. Does a farmer need new fences? His barbed wire and sheep netting cost more. Does he need new or improved cattle sheds or other buildings? Bricks are protected and cost more and so do cement and timber, iron and steel joists, fittings of all kinds, nails, screws and all other necessary components. Farm wages have just been raised again and farmers do not like it. That of course adds to the cost of production. But if the cost of everything a farm worker has to buy is increased because

some producer or other wants to have a statutory right to dip his hand into the pocket of the consumer, what help is there for it? Why should the farm worker be expected to carry the burden? And when all is done if the unfortunate consumer is much worse off can anyone say that the producer is much better off? Have all these schemes made agriculture prosperous? Everybody knows they have not.

So much for some of the things done by the present Government and their effect upon the welfare of various classes of the community. What effect would an exactly opposite policy have produced? First, I would like to suggest that the object we ought to have in view is the welfare of the community as a whole and not the welfare of particular classes. No particular class can receive subsidies or protection except at the expense of some other class and the ramifications and repercussions of trade and business are so infinitely complicated that no government can possibly know how far-reaching will be the effects of its actions upon innumerable people, particularly those small people, unorganised and with no means of voicing their injuries who constitute so large a part of our population. No man knows where a shoe pinches except the wearer and the idea that the interests of millions of consumers can be protected by a few very worthy, well-intentioned and perhaps very able gentlemen formed into a consumers' committee often with only advisory, but no determining power, or constituting a small portion of a governing board upon which they can always be out-voted, is mere moonshine. They do not and cannot know where the shoe pinches. They are in fact always just so much eyewash. The real reason for producing anything is surely to provide a consumer with something he needs as cheaply as possible, and the only justification of a consumer's existence is not that he may buy just those things which somebody chooses to produce at any price which the producer can induce the Government to fix.

If the price of milk, for example, were uncontrolled, those who can produce at 6½d. a gallon would immediately reduce their selling price to the immense advantage of the population as a whole and particularly of those who are too poor to buy any at present prices. Such producers would increase their production and the quantity of employment which they provide, until at the lower price their total profits would be

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asked because the Statute of Westminster has given complete sovereign independence to the Union of South Africa. General Hertzog would doubtless agree that it is only reasonable to ask this elementary question.

It must never be forgotten that Great Britain has no right, morally or legally, no right by reason of conquest, no right by reason of treaty, to transfer a single acre, nor a single native tribe in any Protectorate to any other Power whether within or without the British Commonwealth of Nations. The territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland in so far as they are Protectorates are not British soil, the inhabitants are not British subjects. It may be true that by straining the terms of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act and by running dangerous risks, the Secretary of State can escape from Britain's Treaty obligations to a protected people, but British public opinion is very sensitive upon any attempt to break faith with a weaker race.

The debate in the House of Lords, initiated by Lord Noel-Buxton, is likely to prove an historic turning-point on this subject, because in that debate the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava made a formal declaration of policy on behalf of the British Government at the time the Dominion Premiers were gathered in London, one of whom was in the House of Lords and listened to the debate. The declaration of Lord Dufferin was so clear, so explicit, and so reassuring that the British public will certainly hold firmly to it :

The conclusion was reached that the policy of both Governments—the Union Government and this Government—should in the next few years be directed to bring about a situation in which, if transfer were to become a matter of practical politics—I would ask your Lordships to mark those words—it could be effected with the full acquiescence of the populations of the territories concerned.

In point of fact, this only put into a House of Lords' debate the principle of a statement made by General Hertzog himself* :

Our position has always been as a party, that we are not prepared to incorporate in the Union any territory unless the inhabitants of the territory are prepared to come in.

* In the Union Parliament on March 25th, 1925.

The elements of conflict are, first, the question of native policy, secondly the desire of the inhabitants, and thirdly the means by which an arrangement satisfactory to all parties could be reached. It is clear that no method of transfer is in sight which would satisfy anybody. In any case, Britain presumably would need to put herself in a position to transfer by first annexing all the territories and making the natives who are "foreigners" into British subjects. This she could hardly do without some sort of consent being obtained from the native Parliaments. There would be no difficulty about this providing the natives understood that thereby their Treaty relationship would not be weakened: they have always desired, and, indeed, want nothing better than, to be made British subjects.

With annexation the way would then be clear to consider the next stage, namely, the obligations of any transfer. For this there are two instruments, first the Union Act of 1909, in which power is given to transfer "any territories" (be it noted not merely Protectorates, or any one of them) other than territories administered by the British South Africa Company "*upon terms and conditions embodied in the Schedule to this Act.*" Furthermore, although the inhabitants came under the protection of the British Crown by definite Treaties and Agreements which are still in force, they were not parties to the Act of Union, nor to any instrument implying transfer. Then it is important to remember that the Act of Union did not in fact promise the transfer of the Protectorates to the Union, as the British Parliamentary Committee has pointed out through its Chairman, Lord Selborne :

It is quite clear that Rhodesia was not given to the Union at the time of the passing of the South Africa Act, 1909. Nor were the Protectorates.

In short, Great Britain is not a free agent to do as she will about her guardianship or trusteeship of these territories.

In these circumstances, the Schedule becomes of supreme importance. This Schedule is a document of twenty-five paragraphs, it is attached to the South Africa Act, and its author is known to have been the Earl of Selborne. In point of fact, it comes so near to a mandate that one might be pardoned for thinking that the Schedule was actually used as a model for the mandatory system. All the more so when

even larger than they are now. The costs of some producers are as high as 15½d. per gallon and no doubt many of such men would have to go out of production as being unable to compete. Can anyone say that they ought to be bolstered up and maintained out of the pockets of the rest of the community? Other producers would find themselves obliged to improve their methods and eventually the price would settle down to that figure which would provide a profit sufficiently attractive to induce the production of all the milk which could be sold. The most efficient producers would make a very good profit, the least efficient would cease to produce milk and the moderately efficient would use every effort to improve their methods under penalty of being forced out of production. The most powerful inducement to the high cost producer to improve his methods and reduce his costs is the urgent pressure of economic necessity. If a 9½d. producer finds that his trade is going to a 6d. or 8d. producer he will soon learn to adopt his competitor's methods. But most important of all the largest possible number of the poorest of the poor would be able to provide themselves with milk.

And what ought the action of the Government to be in relation to the matter? Surely, it should take care to do nothing whatever to increase the cost of production. No taxes on farmers' implements, no taxes on his artificers nor on his feeding stuffs, nor on his fencing or building materials, no limitations on his facilities for transport and above all no taxes which will raise the cost of living of his employees, involving as that must do continual increases in wages, which are one of the heaviest items in his cost of production. And when all that has been achieved and the cost brought down to the lowest possible figure there may still be some of us so poor that adequate nourishment is still missing. Then, but not till then, there will be just ground for provision being made out of the taxes for the nourishment of those unfortunates. Do not let us first make staple articles of food so expensive that the poor cannot afford to buy them and then give them away for little or nothing out of the public pocket.

The question of milk supplies is only a typical example of the difficulties involved in the nutrition problem. Exactly the same considerations apply, not only in the case of all foodstuffs but of everything else which we need. Labour is

the biggest item in the cost of production of almost everything, and the cost of labour must depend chiefly on the cost of living. What matters to the worker is not so much the nominal amount of cash which he receives for his week's work as the quantity and quality of the things which he can buy with it. If that quantity or quality is less he is worse off even if the amount of cash which he receives is higher and the only result is that his wages must be raised to prevent his standards of living falling. Then the cost of production will again rise and with it prices so that again wages must be raised. As the cost of production rises we become ever less able to sell our manufactured goods to foreigners and the distressed areas which all depend very largely on foreign trade must become more and more distressed and more and more dependent on artificial government support.

I have said that nutrition in its wider aspects comprises much more than food. It involves, for instance, housing and we are told that a million more houses are urgently needed to replace slum dwellings. Yet this is the moment which this Government chooses to put import duties upon all the chief ingredients of building, and to the duties in some cases it adds quotas to limit the quantities imported. The object and effect is to keep up the prices of these ingredients and thus to make the cost of building higher than it would be if only the Government would keep its hands off. We cannot afford in these days to buy everything we want but we can afford to set aside a certain sum for re-housing. The cheaper the cost of building is, the more houses we can afford to build, the more people we can employ in building them, the sooner will the slum dwellers be re-housed, the more healthy will be the population and the more money we shall be able to devote to other beneficial purposes. What funny fellows these protectionists are. They prefer before beginning to build houses to make the cost of building as high as possible.

But it is not only houses which are wanted. Where you have houses you ought if possible have a water supply and a drainage system. Always for the first and frequently for the second a good deal of machinery is required. Machinery means the use of steel. So the Government protects steel in order that the price of steel may rise. That increases the cost of producing the machinery. Both water supplies and drainage systems involve the use of great quantities of pipes: so

it is remembered that the mandatory idea was born in South Africa in the fertile brain of General Smuts. In the first place, the administration itself, as envisaged in the Schedule, is mandatory in principle, for it is to be conducted under the supervision of the Prime Minister of South Africa, assisted by a Commission composed of three persons who are to be appointed by the Governor-General in Council. These Commissioners are to have secure tenure beginning with ten years, and then successive terms of five years. They cannot be Members of Parliament and can only be removed from Office by both Houses of Parliament sitting in the same session. In the event of a difference between the Prime Minister and the Commissioners, the subject must be referred to the Governor-General, whose decision in the matter is final. To the Governor-General as the representative of the Crown is left the duty of appointing a Resident Commissioner for each territory transferred.

In so far as Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland may be concerned, none of the native lands may be alienated. The Basutos, as Sir Edgar Walton, former High Commissioner of South Africa, has just pointed out, came under a special compact in this respect. All native Parliaments must be preserved; all revenues raised in the territories must be expended for and on behalf of the territory. Article 20 reads: "The King may disallow any law made by the Governor-General in Council . . ." and under Article 23 an appeal may be made to the Privy Council.

If some form of mandate could be agreed, it would have appreciable advantages. In the first place, it is generally accepted that political developments in South Africa have made it almost impossible to preserve the whole of the Schedule as it is drawn. If transfer is to take place as now demanded—but never contemplated either in the Act or in the Schedule—it has been suggested that it should take place by means of a Treaty embodying the terms of the Schedule. Why not, therefore, adopt the mandatory form of a Treaty?

A Treaty between Britain and South Africa might be drawn which would satisfy two of the parties, but not the one most concerned, namely, the natives, who are haunted by the fear that the anti-British elements in South Africa will one day succeed in driving the Union out of the Empire. It is a

strange fact that the natives know a good deal more of what is happening in this respect than people in England.

Since the South Africa Act two bulwarks safeguarding the principles of the Schedule have gone—the presence of a British-appointed Governor-General as something more than an umpire, and secondly the right of disallowance of legislation by the Crown. It is obvious, therefore, that some Court of Appeal in the event of disputes or of administrative difficulties must now be found to take their place. It may, of course, be that disallowance of legislation, Privy Council appeal, and a separate Governor-General could be provided for in a Treaty. But, does anybody suppose that for a moment both or even either of the Governments concerned would agree? The mandatory system alone is the alternative in sight in this respect.

It is common ground to-day that not a single native people is prepared to come willingly under Union control. Let us be frank and ask ourselves whether either Boer or Briton would do so if they were told in advance that when they came "into the parlour" they would be stripped of every element of manhood, relegated to helotry in industry and outlawed for all time from equality in Church and State? Of course they would not. Boer and Briton would fight to the death against it.

General Hertzog has wisely and rightly said that his Government does not want any subjects who are unwilling to come under the Union flag. As the British Government, which has the last word, has said it will not force unwilling tribes into the Union, it is obvious that the attitude of the natives has become the crux of a problem which grows in gravity. The native attitude would be radically changed if the administrative transfer could be carried through under a mandatory system which guaranteed certain essential things for all time, and especially three—first and most important of all comes guaranteed British citizenship, secondly the main principles of the Schedule, such as inviolability of lands and preservation of the native Parliaments, and thirdly the usual provision of mandate, such as rights of citizenship, freedom of commerce, freedom of conscience and religious exercises.

What would be lost or gained by adopting a mandatory solution? In the first place, it may be true that sovereignty would be "diluted," but that would be more apparent than

the Government protects pipes. The result of thus increasing costs is of course that we cannot afford so many of these schemes as we might otherwise do. If however you have water supplies and drainage systems you can have other conveniences, if they do not cost too much. But baths, sinks, laundry basins, w.c.s, taps and all such fittings are protected and the prices raised. And then clothes, which after all are perhaps more important than anything else except food. It is hardly worth while saying anything about that. There is not a man or woman in the country who does not know that clothes of every kind have risen in price and fallen in quality but not all of them realise that the reason is the protective system imposed upon us by the present Government.

Somehow or other something must be done to help that unhappy quarter of the population which is living on or below the border line of poverty. Somebody must do it. Curiously enough nearly every foreign country in the world and nearly every Dominion is striving to do it for us. The world is glutted with the things which those poor people need. Everything is offered to us at low prices often assisted by the bounties paid by foreign or Dominion Governments. The world is full of bankrupt stock which we can buy for a song. But our Government will not allow us to benefit by this state of affairs and busily occupies itself in devising new methods to prevent us from obtaining what we want at prices which we can afford to pay. It does seem odd that when foreigners want to pay subsidies to provide food and other necessities for our poor children we should refuse to let them do it and insist on paying subsidies ourselves.

Now I return to the questions which I asked at the beginning of this article.

(1) Whom will this generous Nutrition Policy benefit? Not the poor for whom it is supposed to be intended. The benefits which they need can be provided otherwise. Not the agricultural producers. Is there any farmer who will say that the Government's plans have made agriculture prosperous? But high financial interests will benefit. The big interests stand to make big profits. Are you interested in bricks or cement? Then get Government money spent on housing. The higher the price of bricks or cement the higher will be your profit. Are you interested in fertilisers or feeding cake? Vote for the Government buying milk and giving it away for

little or nothing. Are you interested in the production of piping? Vote for water supplies and drainage schemes.

(2) Who will pay for the Policy? The whole body of the people. The rich through the income tax; the poor through the higher cost of everything they need. It will be paid for out of the plunder of the public.

(3) How will effect be given to the policy? By regulations and controls and armies of permanent officials. The staffs employed in Government departments in April 1936 numbered 338,604, which was an increase during that year of 11,187 and these figures do not include the many thousands of persons employed by the various marketing and other semi-public Boards or by the local authorities.

(4) What repercussions will it have on other things? It will involve leaving undone for lack of money many social reforms which otherwise we might enjoy.

Do not let us be carried away by any attractive parrot cries into squandering public money uselessly. It is not by any such methods that the standard of living can be improved, but by freeing trade from tariffs, controls, quotas, monopolies, marketing boards, officials, red tape and restrictions of every kind with which this Government has afflicted us.

ALFRED BEESLY.

real, for no step could be taken without British annexation and a declaration of full sovereignty, thus Britain would in fact lose less than she might by any other procedure. Then the natives would stand to gain. Admittedly it may be difficult to persuade them to surrender any treaty or contractual rights. No doubt the British statement of policy by Lord Dufferin and Ava would be as binding before any transfer to a mandatory system as a transfer to the Union Government. It is frequently argued that native races have no machinery for registering their "full acquiescence," but such arguments ignore plain facts. So far as the High Commission Territories are concerned, each of them not only has its own properly constituted native Parliament, but those very institutions are preserved for all time in the Schedule to the South Africa Act. These native Parliaments hitherto have been held competent to make Treaties: in the case of Basutoland its *Pitso* made formal peace with Cape Colony and received the indemnity (£20,000) and confirmed "dis-annexation." In Bechuanaland the native Parliament has functioned for all forms of negotiations with the Protectorate Power. How then can it be argued that there is no competent body available to give a native opinion upon the future destiny of the tribes represented in the native Parliament?

The third party to any such arrangement is South Africa. General Hertzog has really nothing to lose by agreeing to a mandatory method. In the first place, his Government already has one large mandate (South West Africa). In this sphere the South African Government has experienced no real disability in regular administration. Then, as the original home of the mandatory principle, South Africa should be prepared to welcome its extension with alacrity.

If considerations affecting all three parties are taken collectively, there is indeed much to be gained. At the moment the wishes of South Africa, the Home Government, and the native, are in such definite conflict, that prolonged and deep-seated bitterness may arise, leading possibly to a situation of some gravity. The mandatory solution would avoid such an unfortunate development.

But there is an international aspect both psychological and practical in adopting a mandatory solution. In the first place, if Great Britain should take the initiative in embarking upon such a policy it would enormously enhance her reputation for

enlightened and far-seeing statecraft. In the sphere of practical politics it would be timely, because the whole question of colonial policy is destined before long to come before an International Conference. When that Colonial Conference does meet, the position of six or seven territories at least will need to be considered. Great Britain would then be in an immensely strong position if, whilst firmly adhering to the mandatory system, she were in a position to demonstrate her confidence in its working by pointing to a voluntary act by which she herself had recently agreed to place an area as large as Germany and Italy combined under a mandatory system. The form of mandate need not, probably could not, be identical with any existing mandate, but it should incorporate all the principal features of the system.

The only alternative methods suggested have involved either the compulsory transfer of the native territories, or the scrapping of British Treaty obligations, or, thirdly, the tearing up of the Schedule of the South Africa Act. The contemplation of so great a wrong, the committal of so grievous a crime against the natives, is surely unthinkable, and yet, as things stand at the moment, no constructive alternative has been suggested either in South Africa or in England. Thus it comes about that a mandatory solution in default of any other suggestion provides a way to satisfy the real desires of all three parties. Moreover, it is a solution which provides advantages for each, and benefits for all.

JOHN HARRIS.

NEW LIGHT ON FRENCH HISTORY.

I

MORE than once during the sixteenth century France seemed to be hesitating between the old faith and the new. The fear that France might turn Huguenot and make common cause with the Protestant rebels in the Low Countries obsessed Spanish ambassadors to the French court. One of these, Don Francesco de Alava, wrote to Philip II that "Paris was completely perverted and heretical," that at Lyons a congregation of eight thousand had assembled at a Huguenot *Prêche*.

This Don Francesco, besides being an accomplished diplomat, was a clever spy. With a flair for heretics as keen as "a hound of God," he smelt them out everywhere, reported them to his King and to the Grand Inquisitor, and did not hesitate to intercept their letters. Among them was one from the Protestant leader, Admiral Coligny, to Catherine de Médicis, asserting that two-thirds of France was Huguenot. The despatches of these ambassadors, Don Francesco and his predecessor, Perrenot de Chantonnay, written in cypher to Philip, decoded for the King's benefit, and frequently commented upon by him in the margin, had until the Napoleonic wars formed part of the famous collection at Simancas. But Napoleon's Generals could not permit papers so vital to the history of France to remain abroad. They brought them to Paris; and there they have lain, in the Archives Nationales, apparently unexplored, until M. Pierre Champion discovered them the other day.

They have suggested to him his latest work, *Catherine de Médicis présente à Charles IX son Royaume*.^{*} An enthralling story they unroll of two critical years in French sixteenth-century history, years occupied by the progress through France of Catherine, her children and her court. The journey began on January 24th, 1564, and ended on May 1st, 1566. No less than thirty-eight important towns as well as many smaller places were visited. Drawing on other contemporary documents as well as the Spanish letters, M. Champion gives us a picture of the towns, villages and *châteaux* at that time, of the King's state entries into them and of the festivities arranged by his mother, a past mistress in that art.

^{*} Bernard Grasset, 30 f.

Nominally the first war of religion had been closed by the Edict of Amboise. But impoverished France was still rent by religious strife and overrun by bands of soldiers, clamouring for arrears of pay, and presenting a problem as difficult as that of the unemployed in our own time. At court the feud continued between the old and the new nobility, the first led by the House of Chatillon with Huguenot sympathies and the second by the Catholic House of Guise. Certain nobles wavered: one for example, writes Don Francesco, was one year a Huguenot, the next a Catholic and the next an atheist. But the people were ranged into two bitterly hostile camps. Even the presence of the court failed to restrain them from violence. Stones were thrown at the carriage of a Huguenot princess on her way to join the King. While the King was in residence at Catholic Tarascon, the Huguenots of Beaucaire, on the opposite side of the Rhone, came out at night and hurled insults at their Catholic neighbours across the river. "You folk of Tarascon," they yelled, "tell the Count of Tende to observe the edict.* For if he do not he will pay for it dearly. And if King Charles orders him otherwise, go and tell him to mind his own business . . . for if he be so incensed against the Huguenots he will pay for it dearly."

It is mainly to the despatches of the Spanish ambassadors that we are indebted for this book. Without them it could not have existed. "It was written," we are told, "on the very table of the archives." Collation with other contemporary documents proves that the ambassadors can be relied upon. Keen observers and expert psychologists, they had created in France the most efficient secret intelligence system in Europe. *Les Espagnols*, writes M. Champion, *me semblent uniques pour cette époque. Ils sont les maîtres de l'observation réaliste, comme leurs peintres et leurs artistes, avec ce goût sobre de l'introspection psychologique qui est peut-être le prolongement de la confession catholique.* Consequently in these letters we see drawn to life all the most influential personages of the day. Constable Anne de Montmorency, Chancellor Michel de l'Hôpital, the little King Charles IX, his younger brother Henri, Duke of Orléans (later Henri III), and, dominating them all, the Queen Mother, Catherine.

To those who can never regard Catherine as anything but the sinister figure of the St. Bartholomew Massacre, she will

^{*} The Edict of Amboise which granted the Huguenots a certain measure of toleration.

LABOUR'S RALLY AT BOURNEMOUTH.

THE Labour Party has made a fine rally at Bournemouth. Last year at Edinburgh there were mutterings and premonitions of disaster or defeat. Some made light of it, ascribing it to the well-known "east-windy, west-endy" temperature of the modern Athens, but most who had eyes to see discerned that the Party had reached a period of darkness where many grave and unsolved problems were on its hands and where it could not declare with confidence or any approach to unanimity what was the straight road to success. It was groping confusedly in a growing but still dim and uncertain light and the speeches lacked that clear ringing note of passionate conviction which denotes that great deeds are being done in the constituencies. It was essential to any certainty of future success that this state of affairs should be altered. The outward omens were scarcely propitious. The very delightful sea resort at which the delegates met has the reputation of being mildly enervating and it was a sign of soundness at the core when it soon became plain that Bournemouth was going to be a centre of encouragement for the future of the movement.

For that the Conference was this time a success there could be no doubt. A considerable responsibility for this must be ascribed to the Chairman, Dr. Hugh Dalton, who managed it with unvarying persuasiveness and toleration. The Agenda was well timed and arranged. Nobody was inclined to run amok. And above all, it was plain from the Chairman's opening address, which, as few addresses have done before, struck the veritable keynote of the Conference, that much good work during the year had been completed in the solution of questions which had formerly distressed the delegates' hearts. Here are a few straws from the Chairman's speech which show how the wind is blowing: "We have visited the Distressed Areas, made contact with all sections of our movement there, collected evidence, gathered practical proposals and issued one Interim and five Regional Reports . . . your National Executive prepared and issued last March 'Labour's Immediate Programme,' the sales of which now exceed 300,000, a record for any Party pamphlet in recent years. . . . This programme is a big constructive job of work which we believe that a Labour Government with an effective majority in the

House of Commons could accomplish within the lifetime of the next Parliament. . . . We have just completed a special Crusade Week and started a new drive for increased individual membership of the Party. . . . We have reached a satisfactory agreement, for the time being, regarding Co-operative Candidatures for Parliament. . . . We have held consultations all over the country with representatives of Constituency Labour Parties regarding a number of suggested changes in the Party Constitution. . . . The membership of the Party is still rising. . . . There has been a steady rise of the past twenty years in the proportion of individual to trade union membership. . . . Tremendous dangers overshadow us. Nothing is to be gained by playing Ostrich. It is foolish to deceive ourselves and it is wrong to deceive those whom we represent and those who trust us."

The last in this *cento* of quotations relates to the international situation and it necessarily loomed large in the subsequent course of the debates. The Immediate Programme declared that "the Labour Party goal is the Socialist Commonwealth," but it set forth immediately afterwards that "a just and lasting peace is an essential condition of human progress." Roughly speaking, it was the opinion of the Trade Union Section, the most influential section of the Conference, that to attain that desirable condition of peace it was necessary to prepare for war. Trade unionist speakers like Mr. Bevin saw in the present troubled state of affairs the signs of a great Armageddon. On the one hand were the Fascist Powers who had destroyed trade unions in Italy and Germany and were even now doing their utmost to stamp out any appearance of working-class organisation wherever they might find it. If these embattled forces obtained any hold on Great Britain, it would be short shrift for the trade union movement. The times demanded haste. They must put themselves in such a condition that they might defend their existence successfully against these implacable adversaries. Mr. James Walker of the Iron, Steel and Timber Trades Association, who certainly surpassed himself in a bold and fighting speech, reminded the Conference that men were not "fallen angels" but "risen apes"; and that St. George, when he went out to slay the dragon, did not forget to take his sword along with him. When Mr. Lansbury retorted to sentiments like this, that "they who take the sword shall perish by the sword,"

here be hardly recognisable. For she appears throughout this book as a good-natured, cheerful woman in the early forties, with as much French as Italian blood in her veins, passing swiftly from laughter to tears, loving a joke, an opportunist and an optimist, but above everything a mother. Her children always came first, then her son's kingdom, then the Catholic Church. Such an order could not fail to incense the emissaries of the Catholic King.

The mother of sickly, tuberculous children, with the one exception of her daughter Margaret,* Catherine enjoyed excellent health, unimpaired throughout the exhausting two years' journey through the perturbed dominions of her son. Once only does Don Francesco record that she broke down: "She swooned, fell to the ground and remained unconscious for a while"; this was when the news was brought to her (false it turned out to be) that the Chatillons and Guises were again going to take up arms against each other. More than anything Catherine dreaded another religious war. To play off Chatillons against Guises, Protestants against Catholics, to avoid war with any foreign power; this was her policy, throughout these two years—a policy in the execution of which she was ably supported by her counsellors Anne de Montmorency and Michel de l'Hôpital.

Catherine's lukewarmness in the matter of religion, her lack of personal animosity against Protestants, drove the Spanish ambassadors to despair. But her tolerance is not difficult to understand. At the court of King Francis I, during her early married life, the new ideas had been fashionable. Her most intimate women friends had then been and still were her cousin, Jeanne d'Albret (Mme de Vendôme Don Francesco calls her), mother of the future Henri IV, her sister-in-law Margaret of France (later Duchess of Savoy), and Renée of Ferrara, daughter of Louis XII. All three were under the influence of, and corresponded with, Calvin until his death in the year when the royal progress began. Jeanne and Renée at frequent intervals during the progress appeared at court, Margaret joined it at Lyons, where her sister-in-law welcomed her with tears of joy. All three showed a disinclination to go to mass, and demanded *prêches* in their own apartments. Don Francesco hears, however, that Margaret's Protestant doctor, an ugly hunchback, a pupil of Melancthon, is telling her that

* The first wife of Henri IV, who lived on until the reign of Louis XIII.

she may go to mass provided she disbelieves in her heart everything she hears and turns away her eyes from the cup and the wafer, except when her ardently Catholic husband is looking at her.

It was no doubt under the influence of these friends that Catherine had chosen a Huguenot nurse for Charles and a Huguenot tutor for Henri. Don Francesco kept his eye on this heretic heir presumptive. His favourite saying, "I am a little Huguenot now, but one day I shall be a big Huguenot," was duly reported; and the little Princess Margaret at the ambassador's instigation searched the pockets of her younger brother for incriminating papers, but found none. It seems almost as if Catherine intended to have a Huguenot king ready to offer the country in the place of Charles should the country turn Protestant.

Even Charles, though his tutor was Catholic, had a Huguenot for governess, the clever and witty Mme de Crussol, Duchesse d'Uzès. Perrenot de Chantonay relates with horror an incident which took place at court on the day of the Feast of Kings. Charles and his young friends were keeping the feast in the usual way when their merriment was interrupted by the King's chaplain, Jacques Amyot, who came to say it was time for vespers. The children made faces at him, and the illustrious Amyot withdrew, whereupon Mme de Crussol, instead of rebuking her charges, remarked laughing that "schooldays were over."

"The ladies, Savoy, Vendôme and Ferrara were," as Don Francesco realised only too well, bent on supporting the authority of the Huguenot chancellor, Michel de l'Hôpital, on sowing distrust between Catherine and her son-in-law Philip, and on urging her to negotiate with the Protestant Germans and with England. Anne de Montmorency, upbraided by Don Francesco for neglecting to take decisive measures against the Huguenots, pleaded as his excuse the influence at court of these ladies. But the Constable was an old deceiver; for Don Francesco heard that the very next day he went to Catherine and assured her she could count on his service in anything. *Pour cela nul besoin de mettre en avant ni la religion, ni autre chose, rien que votre bonne volonté.*

With the Queen Mother herself the Spanish ambassadors dealt faithfully. They lectured her as if she had been a school-girl, denouncing again and again *les prêches de Mme de*

Mr. Walker replied that it was not their own sword but the other fellow's sword that menaced their existence.

All this was plain and uncompromising and it was certainly the dominant view of the trade union who constituted the controlling force of the Conference. It authorised the Labour Party to vote for rearmament now, for as Mr. Clynes put it, in his weighty speech which opened the debate, they could not wait until they came into office and reformed foreign policy before they put the country in a position of security against foreign invasion. Against this position there beat in vain two forces of attack. The first was the narrow attenuated hosts of the Pacifists, represented in the cruder form by Mr. Lansbury and in a subtler form by Lord Ponsonby, or as he termed himself, the "frustrated Labour Peer." Mr. Lansbury simply said that he would have counselled the helpless Negus, in the conditions in which he found himself, to stand aside and allow the Italian to overrun his territory; and that by implication he would give the same counsel to Great Britain in the presence of an equally determined foreign foe. Lord Ponsonby laid stress on the failure of the League of Nations and dwelt on the fact that the Labour Party, owing to the skillfulness of their adversaries, were being manœuvred into a false and bellicose condition. But neither of these points of view cut much ice at the Conference.

Equally futile in attack was what its supporters loved to call the Socialist point of view, represented in its most significant form at the Conference by Mr. Aneurin Bevan. Mr. Bevan would not vote for rearmament under a Tory Government because, as he said, the Tory Government might use the arms so obtained in the interests of the spread of Fascism in Great Britain. When it was asked what then would he do in the event of a foreign attack, especially as he and his supporters were crying out for intervention in Spain and an economic boycott in Japan? "Oh," was Mr. Bevan's somewhat light-hearted reply. "We know that we are not in the majority and that, despite our opposition, Great Britain would be rearmed against foreign attack all the same." It is true this somewhat Macchiavellian contention obtained a certain amount of applause but it commanded few votes at the Conference.

Roughly, then, it may be stated that the trade union view has triumphed and that the Labour Party in Parliament are

instructed not to oppose rearmament. Mr. Aneurin Bevan, indeed, challenged anyone to show where, in the Orange Book compiled by the Executive, and on which and the Report of the Executive the debate was held, there was any specific recommendation to support this present rearmament. At other times it was contended that the Labour Party in Parliament were, according to usage, the judges of Parliamentary procedure and that, though Conference might lay down the main lines of Parliamentary policy, the Parliamentary Party had the sole responsibility of applying that policy in the play and interplay of Parliamentary discussion and debate. Mr. Noel Baker, too, in an impressive and high-toned speech, pleaded for a more potent League of Nations. The old League of Nations had stopped wars in the past and it might yet stop them in the future. In these devious days they could not afford to remain, like spectators in the Greek tragedy, beholding the good and the evil locked in a deadly embrace and yet impotent to control the issue of the contest. The League of Nations could yet be enabled to wield the sword of the Lord and of Gideon but did Mr. Baker desire not to provide the sword until this particular swordsman is strong enough to hold it? This is a question which must have been asked of him by many who heard his impressive speech. But probably the answer to it does not alter the main conclusion, which is that the Labour Party at Bournemouth reaffirmed the position on rearmament of the Trades Union Congress at Norwich.

There was never much doubt that the Conference would affirm by a great majority this Trade Union view on rearmament, but on the next question, that of Constituency Representation, there was such strong feeling among the big Trade Unions that it was doubtful whether they would support the Executive recommendation to give such Constituency Parties a separate vote for their own representatives on the Executive. This question of the reconciliation and adjustment of the territorial and functional principles is fundamental for the modern state whether in its Syndicalist, Soviet, Fascist, or orthodox Labour editions. In the Liberal Democratic State the territorial principle is supreme, but in the Labour Party, at the beginning of its history, there were incorporated the Trade Unions, strong numerically and based on the functional principle and the Independent Labour Party, weak numerically, but strong in conviction and influence and based on the

Vendôme, the heretical books circulated by Mme Renée at court, the presence at court of Coligny, whom they charged with having at least instigated the murder of François Duc de Guise. To these scoldings Catherine listened with amazing good humour. Seldom did she lose her temper. Once, "passing swiftly from insults to cajolery," she closed the interview by saying to Don Francesco, "Now, go, God be with you. After all you are our friend." When he fell ill Catherine looked after him like a mother. But neither her attentions nor her cajolery shook the ambassador's conviction that the Queen Mother was the enemy of his country.

M. Champion reproduces many of these lively, impassioned conversations recorded so vividly that they make us feel, as they were intended to make Philip feel, as if we are present at the interview. Nothing escapes notice, not a frown, not a nudge, not an aside, however softly whispered. When Don Francesco, on his first appearance at the French court, tells the King he has come to save him from the Huguenots who are threatening his crown, Charles cries out with fear: "What, what!" The Queen gives him two reassuring pokes, saying, "All is well."

We are not surprised that of this little King, Don Francesco has a poor opinion. He describes him as a pale, sad, unhealthy youth, unlikely to live long. He is contrasted with his brother, Henri, an attractive child, full of life and mischief. In spite of the attempts of court ladies to arouse in Charles some interest in women, he remained as cold as a stone, refusing to dance until at the age of sixteen he was given lessons in private. In public affairs he took not the slightest interest, referring everything to his mother. There was one exception, however. Charles IX, writes M. Champion, *a le cœur marin*. He took an interest in his fleet, inspected the French galleys of the Levant, and even ventured to disagree with his mother when Don Francesco was trying to persuade her to break the old alliance between France and the Turks, and Catherine replied, "There is no reason why we should." Then her son broke in. "Why do you say that, Madame? As for me, I should like to see them all at the bottom of the ocean." He lived long enough to see his wish partly fulfilled at Lepanto.

Frequently Don Francesco remonstrated with Catherine on the question of her alliance with the pirates of the Levant.

He was scandalised that she should permit the court to dress *à la Turque*, and even to attend mass in that costume. But far more serious was her reception of a Turkish emissary, "the Devil's messenger," "an ambassador from Hell," Don Francesco does not hesitate to call him in the Queen's presence. Thereupon Catherine, bidding her courtiers withdraw, bursts into tears: "I don't know from whom he came," she pleads, "whether from the Grand Turk or another! He would not speak to anyone but the King, my son." . . . "And are not princes entitled to listen to ambassadors from another prince?" "Certainly, Madame. But considering the bonds of friendliness and kinship which unite you to the King of Spain . . . and that what he now desires is for the good of the Catholic Church and the crown of your son. . . . As for you, with one ear you listen to the Queen your daughter [Queen Elizabeth of Spain] and with the other to this messenger from Beelzebub!" Catherine gasps and turns as white as a corpse. About this time the cypher used by Don Francesco was stolen.

As the royal progress drew to a close it looked as if Catherine might be able to achieve her object. She seemed at one time on the point of reconciling the hostile houses and coming to some agreement with Philip. Though *le roi moine*, busy building the Escorial, refused to come himself to meet her, he sent her daughter, Queen Elizabeth, and his chief counsellor, the Duke of Alva, to confer with her at Bayonne. Their object was to obtain from Catherine some undertaking for the suppression of the Huguenots. But the Queen Mother refused to promise any such measure until the question had first been settled of the marriages of her children, the boy Henri with Philip's middle-aged sister, and Margaret with Don Carlos. Neither of these proposals would the Spanish envoys consider seriously. All they could obtain from Catherine was a vague promise to convoke an assembly to set the affairs of the realm in order. When that assembly met, the assembly of notables at Moulins, it was far from pleasing King Philip. For it consisted of Huguenots as well as of Catholics, it effected a formal reconciliation between Guises and Chatillons, and its first act was to acquit Coligny of implication in the murder of the Duc de Guise. *La Grande Ordonnance* which followed and which dealt with the grievances presented to the King by his subjects during his journey also displeased the Spaniards; for it

territorial principle. This older Independent Labour Party, with its separate representatives on the Labour Executive, continued an animating force until individual membership was introduced into Labour Party politics by Mr. Arthur Henderson and then the individual members, organised in local Labour and Divisional Labour Parties, took the place, stronger in numbers but lacking its evangelical intensity of conviction, of the old Independent Labour Party. Unfortunately, when the Constitution was adjusted to meet the altered circumstances, the Trade Unions, based on the functional principle, were allowed to elect their own representatives on the Executive, while the representatives of the Constituency Labour Parties, based on the territorial principle, were elected by the Trade Unions and the Constituency Parties together. This on the face of it hardly seemed fair and there would have been no difficulty in obtaining a speedy settlement of the anomaly by the Conference had it not been for two circumstances.

In the first place there has always been a certain difference of emphasis in the enunciation of principles between the Constituency and Trade Union Parties. The Trade Unionist was there because of industrial necessity and his leaders were skilled negotiators and not necessarily vehement upholders of socialist doctrine. On the other hand, the member of a Constituency Party was there because he had subscribed to certain views or methods of thinking and his leaders were amongst the advanced guard of the party theorists. The Trade Union Party had a more numerous membership because it was essential to its success in industrial conflicts that it should as early as possible number in its ranks an overwhelming percentage of the workers in a particular industry, while the growth of individual membership, based on a larger freedom of choice and option, was necessarily more limited and slow. Last year, however, it was a feature of Dr. Dalton's chairmanship that a big and successful drive, led by Mr. Herbert Morrison, was instituted to increase the number of Constituency Members. At the same time a move was made, inside these Constituency Parties, to organise them in separate and larger Regional Conferences which made it appear that they aspired to rival and even neutralise the "block vote" of the Trade Unions themselves. Many hard words were spoken about this movement and when a second

influence was added to the first, it was plain that there might be a serious breach between the territorial and functional principles within the complete structure of the Labour Party.

This second influence was that some of the most prominent leaders of this organised constituency movement were also leaders of what was termed the United Front. It is necessary to be quite plain about the exact extent of this United Front. It was not the French United Front which reigns from the Communists through the Socialists to the Radicals. In the eyes of Sir Stafford Cripps and Prof. Laski, who championed this movement, no one except the Communists, neither Lord Cecil nor Sir William Jowett, is a worthy associate for the Socialist purist. Prof. Laski himself, whose erudition and distinction of thought is undoubted, has lately confined his expositions of that thought almost entirely to the nauseous enunciation of Communist formulæ. Now if there is one thing more certain than anything else in the world, it is that unless the course of the world's history is radically changed, the British Labour Party will never unite in common action with the Communists. Its whole history, outlook, and method of approach are radically different. It has already banned the United Front as a Communist manoeuvre; and there never was any doubt that this attitude would be strongly reaffirmed at Bournemouth. Sir Stafford Cripps indeed roused a passing feeling at the Conference when, in his opening speech on the subject, he made it appear that the question was one of freedom of thought and the expression of contrary opinions within the movement. But whenever it became clear that the objection of the Executive was not to freedom of thought within the Party but to the claim to oppose by forming subversive associations without the Party, the fate of this ill-timed United Front was sealed; and Mr. Herbert Morrison made it further evident that if any members of the Party continued its advocacy on former lines they would be unhesitatingly dealt with in the most stringent fashion.

It is a mark of the sanity of the British Labour forces that, despite these disturbing influences, and despite the fact that they had to reach the conclusion before the United Front decision had clarified that issue, they did the right thing at the end to the Constituency Parties. At an early part of the debate Mr. Bevin offered an olive branch from the Trade Union side, practically pledging the suffrages of his union

contained no anti-Protestant measures. However, wrote Don Francesco, "it will all end in smoke." Don Francesco was right in the matter of the hollow reconciliation between the two houses. He was wrong as to the *Ordonnance*. For some of its edicts, says M. Champion, remained in force in certain parts of France until 1829. Its great inspirer was that consummate lawyer, one of the most attractive figures of the period, the Chancellor Michel de l'Hôpital.

Three months after the assembly at Moulins, the court had returned to Paris. During the six years that were to elapse before the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, Catherine lost the services of her two most able counsellors. The Chancellor fell into disfavour and retired to his country house. The Constable died of wounds inflicted at the Battle of St. Denis. It is the opinion of M. Champion that, had Montmorency survived, the Massacre might possibly have been averted.

WINIFRED STEPHENS WHALE.

II

A pathetic interest attaches to the two handsome volumes,* collected by the late Sidney Hellman Ehrman, and edited by James Westfall Thompson. Sidney Hellman Ehrman belonged to a Californian family distinguished for its services to the Bar and the University. After graduation in the University of California he decided to take up the study of history as a career. He taught and wrote in America. He studied for a year in Cambridge (England) and was influenced by Mr. Arthur Tilley. He then worked in France with M. George L. Lacombe. He designed to write a Life of Marshal Biron, and was busy in collecting materials wherever they could be found. But fate had decided otherwise. A year's illness was followed by his death in 1930. The short but touching memoir which is prefixed to the volumes makes us realise that his early death was a loss to historical research and perhaps to literature.

The volumes contain, in the words of the editor, "the rough stone quarried by Sidney Hellman Ehrman from which he hoped to carve a statue of the Maréchal de Biron." The materials have been published in the hope that someone else

* *Letters and Documents of Marshal Biron.*

may "some day pick up the chisel which Death took from the hand of the young scholar." The care shown in the collection of the documents, in their presentation and in the general editing of the book can hardly be too highly praised. The most interesting as well as the largest part of the two volumes consists of the correspondence of Biron. But this is followed by over two hundred pages of "documents relating to Biron"; by seventy pages of documents relating to the family; by a list of letters from and to Biron already published; and by a very complete bibliography. It is a book not likely to be overlooked by explorers in the difficult field of French sixteenth-century history.

Half a century ago there was hardly any part of European history less explored than that field. There were it is true many volumes of memoirs that cast a doubtful light on the doings of Catherine de Medicis and her children. There were the Letters of Catherine herself excellently edited by M. de la Ferrière, and there were the Letters of Henry of Navarre; but the period was little known and partisanship, religious or political, often decided the opinions of writers. But all that has been completely changed of late, and American historians have been prominent among those who have brought new light into these dark times. If Sidney Ehrman had lived he would have taken an honourable place among the American historians of France.

The Life of Marshal Biron will hardly make an exciting or a popular narrative, when the new sculptor comes along and picks up the chisel that Sidney Ehrman had hoped to wield. The letters here published extend over nearly the whole of the Marshal's life—the first is dated 1557 and the last 1592. But they are not by any means evenly distributed. There is a gap just where we should look most eagerly for fresh information. Biron was employed to conduct Henry of Navarre to Paris for his marriage with Marguerite of Valois. The King of Navarre seems to have been no eager wooer, and King Charles IX protests against the suspicions which make him delay his journey. But from June 29th, 1572, to January 9th, 1573, there is no letter at all. It is an additional piece of evidence to show that all documents relating to the period of the Saint Bartholomew Massacre have been purposely destroyed. Again there is a gap from November 1587 to January 1589, and it is perhaps not accidental that nothing is preserved

if proxy voting and the immediate operation of the scheme were eliminated from the recommendations of the Executive. The Executive jumped at the offer ; but in the end the Conference did one better as they gave to the Constituency Parties a separate vote for their representatives, two additional representatives, and the immediate coming into operation of the whole scheme. The end was that, by the vote of the Constituency Parties, Sir Stafford Cripps and Prof. Laski were both added to the Executive. Thus "all's well that ends well," and it is even probable in the case of Sir Stafford Cripps that he will freely submit to the decision of the Conference on the United Front. At any rate he has resigned from the chairmanship of the Block Vote Movement within the Constituency Parties which had aroused such great opposition, and at an evening meeting held in Bournemouth he declared that in advocating the United Front he would henceforth act within and not without the Movement.

This, then, is the Bournemouth Labour Rally which certainly shows that the British Labour Movement is at present in a condition of vigorous and aggressive life. All the big questions that came before it were satisfactorily approached and settled and that without acrimony or the generation of an undue amount of heat. It was perhaps a pity that in the resolution relating to Japan the delegates demanded the immediate summoning of Parliament for such a request was certain to be refused and they might possibly have created a better impression if they had demanded at first what was in effect granted, a set debate on this thorny problem immediately Parliament met in the normal course of events. The word "frustration" was very much in use throughout the whole course of the Bournemouth debates and a party frustrated in a spectacular demand on foreign affairs is apt to be considered as a party not yet fit for government because it impotently hurls its head against a dead wall. In Spain the Party boasted a splendid record in the provision of medical aid while Mr. Bevin, in a sentence which attracted much attention, looked forward to the British Trade Unions becoming the main agents in the inauguration of the European Commonwealth of Nations.

But it was in internal affairs as well as the inside organisation of the Party for a great forward movement that Bournemouth shewed the reinvigorated spirit of the movement.

For that result, as the chairman's address quite clearly showed, the ground had been very carefully prepared during his year's course of office. Burning words were uttered about the Distressed Areas which had been the subject of several very careful and significant Executive reports. Labour's Immediate Programme was quite successfully launched. A new Pensions Scheme was lucidly explained and the Prime Minister was undoubtedly off the mark in his criticism at the Conservative Conference that no attention was given at the Labour Conference to the financial incidence of such a scheme. Even the League of Youth, whose members have been the stormy petrels at many a previous Conference, found Bournemouth this time more congenial to their tastes. They lost a member of the Executive but they have to have a great drive and a special Programme in order to increase their numbers and intensify their influence in the movement. And the new chairman, Mr. George Dallas, a modest man who has never sought the limelight but who has earned his position by a long past of solid and untiring work, may be trusted to continue and even to improve this record during his year and a half of office. For the next Conference will be held during the Whitsuntide of 1939 and before that time many things may happen that will tend to impart to that Conference a special and enduring significance.

J. H. HARLEY.

referring to the Day of the Barricades and the events leading up to the assassinations at Blois. When Henry III was dead and Henry IV was fighting for the crown, Biron was his loyal and efficient servant, but the letters of this last period are not among the most interesting. Biron was then not in a position of independent power and his letters are usually reports on military details.

The two periods on which the letters do seem likely to cast new light are first the years between 1577 and 1582, and secondly those from 1583 when Biron joined the Duke of Anjou in the Low Countries down to the Duke's death in 1584. In neither period is there anything in the letters that tends to overthrow the current ideas. The years between 1577 and 1583 were comparatively calm for France. They were years of nominal peace for the most part. The great Edict of Monsieur seemed to lay the basis of a just and lasting peace; and, though there were "wars" after that, they were short and were soon followed by arrangements which renewed many of the provisions of the earlier Edict. But we already know how unreal these peaces were, and the letters of Biron show us that Guyenne was almost as much disturbed when the Edicts of Peace were nominally in operation as when hostilities were officially recognised. There are raids and assaults upon towns. An attack on Langon is frequently mentioned and there are many others. Biron, the agent of the Crown and a Catholic, asserts constantly that the real fault lies with the Huguenots who will not try to keep within the limits of the Edicts. His advice is to strengthen the army under his command and, above all things, to pay it regularly and well. But the King had no money, and both he and Catherine de Medicis seem to have been genuinely anxious to maintain the peace established by the Edicts. The King urges Biron to maintain the closest possible understanding with Henry King of Navarre. But instability and weakness are the constant characteristics of Catherine and her children, and at times Henry III writes that there is no chance of peace unless a single religion is established in France. But that was at the beginning of this period. An *entente* with Navarre was his later policy, and Biron was apparently withdrawn from Guyenne because he had offended Henry of Navarre.

In 1583 Biron was transferred to the service of the Duke of Anjou in Flanders. The glimpses that we get of that episode

are strange and baffling. It seems a miracle that the rebellious Dutch should have succeeded in maintaining their independence; for Parma was advancing, and the Dutch were betrayed on all hands; betrayed by their own troops, by the French and by the English. None of the troops were paid with any regularity, and occasionally we read that a town has to be sacked to satisfy them for a time. France was not at war with Spain, though French troops were fighting against the Spaniards, and Biron was in frequent communication with King Henry III and with his mother Catherine. It is indeed interesting to see how much influence Catherine has during these last years of her life. Anjou is in these pages the mean and stricken creature that we know him to have been from all sources. After his criminal attempt on Antwerp—which history knows as the "French fury" but which Biron calls "*un malentendu*"—he almost withdrew from any active share in the direction of the campaign, if the desultory operations deserve to be called a campaign. There is one letter attributed to him here which reads more like a satire or a parody than an original document. The Duke of Anjou was at Dunkirk, and Biron wrote to him again and again without getting any answer at all. In May 1583 the Duke at last wrote a letter. He found himself in danger there, he said, from the attacks of an angry people and appealed to the States to provide him with "*autre lieu plus sain et convenable à ma qualité pour ma demeure*." But he adds that "when peril or danger threaten his usual remedy is to run away as quickly as possible." It is fair to say that the reading of the last sentence does not seem certain. A letter (CLVIII) should not be overlooked. In it Biron's correspondent "*le jeune Lansac*" suggests a new method of dealing with the Spanish, which would be to a large extent to copy the methods of the English Government. Briefly, the proposal was that France should limit her activities on land and turn her main attention to her fleet. The Indies should be attacked; Cape Verde made a French colony; the Spanish vessels should be sunk wherever found; Italy and Spain should be raided. Lansac is sure that if this procedure were followed Philip would at once abandon the Netherlands and even Italy in order to get back the Indies. He underrated the tenacity and pride as well as the resources of Spain.

A. J. GRANT.

EX-SERVICE MEN AND PEACE.

THERE is a mistaken idea held in certain circles that ex-Service men are anything but peace-loving. The truth is the very opposite. Would it not indeed be extraordinary were it otherwise? What normal individual who has once experienced the horrors of modern warfare could possibly desire himself to undergo a repetition of such experiences or to wish the rising generation to suffer in the same way as did his generation? Take any country—Germany, Italy, France—you will find that the men who know what war is are strong in their determination to work for peace. The experiences, however, which these men have been through have taught them to face realities and, for this reason, they do not accept the views of the doctrinaire pacifist who, in his zeal to grasp the ideal, too often ignores the real.

In almost every country which took part in the war, ex-Service associations have been formed more or less on the lines of the British Legion, though, unfortunately, in many cases not with the complete freedom from political or sectarian bias which distinguishes the Legion. It was obvious that these organisations of ex-Service men, actuated as they are by the ideas above set forth, could be, if knit together, of material help to statesmen and diplomatists in their work for peace. This, indeed, was the thought which prompted the British Legion, led by its energetic chairman, Sir Francis Fetherston-Godley, to take a leading part in getting the ex-Service organisations of both sides to come together to form an international body known as the C.I.P. (*Comité International Permanent*). The Allied ex-Service men had been linked together for many years in the FIDAC (*Fédération Interalliée des Anciens Combattants*), but it had long been apparent, at all events to ex-Service men in this country, that the Interallied limitation had become entirely out of date. All attempts, however, on the part of the Legion to convert FIDAC from being Interallied to International have so far failed, hence the steps taken to form the new body. It is true that there has been in existence for some years an international body of ex-Service men known as the CIAMAC, but this body has never been representative. The British Legion has always refused to join because it has never been sufficiently satisfied as to its composition. German and

Italian ex-Service men are not members and its power, therefore, to work for a better international understanding is extremely limited.

To those who have never been brought into contact with ex-Service organisations it might appear that the effect which they could produce on the international situation would be too intangible to be of any real value. Where, it will be asked, are the leaders with the outstanding qualities necessary to impress their views upon the multitude? Who ever sees their newspapers or journals on the bookstall, and can their circulation be such as to have any appreciable influence? The answer to the first query is that these organisations do not affect public opinion through pre-eminent personalities but through the mass action of their members. In many countries membership is counted in hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Large meetings and open-air rallies are common to all of them, and with the help of loud-speakers it is possible to get messages across at any one meeting to tens of thousands. In July of this year the writer was invited to speak to a great gathering of the Reichskriegerbund at Kassel in Germany. There were no less than 120,000 German front-line soldiers on parade, and an appeal to them to work for peace and goodwill and to teach their children the terrible cruelty of war was received with applause.

As to the literature of these associations, it is correct to say that there is not a single one without its weekly or monthly periodical, and that in many cases the members' annual subscription includes the official organ so that the written word reaches as many homes as there are members. Ex-Service influence is not spectacular, but its steady permeation may easily produce a more permanent effect than action which is of better news value.

Again, consider for a moment quite another aspect of the question. A sense of injustice, a feeling that sacrifices have been forgotten and that the tide of life flows so fast that the ex-Service man gets engulfed in the stream, causes discords in the national life which, if not harmonised, may easily make their jarring notes extend beyond the boundaries of their own countries. How often has not the unemployed ex-Service man exclaimed in his misery: "Another war would be better than this. At least in the war I got good and regular food, my wife had a separation allowance and work in addition, and there

CATHOLIC ACTION.

SINCE the conclusion of the Great War a remarkable change has developed in the relation of the Roman Catholic Church to Civil States. That change, of course, is by no means a complete one ; but it is of sufficient extent to constitute a new and important phenomenon in European (indeed, in World) affairs. Its nature may be estimated by the most striking of its instances ; that of the present, as compared with the recent past, position of the Papacy in relation to the Kingdom of Italy.

After the occupation of Rome by the armies of King Victor Emanuel in 1870, and the fall of Pope Pius IX from the position of ruler of the States of the Church, the Papacy and the Italian State remained in virtual and very thinly veiled hostility until after the Great War of 1914-18. The coming of the Mussolini dictatorship, however, gave the Papacy an opportunity to compromise the situation : a situation which in many ways had been becoming ridiculous. After long negotiations, a Treaty was concluded between the Fascist State and the Papacy. That Treaty—although it and the Concordat annexed to it affected the Italian nation vitally—was arranged in utter secrecy ; the Italian people were not allowed to be aware that it was in prospect.

Thus did two autocracies—a secular and an ecclesiastical—settle a long-standing quarrel affecting the vital affairs of a nation. True, not long afterwards a dispute arose between the Papacy and the Fascists, owing to the unwillingness of the latter to recognise the independent existence of the organisations of "Catholic Action" in Italy : but the differences were adjusted, and since then the Italian Church has been a devoted ally of Fascism. That, in fact, is why the agreement between the Papacy and Italian Fascism is typical—in nature, if not in degree—of the remarkable change which has come over the relations of the Roman Catholic Church with Civil States in a number of countries. It may be expressed thus : the Papacy has emerged definitely as the ally of Fascism as against "Left" parties ; provided that Fascism is prepared to come to terms with the Church. This fact is of the greater importance in view of the vigorous emergence, during the reign of Pius XI, of the movement known as Catholic Action. That movement is being assiduously

promoted in various countries ; so it may be useful to enquire as to its nature.

The definite initiation of the movement was when Pope Pius XI addressed, on November 18th, 1928, a letter to Cardinal Bertram, Archbishop of Breslau, saying : "Catholic Action is nothing other than the participation of the laity in the apostolate of the hierarchy." In other words, the bishops, as the apostolic leaders of the Church under the headship of the Pope, are in future to avail themselves increasingly of the active assistance of layfolk. "Differing little," continued the Pope, "in this respect from the divine mission entrusted to the Church, or from the apostolate of the hierarchy, Catholic Action is not of a material but of a spiritual order ; not of an earthly but of a divine one ; not of a political but of a religious one." "Party politics," he went on, "must be carefully ignored." Nevertheless, "Catholic Action will not necessarily exclude its members from taking part in public life. On the contrary, it will make them more able and more anxious to do so, by reason of the strict formation of character which results from the practice of Christian virtues ; and thereby it will offer to society the best possible citizens, and the State experienced and honourable leaders." Catholic Action "deserves every favour and encouragement not only from bishops and clergy, who know that it is to Us [the Pope] as the apple of Our eye, but also from statesmen and Governments."

The foregoing seems to amount to this : Catholic Action is a purely religious movement, which must disregard politics, but which nevertheless must aim at supplying leaders to the State. There seems a contradiction here, but the explanation is simple : In the eyes of the Roman Church everything is "religious" which has any bearing not merely on abstract theological dogma, but even on morals ; few matters are disconnected from morals ; the Roman Church is the divinely-appointed teacher of faith and morals ; therefore there are few matters as to which she will not claim to speak with authority. At the same time she will claim that the matters on which she animadverts are not merely political—even when they affect intimately the State and the general community—but religious. By forbidding Catholic Action to ally itself with any particular political party, the Church will enable it to influence any party or all parties : in short, the social and political life of the entire community.

was a future for my children!" The question whether successive Governments in this country should not have done more for the ex-Service men does not come within the sphere of this article. It may, however, be at once admitted that our pension system (to which the British Legion has greatly contributed by consistent action, advice and reasoned argument) is one of the best to be found in any country. The fact remains that governments cannot do everything. They certainly cannot introduce the sympathetic touch of the voluntary organisation. I believe the public, by its continued and generous support of the Poppy collection on Remembrance Day, does realise what the Legion has done and is doing to remove bitterness, to give a helping hand, to replace despair by hope. This great work carried out unobtrusively year in year out by thousands of voluntary workers, men and women alike, has meant much for the harmony and unity of the nation, and in that way has made a contribution to its influence in the cause of peace.

The same may be said of other countries where efficient and benevolent ex-Service organisations exist. And now at last these are all knit together in the new international body which comprises the leading ex-Service associations of Austria, Belgium, the British Empire, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Roumania, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

The C.I.P. came into being in November of last year at a meeting in Rome called together by Signor Delcroix, the chairman of the Italian Disabled Society, blind and without arms, but blessed with a fine intellect and an indomitable spirit. At this meeting it was agreed that it was necessary for the maintenance of peace that there should be a greater spirit of understanding between the peoples of the world, and that organised ex-Service men could make a definite contribution to the creation of that spirit by making contacts no matter what obstacles might lie in their path. Under no consideration was the C.I.P. to interfere with domestic politics or to become involved in sectarian questions.

The first regular meeting of the new committee took place in Berlin in February of this year, organised with all that attention to detail for which Germans are famous. At this meeting Delcroix was elected the first chairman, and the writer of this article the first honorary secretary, both offices

to be held for one year only, the object of this proviso being to enable these positions to circulate amongst the fourteen countries. The methods of promoting the aims and objects of the committee were laid down on the following broad lines: interchange of visits both of ex-Service men and of the rising generation; interchange of speakers and of ex-Service journals and newspapers; correction of false and tendacious news; formation of bilateral committees where difficulties exist between any two countries, and so forth.

At first sight it might appear that the utility of meeting ex-Service representatives of totalitarian States would be of small value, but even dictators cannot afford to ignore the feelings of their people, and certainly in Germany and in Italy, where the Führer and the Duce are both ex-Service men, there is evidence that the views of front-line soldiers are definitely taken into account.

At the meeting in Germany, the delegates had the privilege of spending three hours with Hitler in his country home at Berchtesgaden. The Chancellor spoke to each of the national groups separately and pleased everyone with his simplicity and frankness. His whole attitude might be summed up in the words that men who had been through the hell of the last war ought to be the first to work together to prevent another war. The French, who were represented by five ex-Service men, each from a different organisation, were so pleased with their talk with Hitler that they begged him to come to France, saying that they would give him the finest bodyguard of ex-Service men he had ever had! The Roumanians were particularly pleased because they were told that their country, as at present constituted, was looked upon as a bulwark against Communism. The Czech delegates were agreeably surprised by the frank way in which the subject of minorities was dealt with, stress being laid on the great importance of the economic aspect of the question. So favourable was the impression produced on the Czech delegates that Dr. Krofta, the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, in view of the kind way in which the Czech delegates had been received by the German Chancellor, materially modified a speech which he made in the Czech Parliament concerning the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Germany. I venture to say that during that afternoon, in those lovely surroundings of the

What are the ideals which this movement is to promote? The ideals are those which are set forth in detail in Papal encyclicals. A difficulty here at once arises. What is the degree of authority ascribed to those documents? The definition of Papal Infallibility, proclaimed at the Vatican Council in 1870, said that the Pope is infallible "when he speaks from the chair [*ex cathedra*]: that is, when he defines a doctrine of faith or morals to be believed by the Universal Church." It has never been settled, however, as to exactly what Papal declarations come within that category. How far do encyclical-letters come within it? Of those circular-letters which from time to time are addressed by the Pope to all the Roman Catholic bishops of the world, or to some of them, Addis and Arnold (*The Catholic Dictionary*; ed. 1917; p. 298) say: "Encyclicals are not necessarily *ex cathedra* pronouncements, though the Pope could, if he so willed, issue definitions in this way. The faithful are bound to give them a religious assent, interior as well as exterior, and respect." We may ask, however: How can there be an obligation to give interior assent to what is not claimed to be infallibly true? "Internal assent" is acceptance, by the intellect, of the truth of a statement. To be bound to give such assent means that it is certain that the statement cannot be wrong; i.e. it is infallible. There can be no obligation to give "internal assent" to encyclicals if they are not within the category of infallibility. In point of fact, the position has come to be this: Theoretically, encyclicals are not commonly reckoned as within the ambit of the 1870 definition; but in practice they are treated as though they were. Their teaching imposes itself on the Church and guides the thoughts and activities of the faithful. Naturally, therefore, it is that teaching which provides the inspiration of Catholic Action. What, then, are its fundamental principles?

Those main principles, as set forth in encyclicals, are (we may place them under several heads) these:

The Relations of Church and State.—"No one doubts that Jesus Christ, the Founder of the Church, willed her sacred power to be distinct from the civil power, and each power to be free and unshackled in its own sphere: with this condition, however—a condition good for both, and of advantage to all men—that union and concord should be maintained between them, and that on those questions which are, though in

different ways, of common right and authority, the power to which secular matters have been entrusted should happily and becomingly depend on the other power [the Roman Church] which has in its charge the interests of heaven" (Leo, *Arcanum Divinæ*: February 10th, 1880). "Since then no one is allowed to be remiss in the service due to God, the chief duty of all men is to cling to religion in both its teaching and practice: not such a religion as they may prefer, but the religion [Roman Catholicism] which God enjoins, and which marks, certain and most clear, show to be the one true religion" (Leo, *Immortale Dei*: November 1st, 1885). "Just as the end at which the Church aims is by far the noblest of ends, so its authority is the most exalted of all authority, nor can it be looked on as inferior to the civil power, or in any way dependent on it" (*Immortale*).

The Coercive Power of the Roman Church.—"Some people, while not opposing the existence of the Church (they could not do so), yet would despoil her of the nature and rights of a perfect society. They maintain that it does not belong to her to legislate, to judge, or to punish, but only to exhort, to advise, and to rule her subjects with their own consent and will. By such opinion they pervert the nature of this divine society, and attenuate its authority, its office of teacher, and its whole efficiency" (*Libertas Præstantissimum Donum*: June 20th, 1888).

Liberty and Toleration.—"Let us examine that liberty in individuals which is so opposed to the virtue of religion: namely, the liberty of worship, as it is called. This is based on the principle that every man is free to profess as he may choose any religion or none. . . . When such a liberty is offered to man, the power is given to him to pervert or abandon with impunity the most sacred of duties, and to exchange the unchangeable good for evil: which, as We have said, is no liberty but is its degradation, and the abject submission of the soul to sin" (*Libertas*). "So, too, the liberty of thinking, and of publishing, whatsoever each one likes, without any hindrance, is not in itself an advantage over which society can wisely rejoice. On the contrary, it is the fount and origin of many evils" (*Immortale*). "We must now consider briefly liberty of speech and liberty of the Press. It is hardly needful to say that there can be no such right as this, if it be not used in moderation. . . . Lying opinions,

Bavarian mountains, a definite contribution was made towards goodwill and better understanding.

Even when countries may be politically opposed, their ex-Service men, having experienced the same dangers and hardships, whether alongside or against each other, have a foundation ready made on which a structure of mutual understanding can be built. The political antagonism and mistrust existing between Hungary and Czechoslovakia is, alas! only too well known, and at the first meeting between the representatives of these two countries which took place at Lord Harrowby's Camp, the feelings could hardly be accounted as cordial. Through personal contact, however, and the good spirit of comradeship which permeates the C.I.P., the relationship between these two delegations has improved beyond all recognition. Take another example, namely, the difficulties existing between the Germans of Deutsch Böhmen and the rest of Czechoslovakia. Hitherto, the ex-Service men of the German portion of Czechoslovakia and the Czech ex-Service men had never met. It was not until the British Legion sent a delegation, led by the National Chairman, to Prague that German ex-Service men from Reichenberg, Karlsbad and other towns in Deutsch Böhmen sat side by side with Czech ex-Service men. That meeting, which was a public one, passed off most happily, and the ex-Service group in the German portion of Czechoslovakia will soon be part and parcel of the international organisation.

I hope the above instances will show that it is worth while, irrespective of whatever political system may be established in any country, for men who fought in the Great War to get together and to help to foster a fund of goodwill which can be at the disposal of statesmen and diplomatists. That is the view of the British Legion and of the C.I.P. It is this view which has caused the Legion to visit in the last two years nearly all the countries which took part in the war. It is the reason why we went to Italy at the beginning of this year to meet the representatives of the Italian Combattenti and Mutilati. We said to our Italian comrades that, whatever might be printed in the Press of both countries, we men who had fought shoulder to shoulder with them had not forgotten, and would not forget, our friendship of those days; that we of the Legion were out for peace and that we believed they, too, were out for peace. The meeting which we had with our

Italian friends led to a meeting with the Duce. The psychological effects of that meeting, the results of which were reported in every Italian paper and were broadcast three times running, were noticeable. Surely, whatever political views may be held, the normal man and woman, realising that another world war would spell the complete collapse of civilisation, will agree that such meetings help to provide useful lubrication to the international machine.

The C.I.P. holds two meetings per annum in different capitals. The next meeting is to be in Paris sometime in the autumn, and the following one is to take place in London in May. Let us hope that by that time the tension in Europe will have been further lessened. But, in any event, there will be plenty of work for ex-Service men to perform in removing mistrust and creating goodwill. As Captain Dimancesco said to me in Bucarest the other day—"at the end of the war countries demobilised their troops but, unfortunately, not their hatreds." Assistance in the removal of hatreds, misunderstandings and mistrust is the task to which the International Committee of ex-Service men has dedicated itself. We were all soldiers of war and we have now to be soldiers of peace. Perhaps our greatest responsibility is to impress on those who were too young to know what the war meant the need of friendly thoughts towards the youth of other countries outside their own.

GEORGE CROSFIELD.

than which no mental plague is greater, and vices which corrupt the heart and moral life, should be repressed assiduously by the public authority" (*Libertas*). "The Church, indeed, deems it unlawful to put various forms of divine worship on the same footing as the true religion [Roman Catholicism]; but she does not, on that account, condemn those rulers who for the sake of securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, tolerate in practice that these various forms of religion have a place in the State" (*Immortale*).

Various Political Systems.—"We lay down the principle, long since clearly established by Leo XIII, that it is our [the Pope's] right and duty to deal authoritatively with social and economic problems" (Pius XI, encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*: May 15th, 1931). "The right to rule is not bound up necessarily, however, with any special mode of government. It may take this or that form, provided only that it be of a nature to ensure the public good" (Leo XIII, *Immortale*). "The sovereignty of the people, and this without any reference to God, is held to reside in the multitude; which is doubtless a doctrine well calculated to flatter and inflame many passions, but which lacks all reasonable proof" (*Immortale*). "Yet it is not wrong in itself to prefer a democratic form of government, provided the Catholic doctrine be maintained as to the origin and exercise of power" (*Libertas*).

The Right of the Roman Church to declare Civil Laws Invalid.—"If the laws of the State are manifestly at variance with the divine law, containing enactments hurtful to the Church, or conveying injunctions adverse to the duties imposed by religion, or if they violate, in the person of the Supreme Pontiff, the authority of Jesus Christ, then, truly, to resist becomes a positive duty, and it is a crime to obey" (Leo XIII, *Sapientiæ Christianæ*: January 10th, 1890). "Although, in the extraordinary condition of these times, the Church usually acquiesces in certain modern liberties, she does so not because she prefers them in themselves, but because she judges it expedient to permit them until in happier times she can exercise her own liberty" (*Libertas*).

To what do the foregoing principles amount but this?—That the criterion of what is right or wrong is its approval or disapproval by the Roman Church; that State laws must meet with that approval, or they are not binding in

conscience, and, if they do not meet with the approval of the Roman Church, they are tolerated merely until, in better days, the Roman Church can procure effective condemnation of them; that the State should give privileges to that Church as a right, and make the civil law agree with its wishes; that State toleration of beliefs disapproved by that Church is an evil, to be acquiesced in at any time only as unavoidable, and to be as limited as possible; that freedom of opinion, speech, or publication is sinful if it involves propagation of views against the Roman Catholic doctrines; that the people has no right to free self-government, but can be allowed it only so far as is agreeable to the Roman Church. In short, the fundamental principles of the Papal conception of social and political life are those of fullest possible clerical dominance, with penal repression of dissent. It may be added that in 1931 the social and political teachings of Leo XIII were adopted and reaffirmed (by special mention of the chief encyclicals of that Pontiff) by Pope Pius XI in the first paragraph of his encyclical *Quadragesimo*. It is clear that those teachings are the established social-philosophic principles of the Roman Church, to which all Catholics "are bound to give interior assent." They form, then, the doctrinal basis of Catholic Action.

Yet their foundation is a logical fallacy. It introduces a conception of metaphysical certainty into a sphere where such certainty cannot exist. How can the State—an organisation of fallible men—know that such-and-such metaphysical doctrines are infallibly true? It can have no such knowledge—but, if it has no such knowledge, how can it have a right to impose on citizens such doctrines as true, and repress others? Many of the maxims stated by the Popes—such as that we should be guided by truth and goodness—are, apart from their context, quite just, and even may seem to be so obvious as to be moral platitudes. It is their context, however, which spoils them. The Papal teachings ignore the free search for truth by the candid intellect, and aim at imposing truth (or what is assumed to be truth) by an imperious visible organisation. That ideal has always led to tyranny and has also lessened the appreciation of truth itself: which requires, for its discovery, a free, fair field of search.

Some remarks must be added here as to Papal teaching on three important social matters:

JAPANESE STRATEGY AND AIMS.

TO the outside world, the Far East is in chaos and confusion. To the Japanese, there is ordered movement. For behind the screen of trenchant and elusive phrases, beneath the turbulence of emotions and the shock of battle, there is a plan—and the plan is Japanese. In it, military, political, and economic strategy are all parts of a larger strategy for Japanese expansion and ultimate hegemony in eastern Asia. Each is clearly reflected in the events now taking place, as, with consummate realism, the "Sons of Heaven" press forward toward the achievement of their "manifest destiny." It is the continuation of an historical process. But never before have such large stakes been chosen, nor such grave risks incurred.

The essential features of Japanese strategy are apparent to any close student of Far Eastern affairs. On the military front, two campaigns are being waged at once, both with forces superior in mechanised equipment to the Chinese who oppose them. The northern campaign began with an advantage in that Tientsin, principal port of north China, and the surrounding portion of eastern Hopei were already under Japanese military domination. With a series of quick, decisive moves, the area was extended to include Peking, the remaining Great Wall passes to the north, and terminal sections of trunk railways to the south-west and north-west. These railways are of immense importance from a military standpoint, and it is along these that the northern campaign is being pushed forward in a double wedge with Japanese forces which probably outnumber those operating at Shanghai. The Hankow line, to the south-west, provides the only arterial transport by which Chinese reinforcements and supplies can be sent from central China to the northern front. Control of the other railway which runs through the Nankou pass and Kalgan north-westward into Suiyuan is even more important, as a means of checking any flanking movement through Jehol into Manchuria by the Suiyuan forces of Fu Tso-yi, or by passionately anti-Japanese troops formerly under the command of Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, or by the even more determined and ruggedly disciplined Red Army whose present foothold is in the north-west. The Peiping-Suiyuan (Ping-Sui) line is also the only

means, other than through Manchuria, whereby effective communication might conceivably be set up between China and Soviet Russia. While these thrusts are taking place, defences are being strengthened south of Tientsin, especially along the Tientsin-Pukow railway which links north China with Nanking and Shanghai.

These movements have long been expected, it having been understood ever since Doihara's abortive attempt to inaugurate a Five-Province Autonomy for north China that the Japanese military desired to establish a buffer area separating China proper from Manchuria and Soviet Russia; the question was largely one of time.

But the initiation simultaneously of a major offensive at Shanghai reveals aims of a larger dimension, the attempted execution of which has been hastened by the course of developments within China. During the past two or three years, Japan has been forced to change her view of China as a vast and sprawling nation rendered politically impotent by the jealous rivalries of autonomous warlords. Without great fanfare, and with rare strategic acumen, Chiang Kai-shek has been relentlessly welding together under his personal leadership the vast agglomerate of China's military organisation. The quick suppression of the Fukien revolt (in which Japanese were suspected of back-stage involvement) revealed a decision and strength on the part of Nanking that were totally unexpected. The Kwangsi rebellion of last summer was tactically managed in such a way as to discredit altogether the insurgent chiefs and to solidify the support of the Nanking government.

Most important of all perhaps, as indicative of a changing China, was the lesson and the fruit of the fifty-five-day kidnapping of Generalissimo Chiang in November and December. The lesson: that the country was behind the Chiang régime to a degree hitherto unrecognised. It did not break up into a dozen factions; it clearly indicated, through the spontaneous demand for and jubilation after his release, that in Chiang Kai-shek the nation saw its chief, if not its only, hope of a united strength capable of checking the invader. The fruit: an effective settlement, not only with the "recalcitrant" generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng who stood for war with Japan and cessation of the anti-Communist campaign, but also with the Communists themselves. For ten years, since the rupture of 1927, the

Marriage.—"As, then, marriage is holy by its own power, in its own nature, and of itself, it ought not to be regulated and administered by the will of civil rulers, but by the divine authority of the [Roman Catholic] Church, which alone in sacred matters has the office of teaching" (Leo, *Arcanum*). Any union between a man and a woman, if contrary to the rules of the Roman Church, "has not the force and nature of a proper marriage. Although contracted according to State laws, it cannot be more than a rite or custom introduced by the civil law" (*Arcanum*). By the decree *Ne Temere* of Pius X (1907) no "mixed marriage" (of Catholics and non-Catholics) is valid except on the stringent conditions of Roman canon-law. "Non-Catholics who contract amongst themselves" are exempt from that requirement; but the exception is an act of condescension, and could be abrogated.

Education.—"Education belongs pre-eminently to the [Roman Catholic] Church, by reason of a double title in the supernatural order, conferred exclusively upon her by God Himself"; and to that mission "there is no power on earth that may lawfully offer opposition or impede its path" (Pius XI, *Rappresentanti*: December 31st, 1929).

The Catholic Clergy and the Civil Law.—In October 1911, Pope Pius X issued a *Motu proprio* decree, *Quantavis Diligentiâ*, on "the civil constitution of the clergy." It declared it to be an offence incurring excommunication *latæ sententiæ*, reserved to the Pope, "for any private person, layman or cleric, male or female, without permission of ecclesiastical authority, to cite before a lay court any ecclesiastical persons whomsoever, either in a criminal or in a civil case." This, of course, is the old "immunity of the clergy."

It will be seen that there are grave possibilities of confusion in the State from these ecclesiastical laws of marriage, education, and clerical immunity. Of course, the Papal encyclicals do not confine themselves to the enunciation of basic principles. They go on also to advance specific suggestions on particular social problems; and in so doing they put forward some excellent proposals and proclaim some lofty humanitarian ideals. Leo advocated better distribution of wealth, and, in fact, a considerable degree of social amelioration. Unfortunately, however, he (and it has been so also with his successors) was so preoccupied with opposing

Socialism and Liberalism that his reforming suggestions had little fruit, while his hostility to the "Left" parties tended to rally Catholicism on the side of Conservatism, and on the Continent Conservatism of a bad type. Furthermore, the ameliorative suggestions were subject to the narrow ideals of a dominance of clericalism, as shown above.

Catholic Action is as yet but in its initial stages of development; but it is far enough advanced for it to be possible for some estimate to be made of its prospects. It (*Action Catholique*) is vigorous in France. In Germany it is fatally restricted by the all-pervading Hitler dictatorship. In Portugal, the semi-clerical dictatorship, being favourable to the Church, allows it full scope. In Spain, prior to the civil war, it was very vigorous. To quote an English Catholic paper (*The Tablet*, October 17th, 1936): "All the enterprises and organisations of pious, social, or apostolic character are powerful aids to [Spanish] Catholic Action, but it alone stands solely for the organised work of the laity." In Italy the Mussolini dictatorship lies heavily on all independent efforts at organisation, but, as a result of the Concordat of 1929 and the compromise-settlement of the dispute which followed it, Catholic Action has some modicum of liberty. In Austria, since the setting up of a semi-clerical dictatorship in 1934, it has full scope. "Following the enactment of the new Austrian Constitution, the Concordat between Austria and the Holy See was ratified by President Miklas, in the presence of the Papal Nuncio, shortly before midnight on May Day (1934). . . . It binds the Austrian Government to give full liberty of organisation and activity to the associations forming part of Catholic Action." Under Cardinal Innitzer, Archbishop of Vienna, the organisation is proceeding apace, favoured by the militarist political despotism.

At Whitsuntide, 1934, a joint pastoral-letter was issued by the Roman Catholic archbishops and bishops of England and Wales, announcing their intention to set up "a Board of Catholic Action consisting of the members of the hierarchy of England and Wales under the presidency of His Eminence the Cardinal-Archbishop of Westminster," to have oversight and control of all the Catholic societies in the country. The Cardinal-Archbishop (Dr. Bourne) died on December 31st, 1934; but his successor (Archbishop Hinsley) followed his precedent by promoting energetically Catholic Action.

government had been carrying on an intermittent campaign to "exterminate" the Reds—a civil warfare as fruitless as it was costly, for the Communists, toughened by untold hardships during their epochal march from Kiangsi westward through Szechuan and then north, were now more firmly entrenched than ever in the far north-west, their prestige enhanced, particularly among a section of the youth of the country, by their social programme and their reputation for action. In the dispossessed North-eastern (Manchurian) Army of Chang Hsueh-liang and the under-fed North-western Army of Yang Hu-cheng, they found a fertile field for propaganda and an intense sharing of their anti-Japanese sentiments. It was refusal by these armies to march against the Communists when ordered to do so that precipitated the kidnapping of the Generalissimo.

Both Chiang and the Communist leaders had been gaining new insights which, during the fifty-five-day captivity, were borne in upon them as, for the first time, they met face to face. The futility of the anti-Communist campaign and its divisive, rather than unifying, influence were impressed upon the Generalissimo as never before. The Reds, in their turn, had realised the small political gains attending their ten years of struggle; moreover, in their developing ideology, the most imperative necessity for China's future freedom and self-determination was to check now the inflowing tide of Japanese imperialism. Being themselves realists, they saw that there was little hope of this being achieved except under the leadership of Chiang. Accordingly, in return for a cessation of civil warfare, they were prepared to submerge their insistence upon the class struggle during a period when, under a united command, preparations could go forward promptly against the day of reckoning with the invader. From that meeting came a new mutual respect between Chiang and the Communists, and it was Chou En-lai, Red leader, who insisted upon Chiang's release. The settlement reached was unpopular among certain groups in Nanking, and its terms were obscured by a cloud of conflicting reports, face-saving, and propaganda. The best evidence of its results is to be found in the cessation of the anti-Red campaign, and in a further stiffening, since January, in Nanking's response to Japanese demands.

This long digression is necessary in order to show why the Japanese deem it necessary to strike now, not only in north

China, but also at the fountain-head of military and political organisation in China: the lower Yangtze valley. What the Japanese most fear in China is the rise of a broad people's movement capable of giving organised resistance to the realisation of their military, political, and economic aims; any such movement is to them "Communistic." So long as Nanking, undergirded by small minority owning classes, was ready to undertake the task of suppressing Communism and, under that name, all anti-Japanese movements, it was to Japan's interest to keep the existing government in power, while preventing it from becoming too strong through affiliations and assistance from other powers. But once that government reached an understanding, however vague, with the Communists and other openly anti-Japanese groups, thus raising the spectre of a popular anti-Japanese front, once that government and the people revealed a stiffening morale never before seen, and once it appeared that bids for foreign capital and mounting imports of aeroplanes and artillery were by no means for internal "pacification," it became abundantly clear to the Japanese military mind that the foundations must be cut out from under the Nanking government—by drastic military action if necessary—and a régime initiated which could be "co-operative" and "sincere" in its dealings with Japan.

The Shanghai action was presaged by fresh demands at Nanking, the withdrawal of Japanese citizenry from the interior, and the approval in Tokyo of large new appropriations. The occasion was furnished by the fate of two Japanese who, in a tense period, endeavoured to force their way into a Chinese aerodrome.

Shanghai is the commercial and financial nerve centre of the Yangtze valley upon which are concentrated some 200 million of China's population. Through it passed last year more than half of the total foreign trade of China. In it are concentrated the three government banks as well as a strong group of Chinese and foreign private banks. Its industries are far ahead of those in any other Chinese city. Through Shanghai have come military and other supplies from abroad, and here have been collected a substantial portion of the customs duties which constitute Nanking's principal source of revenue. Shanghai connects by rail with Nanking, the seat of government, and Hangchow, an important provincial military and

At Advent, 1936, a second joint-pastoral was issued, confirming the establishment of the Board and setting forth in some detail its programme. Dr. W. J. O'Donovan, formerly Conservative M.P. for Mile End (and who at a former election had ousted a Catholic Labour member, Mr. John Scurr), was appointed lay-president. In Scotland also Catholic Action is being vigorously forwarded. In the Irish Free State it is the power behind the "Christian Front," whose main object seems to be opposition to "Left" political tendencies.

Catholic Action has incalculable possibilities for the future. While recognising its good points, however, one cannot but feel disquiet on account of the intolerant and reactionary ideals of the Papal teaching which is to inspire its activities.

J. W. POYNTER.

NOTE.—The foregoing article was written before the issue, by the present Pope in the third week of March, of two encyclicals, one addressed to the entire Catholic episcopate on "Atheistic Communism," and the other to the bishops of Germany on Nazi oppression of the Church. Those encyclicals confirm the argument of this article. The Pope denounces Nazi tyranny—for it injures the Roman Catholic Church. At the same time, however, he is an ally of Italian Fascism, and fails to censure its militarist activities. The weakness of the Papal attitude is that it is not really favourable to liberty, but desires clerical ascendancy first and foremost.

Two interesting books have just been published: *The Papacy in Politics To-day*, by Joseph McCabe (Watts), and *The Pope in Politics*, by William Teeling (Lovat Dickson). The first is by a writer strongly opposed to Catholicism; but the other is by a Catholic. The remarkable fact is, however, that they agree (though with different degrees of stress) that a characteristic of Pius XI's pontificate is an undue favouring of anti-democratic Fascism: a tendency Mr. Teeling seems to think likely to have serious consequences.

THE RECOVERY OF SOUTH AMERICA.

AS is the case with the rest of the world, South America has changed greatly within less than a generation. It was in 1909 that I visited the country, and at that time it was generally believed that the Continent had left behind its troubles, which had been a byword during the first seventy years of the history of the Republics, and had entered upon a long era of prosperity and stability. But these expectations were by no means fully realised.

It was chiefly the War that brought about the change, although the Continent was not directly concerned in it, all the Republics being either professedly neutral or practically so. As was natural, they benefited greatly during the period of hostilities. But the outstanding feature of that period was the immense expansion of the trade of the United States and their capital investments. During the War and the next few following years the United States' investments in South America increased from a comparatively small amount to eight hundred millions sterling. They stepped into the position of Great Britain, who, greatly aided by her invested capital and the ownership of railways, had been easily first in the trade of the most important countries. Since the War the position has been reversed, although we have made up a considerable amount of lost ground.

Now Argentina and the other countries found themselves in closer contact with the outside world and compelled for good or evil to react to it in a far greater measure than before. The termination of hostilities was followed by "unrest" and, in some cases, by dangerous insurrections in certain parts of Europe and Asia, and South America shared in these troubles. In the populous city of Buenos Aires, which receives great numbers of immigrants from Europe, there are always smouldering dangerous tendencies, due to Communists, Anarchists, and more or less chronic discontent with the Government. Towards the end of 1918 a serious rising took place in the capital, which was vigorously suppressed, but not until a thousand persons had been killed or wounded.

Unfortunately the plague of turbulence did not subside when the world began to resume its usual course. Peru had several revolutions and Chile was by no means tranquil. In 1930 there was civil war in Brazil and the result amounted

financial centre. From the great port city, battleships can steam up the broad Yangtze to Nanking, Nanchang, Wuchang, Hankow—strategic centres in the heart of the area wherein Chinese political and military unity are most complete. Military observers from abroad have long suspected that Japan's main movement in a general war would be through Shantung toward central China. When the issue at Shanghai has been decided, it is not improbable that such a movement will occur.

Political strategy has entered into the timing of these military movements. As heretofore, Japan has chosen well a moment when the chances of international interference are at a minimum. The Soviet army is preoccupied with internal purging and reorganisation. A test case—the sinking of a Russian gunboat in the Amur River—yielded satisfactory evidence that the Bear's growl was gentler than usual. Great Britain is too intimately concerned with the Spanish conflict, her Mediterranean interests, and European politics generally, to risk much in the Far East. The United States, with its neutrality legislation and growing isolationist sentiment, is not likely to go further than moral pronouncements. At least, that is the way it looks to the realists in Tokyo. With China growing more united politically and time in her favour, there might never be a better opportunity than now.

No less important a factor, I think, in determining the military to engage in a foreign campaign at this time, was Japan's own internal political and economic situation. During a period of crisis the Japanese, a practical, disciplined, military-minded people, are capable of acting as one. But during a time of quiescence, when policies are in the making, factional differences can become deep and bitter. Such a time it has been during the past winter and spring.

The principal line of cleavage fell between two potent groups of industrialists. The magnates of heavy industry (which centred about the armaments industry), with the powerful alliance of army and navy, were in favour of a strong Asiatic policy, not so much for the sake of immediate armaments profits as in order to ensure sources of raw material and ultimate markets. The magnates of light industry, on the other hand, with the support of civil authorities and public opinion generally, favoured a more moderate policy which would not endanger Japanese expansion in world markets and would,

incidentally, reduce the crushing fiscal burden of armaments. The first group favoured an increasingly centralised military dictatorship in Japan and economic organisation of the country along fascist lines. The second group favoured a continuation of parliamentary government. The slaying, on February 26th, of several Cabinet members did not heal the breach. Opposition to the government grew until, at the elections, it was defeated at the polls. The Hayashi Cabinet, it will be recalled, refused to resign. Although Prince Konoye eventually replaced Hayashi as Premier, with a reorganised Cabinet, the first group still held the power. But the situation was serious. Something must be done to bring the nation, as one man, to the support of the government. It was about this time that an "incident" occurred near Peking. And the economic life of Japan is now being placed on a war basis. It may be taken for granted that every means is being used to swing dissident groups into line, and to engender and maintain among the whole population that almost religious patriotism of which the Japanese are so eminently capable.

Underlying military movements and foreign and domestic political strategy are economic aims which, to my mind, are the ultimate determinants in Japan's Asiatic policy. As a young and energetic capitalist economy, Japan was late in entering upon the world scene. The areas of the earth's surface wherein raw materials were abundant had largely been pre-empted by the Great Powers of the western hemisphere. These same powers had an entrenched foothold in world markets—even those of China where their commercial interests were protected by a system of treaties and concessions and by a concerted Open Door policy.

During the World War, Japan saw her chance and launched the famous Twenty-One Demands. Since that time, her policy *vis-à-vis* China has clearly been informed by the needs of a growing commercialism and industrialism. This history is complicated and cannot be entered into here. It may suffice to recall that in 1931, with the world in the toils of a major depression, Manchuria was taken. During the Abyssinian conflict, a less successful attempt was made to segregate north China. Now, at a new juncture in world affairs, a new effort is being made—this time far more ambitious than any hitherto attempted. Its aim appears to be no less than the

to a revolution. Later there was a long and sanguinary war between Bolivia and Paraguay over a boundary dispute, that prolific cause of bloodshed in South America. Indeed, while it would be too much to say that the clock has been put back sixty years, there has been too much resemblance to the conditions of the 'seventies; and disastrous revolutions, the curse of the new nations in the nineteenth century, which, it was believed, were things of the past, keep recurring in a mitigated form. Communism is partly responsible; the Communists pay particular attention to propaganda in South America.

In the programme of the Third International several South American countries are named and pronounced not to be in the "capitalist industrial stage." They, therefore, require special treatment. "The principal task in such countries is, on the one hand, to fight against the feudalism and pre-capitalist forms of exploitation and systematically to develop the peasant agrarian revolution; on the other hand, to fight against foreign imperialism for national development." It is easy to see what mischief such activities are likely to effect, particularly in view of the close connection between Buenos Aires and Barcelona, which is infested with Anarchists and, to a lesser extent, with Communists. However, the Bolivia-Paraguay war is now over, and during the last few years there have been no serious disturbances. Venezuela, which was credited with fifty revolutions in the first ninety years of her history, has enjoyed nearly thirty years of tolerable government and prosperity—a fine record for a Latin-American State. The chief problems are economic.

