
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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JANUARY 1937.

THE THRONE.

OUR first duty on this New Year's Day is to offer on behalf of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW our heartfelt loyalty to King George VI and his Consort, Queen Elizabeth. The King has ascended the throne after a long career of high and devoted service to the State, by which he has firmly established himself in the confidence of the Nation and Empire. In his great task he will be nobly assisted by the Queen, who has long since captured the admiration and affection of the whole people. Together the King and Queen will preserve to the Nation and Empire the priceless treasure of public and private dutifulness bequeathed to them by King George V and Queen Mary.

Of the painful circumstances which have brought King George VI to the throne little need now be said. They will for ever form a tragic but salutary page in our history. King Edward VIII was endowed with many high qualities which had enabled him to render conspicuous services to his peoples, which will not be forgotten. He ascended the throne with a wealth of trust and affection which promised a glorious reign. But in indulging an indisciplined affection he misjudged—with disastrous effect to himself—the fidelity of his peoples to the high standards of conduct any lowering of which would be a symptom of irreparable decay. Hence he went too far to recede, and the abdication by which he has forfeited a great career will bear lasting witness to those moral principles which are the only sure safeguard of the Throne.

Words fail adequately to express the universal sympathy which has gone forth towards the revered and beloved Queen Mary in the poignant troubles through which she has passed.

A tribute of admiration must be paid to the Prime Minister for the courage, wisdom and sympathy with which he fulfilled his trust so nobly throughout this well-nigh heart-breaking crisis. By his fidelity he gave ideal interpretation to the mind of all parts of the Empire and all Parties in the State, as their attitude immediately revealed. Hence the new reign begins with an enhancement instead of a lessening of the moral dignity and solidarity by which alone the British Empire can preserve its unity, stability and greatness.

THE BLUM "EXPERIENCE."

THE French are addicted to "experiences." Ever since I have been acquainted with the French Parliament I have heard the doleful plea that France must accept such-and-such an "experience." The implications of this word, used in this way, would provide the material for an illuminating study of the French political mind. By it is partly meant an experience in the English sense, and partly an experiment. The deputies systematically take the attitude that the Government is probably the worst possible government, but, as it has become inevitable, it is better to submit to it and have done with it as quickly as may be—like measles. They shrug their shoulders and steel themselves to pass through the unfortunate "experience." But, on the other hand, as an experiment it may, of course, turn out better than anyone can expect, and have some good results. In any case it must not be interrupted too soon. The country must first be convinced that it has failed. In some quarters regret may be expressed at the supposed necessity of treating the nation like a guinea-pig, for a good deal of harm is often done before an experiment can be stopped. Yet the French deputies have seldom the courage of their convictions, and as a matter of tactics allow the Painlevé or the Clemenceau or the Poincaré or the Briand or the Laval or the Blum "experience," whatever they *may think* of it, to run its course and die, as it were, a natural death.

The Blum "experience" was bound, for better or for worse, to be profoundly disturbing. It would seem that M. Blum himself shrank from the ordeal, but was persuaded by his followers that there was no way of escape. The difficulty of his position lay in the fact that it was the result of an equivocal electoral combination of Communists, Socialists, and Radicals. It was all very well for the Front Populaire to win the elections by a momentary bargain about vote distribution, but it was apparent to the meanest political intelligence that Communists, Socialists, and Radicals could not work satisfactorily together. In France the Communists have certainly not abandoned their revolutionary methods, and as they are by far the most enterprising section of the Front Populaire, they have taken full advantage of the dependence of the Government on them to conduct a vigorous campaign of

intimidation and proselytism in the workshops. On the flimsiest pretext, the workers are called upon to strike. There is a perpetual agitation, which has greatly and perhaps permanently affected the mentality of the French worker, and tends to paralyse industry and commerce, and to create still more favourable conditions for Communist propaganda. The stay-in strikes, with their complete disregard of the laws of personal liberty and of private property, can only be regarded as revolutionary, and indeed the more unscrupulous politicians assure the workers that they will soon be in absolute possession.

What could M. Blum do to check this turbulence, this recourse to illegal methods? Clearly if he had ordered the evacuation of the factories, if necessary by armed forces, he would have appeared to be a greater enemy of the working classes than his predecessor, M. Albert Sarraut, under whose government the stay-in strikes began and were not repressed. But to condone a movement which is palpably dangerous was to risk the speedy defection of the Radicals, who, as good Republicans, stand firmly by the 1789 principles of personal liberty and private property. The Socialists themselves, whatever theories they profess, looked for the most part with dismay on the utter breakdown of discipline. They have repeatedly declared that changes should be effected in an orderly manner. M. Blum has even pointed out that he has no mandate to act as a Socialist Prime Minister, but only as a Front Populaire Prime Minister, that is to say, to go no farther than the Radicals permit. It was assumed that, after a few weeks of commotion, the excitement in the factories, which recalled that of Italy before the advent of Mussolini, would die down. It was therefore advisable to temporise, not to engage in a frontal attack on the agitators, and in the meantime to pass a series of social reforms. There are, however, elements which do not intend to relinquish this weapon of the stay-in strikes, which have now lasted six months. Circumstantial stories of the most high-handed action by the workers' delegates, of ringleaders of doubtful origin, are recorded in the French newspapers. It is hard to see how control is to be regained, especially as sections of the workers have persuaded themselves that they are already their own *patrons*.

The Communists, who are thus the masters of the

Government, holding it under the constant menace of overthrow, refused to participate in the actual composition of the Cabinet. They preferred to take no responsibility. It will be upon the Socialists that the odium of failure will fall. Yet the Socialists are not alone. Many of the principal posts in the Government are occupied by the Radical leaders. Surely these Radical leaders, who look with growing distaste on the social situation, cannot escape their share of blame if the "experience" turns out badly? In fact, they have discreetly intimated their disapproval of a great deal that has happened, though remaining members of the Cabinet. They shake their heads sadly, they even raise their voices occasionally, and they let it be understood that they are exercising a moderating influence. They are waiting for the proper time to denounce their anomalous association with the Communists, with whom they are fundamentally in opposition. The Radical Congress virtually instructed the Radical Ministers to withdraw from the Blum Government in certain circumstances, and it would be surprising if they did not, sooner rather than later, act on these instructions. How, indeed, is it possible for M. Blum to please the Communists without offending the Radicals, or to satisfy the Radicals without infuriating the Communists? From the beginning this dilemma presented itself; and the international developments, especially in Spain, into which the Communists would plunge heedless of the consequences, while the Radicals are resolved to stand aside, intensified the problem of driving abreast such a disparate team.

The chances of success would undoubtedly have been increased if the Government had given the impression that it intended to rule in the interests of the nation as a whole and not of parties. Socialism had a wonderful opportunity of demonstrating its rejection of class prejudices, of partisanship, and of making an appeal for national unity in face of the perils, domestic and foreign, which everybody sees. If it has not thus given an impression of impartiality in legislation, and above all in administration, to whom is the fault to be attributed? Naturally the supporters of M. Blum urge that obstacles have been put in his way, and that his adversaries have forced him into a position of self-defence. Certainly the opposition has not always been wise, but it is not accurate to pretend that it has been aggressive. Far-reaching laws, whose

timeliness may well be questioned, have been passed almost without protest. As for the foolish allegations that France is falling into the hands of "Fascists," and that there must be a rally of the anti-Fascist forces, I have always been unable to understand how so-called competent observers could discover any substantial Fascist organisation in France. The Croix de Feu of Colonel de la Rocque has always been marked by its singular tameness. Obviously a real Fascist movement might easily be provoked into existence by the much more real danger of a highly organised and well-armed body of Communists who are getting ready for any emergency. In the meantime, every good citizen who walks in the middle of the road, pays his rates and goes to church, is deemed to be a Fascist, simply because he is not a revolutionary. My own sympathies—partly, I confess, for personal reasons—are with M. Blum, but I have been unable to see how he could hope to obtain genuine success in a divided nation. When the Front Populaire adopted the Clenched Fist as its mode of salutation, it made the disunion of Frenchmen inevitable. The Radicals themselves, alarmed at the prevalence of this symbol of class hatred, tried to invent a mode of salutation which should neither be the Roman gesture nor the Clenched Fist—but the best they could do was to clasp their hands above their heads in the Masonic sign of distress!

There is, of course, a reaction. In the May elections the French voted not so much for the Left as against the Right, which had made a sorry muddle. And by Right I mean the Radicals, who could command a majority, as well as the Moderates, though the Radicals sought to save themselves by joining up with the Socialists. The economic crisis was bitterly felt. The cost of living was high. Wages were scandalously low. Trade was at a standstill. Parliament had fallen into greater disrepute than ever. It was by way of protest that tens of thousands of discontented Frenchmen voted for the Communists or for the allies of the Communists. Things, they argued, could not be worse. Perhaps they would be better. Yet despite the discontent, the national figures by no means gave a predominance to the Socialists and Communists. By a curious paradox, the Socialists obtained fewer votes than in 1932, while the Communist votes on the first ballot were under a million and a half. The essential fact is that the Radicals, who had long been the biggest party, fell

to the second place, and therefore, according to Parliamentary custom, the Blum " experience " had to be accepted.

I believe it was loyally accepted by the majority of Frenchmen and by the politicians. But while everybody recognised the need of social justice, it is impossible to obtain social justice by encouraging social hatreds. Violent incidents, which mostly go unpunished, indicate that the object of an invisible director is not social justice but an immense social upheaval. So apparent did this become that M. Daladier, President of the Radical Party, who is War Minister in the Blum Government, found himself obliged to declare : " They will not accomplish in our country what they have done in Asiatic or barbaric countries. France is the country of personal liberty and personal property ; that is why we admit every reform, but in conditions of order and domestic peace."

It is impossible that M. Blum, or his successor, should allow the indefinite prolongation of the spirit of insurrection which has been introduced into the workshops and the offices ; and that insecurity, inquietude, indiscipline, should continue to menace industry and commerce and paralyse the normal life of the nation. It was right that wages should be substantially raised, and collective contracts legalised. Nobody will quarrel in principle with the forty-hour week, though it adds inopportunely to the burden of employers. The sudden institution of paid holidays for workers last summer was a considerable and unexpected additional cost, but it can be reckoned in the estimates in future years. When all these concessions were made, it would seem that the workers would be contented. They are, in fact, far less contented than I have ever known them—or, at any rate, the agitators make them appear less contented, and the employers cannot now count on the faithful and uninterrupted service of those who have so greatly gained.

Another trouble with these reforms was that they made impossible the maintenance of the franc, although M. Blum had solemnly promised, on June 6th, that its value would not be changed. Nobody can complain of the decision to devaluate as such. There was no option. It must have occurred under any government, and whatever hardships it inflicted on respectable classes of thrifty Frenchmen, it was doubtless unavoidable. Yet there had been a curious contradiction between the definite policy of non-devaluation of the Front

Populaire, and the policy of " reflation " which was practised. In my view, devaluation was wise ; but it nevertheless ran counter to specific pledges, and, one must believe, to the desires of the Front Populaire. It was at least hoped that, after devaluation, steps would be taken to keep down prices, to balance the budget, and generally to make sure that the country, in accepting the disadvantages of devaluation, would obtain by way of compensation its full advantages.