As we have said, the demands of the belligerents during the War for South American products brought great wealth to the Republics, but within three years of the Armistice there was a sharp check, which was followed by a gradual recovery. Then came the world-wide slump which now seems to be passing away. No part of the world felt it more than Latin America, and its position was made worse by the policy of nationalism and protection which was adopted by almost every nation. Even the raw products, which formed an overwhelming proportion of the exports, were not easy to sell. Some nations protect wool, or wheat, and impose a tariff against meat of every description. The depression, of course, lessened the demand for minerals and metals, and thus the trade of the Republics was hard hit in every direction.

As regards the exports of Argentina, the year 1930 showed a falling-off of 33 per cent. as compared with the previous year. The value of her exports to Great Britain in 1933 was forty-one millions sterling, as against eighty-two millions in 1929. It is obvious that such a falling-off meant hard times in the country. Brazil fared no better. In 1929 the exports were a little over eighty-six millions sterling; in 1933 they were under thirty-six millions. Of course the trade of the two Republics with Great Britain shared in the shrinkage, which, however, was not quite so pronounced. Both these countries are now making a good recovery. Chile used to be in a peculiarly fortunate position. This Republic had a monopoly in nitrate, practically all the mines of that commodity being situated in its territory. The bleak Nitrate Pampa was a source of apparently perennial wealth. The export tax produced far more revenue than all the other imports combined. But these happy conditions did not last. For many years past there has been chronic distress in the industry. When there is a depression in world trade, the demand for nitrate slackens, and other causes have contributed to depreciate Chile's main industry. A few years ago the President urged the people to develop agriculture "to make good the losses to the country caused by the chaos in the nitrate industry." Over-production is an ever-present trouble. Just as Brazil has contrived numbers of valorisation schemes to keep up the price and check the production of coffee, so Chile has attempted the same task with nitrate, and the industry is constantly "reorganised." There is a sad falling-off in Chilean prosperity. The financial deterioration of the country may be judged by the fact that the 6 per cent. Government Stock is now quoted at about 23-24.

Peru has never recovered from the disastrous war with Chile in the 'eighties, when she lost her nitrate territory. Happily, the dispute over Arica-Tacuna, which had estranged the two Republics for nearly half a century, was satisfactorily settled in 1929. The settlement followed very closely the lines recommended in these columns a few years before. But there is seldom anything satisfactory to say of Peru. Her financial position is always precarious, and insurrections occur frequently. Not long ago there was a brief war with Colombia. Dictators and Communists between them are a cause of bloodshed. This is unfortunate, for the Peruvians are a

establishment once and for all of Japanese political and economic domination in China.

And what may Japan hope to gain from such a conquest? She may hope for quick and needed cash returns from control of the railways, and may confidently expect such returns from the control and systematic sale of narcotics. More important, from an economic standpoint, are resources which she hopes to tap. Geological survey of China's raw materials has not been completed, but it is known that there are extensive coal deposits, particularly in the north and north-west, which have never been properly exploited; that iron, though limited, would be of value in augmenting Japan's meagre store; that deposits of oil and oil shale would lessen her dependence upon other nations for petroleum; that with other minerals the China mainland is well endowed. Moreover, a control over Chinese economic policies would ensure the production in quantity and at low cost of such greatly needed raw materials as cotton.

Even more alluring, in the light of Japan's immediate needs, is the prospect of controlling a market with more than 400 million people, fixing the terms upon which other nations can participate in its trade. The importance of this aim to Japan has already been reflected in the north China smuggling and in attempts recently made to exact tariff concessions in favour of the island empire. No one realised better than the Japanese, to be sure, the way in which the China market is limited by the low purchasing power of the masses. It is also true, however, that no nation is better equipped to exploit such a market through the production of a wide range of consumption goods. Political control would obviate greatly, so it seems, the difficulties of such exploitation.

There are, moreover, within Japan, economic as well as political reasons for drastic action at this time. The remarkable gains in Japanese industries and shipping since the beginning of the World War and especially during the recent depression have been achieved at a heavy cost in State subsidy; this burden has been augmented by an unprecedented growth in armaments in an attempt to match strength with the Powers who might interfere with Japan's continental aspirations. Manchuria, furthermore, has not yet come up to expectations. Its administration to date has been more costly than fruitful. The net result of these

influences has been a steady rise in taxes and bonded indebtedness to a point extremely burdensome; impartial observers have been wondering how much longer it could continue. Matters were not helped, during the past year, by an adverse trade balance, while social unrest—unfailing barometer of economic strain—became increasingly evident.

In the face of this situation, two main lines of policy were advocated. The one involved economy, continued trade competition in world markets, the cultivation of more favourable trade relationships with China. The other, far more drastic, involved rigid reorganisation and control of the national economy, continued armament expansion, and the assumption if necessary of present risks in order to achieve large gains for the future. The latter policy has won, but it is certain that there are in Japan heads that shake slowly with disapproval and apprehension.

It would be premature at this time to dwell upon other aspects of Japanese policy and strategy—social, religious, and cultural—which would follow upon a military and political conquest of China. But the nature of such policies might reasonably be inferred from demonstrations that have already been furnished in Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria.

Thus, at a moment when foreign intervention seems least likely, Japan now endeavours to deliver a smashing blow at Chinese unification and self-determination under independent rule, to achieve a definite advantage over other Powers in the China sphere, and to realise economic aims which, under present conditions, are hindered. In the minds of military men, there is little doubt that ambitious dreams of empire are often commingled with the desire to achieve these more tangible results. To the attainment of their objectives are brought redoubtable resources in equipment, man-power, war morale, and practical ability. With characteristic realism, the Japanese have estimated their chances and entered upon a bold move.

If, as difficulties mount, the Japanese endeavour to extricate themselves with as much dignity and gain as possible from the Shanghai campaign and consolidate their position in the north, then that is one matter. But if, as recent developments would seem to indicate, they mean to carry through to a finish a war in the lower Yangtze valley

polished and charming people, and Lima is the pleasantest capital in South America. In common with Venezuela, Colombia has turned over a new leaf in the present century. Trade has greatly increased and disturbances have been infrequent. In the dispute with Peru, Colombia was pronounced by the League of Nations to be in the right, and the affair was speedily settled.

Boundary disputes are one of the main causes of the unenviable reputation which South America used to have for chronic wars. It should be said that in many cases neither party can be blamed, for the old Spanish provinces had imperfectly defined boundaries, and much of the territory was unexplored and unsurveyed. Either claimant could produce maps, charts, and documents which upheld its point of view and confuted the opponent. It is the sensibility for national honour rather than material interest that makes the peoples obstinate. I was in Lima when the news came that a vast slice of territory disputed by Colombia had been awarded to Peru. A prominent Peruvian told me that the territory would be of no use to them as they had not the means to develop it. Much of the land, which is the subject of these boundary disputes, has little present value, being merely a breeding-ground for savage Indians and innumerable animal and insect pests. It may be mentioned that a generation ago the brother of a President of Colombia was eaten by cannibals.

But, in some cases, the boundary question is of great moment. Bolivia, joining with Peru in the war against Chile, lost Antofagasta, thus being left without a sea coast. A port has often been promised to her, but the promise has never been kept. Bolivia's justification in the late destructive war with Paraguay was her urgent necessity for a port on the great river, which lay in the disputed territory, but Paraguay refused to accommodate her in any way and is undoubtedly responsible for the war.

We thus see that the history of South America during the last twenty years has been by no means cloudless. Now, however, the prospect seems to be brighter than ever before; prosperity is returning, and, if the countries will follow the Brazilian heraldic motto, "Order and Liberty," the happier conditions of the first decade of the century should return. Argentina has always been the most flourishing of the Republics in modern times. The export of wheat averages

four million tons annually, and that of maize is considerably greater. The wheat acreage is larger than that of Australia. The yearly value of the wool produced is about seven millions sterling. Our country receives from the Republic annually chilled beef worth seventeen millions. The Argentine pastoralists have long been enterprising in improving their bloodstock, and give high prices for bulls and rams.

Until recent years all the products entered our country duty free, but recently it was considered that, whereas Argentina took but a comparatively small amount of our goods and Australia and other Dominions were much better customers and also were anxious to develop their meat exports—thus we began a process of limitation by quotas and duties. This policy was necessarily most unpopular with the Argentinos. The matter has been under discussion for some time, and it has been decided to place a small duty on foreign beef. It is to be hoped that the system of quotas will be definitely abolished. They restrict trade, irritate everybody, and do not bring in a penny to the revenue. The Argentine Government is beginning to realise that the English market is worth retaining, and have granted our importers some advantages, but our trade reports state that these are very small, and they are, of course, resented by the community. The fiscal system is rigidly protectionist. When I was in Buenos Aires, the Consul told me that whenever anyone starts a new industry, however small, he goes to Congress and asks for an increase upon the articles which he manufactures.

Shortsightedness is the bane of public opinion in South America. Although foreigners have been responsible for the industrial prosperity of the countries, and the English are personally popular, both politicians and people view the proceedings of their benefactors with grudging suspicion. The far-seeing ones are in the minority, although highly placed, but they are largely dependent upon the suffrages of the multitude. Sir Stephen Killik remarks: "The position is, of course, well understood by the leaders of political thought in Argentina, and it is improbable that the export trade on which the commercial life of the country depends will for much longer be permitted to be jeopardised by uninstructed opinion."

One of the main factors in progress has been the splendid railway system. Less than a century ago cattle were killed for

as well as in north China, then the question would seem to be whether Japanese realism has gone far enough in estimating its chances.

It is sometimes remarked that the Japanese as a race lack imagination. The statement needs qualification, but it does seem to be true that they have failed to grasp the full import of changes in Chinese psychology since 1931. After the loss of Manchuria, lethargy and deep discouragement verging on despair characterised political opinion in China. Gradually the realisation was borne in upon it that, in order to preserve her freedom, China must pull together and rely upon her own efforts. Gradually, in response to unending pressure from without, political breaches were closed within. A new and deeper nationalism was being welded, and with it a new hope and determination. This movement and spirit, gathering momentum, have been particularly marked during the past two years. Despite all the crossing currents of opinion, one living in China could not help but feel it. It influenced and was influenced by an increasingly stable government. After the kidnapping and release of Chiang, even those groups that had been most critical of his internal militarism and external temporising, swung into line with their support, in the hope that the time was indeed approaching when China would *k'an erh*—i.e. resist Japan.

Events of the past weeks have raised that spirit to a high pitch for a people so vast, so unorganised on a large scale, and, for the most part, so poverty-stricken as the Chinese. The realisation has come among them that they are struggling for their "salvation" as a nation free from foreign domination. In the present struggle are evidenced qualities which hardly come within the typical Japanese portrait of Chinese character. All of which means that the war, if the Japanese military mean to carry it through, will be a long one. It will not end with the capture of strategic points, nor even with the lull of temporary compromise. The difficulties encountered, and not yet surmounted, in subduing the 30 million people of Manchuria, will be multiplied manifold in the effort to subjugate China, or even a portion of China, and to inaugurate there a régime of their own choosing.

The longer the period of conquest, the greater the strain upon an already over-burdened population at home. Making full allowance for the surprising resilience and endurance of

a nation at war, it is yet a question how long it will be before acute financial distress and social tension make themselves insistently felt in the homeland. Japan's feet are not of clay, but neither are they of iron.

It may also be questioned whether the Japanese military may not have underestimated the possibilities of foreign interference. Russia's military and political shake-up may not continue indefinitely, and substantial assistance to Manchurian Volunteers, Chinese Reds, or even Chinese main forces, is not altogether impossible. Great Britain, the United States, France, and other nations may wish to protect their own trade interests in China to the extent, at least, of denying munitions and credits to the aggressor. Such influences, in a long campaign, will make themselves increasingly felt. The possibilities of further involvement exist, and they will grow rather than diminish with the protraction of hostilities.

For China, the consequences of the conflict are even more significant than they are for Japan—a fact which is sometimes overlooked. No country in the world has greater and more difficult internal problems: economic, political, educational, and social. Only recently has there begun to emerge that semblance of political and administrative unity necessary to the initiation of constructive policies on a large scale. Only recently has "reconstruction" become the watchword of a growing body of social-minded and technically trained workers. To have that process checked, to have a period of unutterable chaos in which the existing order was upset and displaced by another under which primary, if not sole, loyalties must be to the interests of Japan, would be to China a cruel blow. Granting all the difficulties and weaknesses of Chinese administration during a difficult period of transition, it is, from the Chinese standpoint, infinitely preferable to a régime which, while it did endeavour to maintain peace and order, would so mould the economic and social organisation as to make China subservient to the interests of Japan—and keep her there.

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their hides and the carcase was left to rot on the ground, because there was no means of preserving or transporting the meat. Now, the fine estancias and well-bred cattle are the main feature of the Republic. If beef failed, Argentina would be semi-bankrupt. And it has been the railways which have created and maintained this vital trade. Great Britain has invested hundreds of millions of pounds in them, and they are among the best managed in the world. But they have fallen upon bad times. The difficulties in working the railways at a profit, or even without serious loss, have long been almost insuperable. Sir Stephen Killik points to returning confidence and improved business, but adds: "Unfortunately the holders of Argentine Railway Securities, so far from having participated in this improvement, still find themselves in the case of all but the best secured of the prior charge stocks without interest on their investment, the capital value of which has, in most cases, largely disappeared." The Buenos Aires & Pacific, which linked the Atlantic with the Pacific, has paid nothing on its Ordinary or Preference shares for six or seven years. The Central Argentine a few years ago contrived to pay 2½ per cent. on its Preference. The most important of all, the Great Southern, is paying dividends on its 5 and 6 per cent. Preferences, but for a long time the Ordinary has yielded nothing. The Cordoba Central is not always able to pay interest on its debentures. The depreciation of the paper peso has greatly aggravated the difficulties. Sir Stephen complains of the refusal of the authorities to lighten the burdens, for the reasons already referred to: "the Government appears disinclined to risk any possible disturbance of the political atmosphere." It must be said for Argentina that she respects definite obligations. *The Times* recently commended the punctuality of the Government in meeting its liabilities. The 4 per cents. stand at about par. Certainly Argentina has least cause of all South American Republics to feel anxious about the future.

Brazil seems to have got over her internal troubles and is largely developing the export of raw cotton. But her share in the world's production of coffee, although still enormous, is diminishing. Owing chiefly to the coffee exports, she has what is usually known as a favourable balance of trade. This vast state teems with undeveloped wealth. The possibility of exploiting it depends, of course, on the confidence which she

is able to inspire in foreign investors. Chile's foreign trade is making progress and nitrate is improving. It could be wished, however, that the Republic would pay some regard to financial method. Even in its most prosperous days waste and mismanagement abounded, and the currency was in a bad state. Things are now infinitely worse. As we have seen, credit is at a low ebb. The Chileans are the most industrious people of the Continent, and the educated classes are highly intelligent. But when I was in the country, I heard much of public mismanagement and self-seeking. The politicians were held in complete contempt. Good and disinterested government is an urgent necessity. Peru is making a recovery and confidence is said to be growing. A notable feature is the development of German trade, German exports actually exceeding those from our own country. Before the War that country was quite as formidable a trade rival to us as the United States, and there is little doubt that she will take an increasing share in South American trade.

We may, on the whole, take a hopeful view of the Continent. The smaller Republics, which we have hardly had space to notice, are in better order than ever before, and all have nearly thrown off the ill-effects of the depression. Tranquillity and intelligent management of public affairs and the encouragement and safeguarding of capital, are conditions upon which it is possible to found permanent prosperity.

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THE DEAD CITY OF SOUTHERN FRANCE.

GR EAT consternation has been caused among lovers of the picturesque in France by the announcement that Les Baux, the most curious of all the natural and architectural marvels of Provence, is coveted by the military authorities, with the object of establishing there a gigantic depot for explosives and asphyxiating gases. An appeal is being made to the Ministry of Fine Arts, so that immediate steps may be taken to protect these relics of the Middle Ages.

This dead city of Southern France, which some archæologists have claimed is worthy to be ranked with Herculaneum and Pompeii, this former home of the troubadours, and the many ancient monuments to be found in the Avignon and St. Rémy region are too often forgotten by travellers whilst on their precipitate journey to the Mediterranean coast. They are among the finest examples of the architecture of the period to be found in the whole of France, if not of Italy. . . . Who, especially when so near as St. Rémy, could resist the temptation of pushing on towards the hilly district where the Alps begin to rise from the plain of the Rhône, there to come face to face, with dramatic unexpectedness, with the fortress and Dead City of Les Baux? To make that journey by carriage (as I myself did), starting out from St. Rémy early some summer morning, slowly mounting the winding roadway amidst a landscape of grey rocks, vineyards, plantations of almond trees, stunted vegetation, and lavender bushes until one reaches the top of the mountain and, passing through a cleft in a huge boulder, comes suddenly within sight of the rocky wilderness beyond which Les Baux stands, lonely and deserted, is one of the unforgettable experiences of a lifetime.

A crumbling fortress stands on the top of a rocky height, and beneath it are the ruins of the town, overlooking a huge amphitheatre of soft limestone rocks, out of which enormous blocks have been cut by local quarrymen. In spite of the southern sunshine and the clear Provençal atmosphere, the whole scene is so full of the spirit of a civilisation long since dead and buried that one's mind is impressed in much the same way as it is by a passage from Dante's *Inferno*. . . . To think that in the tenth century this place was one of the largest towns of the country, and that over a long period it

was the seat of a famous Court of Love; that in the thirteenth century the Lords of Les Baux were the proud possessors of seventy-nine free burghs; that they were among the most powerful barons of Provence, being in turn Counts of that country, Princes of Orange, Kings of Arles and Vienne, and even Emperors of Constantinople; that they commanded fleets and armies, distinguished themselves as Crusaders and rendered valuable assistance to Charles of Anjou in his conquest of Naples! A truly impressive picture of departed glory is this Dead City of the Midi and its ruins, which necessarily, according to Chateaubriand, exercise a "secret attraction" over all men, because of "the fragility of our nature," and "the secret conformity between these shattered monuments and the rapidity of our existence."

The standard history of Les Baux was written by Jules Canonge, who was the first to make clear the importance of the part played by the town in the annals of the country, the attraction it has for travellers, and how, while exalting the imagination of artists, it offers abundant food for the curiosity of archæologists, whose "learned sagacity is often irritated and confounded" thereby. Certainly one's first glimpse and examination of the ruins are calculated to provoke astonishment and the wildest conjecture.

This remarkable place is by no means a solitary example of a southern French town overtaken by decay and death. There are others which the reader will find described exhaustively in Charles Lenthéric's *Les Villes Mortes du Golfe de Lyon*, a most excellent book which was published in 1876. But the ancient capital of the Lords of Les Baux is unique in this respect, that it is a town not *built* but, to a great extent, *excavated* out of the rock. One finds, after ascending to the castle through the almost deserted streets of the portion of the town constructed in the ordinary way, that the walls are composed of solid rock, the superfluous material being cast away both inside and outside. David Macgibbon, the author of that admirable work *The Architecture of Provence and the Riviera*, puts forward the suggestion that some of the great chiefs of the family of Les Baux may have adopted this idea from examples of rock-hewn temples, tombs, and other buildings they saw in the Holy Land. But it may well be that the first Lords of Les Baux, including the earliest known member of the dynasty, Count Leibulfe, who lived at the end of the

THE TWO BOSTONS. }

NO part of England has remained so unchanged through many changing centuries as the wolds of Lincolnshire ; there, in some two hundred villages, the population is numerically much the same as recorded in the Domesday Book, while the manor house has often been occupied by the same family for hundreds of years. In the fens it is different : the drainage of two centuries has permitted intensive cultivation, and the country is prosperous, full of a new life; and inhabited by people largely of the old stock but much more numerous than used to be the case.

Towards the northern end of the fenland lies the town of Boston, once the chief seaport of England. During the thirteenth century its customs dues were frequently the largest in the country, many monasteries had within its walls their agencies for the export of wool, and the Hanseatic merchants built a large steel yard. The wonderful church, with a tower that dominates the countryside, is a monument to zeal and enterprise. Then there came many decades of quieter life. The introduction of weaving on a large scale diverted the wool trade westwards. The town was thirty miles away from the Great North Road, and in the nineteenth century the main line of railway followed the direction of the road. Boston has been isolated, until motor transport has suddenly realised that eighty per cent. of the population of England lives within 125 miles, and that round the old port are the most fertile farming lands in Europe.

As yet there has only been a small influx of population from outside, but young life is staying at home—as it likes to do, for the people of this eastern coast town are clannish, or perhaps it would be truer to say that instinctively they look rather to the sea than inland if they must leave home. But in the main the inhabitants are of the old stock : in to-day's directory there are 553 surnames that appear in the Elizabethan registers, 624 in those of the early seventeenth century, and it is not surprising to find that the townsfolk are a large family with an unusual corporate sense, aloof perhaps from the outside world, but happy with one another and proud of their traditions.

In view of all this it becomes understandable that Boston was an early centre of Puritanism, not so much for reasons of

doctrine as from a resentment against dictation or interference from elsewhere : and others of a like mind found their way into the town. For example, as far back as 1585 the Earl of Lincoln, then in command of the North Sea and a firm Protestant, persuaded the borough to elect Nicholas Gorges as one of its members of Parliament. He was brother to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, a fellow sea-captain, who became governor of Plymouth, and learning about eastern America decided to promote a Plymouth company for colonisation there—which brings Boston into the story again, but not yet.

Or again, the church registers have a remarkable feature. While the native population included Emersons, Truesdales, Wadsworths and others whose names were to figure in American history, while the vicar was presented to the Archdeacon because “ he weareth not the surplice but sitteth upon it,” there is a continual trickle of casual entries that deal with Puritan families from elsewhere. In 1590 Francis Bellingham was married in the church, and fourteen years later was chosen M.P. for the borough ; a young Lowell was baptised ; Joan Appleton was married ; a Nutting, a Burdett and a St. John were buried. Into this atmosphere of growing Puritanism, the year 1607 brought a new element. At Scrooby in Nottinghamshire there happened to be a particularly earnest band of Puritans, and one of them, William Brewster, would seem to have had Boston relations. Tired of persecution and molestation, this famous group resolved to go to Holland in spite of prevailing governmental restrictions. Possibly escape might be engineered in Boston, and to Boston they came. They found a ship, they had even gone aboard, when betrayal intervened, and they were taken to the old Guildhall for imprisonment in cells that still exist. Trial ensued and most of the party were released ; seven were committed to the assizes also to be released on bail, and in the following year to find their way to Leyden.

There is every ground for belief that the Boston authorities were as sympathetic as they dared to be, and the old town still takes a pride in showing the cells where the “ Pilgrim Fathers ” were imprisoned, the court room above, and the heavy railing behind which they stood. In a like manner one of the most treasured possessions of the New England Boston is a large section of that same railing now displayed in the city library. It has been with feelings of awe and gratitude that American

eight century, only followed a local practice, modelled on the handiwork of much earlier troglodytes.

There is no need to enter too minutely into the often obscure details of the early history of Les Baux and the powerful families who held their Courts there with all the magnificence of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. But to omit to outline some of the principal episodes in the history of the Dead City and its many masters down the ages would be to miss—in the words of Macgibbon—"a more lively and impressive idea of the life and manners of those stirring mediæval times in Provence than can easily be found elsewhere." After the Roman period and that of the hordes of Barbarians, including the Visigoths, who poured into Provence and conquered it in the fourth and fifth centuries, Marius' fortifications gave place to those of the Lords of Les Baux, who took their family name from a Provençal word *Baou* (derived from the Ligurian *bal* or *baou*) meaning height or escarpment. The first to assume the patronymic was Hugues (981-1060), the son of Pons, a wealthy landowner of the County of Arles. We find his name in several ancient charters, and thus, between the muniment-room and the treasure-house of legend, we are able to piece together the romantic history of his family.

Raymond des Baux (1095-1150), the grandson of Pons and husband of Etiennette, the daughter of Gilbert, Count of Provence, laid claim against Raymond Berenger IV, Count of Barcelona, his brother-in-law, and failing in his suit saw the castle and all the family possessions confiscated. However, they were afterwards returned to his widow on condition that she and her descendants swore fidelity to their natural suzerain, Raymond the Younger, Count of Barcelona. Hugues (1150-70), the son of Raymond des Baux, unable to keep to the bargain, was besieged in his castle, conquered and dispossessed. And of such events (with assassination added now and then) is the history of the Princes of Baux composed during the reigns of Hugues I (1173-1240), Barral (1217-68), Bertrand (1244-1305), Raymond I (1305-21), Hugues II (1321-51), Robert (1351-3), Raymond II (1354-72), and Alix, the daughter of the last-named and the last of her race. She was Lady of Les Baux between 1375 and 1426.

Around the death of Princess Alix has been woven one of the most poetic legends handed down to us from the Middle

Ages. It is said that as her end drew near a star fell from heaven on to the ancient tower of the Castle of Baux, entered her chamber, shone with great brilliance, and was extinguished only at the very moment she expired. . . . Poetry and chivalry permeated the whole of this period. The most celebrated of the famous Courts of Love, to which troubadours flocked from distant countries to celebrate feminine beauty and knightly valour, were held at Les Baux. Etienne des Baux, Adélasie, Vicomtesse d'Avignon, Jeanne des Baux, Laurette de Sade, Phanette de Gantelmi, and Briande d'Agout were among the beautiful women who presided over those Courts. On those occasions Guilhem de Cabestan sang of the charms of Bérançère des Baux, or Sordel addressed poetical homage to Rambaude des Baux, or Bérard des Baux and Rambaud des Baux entered into friendly rivalry in extolling the grace and virtue of Marie de Châteaufort and the Comtesse d'Orgueil.

No wonder that this, the most brilliant period in the history of Les Baux, inspired Frédéric Mistral in both *Calendaï* and *Miréio*. In the former poem are some admirable lines in honour of the first Lords and Princes of Les Baux and their ancient castle. . . . After comparing the Lords of Baux to a "race of eaglets, who with the tips of their wings lightly touched the tops of every height, a race in whose veins whirled the wind of the Rhône, which still rumbles, strong and powerful, between the doors and tottering towers of their ancient dismantled castle, a race which, like a vigorous tree, waved its branches from the Cevennes to the mountains where the Durance rises," the great Provençal poet introduces, in the same poem, a charming evocation of the Princesses of Les Baux, Queens of the Courts of Love. . . . "Huguette, Sybille, Blanche fleur, Baussette and those other exquisitely beautiful and joyful-souled Princesses who radiated love, joy and light from their throne of rocks of gold, from the hillocks of Mont Pahon, and the azure tracts of La Crau, whose perfumed footsteps are preserved in the odour of thyme" seem to the Poet to be "reflected in the mirage" that is sometimes seen on those barren wastes. And at their feet he pictures the troubadours still singing.

Les Baux ever exercised this powerful influence over my old friend Frédéric Mistral, and when I visited him at Maillane but a few years before his death, he himself referred to the

members of recent "pilgrimages" to the ancestral home of so many of them have been entertained to dinner in the Guild-hall, near the original railings and near the cells.

In the year 1620, these Puritans, who once knew the darkness of the cells, left Holland and, after leaving Southampton, the *Mayflower* put in to the port of Plymouth. There Sir Ferdinando Gorges was still governor with his schemes for a Plymouth colony: was it with his blessing that the settlers sailed afterwards—was it at all due to him that they called their ultimate landing-place Plymouth Rock? Some few years later his second son married a Boston girl and followed them.

While the Pilgrim Fathers were in Holland, and afterwards, while battling against privations, Red Indians and all the strangeness of a new life, they were slowly building up a new home, Puritanism in Boston became more intense. In 1612 the living fell vacant, and the corporation chose John Cotton, Dean of Magdalen College, Cambridge, to fill it. The Bishop of Lincoln objected, "He was a young man and unfit to be over such a factious people who were imbued with the Puritan spirit," but the "factious people" were determined to have a vicar of their own way of thinking, and the Bishop, as he knew the man better, confessed that he was "honest and learned." His ability and zeal soon began to tell: crowds came to hear his sermons in spite of, or perhaps because of, their length: the altar rails were thronged at the monthly Communion. "A great reformation was wrought in the town" and "many strangers came to Boston." Among these there was now and again a Pelham: Edward Sturgis of Northampton had relations in the town and stayed with them: Thomas Oliver buried his wife in the churchyard; Francis Ingalls, one of two brothers who founded Lynn, Massachusetts, was married in the great church and his children were baptised in its font. In the vicarage there was a succession of visitors, theologians from abroad or young men from Cambridge reading for fellowships—Hill, who became Master of Trinity; Tuckney, who became Regius Professor of Divinity; Winter, to be Provost of Trinity College, Dublin; Angier, who only gave up ideas of going to New England because of a call from a Nonconforming congregation in Lancashire.

Other men and their families rather centred round the Boston home of the young Earl of Lincoln. In his service as

steward was Thomas Dudley, a relation of the famous Earl of Leicester. He had been a lawyer at Northampton and married a lady of Calvinistic tendencies with the result that he was drawn into the circle of her Puritan friends, and "it pleased the Almighty to season his heart with the saving knowledge of the truth." He became steward to William Fiennes, Lord Saye and Sele, a Puritan much disliked by Clarendon: known popularly as "Old Subtlety," he was an enthusiast for Puritan migration, he had shares in the colonies of Providence Island and Connecticut, and would have gone to Massachusetts if the company for that colony had agreed to recognise a hereditary peerage.

From service with Fiennes, Dudley passed into that of Theophilus Clinton, Earl of Lincoln, and was instrumental in arranging a marriage between his new master and the daughter of his old one. Often in Boston, he struck up a friendship with the vicar and ultimately rented a house near to that of the Earl. In course of time Lord Lincoln had three daughters who all were married to leading Puritans—Isaac Johnson, John Humphrey and John Gorges, son of Sir Ferdinando. By then Dudley had married his daughter Anne, later the first of New England poetesses, to Simon Bradstreet, and had passed his stewardship on to his son-in-law, for he himself was becoming more and more deeply immersed in projects of sailing to America with his Puritan friends.

The townsfolk, too, were talking of similar schemes; among them were Alderman Leverett, a great supporter of the vicar, and Alderman Hough, who clambered half-way up the "Stump" that he might throw down an old statue of St. Botolph because it looked like the Pope, while Alderman Westland, who could not see his way to go, readily subscribed to finance those who would. When Charles I dismissed Parliament in 1629 and everyone knew that matters had reached a crisis, the first of a series of expeditions to New England was carefully and thoroughly arranged.

Such arrangements took time: John Winthrop came into Lincolnshire to discuss them; it was not until the following year that he set sail from Southampton with a fleet of four ships containing a large contingent of Boston families—the Dudleys, the Cheeseboroughs, Richard Truesdale the butcher, Tom James, son of the parson at Skirbeck, and the daughters

dead city and how it had inspired him to write *Miréio*. The action of the poem opens at the base of the ruins of Les Baux. Mistral exclaims, in the course of a touching burst of enthusiasm put into the mouth of Clémence, a peasant of those parts, that "if some king were, perchance, to fall in love with her and make her Empress," she would "choose Les Baux for her capital and, rebuilding the old ruined castle, would add a tower which, with its white spire, would reach the stars."

The end of the power of the Lords of Baux came within view when the family lost its prestige through Barral, *podestà* of the free town of Arles, betraying the Republic to Charles of Anjou. The Seignory was then annexed to the Crown of Provence and the town, losing its freedom, entered on its decadence, despite the restoration of the ramparts and the towers of the castle in 1444 by King René of Anjou and the embellishments added by his second wife, Jeanne de Laval, who did her best to make the place an agreeable residence.

During the period of the Renaissance, when so many of the fine houses whose façades are still visible were built, the place was under the authority of Captain-Governors, appointed by the Counts of Provence, the Kings of France and their successors. Members of the House of Grimaldi (the present-day head of which is the reigning Prince of Monaco) were the last owners of Les Baux, which, in spite of the protests of the democratic Council of Baux and St. Rémy, was granted with a Marquisate to Hercule de Grimaldi, in 1643, by Louis XIII, as a reward for having driven the Spanish garrison from Monaco and replaced it by a French one. At the end of the Revolution the Marquisate of Baux and the lands going with it naturally became French national property; but not before a somewhat heavy indemnity had been granted to Honoré Camille de Grimaldi (1751-95). Assuredly the most astounding good fortune has ever followed in the footsteps of this family of "corsairs and soldiers of fortune," to quote the memorable words of John Richard Green, who was one of the first to strip the modern "pirate town" of the Riviera—Monte Carlo—of all the romance "which has been so profusely showered over it."

Both the action of Nature and the hands of the peasantry of the neighbourhood combined to bring Les Baux to its ruined state until, in comparatively recent times, the day came when the Commission des Monuments Historiques

stepped in and undertook, a little too late, to preserve one of the most striking of the antiquities of the South of France. The restoration of the parish church of St. Vincent* has been completed; many of the ancient houses have been saved from utter ruin; and a very complete plan of the ancient town, with all the streets and houses carefully identified in the light of old documents, has been drawn up for the benefit of visitors. Here, in the Grande Rue, facing the Place de la Lause, is the mansion of the De Manvilles, and, with a 1571-metre façade to the Rue Neuve, the dependencies of the house. The mansions of the Constable of Montmorency, Bertrand Mocadeu, and of Jean Manson the Elder face the Place de la Ville and the Rue de la Place. The Tour de Brau, whose Salle des Fêtes has been converted into a small museum of pieces of sculpture, is encountered on the way to the ruined castle on the heights. There we come across the imposing remains of the *donjon*, the Tour Paravelle of the twelfth century, the chapel dedicated to St. Catherine, and many other evidences of the great antiquity of Les Baux.

Before I descended from those dizzy heights, on a certain favourable day in summer, the panorama spread out before me presented a most wonderful picture of Provence. The atmosphere was remarkably clear, so clear that I could distinguish, in the west, the distant tower of Constance on the ramparts of Aigues-Mortes, and then, successively, as my eyes moved along the horizon towards the south, Saintes-Maries (where the Gypsies go on their annual pilgrimage), the Lake of Vaccarès, the Camargue with the many mouths of the Rhône, the Gulf of Fos, and finally the stony plain of La Crau. On the east are the mountains of Sainte Baume, the Pilon de Roi, the mountain of Sainte Victoire, dominating Aix, the Estaque chain enclosing the Lake of Berre, and, nearer to the south, glimpses of Miramas, Salon, the Lake of Comte, and the marshes. Still nearer, to the right, were Arles, Montmajour, the villages of Paradou and

* It possesses a nave dating from the Carolingian period, another of the twelfth century, a third which is Gothic, a bell-tower of the twelfth century, and crypts in which Princes and Princesses of Baux are buried. In one of these crypts, opposite the altar of the Holy Virgin, there was discovered the famous "Chevelure d'Or" which Frédéric Mistral placed in his *Museon Arleton* at Arles. These beautiful golden tresses, of great length at the time they were brought to light, were all that was left of some unknown princess of the House of Baux, a beautiful young girl whose charms, maybe, had been sung by troubadours ere she died in the flower of her youth.

of Lord Lincoln. It was their presence at the early settlements of Trimountain which prompted its change of name to that of Boston. Cotton saw them off and only slowly returned home, for he was not well and he was bent on following; on July 22nd, 1633, the Corporation received his resignation, together with those of the two Aldermen. It is in commemoration of this date that recent "Pilgrimages" from New England to the old town have been fixed on and around the third Sunday in July. This expedition on the *Griffin* included many Boston Puritans besides the vicar, the Aldermen and their families. There were the Quinceys, Richard Bellingham the recorder, William Coddington, who was in due time to become governor of Rhode Island, and in all probability Anne Hutchinson, her husband and her brothers-in-law. She belonged to the edge of the wolds, but she was a fervent disciple of Cotton. There were Hutchinson relations in the town, and, after her tragic death at the hands of the Red Indians, one of the brothers-in-law returned to it. His son became Mayor, and recently his wall memorial has been recovered from a neighbouring garden; cleaned, with the arms re-emblazoned, and restored to its place in the church, it is evidence that some Puritan settlers remembered their old home.

He was not the only one. In 1636 a third expedition set out from Boston in the *Prosperous* under the leadership of Harrington Fiennes—cousin to Lord Lincoln's three girls. The party numbered eighty, of whom the most prominent were the Rev. Samuel Whiting with his wife, Elizabeth St. John, Cromwell's cousin, and their young baby. His family had been in the town for centuries, and a second son, born soon after they reached America, felt the call to come home—to live and to die in the fen country. The father became Minister of Lynn, Massachusetts—in fact the Boston group dominated the new colony: four of them, Dudley, Bellingham, young Leverett and Bradstreet, held the governorship for thirty years out of the first sixty of its history.

Slowly but surely, however, the lives of the two Bostons drifted apart: personal and family ties grew weaker and buildings with reminders of the old home disappeared—in particular "Seven Stars House," an echo of the "Seven Stars Inn," whereat the bellringers for centuries regaled themselves, gave way to the "Old South Church."

In 1760 the connection had a momentary revival: Francis Bernard was appointed Governor of Massachusetts. He had been associated with the old town, firstly by marriage—his arms appear on one of the hatchments in the church—and secondly as recorder. His governorship was not a success; those were the days of the Stamp Acts, the Tea Party was not far ahead, and Bernard was recalled to England: he settled down in Lincolnshire, and no doubt was sometimes in Boston describing to his relations his experiences in the daughter city. That was the last intimate touch between the two Bostons for nearly eighty years; the revolutionary war and hostilities in the days of Napoleon hardly made for the fostering of ties of kinship. But gradually animosities died down, facilities for travelling between England and the United States developed, and the old connection reasserted itself to the pride and happiness of both towns.

In 1849 John Lewis Clark paid a visit to old Boston, and the Mayor at his suggestion sent back with him a gift of six impressions of the old Corporation seals. A few years later some Americans in the great church were astonished to find no memorial to John Cotton, and they set themselves to restore the one Guild chapel which had survived from the Middle Ages: in that chapel to-day the arms of Eliot, Lowell, Appleton, Quincey and others figure on the corbels, while, if Sir Gilbert Scott had had his way, the ceiling would have been embellished with an adaptation of the Stars and Stripes.

In 1879 the tracery of one of the chancel windows was sent as a gift to Trinity Church in the centre of the City of Boston; enshrined in the cloister, it is near to the statue of Phillips Brooks who more than once preached in what is the mother church of all who claim inheritance in either Boston. Three years later St. Botolph's Club in the newer city received a silver-gilt loving cup which was once part of the Corporation plate in the old town. In fact any visitor from the mother to the daughter city is constantly reminded of home—the gateway on the east side of the State house itself is adorned with some old iron scroll work bearing the arms and supporters of the English port. Other gifts have crossed the Atlantic in an opposite direction. The old Guildhall contains a tablet, which records New England help in its restoration, and a bronze plaque of the landing of the first Puritan settlers, which was presented to the Mayor of Boston in 1930, when he

Maussane ; then Mouriès with the Vacquièrre mountains on the left.

Those who make the pilgrimage to Les Baux will find other pleasures than memories of the Dead City in store for them. Do not forgo the delight of seeing the pavilion of Queen Jeanne, a domed building of the Renaissance on the site of the former seignorial garden, reached by following the road towards Baumanière. Visit, too, the Grotte des Fées, a cavern to the west of the historic rock of Les Baux which Mistral immortalised, through the mouth of Taven, the Witch, in *Miréio* ; and also the Val d'Enfer, a gorge some three hundred yards long, strewn with rocks in the most extraordinary confusion, a gorge which may well have inspired Dante when he wrote the eleventh canto of his "Vision of Hell." For, as Frédéric Mistral says in a note to Canto VI of *Miréio* : "Comparing Dante's description of Hell to this topsy-turvy, cyclopean, and fantastic landscape, one becomes convinced of one thing, that the great Florentine poet, who travelled in our district and even sojourned at Arles, visited the City of Baux, sat on the heights of the Valoun d'Infèr, and, struck by this grandiose desolation, conceived, in the midst of this cataclysm of rocks, the configuration and sombre character of his *Inferno*. Everything leads us to that idea : the name of the gorge itself, *Infèr* ; its form, that of an amphitheatre (applied by Dante to Hell) ; the huge detached rocks which form the gradines,

"In su l'estremità d'un' alta ripa
Che facevan gran pietre rotte in cerchie,"*

and the Provençal name for these heights themselves, *baus*, italianised by the poet into *balza*, and applied by him to the heights of his gloomy crater."

May I say, in conclusion, that I trust these notes and impressions will make Les Baux better known among Anglo-Saxon travellers who, whilst on their way to the Côte d'Azur, would perhaps do well to make a point of visiting the Dead City of the Midi before the military octopus has fastened its tentacles upon this sanctified spot and utterly obliterated a vivid picture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

GEORGE FREDERIC LEES.

* "Upon the utmost verge of a high bank
By craggy rocks environ'd round . . ."

—Cary's translation.

RAW MATERIALS AND COLONIES.

THE colonial problem has four main aspects, economic, strategic, demographic and political. The raw materials problem has two aspects, economic and political. But neither of these problems stands alone. Both are caught up in the central issues of world affairs and depend for their outcome on the decision taken at the cross-roads which mankind is now rapidly approaching.

On the economic side the burning question is whether raw materials, when not produced within national frontiers, originate mainly in colonial areas ; and whether an industrial nation must therefore possess colonies in order to assure adequate supplies. This question has often been studied, notably by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in its valuable memorandum on *Raw Materials and Colonies*. The facts, moreover, are freely accessible and fully documented, for example in the publications of the Economic and Intelligence Service of the League, the International Institute of Agriculture, and the U.S.A. Department of Mines. But since the results reached by an official international body naturally possess greater authority than private studies, the report of the League Committee on Raw Materials should set the problem in perspective and clarify world opinion.

Do raw materials in fact come mainly from colonial territories ? The answer is in the negative. "Most raw materials," the Committee states, "are produced wholly or to a great extent in sovereign countries. . . . Including production both for domestic consumption and for export, the total present production of all commercially important raw materials in all colonial territories is no more than about three per cent. of world production." With the exception of rubber, the colonial three per cent. does not even include major key materials whose lack would hold the non-colonial Powers up to ransom. "In fact," the Committee points out, "the raw materials which are typically colonial—that is, those which colonial territories produce or are in a position to produce—number only three—namely, palm oil, rubber and copra." Tin is a fourth product which comes largely, but not exclusively, from colonies. Rubber and tin are of course essential industrial materials ; but palm oil and copra compete and are interchangeable with half a dozen other vegetable and animal fats and oils. "As

officially took part in the commemoration of the tercentenary of the founding of the newer Boston.

This commemoration gave rise to a new impetus for friendly relations that seems to be growing in strength. In 1929 Mr. Allan Forbes of the State Street Trust Company of Boston paid a visit to the Lincolnshire town; he found the whole population not only engaged in raising £23,000 for the restoration of the roof of their historic church, but also confronted with the problem of serious cracks in the famous tower. On his return home he enlisted the support of an influential committee which in a few weeks collected over fifty thousand dollars for its repair—a birthday gift from the daughter to parent. In the summer of 1931 a cheque for the money was presented by Mr. W. R. Whiting in the church of his forefathers into the hands of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The work soon began, and just before Christmas 1932 the service of dedication and the ringing of the bells were broadcast to America in order that the citizens of the newer Boston might share with their kinsfolk in the old a gladness common to both.

From this happy co-operation has begun a series of annual pilgrimages from Massachusetts to the historic Lincolnshire seaport. In 1933 Mr. Whiting led the party, and was present when the great west doors were reopened. The next year's pilgrimage included the Bishop of Rhode Island, who opened the gates of an iron screen which commemorates the story of the restoration. In 1935 the pilgrims were accommodated in private houses and the dinners in the Guildhall began. Last summer the President of the English-Speaking Union in the American Boston spoke at the unveiling of a "Five Governors Memorial" at the base of the tower. So once again we hark back to the common origin of two historic communities, with memories of an interchange of gifts, of visits, of friendships, of life—memories that have been preserved and are ever worth preserving in freshness of contact and kindly understanding.

A. M. Cook.

A PAIR OF SPOTTED FLYCATCHERS.

IN the spring the windows of our house serve as peep-holes into the nursery secrets of many birds. This one looks out upon a fir, in the crown of which a pair of brown owls occupy a box. That one opens into a starling's nursery and gives us a glimpse of the marsh tits that breed across the lawn. A third lets into the house not only the clamour of a great tit family, but the tinkling song of a spotted flycatcher whose cobweb nest lies on a ledge protected from the hottest sun by trailing clematis. And so it goes on—even to the window that gives a distant view of a nesting-box no longer used by birds, because it holds a dormouse.

Naturally this pleasant state of affairs did not come into existence all at once. It has been a gradual process. Take the flycatcher, for example—years passed before the first nest was built beneath my window. Four seasons went by before we even began to think of these little birds in connection with our house, the nearest pair nesting half a mile away and at a lower altitude. Nor did they, to my knowledge, ever visit the garden in those first four years. Then in 1934 there was a nest in a quarry half-way between the flycatchers' usual territory and our own. For the first time, moreover, one of the pair began to make excursions into the lowest part of our garden, where it overlooks the quarry; while in the summer the flycatchers brought their second family close to our windows, and for a whole afternoon fed them in the trees around the lawn. This was so encouraging that I fixed a ledge to the house in a sheltered place and began to look forward with real hope to the future. But in the following spring when the flycatchers arrived in the quarry, neither they nor any of their descendants came up to the house. Then, quite suddenly, later in the year, a pair flew up to my ledge, built a nest and successfully reared a sturdy brood of brown, buff-spotted youngsters.

That is the story of our flycatchers up to the end of 1935. Their activities in the following year I can give in greater detail, because I spent many happy hours watching these dear little birds at very close range. It must be emphasised that my ledge is a flycatcher outpost among the hills, a newly established breeding place on the very edge of the treeless expanse of Dartmoor. In all Africa that winter, its existence

for other products of the colonies," the Committee therefore concludes, "they have to compete with similar products of sovereign countries, from which the great part of the supply is derived."

Exports can be hindered in various ways for various reasons. Foodstuffs may be kept in a country because of short harvests. Industrial raw materials may be retained for the use of domestic industry or to husband limited natural resources. The export of seed may be prohibited in order to preserve a monopoly or quasi-monopoly, as in the case of the abaca palm, the sole source of Manila hemp, obtainable only in the Philippines. Export duties may be levied for purely revenue purposes, as a royalty on wasting assets (such as mineral deposits), to establish a fund for developing markets for a particular commodity, or, with discrimination in the country of consignment, in order to preserve processing rights (for example, in the case of tin ore and concentrates) for a producing area or a metropolitan Power. Finally, where natural monopolies exist—such as helium gas in the United States, cinchona bark in the Dutch East Indies, and camphor in Japan—they may be unreasonably used.

Broadly speaking, the Committee's attitude towards these matters is based on three principles. First, a country has the first claim on its own products. Secondly, discrimination against particular countries or the use of its supplies by one nation to bring pressure on another is normally indefensible. Lastly, even where no discrimination exists, there should not be room for doubts on this point; Cæsar's wife should be above suspicion. These criteria must command general assent. But when the Committee came to apply them, it had practically no concrete examples to condemn. It found even natural monopolies harmless in practice. Its conclusions are therefore mainly negative and hypothetical: if there were malpractices, they would be offensive; and in certain cases governments should announce that they do not intend, nor will they allow their subjects, to misbehave. To which no one can object.

More important is the Committee's examination of commodity restriction schemes, which exist in two forms: governmentally controlled, as in the case of tin and rubber; and privately controlled, as in the case of copper and many other commodities. To such schemes, if operated reasonably

so as neither to starve the market, raise prices unduly, nor discriminate between purchasers, the Committee take no exception. "It cannot be to the advantage even of consumers," they write, "that markets should be allowed to fall into a state of complete disorganisation, for history shows that market disorganisation leads inevitably to cessation of production, scarcity and high prices." Indeed, in so far as such schemes, reasonably operated, have brought purchasing power back to small and poor communities which are normally large importers of manufactured goods, the Committee commend them "as a valuable means of restoring international trade." On the other hand, private schemes, whether organised as cartels or otherwise, come in for a measure of criticism, not necessarily because of improper working, but because (and to the extent that) they usually fail to provide for effective representation of consumers and adequate publicity as to objects, terms, methods of organisation and statistics. These safeguards, the greatest permissible degree of governmental supervision, and machinery to prevent or stop unreasonable rises in prices, the Committee consider to be essential. With this conclusion, and with the desirability in some cases of creating buffer stocks, informed opinion will generally concur.

Natural resources must be developed before supplies of raw materials are available; and non-colonial Powers complain that they have not the same opportunities of sharing in this development in colonies as metropolitan Powers to whose nationals special privileges and advantages are reserved by legislative enactment, deliberate policy, or administrative act. *Mutatis mutandis*, a similar problem arises in sovereign states. The Committee recommend that, where such privileges exist, governments should be invited to terminate them, if need be by bilateral or multilateral agreements. This step, if taken, would certainly remove very natural grievances. It is therefore important to note what areas would be affected. As regards sovereign states, the Committee's report gives no details. There is of course no obstacle to foreign investment in the United Kingdom; in other countries the position varies. As regards colonial empires—the real bone of contention on this point—the Committee state that "no special privileges are reserved for the nationals of the metropolitan countries" in the Belgian, Dutch or Portuguese colonial empires; in the British colonial empire except for petroleum,

can have been known, I think, to no more than two adult and four young birds. Yet on the morning of the eighteenth of May, two flycatchers flew to the site beneath my window, and I felt again something of the mystery and wonder of life. There are lesser birds that make this double journey every year, but here before my eyes was the first flycatcher to take to Africa something of my garden and my home. As I watched, the cock sang a curious and delightful little song, a soft and gentle warbling that tinkled now and then. All day long the pair were in evidence, alternately visiting the ledge and exploring almost every twig and branch in their domain. So began another season in England, a time of joy and a time of sorrow.

Watching a pair of birds in which the sexes are alike, one often notices small individual differences that make it possible to tell the birds apart. This pair of flycatchers, however, were as much alike as two pins, at least to my eyes at a range of two yards. I take it that it was the cock bird that sang, brought food for its mate and (normally) took no part in the building of the nest. Conversely, I regard the bird that built the nest, ate the flies that were brought her and did not (normally) sing, as the hen. This assumption was constantly confirmed, as when the birds paired. Moreover, had it been very far out, I think it must sooner or later have brought chaos to my notes, for I watched the birds flying up to the ledge a good many times, and have a written record of a hundred visits. Yet on only four or five occasions was it doubtful which bird was at the nest, and on none of these did anything of interest occur.

On the day after their arrival the flycatchers placed a little tuft of moss in one corner of the ledge, and on the twenty-first day of May I was able to watch them at work on their home. The hen, sitting on the nest, opened her wings wide, placing them down on the ledge on either side of her, so that they held down the nesting material in two places. Actually, there were only a few small pieces of moss and lichen on the site. As she tried to hold these scanty beginnings in place, she "scratched" hard with her legs beneath her against the wooden floor, as though trying to scrape a hole. The only result of this energetic action was to keep the centre of the ledge clear and to build up the rim of the nest first. As a matter of fact, the hen for many days put all her material on the rim. I have

seen flycatchers nest on a sandy ledge above a gravel pit, where no doubt the hen did manage to make a nesting hollow with her feet. This my little hen, of course, could not do. Perhaps for that very reason she was able to build a particularly strong nest on a smooth piece of wood, for the ledge has a rim against which she was able to kick and push material to her heart's content, until she had a solid rim of moss and lichen all around her.

Flying often to the nest alone, she was accompanied on occasions by the cock. He simply looked on while she worked, though at times he bent down and lightly touched a piece of moss with his beak. Often, warbling softly, he seemed to be humming over to himself what is at the best of times a very feeble little song. Sometimes he would fly to the nest alone, with a blue-bottle for the hen. If she did not soon arrive, he would swallow it himself and then, jumping on to the nest, poke about for several moments without, however, actually moving anything. In this he gave the impression of a model husband, interested in his wife's affairs but aware of his limitations in the domestic sphere. On my first day's watching I got the impression, too, that there was more joy in that small body than could well find an outlet in song so gentle and so low. For, standing on the nest, the bird would sing and sing again with trembling wings and quickly beating tail, as though carried away in transports of purest happiness.

Visiting the nest on six of the next eight mornings, I learnt to expect the flycatchers a little before six o'clock. Only once were they early, arriving at half-past five. Of course, they were awake and feeding some time before they reached the nest. Watching the latter grow, it was interesting to notice the hen's technique changing to meet new requirements, changing so gradually sometimes as nearly to elude the eye. For instance her wings, as I have said, were at first opened wide to hold down the growing nest each time the hen "whirred" her legs. And she whirred them several times during each brief visit, on one occasion over thirty times. At this stage the tips of the wings naturally pointed in almost opposite directions, and were as widely separated from one another as could be. As the walls of the nest rose up, however, the wings were opened ever less widely, until at last the wing-tips crossed above the tail. Looking down on to the nest I saw, between these two extremes, a pretty arch of feathers

a restriction which will cease in 1938 ; in the overseas territories controlled by the U.S.A. ; or in parts of the French colonial empire in respect of agricultural and forestry concessions only. Hence if the Committee's recommendation on free participation in the development of natural resources were fully carried out, the colonial empires affected would be the French (except as stated), the Italian, the Japanese, and the Spanish. It is interesting to see that in this list Italy and Japan are included.

Difficulties arising from the need to pay for raw materials in foreign exchange are on another footing. These difficulties, the Raw Materials report points out, "vastly transcend in importance those in regard to supply, and the Committee would be failing in its duty if it held out any hope of an easy solution of them." They arise from the vast complex of excessive tariffs, quotas, exchange control and clearings which block international trade at every turn. Among causes and contributory factors, the Committee mentions the present scale of armament programmes, the abandonment of free trade by Britain, and the growing tendency of metropolitan Powers to make preferential tariffs with their colonies. The Committee makes various suggestions to ease this situation, such as greater elasticity in the operation of clearings ; closer co-operation between central banks and the mutual grant of short-term credits ; financial assistance under suitable safeguards for countries which need help at the outset if they are to abandon exchange control. These are undoubtedly constructive proposals which the Assembly has referred to the Economic and Financial Committees of the League for further action. If they nevertheless do not go to the root of the matter, that is not the fault of the Raw Materials Committee, which was necessarily limited by its terms of reference.

On a broader view, colonies and raw materials, and particularly the question of payment, are parts of three larger problems : obstacles to international trade generally ; armaments ; and the adaptations required by the next stage of industrialism. The issues involved are largely economic ; but to a great extent they overstep the bounds of economics as such and involve major problems of politics.

The excessive existing barriers to international trade were originally the offspring of the economic crisis, created and adapted by their users to safeguard national economics against

the catastrophic consequences of violent change. As such they played their part during the period of most intense strain, and with the advent of recovery their gradual removal might reasonably have been expected. Quotas, clearings and exchange control represent the most hampering of these barriers, the most vicious in their effects on international trade and national prosperity. As and when they were swept away, the adjustment of national economics to the new world situation, from the full effects of which excessive barriers had previously sheltered them, was bound to be disturbing and painful. The prospects of such adjustment could therefore in no case be welcomed for their own sake. Moreover, behind the barriers new private interests had been established and grown strong ; and their concentrated opposition was naturally also thrown against fresh change.

Whether unimpeded economic forces would have surmounted these obstacles, destroyed excessive hindrances to trade, faced and overcome the rigours of readjustment, and brought the insulated nations back into a world economy, must remain forever a matter for speculation. The manifest advantages to national prosperity and well-being of participating in a suitable international division of labour, based upon the varying resources and skills of the nations of the earth and yielding larger returns for all than complete or partial self-sufficiency can ever attain, would have been a powerful magnet in attracting countries anew to freer trade and fuller co-operation. But such considerations were doomed to a minor role. The system of controlled economies, originally adopted as a defence against the world crisis, proved a perfect instrument for developing national armaments on a scale hitherto unimagined in times of peace. In the threatening presence of Mars, the voice of Ceres was silenced.

Armaments have a dual bearing on the problem of raw materials and colonies. Their production puts intense strain on supplies ; their existence, on their present scale, raises a barrier to solution. Why are such gigantic armaments wanted ? For war ? Or for peace ? If for peace, then difficulties over raw materials for their production can be effectively met by agreeing to limit or reduce arms. If for war, then the demand of nations which want great and assured supplies of raw materials whatever their policy or their conduct is tantamount to a demand that other countries should help them to victory.

over the little bird's back. The pressing down of the nest rim, at first undertaken by the wings, in time devolved on the tail. The latter, at the end of each breathless bout of scraping and scratching with the legs, was brought down with a thump upon the nest edge, sometimes so violently as to force the hen to her feet.

Then there were other changes more suddenly begun. At first, bringing material to the nest, the hen would simply drop or lay it on the rim, sit down, open her wings and whirr her legs. But in due course she began to tidy up the nest with her beak, until at last this tidying occupied the greater part of each visit. Not only, in the end, did she move tiny fragments of moss from one place to another, she also tucked in pieces between the nest and her own soft breast. In the actual shaping of the structure, this tidying was less important than the wing, leg and tail movements. But the point I wish to stress is that the hen started this new activity on entirely imaginary material. That is to say, she suddenly went through all the proper movements of taking a piece of moss in her mouth, opening her beak to pick it up and finally putting it down in another place, without even touching a single thread of moss ! It was a curious thing to watch this activity in embryo.

The nest at first was made of lichen and of moss. On the fifth day, however, the hen began to bring cobweb, arriving with a beakful which she tried to put down on the ledge in the usual way. But this new material clung to her so firmly that in the end she was obliged to wipe it off upon the nest. Nothing daunted, she brought three more clinging skeins in the next two hours. The fact that it needed smearing over the nest, if it was to be used at all, added to its capacity to strengthen a rather flimsy avian cradle. The hen's leg-work and the fact that all material was added only to the edge of the nest, resulted in the formation, as I have said, of an ever thickening ring of material rising above the centre space of wood. Gradually the ring encroached, particularly at night during the birds' absence, when the living moss stretched in rebellion against a whole day's battering into unnatural positions. In the morning, on her first visit, the bird would push back the offending moss and the nest would become but a ring again. This went on until, it seemed from sheer pressure, the hen gave way. As though determined to have

the last word in this tussle with silken cobweb strands and moss, she brought some material on the ninth day of building and, placing it in the very middle of the nest, herself banished the last fragment of the wooden ledge still showing bare at the bottom. With the addition of a little hair and some few bents the nest was finished on the thirtieth of May.

When both birds flew to the ledge together, the cock would often sing to the hen with lowered head and beating tail. Sometimes he would stay behind while she flew off to collect more moss, sitting perhaps for a moment on the nest and then perching, until the hen's return, on a neighbouring clematis twig. On one such occasion, to my surprise, instead of greeting the hen on her return, he jumped quickly down into the nest and went through a correct leg-action ! She followed suit after waiting her turn, and then they both flew away. On no other occasion did he show the slightest inclination to help the hen with the nest.

Within a fortnight of their return, the flycatcher had not only completed the nest but had begun to lay the five red-spotted whitish eggs that made up the clutch. I was present during the laying of some of these. Let me describe what I saw early on the second morning in June. In the first place, you must imagine two eggs in the centre of the nest, two eggs that were cold and looked deserted. As the minutes flew by, this appearance of desertion increased. Six o'clock arrived, but the flycatchers did not put in an appearance. Another hour passed and still there was no sign of life on the flycatchers' ledge. At last, at half-past seven, the cock appeared for a moment and then flew away. Four minutes later he accompanied the hen to the nest and left her there. She began to brood and turned the eggs from time to time with her bill, the turning looking accidental as the eggs were rolled along the floor of the nest. Once or twice the hen kicked hard with her feet in the usual way, but as the eggs were under her breast they were, I feel certain, not turned or moved at all. Sometimes she tidied the nest and once she flew off for eight minutes. Best of all, on one occasion she sang a little warbling sub-song of short duration. Rarely have I heard a sound of such sweet content. At ten minutes to eight the moment for which I had been waiting arrived. Having sat perfectly still during the preceeding four minutes, she now slightly raised her tail from the nest, just so that it no longer touched the

Conversely, if countries which possess supplies make these freely available regardless of their actual or potential use, they are merely preparing their own disaster. That raw materials are or can easily be made abundant for the purposes of peace is not open to reasonable doubt. But before the great alternatives of peace and war, raw materials and colonies cease to be a problem of economics and become a question of politics, a supreme matter of national life or national death.

Neither excessive barriers to trade nor huge armaments exhaust the problem. The world's centre of economic gravity is shifting. There have been similar shifts before. The industrial revolution in England, the industrialisation of Germany, and the economic upswing of the United States since the World War are three examples. Another is now in train. It takes several forms. On the one hand is intensified industrial development in countries which, like Japan and India, have been engaged in manufacture for many years past. On the other hand is industrialisation in countries which hitherto have been almost wholly producers of primary raw materials or self-contained agricultural communities living mainly to themselves. Australia, South Africa and some Latin-American countries exemplify the first type of development; certain Baltic and Balkan countries the second.

Both intensified industrialisation and excessive armaments present the countries embarking on them with certain common problems. Given the requisite technical means, to produce is easy. It is markets that are the key to economic life. The older manufacturing countries were able to grow and thrive because people elsewhere wanted the products of their industries and paid for them with foodstuffs and raw materials. The experience of these countries—which include such industrial non-colonial nations as Sweden and Czecho-Slovakia—shows that, if the right policy is pursued, both raw materials and the necessary means of payment can be obtained without colonies. Hence the difficulties in obtaining raw materials encountered by countries now developing their industries arise, not from lack of colonies, but because older competitors are already established in foreign markets and because demand for goods of any particular type or types is quantitatively limited. Similarly, the difficulties met by countries with swollen armament industries are due to their desire for more

raw materials than suppliers will give for the products offered in exchange. No doubt it would be very pleasant for nations, as for individuals, if they could merely stretch out their hands and take what they want. But that is not the nature of things.

This means that to remove these difficulties two distinct sets of adjustments have to be made by the possessing and the dissatisfied countries respectively. Possession, whether of raw materials or colonies, implies responsibility; to the native inhabitants in the first place, and then to other nations. That it is no longer permissible to do as one likes with one's own applies as much to natural resources in a crowded world as to motor cars on a crowded road. Attempts to do so from an overweening sense of property are bound to meet with disaster which the conscience of mankind will regard as deserved.

It follows that duty and self-interest alike demand that the possessing states should really make the resources under their control available for the pacific needs of all countries equally. During the September meeting of the League Assembly at Geneva Mr. Eden stated that Britain is prepared to negotiate with any nation about the reduction of any colonial preference which is shown to be harmful to that nation's trade. Whether or not this new policy goes far enough will depend on the conditions attached and the manner in which it is carried out. It is certainly a step in the right direction. The mandates technique and the principle of trusteeship offer further means for easing the difficulties of the colonial problem. Doubtless it will not be easy to frame the details of application or to persuade the colonial Powers to abate their pride in possession. But given goodwill that task is not beyond the wit of man; particularly where, as at present, there are strong reasons for attempting it.

In the final analysis the problem of colonies and raw materials is a door with two locks. The key in the hands of the possessing Powers has been described. The key which the dissatisfied Powers hold is their answer to the question of method. Will these Powers be content with the adjustments which can be made by peaceful means even if not wholly to their liking, or do they intend to try and impose their own solution by force? Larger issues than colonies and raw materials will determine the answer. But while there is room for serious doubt neither the colonial nor the raw materials problem will be finally solved.

JULES MENKEN.

rim. Then the egg was presumably laid, for after a moment or two in this position the tail was lowered and the bird settled to brood again. A few minutes later I saw a third egg as she stood up and peered down at this, her latest acquisition.

Laying was not always as easy as this. Once I saw her straining, the tail pressed tightly on the nest, the wing-tips tightly on the tail, as with humped back she tried to lay her egg. In this position and with her head and neck pressed down forward, she was evidently in trouble. However, when the egg emerged, she at once relaxed and, turning round her head, began to preen her back and the feathers under her tail.

So far the idyllic scene beneath my window grew daily more attractive. Two or three days, however, after the laying of the fifth egg, a tragedy occurred—no unusual thing in nature. The hen disappeared and the nest was deserted, and though the cock called for ten days, he called in vain. What had happened? I do not know. Possibly some prowling village cat might have answered the question. Though the cock called for ten days, it must not be assumed that he was all the time crying for his mate, though perhaps at first he was. He rarely sang now, not because he was sad, but because a song so low was of little advertisement value. With a better voice, he would have been singing when now he called, to spread abroad the interesting news that here again was a bachelor ready and willing to open his wings to any hen. Twice he started a nest of his own, one over the front door and, when the wind blew this feeble effort down, another on a great tit's sleeping ledge. Then, on the eleventh day of his bereavement, the long awaited second female did actually arrive. Once again the cock bird sang.

Later, thinking to please the cock, we drove a stake into the lawn so that he might sit near the nest his new wife was making—for she would have none of his. Much of the day he would sit there, darting out after flies and returning. But at night when the flycatchers slept and the garden was silent and still, a brown owl used the little cock's perch, pouncing on worms that browsed on the dew-soaked lawn, bracing its legs as it pulled them from their holes. Getting up early to watch the flycatchers, staying up late with the soft-winged owl, one felt, not that the day was long, but that time was short indeed if one hoped to watch even a fraction of England's birds.

G. B. GOOCH.

THE EVOLUTION OF POLISH NATIONALISM.

THE god-parents of present-day Polish nationalism were the French Revolution, Romanticism, the theories of Herder and Fichte, and the struggle to restore the ancient republic of the aristocracy. The influence of these tendencies lent a fresh significance to the conceptions of "Fatherland" and "Nation." The Fatherland formerly implied the State, the country, material culture: nowadays the essence of nation and fatherland includes language, tradition and the spirit of the people. To this must be added a glorification of the past and idealisation of the characteristics of the Polish nation. During the rising of 1830-1, glorification of the Polish spirit became transformed into the doctrine of the mission of Poland. It is no mere coincidence that the theory entered on a new life at this period. Poland, in fact, was to prove to the world that in struggling against Russia she was fighting for the liberty of Europe.

The clearest expression of this idea was given by Brodziński in his celebrated address on Polish Nationality, on May 3rd, 1831, in the Warsaw Union of the Friends of Science. He extols Poland as the Copernicus of the nations, because she has proved by her resistance to slavery and darkness that no nation lives to itself alone, but that each is moved by a higher ideal. He praises Poland for her simplicity, steadfastness, generosity and chivalry. Polish fanaticism may be blind, but it does not stoop to bloodshed. "In the day of their freedom as in the day of their bondage, the Poles were condemned to suffer for Europe." He closed with the words: "The independence of Poland is conducive to the well-being of all nations, and constitutes no threat to any throne." Brodziński's importance lies in his stressing of Poland's mission, and in the fact that for him nation and people are identical.

When the November rising collapsed, the intellectual *élite* emigrated to France. Poland's best sons assembled in Paris, where new theories arose concerning the spirit of the nation and the vocation of the Polish people, which in many respects may be considered the continuation of Brodziński's ideas. The aim of the great emigration was to protest to the whole world against the partitioning Powers, and to take the lead in the nations' struggle against their governments. Mickiewicz,

NEW LIGHT ON BISMARCK'S FALL.

N EARLY fifty years have elapsed since Bismarck retired from his post as German Chancellor. Discussion of the causes and the results of his fall is as lively as ever, since the policy that followed his dismissal entered the paths which led to the World War. Holstein is held responsible for it between 1890 and 1906. I consider this a mistake. Responsibility always rests with the Foreign Minister. Yet it is correct to designate him as the dominating official of the Foreign Office.

From 1876 to 1906 Holstein held his post uninterruptedly as *Vortragender Rat*. He neither accepted, nor appears to have sought, any other diplomatic positions abroad after his return from Paris. Did he dream of a great career in this manner as Bismarck's closest colleague? In addition to being an extraordinarily hard worker, he was inspired by a passion for politics. Nor was he lacking in ambition. When he laid stress, in later years, on "no longer desiring distinction," he admitted that once he had wished to gain something from life. The manner in which he lived and worked proves that he was mainly concerned with keeping the leadership in his own hands without coming into the limelight. After 1890 he managed to remove from all important diplomatic positions and from the leading posts in the Foreign Office those who were displeasing to him—one might almost say, those sincere, independent personalities who did not turn their backs on Bismarck after his dismissal. He replaced them by friends and men whom he could trust not to resist his influence. He made them write confidential reports directly to himself, which ought to have been addressed to his chiefs, and, in the same manner, gave them independent orders over his chiefs' heads. He would never have been able to do this under Bismarck as Chancellor and Herbert Bismarck as Foreign Secretary.

Did Holstein work consciously, then, for the fall of Bismarck, who had promoted his career ever since the young attaché joined the Embassy at St. Petersburg? Hitherto opinions have been divided. After 1890 he was looked on as the supreme exponent of Bismarckian statesmanship. So he was, but only in the sense of Goethe's poem on the wizard's apprentice, who did not understand how to wield his master's

magic broom. That he was to blame for Bismarck's fall is considered improbable by two German diplomats, in their recently published Memoirs, who had first-hand experience of his activity for decades before and after 1890: Count Lerchenfeld, Bavarian Minister in Berlin 1880-1918, and Arthur von Brauer. Lerchenfeld even relates that in March 1890, Holstein, with tears in his eyes, spoke of Herbert Bismarck's possible departure from the Foreign Office as a misfortune. This, however, is contradicted by his own statement that he had submitted the secret treaty with Russia to the new Chancellor, Caprivi, while Herbert was still in office, and that he had brought about his breach with Herbert thereby.

Holstein's first step was to prevent the renewal of the treaty with Russia, which had already been approved by William II. By doing so he forced the alliance of Russia and France, with all its consequences. Since the founding of the Reich Bismarck had employed a large portion of his diplomatic skill in preventing this alliance. The change brought about the collapse of the German Empire.

I have discovered a proof of Holstein's share in Bismarck's fall from a private letter written by another distinguished official of the Foreign Office, who likewise reached the height of his career only after 1890, Paul Kayser, who later became head of the Colonial Office. The two men were very different, both in their origin and in the object of their ambition. Holstein was the last of an old aristocratic family, and his greatest desire was to keep all the threads of power in his own hands without coming into the limelight. Kayser's origin was partly Jewish, a fact which always troubled him. In spite of it—or, possibly, goaded on by it—his fervent desire was to hold a leading position in the state. The careers of the two men, however, were very similar. Both believed they could make their way by forming close connections with Bismarck and his family, and by working wholeheartedly in the Chancellor's service.

As a young Judge Kayser had prepared Count Wilhelm Bismarck, the Chancellor's second son, for his state examination in law, and then, thanks to his pupil's friendly support, had been promoted rapidly to the Ministry of Justice, the Imperial Insurance Office and the Imperial Chancellory. By the end of the eighties he was *Vortragender Rat* at the

Poland's greatest poet, laid down the principle that the existence of nations is only justified if they serve all humanity. This spirit also pervaded the numerous speeches addressed by the exiles to the governments and the nations.

The most brilliant vindication of the idea of Poland's mission is to be found in Mickiewicz's *Book of the Polish Nation and its Pilgrimage*, which compares his country's sufferings with those of Christ. The book states expressly: "The Polish nation shall rise again and shall set free all the nations of Europe." "Since the Polish nation was always the most righteous and the most free among the nations, it is called to lead the peoples of Europe into the Promised Land of liberty and of justice." "Wherever freedom was down-trodden in Europe, wherever men were struggling in her cause, a battle was being fought for the Fatherland, and in this battle everyone must take part. Hitherto the call had gone out to the nations: 'Lay down no weapons while the enemy holds one inch of your soil.' 'But ye shall say unto the nations: 'Lay down no weapons whilst despotism holds one inch of soil anywhere.' " Here Mickiewicz is preaching a new form of patriotism, which proclaims the solidarity of all nations. The Messianic idea worked so suggestively that at that time Poland was identified with the struggle for liberty. It is characteristic of the new spirit which inspired this book that his teaching starts, not with the individual and his rights, but with the liberty and the rights of the nation. He rejects party struggles and class warfare, and recognises only Poland. "We need the princes and counts as well as the peasants and the Jews. We must make each one of them a Pole." Sixteen years later Hegel's disciple Bronislaw Trentowski was to express the same point of view, saying: "I am neither a Monarchist nor a Republican, but, with all my heart, a Pole."

The idea of class and race plays an important part, on the other hand, in the theories laid down by the historian Lelewel. The basis of his work on Poland's history is the doctrine of the racial characteristics of the Slavs and the Poles and the theory of the sovereignty of the people. The Polish nation has always had a political and social ideal. This is embodied in national and social liberty. As long as the former drew nearer to the practical realisation of the latter it advanced, but it began to decline as soon as it became a mere theory. He points out that the power of action lies in the nation, and that individualism

is of no significance for the course of history. He traces characteristic racial qualities to climate, soil, manner of living, diet, level of civilisation and political organisation. He attributes to the Slavs refinement and patriotism, hospitality and gentleness. Further characteristic Polish qualities are independence and a high sense of social duty and political life. These also distinguish them from other Slavs. Lelewel, working with the idea of "class," holds the view that the nation constitutes no homogeneous unity, but rather that it falls into different classes, distinguished from each other by temperament and character. This difference he traces back to the varieties of social position and of education. Like the German historical school, he also sees in the history of Poland a revelation of the spirit of the nation. "It is the national character that creates State organisations, and it is national organisations which, in their turn, create genius."

Though voices had been audible, even at the time of the great emigration, protesting against the glorification of Poland and the Polish nation and urging self-criticism, her political and spiritual life, down to 1863, was stamped by the humanitarian-Messianic nationalism of Mickiewicz and Lelewel. It was only under the weight of the Russian government's terrible reprisals, following the collapse of the rising of 1863-4, that the nation awakened from its romantic dreams and brought sharp criticism to bear on the ideology that was held responsible for the disaster. The same generation that had gone out into the wilderness for the sake of ideas, now repudiated all theories, was enthusiastic for Comte and Positivism, for Darwin and Haeckel, for Büchner and Moleschott, Mill and Buckle, lauded science, opposed every form of superstition and reaction, was eager for the emancipation of women and the enlightenment of the nation. Polish Positivism arose, not as a philosophical system, but as a reaction against Romanticism.

Theories were developed by Swietochowski, leader of the Warsaw Positivists, which stood in glaring contrast to previous Polish ideology. He set civilising above political achievements. Instead of urging the old ideal "From sea to sea," he advised his countrymen to conquer the markets and industrial centres of the East; for "universal happiness" does not bring social and political independence in its train. Poland needed neither an independent army nor military

Foreign Office. Like Holstein, he found himself fettered by the subordination to which everyone had to submit as long as Bismarck's genius ruled Germany. In December 1891 he was named in the semi-official Roman paper *L'Italie* as one of those who had repaid the friendship of the Bismarck family with base treachery. He was said to have given information to the Kaiser concerning all the incidents and all the criticism that occurred in Bismarck's family against the Emperor. The *Berliner Tageblatt* published a translation of the article. To this attack we owe an outburst by Kayser in a letter written to a relative, the lawyer Professor Baron, living in Bonn, concerning Holstein and his rôle during the winter of 1889-90. It is true that he denies indignantly having given information; but he boasts that, instigated by Holstein, he passed on important matters to the Emperor which ultimately led to the decisive disagreement with the Chancellor and brought Kayser himself into direct contact with William II.

As early as the summer of 1889, the difficulties of continuous co-operation between the thirty-year-old Emperor and the seventy-four-year-old Chancellor had become a matter of public knowledge. They arose from the difference of age, the Emperor's immaturity, and the divergent temperaments of the two men. Bismarck's probable successor was believed to be Count Waldersee (the Chief of Staff) and, at that time, the Emperor's favourite. A considerable group speedily gathered round him of ambitious, embittered men, who believed that their hour would only come when Bismarck was no longer Chancellor, and whose correspondence with Waldersee tendered him advice to that end. One of them was Holstein. As early as July 1889 he took sides in the vexed question of Russian policy with the Emperor, who, unlike Bismarck, reckoned with Waldersee on imminent war. Holstein also advised the Emperor through Waldersee to give more frequent direct audience to the Prussian Ministers—passing over Bismarck, the responsible Premier. He must have known that this would irritate Bismarck sorely. As a matter of fact this was the question which actually led to the formal breach in March 1890.

In October 1889 the question of renewing the measures against the Socialist Party came into the foreground, and the whole labour problem was reopened. The opposing

views of the Emperor and the Chancellor had already come to light in the May of that year, during the great mining strike in the Ruhr. The former was in favour of speedy improvement in labour legislation; the latter believed that the workers' discontent was caused by Socialist agitation, which he wished to quell by sharp measures.

On January 24th, 1890, the Emperor unexpectedly summoned a Crown Council, which led to the first open clash with the Chancellor. The Emperor ordered the Minister von Boetticher to read out a programme of protective legislation for the workers, which he had dictated to his adjutant, and which came as a surprise to the other members of the Council, including the Chancellor himself. One of Bismarck's most faithful supporters, the Minister Lucius, thus describes the scene:

We sat there in increasing astonishment as to who had suggested these ideas to him. . . . We broke up amidst unsolved differences of opinion, with the feeling that an irreparable breach had opened between Chancellor and Sovereign.

Those who were present were struck by details which awakened an impression of intrigue against Bismarck, though they could not see the connecting links clearly. Thus Count Herbert Bismarck noticed that much of the programme coincided, word for word, with what the Grand Duke of Baden, the Emperor's uncle, had said to him a few days previously. The Chancellor himself felt that Boetticher read the programme like a man who was well acquainted with the text. As a matter of fact, a document was found among Boetticher's papers after his death, according to which the Emperor had already handed over "Hinzpeters Promemoria" on December 24th, 1889. Bismarck, therefore, had judged correctly. Moreover, this document shows that the Emperor, too, believed that the Promemoria which incited him to his action in the Council issued from Hinzpeter. The latter had been his tutor and for some time Bismarck had angrily opposed his political interference. Strange to say, until to-day apparently nobody seems to have noticed that Hinzpeter was a philologist and could hardly have worked out the programme for protective legislation for the workers, for which legal knowledge was necessary.

Kayser's above-named letter shows that Holstein was the

glory nor battles. Only positive and unceasing work could save the nation. The well-known novelist Sienkiewicz proclaimed a nationalism that was based, not on Messiahship, but on the idea of national responsibility. It is significant for this aspect of nationalism that the political factor is out-balanced by the social. Messiahship was now replaced by the notion of organic work. Simultaneously sharp criticism was brought to bear on theories concerning Poland's past, and the point of view represented by the so-called Cracow historical school found expression in the opinion that it was not the partitioning Powers, but the Poles themselves, who were to blame for the downfall of the old aristocratic Republic.

This state of affairs lasted until towards the end of the 'eighties. At that period a struggle for the Polish soul between the old and the new generation was inflamed by the appearance of Social Democracy and the National Democrats. Neither party would hear of reconciliation with the Partitioning Powers; they dreamed of an independent Poland and preached a new nationalism. At first social democracy wavered between cosmopolitanism and patriotism, but at the Congress of Paris in 1892 victory fell to those who understood how to reduce the postulates of the social revolution and the aims of the independence movement to a common denominator. The spiritual fathers of Polish social democracy were Marx, Engels and Lassalle as well as the great national poets Mickiewicz and Slowacki. The standard-bearer of this synthesis was Limanowski, who taught that patriotism is the cement which holds society together. The rooting out of patriotic feeling, explained the theorist of Polish socialism, would mean death to the independence of the social organism, and would make it easy for it to be absorbed by other bodies. "The renunciation of patriotism means incitement to suicide." "Patriotism and socialism do not exclude one another. They complement each other splendidly. For true patriotism turns first to the labouring masses who form the strength and the basis of every nation, and therefore it must be socialistic; and on the other hand true socialism, out of which the love of one's nation arises, must be patriotic." Thus the restoration of Poland would imply not only the shaking off of the yoke of the Partitioning Powers, but an act of social justice and the liberation of the working classes. Such is the standpoint, even to-day, of Polish social democracy.

Whilst the Polish Social Democrats follow the lead of Marx and Engels as regards the social side of nationalism, in respect of the treatment of national minorities they follow the traditions of the old aristocratic republic and the doctrines of Mickiewicz. As early as 1892, in their first programme, they laid down the principle that in a restored Poland all nationalities that should enter voluntarily the newly organised Federative Association should enjoy complete equality of rights. At the same time they proclaimed the equality of all citizens irrespective of descent, nationality, race and religious belief. They have remained true to these principles, and are almost the only party in Poland that accepts the national minorities. Both in the legislative bodies and in the party press they stand for far-reaching autonomy for the Ukrainians and the application of all laws and enactments touching the protection of the national minorities.

The development of the National Democrats was not so straightforward as that of the Social Democrats. Their more humanitarian nationalism was soon replaced by a more intransigent type. They gained recruits above all from the ranks of the upper and middle classes, alarmed as they were by the rapid progress of social democracy. This circumstance led the National Democratic Party to revise its attitude to Russia and to become reconciled to Tsardom, all the more since they were convinced of the invincibility of Moscow. Their approach to the Russian Government was hastened by the anti-Polish measures of Prussia; for it was at this time that Bismarck started the colonisation of Posen, and a section of German public opinion declared war on the Slavs, and on the Poles in particular. The leader of these circles was the famous philosopher of the Unconscious, Eduard Hartmann, who demanded the extirpation of the Slavs. These and similar theories did not fail to leave their traces on the National Democrats. The heralds of this nationalism were Roman Dmowski and Zygmunt Balicki.

Dmowski, who was the Polish delegate at the peace negotiations in Versailles, rejected romantic patriotism. "The objective of this patriotism, or, more accurately, nationalism, is not a certain number of liberties, called one's country, but the nation itself, the living social organism, with its own spiritual character, developed on the basis of race and history, its culture, its needs and interests." In the

spiritual father of the programme and induced Kayser to work it out. Then he got Kayser to send a copy to the Emperor's confidant, Count Philip Eulenburg, who had likewise made a career for himself through being a friend of the Bismarck family, and who was now in close contact with Holstein. Eulenburg presented the programme to the Emperor, naming not Kayser but Hinzpeter as the author. Holstein forwarded his own copy to the Grand Duke of Baden through Marschall, the Baden Minister in Berlin. This explains how Count Herbert heard the same ideas from the Grand Duke on January 22nd, and from the Emperor on the 24th. The Grand Duke had feared for some time that the "Bismarck Dynasty" might replace the Hohenzollern Dynasty, and accordingly worked against Bismarck, as did also his representative Marschall, the future Secretary of State at the Foreign Office.

Kayser maintains that both Eulenburg and Holstein passed on the programme without his knowledge, and that Holstein sought to reconcile Emperor and Chancellor by means of it. He asserts that Holstein told Kayser about the quarrels between William II and Bismarck, and continually induced him to write to Eulenburg or to Hinzpeter in order to keep the Emperor informed and to avert his anger by suggestive advice. We are told that Hinzpeter passed on these letters to the Emperor; that in December 1891 William assured him three times that he had burnt them, but that possibly one of them was taken out of the Emperor's hands and found its way to Bismarck; and that Kayser asserted in the letters that he would rather die than harm Prince Bismarck, but that excitement might have made the tone of one or the other letter sharper. He thus admits that he wrote reports which, if not actually addressed to William II, were nevertheless meant for his ear. He was obviously filled with anxiety lest they should be made public. We have already seen that, when the legislative programme was read which the Emperor declared he had dictated, the Ministers' immediate impression was that the ensuing discussion had led to an irreparable breach with the Chancellor. From the psychological standpoint alone, it is difficult to believe that Holstein, and Kayser with him, should have believed that their conduct would keep Bismarck in office. They were indeed placing a weapon in the Emperor's hand, in order to force

Bismarck to a policy which he did not approve. What damages Holstein's good faith above all is the underhand method by which he informed the Emperor and others of the "Programme," and misinformed not only Bismarck and the Ministers, but also William II as to its author.

Holstein and Kayser were Bismarck's subordinates, and they preferred to remain in obscurity, as they had no wish to lose their posts in the event of the Chancellor's remaining in office. Yet they knew what they were doing. As early as February 6th Kayser was boasting that he had broken down the Chancellor's resistance, without the latter being aware of it. In the archives of the Ministry he confirmed the fact that the Emperor had incorporated Kayser's programme word for word in his decree. Throughout the winter Kayser played an equivocal part. He tried to obtain from the Governor of Alsace-Lorraine a sinecure as Alsatian attorney in the Federal Council, with a salary of 15,000 marks, but he feared that his chief, Count Herbert Bismarck, would not sanction it, in order to retain his services at the Foreign Office. For this reason, the fall of the "Bismarck Dynasty" was in Kayser's interest. Nevertheless, at the same time as he was labouring for this, he did not hesitate to ask the unsuspecting Count Wilhelm Bismarck's mediation with his brother for permission to accept the Alsatian post. What is more, he obtained it! And it is characteristic that at this very time, on February 24th, Waldersee wrote in his journal: "The rats are beginning to desert the Chancellor's ship. About a week ago, when it looked as if he would soon retire, several of his subordinates—such as, for example, the notorious Privy Councillor Kayser—dropped him completely and slandered him without further ceremony. Now, when they believe his position is secure again, they are once more full of praise for father and son."

Shortly afterwards, however, Kayser succeeded, as Secretary of the Prussian State Council and of the Emperor's Labour Congress, in being included in confidential conversations, and with this support at his back he again placed himself at Holstein's disposal. It was Kayser who handed to William II, behind his chief's back—that is, in breach of his official duty—the reports of the German Consul in Kieff, which confirmed the massing of Russian troops in that district. Working from knowledge of all the details, he

name of this patriotism his followers in Russian Poland spread the economic boycott of the Jews, and his adherents in Galicia refused the Ukrainians their right to liberation. Concerning the Ukrainians Dmowski represented the view that only two ways lay open to them, either to become Polish or to preserve their national independence. Should they decide on the latter they must be opposed by the Poles, for it is only out of hard struggles that firmly knit nations are born. Dmowski thus wished to give to the Ukrainians the same treatment as was dealt out to the Poles in Posen. The National Democrats' hatred of the Jews and Ukrainians sprang from their belief that Poland's chief task was not the struggle with Russia, but the contest with the foe within her gates. True, this theory rested on economic grounds. The boycott of the Jews, and their suppression in economic life, was to smooth the way for the strengthening of the Polish middle class. The oppression of the Ukrainians, which was lauded by Dmowski and his followers as a benefit to that nation, was to be to the advantage of the Polish landowners in East Galicia, who viewed with jealousy the efforts for emancipation of the Ukrainian small-holders and agricultural labourers, who demanded land and the division of the large estates. Moreover, the struggle of the National Democrats against the Ukrainians was in the interests of the Russian government.

The National Democrats' doctrine of the enemy within the gates constituted not only an abrupt break with the humanitarian-Messianistic nationalism of the time of the emigration and a renunciation of the policy of national risings, but a new tendency in foreign policy. Whereas the Polish Independent Parties were based on the so-called Jagiellonic theory, which visualised a Poland extending from sea to sea, favoured alliance with the Central Powers in the event of a European conflagration, and saw in Russia the arch-enemy of their country, the National Democrats were content with an ethnographic Poland, and declared that it was not Moscow but Prussia that threatened the existence of the Polish people. At the same time they declared that Germany was a danger not only to Poland, but to the world, and that the Poles, in opposing Germanism, were doing the world a great service.

Whilst Dmowski was summoning his countrymen to fight against Germans, Jews and Ukrainians, his friend Siegmund

Balicki was formulating the theory of national egoism. To be sure this was no original achievement. He only revived a slogan used long since by German nationalists in the struggle against Poland. We need only recall the words of Wilhelm Jordan, delegate to the National Assembly in Frankfurt, who cried, speaking to the friends of Poland in a meeting in Berlin on April 1st, 1848: "The nations have their own egoism, the golden age of brotherhood is still far away."

Balicki's theories started with social ethics, which he contrasted with the ethics of idealism. The leading idea is the good of a concrete society, to which the individual belongs. The old commandment, "Thou shalt not lie," is replaced by the maxim, "Be not a liar." Instead of the commandment, "Do no wrong," we have the precept "Endure no wrong." He declared that only that nation has a right to independence which possesses a strong individuality, can fight for its existence and conquer, and is in a position to avenge the wrongs it has suffered. He grants a nation the moral right to extend its power, not only at the cost of sluggish, thoughtless and socially nebulous elements, but also at the expense of other nations. This must not be brought about either by methods of brutality and force or by exceptional legislation. This rider was very necessary, otherwise his theory would have formed the best justification of Prussia's anti-Polish policy. Not every Pole can represent the nationalism of Balicki, but a special type, constituting a mixture of soldier and landowner. Thus the new nationalism is egoistic and anti-democratic.

In the new Poland the slogan of national egoism is unknown to the National State, and the real opponents of the National Democrats are no longer the Social Democrats, but the followers of Pilsudski, who inscribe the motto "Pertaining to the State" on their banner. The gulf that divides these tendencies reminds us of the differences between Fascism and National Socialism concerning the conception of nation and state. Whilst the Fascists stress the primary importance of the state, the National Socialists subordinate the entire life of state and society to the nation. The same differences exist between the protagonists of the national state and the adherents of state supremacy. The theory of state supremacy was formulated by the former Minister of Education, Czerwinski. The first duty of the schools is to train good citizens.

should have drawn the Emperor's attention to the fact that these movements were merely of local significance and not worth special consideration. Partly, too, they were already out of date. As these were addressed to him secretly, William II was obliged to assume that the Chancellor was concealing important matters from him. He used this supposed incorrectitude to inflict fresh wounds on Bismarck, which, together with other causes, speedily led to his resignation. There is no written proof that in this matter also Kayser acted as Holstein's tool. It is probable, however, for Holstein had more ready access than Kayser to the Foreign Office reports.