Unhappily, the tendency is for prices to rise, and for the workers, whose wages have just been increased, to demand still higher wages—a " readjustment " to the depreciated franc—and for costs of production again to go up. So that, if we are not careful, the franc will again find itself overvalued, and French prices will be higher than world prices. As for the budget, instead of balancing it, M. Vincent Auriol has adopted the worst device of the war and post-war years—that of an " extraordinary " budget side by side with the " ordinary " budget. On the " ordinary " budget there is admittedly a deficit of three and a half milliard francs. Moreover, the Finance Minister is optimistically looking for a considerable increase in taxation revenue—and his estimates may or may not be justified. The " extraordinary " budget is to be covered by borrowing. It provides for supplementary expenditure of eight and a half milliard francs on national defence. It allocates three and a half milliard francs to public works, it allows seven milliard francs to the railways. The total estimated deficit is, then, between twenty-two and twenty-three milliard francs (something over £200,000,000), but many people would put the amount much higher. M. Vincent Auriol defends this unbalanced budget on the ground that it is a budget of " transition," and when the " reflation " policy has produced business recovery, there will be plenty of time to straighten finances. It should be noted that the Radicals, although members of the Government, and enjoying a majority in the Senate, pronounced in their party congress for a balanced budget.

It is, perhaps, in the realm of foreign affairs that the Blum Government has had to encounter the greatest difficulties. Every Frenchman is now obsessed by the belief in war at no remote date, and most Frenchmen are eager to do everything in their power to preserve peace. But the Communists, under the control of Moscow, and many who have associated

themselves with the Communists on this issue, have behaved exactly as though they wished to provoke a great European war. They have never ceased to cry for cannon and aeroplanes for Spain, and instances have been recorded of some materialisation of their demands. It would appear that their propaganda has been remarkably successful, and that the cry of "Cannon and aeroplanes for Spain!" is being caught up in widening circles. This kind of frenzy in favour of intervention, though the consequences of intervention must be calamitous, has been a source of much embarrassment to M. Blum.

For it is claimed that the Front Populaire, which M. Blum leads in France, is the equivalent of the Frente Popular, against which General Franco is fighting in Spain. The doctrine of the unity of the proletariat, irrespective of frontiers, has been preached by Socialists, as well as Communists, with vehemence. The application of "sanctions" against Italy by the League of Nations, at the behest of Great Britain, was only possible, even in a limited and ineffective manner, by the encouragement of an international crusade against "Fascism." That crusade cannot now be called off. Long after Great Britain has tried to forget the deplorable incident, the anti-Fascist crusade, so thoughtlessly invoked, is spreading like wildfire throughout Europe, and has naturally provoked a rival crusade—against Communism. France is linked to Russia by a pact which, however defendable it may be, has been made the pretext for a series of anti-Russian protests, for the rearmament of Germany, for the reoccupation of the Rhineland, for counter-agreements by Germany with Italy and now with Japan, and has enormously disturbed good relations in Europe. The Russian alliance was, on the whole, unpopular in France. At the best it was received with indifference. But now, with the Left in power, and the Communists prodding the Government into action, the Franco-Russian pact takes on a new and sinister significance. Like "sanctions," it is one of the principal factors in the division of Europe on "ideological" lines.

M. Blum, to his credit, saw the danger from the beginning, and resolved on non-intervention in the Spanish imbroglio. Wherever his sympathies might lie, he realised that it would be madness to jump into an arena into which he would quickly be followed by Hitler and Mussolini. He had wisely chosen a Radical, M. Yvon Delbos, for Foreign Minister, so

that the full brunt of the attack of the Communists did not fall on M. Blum and the Socialists. M. Delbos, though without experience at the Quai d'Orsay, has been admirable. He has never allowed himself to be deflected from his absolute refusal to range France on the side of the nondescript forces of Anarchy, Communism, and violent anti-Clericalism, which are fighting the battle of Russia in the Mediterranean. He is enabled to resist the pressure put upon him by the interventionists by taking refuge behind France's understanding with Great Britain. Indeed, it has been rather curious to notice how the French always refer to British policy as their excuse, while the British Minister pleads the necessity of keeping in step with France.

The opportunity, even if only internal politics were concerned, was too good for the Communists to lose. Though they did not want to break with M. Blum too soon, they never ceased to harass him and to represent him as false to the causes for which he has professed to stand. It is an irksome relationship, that of the Communists and Socialists in France. For although they are members of the Front Populaire, they remain deadly political enemies; and the design of the Communists is to make as much headway as possible, and to occupy as many strategic points as they can, under the cover of the Front Populaire, while endeavouring to discredit the Socialists as men who talk but do not act.

Already the Front Populaire Government has, to its dismay, learned the difference between irresponsible criticism when in opposition and responsible decision when in power. Its members had bitterly attacked M. Laval because he was not sufficiently ardent in the application of "sanctions" to Italy, but the Government was obliged to raise "sanctions" as soon as it came into office. M. Blum is fully alive to the extreme peril of further antagonising Italy in a Europe which is armed to the teeth. It would be desperately difficult for France to defend itself on two fronts—to say nothing of the possibility of an unfriendly Spain. No Government is, therefore, more anxious to make peace with Italy than the present Front Populaire Government. But it is terribly handicapped by its "ideology." Its supporters on the extreme Left intimidate it and prevent it from doing the sensible thing in time. A bad technical blunder was made, too, in recalling the Comte de Chambrun, the French Ambassador, who had the

ear of the Duce, under a new regulation of age limit. His successor cannot be sent until France is prepared to accredit him to the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia; and so France is without adequate representation in Rome, precisely at a moment when European diplomacy is working overtime. This is not a trivial or personal matter; it may have vital consequences.

France cannot afford to lose any more friends. Belgium has given notice that it will return to neutrality. Rumania and Yugoslavia are undoubtedly "accommodating" themselves to a new situation. The old alignments in Europe can be regarded as completely shattered. The central question is whether France is prepared to effect a *rapprochement*, or at least to enter into a *modus vivendi*, with Germany. If it is, there is still a possibility of averting the worst. If the cleavage, which is not one of interest but purely about political forms, continues much longer, we might as well resign ourselves to European shipwreck.

It is plain as a pikestaff for all dispassionate observers that the mischief in France, as elsewhere, lies in the excited mouthings of words that are almost devoid of meaning, but that have been put together into what is called an "ideology." The Front Populaire owes its existence to a medley of catchcries which cannot withstand the force of realities. The future of the Front Populaire—and perhaps of France, and indeed of Europe—will depend on whether it can adjust itself in time to the facts.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

THE FUTURE OF SPAIN.

SPAIN has found no satisfactory political structure from the Visigoths to the present day. But we must remember this significant contrast. The epochs of disintegration when each race had its own legislation (Visigothic period), each city its statute (Middle Ages), each little territory its sovereign (Christian and Moorish kings), and each subject his own religion (Christian, Mohammedan or Jew) have shown, under superficial disorder and even petty tyrannies, rich germs of vitality, original ideas and artistic inspiration. The eras of territorial, legislative and religious unity have hidden under their grandiose ostentation internal misery and decadence. Let us note another significant fact: Spaniards, with their artistic temperament and their fierce individualism, have often been capable of exquisite achievements on a small scale, but have generally failed when attempting to cover a large field. Moreover, the models for a unified Spain have been for the most part imported and dictated by the rulers against the spontaneous multiformity.

The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30) was the last attempt at unity of territory, legislation, language, religion and culture. As he had sought inspiration in Italy, it was natural that the republican politicians should seek theirs in the opposite type, though they could not forget the fate of the first Republic in 1873, victim of regional and municipal disintegration, anarchism, insecurity and its counterpart of military rebellion. The second Republic was faced with the attitude of Catalonia, whose support had become decisive on one side or other in the political game. The Spanish Lefts, who in the nineteenth century represented national unity against clerical tradition and medieval privileges, had leaned afterwards towards regional autonomy and now found in it a means of paying Catalonia for her support. The Catalonian diehards, capitalists and Catholics, could neither oppose the Left republicans who offered to fulfil the long-delayed regional dream nor trust them as rulers. In the rest of Spain, opinion is divided into optimistic believers in decentralisation, worshippers of form who would have preferred an opportunity less humiliating for the national feelings, and stubborn unitarians who regard autonomy as a first step to separation. The two heedless declarations by Catalonia of her independence

during the short republican period have given them a powerful argument. The Labour parties, which had always opposed regional autonomy, have accepted it when they saw it would fall into their hands. And a reform, long prepared and amply justified by the neglect and mismanagement of the central power, has failed to secure the general approval it deserves.

The Republic, born without preparation in 1931, never dreamed in its beginning of becoming a communist State. There had been hardly any previous study of political solutions, any free discussion of programmes or any attempts to enlighten public opinion by experiments. The debates in the first Parliament were dominated by the fear of a monarchical revival. In order to obtain the greatest possible number of supporters the Constitution tried to satisfy democrats, liberals, conservatives, radicals, socialists and communists. But before it could be tested in practice the very same Parliament reversed it, and an emergency bill for the defence of the Republic, a Spanish D.O.R.A., conferred extraordinary powers on the Government. This set the direction towards and afforded the instrument of a totalitarian State, just as the "extraordinary powers" conferred upon the republican magistrates of ancient Rome marked the beginning of absolutism.

Spain was thus divided into two halves, good and bad republicans; and the classification was decided at each moment by the opinion of the ministers then in office. The "bad republicans" cast out of public life soon felt themselves deprived of State protection. Their only hopes were an electoral triumph or a revolution. Newspapers were suppressed, associations dissolved, thousands of citizens imprisoned and sometimes crimes tolerated. Civil war implies despotic majorities and intolerant minorities. Very typical of the Spanish temperament is an attitude of patient submission to authority interrupted by spasmodic and violent protests. The problem of repression appears, and rulers, like educators, are apt to forget that punishment may weaken their authority and that severity or benevolence can be equally fatal. The more so in Spain, with its accumulated legalistic tradition—Roman, Mohammedan, Visigoth and Scholastic.

When the Dictator Primo de Rivera and afterwards the republican Parliament imposed unlawful punishments with

retrospective effects, or reprieved criminals condemned under the legal procedure, the old idea of justice was replaced by arbitrary whim, and the minorities were driven more and more to direct action as the supremacy of law had been their only safeguard. The rulers on their side maintained the absolute power of government and Parliament, and advocated strong action unhampered by acquired rights or previous legal conditions because it aimed at a "revolution from above." The interpretation of democracy as the supreme and unlimited imposition of the will of the majority had to lead to war. Democracy, conceived as a permanent form of social life, requires of those who possess the force of numbers ability and patience to protect minorities which are such only because they are weak. They have to be educated as the possible "heirs of the crown." Instead of being a nuisance they are likely to offer ferments of renovation and originality.

Under the Monarchy, Parliament was an assembly of representatives of local interests and private ambitions agitated by petty intrigues. Under the Republic, it became a battleground for social classes, regional disputes and religious beliefs, dominated by force. Parliaments have not been so much mouthpieces of public opinion as councils of functionaries inclined to take in their hands, often without the slightest preparation, the most delicate and important measures. Whenever strong action was required they had to grant dictatorial powers to the government. Excessive and indiscriminate parliamentary action led thus to parliamentary corruption and paralysis. It is very doubtful whether public opinion can ever do more than express needs, desires or feelings. The legislative assemblies in republican Rome were devoid of initiative. The Cortes of old Spain could not take other resolutions than the making or refusing of petitions. Some of the modern States have accepted democracy without a parliamentary régime. But the Spanish republicans were very eager to put in the hands of the nation its own destinies, and could not think of any other way than enlarging the faculties of Parliament and multiplying the functions of the State. It was a contradictory purpose: totalitarian State and parliamentary régime seem to be incompatible. The future Spain will have to choose one or the other.