Holstein's share in Bismarck's dismissal was far greater than has been assumed. The causes certainly lay deeper than differences of opinion concerning the labour problem. But Holstein started the avalanche through his intervention with Kayser's programme, and—which was characteristic of all his tactics, both personal and official—he knew how to conceal his hand so skilfully that it has only now been discovered. Worst of all was the unhappy hour in which Bismarck's retirement from office was ratified. For nearly twenty years he had carried out his peace policy, not only in the interests of Germany, but also in those of Europe. A fortnight after March 20th, the day on which he retired, one of the main pillars of that policy, the Treaty of Reinsurance with Russia, was annulled. This was all the worse since no one knew the futility and aimlessness that now governed German policy.

Bismarck had won such prestige for Germany in the international diplomatic world, that the latter simply could not believe that her clear-sighted foreign policy had come to an end, and that every diplomatic step would no longer be taken as part of a maturely considered policy. Above all, William II appeared as the successful opponent of the most powerful statesman of his day. A statesmanlike lead was expected of him, and his frequent threatening speeches were believed to be based on a great and premeditated offensive, against which Europe felt it imperative to unite. As a matter of fact, the speeches were merely meant to express the consciousness of power. He and his Chancellors were as desirous as Bismarck of preserving peace; but their will to peace only found expression when the danger of war became

obvious, and then it bore a close resemblance to diplomatic retreat.

The Kaiser's impulsive temperament only carried so much weight in this manner because the practical conduct of affairs, as described above, passed, after Bismarck's fall, into the hands of Holstein. Count Lerchenfeld asserts, from his own experience, that for sixteen years German policy bore the stamp of this man's wavering, restless and hysterical temperament. Doubtless his knowledge of preceding events and his power of co-ordination made him a great force and inspired him with the best will as a patriot; but he lacked the large vision. His policy was always based on unbounded suspicion. He saw precipices everywhere, and for that reason could never pursue a straight path. He ought never to have been allowed to rule. It was the tragedy of Germany, and, in view of the World War, it may well be said, of Europe, that he succeeded, as Kayser's letter proves, in his campaign against Bismarck.

HANS GOLDSCHMIDT.

"We do not wish or demand that the Germans and Ukrainians in the schools or other educational establishments shall be educated as Poles." These words point to the granting to all national minorities the right to cultivate their own individuality and culture. These minorities are only required to recognise the Polish State and to help to strengthen its international position.

The adherents of the national state, on the other hand, will not hear of the right of equal votes for the national minorities, and argue that only the Polish section of the population can decide on questions that concern the state. Thus Grabski, a prominent National Democrat leader, says: "The sovereign ruler of the Polish State is the Polish people, not the sum total of its inhabitants." Grabski draws pregnant conclusions from this principle, which culminate in the words: "The sovereign nation must never be in the minority." That is to say: even in the provinces and municipalities in which the Poles form only a fraction of the population, they can send as many representatives to the municipal bodies and municipal corporations as the non-Polish majority. No less important is Grabski's suggestion as to the division of the state population into Poles and non-Poles. Professor Rybarski does not wish to deprive the national minorities of all rights, for he admits that the national state can recognise certain rights for minorities also. But, like Grabski, he demands that the Polish nation alone should form the political will of the State. This is the tone in which all the theorists of the National Democratic camp express themselves. They also proclaim the assimilation of the national minorities, with the exception of the Jews, whom they regard as an alien body.

JAKOB RAPPAPORT.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE NERVE STORMS IN EUROPE.

THE repercussions of the Spanish war upon the nerves of those who manage, or mismanage, the diplomatic affairs of the Great Powers in Europe, have continued their course unchecked, and have even increased in their tempo. During the past month another of the really first-class crises—one has no alternative but thus to distinguish between the varying grades of the apparently never-ceasing disturbances—has had the effect of renewing the solemn talk about a possibly imminent war. Certain eager, earnest people in Great Britain, for instance, again let loose their indignation and seemed some of them to contemplate, not calmly, but with frenzied idealism, the notion of accepting war with Germany in the North Sea and with Italy in the Mediterranean at one and the same time. It is one of the odd features of the demoralisation in intelligence characterising many of the contemporary people who exert influence on affairs, that they seem unable to resist their own welling sense of indignation. The demoralisation aforesaid is no doubt one of the long-distance effects of the last great war, which killed off the flower of this country's, and of most of other countries', manhood. Indignation is one of the stupid emotions. The mature, experienced people always find that common sense is the better part. In the present case it simply has happened that in those quarters where foreign affairs are apt to be discussed by people who, if the qualification of knowledge be by itself an adequate qualification, are indeed qualified to discuss them, one has heard this sort of childish thing: "It is time that we made a stand. Are Germany and Italy always to 'get away with it'?" The more we yield to them, the more impossible they become." The narrative given below will provide the background of fact in which such alarming nonsense was heard.

In the last month's CONTEMPORARY REVIEW the tiresome story was related up to the point where the four Great Powers of Western Europe were urgently negotiating with each other about a system of collective security for the four navies patrolling the Spanish coast. The German "pocket" battleship *Deutschland* had been bombed at Iviza in the Balearic

A CENTURY OF ENGLISH ARCHITECTURE.

ARCHITECTURE, which may be described as civilised building, must always, as the most conspicuous of the arts, command a certain prestige, while, as in one form or another the most essential of them, it should likewise enjoy a wide popularity. Capable of serving in a high degree the purposes of both use and beauty, and of thus expressing both the needs and the aspirations of a nation, it should indeed make a universal appeal. Few however would assert that modern architecture inspires general interest or respect.

Public indifference was indeed typically displayed by the scanty attendance at the very notable Exhibition of Architecture held in the early part of this year by the Royal Academy. Nor did the Press notices compensate for this neglect. These facts may be partly accounted for by the insufficiency of pictorial representation in the case of an art which, like sculpture, should be viewed in the round—or rather in the *cube*. But one became conscious of another probable and more fundamental reason in the nature of the record itself, namely the devious and often conflicting paths pursued by the professors of the art since the advent of the Victorian age—a period well illustrated by the unique “Retrospective Section” of the Burlington House Show. And here even an expert would find himself faced with a serious problem—namely that of tracing any coherent sequence or any logical development in the vast diversity of architectural styles pursued during that age, and in a less degree down to the present day. An outsider must indeed have felt at a loss to discover in this medley of modes and movements—now native, now foreign, now ancient, now modern—any fixed principle or practice on the one hand, or any orderly evolution on the other; so much seemed arbitrary or accidental that he might well feel disconcerted, and so far, irresponsible.

Let us then endeavour in the first place to give some kind of independent and chronologically connected survey of the main influences and elements traceable in English architecture of the past hundred years, while at the same time keeping the Exhibition catalogue in mind for reference. This period of a century is not, in the present case, just a common and convenient unit of time; for the beginning of it actually coincides

with the advent of a veritable revolution—the “Gothic Revival” was nothing less—in contemporary architecture. At that time the Classical style, in a version for the most part formal and effete, was still established in pride of place. There had indeed existed for some time past a current of change and reaction, but it was not until 1836 that the young Augustus Welby Pugin sprang upon the world the challenge of his *Contrasts*, stressing what is known as “the Battle of the Styles.”* In that work his unsparing pen and ironic pencil denounced and derided the essential anachronisms and the particular falsities of the neo-classic tradition (his own word being rather neo-“pagan”) and extolled on the other hand the merits and the claims of medieval architecture. This thesis he proceeded to expand in other volumes, and to exemplify in his own practice, chiefly ecclesiastical, a domain in which he was enthusiastically followed by others.

There was no effective reply to his general onslaught; and indeed it would need an able advocate to show cause why English architecture in the year of grace 1836—or for the matter of that, 1936—should remain tied to the apron-strings of Roman antiquity, or of its Renaissance versions. He was in fact unanswerable when he argued that medieval or “Gothic” architecture was not only a beautiful but a vital and a logical architecture (an “organic” style, as William Morris insisted fifty years later), one moreover native to our soil and climate, and above all, a Christian architecture. Gothic, too, is unquestionably the most various and elastic of architectural modes, contrasting in these points especially with the alien and autocratic “Orders” of Classicism. Whether structurally or æsthetically considered, it remains in all such respects valid and practicable. Its adaptability to modern conditions, if less simple than in Pugin’s day, cannot be impugned without at least raising a stronger presumption against its rival.

The crusade thus launched was later on powerfully supported, although from an independent angle, by the teachings of Ruskin, stressing moral and social aspects. But his *Stones of Venice*, together with such publications as Street’s *Brick and Marble Architecture*, and the French *Dictionnaire Raisonné* of Viollet-le-duc, unhappily gave a foreign bias to its style,

* The Houses of Parliament, that great exemplar of the early Revival, had indeed been conceived a year or two before, but it must be remembered that Pugin himself had, to say the least, a considerable hand in its details.

Islands on May 29th. The Italian ship *Barletta* had already been bombed. As a reprisal for the bombing of the *Deutschland* German vessels shelled the fortified port of Almeria on May 31st. Italy by contrast had taken no retaliatory action after the bombing of the *Barletta*. The Non-Intervention Committee had to set about the awkward task of considering what to do about it all. The British Government on June 3rd made a certain proposal to the German, French and Italian Governments. Out of the resultant four-Power discussions there emerged on June 12th an agreed scheme of sanctions against the recurrence of incidents to the patrolling navies. The discussion had been mainly confined to the question, how far satisfaction could be given to Germany's claim to freedom of action or, in the alternative, to some suggested form of collective action by the four supervising navies. Although Russia was not a party to the conversations (having refused on February 26th, before the control scheme came into operation, to take part in the naval patrol duties) she none the less unofficially put about a suggestion, which at first seemed to be approved by French opinion, that the separate zones allotted to the four navies be abolished and a collective scheme of mixed patrol by the four navies be substituted. For that purpose the four navies would virtually need to be amalgamated: a corollary that was not accepted as practical by Great Britain, Germany, Italy or on second thoughts by France.

The device finally adopted was based on the British proposal of June 3rd. It was a four-Power agreement. It was framed in two parts, the first part being designed to provide guarantees against any further attacks on the patrolling ships, and needing, to make it effective, the agreement and collaboration of the two parties in Spain. The second part took the form of an annex, not for submission to Spain, explaining to the Non-Intervention Committee the nature of the proposed consultation to be undertaken in the event of further attacks upon patrolling ships. The substance of the agreement about guarantees was as follows: (1) At the request of the four Powers the two authorities in Spain are to give assurances that they will respect the naval control units and establish an extended system of safety zones in Spanish waters where ships can lie at anchor without risk of being exposed to military operations; (2) The two authorities in

Spain are to give binding assurances that they will do their utmost to prevent any recurrence of incidents involving the ships of the four Powers, this to include strict instructions to the naval and air forces; (3) The four Powers agree that, in the event of any future attack, independently of measures of self-defence taken on the spot they will at once consult upon measures to be taken in concert; in so doing, they will naturally take into consideration the opinions which the Power attacked has the right to make known concerning the line of action which should be followed. As a result of that agreement it seemed reasonable to expect—if reason any longer played any part in European diplomacy—that Germany and Italy would resume their participation both in the Spanish patrol duties and in the work of the Non-Intervention Committee. When they withdrew on May 31st from such participation they informed the Non-Intervention Committee that they would resume their part when they had been given guarantees against the recurrence of attacks.

For the moment, therefore, the sky looked less stormy. On June 15th, at the end of the Imperial Conference, it was made known in London and in Berlin that Baron von Neurath, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, was to pay an official visit to London. The two things were connected. The Dominion Prime Ministers had left no doubt of their aversion from any policy of meddling in Europe, or of commitment against hypothetical contingencies. Moreover, the new British Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, had two clearly defined attributes, one that he was a radical at heart in domestic matters, and in foreign matters was an isolationist. In the chaotic and critical condition of European relationships it was obvious that Germany was a decisive factor. If an Anglo-German understanding could be reached, obviously the peace of Europe might be strengthened. The four-Power agreement of June 12th gave the opportunity. The Chamberlain Government tried to take it. The invitation for the von Neurath visit was duly given and accepted; and it looked at first as if the matter were to be taken seriously both in London and in Berlin. The official pundits in both capitals made it known that they would make a point of keeping Count Grandi informed of what took place at the interviews in London. It was also emphasised that the purpose of the visit was not to negotiate any particular

which helped eventually to bring the movement, especially where secular buildings were concerned, into disfavour. This phase with its severe forms and oftentimes harsh, parti-coloured materials,* was exemplified in, for instance, the Law Courts of London and Manchester, the Town Hall of the latter city, St. Pancras Station, and the first Memorial Theatre at Stratford-upon-Avon—some of which were illustrated in the Exhibition—while it affected generally the ecclesiastical and even the domestic buildings of the period. It gave us, too, the Albert Memorial.

The Classicists were thus enabled to regain something of their lost prestige, but not without an interlude in the late Victorian decades of so-called "Free Classic," in which may be included the "Queen Anne" mode, and certain Netherlandish ventures. The outstanding exponent of this fashion was Mr. Norman Shaw, who, together with his school, eschewed severity and grandiosity alike, and gave us not only individual buildings, but whole quarters, of great charm and interest, mainly of the domestic order, and in picturesque brickwork. But that vogue could also produce so dignified a public building as the Imperial Institute. In inferior hands, however, it suffered abuse, and in its turn declined and so ran to seed. Meanwhile church architecture, recovering gradually (yet with a widened outlook) from its continental "grand tour," produced, under such men of genius as Bodley, Bentley and Pearson (the architect of Truro Cathedral), some very beautiful and very scholarly buildings—sufficient in themselves to make the Gothic Revival worth while. It seems singular and untoward that Bentley, a master of medievalism, should have been called upon to design Westminster Cathedral in an exotic manner, however greatly he rose to the occasion. But so it was, and his creation (represented at Burlington House by a model) caused, in the early century, a distinct wave of Byzantinism in church architecture. This was yet another instance of how, in the absence of settled principles, the profession has been swayed by the appearance of some notable building, some exceptional man, or even some particular book.

The foregoing sketch corresponds roughly with the more modern period of the "Retrospective" Section in the Exhibition. From this point on, and especially since the War, it

* Aptly termed by its critics the "streaky bacon" type.

becomes less easy to characterise buildings in terms of style. The old categories persist, but they are threatened by serious innovation. In point of fact one of the notes of the newest architecture is the rejection (for the first time) of style even in its broadest sense, and in the worse cases by the cult of the eccentric—to put it no lower. This trend is no doubt partly a reflection of the general dislocation consequent on the War, and partly due to the recent introduction of new technical methods and materials, and of new classes of buildings; but of this anon. In the meantime, one may briefly follow the Exhibition scheme in its division according to subject or purpose, dealing by the way with the problems presented. Thus in the "Cathedrals and Churches" Section were to be found not a few excellent designs on traditional (i.e. medieval and mostly native) lines, while others showed signs of the abnormal, and a few, easily picked out, had crossed the border-line of perversity. Incidentally, it is noteworthy that there are at the present time two spacious cathedrals in course of erection at Liverpool. Of the earlier, Anglican, pile with its marked foreign-Gothic strain, was shown a fine drawing of the central tower, but strangely enough none at all of the more lately founded Archiepiscopal church, whose style is however known to be *sui generis*. Of the newest cathedral of all, that of Guildford, there was an effective model, showing a Gothic church with fine masses, and a blend of modernism in detail.

In the wide domain of Secular Architecture there were naturally numerous categories of building, with also a great variety of styles and treatments. As to the former, it was evident that for the more important public and commercial edifices, the more uncompromising and academical strain of Classicism is again uppermost. One was in fact surfeited with a columnar diet and its frigid ponderosity. At the same time the monotony of the fare was aggravated by the sense of its unpractical nature; for it is plain that all this conventional paraphernalia is for the most part the application of a prescribed formula for the sake of effect, and not the free and flexible expression of the actual requirements of the case—a formula indeed often positively detrimental to the actual uses of the building. Even æsthetically viewed, these pompous porticoes, these tedious colonnades, this stereotyped detail, pall upon the palate by repetition. Nevertheless, since treatment, as distinct from style or subject, must always count, it

agreement but to lay the foundation in friendly feeling for subsequent negotiation about such matters as the proposed Western Pact and the problem of Spain. It was taken for granted that Count Grandi would not only be kept informed but would even be consulted. M. Corbin was an ever-present influence, always at hand for consultation as a matter of course.

The prospect therefore opened that the Anglo-German conversation might develop into a machinery for a Four-Power understanding. The omens seemed altogether good. German opinion had lately shown an unmistakable desire to cultivate a better relationship with Great Britain. Italian opinion did its bit promptly in showing that there was no danger of the impression being created that Italy was being ignored in conversations about matters affecting herself. It had been specifically stated in London and in Berlin that Spain was to be a subject of discussion; and Italy was involved in Spain to a greater degree than was Germany. Italian quarters played up by explaining why it was that Baron von Neurath's visit could not create any uneasiness in Rome. In every joint Italo-German statement made since Count Ciano's visit to Herr Hitler last October emphasis had been laid on the desire that the Rome-Berlin axis should lead to what was called, for instance, when Baron von Neurath left Rome on May 5th, "a wider collaboration with the other Powers." The further argument was heard in Italian quarters that the Anglo-Italian "gentleman's agreement" had suffered at the time it was made (January 4th, 1937) from the strain that was then felt in Anglo-German relations, and that an improvement in German relations with Great Britain would in Italian eyes increase the value of Italy's agreement with Great Britain. Moreover, the achievement of the Four-Power agreement on June 12th had resulted in the spectacle, seen on June 18th and 19th, of the German and Italian delegates again attending the meetings of the Non-Intervention Committee, whence it could even be deduced that the opportunity was ripe for renewed discussion of the problem of evacuating the foreign troops from Spain. There also emerged an improved likelihood that the projected Western European Pact, launched a year before on Germany's repudiation of the Locarno Treaty, might now be discussed with some prospect of success. One of the results

of the latest manifestation of the Russian terror was the probability that the Franco-Russian Pact, the chief obstacle to the conclusion of a new Western Pact, could not be extended into a military pact. Apart from the weakened prestige of Russia, there was the practical consideration that the further conclusion of any agreement of any kind with Russia was impossible for the simple reason that no plenipotentiary could be regarded as safe from the purge. All seemed well. The von Neurath visit was fixed for June 23rd and was to last two days. Alas! It did not take place. On June 21st the German Government issued this statement: "As the situation which has arisen through the repeated Red Spanish attempts on German warships does not permit of the absence of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs from Berlin, the British Ambassador here was informed yesterday that the visit arranged for Baron von Neurath to London must be postponed." There is no room for doubt that the reason given in the German statement was not the real reason for the "postponement" of Baron von Neurath's visit. The alleged attack on the *Leipzig* was a mere pretext.

What exactly did happen? On June 19th, exactly a week after the Four-Power Agreement had been concluded, Herr von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador in London, demanded a meeting of the four Powers. A meeting was duly and immediately convened for 5 p.m. that day, and it took place in the British Foreign Office. Mr. Eden presided. The other persons present were the German, French and Italian Ambassadors, Herr von Ribbentrop, M. Corbin and Count Grandi. The meeting was preceded by an announcement made in Berlin that an attack had been made on the German cruiser *Leipzig* (6,000 tons) which had been despatched to Spanish waters after the bombing of the *Deutschland*. The detail was given that three torpedoes had been launched at the *Leipzig* while cruising off Oran on June 15th, and that another torpedo had been fired at her on June 18th; but all the shots had missed their mark. Herr von Ribbentrop, however, was instructed to request a meeting of the four Powers. At the meeting Herr von Ribbentrop gave an account of the alleged incident and explained that instead of taking reprisals the German Government was now acting under the terms of the June 12th agreement by "consulting" the other three Powers about the action to be taken jointly by them.

is almost needless to say that, within the limitations of the system, the resources of agreeable proportion and composition, and of effective if not interesting decoration, still remain open to the architect—as was evident in fairly numerous exhibits. This personal factor must always be kept in view in any critical estimate. It is this which may enable even a block of flats to be sightly, and even a Church-building repellent.

But in truth Classicism seems to be tolerable only when it forgets its “grand manner,” its Augustan pose, its obsession of “monumentalism.” When it drops its stilts it can walk quite naturally! In the case of lesser public and official buildings, of scholastic and business premises and the like, there were to be seen many examples of a quietly dignified or even genial Georgian manner, mostly in red brick. It is this strain, unpretentious and amenable, and of a naturalised type, that seems, failing the adoption of earlier and freer precedents, to afford the most hopeful line of cultivation. As to such earlier precedents, it is not a little singular how seldom they are sought nowadays in connection with civic buildings—whether it be through the force of fashion or of prejudice, or through the mere difficulty of designing without a rule-book. The most (relatively) recent example that comes to mind was recalled at Burlington House by views of the Middlesex Guildhall—by common consent a charming building, although a comparatively small one. This at least remembered and respected the medieval atmosphere of Westminster—although, it must be owned, after a foreign fashion.*

And this point of congruity with historic surroundings recurs upon reflecting that at the present time two historic cities, namely Norwich and Bristol, are proceeding to build Town Halls on an important scale, and that in both cases they will neighbour important medieval memorials—at Bristol unfortunately the Cathedral itself. Now in the heyday of the Gothic Revival such situations would no doubt have been hailed as a providential opportunity for erecting a building which, in intention at least, would have harmonised with its setting. Even at the *fin-de-siècle* or later, Mr. Norman Shaw or Mr. T. E. Collcut might have given us a pile which, without attempting medievalism, would in pictorial conception and in scale and variety of parts have fitted happily enough

* Meantime the new Church House in Dean's Yard will affect a discreet classicism—in distinct emulation, as it were, of the Wesleyan Hall without.

into the scene. At this early stage, accessible particulars of the Bristol and Norwich designs are scanty, but they would appear altogether to ignore their historic neighbours. Nevertheless, but a few years ago and but a short distance away, there arose in connection with the Bristol University one of the most striking groups of Gothic building erected in recent years. The credit here, however, was due to private initiative, and not to any enlightenment on the part of a municipality. It may be added that the modern Public Library near to the Cathedral Gateway was not designed without reference to its ancient neighbour.

In many modern buildings, and especially in those of a commercial class, architecture is up against the problem of steel construction. Now a steel skeleton clothed with masonry is bound to be an unsatisfactory affair, for the underlying conditions of the fabric are not the apparent ones. A masonic mask on a metallic framework involves in fact a falsity (since cause and effect are not duly related) which must in one way or another make itself felt. The result leaves the impression of a *tour-de-force*, or at best a compromise—which the treatment of the façade in any historic style only stresses. One cannot call it honest architecture, yet it has become a part of everyday procedure. Furthermore, the system lends itself to the creation of those overgrown edifices*—monsters with uncountable eyes in the shape of windows, but no inkling of a soul—which, intruded to-day into the most conspicuous situations, form an increasing eyesore in our midst; while the bleakness of their bulk is worsened by the bleakness of the Portland stone in which they are usually sheathed.

The position as regards ferro-concrete is different. It may mean much to the engineer (although the visible results are apt to be appalling); but from an architectural standpoint, it would seem sufficient to say that one cannot expect to get A1 architecture out of C3 materials—that is, in this case, a compost of rusty rods and cement porridge, however scientifically combined. Incidentally, the general observation may be made that the more architecture tends to become an exact science, the less possible it is for it to exist as a free art. For the rest, it seems to be according to natural and salutary law that man can only produce his finest and most enduring work by means of material delved directly out of his

* We have even the transatlantic type in the London University's new book store.

The meeting passed in a calm, even friendly spirit and was adjourned so that the four delegates could consult their governments. June 19th was a Saturday. It was arranged that the adjourned meeting should take place on the Monday, June 21st. But before it took place, namely on Sunday, June 20th, the British Government was informally advised that the von Neurath visit could not now take place. The official intimation to that effect was not made public till twenty-four hours later.

It was quite clear that the *Leipzig* incident was not the real cause, but only a pretext. The attack on the *Leipzig* had taken place on Tuesday, June 15th, and nothing had been said about it in Berlin. Suddenly, on Saturday afternoon, June 19th, an announcement is made in Berlin and Herr von Ribbentrop requests a meeting of the four Powers. Why? Those who moved behind the scenes of high diplomacy could make a shrewd guess. The impending visit of Baron von Neurath to London had been announced on June 15th and was to take place a week later, on June 23rd. It was known behind the scenes of general diplomacy, in the several embassies, for instance, that Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Sir Samuel Hoare had been the initiating spirits in the proposed Anglo-German conversations, and that Mr. Anthony Eden had more reluctantly consented. It is a normal, though not invariable, diplomatic practice to send communications to a foreign government through the channel of the originating country's ambassador in the capital of the country addressed. For instance: in inviting the German Foreign Minister to visit London, the British Government would send the invitation through Sir Neville Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, not through Herr von Ribbentrop in London. It is even more businesslike to send such messages through the co-national source; that is, it is better for a British message to Germany to be passed on by a British agent rather than by a German agent and *vice versa*.

But it was a matter of common gossip that certain British quarters, official and non-official, were less than well disposed towards Herr von Ribbentrop personally. In those circumstances it was at least unfortunate that Herr von Ribbentrop was in form—even though that form itself was correct—ignored in an attempt, initiated from London, to improve Anglo-German relations. After all, Herr von Ribbentrop

was the German Ambassador stationed in London, and it was part of his job to improve Anglo-German relations. Could tact, could courtesy, not have been used? Even though there was no dictate in diplomatic practice to that effect, could not Herr von Ribbentrop have been informally consulted and his goodwill ensured, or cultivated? It happens to be known as one of Herr Hitler's qualities that he is loyal to his friends so long as they are loyal to him. Herr von Ribbentrop is a great friend of Herr Hitler's. He is able to communicate with Herr Hitler, and the British Foreign Office, of course, does not know the content of what he thus communicates. In the present instance the inescapable facts are that on June 15th it was announced by the British Government that the German Foreign Minister had been invited, and had accepted the invitation, to pay an official visit to London; and that a week later, on June 21st, it was announced from Berlin that the visit was "postponed." Such a publicly advertised mishap argued mismanagement somewhere; and the enterprise was a British enterprise.

The explanation was not indeed far to seek. It is known in the embassies and other well-informed quarters that certain British newspapers are inspired. If it be desired to know what exactly is in the mind of Mr. Anthony Eden at any given moment, the well-informed people know exactly where to look in exactly which newspapers. On the morning of Saturday, June 19th, certain newspapers made certain comments on the approaching visit of Baron von Neurath. When Herr von Ribbentrop read them he must have been amazed, and secretly delighted. In effect what they said was this: "The German Foreign Minister has been invited to come to London. We are delighted to receive him. But it must be clearly understood by him that he comes on all fours, crawling. British rearmament, by jingo, has made the German Government desire an understanding with Great Britain. There must be no nonsense about colonies, or about anything else . . . etc." That parody contains no extravagance, no exaggeration of the blatant spirit of what was written in those particular newspapers, whose source of inspiration was well known. It would be interesting to read what Herr von Ribbentrop wrote to Herr Hitler, or to know what Herr Hitler said, or what Baron von Neurath thought. The open fact is that it was on that

mother-earth, or hewn from his native forests, and shaped by his own handicraft.

The ordinary modernist however does not need either technical novelties or outsize buildings in order to show his hand, to effect a nondescript or a revolutionary style—beside which conventional Classicism becomes almost desirable. Just as in painting and sculpture we have for some time past been faced with productions of which it can only be said, “this is not art, but aberration,” so it is with architecture. We know this type of work only too well; its simple formula is: to be bare and square, blockish and abrupt, while at the same time defiant of accepted proportions. It does not in fact pretend to be civilised. Set, as is too often the case, among buildings of a normal kind, it reminds one of a man in shirtsleeves in a decently dressed company. Or it might be still better described as the “nudist” style. It is sometimes sought to justify this nudity under the title of “functionalism,” whereas “fitness,” in every relevant sense, is the true test of merit. Should this class of work, as a concession to appearances, attempt detail, the result is no better. The detail is rudimentary, flat and rectangular, where not crudely erratic—or a mere matter of grooves and notches; while the absence of mouldings suggests an incapacity to design even the simplest. In fact the whole raw type is bankrupt of scholarship as of beauty.

How, one must ask, has this decadence come about, and how has it come to be tolerated among us? Can we acquit the profession or its tuition of responsibility? or the public authorities, who at least have certain powers in the matter? And what kind of figure will this London—to name only London—cut in the future?—disfigured as is too often the case by destruction and construction alike? Take, for instance, the river frontage from the Adelphi to Adelaide House, and note both what has perished (including Waterloo Bridge) and what has sprung up. . . . Can one conceive of similar operations being perpetrated in Paris? It might sober us to reflect not only on the impression we are making upon strangers, and the heritage we are handing over to posterity, but upon the epitaph that we are infallibly writing upon ourselves—for a generation judges itself by its works.

To revert to the Exhibition. It was with genuine relief and refreshment that one entered upon the pleasant territory of

Houses and Gardens. Here at least were things human, kindly and gracious, and as to a large part of them after a traditional manner; for there had to be a revival in domestic architecture no less than in other branches of it. And this has proved to be one of its most successful spheres. Not only Georgian but Tudor precedent, thoroughly understood, here contributed to a very charming and notable display, and on every scale of size from the cottage to the castle—a fact which carries its own lesson. Of course there were degrees of merit, and of demerit—houses for instance that looked as though cut out of cardboard, or converted from rolling-stock; the elementary shelters, one would say, of a primitive people, and incidentally blots upon an English landscape. They served at least to heighten one's appreciation of other types. Mass-housing, on the other hand, like mass-production, is open to objections in principle, and hence difficult to treat in the concrete. We are conscious that mass-conditions are not desirable, and so the impression produced can seldom be a pleasing one, although it may be favourably modified by skilful handling. The average block of flats, however, with its standardised parts and piled-up masses, its accumulated windows, and its sarcophagal balconies (the balcony which was once the most graceful feature of a dwelling!), has a crushing effect, and from certain angles suggests a battleship with its “fighting-tops,” rather than a habitation for human beings. It may be that social and economic conditions demand such arrangements; but if so, they certainly will not give us beautiful cities or comely suburbs. And similar considerations apply to any great congregation of individuals in a single building for a permanent purpose.

It becomes clear in any survey of the general situation that behind architectural values lie social and moral issues. Broadly speaking, an art cannot rise above its main source—Society. That is why when, as is apt to occur, we are told: “be of your times, express your age, and all will be well,” we perceive a fallacy. For if the times be out of joint, so will be their art: with whatever sins and shortcomings they may be chargeable, the same will in some fashion or another be reflected in their architecture, failing independent control; while conversely, a degenerate architecture will assuredly indicate disorder in the body social.

W. RANDOLPH.

very day, Saturday, June 19th, that Berlin decided to make its song about the incident of the *Leipzig*, which had taken place on the previous Tuesday, and that the meeting of the four Powers was requested urgently for that day in the palpable hope that it would go badly and thus provide the German Government with the pretext it, in courtesy, wanted for cancelling the von Neurath visit. Instead the meeting went well. Herr von Ribbentrop is a human being, and he was in a good temper. Mr. Eden (in whose nature there is a certain simplicity, which, other things being equal, might have made him an effective and good Foreign Secretary) was obviously pleased that the four-Power Agreement of June 12th was working well. M. Corbin and Count Grandi were not the active parties in that particular meeting, partly because the general diplomatic situation at that moment happened to be dominated by the impending Anglo-German conversations. On the next day, Sunday, June 20th, Mr. Eden, to his great surprise no doubt, was advised that the von Neurath visit would not take place because Baron von Neurath was unable to leave Berlin. Could any pretext be more transparent? At Germany's own request the four Powers were actually considering the *Leipzig* incident.

As the cold disillusion dawned the diplomatic influences quickly changed. The five-days' wonder of an impending attempt to improve Anglo-German relations was dissipated. All the diplomats at once worked themselves up in an opposite sense. We know what Europe is like. We know how swiftly a crisis in these nervous days can develop. Instead of Baron von Neurath coming to London to the accompaniment of Anglo-German mutual admiration and fellowship, we saw the British and the German press relapsing into their more habitual practice of mutual recrimination. In common with other fields of human work the press of most countries has been devastated by the loss of man-power resulting from the last great war.

The week June 20th to June 26th was characterised by a crescendo of emotional disturbance. On Monday, June 21st, the day when the von Neurath visit was officially postponed, the four Powers held their adjourned meeting in the British Foreign Office. They failed to agree. They met again on the following day, Tuesday, June 22nd, and then issued this statement: "It was unfortunately found impossible to reach

agreement on the measures which should be adopted in this case. It was considered on the one hand, that while proposals should be jointly examined for increasing the security of the ships of the four Powers on patrol, an inquiry into the circumstances of the incidents should precede any steps directed against the Spanish party involved. On the other hand, the facts were regarded as being clearly established, and the incidents were considered to require immediate active steps in order to maintain the solidarity of the Powers and forestall the recurrence of such incidents. The proposal on which agreement could not be reached was that an immediate naval demonstration, showing the flag of the four Powers, should be held off the coast of Valencia." What had really happened at the meeting, and was commonly known to have happened, was that the German and Italian Ambassadors had ranged themselves in a head-on opposition to Mr. Eden and the French Ambassador. Yet Herr von Ribbentrop had demanded nothing more drastic than the sending to Valencia of a stern protest by the four Powers and the staging of a four-Power naval demonstration off Valencia. The actual facts and details were, however, of no consequence in circumstances where passions had become engaged.

On Wednesday, June 23rd, the German and Italian Ambassadors in London announced to Mr. Eden their "final" withdrawal from participation in the supervisory patrol of the Spanish coast. Herr von Ribbentrop then flew to Berlin for consultation, and Mr. Anthony Eden went to see the King. There was a general atmosphere of crisis. The situation was indeed deplorable.

Then a curious thing happened. A debate took place in the British House of Commons on Friday, June 25th. Mr. Neville Chamberlain rose to speak. It was his first essay in foreign policy since becoming Prime Minister. He spoke coolly, wisely. He paid a tribute to Germany for her restraint in not taking reprisals for the *Leipzig* incident, but instead referring the incident to the four Powers. It was clear that the British Cabinet had been applying a little common sense to the emotional circumstances. Mr. Chamberlain ended his speech with this impressive appeal: "I have read that in the high mountains there are sometimes conditions to be found when an incautious move, or even a sudden loud exclamation, may start an avalanche. That is just the condition in which

LUDWIG BOERNE.

LOEW BARUCH was born on May 6th, 1786, at 188 Judengasse, Frankfurt. His entry into the world followed the first performance of Mozart's glorious *Figaro* at Vienna on May 1st. A few weeks later Frederick II of Prussia died. Thus young Boerne's birth falls between these two significant dates of that year; the appearance of the last flunkey of feudalism, *Figaro*, and the passing of the last of its despots. Between these two—servant and king—intervened Ludwig Boerne, Germany's first and possibly also her last singer of liberalism. The lad grew up in stormy times, which even threw their shadows into the dark recesses of the Frankfurt Ghetto. He was three when the French Revolution proclaimed the "Rights of Man" to an astonished world; he was adolescent when Napoleon, the last of the tyrants, traced his bloody tracks upon the Continent; he was a young man when the "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," the reactionaries, Metternich, Talleyrand, Wellington and Bismarck, followed on Napoleon's heels; he was a tired man when he shook the dust of Germany from his wanderer's feet and died, five years later, an exile, in a foreign land.

Of his early upbringing there is little of importance to record. His father, a rich man, but despised as a Jew by his fellow townsmen, was able to give him a good education, at first privately. At fourteen, young Loew, who now called himself Louis, went to Giessen to the house of the orientalist, Hetzel, to prepare himself for the study of medicine, then the only profession open to Jews. Three years later he proceeded to Berlin to continue his studies in the house of the celebrated doctor and philosopher, Marcus Herz. Here he fell in love with his patroness, Henrietta Herz, but after a year of sorrow and happiness he had to leave this house because its master had died. The next years were spent in Halle, Heidelberg and Giessen, where he graduated Doctor of Law in 1808. With that event his youth had vanished, and with it the time of love, longing and ardour. Boerne's *Werther* time had passed for ever. Life had begun in earnest.

For ten long years, from 1809 to 1819, he almost had a home. Frankfort had become a human settlement. No longer were human beings, hating and suffering as they all do, divided from one another by a brutal *soldatesca* standing guard at the

gates of the Ghetto. Napoleon had achieved it. The Ghetto walls had fallen before the trumpet-blasts of the *Grande Armée*. Boerne, freed by Napoleon, began his journalistic activity with articles against Napoleon; Boerne, the emancipated ghetto Jew, became a patriotic super-German, more German even than his hated, yet still loved Goethe, who had often bowed the knee to the Corsican. With half a million gulden the Frankfurt Jews had bought their freedom, and now Louis Baruch became a police officer. With scarf and sword he now sat in the *Roemer* and acted as Frankfurt's providence to tramps and itinerant journeymen. But then came Napoleon's fall, and with him fell all Jewish rights and Jewish police officers. With the great Corsican fell the little Jew who had opposed him. He was once more as in a fairy-tale, a prince without a crown, a policeman without a sabre. He now turned his attention to better weapons, such as he once so beautifully and clearly described: "Rather the torch of truth than that of the incendiary should illumine the night." It was not yet too late. Armed with the sharp weapon of his spirit, seconded by his equally sharp pen, the ex-police-officer Loew Baruch, now Ludwig Boerne, began the last, greatest and noblest fight of his life—a fight for justice, freedom and brotherliness.

"Thirty-three years of serfdom already," so begins Germany's *Marseillaise*, the *Hecker Lied*. The period almost exactly coincides with that between the Congress of Vienna and the Austrian Revolution of 1848, and Ludwig Boerne still had two-thirds of these thirty-three years to live. Night had so far only reigned for fifteen years over Europe, watched by its apocalyptic riders. Then a ray of light gleamed through the European darkness like two lightning flashes—the Spanish Revolution of 1820 and the French Revolution of 1830, which had but exchanged two stuffed wax figures. So Boerne lived, touched by three revolutions, 1789, 1820 and 1830, in the treacherous twilight of three reactionary periods, those of Frederick II, Napoleon and Metternich, dying with the conviction that for decades no morning would follow this twilight. And since then a century has passed over us.

It was a beautiful symbol that Dr. Boerne, who had changed his old faith as well as his name, called his paper *The Balance* upon which he would weigh right and justice against might and stupidity. Of his change of religion, he said: "I do not

we are finding ourselves to-day. I believe, although the snow may be perilously poised, it has not yet begun to move, and if we can all exercise caution, patience and self-restraint, we may yet be able to save the peace of Europe." Mr. Eden, too, spoke like a wise man on that occasion. Clearly, the British Cabinet had put in some earnest team work. Mr. Eden argued a reasoned, tempered case for "peace at almost any price." It is a refreshing thing to hear such words from the lips of a European politician. What the hot-heads always say is: "There's a rock ahead. Shall it be said that Britons are slaves or cowards? Never. Away with defeatism. Let us muster all our courage and dash into that rock." Mr. Lloyd George, for instance, in this same debate spoke thus: "The Prime Minister said that we must keep cool heads. Yes, but we must have not only cool heads, but stout hearts. Any fish could have a cool head. Our great failure during the last four or five years has been that our hearts have failed us." Mr. Eden on that occasion gave this excellent contrasting doctrine: "It is a true saying that to keep this country at peace is a great contribution to the peace of Europe, and, whatever may be said about 'peace at any price,' if the right hon. gentleman puts it 'peace at almost any price' I shall scarcely quarrel with him."

A marked easing of the general tension followed the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Eden. The better feeling was helped by certain reassuring indications that the German Government was disposed to continue its full part in the work of the Non-Intervention Committee. At a meeting of the Chairman's Sub-committee on June 29th, the British and French Governments submitted their joint proposal for closing the gap made in the supervisory naval patrol by the withdrawal of the German and Italian ships. The proposal was that the French and British navies should extend their zones so as to incorporate the stretches of coast now left uncovered, namely on the south-east from Cape De Gata to Cape Oropesa (formerly patrolled by the German ships), and on the east coast from Cape Oropesa to the French frontier, as well as the Island of Minorca (formerly patrolled by the Italian ships). If that proposal were accepted by the sub-committee, it was the further intention, on French initiative, of France and Britain to suggest a redistribution of zones to the effect that the whole Mediterranean coast of Spain be patrolled by the

British Navy, and the whole north coast by the French. That would involve the vacating by the British ships in favour of the French of the coast-line from the French frontier to Cape Busto, and the taking over by Britain of both the former German and Italian zones. It was not concealed in either German or Italian quarters that if co-operation was to be recaptured in the cause of non-intervention it would be necessary once for all to deal with the juridical discrepancy between the four Powers. All that was claimed by Berlin and Rome was that London and Paris should adopt an open attitude and should treat the two sides impartially. If, it was argued, belligerent rights were accorded to the two sides, such incidents as those of the *Deutschland*, *Barletta*, and *Leipzig* would be the less likely.

During the first and second weeks of July the governments in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Moscow, Lisbon, and the twenty-one other countries represented on the Non-Intervention Committee were considering what was called the "dead-lock" between the German-Italian view on the one side and the British-French view on the other. It was a fortnight since the attack on the German cruiser *Leipzig* had been made the occasion for a Big Power crisis over Spain. The point now reached was an apparent division of opinion between Germany and Italy, supported by Portugal on the one side, and France and Britain supported by Russia on the other. But the issue no longer concerned the attempted torpedoing of the *Leipzig* or the machinery of sanction against the recurrence of such an incident. It had broadened into a direct, generalised, but in some ways unsubstantial conflict of feeling between two sets of Powers.

Against the Franco-British proposal that the French and British navies should fill the gap made by the withdrawal of the German and Italian ships from the naval patrol, Berlin and Rome made a counter-proposal now to be considered by the twenty-seven Governments represented on the Non-Intervention Committee, of a somewhat wider import. The counter-proposal simply was that the Valencia and Franco authorities in Spain be equally "recognised" in the diplomatic sense by all the non-Spanish Powers. As a result of such a step, belligerent rights would be impartially conceded to both sides. The existing position was that Germany and Italy recognised Franco as the lawful Government of Spain,

love the Jew, nor the Christian, because he is Jew or Christian. I only love them because they are human beings born to be free. May freedom be the soul of my pen until it is blunt or my hand has lost its cunning. To live is to love, but we are the slaves of hatred." By the *Balance* perhaps Boerne meant not only the weighing instrument but rather the command to weigh, the only categorical imperative which from now on he obeyed.

With Boerne's *Balance* a new chapter of German literature was opened. Its editor described it as a "journal for citizenship, science and art." Its contents were arranged as follows: Prospectus—Freedom of the Press in Bavaria—serious thoughts about the Frankfurt theatre bills—book reviews—the Frankfurt People's theatre—miscellaneous. The story of his journal—for it was his own property materially as well as intellectually—in the next five years was a Herculean struggle against Metternich's police. The struggle was unique; from the first day until his last, that is for almost twenty years, it was a war on two fronts. The one was political reaction, personified by Metternich, who was all-powerful wherever German was spoken; the other no less significant front was the reaction in public and private opinion, personified by the German "Michel," who at that time was particularly narrow-minded, bigoted, devout, stupid, cowardly and malicious. Boerne carried on this war alone, methodically, ingeniously. His *Balance* was the most interesting German journal. Metternich, Gentz, Hardenberg, wanted to buy it, but he laughed at them. The public began to hear, to see, to learn. If through two decades long there was ever a breath of freedom in Germany, it was his work and achievement. His most significant and, for us, the most living expression of his ideal was: "I hate every society that is smaller than humanity. Nothing is at the same time more miserable and ridiculous than the sickly delight which the Germans have voluntarily to crowd together, and for fear of the few wolves to surrender themselves daily to the whims of the shepherd and his fatal dogs." Thus he continued the work of Voltaire and Lessing. Only Addison's *Spectator* is comparable to Boerne's *Balance*.

Boerne was Germany's first journalist, first in time and first in rank. He consciously suppressed and renounced every poetic strain. There was no room for it in Germany. Poetry

he left to the poets, to the three he approved: Heine, to whom he condescended; Jean Paul, whom he idolised; Goethe, whom he hated. At this time he not only wrote for his *Balance*, but also for Cotta's *Morgenblatt*, for Brockhaus's *Literarisches Wochenblatt*, for Werner's *Frankfurter Staatsristretto*. Finally, when the *Balance* was broken in two, after being long and cruelly mutilated by the censorship, he raised his voice a few times against the "Zeitschwingen" that fluttered up in Offenbach. But this, too, was soon silenced by the Federal Diet. He was evidently of the race of Midas, for everything he touched became "politics" in his hand. Long before Marx he had known how to apply the Marxian principle: nothing in the world can be regarded as static, existing in airless space. For him no incident, from the latest theatre lottery to the most decisive events, was only a fact, an object, a completed happening, an individual case. For him what happened was transformed into some dynamic force that either destroyed something old or gave rise to something new, something creative, instructive and enlightening, capable of further development, drawing its strength from the surrounding and accompanying circumstances.

Restless and unstable Boerne's life became from now on. There was no room for him in that spy-infested hell of the Holy Roman Empire, or, more correctly speaking, the Second or Austrian Empire. From his modest journalist's quarters near the Fahrgasse in Frankfurt where he had lived, loved, hated and suffered, he went into the world. Speaking of this in his ironical and melancholy words he declared: "Travelling would be the most pleasant thing in the world if nostalgia did not now and then disturb our pleasure. To escape this malady there is no better remedy than to have yourself, before leaving your native city, condemned to death. How we then rejoice when we have departed, how little we then think of returning home!"

In October 1819 Boerne saw Paris for the first time. He was intoxicated; he was a man; he was treated and respected as a man; not a Jew-boy, not a Jew forced to salute the non-Jew, no jokes at the expense of the convert, nothing but humanity. In the following spring he returned to Frankfurt and was arrested by the secret state police, for the *Gestapo* is as immortal as its inspirer, Metternich. But as he had not committed the "crime" of propagating opposition to the

and France and Britain recognised Valencia in that sense. The Berlin-Rome proposal, therefore, incorporated an offer; the offer on their part to recognise Valencia.

The British Government's assumption was that Valencia must be accepted as the Government of Spain unless and until the Franco organisation succeeded in suppressing the Valencia authority. But the difficulty felt, both in British and in other quarters, was that the present title of Valencia to sovereign status rested merely upon the accident that the Caballero *coup* (for it was nothing else) of last summer happened to be staged in Madrid. Señor Caballero had no more electoral or constitutional mandate than General Franco. But there were other issues now at stake than merely juridical issues. British interests were increasingly recognised to be involved. The iron-ore mines of Bilbao, in which in the past one-third of the entire output had come to Britain, were now in Franco's control. Gibraltar is a vital gateway to Britain's eastern outposts. Hence it was that the policy of gratuitously antagonising Franco was being subjected to a closer scrutiny than before in official quarters in Britain. No less pointed a question had to be faced by the British Government than whether it would accept a continued state of tension with Germany and Italy over what was essentially a Spanish matter. Also, it was emphasised in German and Italian quarters alike that they wanted the scheme of non-intervention to be continued. They suggested that the naval part of it be eliminated on the ground that only ships flying the flags of the non-interventionist Powers could be challenged. Ships flying either the Spanish flag or that of any Power not represented on the London Committee were immune. As a means of control, the naval scheme, according to Berlin and Rome, was useless. If Germany and Italy on the one side and France and Britain on the other equally wanted a policy of non-intervention, was it impossible for the four of them to agree on a policy of non-intervention? As this paper was written, so elementary a question had not been answered. The British Government on July 9th was unanimously invited by the Non-Intervention Committee to explore the possibility of a solution.

July 12th, 1937.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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EGYPT THROUGH THE AGES.

Emil Ludwig's study of the Upper Nile, reviewed in these pages not long ago, has been quickly followed by a volume* describing the progress of the mighty river through the land of Egypt. There is naturally less novelty in the sequel, but it is in no way inferior in many-sided interest. While three-quarters of the first volume were devoted to nature, and only one quarter to history, half of the second is concerned with the past. The author surveys the successive stages of the long story from the standpoint of the fellah, the connecting link between the dynasties and the overlords. But the real hero of the drama is the river itself, which inspires Dr. Ludwig to his most eloquent passages. He never tires of recording its achievements and its place in the making of civilisation. It was the Nile that created astronomy and mathematics, law and equity, money and police, long before any other association of people in the earth possessed them? Not the least of its creations was the Egyptian people, who learned the lessons that nature taught them with such astonishing success. "Canals are their epics, dams their dramas, the pyramids their philosophies." The centuries are sometimes spanned in a single sentence. "In 600 B.C. Necho began the Suez Canal, which was not finished until our own epoch."

* *The Nile in Egypt.* By Emil Ludwig. Allen & Unwin. 16s.

"system" he was set free, since "protective arrest" had not yet been invented. Weary, with no desire for work, he wandered from Frankfurt to Stuttgart, Munich, Berlin, Hamburg, the five fortresses that kept watch and ward over the German reaction. His father's death now made him materially independent. From now on he had an annual income of about 1,500 florins. With the publisher, Campe of Hamburg, he concluded a long-term agreement, and began the editing of his works that had not hitherto seen the light, to prepare for a complete edition. For this reason, as well as on account of his health—tubercular trouble was causing him growing anxiety—he lived in Cassel, Ems, Hanover and Soden. "Friends and sympathisers," he wrote, "reproach me that I so seldom take up the cudgels for our dumb fatherland. Well, you believe that I write like the others with ink and with words, but I write with my heart's blood, and I have not always the courage to torture myself nor the strength long to endure it." It was at Soden that he heard of the July Revolution. He was as if new-born. Henceforth the homeless one had a home—Paris.

For seven years the city held him in its grip. It became his friend, his mistress, his companion, his mother. Three long years the sick and weary Boerne had to bear his burden alone. Only one brief interval, a visit to Hambach, in 1832, the year of Goethe's death, interrupted this period. Here, on the threshold between Feudalism and Fascism, he was enthusiastically received because he was the only one of *Das junge Deutschland* who had dared to come home, and had joined the 3,000 assembled there in their claims for a German republic and a European Confederation. But he knew better than the Bavarians and others foregathered there, before they were scattered by Metternich's soldiers, that the road to a "united republic of Europe" was still a long one. He returned to exile and a year later came the happiest event of his life. Mr. and Mrs. Strauss came to Paris and offered the lonely man a home. The latter had for years been his motherly friend to whom he had written the hundreds of letters that form for us to-day the centre of his life's work. So the three lived in the suburb of Auteuil, quietly, patiently or impatiently, as events permitted. Boerne wrote for various journals and even began a French continuation of his *Balance*. His political testament is contained in his pamphlet *Menzel*, where he settled accounts

with a cowardly and venal renegade and Francophobe. Then he languished until death released him on February 12th, 1837. His last smile was for his friend, Mrs. Strauss: "You have given me great joy." His last sigh was for the future: "What will become of the young?"

Boerne's works consist of eight volumes. They contain, besides his beautiful stories: *Denkrede auf Jean Paul, Roman, Der Esskuenstler, Der Narr im Weissen Schwan*, essays, criticism of plays and books (many of these about Shakespeare, Goethe and Schiller), the famous *Letters from Paris*—altogether more than five thousand pages of prose. In Frankfurt a monument, a street and a square opposite the synagogue testified to his reputation within the course of the hundred years. But all that is over. The monument has been taken down, like Heine's in Hamburg and Mendelssohn's in Leipzig. The streets have been renamed.

His writings both in his lifetime and since his death, often reprinted as *Collected Works* and forming twelve substantial volumes, have never left the study and the library to penetrate into the daylight of political controversy. What is the cause of this ineffectiveness? Boerne's style is clear, his wit penetrating, his logic convincing, yet he misses popularity. Heine fared better. He was a poet and those who read his poetry also read his political works. For years Heine's works were forbidden in Germany. Teutonism, to-day resurrected as Nazism, has driven the finest of Heine's poems—the folk-song—into the obscurity of anonymity. In Boerne's case this was impossible, since he wrote no poetry. A similar fate has befallen him abroad except in France, England, Italy and Russia. Furthermore, he lacked the social *flair* which enabled Heine, Freiligrath, Herwegh, Gutzkow and other exiles to surround themselves with a circle of friends and protagonists. He was likewise wanting in a sense of leadership and demagogic power indispensable for the formation of a political personality. He was the least vain and the least ambitious author imaginable. It is true that he sometimes spoke of himself, but only in the sense of Job who carried on a one-sided conflict against injustice and the powers of darkness. So his grave and his work sink ever deeper into the shades of oblivion; yet he was one of the noblest men of his age.

FRITZ GROSS.

Time seems to count for less in the Valley of the Nile than elsewhere.

Among the many portraits in the long picture gallery Alexander and Cleopatra stand out with startling vividness in the ancient world. Our author's interest in faces is well known to his readers, and he reconstructs the young Conqueror from the busts and coins, paintings and literary records. "Egypt received him like a god," and he repaid her homage by the foundation of the city which immortalises his name. Cleopatra, we are told, lived out her nature with more genius than any other queen, dying at the age of thirty-nine, after reigning for twenty years and loving for at least twenty-eight. "Chance such as comes once in a thousand years drew the men of the mightiest empire into her country; they came to seek corn for their voters, and they found an enchantress."

In the modern world, which for Egypt begins with Napoleon, we meet at the outset Mehemet Ali, the Albanian adventurer of genius, who founded the dynasty which rules in Cairo to-day; his son Ibrahim, the soldier of the family; his grandson Ismail, who made the Suez Canal and whose extravagance brought the English occupation which lasted half a century and was terminated by the recent Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Of Lord Cromer he writes with respectful admiration. He notes his sense of reality, his sincerity, his entire absence of vanity, his devotion and endurance, his sympathy with the toiling fellah. "And yet his work was by no means entirely beneficent. Much was left undone; many problems were solved in the interests of the Europeans, and against those of the fellah whom he wished to protect . . . What is done for the good of the community cannot be completely severed from the advantage of the civilising Power, even though its mission is in the hands of a man moved by pure love of mankind." Dr. Ludwig also pays tribute to Arabi and Zaghlul, the leaders of Egyptian nationalism and, according to their lights, the champions of the poor. "When he died in 1926, Zaghlul was given a funeral such as no Egyptian had ever had before him . . . A fellah lay on the bier past which the nation defiled, a fellah born in a little dark room of Nile mud, among fowls and pigeons, between the donkey and the camel, and doubtless furnished with the talismans of the wise woman, which for once were worth the

money. How high such a life towers above that of Cheops and his huge pyramid!" Whether the days of which Zaghlul was the most eminent representative will profit by the complete disappearance of British rule remains to be seen. Taxation is unlikely to decrease, and oriental justice is not always to our taste. But it is well that Egypt should now shape her own destinies, and her late masters will watch her effort with sympathy and hope.

G. P. G.

ASPECTS OF A CHANGING SOCIAL STRUCTURE.*

This publication of last year's Halley Stewart Lecture makes a very serviceable discussion of the economic problems of our time from a humanist standpoint. No one is better qualified by long personal experience and sympathetic judgment to handle these grave matters than Sir Percy Alden. Opening with a chapter on "The Child and the Citizen," he sets forth the requirements relating to food, housing and other health conditions and the existing means for meeting these requirements. The wider aspects of health and housing with the latest available statistics are treated in separate chapters, showing what has been done in recent years and how much still remains to be done by the combined powers of private enterprise, municipal and state assistance. Approaching the subject of social security, Sir Percy launches out into the broader issues of poverty, employment, and the new social services as devices for security of life.

In an exceedingly thoughtful chapter, "The Future of Industry," he enters upon a general discussion of industrial reform movements in relation to the needs and dispositions of a people little given to economic theorising, and by long tradition opportunist in their progress. "We aim at equality of economic opportunity, for we all recognise that totalitarian equality, as human beings are constituted, is impossible. The distribution of wealth in a well-ordered state should aim at realising common justice." Much of the later part of the book is given to explaining what can be, and is being, done to promote this ideal of equality and justice. Sir Percy sees a growing willingness of employers and employed to come

* *Aspects of a Changing Social Structure.* By Sir Percy Alden. Allen & Unwin, 4s. 6d. net.

THE TERMITE OR WHITE ANT.

THIS insect, so well known to dwellers in warm climates, exhibits an intelligence which is amazing and outstanding amongst all other insects. It is considered to be of extraordinary antiquity, Maeterlinck computing its beginnings to have been "at least a million years before man". The various phases of the insect, as known to us to-day, may be seen depicted upon the most ancient obelisks and rock temples in existence. The termite is, however, not an ant at all, differing from these insects in almost every respect, but principally in development, in conformation and in diet. Termites live upon and can only digest cellulose, they are purely vegetarian, while the ants are carnivorous and omnivorous and the termites' deadliest enemy.

During many thousands of years the termite has developed into various castes, each one constructed to carry out a particular duty making for the existence and propagation of their community, but if any one caste is removed from the community the remainder cannot exist. Not the least astonishing of their mysteries is the fact that the different castes are developed from the eggs of one "queen" termite; as they are laid the workers carry them away to special chambers and cells where, apparently by differential feeding of the larvæ, they are able to produce any of the diverse castes they desire; for on emergence from the egg the larvæ differ in no single respect from each other. They can thus make good any deficiency in any one caste. With the exception of the male and female nymphs, who become "kings" and "queens," the remaining castes are sexless and blind; they have, however, developed their senses of touch, of smell and of hearing to an exceptional degree and are able to locate at once any invasion or injury to their termitary, chiefly by vibrations conveyed to their feet.

In every termite community there are six different castes consisting of a "king" and "queen," and a considerable number of male and female winged nymphs; these are all sexed, the nymphs being potential kings and queens who, in the spring of each year, are released from the termitary to establish new communities elsewhere. Then come an enormous number of workers and a comparatively small number of soldiers, who are asexed neutrals. Perhaps it would be more

accurate to call the number of castes four in number, as all the nymphs are supposed to be "kings" and "queens," are produced with that object and are then merely nymphs with their wings detached.

THE WORKERS

Although the smallest member of the community, this caste occurs in overwhelming numbers, probably amounting to many thousands in every termitary; they render the most important and the most diverse services to the community. The heads of the workers are markedly larger than those of all other insects of a similar size, evidencing a larger brain and increased intelligence; it is the only part of the insect protected by a covering of chitin or horny material, the rest of the body being naked and maggot-like in appearance. Their mandibles or jaws are exceptionally strong, appropriate for gnawing the dead wood upon which they feed. In a house infested with termites one can distinctly hear them gnawing the woodwork in their hundreds. The workers' movements are slow and deliberate compared with the quick, jerky activity of other insects; led to their various duties by numbers of soldiers, they flow slowly and steadily along in a stream, three or four abreast.

Not the least important duty of the worker is the consumption and digestion of cellulose and to feed it to all the other castes in the community by regurgitating it into their mouths whenever they desire it, for no other caste is able to feed itself by any other means. As a stream of workers moves along, a soldier here and there may be seen to approach one of the workers and stroke it with its antennæ, when the latter will leave the column and, standing mouth to mouth, will supply the desired nourishment. It is the worker who keeps the whole community alive. Under the guidance and supervision of soldiers it is the worker who builds the termitary above ground, excavates the large ventilating shafts throughout and the many cells and chambers of various sizes underground, passing through their bodies every grain of earth that enters into the construction of the edifice.

When the termitary is injured a few soldiers make their way to the spot and, waving their antennæ, apparently take stock of the damage done; then while a few of them are

together so as to combine good conditions of labour with profitable business. Labour will take not only a larger share of the industrial income, but an increasing part in the organisation of industry. Industry in general will be put upon an equitable basis by these better relations between capital and labour, with the requisite state controls to prevent the emergence of oppressive monopolies and to secure the interests of the consumer. There will be some nationalisation alike of ownership and control, but in most industries the operation will be left to Councils representing employers and employed. "A completed organisation would mean that employers and employed are working in harmony, planning for the future and understanding the difficulties that confront both sides." Sir Percy does not discuss the difficulties attending such co-operative management, the fact that the expert knowledge for such planning is confined to the employing class. He trusts, however, to growing education and goodwill to make such co-operation effective, a process that will require considerable time.

The final chapters are devoted to Coal-mining and Agriculture. On both these matters Sir Percy speaks with much expert knowledge, and his interpretation of the coal situation is most useful. Our agricultural policy he recognises as mainly dependent upon two issues, the production of foods congenial to our soil and climate, and the importance for health and physique of retaining upon the soil a large proportion of our declining population. The pervasive purpose of the book is to enlist the goodwill, reason and sense of justice, which the author holds to be our most distinctive heritage, in the causes of peace, security and progress.

J. A. HOBSON.

PEACEFUL CHANGE.*

The problem of peaceful change which is now generally recognised as inseparable from any lasting system of security is receiving ever-increasing ventilation. Various aspects of the question are discussed with advantage in a series of published lectures which were recently delivered at the

* (1) *Peaceful Change*. A symposium edited by C. A. W. Manning. Macmillan. 5s. net. (2) *A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World*. By C. R. M. F. Cruttwell. Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d. net. (3) *International Legislation*. By Torsten Gihl. Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d. net. (4) *Legal Machinery for Peaceful Change*. By Karl Strupp. Constable. 4s. 6d. net.

London School of Economics by well-known authorities and which should help to remove some misconceptions commonly associated with revision. The relation of economic needs to territorial change is lucidly put by Professor L. C. Robbins, who points out that territorial sovereignty is of small advantage in a world of free trade and that under present conditions it is advantageous in so far as real incomes are not lowered by restrictions and manipulations which otherwise would be imposed by a foreign state. This is endorsed by Professor T. E. Gregory who, in discussing the demand for colonies as the source of raw materials, holds that the currency argument "has nothing in fact to do with the issue of territorial control," and that it really conceals a tariff argument. The paramount need is for tariff concessions and the open door. On the other hand, in existing circumstances transfer would enable Germany to monopolise and exploit the resources of a colonial area, though the poverty of colonies in raw materials is well known.

The historical background to the problem of change has been surveyed by Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell in a work which examines "all the more important and significant examples" of peaceful political changes since 1815. There was during the nineteenth century a steady increase in the proportion of issues determined by peaceful means, and disputes so resolved included almost every class of case relating to the acquisition, cession and self-renunciation of territorial sovereignty. It is also "noteworthy that no boundary dispute or question of contested jurisdiction had led to war between European states since 1815." Perhaps the most remarkable instance of peaceful change was the agreed secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905. Mr. Cruttwell also deals with changes in national status, but deliberately omits the evolution of the British Commonwealth, admittedly "the greatest and the most genuinely peaceful transformation of status" in history. He concludes generally that peaceful change thrives under modern conditions and that vast armaments favour the solution of all minor disputes, although the nineteenth century displayed a greater grasp of non-essentials than its distracted successor seems able to show. Precedent demonstrates that in the settling of concrete and tangible issues, secrecy is the best way of ensuring a fair bargain and its acceptance by public opinion. He cites in particular the

left there on guard others hurry away into the depths, to return accompanied by a stream of workers and more soldiers. Each worker carries a minute brick of evacuated earth in its mandibles which it deposits next to or on top of the last one deposited and, labouring unceasingly through the night, until the sun becomes again too hot for their naked bodies, the largest fracture is soon repaired by the swarms of busy workers. Beginning work in the cool of the late afternoon, in the open, most of such labour is carried on during the night, to cease soon after the sun is up; where they must travel and work in bright sunlight, workers construct a covering of earth to protect themselves; it may be to the very top of a tall tree where dead wood has been located, and under this will be found a double stream of going and returning workers day after day until it is demolished.

A stream of workers is in constant attendance upon the queen termite in her special chamber, feeding her constantly and carrying away the eggs she lays to other cells and chambers where they are tended and the larvæ fed as they hatch out. A large number are so employed whose labours never cease.

In every termitary a steady supply of water is an essential, particularly to keep always moist the beds of growing fungus which they all grow and use as a food. To reach water the workers sometimes excavate a shaft of almost incredible depth into the ground, with a discernment which is astonishing; up and down such a shaft a never-ceasing stream of workers pass and return with their bodies distended with water. This phase of their labours again continuously employs a very large number.

The worker, then, feeds the community, makes the bricks and builds up these often huge termitaries, keeping them in repair, he carries the water supply to the mushroom beds from a considerable depth, he attends the queen and nurses the progeny into adult life, and apparently his labours are interminable.

THE SOLDIER TERMITE

Nearly three times the size of a worker, with a large chitin-covered head which is half the size of the insect and a small naked body like the worker, the soldiers form a comparatively

small proportion of the community. The soldier's head is armed with a strong pair of pincers, and he is obviously the protector of the termite family; like the worker he is a neuter and blind. In the forefront of all investigations, leading, controlling and directing the stream of workers in every excursion and in all their labours, their excessively large heads and their every behaviour suggests that it is the soldier who organises all work and the defences of their termitaries. In attack his pincers maintain so forcible a grip that any effort to detach them results in the head being torn from the body; he is probably known to all enemies as the terror that lurks in every termitary.

THE QUEEN TERMITE

This loathsome-looking insect, with a small termite's head and a body, nearly four inches long and a girth of nearly two inches, distended with an enormous number of eggs, resembles a monstrous maggot. Looking at a mature queen, confined in a special chamber in the lower regions of a termitary, incapable of movement with her few ineffectual legs, it is difficult to believe that she began life as a slim and agile nymph, with beautiful gossamer wings able to sustain her in flight! Yet so it undoubtedly was. Now a mere egg factory, her fecundity is prodigious. It is recorded that a mature queen produces an egg every second, some eighty-six thousand every twenty-four hours and in the course of a year thirty millions! Her term of existence is computed to be about four years, but as soon as her flow of eggs begins to fall off her attendants cease to feed her, she soon dies of starvation and they devour her, installing another young female nymph in her place.

THE WINGED TERMITES

Often referred to as nymphs or immature insects, they are not so in reality, but mature male and female termites who have developed wings to carry them clear of the termitary in which they are reared; if their annual flight did not take place termitaries would soon become overcrowded and starved out of existence. An analogy occurs in the vegetable kingdom, where many trees and flowers produce seeds with

Anglo-American boundary treaties which, though negotiated amid inflamed feeling and subjected to intense criticism, have become accepted as reasonable and permanent compromises. The author also surveys the growth of the plebiscite up to 1870 and its revival after the War and concludes that it is, under impartial international control, a reasonably accurate method of ascertaining popular wishes.

Mr. Cruttwell has inevitably to give a wide interpretation in defining "peaceful" change; for, as he points out, "the contingent threat of war" has been most often the decisive factor in securing pacific revision. But ultimately it is not so much the background of force as its source and motives which are most material. A judge's decision is none the less peaceful because its enforcement depends ultimately on force. In this connection it is well to note Mr. Cruttwell's tribute to the valuable work of the Great Powers in the nineteenth century in imposing or initiating solutions for many difficulties which might have caused a general conflagration. Though neither impartial nor disinterested, their methods "were far from being exclusively cynical." All changes outside the British Empire have been hitherto, as Professor Arnold Toynbee points out in his instructive historical sketch in *Peaceful Change*, "haphazard and not in application of any uniform principle." Pacific revision cannot be the rule without the creation of a regular and impartial organ of change.

The procedural aspect is discussed in a contribution by Dr. H. Lauterpacht, who takes the extreme view that no institutional system of peaceful change is possible without an international legislature with power to impose its will. Short of this, States can only be assisted by procedural methods to surrender rights in obedience to morality and political wisdom. He rejects the conception of an equity tribunal deciding political disputes *ex aequo et bono*. A somewhat analogous view is held by Dr. Torsten Gihl in the course of a closely reasoned and technical study of the growth of international law and of change in legal relationships. Although he regards an equity court as a practical possibility, its decisions would be determined on arbitrary and extra-legal considerations by persons without sufficient qualifications. A further objection, that "any state could at any time call for a change in existing conditions," questions the

whole need for their constant reconsideration. In *Legal Machinery for Peaceful Change*, Professor Karl Strupp has compiled a draft convention, setting up alongside the Hague Court an equity tribunal constituted on analogous lines. To the latter, signatories would submit, in the absence of agreed arbitration, all non-judicial disputes for decision, based on principles of international justice which would override, where incompatible, legal rights. The award *ex aequo et bono* draws a valuable comparison from the old English Chancery jurisdiction. When Dr. Lauterpacht remarks that "drastic interference with existing rights has seldom, if ever, been achieved by the process of judicial legislation," he forgets that the English court of equity overrode and prevented the enforcement of legal rights when contrary to equitable principles and created its own supplementary remedies. That an analogous system in international relations is recognised as practicable is demonstrated in existing treaties which provide for an award in equity.

THE FRENCH ARMY.*

Mr. Davis is probably right in the importance he attaches to the nature and quality of the French army. "If," he writes, "there is one thing certain, it is that the fate of the Anglo-Saxon nations is bound up in the fate of the French, and on their fate depends the fate of democracy, liberty, and justice in the world." It is not Mr. Davis' purpose to argue the case for an Anglo-French *entente* on diplomatic grounds, still less to argue the absurd rivalry between a pro-French or a pro-German policy on the part of the British Government. He rather takes it for granted, without elaborating the diplomatic circumstance, that the accident of geography and of other acts of God, do make of France a matter of material concern to Great Britain. He has therefore been at pains to sketch the recent history of France from a particular point of view, namely from the point of view of the relative fighting strength of France and Germany. If the truth were simply told, most of us in our bones believe that the current nightmare of possible war centres round the old antagonism between Germany and France. We equally

* *The French War Machine*. By Shelby Cullom Davis. Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d. net.

delicate parachutes, blade-like appendages like the wings of an aeroplane and other contrivances by which they are suspended in the air and carried by a breeze clear of the parent tree or plant, instead of falling and propagating amongst its roots.

The female nymph is about an inch in length and rather stouter than the shorter male; each sex possesses four fragile gossamer wings which are able to sustain them during a flight of a hundred yards or so from their original termitary. They are also provided with a pair of weak eyes which enable them to avoid colliding with each other, with trees and bushes during their short flight, and which give them some direction in avoiding their old termitary. Their flight takes place every spring, as soon as the first good rains have softened the surface of the ground; flights always occur towards evening when the heat of the day has passed. Then a number of small holes appear in the ground over an area occupied below by termites, often where this was quite unsuspected. Through these holes pour streams of winged termites in hundreds who flutter up into the air, a veritable cloud reminiscent of a flight of locusts. For a while they flutter about aimlessly in the air, wafted by a breeze, before coming to earth abruptly as though exhausted. Here the sexes sort themselves, scampering about in feverish haste, the males closely following females. The males soon snap off their wings with their legs, which hamper their rapid progress amongst the grass and presently the females turn upon the following males, who turn upon their backs and clasp the legs of the female and she rises with him into the air once more; she only bears him a short distance, clear of the ever increasing cloud of nymphs, before she again alights, snaps off her wings, and together they burrow beneath the surface with all speed. They are still in the environs of termites below ground and the probability is that, guided by their sense of smell and hearing, they burrow towards them and on reaching them are fed and conducted to a chamber, rapidly excavated, which they never leave, for the female's existence as an egg-producing queen now commences. The ground is carpeted with patches of discarded wings where most of them have succeeded in getting below the surface; by this time it is dusk, or even dark, when most of their enemies have retired to their own nests for the night.

In the desert places of Central Africa the flying termite,

like the locust, is highly prized as food by the natives, who have learnt how to entice them to the surface by simulating the conditions which determine natural flights. They clear a patch of ground of vegetation where termites are known to exist underground and shelter it from the sun by raising a rough leafy bower over it. The patch is now well watered and, when it has soaked in, a native commences to beat a tattoo upon it with light switches to simulate falling rain; soon a number of small holes appear over the patch through which the nymphs pour in numbers and are collected as they appear.

THE TERMITARY

This is the name appropriate to the erection above the home excavated below ground occupied by a community of termites. The rounded or peaked erection over the termitary, popularly known as an "ant-heap," impervious to the rain which periodically falls upon it, is freely pervious to heated air from below ground and is raised for the purpose of ventilating the termitary. Into these mounds and the highest peaks of the overhead erections, which are more familiar in tropical and sub-tropical countries, extend a number of far-flung galleries which extend to the lowest ramifications of the termitary, opening into the various chambers, and, while freely ventilating all parts, also serve to give free access to them. In parts of the country where the heat of summer calls for still more ventilation, small rounded chimneys are erected on the surface at intervals, sometimes in groups of two to four, open at the top and from eighteen inches to four feet in height. A certain mean temperature throughout the underground termitary is essential to the development and existence of the thousands of eggs and larvæ produced, as well as to the free growth of the strands of fungus upon which the higher castes are fed. The cultivation of this fungus food is of considerable interest.

The cult of the mushroom chamber, to which a host of workers devote themselves, shows an astonishing degree of intelligence in the termite. The large chamber, excavated invariably at a depth of three feet beneath the surface, is ventilated by two or three large flues from the surface, opening into it by trumpet-shaped mouths. The floor of the cavity consists of a peculiar sponge-like mass of clay, everywhere

believe that nothing short of a miracle could keep us out of it. One of the practical questions, therefore, that cannot be dodged in present circumstances, is what chance would France have in the military sense in the event of another war with Germany? From that point of view, Mr. Davis' book is wholly commendable. He has taken infinite trouble. He puts the military facts in their political background (for the political cannot be divorced from the military factor in any country) and he spreads his enquiry over the evolution of the past half-century.

The immediately interesting aspect of the book is that the author fully describes the present organisation, strength and moral of the French army. But he assigns a predominant importance to the question of man-power. That unfortunately is one of the indisputable facts of the human jungle we know as "civilisation." The book we have before us devotes its first and most important chapter, headed "A Bid for Babies," to a consideration of the central mystery of human life from the exclusively cold-blooded aspect of war material. He quotes the German who gave as his advice for the disarmament of Germany: "Seize the German women, for it is they who manufacture the most redoubtable and most necessary material of war." He gives a long account of the historic race between the German and the French population and incorporates the frantic tale of the devices that have been adopted in France to make good in that race. The quicker tempo of German fertility and the obstinate fact that the population of Germany exceeds that of France by some fifty per cent. is represented by the author—and who shall deny it?—as the very kernel of Europe's diplomatic problems.

The book ends with an informative examination of the problem as it confronts M. Blum's Government. The author gives it as his opinion that M. Blum will be forced to concede a French demand for a longer period of army service, but so far M. Blum has confined his efforts to improving the army's equipment. Mr. Davis ends with the somewhat half-hearted hope that "New guns, new machine-guns, new tanks, new aeroplanes, coupled to a wise production organisation, may render France's smaller striking army a more formidable force than Germany's *Millionheer*."

G. G.

DR. HORTON'S BIOGRAPHY.*

Dr. Horton's biographers are to be congratulated on achieving a difficult task that would have daunted the less equipped. Love for the man they portray is not allowed to impair objective estimates or copious material to overwhelm their discernment in selection. Dr. Peel, who contributes the major portion of this compendious record, admits that passages in Dr. Horton's diaries and autobiography would provide "splendid case material for the psycho-analyst"; and those who do not accept certain premises of psycho-analysis will agree that problems raised cannot be solved until "the psychologist and the philosopher have done their work, and their conclusions have been examined by one capable of sharing Horton's religious experience." Meanwhile the authors may rest assured that no other diagnosis can obliterate the significance of their findings, the chief of which is an Unseen Presence and Power. Through hearing and knowing Dr. Horton they and numerous others came into contact with a sphere of existence that kindled or transformed their lives.

"For me, more than any other man I have met, he was," writes one of his disciples, "a revelation of Christ. . . ." Nor was this disciple's experience by any means singular.

"His one burning passion was to know Christ and reveal Him to others"; and such revelation was comprehensive, as testified by personal intercourse, by his preaching and pastorate at Lyndhurst Road Chapel, Hampstead, his fearless advocacy of social righteousness and service, his writings, and by his enthusiasm and travels on behalf of foreign missions. By their willingness to accept the findings of Biblical criticism he and George Adam Smith averted bitter controversy concerning Old Testament inspiration; and in order to consider Christian faith in the light of modern science and criticism, he founded and presided over the Modern Free Churchmen's Conference in 1927.

Certain things were clear and definite and authoritative to Horton all his life—a belief in prayer and in God's revelation in Christ Jesus. About everything else he was prepared to improvise, and with wonderful skill he did it.

* *Robert Forman Horton*. By Albert Peel, Litt.D., and J. A. R. Marriott. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.

pitted with small cells, each one of which is packed with a mulch of pre-masticated vegetable matter which has been inoculated with mushroom spawn; this must have been gathered on the surface, where they had been growing. Workers keep these cells constantly moistened with water, and minute white buds of fungus soon appear in them which grow into long filaments, the size of the quills of a chicken's wing feathers. Their free ends are continually eaten off so that they never form mushroom heads but remain long stalks which are trained to run up the flues to a length of eighteen inches.

When pieces of this mushroom sponge have been removed from such a chamber and kept warm and moist, the buds have produced perfect mushrooms, sometimes as much as six inches across. In the Bechuanaland Protectorate, where tall ventilating erections often occur on the banks of dry river beds, the summer floods frequently undermine and wash out the basements of these termitaries, scattering the sponge along the banks below, where they produce extensive beds of perfect mushrooms, which may be gathered and eaten. In the termitaries mushroom cellulose is evidently a special food, only supplied to meet certain limited requirements, for it is not produced in sufficient amount to feed the entire community.

H. A. SPENCER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ITALY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE

IF one could be confident that they would not muddle us into general war, the recent manœuvrings of high diplomacy in Europe would be a subject merely of curious, almost fascinating, interest. Apart from the horrible dangers of it all, the unfolding story of what is done in the name of the European Governments is such as almost to baffle belief. The theory of diplomacy is that it is the servant of national interests. The foremost of those interests is the preservation of peace. At all times, and especially in times such as the present, when the technique of war is as ruinous and destructive as perverted science can make it, the effects of war are wholly disastrous for every party concerned. It is the clear interest of every nation not to go to war. Yet the cumulative experience of one generation after another proves that the hardest thing for the nations to do is to agree not to go to war.

Stripped of its elaborate refinements, pretences, conventions, its hollow heroics and shams, diplomacy is the low, vulgar vehicle through which the nations convey their collective inability to behave like reasonable, ordinary human beings. Common sense is not only uncommon, it is absent, in diplomacy. The plain man is driven to exasperated despair by the obstinate, gross folly that is persistently practised by the spokesmen of the five Great Powers in Europe. There is not a pin to choose between them. The one thing that the British Government obviously ought to do—it is at any rate obvious to almost everyone outside official circles—is to give Germany a colony or two. It is simply silly that Germany, alone of all the nations, should on principle be denied the right to possess colonies. Or it would be silly, if it were not something worse. Yet the one thing the British Government so far will not do is to offer Germany a colony or two.

Apart from the question of German colonies, it would not be easy to say precisely what the nations of Europe have to quarrel about. Yet they quarrel in an unbroken crescendo of intensity. The Great Powers are all more or less involved in the Spanish war. The so-called cause of "non-intervention" in Spain recalls the famous misnomer of the Holy Roman Empire, which was not holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.

He was Chairman of the Congregational Union in 1903 and President of the Free Church Council in 1905. At Oxford he had been a Fellow of New College after taking a record First in Greats and being President of the Union. But the decisive influences in his career were pre-Oxford—the beginning of the friendship with Mrs. Oakes that bewildered his admirers, and Puritan assumptions and prejudices which puzzled contemporaries as well as the post-war generation. “Despite his classical training, the Puritan in him was dominant”; but had he been brought up in a different environment as a boy, it is almost certain that the Greek in him rather than the Hebrew would have won the victory. To others he often appeared “an innocent abroad,” ignoring his own interests, and “was adored and ridiculed, worshipped and condemned, esteemed and decried.” He lacked a sense of the incongruous, but persistently curbed his own ironic wit.

His life-long desire was that of the unknown mystic, “I would fain to be to the Eternal Goodness what a man’s hand is to a man” but that such a yearning should lead to preoccupation with self is inevitable, and therein are many perils.

Yet Sir John Marriott predicts that his enduring fame will rest on “the greatest victory of his life,” that over himself.

“His pre-eminent quality was that of an earthly saint.”

D. P. H.

SWIFT.*

It is a pleasure to read the fine biography of Swift that Mr. Bertram Newman has written. It embodies the latest results of assured scholarship, and is notable for the piercing insight into the remarkable character of the Dean himself. Throughout the book there is that loving familiarity with his generation that marks it out as one no student can ignore. While all aspects of his life receive due attention, the man himself is never lost among the pamphlets he wrote or the people with whom he mixed. He stands out as formidably as he stood out in life. The author realises that the tragedy of his life lay not in the last few failing years, pathetic as they were, when aphasia and apathy silenced the bitter tongue and numbed the vigorous intellect. It happened thirty years before, when he was suddenly uprooted, in the prime of life, from busy political work and congenial friends, to be exiled for ever to a

* *Jonathan Swift*. By Bertram Newman. Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.

country he detested and society he despised. “Driven to this wretched kingdom,” is his view of his appointment to the Deanery of St. Patrick’s Cathedral. He frequently complained, with his usual exaggeration, that in Dublin there was hardly a house fit to dine in. Mr. Newman is quite aware that there was an abundance of gifted men and women among the landed gentry, in Trinity College (where he had two friends in Delany and Helsham), on the bench, and among the peers and great commoners. They were all in his opinion dyed with the stain of Whiggery, and he went so far as to state that he had not the acquaintance of a single peer in Ireland—a statement flatly contradicted by his own correspondence.

One of the ablest chapters investigates the relations of Swift with Stella and Vanessa, and here the author spends his strength without any dogmatising. The story of Abélard and Héloïse is not a whit more poignant than that of Swift and Stella, and it has conferred an immortality upon them independent of the literary reputation of the pamphleteer who defeated the invincible Duke of Marlborough. Life proved too hard for them as for many another. He preserved her hair in an envelope in which he had written the deathless phrase, “Only a woman’s hair.” Were they or were they not actually married? The author has conducted his researches with the view of satisfying himself on this point, and he has slowly come to the conclusion that they were not. Perhaps the solution of this problem is as impossible as that of the authorship of the letters of Junius, but will this consideration ever deter men from endeavouring to find it? We must not forget that it was Swift’s “trade to deal in mysteries,” as Bolingbroke informed him, and mystery formed a constituent part of his strange career. The man whom Stella loved, and the poor in the vicinity of the Deanery adored, was clearly not a misanthrope. The world, however, remembers the man who used to read the third chapter of Job on his birthday, that he might curse the day he was born. His long experience of public life had taught him to distrust—to hate, he says—all mankind. The truth is that Swift was a disappointed man, disappointed with himself, disappointed with human nature, from which he expected more than it could ever give and more than he himself was willing to give. All that he hoped at the last was to lie *ubi sæva indignatio ulterius cor lacerare nequit*.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

Metternich's description of another famous organisation as a "loud-sounding nothing" or Castlereagh's "a piece of sublime mysticism" would apply to the London Committee on Spain. The opposite cause of active intervention by contrast has increased uninterruptedly in strength to such a pitch that it has become the chief menace to the general peace.

Italy has about 100,000 men fighting in Spain. In its most recent manifestations this Spanish complication has centred chiefly round Italy. France is for obvious reasons concerned about the presence of Italian troops in Spain. British opinion is exercised about Italy's ultimate designs in Spain and throughout the Mediterranean. In the present circumstances French and British opinion, it would not be an exaggeration to say, have singled out Italy as Public Enemy No. 1.

The diplomatic situation became so much worse in the first half of October that, despite the remaining few who still believed a major war to be unlikely, there were those who now cold-bloodedly regarded such a war as inevitable. They moreover expected it sooner rather than later. They diagnosed its beginning as an open conflict between Italy and Britain. Italian opinion as well as British opinion was hardening in that sense. The argument was commonly heard in French and British quarters, both official and popular, that Signor Mussolini had gone so far that he could not go back. His purpose was nothing less than a virtual conquest of Spain through the means of a Franco victory and a naval mastery of the Mediterranean. His conquest of Abyssinia was the first step in a new Roman conquest. If the argument proceeded, the militarist dictators were allowed to achieve their objects, the day of democracy was over, and political freedom was irrevocably lost.

As is the case in every diplomatic catastrophe, the truly tragic circumstance is the depth of sincerity engaged in it. In the present instance British opinion is bitterly divided between those who think the time has come to make a stand against the dictators and those who think that "peace at almost any price" is the wiser part. The tragedy is that both arguments are sincere. In the last great war the motive that carried British and Allied opinion through to the bitter end was the deep conviction that a victorious Germany would enslave the world. Those of us who in our own experience remember those bitter years can recall the crusading holiness

of indignation against Germany as the anti-Christ. There are those whose withers are still unwrung; who still believe that Germany then was a menace which at all costs had to be subdued by the sword, if the best in political civilisation was to be saved. By contrast there were those of us who believed then, and who regard every subsequent experience as confirmation of the belief, that the last great war, as every war before it, was a form of madness impartially distributed over all the participants. The next war, whether it start in an Anglo-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean, or a Franco-Russian acceptance of a German challenge in Central Europe, will equally constitute the very negation of common sense, decency and humanity, on both sides. Yet the motive is clothed in the same heroic glamour of righteous indignation that clothed every other war motive since the beginning of time. The problem of war on earth must in the last analysis be regarded as a religious question. There is something in human nature that seems to be the perennial spring of war. In each succeeding war the same sincerity, heroism and suffering are displayed. Only the identity of "the enemy" changes. By a sort of macabre game of musical chairs first one country, then another, fills the rôle of enemy to everything that is good. Latterly Germany has slid into the background and Italy has become the foe-in-chief. The issue with Italy has been developing ever since the war on Abyssinia. Attempts have been made on both sides to arrest the growing ill-feeling. They have not had much effect. The Anglo-Italian "gentleman's agreement" of January 4th last, though it contained little of substance, was designed with equal hope on both sides to create a better atmosphere in the relations of the two countries. It did in fact for a short time create a better atmosphere. Its real purpose had been expressed in advance by Mr. Eden in these words (November 5th, 1936): "In years gone by, the interests of the two countries in the Mediterranean have been complementary rather than divergent. On the part of His Majesty's Government there is every desire that those relations should be preserved in the future." Within a week of that statement Count (then Signor) Grandi made contact with Sir Robert Vansittart at the Foreign Office and began a course of negotiation, not about anything in particular, but about the general relationship, that was to last two months. The main reason why it did not

CARDUCCI.

Signorina Maria dell' Isola is already well known to all lovers of Italian literature, not merely for some few but extremely moving and delicate elegies, but also and mainly for her work on *Napoleon in Italian Poetry*. Her latest book, which ought to have appeared in Bologna as part of the celebrations of the first Centenary of Carducci's birth, is, however, not merely the greatest of her works, but unquestionably the most important work on the influence of the first great poet of United Italy on the literature of all other countries of European culture. It is highly to be regretted that the book was prevented from appearing in Italy, presumably because the authoress has not suppressed any aspect of Carducci's immense literary contribution to culture obviously incompatible with the régime now existing in that country: for few poets have been so steadfastly noble fighters for liberty. Of him also indeed one might say, as he said in a fine epitaph to a Garibaldian, that "Athens without slaves, Venice without Doges, Florence without friars, have been his ideal fatherland, the whole of liberty with the whole of civilisation his republic."

The title of the book might, of course, at first raise a question: has there been any real influence on the part of such an intensely Italian, classical and Latin poet as Carducci on any European literature, in the sense of a new movement in poetry? Is it legitimate to speak of influence where there has been only either a wave of literary criticism or a series of translations, however excellent and even by such famous hands as those of a Mommsen and a Wilamowitz? First of all the great Italian poet exerted a real creative influence in the said sense in Spain and Rumania, by inspiring in the former the not less deeply classical poetry of Juan Costa y Llobera, and in the latter the poetry of Duilio Zamfirescu. Secondly, some of the translations of Carducci's greatest lyrics are in themselves new creations, and testify to the existence in all countries, perhaps especially in England and Germany, of an *élite* of minds which find in him the interpreter of the continuity of the Hellenic spirit in the modern world, and of that emotion, peculiar to the modern age, which is the historical emotion, the historical *pietas*, so often in his case interfused

* *Carducci nella letteratura europea*. Di Maria dell' Isola. (Les Presses Françaises, Paris, 1936.)

with cosmic emotion. Finally, this work deserves the attention of all who wish to know the psychological reaction of a first-rate critical Italian mind, imbued with reverence toward the Master, to the most sympathetic foreign interpretation and criticism of Carducci's poetry and outlook.

ANGELO CRESPI.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The Price of European Peace,* by Mr. Frank Darvall, is a pregnant and significant work which, in the words of General Smuts, is as an academic essay "a very able and searching discussion on the whole problem of European peace." It contains, in short, radical proposals for removing the inequality of status, treatment and opportunity which exists between Germany, Italy and the other "Have-Not" States and the so-called "Have" nations, in particular France and Great Britain. To attain this equality Mr. Darvall urges a redistribution of frontiers "on the sole basis of national preference" as determined by plebiscites. This is to be supplemented by the creation of "a common authority" to guarantee to all States, great and small alike, equality "in respect of economic opportunity, military security and all other factors calculated to affect materially the contentment or otherwise of states." All colonial territories are to be pooled and redistributed among nations in accordance with their own peculiar needs and capacities and with the desires and interests of the natives themselves; and they are all to be governed on mandatory principles. International control of strategic points, such as the Suez Canal and Singapore, will remove any insecurity felt at the loss of territories of military importance. Mr. Darvall finally urges Great Britain to take a courageous and unselfish lead in furtherance of these principles which alone can form the foundation of a stable peace. In Count Bethlen's view the author has "found the theoretical answer" to the problem of peace and justice in "a harmonious synthesis of security and revision." As a practical programme it is condemned by General Smuts, who considers that frontier revision is "hopelessly impracticable" and likely to cause more confusion, that no Great Power will accept a limitation of national sovereignty, and that the "Have-Nots" are not likely to favour a new mandate scheme. In his opinion immediate policy should be to "tackle the economic and financial problems with generous concessions from the 'Haves,' halt the armament race" and revive the League, with all the Great Powers, except the U.S.A., as active members and "with a mandate to deal with the more urgent discontents. . . . And leave the rest to future developments."