It may be difficult to determine the extent of State functions and the rôle of constraint in social life. In this central

puzzle of our time the Spanish Republic affords a valuable experiment. The natural inclination of its governments to gain the support of public opinion by means of rapid multifarious reforms on a big scale has been the main cause of their failure. There cannot be the slightest doubt of the sincere and general desire for a fundamental change in Spain at the advent of the Republic, but there was no general agreement upon the direction to be followed. The general elections revealed the division of public opinion into two halves. Had the country had a more sensitive and elastic electoral system, the strong contrasts of evolutionary socialism, revolutionary Marxism, communism, syndicalism, anarchism, liberalism, democracy, monarchism (constitutional or absolute) and fascism would have revealed themselves. And it is obvious that the more divided the public opinion the more sober, prudent and cautious ought to be the public power. No political constitution has any value if superimposed on such fundamental divergencies. The strength of authority has then to concentrate on keeping order, preventing violence and assisting justice. A totalitarian State has to be built on an almost unanimous coincidence, or it degenerates into a violent and ephemeral tyranny.

Thus the conflicting tendencies in Spain would have needed an abstaining liberal government; but liberalism appeared as an old-fashioned unsatisfactory solution, unsatisfactory for the political leaders who had promised a rapid and radical transformation, and unsatisfactory for the masses educated in the tradition of miracles and absolutism. In times of fear and hatred self-confidence is substituted for messianic hopes. The future rulers of Spain will be confronted with this tragic contradiction: radical reforms will have to be inflicted by a minority in provisional possession of material force or in unsteady alliance with other groups. Forbearance, education and evolution will run counter to the impatience derived from ignorance and to the misery caused by the war.

The religious question was one of the main obsessions of the Republic. It tackled it with perfect right, though too hastily and without much sagacity. The Spanish Church at the fall of the monarchy was rather discredited. A considerable part of enlightened opinion could not share its materialistic tendencies, its popular version of Christian doctrine, its exploitation of miracles and superstitions, its

avidity for political power and its indulgence of the dictatorship. Furthermore, the Church was partly in a privileged and partly in an openly illegal position. Privileged in publicity of worship, in education and in marriage; unlawful because since 1851 it had refused to comply with the agreed reduction to three of the number of religious orders in Spain, and it had fooled the artless State by evading the prohibition of holding property. The more balanced Republicans wanted a disestablishment which would have been tolerated by many Catholics and had even been advocated by some of them, in the hope that it would improve the spiritual interests of the Church.

But the religious question became once more a political issue and the enthusiastic republicans fell into the trap of emphasising the danger of the Church as a political force. Parliament decided to suppress the State grants for the Church, to dissolve the order of the Jesuits, to prohibit teaching or industry to all religious orders, and to confiscate their property and schools without indemnity. Their reforms were resented by Catholic opinion and considered unfortunate by many republicans. The suppression of the grants was denounced as a breach of the Concordat with Rome by which the State had consented to maintain the clergy as a compensation for the property of the Church confiscated in the nineteenth century. Dissolution of a religious order by the State turned it inevitably into a secret association; and the Jesuits being no longer officially a religious order became automatically entitled to teach and to engage in industry. The law of confiscation was unnecessary if the property had been held illegally (as it was merely a matter for the law courts) and was an unjustified attack if legally possessed.

As a consequence of this religious policy the two antagonistic extremes gained in force; the moderate Catholics and the liberals were considered suspicious as merely compromising doctrinaires. In the political confusion which ensued, the rabble could burn churches undisturbed, while the government decided to appoint an ambassador to the Pope. The Church when poor and persecuted found its position strengthened as a power capable of challenging the State. The acts of fanaticism and hatred on both sides prove that the religious clash is more acute than ever in Spanish history, though in reality it is now less religious than political, and the Church loses spiritual grip as it gains official protection.

Economic reconstruction is going to be the most urgent need after peace and even before it. The great boom of the European war was followed by a great business depression, which began in 1919 and has been increasing up to the present day. It started with heavy losses in speculation in German marks and the ruin of Spanish industries set up to meet the demands of the war, and was increased by the world economic crisis. The three remedies directed to avert it, raising of tariffs, State control of exchange and superfluous public works, only made it worse. The republican policy against capitalism, the instability caused by social legislation in wages and prices, and the unrestricted public expenditure would have led to a very serious financial situation if the military rebellion and the uprising of workers and peasants had not precipitated the huge disaster. Industries, commerce, banking, public credit, currency and national capital have been so severely hit that their restoration would be slow and difficult even without the additional burden of war debt, disabled men, orphans and widows. The traditional, simple Spanish farming can soon be resumed, though the shortage of mules and horses is likely to cause delay; the destruction of livestock, one of the main items of Spanish production, will require longer time; the revival of industry and credit, the renovation of destroyed wealth, the reconquest of markets and the adoption of an accepted steady system of ownership and labour are much more complicated and hazardous undertakings.

The two totalitarian currents, communist and fascist, which aim at a radical change, represent only minorities as yet. They have definite models and foreign expert advisers; but they probably will run counter to the Spanish tradition and temperament, especially in certain regions. The intermediate policy of directed economics, the ideal of the early republican parties, failed to bear fruit because it was promoted by governments composed of conservatives, liberals and socialists, in internal contradiction and continuous change of direction. It was harassed both by capitalists who resisted and by workers who declared strikes and instigated revolts, and it lacked scientific preparation and a body of trained reformers. In Spain the State-controlled institutions have been wasteful and inefficient compared with private concerns. If a liberal optimistic régime for Spanish reconstruction seems to be out of the question, at least a sense of thrift and of cautious

experiments on a small scale may save the country from starvation and the rulers from failure.

Whatever the political régime and the religious, economic or social solutions may be, they will need the concerted operation of able citizens, imbued with a spirit of devotion, tact, impartiality and perseverance. The monarchy had a civil service, an army and a navy, too large in numbers, inefficient and underpaid. The liberal principle of respect for the political and religious beliefs of public servants had been violated in some isolated cases, but was recognised as fundamental, maintained in general and defended vigorously by the parties of the Left. But once in power they considered it indispensable for the entrenchment of the new régime to reverse that principle in order to eliminate judges, diplomats, teachers, professors, army officers or clerks in the central and local offices whom the ministers or political leaders considered undesirable. Secret information, without hearing the alleged culprits, led to their dismissal. The liberal ideal was superseded by the contrary: unity of spirit and creed. It had been the aspiration of the reactionary Church parties while in power. It could now be considered as unanimously accepted, but working in two opposite directions.

The amalgamation of the republicans was less close than the unity of the Church, and the changing governments, each with a different concept of loyalty, opened the way to secret denunciations, private vengeance and favouritism, which demoralised and terrified the majority of State servants. Falsehood and hypocrisy could not be distinguished from devotion. The traditions, training and corporate spirit of army and civil service having thus been overthrown, there remained in the country only two large organisations with an internal sense of discipline and allegiance: the socialist and the Catholic. They have been the nerve of the civil war and they are the only instruments available for reconstruction, until, after a period which is likely to be long, the liberal wave comes up again and the State claims loyalty to service at the same time as it protects the freedom of conscience.

With great enthusiasm and lofty intentions the Republic took some of the most able youths, who should have infused new life into the public administration if placed in permanent posts, and sent them to Parliament or to ephemeral political positions. It proved to be a fatal mistake; they became

discredited and their proposals degenerated into mere slogans in the political battle. Prudent measures like land reform or the inclusion of Church and religious orders within the legal system, which could probably have been carried out by a competent civil service, were shattered in political hands on the rocks of party passions. This is one of the great lessons for the future. Public officers, if they have to bear the responsibility of a function need, like doctors or surgeons, an adequate independence for diagnosis and treatment. The tragedy of well-minded dictators or totalitarian rulers is that if they intend to conform to public opinion they may perpetrate dreadful mistakes, and if they depart from it they fall victims of the irresistible democratic force. Intelligence and will, competence and democracy cannot have the same organs.

How can a struggle which resembles the religious wars be brought to an end? A solution of joint harmony with partial concessions to each side seems farther off to-day than ever in Spanish opinion, though nobody could really measure it under the present reign of terror, and if free expression were allowed it might reveal more moderation than now appears. But in any case we must remember that a compromise between liberalism and socialism, unity and decentralisation, Church and State were the purposes of the governments in the first two years of the Republic, and unfortunately they only succeeded in accentuating the divergencies. The complete, long and costly victory of either of the combatants would lead to a dictatorship abounding in cruelty and revenge, without achieving unity, for each side bears in its breast heterogeneous and contradictory elements: anarchists, communists, socialists, liberals and democrats, or Carlists, fascists, constitutionalist and republican conservatives. One cannot expect repentance of the combatants. The acknowledgment of error is beneath the dignity of a Spaniard. But reciprocal accusations of cruelty ought not to be the only basis for judging the country. It has revealed unsuspected energy and singular capacity for heroism.

A peace without more victims, which would safeguard a maximum of freedom and permit the boldest transformations, must probably be sought in a loose federation of four or five small Spanish States, each with its freely chosen political régime, but assuring the right of migration for discontented subjects. The Federal Government should only have the

functions of mediator and arbiter between autonomous regions, leaving to these the widest faculties for their social, religious, economic and educational organisation. The world nations cannot be mere onlookers nor limit themselves to mere futile discussions of culpability, or they may repeat again the mistakes of Versailles. Communism and fascism are after all partial aspects and stages of social life pregnant both with destruction and fertility. England, like ancient Rome, possesses the art of taming, combining and humanising the most antagonistic ideas. The United States are the incarnation of the daring spirit of youth. The Latin American countries feel the Spanish agony as though it were their own. Could not this triple group of nations make a gesture of peace and advance an unbiased proposition based on the respect of the will of the Spaniards whatever direction it might take? Could any European Power object to it without revealing its own egoism?

José Castillejo.

ROOSEVELT: AN AMERICAN VIEW.

MOST non-partisan observers anticipated the re-election of President Roosevelt. Many, it is true, hoped that his margin would be a narrow one, believing that he would be helped, rather than harmed, by a vigorous opposition. Popular approval has, however, been overwhelming. It remains to be seen whether criticism within his own party will be sharp enough to act as a substitute for the correctives that under other conditions might be furnished by a strong Republican minority. There are two reasons why many Americans are uncertain regarding the next four years. One is the unpredictability of the President. They think he is intrigued by the dramatic; that he is too easily persuaded to attempt spectacular rather than prosaic methods. Some such gestures are helpful and may be tolerated or even approved. In other cases they may be ill-considered, of no immediate value and perhaps harmful in the long run. Some have not yet forgotten or forgiven the fantastic attempt to control the price level by daily changes in the price of gold or the tragic message to the London Conference in the summer of 1933. Another reason for doubt is that in the last few years the federal government has assumed a tremendous volume of new responsibilities. There has resulted a vast confusion. Many efforts have been contradictory and have offset or at least seriously weakened each other. New tasks have been assumed by many of the regular departments, and a large number of independent bodies have been created. Even if it be conceded that all of the changes have been in the right direction, there is much to be said for a period of consolidation and organisation—a time in which to digest and absorb what has been undertaken. It is quite possible even for enthusiastic supporters of the New Deal to counsel a slowing-down of the pace.

In a recent editorial the London *Economist* observed that Mr. Roosevelt has been the first of our Presidents in many years to pose the right questions. Many of his answers may have been wrong, but at least the questions have been the right ones. There is much to be said for this view. Presumably few American voters could state these questions clearly, to say nothing of formulating appropriate answers. The last few months have been a period of emotional jazz, during which skilful political leaders have been debating many

inconsequential matters to the confusion of the public and probably of themselves. Yet the election returns have probably reflected more than this mental confusion and excitement. They reveal a public attitude toward the questions of the day that will influence both the President and his opponents. That this is not escaping the attention of many who were bitterly critical of the President is being revealed by their post-election statements. The victory at the polls was decisive and is being accepted as such. Mr. Farley has announced that there will be no "reprisals" against the opposition, and the opposition announces its readiness to join with the victors in every effort to further the common good. Even Mr. William Randolph Hearst has declared that "perhaps Roosevelt, like Jackson, has given essential democracy a new lease of life and will establish it in power for a generation." Such statements are no guarantee of immunity from attacks in the years ahead, but it is gratifying to have even this much acceptance of *vox populi*. That there will soon be opportunities for attack and and counter-attack is quite certain. All over the world we see a gigantic effort to readjust economic and political institutions to the changed background presented by the twentieth century. Relatively the United States may be isolated, but actually she is not. Many of the same pressures that are evident in Europe and in Asia are evident here. They differ in many particulars, but in their general nature they are remarkably similar. President Roosevelt has challenged the older institutions; has raised the questions. Most of the answers have yet to be given.

First to be mentioned is that an increased amount of American economic life is broad in its scope and difficult to direct by leaving legislation and supervision to the separate states. This was evident fifty years ago in the field of railway transportation, and was met by the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act and by the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission. This could be done quite readily because the Constitution presented no obstacles. The Federal Government was clearly given control over interstate commerce. By a broad interpretation of its powers the Interstate Commerce Commission now dominates even interstate transportation matters, since its jurisdiction over interstate commerce is not questioned, and since orders affecting inter-state matters are necessarily a determining factor in inter-state

commerce. But other economic activities have spread beyond state lines. The great railway systems sprawl over many states, but so do the electric light and power companies. Automobile trucks carry merchandise from coast to coast, and airplanes have a regular transcontinental service. Manufactured goods have a nation-wide market, not a local one. Great corporations may get their charters from some one state such as Delaware, and maintain offices in a single city such as Wilmington. Their important business is actually conducted elsewhere, often in New York, and is nation-wide.

There are still wider ramifications. Residents of New York or of Pennsylvania may receive a quite high percentage of the national income, and may protest against relief appropriations that give to residents of Arizona or of Oregon more *per capita* than is received in their own states. Or they may oppose federal income taxes that take from New York and Pennsylvania larger amounts than from citizens residing elsewhere. These very objectors in all probability are investors in corporations that operate on a nation-wide basis, or may even have holdings in enterprises whose activities are in distant parts of the country. Then there is the evil of child labour, and the difficulty faced by an employer in a state where controls are strict because his most dangerous competitors may be manufacturing in a state where there are few restrictions on the employment of children. The same difficulty appears in connection with regulations over hours of labour and rates of pay.

Just how some of these basic changes affect our economic structure and procedure was emphatically shown during the depression. Assistance to the unemployed is probably the best illustration. The traditional method of poor relief has been to rely upon private charity and upon county and municipal aid. But private funds could not be secured in amounts large enough to meet the huge demands, and local governments found themselves in financial difficulties, some of them actually becoming bankrupt and many others nearly so. Also the state governments found that their income from taxation was inelastic, and that their powers to borrow were frequently restricted by limitations imposed by their constitutions. It was natural and perhaps inevitable that demands for assistance should concentrate on Washington and that the vast resources available there should be utilised. Business, including the banks and the railroads, also clamoured for help and

received it, for example, through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, first under the Republican President, Mr. Hoover, and then in larger volume under Mr. Roosevelt.

It was not possible that aid should be given in so many directions without an extension of federal controls. Accepted temporarily with little or no protest, it was to be expected that opposition to these controls would develop as soon as business improved. But what had occurred produced a curious result. The Democrats, who have traditionally been the champions of "states' rights," were impelled to defend their procedure and to advocate a strong Federal Government. Their opponents, including the conservatives of both parties, but especially the Republicans, could attack the Roosevelt Administration best by espousing the cause of state control and by appeals to the Federal Constitution. Cynical observers may allege that this opposition merely expresses the desire of business to avoid regulation, and this is to some extent the case. But the basic question not yet answered is how to maintain American economic life on an even keel in a vast federation of forty-eight states, each of which has retained for itself and for its people all powers not expressly delegated through the Federal Constitution to the government in Washington. There will come a number of important efforts at adjustment. From them there will emerge in time a recognition of the enlarged base of our economic organisation. There will be no disposition to abandon or even to revise the Constitution, but there will be many suggestions for its amendment.

Around this central issue the disputes will occur. They will have many aspects. In some cases they may not seem to be closely related to constitutional questions, while in others the connection is clear. Labour groups will seek aid in the form of higher wages and shorter hours. More and more the influence of the Federal Government will be sought, since the great labour unions are nation-wide in their organisation. A struggle is being waged in labour circles which involves a decision between the respective merits of craft and industrial forms of unionism. It is complicated by the rival ambitions of leaders, but these are basically an expression of the broader scope of all our economic life. The President cannot avoid being drawn into the dispute, although he may exercise his influence by indirection rather than openly.

Another expression of the conflict is the call for regional planning. Again state lines are a hampering influence, as in the Tennessee Valley about which there has been so much dissension. The opposition relies heavily on the alleged constitutional limitations on federal powers to do this and that. But the Tennessee Valley is not the only area for which planning may be considered. Considered development of general social value simply cannot be carried on within existing state lines. Our states have not been marked off with a view to economic or even political effectiveness under twentieth-century conditions. An attempt at a better grouping is to be found for banking purposes in the formation of the twelve districts of the Federal Reserve System and in many other groupings. Neither state areas nor state controls are now satisfactory.

During the campaign much was said about the federal budget. Now that the excitement has somewhat subsided the wildest of the accusations are not being repeated. Some at least of the American public have been won over to the view that there is nothing sacred about a strict annual balance and to the belief that a cyclical balance is not only possible but even better. But even adherents of this theory admit that the time has come to bring current receipts and expenditures more closely together and to reduce the debt. No matter what refinements are introduced into the analysis, there is no escaping the fact of an enlarged debt and the necessity for a larger ordinary budget in the future than in the past. While all this is true there is no occasion in the United States to talk of the " insupportable burden " of debt or of taxation. First, the amount *per capita* or as related to the probable national income is less than has been carried by other countries. Second, funds paid to a government do not vanish, but pass through government hands to the general public as wages, as repayment to holders of government debt and in purchase of supplies. American experience in debt repayment during the decade immediately following the war should be reassuring to the alarmists. There are, however, difficulties that must be faced. As in Great Britain and elsewhere, an easy money policy has prevailed. Its merits in all countries have been overrated; but, regardless of the arguments for such a policy, the result in the United States during the depression has been to concentrate with the banks a large

fraction of the federal securities. Yields have been extremely low, but the banks have not had other uses for their funds and have also been sensible of pressure to make such purchases. There is no denying that government credit is still good if the test is the market price of government bonds. But it will be hard to avoid strain if business improves and interest rates harden. Unloading the " governments " without losses will not be easy.

This problem leads directly to another. The amount of monetary gold in the United States is approximately $11,000,000,000, and the excess reserves of the banks are still enormous, in spite of the recent fifty per cent advance in reserve requirements. Business is improving, prices are rising, wage increases are being announced or forecast. Here, as in other countries, there may come a rise in prices too great and too rapid for safety. Because of our large gold holdings controls will not be easy. It is hard to find competent observers who have much confidence in our ability to check a rapid and extreme advance. It is our large stocks of gold rather than the government deficit that is the problem. President Roosevelt and his associates have here one of their hardest tasks. At present little is heard from the groups who a few years ago sponsored various inflationary proposals. There are rumours of their activity behind the scenes, but nothing definite can be learned of what they are doing or planning.

Many here are of the opinion that foreign affairs will be the field of most absorbing interest in the immediate future. News from Europe and from the Far East is disquieting when it is not alarming. Like all other people, Americans do not want war and may be expected to insulate themselves from it if they can. But conditions are not basically different from those in 1914. One of our recent efforts at isolation is the Neutrality Act, but experience with it last year was discouraging. Restrictions imposed merely on exports of munitions of war are inadequate, while an extension to include oil, motor trucks, cotton and the hundreds or thousands of other articles that are so important in modern warfare probably could not be imposed effectively even if Congress should legislate such restrictions. Too many business interests and too many people would be adversely affected. Further discussion and proposals to strengthen the Act may be anticipated, but optimism is conspicuous by its absence. It is to be

hoped that there will not be a test of our attitude toward another great war. If it should come, the same influences that were at work here from 1914 to 1917 will reappear, and the numerous economic forces that involved us then will again operate.

Mr. Roosevelt's record in adding to or relieving international strains is a mixed one. His message to the London Economic Conference in 1933 is still a mystery. His support of the so-called Warren policy of a varying price for gold in spite of a mass of expert opinion, his failure to oppose the silver interests in their general raid upon the public, with its tragic consequences in the Far East, and his devaluation of the dollar, are not yet explained to the satisfaction of many critics. On the other hand, his " good neighbour " policy in Latin America and the patient work of Secretary of State Hull in negotiating a long list of bilateral trade agreements must be placed to his credit. But in the international field as in that of domestic affairs the main questions are still unanswered. In fact, not all of them have been clearly raised. The explanations are much the same as those which may be given in other countries. Economic nationalism has been everywhere rampant. It has been developing for decades in all parts of the world. The war and the post-war dislocations increased it and the depression intensified it. Here and there a few reversals are noticeable, but they are slight and offer but little encouragement.

The leading unanswered questions are three in number. First is the attitude to be taken by the United States in the event of another great war. As already suggested, the Neutrality Act now in force is inadequate, but there is not yet visible in the United States a clear consensus of judgment regarding its improvement. The only point of agreement is the desire not to become involved. The revelations of the Nye Committee lead some to the view that the desire for profits on the part of our great industrialists and bankers was the basic reason for our declaration of war in 1917. On the other hand it is urged, notably by Mr. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War under President Wilson, that the motivating force during that period was to protect American legal rights, and that economic considerations were of slight importance. This is past history. To-day the United States confronts the serious probability of another great conflict. No matter what explanations

may be offered for the period from 1914 to 1917, it is overwhelmingly clear that no country to-day can divorce itself from world affairs. The only way to remain aloof from war is to prevent the war. But " the price of peace," as it was termed by the late Frank Simonds, is one that few are willing to calculate and to pay. As yet the issue is not clearly formulated in the minds of the American public.