* Hodge. 5s. net.

succeed in achieving any permanently better relationship was that Signor Grandi had to insist on appearing as the envoy of the "King-Emperor" whereas the British Foreign Office, not having recognised the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, had perforce to receive him as the representative of the "Italian Government." As there could not be any agreement even on the status of one of the parties to the discussion, the discussion itself obviously could not go far. That difficulty about Abyssinia still remains.

During the year, however, there were various gestures of a desire for better relations made both in London and in Rome. At the beginning of August, Signor Mussolini again took an initiative. Mr. Chamberlain exchanged pacific, good-tempered letters with him. It was even arranged that Lord Perth (then Sir Eric Drummond), the British Ambassador to Italy, who was in England, should on his return to Rome make contact with Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, and elaborate the friendly exchanges. But he was delayed in England over the personal business of assuming an earldom. By the time he did reach Rome at the end of September the situation had changed so much for the worse that the Perth-Ciano conversations were never even suggested.

During the month of August the Spanish trouble broke out in the Mediterranean on a somewhat alarming scale. Some fifty ships of various nationality—German, Italian, Danish, French, British—were attacked by air bombs or submarine torpedo. The attacks culminated on the last night in August when the British destroyer *Havock* was attacked, presumably by submarine, off the Spanish coast. The suggestion was at once made that the "Mediterranean" Powers should meet to discuss measures of common protection against such attacks. Some involved and acrimonious diplomacy thereupon started on the problem, what was a Mediterranean Power? The origin, course and upshot of that controversy were related in these pages last month. The conference, however, succeeded in meeting at Nyon on September 10th, neither Italy nor Germany being present. France and Britain at once jointly proposed that the Mediterranean be divided into zones, to be patrolled severally by the navies of the Powers participating in the scheme to suppress what was called "piracy." On the following day, however, it was proposed and agreed instead that the main trade routes

through the Mediterranean, 5,000 miles long, should be patrolled by French and British warships only. Those warships were to have the power of treating as pirates and sinking all submarines not conforming to the 1936 rules for "humanising" submarine warfare. It was further agreed that the "sanctions" should operate not only against submarine pirates, but against aircraft and surface vessels engaged in "piracy." The reason why the patrol duties were restricted to France and Britain was given as the disproportionate responsibility that the original plan would throw upon the six small Powers.

From the moment the so-called Mediterranean Arrangement was drafted, it was clear that any scheme of naval patrol in those waters, not shared by Italy, would be defective in itself and dangerous in its implications. One of the diplomatic complications was obviated by excluding Russia from the plan, and the other, it was hoped, would be obviated by offering Italy a share in the plan. Italy was therefore invited to patrol the Tyrrhenian Sea. This invitation was delivered in Rome on September 13th. It was promptly cold-shouldered as inadequate. Signor Mussolini is not only a dictator with a highly developed taste for the big, rather than the little, share in things. It also happened that on any reasonable view the share offered was indeed disproportionate. It is always better, though never easy in the embittered state of European relationships, to see things as others see them. Suppose France and Italy, in a comparable hypothesis, had agreed to patrol the trade routes across the Atlantic, and had offered Britain the patrol of the Irish Sea? The Tyrrhenian Sea had about the same sort of relevance to the main Mediterranean route. Of course, Italy had of her own choice refused to take part in the Nyon Conference; but if the object was the greatest measure of harmony in the difficult relationships, there was something to be said for making an adequate offer to Italy. Moreover, such had been the genuine motive of France and Britain during the Nyon Conference itself. At every stage of the procedure Italy was carefully and courteously kept informed and even consulted about the work in hand.

None the less the danger that sprang from Nyon was that the European division into two armed camps might be emphasised. The main participants in the conference were France, Britain and Russia. A Paris-London-Moscow "axis"

The fifth edition of Mr. Wickham Steed's *Hitler, Whence, and Whither?** contains a new Introduction and a supplementary chapter. The former proclaims afresh the gospel of liberty, of which he is one of the most eloquent champions. The latter summarises the correspondence of Houston Stewart Chamberlain with the Kaiser over twenty years, and adds a remarkable letter written to Hitler in 1923, on the eve of the Munich *putsch*. The close affinity between these three ill-balanced minds is very striking. They were bound to each other by their common belief in the "Aryan" race and their common detestation of democracy. "Nothing can be done so long as the Parliamentary system rules," wrote Chamberlain to the Nazi chief; "God knows that the Germans have no spark of talent for this system." The renegade Englishman did not live to see Hitler's victory, but he is a deity in the Nazi pantheon.

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Prince Ito,† by Kengi Hamada, is an authoritative record of the manifold achievements of the greatest of the makers of modern Japan. Containing as it does a mass of new material, taken from his official papers, the book is an important contribution to the history of the later decades of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth. The first half of the volume is devoted to the dramatic story of how Japan emerged from her age-long seclusion and took her place among the up-to-date communities of our modern world. When the process had been in the main accomplished, the stage widens and Japan enters the ranks of the Great Powers with her victories over China and Russia. It is here that the narrative becomes of most value to historical students, and the pages on Ito's mission to Russia at the end of 1901, when the Anglo-Japanese alliance was being discussed in London, are of first-rate importance. The closing chapters describe his work for Korea, and the final pages his murder by a Korean at the age of 69. "This apostle of Japanese liberalism" was obviously a very great man, and, though his work was unfinished, no statesman since Bismarck has left behind him a more imposing monument.

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Dr. William A. Robson has edited in *The British Civil Servant*‡ a valuable collection of essays relating mainly to the character, functions and efficiency of the personnel in the various branches of public administration. The contributions are at once explanatory, appreciative and critical. The Editor pleads for a "more constructive type" of official, for a wider social basis of recruitment and for greater flexibility and co-ordination over the whole range of public service. The need for "genuine social experience" and closer contact with the outside world is also expressed by Professor Ernest Barker in the course of a short survey of the administrative class of the Home Civil Service. Mr.

* Nisbet. 4s. 6d. † Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. ‡ Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.

Harold Nicolson would further democratise the Foreign Service by fusing the consular and diplomatic branches into one and establishing a Staff College through which all aspirants for the highest posts would have to pass. Prospects in the I.C.S. in the light of the new Constitution are discussed by Professor John Coatman. Other essays include that in which Sir Ernest Simon has brought his unrivalled experience to bear upon the conduct and efficiency of local government. Under the present system there is "no effective machinery for central control" of local policy. He would widen the powers of the Town Clerk who would become the Chief General Manager, with administrative rather than legal qualifications. The personnel of the public service corporations are discussed by Dr. Herman Finer. Some of his fears as to recruitment and facilities for public information are shared by Mr. Terence O'Brien, who in an able work, *British Experiments in Public Ownership and Control*,* analyses in turn the origin, structure and record of the Central Electricity Board, the B.B.C., and the London Passenger Transport Board. His general attitude is one of approbation and he concludes from these examples that where public service to the exclusion of private profit is desired, the public service corporation can be at once efficient and enterprising and susceptible to the general will.

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The valuable services performed by the Royal Institute of International Affairs are well described in *Chatham House*,† by Commander Stephen King-Hall who, as chairman of the endowment committee, is appealing for £250,000. Since its foundation in 1920 the Institute has grown with remarkable rapidity to become the principle centre in the British Commonwealth for the scientific investigation of international problems and the collection of information upon all aspects of imperial and foreign questions. The reports of its study groups are well known and widely appreciated for their accuracy, impartiality and objective treatment; and Professor Arnold Toynbee's annual *Survey of International Affairs*, published under the auspices of the Institute, bears a world-wide reputation. For several years, also, the Information Department Papers have proved of the utmost service in providing the public with a groundwork of well-founded knowledge on current issues. Chatham House has developed not through its own propaganda, but owing to the increasing recognition and demand for its services, both as a centre of research and discussion and as a depository of information. Its work is only limited by its financial resources.

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Among recent books on the countryside must be noticed Mr. J. Dixon-Scott's *England under Trust*,‡ which bears striking testimony to the work of the National Trust since its foundation in 1895. The

* Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. † Oxford Univ. Press. 5s. net.
‡ Alexander Maclehose. 7s. 6d. net.

was thereby subtly suggested. And the suggestion was made the most of by those who wanted to make the most of it. French admirals playfully—but there was a grim note in the play—talked of the impending Anglo-French “naval manœuvres” in the Mediterranean. Germany and Italy were absent from the conference, and there was no doubt in anybody’s mind about the Berlin-Rome “axis.” It was, however, one of the fortunate things that France and Britain promptly recognised the expediency of satisfying Italian prestige by offering an equality of patrol duty under the Nyon plan.

The Nyon Conference had been called to deal with one of the side products of the international complication in Spain. Spain was still the real danger zone. The real problem was still the localisation of the war in Spain. Such had been the theoretic purpose, not achieved, of the London Non-Intervention Committee for more than a year. On September 17th the French and British Governments informed Lord Plymouth, Chairman of that Committee, that as a result of the new duties imposed upon their navies by the Nyon arrangement, they had decided to withdraw from the existing scheme of naval patrol round the coasts of Spain. In effect that decision destroyed the Non-Intervention Committee. It was now virtually superseded by the Mediterranean Arrangement made at Nyon.

The reason why the conference had been held at Nyon, and not at Geneva, was to nurse Italian susceptibilities and to encourage Italian participation. As that object had not been achieved, there seemed no longer anything to be gained by the various delegates travelling to and fro over the thirteen miles that separated Nyon from Geneva. On September 15th, therefore, the headquarters of the conference were moved to Geneva. On that same day the Italian Government formally refused the part at first offered to her in the Mediterranean arrangement. The reason she gave was that Italy’s “vital interests demanded that she should have absolute parity” with any other State in any joint action that was taken in the Mediterranean. The position now reached was that Italy had in effect suggested that Geneva-Nyon should make her a revised offer, and that Geneva-Nyon was prepared to make a revised offer. That remarkable position produced something like a stalemate for several days. In diplomacy faces are always difficult. They have to be saved at almost all costs.

Prestige, which schoolboys would more expressively and more truly call “huffiness,” is one of the great obstacles to common sense. Those who inspired the emotions at Geneva said that the Nyon offer stood, and that if Italy did not like it, it was for her to ask for something else. Italy in the answering spirit maintained silence because she expected Geneva-Nyon to amend its own offer. The compromise that was reached in that exhilarating contest of diplomatic strength was that another conference was arranged. It was arranged that the naval experts of France, Britain and Italy should meet in Paris on September 27th to give effect to the already established principle that Italy should be given an equal share with France and Britain in the Nyon patrol duties.

In the meantime still another idea came to fruition. While Geneva and Rome were waiting for each other to take the initiative about the Nyon duties, the statesmen assembled in Geneva were coming into personal contact with each other as a routine. Italy has an official at Geneva whose title is that of Italian permanent delegate to the League of Nations. On this occasion that circumstance proved less ironic than on other occasions. Signor Bova-Scoppa, the said Italian official, conversed with M. Delbos, French Foreign Minister, who was still in Geneva, about the general situation. M. Delbos made the suggestion that the three chief Mediterranean Powers, Italy, France and Britain, should together discuss the problem of the foreign armies operating in Spain. The British Government approved that suggestion. Speaking in the League Assembly at Geneva on September 20th, Mr. Eden had already offered some measured and dignified general encouragement to Italy. He said that the Nyon Powers “will certainly be at all times ready to consider all suggestions.” On the following day M. Blondel, French Ambassador in Rome, and Mr. Ingram, British Chargé d’Affaires, acting for the still absent Lord Perth, saw Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, and informed him that France and Britain “had never failed to recognise the position of Italy as a Great Mediterranean Power.” It was on that occasion that they suggested the naval experts of the three Powers should meet in Paris to translate into practice the equal greatness of those Powers as applied to the Mediterranean patrol. On September 24th Mr. Ingram again saw Count Ciano and assured him of the British Government’s full approval of the suggestion made by M. Delbos at Geneva.

principal properties of the National Trust, which now owns or controls 60,000 acres, are described in turn, including short accounts of their historical associations. They are illustrated by 62 impressive photographs. A valuable survey of farming conditions prevalent over the different areas of England is contained in *Farming England*,* by Mr. A. G. Street, who is at once a practical farmer and a well-known writer. If he has at times something bitter or cynical to say on politics and townsmen, he writes objectively as an expert observer, in a direct and descriptive style which all readers will enjoy and appreciate.

For those who love the waterways, seas and coasts of England, Mr. Frank Carr's *The Yachtsman's England*† will come as a delight. He writes with a knowledge gained by long experience, and his adventures embellish a fine piece of descriptive and informative writing. This is not a technical book. The budding yachtsman who wants an elementary book on types of craft and a groundwork in the theory of sailing and navigation may read with advantage *Sailing and Cruising*,* where Mr. K. Adlard Coles has put together a quantity of useful information.

The distinctive character of the North of England is graphically portrayed in *North Country*,* by Mr. Edmund Vale. The volume is one of strong contrasts, between matchless scenery and historic buildings and great black and ugly agglomerations of industry. Mr. Vale, however, finds inspiration among these areas and their teeming inhabitants. Every passage in this book is alive and vibrant, written by one with deep feeling and appreciation of his subject. Another volume which imparts an atmosphere of reality is Mr. Michael Floyd's account of *The Face of Ireland*.* He takes the reader on long tours of the countryside, describing with care the infinite varieties of the landscape and imparting the character of this land of small farmers and peasant holdings. The quantity of detail will appeal more to the tourist than to the arm-chair reader. *The Land of Wales** covers a much wider scope. It is an ambitious attempt by two Welsh authors, who are brother and sister, Peter and Eiluned Lewis, to compress into 116 pages a survey of Welsh origins, the heritage of national culture, the outlook and lives of the people and a description of the countryside. If the book is inevitably inadequate it is written with much literary skill and undoubtedly portrays something of the spirit and temper of contemporary Wales. In all these volumes the excellent illustrations add greatly to their worth and interest.

* Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

† Seeley Service & Co. 8s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

SEPTEMBER 1937.

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM.

I

IN their brilliant historical survey of the Palestinian problem, the Palestine Royal Commission note that Pompey captured Jerusalem in the year 73 B.C., and since that time no independent Jewish state has existed in Palestine. They presumably intended to mark the coincidence that, after exactly two thousand years, the offer is made to the Jewish people to re-establish a Jewish state in a part—a very small part—of Palestine. The Commission do not note another coincidence; that this year of grace will be the fortieth anniversary of the first Zionist Congress at Basel, when representatives of the Jewish communities of the world for the first time in modern history met together, and defined the aim of Zionism as the establishment in Palestine of a home for the Jewish people, secured by international law. For forty years the Jewish people have been—if not wandering in the wilderness—reclaiming the wilderness, in the first efforts to build their National Home; and at the twentieth Zionist Congress, which is being held at Zurich in August, they will have to decide whether the opportunity of a state will compensate them for the deprivation of nine-tenths of the Promised Land. An Arab authority has pointed out a third coincidence: that this year marks the thirteenth centenary—according to the Gregorian calendar—of the Arab conquest of Palestine. These historical coincidences and the memory of them are significant of the historical and psychological complexity of the problem with which the Royal Commission had to deal.

We have become accustomed in recent times to revolutionary proposals of Royal Commissions dealing with imperial problems. We have had the Reports of the Simon Commission on India, and of the Donoughmore Commission on Ceylon, which preluded fundamental changes in the government of our Eastern empire. But the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine is the most revolutionary of all. Fifteen years after Great Britain accepted from the Council of the

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that the three countries should consult about Spain in particular reference to the foreign volunteers. It was understood that M. Delbos had gone so far as to assure Signor Bova-Scoppa that if Italy would withdraw the Italian troops, France could guarantee that the International Brigade, fighting on the side of Valencia, would be disbanded.

It was indeed now clear to all concerned that French opinion was more concerned over the presence of foreign troops in Spain than about the issue between Franco-Spain and Valencia-Spain. The French Right indeed had shown sympathy with General Franco's cause. But if France was divided in partisanship as between the two Spanish belligerents she was unanimous in her desire to see all the foreign troops of whatever nationality evacuated from Spain. That was a readily understandable anxiety.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI'S VISIT TO GERMANY.

It was in the very middle of the preliminary exchanges about an Anglo-French-Italian consultation on Spain that Signor Mussolini paid his memorable visit to Herr Hitler. "Memorable" is probably a fair judgment because no one can mistake the potential power implied in the Berlin-Rome "axis." The personal jealousies and dislikes of each other attributed to Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini are of less practical interest than the coincidence of interest between two nations together numbering 100,000,000 people, armed, equipped and virtually mobilised for war. In its present state of preparation for war the continent of Europe is alarming for the reason mainly that the system of universal compulsory military service has been carried to extremes never before contemplated. There is no longer any rigid test of physical fitness. In France, Germany and Italy, every man except old men, fit or unfit, is in possession at this moment of his marching orders. In the event of mobilisation every man in those countries is ready within a few hours to report for duty at his barracks, where his kit and equipment are all ready waiting for him. The numbers that could be put into the field immediately by France, Germany and Italy would be nearer 15,000,000 than 10,000,000. It sounds incredible, to English minds it is incredible, that the whole manhood of nations should thus as a permanent condition of their lives be trained and equipped for war.

Signor Mussolini left Rome on September 24th, travelled through the night, and reached Munich on the following morning. He was greeted amid scenes of disciplined pomp and ceremony on a gigantic scale. He arrived in Berlin on September 27th and was back in Rome on the 30th. Those four days of mass enthusiasm and demonstration were in one sense the artificial product of disciplined mobs, the figures of the Führer and the Duce inevitably suggesting those of first-class actors in the rôle of uniformed heroes. But the strength of the spectacle lay in the very fact of the disciplined and canalised singleness of idea. Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini are supreme and unchallenged in their leadership. They have at their disposal a combined military force that no wise man would underestimate. The "axis" between them as the motive for action is strong. Financially the two countries may be bankrupt. So is France. Britain has an income-tax of 5s. in the pound as the standard rate; and the rate is more likely to go up than down even in the present time of so-called peace. It is true that Germany has been adroit enough to manoeuvre herself into the Spanish background and to leave Italy as the exposed non-Spanish champion of the Franco cause. It is true also that the German General Staff is averse from present adventures whether in Spain or in Central Europe. But in all essential points of policy the solidarity between Berlin and Rome is apparently impregnable. It constitutes one of the basic factors of the Europe of to-day. The real interest of the Hitler-Mussolini meeting is that it illustrated and dramatised that factor.

THE PROPOSED TRIPARTITE TALKS

Two days after Signor Mussolini returned from Germany the new Anglo-French initiative about Spain took form. On October 2nd Lord Perth, who had now returned to Rome, and M. Blondel handed to Count Ciano the text of the joint invitation to a tripartite consultation. The note alluded to the conference of naval experts in Paris and deduced that "favourable conditions are thus created to enable the three governments to examine in a spirit of perfect frankness the situation arising from the prolongation of the Spanish conflict." It recalled Count Ciano's assurances, given to M. Blondel and to Mr. Ingram, that Italy had "no present

League of Nations a Mandate for Palestine, with the double trust of establishing a Jewish National Home and not prejudicing the rights of the other communities in the country, the Commission recommend, and the Government have somewhat precipitately adopted the recommendation, that the trust cannot be executed and the Mandate should be terminated. They propose to cut the Gordian knot. This "least of countries" should be divided into three states: an independent Land of Israel (which, paradoxically, comprises the land of the Philistines and Galilee of the Gentiles, but not Judea): an Arab state, comprising the rest of Palestine cis-Jordan and the present territory of Trans-Jordan; and a British enclave remaining under Mandate, and containing permanently Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and a narrow corridor from Jerusalem to the sea by Jaffa, and, temporarily, four towns in the north: Haifa, Acre, Tiberias and Safed, which will ultimately be part of the Jewish state. The policy of building a bi-national Palestine under Mandatory guidance, which has been pursued since 1920, is judged to have failed beyond repair. Neither Jews nor Arabs would recognise the dual character of the policy of the Mandatory: "neither community believes in its heart that it will be safe unless it is master in its home."

The experience of the last years has shown the extreme difficulty of maintaining the Mandate, as it was conceived by the framers of the Covenant of the League, over those countries which were detached after the war from the Turkish Empire, and were to be recognised provisionally as independent nations subject to advice and assistance from a Mandatory Power till they are able to stand alone. The relation of guardian and ward, with responsibility of the guardian to the League of Nations, has had to be exchanged, first in Iraq and then in Syria, for a treaty relation as between independent states, without that international responsibility. And now, if the recommendations of the Commission and His Majesty's Government are approved by the Council of the League and by the Government of the United States, which has treaty rights in the matter, the same process of emancipation—or "emandation"—already half applied to Trans-Jordan, will be extended to all of Mandated Palestine. Modern nationalism, which has become the religion of oriental as well as of certain western peoples, has been too strong for those who believed in a system of gradual self-determination.

Palestine, indeed, from the beginning has been in a special position. Not only is it, as the hearth of three great religions, a sacred trust for civilisation; but it is the scene of the great experiment of restoring, under the ægis of the Mandatory, to the most historical of peoples their national home. What has been done during the twenty years since the Balfour Declaration was issued is one of the remarkable achievements of our day. In 1917 the population consisted of 650,000 Arabs and about 50,000 Jews. To-day it has nearly doubled: there are 950,000 Arabs and over 400,000 Jews. The bitter anti-Semitism in Germany and in Central Europe during the last years has enormously increased the tempo of the development. Jewish immigration is due to an expulsive force from Europe as well as to the impulsive attraction of Palestine; and to-day six million Jews in Europe yearn for a home where they may live a free and upstanding life. The Jewish immigration has brought the country amazing development, and made it an oasis of prosperity in a desert of world depression. Jews have invested there some £80,000,000, which have been used to expand agriculture, industry and commerce, and every aspect of intellectual life. Nor has the progress been restricted to the Jewish population. Their enterprise, as the Royal Commission affirms, has raised the economic and social condition of the Arabs, who have multiplied by nearly 50 per cent. The very success of the idealistic enterprise has stirred and inflamed the national feeling of both sides, and engendered a disease of the body politic which, the Commission finds, cannot be cured by any medicine, but only by a surgical operation.

The Report of the Commission is divided into three parts: the first deals with the history, ancient and modern, of Palestine; the second with the operation of the Mandate and the grievances brought forward by Jews and Arabs against the Administration; the third with their conclusions. The first part is a masterpiece of historical writing and contains a thorough and understanding description of what has been done under the British Mandate. The second part, while affording a searching analysis of a number of specific difficulties, has an accent of futility, because the recommendations are not intended to be carried out. They find that both nations had legitimate grievances, and make suggestions for drastic administrative changes in matters of immigration,

intention of permitting the despatch of further volunteers to Spain"; as also Signor Bova-Scoppa's assurances, given to M. Delbos, that "Italy had no intention of making the smallest change in the territorial status of Spain; that she had no designs upon the Balearic Islands; and that the continental and insular territory of Spain would be strictly respected."

The two governments for their part now gave the like assurances to Italy about "the political independence of Spain." They went on to say that they "earnestly desire that the civil strife in Spain shall cease to be a cause of international unrest and suspicion." They gave the invitation to tripartite talks in these words: "But they are convinced that no considerable improvement in the situation is possible until further measures have been carried out to make the policy of non-intervention effective by the withdrawal of the non-Spanish nationals who are now taking part in the struggle. . . . With this end in view, the French and United Kingdom Governments have the honour to invite the Italian Government to join with them in conversations with the object, if possible, of reaching an agreement on measures to carry this policy into effect."

When that note was delivered Signor Mussolini was away at his country seat. He did not return to Rome till October 6th. He presided over a meeting of the Fascist Grand Council on the evening of the following day, when the Italian answer was drafted. That same evening Lord Perth and M. Blondel called on Count Ciano and made friendly, but impatient, inquiry as to when the invitation would be answered. The *Popolo d'Italia* on the morning of October 8th, in an inspired message, announced that Italy's answer would be to refuse the proposed tripartite talks on the ground that Italy would not engage in any such diplomacy unless Germany also participated, and to make the counter-suggestion that the business in hand should continue to exercise the Non-Intervention Committee. The Italian note was transmitted to Paris and London on October 9th. In it these passages appeared:

"The Fascist Government willingly take note of the assurances furnished by the British Government regarding the political independence of Spain. For themselves they do not need to recall the assurances furnished on repeated occasions, in the most solemn fashion, regarding the political

independence and consequently the territorial integrity of Spain, its main land, its islands, and its colonies. The Fascist Government fully share the hope expressed by the British Government that the internal struggles of Spain may cease to be a cause of suspicion and friction between the other nations. . . . The proposed discussion, in the absence of the other States, would lack the elements indispensable for reaching an agreement. It is the conviction of the Fascist Government that the adoption of procedures—even if only preliminary—outside the London Committee and its organs would in the present situation result not only in not diminishing but in increasing the possibility of misunderstandings and complications and in retarding, instead of hastening, the attainment of the general agreement, an agreement which the Fascist Government regard as supremely necessary. The Fascist Government are therefore of the opinion that the question of non-intervention should continue to be dealt with at the London Committee. The Fascist Government have finally the honour to state that they will not participate in conversations, meetings, or conferences to which the German Government have not been formally invited and in which they do not participate."

Even before the Italian note was received in Paris and in London the relations between the European capitals were subjected to a greater strain than they had experienced for many months past. For it was known in advance that Italy would refuse; and it was known that in effect the Italian answer was as truly a joint Italo-German answer as the invitation had been a joint Anglo-French invitation. The alignment of one axis against the other was thereby hardened. The very clarity of the Spanish complications seemed to make them the more obstinate. Italy refused even to discuss the Spanish question unless Germany were a party to the discussion. There was equal force in the French rejoinder that if Germany were a party to them, Russia could not be excluded. But neither Germany nor Italy would consent to the inclusion of Russia. It was their policy, as far as they could, to divide the east from the west of Europe. The London Non-Intervention Committee embraced all the Powers concerned, but had been proved by a long experience to be an organisation for shelving, rather than solving, the problem. The fact has to be faced that the Spanish problem has so far been made insoluble

land settlement, education, public security, local government. But again and again they come back to the theme that no administrative changes and no fresh regulations will touch the heart of the problem. They are convinced that, if the Mandate is continued in its present form, there is no hope of peace in Palestine; and their palliative recommendations appear to be designed to deter, to point the lesson that the Mandate cannot be maintained. In answer to the Jewish complaint that immigration has not been facilitated, they introduce the crippling proposal that regard should be had not only to the economic absorptive capacity, but also to political, social and psychological considerations. They fix a "political high level" for the next five years, of 12,000 immigrants a year, to include Jews of every category. The British Government in adopting the Report at once applied this stringent limitation for the period of the next eight months. Seeing that the immigration figures for 1935 were over 60,000, and for 1936, in spite of the rebellion, 30,000, while the difference between the Arab natural increase and the Jewish natural increase in the land is nearly 20,000 a year, the measure of restriction seems explicable only as a means of pressure on the Jews to adopt the project of partition.

That project had a good press in England, but a mixed reception in Parliament, and an almost unanimously bad press in Palestine and in the organs of Jewish opinion throughout the world. The feeling is general outside England that there is "no wholeness in it," and that it is directed principally—if precariously—for the benefit of British imperial interests. Great Britain would retain her strategic points at Haifa and Akaba, and her trust for the Holy Cities, as well as her bases in the "bridgeland" which are vital to her communications with the Middle and Farther East. She would, too, be freed of a cause of violent Arab irritation against her Empire.

Both Jewish and Arab nationalists complain bitterly of the division of the land they love. Both want the whole, and both, at present, concentrate their attention on that part of which they are potentially deprived. It is, indeed, an essential difficulty which drove the Commission to recommend partition, that Arabs and Jews, both Semites, have, as Lawrence put it, "no half-tones in their register of vision." The English idea of compromise is repugnant to them. Besides, however,

their opposition to the principle, the Jews complain of details of the proposed partition; of the narrow limits placed on their independent state, which comprises in all less than 2,000 square miles, the area of an average English county, out of the total area of Palestine cis-Jordan of 10,000 square miles; of their exclusion from the unpopulated, derelict southern half, which their enterprise and capital alone could reclaim for civilisation; of the inclusion in the Arab area of their two vital enterprises for the development of the natural resources of the country, the hydro-electric station at the junction of the waters of the Jordan and the Yarmuk, and the works at the Dead Sea for the extraction of minerals from that vast chemical reservoir; of the maintenance of a temporary British mandate over all the towns in their area save Tel-Aviv; and lastly, and most grievously, of the inclusion of Jerusalem, the spiritual and cultural centre of Jewry, in the British corridor. That Jerusalem, or anyhow that part of it which has been built around the Holy City in recent years almost entirely by Jews, and contains the Hebrew University and the principal national institutions, should not form part of the Jewish Home, seems unthinkable. It takes the heart out of the state. Thanks to the Parliamentary debate in July some of these matters will be rectified if the principle of partition is in the end accepted. The Arabs, on their side, complain as bitterly of the division which includes in the Jewish area a large Arab minority and a district in Upper Galilee with a mainly Arab population, and which "gives the richest land to the Jews, the holiest to the English, the most barren to the Arabs."

Yet these complaints of detail do not touch the heart of the problem. For the Jews it is the moral loss involved in division. They are offered a National Home which, though it may be a toy state, gives them scarce any room to develop freely and to build up the ideal community of which they have dreamed for two thousand years. For the Arabs, there is not a corresponding moral loss: and Arab champions like Mr. Philby have urged that they should take with open hands what is offered, seeing that it gives them twenty-three parts out of twenty-four. The creation of a separate Jewish state comprising the coastal plain of Philistia and Galilee is comparable with the creation of the separate republic of Lebanon along the coast of Syria. It would mean that in

by non-Spanish complications. French policy has been, for the most part, allied to Russian policy, the true motive of the alliance being the common fear of Germany, but an incidental motive on Russia's part being, for purposes of domestic prestige, to encourage Spain to go bolshevik. The "world revolution" is still one of Moscow's dreams. If the cause of bolshevism wanes, the Russian dictatorship wanes. Similarly, if the cause of fascism or nazism wanes, the power of Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini wanes. Russia, however, was indisputably the first non-Spanish Power to intervene in Spain. Could any member of the Non-Intervention Committee deny that fact? France in the first instance merely supported Russia on general principles. Italy's original interventionist motive was undoubtedly to counter a bolshevik attempt on Spain, the rival ideologies being quick to engage themselves. It may now be that Signor Mussolini's quest of military prestige in Spain is designed exclusively to impress the German General Staff; but does anyone really believe that General Franco, a proud patriot of a proud country, as proud of his country as any other Spaniard, would in the event allow Signor Mussolini to obtain a foothold in the Spanish aerodromes or submarine bases? Does it make sense that General Franco should attempt to obtain power in his own country, merely in order to hand the country over to a foreign Power? Germany has been aligned in sympathy with Italy, but has refrained from taking a leading rôle among the interventionists. The present difficulty is that Spain has become the cockpit of a struggle of prestige between the Rome-Berlin and the Moscow-Paris axis. The British Government has attempted its traditional rôle of impartial optimist, always hoping for the best and trying not to be too clearly identified with either axis, and not at all identified with either of the two Spanish belligerent parties. It has proved a hard rôle to fill, and circumstances have driven British policy more towards the Moscow-Paris axis than to the other. When these lines were written Spain had become both the symbol and the storm centre of the European divisions.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

October 12th, 1937.

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RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.*

Professor de Burgh has rendered a great service both to Religion and to Philosophy by the publication of his book entitled *Towards a Religious Philosophy*. In this volume he has gathered together a number of essays, most of which had appeared previously, but which form a closely connected whole. In the course of a continuous discussion, he treats many of the most outstanding problems both of philosophical thought and of religious concern. Among these may be specially mentioned, Metaphysical and Religious Knowledge, The Time-Process, Eternity and God, God and the World-Order, The Relations of Morality to Religion, and Humanism, Theocentric and Secular. In the course of his argument the author deals carefully with Theories of Immanence, and particularly with the systems of Spinoza and Gentile. The book is intended to establish the *Prolegomena* of a religious philosophy, and to substantiate the claim "that what is revealed to religious experience is knowledge; and that,

* *Towards a Religious Philosophy*. By W. G. de Burgh. Macdonald & Evans. 10s. net.

either case the Arab is turned to the east, while his neighbour is turned to the west. But partition can give a prospect of peace only if there is goodwill and neighbourliness between the two states into which the country is divided: if, in other words, the Arabs and the Jews make separation a starting-point of co-operation. Economically, the two parts of the country must remain interdependent: they can only attain political well-being if they work with each other and not against each other. If, instead of "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state," the project led to the establishment of two sovereign nations, armed for constant strife against each other, their last fate would be worse than the first. The recommendation of the Commission is almost admittedly a counsel of despair; before adopting it another counsel might be tried which, though of uncertain hope, is less desperate, and would give a better prospect.

Assuming that the British Mandate will be given up after a definite short period, and that the two peoples will be happy only with self-government—which, like others, they prefer to good government—and assuming that they should enjoy forthwith autonomous regulation of their social life, it would still be possible to make a more earnest effort than has been tried to bring them to some understanding for the maintenance of an integral Palestine. The Report of the Commission disposes brusquely of the idea of "cantonisation," which has been put forward intermittently in recent years. It mentions the administrative difficulties; it emphasises that it would not settle the question of ultimate destiny which to-day looms so large. But at least the trial of that plan, for a short period in preparation for independence, would give breathing-space for improving the relations of the two peoples in an undivided homeland. If it was found to be unworkable, then partition might be accepted as the inescapable solution. The truth is that neither on the part of the Mandatory Government, nor on the part of the Jews, has there been an earnest and steady effort to bring about co-operation between Jews and Arabs, while on the part of the Arab leaders there has been a steady and relentless effort to prevent it. It may be said that the Arab leaders will remain implacable, and that extreme nationalist feeling has been growing ominously during the last years. Yet there are indications, since the Report was published, of a greater

willingness to face the essential facts, and to recognise that the Jews come to Palestine as of right, and that the country must be a homeland for them as well as for the indigenous Arabs. The biggest difficulty about a *modus vivendi* is the question of immigration. For the Arabs Jewish immigration, unrestricted, or regulated by economic considerations, spells a Jewish majority in a few years, and then, as they see it, the doom. For the Jews, immigration seems to offer both the principal salvation for tens of thousands of their brethren fleeing from persecution, and the means to securing equal rights with the Arabs. Yet if, during a probationary period before the Mandate is ended, the fears about immigration could be removed on the one side, and the measure of immigration could be reduced on the other by voluntary sacrifice with a view to peace, a foundation might be laid of better understanding between the peoples of Palestine, which would extend to the whole of the Arab body politic, and enable co-operation and joint expansion in an area twenty times as large as Palestine cis-Jordan, nearly one hundred times as large as the proposed Jewish state.

The Commission's conclusion is regarded by some as a judgment of Solomon, by others as a more realistic and opportunist solution which follows the experience of Ireland. Those who hold the latter view hope that circumstances and necessity, together with the removal of present irritants, may work to bring the two peoples together if they are each master in their home, and have not to make mutual sacrifices. Those who take the former view believe that the love of the Palestine child which moves the Jews is stronger than any desire for a state, and that they would be prepared to make a sacrifice of the present for the sake of a more ideal future.

Whichever solution is finally adopted, a large measure of goodwill and generosity will be required. It must come from the Jews in the first place, without condition of reciprocity; though, with that unquenchable hope which has kept alive their faith in the return to the land of Israel, and is to-day the theme of their national anthem, they may expect that the Arabs, achieving independence, will bear goodwill to their neighbours. Harold Nicolson wrote of "the immense pathos of that little country [Palestine], twisted and tortured into a thousand arid folds and containing the romance of half the world." The pathos has been illustrated during the last years.

being knowledge, it falls within the scope of reason, and therefore also within the scope of philosophy" (Preface). In order to reach this conclusion Professor de Burgh is concerned, on the one hand, to make good his leading contention that in religions, and most of all in Christian faith, knowledge of Divine Reality is revealed, and on the other, that an "enlarged view of reason" must be accepted, which "carries us back, behind the narrow channel of Cartesian rationalism, to the great traditions alike of Jewish-Christian and of Hellenic thought." This twofold revision of widely held views (p. 248) would open the way for the acceptance of a Theocentric Humanism, by which alone can the illusory promises of merely secular humanism be fulfilled. It would also prove an effective—and the only effective—remedy for the evils which afflict and threaten civilisation at the present time. This sustained argument is presented as the result of deep reflection and extensive study. It is conspicuously fair, and well reasoned. Not the least of its merits is that the writer's thought is conveyed to the reader in a literary style that is both lucid and lively, arresting an attention at the outset that is held fast to the end. The book makes a noble plea for the close alliance of Religion and Reason; and what is more, for the interfusion of both by their direction to the only adequate Object—God. Failing this highest object, treated as revealed in and authenticated by religious experience, both religion and philosophy must needs miss the mark.

The present reviewer is in complete general agreement with Professor de Burgh's main conclusions, and with most of the reasoning by which he reaches and justifies them. At only one point does he desire to offer a criticism. The author finds difficulty in ascribing such attributes as Wisdom, Power and Goodness to God, for if the analogies involved be pressed home, "either we fall into anthropomorphic mythology, construing God in the likeness of finite man; or, if we stress the *eminenter* and the difference in kind, the analogies lose their positive meaning and we are back once more in the negative theology." He suggests "that Love can be affirmed of God with positive meaning, without the qualification implied when we ascribe to Him" these other attributes (p. 125). In support of this suggestion an eloquent passage is quoted from a sermon by St. Bernard of Clairvaux. This

view seems questionable at every point. It is impossible altogether to avoid anthropomorphism in theology, since man's kinship with God supplies the only means of apprehending Him. Anthropomorphism must always be vigorously criticised in order to clear it from accretions that are clearly inapplicable to God. But it seems manifest that if God be so "altogether other" than man, that human qualities, at their best and most essential, can offer no trustworthy suggestions as to His nature, He must remain for ever unknowable by man. Even if it be granted that Love is an exception, the purposes and methods of Divine Love must then apparently be beyond human ken. Yet if it be true that God, of His Love, has come forth from His Eternal Blessedness to create order and eventually fulfil the universe, then may not men count upon discerning signs in it of His Wisdom, Power and Goodness, conceived as surpassing, yet resembling these qualities in men? And this without either falling into excessive anthropomorphism or destroying all positive significance by adding the qualifying *eminenter*. On this point the vehement protest of J. S. Mill against Dean Mansel may be recalled. Furthermore, is it so certain that Love, even taken in its full Christian meaning and held to include Spinoza's *Amor Dei intellectualis*, can be altogether exempted from the qualification with which all inferences from man to God must be accepted? Love does indeed supply the means of combining the eternal perfection and blessedness of God with the forthgoing of His creative and spiritual self-giving. Yet unless Love be the fount of a Wisdom, Righteousness and Goodness revealed in Divine fellowship with men, the conception of Love may sink, it appears to the present writer, in regard to God to the level of Bergson's *élan vital*, and in the case of man to merely emotional religion, against which Professor de Burgh so constantly and rightly protests.

This single criticism, however, even if well taken, in no way detracts from the great importance and value of a book which, in advancing impressively the great object that the author has in view, furnishes at every stage of the discussion illuminating guidance in respect of all the questions, both religious and philosophic, with which it deals. It demands the careful attention both of theologians and of philosophers.

J. S. L.

A new chapter may be added to the romance. But a mixture of realism and idealism, of generosity and faith, must precede. Then the dream may be realised of another English writer, George Eliot, who more than sixty years ago foretold: "a new Judea, poised between East and West, to be a covenant of reconciliation between the peoples."

NORMAN BENTWICH.

P.S.—During the first half of August, the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva and the Zionist Congress at Zurich were both examining the Palestine Report, but from very different angles. The League body brought to its work a sceptical and expert criticism, questioning whether Great Britain had been loyal to her mandatory obligations, or had not only failed to try, but tried to fail. The Jewish Congress approached its fateful task in an atmosphere of deep emotion. Could the delegates renounce a large part of the age-long hope? Could they, as the majority felt, on the other hand simply reject an opportunity of realising a home for hundreds of thousands of their brethren and the creation of a State of which they had dreamed? In neither place could the debate be conclusive. The Mandates Commission can only submit its cautious advice to the Council of the League: the Congress can only authorise its executive body to confer with the British Government. It is certain that Parliament, the League, and the Jewish people will not endorse rapidly the proposal of partition.

II

THE Royal Commission rests from its labours after a full year of strenuous inquiry culminating in the presentation of its unanimous report a few weeks ago. The report has come as a shock to all parties in the conflict. The British Government has declared its readiness to cut its losses in an inevitably losing game. The Jews, confronted with the whittling down of their Zionist ideal to a mere shadow of the Balfourian conception, have, after lively discussion at Zurich, realised the opportunity of bargaining for more crumbs of comfort than the Commission was prepared to offer them.

The Arabs, astonished at the concession of nine-tenths of their extremest demands, demand the whole pound of flesh promised by McMahon. It is a strange inversion of the Jew and Gentile contrast—but there it is. The Jews are prepared to entreat for a little mercy. The Arabs insist on a hundred per cent. or nothing. It may well be the latter if they remain unwise.

Almost without exception the friends of the Arabs counsel acceptance of the Commission's recommendations subject to the discussion of details. To their friends they turn a deaf ear, pleading religious scruples to the recognition of a Jewish State in Arab territory. But does their religion countenance acceptance of the suzerainty of an infidel (Christian) Power, to which in general the people of Palestine at any rate have no objection except on the issue of Jewish immigration? Certainly not. Did not the Caliph of Islam countenance Zionist colonisation in Palestine? Certainly. Do the Arabs demand the extrusion of the 400,000 Jews now in the country? No. What then do they want? They want to rule the whole of Palestine and are prepared to give all requisite guarantees for the security of the existing Jewish population. After all, the Jews have no serious ground for complaint in 'Iraq, in Syria, in Yaman, in Sa'udi Arabia. But are the Jews, is the League of Nations or its Mandatory, is America prepared to accept such a guarantee? Unfortunately, and for sound reasons, they are not. Palestine is different—since the days of Moses it has been the apple of discord between Jews and Gentiles.

For that reason alone it must be partitioned as proposed by the Commission or ruled by a neutral Power as it is at the present. The latter alternative can scarcely be other than permanent if it is forced on the League and its Mandatory by Arab intransigence. Partition can scarcely be other than temporary, for that alone can compel the two parties to an agreed settlement on the basis of Arab sovereignty and Jewish privilege. From such a settlement both parties have everything to gain. Only the Jews can profit by the continuance of the existing Mandatory administration.

But that is not the crucial issue. In suitable circumstances—such, for instance, as those envisaged in the Royal Commission's report—an Arab-Jew understanding is perfectly feasible. The Mufti himself has volunteered the suggestion. Nashashibi has gone even further in offering a substantial

THE SPANISH COCKPIT:

The literature of the civil war in Spain is already large, but most of it is too propagandist in tone to be of much use. Dr. Borkenau's *The Spanish Cockpit** ranks with Professor Allison Peers' *The Spanish Tragedy*, reviewed in these columns a year ago, as a cool and balanced survey of the boiling passions which are reducing the country to an ash-heap. The work is based on two visits to Republican Spain in the summer of 1936 and the opening of 1937. It is not the author's fault that he did not go further. "I tried to travel to the Franco camp too, but did not succeed. It is a new-fangled habit, growing with the gradual development of totalitarian states, to forbid entry not only to definite adversaries but to all observers of whose subservience one is not certain in advance." Yet though he only saw one side of the picture, he retains his complete independence. Neither Right nor Left, he declares, will be pleased with his description of the struggle nor with his forecast that neither will win. For though there may well be military victory, political victory for either combatant is not to be expected. Behind the contending armies stands the people, which is not to be identified with any of the factions which are tearing Spain to pieces. "Only the Spanish people, as distinct from its factions, parties, newspapers, and, last but not least, foreign allies and enemies, is inarticulate."

The volume opens with a historical retrospect which is also a sociological analysis. While most writers content themselves on such occasions with a record of events, Dr. Borkenau as a professional sociologist seeks to explain them. The age of enlightenment in Spain, he declares, was simply a delusion of a few men of goodwill, never a reality. This emphasis on the difference between Spain and most other countries of Western Europe runs through the book. The sharp severance between the masses and the classes manifested during the Napoleonic invasion remains unchanged, and the author finds little to praise in either of them. "In the upper stratum: decay, corruption, political incapacity, as well as complete lack of creative power. Below: fanaticism, capacity for self-sacrifice, spontaneity of action, but of action in a narrow, local, prejudiced sense, without constructive capacities in a wider scale. . . . The content of the political antagonisms has changed,

* *The Spanish Cockpit*. By Franz Borkenau. Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.

but the cleavage between the two strata has remained and broadened." Elsewhere, he reminds us, popular movements originated in the higher stratum of society and then permeated the masses. In Spain no movement in the higher classes ever deeply penetrated the masses. Hence the savagery of the conflict between Right and Left, between the Church and the possessing classes on the one hand and the manual workers on the other. The Monarchy is gone, but its old supporters remain strongly entrenched. The Church lost most of its landed property a century ago. "The Church to-day is not the largest landowner but the largest capitalist in Spain, particularly the Spanish Jesuits. That is part of the explanation of the financial sources of the Franco rising. . . . In the beginning of the nineteenth century it was all-powerful over the souls of Spaniards in general. Towards 1930 it had lost all real authority except in those districts where the clergy had kept close to the masses, Navarra and the Basque country." In a word there is no cement, political, economic or ecclesiastical, to hold the country together.

The author's diaries of his two journeys are a skilful blend of narrative and reflection. It is not his fault that the many groups who make up the Government forces should be rather puzzling; for the Spaniard is an individualist, and if he cannot find satisfaction in any existing party he proceeds to form a new one. We hear a good deal of the leading figures on the Government side, President Azaña, an academic Liberal, Caballero, the first Socialist Premier, Prieto, the strong man of the present Negrin Ministry. The latter, we are told, has never been in favour of "Bolshevism," or, in other words, of social revolution. "He is fully justified in appealing for the help of the democratic West in the attempt to carry through his policy." Even the Communists, according to the author, have ceased to be a revolutionary party and have become one of the mainstays of the anti-revolutionary forces. Who, then, has committed the wholesale massacres which have shocked the world as much as Franco's bloodbaths? Principally the Anarchists, the real party of revolution in Spain. Dr. Borkenau compares the massacres in Barcelona a year ago with the September massacres of 1792—the slaughter of prisoners at a moment of supreme danger before going to the front. They were carried out, we are told, with extreme ruthlessness and cruelty, not by the party organisations but by the masses

extension of the area open to Jewish colonisation and development. The real issue, however, is the old factor of Arab internal discord. The Amir 'Abdullah of Trans-Jordan is implicitly the chief prospective beneficiary from the Commission's proposals. It is obvious that the Mufti objects more strenuously to that than to the accommodation of the Jews. The Government of King Ghazi of 'Iraq has objected vehemently and actively, in a more legitimate manner, followed up its objection to the advancement of King Ghazi's uncle. Ibn Sa'ud himself, the only Arabian King that matters, can scarcely be expected to welcome the enthronement of another Sharifian prince, though he has confined his criticisms of the Commission's proposals to the usual diplomatic representations. And, finally, it is unreasonable to expect the Amir 'Abdullah, with the British Government's support of his candidature, to subordinate his ambitions to the popular will.

So all, except the Amir 'Abdullah, combine to resist the minimum concession to the Jews for no other reason than to prevent 'Abdullah's accession to a throne. That is a fact that cannot be ignored. It is an obstacle that can and must be circumvented. Either 'Abdullah must sacrifice his ambitions to the common weal or his opponents must acquiesce in his realisation of a dream, faithfully pursued for the past twenty years with a skill and tenacity that cannot be denied. It is surely a case for an Arab round-table conference to decide the future of Arab Palestine on the basis of the Partition recommended by the Commission.

Any agreed Arab proposals regarding the actual form of the future Arab State will command attention and respect at Whitehall and Geneva. Any suggestions they may have for the alteration or modification of the scheme envisaged by the Commission will, they may be sure, be considered with sympathy. It may be well, therefore, at this stage to consider the problem from these angles, as the Jews have already begun to do in respect of their State. The Jews, for instance, want the Negeb desert tract included within their frontiers and are far from relishing the prospect of the inclusion of 225,000 Arabs of Northern Palestine within their jurisdiction. Those same Arabs object to being left to Jewish rule—the suggestion of their voluntary or forced removal from their ancestral territories is too fantastic to require examination—and this problem, looming so large in the counsels of both parties, is

happily susceptible of a very simple solution. The Arab tract of Northern Palestine down to Acre on the coast can and should be reunited with Syria. It is surely out of the question to retain it in Arab Palestine by a corridor across Jewish territory. As for the Negeb the Jews cannot reasonably expect the concession of their demand by the Mandatory or by the League. The Negeb may well be the *quid pro quo* of the inevitable Arab-Jew understanding of the not distant future.

The Jews object to the retention of Mandatory control in the four towns of Haifa, Nazareth, Tiberias and Safad. Such control will cease to be necessary if the bulk of the Arab population is left to Syria as above suggested. It might further be agreed that the port of Acre should not be developed in rivalry to Haifa by the Syrian State. To balance this the development of the Tel-Aviv harbour should be banned in the interests of Jaffa. No Mandatory control of the latter would then be necessary, and the economic balance would be held evenly between Jews and Arabs, each having unrestricted sovereignty in one of the two principal ports of Palestine. The surrender of Mandatory control at Jaffa would do away altogether with the need of the proposed strategic corridor linking that port with Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Part of the territory so released could be made over to the Jewish State in compensation for the area excluded from it on the north. The rest would go to the Arab State. And there would remain but one problem to cause concern. For sentimental reasons Rehovoth and the neighbouring villages can scarcely be torn away from the main body of the Jewish State. A Jewish corridor linking the two across Arab territory is as undesirable as any other corridor in any part of the world. The exchange of the Rehovoth area for some tract contiguous to the frontier of the Jewish State would be the best solution if feasible. If not, this section of Jewish Palestine must remain detached from the main body of the State with sea communication in lieu of a land corridor.

The retention of Jerusalem and Bethlehem as a sacred enclave under neutral control is too essential a part of the Commission's proposals to be challenged. The British Government may, indeed, not care to assume responsibility for such a charge without the ample accommodation requisite for a considerable military force. In that case it would surely

in action themselves. We hear little of Russia in these pages. "The Russian help was by no means extensive. They sent a certain number of specialists, instruction officers, artillery officers, pilots and the like. They sent, moreover, a considerable amount of material, not only once but all through the critical time. The material is paid for of course." Of more importance was the International Brigade, formed of Communists from almost every country except Russia. Comparing the absence of Russian soldiers with Italy's tens of thousands, we realise which country is mainly responsible for turning the civil war into an international problem. Russian aid was only sent in the autumn of 1936, when Franco's armies, stiffened by Italians and Moors, were at the gates of Madrid.

The volume ends with a chapter of Conclusions which should be carefully read. The Franco régime, declares Dr. Borkenau, has little popular backing, and cannot, owing to its reactionary elements, give Spain the educational, agrarian and other reforms she needs. "It is simply a reactionary military dictatorship such as Spain has seen in dozens, with the difference that it is backed by foreign Powers. Without this backing, limited as it is, Franco would no longer exist." Yet the author views the Government side without enthusiasm. "The driving force behind the rising of the masses against Franco was not a specific desire to create some sort of modern order on the European pattern, either liberal, democratic-republican, or socialist. As in 1707 and 1808 they rose simply to ward off an attack." Spain, he believes, "will not become either genuinely Fascist, or genuinely Communist, or a parliamentary democratic republic. She will not be Europeanised. She will remain what she was, a country whose evolution has been arrested at the end of the seventeenth century, which has since displayed an enormous amount of resistance to foreign intrusion but not capacity for rejuvenation." The stagnation and inefficiency which annoy the foreigner are an essential part of the national life and character, too deeply rooted to be much changed by the cataclysm of the war or by the political colour of the victor. Yet the unprogressive Spaniard may perhaps have his silent revenge on the progressive European. "The one seems destined to last, un-moving, through the cataclysms of the surrounding world, and to outlive usurpers and foreign conquerors; the other, progressive, may progress towards his own destruction."

G. P. G.

THOMAS PLATTER'S TRAVELS IN ENGLAND, 1599.*

We have had to wait a long time for a translation of Thomas Platter's *Travels in England*, although the traveller himself is well known to students of Shakespeare on account of his mention of a performance of *Julius Cæsar* in 1599, which makes it clear that the play was acted two years earlier than had been generally supposed. The text of Platter's English journey was printed by Professor Hecht in 1929, and we now have an excellent translation by Mrs. Williams, who has made a special study of the literature of foreign travel in England. She has already placed English readers in her debt by her edition of the travels of Sophie von la Roche. If Platter lacks the sprightliness of the eighteenth-century traveller that is a matter of temperament and outlook, but Mrs. Williams has made him as attractive as possible, and he has something to tell us which is new and interesting.

Platter's visit extended from September 18th to October 20th, 1599. He had studied medicine at Montpellier, and no sooner had he landed at Dover than he was summoned to prescribe for the mayor, who was suffering from colic. Besides his fee, this worthy man gave Platter a letter of introduction to Lord Cobham, who procured his admission to the royal palaces, and later provided him with a passport sealed with the Queen's seal. The traveller had also a number of friends among the foreign residents in London, so that his opportunities for sightseeing were unusual.

Like other travellers, before and since, Platter revised his notes after his return and thought to improve his narrative by adding copious extracts from other writers. We have therefore a mass of miscellaneous and undigested information concerning the history of England and the English people which may have amused and instructed the family circle at Basel, but which the modern reader finds tedious. Professor Hecht and Mrs. Williams have shown much ingenuity in tracing these extracts to their sources, but they are of little importance. Luckily Platter was not only a copyist. He was interested in people and places, and, if his style is unattractive, he could observe and record.

* Rendered into English from the German, and with introductory matter, by Clare Williams. Cape. 10s. 6d. net.

not be asking too much of the League of Nations to suggest that an international Commission should be responsible for the administration of the enclave, whose neutrality in perpetuity might be guaranteed jointly by the League, the United States and all the Governments of Arabia. An international police force to maintain peace therein would not be unprecedented in a world that knows Shanghai and Tangier. This would certainly be the solution least likely to give rise to future trouble. And the co-operation of the Arab Kings would remove the one danger always inherent in the actual situation of Jerusalem.

There remains only the minor question of 'Aqaba, where the Royal Commission proposes the retention of Mandatory control. It is hard to see any reason for such a proposal—a proposal inconsistent with the admirable sentiments expressed in a recent speech of Mr. Eden, who deprecated the establishment of a favoured position on the eastern coast of the Red Sea by any Great Power including Great Britain. The 'Aqaba district belongs as of right to, and has consistently been claimed by, Sa'udi Arabia. To Sa'udi Arabia it should certainly be restored. If Great Britain cannot bring herself to rectify that little injustice of twelve years ago, 'Aqaba should certainly be left to Arab sovereignty in the new Palestine.

It will be seen from these suggestions that it will not be a matter of extreme difficulty to put the finishing touches on the necessarily rough sketch of Partition presented by the Royal Commission. If permanent peace in Palestine is the sole objective of all concerned, the British Government should have no qualms in relinquishing the doubtful strategic advantages of a truncated Mandate. On the other hand the Jews will get a less unwieldy State than that actually proposed by the Commission, while the Arab area will be substantially enlarged. Indeed the only serious departure from the scheme adumbrated by the Commission is the suggestion of League administration of the Holy Cities in lieu of a British Mandate.

The Jerusalem arrangement cannot be tampered with. Jerusalem cannot be dismembered. So the Jewish settlement cannot be included in the Jewish State. Apart from that the Jews will have no ground for discontentment with one exception. They want the Negeb, and the Negeb is their

opportunity. Only from the Arabs can they get it. And they must pay for it—not in money, but in surrender of a sentimental dream. If they would have opportunity for expansion and development, they must relinquish the sovereignty they are offered in a limited area. The Arabs are ready to meet them. They could gain access not only to the whole of Palestine but to Trans-Jordan as well. Their co-operation in the development of derelict territories would be welcomed. But they must come as guests. For the Jews then it is a question of sentiment against practical considerations.

And what of the Arabs? Hitherto they have shewn no sign of willingness to consider the great advantages offered by Partition. To them the creation of a Jewish State in a tiny fraction of Palestine seems infinitely worse than the abandonment of the whole country to foreign domination. Let them consider the matter well. They demand the recognition of unrestricted Arab sovereignty over the whole of Palestine and the subordination of the Jews to Arab rule. Neither Great Britain nor America nor the League of Nations will or can accede to that demand. And the Jews now in Palestine cannot be expelled from the country by the Powers that encouraged them to go there. Some compromise is clearly necessary and inevitable. A compromise has actually been proposed by the Mandatory Power. The Arabs can have four-fifths of Palestine for themselves in full sovereignty. The Jews will be segregated in the remaining fifth. As the Commission aptly says, half a loaf is better than no bread.

But the matter does not end there. Partition is only the beginning of a new era, not the end. In their restricted space the Jews cannot develop and expand in the manner envisaged by Zionist ideals. They will be forced to negotiate with the Arabs for more elbow room. And the Arabs can negotiate with them as free men on equal terms. They will have unrestricted control of the valuable asset of vacant land. They can barter it against the sovereignty now left to the Jews. But, if they leave that asset in the hands of the Mandatory, the Jews—whatever limits may be imposed on their immigration—will some day inevitably become the majority of the population of Palestine. And then it will be too late for the Arabs to reconsider the obvious advantages to them of the Partition proposals made by the Royal Commission.

H. ST. J. B. PHILBY.

As a result we have glimpses of the Thames boatmen with their trim, upholstered wherries. We see the citizens in the streets and taverns, at the Globe Theatre (with a note of the prices paid for seats at the playhouses), and at the Curtain in Bishopsgate Street. It is clear that he enjoyed himself. There was a dinner with the Mayor, where the ladies received him with kisses, and the servers and carvers lavished food and drink upon him from noon until late afternoon. He saw the lions in the Tower, as well as a tiger, a wolf and a porcupine, and in a house on London Bridge he beheld a large live camel. Mr. (afterwards Sir Walter) Cope received him in his fine house in the City and showed him his closet of rareties, and at Nonsuch and Richmond he saw the Queen herself beautifully attired and made up to look like a girl of twenty. He has much to say about drink and particularly about tobacco, but did this young physician really believe that it was tobacco and not Canary wine which made the Londoners first merry and then drowsy, or that when a pipe-smoker died his veins were covered with soot like a chimney? I should also like some confirmation of the statement that outside St. Paul's, on a conduit, was a vessel left there for a purpose both convenient and necessary, but not usually associated with a place of worship.

Platter gives a long inventory of the strange things preserved in Cope's house, one of the collections which Hakluyt "was, as it were, ravished in beholding." Platter tells us that the house stood in the Snecgas, which cannot be identified, although Snow Hill has been suggested—I think rightly. Those of us who have worked on Platter's manuscript know how wayward he could be in the transcription of unfamiliar names, and Snecgas may well be a mistranscription for Snee (Schnee) gasse, or Snow Alley.

Mrs. Williams gives some interesting details about the travels in France and the studies in Montpellier of Thomas and his elder brother Felix. Felix became a noted man, and his writings on medical subjects, as transmitted by Robert Burton, still serve to instruct and amuse readers of *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. It is a pity that Felix Platter did not make an English journey.

MALCOLM LETTS.

NATIONALISM AND POLICY.

Dr. Friedrich Hertz is well known as an expert on all questions of race and nationality. His book on *Race and Civilisation* was a remarkable contribution to the history and psychology of racial doctrines from the impartial standpoint of pure research. The author has done important political work in the Austrian civil service and was Professor of Sociology at Halle when the Nazi revolution occurred. Thus he combines an unusual amount of practical experience and scientific knowledge. Professor Hertz, being of Jewish origin and social-democratic convictions, proved *persona ingrata* to the present régime in Germany. He returned to his native Austria, and devoted himself to a comprehensive study of national and international ideas. The first of a series of volumes has just been published.* The author does not set out to give a history of pre-war foreign policy. He aims at an understanding and interpretation of spiritual types and individualities. Behind the visible activities of diplomats there is in modern Europe a remarkable force at work. Many people superficially call it public opinion. It is something much more profound: the tradition of the state, the collective spirit of the country, the national ideology as it is believed in by its leading classes. The sources of this anonymous power are to be found, apart from the usual historical documents, in official propaganda, in newspapers, in programmes of parties and unions, in the pamphlets of publicists and the books of philosophers. Facts and actions, plans of statesmen, discussions in parliaments are comparatively concrete and simple; yet sentiments, feelings, creeds, dreams, to-day move the souls of groups and classes in quite another degree. They are vague, are like clouds veiling the sharp lines of the mountains, but the destiny of millions of people now depends on these psychological factors.

After two introductory chapters on certain aspects of the origins of the world war, the author deals with the origin of the "*Staatsgeist*" in England, Austria, Prussia, Russia. A special chapter on Bismarck follows, for his political work opens a new historical period in the development of nationalism. The second part of the book resumes the description of

* Friedrich Hertz, *Nationalgeist und Politik, Beiträge zur Erforschung der tieferen Ursachen des Weltkrieges. Erster Band: Staatstradition und Nationalismus*, Europa Verlag, Zürich, 1937.

JAPAN RIDES FOR A FALL.

OUTSIDE the Yamen of the Provincial Governor of Suiyuan there stands a stone lion. Nothing unusual in that. Snarling stone lions guard many gates across China ; often they are so covered in dust that the snarl seems a comical grin. But on the pedestal of this lion up in Inner Mongolia four characters have been carved : "Wake up, sleepy lion!" Past the lion, across a great courtyard, in a small room in the heart of the Yamen, I was interviewing the Chinese Commander-in-Chief of the Suiyuan campaign. He had come from the front, and was dressed like his soldiers. "Two days ago our troops captured Pailingmiao," he told me. "It was a sharp engagement but the enemy is routed." Chinese soldiers had beaten Mongols officered by Japanese and using Japanese guns and aeroplanes.

The scene changes. I am in another Yamen 300 miles from the first, far across the Great Wall. This headquarters is more elaborate and lies far from the fighting line, deep within the double walls of the old city of Taiyuan. The man before me is one of the most important war-lords in China, Marshal Yen Hsi-shan, Commissioner of Shansi and Suiyuan. We have been talking a long time and come at last to the main point, the new Japanese aggression up in Inner Mongolia. Marshal Yen speaks quietly : "Not only will China cede no more territory ; she must regain her lost provinces, and by her own power. That is how the nation feels to-day, and the nation is right."

Again the scene changes and again I have travelled hundreds of miles, through the bare dusty lands of Western China where camel trains pad down the dried riverbeds, and no white men are seen. I have crossed the Yellow River, am in another walled city, and before me is another war-lord. He is round-faced and bullet-headed, younger than the other two. He seems keyed up and excited. Suddenly he leans forward and taps me upon the knee. "Listen," he says. "There have been many examples in history of a strong power attacking a weaker one, seizing some territory and holding it. If this was the case with Manchuria it would be bad enough. But it isn't that way." He ticked off on his fingers the encroachments of the Japanese Army ; first Manchuria, then Jehol, then Chahar ; penetration into North China ; penetration into Fukien ; now the attack on Suiyuan.

"Where is it going to stop ?" asked the young man. "Why should it stop at all, unless we ourselves cry a halt ? Are we to wait until they are on the Yangtze ? We did not want to fight Japan or anyone else, but they give us no alternative." His voice sank and he leaned back in his chair, but his eyes bored as keenly as ever. "There is a new China to-day. The world may not believe it yet. They will see. Young China demands that we *shall* resist the invader. Young China is right."

Chang Hsueh-liang marched out of my bedroom in Sian, to be swallowed up among the crowd of secret police, war-lords and bodyguards who then swarmed in the hotel. Chang marched to his destiny. Forty-eight hours later this "Young Marshal" had arrested the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On the outcome of that incident has turned the history of the Orient. For Chiang Kai-shek was considered "pro-Japanese." At Sian he was put on the spot by his subordinate officers and confronted with the people's demand for a firmer resistance.

One more interview I will quote, this time from the far-away Province of Kwangsi, on the borders of French Indo-China. I am in a little white tropical city, miles beyond any railhead. No fur caps to be seen here, cotton uniforms and conical straw hats for the soldiers ; naked men on the junks on the great river ; bamboo-hidden villages instead of mud-walled towns, a warm sun in mid-winter. Marshal Li Chung-yen is small and fiery ; he talks much but is friendly. His partner, Marshal Pai Ching-hsi, is tall and morose. Six months before I met them they had revolted against Nanking, again on the Japanese question. The Kwangsi leaders demanded war on Japan ; Chiang Kai-shek attacked them instead. Li's eyes glinted as he told me his version of events which had puzzled the world.

"Here in Kwangsi we were vastly outnumbered when the Central Government surrounded our frontiers. We resisted and the would-be invader withdrew. And that," he said fiercely, "is the attitude which I want the Central Government itself to adopt towards Japan." He paused a moment, then snapped out again : "An invaded country cannot afford to bargain. It must defend itself. The more China resists the Japanese, the less will her territory be encroached upon, and the less, therefore, will be the threat to world peace. It is by weak-kneed concessions to bluff that peace is really endangered."

international ideology as it has been influenced by Bismarck's actions. There are special chapters on Alsace-Lorraine and the Oriental question. British Imperialism, French, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and German nationalism are then discussed, each in its own chapter. The architecture of the book is remarkable. By a process of suggestion the reader becomes the witness of the deepening and sharpening of international problems. Willy-nilly he takes part in a tragic process. Princes have built up states, classes have produced mass movements and mass feelings. Its Majesty the Mass has become the modern ruler and sovereign; the instincts, passions, needs of masses are sweeping away all the wisdom, reason and good intention of the past.

There is little occasion to criticise the details of a book, which, if continued in the spirit in which it has been conceived, promises to become the standard work on nationalism. It is based on an admirable knowledge of international history and sociology, it is written in the stimulating style of a convinced and faithful fighter, and it deals with an enormous quantity of problems fairly and wisely. The author probably feels his spiritual isolation. If so, he may be comforted by the fact that there is and will remain a small congregation of men of goodwill who have been at work, incessantly and indefatigably, for centuries past and centuries to come. Their task is to forge the tools of idealism, that is of the new humanism as it is admirably interpreted in this book—as the real source of the two great movements "*Aufklärung*" and "*Romantik*," which are only two sides of one great spiritual Renaissance. If the creed of racial prejudice, economic brutality and blind militarism is strong enough to excite millions of peaceful people and to push them into unspeakable horrors, should not our humanitarian conviction defy the challenge and, by the double strength of right and kindness, prepare for mankind the new conditions of a dignified life?

Let me raise a few special points. The French philosopher Georges Sorel should not be underrated. He is the acknowledged father of Fascist theories, in any case a thinker of reckless originality. Was the exchange of letters between Napoleon III, Francis Joseph and Victor Emmanuel in 1869-70 not a considerable substitute for the abortive Triple Alliance, and were the military conversations and visits not an important supplement? The indulgent Peace of Prague in

1866 in no way prevented Francis Joseph from thoughts of revenge; he only dropped the idea in consequence of the German military triumphs in 1870. As to Frederick the Great, the late Werner Hegemann should have been quoted and some interpretation given of the great excitement amongst experts and laymen. The separation of Russia's western provinces during the Crimean War was not engineered by irresponsible brains, but was included in the English political programme as officially communicated in Lord Clarendon's speech on February 17th, 1854.

The climax of Dr. Hertz's book is formed by the two chapters on Austria, especially the second. This presentation of a lost cause is written with the heart's blood of a good Austrian whose innumerable disappointments could not beget any bitterness. Never before, so far as I know, has the lamentable fact been more sharply analysed that the unfortunate Germans of Austria themselves ruined the old Monarchy by their stubbornness. Therefore Palacky, in 1872, recalled his famous saying of 1848, that Austria would have to be invented if she did not exist. The reason was his despair at the unfair attitude of the German Bohemians. All those deadly racial enemies in Bohemia were close cousins to one another, by blood and education! Of special value are the suggestions as to the consequences of Austrian home affairs on foreign policy. The clumsy organisation of the Diets in the Crown Lands weakened Maria Theresa's fight against Frederick of Prussia. Later on the Austrian generals disliked each concession to democratic and national principles for fear of a possible war with Prussia. The Slavs in Austria had to be flattered and spoiled by reason of their Russian sympathies, the Germans could be ill-treated since the German Empire very wisely did not take any active interest in their affairs.

One last word on militarism. The Prussian mode seems to have been unique in modern history as a principle of civil affairs. The author gives many interesting examples. Wellington, the Iron Duke, became a most peaceful Prime Minister. The jealousy of the civil leaders of the Third French Republic did not admit of any military ambitions. Neither MacMahon nor Boulanger nor any later French general dared to attack the French constitution in the style of the *Kapp-Putsch*. On the other hand the *Action Française* first developed and

And so it went on, throughout the three months that I spent wandering the interior of China; demonstrations by school children; demands by the soldiers; students in the freezing north giving up meals for a day and heated class-rooms for a week—in order to send the money to the One Big Cause. I ask a question about the political situation and am dragged across the road by my arm and planted before an enormous painting on the wall of a Marchants Guildhouse. The painting shows a map of China with arrows indicating where the Japanese are in control. Manchuria is coloured black and above it grins the Sun flag of Japan. On the black background Japanese troops are depicted bayoneting Chinese farmers. More Japanese troops stream through the Great Wall, which zigzags across the painting. But down in the South is a picture of China resurgent, armed and mounted, riding to resist the invader. Again I am jogging in my ricksha through the Legation quarter in Peking. We are passing the Japanese barracks when suddenly Ssu, the ricksha boy, drops the shafts on the ground, almost spilling me out. With a face flushed with anger he turns to me, "You like Japanee, sir? You likee?"

Never has a people made themselves more universally detested than the Japanese have made themselves on the mainland of Asia. And can one wonder? These people, who can be so charming at home, behaved abroad as the Italians behaved in Ethiopia or as their Nazi friends treat their own countrymen. Terror is their weapon and savage oppression their interpretation of the "kingly way." Murder, rape and robbery go on wholesale, not merely all over Manchuria but in North China as well, where the Japanese have established their own hired Chinese puppets in control of the Provincial administration.

Not content with having trebled the traffic in narcotics and ruined the finances of China by their smuggling, they draft labourers wholesale to help build their own "national line of defence" against the Chinese on Chinese soil. Individual atrocities are literally without number. I myself saw men beaten on railway platforms; I spoke with many who had seen murders and some who had themselves experienced torture. In Jehol two Chinese coolies inadvertently crossed the corner of a field which the Japanese had seized for an aerodrome. They were then and there buried alive. In

Northern Manchuria an old woman and a child were digging dandelions for food near a Japanese fort. They were shot down by the sentry on the wall. In Tientsin, which is already virtually a Japanese city, over 300 bodies were recently discovered within two days, floating in the river near the city. They were young coolies who had been used to dig secret fortifications, and, like the slaves of old, had then been drowned to prevent them talking. It is no exaggeration to say that the West would not credit half the things which the Chinese to-day are experiencing under the Japanese.

It has had its effect. For the first time in Chinese history the illiterate masses have combined with the "intellectuals" to stage a revolt. From all over China comes the cry: "Down with the traitors. Forward against the devils from the Eastern sea." And by "traitors" they mean not only Chinese who have been bought outright by the Japanese, but all those in Nanking who are "pussyfooting."

Nor are the masses of China remaining illiterate. In the past few years there has come a new alphabet, reduced to a more normal number of characters. Millions have already learnt to read by it. Children teach their elders, one village educates the next one. The avidity for education can be likened only to what happened in Russia after the Revolution. That is why what is happening in China to-day is so fundamental. Four hundred and fifty million people are, for the first time, taking a voice in the control of their destinies. In Shanghai I have seen a crowd of ricksha coolies milling round a class-room door, rushing in when it opened, scrambling to miss not one moment of their short lesson-time. They never wished to read before. They do not want to learn now in order to read poetry. They want to read in order to learn better how to kick out the Japanese.

Japan has feared only one thing in China. Not Chiang Kai-shek or the Army or the League of Nations. They knew they could buy war-lords, bamboozle the Great Powers and defeat the Chinese Army with their machines. But Japan has feared a revolutionary movement among China's millions; for such a movement must necessarily be, above all, anti-Japanese. That movement they have created, and it alters the whole balance of forces against them.

Eighteen months ago China was on the verge of civil war. To-day she is more united for one thing than at any time in

used methods of political terrorism which were adopted later in many other European countries. We hope that this book will be continued in due time, for it illumines a large scientific field and may influence policy in a favourable sense. A condensed English version is very desirable.

VEIT VALENTIN.

COLLECTIVE INSECURITY.

*Collective Insecurity** is an important book on the League and peace by Mrs. H. M. Swanwick, who enjoys a close knowledge of foreign affairs and has twice served on the British delegation at Geneva. She thus writes with an authority which entitles this book to respect and consideration. The argument is presented with lucidity and much bitterness and is a remarkable piece of destructive criticism. Her conception of the League as a mere conciliatory organ undoubtedly represents a large body of opinion, while her historical conclusions will draw a still wider assent.

This book is at once an attack upon the character of the Covenant and the post-war policy of League members. It was impossible, she argues, to expect a system, wilfully excluding Germany and endowed with coercive powers, to be managed altruistically by nations imbued with every motive of self-interest. She roundly condemns, as indicating the predatory spirit of the Allies, the Secret Treaties and also, without difficulty, the vindictive provisions of Versailles. The League was undermined from its foundation by its association with the Peace Treaties and their ruthless administration. In the course of a historical sketch Mrs. Swanwick deplores the "most unfortunate diplomacy" headed by France which refused to Germany so long those just terms which it was later forced to concede. She cites, for example, the Ruhr occupation, the long-drawn struggle over Reparations and particularly the failure to disarm. "By the refusal of generosity, force has had a tremendous impetus." Germany has been long-suffering in her patience, and, in spite of ultimate unilateral action, "is the only Great Power who has not broken the peace anywhere." That the membership of the League Powers is tainted with hypocrisy and subject to their

* *Collective Insecurity*. By H. M. Swanwick. Jonathan Cape. 8s. 6d. net.

selfish aims is evident from the Manchurian campaign of 1931 and the more recent Italian conquest of Abyssinia. In these circumstances, sanctions cannot be relied upon to emanate from detached and impartial intervention. "They are fundamentally unworkable according to their professed intentions, but capable of being twisted to sinister purposes." Mrs. Swanwick sees the twist in regional pacts which are in fact a reversion to the old system of alliances, exemplified in the Franco-Russian Pact. Though in theory open to all, such agreements, concluded "secretly and between selected partners" and buttressed by joint military plans, are at once suspect to those outside. The author has little less aversion to the idea of an international force, which is quite impracticable and bears no real analogy to a municipal police force. Her argument in this respect is highly superficial but at least expresses her basic view that force whatever its origin can have no beneficial function.

"Peace is a way of life. A rational conduct of international relations would result in peace." This view is apparently based upon the assumption that "all nations are composed of people who are amenable to considerate treatment." Unfortunately nations and their leaders are no more rational than private individuals, as a great part of this book so vigorously points out. While a policy of sympathy and generosity may well improve the chances of permanent conciliation, it cannot of itself ensure peace. If Mrs. Swanwick is confident of peace through rational diplomacy, she yet urges the organisation of collective neutrality to "promote the early end" of any war that might arise. She envisages, in short, a system of non-intervention and boycott supervised by the League which would offer continuous mediation and disseminate the truth about the conflict. Whatever the circumstances, foreign munitions would be withheld from all belligerents, because, however unjust, the only alternative would be the graver evil of declaring the aggressor. Were Mrs. Swanwick's system capable of insulating war, it would but encourage all the lowest and aggressive instincts of nations and place power diplomacy on a permanent footing. The author refers next to organised passive resistance as the simplest and most drastic method of stopping war. Whatever the strength of absolute pacifism in this country, she has no belief in any immediate response from abroad.

her history. The Japanese militarists see history repeating itself. In 1931 they could have taken Siberia from Russia. They took Manchuria instead, and now Siberia cannot be taken. The Far Eastern Red Army has become too strong. The Japanese fear the same thing will happen in North China, if the Tokyo industrialists have their way and "peaceful penetration" continues. They have therefore staged an "incident," on the strength of which they intend to force a show down and, they hope, defeat China before unification makes it altogether impossible. General Sung Cheh-yuan, Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, has seen this coming. Although Sung has gone a long way to meet Japanese wishes, he would not repeat, on his own territory, the surrender of Manchuria. He has been away from his post for some time, those he has left behind will surrender, but China will fight.

The outcome is by no means certain victory for Japan. Numerically the Chinese are far stronger. They have some 2,500,000 men under arms, and, though many of them are inadequately trained and poorly armed, a large number are as well equipped as the Japanese. As mercenaries the Chinese make poor fighting material, but, roused as they are to-day to an unprecedented fervour of patriotism, most observers believe they will give a good account of themselves. Their weakness is the irregular quality of their air force and the fact that they lack aeroplane factories. As mechanics and pilots the Chinese are better than the Japanese. Leaving aside the disadvantages of fighting in a thickly populated and hostile country, the position of the invaders is not encouraging. Japan has a standing army of seventeen divisions, approximately 250,000 men. Of these more than half are already on service abroad; the new campaign will mean that hundreds of thousands of reservists will have to be called to the colours in order to maintain the long-drawn lines of communication. Those lines of communication themselves lie across hostile country. The Japanese have been in Korea for thirty years, but the Koreans hate them and only wait for a favourable opportunity to revolt. They have been in Manchuria six years and still have on their hands a perennial war there.

When I crossed the border recently from Korea to Manchuria, every spare corner of the train was filled, at the frontier station of Antung, with Japanese soldiers. They were

the armed patrol, necessary to protect even this main-line railway from "bandits." Since Japan took Manchuria the country has cost the Japanese taxpayer at least 300 million gold dollars, some 5,000 Japanese lives, and over 200,000 evacuated for wounds and sickness. But it will not take many months of fighting in North China before this is doubled. The Japanese have succeeded in convincing the world that all they have against them in Manchuria are "bandits," and that these "gangs" are being liquidated. On the spot they are not quite so naïve. They told me that if I went to one place I would do well to "ride in the armoured car with the machine-guns."

The term "bandit" in the Far East is elastic. In Manchuria it is used to describe a scattered but organised force of nearly 150,000 men. Some of these troops are or have been real bandits, others are dispossessed farmers, both Chinese and Koreans, remnants of old armies, political refugees, deserters from the "Manchukuoan" Army, and, although the Japanese strenuously deny it, even deserters from their own Army who have turned "anti-Imperialist." This mixed but cohesive force operates with the assistance of the Manchurian peasantry. They prove a formidable enemy and have often broken regular detachments sent against them, for they employ guerilla tactics and the Japanese are routine fighters and hate all surprises. These North-Eastern Anti-Japanese Allied Armies, as they call themselves, have been operating to hamper the Japanese occupation. If fighting breaks out on a large scale in North China, the Japanese will require enormously increased forces if they wish to hold Manchuria.

And all this costs money. A few years ago Japan possessed a financial genius in her 80-year-old Takahashi. Takahashi set 10 billion yen as the danger line of debt for the country. If this was exceeded inflation would follow. Takahashi was murdered by the military and to-day the Exchequer has exceeded his limit by over 135 million yen. Japan's total indebtedness is now double that of five years ago, and well over 50 per cent. of the budget is devoted to the fighting services. There are many competent observers in the Far East who have said for two years that, whatever the result in the technical sense, any war in which Japan was involved would break her financial back.

But even this is not the worst in the Japanese house of

Mrs. Swanwick's constructive suggestions are not convincing because they fail to recognise that the rule of law in world, as in municipal, affairs must rest ultimately upon compulsion. Without it, law fails in a primary function of its being, to secure conformity with its rules. There is no short cut to lasting peace, but only by the long and often treacherous path towards creating just law and impartial force.

DESIGN AND MEDIEVAL ARCHITECTURE.*

Dr. Rosenau's study has an interest and importance that are by no means to be measured by the size or price of this small but attractive booklet. In three chapters she discusses with freshness and learning a number of obscure but perennially fascinating problems. She shows how strict orientation came to be established in the thirteenth century as characteristic of ecclesiastical architecture as a result of artistic impulse and liturgical necessity, after a long period in which the tradition of pagan temples, the planning of villas and *thermæ*, and the usages of synagogue and mosque were all potent, though sometimes conflicting, influences. With the coming of the Renaissance, however, the principle is relaxed, and altars may be placed in the west, or indeed at any point of the compass. The chapter on Planning and Architectural Design makes it clear that measured plans were used by the Egyptians and in classical times, while the technique of drafting was still known at the beginning of the Middle Ages; during the Romanesque Period plans, in the technical sense, no longer existed, but definite planning returned with the development of Gothic building, while the discovery of perspective, with its feeling for unity, marks the beginning of the Renaissance. The concluding chapter deals with the Architect and Architecture. The impression of harmony created by the great Gothic buildings is explained as the result of an alteration in the standard of proportion: the earlier norm was that of man's measurements, the later one was architectural, a change from absolute to relative proportion. The treatment throughout is refreshingly original: Dr. Rosenau's conclusions may not always be accepted

* By Helen Rosenau. Batsford. 2s. 6d.

without reservation, but the book is thoughtful and stimulating and will give pleasure both to the antiquary and the tourist. There are six plates of illustrations, some of which will probably be new to the great majority of English readers other than professional students of art and architecture.

J. F. N.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Men and Things,* by J. A. Spender, contains both new and old material. Among the new is a series of personal sketches which will be read with delight. The study of Grey, a friend from Oxford days, is written with the warmth which we expect. His selfless simplicity is emphasised and his steadiness of policy is approved. "He had one predominant idea throughout—that to let Germany conquer France would be disastrous for Europe and eventually for the British Empire." Incidentally it is interesting to learn that, contrary to the general belief, his French was quite fluent and intelligible, though his genders and tenses were not impeccable. The portrait of Haldane in his library in old age—mellow, kindly, wise—is charming. "No trouble was too great for him when it was a question of helping a friend." Everybody knows something of Grey and Haldane, but how many of us realise what an important person was Lord Knollys, King Edward's principal Private Secretary? Lord Esher was a more familiar figure, and his Journals and Correspondence have been published by his son. But his work was largely behind the scenes, and Mr. Spender's tribute is a welcome addition to our knowledge. Sir Alfred Keogh, Director of the Army Medical Service in the World War, is praised for preventing the casualties from being even more terrible than they were. Equally laudatory is the account of Myron Herrick, American Ambassador in Paris when the war broke out. In Part II the author collects some of his reflections on politics and history. The veteran Liberal publicist has moved with the times, but he cannot swallow all the shibboleths of the young Left wing intellectuals—their indifference to the cruelties of the Russian Government, their disparagement of civil and political liberty, their crude assertion that wars are made by capitalism and capitalists. A lecture recently delivered at Oxford on the Origins of the War is an excellent summary of a vast and complicated subject. Parts III and IV contain travel pictures from many fields and a few miscellaneous sketches grouped under the heading Side Issues. Mr. Spender has lived so long, seen so much, and known so many makers of history that it is always a pleasure to listen when he unlocks the storehouse of his mind and memory.

* Cassell. 10s. 6d.

cards. Despite the Police terror and such devices as the "Bureau for Suppression of Dangerous Thought," open discontent with the régime is growing apace in Japan. I found signs of it in the poverty-stricken rural villages and amongst the fisher folk, as well as in the great cities. Not for many years has the military clique been so unpopular, and hence come their repeated attempts to dispose of such semblance of "democracy" as exists in the country. Japanese agriculture is conducted chiefly by a smallholder peasant class. The total agricultural production is 2,100 million yen annually, and this production carries a burden of debt amounting to 7,000 million yen. It is little wonder that the Japanese farmer has to sell his daughters to the brothel keepers. Behind the polished façade of Japan's feudal industrial system the situation is little better. With commodity prices rising steadily (they are already 25 per cent. higher than last year), labour troubles have become too widespread to be hidden. During 1936 there were 2,000 cases of labour strikes and disputes, and the demand for a political Popular Front has begun to rise. Recently the railway and street car operators of Tokyo and Kobe went out on strike with the slogan: "If our wages are not raised we can but wait for the arrival of the god of death." That, indeed, is all that awaits the peoples of both Japan and China from the Japanese military.

HARRISON BROWN.

THE WAR IN SPAIN.

A YEAR ago, in August and September 1936, it seemed as if the insurgent forces might quickly overrun the whole of Spain. The military revolt, crushed almost miraculously in Barcelona, Madrid and other towns of eastern Spain, had nevertheless gained sufficient strength in the north and south-west to appear an almost irresistible force. Advancing from the south and the north the fall of Madrid in the autumn seemed inevitable. In the maps published on July 18th of this year, the insurgents can show large gains in territory in the last year, but nine-tenths of those gains were made in the first few months, Malaga and Bilbao being their only notable achievements, so far, in 1937.

To-day the map shows a "front" which, including that of the provinces along the Biscay coast still held by the Government after the fall of Bilbao, extends to something like 1,200 miles. Of course, not a "front" as we knew it in the Great War, but nevertheless sufficiently defined for the changing hands of villages to be an event of importance. On both sides efficiency in man power and equipment has increased, so have the number of men under arms and the quantity of war material available. Moreover, except where special circumstances prevail, the war seems to have reached the stage where the defence is more powerful than the attack. The insurgents still hold out, almost surrounded for months, in the University City. Their capture of Malaga in the spring was not followed up by their expected drive along the Mediterranean coast, albeit the retreat from Malaga by the Government forces was a rout. Nor were the Government able to take full advantage of the crushing defeat of the Italians on the Guadalajara. The war drags on; the outcome is still uncertain, and it may be, as in the Great War, that the military factor will not be decisive. But in the meantime, before considering other factors, let us examine more closely the military situation.

The insurgents started of course with an immense technical superiority. This superiority has been maintained, in quantity of material if not always in quality. The following quotation from the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of April 22nd with

Professor W. C. Abbott has recently published the first volume of his huge work on *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell** which aims at a complete collection of all known and accessible material. In addition to the Carlyle-Lomas collection, Professor Abbott has gathered together some seven hundred more documents of which one hundred and fifty have not been published hitherto. His method is to incorporate all these documents within an interpretative narrative. The result is a lengthy and strictly judicial account, but not of course a balanced biography. Professor Abbott does not claim that this body of material can greatly alter our general knowledge of Cromwell, established by the work of Firth and Gardiner, but that with its infinite details it "may provide a truer picture of the man himself." The material contained in this volume which covers the period up to the execution of Charles I is not of particular value except for a number of hitherto unused documents which throw light on Cromwell's parliamentary activities. Professor Abbott points to the difficulty of reconstructing during these earlier years Cromwell's inner thoughts, ambitions and plans. "His letters give only the barest suggestion of what we want to know, his speeches little more." The importance of this work is likely to be most apparent in the later volumes, particularly in regard to Cromwell's foreign policy. Professor Abbott is assembling for the first time a "reasonably complete" collection of diplomatic despatches and letters and other documents during the Protectorate "from which it is possible to draw a more comprehensive picture of Cromwellian policy than has hitherto been the case."

* *The Empire Yesterday and To-day*† is a useful elementary sketch by Commander Stephen King-Hall, who has grouped together lucidly a large quantity of material within short compass. The first half contains a historical summary outlining the early colonial system, the great expansion in the nineteenth century and the emergence of the self-governing commonwealth culminating in the Statute of Westminster of 1931. In the rest of the volume the author describes the characteristics and forms of government of the constituent parts of the Empire and Commonwealth and the constitutional framework and ideas which bind the whole. While in general this is a reliable book, there are, inevitably, expressions of opinion and emphasis open to question, and some errors of fact. The Dindings are no longer part of the Straits Settlements but belong to the Federated Malay State of Perak. Burma strictly is not governed by the Secretary for India, but by a separate Secretary for Burma; and Great Britain is no longer bound under the Locarno Treaty to assist Germany in the event of French aggression. Though the book has several maps, there are no index and no bibliography.

* Harvard University Press; published outside U.S.A. by Oxford University Press. 21s. net.

† Oxford University Press. 2s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

DECEMBER 1937.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

IN attempting to write on the international situation I feel that I cannot do better than hang what I have to say on some points made by Sir Norman Angell in the last issue of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW. "Can aggressor States be checked?" This article deals so well with the really fundamental point of the situation as I at present see it that I am bound to come to the conclusions reached by Sir Norman. But my route may be a little different, and I shall try to relate them even more closely than he does to recent events. He began by reminding his readers that Mr. Lloyd George answers the question whether the Great War could have been prevented by saying that it could if Germany had known beforehand that she would have to face the forces which finally entered the field against her. This is perfectly true if we realise the meaning of the word "finally" as including the United States, for of course Germany did not know in 1914 that she would succeed in forcing America into the war on the other side; but it is not true unless the word "finally" is thus fully appreciated. Germany knew perfectly well what European combination of powers she was certain to have to meet, and that, if she was to prevent Italy coming in on the other side, she would have to outbid them. My explanation of the cause of the war was not that Germany had any reasonable doubts about these things, but that, believing war to be inevitable, she chose a time when her war plan would be more likely to come off than at any later time that could be reasonably foreseen. She was afraid that, if she did not start the war when she did, Russia or France would start it later; I believe that there was justification for this fear; for both France and Russia were then very difficult neighbours, much more likely to resort to aggression than either of them is now. The mere fact that the Czar could only maintain order in St. Petersburg by mobilising the Russian Army is sufficient evidence of this, for of course as soon as the Russian Army was mobilised Germany must fight, otherwise her war plan broke down. The war plan, as we all remember, was to immobilise France by

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regard to the offensive against the Basques illustrates the situation :

A comparison of arms must reveal an absolute disadvantage on the side of the Red northern provinces. Since the approach from the sea is as good as blockaded the Basques and their allies have only existing supplies of arms and armoured cars . . . still worse is the comparison in air arms. The twelve or fifteen dozen bombers and pursuit planes which have been mustered by the nationalist command can if they are not prevented by the weather fly over the entire Red country practically undisturbed. It is only rarely that one of the ten or fifteen Red planes gives battle or that their anti-aircraft guns come into operation.

It has been stated on good authority that the Spanish Government lost more than fifty aeroplanes, attempting to get through to Bilbao. To all intents and purposes the Basques possessed no anti-aircraft guns whatever. The large fleet of aeroplanes that General Franco brought to the attack consisted of German types, including the types Junker 52 heavy bombers, Heinkel 111 which made their appearance only during the campaign, and Heinkel 51 (chasers). Of the aeroplanes brought down by machine-gun or rifle fire, the personnel, numbering ten, all were German without exception, and unanswerable proof has been provided by documentary evidence that crews and aeroplanes had left Germany many weeks after the agreement on volunteers which came into force on February 20th.

The superiority in the air was probably not as decisive as that on land. As the offensive battered its way towards Bilbao, the number and size of the guns employed steadily increased. In the final assaults upon the defences of Bilbao, *The Times* correspondent estimates that 10,000 shells were fired in the course of a few hours against a small section of the front. And a peculiar feature of the final attack was the use of twelve-inch guns, not hitherto used elsewhere in Spain or on the Basque front, suggesting their recent arrival. In the artillery and infantry the Italians took their part. I have the captured list of one "mixed" battery in which all the important positions are held by Italian officers and men. A captured cook remarked with regard to another "mixed" unit that all the food was Italian. As against this no suggestion has been made, either by insurgent headquarters or by press correspondents, that non-Spanish personnel was employed by

the Basques. Undoubtedly, the working of the non-intervention agreement was the decisive factor in the defeat of the Basques. The northern coast of Spain is assigned under the naval observation scheme to the British Navy. And quite apart from the blockade instituted by the insurgent naval forces—largely a paper blockade, especially after the sinking of the *España*—the Basques were unable to obtain supplies by the only channel open to them—their ports.

The non-intervention agreement has of course made it much easier for the insurgents to institute a *de facto* blockade. Let it be remembered that without being granted belligerent rights they have no legal status whatever. In law, whether inside or outside territorial waters, their ships are pirates. When in the latter part of the last century two Spanish warships hoisted the red flag, British and German men-of-war sailed in and arrested them within territorial waters, even before they had taken any action and solely upon the ground that they were rebels. But Britain was on this occasion prepared to take the view that non-intervention must apply within territorial waters but not without, and that the British Navy should abstain from giving protection to British merchant ships within the three-mile limit, even when the insurgent warships have themselves remained outside territorial waters and fired upon British ships within. British acquiescence in the insurgents' blockade has, however, gone farther. By issuing warnings to British merchantmen, the British Government has assisted very materially in making the blockade effective. If it had not been that on April 20th the *Seven Seas Spray*, disregarding the Admiralty's advice, ran the blockade and set the example to other merchant ships, a very peculiar legal position would have arisen, and British commercial interests might have found themselves liable to very heavy damages to the Basques for non-fulfilment of contracts. Not only has careful investigation by experts shown that the reports given credence by the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty and others, of the extent of the dangers from mines and warships, have been enormously exaggerated, but in actual practice during April seventy-one, and during May ninety-five, cargo ships entered Bilbao without casualty.

But undoubtedly the delay, difficulty and expense that this abortive blockade caused to the Basques in obtaining food

the capture of Paris, in time to be able to turn round and deal with Russia before the Russian steam roller became a serious menace.

If I may continue for a moment with history, before I come to its lessons—and it was my business as Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office at that time to know the history—in August 1914 the German war plan seemed particularly likely to work well for one reason, and for two other reasons less likely to work at any further date. The first reason was that Serbia was supposed to have fought herself to a standstill in the Balkan wars and therefore Austria could be relied on to go straight for Russia, which it was hoped would to some extent keep that country quiet. The other reasons were that Russia had begun to build roads and railways up to her side of the common frontier, which on the German side was already plentifully supplied with them, and this threatened to upset the German time-table. And, lastly, the Germans had just spent fifty million pounds (what a tiny sum that seems nowadays) on improving army equipment, and the French retaliation of adding a further year's military service had had no time to take effect.

Let us see where this leads us in comparison with the present position. Germany and her allies were then afraid of waiting, but I do not think that Hitler and his allies now are really in the least afraid of waiting, for they know that there is no chance of their being attacked. Aggression in Europe quite certainly can now only come from them. Secondly, the old balance of power was in no sense a condition of full security against an aggressor. The balance was liable and indeed certain to tip up, as it is in the nature of balances to do. But that is precisely the position that we are in to-day unless and until the League system can be made genuinely to operate against aggressors whoever they be. And of course Hitler and Mussolini and Japan are much more likely to disturb it than were Germany and her allies in 1914. They will no doubt allege when they do that they have to defend themselves against the Communist menace, but this of course is common form. A sign of the times surely in this matter is that on October 28th Mussolini said with complete bluntness that Bolshevism must be eliminated from Europe, beginning with Spain. And while the balance is likely to be disturbed only by the would-be aggressors, surely we must realise that

those would-be aggressors are very much more likely to win than Germany and her allies at the beginning of the Great War. Moreover, they could hardly now begin a war except in the middle of Europe without touching the British Empire, and therefore bringing us right into the war much more certainly than we were brought in by the invasion of Belgium. The moral is that war in Europe would be at any rate a good deal less certain than it now is, if it were known in advance for certain that under a restored League system we should be bound to come in. This surely is also true, when we remember America's entry into the war in 1917, that war can never be a careful game played out to the end by the original protagonists as if it were chess. It is much more like a game of blind man's buff with everyone blindfolded and liable to cannon into any one else at any time. Wherefore the cry on the Government side—let us keep the Empire out whatever happens—is foolish, and likely to be fatally foolish. But then it will be too late.

I will now turn to another quotation from Sir Norman's article and see where it will lead me. He says, very truly, that, even though Germany had before the war all her colonies and possessions, yet war came—for great possessions are no preventive. Nothing, I think, can possibly prevent war except a conviction in the minds of would-be aggressors that it would be absolutely fatal. Yet if we had a complete League system, even this will never stop dictators from making war if they think it is their last chance of remaining in power. When a dictator sees a lamp-post in front of him, not as a shedder of light but as a suspender of despots, he will gamble. For after all, with war there is no telling. He may conceivably come through.

Here is another point made by Sir Norman which has its lessons for the proper understanding of the international situation to-day. Though we had solved many differences with Germany before the war—Morocco, the Bagdad railway, and African spheres of influences—yet war came. This is quite true. But I remember when I was a student of Pädagogik at Jena in 1899 there was a school of pamphleteers at work beginning to develop what became the full-blown theory of *Machtpolitik* of later years. That was of course long before the Kaiser's "shining armour" speech of 1909; but already at the end of last century the theory was being developed that

and other supplies necessary for their civilian population, hampered them vitally in the conduct of their defence of the province. The same position exists now at Santander, with some difference, in that at Bilbao the shore batteries were more than adequate to command not only the entrance of the harbour, but the whole and more than the whole extent of territorial waters outside. At Santander and Gijon the batteries are not so powerful, and the *de facto* recognition by the British Government of the blockade is even more damaging to the trade of these ports.

General Franco's drive along the north coast of Spain came to an end when the Spanish Government launched an offensive north of Madrid which broke through, and very nearly succeeded in freeing the immediate neighbourhood of Madrid from the insurgent threat. It was only partially successful, but neither was the very powerful counter-offensive launched by General Franco after he had time to withdraw his best troops and equipment from the north. Brunete was recaptured, at the head of the salient which the Government had forced into his lines. But it was not possible for the insurgents to recover the whole of the ground lost. In Biscay the insurgents had three great advantages. They had undisputed control of the air; owing to the isolation of Biscay they had overwhelming superiority in artillery, machine-guns and tanks; to the terrors of bombardment by land and from the air they were able through the blockade to subject the civil population to famine conditions.

On the main fronts these advantages are less definite. In the air the Government has for many months enjoyed a qualitative if not a quantitative superiority. The defences of Madrid, by anti-aircraft guns and chaser planes, have reduced the air raids that were a daily if not hourly occurrence last autumn to a rare event. The city is constantly shelled with a growing intensity, but the Government has made it not worth while carrying out air raids.

In the field the insurgents probably maintain a superiority of ten to one in the number of machine-guns. The days when the Government's militia were armed with museum blunderbusses are past, but the rifles of the insurgents are still greatly superior to those of the Government. German technicians have undoubtedly given General Franco invaluable service in fortifying his lines. His guns are better, and the marksmanship

of the German and Italian gunners is said to be excellent. On the other hand the Government enjoy an overwhelming superiority in Spanish man power. It is perhaps not worth entering in any detail into the controversy as to exactly the relative numbers of foreigners on either side. Since casualty lists were published in Italy, and the *Popolo d'Italia*, Mussolini's paper, has announced that "Italy has not been neutral," and with regard to the withdrawal of volunteers, "the Italian Government cannot do it and in the present circumstances will not do it" (July 1st), and since large numbers of Italian and smaller numbers of German prisoners have been captured, there is no doubt whatever that such intervention has been of immense importance to General Franco. Moreover, a considerable body of detailed evidence exists to show that substantial numbers of Italian and German personnel have arrived in Spain since the agreement on volunteers on February 20th.

But perhaps the attitude of the two parties to the proposals for the withdrawal of volunteers affords the most definite clue to the question of which side is benefiting most by their presence. When the British Government's recent proposals were first announced, a few statements appeared in Germany and elsewhere suggesting that General Franco was willing enough to forgo such assistance, but following a broadcast from Portugal General Franco made a categorical announcement that for his part he intended to retain the foreigners. This is to be contrasted with the Spanish Government's repeated statements that they were at any time prepared to agree to withdrawal. The best informed and least biased estimates give a balance of foreign personnel of at least five to one in favour of the insurgents.

But "war is too serious a matter to leave it to the soldiers." It may well be that the end of the struggle may come as a result of the influence of other considerations not purely military. In the Great War it was Germany's collapse rather than her defeat in the field that brought the end. It is possible that either side might collapse, but the Government rests upon a wide democratic basis, and the remarkable reorganisation of its forces in the last six months would not have been possible but for a mass of support from the rank and file of its people. Both sides represent composite forces with varying ultimate aims, but observers constantly report the increased

Germany would never get anything she wanted unless she made other nations afraid. That is always an element which must be reckoned with in the German attitude. With this theory naturally developing it became inevitable that all the friendly arrangements that Grey afterwards made with Germany in order to give her more of a "place in the sun" were reckoned by many to be proofs that England was weak and could safely be squeezed to give away more and more. It was this feeling, as we all remember, which was played upon as the strength of the German fleet was increased. England, according to the German argument, had given way, and therefore was quite certain to go on giving way if only the attitude of threats was sufficiently persisted in. This surely has its bearing on the present German demand for colonies.

I wonder, by the way, why this demand for colonies never takes the form of a suggestion that Portugal should surrender some of hers, for I feel quite certain that Great Britain now would be in no condition to resist a demand made upon her ancient ally. If the Germany of Stresemann and the Weimar Republic were still with us, I should be willing at any time to consider the question of colonies with Germany; for, though the *Machtpolitik* doctrine would no doubt still exist, it would not be on top, and were the Republic still continuing, the best way, surely, would be for us to propose that she should be given a mandate under the League for her old colonies, we on our part, as a guarantee of good faith, being willing to accept a similar mandate for ours. But with Germany as she is now, or anything like it, any discussion of the colonial question cannot possibly be a solution of her grievances, but only, from her point of view, a fresh proof of our weakness, and therefore a signal for further pressure upon us which could only lead to war even more certainly than it is bound to come as things are.

I have left myself little space for bringing things up to date, which means bringing them to the point at which Mr. Eden left them in his speech of November 1st. I am something of an Eden-fan. This does not mean that I ever listen to his speeches, for listening produces such a feeling of *quantum mutatis ab illo* (as I will shortly explain) that I cannot stand it. But I always study the speeches carefully next day. And I marvel more and more, every time I do so, that on the strength of them he can pass for a great Foreign Secretary. His last speech was an excellent example of his method, and

many members said it was the best they had ever heard him make. I have analysed it carefully. There was a column and a half at the beginning and another at the end which were general and meant nothing new. All the rest was simply brilliantly devastating overthrow of the ninepins which other speakers had been foolish enough to put up for him, except seven lines to which I will return. He never dealt with the essentials of their speeches. Here again I think I can illuminate the disasters of the present from the facts of the past. As Grey's Under-Secretary it was my business to prepare a brief for him—from the House of Commons point of view. In those days there was still real democracy in the House of Commons. By the House of Commons I mean the procedure on Government business in the Chamber—it is this which is now stone dead. So I found out in advance who were likely to speak and what they were likely to say. I made my notes, and against them I indicated the obvious parliamentary reply, which in part took the Edenesque form without its cleverness, namely selection of the weakest point. Grey would look through my papers with his usual courtesy, getting into his head in advance the main subjects which were likely to be raised, but entirely ignoring both at that stage and later anything which even remotely resembled a debating point. He said to me once: "One should always see the best points of any critics' case, and try to answer them in a way which will lead to better understanding of our policy." Grey therefore, in winding-up the recent debate, would have tackled the main points: had non-intervention on balance helped Franco unduly? Where was it likely to lead us? Could we trust Mussolini? (and Grey was always frank on this sort of matter, even when he was dealing with Russian Grand Dukes occupying a further part of Persia). Had we to put up with Mussolini (as then with the Grand Dukes) because of some other interest? If so, and if this other interest was the avoidance of war, what were the probabilities of war, and would trusting Mussolini make them greater or less? On all this the House was left by Mr. Eden in as deep a fog as ever. And that in a speech in which he said he was going, "as nearly as I feel I can," to be "appallingly frank"! The best I can say of it all is that the speech did not truckle to Mussolini as the Prime Minister had done on the closing day of last session—October 21st. When the latter said, for instance, that there

unity and efficiency of the forces supporting the Government. On General Franco's side the unity would seem to depend more upon an individual. The recent disappearance of Manuel Hedilla and other leaders of the Falangists suggests that all is not well between the newer fascist movements and the old aristocratic elements supporting General Franco. There are repeated and consistent rumours of rebellions behind the insurgent lines, and the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy as a means of cementing differences is not to be overlooked, though such a solution might create as many difficulties as it solved. To such a question General Franco is reported (*Times*, June 16th) as stating: "they judged it as much an error to propose a monarchical restoration as to reject its possibility in the political future of Spain."

Undoubtedly the Germans and Italians have made themselves exceedingly unpopular in insurgent territory. It was widely believed in Madrid in the winter that the continuous bombing of the civilian population was dictated by Germans, and that Spaniards had refused to take part. Whether that be true or not, it represents a similar state of mind to that which immediately after the destruction of Guernica attributed it to the Germans acting without the authority of Salamanca.

A Spaniard who has returned from Junta territory informs me that there are many of them [German airmen] and that he as a Spaniard and a Conservative was ashamed to admit that many Spanish and Basque men, women and children were being killed by German bombs from German machines piloted by Germans. (*Morning Post*, April 29th.)

After questioning many persons on their return from insurgent territory, I have failed to find anyone who has experienced the same type of deliberate terrorisation of the civil population by aerial bombardment as has been practised by the insurgents on Madrid, at Guernica and elsewhere. It is possible that in the end "frightfulness" does not pay, especially when it is committed in a civil war by foreigners. Of course it is possible that within insurgent territory the myth that Guernica was fired by the Basques may receive credence. No even moderately impartial person can believe that it was not the work of the insurgents, after looking into the evidence. But in any case it is possible perhaps to lay

too much importance upon the "morale" of the contending parties. The Italians have not been conspicuous by their military achievements, nor have the Germans their heart in the struggle, neither those in Spain nor the mass of Germans at home. Equipment and war material does count for much, but not for everything, and General Miaja's forces believe with him that time is on their side.

Diplomatically the insurgents have undoubtedly improved their position. The British Government would not hear of the granting of belligerent rights until after the fall of Bilbao. And though the plan by which such rights should be granted conditionally upon a "substantial withdrawal of volunteers" seems to be indefinitely shelved, yet the very fact that such a proposal has been discussed strengthens the insurgents' position. Undoubtedly General Franco's plan was to conquer the whole of the north of Spain, then, having obtained belligerent rights, to proceed to a similar campaign along the Mediterranean coast. The plan failed for two reasons, one military and one diplomatic. The Spanish Government's offensive north of Madrid was too effective and dangerous, and called for the whole of General Franco's forces to repel it. The other reason was that the Basque offensive had relied too patently upon German and Italian assistance, and with the change of French Government the French people have become absolutely united from Left to Right in their alarm at a possible victory for the insurgents. British opinion is more difficult to assess, but the British Foreign Office sometimes gives the impression that the only question to which they are anxious to find the answer is "Who will win?" Mr. Winston Churchill's argument that because the German guns installed on either side of the Straits of Gibraltar can command both the sea passage and our fortifications, therefore we should "hasten to make friends with our enemy while he is in the gate," seems to proceed on the same reasoning. The argument is, of course, that if the insurgents are going to win we should first grant belligerent rights in order that we may show our goodwill, and that later we shall be able to overbid both Germany and Italy in the financial assistance which General Franco will require to reconstruct the country.

While it is true that General Franco has already enjoyed in fact some of the advantages of a belligerent, he would if he were recognised as such reap considerable additional

was no official confirmation of the landing of Italian troops, Mussolini having officially admitted to 40,000, I felt more ashamed of being an Englishman than at any time since the Hoare-Laval agreement two years ago, and that is saying a great deal. When I listen to Mr. Eden I am only ashamed that the country acclaims him as the best Foreign Minister they can remember. It is a terrible comment on the fall of democracy in this country.

And now for the seven new lines in Mr. Eden's speech. They were those in which he dropped heavily on Mussolini for suggesting that we should give Germany colonies when he was not willing to do so. Very well said, no doubt, but it has a very terrible inner significance. When Tories see that the Empire is touched, however indirectly, they react at once through the mouth of their Foreign Secretary. But that the Empire will be touched far more seriously when we have the Franco Spain on which they are apparently determined, they refused to see at all.

I have not touched China, being content to leave it as it was stated by my friend Sir Frederick Whyte in the last number of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW. I believe the keynote there must be the phrase of the American President, "concerted effort," and this from many points of view means patience, and I think there should be just a little more hope of things going right than there is in Spain. The real reason for the Cabinet's continued immobility over Spain I believe to be the belief of several of them that Franco, being a Catholic, is a Christian. To them, therefore, the bombardment of Guernica must have seemed a highly Christian act, but I have not yet heard even a minor Minister suggest that Canton also was bombed in the name of the Prince of Peace.

FRANCIS D. ACLAND.

. CHINA'S REBIRTH.

DURING the last four or five years China made, until the Japanese invasion, more progress than in the twenty-five preceding years. Indeed the difference between the mental progression of the two nations is instructive. Japan had constituted herself a modern state many years before. The terrible and memorable earthquake of 1923 shook down what was left, so to speak, of the ancient material structure; and Tokyo, for instance, was rebuilt almost *de novo*, and that city to-day might be Chicago or Berlin with its wide roads, motors and concrete buildings. Yet one has the curious feeling that the effort to make this outward and visible change in the realm of psychology has had the reverse effect, and turned the thoughts of the Japanese inwards; and more particularly because they had proved to themselves, and the world, their power to grapple with western material inventions.

China's political progress lagged. She who had been the teacher had to stoop to be the learner: never an easy adjustment. She had to turn from the realm of thought to that of action, from the philosopher's desk to the public laboratory. The tremendous change-over, too, from the dependence upon a monarchy to the active co-operation of a republic, only possible because of an inherent democratic strain running through Chinese history from Confucius down, had to be assimilated by a people comparatively few of whom ever saw newspapers. It is in truth, perhaps, one of the miracles of this century that a country passing through so radical a change of government should have taken a mere twenty-five years to return to cohesion and unity of purpose. One would not dare to make a prognostication as to Japan's reactions if she had had to make a similar *volte-face*. Despite the war-lords and the bandits, the cruel selfishness and inhuman treatment too often displayed toward the defenceless poor, China's long heritage of a common culture has stood the strain. It has been strangely helped by that magic of their written word, which appears to us such a stumbling-block but which, to Chinese readers, draws them, the whole land over, into a mystic bond of understanding.

People are apt to say that Japanese aggression has "unified China"; but there is only a certain amount of truth in that,

advantages in any further blockade he might attempt. On the other hand the formal recognition of belligerency does not seem to Germany and Italy to be worth the price that the British Government has asked, namely the withdrawal of volunteers. Possibly they hope that in effect the advantages of belligerency will be obtained without paying any price at all.

In conclusion, in the first year of the war there can be little doubt that the whole policy of non-intervention has assisted General Franco. The simple reason is that the "gaps" in the system have been easier for him to slip through than for the Government. General Franco's friends have been able to fly their aeroplanes into Spain, while the Government's sources of supply being far distant, South America or Russia, have had to come by boat and elude the control scheme. General Franco's sources of supplies for munitions and equipment are also nearer and more easily able to elude control. It is also true that Germany and Italy, while frequently protesting their disinterestedness in Spain, stand to gain enormously by victory for the insurgents, and are prepared to run risks of international complications which the democracies dare not take.

It is doubtful really whether the inextricable complications of non-intervention diplomacy have not been more likely to involve Europe in war than a simple and more orthodox neutrality. Be that as it may, while the insurgents have enjoyed superiority in equipment, the Spanish Government has been steadily building up a more powerful war machine. The war seems to have reached the stage when the unsuccessful attack becomes, owing to its cost, in reality a defeat. It is possible that the collapse of one side may bring a speedier end than is in sight to-day, and of the two sides, the insurgents seem the more likely to suffer from such internal conflict.

WILFRID ROBERTS.

NEW TENDENCIES IN HUNGARY.

THE political season in Hungary closed amid symptoms of harmony and goodwill. For years, nay decades, there has never been better feeling between the Government and the opposition. The cause of this unwonted mood is not far to seek. To a certain extent parliamentary government in Hungary has always been a *fable convenue*. With one notable exception no government has ever failed to secure a majority at the elections. The power of the Government is so great and the administrative machine mostly so unsparingly used in its favour that a prime minister who knows his business rarely does run any appreciable risk. On the other hand, Hungary has always had a parliamentary opposition, even in the times of the all-powerful Liberals, and the opposition has frequently had the support of dissident groups of the Government party, much as in post-Gladstonian days the Unionists voted with the Conservatives in the British Parliament. In spite of the present authoritarian system the opposition is making its voice heard. Hungary, greatly to her credit, has never gone in for a totalitarian form of government, implying the identification of State and party and the enrolment of all national forces in the service of one individual and his immediate henchmen.

That even in the heyday of dictatorial rule Hungary is not likely to fall a victim to it is due in the first place to the personality of the Prime Minister, Dr. Daranyi. When he was appointed to his present office it was widely believed that he was chosen as a stopgap, but he has proved himself a statesman who combines energy with reasonableness and is averse to all extremist political courses. He keeps right-radical tendencies under control far more effectively than the late General Gömbös. He is more imbued with a sense of impartiality. He endeavours to effect a compromise between opposing factions and is not carried away by demagogic catchwords. Among the matters to which he has had to give his attention the settlement of the question of the successorship to the Regent Admiral von Horthy stands out prominently. It is humanly understandable that the head of the State wished to secure the continuance of the conservative course and the present system of government beyond the span of his life. In this question the country, the Government and the Regent himself

though doubtless it has hurried matters. The idealism of Sun Yat-Sen was translated into action by the Nationalists in 1926 when they marched northward from Canton. Its successful propaganda showed that Chinese people were getting ready to think things out for themselves, however wrongful we may deem some of this thinking to have been, and however badly directed. Democracy is the hardest form of government to achieve, for it leaves room for unwise as well as wise efforts. Yet the results show themselves quickly too; and Democracy can retrace its steps, as China did, when she found that Soviet ideology was not suitable to her affairs of state. Possibly fighting the Communists was equally as unifying a process as trying to stave off Japan. For China has moved definitely towards the middle ideal of an educated democracy, with its individual freedom and expansion, and has rejected both the Fascism of Japan and the Communism of Russia.

I had not visited China for ten years till my arrival in Canton last year. For the first five of those years there had been violent anti-foreign suspicion and attack, hard to endure by China's friends. Yet we foreigners had to learn too: the chief lesson being that we must let Chinese beginners in western arts and even the science of government make their own way, letting them make mistakes, and stand by, ready to pick up the wreck when necessary, and again permit them to start on their own. Perhaps we had been too grandmotherly. We of the West know the long years and sacrificial technique which are needed to produce a hospital, a university, a civil administration. China's pomposity, recklessness and ingratitude of 1926 and 1927 hurt, as youth always hurts age, for in these things we were the more experienced and the benefactor. During this recent year's visit of 1936-7 I was more than a little proud that, apart from a few foolish talkers in the settlements, who in any case rarely contribute in the way of cultural benefits to any community, the foreigners in China, for all practical purposes, had put into oblivion their sufferings and losses of 1927-8. They were accepting wholeheartedly the new régime: and this could be said of all branches, consuls, missionaries and the business people.

As I opened my porthole on arriving at Canton in July 1936 I looked out upon a rainbow: and my heart leaped up! It seemed a good omen for this new China of which people had written me. And when I left China this spring I felt even

more happy, for the promise had been more than fulfilled. It was as if at last one saw harvest springing to fruition from the seed which had been so painfully sowed by those many Western sojourners in China in the past, who had long given their best. And Canton's progress was typical of what I saw all over the land.

At the end of July the weather was terribly hot and my visit was short, for I could not endure it: but, even so, in a flash I realised it was a different Canton from my last visit. A consular friend sent me round with his Chinese secretary in a car to see the main improvements. Everyone has heard of the wide new streets of which Canton boasts, on which motor-cars run. The old crowded narrow areas are now intersected by these arterial roads, and await further demolition. This is not so difficult as one might imagine. Chinese houses for the most part used to be single-storeyed. Very well; if you pile up your front room on top of your back, and perhaps do it again to make a three- or four-storey house, you have widened your street. The trouble is the expense this means to the multitude of the poorer people, to whom the most meagre financial compensation is given. If they do not do the work themselves, the demolition gangs do it for them and charge them for labour. I found this method of street-widening going on all over China. There are broad streets now in Old Ningpo, the home town of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. They have so altered the appearance of the town that people who have been away a mere two years cannot find their streets—they are non-existent! If only water or gas works could have been started at the same time, the improvement would have been even better, although for years electricity has been used for lighting purposes throughout the land. China, however, has not done away with the picturesqueness of its gilded shop fronts, as has been the case too often in Japan. One of the pities of the present distress is that China must now be held back long from the installation of other amenities which we consider necessities. China's possibilities as a customer, especially in the heavy industries, were but beginning. The conceptions were in her mind.

"Now we have made our city roads, we must have an iron bridge over the creek, instead of the old bridge of boats," said one Chinese mayor to me; "and then we shall think of installing waterworks, if we can raise the money."

had one interest in common, namely, to prevent this issue from becoming fiercely controversial and leading to commotion in the country and a deadlock in Parliament.

Under the act which the Government succeeded in passing, important prerogatives are conferred on the Regent and his rôle in the legislative side of the Government is defined. In the absence of a full-fledged right of sanction the Regent is endowed with a suspensive veto which he can exercise twice against bills of which he does not approve so that he has the means of delaying for a considerable time legislation to which he objects. The Regent will also have an important voice in the appointment of his own successor, being entitled to propose three nominees. In framing the Regency Act, Government and Parliament have carefully avoided a wording which might be construed into a prejudice against a return of the Habsburgs or an identification of the powers conferred on the Regent with the prerogatives vested in a crowned king. It was statesmanlike of Dr. Daranyi not to stress the issue too much and to content himself, after listening to the opposition, with a compromise which, while ensuring parliamentary influence in the case of an election of the head of the State, excludes the possibility of unwelcome surprises which might place Hungary in a dangerous position in regard to other countries. He had the satisfaction of securing the support of all parties for the solution proposed by him.

This is the more remarkable as Hungary, notwithstanding the common front her people has always presented in international issues, is strongly divided in a great number of questions by deep economic and political cleavages. In the Unity Party, as the majority group supporting the Government is called, the lower middle class, inspired by the ideas which the late General Gömbös professed, is represented along with the legitimists and the radicals of the right who form perhaps one-third of the Government camp, but the majority also includes numerous adherents of Count Bethlen, the former Prime Minister. The Government party as a whole, it should be remembered, was formed by and owed allegiance to Count Bethlen, and it was only through a bold and almost desperate operation that Gömbös succeeded in winning it over. Under the Gömbös Government, therefore, Count Bethlen was in open opposition to the Prime Minister. It frequently seemed as if the duel between them would end with the political death

of one of the adversaries. Under the Daranyi Government the tension between the former and the present leader of the party has almost disappeared and made room for a tacitly agreed co-operation.

A similar easing of the tension has taken place in the Government's relations with the "Small Holders' Party," a very active group under the leadership of M. Tibor von Eckhardt. In the course of the last months he has expressed views which would have been considered nearly revolutionary under the former Government, but which fit better into the political frame of mind encouraged by the new dispensation. The right-radical tendencies, which temporarily assumed alarming proportions, have found a determined opponent in M. von Eckhardt. He considers that absolutism, dictatorship and the abrogation of civil liberty, as he recently told his constituents, make for national weakness and not for national strength, and he added: "The exercise of arbitrary power is not a natural growth of the Hungarian soil and does not bear fruit in Hungary. To the adherents of the absolutist fashion, now already on the wane, I declare that the Hungarian nation is ripe for the most advanced type of parliamentary government. A strengthening of civil liberties and an enlargement of the political power of the people must not, therefore, be further delayed." Revolutionary attempts from above or from below, from the right or from the left, are abhorrent to him. In foreign politics he is averse from intransigence. He also deserves credit for his firm stand against occasional cases of corruption and the infusion of narrow party views into the government administration. It was largely due to his efforts that one of the Ministers resigned his office when certain incompatibilities between his position as a member of the Cabinet and as a party politician were insistently drawn attention to. Towards the Daranyi Cabinet, however, and more particularly the Prime Minister, M. von Eckhardt has never indulged in violent or impassioned oratory and the compromise in regard to the Regency Act received his blessing in a solemn form.

No more than M. von Eckhardt did the competent leaders of the legitimist group, the Archduke Joseph and Count Sigray, or even the democrats under the leadership of M. Rassay, refuse their co-operation to the Prime Minister. One can hardly fail to see an analogy with British parliamentary

With the peace which, but for Japan, was beginning to be a settled condition, would have come equally the idea of municipal loans for community needs. Even in the farthest west, the ancient, turgid, hill-built city of Chungking, 1,500 miles up the Yangtze River, the last port of call, is opening up roads within its walls, though with much tribulation. Up its narrow dark flights of steps, between congested terraces of houses, for centuries men have been carrying buckets of water, two slung from their shoulders, painfully stepping upwards and downwards, bearing the water for a whole city's needs from the river—by hand, so to speak. Waterworks would be a godsend there: and the city magnates were pondering how, how this could be accomplished. Public water is but one of the greater needs of modern China, in which the West would surely have had to aid, and trade. There is a student or two in England at this very time studying the uses of coal gas, for they will need that commodity also in their industries: and perhaps help to deliver housewives from using dried bracken with its acrid vapours, blinding and stinging the eyes, for fuel. The possibilities of China's Four Hundred Million Customers are very attractive—if only there could be peace.

In this rebirth of China there was a will, a wish and a hope which were deeply encouraging. I arrived in Canton just three days after Chên Chih-Tong, the last recalcitrant against Nanking, had asked and been given a passage in a British gunboat away to Hongkong—the *métier* of our gunboats from Sun Yat-Sen onwards. Had he been denied it, he might easily have stirred the armies which remained faithful to him to fight; and the streets of Canton would once more have run with blood. All Canton knew this and waited, with fear in their hearts. When they found that he had gone, their relief and thankfulness communicated itself in an extraordinary way. They wandered aimlessly, smiling, about the streets—something in the way we did at the Armistice. Chiang Kai-Shek had not been able to visit Canton for many years: Nanking and Canton had been at loggerheads, and Canton refused to send Nanking financial contributions. Canton accused Nanking of having deserted the pure truth of Kuomintang doctrine. In this she was right—fortunately, most people thought, for Sun Yat-Sen was too doctrinaire. Nanking asserted that she was working on his main principles,

and that was sufficient; and she paid homage to his portrait every Monday morning. When in July Chiang Kai-Shek announced that he would visit Canton, the news was welcomed with an enthusiasm that spoke of a city's thankfulness for long years of disillusionment at last ended, and hope for future unity.

Another manifestation of China's rebirth which caused me intense satisfaction was her renewed attention to her past. Ten years ago China was busy throwing this away with both hands. There was a time, indeed, in central China when a straw image of Confucius was whipped through the streets. Confucius had been their downfall, they said to me in Peking in 1926, with his everlasting reference to a previous Golden Age, to the importance of the Emperor, to his insisting on courtesy and ritual instead of "go-getting." In such an atmosphere no wonder China's arts fell away. The makers of the beautiful glazed tiles, the colour of lapis lazuli, the green of jade, the yellow of ochre, which cover the glorious palace roofs of Peking, were reduced to four old men, whom the architects of the Rockefeller Hospital found with difficulty. They set them to work to produce similar tiles, and teach others. Young foreign architects from North America came with bursaries to study Chinese buildings, and stayed to build. They eliminated the overweighting burden of the Chinese roof, while keeping its grand straight lines and strength and the exquisite turn of the eaves. The few buildings at Nanking and Peking, a college, a hospital, which they created showed that traditional pillared Chinese architecture, with its noble proportions and its enchanting colours, could be adapted for modern use, and keep its dignity when built up into two and three storeys.

Chinese themselves are now raising great monumental buildings after this ancient style of beauty, and are proud of them. Dr. Hu Shih once said to me, when he visited our home at Oxford and saw Chinese tapestries hanging on our walls: "One thing the West has done for us. It has taught us to appreciate our arts other than those of poetry, painting and calligraphy which we value most. You have made us see the art in our embroidery and architecture." From that time forward foreigners building in China have been sad if funds prevented them from pursuing this "native architecture" policy, though perhaps in less expensive a fashion. Such mission

traditions in the rally of all parties round the Government when issues of truly national importance are at stake. It is to be hoped that this tradition will not fail the country in the solution of other important problems with which it is faced. This is notably the reform of the electoral law and of the Upper House which require concessions on the part of the ruling classes and a larger measure of confidence in the political reliability of the masses. The reform is urgent because Hungary still has a system of open voting in the country districts, and the benefits of the secret ballot are on the whole confined to urban constituencies. The Government is desirous of introducing democratic principles into the electoral system while taking all precautions lest the pendulum swing too suddenly and too far in a new direction. The Government is naturally anxious to avoid a political landslide which might bury the rigidly conservative system of to-day. It would be a great triumph for the Prime Minister if he were able to find a middle course, satisfying all legitimate aspirations, for the solution of a problem which is beset with difficulties. The effect would be to give more reality to parliamentary government and to keep it from degenerating more and more into a sort of hallowed fiction. Competent observers, however, are by no means certain that a reform of the electoral system can be effected without rousing fierce passion in the country.

Another important turn of government policy concerns foreign relations. It is still in its initial stage and—remembering Bismarck's saying that fruits do not ripen quicker if you hold a lamp to them—it is best not to over-rate its scope as yet. However, it deserves notice that from statements made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister Koloman von Kanya, references to territorial questions have been absent. Hungarian policy, according to these authoritative expositions, aims at full equality of rights and a better treatment of Magyar minorities in other countries; but territorial revision, implying the return to Hungary of purely Magyar districts which the country had to relinquish under the Treaty of Trianon, does not occupy the foreground of the Government's foreign policy platform, at any rate for the time. This does not mean, of course, that a decisive change has taken place in Hungarian public opinion with respect to the territorial provisions of the peace treaty, or that a sincere reconciliation with some of the neighbouring countries is a near

contingency. Visitors to Hungary are still greeted at the frontier stations by a plan showing the territorial amputations which Hungary suffered under the Treaty of Trianon—and the words "Nem, nem, soha!" (No, no, never!) which strike their eyes on the railway station of Buda-örs, at the gate of the capital, still show a mood which is very far removed from resignation. There may thus be no more than a strictly limited and relative softening of the tone, but it is already something that at least hatred does not flare up sky-high and that there are signs of a more conciliatory spirit. It is more or less in keeping with this new shade of policy that Hungary has refrained from following the example set by Germany in the open defiance of the military clauses of the peace treaty.

Such subtle touches are sometimes of greater practical importance than full-dress diplomatic actions. They have already produced a better spirit between Hungary on the one side and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the other, though in the improvement of the relations with the latter country Italy has also played a hand. The Regent paying a visit to Rome was able to travel over Yugoslav territory where he received a cordial reception. Another sign of an improved atmosphere was that Dr. Milan Hodza, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, unveiling a memorial to a celebrated Hungarian author in the latter's native place, now included in Slovakia, in a speech in the Magyar language gave the assurance that the rights of the Magyar minority would be protected and enlarged.

Hungarian relations with Germany are now also viewed in a significantly, if ever so slightly, different shade, as even in its foreign policy the Government seems bent on rejecting extreme ideologies. Since the death of General Gömbös a more reserved tone and greater circumspection are in evidence. Two circumstances have contributed thereto: The discountenancing of Hungarian revisionist aims in the German press, among others also by Hitler's powerful paladin Rosenberg, and certain subversive tendencies which made themselves felt among the German population in Hungary, causing considerable anxiety to the Government as well as to the moderate leaders of the Hungarian Germans, above all Dr. Gustav Gratz. The German-speaking population in Hungary numbers about 500,000, many of whom have become converted to a camouflaged Nazidom. However, thanks to the

churches as can scrape enough money together are following this rule, and the results are as inspiring as any Gothic church over here, for colour enters into the scheme of a Chinese building as well as proportion. Our spires soar upwards: the long eaves of their roofs end, too, in heaven-bound points. Chinese municipal authorities also are conceiving that city buildings should be Chinese and beautiful. Hence the spasm of pain with which one learned that Japanese bombers were attacking the regal buildings of the new Chungshan University at Canton. It is set amidst twelve hundred acres of campus, in which young China was going to get its hands healthily dirty, doing agricultural research. It was almost worse to learn that the glorious new Civic Centre and Library on the outskirts of Shanghai had been holed by the Japanese.

These Chinese modern-built buildings are expensive to build, even though labour is still cheap. They represent not only hard-spent money, but a dream of abiding Chinese culture. They lift a city to a higher level. We used to think of Peking as the city supreme for her buildings, and she still remains so. Now there are as amazing creations of Chinese architecture, adapted by the help of the useful foreigner, to be found all over China; such as the new University of Wuchang on the Yangtze, one of the most beautiful universities in the world both for design, materials, and its position on a hill and near a lake. They certainly present a startling contrast with the small and insanitary houses of the working folk around: but they were only a presage of the nobler China that should rise, and they gave her leaders a sense of healing for the many wounds which her dignity has received for over a century.

Moreover, in these new buildings there is "plumbing," as the Americans put it: not always acting as it should, to be sure. Fifteen years ago I was in a Japanese hotel in Moukden which dripped hot water at every pipe-joint, and where the switch for the electric light for my bedroom was placed outside my door! Plumbing seems a Nordic gift which needs a certain firm assured hand over wayward elements, and time to acquire. But the Japanese had learned: and the Chinese were equally appreciative of good plumbing and were striving towards it.

It was, of course, the spiritual unity that gave most ground for hope. Curiously, China was being best welded together by a song—the hymn of the Kuomintang, which has been

adopted as the national anthem, and of whose words I have made as good a translation as I can:

For the people's rights
We firm will stand,
One family,
One united land.
May our leaders long,
Like a spearhead strong,
Clear the way, nor delay;
Forward strive, never stay.
We vow strength and skill,
Courage and goodwill:
One in heart, one in mind,
The goal we'll find.

There is no religious instruction allowed in the schools—a problem which has had to be faced by missionaries. Their solution has been to hold a service, which has to be voluntary, before school, often in some other building. But in every school and college on the Monday morning the pupils gather before the dais, at the back of which is a large photograph of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. At a signal, there is a three minutes' silence. Thus do the young men who battled for the good of our empire and our civilisation speak, though dead, to young China! Next, all bow three times to the portrait of Dr. Sun, founder of the Chinese republic; after which the assembly sings the national anthem. Few things could be more moving than to hear, as I have done, 800 or 1,000 young men, and women too, sing in this fashion, and sing extremely effectively. This is surprising, as the tune is reminiscent of the Belgian national anthem and Handel's *Largo*, was the creation of someone who conceived it in America, and ranges in gamut from middle C to upper E. They begin singing slowly and majestically, then press almost with jerking shouts as they urge their leaders to work (literally translated "by night and day" and "not to be lazy")—a truly Chinese piece of governmental didactics! They come slowly down the scale again and end with yet another sweeping fuller tide upwards to unity.

You have not understood their eagerness to serve, if you can begin unmoved to address these hundreds of courteous listeners, who are so often at college with the slenderest

energetic action of the Government and to the efforts of Dr. Gratz, the majority of Hungarian Germans did not depart from their loyalty to the State and were kept free from contamination with the Nazi spirit. No exception could be taken in Germany to the statement of the very efficient Minister of the Interior, Dr. von Szell, that Hungary will certainly protect the rights of her German minority but will not permit any existing under-currents to become dangerously strong.

The political frame of mind in which the German and the Austrian Governments are facing each other has naturally also had an influence on the relations between Germany and Hungary. It is perhaps true that certain Hungarian quarters do not sufficiently realise what a Nazi Austria, or an Austria having practically the status of Danzig, would mean for Hungary. In pre-war times Hungarian politics were frequently affected by a morbid vision of "Vienna" as the seat of centralised power, oppressive, blood-sucking and tyrannical. If such apprehensions were entertained of Vienna in the easy-going times of Franz Josef, whose rule in the latter half of his reign was decidedly Magyarophil and who as Emperor of Austria nearly always recognised the supposed obligations which the kingship of Hungary imposed upon him—what would not have to be feared from Vienna if the city towered near the Hungarian frontier as the exponent of a country of 70 million people united by nationalist fanaticism? If it came to that, Hungary would be little more than a corridor to the Balkan countries for the Third Reich. One must assume that the competent personages in Hungary realise the implications of such a contingency.

All these problems are also, and in some cases mainly, economic problems. With skill and large-mindedness, German economic policy has aspired to and gained the first place among the countries which trade with South-Eastern Europe. The accretion of political power and prestige which Germany has gained thereby is not substantially diminished by a realisation on the part of her clients that German trade with them frequently takes forms which, by the usual economic standards, would appear irrational and even grotesque. To Hungary, Germany has supplied many hundred thousands of mouth-organs, many of them probably in exchange for rye, and to the Balkan countries enormous quantities of cigar-lighters were exported. On the other hand Germany, in the

endeavour to find an outlet for her industrial products, frequently pays more for her imports than she would otherwise have to. For Hungary, however, the export of her agricultural surplus is vital, and, even if the goods offered in exchange are not for her of primary necessity, she cannot afford to disdain a barter operation of the kind.

Until the conclusion of the Pacts of Rome three years ago Hungary received no more than about eight pengő (7s.) per metric quintal for her wheat, i.e. substantially less than the price of production. Through the co-operation of the signatories of the Rome Agreements it has been possible to obtain a price of 20 pengő and more. The progress is enormous, and particularly so if the social conditions are taken into consideration under which the Hungarian peasants are still existing. Other countries are also certain to benefit largely by this improvement. Dr. Hodza has estimated that British industry has lost about 500 million pounds through the decline of purchasing power in the agricultural countries, and he supported his argument by a reference to the Czechoslovak textile industry whose machines, imported from England, stood idle for years owing to the inability of the peasants in the distressed agricultural areas of Central Europe to afford the purchase of textiles.

In Hungary, with a population of 9 million, the number of the destitute is put at 3 million by competent authorities. Altogether 5 million people, though not all distressingly poor, would be called indigent by Western standards. Among the poorest of the poor are the agricultural labourers, who frequently have to eke out an existence with 1 pengő a day, and in some cases with one-fifth of a pengő only. They are not in danger of starvation because food is extraordinarily cheap on the farms; but the satisfaction of any cultural needs and the most elementary boons of technical civilisation are entirely beyond their reach. The Government is giving this question its anxious attention, and the very capable and progressive President of the National Bank, Dr. von Imredy, whose opinion carries great weight, no less than the Minister of Finance, Dr. von Fabinyi, feels the urgency of remedial measures.

Hungary, like many other States, is a country of sharp contrasts. Crying need and ostentatious wealth, seething unrest and smiling contentment are to be found side by side.

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resources behind them ; who ache to see their country progressing, yet are so straitened in their possibilities. I travelled all over China on this trip, from Canton to Peiping, from the eastern province of Shantung up into the tableland of Shansi where the Japanese are now marching upon Taiyuanfu, and then into Szechwan near the Tibetan border. Everywhere on Monday morning that ceremony was gone through, the song was sung, the silence kept, and the bows made. Nor was it ever done, that I could see, in the spirit of animosity or hatred: it was the purer patriotism of the desire and intention to make their country a better place to live in. In many places the temples of China have been turned into schools, or barracks. In front of the massive gilt contemplative Buddhas, soldiers were learning the weapons of war, and one wondered what would Gautama think. But soldiers, or scholars, in colleges and temples, or barracks, all began the week with this "Hymn of the Republic."

I climbed the ten thousand difficult feet of the sacred mountain of Omei to look towards Tibet, and I made friends up there in the cold, for it was December, with a small acolyte priest of twelve. "And can you sing the San Min Chu Yi?" I asked. "I can," he replied, and stood up in his long grey priestling's gown and piped up in his treble for me, while the old bleary-eyed temple guardian beat time on the earth-beaten floor.

It was as I was coming down "the River," as one calls the Yangtze, that I heard of the capture of Chiang Kai-Shek up in the north-west. That capture achieved China's complete unification in the hearts of Chinese of all sorts and provinces. From north to south, there was only one thought and word: "If he is killed, our progress will be of no use. We shall be eaten up by Japan." The head of a large college wept as he spoke of it to me. I could only reply to him what a Canadian had said to me a week earlier, on the Tibetan edge, when we had been listening in on the radio to London and heard of the trouble over Edward VIII: "No commonwealth of free peoples depends on one man."

There were many more happy instances of marked improvement. So much has been written about the new position of the Chinese women that I can but corroborate the good news. Co-education is universal, perhaps because the money is lacking for two types of school: but it seems very successful.

This in China, which till now has segregated its girls! Their physique is enormously improved, and every school has its slide—or tailor's friend, as one missionary woman put it, with thoughts of the seat of the trousers! Parks and children's playgrounds are to be found in any town of any size and many villages; and kindergarteners are laughingly exercised therein. China was learning to play. As for the grown women, they take part to-day in all social affairs, and in this one must admit that the Communist fashion of dealing equally with men and women has had a good effect—except, alas, when the Communists take prisoners and shoot the women who cannot keep up in the forced marches. In Shanghai or Tientsin, where there is a large section of well-to-do Chinese living in elegant houses, they are very willing to come to a party with the foreigners with both sexes present, and the ladies present a most enticing appearance. They are charming in giving hospitality themselves. They have achieved a charm and a freedom in their clothes much envied by Japanese women who are still bound by their harsh obi, clinging kimono and long sweeping sleeves. Chinese wives are taken proudly out by their husbands to all sorts of functions, and their natural aplomb has soon done away with the *gaucherie* and silence with which they faced mixed society twenty years ago.

This is just a little of what has happened to China since I was there ten short years ago. Mr. Cranmer-Byng, writing of China in his *Vision of Asia*, quotes Gilbert Murray's words concerning "the spirit which, since the very beginning of history, men have expected and found in the average common soldier—a will to endure hardship for the sake of duty and to use life as one who knows of better things than life." In the past Chinese soldiers, living as they thought in the centre of the world, felt no need of this spirit. To-day, realising they are but one of a world of nations, they have come to love their own land and to prize their own genius. So they are dying with a gallantry and heroism unknown in their past, and which arouses our admiration: not for love of military prowess, but "to save China" as they always put it, using the same word with which they used to speak of Buddha, or, if Christians, of the Man of Golgotha, in a sacrificial sense. They die—but they die in hope. Surely their name shall live for evermore.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

Walking or driving through the imposing thoroughfares of Budapest, through Andrassy Street, for instance, with its resemblance to a Parisian boulevard, or taking in the glorious vista of the Danube quay, which in some of its perspectives reminds the visitor of Prague and in others of Salzburg, one is able to give oneself up to that enjoyment of life which is nowhere more intensely felt than in Hungary. The splendour of the city, capital wines and excellent food and music create an enchantment against which few foreigners are proof.

Objectively, Hungarian economic conditions have recently shown an extraordinarily favourable development which has moved parallel with the general world recovery. Since 1927 industrial production has risen by over 30 per cent., and the value of exports in the first five months of the present year was nearly 40 per cent. above the corresponding figure of 1936. An adverse foreign trade balance of 6 million pengö has been turned into an export surplus of 70 million in the current year. In consequence, Government receipts have risen and the budgetary position as well as the status of the National Bank have improved considerably. The budget, one cannot help feeling, might with advantage be a little clearer and present a more comprehensive picture of Government receipts and expenditure. In contrast to the methods adopted in Austria the gradual rehabilitation of the Hungarian banking system was effected by conservative therapeutics. The situation has long ceased to present any acutely critical symptoms. The present relatively favourable position may perhaps offer an opportunity for an attempt at concentration, which Dr. von Imredy has under contemplation, as in conditions of comparative health such an operation would present fewer difficulties. At any rate the opening of new sources of credit, both external and internal, will be an important task of the Government, and in this connection the new arrangement made with the foreign creditors will prove of great advantage. In conversation with the writer, a prominent Hungarian financier expressed the opinion that only an honest co-operation between Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia can guarantee the existence of these countries. With luck we may witness a gradual development in that direction. Already the first indication of such a turn would be an historic event.

ERNST BENEDIKT.

FRANCE: A CAUSERIE.

ON reading Professor Ritchie's masterly symposium on France and French culture,* one inevitably asks oneself the question: Why is it that the average individual of either nation is such a *terra incognita*, not to say enigma, to his fellow-creature across the Channel? Here are two peoples who are only divided by a strip of salt water which at its narrowest is only eighteen miles across, and which in the early days was the principal highway between the Belgæ whom Cæsar knew and their closely related brethren in what is now called East Anglia. It continued to be so during the period when the northern coast of France was known by the significant title of the *Litus Saxonicum*, while the connection was later maintained through the Norseman settlements in Kent and Normandy. It became still closer under William the Conqueror. Thereafter for some 150 years the boundary ran not along the southern coast, but along the shifting land-frontiers in France itself, of the Angevin kings. These possessions were lost, but subsequently the southern part of France became and remained for a long time English. Bordeaux was an English town for two centuries, and even Montaigne, some hundred years later, could recall with pride his English ancestry. After Agincourt Henry V became *de facto* monarch of the greater part of the kingdom of France, while Calais remained English till the reign of Mary. In the eighteenth century, as Professor Ritchie shows at length, there was a second English invasion, this time of the "English Ideas," which lasted till the French Revolution, itself the consequence of the teachings of English philosophers adapted to French conceptions. In fact, during the whole of the eighteenth century a close understanding and appreciation existed, especially between the aristocracies of the two nations. There was even a moment at the beginning of the French Revolution, when a similar understanding and appreciation became possible between the Whigs and Radicals and the makers of the Revolution; but the Terror killed it, and so what might have been a real understanding and *entente* between the rank and file of the two peoples was nipped in the bud. Even the *entente* that preceded the war of

* *France: A Companion to French Studies*. Edited by Professor Ritchie. Methuen. 16s.

CAN FRANCO WIN THE SPANISH WAR?

ON returning recently to England after a 1,500-mile tour of Spanish Government territory, I was surprised to meet with a widespread belief that the war would shortly end in favour of General Franco. Some had formed this opinion after the fall of Gijón and the extinction of resistance in Asturias. Others, taking the Asturian conquest only as an incident, had been led to the same conclusion through a general survey of the situation. They were aware that General Franco now holds some three-fifths of the total area of Spain. He is in possession of the mining and industrial region whose outlet is Bilbao, of the coal-mines of Asturias, and of the copper-mines of Huelva and Rio Tinto. The principal wheat- and cattle-producing provinces are also in his hands. In the military field his record has been one of steady advance. What checks he has suffered—notably before Madrid and at Guadalajara—have been in the nature of local setbacks resulting in no appreciable loss of ground and modifying but little the general aspect of the campaign. At sea his superiority is also marked. He holds the Atlantic coast, and has enough bases in the Mediterranean not only to safeguard his own lines of communication but seriously to threaten those of the Government. From Málaga and Morocco he can strike at hostile shipping at least as far north as Alicante. From Majorca Spanish cruisers such as the *Canarias* cover easily the whole coast from Port-Bou to Valencia, while the Savoya (Italian) and Heinkel (German) types of aircraft in current use find the towns of this same seaboard within easy range of their bombs. General Franco enjoys further the advantage of strong and open foreign backing. The prestige of Italy has been more than ever bound up with his success since Signor Mussolini publicly proclaimed the crusade and honoured Italian troops fighting on Spanish soil. And if it be objected that the interest of the U.S.S.R. in the defeat of General Franco is no less great than Italian interest in his victory—though on both strategic and ideological grounds this is open to question—the scales are still far from being evenly weighted. Russia, even were she willing to make such strenuous efforts on behalf of the Spanish Government as Italy is making against it, is too remote geographically to send a really effective contribution.

For these apparently cogent reasons the majority of the British public expects the early triumph of General Franco. In a few months, it is supposed, he will be in effective control of the whole peninsula, and in a position to administer the territory on relatively normal lines. This opinion, which, to judge by statements in the House of Commons, is shared by the Foreign Office, arises from a grave miscalculation of forces. Misconceptions among the public, who must rely on tendentious or incomplete newspaper accounts, are easily explicable. But that the British Government itself should be similarly misled is a matter for considerably greater surprise. Yet to those who know Spain, recent pronouncements by Ministers in the House throw grave doubt on the reliability of their sources of information.

Leaving out of consideration the desirability of an Insurgent victory—as it would affect both the welfare of Spain and the real interests of the British Commonwealth—let us examine whether such a victory is probable. Supposing it could be won soon by force of arms, would it mean a return to peaceful, productive conditions? General Franco, it has been noted, holds some three-fifths of the whole Spanish territory, the Government holds two-fifths. In point of population, however, these ratios are reversed. Government territory contains some 60 per cent. of the total inhabitants. Of this number the majority are consciously anti-Insurgent, the rest war-weary or indifferent. The conception of hundreds of thousands of oppressed Spaniards longing for liberation from the “Reds” fades into the realm of fantasy before the existence of two million refugees, of whom at least half left their homes and all they possessed rather than await the arrival of the Insurgent troops; before the further fact that private property has not been abolished in Government territory, and that thousands of shopkeepers, factory owners and small farmers are still in possession of their lands and businesses.

Many have indeed had their property confiscated, in some cases at the whim of local workers' committees, in others because they revolted against the lawful régime. But expropriation is by no means the general rule, and the number of Spaniards rendered hostile to the Government for this reason is not large. Conversations which I have had with scores of shopkeepers and peasants suggest that pro-Franco feeling among both the lower-middle class and the tillers of the

1914 was the work of Edward VII and the upper classes. Considering that the English and French are the only two real democratic powers in the West, it is a misfortune that there is so little mutual comprehension and sympathy between the proletariat in the two countries. By the average Englishman the Frenchman is still regarded as a slightly comic person whose principal diet is frogs, snails and "kick-shaws." He is quite oblivious of the fact that French cooking in the lower classes is far superior to the standard found in the bulk of English homes. On the other hand, the stay-at-home Frenchman is wont to regard the holiday tripper, in plus fours or jumpers according to sex, as typical of the whole nation. The reason why such a *rapprochement* has only taken place between the two aristocracies is that it has been largely one of intellect and taste, helped no doubt by the fact that the two aristocracies had certain ideals, common to both, that date before the rise of the notion of nationality, while though both democracies are sincere lovers of liberty, each no doubt after his own fashion, the average Englishman has no use for equality. And fraternity, which with the French people means fraternity between groups or between nations, makes little appeal to the more insular English character, except in trade union circles; even the word "comrade" seems to have largely a communistic flavour in this country.

The two nations are in many ways really very unlike. Where the French excel we are weak, and *vice versa*. Our opportunist philosophy of life makes us unpredictable to the French, their regard for logic seems to us to make them slaves to a system. There is a Latin phrase—*Primum vivere, deinde philosophari*. The Englishman stresses the first (*vivere*), the Frenchman the second; the one pins his faith to experience, the second to reason, which is codified experience. In a word we are in all sorts of ways really complementary. And this brings me to the conclusion that we are so unlike, yet so interesting, that we have every reason, without ceasing to remain good Englishmen or good Frenchmen, to learn more about each other: there is much to be gained from such studies. Let us take a few of the differences.

The tie, as Professor Ritchie points out, that binds Frenchmen together is not race but a common heritage of ideas, or in other words a common culture and a common civilisation. Even the notion of nationality came later. It only woke to

consciousness under Joan of Arc. This explains how Alsace, a German-speaking region, is largely French at heart, and how coloured races are also proud of their French citizenship. As Sisley Huddleston points out, there is no colour bar, and the coloured deputies who sit for Martinique and elsewhere are held in high respect in the Chamber. French patriotism is clamant but not aggressive. Germany, on the other hand, is held together by a race theory *plus* a folk-culture theory. German patriotism is both clamant and aggressive. Above all it is a Government concern, a rigid creed that all must profess under penalty of excommunication. We again are different. We are English because we are English, we do not analyse our ideas, and we are content to leave it at that. Moreover, we have been so long English, we cannot imagine that we could be anything else or that there could be anything better. You may remember the story of the Frenchman who said: "If I were not born a Frenchman I should like to have been born an Englishman"; and of the Englishman who replied: "If I were not born an Englishman I should like to have been born one"! Nor do we try to make our subject races proud of being English; we often treat them as second-class citizens. The same is true of political refugees, whether the Huguenots of the seventeenth century, Germans of 1848 or Jews in the twentieth century; we admit them to citizenship, or rather we suffer them to become citizens. Patriotism also, like nationality, is taken for granted with us.

Take another point of difference. In the volume under review emphasis is laid on the strength of the French family. Compared with it, the connective tissue that binds the English family together is far looser. One reason possibly is that in the past the younger members were expected to leave the family nest to seek their fortune. The family and the peasantry (unfortunately a diminishing number) constitute the backbone of France. If I were asked what is the chief strength of England, I should say the social structure. There are no hard and fast barriers due to caste or religion, which latter unfortunately splits France from top to bottom into two nations—Catholic and non-Catholic. The split extends to every charitable or social activity; there are two Red Cross Societies, two Boy Scouts, two Girl Guides. I only know of one society which embraces both elements! On the other hand the social structure in England ranges without a break

soil can be counted as negligible. Opposition to the Government on religious grounds, which is one of the main articles of Insurgent propaganda, has also been much exaggerated. The churches are of course closed to worship. When travelling in Spain I endeavoured in each town and village to visit the churches, and found that perhaps one in ten had been externally damaged. Inquiries usually elicited the reply that the priests had been shot or were in hiding. No one would seek to deny, or, from a humane point of view, to excuse, the persecution of the Spanish Church. From the historical and political point of view it was inevitable, for too many priests had abused the pulpit and the confessional as canvassing-places for the parties of the Right. What stands out is that hatred of the Church was neither the result of Government policy nor, in the main, the fruit of Left propaganda, but a spontaneous movement of the people. Country priests were complaining long before the advent of the Republic that 90 per cent. of their parishioners were "pagan," i.e. never attended Mass—a statement amply borne out by lay observers. In face of this, it is difficult now to explain, except on grounds of ignorance, implied comparisons between the Spanish *campesino* and the devout peasantry of parts of Ireland, Germany, and France. The Navarrese and Basques are a different race. Genuine devotion, together with their Carlist traditions, ranged the first on General Franco's side. It did not prevent the second from declaring against him. The Basque Provinces are, however, a small and unrepresentative part of Spain. Catholics who support General Franco on religious grounds should realise that, in the event of his triumph, their Church's task would be not so much the rescue, as the conversion, of the bulk of the Spanish people.

Of political feeling in territory at present occupied by General Franco it is harder to judge. But is it conceivable on the one hand that the working population of such towns as Saragossa, Seville, Granada and Cádiz should all have been wiped out, or on the other that they should have become genuine supporters of the Insurgent régime? Left-Wing strength in these towns before the Movement, as well as the bitter struggles which are known to have taken place there before the Right triumphed, rule out the possibility of such a conversion. As to the more recently conquered Asturians and Basques, General Franco's own words and acts show that he

expects from them little but continued hostility. In other districts on both sides of the line many peasants may be indifferent to the outcome provided that they are given an opportunity to earn a living wage, but the industrial worker, who because of his militant qualities and quicker intelligence is the deciding factor in any political struggle, is now fully aware of where his interests lie. Even if forced underground for a time by a military dictatorship, it is idle to suppose that he could ever be won over. If in July 1936, unarmed and unorganised, he nevertheless overcame trained garrisons in Madrid and Barcelona, how much more formidable will he have become after eighteen months of service in modern warfare? The rule of General Franco, should it come about, can only be a rule of force, subject at any moment to being overthrown by a revolution of greater violence than any Spanish Right-Wing government has had to face before. It is, indeed, doubtful whether he could hold the country at all without the continued assistance of foreign troops.

Such would be the unsettled condition of Spain in the event of an Insurgent victory. Even this victory, however, is far from realisation. On purely military grounds it becomes more and more unlikely with the passage of time. The reduction of Asturias was inevitable, and had long been recognised as so by the Government General Staff. Isolated in their mountain villages, faced with an enemy overwhelmingly superior in arms (particularly aircraft) and in numbers, the Asturians fought back desperately, and inflicted heavy losses before their defeat. The troops which this now releases for use on other fronts may not be in a condition to be thrown into a new offensive before the spring. They need rest and reorganisation. Even if they can be used at once, the long-drawn resistance of the miners has given the Government time to consolidate its fronts, as well as to continue the serious training of a competent army.

I have seen some of that army in its finished form, holding various points of the eight-hundred-mile fighting line. It is well-fed, well-clothed, well-officered, and 99 per cent. Spanish. It has lost entirely those features of haphazard improvisation which distinguished the Government forces early in the war. It is not yet ready to undertake a major offensive, but such movements as the taking of Belchite in September show that it is learning the technique of successful attack. In a few

from the woman in the slums who does not wash her front door steps, through the woman who does, up through a hierarchy of infinite social gradations to millionaires and the oldest members of the aristocracy. Social advancement is a kind of race open to all, in which the charwoman competes with the duchess. Naturally she does not beat the duchess, but there is always someone whom she hopes to get her head in front of. English society is rather dynamic, French rather static. We are always hoping to better ourselves. With the Frenchman it is often a case of safety and comfort first. I remember once interviewing a French firm of world-wide reputation. I asked one of the principals why he had not a branch in London. He said: "I make a good living a year. I don't want any more money. A branch in London will no doubt bring more money, but also a great deal more trouble. What should I really gain?" Nothing again illustrates better this French idea of safety first than the universal desire of parents to put their children in the Civil Service, in which the pay is poor but the position secure. Thirty years ago the reverse was true in England, though to-day the competition to enter the Civil Service is far greater.

The same desire for security is to be seen from the French passion for saving. English people are much more inclined to live up to their income, or, like Mr. Micawber, beyond it. The French are a nation of savers. With them economy seems inbred and instinctive. The reason for this seems to me that while the labouring classes in England have had their periods of short commons during the Industrial Revolution or the Hungry Forties, it has only been incidental. We have had no Hundred Years War, no lengthy civil wars, nor extravagant sovereigns like Louis XIV to maintain generations of peasants in penury and starvation, such as the author of *Aucassin and Nicolette*, La Bruyère and other contemporary writers have described. Again, quite early in our history the Commons asserted the right to tax everyone except the clergy, and even they were taxed after the Reformation. So that for generations the Englishman has always been willing to pay because he feels he calls the tune. Whereas till the French Revolution in 1789 the peasants had to find all the money, and the revenues were farmed out. So even to-day the idea of paying one's share has never caught on in France. Hence evasion is rife, with periodic flights of French capital to foreign countries.

Here is another instance. French education, especially secondary, differs profoundly in its fundamental objectives from English. Putting aside physical training, education may be considered under the threefold aspect of intellectual, æsthetic and moral training. In France the training of the intellect and of taste are considered equally important. Knowledge is valued not for its own sake as in Germany, but as a means of culture. Moral training, on the other hand, is largely left to the home, due no doubt to the difficulty of finding a common ground for the children of parents who range from free-thinkers to devout Catholics. If in turn we consider English education, all I think will agree that we put the training of character first, the training of the intellect comes second, while the training in taste and appreciation comes a very bad third, except in some girls' schools. Far from teaching appreciation, there is still a widespread feeling that to dissect a rose is apt to destroy the rose; and in my school-days at least, appreciation was regarded as a matter for private judgment. In fact, it was almost sacrilegious to pry into these particular recesses of the pupil's mind.

Another interesting contrast is the close connection that has existed in France for over three centuries between literature on the one hand and the State and Society on the other, and the far looser link between them in England. State and royal patronage dates from the foundation of the French Academy by Richelieu, and has lasted on to the present day, reaching its apogee in the time of Louis XIV. The influence of Court and private patronage was never so strong in England, and gradually waned from the time of Dr. Johnson, as authors were able to find a public of their own to pay for their work. Literature in France has always been the pet of Society from the Salons of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onward, though some of the greatest writers have preferred Bohemia, and the Salon to-day no longer occupies the same place. In this country the existence of the word "lionise" is enough to show how the notion of a Salon has always been an exception, in spite of Horace Walpole, and Samuel Rogers with his breakfasts; while the name of Grub Street is sufficiently indicative of the wide gap that long existed between the average writer and Society. Nothing illustrates the difference better than the treatment of the budding poet. In France his work is often greeted with

months' time it will consist of nearly a million trained and disciplined men. The Government reserves of man-power are very large, and this figure is reached by calling up only the military classes between the ages of 20 and 28, to whom must be added some 150,000 volunteers of higher age.

In matters of transport and supply this army is adequately served. Shortage of arms would appear to be its chief handicap, though this is growing gradually less noticeable and now applies chiefly to heavy material such as artillery and tanks. The offensive west of Madrid in July, which promised to disengage the capital and cut off the besieging forces from their communications with Toledo and Talavera, only failed to be pushed home because of lack of sufficient war material. The factories in Catalonia are now working at pressure to remedy this want, and their output should be further stimulated by the presence of the Government in Barcelona.

If General Franco does not advance this winter, there is every possibility of the initiative passing to the Government forces in the spring. Assuming, however, that he realises the necessity of pushing forward while there is still time, on what point is his thrust likely to bear? Probably not on Madrid, which, though the civil population would suffer cruelly from bombardment, has now been rendered almost impregnable against direct frontal attack. Moreover, although the moral effect of the fall of the capital might be considerable, Madrid is now of little strategic value. To the military mind the immense cost of an offensive against it might well appear too high for the material advantages to be gained. An attempt to break the Government lines in Aragón and, by pushing rapidly forward into Catalonia, to finish the war at one stroke, is a plan which would appeal more to a bold and confident general staff. Such a push would require the backing of an immense amount of men and material and would be in the nature of a supreme effort whose failure might easily be disastrous. Fail it probably would, for the Government front here is of considerable strength, and the *terrain* presents great difficulties to advancing forces, particularly in winter. The proximity of the Catalan war industries to the fighting zone, with the comparative shortness of the lines of communication between the Government forces and their source of supply, would be another factor in favour of the defence. There remains the possibility of a push down the Teruel salient which,

if carried far enough, would isolate Catalonia from the rest of Spain, and attain, though more slowly, the same results as a direct attack in Aragón. But here again the mountainous nature of the country and the strength of the Government positions are powerful obstacles in the way of an offensive.

From what has been written it will be seen that the present military situation can fairly be described as a deadlock. Surprises can always occur on an eight-hundred-mile front made up of complicated curves and salients and of necessity lightly held at many points, but the probabilities are that neither side, given their present resources, will make any appreciable progress during the next few months. After that, the balance of strength should fall slowly in favour of the Republic.

Military strength is vain without political strength to back it. What power does the present Government possess, and how is it using it? Two mutually exclusive descriptions are often given of the Spanish Government. Either it is described as the tool of Soviet Russia, or it is said to be so torn by party strife as to be incapable of disciplined rule. Clearly it cannot be both. If Russian influence is so strong, and if, moreover, as some claim, there existed before July 1936 a Communist conspiracy to seize the reins of power, how is it that the Communist Party has not profited by the magnificent opportunity of a civil war to come into the open and assume the leadership of all the Left-Wing forces? If the Party was already armed and organised for aggression, why, when fighting broke out, did it not play a dominant part in resistance? The logical answer, which is also the true one, is that in 1936 the Spanish Communist Party was in its infancy. It has grown since, in membership from 50,000 to an outside estimate of 300,000, and even more in prestige. But it still lags far behind both the Anarchists and the Socialists, and in numbers, though not in drive, it cannot even compare with the Centre and Left Republicans who support the Government. Nevertheless Russian influences may be present in a disguised form outside the Communist Party? Certainly they may. *Le Matin*, which is strongly pro-Franco, recently accepted the figure of 1,000 Russians fighting with the Government forces, but suggested that "five or six times" that number were working behind the lines to disseminate propaganda and control administration. Against this estimate I

kindly applause; possibly a post is found for him in the State Service. Here he is welcomed with verbal brickbats, and like a witch left to sink or swim, if he has not also to go through a sort of *Probezeit* that rivals the ordeals of the Red Indian or the schoolboy of Tom Hughes' days. One has only to contrast the treatment meted out in their early days to Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats with that accorded to their fellows in France.

It may be interesting here to recapitulate what each country already owes to the other from their long if often intermittent contact. Our indebtedness to France starts from the time of William the Conqueror who, as the late Dean of Winchester once forcibly said, dragged Anglo-Saxondom by the scruff of the neck into the orbit of Western civilisation. Again, English chivalry owed much to French, with its imposition of a code of honourable warfare and its respect for women, even if these were only confined to a privileged class. In the Middle Ages the University of Paris was a focus of learning to Western Europe and to the numerous English and Scottish students who flocked to it—so numerous that they constituted one of the four nations into which the students were divided, while its influence on Oxford was considerable. During the Renaissance, and especially in the time of Elizabeth, the influence of France, though much less than that of Italy, was considerable. At the Restoration the theatre fell under the influence of the French stage, while Pope and his school were also profoundly affected by the theories of Boileau. The Court of Charles II served as a centre of dissemination of French manners, including table manners, themselves already profoundly influenced by Italian models. At the same time, modern furniture of French make took the place of the more austere household gear with which people had hitherto been content. Pepys speaks with wonder of the luxury of the furnished apartments of the Duchess of Portsmouth, Charles the Second's French mistress.

French influences again in aristocratic circles steadily increased during the first part of the eighteenth century, thanks to the Grand Tour which always included France, and the close intercourse between the two. The books of Smollett indicate how these influences penetrated to the ordinary county gentry. The Napoleonic Wars produced a profound rupture in the reciprocal influences of the two countries on one

another. England turned more and more towards Germany for models; but Matthew Arnold in the latter part of the century founded his battle-cry: "Organise your secondary education," on what he had seen of French secondary education, while the discoveries of Pasteur renewed English interest in French science and revolutionised English medicine. French impressionists also appealed to many English painters, as have also the later schools that followed; while during the last thirty years the influence of French writers like Proust and philosophers like Bergson has exercised an increasing effect on English authors and thinkers.

Turning to France, it was not till the invasion of English ideas (already alluded to) in the eighteenth century that this country exercised the first outstanding influence on France. But no influence exercised by either country has ever been so potent or permanent. It changed the whole political conception of the French, and ultimately led to their successful intervention in the American Revolution, and to the French Revolution itself. Modern French democracy is essentially its offspring. Newton, Locke, Shaftesbury and others supplied the ferment from which Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu distilled the intellectual and heady vintage, which not only turned the heads of the French politically, but profoundly affected the course of literature and the theatre—the two latter being further influenced by the discovery by the French of Shakespeare, and later of the novelist Richardson. Many English words passed into the French language. Professor Ritchie's chapters on the eighteenth century are an amplification of the penetration and permeation of English ideas. It is only in the twentieth century that the influence of England after the war has been again appreciable, in certain experiments in education on English models like the *École des Roches* and in the realm of sport and physical culture. To put the two influences in a nutshell, one may say the French, if periodic, has been far longer, but the English, if shorter, far more intensive. It is indeed for the admirable way in which Professor Ritchie and his team have brought out these differences as well as for the wealth and abundance with which they have described the nature and growth of the French genius, especially during the last three centuries, that one feels compelled warmly to commend the present volume.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

must place on record my own experience, which was that in the course of a 1,500-mile tour during which I stayed in Barcelona, Valencia, Madrid, and a number of towns and villages in the centre and south, I met two Russian soldiers. The five thousand Russian civilian agents were cleverly concealed, for though my business took me into ministries, centres of local administration, and even newspaper offices of the extreme Left, no single Russian ever came my way. It is hard to take seriously stories of Bolshevik influence when one recalls that in December 1930 the correspondent of the *Daily Mail* reported that General Queipo de Llano and General Franco's brother—now in Majorca—were Red agents receiving subventions from Moscow.

Yet although Russian interference in the internal affairs of Spain runs counter to the evidence and to the feeling of the Spanish people, the prestige of the U.S.S.R. is undoubtedly high in Government territory. It is based on the kind of gratitude which an unarmed citizen waylaid by a gunman feels towards the policeman who comes to his help, or more precisely on the relief which a defenceless civil population bombed and machine-gunned from the air felt when the first *chatos* appeared in the sky above Madrid. Anyone who has experienced an air-raid in a town devoid of defences of any kind will understand this feeling of friendliness towards any Power which will provide the means of hitting back. The Government has of necessity bought arms from other countries—not only Russia—but this does not mean that its policy is dominated by the suppliers.

As to the charge of disunity and indiscipline levelled against the Government, I take it to have been true of the first few months of the war. It is the best proof, for those who need one, that General Franco's attack was made on a democracy taken by surprise. A country in which, sixteen months after the outbreak of hostilities, there still exist four main groups at variance on many points and not afraid to voice their differences, is not a country controlled by the executive of any one party. There would have been an immense improvement in the conduct of the war if a dictatorship or council had been set up comparable to the opposing Burgos Junta. The fact that the movement has been away from, rather than towards, such conditions has perhaps been detrimental on military grounds but reassuring from the standpoint of democracy.

It has also, since a nation can be recognised by its faults as well as by its virtues, been a token of the "Spanishness" of the Government. By now, however, the necessity of political unity has been realised. Dr. Negrín commands general confidence, and his Cabinet as it stands rests on a solid foundation of popular support. Only the Anarchists remain politically aloof, but even by them no difficulties are likely to be raised in the immediate future. "First win the war. Then adopt the form of government that the people decide on." Such is the opinion that I have heard uttered by men of all parties—and as often as not by members of the C.N.T.

The idea that either terrorism or chaos reigns in Governmental Spain is completely false. Life in the country towns and villages goes on much as before, with the obvious reservations that food is scarcer and that many of the men are in uniform. Work and the simple social life of these places have not been interrupted. Rarely can a nation have been more orderly with a minimum of police. It is easy to object that all dissentient voices have been silenced, but if this is so they cannot have been numerous. I have described elsewhere* the workings of an "anti-Fascist" tribunal at Jaén, where I was struck by the equity of the proceedings. The very large remainder of the population goes about its business and pleasure in a normal way. It has two main preoccupations: fear of air-raids and anxiety for relatives at the front or living in Insurgent territory. Lack of news and the division of families is one of the most pathetic aspects of this war. Lest it should be thought that I was "shown round" I must say that, having procured a pass authorising me to go where I liked during a space of sixty days, I travelled without the assistance of the authorities and without informing them of my route. The only occasions on which I was given official guidance were on visits to the front and to a prison and a prison-hospital. In most countries in a state of war I should certainly have been suspected as a spy, but in Spain I met only with friendliness and help.

GEOFFREY BRERETON.

* In the *New Statesman and Nation*, issue of November 13th, 1937.

THE UPPER SILESIAN SETTLEMENT.

THE month of July saw the formal conclusion of one of the most courageous and salutary moves for peace undertaken by the League of Nations in post-war Europe. I refer to the completion of the Fifteen-Year Interim, provided for in connection with the drawing of a new German-Polish boundary in Upper Silesia. Two agencies which, during good times and bad, have made a real contribution to the maintaining of law and order in a densely populated area, will now terminate their work. They are the Mixed Commission, with Felix Calonder, the veteran Swiss statesman, as President, which was charged with supervising in particular the claims of Minorities to fair treatment; and the Tribunal of Arbitration, under the presidency of the Belgian expert on international law, the much younger Georges Kaeckenbeeck, D.C.L.(Oxon.). Apart from such cases as have not yet been concluded—and some of those coming before the Tribunal require years for settlement—these two League agencies will now be ready to fold up their tents and depart. It is certainly in large part due to them that in spite of all disputes and tension during the trying period 1926-31 the German-Polish frontier here was never closed.

For years there has been little "news" from Upper Silesia, and the work of the League agencies could go on relieved of the limelight of publicity. This is what Dr. Kaeckenbeeck has always earnestly desired, and what in his field he has for the most part enjoyed; whereas the work of the Mixed Commission has nearly always, in the nature of things, provided the Powers with material out of which to make political capital. One recalls the anxious years of 1926-8, when the Schools question was made the subject of a special inquiry by the League, and even the Hague Tribunal was requested to hand down a decision as to the interpretation of the Articles of the Convention. No less troublous were the following two years, when charges were brought by the German Minority in Polish Silesia with regard to terrorisation and other injustices at election times. We had the spectacle of the usually so self-controlled Dr. Stresemann striking the table with his fist, and of the studied replies of the Polish Minister, M. Zaleski. From then on, however, the face of things changed. Much more readiness has been seen to deal with matters on

the spot; notably since 1933, when both Berlin and Warsaw realised that disputes could be settled at home, and perhaps even better than by carrying them to Geneva. Of course, when Germany left the League, further appeals to that body were unlikely, not to say unwanted.

What we all would like to know now is, whether the end of the Fifteen-Year Term will bring any disturbance of the more or less normal relations obtaining between Germany and Poland; and in particular what sort of changes will ensue in Upper Silesia itself? Neither party concerned has been too pleased with the presence on its territory of a League agency, whose powers meant an infringement of its "sovereignty." Both seem to be well satisfied that this unnatural state of affairs is over. This does not at all mean that Poland and Germany have not collaborated throughout with the Commission and the Tribunal: perhaps more loyally than powers of Western Europe might have done this. It does seem, moreover, to compel the inference, that the said agencies have done their work with detachment and fairness, and have made their presence felt in the land, even to the point of becoming unpopular. As to the changes likely to follow in the land, one or two will affect closely a larger number of people, and may give rise to dissatisfaction. In order that these may be understood, a brief review of the provisions and working out of the Geneva Convention, signed on May 15th, 1922, is necessary.

The special and complicated nature of this singular document, which is longer than the Treaty of Versailles, was not due to the fact of a new boundary being drawn in Upper Silesia. It was due to the drawing of that boundary right through the heart of the highly developed "Industrial Triangle," as it was called; whose growth during the nineteenth century had been only less phenomenal than that of Westphalia itself. Here an intensive production of coal, iron and steel products was made possible by a net-work of railways, and a single system for providing such necessities as electric light and water, so that the cutting of such an "organism" in two was felt to be nothing less than an operation that would kill the patient. The Germans claimed the whole area, as being the creation of their capital, and their energy and organising abilities; the Poles on the ground that they had provided 90 per cent. of the labour, and that the Triangle was nothing less than an island, virtually surrounded

RAMSAY MACDONALD.

SO much has been written about Ramsay MacDonald that it is difficult to say anything of value to supplement this spate of criticism and appreciation. Over forty years of friendship with him may perhaps give the writer some claim to interpret very briefly a striking personality. He has been called "enigmatic" by many writers, and it is true that he was difficult to understand. Some people accused him of coldness and lack of heart. It was not easy to get into close touch with him or to feel that he really desired your friendship. It was partly his Highland temperament and partly the struggles of his early life which created this attitude of aloofness, while the obloquy incurred by his speech and action at the outbreak of the war doubtless caused him to shrink from too close contact even with fellow workers of long standing.

My first meeting with him dates back to the time when he paid a visit to the Settlement in East London of which I was Warden and gave a lecture to a Sunday-night audience on some aspects of the socialist doctrine. I remembered and noted at the time one sentence in his speech: "No evil that is due to widespread economic causes can be cured by private philanthropy. The sufferings and hardship of the common people may be ameliorated, but it is only by national effort on constructive lines that we can cure the diseases of the body politic." The working men in that audience were for the most part shrewd and competent judges of character and ability, not easily swayed or convinced, but they were carried away by his enthusiasm and his persuasive oratory. In those early days I heard him many times and there can be no doubt about his remarkable power to influence an audience. When Keir Hardie became Member of Parliament for South West Ham and laid the foundations of the I.L.P., MacDonald became his able lieutenant. Keir Hardie told me that he never had any doubt as to the high position for which MacDonald was destined. He regarded him as a future leader of the new party, a belief that history has justified. MacDonald acquired a real ascendancy, not only with the rank and file of the trade unionists, but also with a large group of intellectuals drawn from various sections of the middle class.

Whatever may be said of his aloofness in those early days,

he took the utmost pains to make himself acquainted with the men who were shaping the policy of the Labour Party. In some of them at least he created a feeling of warm affection that has not died down even to-day. When the fateful decision of 1931 was made they reeled under the blow. The majority felt only bitter hatred for the man who in their view had betrayed the cause of socialism. But with a few intimate friends it was only grief that they felt. Mr. Attlee, the leader of the Opposition, speaking in the House of Commons rightly laid stress upon his great achievements for labour and social reform, and few would deny that the Labour Movement as we know it to-day owes much to his untiring efforts and his wide intellectual appeal. It will be the task of the historian of the future to determine how far his action was dictated by a patriotic desire to save the country from disaster, but I have no doubt in my own mind that he believed that the economic and financial situation was full of danger. The pressure of the forces behind him was driving him to actions which he conceived to be unwise, and we must remember that democratic pressure within the ranks of the socialists is not always tactfully applied. Other leaders besides MacDonald may in the future have to face the difficult choice between submission or ostracism.

The tributes paid to him in the House of Commons for his many great qualities are impressive in their unanimity. *De mortuis nil nisi bonum*, but in this case there was no need for insincerity since there was so much in his character to praise without descending to tepid amiability. His physical and mental courage in the face of much suffering, his unflagging industry both as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, his knowledge of international affairs and especially of the leaders in other countries deserved and received full recognition. His visits to these countries (for he was a widely travelled man) were of great value to him when he occupied high office, and since so little reference has been made in the many articles that have appeared, it is worth while to call attention to his insight into the position of India—a country that he visited on several occasions. I remember talking to him when he came back with his wife from his first journey to that country. He was deeply impressed with her art and culture, and wrote some articles which were published afterwards under the title of *The Awakening of India*. His articles were very appreciative

by Polish peasant communities. The German population there was overwhelmingly "immigrant," the area lying well out to the east from the Oder river.

- Once a plebiscite was decreed, the only thing to do was to live by it. True, there never was a territory less suited to, or fit for, an ordeal so serious as a plebiscite, in the world. But out of it came a counting of heads and a division of the territory *pro rata*. Roughly three-quarters of the land was left to Prussia, but two-thirds of the precious Industrial Triangle was assigned to the new Poland. The terms of the Convention provided for every possible contingency—even for some which never arose. Railway rolling-stock was to be divided, the railwaymen slowly to be sorted out into German and Polish. An interchange of indispensable materials, across the new frontier, was permitted; so that no branch of industry would be lamed. The same was done with light and water, etc. The right was given to such nationals as wished to move to the other side of the new line, and tens of thousands did so. Opting for citizenship as an alternative was permitted; and the right of Germans to remain Germans, but live on the Polish side because they were needed in some industrial plant, was conceded. (This last only during the Interim years.) In the same way care was taken to make as easy as possible the adjusting of property claims. Finally, and most important of all, provision was made for the passing and re-passing of the new boundary, just as of old, for those whose domicile was on one side, but who earned their bread on the other. Of course the respective Minorities were given special attention, a guarantee of equal and just treatment in all respects being assured, on the basis of reciprocity between the two nations.

And right here a surprise was in store for those concerned with the working out of this project. All the tangle of technical and material adjustments, such as transportation, industrial relationships and business matters, straightened themselves out in unexpected fashion. On both sides the will was shown to make the best of a settlement neither liked, and to have done as soon as possible with any dependence on one another. In the sequel useful ends were thereby served, and the chances of conflict greatly reduced. On the other hand the whole field of cultural relations, the things concerning the mind and the spirit, refused to settle down in the new conditions. They remained a serious and growing instrument of

trouble. The chiefest of these issues was the schooling of the young generation.

Only less fruitful in disputes was the unavoidable question of earning a living—*die Brotfrage*. Grave enough at any time, this problem became especially acute as the depression deepened, owing to the density of the population. There were times when up to 40 per cent. of the able-bodied men were out of work, and many more doing only half-time. This state of things would have material significance in any country; but in the upper Oderland it had social and political consequences too. Large numbers of these workers had been half-way Germanised in pre-war times, largely because the job demanded this. At heart they were Polish, however, and they welcomed the new order with open arms. As long, that is, as it gave them work and a weekly wage. When hunger threatened, they did not stop to ask who was to blame, but like most such put the responsibility on the "government." This had happened in the bad winter of 1925-6, but it was much worse six and seven years later. A careful observer can only wonder that there was so little real trouble; but everyone has been relieved things have got steadily better since 1935.

Against this background stands the ending, on July 15th, of the Interim ordained by the League. During that time the German land-barons, the Prince of Pless (Pszczyna), the Henckel von Donnersmarcks, etc., who owned half the province in the old days, have been exempted from the Agrarian Reform being achieved in the rest of Poland. This protection has now ceased, and radical steps may be expected toward "parcelling"—for compensation, of course—the bulk of these estates. As for industry, what was a virtual monopoly of German ownership has been substantially reduced. Prussian state enterprises naturally passed to Poland anyway. The Giesche zinc interests were bought out by the Americans (Harriman). Finally, a long series of abuses, in which every man was robbing his neighbour, compelled the Polish authorities to interfere in the big *Friedenshütte* (Peace Foundries), and more recently in the *Interessengemeinschaft* (United Interests); with the result that the German shareholders retain up to 40 per cent. of the shares, but the control is now in state hands. This has affected directly the personnel, both clerical and manual: notably the "black-coated" group, which as late as 1934 were still two-thirds of the whole. Many of these

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and sympathetic and created much interest at that time. His next visit to India was as a member of the Public Services Commission. He made many friends on that occasion and gained a knowledge which enabled him to speak with sound judgment at the opening of the Indian Round Table Conference in 1930. His subsequent interventions in these long-drawn-out discussions were always opportune and did much to ensure the success of reforms that we may hope will change the face of India.

I have always felt that MacDonald was never quite the same after the death of his wife. The Memoir which he wrote of her was a touching tribute to her worth, and Margaret MacDonald certainly was a lovable woman of exceptional charm and great ability. Their flat in Lincoln's Inn Fields was a meeting place for all sorts and conditions of people, not only for advanced thinkers in this country, but also for socialists from all parts of the world. It was "a workshop of social plan and effort," to use his own words. He and his wife did very much to mitigate the quarrels which are certain to arise in the ranks of any new movement. The Labour Party was constantly threatened by schisms and disruptions, but both by his writing and by his speeches he was able to keep the party together and eventually to become the recognised leader in the House of Commons.

MacDonald can hardly be understood apart from his native village. Lossiemouth was his home, and those friends of his who met him there met him under the most favourable conditions. For there he was amongst his own folk, the fisher folk that he used to visit on Sunday afternoon; and it was there amid the whins and the heather that border the Spey, that he gained the courage to face the many difficulties that leadership always imposes. A Scotsman and especially a Highlander finds it difficult to unbend, but MacDonald was simple and natural when he was amongst sincere friends who had been tried over a long term of years. To such friends he would talk of his ideals and his hopes for the future, dwelling very little on the disappointments and disillusion which he, like many other statesmen, must be prepared to suffer. With his own family around him and amongst the people of his native place, no one could be gayer or more light-hearted. He lost that dourness so natural to the men of the north and seemed to become almost young again. He delighted in

taking us all off on some holiday picnic, and with his own hands he would kindle a fire in an open space amongst the heather. There he made tea for the many friends who foregathered with him. At such times he forgot the dissensions and the bickerings of politics, and all his talk would be of sheepdog trials or Highland games, of birds and books and the fisher folk of the harbour. At that time he was suffering a good deal with his eyes and this trouble made both reading and golf very difficult. Still I never heard him complain, and when I commiserated with him on one occasion he said after all they are only "*light* afflictions." I do not think he intended it as a pun, but was referring rather to the apostolic exhortation. Nothing indicates his true nature so much as his refusal to accept honours and his express wish that when he died he should rest at Lossiemouth, not far from the cottage where his mother lived and where he spent the happiest years of his own life.