A second issue is that of our monetary system and its relation to those of other countries. There is said to be an understanding of some kind between the governments of France, Great Britain and the United States, entered into at the time of the recent French devaluation. Apparently it is of the most general sort with no final commitments by any of the three. It is true that the drift is away from the idea of a " managed currency " of the type so freely proclaimed two or three years ago and toward a more definite gold standard. Economists, however, are keenly aware that certain inflationist groups are active behind the scenes. They also note that the dollar may be devalued another ten points, that the weight of the franc may be set by decree anywhere between 43 and 49 milligrams, and that there is as yet no responsible pronouncement regarding the ultimate weight of the pound. Like the guilder, the pound is " floating." In some manner and under someone's advice the new relationships must be determined. This is no abstract question without immediate importance. The current quotations of $4·89 for the pound and of 4·65 cents for the franc are not being easily held. The dollar is persistently strong, as it is bound to be, and gold is still being imported. In England alone $106,600,000 was engaged for New York in the six weeks following September 26th. There are some $11,000,000,000 of monetary gold here, and the foreign exchanges are definitely unsettled. The problem is not one for the United States alone, and its clear statement and its solution are among the major tasks of the President in the near future.

The third is an even more general task. All over the world there is need for a better adjustment of economic relationships between countries. The position of the United States is peculiar in the important particular that it became heavily a creditor within a very few years. We hear much of the burdens of debtor countries, and find it easy to criticise a creditor who is slow to adapt himself to his altered status. But such

adaptation is not easy. Vested interests, both of labour and of capital, may be affected if imports are increased. Mercantilist ideas are fascinatingly simple and not easily altered. In a world of high protective tariffs, quotas and clearing agreements, a determination of policy is not easy. Yet no understandings about currency stabilisation can be maintained unless these other and more basic matters are adjusted. It is clear that the American public does not appreciate the difficulty. But in this one field at least something has been done. Stimulated by a general world recovery and aided by a number of bilateral agreements with their most-favoured-nation clauses, foreign trade is increasing. The progress is slight, but it is clearly visible. Mere increase in volume and in value of this trade does not adjust the equilibrium, but imports are growing more rapidly than exports and the protests have been surprisingly few and ineffective. Moreover, the general rise in business activity sharply offsets any losses due to an increase of competition from imported goods.

In conclusion, it may be repeated that President Roosevelt has not yet progressed far in the solution of our major problems. In many lines the questions are very clearly raised, in others less clearly. The answers cannot and will not be quickly given. Like other countries, the United States is undergoing profound adjustments. The way in which the country as a whole has accepted the results of the recent election is most reassuring. There is now little or nothing heard about the "menace" of communism or of fascism. For the time being Americans believe they are democratic, and that they have just given an emphatic demonstration that democracy is still workable.

ERNEST MINOR PATTERSON.

Philadelphia.

BELGIUM EMPHASISES SECURITY.

THE Belgians are a nation of realists. It is a state of mind into which they have been driven, for the harshest facts of diplomacy and war and enemy occupation are ever present in their history. Thrust in like a wedge between three powerful neighbours, their land has been scarred by the march of foreign armies and studded with the battle monuments of invading German, French, and British generals. Our nursery rhymes and our novels are filled with Belgian memories, of which only the most notable is Waterloo, and the most recent, which has scarcely yet begun to find its place in literature, is Ypres. Within the last twelve months, less than a score of years after the Armistice and while still we are dedicating our memorials in Flanders fields, discussions of new invasions of Belgium, which is the shortest or rather the easiest route by which Frenchmen and Germans might come to grips, have taken an unexpected turn. It is no longer taken for granted that the trespasser would come from the east only. In the event of a war between Germany and Russia, France might be obliged by the Soviet Pact to engage German armies in the Rhineland, and might find the Belgian trough the only feasible approach. Belgian neutrality, if violated, has been declared by Mr. Eden a matter of immediate British concern. In all Europe there is at this moment no land where military invasion seems so imminent, in the event of war, as Belgium. And if war does not come, there is a subtler invasion which Belgium has to fear. Based on the principles of a limited monarchy, the democratic Belgian constitution, until to-day most influenced by that of England, is exposed to the sapping operations of communism, whose leaders point to the eminence attained by their fellows in Paris, and of a fascist movement, based on the ideals of the absolutist State and directly inspired by the example of Berlin.

It was to make a stand against these threats of attack, both from without and from within, that the young Belgian King, Leopold III, addressed an important message to his Council of Ministers on October 14th. The immediate occasion for this personal intervention was the introduction of a new military law, proposing to extend the period of compulsory training, which every young Belgian is obliged to serve, from one year to eighteen months, and laying the foundations for

a new system of territorial defence. Because the integrity of Belgium is a matter of international importance, the King did not avoid the issues and obligations rising out of the ultimate dependence of his State upon certain of its neighbours in case of attack. He said, in part :

> Our geographical situation forces us to maintain a military establishment adequate to dissuade any of our neighbours from borrowing our territory in order to advance against another. In filling this mission, Belgium co-operates in an outstanding manner to guard the peace of Western Europe ; and she creates *ipso facto* a right to the respect and eventually the aid of all States which have an interest in this peace. . . . But our engagements should not take us further. Any unilateral policy weakens our position abroad, and gives rise—rightly or wrongly—to division at home. An alliance, even purely defensive, does not attain its end, for, however swift may be the aid of an ally, it would not intervene until after the shock of invasion, which would be crushing. . . . This is why, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs said recently, we must pursue a policy " exclusively and entirely Belgian." This policy should aim resolutely at placing us apart from the conflicts of our neighbours.

As a declaration of realistic neutrality, the King's speech alters the line of Belgian foreign policy followed since the memorable debates of December 1918, between the ageing parliamentarian, Charles Woeste, and the Foreign Minister, Paul Hymans. At that time already, while the League of Nations was yet unborn, it was obvious that the Belgian neutrality of before the War was no longer tenable. The ideal of Richard Cobden, who had advised Leopold I, in 1832, against inviting trouble by building forts and organising an army, had long since been ignored. The pre-War ideal, of a small armed force, a few fortified places, and a multitude of clauses guaranteeing neutrality, had been demonstrated inadequate. Paul Hymans attacked the treaties of guaranty which had inspired a sense of false security. He proposed to take the country into the League, and envisaged that epoch of collective security which the League was to inaugurate.

To-day, Belgian statesmen no longer repose confidence in collective security. The obligations to the League, however, make it impossible to return to the simon-pure neutrality of before the War, even if that were not shown to have been a delusion. As a Belgian Minister of State, M. Carton de Wiart,

has observed, in commenting upon the King's message, " the word *neutrality* does not serve, in so far as all the States which have become members of the League of Nations accept by that very fact obligations which, in certain eventualities, can no longer correspond to neutrality."

The realistic neutrality proposed by Belgium's king is therefore to be conditioned by existing obligations. In answer to a storm of protest from Paris, this point was made clear by M. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, in his note to the League of Nations and in several addresses, of which that of December 2nd is most illuminating. Belgium desires to co-operate with the League in building up the structure of European security and in perfecting the Pact, yet this participation will be governed by a certain reserve, permitting the country to propose and accept nothing but obligations which can surely be performed. Because the realistic Belgian mind holds doubts as to the extent that one may hope to see League obligations fulfilled, the Foreign Minister has definitely stated that in principle he believes in a system of constructive collective security, yet his countrymen must not permit any such system to blind them to the other steps which must be taken to secure their territory. He does not believe that the League can be effective so long as the United States and Brazil are not members, while Germany remains apart, and Italy " pouts." There is danger of the League becoming " a sort of alliance which will set up certain countries against a *bloc* of other States." Belgium works to prevent this, and in the meantime engages scrupulously to observe the Pact of Locarno and the accords of London. The country has no intention, after the experience of 1914, to encourage the practice of discarding treaties as " scraps of paper."

Recent developments in international relations, in military science, and in the domestic and foreign policy of neighbouring States have shown Belgium that treaties may still be violated, that armies can now advance at a speed and with a power never before approximated, and that to the dangers of nationalistic and economic rivalries must now be added the hostility of political and social ideologies. And again, it is Belgian destiny to lie between proponents of opposing systems, for as Germany moves more toward the Right, France edges toward the Left. The outbreak of strikes throughout France upon the establishment of M. Blum's government last spring

found an echo in Belgium, where, especially in Antwerp during the first week of June, the agitation took on a definitely revolutionary character. It is not necessary to follow the series of misunderstandings as to economic and financial matters, migrant frontier labour, and political and diplomatic activity which has rendered especially galling to Belgians the existence of an agreement between Paris and Moscow. Even if there were not a certain feeling of disappointment, the warmest friend of France—and there is no country where France has enjoyed such affection—must admit that with the best will in the world French armies could not protect Belgium from a modern invasion, but could only come up to support a retiring Belgian line after immense destruction had been wrought. Even leaving out of account the hypothesis that France might be obliged by the Soviet Pact to cross Belgium in attacking Germany, there remains in any consideration of present strategic possibilities no conclusion but that Belgium cannot hope for help from even the best of allies to stem the first inrush of invasion. Her statesmen, while abiding by their signatures to existing pacts, look only to a stronger self-made weapon for the effectual defence of the frontiers. In future they propose to avoid pacts of mutual assistance, where they may find themselves engaged in a contest not for the defence of their homes but for the defence of a system of political thought grotesquely foreign to their institutions.

With the intention of entering into no further engagements, how can Belgian statesmen anticipate that the great Powers will come to their aid in case of an invasion of their territory? It is M. Spaak's contention that by building up the army and extending the period of military service, Belgium is making a contribution to European peace which outweighs any number of treaties. The new strategy which the military law will make possible offers "the positive assurance," to quote M. Spaak's speech of December 2nd, "that we will defend ourselves against no matter whom, in case of attack, and that we will never permit our territory to serve as a corridor of passage or as a base of attack against any one." That this assurance is adequate is shown by Mr. Eden's statement that Belgian independence and integrity are vital to this country. That the French found it comforting was recognised in the Chambre des Députés on December 4th when M. Yvon

Delbos replied to Mr. Eden, pledging the French arms to defend Great Britain in the case of a non-provoked aggression, and adding, "I shall say as much for Belgium." Thus, without further pledges, Belgium has obtained through the policy of improving her own defences such expressions of support from this country as might have caused the Germans to hesitate had they been uttered in 1914, and such a promise from France as to show that the Quai d'Orsay appreciates the Belgian position.

What exactly does Belgium offer which is so acceptable? The new military plan is based on the principle of providing a permanent force for the frontier, adequate to act as a cover or screen for mobilisation in case of sudden attack, and thus to hold off an enemy until larger forces may be moved to its relief. As explained by an army expert, none other than the Belgian Minister of War, General Denis, during the Parliamentary debates of December 1st, the object is to substitute a longer period of military service for that now employed, permitting six months for training the soldier, and twelve months for service on the frontier "front." Behind a large permanent force of infantry would be a second element, the motorised cavalry and the cyclists, who would be made up of volunteers to a large extent and who would be equipped with the best arms and swiftest machines possible. The infantry would be ready to guard the obstructions which would be placed in the way of any advancing force, and for this purpose would be provided with anti-tank guns and other material promising the superiority of fire. If, as has been the case on similar occasions, an invading enemy were willing to pay the price of advancing against this superiority, and thus carrying and surmounting obstructions through sheer weight of numbers, there would still remain the mobile reserve, characterised by its power and rapidity. Other forces are to be organised in the interior, to protect strategic points at which heavy planes, having crossed the lines to bring in small armoured cars and their crews, might make possible enemy attacks long before the main mass of the invading army could have advanced so deeply.