PERCY ALDEN.

had special permission to remain on the Polish side, though they did not become Polish citizens. Numbering some thousands, they will now have to return to Germany.

Allied to all this is one of the most troublesome changes faced by the public on July 15th, viz. the cancelling of the special Travel Permits, which served as passports over the new frontier for all people who lived in one land, but whose business or daily work was in the other. Many people have spent their week-ends at home, say in Poland, but earned their living in the Reich, or *vice versa*. As many as 300,000 of these Circulation Cards, good only for the plebiscite area, have been in use in certain years. They were a unique thing in Europe, a concession to the fact that the province had developed as a single unit, and that not even political division could convince the people that they were not still "one folk." All this going and coming must now cease. At best some arrangement can be expected, by which a small fraction of these people will, for good reasons, be given some such rights in the future. Of course, as everywhere, those living close to the frontier have always been able to get *laissez-passers* for a single visit on the other side. This curtailing of freedom of movement will be resented by large numbers of people, and general grumbling is inevitable.

In effect, the two parts of Upper Silesia realise at last that they are sundered. This realisation has, it is true, been steadily growing ever since the spring of 1933, when the Nazi régime was established on the upper Oder. One side of the line has been getting more obviously German, the other more obviously Polish. In the circumstances, this is the best thing that could happen.

With regard to cultural questions proper, certain trends have emerged, and may be expected to mature in the future. Taking the general fact of the Minorities, it may be said that on both sides of the frontier their numbers have been steadily declining; and thus getting nearer to their real dimensions. Tens of thousands had only the foggiest of ideas in 1920 where they belonged. Neither names, nor domicile, neither religious faith nor even speech, could be taken as a criterion. After fifteen years the groups are fairly clear. Of course, as before, the two Minorities are disparate in structure, the Polish one in Germany being mostly workers, the German one in Poland being largely the owners of lands and foundries or mines,

with their extensive staffs and professional people. This disparity has made any sort of equality of treatment almost a joke from the beginning. On the Polish side the very well-organised German group have splendid schools, libraries and other institutions; while on the German side there is almost nothing to correspond to this at all.

Grouped together under the ægis of the famous *Volksbund*, German self-help organisations in Polish Silesia offered for years a striking example of efficient service. The *Volksbund* was spokesman, whether within or without the province. Its most active agency was the School Union, whose leaders were careful to see that German children got German schooling. Convinced as the years went on that what they wanted could not be provided by State schools (though the work done here was of uniformly high-grade), they have come more and more to build private institutions, whether elementary or secondary. Of these the palatial High School in Chorzow (formerly *Koenigshuette*) is a notable example.

But the School Union was over-zealous. Better said, they were the victims of a widespread illusion. While claiming the results of assimilation as seen under pre-war conditions, German Minority leaders were slow to admit that the same thing would go on under the new order. Only now it went on faster, since it was rather reassimilation: the recovery by the Poles, as they saw it, of numberless "children" lost to them in the nineteenth century. This process has been a feature of a dozen areas of post-war Europe, and will continue as long as the effects of the old imperial system are still felt. In Polish Silesia it was checked by the depression, but in the main it has brought a steady decrease in the number of children being reported for the Minority Schools. There will be still further decrease in the future.

This kind of thing, which ought to be acceptable to the prophets of "purity of race" everywhere, has been advocated long since by certain wise people inside the German Minority; who knew that the true Germans in the upper Oderland were far fewer in number than was always reported. Led by Dr., formerly Senator, Eduard Pant, these men and women demanded long ago a "genuine" Minority, whose members were to be depended on, because they were not bread-and-butter patriots. The same group took another, at that time unpopular, attitude, viz. that "cultural activities" among the

THE HOME SECRETARY'S OPPORTUNITY.

ALMOST at the outset of his tenure of office as Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare was called upon to deal with the vote for the Prisons Commission and his speech on that occasion impressed the House of Commons by the insight and sympathy with penal reform by which it was marked. He cherishes the memory of an ancestress whose work for the poorest and most degraded of prisoners has borne fruit in many lands. Elizabeth Fry's devotion to the welfare of prisoners may well be an inspiration to the Home Secretary, and if he can approach the task before him with something of her tenacity of purpose he may yet quietly achieve a great work for which his countrymen will some day be grateful.

The time is ripe for far-reaching transformation of our prison system. The obstacle in past days lay in the indifference and ignorance of the public, and in the honest but rigid conservatism of the official machine. To-day there is certainly a more widespread interest in penal reform than in former years, as is shown by the number of books by ex-prisoners, ex-governors and others, describing prison life. The Prison Commissioners themselves have for years past proved themselves earnest and successful reformers and the outcome of their efforts has been reflected in the Reports which year by year have recorded a series of improvements and changes achieving a remarkable transformation of the English prison system from the grim mechanical uniformity of a generation ago.

The beginning of a new era may be traced in the birth of the Borstal Institution in 1909, when a new spirit and more flexible and human methods were shown in the treatment of juvenile offenders, with the object of replacing punitive repression by training for citizenship. Yet Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise who initiated this great reform was far from considering it desirable to make any corresponding change in the prison system as a whole.

Twenty years ago when a deputation of Members of Parliament drawn from all parties in the House interviewed the Home Secretary in his room in the House of Commons, Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise sat beside him while, with iron

courtesy, Sir George Cave refused the request for a departmental committee, declining to admit any need for further classification of prisoners, for more careful medical treatment of those of abnormal mentality, or any modification of the absolute silence system which poisoned the atmosphere of prison life. Then came the unofficial inquiry set up in 1919 by the Labour Research Department and as its outcome (in 1922) the memorable volume, *English Prisons To-day*, in which Stephen Hobhouse and Fenner Brockway gathered together the results of that inquiry in the light of their own personal experience and that of many known to them.

Seldom has a critical examination of an entrenched official system had so speedy and far-reaching an effect. An advance copy of the book was read by the newly appointed Chairman of the Prison Commission, the late Sir M. L. Waller, and at once he set to work steadily, with his colleagues, on a task of continuous, quiet reform. The hideous "prison crop" disappeared; prisoners were allowed to shave themselves, the old tyrannous rule of strict silence was modified, "honour parties" were introduced in which prisoners were trusted to work without continuous supervision, while a friendly link with the outside world was brought into the lives of numbers of prisoners by the institution of unofficial visitors who were permitted to visit prisoners privately in their cells. Sir Maurice Waller's successors have continued his work and have had the courage to make experiments which have already proved fruitful. The old prison uniform has gone, the exercise ground is no longer a hideous place; physical training is given to those who are fitted for it; every prison has now a certain number of evening classes conducted by voluntary teachers, while in the training centre at Wakefield a variety of occupations are being developed and opportunities provided for the growth of comradeship, and for group activity, as well as for a certain amount of recreation. For several years a small payment has been made as a recognition of good work by a group, which though itself trifling in amount, has had a remarkable effect both as regards the work accomplished and in the interest which it has evoked among the men. From the money thus earned purchases may be made from a canteen, or remittances sent to relatives. The system has proved such a success that it is already being

Minority were not likely to build the cause, if and when paid for by funds provided from the Reich. A *quid pro quo* was always demanded; and this sort of thing made the Minority into a political bone of contention, as well as fostering artificial rather than real loyalties. Being Roman Catholics by conviction, these people could not accept the Nazi view of life, and declined to be "regimented." As a result, Dr. Pant has been branded as an outcast since 1933 by all "one hundred per cent." Germans, and his courageous weekly, *Der Deutsche in Polen*, condemned as traitorous newsprint.

His casting out has meant the creating of a Minority inside the Minority—about one-fifth of the Germans in Polish Silesia have had the courage to follow him. These are the people who face facts, who accept the lot that has come to them, involving a double loyalty on the one hand to their nation, on the other to the Polish state. They alone have been warning their compatriots that the Geneva Convention was, in fact, going to end; and that to fancy anything else was to cherish an illusion. By contrast with the two German dailies, they have made their weekly a paper that does try to serve the community, not to hoodwink it with fine theories about the grand destinies of Germandom, etc., etc.

The Hitler régime in the Reich has affected the appearance of things in Polish Silesia rather than the reality. The almost moribund *Volksbund* was revived, a "forward movement" for everything German was proclaimed by a Young German Party, and the news spread abroad right through the summer of 1933 that "Hitler was coming!" Nothing happened, however, and the Non-Aggression Pact of January 1934 dealt the hopes of credulous people a cruel blow. Clearly they had been fooled again. Soon a sense was growing that the Minorities on both sides of the frontier were victims rather than beneficiaries of the said Pact: since neither government concerned was as ready to take up complaints as before. Actually, in the opinion of sober observers, only short-range losses can be registered, the more permanent effects have been distinct gains in every way. Not only on the 1,000-mile-long frontier, but all over Central Europe the good results have been manifest.

It is not the least thanks to this fact that the termination of the Interim in Upper Silesia can be faced without misgivings. The single group that has cause for fears are the 8,000-strong

Jewish community on the German side. Protected hitherto by the Convention, they have already been warned that the Nazi legislation affecting non-Aryans is now extended to them. In general the Minority groups realise how tried a friend they are losing in President Calonder; whose absolute faith in the goodwill of all those around him made possible the solution of knotty problems, where a man of lesser calibre would have failed utterly. Close beside him was the cool and keen mind of Dr. Kaeckenbeeck, resolved at all costs to maintain the dignity of law and order, and setting an example of a different, but no less needed kind, to both nations. During fifteen years these men have had the help of not a few able and resolute colleagues, both German and Polish. This alone is something worth recording on the page of history. But the salient facts of the whole experience should be brought in due course to the attention of the widest possible public. It is to be hoped that one of the chief actors in the drama can be prevailed upon to tell us the story.

WILLIAM JOHN ROSE.

extended to other prisons and it is to be hoped that it will soon be generally adopted.

But perhaps the most valuable of recent experiments at Wakefield has been the pioneer camp which has now been carried on with success for a year. Here in a secluded woodland valley a few miles distant from Wakefield a group of men live in simple wooden huts, erected by the prisoners themselves, and work in the open air in conditions approximating to freedom; felling trees, clearing the ground of scrub and roots, planting potatoes and draining the land for tillage. A hut is provided for reading and recreation, with a varied library, the further end of the building being adapted as a simple chapel. Here men may gain something better than the sturdy limbs and bronzed arms and faces which make labour in such conditions so different from that in a prison workshop. They are trusted and no one has attempted to escape. A period in such a camp is especially useful during the later portion of a man's sentence, as forming a transition to the normal life of freedom.

The Borstal system has undergone in recent years a beneficent transformation almost as remarkable. The various Borstal Institutions have now each a special character of their own and care is taken to send every lad to the particular Institution for which he is best adapted. The older Institutions suffer from the fact that their original buildings were designed as prisons (in one case as an industrial school), but even here great improvements have been made, the large areas of land available giving opportunities for development. Housemasters are in charge of different houses who have some of them given up the opportunity of far more remunerative posts in order to devote themselves to this work.

The best work done either in prison or at a Borstal Institution cannot be measured by statistics. But the figures given in successive annual reports do show a steady improvement. In spite of the continuance of widespread unemployment the number of prisoners is falling steadily; in 1936 the daily average was less than 11,000 compared with about 13,000 in 1933. For the first time in our prison history the Commissioners were able to state, in their last Report, that there had been not a single case of corporal punishment in any prison, including convict prisons, during the year under review (1935). But in spite of the beneficent changes of

recent years, it would be a mistake to view with complacency the condition of English prisons to-day. In dealing with delinquency imprisonment is at best a *pis aller*. There are still far too many behind prison walls who ought to have been dealt with in other ways, whether in Borstal Institutions, or by being placed on probation, especially with obligations of making restitution. Until quite recently a large proportion of prisoners were in prison for the crime of poverty. The Courts had ordered them to pay a fine and because of their inability to do so they had to submit to imprisonment. The passing of the Criminal Justice Administration Act in 1914 for the first time allowed the Courts to order the payment of fines by instalments, and in consequence the number of imprisonments was reduced by 70,000 yearly. But many Courts failed to make proper use of the Act and it was only when the Money Payments (Justices Procedure) Act came into force at the beginning of 1936 that provision was made for inquiry as to the means of payment of a person ordered to pay a fine, before the alternative of imprisonment should be enforced. This has resulted in a further reduction of imprisonments. Over 20,000 cases of imprisonment occurred in 1932 in default of fines or other money payment, while in 1936 there were 11,623 such cases. But if all Courts made full use of their statutory powers the number might be still further diminished, as has been clearly shown by Mr. W. Thoday in the *Howard Journal*.

Among the least satisfactory of these cases of imprisonment are those of men who have not paid money due under a wife maintenance or affiliation order. In Scotland such claims are dealt with by a writ of attachment by which the money is made deductible from wages or salary. Our English system gives no relief to the aggrieved wife or mother; it is costly to the taxpayer and ineffective in redressing the wrong that has been done. But still more serious is the fact that in 1935, the latest year for which figures are available, 1,608 youths and 99 girls under twenty-one years of age were sentenced to imprisonment, of whom over a third had not been previously convicted of any offence. Among the chief offences giving rise to this imprisonment were offences against the Highway Acts, breaches of police regulations, begging and sleeping out. In spite of repeated representations from the Home Office, magistrates continue to give

EDUCATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

NO one, I think, would deny that international relations are profoundly affected by education, the attitude inculcated into the children of to-day and the recruits and voters of to-morrow with regard to their opposite numbers in other countries and with regard to the value or the iniquity of war. In the democratic countries, where free discussion can occur, and governments depend upon free expression of majority support, the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion is obvious; it is perhaps more remarkable that not even the most arbitrary dictatorship dares to take important international action without having sought to convince its subjects that this action was necessary and justifiable.

Few countries other than Germany since the Hitler régime supply direct political teaching at school, and it is therefore generally agreed that, in shaping the attitudes of children towards international questions, history is the most important subject in the school curricula. Here the achievements of France in the last ten years or so are of particular interest. Even before 1914 there was a strong internationalist and pacifist element among the school teachers of France. This re-emerged and developed prodigiously after the war, strongly condemning Poincaré's policy and the French occupation of the Ruhr. In 1926 the National Union of French Elementary Teachers decreed a boycott against all chauvinistic history text-books. "We wish to end historical misrepresentation which contains the germs of defiance, of suspicion, of hatred and of war," they declared; "we hope that a great gratitude and a great pity will be born in them [their pupils] for men of all ages and of all countries." The teachers were backed by the *Confédération Générale du Travail* or French Trades Union Congress, and the boycott was systematically carried out so that publishers found it in fact impossible to sell sufficient copies of history text-books with a jingoistic flavour. The books in widest use since then are the series compiled by the famous historian, Ernest Lavisse. A characteristic passage from his history of France for the children of eight and nine, after telling its readers

that they will be proud of France, concludes with the words:

"But you will not be arrogant. You will not wish to dominate or humiliate other nations. War is a terrible scourge; you will detest it, and you will work in your turn with all your heart to make France prosperous in peace as she was valiant in war."

As a matter of fact C.G.T. officials regard even the Lavisse text-books as too unprogressive and too chauvinist in tone, and it is true that on one occasion Lavisse writes, "No country has done so much for humanity as France." Typical of a group of text-books rather more to the left is the sentence, "Pasteur, who served humanity so well, saved more millions of lives than ever the folly of men destroyed upon battlefields" (see Gauthier et Deschamps—*Histoire de France—Cours élémentaire et moyen*—Hachette). Marshal Pétain, as his speech at the *Revue des Deux Mondes* annual dinner in 1936 showed, is among those who consider that pacifism has gone much too far in French education.

The efforts of the teachers of France towards putting an end to "historical misrepresentation" extended beyond their own frontiers. After wearying delays partly to be attributed to the stormy nature of events in Germany, it was at last arranged towards the end of 1935 that representatives of the elementary teachers of France should consult with representatives from Germany as to the possibility of agreement over controversial points, so that French children should not constantly be taught to interpret history in a manner exactly opposite from that prevailing in Germany. The French readily made various admissions; they agreed, for instance, that chauvinistic influences had increased in France from 1911 to 1914 (as typified by the extension of military service, etc.). But when in their turn they asked their German comrades, as they habitually called them, to admit the bellicose influence exercised by the German General Staff in July 1914, the German elementary teachers found themselves compelled to refer to Berlin, and nothing further has ever been heard from them.

While the large majority of French elementary school teachers has had pacifist and internationalist sympathies for a sufficient number of years to affect the results of the Parliamentary elections in spring 1936, the accession to power of the Blum Cabinet removed what little resistance

short sentences of imprisonment, under the impression that this is the best way to teach a lesson to delinquents. The lesson actually learnt is too often no help either to the individual or to society.

In addition to these cases over 700 boys and girls were committed in 1935 to Borstal detention. Unfortunately a large number of these spent some time in prison awaiting trial or awaiting transfer to the wing of Wormwood Scrubs Prison, which has for some time been specially adapted as a sorting house for the various Borstal Institutions. In some cases three months elapse between a lad's committal to quarter sessions or assizes and the final decision sending him to Borstal; often he has to spend several weeks in a general prison in similar circumstances. One of the objects of Borstal training was to remove young offenders from the prison taint and all association with adult prisoners; and even though the Prison Commissioners have rightly decided to remove such lads, who are waiting trial for periods of a month or more, to special accommodation for younger prisoners provided at Durham and other gaols, this is not enough. There is need for amendment of the law to provide that youths recommended for Borstal should, if not released on bail, be detained in remand homes and not in prisons.

A further reform should provide for the raising of the age at which imprisonment is legal. Prison officials still on active service can remember a time when boys of nine and eleven years of age were imprisoned for petty larceny. There are boys of seventeen or eighteen imprisoned under our present laws who are mentally far younger, who have had home life and circumstances all against them. I remember seeing in prison an orphan lad of eighteen who had been guilty of throwing missiles at a horse-chestnut tree to get horse chestnuts for a game; another unemployed lad who had taken coal from a colliery dump for use in his home. Many similar cases must be familiar to prison visitors. Young offenders should be dealt with by a fuller use of probation and by an extension of the Borsal system, not by imprisonment.

Only gradually has the Borstal training evolved from its first experimental stage, and it is still handicapped in the older Institutions by buildings which were originally prisons. The whole admirable work of the Prison Commissioners suffers from this defect. Most of our prisons are in towns,

housed in massive buildings erected generations ago as fit expressions of a repressive system intended to be deterrent and punitive rather than reformatory. New methods have done much to change prison life for the better, but the prison buildings create an atmosphere which is adverse to the spirit of reform. It casts its gloom over officers and prisoners alike. These prisons occupy valuable sites, which in some cases like Pentonville are urgently needed for housing schemes, while the sale of other closed prisons such as Reading would provide funds for new buildings. The prisons of the future should not be situated in crowded urban districts, but in places where simple buildings could be put up with ample land around them, so that a large proportion of prisoners might be engaged in hard and healthy open-air work. Centres of reception would still be required in the larger towns, but nothing like our existing prisons.

Such an improved background would give fuller opportunity to the prison staff to do their best; it would also make possible a greater variety and a better grading and classification of prisoners. The experience of the Wakefield Training Centre has shown that under suitable conditions prisoners can do much to help their fellow prisoners' progress. In the open-air prison camp there is fuller opportunity for the best influences of mutual aid to be exercised.

The staff of the Prison Service are engaged on an unending task of great difficulty, for which the very best men and women are needed. For some time special training has been given at Wakefield to intending prison officers and a school is now being built there in which Scottish officers and officers of the colonial prison services will also receive training, and it is to be anticipated that further improvements in the conditions of service will follow before long. But one important branch of the staff whose work calls for the highest personal qualifications needs careful and understanding consideration by the authorities. The prison chaplain's work is unique. He has access to every prisoner in his cell. If he wins his confidence he can talk over with him freely the problems and difficulties of his life and be the means of liberation from mental and moral chains. Such work needs special training and calls for the best and ablest ministers of the Church to fulfil a task which demands patience, tact, and insight, sympathy and firmness. Bishop

was offered by the Ministry of Education. As a matter of fact the Ministry has not been in the habit of interfering very much; teachers are left almost entirely free to choose text-books so long as they succeed in preparing their pupils for the examinations set by the State. In the secondary schools of France the teachers are much more evenly divided between the Right and the Left; it is especially in private (mostly Catholic) schools that a strongly nationalistic note prevails and the influence of writers such as Jacques Bainville no doubt makes itself felt. In the *Lycées* and *Collèges* (organised respectively by the State and the municipalities), the admirable Malet-Isaac text-books have been generally used among history teachers for some time. M. Albert Malet was killed in the war in 1915, since when his books have been more or less re-written by M. Jules Isaac and purged of everything which might conceivably be condemned as chauvinistic. Instead M. Isaac has made a number of valuable additions. He has, for instance, included an account by a German colleague of the causes both of the war of 1870 and of that of 1914, and he has taken great care to mention the German belief in Belgian sharp-shooting as an exonerating circumstance with regard to the worst barbarities in Belgium.

It is sometimes alleged that there can be no valid co-operation between states which have adopted political systems of a strikingly different kind. In France and England school children are fairly certain to imbibe some respect for constitutional democracy at the expense of dictatorial systems. The defence of democracy, as it is presented to them, is, however, based upon the necessity for the tolerance upon which democracy is built up, and this tolerance provides some sort of foundation for constructive internationalism, and involves the condemnation and avoidance of war. Not only tolerance, but any attempts to achieve objectivity, are frankly condemned in the authoritarian states. Among contemporary German educationalists there is an overwhelming number of assertions that history must be taught as part of the National Socialist *Weltanschauung*, and that it is foolish for Germans to attempt to understand anything but a German point of view. An authoritative statement to this effect was, for instance, provided by Professor Walter Voigtländer of Berlin in a lecture entitled "Historical knowledge and historical teaching"; this was given at the

first historical conference of the Nazi Teachers' Association held at Bremen from September 28th to October 6th, 1935. At the second of these conferences at Ulm in 1936 the same principles were duly re-emphasised; one of the lecturers was Karl Alnor, who wrote in his *Geschichtsunterricht* (1935) that it is too intellectual a goal in historical education to attempt to provide understanding of foreign conceptions.

The prevalent attitude to war, in Nazi Germany as in Fascist Italy, is summed up in the sentence "War, the father of all things, is also our father; it has hammered, chiselled and hardened us into what we are," quoted in Wilhelm Rödiger's *Geschichte, Ziel, Stoff und Weg*, 1934. Whereas in France history teaching has turned away from battles, and instead of the old Bonapartist cult the youngest pupils of Lavissee learn that "*Napoléon aimait trop la guerre*," in Germany the view is taken that "in order to awaken comprehension of military questions, the history of war must be more cherished than under the Republic" (Professor Ottmar Fecht). Even a well-known publisher's catalogue (*Pädagogische Nachrichten der Verlag Moritz Diesterweg*) takes care to explain that the German schoolboy "must know that mathematics are not a subject needed merely for a few technical professions, but that one must master them in order to comprehend the life in the body of the nation and in order to learn to use arms to defend it." The Great War is presented in all school books or hand-books for teachers as a demonstration—in the midst of a malevolent world—of heroic national solidarity out of which National Socialism was born.

German education to-day is hampered with regard to international relations in two ways in particular. In the first place the word "international" itself has been turned by Nazi ideology into a term of positive abuse, representing treacherous and Jewish qualities inimical to Germany. In new Nazi history books Charlemagne has become a dangerous cosmopolitan, over-influenced by the sinister international traditions of the Roman Catholic Church and consequently a slayer of good German Saxons; in one historical picture book (*Anti-Semitismus der Welt in Wort und Bild*, by Dr. Theodor Pugel and others, Dresden, 1936) he is even accused of being himself a Jew. As for modern internationalism, that is bitterly, and often lengthily, denounced, along with the

Berggrav in Norway is a fine example of such a prison chaplain. There are good chaplains in some of our prisons, doing devoted and admirable work. But too often in the past chaplains would seem to have been chosen at haphazard and with very different results.

The responsibility of the community for the prisoner does not end with the expiration of his sentence. This has been recognised in the financial assistance given by Government grants to Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies. In recent years the creation of the Borstal Association and the formation of local groups of helpers for ex-Borstal prisoners has been a most helpful development, not only in finding suitable posts for the lads, but in giving them a friend in whom they can confide who can help them in other ways.

To provide similar help for adult prisoners is far harder. Within limits, usually made narrower by restrictions of finance, a number of discharged prisoners and societies have done most valuable service. But other societies still work along fixed lines laid down many years ago and there is great need for better co-ordination, a task upon which the National Association of Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies is now engaged. Such after-care work cannot be carried through by an official machine, however excellent. It depends upon the co-operation of voluntary workers able to visit the home and to show themselves the friends of the ex-prisoner. There are not enough of such men and women coming forward to assist in this essential service. The State can increase its grants in aid, can secure better co-ordination and insist on a common minimum standard of assistance. It cannot bring into being the voluntary helpers who are needed if the end is to be achieved.

It is not possible to find suitable work for every discharged prisoner. There are two groups in particular for whom other provision is urgently required: those who by reason of age or physical disability are unable to find work as labourers, and young prisoners who have received no previous training and have no homes upon which they can fall back. The Salvation Army and Church Army Labour Homes continue to be of great service in many of these cases, but they are not suited to be training places for young prisoners, nor are they adapted to certain other cases requiring special care. More voluntary institutions are needed, some like the training

centre of the Wayfarers' Benevolent Association in County Durham, especially adapted for the training of youths, others which would provide for the older men. This is essentially work for volunteers, but it fills a gap which our public assistance system cannot do, and in every case where an ex-prisoner is thus kept from falling back into a life of crime there is a definite saving to the community. There is thus good ground to press for a grant in aid of maintenance from the public funds to such institutions, based on the number of inmates of each, and subject to satisfactory reports from Inspectors. For lack of such homes and training centres numbers of ex-prisoners drift back to prison. The aim of the Prison Commissioners to-day is to help the prisoner to leave prison a better citizen than when he came in. If that object is not to be defeated in many cases, more must be done for the ex-prisoner; above all, more to give to younger prisoners the opportunity of making good.

T. EDMUND HARVEY.

Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, in the history books which deal with the post-war period.

The second obstacle placed by contemporary German educationalists in the way of international agreement is the Race Theory, which does not ask simply that political should be identical with racial frontiers, but proclaims a hierarchy of races. The Germans, according to Reich Home Office instructions in 1933 and according to Dr. Hans Bogner's lecture at the Bremen Conference, are to be specially associated in the minds of children with the ruling caste in Ancient Greece. For the heroic Germanic race is held to be superior to all other races, and, of course, to racially confused communities; indeed the Germanic race is described as a race of masters with a mission to rule others—how the others are to be ruled unless they are first conquered is not always clear. Even in official teachers' journals one constantly reads such sentences as "Only peoples with a specially valuable blood inheritance find enough strength to become masters of the space they need to live in" (see *Nationalsozialistische Erziehung*, No. 47, November 21st, 1936). Statements about the Eastern frontier—a favourite topic—express constant regret that Bohemia and Western Poland were not more thoroughly Germanised in the past (cf. *Studienleiter* Helmut Lüpke at Bremen, 1935).

Nazi doctrine is taught in special "national-political" lessons, which are nowadays attended twice every week by all school children in Germany, with the exception of the top classes in the secondary schools; the Race Theory pervades the history lessons as well. The well-known Nazi educationist, Herr Dietrich Klagges, has recently brought out a book on the teaching of history (*Geschichtsunterricht*; Frankfurt a/Main, 1936) in which, among many other statements of the kind, he writes that the "nordic colony, Rome," was not able to fulfil its greatest purpose, "*den ganzen Erdball nordisch zu bestimmen*," because it had failed to keep up its racial strength. Of the dark ages he writes, "The Germanic will to live is at this time dynamic; its impulse is directed towards the Germanisation of Europe and finally succeeds in achieving its goal through constant fights against Celts, Slavs, Greeks and Romans."

The most deliberately fanatical teaching of all occurs in the Adolf-Hitler Schools which prepare boys from 12 to 18 for

the *Ordensburgen*, i.e. for the final training of Nazi leaders. Tremendous care is taken, however, to ensure that teachers of every possible kind are impregnated with the Nazi point of view. According to the decisions of the Bremen conference, and according to official and semi-official instructions to teachers, the Race Theory is to be closely related to biology, for race is a matter of physical forces finding their equilibrium. History teachers are in future to make history a thing that is felt, rather than a coldly comparative study of facts. In pursuance of this objective, a now approved method is to send groups of students training to become teachers, and even school children from crowded towns, to camp near some small village on the German-Polish frontier. Here they are to be made to feel that German is superior to Slavonic culture, and that across the frontier there is space for Germans from over-populated cities. Many camping expeditions are also made by the Hitler Youth groups; indeed young Germans depend as much upon the Hitler Youth organisation as upon actual schooling for their education to-day. There is nothing in the democratic countries to compare with this virtually compulsory State organisation of the young. In France, for instance, scouting is usually organised by the *curé* or by the Protestant minister; there are unconfessional scouts as well, but none of the scouting has anything to do with the State nor is there any pressure upon boys to go in for it.

It is easy to understand that the Germans, whose country has been subjected to the sufferings which followed the Treaties of Westphalia, the Napoleonic occupation and the last Treaty of Versailles, all of which were to some extent justified in the name of internationalism, should readily accept condemnation of this word. Nor must it be forgotten that many German teachers would wish to formulate the Race Theory as a belief that several races should have equal rights. The history of Italy, also, makes intelligible an angry reaction against anything that savours of international control. Yet however explicable these attitudes are, the consequent educational systems are such as to tempt one to accept the inevitability of the division of the world into politically irreconcilable blocs.

Before one succumbs to this dismal suggestion, two mitigating achievements deserve to be mentioned. The

THE "FRONT POPULAIRE" AT DEADLOCK?

THE French Popular Front has been criticised both by its Socialist followers for not having gone "far enough," and by capitalist adversaries for having gone "too far." The statistics emphasised by the Government and their followers prove that business has been revived through their policy; other statistics quoted by the opposition show that if not business, at least finance has gone from bad to worse. Foreign observers, on the other hand, whose point of view is less hampered by political preferences, are very often inclined to judge from the political landscape of their own country and, therefore, fail to see the particular features of French society. A French syndicalist will always look on an English trade union leader as a Conservative, though both are members of the same International; English Conservatives, in their turn, will be astonished to find the French "Gauche Républicaine" so stubborn in their fight against social progress. English observers seldom realise that French workers are often owners of considerable savings bank deposits, that hotel butlers are often themselves owners of other boarding-houses, that one-fourth of the population are railway bondholders and another fourth gilt-edged speculators. There are few people even in the highest State offices who have no peasant relatives, and still fewer who do not hope that their children will climb the social ladder. Briefly, the social pyramid and the distribution of income is a rather smooth and comparatively even one, and the middle classes, therefore, comprise more people than in other countries. On the other hand, there are many people whose great-grandfathers took part in some revolutionary movement and handed down to their descendants the Jacobin spirit. The middle classes are economically conservative and politically *avancés*; they pervade the other classes and influence their state of mind. Moreover, there is hardly any political movement that could succeed without middle-class sympathy.

The bulk of the middle classes are democratic and, since the *putsch* in 1934, anti-Fascist; they are strongly opposed to great warehouses, trusts and banks and what is called in France "the 200 families"; they believe in the "consumption theory," since their customers are the great masses of the

working population, and for this reason were hostile to the Laval policy of deflation. They joined the Popular Front movement and backed the great strike movement in 1936. Numerous small retailers advanced their commodities on credit to strikers and even spent money for the movement. Moreover, their confidence in the new era was so great as to repatriate savings from abroad in the first weeks of the Popular Front Government. They approved the new social legislation which in July and August 1936 put France finally on a level with other European countries. For most of the increased wage rates went to the retail trade, and it might be hoped that the increasing purchasing power would accelerate the marked revival in consumption industries since the beginning of the year.

Up to that point the middle classes and a large number of peasants who benefited from the wheat revalorisation policy of the Government backed the social reforms. But there were other factors to counteract these currents. The middle classes are economically conservative, or "classic" as it is called in France. Moreover, these individualists were opposed to devaluation and did not make up their minds to an increase of turnover at low prices; the trade discipline which assured the success of the English devaluation was entirely lacking in France. If the small retailers could not always follow immediately the rise in prices, the wholesale dealers did not resist the temptation, and thus lowered the margin of retail trade. Considering the share of wages in the price of finished articles, the rise in wholesale prices should have been about 16 per cent.; in fact it was much higher, and after the devaluation it went on at an accelerated rate.

The Government did not dare to devalue the franc in time. When it did so in October, the reactions of devaluation coincided with the rise of the world price level, so that French prices were not adjusted to world prices and the workers lost the whole of the advantages they had gained in the June and July strikes. By March 1937 real weekly wages had already fallen below the level of March 1936 (this calculation does not include the advantages of fewer hours of work), the margin of retail trade had diminished, the middle classes had lost part of their invested savings (for the rates of stock and bonds had not followed the depreciation of the franc), export trade had not improved. Who was to be held responsible? Employers

reading books recently brought out by the Schuschnigg régime in Austria provide an interesting example of an authoritarianism which is not provocative. If one considers, for instance, an official reading book, *Ich bin ein Österreicher*, for the top forms (children aged 13 to 14) of the elementary schools, one finds that democracy is condemned, and that there is a great deal of homage paid to military heroes of the past. Yet war is not praised *qua* war, nor are "internationalists" like Charlemagne decried. And, whereas all the new German books invariably refer to the "present" frontiers of the Reich as if they could not be its future ones, the Austrian reading books refer to the tremendous losses of Austria in 1919 without any implication that lost territories should be recaptured. No Austrian is indifferent to the fate of the South Tyrol. Yet many of the best friends of the South Tyrolese will agree that international relations in general are perhaps better served if the children of Austria are brought up to something more constructive than bitter indignation.

The second mitigation consists in a remarkable agreement, which was reached early this summer, between some French and German professors of history with regard to the teaching of that subject in secondary schools. Late in 1935 two German historians, representing the *Verband deutscher Geschichtslehrer*, Professor Herre of Leipzig and Dr. Reimann of Berlin, approached M. Jules Isaac (who now holds an important position in the French Ministry of Education) as to the possibility of eliminating the most glaring discrepancies in the history text-books in use on each side of the frontier between Germany and France. M. Isaac gladly put the two Germans in touch with the French Society of History Teachers, who provided five further representatives; a representative of the French elementary teachers also attended the meetings of this Franco-German commission. A joint memorandum had been compiled with difficulty and even reluctance when, in June 1936, the German Government caused the whole transaction to be broken off. On March 31st of that year Herr Hitler had himself proposed, *inter alia*, that in the education of the young in France and Germany "everything shall be avoided which might be calculated to poison the relationship between the two peoples," so that the interference from Berlin with the Franco-German historians' deliberations seemed to be strikingly inconsistent. Any

compromise, even with the most liberally-thinking Frenchmen, would, however, necessitate the revocation of all the history books which had appeared in Germany since 1933.

It is all the more perplexing that in the spring of 1937 the negotiations were allowed to be resumed, and the results were published in two educational journals in both France and Germany in May. Among other things the French have agreed to put a stop to suggestions that Bismarck was essentially a war-monger, and are willing to teach, in future, that he only desired war in the interests of German unity. The Germans, on their part, agreed to recognise that Napoleon III was not an inveterate enemy to German unity, and that Alsace, though essentially German in the Middle Ages, had become an integral part of "*la communauté nationale française*" with the revolution of 1789. The Germans wished to depict the wars of Frederick the Great as less guilty than those of Louis XIV because Frederick's aggressions occurred, as they claimed, only within German territory; the French believed that this distinction could not be historically justified.

When it came to less academic and more recent controversies, the discussions became more difficult. It was agreed that French text-books had tended to exaggerate the importance of Pan-Germanism, and that German writers had made too much of the "*idée de revanche*" which had ceased to count after 1890. Even over the Moroccan question, from 1904 to 1911, agreement was possible, but over the outbreak of the war in 1914 and especially over reparations and the post-war period the difficulty naturally increased. The agreement is nevertheless an astonishing achievement. The negotiators have promised to keep in touch with one another while exerting all their influence to get their recommendations applied, not only in secondary, but even in elementary schools, where there is of course very much less time for the subject. In France very little change is indicated since the Malet-Isaac books, for instance, are already consistent with the suggestions in the agreement. As for Germany, it can scarcely be imagined, though it should still perhaps be hoped, that the influence of Professor Herre and Dr. Reimann will affect the stream of educational publications and appeals which condemn objectivity and denounce internationalism, especially in the only form in which it has been tangibly if faultily realised at Geneva.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

accuse the policy of social reform and the uncertainty created by the strike movement. The Government, on their side, charge the employers and capitalists with the reproach of sabotage and of a "strike of capital." Neither of these factors is to be neglected, but they are interdependent. If the Government is to be criticised, it is certainly for its hesitation to devalue the franc despite the high price level and the heavy charges weighing on the Treasury. Devaluation was overdue. Social reform was also overdue; the violence of the strike movement has shown that these reform laws only stole a march on revolution, for the standard of life of the workers had seriously suffered from the crisis. The Government did their best to stop the movement; even the Communist leader Thorez said that "one must know how to stop a strike." The establishment of collective bargaining and of the mechanism of industrial arbitration was a masterpiece of statesmanship on the part of the Prime Minister. But employers could not make up their minds to this method of industrial relations, which is now in operation in all capitalist countries; they hold that trade union representatives and State arbitrators are hampering their liberty, and that trade unions in general are prejudicial to "freedom of work."

This state of mind of the French employers was not reckoned with in the plans of the Government. In France psychological factors, and in particular the estimate of the Minister of Finance by the big investors, have always been of great importance. Vincent Auriol had not the confidence of business, and his menaces were not reassuring. Capital fled from France. Employers would rather shut down their plants than suffer trade union representatives; capitalists would rather content themselves with no interest abroad than leave their money to a Socialist Government. New investments were rare, and engineering, which had a favourable outlook in the summer of 1936, suffered a setback in consequence of the "strike of capital." There were factories which could not meet the demands of increased purchasing power, but they did not think of enlarging the plant or buying new machines. It had been hoped that in consequence of the forty-hour week and of the adjustment of wages many managers would rationalise and revive engineering. This hope was disappointed, for capitalists seem to have adopted the tactic of a

tacit conspiracy against enlarged turnover. Wholesale prices went up in an atmosphere of panic. The middle-class retailers, who follow the financial lead of their political enemies, did not invest the accrued earnings at home but sent their capital abroad. The stream of capital set flowing by the Government, by wage increases, public works, armaments and the Exhibition was stopped after one turnover. The money pumped into circulation fled and did not return to the National Bank. Nor did the expected taxation returns materialise. The whole venture of purchasing power reflation collapsed, the State had more expenses and comparatively less income. The Treasury, which even in normal times has to borrow yearly ten to twenty thousand millions, did not find any more credit. Even the National Defence Loan, which was rather popular, had to be offered on conditions which must ruin the credit of the State for years. If it pays 6 per cent., business credit cannot be much cheaper. The precarious situation of the Treasury therefore hampered long-time investments in trade, in particular building enterprise.

This order of things may appear strange to English people. But French capitalists and managers follow their political opinions rather than their economic interest. The workers made many sacrifices for "their" Government; capitalists were not inclined to be helped by a Socialist (or a Fascist) Government. The Government thought they had just to loosen the brakes of deflation in order to revive business. They would have succeeded had they dared to control capital and exchange markets, which they did not for fear of the middle-class investors. If there is any case against the Government, it is that they have not thought logically. They should have made no experiment at all or a more thorough one. A "plan" without control of its effects is a contradiction. The Government have created a situation where their success depended on the good will of their political adversaries; indeed they suffered capital to hold the Treasury by the throat. On the other hand, the case against the capitalists is fairly exhibited by their attitude to the Treasury. The Socialist Minister Auriol could not even borrow call money, and the Senate refused authority for rescue measures. When Bonnet, who is neither Socialist nor Front Populaire, succeeded him in office, he carried through what Auriol had proposed and could even launch a consolidation loan. The

THE BACKGROUND OF THE FIGHT FOR MONGOLIA.

ONLY a short time ago the roaring of cannon, bombs and machine-guns was sounding over the Chinese province of Suiyuan in Inner Mongolia, where "irregular" Mongol and Manchukuo forces, assisted by the aeroplanes, tanks and all the equipment of modern warfare of a "certain Power," attacked the Chinese provincial and Government troops. Hitherto the invaders have been repulsed. But this is not the first fighting in Mongolia and it probably will not be the last. Its location between three interested Powers, the sparse population of the vast region with newly developed but not uniform ideas of nationalism, and the complicated international and legal relations of the different districts of the country make the situation difficult and dangerous.

It is indeed a fiction to speak of "Mongolia," for in reality no such country exists. The region where the Mongols live has belonged to China since the time of the Ching dynasty at least. It is separated into Outer and Inner Mongolia by the Gobi desert. To-day it is politically divided into three different territories: Outer Mongolia under Russian influence, Manchurian Inner Mongolia belonging to Manchukuo, and the rest of Chinese Inner Mongolia where the fight between China and Japan is now taking place. To understand the situation in this key position in the Far East, one has to follow the developments and political relations of all these different parts of Mongolia.

Under Ghengis Khan and his successors the Mongols were a world power. Although it is said that the famous legal code which to-day is still respected by the nomadic tribes—the so-called code Ghengis Khan—dates from that time, they were never able to build up a true Mongolian state, but were satisfied with the domination of conquered nations. Or they were absorbed as, for instance, in China, which they ruled in the time of the Yuan dynasty (1260–1367). They were strong only when united; and not until Ghengis Khan were they one people with the new name "Mongols." But the golden age had passed and they remained under Chinese domination.

Chinese policy towards Mongolia had its own tradition. Knowing that only unity made the Mongols strong and dangerous, the Chinese dynasties learned to apply the principle

of *divide et impera* to their north-western neighbours. The Manchus, who themselves were first allies, made an alliance with the Mongols in 1640 in order to conquer China. But the policy of the Manchu Emperors towards the Mongols remained the same. The absolute power of princes was limited by the introduction of democratic leagues, the heads of which had to be appointed by the Emperor. The highest authority was the colonial ministry, but the actual Chinese control of Outer Mongolia was carried out by Chinese officials in Urga, Uliassutai and Kobdo, while Inner Mongolia came more and more within the reach of Chinese colonisation and was finally formed into Chinese provinces. Buddhism also played an important part in the Chinese domination of Mongolia, and the relations of the Chinese Government to the leading Lamas of Tibet are to-day as in former times an important chapter of this policy.

Chinese policy in the past towards Mongolia shows frequent change from domination of the regions, as well as control of the important silk roads to the West, to self-defence behind the fortifications of the Great Wall. The mechanisation and improved communications of the present time would give China, with her natural talents for colonisation, a great advantage over the nomadic peoples. Indeed the colonisation of Mongolia through a united China would probably make rapid progress, if it were not for the appearance of two outside powers, Russia and Japan.

Russia has had relations with the Mongols ever since the expansion of her power in Siberia, but only in modern times has she become one of the most important factors in Mongolian affairs. After her Far Eastern advances into Manchuria had been repulsed in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 and her ambitions at that time still limited to northern Manchuria, the Governments of the Tsar and later of the Soviets concentrated their attention on Outer Mongolia. This vast country between Altai and Gobi is to-day of vital importance to the Soviet Union, not only because it lies along the Siberian railway, but because it protects also the central and most important industrial basin of Kusnetzsk, newly developed by Russia.

After the fall of the Ching dynasty in China in 1911, the Mongols of Outer Mongolia drove the Chinese officials away and declared their independence under the Hutuktu, the

economic forces of the country are strong enough to make quick reconstruction possible but for the stubborn individualism of the middle class.

The situation has been saved by the second Cabinet of the Popular Front with Chautemps as Prime Minister. It suits the middle classes, for it is economically capitalist and politically anti-Fascist. If Blum was the only political leader who was able to force the "pause" upon the workers, Chautemps is the only one to make the middle classes acquiesce. The political equilibrium has been restored in the frame of the classical French economy. This cannot be said of economic equilibrium. Devaluation has impoverished many people who were considered hitherto as the basis of social equilibrium. The structure of prices has rendered competition difficult for the small retailers; the social reforms have raised cost prices and eliminated many small factories (half of the factories in France employ less than 100 hands). In consequence there are fewer middlemen, the margin of wholesale and retail trade will be compressed, and there will be fewer people to live upon workless income. In other words: the "proletarianisation" of the middle classes emphasised by Socialist theorists will be much more marked than it was before. If French economy is to compete with foreign countries, it must necessarily get rid of the weight of non-producers. The coming political struggle will decide whether producers or bondholders shall govern the country.

The political structure of the Popular Front will not permit the present coalition to settle this problem. It would be faced with strong opposition, and it is unable to lead France to a new plan. The Prime Minister has hinted that "there are always *hommes d'argent* watching the public difficulties," by which he pointed to the proverbial *mur d'argent* which had overthrown so many Radical cabinets by refusing to lend their money to the Treasury. In fact even the most optimistic acknowledge that the Treasury will have to borrow fifteen thousand millions next year. The capital market will be able to furnish it, but the City will certainly not do so without more political guarantees. There are plans to "enlarge" the present majority. Certain business circles would agree to collaborate with the Popular Front, if it could be transformed into a "National Front" comprising all parties from the Socialists to La Rocque. This fraction is represented by

Pâtenotre (who recently sold his Radical Popular Front newspaper to La Rocque), Finaly (who mainly for this reason had to resign his seat on the Board of Directors of the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, one of the greatest business banks), and the electro- and chemical "king" Mercier (who financed the nationalist Croix-de-Feu movement and at the same time the "Friends of the New Russia"). On the other hand, the group De Wendel-Moreau (who ousted Finaly) and perhaps the Rothschild group, who are more favourable to an understanding with Germany, decline any collaboration with the Popular Front; they try to create a "liberty front" comprising all nationalist parties and some of the Radical deputies. The political mouthpiece of the first group is the former Minister of Finance, Paul Reynaud, that of the second the former Communist Doriot and the former Premier Tardieu. These different appreciations of the Popular Front are the cause of the violent hatred, the calumnies and the recent outrages among members of the Right. A series of lawsuits about the subsidies La Rocque obtained under the Laval and Tardieu Ministries will clear the situation. If they reveal the weakness of the present opposition, they equally show that the fate of the Popular Front is already a matter of discussion among its adversaries. La Rocque prefers to use it up, Doriot to overthrow it by force if necessary. Of these groups, the latter is sure to collect those former supporters of the Popular Front who have been disillusioned.

But France is not a country of great political landslides. The recent local elections show a fair recovery of the Radical Party, great stability of the Socialist constituencies and a further setback of the moderate Republicans. The Fascist candidates made no progress; the Communists could not win anything, in spite of considerable propaganda, except in Alsace, where their new nationalist line had some success. If Paris had taken part in the vote the Communists would have achieved a slight success, for their influence in the Paris trade unions is still growing and the bulk of the unemployed dwell in the Paris suburbs. The party caucus of the traditional leaders has turned out to be still strong enough to secure a following in the constituencies they "own," and the electorate are not ready to change their political *mystique* unless the leaders do so. Moreover, the Radical success shows that the majority want to accomplish social reform in the

living Buddha at Urga. The Pro-Russian party organised the new government. Russia guaranteed autonomy in the agreement of November 1912, protecting Outer Mongolia against China. The Mongols were partly disappointed by their new friend, as Russia, for the sake of her foreign relations, assisted the movement only in Outer Mongolia, and even there did not help the Mongols to achieve full independence, but only autonomy. Chinese sovereignty was recognised in a Sino-Russian agreement of November 1913, while China recognised the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. And the Mongols tried in vain to start relations with other Powers.

Under the new Mongolian régime imperial Russia initiated a policy of commercial, financial and military control. The agreement of 1912 had given her the right to import and export goods duty free. To this advantage was added that of natural proximity. Not satisfied with this, she had plans to levy duties on goods coming from China proper, which were renounced at last because she feared international complications. But it is interesting to note that the Russian Government felt that the collection of custom duties on the Chinese border was in contradiction to Chinese sovereignty, although the latter was embodied in a Chinese representative without much power. Financially Russia made a "loan" of 3 million roubles and secured herself a virtual monopoly in railway construction, not because she wished to build railways herself, but to prevent a more favourable commercial connection with China.

During the world war, while Russia was preoccupied in the west, China brought about the conclusion of the tripartite treaty of Kiachta, 1915, with Russia and Outer Mongolia. Chinese sovereignty was again recognised by Mongolia herself, which promised not to conclude any treaty of a political nature or with territorial clauses without consulting China. When Russia broke down in the revolution, the nominal Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia revived and General Little Hsü regained power. Later Mongolia became one of the battlefields of White and Red Russian troops; and after a short interval of government by the White Russian officer Baron Ungern-Sternberg, Outer Mongolia was conquered in 1921 by the Soviets, who since then have kept it under their influence.

The rights of the princes were abolished, the debts

repudiated; as a result Chinese commerce suffered greatly. A treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia was concluded in 1921, in which no mention was made of Chinese sovereignty. But an abortive rebellion of the princes in 1922-3, in which Chinese help was called for, made Russia more inclined towards a new understanding with China, which was also in accord with the Sino-Russian relationship at that time. The Sino-Russian treaty of May 31st, 1924, stipulated that Outer Mongolia should remain an integral part of the Chinese republic, that Chinese sovereignty should be respected, and that the Russian troops should be withdrawn. In March 1925 the Soviet Ambassador informed the Chinese Foreign Office that the Red Army had been withdrawn.

Nevertheless Russia maintained control over Outer Mongolia. After the Hutuktu had died in 1924 no new reincarnation was allowed. The People's General Congress adopted a Russian-made constitution, abolishing the feudal theocratic system and reorganising the state according to the Russian plan. The experiments in introducing a communistic economic system failed, after the attempt to introduce the national ownership of cattle caused a great reduction in number. Only the state monopoly of external trade was maintained despite its bad results. Outer Mongolia is a "democratic and anti-imperialistic" but no more a communistic republic. All commercial and political relations with the rest of the world are barred, and all Japanese influence is cut off. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the resulting pressure on Outer Mongolia, Russia again took more active steps towards the military protection of the country. In March 1936 she made a military pact with Outer Mongolia, showing her intention not to give it up without a fight.

Russia's position in Outer Mongolia to-day is the same as in the time of the Tsars. Besides the Sino-Russian treaty of 1924 recent statements of the Russian Government indicate that she still recognises Chinese sovereignty. When she concluded the new agreement with Outer Mongolia in 1936, China protested twice that her sovereignty rights had been violated. Russia rejected these protests, "for the agreement granted no territorial concession in Mongolia to Russia," and expressly recognised anew Chinese sovereign rights. According to the Russian interpretation therefore territorial integrity is the basis of these sovereign rights.

framework of the actual Constitution and disapprove of the Socialist constitutional reform plan.

"Structural changes" are advocated only by some small groups—the Bergery "Frontists," the Trotskyists, the Left-wing Socialists led by Marceau-Pivert and the J.E.U.N.E.S., a club of young intelligentsia, neither of whom has as yet secured mass support. It is common opinion that the New Deal and the reform laws brought France abreast with social progress in other countries, but that revolution is still far ahead. Undercurrents either of disappointment or in favour of more revolutionary tactics may exist among the workers, but have as yet not emerged to the surface of political life. Nor is there any movement for a repeal of the reform legislation. Collective bargaining, social insurance—soon to be completed by old-age insurance—the National Economic Council, the Wheat Board, corporative control in the National Bank, State control over the armaments industry and the railway system will remain and will bring useful results as soon as the period of adaptation to the new régime is over. Moreover, the economic outlook is now better than a year ago, since the re-equipment of plant and rationalisation have begun, industry profits from the depression in raw material prices, and consumers buy cheaper than a month ago.

One may safely say that the reforms have strengthened the general situation of the French market and that the legacy of the first Popular Front Government to the second was not as bad as the Employers' Association would have it. The Budget for 1938 seems to be virtually balanced, confidence in the stability of the franc is restored—and the opposition have no programme. There is still the question of the "pause." Communists and trade unionists attack the Minister of Finance for his conservative policy; State officials require adjustment of their salaries; some categories of workers complain of employers who do not keep to the agreements of collective contracts. Trade Unions and Left-wing Socialists argue that the "spirit" of the original "*Rassemblement Populaire*" has given way to a mere parliamentary coalition, which only conserves the old name. Though that is true, the recent Socialist conference made it understood that the Socialists are not prepared to consider a withdrawal from Government.

The Radicals, on their part, will follow the policy they

adopted in 1936. The Congress of Lille confirmed its adhesion to the Popular Front and has given power to its representatives to carry on the work they have begun. The opposition to the Minister of the Air Fleet was shouted down, the Right-wing leaders of the North did not even try to oppose the resolution on general policy. The Radical Party will continue its rôle as mediator between the Right and the Left and as moderating element in the Government. It will not break the coalition to enter a moderate Government, where it would be as helpless as in the late Laval combination, and it will not take the risk of once more losing control of the masses by abandoning what Daladier called in his final speech "the old alliance of the *tiers état* and the proletariat." Indeed, the Radical Party is eager not to appear before the masses as a handicap to social reform. As long as the middle-class masses will not change their traditional mentality, the Radical Party will be faithful to the Front Populaire in the political field and to the classic doctrines in the economic field. As they obliged the Socialist Ministers of the first Cabinet to give up the intention of controlled economy, so they will now insist that the era of the reform movement is closed.

It was noticed that the resolution supporting M. Bonnet reads as if implying blame of M. Auriol. There will certainly be some discussion between the two parties in office on this issue and on the main issue of the "pause." But these discussions will not alter the structure of the Popular Front and, therefore, will not cause its breakdown. Although the present coalition is not likely to raise as much enthusiasm and to develop as much activity as its predecessor, and although it will not be able to tackle the major problems of the country—such as the debt burden and industrial reconstruction—with more authority than any other post-war Government has done, its outlook in the short run is now rather promising.

HEINZ PAECHTER.

P.S.—On November 19th, the Chamber ratified the development by a vote of 399 against 160.

This situation has been differently interpreted. Most of the textbooks on international law regard Outer Mongolia as a dependency of Russia, neglecting totally the formal Chinese sovereignty. But the very history of Outer Mongolia shows us that Chinese sovereignty, as long as it is recognised, must be interpreted as more than a farce. We agree with Cleinow who states in his book, *Neusibirien*, that there has been no fundamental change in Russo-Sino relations since the time of the Tsars, and that, although the Chinese government has practically no possibility to-day of exercising its sovereignty in Outer Mongolia, the situation may change with the changing political constellations in the Far East. One has only to think of the episode of 1919, when General Hsü re-established Chinese power in Outer Mongolia; and it is even possible that this country could become a link in a new Sino-Russian understanding. We define Outer Mongolia as an autonomous country under Chinese sovereignty and inside the framework of the Chinese state. Internationally China is bound by treaty with Russia to respect its autonomy.

Inner Mongolia had taken part in the independence movement of 1911 under more important leaders than Outer Mongolia, but had been left without assistance. The leaders of the quasi-revolutionary Mongolian party tried to find help in China, and thought to use Sun Yat Sen's programme of local autonomy and self-government of national minorities. This programme includes the principle of the union on an equal footing of the five nationalities which form the Chinese Republic represented by the five colours in its first flag. There was some hope that Inner Mongolia could be organised on a federal basis, but it vanished when the Chinese Government chose a policy of subjugation. Thus it was the shortsightedness of the local Chinese colonial administration that drove the Mongols back to their ideas of independence, a dangerous policy in a time of international complications.

Inner Mongolia had more reason than Outer Mongolia to rebel against China. There had been real pressure brought to bear by the Chinese, especially in the economic field. The Mongol princes, a number of whom had been bought, had been the nominal heads of the local government; but to the extent that colonisation by Chinese penetrated into the country—cramping more and more the life of the Mongols—the country and with it the Mongols came under Chinese

administration. And this administration, far from the central control, was often corrupt. The Mongols had leased land to the Chinese for colonisation and were financially dependent on these leases. But after a while the money was not paid in many cases, on the pretext that the country and with it the land belonged to the Chinese nation. The concepts of *dominium* and *imperium* were confused, and the land was seized without compensation to the owners. To prevent this the Mongol princes themselves tried to draw up modern title deeds but the Chinese did not recognise them. This colonisation of the land of their fathers, dividing the country into provinces and districts, threatened the very basis of Mongol life. It was the cause of the autonomous movement of Inner Mongolia. The idea of autonomy remained in the minds of the Mongols, and was, for example, expressed at a meeting of Mongol representatives at Nanking in 1930, but in vain. And very likely the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, having no possibility of union with Soviet Outer Mongolia, would have been absorbed by Chinese colonisation if a new outside factor had not changed the situation.

Japan was well aware of the advantages of promoting the Mongol movement. The well known Tanaka memorandum, though a forgery according to Japanese statements, and the Sino-Japanese agreement of 1915 illustrate the Japanese point of view: to use the Mongols as a basis for their continental policy against China and Russia. Young Mongol leaders had been educated in Japan, and in founding the new state of Manchukuo Japan did not forget to grant within her territories a special status to the Mongols. Some of the Mongols had favoured the creation of the new Manchurian state, hoping thus to get a better understanding of their wishes on the part of the Japanese than they had obtained formerly from the Chinese. As a matter of fact Japan has granted them a degree of local self-government in the newly created Hsingan province, where they are also protected against further Chinese encroachment. But as the administrative centre is still Hsinking, the new capital of Manchukuo, all important questions are decided by the officials and Japanese advisers there. The Lytton Report says: "*Si l'appui de certains de ces éléments Mongols est actuellement sincère—encore que prudent—ils sont tout prêts à le retirer s'ils viennent à constater que les Japonais menacent à un moment*

RUSSIA AT THE CROSS ROADS.

ONCE more Russia seems to be face to face with an acute internal crisis. Once more the Soviets are at the centre of public interest and discussion. And again, as often before, it would seem that the Bolsheviks are with their own hands destroying that confidence abroad for which they have so slowly and painfully laboured. For recent events in Soviet Russia—the wholesale slaughter of the Old Guard of the Bolsheviks, the shooting in one day of eight of the most highly placed men in the Red Army, including Marshal Tukhachevsky, spectacular legal proceedings broadcast by loudspeakers and secret tribunals in unnamed places, denunciations of old colleagues and self-betrays by individual confessions, discovery of alleged acts of sabotage and treason in the most exalted circles, incessant death sentences and arrests at the centre as in the outermost borders of the State, and the endless hunt for the Trotsky bogey in German-Japanese disguise all over the Union—these have given a severe shock even to those foreigners most sympathetic to Soviet Russia. Everywhere the questions are being asked: Is Stalin the victim of persecution mania? Is his régime not undermined by these latest events? What are the prospects for the continuance of his dictatorship?

Let us pass straight to the second question, for an examination into Stalin's state of mind would hardly be in place here, and the attempt to find psychological explanations for complicated political developments even in states governed dictatorially is generally harmful and misleading. It will be asked: has Stalin grown stronger or weaker in recent times? This question can be answered neither with a simple affirmative nor with a simple negative. As the leader of Communism, the pathfinder and architect of the foretold World Revolution, he has recently lost very much of his power, confidence and authority. This accounts for the dissensions and confusions in the Communist camp in all countries, inside and outside Europe. For this reason Moscow is no longer the Red Mecca of orthodox Communism. So we can now see in Hyde Park two revolutionary banners—one with the Soviet Star for the followers of Stalin, the other, a plain red one, for the Trotskyists. And the accusation of the betrayal of the Revolution, brought against Stalin by Trotsky in

his books, articles and interviews, can thus be said to be justified.

In truth the Stalin of to-day is no longer the man of 1933 or of the years following the death of Lenin. From being the revolutionary leader and exponent of international socialism he is becoming ever more the despotic guardian of Russian national interests. But it is precisely as a forerunner of the next stage in the history of the Russian Revolution, which may perhaps be called the National Bolshevik period, that he has still further established and consolidated his régime. He himself is not necessarily aware of this inner evolution. He may still imagine himself to be a conscientious trustee of the Lenin heritage. Stalin's present position may be illustrated by an anecdote which was widely circulated in Russia during the Civil War. Two friends met in a Moscow street, and one was telling the other of the shooting of their neighbour Mr. X. The other, however, doubted the authenticity of the information in view of the fact that at that moment he saw Mr. X. himself going by. "Hush," said his friend, "the poor devil is certainly dead, but he still doesn't know it!" Stalin, the prophet and hero of the World Revolution to be, has been slain by Stalin the tool of the dawning national rebirth of Russia. The outcome of the struggle has, however, possibly not yet been communicated to the Communist ex-champion. Theoretically it may be that Stalin still occupies the ground indicated in his famous interview with Wells; as a realist, however, he has found himself obliged to adapt his policy to the changed world situation. Whether later a return to his abandoned revolutionary position can or will prove possible seems problematical and on the whole unlikely.

The transformation of Stalin and the present far-reaching internal political evolution in Russia are not chance phenomena. Both are symptomatic of the precarious foreign political situation of the U.S.S.R. The rise to power of the Nazis and the pious hopes of Hitler to win for the German millions colonies and an outlet in Eastern Europe have decisively influenced the divergence of ideas in Russia and the reorientation of Russian internal policy. The ambition and land-hunger of the Japanese military party have brought additional pressure to bear. In the course of later Russian history wars have repeatedly proved decisive factors in the

donné leur indépendance ou leurs intérêts économiques." The situation seemed to have come to this point when last year the Mongol governor, chief of General Staff, and chief of police of Hsingan province, were shot by the Japanese as Russian spies.

The status of Hsingan province from the legal point of view, as well as of the province of Jehol where also many Mongols live, is not easy to define. It can be judged only in connection with the status of the whole of "Manchukuo," of which it is supposed to be an autonomous part. And here facts as well as legal regulations have to be taken into consideration. For more than four years there has been no actual Chinese control of the region; and the power exercising the actual control does not recognise any Chinese rights. Thinking of the Japanese influence one is tempted to call Manchukuo some sort of Japanese protectorate or colony. But the difficulty is that Japan herself denies such a state of affairs and speaks of Manchukuo as an independent state. And if we consider the somewhat independent policy of the Japanese army and advisers in Manchukuo, we find some truth in the thesis of the "independent state," though not the Japanese interpretation of the term. Legally, on the other hand, China has never yet renounced her rights, and the other states still recognise them. As long as the actual state of things is therefore not legally recognised—or changed—we find a discrepancy between legal and actual situation, as is often the case in international relations. International regulation, generally a stabilising factor in the ever-changing political events, became here a political weapon. At this point the Mongolian problem in Hsingan and Jehol, as well as in the other parts of Inner Mongolia, links up with the development of Sino-Japanese relations—in itself perhaps the greatest problem of the Far East.

It was through the establishment of Manchukuo that the Mongol autonomy movement in the rest of Inner Mongolia, consisting of the Chinese provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia, became of new importance. After the fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops was ended by the Tanku agreement in 1933, northern Chahar was included in the neutral zone. So-called irregular troops from Manchukuo occupied after some fighting the strategic towns on the way from Kalgan to northern Chahar, so that most of Chahar

province was cut off from any Chinese control. It would have been easy now for Japan to include this part in the new state of Manchukuo, but she apparently had more ambitious plans.

In the region in question lives the Mongol Silingol tribe which has not been much influenced so far by Chinese colonisation. Its leader, known under the Chinese name as Prince Teh, had played a leading part in the Mongolian struggle for autonomy. It was said that he went to the new capital of Manchukuo to meet Pu Yi's Japanese advisers. He became the head of the new autonomy movement whose leaders in June 1935, in a meeting in Pailingmiao in North Suiyuan, decided to emancipate the Mongols from the Chinese provincial governments of Suiyuan and Chahar. Because of the danger of foreign interference China could not use force. The Mongols themselves did not aim at complete separation from China. After negotiations on the question whether the Chinese control over the Mongolian autonomous government should be exercised by the central or the provincial authorities (the latter much less to the advantage of the Mongols) China finally accepted the Mongol point of view. Chinese Inner Mongolia obtained local autonomy while the central government of China remained the highest authority. But Japanese military and political influence spread over the autonomous region.

The territory in question is, as the map shows, of great military importance. It borders on Outer Mongolia and so links China and Russia. If this region, including the important Peiping-Suiyuan railway, were in Japanese possession, China could establish connections with Russia only by means of the long route through Chinese Turkestan, which also could be broken by flank attack. So it was not astonishing that the Mongolian autonomous movement came more and more under Japanese influence. Permanent military and political advisers remained with the Mongol princes; ammunition and war material were stocked; radio stations and aerodromes were established. The Mongols could not resist this "assistance." And in January 1936 the news came from Pailingmiao that Prince Teh had proclaimed a new independent Mongolian state, "Mengkuo." This news was denied by the Chinese government; but subsequently the Suiyuan section of the Inner Mongolian autonomous régime was split off, and

internal political development of the country, and, as Lenin himself once said, the Communists could not change Russian geography. The creation of modern Russia by Peter the Great was only the result of a struggle of many years with his Swedish rival. His great revolutionary reform was not based on any detailed plan worked out beforehand. The reform measures of this genius were time and again only adjustments to the challenge of the war situation. The Crimean War, meaningless and avoidable from the standpoint of international policy, had from Russia's point of view a *raison d'être*: it brought to the country, five years after the Peace Treaty, the solution of her greatest social problem, the abolition of serfdom. The unpopular and unlucky Russo-Japanese War gave Russia her constitution. The World War, too, transformed the agrarian, industrially backward Russia of the Tsars into the first Communist State under the dictatorship of the proletariat. And to-day the very danger of war threatening Russia from east and west is casting long and dark shadows before. With the greatest possible speed she must put herself into a state of complete preparedness. Everything else must give way before the possibility of a German-Japanese invasion, even though the measures taken may be in direct opposition to the programme and practice of the Communist Party.

The very form of the Soviet State had to be adapted to the recently developed situation of power politics. The successful carrying out of the first and second five-year plans has been of secondary importance in the last constitutional reforms in Russia. To the American Constitution there have been made since its creation 150 years ago only twenty-one amendments. The fourteen-year-old Soviet Constitution, on the other hand, has been revised nearly every other year. For the first time, however, in the constitutional reforms of the last year, definite concessions have been made to democratic and liberal ideals, following the official recognition by Stalin in his famous speech of May 4th, 1935, of the value of personality, so long denied in Communist Russia.

The new Constitution is no longer the fighting Constitution of the first years after the Civil War. The Moscow Government now needs for the defence of the country to extend as far as possible the social basis of its power. Peace therefore is also to be made with formerly outcast groups of the

population. Accordingly, by the new Constitution, all citizens of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the mentally deficient, will in future receive the franchise on reaching the age of 18. The social origin and even former counter-revolutionary activities of individual citizens will no longer be taken into account. Theoretically even former "usurers and police spies" will be clasped in the fraternal arms of the proletariat." Military service and also entrance to the universities now cease to be as formerly the privilege of the proletariat. On the contrary, military service is declared to be the honourable duty of every citizen. And it is significant in this connection that even the Cossacks, the shock troops of the old Tsarist army, the terror of the Germans in the World War and afterwards for many years the bitter enemies of Bolshevism, have recently been given back their old uniforms and privileges. Thus all available forces are to be enlisted in defence of the newly discovered Russian Fatherland.

This is, however, only the outer framework. The minds of the peoples of the Soviet Union, too, must be trained and steeled for the new tasks. No longer must it be possible, as happened in the Great War, for peasants even from the immediate neighbourhood of Moscow to be completely vague as to whether the Germans were enemies or allies. If one closely examines the Soviet press of to-day one is more and more astonished at the thorough and ever-increasing change in the ideology and official phraseology to be found therein. Old words are now being brought out again from the treasury of the language for so long sealed up and carefully guarded. For example, the word "Fatherland" must now appear in nearly every leading article. Patriotism is once more lauded as the highest of human virtues. "Fatherland!" we read in the September 26th, 1937, issue of *Izvestiya*, the Moscow Government organ, "How much this simple word can say to the hearts and minds of every citizen of the U.S.S.R.! In it are expressed the best, highest and noblest feelings of the Soviet patriot: the love of one's own land, the pride in one's own people, the consciousness of its unconquerable power, and the readiness to serve it and if necessary to sacrifice one's life for it."

Not so much is now said of the Russian proletariat as the forerunner of the World Revolution, of proletarian culture, but more of the greatness of the Russian people and the value of its

a new autonomous council of Mongol princes faithful to China was established to balance the power of Prince Teh.

This countermove from the Chinese side upset the plans of the Japanese in Inner Mongolia. The recent attack on Suiyuan was the result. But the Chinese Government was firmly decided this time to resist. Troops were massed in the region, and the attack was not only repulsed with great loss, but Pailingmiao, formerly occupied by Prince Teh, was conquered by the Chinese troops. Prince Teh has withdrawn to Chahar, where according to the latest news he will now formally establish an independent government with the help of Japanese "advisers." The attack will very likely be followed up. Both parties are making preparations, and Inner Mongolia may become a starting point in the fight between China and Japan. Both countries are weakened by internal difficulties; but there is at the same time less room for compromise than before, as China has gained in strength.

What can be said about the Mongols themselves? Their tragic scission has gone farther than ever. Their number and importance has decreased. It remains an open question whether venereal diseases or lamaism, political weakness or other factors are responsible. But under the pressure of Chinese colonisation and Russian and Japanese plans, they have learned the necessity of protecting their own people and mode of living against outside aggression. Their national feelings are a mixture of modern thought and of pride in the past, based on the history of Ghengis Khan, from whom the autonomous council of Inner Mongolia dates their new calendar. In Outer Mongolia the new thought came in from communistic Russia. In Inner Mongolia, which sticks to tradition and where the princes uphold their feudal rights, Western ideas came in through the young Mongolian intelligentsia. But the Mongolian national question seems hopeless with the Mongols standing in different political camps, unable to do much against the will of their different powerful "friends." Mongolia, split into different parts among the three Powers of China, Japan and Russia, might well attain new historical importance. It seems to become gradually clearer what place China will take in the new grouping of the Powers. But no matter from which aspect the situation is viewed, Mongolia will always retain a key-position.

FRANZ MICHAEL.

NEW LIGHT ON AGADIR.

ALMOST nothing is known of the intimate story of the weeks which immediately preceded the great European tension of 1911, just before the outbreak of the Italian-Turkish war, namely the second Morocco Crisis. Despite the big volumes of German and British documents, we have practically nothing on the decisive days of June 1911, nothing on the German deliberations which led to the despatch of the *Panther* to South Morocco. Why was she sent, followed by the sister gunboat *Eber* and the small cruiser *Berlin*? Was it one of the Kaiser's sudden decisions, as the outside world was always inclined to think, or who else took part in the preliminary steps? Kiderlen, the Foreign Secretary, stated that he wanted a "*Faustpfand*," a pledge to get some compensation. But this is no solution of the problem how the decision to send the *Panther* was arrived at. This question can now be answered from the diaries of a German, Dr. Regendanz, whose active part in colonial acquisitions of Germany has been mentioned in the memoirs of Dr. Rosen, a former German Ambassador and Foreign Minister.

There were on the German side two driving forces in Morocco: the Mannesmann group, which in 1911 was already in possession of mining rights, and the Hamburg group, which had recently founded the "*Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft*" with Dr. Melchior as chairman and Dr. Regendanz as managing director. As the latter had been a member of the German Colonial Office he regarded his task more from a political than from an economic point of view, and he naturally found himself amongst the chief promoters of an active policy. The Morocco market should have been open to every signatory of the Act of Algeciras, which granted equality as to trade and mining rights. But since 1906 Germany had not been able to prevent France from considering Morocco increasingly as an exclusive French domain. Despite the efforts of German trade and finance the Government had not been induced to move: only now, in the hot summer of 1911, it made up its mind to ask for a fair share. It was six years after England's entente with France, when Morocco had practically been handed over to France. Was it not already too late?

On Sunday, June 18th, a telegram from the Under-Secretary,

national achievements. The people of Russia are now taught by her press to be proud of her history, literature and art, and also of her great sons, the conquerors of the Arctic. Frequent reference is made to such examples from national history as will increase the national pride. A favourite theme is the defeat of the German Knights in the thirteenth century in their attempt to conquer Russian territory in the East. And the 125th anniversary of the battle of Borodino has just been celebrated throughout the land with much propaganda as a page of honour in the history of the Russian people and the Russian army, which, as was emphatically remarked, lends itself to many comparisons with the present-day situation.

Even literature is used nowadays for propaganda purposes in the service of the approaching war of defence. Russian authors are urged to deal chiefly with the problems of the defence of the Fatherland, and to educate the reader in love of his country and the spirit of sacrifice. On the same grounds popular heroic songs, greatly beloved in the old days, are enjoying an immense vogue, for in them, embellished with many legends, are sung the defence of the Russian frontiers and the struggle of the Russian giant heroes against enemies threatening the country. Patriotic propaganda in Soviet Russia is even taking on chauvinistic aspects. The Russian poet Lugovskoy was recently threatened with expulsion from the Soviet Authors' Association simply because he ventured to reprint some of his earlier poems in which he spoke of the cheerlessness of Russian village life and the savagery of the Russian nature and landscape.

Another field in which a process of change both significant and informative is taking place in recent times is that of the study of history. A shrewd British traveller once observed that when visiting foreign lands he always took care to study their school history-books, as these formed the best indication of the mental trend of the nation in question. Immediately after the October Revolution, and chiefly under the direction of Professor Pokrovsky, an attempt was made to give the whole course of Russian history an entirely new interpretation. The rôle of personality was reduced to the lowest possible level, although the cult of Lenin then at its height would seem to be in direct opposition to this theory. Every historical event was to be explained exclusively in terms of the class struggle. Historical events were thus often robbed of their

uniqueness and historical development of its individual features. But in this direction, too, a clear reassessment of values in a nationalistic direction can now be noticed. Already in 1934 the Soviet Government was beginning to recognise that the current historical methods in Russian schools, "instead of teaching history in an animated and entertaining form," were only presenting the scholars with "abstract sociological schemes." The books of Pokrovsky, highly praised by Lenin himself and broadcast for many years in millions of copies as pattern works on Marxist lines, are in the Russia of to-day condemned as anti-historical, false and harmful. And even the isolated events and periods in the course of Russian history are now seen with other eyes and correspondingly re-valued. In contrast to the idealisation of pre-Christian paganism in Soviet Russia, historical research to-day refers to the introduction of Christianity into the country as a progressive factor. In an equally positive manner the cultural significance of the Church and particularly of the monasteries in her early history is recognised. The Russian expansion and the incorporation of the Ukraine and Georgia in Tsarist Russia is now significantly upheld as a deliverance of these lands from the threat of the heavy yoke of the Polish nobility and the Sultan of Turkey. Peter the Great no longer appears as despot and oppressor of the Russian masses, but as a "wise and progressive Tsar." The historical development of pre-Bolshevist Russia—"the dark ages of Tsarism"—are therefore no longer as formerly painted by Soviet historians almost exclusively in sombre colours, and whole historical periods are now being belatedly rehabilitated.

Hand in hand with the surprising official pressing of Russian intellectual life into the national-patriotic mould, there is also taking place in Russia a backward movement towards the ideas of bourgeois society. Liberalism is, for instance, showing itself in the articles of the new Constitution, whereby the inalienable rights of man are to be at least in theory reinstated. And the most recent reforms in Russia, the adoption of the new Constitution itself and the reorganisation of the laws governing the family, were not directly decreed from above, but were first submitted to wide circles of the Russian public for consideration, discussion and criticism.

With the consent of the masses Soviet Russia is henceforth to be transformed from the land of free love to a model of

Zimmermann, reached Dr. Regendanz at his home at Hamburg. "He would be grateful if I could come for a discussion at the Foreign Office on Monday morning," wrote Dr. Regendanz in his diary the same day. "Certainly that means political talk on Morocco. France with troops in Fez, France performing a '*pénétration pacifique*' with 42,000 soldiers, Spain with troops landed at Larache—and all that though there is an Act of Algeciras, and though we have a State Secretary von Kiderlen whose energy is being praised. Shall we march at last? My last memoranda on the position in South Morocco have not excited the Foreign Office sufficiently yet."

"It was amusingly diplomatic in the Foreign Office," he noted after the discussion. "For five minutes Baron Langwerth von Simmern talked about the weather or similar things before broaching his subject. Germany intends to occupy the port of Agadir, perhaps Mogador, too, with battleships. We shall then have a *Faustpfand* which will ease the diplomatic discussions with France (what about?). Reason to be given: allegation of a violation of the Act of Algeciras not quite possible, as France and Spain have, after all, for justifying their measures some sham reasons which cannot be called by their real names amongst diplomats. Therefore the German Government will declare almost the opposite to be true: your measures, dear Frenchmen and still more beloved Spaniards, are completely in order; you had to intervene as it has become obvious that Morocco by itself cannot recover. That it could was the presumption under which all the Powers signed the Act of Algeciras. As this has proved wrong the Act is void, and we have a free hand in Morocco."

Thus, on June 19th—more than ten days before any foreign Power was informed—the outline of the action to be taken was already decided upon and the reasons which should be given were fixed: a new start in Morocco, one, perhaps even two, ports to be occupied. A week before Zimmermann had outlined this plan, the first draft of which, dated May 30th, had been drawn up with Baron Langwerth. It had been based, as the *Grosse Politik* says, on "very confidential information from Messrs. M. M. Warburg in Hamburg"—the memoranda sent in by Dr. Regendanz which he mentioned in his diary as quoted above. Messrs. Warburg were the principal shareholders of the Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft, and

had been interested in colonies by Adolf Woermann, the shipping magnate, who played an important part in Germany's colonial history. Zimmermann had then proposed to send four cruisers to Mogador and Agadir (two to each port), and to inform the Powers only twenty-four hours before their arrival. Now, says the diary of Dr. Regendanz, the number of the vessels has been diminished; but there remained the question how to procure sufficient material to justify the intended action. Some time before Dr. Regendanz had told Baron Langwerth that he collected all the complaints of the firms in Morocco about the French violation of the promised equality of rights in the economic field, such as tricks of the customs authorities, police measures, intimidation of Moroccans dealing with German or English business men. But Baron Langwerth had then declared that it was still too early officially to take note of this, and Dr. Regendanz had therefore only sent in some general memoranda on the situation in South Morocco, where, as he stated, all the chiefs were friendly towards Germany. Only a few days before the meeting of June 19th, two of these Moroccan chiefs had been deprived of their positions on account of French influence.

These accounts seem to have influenced the Foreign Office when drawing up the plan of action and helped to overcome the aversion of the Government to move. "Baron Langwerth to-day wants an address to be sent to the Foreign Office which justifies the Reich in intervening by force in South Morocco; but the content and the purpose of this address shall still be kept secret, even from its signatories, so that France cannot become aware of the plan and thwart it." Thus Dr. Regendanz got the order to procure the reason for the intended action and to get the necessary assent of the companies without even telling them: a leakage would upset the whole plan. Even Max Warburg, who was to have lunch the same June 19th with the Kaiser, and who was to be with His Majesty again the following day, must not hear too early, "so that the Kaiser, who does not yet know anything about it, will not learn from him . . ."

Thus, according to Dr. Regendanz's diary of June 19th, the idea of the German Foreign Office was this: "A battleship shall put into Agadir, perhaps one also into Mogador and a third into Saffi and stay there, we thus occupy the whole South Coast of Morocco, though at the beginning troops shall

family life. A number of recently promulgated reforms are directly intended "to combat an irresponsible attitude towards the family and family obligations." Divorce is from now on to be made considerably less easy; until recently a written statement by one party was sufficient to dissolve a marriage. For every new divorce in Russia a correspondingly higher sum of money will have to be paid, which, incidentally, will tend to make divorce into a privilege of the financially better-placed citizens. Abortion, legalised for sixteen years, is now forbidden on pain of heavy penalties as "harmful to health." Motherhood—the bringing into the world and rearing of citizens (the future defenders of the Fatherland)—is now upheld as a "great and responsible duty," and mothers of large families of six or more children are to have a special state grant as in Fascist countries.

Only some few more significant changes, all aiming at the abolition of "extremist experiments" in Russia, can here be briefly mentioned. In the realm of architecture we see, for instance, recently the sharp condemnation of the "nihilistic attitude to the architectural values of the past" (*Izvestiya*), the conscious revolt from the "box houses" hitherto erected with so much enthusiasm, and to-day regarded as inadequate and primitive. Constructivism and functionalism in Western architecture, formerly so passionately admired, is now quite definitely rejected, and reproached above all with its break with the past. Even the more recent reform measures in the realm of public instruction tend definitely towards the practice and experience of the pre-revolutionary schools. The status and authority of teachers, as of the parents, is now restored and their co-operation is sought in the discipline of the children. In the universities the old pre-revolutionary academic degrees have been reintroduced. And in the higher walks of literature there is an increasing and significant demand for the works of Russian classical writers and outstanding figures in world literature. The reader is turning away from the compulsory "socialistic" realism of Soviet literature, from all the works written by State order, back to the cultural heritage of former times. Even the leader of a group of Arctic research workers, decorated with a high Soviet order, chose as the best books for their library the works of Pushkin, Goethe, Byron, Heine, Balzac and Turgenev. Shakespeare's plays, hailed as the "summit of classical drama," have taken their place in the

Russian theatre, and there is actually talk of "Shakespearising" the Russian stage. Tolstoy's novel *Anna Karenina* is again to-day the most widely read book in Soviet Russia, and the play proved the greatest triumph of this year's productions at the Moscow Art Theatre. And Pushkin, despised by the Bolsheviks as a "Tsarist lackey" and ideologist of the nobility, has recently, on the hundredth anniversary of his death, with the help of every possible means of propaganda, been acclaimed throughout the whole Union as the incarnation of the Russian national spirit.

Russian revolutionary fervour has obviously come to a standstill. The pendulum of the Revolution, pushed very far to the left, is at present swinging sharply back. An undeniable fatigue is noticeable in the most varied spheres of life, and the revolutionary phrase is giving way to the realities of the present day. A Russian censor of the last century once remarked jokingly in his records that the easiest way was to trim one's sails to the wind, but that in his country the winds blew from every quarter of the heavens at once. And to-day in Russia the most heterogeneous elements and ideas—Communist, liberal, national, international, chauvinist and revolutionary—seem to be all mixed up and struggling together in a hopelessly inextricable tangle. The unprejudiced observer of the present situation in Soviet Russia gains the impression of a giant news film of the Bolshevik revolutionary period now being shown in the reverse direction. And this accounts for the grotesque, often dramatic, but on the whole contradictory and ugly forms taken by political and intellectual life in Russia to-day.

The Bolshevik revolution, therefore, has now, it seems, reached the stage at which it is beginning to devour itself. And it is devouring not only its own children—the revolutionary ideas and institutions to which it has given birth—but also its creators. The transference of the Revolution from the paths of pure Communism into those of a Bolshevik nationalism could naturally not be accomplished without severe conflicts both of a personal and general nature. Young Communists were the first to send inquiries to the offices of the Soviet newspapers; they could not understand all this sudden talk about a national culture, while they themselves were full of a blind belief in the value of a proletarian culture. The surrender of revolutionary gains and the renunciation of

not be landed. The purpose of this move is to have a *Faustpfand* during the negotiations with France, which will ease the discussion necessary on Morocco and on other things. If the German Reich does not get a share in Morocco, it can thus obtain 'compensations,' perhaps in the Congo. The Kaiser, who knows nothing about it, will get a report from Kiderlen and from the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg on Sunday, June 25th, when they will ask for his authorisation and for the sailing order for the battleships. It is still very uncertain if he will agree with such a policy of force. He is incalculable. Prince Reuss XXXII for instance, a friend of the Kaiser's son August Wilhelm, told me recently that the Kaiser—since he had been attacked so very much in the November debates owing to his speeches, etc.—has lost any initiative and does not really dare to decide even the most unimportant things. I cannot believe it. Certainly he is a difficult factor, the more as already people have said that he is afraid of a war. 'Peace Kaiser'!

This summary is most important. First it shows once again that the Kaiser, especially during the last ten years of his reign, was not an autocrat deciding German policy exclusively on his own lines: On the contrary, very often things were prepared, like this on June 19th, when he did not even know that Germany was going to move, when he was informed only after the decisions had practically been taken. The November debates referred to are the famous Reichstag proceedings of November 1908, when there was talk of abdication following an "interview" published by the *Daily Telegraph*. Furthermore, the diary of Dr. Regendanz shows that the Foreign Office had not yet decided if Germany should lay hand upon one or two or three ports, and if she should land troops too as Spain and France had done. It is interesting to note that on the Saturday chosen for informing the Powers of Germany's sudden action, July 1st, the German Ambassador in London did not know whether troops would be landed or not. Sir Arthur Nicolson asked for information about this important point, but Metternich said he could, officially, add nothing to his communication. Agadir was one of the ports not open to shipping under the Act of Algeciras, but it was considered important owing to the pretended fertility of the valley of the river Sus. Mogador, the other port in question, is about eighty miles north, and Saffi, the third, still another sixty-five

miles farther north—a long strip, indeed the whole coast of South Morocco. But would Germany really claim this? The idea of asking for compensation was envisaged from the beginning. Even the Congo was mentioned as a possibility in Zimmermann's first draft and now again in the conversations with Dr. Regendanz.

In the afternoon of June 19th Dr. Regendanz had finished a draft of his address and showed it to Baron Langwerth: his proposal was to declare the whole district from Cap Youbi to Mazagan to be chiefly a German sphere of interest. But as Casablanca seemed to Baron Langwerth to be too close to Mazagan, Dr. Regendanz had to omit this port. The two men agreed on the text of the letters to be sent by the representative of the Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft at Mogador, Herr Wilberg, to all the chiefs of the South telling them that the German battleship was coming as their friend.

On June 20th Dr. Regendanz, back in Hamburg, wrote the final text of the address by hand (to keep it strictly secret), and made the other companies sign it without seeing its contents. The following day Max Warburg also signed. "According to my request," Dr. Regendanz states in his diary, "Warburg had carefully avoided talking about Morocco with the Kaiser, who does not yet know. The Kaiser seems to be not much prepared for the carrying out of the plan which seems to be urgently necessary for raising the prestige of the Reich in foreign politics. On Monday he said in a large company that we had no objections at all against France in Morocco: France would bleed to death there. This conception is as wrong as it is inconvenient for the Foreign Office. I am going to Berlin."

"Berlin, June 21st, in the evening. Geheimrat Schoeller of the Disconto Gesellschaft refuses his signature. A war on behalf of Morocco would not be worth while. (There will be none in spite of the fact that we are now proceeding energetically—therefore without any foundation.) The interests of his company were very small—as for the rest he was a good patriot, as the Foreign Office knew from Venezuela." This was the only refusal, though Dr. Regendanz had been allowed to tell in this one case the reason for the address and its content. The other signatories trusted that it was, as Dr. Regendanz told them, a necessary address of patriotic

the world revolution also caused dismay and called forth protests against the self-liquidation of the Revolution in the circles of the older, more dogmatically-minded Bolshevik fighters, and those most imbued with the doctrines of pure Communism. This probably partly explains the slaughter of the Old Guard of the Bolsheviks by Stalin, the champion of the new stage in the development of Soviet Russia. The revolutionary conscience must be done away with. The doors of the Association of Old Bolsheviks were shut some time ago by order of Stalin. And the most recent events give rise to the suspicion, paradoxical as it may seem, that Stalin, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, is now beginning to aim at the destruction of the Party itself in the form in which it has hitherto existed. Characteristic also in this connection is the gradual shelving of and coldness towards the foreign Communists who have come to Moscow as pilgrims and refugees. These, with the exception of those most blindly devoted to Stalin, see in the changed face of the Moscow of to-day the caricature of their former hopes and dreams.

The case of Tukhachevsky presents more serious difficulties. The type of general who mixes in politics has become almost a mass phenomenon in post-war Europe. The affair of the Red Marshal, however, seems to have presented special characteristics. The betrayal on the part of Tukhachevsky of which he was officially accused is, in view of all that is known of his past, hardly convincing. It would seem much more likely that he acted on patriotic grounds, even if some sort of subversive intentions could really be proved against him. The present Russo-German tension has nothing to do with a natural antipathy between the two lands and peoples. It is rather due to an artificially generated antagonism between Fascism and Communism, which is using the two nations as a duelling-ground. In the German Reichswehr, however, in the Third Reich as during the Weimar Republic, there is a very strong party actively in favour of an understanding with Russia. Tukhachevsky, who was in the best position to realise the danger to his Fatherland of a simultaneous war in the west and the east, had possibly tried to get into touch with this party, and such an act would have been dictated by patriotic motives. It would, however, have contained the germ of a conflict, possibly even of a conspiracy against Stalin. The recent reorientation of Russian political

life had already created the mental atmosphere favourable to a possible *coup d'état* on Tukhachevsky's part. Its success would have still further hastened the process of nationalisation in Russia. Stalin, however, was obviously warned in good time. Through the execution of Tukhachevsky the Red Army lost one of its best and most daring leaders.

Another group of shootings which has recently taken place in Russia is also symptomatic. The nationalist reawakening in Moscow, speeded up by propaganda, is apparently having repercussions in other parts of the Soviet Union, and is setting up similar nationalistic developments in the "native" autonomous and independent republics. These developments, however, contain the dangerous germs of separatist tendencies. On that account they are at present being ruthlessly suppressed by Moscow, and the leaders of these national minorities are banished as traitors and wreckers, deprived of their office and quite frequently of their lives as well. Here again is a step towards Great Russian Centralism.

There is one more question: Is the rule of Stalin going to last? Is Hitler going to last? Will Europe survive if there should be another world war? Is there still any hope of avoiding this war? These are all questions in the same category, and closely connected with each other. It is affirmed that it is difficult to be a prophet even in one's own country. How much harder, however, to make any prophecy about a country which, like Russia, is passing through a period of profound change. At present it would seem that Stalin has succeeded once more in consolidating his power through force. But under ever stronger pressure from abroad, in the conflict with revolutionary elements in his own followers and in conformity with the ever more active national currents in the country, Stalin will doubtless be forced decisively into the National Bolshevik path. At the moment of the twentieth jubilee of the October Revolution it seems to be less the personal dictatorship of Stalin than the spiritual heritage of Lenin that is threatened. The mausoleum of Lenin still stands as a place of pilgrimage in the Red Square in Moscow. But is it still a living inspiration? Monuments have a way of out-living themselves.

R—us.

importance. The same day he handed the memorandum to Baron Langwerth, "whose joy was great." The address, dated Hamburg, June 21st, 1911, is a fairly lengthy document which has never been published, as the editor of the *Grosse Politik* quoted only a few sentences. It says that owing to the march of "foreign troops" into North Morocco there is a certain alarm in the South, too. "Already attacks on Europeans have occurred on the road between Saffi and Marrakech," and the danger of great disturbances in the whole district is imminent. "Now the undersigned firms have large economic interests there; they own houses and wide districts around Agadir, Mogador, Saffi and Schiema." The memorandum then gives a few figures, pretending for instance that the Moroccan ore contains up to 30 per cent. of copper. Security for these great German interests is only to be found, the address goes on to say, if the Government will now show its readiness to act. Nothing else will impress the Moroccans, and it is necessary to act before the actual outbreak of disturbances.

This is the gist of the address which was to justify the action of the German Government, and which was used on July 1st, when the representatives of the Reich called at the Foreign Offices of the Powers concerned. "*Des maisons allemandes, établies au Sud du Maroc et notamment à Agadir et dans ses environs, se sont alarmées d'une certaine fermentation parmi les tribus. . . . Ces maisons se sont adressées au Gouvernement Impérial. . . . Sur leur demande le Gouvernement a décidé d'envoyer au port d'Agadir un bâtiment de guerre. . . .*" Now at last we know how this request had been brought about and who were the initiators. It is interesting to know the signatories of the address: (1) M. M. Warburg & Co., (2) Gebr. Marx & Co., Hamburg, (3) S. Elkan & Co., Hamburg, (4) Weiss & Maur, Saffi, (5) Oldenburgische Portugiesische Dampfschiffs-Rhederei Aug. Schultze, (6) Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft, Dr. Regendanz, (7) Gebr. Marx & Co., Mogador, (8) Heinrich Freiherr von Ohlendorff, (9) Retzmann & Co., (10) W. Marx & Co., Marrakech, Medinah, (11) W. Marx & Co., Marrakech, Mellah. Eleven signatures? Yes, but the Marx firms have signed not less than five times since Weiss & Maur also belonged to the same concern. Similarly Messrs. Warburg, the Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft and a few others are only different names for the same

company or, in any case, are all shareholders of the Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft. It has always been pretended—and one writer copied it from the other, including M. Tardieu in *Le Mystère d'Agadir*—that the Mannesmann group pressed the German Government to act. This is not the fact as we have seen: Even the Hamburg group, which took such an active part, did not supply much more than the screen behind which the Government could hide, although these German bankers were really interested in protecting the important trade in Morocco, whereas the Government was already thinking of the action as a mere move to get "compensations" elsewhere.

"I asked," Dr. Regendanz noted, after the handing in of the address on June 21st, "if Kiderlen, who is still in Kissingen, knows about the whole plan. 'Naturally.' Kiderlen-Zimmermann therefore! An excellent team! Kiderlen met the French Ambassador Cambon at Kissingen yesterday and they talked in a 'friendly' way! The greater the surprise will be." Now all depended on Kiderlen's success when he tried to convince the Kaiser that Germany had to act. It seems that the Chancellor had not been consulted, Kiderlen feeling that he would always follow his proposals. On Sunday, June 25th, Bethmann and Kiderlen went to see His Majesty, and Dr. Regendanz wrote in his diary the next day: "The Chancellor and Kiderlen have to report on Sunday. They intended to give him a nice account, but they saw no advantage in approaching him now, because the Kaiser had just said again in a large circle that France was in quite a dilemma, that for us the best to do was to look on. Bethmann (in order to find a friend of the Kaiser who could work upon him) asked Ballin if Max Warburg was on board. 'No,' but he could send for him. 'For the moment not necessary yet.' Then Bethmann told Ballin all about it and asked him to prepare the Kaiser. Ballin did it; then Kiderlen gave his report, and the Kaiser agreed. Hurrah."

This is the interesting unknown story showing how the Kaiser, of all the deciding factors, was the last to be informed. In the *Grosse Politik* we only have a single sentence in a dispatch from Kiderlen saying that the ships were agreed to. The new version shows how uncertain Bethmann was of his own capacity to influence the Kaiser, and what an important part was played by the Emperor's friend, Ballin, the director

VAUCLUSE—A CORNER OF PROVENCE.

FOR travellers in France, Vaucluse has been a name to conjure with from the eighteenth century to the present day. Its spell draws enthusiasts from the corners of the earth, for quite apart from the enchantment of meadow, crag and stream, a magical halo of romance surrounds the spot, and there is no charm more compelling than this. Indeed, the valley of the Sorgue makes an irresistible appeal. It is adorned by Nature and by the glamour of the ineffable verse it has helped to inspire. Tucked away in a leafy corner of Provence less frequented than the big towns, its flowery meads cradled the loves of Francesco Petrarch, the world-famed poet, and of Laura de Sade, his beloved lady.

Many are the illustrious names of those who have made pilgrimage to Vaucluse. A great French writer, Professor Lenthéric, calls the spot the Provençal Mecca of Poetry and Love. During the year 1745 it was visited by Giovanni Jacopo Casanova, an attractive "*chevalier d'industrie*" whose unscrupulous and versatile wit had captured the fancy of the day. The scene of the famous couple's love-story drew from him unrestrained gushes of sentimentality. Later, in 1789, Arthur Young, the well-known traveller, journeyed there, tempted by the romance which surrounds the valley of the secret spring, and in 1837 Wordsworth, travelling to Italy, declared himself most of all pleased with the day he spent at Vaucluse, where the beauty and the grandeur of stream and rock enchanted him.

Such praise of the spot prompted one to see at first hand its attractions and recall its poetic memories. An idyllic day, therefore, unforgettably golden and blue, was chosen to flit from Avignon to "the Fountain," and visit those "*chiare, fresche e dolci acque*," of which Petrarch writes. The country lay calm and smiling, revealing its fresh spring charm. A wide valley of pasture-land was limited on the left by the opalescent outline of Mont Ventoux, and lay hazily mysterious in the noonday sunshine. At certain hours of the day, however, the great chain wears a different guise. Professor Lenthéric says of it that "Seen then from afar in the radiant atmosphere of Provence, and set in the midst of the fertile plain of the Comtat, whose skies and scenery vie with those of Italy and Spain, the dusky silhouette of Ventoux stands out in peaceful

majesty from the horizon with a clarity of outline which harmonises well with the landscape." Recently there had been but little rain in Provence and the breeze raised clouds of fine white dust, so that the cool shade of plane trees bordering the highway was welcome. In the new green of their foliage, tramping two and two along the road, like Italian students in their black and purple habits, they formed an arch that screened the glare of the sun.

On the way, skirting an old wall, the small village of Thor was passed, and a glimpse of a ruined pile, the castle of Thougon, was gained. Afterwards the little ancient church of Ste. Marie au Lac came in sight and a brief halt seemed advisable. The church, so runs a legend, owes its name to a buried statue of the Virgin. This was miraculously disclosed one day by a bull, who stumbled upon it in one of the marshy pools surrounding Thor. Since then the magic wand of cultivation has transformed these pools into rich meadow-land. The exterior of the church is grandly Gothic. The unpretentious approach to it is marked by an old wrought-iron cross. The interior made no very deep impression, but there were two beautiful twisted pilasters of brass that flanked the altar and were similar in workmanship to some placed in St. Pierre at Avignon.

Resuming the drive, one bowled along to Isle-sur-Sorgues. Here the river divides into a number of small streams, the Sorguettes, so that Isle-sur-Sorgues would almost seem to be an amphibious town. The foam of its many mills gushes through the little place. The huge wheels of its factories churn the water into frothy runnels. For more than four hundred years it has been one of the busiest and most prosperous centres of the Comtat. The musical ripple of the river provided a cheery accompaniment to an onward move. The many streamlets threaded the fields like blue ribbons laid on the velvet of the grass. The meadows' green was pierced by purple spires of grape-hyacinth and campanula, and the air was fragrant with the sweet breath of Venaissin violets. Wild pheasant-eyed narcissus lifted smiling white faces to the sun. Wayside bushes gave forth the spicy scent of golden broom, or were flushed with blossoms of innumerable rock-roses. No wonder the bees have made the Comtat du Venaissin their happy hunting-ground! From here onward the cliffs closed in on either hand. One could fancy that the white stratified

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of the Hamburg America Line. Even Zimmermann and Langwerth did not know anything of Ballin's help when Dr. Regendanz told them on June 28th. On this day Dr. Regendanz was back in Berlin, as Baron Langwerth asked him to telegraph to Herr Wilberg of his company at Mogador to go as quickly as possible to Agadir: At the end of June there was not one German or other white man there, and it was therefore urgently necessary that at least Wilberg should reach it earlier than the gunboat to protect the German citizens! Wilberg has since been nicknamed the "endangered German." But how to inform Wilberg? All the telegrams were transmitted by the wireless in Morocco, French of course. Though Wilberg and his company had a secret code, there was no code word for Agadir. The difficulty was at last overcome by sending three telegrams: the name of Agadir could be made out by Wilberg by taking the first letters of the words of the second telegram. The French were unable to read them, and all they could do was to delay them, so that Wilberg received them only on June 30th, when he immediately started for Agadir. He arrived only on July 3rd. Thus, when the *Panther* steamed into the Bay of Agadir on July 1st, there was not a single German at the port.

The story of the international crisis which followed the appearance of the gunboat *Panther*—and, later, of the gunboat *Eber* and the small cruiser *Berlin*—has often been told. Finally, Germany renounced her share in Morocco and, in the coming years, her trade was more and more hampered, until, during the war, the German settlers were imprisoned and several of them shot. A good many died in the French concentration camps of Sebdou and Laghouat. The official end of the crisis itself was the agreement of November 4th, 1911, by which Germany got a small strip in the Congo. It was signed on the French side by a young official of the Colonial Office, Monsieur Lebrun, to-day President of the French Republic.

F. W. PICK.

NOTE.—Dr. Regendanz, London, adds the following information: The *Panthersprung* was the beginning of Germany's effort to acquire new colonies, seconded by four German diplomats, Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann, Colonial Secretary Dr. Goltz, Ambassador Baron Langwerth von Simmern, and the German Ambassador in Portugal, Dr. Rosen. The

mistake Germany made in 1911 was completely to neglect diplomatic preparation. The German Ambassadors either in London or in Paris had not sufficient information and had not been consulted. The German Minister in Morocco, Baron von Seckendorff, told me in 1911 that he could not get any information from Berlin concerning the intentions of his Government, even when the German ships were already in the Bay of Agadir. When he tried to send a few suggestions of his own he was told that he should only make proposals when asked to do so. Many Germans undoubtedly desired the conversion of part of Morocco into a German colony. On the failure of this plan Germany hoped to acquire some other colonial possession in a peaceful way.

After the failure in Morocco—attributed to the diplomatic assistance England had given to France—a new way, the understanding with England in colonial questions, was chosen. In consequence of this new policy Geheimrat Hardy of the German Ministry for Colonies was attached to the British Colonial Office, on the invitation of the English authorities, for six months in 1913-14. The Anglo-German agreement on Mesopotamia and Africa was in 1914 ready to be signed. In anticipation of its conclusion, I made, with the consent of the German Foreign Office, on May 27th, 1914, an agreement in London with Sir Edmund Davis, by which Germany acquired the control of the Nyassa Company, a Chartered Company which owned practically all the sovereign and economic rights in Portuguese Nyassaland. The purchase price was paid out of the secret fund of the German Foreign Office, nine weeks before the war began, which proves that the German Foreign Office at this time had no warlike intentions. During the war the English Public Trustee confiscated the Nyassa shares which Germany had deposited in London.

English assistance was also sought in 1914 for the protection of German commercial interests in Morocco. Since 1906 the fight by the French officials against English and German trade in Morocco had been going on: the export and import trade was then nearly exclusively German and English, though the banks—except the Moroccan State Bank—were solely French. This led to negotiations with English bankers, represented by Lord Milner, in 1914, for the purpose of establishing an Anglo-German bank for Morocco. The German Foreign Office had consented to this project and I am convinced that Lord Milner had the consent of the English Foreign Office. The agreement was already printed and ready for signature after I had got the approval of the German Foreign Office, in July 1914. Then the war broke out.

rocks assumed, from time to time, fantastic shapes. Sometimes they seemed ruins of Gothic castles. Often they showed huge profiles, human or sphinx-like. Or again, they suggested the crouching leonine forms of mammoth beasts.

Rounding a corner between the pinnacled cliffs, the little hamlet of Vacluse was at last reached. In a path bordering the stream stood an ancient church and an attractive-looking inn, garlanded with wistaria. Soon after one came to a bridge spanning the blue-green waters of the river and near it was set a slender monumental column dedicated to Petrarch. Beneath the low stone parapet of the bridge a bevy of energetic laundry-women dealt actively with the weekly washing. An atmosphere of cheerful serenity pervaded the village. The only disturbing element was a touch of commercialism obtruding itself on the right bank of the stream. At the spot where, rumour says, the Sorgues washed the garden of Petrarch's little house, now stand some utilitarian brick buildings—the Papéteries Valdor. These prosaic paper-mills certainly strike a rather discordant note in the symphony of Nature and one almost wonders if the spirit of the great poet is not disturbed by them when, as imaginative people declare, his shade haunts the river-home to which he was so deeply attached. . . .

Professor Okey tells us that Petrarch "always found solace and refreshment in his gardens. A true lover of horticulture, he cultivated exotics, experimented on soils and plants, and wrote to Naples for peach and pear trees." But to him as to other garden lovers came the inevitable drawbacks from wind and weather. In some verses to Cardinal Colonna Petrarch writes that his grounds were constantly invaded by a number of naiads from the Sorgues, who resented his intrusion near their beloved waters. They were, of course, a poetic image typifying the torrent which, from time to time, flooded the cherished retreat. Again and again the poet fought the encroaching nymphs. Yet after every absence, on returning to his home he found the devastating traces of their revengeful work and all his loving labour on reclaiming the soil had to be renewed.

Farther along on the right bank of the stream, set high among the towering crags from which it seems to be an outgrowth, rises a ruined castle. It was in former times the home of Philippe de Cabassole, Bishop of Cavaillon, Petrarch's faithful and trusted friend. Cabassole was a man of integrity

and held many honourable and prominent posts. That he was also highly appreciative of the claims of literature and art is proved by the sympathy which existed between him and Petrarch. Doubtless their intercourse increased for the poet the attractions of Vacluse. But even the abiding friendship of Cabassole was a slight thing in Petrarch's life compared with his devoted love for Laura de Sade. He fell a willing slave to the charm of the beautiful Provençal girl and remained true to his worship of her through life.

Professor Okey declares that early one April morning in 1327 Petrarch, entering the little church of The Poor Clares at Avignon, first happened to see Laura. Sir Theodore Cook, however, asserts that the poet met her near her home in the hamlet of Pieverde one Good Friday morning. "His heart," says Sir Theodore, "took fire like tinder as her golden hair was twisted by the breeze into a thousand pretty knots while she walked about in the grass and talked, wearing a green dress with violets at her bosom. . . . Purer than a white dove, she bound her lover fast 'with words and nods,' and their courtship lasted untainted for one and twenty years." There has been much controversy as to her origin. Some writers declare that she sprang from the family of the de Sades. Others say she was descended from the de Noves, but was married to Hughes de Sade. Others again have the boldness to suggest that she was a figment of Petrarch's brain, a poetic lay figure on which he draped his sublime '*Rime*' and Sonnets.

This last suggestion, however, one may venture to ignore. Even if the phrase "poetic licence" should be disturbing, and perhaps cause one to doubt the frankness of his delightful verse, the obvious sincerity that breathes through his letters must at least be convincing. When, for example, his friend Cardinal Colonna rallies him on his passion and slyly hints that he does not believe that it is genuine, Petrarch replies so earnestly that it is impossible not to credit his assertions.

"You say," he protests, "that I have forged an imaginary name of Laura, so that there may be some woman for me to talk about . . . but that really in my mind there is no other Laura than the laurel of poetry; that my verses are a sham, my sighs a pretence. . . . Yet you know my pallor and my pain. Your letter is an insult to my sorrow." And again: "The little that I am, she made me. Whatever reputation or glory be mine, would never have come to me, if the weak seedling of virtue . . . in my heart

FRANCESCA DA RIMINI IN ART AND LITERATURE.

AS a result of the disintegration of the Carolingian Monarchy and the neglect shown by the German Emperors of the "Garden of the Empire," Italy was gradually breaking up into a number of small feudal states, partly urban, partly rural, a process which reached its culminating point in the city communes of the thirteenth century, divided into Guelf and Ghibelline factions. Two of those reigning families were the Polenta of Ravenna and the Malatesta of Rimini. Malatesta da Verrucchio had helped Guido il Minore da Polenta against the Traversari, an enemy faction of Ravenna, whereupon the two families decided to cement their friendship by the marriage of their children, Francesca, daughter of Lamberto di Polenta, and Gianciotto, son of Giovanni di Malatesta. Unfortunately, Gianciotto or il Sciancato (the Lamé) was deformed, and it was feared that the high-spirited Francesca might refuse to become his wife. A ruse was resorted to. Gianciotto's brother Paolo, "Il Bello," already married and famous for his charm and insinuating manners, was prevailed upon to represent his brother at the marriage ceremony (1275).

Having found out the trick played upon her, Francesca's loathing of her husband and passion for his brother led to the tragedy in Rimini. Being found together by Gianciotto, they were killed by the infuriated husband (1285). Boccaccio who, in his capacity as Lector Publicus in Florence, commented on Dante's *Divine Comedy*, treats our subject in a surprisingly discreet, almost prudish, fashion. Even the fact that Dante places the lovers in Hell, in the circle of carnal sinners, is no proof of their guilt, but may be partly due to their having been cut off from life without the Sacraments of the Church. Being a contemporary, he knew Paolo as Capitano del Popolo in Florence and enjoyed in 1317 the hospitality of Guido da Polenta, Francesca's nephew. He may therefore have been better acquainted with the family skeleton than Boccaccio, who shows by other minor historical misstatements that his speciality is not history, but fiction. The bare facts, whether we side with Dante or Boccaccio and later chroniclers, tell of a commonplace domestic tragedy, the eternal triangle. But instead of an hysterical Press and a public affected by

psychosis erotica, the case Gianciotto versus Francesca and Paolo is represented by the greatest poet of the Middle Ages, without whose testimony the names of the ill-starred lovers would never have come down to us. Francesca, in the fifth canto of the *Inferno*, is the first soul to meet the poet and pour out to him her tale of woe. Even the most casual reader of Dante knows the passages where he compressed in sixty-nine lines a narrative that ranks together with the stories of Heloise and Abélard, Romeo and Juliet, Tristan and Isolde, Faust and Margarete and Pelléas and Mélisande among the world's greatest love stories. Sublimated passion, not artificially stimulated by a love-potion as in *Tristan and Isolde*, is here brought to its climax through the lovers reading together the legend of Guinevere and Lancelot. "*Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scrisse*." (Galeotto was the book and he who wrote it.) [Gallehault: the go-between in the story of Lancelot and Guinevere.] The plangent *leitmotif* of "*Amore*," the desperate longing for "*Pace*," no repentance, the blissful certainty that her lover will never be separated from her, all this is expressed in a language of such tragic simplicity that it moved Carlyle in his commentary on the episode (*Heroes and Hero-worship*) to define it as "a thing woven as out of rainbows, on a ground of eternal black. A small flute-voice of infinite wail speaks there into our very heart of hearts."

More than any other love story in European literature, Francesca da Rimini became a fruitful *motif* for painters, sculptors, musicians, poets and dramatists. The story is depicted in numerous illuminated codices of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, two of the finest being in the British Museum (Codex Egerton 943 and additional Codex 19587). Among Italian drawings and paintings Botticelli's illustrations are known to every lover of Dante. Michelangelo's sketches were lost in a shipwreck. French artists felt themselves particularly inspired by our subject: Ingres (Musée Chantilly), Ary Scheffer, Alexandre Cabanel (Museum of Amiens) and Gustave Doré who treated the episode in five versions. German painters, such as Anselm Feuerbach, and the Swiss, Arnold Böcklin, laid chief stress upon the *milieu* and stage-setting of Dante's tale. Besides innumerable plastic representations by Italian sculptors, Rodin's grandiose "Portal of Hell" for the Musée des Arts Décoratifs counts among the world's masterpieces.

had not grown up and blossomed in that noble love of hers. She drew me from the society of the base; she guided me in all my ways; she spurred my tiring Muse, and roused my fainting spirit."

After that, how can one disbelieve the reality and deep influence of her whose step, as her lover writes, was not a mortal's step but that of an angel, and whose words were not those of a mere human voice? No wonder one is attracted to the Sorgues and its waters which still make fertile those Venaissin meadows where so long ago Petrarch and Laura wandered together.

The track bordering the stream now showed that the river-side road dwindled to a footpath. On high the mighty shoulders of the laminated cliffs had been hollowed by time and tempest into caves, declared to have been the dwellings of troglodytes in primitive times. The path at length lost itself in a dry torrent-bed strewn with boulders, the home of waving ferns and grasses. In Professor Lenthéric's book, *Le Rhone*, he says that "Between its banks the Sorgues rushes like a mountain torrent. It is no longer a stream but a waterfall, a confusion of rapids and cascades dashing against huge rocks that have pitched down from the cliffs on either side. Then the valley narrows abruptly and becomes, as its name implies, the closed valley, Vaucluse, *Vallis Clausa*. A peaked rampart nearly seven hundred feet high surrounds a circular space flanked by inaccessible buttresses. The whole forms an immense cavity with bare limestone walls, of which the jagged topmost crest stands out sharply serrated against the sky. Here and there one sees in the huge wall a gaping hole, an eagle's nest, a pine-tree hanging between heaven and earth, clinging by its roots to the side of the rocks. At the base of the cliffs yawns an unfathomable abyss. It might almost be the mysterious cavern of some terrible pagan god. It is the spring, or rather it is the spot whence a torrent of water bursts into the open air, violently discharged from the mountain in which it has been pent. Its volume, freshness and clearness, its tumultuous movement and foaming waves, its luminous and iridescent spray have been repeatedly sung by poets, described by geographers and travellers, reproduced by artists and admired by all. . . . What strikes one most about this wonderful fountain of Vaucluse is its sudden change from an impetuous stream into a peaceful and kindly river. . . .

"At the very foot of the falls and the rapids, as soon as the

Sorgues begins to settle down and meets no further obstacles, it expands between the flowery banks into a limpid sheet of water of a marvellous hue. Nowhere, not even in the Alps nor in the Pyrenees, does one see anything to compare with it. The surface of this poetic river is of a delicate, almost translucent green, a green that is gradually lost nearer the depths of the river-bed; it is like a green plant that has dissolved into water (*'une plante verte qui se serait fondue en eau'*), a stream of liquid verdure flowing through the meadows."

About a quarter of a mile farther on, one comes upon a dark cave, brimming with water, icy-cold and profoundly deep. It was clear, yet darkly blue—the blue of a summer's night. On the rock above a young fig-tree had planted itself in one of the fissures. Near it is inscribed the date, November 1907, when the waters of the pool reached their greatest height. A small metal plate inserted in the wall by order of Louis XIVth in 1683—a year of drought—names twenty-four metres as the spring's lowest level. Only four times since then has it been as shallow.

When the Sorgues is at its full, the dry quarter of a mile of rocky pass vanishes under the headlong course of the torrent. The river flows through Vaucluse and the pastoral countryside till it meets and merges with the sapphire waters of the Mediterranean. Through the centuries the silver voice of the Sorgues sings on, though Petrarch's pen has long been laid aside. Yet who knows but that, to the initiated, the purling music of the river renews the harmony of the poet's song?

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Musicians did not lag behind other artists in their enthusiasm for the episode. An amusing instance is Boito's (the composer of *Mefistofele*) setting of a number of lines from Canto V to Schumann's *Abendlied*. Rossini in his *Otello* made a gondolier sing Francesca's "*Nessun maggior dolore*," etc., to an Italian folk tune. But the greatest musical sponsor of Dante's story was Liszt who in *Fantasia quasi Sonata après une lecture de Dante*, and in his *Dante Symphony*, created a magnificent evocation of the "*Lasciate ogni speranza*" inscription and the Francesca episode. Tchaikovsky's Symphonic poem *Francesca da Rimini* is known to most concert-goers. Leaving aside numerous older Italian operas, we meet with names like Ambroise Thomas (1882), whose opera is somewhat spoiled by Meyerbeer's influence (Ballet, Apotheosis). Hermann Goetz, the composer of *The Taming of the Shrew*, wrote a highly effective operatic setting which, unfortunately, remained a fragment. Gabriel Pierné, well known through his *Croisade des Enfants*, set Marion Crawford's text to music. Rachmaninoff's setting was the musician's most ambitious effort as an operatic composer. Among quite recent dramatic and semi-dramatic works, I mention Zandonai's opera and Paul Gibson's dramatic cantata, both having been broadcast a few months ago.

It cannot be the object of a short, comparative study to give a full account of the deep and vast influence Dante's Francesca episode had on European literature. Literal quotations galore occur in Petrarca, Luigi Pulci, Ariosto, Tasso. Arturo Colautti dedicates a whole chapter of his remarkable epic poem *Il terzo peccato* (1908), a history of famous amorous episodes, to Francesca. Chaucer paraphrased in his *Troilus and Cressida* the famous line: "*Nessun maggior dolore*." Byron, whose stay in Ravenna brought him into close contact with the *milieu* of our story, intended to write a five-act tragedy on the subject. In a letter (Ravenna, March 20th, 1820) he tells his publisher, Murray, with his usual sarcasm: "Enclosed you will find, line for line, in *terza rima* of which your British blackguard reader as yet understands nothing, *Fanny* of Rimini. You know that she was here born, married and slain [*sic*], the last also by such people as Cary" (alluding to Dante's translator). Byron calls his own translation modestly "the cream of a translation." In reality it is clumsy and unpoetical, not to be

compared with Dante Gabriel Rossetti's version. That Byron in his *Corsair* uses as mottoes three quotations from the episode, proves the lasting impression the Florentine made upon him. Nor could Tennyson escape Dante's influence, as shown in his *Locksley Hall* where he translates the most famous lines in the episode:


 "This is true the poet sings,
That a sorrow's crown of sorrow
Is rememb'ring happier things."

Keats in a letter to George and Georgiana Keats (April 18th, 1819) describes vividly a dream caused by the reading of Canto V. And even a novelist like George Eliot, whose vein was not exactly lyrical, selected as motto for a chapter in *Daniel Deronda* the eternal "*Nessun maggior dolore*" outburst.

No English student of Dante's poem can forget Leigh Hunt's charming *Story of Rimini* in four cantos, in which Francesca, "a lily at the portals of Tartarus," as Hunt calls her, appears in all the fragrance of a Botticellian maiden. The poem is also technically remarkable for the happy use Hunt makes of Chaucer's and Spenser's rhythms. A play by an American dramatist, Henry Boker, ought to be mentioned, as its Shakespearean atmosphere (even the Fool is not forgotten) may have influenced Stephen Phillips. And finally, no enumeration of Dante's influence would be nearly complete without a grateful acknowledgment of Longfellow's masterly translation which caused Sainte-Beuve to exclaim: "*La belle destinée de ne pouvoir plus mourir sinon avec un immortel!*"

Compared with England's share in the universal Francesca cult, France's contribution is but meagre. Certainly, the great poets know and admire the episode, but only a few use it for their own artistic purposes. Sardou ought to have been sued for defamation on account of the hotchpotch of his Dante drama or rather melodrama. The one French author who employed the *motif* effectively was Prosper Mérimée in an impressive passage of his *Colomba*, where he makes the young Corsican officer Orso della Rebbia read Francesca's story to his sister Colomba and Miss Nevil.

"Orso chose the canto from the *Inferno* with the Francesca episode and began to read it, bringing out to the best of his ability the lilt of those sublime tercets. Colomba came nearer to the
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JAPAN AND THE OPEN DOOR.

THE present military occupation of the North China area by Japan raises the question of the future status of foreign business interests operating in that territory. An indication of Japanese determination to make commercial and economic control a corollary of political dominance can be seen in a survey of conditions of the past five years in Manchoukuo, where, despite lip-service to the principle of the Open Door, the phrase has taken on an ironic significance to such foreign interests as still operate in that area. To them the Open Door means an exit. The extent to which the Japanese have assumed control of all commercial activities in Manchoukuo does not augur well for similar interests operating in North China.

Five years have passed since the establishment of Manchoukuo on March 1st, 1932. The part played by Japan in this is well known. An attempt to allay possible fears among foreign interests as to the security of their investments in the newly established state took the form of a solemn pronouncement communicated to the various powers on March 12th, 1932, by Hsieh Chieh Shih, then Foreign Minister of Manchoukuo. This stated as follows: "With regard to the economic activities of the people of foreign nations within the state of Manchoukuo the principle of the Open Door shall be observed."

The irony of this is reflected in what has actually taken place. Since 1931, 248 companies with a nominal capitalisation of 609,798,000 yen have been established in Manchoukuo. Of these 171 are Japanese controlled. Of the remaining, 77 are under Manchurian management, with 11 financed by the South Manchurian Railway. To-day the Japanese Government, directly or through the South Manchurian Railway, is in the manufacturing of nitrogen, petroleum, magnesium, glass, textiles, cement, paraffin, soya bean production, woollens, ceramics, pig iron, coal, and matches. The Government is also in the distributing business, coal storage, marketing, agriculture, mining, forestry, communications, shipping, warehousing, express, land agents, gas and electricity, building and contracting, banking, exchange, insurance, and hotels and newspapers. A short list of these interests, selected because of their importance

and, from the viewpoint of foreign interests, their competitive features, makes interesting reading. They are:

Firm Name	Authorised Capital MY. 1,000
Central Bank of Manchou ...	30,000
Manchou Telegraph and Telephone	50,000
Manchou Petroleum ...	5,000
Do-Wa Automobile Industry ...	6,200
Manchou Cotton ...	2,000
Manchou Colliery ...	16,000
Manchou Gold Mining ...	12,000
Manchou Mining ...	5,000
Manchou Colonisation ...	15,000
Manchou Aviation ...	3,850
Showa Steel Works ...	100,000
Manchou Electric Industry ...	90,000

It is interesting to note that these include practically every important phase of industry and indicate the extent to which, either indirectly through quasi-official channels or as a result of the investments of their nationals, Japanese interests have attained a dominant economic position in Manchoukuo. The final step in this came on May 1st of this year in the promulgation of Imperial Ordinances Nos. 66 and 67, which placed all industries operating in Manchoukuo under the control of the Ministers of Industry, Finance, and Defence. These decrees require that official permission be secured for starting any venture, provide for their continuous supervision by the Government, and enumerate various fines to be paid for any violation of a series of requirements. The list of the so-called "important industries" for the carrying on of which official permission is required, is all-inclusive, covering arms, aircraft, motor car, and liquid fuel manufacturing; the iron, steel, coal, and all metal industries; woollen, cotton, and hemp manufacturing; flour milling, beer brewing, sugar refining, tobacco manufacturing, soda, fertilising, pulp, cement, and match industries.

The effect of this has been the wholesale withdrawal of foreign interests from Manchoukuo. These include the British-owned Asiatic Petroleum Company, the Standard Oil Company of New York, and the Texas Oil Company, which had previously controlled practically 80 per cent. of

table, raising her head, her pupils dilated and shining with an extraordinary fire. Now blushing, now turning pale, she moved about restlessly. Admirable Italian mentality which needs not, in order to understand poetry, a pedant to explain its beauties!"

German authors felt themselves particularly attracted towards the dramatic adaptation of the subject: Uhland, Martin Greif and Paul Heyse, all of them well-known names in German literature. Unfortunately not one of them had the indispensable experience in dramatic technique, to do justice to their otherwise outstanding poetical gifts. Uhland's dramatic fragment formed later on the basis of Goetz's Opera. An interesting reminiscence, almost a paraphrase of Dante's exquisitely descriptive lines, is to be found in Gottfried Keller's delicate fifth Legend, *Dorothea's Flowerbasket*: "Like two doves, separated by the storm, who have found each other and are circling in wide rings around their native nest, thus the united lovers were soaring hand in hand and without stopping towards the extreme domains of Heaven." (Cf. *Inferno*, V, ll. 82 seq.:

"Like doves who, driven on by sweet desire,
Are soaring, wings outspread, towards their nest;
And whom their longing carries through the air,
Thus out of Dido's crowd those two came near.")

Dante's Francesca poem not only influenced the receptivity of admirers, but stimulated the creative faculty of a number of authors who thus enriched the literature of their country with works of abiding worth. I shall briefly discuss a few dramas by Silvio Pellico, Marion Crawford, Stephen Phillips, d'Annunzio, and Echegaray, and a novel by Wildenbruch, treating the Francesca *motif* either by adhering closely to Dante's tale or modifying it in the spirit of their own age.

Silvio Pellico, chiefly known as the author of political reminiscences, *I miei prigionieri*, was one of the first Italian poets after Dante to dramatise the story (1814). Living during the most romantic period of Italian literature and political events, the gifted poet and fervent patriot erected in this dramatic version a lasting monument to love of country and its traditions. However, though greatly admired by Byron, its many purple patches, for instance the praise of Italy in Act I, cannot compensate for lack of dramatic grip and realism.

Gabriele d'Annunzio's drama (1902), which owed its success as much to Eleonora Duse's and Rosaspina's art as to the author's lurid verbal orchestration, has scarcely anything in common with Dante's immortal couple. D'Annunzio himself calls his play "a poem of blood and lust," a statement defining perfectly the author's work, which is certainly a magnificent reconstruction of the thirteenth century as far as stage-setting goes, but which constitutes at the same time a slander on the mentality of the two lovers as Dante, their contemporary, saw them and on their times which, however crude and realistic, were not perverse and pathological. In this play, as in many of his works, the brilliant Italian cannot help bluffing his readers by unnecessarily shocking every feeling of artistic decency, a curious trait which made the critic, Marc Monnier, write about the first book *Il primo vere* of the sixteen-year-old d'Annunzio: "If I were one of his masters, I should give him a medal and the stick." But although the satyr d'Annunzio shows his cloven hoof in more than one passage, there are pages in this play which deserve a prominent place in any anthology of modern Italian poetry, e.g. the love-scene with its Dantesque reminiscence of the *leitmotif* "*Pace*," and Francesca's dream, both in the third Act. A strangely repulsive and yet fascinating play, it is undoubtedly the most racially characteristic adaptation of the story after Dante.

We are indebted for two of the most interesting dramatic versions of Francesca's story to an English and an American author, Stephen Phillips and Marion Crawford. Phillips' *Paolo and Francesca* (1899) was written under manifold influences: Dante, Shakespeare, Greek tragedy, Maeterlinck. The dramatist, and there Phillips followed Shakespeare, is fully entitled to expand and colour the original plot, as long as he adheres to the essential psychological basis of his story. Phillips introduces two figures foreign to Dante's plot: Lucrezia degli Onesti, Malatesta's cousin, a weird creation, composed of jealousy and Freudian elements of suppressed emotions, and the truly Shakespearean Angela, the blind servant girl who, Cassandra-like, foretells the coming tragedy. Malatesta, stripped of the original brutality of the thirteenth-century *condottiere*, is built on the heroic lines of Othello. Paolo and Francesca are moving almost instinctively towards their final fate like Pelléas and Mélisande, wrapped in an

the sales of refined oil imported into Manchuria; the Skoda Steel Works, a Czechoslovakian concern engaged in the manufacture of steel rails, rolling stock, arms, and agricultural machinery; the Anderson Meyer Company, general merchants; and German trading companies such as Siemens-Schukert, Wittig & Company, and Siemssen & Company of China, the last named in business since 1846; and finally the establishment of the Manchurian Tobacco Company as a subsidiary of the Toa Tobacco Company with a large factory in Changchun, to take over the business of the British American Tobacco Company.

Other circumstances indirectly reflect this trend: the closing by the National City Bank of their branch at Mukden, with frequent rumours that a like fate is soon to overtake their Harbin office, and the closing of the office of the American Trade Commissioner at Mukden. The Soviet Government after March 1935, the date of their sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, withdrew all trading and banking enterprises from Manchoukuo. To-day there is not a single Soviet trading venture in the country.

The remainder of the picture can be gathered from an analysis of Manchoukuo's imports from leading countries since 1932, with percentages indicating the total each sells. It might be added that 1937 figures to date reflect a similar trend, Japanese sources claiming a considerable increase in exports to Manchoukuo over 1936.

1,000 MY.	1932	%	1933	%	1934	%	1935	%	1936	%
Japan (including Chosen)	112,395	58.0	339,763	65.9	408,601	70.9	456,675	75.6	534,630	77.2
China	35,236	18.0	79,821	15.5	57,594	9.7	31,992	5.3	47,743	6.9
Germany	3,699	2.0	10,577	2.0	12,485	2.1	14,741	2.4	13,024	1.8
U.S.A.	11,398	7.5	28,961	5.6	35,227	5.9	24,935	4.1	23,735	3.4
Gt. Britain	23,724	11.0	7,190	1.4	9,315	1.6	9,482	1.6	7,419	1.0
U.S.S.R.	4,376	2.0	7,567	1.5	4,875	0.8	1,168	0.2	260	0.04

This constitutes interesting reading, particularly in the face of claims emanating from time to time from Japanese sources or otherwise to the effect that American interests, particularly, have held their own in Manchoukuo despite Japanese political control and commercial competition.

Apparently one of the major obstacles confronting Great Britain and the United States in attempting to effect some arrangement for the protection of their nationals in Manchoukuo has been the Stimson Non-recognition Doctrine. The events of recent years have shown what the American State Department should have known in 1931—that there was little reason to believe that this policy would constitute an effective instrument against Japanese aggression in Manchoukuo. As a matter of fact no action on the part of the Powers could have so effectively freed Japan from the fear of foreign restrictions. As a result of this bit of unpractical statesmanship, when the State Departments of the various countries have lodged protests with Tokyo against the enactment by Manchoukuo of laws prejudicial to the interests of their nationals, the Japanese authorities in reply have merely pointed out that, although Manchoukuo is a sovereign state as far as they are concerned, yet the non-recognition policy of the Powers would appear to indicate that the territory was still a part of China, to whom, therefore, representations should be made. The Powers, therefore, have been left more or less diplomatically powerless, as Japan, behind the cloak of the Manchoukuo Government, has proceeded to strip nationals of foreign countries of their investments. An instance of this was the Oil Monopoly Laws of 1935.

Another occurrence (1935) indicative of Japanese determination to leave no channel open by which foreign business might draw off revenue from Manchoukuo which might otherwise go to their own nationals, had to do with the automobile industry. In this case an agreement had been worked out whereby the Dodge and Chrysler interests, through Sale & Frazar, their agents in Japan, had agreed to erect an assembly plant (Teikoken Automobile Factory) at Dairen for American-made cars. Permission was first secured from the Japanese authorities in the Kwantung Leased Territory. Land was then purchased, a preliminary building contract awarded, and machinery ordered from the United States. However, the military authorities suddenly decided against the project and withdrew the permit. Instead, semi-government plants took over the assembly plant, using motors and parts of Japanese manufacture. Protests were filed by the Dodge and Chrysler Companies, but to no

atmosphere of spiritualised affinity, the Greek idea of inevitable fatality finding its expression in Malatesta's words before the lovers he has slain :

"Unwittingly they loved, unwittingly I slew them.
They look like children, fast asleep."

The mere fact that Marion Crawford, the Italian-American novelist, dedicated his play (1902) to Sarah Bernhardt proves that the author lays stress on the "*pièce bien faite*." And its success with Sarah Bernhardt in the title role and M. Marx as Malatesta testifies to Crawford's skill as a playwright. Amongst other innovations he introduces a character which has escaped the attention of other adapters : Paolo's wife, an historic figure which Crawford has somewhat modified ; she is the "mad woman" in the play, which would, with an adequate cast, prove a definite hit on the English stage.

As in the Don Juan legend, the timeless universality of the central *motif* is proved by its adaptation in modern garb, one dramatic, the other narrative. The eminent Spanish playwright José Echegaray used it in the "*Gran Galeoto*," his best-known tragedy, where the two lovers are driven to betray husband and friend owing to the malicious gossip of society and relations. The world has in this modern version taken the place of Galeoto. Ernesto, the hero of the play, expresses in the great speech of Act II the author's bitter philosophy : "A man and a woman are living happily in peace and friendship. No one takes any notice of them when suddenly Society, without rhyme or reason, proclaims that a shameful secret is hidden behind the placid course of their existence. Their honour is gone, they are condemned. And the most terrible result is that whereas in the beginning Society had no reason for its verdict, in the end it may really find one. For pressure of circumstances has become so strong that they are unconsciously drawn close to each other, the world being the battering-ram which brings virtue to the fall, another Galeoto of infamy."

Max von Wildenbruch's interesting novel *Francesca da Rimini* is a "*Selbstbeichte*" in Goethe's sense. Francesca von Maibenberg, a brain temperament, destined for the humdrum life of a Prussian provincial town, marries a General considerably older than herself, whom she learns to esteem and love in her quiet way. A young officer, Paul von Gartenhofen,

of exceptional artistic gifts, awakens her dormant senses. The General's Adjutant, also having fallen in love with her, commits the indiscretion of purloining a sketch made by Paul, depicting Francesca as Dante's heroine. Her husband, finding this sketch, breaks down under the blow. Paul fights a duel with the Adjutant in which he is mortally wounded, dying in Francesca's arms. The novel is a valuable contribution to psycho-analysis and the art of transposing a well-worn theme into a different social atmosphere.

We see from this brief study, how, out of the cell of a comparatively insignificant event, "*un petit fait*" as French newspapers call it, owing to its powerful incubation by the genius of a supreme poet, a complicated organism developed in the searching mind of other artists, laying bare all the possibilities for artistic treatment. Dante's "faultless tale of Francesca da Rimini," as the historian Prescott called it, had thus become the centre and focus of a vast treasure house of masterpieces to which numerous artists contributed their share, inspired by the poet's own words which might well be written over each of their works :

"*L'amor che muove il sol e l'altre stelle.*"

M. JOUBERT.

purpose. It was held that the military implications of the automobile industry necessitated its being controlled by Japanese interests.

The methods of the Japanese in establishing themselves in Manchoukuo to the exclusion of foreign interests are many and varied. However, in general they include : (1) the taking over of an industry outright, as in the case of the oil companies ; (2) compelling foreign producers to deal with state monopolies ; and (3) a system of secret customs and freight rebates by which their nationals are favoured to the disadvantage of the foreign shipper. They contend of course that, in view of the fact that Japan is Manchoukuo's best customer, it is only logical that in return Japan should have the greatest part of her imports. Yet it is obvious that the political and trade advantages of one kind or another enjoyed by the Japanese in the Manchoukuo market of to-day make it impossible for other foreign traders to compete with them except in the case of a few items, the number of which decreases daily.

The recent German-Japanese Covenant is reflected in a second treaty signed on April 30th, 1936, between Germany and Manchoukuo. This trade agreement provides for the yearly importation by Germany of Manchoukuo products to the amount of 100,000,000 yuan in value and the importation of German products by Manchoukuo to the extent of 25,000,000 yuan. The agreement, which came into force on June 1st, 1936, to run for one year, was renewed on May 21st of this year to remain in operation until May 31st, 1940. An office has been opened in Berlin by Hiyoshi Kato, Manchoukuo Trade Commissioner to Germany. A German Trade Commissioner is expected to open a similar office at Hsinking in the near future.

However, any understanding of the past history and relative positions of Japan and Manchoukuo must lead inevitably to the conclusion that in the face of the necessity that has impelled Japan to seize Manchuria and even set up a puppet state to secure the friendship of the 90 per cent. Chinese population, the possibility of any nation being permitted to secure any appreciable part of its trade is entirely out of the question. As a matter of fact the ostensible sovereign status of Manchoukuo would appear to constitute an index to Japanese objectives. Designs frankly imperialistic

from the point of view of merely acquiring territory would need to pay comparatively little attention to the sentiments of a population 90 per cent. of whom are nationals of a weaker power. If, however, commercial and trade advantages are sought, a sop to national pride, in the establishment of a seemingly independent state with a sovereign of a former ruling family, would tend to create loyalties which would not resort to the trade boycott as a means of retaliation. It is on this factor that Japan depends for a return on her tremendous investment in Manchoukuo.

To-day there is little question but that foreign business in Manchoukuo can function, if at all, only under conditions which will not affect Japan's stranglehold on the economic resources of the country. The situation represents a *fait accompli*. The important consideration, therefore, would no longer appear to be the status of foreign trade in Manchoukuo, but in the light of recent events how far it will be affected in North China by the political dominance of Japan.

The economic advance of Japan into North China over a year and a half ago which now is assuming political reality under the guns of the Japanese military has been productive of changes which do not augur well for the future of foreign interests operating in that area. To-day five out of the six cotton mills in Tientsin have either been sold or are to be sold to Japanese interests, with the result that the cotton industry of that city, once a promising Chinese enterprise, has passed under Japanese control. They have also established a central agency to control the purchase of raw cotton and the marketing of the finished product. Japan is interested in the cultivation of cotton in North China, with the idea of converting the area into an independent source of supply for the Osaka Organisation. To this end experimental stations have been set up for the purpose of improving the product. A rayon textile industry, glass works, and iron foundries are to be established. Japan also contemplates the exploitation of the Chinese salt fields and of the Lungyen iron mines in North China, as well as the expansion of the Chinghsing Collieries whose deposits are estimated at 220,000,000 tons of coal good enough for smelting purposes. Other organisations contemplate the supervision of importing and exporting activities, real estate, electrical enterprises, and similar projects.

A MADRAS CENTENARY.

AT a moment when India is passing another milestone of her history, an especial significance attaches to the attainment of its centenary by the Madras Christian College. The new Indian constitution which came into operation on April 1st is much more than a political change. It is significant of great social developments, and part of a process that must have profound consequences in many aspects of India's life. At such a time, a people is particularly conscious of its constant need of sound leadership in public life—of men (and women) of wisdom as well as knowledge, of character as well as executive ability, of generous social sympathies and a sense of vocation to public service. So the motives and ideals that inform an educational system are tested. India is pre-eminently a land where all human activities are seen as having real spiritual significance, and we may believe Sir Francis Younghusband that "religion in the future as in the past will probably occupy the supreme place in Indian life, above, though informing, all political, economic and social life." Yet India, not less than other lands, has suffered from "the wounds of reason too exclusively turned to material purposes." It has not been easy to preserve higher education from becoming a system whereby Indians were prepared to participate in the government of the land by passing examinations. So it would be hard to measure the value of the fact that, when Government accepted the task of "advancing by education the moral and material progress of the Indian peoples," Christian educators like Duff of Calcutta and Wilson of Bombay were already at work in the land. Inevitably, if somewhat slowly, Government recognised that it must call the mission schools and colleges into co-operation. It was also inevitable that such men of vision and conviction, holding that true education is a process in which spiritual values inhere, and that secular education is a contradiction in terms, should exercise a considerable influence upon public educational policy in India.

For such reasons the celebrations of January 29th and 30th last were a significant occasion. Such a centenary would be notable at any time, for behind it lies a distinguished history and a remarkable record. It may be doubted whether an institution of learning has made a deeper impress upon a

people than has the Madras Christian College upon South India. Its *alumni* have done incalculable service in every field of activity in Indian life—politics, administration, education, medicine, economic and agricultural development. The congratulations showered upon the college—by the Viceroy and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lords Zetland, Halifax, Willingdon and Lothian, and a host of former students like Sir M. Venkatasubba Rao, Sir A. Krishnaswami Aiyar, Mr. C. R. Reddy, Sir Mahomed Usman, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, Sir M. K. Nair and the Bishop of Dornakal—were in terms which those at all familiar with the College and its work will know to be no exaggeration. As the *Madras Hindu* (which published an excellently produced special supplement on January 28th) remarked, the College "has given to the professions and the public life of this Province, nay of the country at large, thousands of well-equipped, cultured men deeply imbued with the ideal of disinterested service."

This centenary was the more notable, however, because it was celebrated by the opening by H.E. the Lieutenant-Governor (Lord Erskine) of new college buildings at Tambaram. That event is significant of a future that promises to outpace the achievements of the College's first hundred years in its contribution to India's life.

Madras Christian College is a stout tree that has grown out of the sapling known as "Anderson's School." The Rev. John Anderson, missionary of the Church of Scotland, son of Scottish farmer folk of characteristic industry and piety, came to Madras in February 1837. In the April, under the inspiration of Alexander Duff's work in Calcutta, he opened a school in Armenian Street, George Town. His prospectus reveals the man and his mind:

The object is simply to convey through the channel of a good education as great an amount of truth as possible to the native mind, especially of Bible truth. Every branch of knowledge communicated is to be made subservient to this desirable end. As soon as a proper class can be formed, the following branches will be taught: English, including reading, grammar and composition, writing and accounts, history, geography, arithmetic, mathematics, and algebra; the elements of astronomy and political economy; logic, moral philosophy, and natural theology; the evidences and doctrines of Christianity, etc.

Japan has devoted considerable interest to communications. Negotiations have been undertaken looking to the construction of a railway to link Tientsin with Shihchiachuang on the Peiping-Hankow railway. This road would be about 175 miles in length and would give the Province of Shansi a more or less direct outlet for its coal and iron. Further plans contemplate the development of Taku and Tangku to provide harbour and wharfage facilities at these ports of Tientsin.

That Japan, in achieving economic and political control of North China and the linking of it to Manchoukuo, intended to let nothing stand in her way was evidenced from the first by statements from her officials in the matter of Chinese attempts to thwart Japanese designs by a non-co-operation policy. As expressed by a Japanese consular official: "If the Chinese show real willingness to co-operate the tension will be alleviated and then the way will be cleared for the settlement of outstanding political issues and perhaps even discussion of the status of East Hopei and North Chahar, but if it becomes clear the Chinese are unwilling to co-operate there is nothing left for Japan but to consolidate her position in North China regardless of Nanking." To-day statements of intentions and policies have given place to direct action.

There is, therefore, little doubt as to Japan's intentions to-day in Manchoukuo and ultimately in North China with regard to the business operations and activities of nationals of foreign powers. Economic dominance necessitates the elimination of foreign business and commercial interests in these areas—a situation which would appear to be nearing fulfilment. Protests can be made by the United States and other Powers to Tokyo against discriminatory trade tactics by the Japanese authorities as violating the principle of the Open Door, but to no purpose. With the confidence in direct action diplomacy that her recent successes have tended to create, there is little likelihood that Japan will take kindly to any consideration of restraint suggested by the Powers. Japan intends to follow what she believes is her manifest destiny, leaving the Powers to wonder, as each successive incident occurs, as to just what they are going to do about it.

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THE SPECTRE HAUNTING EUROPE.

A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise the spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police spies.

THUS, according to the first words of the "Communist Manifesto," Marx saw the situation in 1847. Ever since, every counter-revolution and reaction, Napoleon III, Bismarck, the Czars, as well as present-day Fascism, have repeated the same argument: "the Communist danger," protection of religion and social order against Communism. It became more weighty after the Russian experiment; and to-day there is again a curious Holy Alliance to exorcise the spectre: European dictators, Japanese imperialists, the Pope. It is the first time that a movement has spread over the whole face of the entirely discovered earth. What is the reality behind the fears and hopes of Communism? Do the final ends of this movement actually correspond to the most general needs of suffering mankind? Is Communism really coming?

The term "Communism" is less vague to-day than in the days of the "Manifesto." The original sects and utopian communities of Marx's time are mostly forgotten. In the general acceptance, it is the Marxist doctrine as interpreted by Lenin to which the name Communism is given. This Marxo-Leninism is mainly an objection to that form of parliamentary democracy which in the late nineteenth century was taken over from England by most of the Continental nations. It is less an objection to Democracy, if we understand by this term the humanitarian and moral ideal first expressed by the Greeks, than to one of the historical forms of Democracy which offers, according to Lenin, no chance for the working class for the conquest of power. The fundamental questions of human right and duty, of liberty and of the destiny of man, have but little place in Leninism. It is tacitly understood that history is working in an invisible way at the creation of a society in which the material satisfaction of the individual will be assured. It is also tacitly understood that such a society is the only and uncontradicted aim of the working class.

We must remember that the German Communist thinkers, whose disciple and interpreter Lenin was, were contemporaries

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Opening with fifty-nine boys, the School had 180 entered in two months. Anderson worked by the monatorial method, himself teaching his senior scholars, who in turn instructed the younger. By the next year new premises had to be sought, soon additional staff had to be sent from Scotland, and an interesting early development was the opening of branch schools in such cities as Conjeeveram, Trivellore and Nellore, out of which grew the Christian high schools of those cities. The sapling struck sturdy roots, proving itself able to withstand the competition of other schools, offering free education, or appealing to caste pupils only. Anderson's view was that those who desired this education, and could pay, should do so, at least in part. He refused none on caste grounds, and so pariah boys attended his school. He also weathered a tempest when some of his pupils embraced the Christian faith.

The disruption of the Church of Scotland in 1843 threatened a difficulty of another sort, but Anderson and his colleagues (the Revs. Robert Johnston and John Braidwood) adhered to the Free Church, and possible legal difficulties were avoided. That same year, again under the pressure of success, the Mission purchased a building in Esplanade, which became the nucleus of the College premises for ninety years. The cost, Rs. 25,000, was almost entirely raised in India. Then followed years of gathering strength, until in 1855 Anderson died of overwork in an exacting climate, after Johnston had died in 1853, and Braidwood had to be invalided home.

At this critical point, the hour produced its man in one who has been lately eulogised by Mr. Srinivasa Sastri for a great part in shaping the whole of the higher education of Madras Presidency. William Miller landed in Madras in 1862, being then only 24. But he had the assets of a fine academic record at Aberdeen and Edinburgh, private means, and gifts of character that matched his mind. All of these he dedicated to the School at this critical moment. The early enthusiasm for English education, it appears, had waned somewhat in Madras. There was even a suggestion that Anderson's School should be closed. Miller was a young man seeing visions. In 1857 the University of Madras had been founded as an examining and affiliating body, on the pattern of the then University of London. This gave a new impetus to efficient secondary education. Miller took the important decision that

Anderson's School must continue, and take its place, an avowedly Christian institution, in the system of public education. So Anderson's rather sprawling curriculum had to be pruned and shaped to prepare for matriculation. In 1865 Miller's first class of six students were ready for matriculation; next year they took the Intermediate examination; and in 1867 a class for the B.A. degree was started. So the General Assembly's Institution became a College of Madras University. Both the Church and Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Societies began to co-operate financially and by sending students. In 1877 it became the Madras Christian College, governed by Senatus and Council, with the Free Church of Scotland in the background. Twenty years followed during which Miller's great plans were steadily worked out. Numbers increased to 600, 1,000 pupils were at the School, new courses were started, premises extended more than once, until the College became a foremost institution of higher education in the Presidency. The wider aspects of the academic life had full recognition. The College Library was a characteristic work of Miller. He founded the Madras Debating Society, largely composed of senior students of the College, in 1877. Scientific, dramatic, vernacular and other societies were born, and physical training, athletics, and notably cricket, became part of College life. Nothing was more statesmanlike than the foundation of the College hostel system. This began with a house for Brahmin students, which was in effect the Head's house. Then a hostel for Christian students commemorated Fenn, of the C.M.S., and a later hostel was for non-Brahmins. In all this development, the Principal was assisted by men of ability who shared his convictions and enthusiasm, but Miller was the master builder. He founded the College Chapel, many scholarships, staff-retiring funds, and the magazine. Miller's work might be measured by his C.I.E. or Kaiser-i-Hind medal, by honorary degrees, his Vice-Chancellorship of Madras University, his Moderatorship of the United Free Church of Scotland, or by the statue erected in Madras during his lifetime. It might be more truly assessed by the careers of thousands of men who, passing under his influence, mediated his ideals, his conviction that service is the true expression of culture, and the spacious atmosphere and high traditions of the College, to the life of South India. After Miller left India in 1907, his Scottish home was visited by many old students—he forgot nobody—and

of Bismarck's *Realpolitik* and disciples of Fichte—as much as of Hegel—and of Ranke's Prussian school of historians. This school claimed, like Fichte, that the institutions of a state are only functions of its natural interest to extend its power. What Fichte and Ranke claimed for the state, Marx and Engels claimed for classes in conflict. It cannot be denied that this theory contains an appeal to different human and social types inside every nation. The less Marxist way of Socialism which does not adjourn the solution of concrete problems till after the conquest of power by the proletariat and which appeals to the feeling of Liberty and to the acceptance of reality, is sometimes in a weak position against this promise of a messianic time made with the certainty of physical science. This seems so, despite the *rapprochement* between democratic Socialism and Communism achieved since the Soviets are devoting themselves mainly to practical tasks.

Registered party-members of the Third International are not a very important quantity outside the U.S.S.R.* Even accepting the rather optimistic statistics published by the Communist sections, one could not attribute great importance to the movement. It would be wrong, however, to judge simply by statistics. Organisation and propaganda have usually less importance than party officials might think. The attitude towards Communism remains the most discussed issue of the day. Without pretending to explain all the reasons, let me try to describe a few of the social groups and psychological types to which it has a special appeal. To characterise them as "proletariat" would be a simplification. This is proved by the great number of proletarians who, after twenty years of a Communist International, remain outside it and join non-Communist or even anti-Communist organisations. Communism appeals, it is true, first of all to those whom the present order deprives of work or the fruits of their work. In consequence of the frequent economic crises of the post-war time it appeals probably still more to the

* In England they did not number more than 11,500, according to Mr. H. Pollitt at the National Conference of the Communist Party of Great Britain at Sheffield (*The Times*, October 12th, 1936). In France, where at the last elections the Communist Party got seventy-two seats in the Chamber with the support of Radical and Socialist votes, the number of the people affiliated to the Communist Party is not above 280,000, according to M. Thorez in an interview in the *Manchester Guardian*, January 23rd, 1937. In this figure are comprised not only party members but all the organised "sympathisers."

workless than to the exploited workers. The very existence of this group of unemployed is felt as a living reproach by the whole society. Hope of deliverance from this evil turns towards the Great Promise. There is in this hope a vague desire for real community. Whether it is a desire for real Communism is not so sure.

More numerous, however, than this group are those who are accessible to social messianism, a phenomenon less novel in our time than is thought and deeply rooted in human nature in every age. The ideal of a perfect Nature, deformed by a bad human order, which may be led back and reformed to its original perfection, is more or less common to all the great moral movements of mankind. Communism expresses in scientific terms the chiliasm of a perfect future and contains equally—as religious movements did before—such a retrospective chiliasm. What seems attractive to the modern mind is its simplicity. It promises the conquest of Nature and a repartition of goods in a simple technical way of organisation. Where chiliastic ideas are still vivid religious reminiscences, only recently broken by the technical age, the attraction is particularly strong. But Communism appeals also to people outside the religious sphere; to the technicians who consider the greatest possible simplification of everything as the real purpose of all social and political activities. Here Communism has an affinity with American ideologies such as Technocracy.

Then come the philo-Communist intellectuals, many of whom are outside official Communism. They are either hesitating sympathisers or radical dissenters, rather than party members. The appeal of Communism to these intellectuals may be thus described: Mankind needs to be led by people with a special insight into the mechanism of historical evolution and whose function is the unmasking of ideologies, the reduction of collective phantasies to the most simple rational formulas. This aspect of Communism appeals to the passion of sincerity and truth. Unfortunately it appeals also to the delaying of the eternal spiritual and moral problems (which are said to have no importance until the time of a better technical organisation), to the intellectual contempt for the feelings and motives of the average man. There is more in it of distrust and contempt than of love and belief. This is probably why the original rigorous form of bolshevism

when he died in 1923 he left the bulk of his property to the College.

After Dr. Miller has come a worthy succession—Macphail, Skinner, Meston, A. G. Hogg—who have steadily developed his policy. The College gives honours courses in Mathematics, Philosophy, History, English, Physics, and Zoology. In common with all colleges, it has made great advance in scientific studies, providing laboratories and apparatus to prepare men for the B.Sc. degree. Two new hostels have been opened. The basis of support has been widened, and now the Church of Scotland, the London Missionary Society, the American Baptists, the Dutch Reformed Church of America, and the S.P.G. all participate in Madras Christian College.

But, no more than a country registering constitutional advance, can a college pause at a milestone. The real significance of this centenary lies in the fact that Madras Christian College has once again struck its tents, and migrated to a new *campus* which itself indicates a fresh and striking development. By the end of the war the College became aware that it must face difficult problems of accommodation and location. The housing situation in Madras was serious, and it was clear that the College could not long continue to advance and flourish in George Town. After unhurried consideration, on Dr. Meston's initiative, and with the approval of the Governing Body in Britain, it was decided "to mark the centenary of the College by an advance which would greatly strengthen liberal education in South India." It was learned that the Forest Department were abandoning the Selaipur Reserve Forest at Tambaram, fourteen miles out of Madras, and there the College sought a site. In 1930 the Madras Government alienated 400 acres of land at Tambaram to the College. The "Minimum Scheme," representing the barest necessities in building and equipment, was estimated to cost £250,000, towards which Government promised a grant up to £120,000 (to be paid on a 50 per cent. basis as money was expended).

Meantime the Lindsay Commission, appointed by the International Missionary Council to survey the work of the Christian Colleges in India, under the Chairmanship of the present Master of Balliol, visited Madras in the cold weather of 1930-1. This Commission strongly approved the removal of the College to Tambaram, but made an important recommendation, whereby the plans for College hostels were

abandoned, and new plans drafted for a new College on the hall system. Another important development (also inspired by the Lindsay Commission) was that in 1933 the S.P.G. decided to transfer the College work of the Bishop Heber College, Trichinopoly, to Tambaram, and there to establish a Heber Hall. This was not an easy decision, for the Trichinopoly College perpetuates a great memory and enshrines a worthy tradition, and it reflects real missionary statesmanship.

Of the "Minimum Scheme," roughly two-thirds has been completed to date, at a cost of £160,000, which has been covered by various grants and gifts, including Government's contribution. The College still needs £50,000 to complete Tambaram. The new College has been designed to secure educational efficiency in fabric and equipment, and the physical, mental and spiritual well-being of students and staff in an exacting climate, with due regard for economy in outlay and maintenance. But the most interesting and important feature of Madras Christian College is the adoption of the "hall" system. This has influenced the planning of buildings, and it will shape and inspire all College work and life. It is a universally accepted view that the most formative element in any true education is the personal intercourse, the interplay of personality, between tutor and those *in statu pupillari*. This method is enshrined in the life of the ancient English universities. It is likewise the traditional India ideal in the relationship of *guru* and *chela*. Madras Christian College has always striven to achieve this, despite the difficulties of size and non-residence—nor, indeed, without success. Nothing has been more striking in the centenary tributes than the testimony of old students to those impalpable things, of infinite worth, communicated by contact with the personalities of their tutors. On the other hand a large college can offer the undoubted advantages of a larger and therefore more varied staff and a wider curriculum. At Tambaram it is hoped to secure, as far as possible, the advantages of both methods. There will be four halls, each accommodating 150 students, with a proportion of non-residents attached. The hall will be a hostel, plus much more. Each will have a resident warden and sub-warden, and all members of the teaching staff will be attached to a hall. The hall will be a centre for tutorial supervision, each student being allotted to a tutor. Each hall will carry on its own cultural and social activities, and games

—which is doubtless rather in Trotsky's than in Stalin's views—could not conserve its influence on the hoping and trusting multitudes. Still, the opposition-Communists are a significant symptom. While official Communism aims at the creation of a friendly atmosphere round the Soviet Union which developed with time into an element of the World peace system, they keep alive the expectation of revolutions through catastrophes. Their number is rather small, but their importance in literature and the press is considerable.

Soviet Russia has been proposed as a model to her believers. Yet the idea of a co-existence of the Communist system with other systems is gaining ground. The Nazi anti-Soviet drive has drawn closer the Soviets and Democracy. Democratic objections against the government methods of the Soviets are, however, bound to emerge occasionally, as at the big Moscow trials which brutally reminded the observer that Russia is a dictatorship. If a doubt remained about the guilt of the condemned, there is no doubt of the crisis of conscience for many friends of the Soviet Union. The present issue, is, however, not between dictatorship or democracy in the U.S.S.R., but whether Soviet Russia can carry out her industrialisation by her own strength, or whether she is to become a raw material colony for foreign industrialists—whether she will rank among the sovereign nations, or whether she will be divided into satellite spheres of Tokio and Berlin. Faced by this alternative a strong patriotism is rising in the Soviet Union, a claim for self-determination which finds a sympathetic echo in the West.

The present rulers of the Soviets may be criticised, if their personalities and methods are measured by the ideal standards of a free, cultured and democratic society. Stalin may be a harsh Georgian with despotic ways, indifferent to moral scruples and inclined to fatalism, as is understandable with a man who comes from a people bordering the Islamic world and who went through that school of modern fatalism which is called Marxism. There is no doubt that he has a great amount of common sense and an understanding of his people's needs. This is his great advantage over his intellectual adversaries, the Communists of the Trotskyite camp. Against this shrewd and energetic peasant, with all the qualities and defects of the people of the stock he comes from, the opposition Communists only produce controversialists of a sophistic

brilliancy to whom their own doctrinal purity is more precious than any reality of the state and of the people's interests.

What are these realities like? The Union is composed of many nations still at a rudimentary stage. Peoples which had subsisted under a heterogeneous state and church system, peoples with little history, or with memories too far remote, have started a national life, a literature in the native tongue and a political existence. This seems the decisive feature of the Union. Whatever the realities of the new Constitution may be at present, its fulfilment will be the aim of the future, through the central power or through new opposition forces amongst the peoples. This young national life and the absence of some social evils in the economic organisation finds sympathy in some sections of Western and Eastern opinion. Is that enough to justify the revolutionary optimism on the one side, the panic fear on the other? To treat this question we briefly survey the resisting forces, cultural and social.

The anti-Communist slogan played an important part in the rise of Fascism and mobilised the support of the middle classes. It is true that many of the Communist methods have been applied by Fascism in the economic and technical field. Fascism has but little to do with the classical enemy of Communism as designed by Marx, i.e. with Manchesterian Capitalism. The interference of the state in economic life, the emphasis on imposed duties in the interest of an untroubled functioning of the state mechanism, are features both of Communism and Fascism. Yet we see Liberals, deeply opposed to such a mechanical conception of the state, who in a desperate alternative would prefer Communism to Fascism. Recent Spanish and French events prove that non-proletarian forces are not "one single reactionary mass" as the Marxist doctrine asserts that they are bound to be, at least since the ceasing of the class struggle between feudalism and bourgeoisie, in which the latter used the proletariat as its ally.

Fascism has won some classes afraid of the Communist prospect and established in two important countries solid systems, as far as despotism and demagoguery can be such. Obstacles in the way of Communism are, however, less the pronounced adversaries than the elements to whom the great appeal fails. Among the resisting forces let us begin with the traditional ones, State, Church, and Property, the natural forces of Conservation. The Marxist view would hardly admit

will be largely organised on the hall basis. Hall life will be a democratic organisation, a preparation for the greater fellowship of post-college life. Each hall will have its own chapel, with daily opportunities of voluntary corporate worship, apart from College service on Sunday. Thus it is hoped to combine the personal values of the small college with the academic advantages of the large institution. Here the relationship of college to university at Oxford or Cambridge is at once suggested. Another analogy, hardly less relevant, is that of provinces with their largely autonomous governments within the federal central government of India.

So Madras Christian College begins its second century, rich in tradition and achievement, and renewing its youth by commencing to work out something distinctive in educational policy, adapted to India, designed to prepare its students worthily to fulfil their part in the great world's life. As a Christian College it will continue to make its distinctive and real moral and spiritual contribution to the new India. To that, indeed, something may be added. With British members of staff growing less in Government colleges as education is Indianised, the Christian colleges alone may practise the fellowship of Indians with British and Americans in a common task. So to Madras Christian College, with its sister institutions, will be committed afresh a ministry of reconciliation.

J. O. DOBSON.

THE OTHER SIDE OF ARAN.

THE film epic of humble humanity which recently so interested the world showed conclusively that life is not all "beer and skittles" on the rocky group of islets off Ireland's western coast. Neither though is it exclusively shark fishing and the back-breaking manufacture of soil, for Providence has tempered the hardships of life even to the people of Aran.

Compared with its two sister islands Aranmore is quite a fair-sized place, totalling over eleven square miles in area. Besides the capital, Kilronan, there are many villages and hamlets, four great prehistoric fortresses, and a wealth of ruined churches, primitive monastic fragments, stone crosses and other relics, many dating back to the very dawn of Christianity in Ireland fifteen centuries ago.

The people of Aran are delightful, with all the kindliness and courtesy of Irish people everywhere. Yet nevertheless they are different in an indefinite but quite tangible way. Some attribute this to long and primitive insularity, some to a reputed Spanish strain in the blood of the people of Connaught, others—and it seems the most probable—to the theory that here in Aran, as in all the other islands of these western seas, is to be found a remnant of the earlier peoples—Picts or Fir Bolg, or what you will—in any case the descendants of the Bronze Age, if not indeed the Stone Age, inhabitants of Ireland. With all their kindliness there is a reserve, an aloofness, a stateliness about even the least of them that is distinctly noticeable, in short the renowned good manners of the Irishman with a touch of the "Grand Manner" applied.

Religion and politics seem to provide here, as elsewhere in Ireland, the chief outlets for the emotional life. The religious life of Irish people everywhere, especially the peasant, is a devout and mystical expression of the human soul and its needs for spiritual uplift. The remains of early churches, primitive monasteries, round towers, and high crosses that are scattered throughout the island prove that this has been the case on Aranmore since Christianity first came. The very place names are witnesses of this fact, for "Aran" is derived from Ara-Na-Naomh, meaning "Ara of the Saints," and numbers of the village names begin with Kil or Kill, the Gaelic term for church. Chief among these towns is Killeany

that they are not simply identical with the existing system of private ownership of the means of production. Yet, from the purely capitalistic side there seems to come hardly any ideological opposition. Fascism started rather from the dissatisfied and pauperised middle classes, from militarists and individual demagogues with literary ambitions and pseudo-socialist slogans. Manchester theories are rare nowadays, and if they exist they are unknown except by academic economists. The accepted ideas are state interference, planning and control. Ideologically, Capitalism has retreated. Collective control is progressing. Does that mean the disappearance of all the forces of Conservation? Certainly not.

As to Religion, the attitude towards Communism is not uniform. Even the churches cannot be considered as "one single reactionary mass." While the Vatican is bitterly hostile, some Protestant clergymen are sincerely advocating the Soviet case and see even excuses for the anti-religious campaign. Most of the elements to whom Communism appeals have, however, previously left church life and tradition. The groups which remain connected with Religion live mostly outside the industrial centres, in traditional circumstances. More pre-capitalistic than anti-capitalistic, they resist every kind of standardisation in whatever form it may be offered. Religion for them remains the expression of personal conscience and independence. Beyond this, there is an increasing religious current in the spiritual life of Europe. To many intellectuals the primitiveness of the materialistic conception, the emptiness of the ideal of a mechanised mankind, seems unbearable. Soviet-Russian materialistic propaganda is probably able to destroy some primitive beliefs. It can certainly not affect cultured Christian minds to whom the technical optimism and materialism appear as a more naïve and lower form of thinking than the religions, the thoughts of a St. Augustine or St. Thomas, or, to name a few contemporaries, of a Maritain, Haecker, Bergamin, Eliot, or Berdiaieff. As Gide remarks,* the Russian anti-Christians deal with religion in a way too similar to the Barbarians, who after their sudden conversion rejected Greek and Roman culture as Paganism.

A further resisting force seems to be the idea and the fact of the nation. While Communism fought religion, it made concessions to Nationalism. The Soviet Constitution is

* André Gide : *Le retour de l'U.S.S.R.*, Paris, Gallimard, 1936.

claimed to be the ideal solution of the problem of nationalities, and in many countries nationalistic slogans became a topic of Communist propaganda. Thus in the vanquished countries after 1918 Communism denounced the "Versailles slavery" and offered, mainly through Radek's pen, alliances to extreme nationalists. To-day French Communism sings the *Marseillaise*, and even the small Communist party of Britain exalts through historical pageants the English liberal heritage. Here again Communism fails to satisfy the European mind. The elementary national liberties, teaching and administration in the native tongue, are surely a great step forward for the primitive populations of Russia. It is, however, already doubtful whether higher developed nationalities, such as the Ukrainians or Georgians, are really contented therewith. In the long run, they may aim at a further self-government and at their deliverance from the burden of an immense Empire mainly supported by the richness of their native lands. What is enough for the Mongols and what is something for the Ukrainians would hardly be anything to nations of old Europe.

This applies still more to the small nations than to the great ones. The intensity of community life, the value of the individual are greater in the small states, which therefore have preceded the big states in Democracy. There are strong reasons, economic and cultural, in favour of a conservation of the small states. The dense population and the comparative agrarian poverty of our Continent force its peoples to an intensive agriculture and industry. Nothing contributes more to this intensity than the stimulant of small individual property, especially of the peasant class. This class resists Communist centralisation, yet it is not necessarily counter-revolutionary or Fascist. In France the small proprietors compose the Radical party, and Scandinavian peasantries have not only Democracy but even Socialist control. In Czechoslovakia and in the Balkans Democracy or the demand for Democracy comes from the peasantry, and is opposed by factions of the town intelligentsia who would prefer a state-controlled system to their own profit.

The first followers of the Third International believed, two decades ago, that the establishment of a Communist order all over Europe would be the result of the War. But Europe refused a unification under the Communist leadership and preferred the national states, the historical essence of Western civilisation.

which lies on the coast to the east of Kilronan. This is a place of the island's most sacred memories ; the name derives from a convert of St. Patrick, the St. Enna who first brought Christianity to Aran and who built his primitive church on the hill-side above the present village. The devout peasants of Killeany have constructed a rude altar on the site, have inscribed a cross on a ruined slab, and here bring their floral offerings and their prayers. On the very top of the high hill are the remains of a later monastic settlement of which the central oratory remains. This Temple St. Benen is one of the most ancient and curious churches in the British Isles and is said to be the smallest in the world, its dimensions (interior) being given as eleven feet long, seven feet wide, and, curiously, twenty-one feet high. Around it may still be traced the outlines of the cells which once surrounded it. Temple St. Benen is attributed to the sixth century, which means that it has stood on this stormy hill-top, time and the elements defying, for fourteen hundred years.

Near Killeany, too, is the Holy Well of St. Columbcill. It lies under an overhanging cliff at the very edge of tide water. A rude stone coping surrounds it, a canopy protects it, and a very primitive stone cross has been erected. It is all very simple and primitive, but it is revered by the people of Aran, and here they come from all over the island in pilgrimage on St. Colum's feast day—women in modern attire, women in the native red petticoat and shawl, men in "store clothes," and men in the home-spun and "pampooties" of Aran's ancient wear ; together in prayer they circle around and around the Holy Well as their forefathers have done for countless generations.

Another manifestation of the deep religious feeling of these islanders is discovered in the curious, and so far as we have seen unique, memorials for their dead. These are not the usual graveyard tombstones, but are found bordering at least two of Aranmore's main roads, and they are so massive and so primitive in construction that in the distance, except for the crosses on top, they suggest megalithic monuments. They are enormous stone cairns, rectangular in shape, six to eight feet or thereabouts high, each bearing on its top a squat, heavy, stone cross, and on its face a tablet rudely carved with simple ornament and a pathetic memorial inscription. The following is typical of all : "Lord have mercy on the soul of —, died

in the —th year of her age, 18— ; Erected by her father —" In all, about fifteen of these monuments were seen along the edge of one road and four or five along another. A very curious feature was that in the case of every one noticed, the inscription was in the English language—and the Aran Islands are supposed to belong to the Gaeltacht ! In this connection, too, it must be said that English is spoken on the island to a much greater degree than expected. This does not mean when talking to visitors, for, of course, even in the most Irish-speaking districts there are few people who are not bilingual. The unexpectedness of it lay in the fact that English seemed to be used in conversation among the natives themselves nearly as often as the Irish tongue.

The physical conditions of Aranmore are much as the film shows them—great rugged cliffs, stony fields, grey desolation, aridity and treelessness—the whole surrounded by a restless sea which even in a summer calm makes thunder on the western and northern coasts. This is Aran as Nature made it, but "Man of Aran," by the characteristics which the film so convincingly emphasises, has made it in places to blossom—well even if not quite like the rose, at least to blossom. Here and there fields of crops may be seen that would do credit to an Ontario farmstead. Small trees and shrubs flourish, most of the cottages grow flowers, and at the north-west end of the island gardens are found where high walls with large glazed openings promote a quite luxuriant growth, even that palmetto species being seen which is so common in coastal North Carolina. To appreciate the enormous amount of grim determination, the generations of tireless energy, and the hard labour which have gone to the making of this fertility, a walk towards the south-east corner of the island, along the slopes and across the top of the ridge which is the island's backbone, should be taken. Here bleak desolation reigns supreme. For miles the surface is one sheet of grim grey rock, broken continuously by the action of the elements into great yawning fissures in the depth of which a multitude of wild flowers have found sustenance, wild flowers which would grace a city garden. But except for them it is a burnt-out world—Earth after Judgment Day—finished and deserted with all life extinct save the flowers which Nature has sown in memory. Even the goats and sheep of the rocky meadows on the slopes have vanished, nothing but grey and tortured rock

Inside Russia the Red Army is likely to assume a greater importance in the future structure. Russian liberty will slowly develop with the autonomous evolution of the Union's peoples. They are, no doubt, under a dictatorship to-day, and probably so they will remain for a time. Two points must, however, be emphasised. First, that this dictatorship is no potential aggressor. A lost war would mean the complete disorganisation of the Union, very likely its dismemberment. But even a victorious war would bring the end of the effort at industrial prosperity, the hope which carries the system. Thus, while the Fascist dictators have reason to hasten the general conflagration, the Soviet dictators have every reason to avoid it.

Secondly, despite the difference of conditions and traditions, an affinity of ideas with Western Europe remains. While the Fascist theories are either mere improvisation without coherence, or ideas clearly opposed to the Christian, humanistic and democratic ideal, Communism shares at least two notions with it: the notion of Universal Mankind and that of scientific Truth. We cannot overlook the difference between a propaganda through which, as Hitler says, "*People can be convinced that heaven is hell or that the most miserable life is a paradise*" (*Mein Kampf*, p. 302), and a doctrine which, despite its oneness regarding human and cultural realities, is based on methodical research.

The Spanish Civil War proves that, even in the extremest social conflicts, the genuine forces of a European nation remain untouched, and that the way out for a Western people appears to be a Western and not the Russian way. But it proves also that there is a possibility of *rapprochement* between Communism and Democracy. The propaganda cry with the watchword "Communist danger" can only do harm. Nothing offers a greater chance to those who promise quick salvation through bloodshed and despotism than the loosening of the discipline of mind and panic. There should be methods to face the real issues, social, cultural and economic, of the time other than the sacrifice of elementary human values to imaginary necessities. The right defence of Europe is to make Europe worth defending, to create a Europe more human, more cultured, more individualised instead of the present Europe hastening towards a dull standardisation of life and a cult of brute force.

BÉLA MENCZER.

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA.

SOME eighteen months ago Americans began to concern themselves less with the British boom and more with the indications of industrial revival in their own country. The illustrated supplements ceased to portray Mr. Chamberlain looking at a panorama of prosperity on one side of a double page, with Mr. Roosevelt looking at Mr. Keynes on the other. The scholasticism that sought in every magazine for some connection between recovery and the policies of the National Government gave way to an optimism that fortified itself with statistics of production and sales. During 1936 many hopeful and some really gratifying figures were quoted, with steel and automobiles as outstanding examples, and by the end of the year industry as a whole had settled down to reap the fruits of another and even better season. What it did in fact reap was a very different crop that had been ripening for some years.

Out of disappointment with the unfulfilled promise of the New Deal, disgust at the complacent inertia of the American Federation of Labour and resentment at the anti-union policies of industry, there had sprung up since the depression a new labour movement, new in its aims, its strategy and its leadership. It bore fruit in the prickly shape of John L. Lewis, the Committee for Industrial Organisation, widespread unionisation campaigns and a succession of strikes, many of them of the sit-down variety and most of them successful. Labour's disappointment with the New Deal began to manifest itself early in 1934. The N.I.R.A. (National Industrial Recovery Act) sought to increase purchasing power by shortening hours of labour and establishing minimum wage rates in each codified industry. It also guaranteed, in the famous Section 7a, the right of collective bargaining. Employers, however, showed a strong tendency to pay the minimum wage and nothing more and to retain the old labour policies virtually unchanged. The only difference was that the traditional refusal to bargain collectively had become a refusal to bargain with anything but a company union. Little was done to clarify the meaning of Section 7a, and during the disputes of 1933-35 many working men came to the conclusion that any effort made

remains, and were it not for the blue sky above the scene, would be almost unbearable. Presently the voice of the sea is heard, and with it the first sound of life in the wilderness, the seagull's plaintive cry. Nothing more solitary than the view from Dubh Cathair can be imagined nor, should the day be cloudy, more forbidding. On one side is a waste of grey water, on the other an even more awe-inspiring desolation of grey rock—for here there is not even movement.

If Aran has any feature to offer more interesting even than its life of the present, it will be found in the crowded memories of its past. Everywhere, on Aranmore at least, relics of the various periods of the island's story may be found, carrying back beyond the bounds of history to the dim ages, possibly before the coming of even the Celt to Erin's shores. The four fortresses, Dubh Cathair, Dun Aengus, Dun Oghil, Dun Onaght, are among the most important of their kind in Ireland, and of Dun Aengus an eminent archæologist has said that "it is the most magnificent barbaric monument now extant in Europe." Dubh Cathair is supposed to be the oldest of all by one thousand years, though why is not clear to the casual eye for, except that it is smaller and more dilapidated, it seems much akin to Dun Aengus. Dun Onaght is the most remote fort, while Dun Oghil, the most commandingly placed, is not only in the best state of preservation but is also the most accessible from Kilronan.

Dun Aengus is considered by most authorities to be at least two thousand years old, though there has been a suggestion of late that its origin may belong to the period of Danish invasions in the eighth to ninth centuries. Whatever its age, Dun Aengus is the most famous of the stone forts and, with Dubh Cathair, most worth a visit. Like Dubh Cathair it is perched precariously on a high cliff at the very edge of the sea, and like it more or less demolished by the falling of the cliffs during winter storms, so that now these forts are semicircular or horseshoe-shaped rather than circular as general opinion considers their original shape to have been. Dun Aengus' inner cashel consists of a three-tiered wall of dry masonry of which the outer section is said to be twenty feet high and the inner about eight feet, the base width being eighteen feet. Outside this massive wall, some yards away, lies another encircling rampart protected by a *chevaux de frise* of great pointed stone slabs stretching over an area thirty feet

in width. A third and outer wall completes the series of defences.

The inner enclosure of the fort is supposed once to have been a circular space about one hundred and fifty feet in diameter. From this ground level a series of steps at frequent intervals led to the different levels of the inner face of the wall. The interior appearance is somewhat reminiscent of a Roman amphitheatre, except that the rough character of the masonry, formed of comparatively small and undressed stones, gives it an aspect at once more primitive and barbaric. The fort is supposed to have been built by one Aengus, a chieftain of an earlier race of Ireland, the Fir Bolg, whom the invading Milesians drove to these far confines of the west.

But with all the fame Dun Aengus has worthily attained it is Dubh Cathair, the Black Fort, which is, of all, the most awe-inspiring and mysterious. It stands on a cliff that is almost a peninsula. In form and in type of masonry it is very similar to Dun Aengus, except that it is much less complete. Across the neck of the promontory at its rear extends a *chevaux de frise*, looking in its wild desolation of tottering slabs like a graveyard after the bugle blast of Judgment Day has driven the sleepers from the tombs and left the gravestones in chaos. In the inner enclosure a series of low walls forms five semicircular, or semi-elliptical, roofless chambers. On the point of the promontory a mass of scattered boulders and slabs remain from huts that have been destroyed by the ravaging waves within living memory. The entire plateau as well as its culminating point, Dubh Cathair, is a place of death—the blasted, haunted abode of ancient men to whose forgotten memory the sea sings a dirge and the seagulls add their wail of lost souls.

The beehive huts, in Ireland at least, seem to occupy a position between prehistoric and early Christian times, and to belong to both, for they are known to have been used as dwellings by pre-Christian peoples, and as religious retreats by the early hermits and monks. From the archæologists' standpoint they are of enormous interest, for they are considered to be "akin in construction to the Mycenean tombs, and the Treasury of Atreus"—a most interesting point when the traditional return of the Fir Bolg from captivity in Greece is remembered. An unusually perfect example of these "clochans," or stone beehive huts, is found in a rocky wilderness by the sea on the northern coast of Aranmore. Its

towards higher wages and real collective bargaining would have to be made by organised labour itself.

But the American Labour Movement had never, since its inception in 1890, been effectively organised or unified. There was the American Federation of Labour, a loose collection of mainly craft unions, and there was a much smaller group of independent industrial unions, the two groups claiming, before the New Deal, a membership of three million. The fact that only one out of every eight or ten "organisable" workers belonged to a union cannot be explained entirely by reference to those special American conditions—immigration, a shifting of industries from place to place, the rapid pace of technological development—that have undoubtedly done much to retard the growth of unionism. And among many of the leaders and rank and file disappointment at the outcome of the Federation's organisation campaigns was acute. While the N.I.R.A. was in force, less than a million new members were recruited and almost no impression was made on the basic industries. Mr. William Green and other Federation leaders did little to calm the storm of criticism which their failure had aroused. In the matter of organisation they remained both reluctant and ineffective. Nor is this attitude difficult to understand. The purposes of the craft unions are those of small special-interest groups, and not at all those of a broad labour movement desirous of winning concessions for the working-class as a whole. And if the large-scale, mass-production industries, with their vast numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, are to be organised at all, they can only be organised along industrial union lines and in such numbers as would put an end to the leadership of the craft unions in the A.F. of L.

To such considerations the attitude of Mr. Green and his colleagues remained, not surprisingly, that of men asked to organise their own destruction. The break came in October 1935 when that formidable figure, John L. Lewis, of the powerful United Mine Workers, announced the formation of a Committee for Industrial Organisation, composed of ten of the Federation's unions and having as its purpose the creation, wherever possible, of industrial unions. Refusing to disband, the Committee was expelled, but to-day some twenty unions are affiliated to the C.I.O. and its membership is at least equal to that of the Federation.

The new organisation tried conclusions first with the huge General Motors Corporation. In 1925 the A.F. of L. had failed in a half-hearted attempt at unionising the automobile industry, and throughout the boom years most companies had paid low wages and maintained a rigid open-shop system. Depression brought a real movement towards organisation. But the A.F. of L. insisted on chartering any new unions as craft unions with no national organisation of their own, and it soon became clear that, so constituted, they could never successfully meet the strength and subtleties of the employers, one of whose first moves after the passage of N.I.R.A. had been to insert a clause in the Automobile Code putting promotion and discharge on a merit basis. This seemed innocuous enough until it was discovered that "merit" meant non-membership in A.F. of L. unions and that to be discharged for "non-merit" was to be black-listed. In 1934 the men threatened a strike, but A.F. of L. leaders, interested, as always, less in the building of strong unions than in the protection of their own jurisdictions, agreed to a peace under which each union, company or independent, was entitled to bargain for its own members. The result was confusion and the playing off by the management of one "organised" group against another. The settlement proved so unsatisfactory that in August 1935 the A.F. of L. reluctantly granted a charter for a single industrial union for the automobile industry. Soon afterwards the C.I.O. was formed and the Union of Automobile Workers, convinced that there was little to choose between the Federation and the employers, quickly transferred allegiance.

In December the Union asked for a conference with Company heads on collective bargaining and was told that demands should be presented to local plant managers. This was done, whereupon the management of a General Motors factory at Flint, Michigan, replied by loading its dies on to a railroad car with the intention of sending them to some less unionised plant. Faced with this indication of what "discussion with local managers" would mean, the men in the factory unloaded the railroad car, barricaded themselves in and started their sit-down strike. Workers in other factories followed suit, and by the end of January a hundred thousand employees had ceased work.

The Union complained of low wages, black-listing of its

structure is still as sound and its characteristic roof masonry as intact as though it had been built in recent years. The interior is cool and dim with the grey-green of moss-clad rock and the perpetual twilight ensured by its one tiny window slit, its small roof-flue, and the two low square-headed doorways which alone admit the light of day. Who shall say how old this "clochan" is or when it last knew human habitation? Time has dealt gently with it; has thatched it and welded its roof stones together with field grass and wild flowers; and the reverent folk of Aran have spared it to be a memorial and a link with Ireland's ancient days.