Testifying before the mixed civil and military commission which drafted the general lines of this new plan, another military expert estimated at 2,500,000,000 Belgian francs the total cost of putting the principle of permanent cover with

adequate material into operation. Only 500,000,000 francs need be required at once, yet even this sum is an important element to be subtracted from the productive side of a national budget. The very fact that the King himself first spoke in favour of the law when it was being drafted, and specified that the necessities of the situation made it vital that it be passed before December 1st, indicates the fact that a certain opposition was expected. Opposition was of two sorts, that which was directed against the bill, either because it laid so heavy a burden on the fisc, or because it further interrupted the preparation of young men for industry, commerce and the professions, or because it placed yet further emphasis upon the militarisation of the country, and that which was directed against the Government as such, regardless of what pretext might be seized upon to push it over.

Actual overthrow of the existing institutions of Belgium is visualised by three Belgian groups, the communists, the Flemish Nationalists, and the Rexists. At the time of the King's speech the Rexists had made themselves much talked about as the fascist future of Belgium. They are led by a young Walloon Catholic, Leon Degrelle, whose natural eloquence, magnetic personality and youthful enthusiasm have won for him supporters for a programme which is not yet very coherent and for an organisation which remains far from perfect.

Three years ago the Rex movement, at its beginnings, was a sort of crusade for the renovation of the Christian faith. François Mauriac and certain Church leaders were enthusiastically hailing Degrelle as a leader of neo-Catholicism. Inspired by this applause, the young man, who is said to have participated in the religious conflicts of Mexico, entered the field of political action, and eventually, after failing to win a footing in the established clerical party, abandoned all connection with the Church in order to attract discontented free-thinkers. One of the inconsistencies of his career has been his attack upon the government stipend to the clergy as too extravagant. Another has been his loose alliance with the Flemish Nationalists, whose attitude toward his Walloon followers is hostile and whose political ideal is *Dietschland*, a hypothetical State whose borders touch the Channel, France, "Wallonie," and Germany, whose people are exclusively Fleming, and whose tongue is Flemish. True to his

original clerical programme, on the other hand, he retains a belief in the corporative State, and when he has no bigger game belabours the communists. His attitude toward the Comintern and his emulation of fascism are the only notable points where his activity may be said to depart from the purely local Belgian frame.

M. Degrelle is a mystic in a land of realists. Taking the name of his party from *Christus Rex*, he has preached the purification of politics, denounced the corruptions to which democracies lend themselves, slandered the Chamber and most of the Deputies, and gradually, as he found that the policy bore fruit, turned toward an almost entirely negative programme, condemning everyone with power except himself. The slogan on which his partisans obtained twenty-one seats at the elections of May 24th, 1936, was "*A bas les pourris.*" Intoxicated with this real success, he has permitted his enthusiasm to carry him to excesses which, but for the watchful and cautious attitude of the Government, might have led to scenes in Brussels like those at the Place de la Concorde, in Paris, on February 6th, 1934, when the cry of the fascists was almost identical, "*A bas les voleurs.*" No one in Belgium denies that there were ugly scandals during the years of economic crisis, such as that of the Boerenbond, a Catholic consortium, and the Banque Belge du Travail, a socialist co-operative institution. These affairs had left an unpleasant memory, which persisted even after the present Government had devaluated the currency, reorganised the banks, set the wheels of industry and commerce moving again, and generally accomplished a worthy task in putting the Belgian house in order. As earnest financiers and professors, many of them non-party men, the present Government did not need to speak about the quality of their work, for the country's recovery spoke for them. M. Degrelle appealed to the left-overs of the crisis, and to the youth whose natural impulse was to sweep clean. He won about 185,000 votes from the Catholic party, about 30,000 votes from the Socialist and Communist parties, and about 55,000 new voters.

The opportunity was a magnificent one, yet during the past seven months he has let it fritter away. Parliamentary obstruction and clowning have cost his followers the esteem they might have won for creative contributions. When the King, with his authority, his record of service, and his

immensely appealing reserve, spoke to the nation through his Council of Ministers on October 14th, he suddenly focused even the most bemused and youthful eyes of the kingdom on another type of leadership. Since then, as upon a signal, the non-partisan members of the Government of national concentration, chief among whom is the Prime Minister himself, and the Socialist members, most vigorous of whom in this connection is the Foreign Minister, have conducted a campaign against Rex. The powerful newspaper, *l'Independent*, has been made a mouthpiece for governmental inspirations, under the genial leadership of its political editor, René Hislaire. The debates occasioned by the defence of the military law have been made vehicles for a counter-propaganda against Rex. Rexist meetings, which threatened to degenerate into riots, especially when they were held in the miners' towns and in the capital, were at first carefully controlled by an adequate detail of gendarmes, and finally prohibited, as on the memorable Sunday in October when M. Degrelle was temporarily taken into custody.

Rex party discipline, which has been bolstered up by the proposal of a much-discussed oath of personal allegiance to M. Degrelle himself, broke down when the vital issue of the new military programme was laid before the Chambers. A majority of the Rex deputies voted for the Government. Those who did not were moved rather by their Flemish partisanship than by Rex, for the alliance of M. Degrelle's group with that of the Flemish Nationalists has produced some anomalies not all of which are in favour of the young leader's authority. The outstanding facts of the past two months in Belgium have been the Government's sudden vigorous taking of the offensive, both in the counter-attack upon Rex and in the pushing of the military law, and the King's emergence as a leader of his people. Other leaders have naturally paled in comparison.

The military law was passed on approximately the date which Leopold III had requested. It stands as the tangible guarantee of Belgian territorial integrity. As such it has already won the approval of Belgium's allies, after the first shock of the royal proposition had worn away. It has done more, and effected a prolongation of the French lines of fortification along the Belgian frontier, continuing thus to the Atlantic the works of the Maginot "wall." Certain spokesmen

in Paris have hastened to express their conviction that Belgium will not take offence at this barrier. On the contrary, the Belgian Government has been interested for some years in having the Maginot line continued along their rear, and the passage of the military law has accomplished, in bringing this about, what diplomacy failed to do. The late Baron de Gaiffer d'Hestroy, Belgian Ambassador to Paris, is understood to have been charged by his Government with presenting the prolongation as a welcome defence against any attack from the east, serving both as a material and as a moral support. So long as everything conspires to make the passage in either direction across Belgium difficult, the Belgians will be happy, and peace that much more secure.

RICHARD WHITTIER.

Brussels.

BERLIN AND ROME IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

IN spite of the pact concluded on July 11th by Italy, Austria and Germany, and of the emphatic speech delivered in Milan on November 1st by Mussolini, stressing the claim that the line of Berlin-Rome had now become "the hub of Europe," there is a kind of secret war being carried on in the Central and South Eastern States of Europe by the two Fascist dictatorships. These events, which are simply the expression of the natural conflict of interests between Rome and Berlin regarding the land and sea passages to the Near East, deserve every attention we can give to them, particularly in those circles which, under the influence of happenings in Spain and the common "fight against Bolshevism," believe in a kind of "Fascist Internationale." Such an Internationale cannot really be imminent, since the doctrine of Fascism repudiates the equality of all people and of all States, and since Fascism leads, by its own expansion, towards yet another Fascism, which wishes to arrest the progress of the first. A provisional co-operation between two Fascist States, however, is possible if there is a definite goal to be reached. Spain may serve as a proof that Berlin and Rome, even though under different considerations, can go a certain distance side by side. But there will always come a point at which the rival Power is no longer needed, and its further progress is checked by an agreement with a third Power.

It is towards just this point that matters in the eastern Mediterranean seem to be driving. It was quite clear during the Vienna negotiations of the Powers of the Rome Protocol that the treaty of July 11th represented a full stop in the Austrian question, not a renewal of Italo-German co-operation in Austria. Any further concurrence of Rome in the matter of National Socialism in Austria would not only give rise to a serious danger of conflict between the two Fascist Powers, but would mean a dangerous weakening of the Italian position in a country so exceedingly important strategically, politically and economically. Unrestrained possession of Austria, which might be effected by a National Socialist *Gleichschaltung* (a modern word meaning equalisation or "levelling down") of the Government in Vienna, would mean an extension of the

Third Reich as far as the Adriatic. This would be equivalent to the exclusion of Italy from the Balkans, its markets and important supplies of raw materials. Austria, according to the tactics of Mussolini, can form provisionally an important connecting link with the Third Reich; and only as such, remaining mostly under the influence of Italy, is it of significance for Rome. As a part of Hitler's Germany it would be a serious danger; and neither the July agreement nor the Milan speech can disguise the fact that Rome is just as well aware of this conflict of interests as Berlin.

From this angle we can also understand the efforts of the Austrian Legitimists, who, in spite of repeated efforts, have hitherto always suffered setbacks in Rome. Recently there have been attempts to effect the restoration of the Habsburgs by way of Berlin; and the frequently denied version that the Austrian Legitimists, especially the Archduke Otto himself, under the influence of the Duke of Hohenberg, eldest son of the murdered Francis Ferdinand, and of Bishop Hudal, who has always been strongly inclined to National Socialism, have had dealings with Berlin, can be proved correct. The basis of these negotiations was an offer from the Habsburg monarchists to legalise Austrian National Socialism as soon as Hitler should look favourably on the Austrian restoration. This plan was nipped in the bud by Hitler himself; since, according to the opinions reigning in Berlin to-day, the setting up of a Habsburg on the throne of Austria would mean the end of the plans for *Gleichschaltung*. All these things, which have caused many notable Legitimist leaders, such as the Vice-Burgomaster of Vienna, Herr Winter, to leave the ranks of the Habsburg movement, point to the falsity of the thesis that "Restoration is the worst enemy of National Socialism." In the present case, it was not to the will of the Legitimists, but to the countermanding of Hitler that the failure of such plans was due. But the result is that Mussolini, after these Habsburg intrigues of the Legitimists, is watching their efforts even more suspiciously than before. The reception of certain Legitimist leaders in Rome makes no difference; for it is known both in Italy and in Berlin that one day Legitimism will become a very important card in the game of what will sooner or later be the inevitable parting of the ways of Berlin and Rome in the Austrian question. On neither side is this moment regarded as having yet arrived; nevertheless, positions are

being already carefully built up and prepared. No doubt Mussolini would at one time have manœuvred more cleverly in this fight for Austria. National Socialism there is now even weaker than before the July agreement, and here time seems to be on the side of Mussolini.

This can be seen even more clearly in Hungary. The efforts of Gömbös to form a dictatorship on National Socialist lines may be considered as having ended with his death. The official reception of Horthy in Rome is to be regarded as a strengthening of this change of policy. Even before his death Gömbös appeared in Munich as a finished man, and it may be that the transitory rise of the Germanophil "small farmers' Party" will end with him too. Thus the National Socialist idea is shattered in Hungary, and that part of Mussolini's speech in Milan which declared for Hungarian revisionism has strengthened the pro-Italian temper of Budapest still more. It would be a grave misunderstanding of Italian tactics to draw from these revisionist utterances of Mussolini any practical conclusions. His attempts to find a *modus vivendi* with the States of the Little Entente on an economic basis will be continued as before; and not only in Belgrade but in Prague and Bucharest it is well known that he would never abandon these prospects merely on account of Hungarian desire for revision. The olive branch held out to Yugoslavia, which must be understood in close connection with the efforts of Rome to clear up British and Italian differences, has already shown clearly how the apparent support in the Milan speech of Hungary's revision claims may be regarded. This could be seen even more unmistakably when, in the Vienna conference of the three States of the Roman Protocol, the revisionist desires of Hungary were not even mentioned, nor when Horthy visited Rome. Just as in Austria, there is, of course, always the chance of a transitory rise of National Socialist tendencies in Hungary. These will never be able to last long, and the comprehensible rebellion of Budapest against the unilateral repudiation by Hitler on November 15th of the internationalisation of the Danube shows quite clearly, among other things, how little Hungary now expects from Berlin. The Italo-German exchanges in the Hungarian field are certainly not yet concluded; but it can be recognised that in home and foreign politics, no less than in economics, where Hungary has been very hard hit by the

German "clearing" agreements, the influence of Rome is steadily growing at the expense of Berlin.

Similar, though not so rapid, are developments in Yugoslavia, which is coming more and more into the sphere of British influence. English capital is playing an increasingly important part in its armament. It has never possessed a factory for working its valuable magnesite ores. The most important magnesite mining company decided in the late autumn to start, with the help of English capital, an enterprise for the working of magnesite ores, and for the manufacture of chemical and pyrotechnical products for industrial and armament purposes. Many further instances might be cited in the Yugoslav armament industry and by the conversion of civil industries to war purposes. English capital is at the same time gaining influence in mining, textiles, and so on. In the last five years, Yugoslav exports to Great Britain and the Empire have increased from 97,700,000 *dinars* to 290,000,000 *dinars*; the imports from 276,000,000 to 526,000,000 *dinars*. All this means a steady diminution of economic connections with Germany, who has harmed herself considerably by flooding the Yugoslav markets with industrial products.

Italy, who lost much ground in the Yugoslav market during the sanctions, is now endeavouring again to renew business relations. It seems to be clear in Rome that this can be only after an understanding with England regarding the Mediterranean—an understanding which, considering the half-ruined Italian finances and the exploitation of Abyssinia with the help of British capital, is urgently needed. After a "gentleman's agreement" on the Mediterranean, we shall not often hear Mussolini utter such phrases as "*mare nostrum*," "Hungarian revision," "the axis of Europe, Rome-Berlin," etc. As long as it was possible for Belgrade to play off Germany and Italy against each other in the economic field, it was in a very favourable position, for nobody believed in a real co-operation between Berlin and Rome. The growth of British influence further tactically improves the position of Yugoslavia, which is now the most courted State in the eastern Mediterranean, indeed in all Europe. The predominant position that Germany had for many years is becoming very precarious. German propaganda has lately been transferred from Belgrade to Zagreb, the aim, of course,

being to play off the Croats against the Government. This, however, strengthens the position of defence adopted by Belgrade against Berlin. Even before the visit of the Prince Regent to London, negotiations with the Croats were already in progress. If, as is expected in well-informed circles, these negotiations succeed, Germany, who is now yielding up one position after the other in Yugoslavia, will be the chief mourner.

The influence of Great Britain, passing from Yugoslavia to Bulgaria, has severely shaken the position of the Zankoff party, strongly National Socialist in tendency and pointed clearly towards Berlin. Not long after the talk between King Edward and Tsar Boris during the King's Mediterranean cruise, both Zankoff Ministers left the Cabinet. In the true National Socialist fashion, the Zankoff party, directed and financed by Berlin, wished to introduce a totalitarian régime in Bulgaria by means of "elections." To this end two Zankoff Ministers entered the Government, and promised that in the second half of October there would be a reconstruction of the Government according to a new electoral law. As a preparation, practically all parties and meetings were forbidden by law, with the exception of the followers of Zankoff; and, the whole election machinery being in the hands of General Zankoff and his people, there was no doubt as to the result. The behaviour of the King, however, at this point suddenly changed; and here it should be noted that the royal house of Bulgaria and that of Italy are in close relationship. Zankoff demanded that the time of the election should be adhered to, and threatened the resignation of the two Zankoff Ministers if the former promise were not kept. Contrary to all expectation, the King accepted these resignations; and, in answer to the threat that the Cabinet would then split, a royal decree explained that the elections would be postponed until such time as a really free appeal to the people could be made. With the fall of the Zankoff Ministers, who were replaced by two other personalities, one a non-political General, the other the chief editor of the sharply anti-Zankoff journal *Mir*, the rise of the National Socialists in Bulgaria may be considered finished. The King is again master of the situation. It is necessary to state here that British influence, besides the Italian, is very strong. The further development of Bulgarian politics is not at present quite clear; only the repudiation of the Berlin National Socialist influence can no longer be doubted. This was also a result of the acute conflict of German and Italian interests, which, in spite of the July agreement, is very marked with regard to all Central and South-East European States. In Bulgarian and Yugoslav development the German position will in no way be replaced by Italian domination alone, and the strength of British influence deserves notice.

While the geographical position of Yugoslavia is in the Italo-German magnetic field, and therefore the conflict between Rome and Berlin is particularly sharp here, both the other States of the Little Entente are much less in the centre of the conflict. This is especially so in the case of Czechoslovakia, whose political, military and economic strength permits of only a very insignificant influence from Berlin. Nevertheless, it is just the decline of Berlin's influence in Yugoslavia, brought about by Rome, that induces the Nazi régime continually to try, by means of propaganda, to gain a footing in Czechoslovakia. Yet the efforts of the German minority in the shape of the Henlein party to push forward National Socialism have had but slight and in any case transitory success. The considerable increase in industrial prosperity, the improvement in export conditions after the second devaluation, great public works and a high degree of employment in the armament industry, have contributed to a marked deflation of the Henlein movement. The constant efforts of Dr. Benesh and the Prime Minister, Dr. Hodža, to improve Czech-German relations, in the language question and so on, along the practical lines of common sense, are more and more successful; especially as of the four German parties, three (all outside the National Socialist Henlein movement) are represented each by its own Minister in the Cabinet. Relations with Italy, especially in economics, and through commercial and political concessions made to Austria, seem to be improving. The support of Hungarian revisionism in Mussolini's Milan speech aroused little excitement in Prague, as the tactics of Rome are rightly appraised in that capital, there being trustworthy information that Mussolini is interested in the maintenance of the democratic State-form of the Republic.

The absurd accusations of the Berlin propaganda that Czechoslovakia is a "herd of Bolshevists," and that the

Czechoslovak-Russian pact was formed for aggression against Germany, have given further impetus to the drift from the Reich. For there is perhaps hardly a people in Europe in whom Communistic influences have taken less root than in the Czechs and Slovaks. Relations between Prague and Berlin are correct, if not exactly cordial; but important politicians in Czechoslovakia believe now, as they did not before, in a practical working out of the Italo-German alliance in Central Europe. To the question of whether the "Berlin-Vienna-Rome block" does not make the situation of Czechoslovakia more difficult, Dr. Krofta, the Foreign Minister, answered that this cannot be the case owing to the conflict of interests inside the "block," which are far too sharp for a serious danger to Central Europe in this respect ever to arise.

It should be noted that in the course of the last few months the prestige of England in Czechoslovakia, in consequence of a definite and active foreign policy, has risen considerably. Thus, English instead of French will be introduced in Czech schools as the first foreign language. The Commons debate of November 5th, in which speakers from all three parties expressed their understanding for the political situation of the Czechoslovak Republic, has enormously contributed to the consolidation of these sympathies. No one believed in the "Berlin-Rome axis of Europe," since the constant accumulation in the neighbouring countries of matter for dispute between the German and Italian Fascisms may be observed at close quarters. Prague sees the true axis of Europe not in the Berlin-Rome line, but in that of London-Paris.

In the third State of the Little Entente, Rumania, this Italo-German conflict is manifest particularly in the economic aspect. As in Yugoslavia, the general improvement in world prices of mineral oil products, cereals, livestock, and so on, removes the necessity of selling goods to Germany on a "clearing" and compensation basis, by which method one is paid either not at all or in goods one does not want. Typical of the conflict of interests in Rumania between Rome and Berlin was the "Soja-Vertrag," which showed clearly how the German influence on the Rumanian market was checked. The Soya Company Limited, a daughter company of the I.G. Farbenindustrie, has, as is known, contracts with many Central European States according to which the soya bean is to be cultivated in these countries in great quantities for

Germany. Germany, through the intermediary of the I.G. Farbenkonzern, obtained the right to pay for these important deliveries of soya beans by exporting to the countries concerned German goods as compensation. After a validity of two years, these contracts with Rumania and Bulgaria expired, and negotiations for their prolongation eventually succeeded; but at the last moment they were altered by a characteristic clause. Whereas Germany could hitherto compensate up to 100 per cent. in German industrial products, in the amended contracts she received the "right" to pay for soya beans not only in German but also in Italian goods. At the first glance this would seem an advantage for Germany. In reality, when Count Ciano visited Germany, Italy obtained in this way security for a ready sale of her goods. For the States concerned, especially for Rumania, which delivers vast quantities of soya beans to Germany, there is now the possibility to evoke this clause, and to obtain from Germany Italian goods that are needed in Rumania, instead of German products which are not so much in demand and about the inferior quality and unfavourable prices of which there had been many complaints. Such manifestations in economic and political directions are already the order of the day in Rumania. Thus one may recall the solution of the Rumanian-German oil contract, which compelled Rumania to deliver every year to Germany large quantities of oil, whereas these are now exported to France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and so on. In political directions also the decline of German influence is clearly perceptible; and it may be noticed how Rome is supporting this development with every ounce of energy compatible with its own endeavours to increase Italian interests in Rumania.

Thus we see more and more clearly how sharply Italian and German interests collide in almost all Central European countries, whether they belong to the Little Entente, like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, or be members of the Rome pact of three, like Austria and Hungary, or stand outside any joint system, like Bulgaria. Further, we can see how, almost without exception, Italian influence is advancing at the expense of that of Germany. And we must realise that, in Central Europe at least, real co-operation between Berlin and Rome cannot exist, because a vital conflict of interests renders it impossible.

Prague. GERHARD SCHACHER.

THE NUTRITION PROBLEM.

THE Roman Augurs were in the habit on certain high occasions of sacrificing a white ox to Jupiter. When they were unable to discover an ox sufficiently immaculate they chalked over the black spots. This question of malnutrition is one of the black spots that we have ignored or refused to recognise. Recently, however, there has been a great revival of interest in the question of nutrition, chiefly owing to the fact that the League of Nations has published an Interim Report of a Committee of which Lord Astor was Chairman, but it is also in large measure due to the research work of Sir John Orr, Director of the Imperial Bureau of Animal Nutrition. Other men who have done good work in this direction are M'Gonigle and Kirby, who recently published *Poverty and Public Health*, and Julian Huxley, whose interests in this direction have been increased by the necessity for careful study of diets in the feeding of animals at the Zoological Gardens.

Sir John Orr as recently as 1935 stated that there were 20,000,000 people living below a proper level of health and energy, and that to attain the output needed to provide these people with the food they require it would be advisable to increase the consumption of milk by 42 per cent., that of fruit and vegetables by 53 per cent., and that of butter and eggs by 25 per cent. He thought that this would involve an increase in the consumption of food of the value of £200,000,000 a year at retail prices. This is a bald way of stating the fact that there are millions of men, women and children, many of whom belong to the ranks of the unemployed or the poorly paid, who are suffering from malnutrition, largely owing to lack of means. Put in a nutshell then, what is required is to raise the standard of living and the purchasing power of the workers as a whole, but especially of this large class of the community. I am not saying that this is possible or probable in the near future, but the fact remains that, whether we import this food or whether we produce it in our own country, until we are able and willing to improve the diet of a considerable section of the nation they are bound to suffer from malnutrition.