Aran's list of churches, monastic cells, and other survivals from her early Christian period is far too long for more than passing notice. They are scattered broadcast throughout these islands so aptly named "Of the Saints." Besides the buildings for worship or for habitation, there is also a wealth of ruined high crosses, and upright stone slabs on which the various forms of the Celtic cross have been rudely cut. Many of these latter almost certainly have been prehistoric pillar stones originally, on which the emblem of Christianity has been incised probably by the missionary monks or their converts. Aranmore can show the stump of one round tower only, a rather curious fact when the numbers of this type of ecclesiastical building on the mainland are considered.

There is one ancient church at the north-western end of the island, between Kilmurray and Dun Aengus, which is so outstanding in appearance as to warrant special notice. For St. McDug is one of the most interesting of all the ancient things on Aran. Said to be seventh century it looks earlier, in fact its fabric, its construction, its immediate surroundings, all conspire to make it seem at first glance a pre-Christian building. It is of the cyclopean type of architecture, its great blocks of stone of the size and kind used by those mysterious builders of the megalithic period. Its doorways and one of the windows are of the trabeated type, with the inclined jambs so common in Europe's most ancient architecture, and which existed in Ireland down to, and in some cases throughout, the period of Romanesque.

Before St. McDug's western doorway stands a great monolith on which a primitive cross has been incised. Surrounding this pillar and beginning almost at the church door extends a thick grove of trees with an undergrowth of grass

and weed knee-high in depth. Standing in this little wood where the light falls dim and green, on the one hand the great blocks of cyclopean masonry, on the other the monolith looming mysterious like the menhir of some ancient cult, not only Druidism seems to have returned to claim its own but an earlier Faith that dwelt in Aran perhaps before the Celt had left his Baltic shores.

All this is Aran even yet, but how long will it so continue now that the islands are thrust into the publicity which has been the doom of so many simple, pleasant places? Is it not possible for the curious Modern to touch Eden without blighting it, to refrain from importing into its tranquillity the dance hall, the petrol pump, and the cocktail bar? To go to these islands—to see, to ponder, to wonder, and to smile a little perhaps—and then to depart leaving untouched what time and the changing tides of civilisation have so far spared—the simple, kindly folk of Aran?

ETHEL BREWER.

members, the employment by the Company of labour spies and the speeding up of the assembly lines. It insisted that its grievances were the result of policies made, not by the local managers, but by directors in Detroit from whom the former took their orders. Hence its chief demand for a national agreement with General Motors covering fundamental policies of employment in all factories, and for the recognition of the Union as the sole bargaining agency. For two weeks the Company refused to negotiate and then obtained an injunction against the strikers occupying its Flint plants. This led to publication by the Union of the fact that the Judge who had issued the injunction was the owner of some thousand General Motors shares. Having achieved nothing by due process of law, the Company turned to self-help. Attempts to prevent food reaching the strikers led to a street battle in which more than twenty Union men and sympathisers were shot or gassed. The "Flint Alliance" was organised out of company unions, citizens from the town and strike-breakers from outside, and set to work to collect the signatures of those who wished to return to work and to circulate loyalty pledges, also requiring the worker's signature on pain of discharge. All this helped to provide that accompaniment of intimidation and espionage without which no American labour dispute is complete.

The strenuous efforts of Governor Murphy were rewarded, after some weeks, by an agreement under which the management was to meet the Union for the purpose of collective bargaining, the men promising in the meantime to evacuate the plants. But before the meeting could take place, the Union discovered that the management had agreed to negotiate also with the Flint Alliance. Since the question whether the Union should become the sole bargaining agency was one of the points to be determined at the conference, the strikers stayed where they were. Another attempt at a conference was initiated by Secretary of Labour Perkins. The Company's refusal to attend so incensed Miss Perkins that she was moved to remark that the management's attitude "must make it clear to the American people why the workers have lost confidence in the General Motors Corporation," and to discuss at some length the desirability of legislation which would make it possible to subpoena the principals in labour disputes. Having allowed a decent

interval to elapse, the Company secured another injunction, from another Judge, followed by a writ for the arrest of the sit-down strikers and leaders of the Union. It was, however, impossible for the sheriff to enforce these orders without the assistance of the military, and this the Governor would not provide.

The end came after forty-four days, the Union emerging with substantial gains. The Corporation agreed to recognise the Union as the collective bargaining agency for those of its employees who are members of the U.A.W., to give sole recognition for six months to the Union in twenty factories, to abandon interference, to reinstate strikers without discrimination, to abandon all court proceedings, and finally to begin collective bargaining negotiations as a single unit, not as a scattering of factory managers. This settlement, while not an overwhelming victory, strengthened the Union enormously and put it in a position from which it could make great advances.

Not the least of the many issues raised by this strike was that of the importance of the sit-down and stay-in method. This was the first time that it had been used in America on a large scale and on many counts it proved itself an exceedingly effective weapon—so effective that it has been used since in scores of other disputes. More comfortable than the picket line, it also rules out that most unpleasant and demoralising phenomenon of American labour conflicts, the professional strike-breaker. By taking advantage of the complexities of mass production, it enables a union to strike, through a few key men, at the most vital points of an industry. It places all the responsibility for violence on the police—amateur, company or regular—and it also raises nice questions as to the division, between legal and actual possession, of the proverbial nine points of the law. It is difficult to make a legal case for the sit-down, given present legal conceptions. It is, however, not so long since ordinary strikes, picketing and mass picketing were illegal. The labour injunction, formerly the automatic reply to almost any strike, can no longer be obtained in the Federal courts, nor in many State courts. Certainly, a great deal of non-legal opinion is less impressed by the law of trespass than by the fact that the sit-down does something to equalise the powers of labour and capital. It knows that among employers it has long been

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

HUMAN PROBLEMS : (1) RUSSIA

ON November 7th next twenty years will have passed since the "Petrograd" revolution enthroned the bolsheviks in power. Recorded history contains few things quite so big as the effect upon Europe and the world of what took place in Russia a generation ago. The counter-revolution, first in Finland, where General Mannerheim's 100,000 White Guards made him the first European fascist dictator, then in Hungary, in Poland, in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, has by now produced something like a general emergency which in the opinion of some people threatens to engulf Europe in a war of opposing ideologies in dictatorship.

It matters not at all that Lenin happened to be the son of a nobleman, Mussolini of a blacksmith. The ideology professed by Russia's dictatorship does not indeed differ much in essentials from that professed by Germany's or Italy's dictatorship. Yet circumstances have ranged the two against each other; and the devil himself has inspired the so-called democratic countries, including Great Britain, to see in the Russian pattern something less offensive than they see in the German or the Italian pattern, with the appalling result that France and Czechoslovakia are bound by treaty to Russia, and Great Britain is in danger of being dragged into the maelstrom.

The nemesis in human affairs was never more merciless than in the still active consequences of 1914. On that famous day, July 29th of that year, when an Imperial Council at Potsdam decided on war against Russia, a war which before it was to end was destined to involve the whole world, there began a process of sin and retribution as fatal, as clear and as elemental as any that was unfolded by the Greek tragedians.

In 1914 the chief countries of Europe had reached a stage of civilisation where a definite "ruling class" found itself in unchallenged authority. Russia happens to have been merely the crudest example. One of the truths that becomes consistently clear in historical retrospect is that as a man or a class or a nation sows, so do they reap. The ruling classes of 1914 had authority. They had privilege. They had responsibility. They wielded their authority and enjoyed their privilege;

but ignored their responsibility. The trust that was reposed in them was nothing less than the well-being of their fellow men. In a blind manifestation of fury not equalled in the history of mankind, the ruling classes of Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and Great Britain—the five Great Powers of Europe—plunged into an orgy of mutual destruction. The lives, the property, the happiness of themselves and of the people whose fate was in their hands, were shattered.

To talk of "war-guilt" as applicable to the ruling class of one country as distinct from another is an exercise of folly no longer tolerated by reasonable people. No doubt there were degrees of culpability. But if the German ruling class in 1914 was the first to betray its trust, what shall be said of those others who in the suicidal name of *la victoire intégrale* persisted in completing the disaster?

The nemesis first raised its head in Russia. The Tsarist ruling class had taught the ignorant peasants to shoot their enemies, the diagnosis of what constituted an enemy being reserved to that ruling class itself. And when the sufferings of the Russian masses had killed their faith in their rulers, and the opportunist bolshevik adventurers saw and took the opportunity of suggesting that those peasants should turn their weapons against their true enemy, namely the ruling class that had betrayed them, the revolution was given at the outset an irresistible momentum. The argument rang true.

Having thus started in Russia, the moral reaction swept through Europe from east to west. Thrones toppled. The authority and the privileges of the old ruling classes were everywhere challenged. "Socialism in our time" became a certainty. The only uncertainty was which particular gang of political adventurers would succeed in gaining the leadership of the various socialist crusades. Adolf Hitler was busy in Bavaria in the early post-war years organising a following against the "communism" that radiated from Russia. But his own creed was in substance as communist as anything that emerged from the minds of Marx, Bakunin, Chernyshevski, or Lenin. It was not a perversity which made Signor Mussolini a "socialist" in his early days. In the name of fascismo he has "nationalised" every human activity in Italy as effectively as Herr Hitler in Germany, or Lenin in Russia. It is merely a question of the particular personnel of the new political bosses thrown

common form to defy, or to entangle in the endless processes of judicial review, such collective bargaining legislation as Section 7a of the Wagner Act. The La Follette Senate Committee has made it aware of the extent to which employers are given to the use of labour spies, hired strike-breakers and armed company guards. And even if the plain law of trespass can be applied, the injunction remedy, in many cases, cannot. A sheriff, even if he owes nothing to the labour vote, may be willing, but will certainly not be able to do his duty with police help alone. And when he applies for the militia to a Governor who, like those of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Indiana, owes much to the labour vote, he is refused, and the sit-down strike continues.

After its success with General Motors, the C.I.O. astounded everyone by concluding an agreement with the United States Steel Corporation. That the greatest of all steel companies, the mould of American fashion in labour relations, should suddenly reverse its traditional policy of the open shop and non-recognition of independent unions was sufficiently surprising. But that this should happen without a long and bloody strike seemed, to anyone who knew the history of the steel industry, nothing short of miraculous. There were, however, natural causes. The Corporation wanted government contracts, and the Walsh-Healey Act imposes a forty-hour week on all companies wishing to sell steel to the Navy. Also, with the whole world in the market for armaments, it would have been singularly profitless to invite the complete stoppage that the sit-down entails. And, inasmuch as a Presidential election had recently taken place with an enormous working- and middle-class vote recorded for the New Deal programme, the Corporation could hardly rely on the support, or even the neutrality, of the Administration and the Democratic State governments.

The power and prestige of the C.I.O. was again greatly increased by this agreement, and further advances—wage increases, record membership figures, closed-shop agreements and new affiliations—followed in quick succession. These gains rapidly gave the C.I.O. a membership equal to that of the A.F. of L. With regard to prestige, there is now no comparison. The working man is impressed by the fact that while the C.I.O. was winning its victories, the A.F. of L., through its opposition to union demands, its belittling of

the gains made and its attempts to build rival organisations out of the ruins of company unions, was playing a part similar to that of the strike-breaker.

Soon after the steel agreement the constitutionality of the Wagner Act was finally decided and collective bargaining placed, for the first time, upon a firm legal foundation. To the opposition this was, apparently, the last straw. For during the following months there developed a counter attack of such intensity as to suggest a decision on the part of many employers to fight the C.I.O. and the labour policies of the New Deal to a finish, at whatever cost. In May of this year a group of union organisers were severely beaten by company guards, known as "service men," at the gates of a Ford factory. Meanwhile the Steel Workers' Organising Committee had been seeking from "Little Steel"—four companies manufacturing about one-sixth of the country's output—signatures to written bargaining contracts. The companies, claiming to be upholding the "liberty of the worker," indicated their willingness to bargain but refused to sign anything, asserting that any grant of a contract would be followed by union demands for a closed shop and the check off of union dues. In the walk-out strikes which followed the four companies used almost every strike-breaking method. Attempts were made to keep mills working with non-unionists; citizens and vigilance committees were set up to mobilise middle-class opinion, "back to work" movements organised, "law and order" and "the right to work" made the text for widespread press and platform propaganda. A procession of union men and sympathisers was fired upon by Chicago police, whose violence was such—ten persons were killed and scores injured—that a film taken of the episode was withheld for several weeks on the ground that its public showing would provoke riots in the cinemas.

The company heads later announced their willingness to meet a Federal Mediation Board, but refused point-blank to come to any agreement with the C.I.O. union, thus moving from their initial offer of negotiation without a signed contract to a new position in which they would make no agreement, written or oral, with an "irresponsible" C.I.O. The National Labour Relations Board was refused permission by the employers to determine by vote whether a majority

up by the great abdication of power by the pre-war ruling classes.

In Great Britain the revolution came with a subtlety that in some degree disguised its character. To a large extent the old ruling classes in Great Britain retain a semblance of their power; but their privileges are largely gone, and the doctrine they preach in effect is socialism. The so-called Conservative party in Great Britain is responsible for the mass of the socialist legislation that has been added to the Statute Book in the twenty years since Lenin began the bolshevik process. To-day the British ruling classes have preserved the form of their authority only by emptying it of its substance and by beating the bolsheviks at their own game. Judged by the amount of property that is annually confiscated by the British Government from its "upper classes," Great Britain is to-day the most bolshevik country in the world. Only this year a "Conservative" Chancellor of the Exchequer launched a project of so extremely bolshevik a quality that the "Socialist" Opposition stood aghast at the spectacle.

In France, last of the pre-war strongholds of privilege, M. Léon Blum has been able to form the first Socialist Government known to the Third Republic. In Spain, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera proved to be merely a palliative, a delaying force, which, however, in the long run, could not prevent the head-on clash between the rivals for dictatorial power in that country. To talk of the Valencia camp as the champions of "democracy" is to miss the point of the struggle for mastery between two sets of dictators whose professions and purposes are equally bolshevik in substance, though for war purposes they may be distinguished by the ideological fiction of Left against Right.

What does it all mean? And what precise stage have we reached in the macabre orgy of politics let loose in 1914? In one sense the words bolshevism, fascism, nazism, democracy, merely confuse the issue. Their essential common attribute is their political substance. It was impossible that the world in 1914 should abandon itself to the dictatorship of the politicians, should give to the politicians the competence to mobilise unquestioned every human force—labour, property, money, life itself—without limit, for the exclusive purpose of senseless mutual destruction: such a thing was impossible

without the enthronement of political power on a pinnacle wellnigh impregnable.

It is a ghastly sight to-day, twenty-three years after the outbreak of the fatal war, fatal not only in its immediate but in its still continuing effects, to see the whole world obsessed by war as the great instrument, actual or potential, of political power. Japan is organised on a permanent war basis, bent in effect upon the conquest of as much of China as may be. China for a quarter of a century has been engaged in multi-form civil war. Russia is virtually mobilised for war against Japan in the east and against Germany in the west. Germany and Italy are organised on a routine war footing, though the particular enemy or enemies are not clearly defined. Spain is an actual cockpit, in which Spanish, Italian, German, Russian, French, British nationals have been fighting in a variety of hypothetical causes. In his recent book, *Armaments: The Race and the Cost*, Mr. Francis Hirst quotes the estimate, made by a serious source, that last year the world spent on armaments twice as much as it spent in 1929, and nearly four times as much as it spent in the last year before the Great War. And the unimaginable figure of last year's expenditure was nearly £3,000,000,000. Mr. Neville Chamberlain, a leading politician, has expressed dismay over what he called "the incredible folly" of "civilisation": civilisation being merely the political organisation of the world.

Who can stop it? How many people even recognise, as does apparently Mr. Chamberlain, the nature of the dilemma itself? The disease is politics. The doctors are the politicians themselves. In Russia, where the logic is always clearest because crudest, they have reached the stage where the politicians simply shoot each other. Apart from the happy Scandinavian countries, untouched as yet by the world-wide plague of politics, there seems to be no corner of the earth which is not being devastated. The United States, largely isolated from the diplomatic epidemic, is struck down by the scourge of industrial politics.

The real emergency in present human affairs derives its fearsomeness largely from the prevalent blindness of the victims. They are lost in the forest and do not know the wood from the trees. The spectacle of Mr. Herbert Morrison (for instance) standing on the plinth of Nelson's Monument in Trafalgar Square and working up an immense concourse of

of the employees favoured the union and towards the end of June the Mediation Board admitted defeat.

In this bitter conflict, still unfinished, the already furious discussion of the issues of unionism has been keyed up to a new pitch. The C.I.O. has been widely portrayed as an organisation led by men of doubtful honesty and communist tendencies. Demands have been made for the limitation of picketing, the compulsory arbitration or the complete prohibition of strikes and the incorporation of unions. The President has been represented as sympathetic to a subversive organisation, the whole labour policy of the New Deal reviewed and damned and the occasion taken to predict a split in the Democratic Party. Much of the debate, in Congress, in the press and from the pulpit, has been conducted in an atmosphere of sheer hysteria. Hysteria is no new phenomenon in American political discussion, but that does not explain why it should have reached its present pitch on such an issue. It is true—and the point has often been made—that the C.I.O. campaign has given rise to irresponsible and undisciplined behaviour on the part of some of the new and inexperienced unions. It is also true that Americans, although, and perhaps because, they are not the most law-abiding of peoples, are very sensitive to any appeal based on property rights and “law and order,” and easily persuaded, therefore, to regard the C.I.O. less as a long-thwarted movement that suddenly has acquired exuberant impetus than as a menace to the fundamentals of “Americanism.” This may explain the attitude of large sections of middle-class opinion. It does not, however, account for the extreme position taken by employers in their bitter and apparently calculated attack upon a movement which asks merely those industrial rights that organised labour in other democratic countries has enjoyed for many years.

Perhaps the explanation is that American employers see the broader implications of a strong labour movement more clearly than did their European predecessors. The new unionism is only one of many social changes that have taken place in America since 1932. The depression and the New Deal gave new hope to the working man. The C.I.O. gave him leadership. The combination helped to re-elect Roosevelt, to put several Democratic governors in formerly Republican states, and to enact such measures as the Social

Security Act and the Wagner Act. But when labour, conscious of this new relation of government to industry, began to move from one big industrial victory to another, the time had come to call a halt. For if labour's advance is to be stopped, it had better be stopped before it gets too far down the road towards high wages, high taxation and a real change in the balance of social forces. If the attack is not made now upon the C.I.O. and, through it, upon the policies of the New Deal, an established labour movement may make of America the kind of social service state that Germany was, Britain is, and France is becoming.

W. A. RUDLIN.

NATIONALITY AND CHURCH MUSIC.

TRAVELLING abroad, seeking points of contact between the people of one's own land and those of lands occupied by races more or less remotely, and some of them even closely, related to our own, one is sometimes surprised at differences where one expects similarities and similarities where one expects differences. This is particularly the case with such a subject as music, in which we all use the same scales, the same instruments, and admire the same great composers and the same virtuosi. Artists, that is executants and composers, just one or two steps lower down than the very highest, are acclaimed very differently in different countries, so that while in one country one of them may arouse a furore whenever he plays or sings or whenever one of his works is played or sung, in another country his work calls for little more than polite acknowledgment. Attempts to introduce the music of Mahler and Bruckner, popular in such different lands as Austria and Holland, into England have met with no serious success, while the Russians can hear nothing striking in the music of Elgar. These are just two instances of which many similar ones could be provided by every travelled musician.

A casual thought on the subject of religious music, and of Church music, that is of music definitely associated with matters of faith and ritual, in particular suggests that such music should more than any other be entirely international. Whatever our religion may be there is scarcely one of us so Erastian as to think that religion is a matter of nationality. There are some, it is true, like the well-known English composer who objected to "religion made abroad," who in an outburst of patriotism will imagine that their own particular religion belongs in some way peculiarly to their own country. Most even of these people, however, in their heart of hearts believe themselves to be part of a world-wide Catholic Church, a Church made up of all who are honestly trying to live Christian lives. The majority will go farther and say that they are members of a body divinely founded nearly two thousand years ago in Palestine, which has spread over the greater part of the world and of which the members in our own land are but a small part even though we think and hope it is the best part.

To-day also, people interested in Church music are generally agreed that the principles laid down by Pope Gregory, an Italian, or by Martin Luther, a German, or by both, are the principles upon which all Church music should be based. And when they have said this they go and compose, or sing and play, music that is almost entirely and essentially characteristic of their own nation.

This difference in national styles of Church music is, of course, only a part of the difference in the wider aspects of religious life which makes our English churches, to take an example with which most of us are familiar, differ from those of Continental countries. Not only have we the differences expressed in the titles of the different religious bodies, Wesleyan founded on the principles and practice of John and Charles Wesley, Congregationalist, Anglican, etc., and those of the Continent such as German Evangelical, Historical Reformed, Liberal Reformed, Remonstrant, but the differences between those holding exactly the same shades of opinion in the wider faith of Christianity. In a Presbyterian Church opened for the benefit of British residents and visitors in a great city on the Continent one finds not only a difference of language from that in the native churches of the same confession, but a difference of mentality and manner which often seems to give a different aspect to their common faith. It is the same with Baptist and other Churches, while even Roman Catholic Churches and congregations, so completely united in faith and discipline, are somewhat different in England and when composed of English people from what they are in other countries. With music as the most direct and obvious expression of religious emotion these differences are most clearly marked.

It is true that the world over one hears in the churches the music of Palestrina, of Handel and Bach, of César Franck and William Byrd, and to a less extent of Sir Henry Bishop, the Rev. John Bacchus Dykes and of Ira D. Sankey. Of such composers as Franck, Bishop, Dykes and Sankey, we may say that what we hear in other countries than those of their origin is a slight overflow into other lands of what is typical French, English or American. The great international geniuses, Palestrina, Byrd, Bach, Handel and a few others, however, hold the national groups together by setting all national and international groups examples of how certain things should be

done, but they do not merge such groups. Palestrina showed the whole world of his day, and the Roman Catholics of all time, how to write masses and motets that should retain the spirit of his Church and yet remain free in their personal expression. Yet when we hear the music sung at Mass in the Catholic churches of England, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, all based more or less on the model he set, we find that in each of these countries there is a style that belongs to none of the others, a style that no other country desires to copy or can copy.

And this refers not merely to the short and easy works written with the amateur choirs of suburban and village churches in view, but also to those written by the most talented composers of every land and period, of a degree of difficulty which precludes their being sung by any but the most capable and well-organised choirs. Palestrina and Byrd, the latter a younger contemporary of the great model of Papal ideas of liturgical music, wrote in entirely different idioms. Samuel Wesley, Louis Niedermeyer, J. J. Viotta and the contemporaries were, doubtless, influenced by Haydn and Mozart, but they nevertheless wrote very differently from their classical masters and very differently from each other. Vincent d'Indy, Diepenbrock, Perosi, each has his own style which may be called national as well as individual, yet each would claim to follow the principles laid down by Gregory and Palestrina. Nor would one mistake the music of Father Turner, a gifted and pious writer of popular masses for English amateur choirs, for that of Hubert Cuyper who holds a similar but still stronger position in Holland, while Nicola Montani or Pietro Yon in America is still less likely to be confounded with their European contemporaries.

Similarly, when we look at that essentially popular form of Church music which we know as the hymn tune, or as it is generally called on the Continent the Church song, we find much the same conditions. What music is more distinctively English than the tunes of Barnby, Dykes, Stainer or Sullivan? Or more German than those of Johann Crüger, or more American than those of Ira Sankey? The Englishman who tries to write what he calls "*chorales*" generally succeeds only in putting on paper stiff and meaningless notes. The Frenchman who does the same usually produces something that is more suggestive of waltzes and minuets than of music

intended to express the religious devotion of a large congregation. If a German has ever tried to write a tune like Barnby's or Vaughan Williams' *For all the saints* or Staniforth's *Jerusalem my happy home*, which is very unlikely, the chances are that he has succeeded badly or not at all.

With the singing of the same music one finds also similar differences. To hear Luther's hymn, *Ein' feste Burg* (*A stronghold sure*), sung by congregations in England, Germany, Holland, France and other countries is to undergo a number of different musical and emotional experiences. The congregation in a church in Switzerland sings the tunes of Louis Bourgeois in a totally, though possibly subtly, different manner from that of a congregation in an English or a Dutch church, while these two latter congregations would each say that the other sings such a tune as the Old 118th Psalm quite badly and incorrectly. Yet each will sing exactly the same notes, syllable by syllable, to similar words.

To a large extent it is the same with plainsong, whether such music be the authorised form or not. The use of Jewish and Greek plainsong is now very limited, and a knowledge of it is as a rule confined by force of circumstances to the singers in the Synagogue and to scholars who devote their lives to historical studies. Some of both these kinds of music, however, is still in constant use, and those who have opportunities of hearing or taking part in one or other of such kinds say that, although following the same rules and singing the same melodic *nuances*, singers in various countries by their expression and phrasing give to the music quite varied characters. Certainly this is the case with Gregorian plainsong sung to Latin words.

One need not discuss the question of plainsong sung to other languages than Latin, for a melody originally intended for Latin words is inevitably different when it is applied to English, French or German words, each so different from the others and from Latin itself. Moreover, the exact parallel provided by the use of the same words as well as the same music, makes the comparison of national styles more obvious as well as more precise. When an Englishman, say, sings the plainsong of the Proper of the Mass (that is, the various verses from the psalms which are used to mark the character of the feast or the Sunday on which such Mass is sung) in a manner that is strictly in accordance with the rules laid down by the

authorities, he still makes it something quite different from that which an Italian, a Frenchman or a German makes of it. His singing has something of the same solidity as that of the German, in which both differ from the Italian and French renderings, but between the same plainsong sung by an Englishman and a German there is still a difference that proclaims the nationality of the singer.

To the person who merely listens this is not so obvious as it is to the organist who has to accompany the singing of plainsong (which accompaniment is not in accordance with the strict canons but is often demanded). Such differences are also very obvious to the choirmaster who has to lead his choir in following up the accompanied singing of, say, the "Preface" by the "Sanctus" set probably to modern elaborate music, the fitting of the two being made more or less difficult by the manner in which the priest sings the plainsong. Generally, though this has less bearing on the national styles of music than on the personal styles of the singers, the English method of singing plainsong is, in the experience of the present writer, easier to follow up without clashing between the plainsong and the modern harmonised music than is the German, even though the modern music may be composed by a German organist.

In the treatment of plainsong as a basis, thematic or stylistic, of original music, too, we find quite distinctive national traits, so that Samuel Wesley, Perosi, Reger or d'Indy, and their smaller contemporaries will not only handle it each in his own personal way but also in a way that is as distinctive of his nationality as is the way in which he handles the original material of his other compositions.

HERBERT ANTCLIFFE.

JAMAICA AND THE TOURIST.

IN recent years the Jamaican Government has done its best to attract tourists. It has founded a Tourist Trade Development Board, which gives good advice to visitors, and has issued some interesting pamphlets. The war in Spain has discouraged the visitors who used to spend the winter in Tangier, the Canary Islands, and the Balearic Islands, and some of them are looking for an alternative. Jamaica is a little further afield, but it is a British possession, and has the advantage that the English language is spoken. If it is possible for tourists to patronise countries under the British flag, there are many reasons for so doing. To those who contemplate visiting this interesting tropical island, and to those who are interested in our vast colonial empire, this brief account of Jamaican conditions may be of some value.

It will be well first of all to give a word of advice to the invalid, who finds the winter too severe, and so seeks warmer climes. Rain in Jamaica is seasonal, and the hot-house conditions at the time of heavy rain will hardly be beneficial. In addition, mosquitoes flourish in the rainy season. The principal rainy month is November, after that May, but November is the worst. So the invalid would be wise not to land till about the middle of December. If it is necessary to leave England before late November, it is best to halt at Bermuda for a few weeks. Two lines of ships go to Jamaica via Bermuda.

The invalid tourist should be warned that Jamaica is fully tropical, even in what is called the winter. Kingston and the coastal regions are liable to be trying, especially at night, which is nearly as hot as the day. There is no excessive temperature; 90 degrees in the shade is seldom exceeded in the winter, but the continual heat is wearing. The hills are cooler; any town above the 2,000 feet level is quite pleasant for those who like a hot English summer. Mandeville can be recommended; its climate varies very little the whole year round, and is like a hot English August. Christiana and one or two other resorts are higher and cooler than Mandeville. Another reason for recommending the hills is that there is no danger from malaria, not because mosquitoes are absent, though they are not so numerous as they are lower down, but because few

residents have the disease in their blood. There is little danger also in Kingston, because of the vigilance of the sanitary inspectors who keep the mosquitoes under control; but in the coastal districts outside Kingston the danger is not negligible.

The ordinary tourist who can take a long holiday in the winter will find Jamaica well worth a visit. Swimming in the warm tropic sea is delightful; but it is desirable to find a properly organised bathing-place. Sharks and barracudas, which are even more dangerous than the sharks, exist, though they are not numerous, unless possibly in the immediate neighbourhood of a harbour. Clear water, a proper look-out, and the protection of a coral reef are sufficient safeguards. There are a number of good swimming-places: Montego Bay, and Boston Beach, near Port Antonio, are probably the best. It is one of the disadvantages of Kingston that visitors do not swim in the harbour owing to danger from sharks, but are confined to the bathing-pools. The Kingston people, who are wondering what to do to attract tourists, would do well to consider whether it is not possible to organise a swimming-place outside the harbour, and run buses to it during the season. Visitors to seaside places outside Kingston should book accommodation beforehand. The season is short—for all practical purposes it begins in December and ends at Easter—and hotel proprietors are inclined to make hay while the sun shines. These remarks apply particularly to Montego Bay. But a number of private residents take guests, and the tourist agency is well-informed and capable of giving good advice.

The usual method of travelling is by car. The railway serves only a small part of the island, and trains often run at inconvenient times. If the times happen to be convenient, the conditions of travel are much better than the Jamaicans will tell you, and the journey gives the traveller as good a view of the Jamaican country as any road. There is a good service of trams and buses in the immediate neighbourhood of Kingston, but outside that area hardly any. Visitors who bring their own cars should be warned that the roads are covered with sharp stones, and that the tyres need to be very strong and reliable. It is better to hire cars locally, and there is no dearth of them. The correct fare for not more than four persons is 6d. per mile, or for a single journey double that

amount, as the return of the car must be paid for. This is not excessive, but it is wise to arrange terms beforehand, as drivers are prone to overcharge the unwary visitor.

The Blue Mountains are well worth a visit. Unlike the scrub-covered hills of the greater part of the island, they are beautifully forested. They contain an interesting little community, mainly small-holders, who live well away from the roads, and carry their produce to market along the narrow mountain trails on the backs of donkeys. Beautiful little rivers are found here which do not, like so many of the Jamaican streams, run dry in March and April. Climbing the trails in these mountains is hot work. Never shall I forget one of them about the 3,000 feet level, with the almost vertical sun shining overhead, and suffocating blasts of hot air coming from the ravine below. But the mountains are imposing. They are not high; very few peaks exceed 7,000 feet; but the scale of the valleys is small, the peaks tower above you and seem grander and loftier than they are. About the 5,000 feet level we can look over the lower hills, and the landscape of Jamaica is stretched out beneath us with the Southern Sea in the middle distance. At night the little fireflies invade the house, cling to the rafters or fly about the rooms giving intermittent little flashes of light. Outside, in the darkness of the forest, the greater fireflies give brilliant displays. Above all, the stars gleam as we seldom see them in an urban land, and as night advances in March and April the Southern Cross is visible. Above the 3,000-feet level the nights are cool, pleasant and refreshing, a welcome contrast to the tropic heat of the day.

The ordinary visitor, who travels the conventional round, is liable to be isolated, and to see very little of the life and conditions of the country. It is a very good plan to stay with some farmer (or planter) and live for a time with the Jamaican residents. A few of these have turned their large houses into hotels for the winter season. Those who have acquaintances in Jamaica can do even better. What they quickly realise is that Kingston, even more than most capital towns, is very unlike the rest of Jamaica. There is no other town of any considerable size, and the bulk of the population live neither in Kingston, nor in the smaller towns, but in villages, hamlets and isolated huts scattered everywhere. Jamaica is a black man's country. In Kingston there is a large coloured minority;

everywhere the whites are few.* In the country the population is mainly black, and the land, except in the hills, is thickly populated. Everywhere along the roads, or the trails, the small shacks of the black people are to be found.

Those who are fortunate enough in this way to see a little of the real Jamaica will find a curious medley of social conditions. Jamaica is agricultural. The bulk of the people work on the land. Of these land workers a considerable proportion cultivate their own little plots.† This system dates back to the days of slavery. In the old days, the slave-holders allowed their slaves little plots of land on which they grew their own food, and the owners did not even need to feed them.

In the neighbourhood of the large estates these native villages are still to be found. The villagers are exceedingly poor, and provide a sufficient supply of cheap labour. The soil of Jamaica is fertile, and it is summer all the year round, but the common half-acre plot is too small to supply sufficient food for a family, to say nothing of giving them a little to sell to buy clothes and the other few necessary items. But it should be noted that the bulk of the Jamaican population own a little land. They are not, therefore, entirely dependent upon the very small wage which is customary in that country. There is plenty of labour available if the employer is respected and treats his people fairly. But their minute holdings of land give the owners a little independence, and the employer who is not trusted may find it difficult to obtain labour when he needs it. It is a feature which distinguishes Jamaica from our own land, and from other West Indian islands, that capital and labour are not so sharply divided, that even the very poor have a modicum of capital, and that the common method of obtaining the bare necessities of life is not by working for an employer, but by growing food and building little huts on their own little plots of land.

We are accustomed to think of the West Indies in connection with the sugar industry. Sugar is grown in Jamaica, but

* The census of 1921 gives in round numbers 620,000 black, 150,000 coloured, 14,500 white. The present estimated population is a little over a million. Most authorities, including Lord Olivier, doubt these 14,000 white, which include the garrison and a floating population, and probably a considerable number of "nearly whites." I have been told on good authority that the pure white resident population probably does not greatly exceed 2,000.

† The official figures for the holding of land in Jamaica are: house lots 25,792; $\frac{1}{2}$ acre lots 44,929; $\frac{1}{2}$ acre to 5 acres 108,477; 5 acres to 10 acres 18,277; 10 acres to 50 acres 12,761, after which the numbers greatly decrease.

not by the small holder, or even by the small planter. A few estates still specialise in sugar, but they are not as numerous as formerly.* The small planters, if they are wise, grow a variety of crops and are not dependent upon the market for one product. The little planter I had the opportunity of visiting well understood this principle. He farmed rather more than 500 acres, and illustrated the value of mixed farming. There were a few cattle. The scrub on his land, not large enough for timber, was cut down as the land was required and the hard wood was sawn into small pieces for the shingling of roofs. When the land was cleared, bananas and coconuts were planted. Pimento was a very useful crop. In the higher lands a disease had attacked the pimento, and this increased the value of the product in the coastal regions. A few inches of rain had fallen in the dry season, and this was just what the trees required. All tropical products can be grown in Jamaica. Semi-tropical plants such as coffee, oranges and lemons flourish on the higher lands. With the passing of the great sugar estates, and of the absentee landowners, cultivation for a living is displacing "planting" for a fortune.

A gratifying feature of Jamaican life is the absence of any overt hostility between white, coloured and black. The frequent trouble in the southern States of America is unknown in Jamaica. There is no open and obvious colour bar. This does not mean that feeling on the subject of colour is absent. The more lightly coloured people form a kind of aristocracy, and obtain the bulk of the Government appointments. Clerical and teaching work is mainly done by them. Visitors should be warned not to mention the colour question, especially among those who are nearly white, for it is a sore subject. A considerable number of families have some small coloured intermixture, and a single family will sometimes show varying grades of colour. In such families the lighter coloured often attain a sort of precedence. There is a very real and strong feeling on this question. But the various grades of white, coloured and black live together in peace. The distinction leads to none of those undesirable and violent outbreaks which are so well-known in some other countries with a mixed population.

* The sugar quota for 1937-8 shows this clearly. Jamaica, with an area of over 4,000 sq. miles and a population of over a million, receives 86,000 tons. Trinidad, with less than half the area and a little more than a third the population, is given 138,000 tons. The little island of Barbadoes (166 sq. miles) receives 114,000 tons.

The visitor who travels about the island will be struck with many curious paradoxes, and by a great variety of conditions, material and social, in an island only about two-thirds the size of Yorkshire. It is an island of plentiful rainfall: the average is about 75 inches a year; yet in some parts, particularly near Kingston, the vegetation is parched, the water-courses are dry, and a number of the estates, particularly that of the United Fruit Company, cultivate their produce with the aid of irrigation. The Government is a modification of the Crown Colony system, with an elected parliament which has considerable but limited powers. Yet even in so small an area there is a "Native State," with a little "king" who is practically an absolute ruler of a part of the cockpit country inhabited by the descendants of the escaped slaves. The streams are small and not navigable, yet on one of them there is a sufficient flow of water for the enterprising natives to entertain the adventurous visitor by shooting the rapids on a raft. Except for the enormous wealth of insect life, and the scorpions and centipedes, there is a great dearth of indigenous fauna; yet a visitor who appreciates such amusements can travel to the mouth of the Rio Minho and try to catch alligators. They are there, though they are not numerous. The land is fertile and much of it is well cultivated; yet the dominant impression of a great part of the country is that of barren hills covered with scrub. The climate and the vegetation are tropical; yet there is an entire absence of jungle or luxuriant undergrowth. The people of the island are religious; the Nonconformist influence is very strong; churches and chapels abound everywhere. Yet with a large part of the population marriage does not exist. The illegitimate birth-rate is over 70 per cent. of the total.

One great drawback from the point of view of the visitor is the manner in which the ordinary tourist is separated from the life of the country. Jamaica is much nearer to New York than to London, and the wealthy visitor from America, or the one who likes to appear wealthy, sets the tone. There is a "dude ranch" among other exotic outgrowths, and a few of the first-class hotels sometimes run to enormous prices. Living is cheap in Jamaica, and money is not plentiful. The visitor therefore is regarded as a source of money, and the inhabitants, whether white, black, or coloured, do their best to relieve him of as much as possible. On this ground, and on account of the

encouragement to beggars, Lord Olivier has expressed a doubt whether the tourist is of real advantage to the country. There is something to be said for this view. It is hardly possible to walk a hundred yards in the main streets of Kingston without being badgered by numerous taxi-drivers who wish to drive you here, there and everywhere.

The ordinary visitor, therefore, will do well to be wary. In Kingston he should use the trams and buses, and avoid the shops which cater specially for tourists. The "native work" which is sold in many of these is made specially for tourists. Decent houses which provide good accommodation at a reasonable price are to be found. Some of them are advertised in the *Tourists' Bulletin*, and some are not advertised. Above all, he should try to get in touch with the people who live in the country, and in that way obtain some insight into Jamaican life and conditions. The island is a remarkable one with many interesting features; and though the stock beauty spots are much over-praised, the warm blue tropic sea, the coral reefs, the coconut plantations, the scrub-covered hills, the mangrove swamps overlooking bays with phosphorescent waters, the whole outlook of a remarkable tropical island, has a beauty of its own which grows on those who live there, and which the visitor slowly begins to realise. The invalid who is looking for an alternative to the Riviera or the Canary Isles, and the curious traveller who is interested in the infinite variety of our vast empire, will do well to give a trial to Jamaica.

H. S. SHELTON.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE VERSAILLES "PEACE."

THE disease of diplomacy in its present epidemic has spread so rapidly in the past few weeks that it now involves five continents. Europe is the abiding source of the infection. Asia, despite Mr. Kipling's famous edict, has in the past fortnight made contact with Europe at two points. A so-called Nine-Power Conference has met in Brussels to discuss the vague elementals of the war between Japan and China. In Rome a new pact has been signed between Japan, Germany and Italy. America is represented at the Brussels Conference, and her statesmen have expressed their concern over the impossibility of American isolation from the prevailing disorders. Mr. Roosevelt, for instance, on October 5th, said: "Let no one expect that America will escape." Africa is involved because the German claim to colonies has become one of the active causes of diplomatic unrest. Oceania is involved for the like reason, both Australia and New Zealand being potentially concerned in the South Pacific aspect of the German claim.

I. GERMANY'S COLONIAL CLAIM.

The unrelieved absurdity of present diplomatic practice, its almost total lack of common sense, are directly illustrated by the matter of Germany's lost colonies. Germany is one of the virile nations. Between 1914 and 1918 she held out in war single-handed against the other six Great Powers combined: the British Empire, France, Italy, Russia, Japan, the United States. She nearly even won the war. After four and a half years of blood, sweat and agony, however, the combined six Great Powers did defeat the one Great Power. They thereupon decreed that Germany's colonies be taken from her. They judged her to be unworthy of what they called, in the subsequent words of the League of Nations Covenant, the "sacred trust of civilisation." Her colonies, therefore, were reserved for appropriation among themselves, the victors; not indeed as the frank spoils of war, but as the sacred trust aforesaid. Great Britain, whose Empire covers one quarter of the globe, took the lion's share, if lion be the right analogy. Perhaps the average lion would have behaved

in a similar way. Great Britain at any rate took the true Briton's share, what time the League of Nations was taking root in British hearts as a new religion, based upon the precept that the old bad notion of war as a means of aggression and of territorial aggrandisement should for ever be banished from the ways of men.

Before the war Germany had amassed colonial possessions in Africa and the South Pacific six times as big as Germany herself. That achievement looks less impressive when contrasted with the territory now administered by Great Britain, which, including the mandated territories, is a hundred and fifty times the size of Great Britain. The French colonial empire is twenty times as big as France. During the war Germany's colonies in Africa were seized by force of arms, despite the Congo Act of 1885, which was signed by all the colonial Powers, including Great Britain, and which provided that the Central African colonies of the European Powers should be neutralised and excluded from the operations of war.

The pre-war German colonies were, in Africa, *German East Africa* (384,000 square miles, exporting sisal, coffee, cotton, gold, ground nuts, hides and skins, copra, wax, sesame, granular fruits, palm kernels, palm oil, tin ore, beeswax and diamonds), *German South-West Africa* (322,000 square miles, exporting caracul skins, diamonds, cattle for slaughter, butter, preserved fish, fish, vanadium, tin, wool, sheep- and goat-skins, cowhide, frozen meat, cheese, copper ore, lead and whale oil), the *Cameroons* (305,000 square miles, exporting bananas, cocoa, palm oil, rubber, palm kernels, coffee, timber, cattle, hides, and tobacco), *Togoland* (34,000 square miles, exporting cocoa, cotton, palm kernels, copra, palm oil, tapioca, beef and mutton, maize, kapok and coffee), and in the South Pacific, *German New Guinea*, the *Bismarck Archipelago* and the *Solomon Islands*, the *Caroline*, *Marianne* and *Marshall Islands* (94,000 square miles, exporting gold, copra, coco-nuts, phosphates and sugar), *Samoa* (1,000 square miles, exporting copra, cocoa beans and bananas), and the port of *Kiao-chow* on the Chinese mainland. Included in the South Pacific Islands was the small island of *Nauru* (nine square miles) from which valuable deposits of phosphates were and are obtained (in 1934 for example 418,950 tons were exported) while phosphates as well as copra and sugar were

also obtained from the Micronesian group north of the Equator.

It would be tiresome to recall the war-time propaganda on the subject of the German colonies. Of course, it became an article of the simplest faith on the Allied, especially the British, side, that Germany was quite unfit to administer colonies, that her record as colonial administrator had been one long series of atrocities, including the paradoxical and nonsensical atrocity of exterminating the native populations themselves. (Mr. Lloyd George for example on January 24th, 1919, said that "in South-West Africa the Germans had deliberately pursued a policy of extermination.") Of course, the colonies, in the interests of the natives themselves, should never again be subjected to the horror of German rule. What then? The African territories were now in fact under Allied military control. On March 24th and May 11th, 1916, an exchange of letters took place between M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, and Sir Edward Grey, whereby it was tentatively understood that the provisional division of Togoland and the Cameroons for the purpose of military occupation during the war should after the war be converted into a permanent division for the purpose of political annexation. On the strength of that understanding M. Simon, the French Colonial Minister, on January 28th, 1919, demanded the "annexation, pure and simple," of Togo and the Cameroons. Italy had pegged out a claim in Africa as the price of her joining the war on the Allied side, and her claim was enshrined in the secret Treaty of London (April 26th, 1915). Japan made a secret agreement with Great Britain in March 1917, whereby in return for giving help against German and Austrian submarines in the Mediterranean she should be recompensed by the annexation of Kiao-chow and of the other German rights and privileges in Shantung, together with the German South Sea Islands north of the Equator.

When the Peace Conference met in 1919, therefore, the spoils were already virtually divided. Mr. Wilson's famous "point" about colonies ("a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined")

imposed an embarrassed pause upon the neo-possessive Allied Powers because those Powers on the one hand were pledged to the division of the spoils among themselves, and on the other hand were pledged to Mr. Wilson's Points as the basis of the peace settlement. The shades of Mr. Pickwick, however, if not even of Mr. Pecksniff, are always available for the comfort of those who are thus embarrassed. The answer in this case took the form of the League of Nations Covenant. The Treaty of Versailles paved the way by the simple expedient of a full renunciation imposed upon Germany. "In territory outside her European frontiers as fixed by the present Treaty, Germany renounces all rights, titles, and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her, or to her Allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin, which she held as against the Allied and Associated Powers" (Article 118). "Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions" (Article 119). "The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interests belonging at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty to German nationals or companies controlled by them, within their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including territories ceded to them by the present Treaty" (Article 297, *b*). Having thus been wrested from Germany the territories were then disposed of within the "sacred" terms of the League Covenant. Article 22 of the Covenant is one of the world's great monuments to *finesse*—or to put it more bluntly and more truly, to humbug—as a diplomatic instrument.

"To those colonies," it ran, "and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their

geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. . . . Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. . . ."

It came to pass that the several mandates were duly apportioned. Let the incidence of that apportionment be compared with the incidence of the secret understandings above alluded to. The greater part (363,000 square miles out of a total of 384,000 square miles) of *German East Africa* was placed under a British mandatory administration and was renamed the Tanganyika Territory. The districts of Ruanda and Urundi (21,000 square miles) were placed under a Belgian mandate. The small "Kionga" triangle was added to Portuguese East Africa by simple annexation, not as a mandate. *South-West Africa* was placed wholly under the mandate of South Africa. The *Cameroons*, like Cæsar's Gaul, but in a quite different sense, was divided into three parts. The biggest part (166,000 square miles) was handed over to France as mandatory, the smallest part (34,200 square miles) to Great Britain as mandatory. The remaining part (104,600 square miles) was annexed outright by France. The interesting thing about that annexation was that the part annexed had before the war been ceded to Germany by France as part of a

bargain. By the Moroccan agreements of November 4th, 1911, and September 28th, 1912, Germany relinquished certain interests in Morocco to France, and in return received these 100,000 square miles of the Cameroons. After the war by virtue of Article 125 of the Treaty of Versailles France took back that territory without reference to any other part of the bargain of 1911. *Togoland* was similarly divided between a British and a French mandate. France received the greater share (20,000 square miles) and Great Britain the remaining 14,000 square miles in the western part. In the Pacific, the valuable island of *Nauru* with its phosphates was placed under the joint administration of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. *German New Guinea*, the *Bismarck Archipelago* and the *Solomon Islands* were given as a mandate to Australia, and German *Samoa* to New Zealand. The German possessions north of the Equator were placed under a Japanese mandatory administration.

Simple arithmetic shows that out of a total 1,140,000 square miles taken from Germany as a result of the war, 826,000 square miles, or more than two-thirds, were added to the British Empire. The fact that in juridical theory the new acquisitions are held, not as "swag," but as a "sacred trust" of civilisation, means only that the resident officials once a year have to spend some hours in writing a report to the League of Nations.

Eighteen years after the transfer of those territories to their new owners, the principle is still maintained that Germany may not have colonies. Britain may; France may; Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Holland, Spain may have colonies. But not Germany. So say the Versailles Powers. They also said that Germany should pay reparations. They went on saying it until Germany stopped paying and then they not only posthumously "allowed" her to stop paying, but gave her loans as well. They said she should for ever remain disarmed, while they themselves were armed. Herr Stresemann and Dr. Brüning patiently, correctly, pleaded for "equality." It was denied. Herr Hitler was thereby imposed upon Germany. He defied Versailles and rearmed Germany. Yet the comic (if it be not worse) pretence is still kept up that Germany alone of all the nations can be forced for ever to abjure colonies. She has not yet made the gesture of defiance in that particular matter; and, therefore, there is still time

for common sense to prevail. It is still possible for Great Britain, say, to make the opposite gesture, to offer back to Germany some of the colonies formerly belonging to her, and thus to reap the benefit in good will of doing the obvious right thing spontaneously. In the alternative no one doubts that Germany will somehow or other follow the example of Italy in Abyssinia and of Japan in China and simply take what she wants. It will then be too late to do other than lamely to accept the accomplished fact. The League of Nations in theory forbade the Japanese virtual annexation of Manchukuo. In theory it forbade the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. In practice it prevented neither. In similar theory East Africa, South-West Africa, the Cameroons, Togoland, the South Pacific islands are not Britain's to give. They are mandated territories at the disposal of the League of Nations.

Yet an abundant experience has proved that a so-called League of Nations such as that which now has its headquarters at Geneva, may in its practical consequence do harm rather than good by its paradoxical pursuance of good intentions. But for the League of Nations the Negus might still reign in Addis Ababa; for it was not the original Italian plan to annex the whole of Abyssinia. It was only when the Hoare-Laval proposal was rejected by an earnest but misguided zeal for League of Nations theories that Italy was driven to the limit of conquest. And Italy was even entitled, by the pledged word of the British Government as affixed to the Treaty of 1915 and to the Anglo-Italian arrangement of 1925, to every square mile of the territory offered her in the Hoare-Laval plan. "The bowsprit gets mixed with the rudder sometimes." That particular perversion has taken place at Geneva. The colonial injustice, even absurdity, of denying in principle to Germany what is the right in principle of every other country in the world, is the sort of unanswerable grievance that most certainly fans the flames of war. Is Geneva to be made again the barrier to peace by common sense? Great Britain and the British Dominions concerned could suggest, as the parties mainly involved, that the sum of mandated territories be handed back to Geneva, the mandates liquidated, and their new disposal, with Germany as a certain participant, be considered in conference or by an alternative diplomatic method. The British Empire holds most of the spoils. If it be the considered determination of

the several British Governments not to disgorge, but to maintain the position that possession is nine-tenths of the law, then let the stand be made upon the frank ground of acquisitive imperialism, and let the territories be openly annexed by virtue of the sword, not hypocritically appropriated behind the shelter of an ideological, dishonest plea that this is the idealist dispensation of Geneva. Of course, it is difficult. Vested interests have been developed. British subjects have been given employment, British trade advantages. Those interests and privileges can be defended in the long run only by the sword. But peace, too, on the lowest ground of material advantage, has its attraction.

There is the lesson of Italy before us. By the secret treaty of 1915 she was promised, as an inducement to joining the war on the Allied side, that she should receive territorial acquisition at the expense of Abyssinia on her Eritrean and Somaliland frontiers in the event of the other Allied Powers acquiring territory in Africa. Except for the small bit of Jubaland handed over to Italy during Mr. MacDonald's first Prime Ministership in 1924, no inclination has emerged from the Allied Powers to redeem that bargain. In 1925 the British Government promised to Italy the southern part of Abyssinia in return for Britain's acquiring the waters of Lake Tsana for use in Egypt. The Negus was therein treated with the most circumspect correctitude. The Anglo-Italian bargain, in which both sides were to deliver exclusively Abyssinian property to each other, was in the very text of the instrument of exchange stated to be not incompatible with the tripartite pledge of 1906, whereby the sovereign independence of the Emperor of Abyssinia was to be respected. Inasmuch as the Negus would be invited by Britain and Italy voluntarily to concede what each wanted, he would forsooth be exercising his sovereign independence.

The case of Italy, clear as it was, was not clearer than that of Germany. Yet on July 11th, 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare, then Foreign Secretary, stated that "we have always understood, and well understood, Italy's desire for expansion. . . . We admit the need for Italian expansion." In the case of Germany it again fell to Sir Samuel to point the way. The speech he made at Geneva on September 11th, 1935, has been worn thin by repeated quotation, yet it must go on being quoted. "Abundant supplies of raw materials appear

to give a peculiar advantage to the countries possessing them. . . . Some countries, either in their native soil or in their Colonial territories, do possess what appear to be preponderant advantages. . . . Especially as regards Colonial raw materials, it is not unnatural that such a state of affairs should give rise to fear lest exclusive monopolies be set up at the expense of those countries that do not possess Colonial empires. It is clear that in the view of many this is a real problem. And we should be foolish to ignore it. As the question is causing discontent and anxiety, the wise course is to investigate it, to see what the proposals are for dealing with it, to see what is the real scope of the trouble and, if the trouble is substantial, to try to remove it. The view of His Majesty's Government is that the problem is economic rather than political and territorial. It is the fear of monopoly—of the withholding of essential Colonial raw materials—that is causing alarm. . . . So far as His Majesty's Government is concerned, I feel sure that we should be ready to take our share in an investigation. . . .”

Therein Sir Samuel suggested a beginning of wisdom. Once started the inquiry would quickly explode “the view of His Majesty's Government” that “the problem is economic rather than political and territorial.” The issue is clear and cannot be evaded. Four years ago Herr Hitler said: “We shall never go to war to get colonies. We are convinced that we are as capable as any other nation of administering and developing colonial territories, and we regard this as a matter for negotiation.” A year ago, speaking at Nuremberg, he said: “Germany cannot waive her claim that justice should be done to her colonial demands. The vital rights of the German people are just as important as those of any other nation.” Such statements have since been multiplied. General Ritter von Epp, head of the Nazi Colonial Political Office, speaking at Munich on October 29th last referred to “the impending action of the Führer, which will provide a satisfactory solution of the colonial question.” A day earlier, speaking at the fifteenth anniversary celebration of the march on Rome, Signor Mussolini entered the lists in Germany's cause. “A great people,” he said, “such as the German people, must regain the place which is due to it, and which it used to have beneath the sun of Africa.” The remaining chance for a fair and sensible settlement by the

method of good will rather than by the inevitable alternative method of open conflict may not last long.

2. BERLIN—ROME—TOKIO—SALAMANCA.

The Brussels Far Eastern Conference met on November 3rd, its declared purpose being to explore a means to mediation between Japan and China. Three days later a so-called anti-Comintern Pact was signed in Rome by Germany, Italy and Japan. There was some connection between the two events.

With the best will it was impossible for the Powers who met in Brussels to avoid giving the impression of an anti-Japanese bias. Germany, who on November 25th last year signed an anti-communist agreement with Japan, refused the invitation to attend the Brussels Conference. Italy attended it, but her delegate, Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti, gave it as his view, that the only thing that could usefully be done would be to invite Japan and China to make direct contact with each other. Japan had refused to attend the Conference. It was clear that neither Japan nor Germany nor Italy wished to give the impression that they were in great sympathy with the Brussels Conference. It was not that they disbelieved in its doing any good. Probably no delegate took it very seriously. Mr. Norman Davis, the American delegate, contented himself at the opening of the Conference with defining the object simply as “peace.” He expressed America's sympathy with the motive of a common effort towards inducing peace in the Far East, but was careful to explain that she had no commitments beyond those incurred in Washington sixteen years ago. Berlin and Rome clearly wanted to make of Brussels a background for the new tripartite pact. Before Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti went to Brussels it was agreed that Italy should become a third, and should thereby be presumed to be an original party, to the anti-communist pact. The pact was signed by Mr. Hotta, the Japanese Ambassador, Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Ambassador in London, who went to Rome for the purpose, and Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. In form the ceremony had all the simplicity of innocence. The instrument was merely a protocol admitting Italy to the German-Japanese Pact. At the signing ceremony Count Ciano declared that they had “no secret aims.” Indeed, it was no

secret that Tokio was being added as a third arm to the Berlin-Rome axis.

There was little doubt about its potential importance. The combination of the three States most militarised at the present time is a fact of immense consequence to the world and especially to Great Britain. As if to complete the perversity the British Government, on November 4th, announced that it was negotiating with General Franco with a view to an exchange of "official agents." It was explained that General Franco controlled the north, west and south-west of Spain, and that a channel was needed for the protection of British interests therein. But London carefully explained that there would be no "diplomatic" recognition. The Duke of Alba, who was in London willing and waiting to be accepted as the representative of Nationalist Spain, was thus informed that he would be accepted, as it were, at arm's length. There was in short no gesture on the part of the British Government to Nationalist Spain. British commercial interests in the territory of Nationalist Spain were merely if possible to be safeguarded. Thereby a still further clarification was given to the alignment, which may at some time prove to be a fatal alignment, between two sets of States, ideologically distinguished as pro-Red and anti-Red. At any rate it is true that Japan, Italy, Germany and Nationalist Spain are openly and of deliberate pretence, anti-Red; that is to say, anti-Russian. The world has come to this pass, that Moscow has become the dividing line in a rival grouping of world powers. On the side of Russia stands France. British policy, though it express occasional vague aspirations towards neutrality and impartiality, in every practical proof stands by France and, therefore, by Russia.

The opportunity for an understanding with Germany is passing by, because the British Government obstinately places a League of Nations theory and a native sense of colonial acquisitiveness between itself and Berlin. Italy is being stabilised as an enemy because of an equally persistent refusal to recognise the fact, though the fact be established, that the former Abyssinia is now Italian East Africa. Japan stands outside the League and receives no sympathy from British opinion in her expansionist adventure. The last-mentioned circumstance is understandable. The deliberate estrangement of Germany and Italy is less understandable.

By refusing to "recognise" in the diplomatic sense the fact of General Franco's existence as a pretender to sovereign authority in Spain, despite the probability that he will establish his claim, Great Britain drives the probable future Spain also into the other grouping. By the same process Britain herself is driven more and more to the Franco-Russian grouping. To the mind of the realist observer, exclusively bent upon British interests, the spectacle that presents itself is that of a hostile Spain at Gibraltar, of a hostile Italy throughout the length of the Mediterranean and at the eastern end—where too the antagonisation of the Arabs may well have a subversive effect upon the 80,000,000 Moslems of India—of a hostile Japan in Far Eastern waters and of a hostile Germany in home waters. Japan, Germany, Italy, the future Spain: these are strong Powers. Are they to be irrevocably accepted as the combined enemies of the British Empire? On the realist ground, what is the precise value of Russian and French support in the hypothetical emergency? Could Hong Kong be held against Japan; the Suez Canal against a combined Islam, Italy and Egypt; Malta against Italy; Gibraltar against Spain; the coasts of Britain herself against Germany? Great Britain and the British Empire is the most vulnerable political organism in the world. Because of its magnitude it is vulnerable in every quarter of the globe. At each vital point, British policy seems bent upon ensuring the enmity of a strong aggressor Power. No one but a fool could imagine it to be possible for British interests and British possessions to be defended against simultaneous attack by Japan, Germany, Italy and Spain. Yet such is the hypothesis presented by the London-Paris-Moscow axis. The logical upshot of the Left predilection in British policy would be to regard the British Empire as unimportant, its disruption as a negligible incident. Yet the very government which, despite its so-called Conservative composition, gives effect to the Left trend in foreign policy, far from taking the contemptuous view of possessive imperialism, has so far found it an obnoxious notion to give up a particle of the former German colonies wrested from her by the sword, even when the gesture might split the present bloc of enemies and thus tend to safeguard the pre-existing body of the British Empire.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

November 12th, 1937.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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MUSSOLINI.

In answering her own question, What next, O Duce?*, Miss Baskerville begins by telling us what the Dictator has already done. As a newspaper correspondent in Rome for several years she writes of what she knows, and her first-hand descriptions of memorable occasions add vividness to her work. The preface assures us that it breaks no lance for or against the Duce, and she cautions us against both the literature of the exiles and the propaganda of the Government. Despite this suggestion that she stands above the battle, her volume ranks among the most impressive indictments of the regime ever published in this or any other country.

The drama opens appropriately enough with a quotation from Machiavelli, recording his experience that the men of craft triumph over men who keep their word. Then we listen to the speech delivered on May 9th, 1936, when the empire was proclaimed from the historic balcony of the Palazzo Venezia. "The hysterical masses held their breath as their Dictator raised his arm for silence. . . . The people he had ruled with a rod of iron for fourteen years went frantic with joy. . . . Once and for ever he had wiped from their hearts the exasperating feeling of inferiority with regard to the Great Powers. He had satisfied their craving for greatness.

* *What Next, O Duce?* By Beatrice Baskerville. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

He had given them a country which they thought of as an El Dorado. It was their night of triumph; a night they had been waiting for ever since their peninsula became a united and independent state nearly seventy years ago. What could they give him in return? Mere titles were trash for the man who loved the name of Duce. Money did not tempt him. He lived the simple life and rode a motor-cycle for choice. They could reward him with only one honour. Rome has never forgotten that in her days of glory she made gods of leaders, who won her Empire. So Rome did as she had done before. As he stood on the balcony she gave him a triumph, and made him a god. . . . Since her old Empire fell, Rome has never staged a drama equal to this in emotional extravagance and disquieting possibilities."

After painting this brilliant picture of the Dictator at the summit of his career, our author turns to the sordid story of the planning and execution of the rape of Abyssinia. No condemnation can exceed in severity the naïve confession of Marshal de Bono that the whole scheme was worked out in 1933, more than a year before the collision at Walwal which was used as an excuse for action. There was no glory in victory over a primitive, untrained and largely unarmed foe. In threatening war against the Powers who imposed sanctions the Duce, according to Miss Baskerville, was bluffing. "The closing of the Canal would have broken him. . . . What the situation demanded in August 1935 was a dash of the Duce's own Machiavellism and a bold front in Great Britain's handling of him. . . . We could not have been better hated, abused and libelled had we closed the Suez Canal." Even when the war had begun, sanctions, half-hearted as was their application, would, in her belief, have crippled Italy had the campaign lasted into a second winter. The Abyssinian collapse came sooner than anyone expected. "Once more, good fortune was on the Duce's side." That the new empire will prove a liability rather than an asset is highly probable, for Abyssinia is one of the most indigestible morsels in the world.

After describing a great crime in the first part of the book, the author passes to the internal consolidation of totalitarian rule. The chapters on the reconciliation with the Vatican are of particular interest. That each scored substantial gains is obvious, but Miss Baskerville believes that the layman had

the best of the bargain. "Having built up a Fascist state, Mussolini has aligned the policy of the Holy See with his own. . . . All through their relations he had his own way : with the terms of the Lateran Pact ; later on he won the duel of wills over the interpretation of the agreements ; and he won the dispute about the education of Italian youth. As years passed and the Pope felt the weight of old age, Mussolini had his way in other matters without a struggle. Notable among them was the attitude of the Holy See towards the invasion of Abyssinia. The Church's policy was one of benevolent neutrality towards the invader." Among the reasons for this development was the fact that Pius XI "is more of an Italian in the modern sense of the word than any of his predecessors."

The third and last part of the volume is devoted to Italy's armaments and ambitions. How, asks our author, will Mussolini maintain himself on that pedestal of godhood ? The peace of Europe, she declares, depends to a great extent on the means he will devise to keep his laurels fresh. That the conquest of Abyssinia is the end of the story of Italian Imperialism she does not believe. "When he holds out the olive branch to a war-weary world, his bayonets are there, glistening between the leaves. . . . Abyssinia is but the beginning. The Fascist Empire must extend along the shores of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea." He is bent on making Italy a warrior nation. Fascists speak of "our sea" and "our Malta." The usefulness of a Fascist Spain for Mussolini is obvious. "True the Anglo-Italian assurances bind him to maintain the territorial *status quo* in the Mediterranean. But they cannot bind him to refrain from a military alliance with General Franco at the end of the civil war."

The outlook was dark when this eloquent and remarkable book was written. It is darker still since the entry of Italy into the German-Japanese pact against Communism. Of the seven Great Powers of the world, four are satisfied with their possessions, three are not. The chief danger to peace to-day is that the three are more closely bound to one another than the four, that they are ruled by men who passionately believe in war as an instrument of national policy, and that the spectacle of successful aggression in China and Abyssinia encourages to further deeds of violence in due course.

G. P. G.

HAS HUMANISM THE KEY ?

Principal Cairns has published another important book, which is primarily addressed to young students, who are perplexed and disturbed by the searching problems of the present time. His volume, entitled *The Riddle of the World*,* embodies the substance of lectures delivered some time ago for the Baird Trust in Scotland and for the Deems Lectureship in the United States. The substance of these courses of lectures has been worked over by the Principal's more recent thought, and the result is given in what may be termed a comprehensive exposition of the Christian faith as the only and the sufficient answer to the "riddle" with which it deals. The problem is stated thus :

On the one hand man has to try to explain the strange mystery that Nature seems to have produced a kind of being higher than herself whom she yet means completely to destroy ; on the other, he has to do his utmost, if he is to be true to what he knows to be the highest element in him, to "overcome the world" (p. 22).

Contact with recent thought, particularly in the United States, has led Dr. Cairns to concentrate his argument on Humanism, and to show its inadequacy to the demands both of thought and life. His argument involves "first of all the consideration of whether the underlying assumption of all the humanist writers, that science is the only pathway to Reality, is sound ; and secondly, whether belief in God promotes quietism and apathy ; and thirdly, whether the fact of evil is fatal to faith in God" (p. 41). The book deals vigorously with this extensive, indeed vast, programme from first to last. After a survey which, starting from the Human Situation, discusses among other subjects Humanism, Science and Religion, Natural Theology and Revelation, the author concentrates upon the Hebrew solution and the substance of the Christian Faith. He reaches the final conclusion that "we have light enough to be sure that a very great Wisdom and Power and Love is over all things, and to look forward with confident hope that the end will justify every step of the long road" (p. 362).

It is impossible within the limits of this short notice to deal with the immense range of subjects which Dr. Cairns

* *The Riddle of the World*. By D. S. Cairns, D.D. Student Christian Movement Press. 8s. 6d. net.

discusses. It must suffice to say that in this book, as in all his other works, the author displays sound and extensive scholarship, wide sympathies, and forceful reasoning. His argument is persuasive and in the main, to the present reviewer, convincing. The book has the merits and some of the drawbacks of a series of lectures. It is vivid in treatment and popular in form. Thus it is admirably fitted to appeal particularly to university students throughout the world. In addition to this, the work of so competent a thinker as Dr. Cairns merits the attention of more mature inquirers than those to whom it is primarily addressed. It is, therefore, a pleasurable duty to commend this book to the attention of all those whose minds are exercised upon the problems with which it deals.

J. S. L.

FRONTIERS OF THE MIND.*

A few years ago a group of friends, which included the Swedish Minister in London, Mme Adila Fachiri, the violinist, and her sister, Miss Jelly d'Aranyi, began attempting to obtain messages from "the Beyond." The mechanism employed was a board with the letters of the alphabet on it, and a glass pointer lightly touched by members of the group, thirty persons at one time or another taking part: a record was kept of the letters touched and it was found that continuous messages were being spelt out. The messages claimed to come through without hindrance or distortion on the part of the subconscious minds of the operators, and to test this claim the operators were blindfolded and the order of the letters rearranged: this had no effect on the messages. Unfortunately it is not possible to eliminate the subconscious as easily as that. Even if the blindfolding were completely effective (which amateur blindfolding seldom is), it would not exclude telepathic knowledge of the position of the rearranged letters, or even direct clairvoyance, assuming that these faculties work with anything approaching the precision claimed by Dr. Rhine.

It is too much to ask of any procedure that it should exclude

* (1) *Horizons of Immortality, a Quest for Reality*. By Baron Erik Palmstierna. 1937. Constable. 10s. net. (2) *Personality Survives Death*. By Lady Barrett. Foreword by Canon R. J. Campbell, D.D. Longmans. 7s. 6d. net. (3) *New Frontiers of the Mind*. By J. B. Rhine. Farrar & Rinehart, New York. Pp. 274. \$2.50.

the subconscious altogether. The student should be content if he can establish factors not reasonably attributable to the subconscious, of which the most impressive is the factor of distributed design appearing in the "Cross-correspondences" so elaborately studied by the Society for Psychical Research. Two other factors which carry weight are communication of verifiable facts outside the normal knowledge both of the sensitive and of the experimenting group, and a manifestation of powers, musical, literary, artistic or whatever it may be, outside the normal range of the sensitive. Of the former type, Baron Palmstierna says that his group received numerous instances, which convinced him of the identity of the communicators. The messages, however, expressly forbade him to publish evidence of this kind, with the exception of two cases in which information was conveyed relating to musical compositions, information stated to have been outside the knowledge, conscious or subconscious, of any of the group. Interesting as these two cases are, particularly that of the Bach Sonata, which has received less publicity than has attached itself to the Schumann Concerto, they form a narrow basis for a judgment as to the "evidential" value of the messages.

The greater part of the book, however, is taken up with messages of a theological or ethical kind, in which the nature of God, the problem of evil, the origin and destiny of the human soul are discussed. Descriptions of the spirit world are not uncommon in trance communications and automatic writings, and too often they are characterised by a parochial outlook, a reluctance to face problems and a materialism none the less fundamental because concealed behind an idealistic verbal façade. If the messages in *Horizons of Immortality* had been of this type, they would not, needless to say, have been put forward by Baron Palmstierna for our acceptance. They were produced to the accompaniment of a thorough-going cross-examination by a highly educated and intelligent group, and in consequence deserve careful consideration even by those who may hesitate to accept them as entirely free from coloration by the subconscious minds of the experimenters. "The revelations must stand on their own" as one of the messages says, and they will stand if they satisfy the intellect and soul of mankind, regardless of any question of subconscious influence. The central concept is that God knows

no evil, and is unconscious of it. This, while it may avoid some intellectual difficulties, will to many seem less ethically satisfying than the traditional Christian view.

Lady Barrett's book does not altogether tally with Baron Palmstierna's in the view it gives of "the Beyond." Sir William Barrett was a devout Christian, and the communications purporting to come from him are in harmony with his beliefs. They were mainly received through the mediumship of Mrs. Leonard, the most remarkable medium of our time, and contain several striking instances of correct statements as to matters which it is very difficult to suppose were within the medium's normal knowledge. Dr. Campbell, in his Foreword, gives a brief but useful account of the development of Psychical Research, and of the courage and scientific curiosity which led Sir William to take a leading part in it from the earliest days. The charge of triviality, often brought against spiritualist "communications," does not, as Dr. Campbell shows, hold with regard to Lady Barrett's book. Many of the messages relate to developments in medical science, of immense practical value, if confirmed by subsequent research and experience, and thoroughly in keeping with the scientific interests of both Sir William and Lady Barrett.

There will, however, always remain an element of doubt as to the origin of messages ostensibly coming from "the Beyond," so long as the reality and limits of such faculties of the living mind as telepathy and clairvoyance have not been clearly established. Hence the importance of the research that Dr. Rhine has been conducting into Extra-Sensory Perception. There has long been abundant evidence of spontaneous and unpredictable occurrences suggesting the existence of these faculties, and a less volume of experimental evidence, not always obtained under strict conditions, pointing in the same direction; but until recently the sort of evidence that impresses the average scientist has been lacking. Now, in the psychological department of a university, Dr. Rhine has produced positive results amenable to statistical analysis, results so much more striking than other experimenters have obtained as to provoke doubts whether his technique was flawless. Cannot other Departments of Psychology spare the time to duplicate his experiments in order to solve this important problem?

W. H. SALTER.

LAW AND OTHER THINGS.*

Lord Macmillan, in a lecture broadcast last year, maintained "that every citizen should have a general conception of the legal system under which he lives." The rules of English law are the unconscious expression of the national mind and exercise a powerful influence on the conduct and characters of the citizens. "Not a single day or hour of our lives," he observed, "is spent in which we do not benefit from the legal system." In this collection of addresses and papers delivered to a wide variety of audiences, Lord Macmillan shows the extent to which law is related to other realms of thought. With a wealth of varied illustration and felicity of expression he examines its association with politics, religion, history, letters and language among other subjects, in a way to convert the most prejudiced mind, accustomed to regard the study of the law as a dismal and repellent pursuit. In the midst of the international complications of the present time it is particularly acceptable to have in this volume the Rede lecture, delivered three years ago, as it has a practical value in providing a better understanding of the different points of view of the continental nations and the British peoples. As an advocate Lord Macmillan obtained a more than usually profound knowledge of Scots law, which, like the laws of the European countries, is based upon the Roman law. Since he came south as a Law Lord he has become one of the greatest exponents of the English system of law. No man living is in a better position to reconcile and interpret the two ways of thinking founded upon them.

The English genius has always had a strong aversion for and distrust of theory and principle. The common law of England developed to meet the needs of the moment guided as far as possible by the appeal to previous experience. "The two great systems of law which thus divide the civilised world between them, the system of code law and the system of case law, exemplify the two main types of mind, the type that searches for the principle and the type that proceeds on precedent." These are, in fact, the two distinct ways of thinking which are having a considerable influence in world affairs at the present time. Lord Macmillan expresses the belief "that the failure of the multitude of international

* *Law and Other Things*. Cambridge University Press. 8s. 6d.

conferences of recent years to achieve the aims which we all profess to have in common is in no small degree due to the incompatibility of the ways of thinking of those who have participated in them." It may be added that although the United States has remained outside many of these deliberations there has been a natural affinity to and sympathy with the British point of view as the United States and the British Empire have the same system of law as the basis of their national lives. The lecture is an example of the suggestive and illuminating reasoning which prevails throughout the volume so that the reader cannot fail to be grateful that this collection has been brought together. The publishers have done less than justice to their reputation and the value of the book by issuing it without an index.

C. E. A. B.

THE DAUPHIN IN THE TEMPLE.*

The problem of Louis-Charles, son of Louis XVI, has been treated afresh in *The Dauphin* by Mr. J. B. Morton, who is already known for his studies of the French Revolution in *The Bastille Falls*. He combines a vigorous and lucid style with a gift of dramatic presentation which conveys the full pathos of the little boy's incarceration. Moreover, he has little doubt in his own conclusions, though faced by a mass of suspect evidence. His argument is thus largely based upon probabilities and most readers will be attracted by its force. As a piece of serious research, however, its value is reduced by the lack of a bibliography and of notes on the sources of many important statements of fact.

At the age of seven-and-a-half Louis-Charles was imprisoned in the Temple with his family, and in July 1793 was isolated from Marie-Antoinette and placed in charge of the notorious Antoine Simon. While the child was brutalised and coarsened, Mr. Morton considers that the cruelties have been greatly exaggerated. The Dauphin's brother had died of consumption, and Louis-Charles himself, always delicate, had already shown signs of that disease in rounded shoulders and lengthening limbs. After Simon's departure in January 1794 seven months of solitary confinement under the most inhuman and filthy conditions ruined his constitution beyond

* *The Dauphin*. By J. B. Morton. Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

hope of repair. Mr. Morton rejects emphatically, as prompted by pity or self-interest, theories of escapes, including the many varieties of that in which a dumb imbecile child was substituted for Louis-Charles, who then escaped inside a dirty linen basket. All the probabilities, as the author shows, are against a rescue; moreover, the child in his last days was recognised by doctors and others. He died in June 1795, and was buried in the common grave, but according to the grave-digger's widow, whose tale Mr. Morton accepts, her husband transferred the body to an individual grave. In the place indicated was found in 1846 a coffin containing a skeleton of startling abnormality. The skull is that of a child, sawn as described by Dr. Pelletan in the autopsy; and the long distended limbs are consistent, argues Mr. Morton, with the known incipient deformity of the Dauphin from his disease of intestinal tuberculosis.

The number of pretenders have been variously estimated at between thirty and fifty; and of these Mr. Morton discusses the careers and contentions of four principal claimants, namely Hervagault, Bruneau, Richemont, and Naundorff. The reader will be especially impressed by the gullibility of even educated people where the wish is father to the thought.

THE FALSE STATE.*

Dr. Oakeley's indictment of the false state should be widely read as a preservative against current illusions; and is the more effective for its brevity—about two hundred pages of large print. The author's learning and philosophy are inspired by intense concern for the sufferings and fate of contemporaries, who insist on identifying their nation with one of its functions, namely the state; and in attributing to that state the human values of the nation. But such values, she argues, cannot be shared by an agency which exists primarily to maintain order within the community and defend it from external danger. It was the enduring nation rather than the contemporary organisation of the state which Burke, despite his use of the latter term, eulogised as a partnership "between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born," and without which certain personal values cannot

* *The False State*. By Hilda D. Oakeley, M.A., D.Lit. Williams & Norgate Ltd. 6s. net.

be realised. Yet the state, owing to historic, mystic and theoretic associations, has come to be regarded as a distinct entity, "an unquestionable and impeccable power" to which other aspects of the nation's life are subordinated. "Seized as weapons to fight with," philosophic principles "appear as it were with their heads off"; and at the point when Hegel no longer spoke as a pure philosopher, he has influenced the makers of history. Governments are assumed to derive authority from the state rather than from members of the community, with the result that men who control governments invoke their power conception of the sovereign state for ends not consciously willed by the majority. The state, indeed, in Mussolini's view moulds the nation. "All in the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state." Nor is a current idea of the nation less erroneous. Hitler, by insisting on race as the basis of nationality in contradiction to historic facts, is leading Germany back "towards a tribal organisation of peoples, from which their ascent through long ages has been concomitant with the advance of civilisation."

We, too, in Britain, the author contends, being impressed by the failure of other agencies to establish universal justice, are inclined to regard the state as morally competent to do so, and to plan for "mass man" instead of humanity like our nineteenth-century forefathers. She regards Mr. and Mrs. Webb's interpretation of Soviet Communism as a classic revelation of belief in state-compelled reorganisation as opposed to that inspired by free persons, and convincingly exposes their illusions and inconsistencies. But she hardly allows for the necessity of mass planning under modern conditions and is unduly alarmed at the spectre of "mass man." He exists on paper and in the imagination of dictators and intellectuals. Administrators have to assume an average which they know will be modified or corrected by those who apply their schemes; and dictators cannot overcome their fear of individuals who do not conform to mass concepts. Dr. Oakeley concludes that a regenerated idea of freedom is our hope, which includes the economic aspect; and predicts that it will be attained by suffering. One thing seems certain that regenerators, as on previous occasions, will confound human planning.

D. P. H.

THE CAMPAIGN IN ABYSSINIA.*

Marshal Badoglio's own account of the Abyssinian Campaign, which was published in Italy a year ago, has now appeared in an English translation. The volume has been lavishly produced with elaborate maps, facsimile documents and a series of panoramic photographs which well illustrate the great difficulties of the *terrain*. The narrative not only describes in terse and lucid language the main outline and essential facts of the war "as observed from a lofty standpoint," but also discloses, step by step, the mind of the commander and his appraisal of the enemy position. It is thus of particular value in appreciating the general strategy of the operations.

The Italian objectives were "the utter destruction of the Abyssinian armed forces and the complete conquest of Ethiopia." Numerous acts of Abyssinian aggression, culminating in the Wal-Wal incident, rendered an offensive war imperative as the only sure method of defence. The patent falsity of this excuse has, of course, been acknowledged in Marshal de Bono's remarkable exposure *Anno XIII*. In a campaign where speed was a principal consideration, Marshal Badoglio sought to crush by overwhelming odds the enemy arrayed in mass formation. After three months of preparation, during which an Abyssinian offensive in the Tembien was repulsed, the Italians resumed the initiative and by a brilliant strategical movement destroyed in turn three of the four Abyssinian armies. Four weeks later, on March 31st, 1936, the Emperor deliberately offered battle with his remaining forces north of Lake Ashangi, and was decisively beaten. Thus lay open and undefended the road to Addis Ababa, reached with remarkable rapidity on May 5th.

That Marshal Badoglio succeeded so quickly in his aims was due not only to immense superiority and strategic vision, but, as he readily admits, to the inefficiency of the Abyssinian command. The inability of the Emperor to control and co-ordinate the movements and tactics of his subordinate generals is apparent from the intercepted telegrams which are not the least interesting features of this book. Marshal Badoglio has praise for the mobility and fighting spirit of the Abyssinian army although "there was nothing

* *The War in Abyssinia*. By Pietro Badoglio. Methuen. 30s. net.

civilised or modern about it but an outward semblance in certain respects." The war was won with "a relative ease," and by the co-ordination of all the armed formations. He stresses the value of the artillery and especially of the air force which was virtually unopposed in the ruthless task of dispersing and decimating fleeing fugitives. The use of gas is not mentioned. As a piece of organisation the whole course of the Italian effort demands close study; not less because feeble opposition enabled it to function with text-book precision.

SPAIN DOMINANT.*

This book should prove indispensable to students of Spanish history. It amply fulfils the aims set forth in the preface, being readable, impartial, comprehensive, and based on facts established by research. The sixteenth century saw Spain at the zenith of her power, and ascendancy in Europe; the opening of the seventeenth witnessed her political decadence, so that the description "golden" would, as Mr. Trevor Davies admits, not apply to the reign of Philip III but for its magnificent literary production. He traces the building up of the great edifice on the foundations laid by Isabella; the gradual unification of the Peninsula, its political and economic problems, its times of revolt, the activities of the Inquisition, the treatment of Moors and Jews. Externally, the relations of Spain with other Powers are discussed, and a special study is made of trade with America, the vast imports of bullion, and their effect on home industries. Spain's economic decay is shown not to have been, as often stated, the result of the expulsion of the Moriscos under Philip III. Several other common misconceptions are removed, such, for example, as that the Armada set forth in a mood of overweening confidence, or that Don Carlos was a romantic, persecuted figure. Not the least interesting chapter is that describing Philip II as man and statesman. The account given of the Inquisition and the *Index Expurgatorius* is judicial, and merits consideration. The former, it is pointed out, "was quite distinct from the Papal Inquisition of the Middle Ages," having been founded in 1478 to ensure "racial purity and religious orthodoxy"; it was a tremendous force in the hands of the Crown

* *The Golden Century of Spain*. By R. Trevor Davies. Macmillan. 1937. 16s.

rather than of the Pope. But, when all that can be said in its defence has been fairly stated, as it is here, nothing can annul the fact of the universal execration in which the Inquisition has ever been held.

This "golden century" is for Spain the age of outstanding figures in religion and literature, of St. Teresa and Cervantes, to name but two: the enduring influence of mysticism on Spanish life and thought is emphasised in these pages. It had its great captains too; Don John's spectacular victory at Lepanto (1571) established, as our author reminds us, the control of the Mediterranean by Christian fleets. Though the seventeenth century is the "golden" one for Spanish art, native painters flourished during the period under review (e.g. the elder Ribalta and elder Herrera), to say nothing of the immigrant El Greco, who was working as painter and architect at Toledo from about 1577. It is rather surprising, therefore, to find art omitted (save for a cursory allusion) in such a very complete survey. The bibliography, illustrations and plans enhance the value of this attractive book.

E. G. S.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The general public's desire for sound historical writing has been well demonstrated in Professor G. M. Trevelyan's *History of England* which has gone through ten impressions since its first publication in 1926. The history concluded with the death of Queen Victoria, and now in a second revised edition* Professor Trevelyan has added four additional chapters which continue the narrative down to the Treaty of Versailles and include some reflections on post-war developments. Some forty pages contain a brief, balanced and objective review of leading events and trends in domestic, imperial and foreign affairs. In a special chapter devoted to the latter, Grey's work for European appeasement and his final efforts for the retention of peace are sympathetically appreciated. To the question whether Grey should, or could, have threatened Germany earlier with British intervention, Professor Trevelyan replies that it was "utterly impossible." "Half the Cabinet, headed by Mr. Lloyd George, was neutralist." The latter's own view of the position, as contained in his *Memoirs*, may well be recalled. He declares that while Cabinet ministers were divided hopelessly upon participation in a purely Austro-German conflict against Russia and France, they were all agreed,

* Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

with the conceivable exceptions of Lord Morley and John Burns, that British intervention must follow a breach of Belgian neutrality. Mr. Lloyd George thus blames Grey for not having proposed in Cabinet much earlier a British declaration to that effect. In discussing the Peace Treaties, Professor Trevelyan compares "the wisely generous treatment of France in 1815" with the vindictive treatment of Germany and is also particularly critical of post-war French policy in provoking the rise of Hitler.

The Country Year,* by Eric Parker, describes the changing scene from the view-point of a fishing, shooting, hunting, deer-stalking country gentleman. Under each month there are about a dozen entries, often of no more than a page and a half in length, whose titles will serve to indicate the character of the book. In March we have, for instance, Penning the Pheasants, Baying the Master and Jay Pirates; in August, In the Grouse Butt, Village Cricket and Naming the Dragonflies; in December, Footprints in the Snow and Shortest Days. Finally, there is a Vision of Summer—plans for an extension to the author's garden. There is an interesting photograph of snipe feeding. The book is written in Mr. Eric Parker's pleasant style.

Mr. H. W. Tilman's book, *The Ascent of Nanda Devi*,† is the modest story of a great climb quietly planned and successfully accomplished by a party of eight British and American mountaineers. Nanda Devi, in the Himalayas, the highest peak in the Empire, rises to 25,645 feet. It was conquered for the first time on August 29th, 1936, after a climb of twenty-five days from the Base Camp. It was the fitting climax to remarkable team work and determination in the face of great obstacles. The collapse of their Sherpa porters which obliged the party to carry their own camps, increased the difficulties incurred by illness and exceptionally severe blizzards. It is a remarkable tribute to their perseverance that the author and Mr. N. E. Odell were able to reach the summit. The inherent interest of this unassuming narrative is increased by the opening chapters upon the mythological, historical and geographical background of the locality.

In *The Challenge of the North-West Frontier*,‡ Mr. C. F. Andrews discusses the difficult question of the bombing of the Pathan villages by our English army. He gives a very fair account of the arguments in favour of this method of subduing wild tribesmen, and of the mitigation in practice, such as giving twenty-four hours' notice. But, in view of all the horrors that have since developed from bombing from the air, the power of Great Britain has been weakened by this bad example,

* Seeley Service. 10s. 6d. net.

† Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

‡ Allen & Unwin. 6s.

and isn't it time we gave it up deliberately and tried some other method? In view of our international prestige, is it worth while? Mr. Andrews advocates "not the sudden abandonment of all precautions against raids, but rather the transformation of the purely military regime for one wherein the benefits of civilised government play an ever-increasing part. Economic development and the provision of medical relief, along with attempts at education. . . ." It is a stimulating suggestion and a real challenge to our civilisation. It is supported by a consideration of the non-violence of the Hindus and the Brotherhood of Islam. Other questions taken up in the book are the maintenance of the huge army in North-West India, which Mr. Andrews considers not only unnecessary, but provocative, the continued administration from London of Defence and Foreign Affairs, which he thinks Indians are quite competent to manage for themselves, and which withholds all hope of independence for the Government of India. It is a thought-provoking little book, and very apt at this moment of national self-questioning.

Mr. Eric Taverner writes on unaccustomed ground in *These Germans** which is none the less a most pleasant piece of writing, composed in his homely and informal style. His book is in large measure a description of towns and countryside, of people and their ways, met with on a motor tour from Wiesbaden to Copenhagen and back in the summer of 1936. It will find a ready, responsive echo especially from those who have recently enjoyed a holiday in Germany. Mr. Taverner also takes the opportunity of writing his impressions of conditions and the trends of opinion gleaned on this and other occasions. He is appreciative in general of the Nazi régime and is favourably struck by improvements in social conditions, such as reduced unemployment and a higher standard of living, and by the united and confident spirit of the new Germany. Public opinion, however, so far as it is ascertainable when spies are everywhere, is ill-disposed towards the excesses of anti-semitic persecution. No mention is made of the religious issue. English friendship is sincerely sought for, Italy being regarded simply as "an ephemeral friend." Mr. Taverner insists that Germany is fundamentally pacific, rearming as an answer to Franco-Russian encirclement.

The Village Carpenter† is at once a delightful and a valuable book by a master carpenter, Mr. Walter Rose, who belongs to a Buckinghamshire family of village craftsmen. In the course of a homely and vivid narrative that never lags, Mr. Rose recalls the family business, with its manifold functions in the rural economy, just before the general intrusion of machinery and factory-made goods during the later Victorian period. This volume will be valued as a first-hand record of


* Seeley, Service. 10s. 6d. net. † Cambridge University Press. 8s. 6d. net.

types of work and methods which have now passed away ; and will be enjoyed equally as the reminiscences of one who has the profound faith and equanimity of the true craftsman. Mr. Rose is not too despondent of the future ; rather he welcomes the machine so far as it removes routine drudgery and permits of more time for creative work for which, he believes, there is a growing demand. Mention must be made of the excellent illustrations.

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*Cæsar Augustus** by Mr. Bernard Allen, contains a short biography of the great Princeps, the bimillenary of whose birth is now being celebrated. It has been written with care in a light and direct style which will appeal to "the British people at large" for whom it is designed. The extensive bibliography indicates the author's wide acquaintance with modern scholarship, including that in the recent Volume X of the *Cambridge Ancient History* on the Augustan Empire. Mr. Allen, however, retains a certain independence of approach, as for example in his view of Cleopatra's attitude to Antony. He can also gloss over difficult unsolved questions, such as the nature of the legal powers vested in Augustus in the settlement of 23 B.C. His estimate of the Princeps' character and qualities runs through the narrative, special stress being laid upon the influence of Julius Cæsar's memory. Half the volume is devoted to the years of struggle terminating in the victory of Actium, and the remainder deals largely with dynastic, political and military events of the reign. Mr. Allen has given us a useful biographical sketch, but it is not to be regarded as providing a general and balanced appreciation of the Augustan achievement when so little space is devoted to constitutional, administrative and, particularly, economic developments.

* Macmillan. 8s. 6d. net.



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