At the recent British Association meetings in Blackpool the question was referred to by the President, Sir Josiah Stamp,

by Sir Daniel Hall in the section dealing with agriculture, and by Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins. All three of them in one way or another laid stress upon the fact that a large proportion of the population was suffering from malnutrition. We may state it as a fact because no one doubts that this is true, although many will be inclined to think that the extent of the evil has perhaps been exaggerated. In the course of his address, Sir Josiah Stamp said: "It has been computed that a benevolent dictator could at a relatively small expense, by applying our modern knowledge of diet, add some two inches to the average stature and seven or eight pounds to the average weight of the general population besides enormously increasing their resistance to disease." The Chancellor of the Exchequer would no doubt question the statement that only a relatively small expenditure is required and, indeed, it is obvious that, if Sir John Orr is right, in order to raise the standard of living and thus abolish malnutrition a very considerable expenditure would have to be borne by the National Exchequer. The alternative would be the raising of wages and so increasing the purchasing power of the working classes. This is an ideal which can only be gradually attained, unless we are anticipating some sudden upheaval amounting almost to a revolution. Sir Frederick Hopkins said that this question of improving the physique and health by improvement in the national dietary was "a national problem of unsurpassed importance." The argument of Sir Daniel Hall aimed at proving that we could produce in this country the very foods that are protective in character and are urgently required to supplement the diet of the malnourished. He contended that both sugar beet and wheat were not the crops that were most important from the national point of view, and he deprecated the encouragement given to sugar beet and urged that we should produce more fruit, vegetables, eggs and poultry, which were indispensable. There can be no doubt that the soil and climate of England are particularly suitable for this purpose, and here he is supported by a majority of the experts.

A deep impression has been made on the general public, not only by these speeches but by the publications referred to, and there is a growing interest in the subject as a result of the stress now being laid on the importance of improving the national physique. In almost every newspaper and in practically every speech dealing with this question it is pointed

out that there is a glut of foodstuffs and that scientific research has added greatly to our powers of production. The paradox is insisted on again and again that there is no need to limit and regulate supplies with a view to raising prices, and certainly no reason why valuable food should be unused when saturation point so far as consumption is concerned has not been reached. On the economic side there are two schools of thought, one advocating greater freedom of trade without competitive check in order that food may be cheaply imported for the benefit of the working classes. On the other hand there is the other school, represented by the farming community and the advocates of rural reconstruction. With the support of the Ministry of Agriculture they contend that the country has suffered from rural depopulation and a consequent weakening of national physique, and an inability on the part of the farming community to make farming pay while food is being produced at an economic loss. Their belief is that it is in the best interests of the nation that we should encourage all who are engaged in farming operations, and that if subsidies and quotas and tariffs are required in order to revive agriculture we should consent to see them imposed, because in the long run a nation that refuses to cultivate its soil is decadent and will degenerate.

The truth is perhaps midway between the two schools. We recognise the possibilities of great increase in productive power owing to the achievements of science, and when we are faced with the economic difficulty of distributing the products to the people who are in need, we feel instinctively that there must be some *via media.* Scientific progress must not be stultified and agriculture must not be allowed to decay. We must import large quantities of food that other countries are capable of producing and exchanging for our industrial manufactures, and we must at the same time continue to produce the foods at home especially suited to our climate and do all that lies in our power to make the cultivation of the soil a desirable and not ill-paid occupation.

The League of Nations Committee, in dealing with the nutritional question, had regard to all other countries in so far as reliable statistics could be obtained, and the evidence adduced as to the inadequacy of diet for the working classes in most countries seems to be conclusive. We see the results of malnutrition in the prevalence of rickets, scurvy, defective

teeth, anæmia, chronic fatigue and sub-normal growth and weight. This is not confined to any one country, but even in the United States, in times of great prosperity, it has been shown that a large number of persons were insufficiently fed and a much larger number badly fed. No country seems to have attained the standard of health scientifically desirable, and in all countries the number of recruits rejected for the army on physical grounds illustrates this point. The result of the Committee's investigations, arrived at after a very careful scientific study of the subject, seems to prove that if we are to have an optimum standard of diet we must lay more stress on the protective foods derived mainly from dairy farming and market gardening. Of all these foods milk is the most important, especially in the case of the mother and the child, since milk contains proteins, fat and carbohydrates giving energy, vitamins which protect, and the minerals which, though only needed in small quantities, are nevertheless indispensable. We lay stress to-day especially upon child nutrition, since it is in childhood that irretrievable damage is often inflicted owing to lack of milk. There are very few countries where the optimum standard of diet for the whole child population is secure, while we know that from a national standpoint it is worth while to encourage whatever makes for the health of the child, since it means an improved physique for the whole adult population.

We all regard the child as important, but do we know how important? In theory the child is regarded as a valuable asset, but are we aware that the child is a *wasting* asset? Infant mortality has decreased from 105 per 1,000 live births in 1910 to 57 per 1,000 in 1935, and yet the child population of this country in 1951 will have decreased by 2,500,000. That is the estimate of experts, and Professor Carr-Saunders tells us that in 1966 the population may be only 37,500,000. That might be a good thing if it were not for the fact that it is the number of young people that is decreasing. In 1901 there were 12,000,000 children up to fifteen years of age, thirty years afterwards they had decreased by 1,000,000, and by now they will have decreased by another 400,000, while the estimate is that by 1951 there will only be 6,500,000 children. The tendency is for the old to take the place of the young. There will have to be some great impulse given to an increased birth-rate if the population is not to fall

with accelerated speed. Hence the value that we ought to set upon the child population that we have.

Taking it for granted that we need the child, it is certain that we need a healthy child. Adequate nutrition, therefore, is a primary requirement and should be an integral part of a national policy. What should be the national policy with regard to the child? The answer is cheap or free milk for every child and probably for every pregnant mother who is poor. Sir John Orr suggests that the cost could be met either by a subsidy or by a reduction in distributive costs or by a combination of the two. Children who are etiolated and devitalised need at least one pint of milk per day. Instead of that, very large numbers receive little or no milk, many of them not more than a pint per week. We are just beginning a constructive policy as regards milk. Out of 381 Maternity and Child Welfare Authorities 377 gave free milk, or milk at less than cost price to nursing mothers and children. During the last fifteen years Infant Welfare Centres have practically doubled and we have increased our Health Visitors from 1,607 to 6,002. A pint of milk a day was given to 2,500 children under five years in a special area in South Wales, and from the point of view of nutrition they were better off than children from a prosperous city in which free milk was only given during the first year of life. Under the Milk in Schools Scheme the number of children paying for milk has increased from 900,000 in 1933 to 2,500,000 in 1935, but more than half the scholars in our public elementary schools are still getting very little milk. It looks as though the Local Education Authority should provide free milk wherever medical treatment with inspection is necessary, and wherever there is any likelihood of malnutrition. Under the Education Act school children cannot obtain free milk unless the family income is extremely small. Under the Maternity and Child Welfare Act milk is supplied free or cheap only after a Means Test and upon medical recommendation. The L.C.C. is now carrying out an investigation into the nutritive value of milk by which 8,000 children are being weighed every four months. This ought to throw a great deal of light upon the close connection between diet and growth.

Here we may refer to the investigations of Dr. M'Gonigle, the Medical Officer, and Mr. Kirby at Stockton-on-Tees. The former traces the extent of physical unfitness among the adult male population to defects which have been shown to exist in infancy, childhood and adolescence. The investigation extended over five years and what has emerged from the inquiry beyond doubt is that death rates, disease rates and malnutrition seemed to vary in proportion to the income of the parents, and that the two factors of supreme importance are housing conditions and diet. He would probably put diet first. The experiment is not conclusive unless it can be tried on a larger scale, but it is valuable within certain limits. I say within certain limits because a large percentage of the families investigated after their removal to a new housing estate were unemployed and had been unemployed in some cases over long periods. The real remedy then is employment. It may be noted that while the infant mortality rate for Stockton per 1,000 live births was 78·8, for the two poor areas investigated it was 134 and 173. We cannot tell from this investigation what proportion of the child population is undernourished, but our routine medical inspection of elementary school children seems to show, taking the 1935 figures, that out of 1,855,000 children inspected over 11 per 1,000 were suffering from malnutrition of a sufficient degree to require treatment, and a further 12·8 per 1,000 were marked for observation because of a less degree of malnutrition.

Compare these figures with those of Dr. Spence, the Medical Officer of Health at Newcastle, who stated that 36 per cent. of the children from the poor districts were physically unfit and that they appeared malnourished. These children were compared with the children from better-class families, and the inquiry seems to show that of the professional classes 40 per cent. were above the normal zone, 38 per cent. were normal, and only 12 per cent. were below the normal zone. The same test applied to heights gave very much the same result, and Dr. Spence came to the conclusion that there is a direct relationship between overcrowding, malnutrition and ill health.

It is to be hoped that it will be possible for the Government, while the Ministry of Labour is undertaking the new inquiry into the cost of living which has been set on foot, to make a sectional inquiry dealing with the problem of malnutrition amongst children. It seems that where the parents are very poor, children do not get either the right quality of food or a

sufficient amount of food, and that specially in the case of little children they lack an adequate supply of milk. The question of the milk supply is a difficult one, but since the production of milk is at least 35 per cent. in excess of consumption and a very large quantity is being sold at a low rate for manufacturing purposes, it looks as though our policy should be directed to obtaining for the child population a larger proportion of the milk that is not consumed. This excess of liquid milk could probably be purchased from the Milk Marketing Board for something under 10d. per gallon. If we add the cost of distribution, liquid milk could be distributed in the Special Areas and to all the elementary school children at a cost not exceeding 1s. 3d. per gallon, or even half the present cost retail. It would require 50,000,000 gallons to supply the needs of all the children in the elementary schools and there would still be an ample surplus for every conceivable manufacturing purpose. The cost would be less than £3,000,000, and if the cost were shared by the Board of Education and the Milk Marketing Board it would not be an excessive price to pay for the knowledge that every child would get a ration of milk daily. It seems certain that if this could be carried out by the State through the local authorities we should see an immense improvement in physique and a consequent reduction in sickness and ill health. The cost might conceivably be less than that of treating the disease after malnutrition has made itself visible. It should not be impossible for the Ministers of Health, Agriculture and Education to evolve a better and more satisfactory policy based on increased consumption. The problem is not insoluble. It requires some sacrifices and goodwill on the part of the community, but it is in the interests of the nation as a whole and in accord with the spirit of humanity for which Great Britain has always been notable.

PERCY ALDEN.

THE CRISIS OF SWITZERLAND.

SWITZERLAND'S problem is threefold. She is a purely inland State lying in the heart of Europe. Her population is made up of three nationalities—of four, if we include the Romansch element. And that population is much denser than befits a country predominantly mountainous and to a great extent even Alpine. The third problem is one of economics. Switzerland stands on the same plane as Belgium and Holland, since she, too, is a highly capitalised small State. Unlike Belgium and Holland, however, which possess raw materials, she has to import her raw materials from abroad. She is also exceptionally lacking in power, for she has neither coal nor oil. Her sole resource is abundant water power, with which she has electrified her railways. But she also has to import grain for about nine months, and this dependence on abroad increases continually owing to the rapid rise in population. Even between 1880 and 1890 the home-grown grain sufficed for only 157 days in the year.

To pay for her imports Switzerland became a land of export and of tourist industry. Owing to her central position, her proximity to great markets and the high standard of her working class, she forms a favourable source of supply for industrial products, whilst the beauty of her scenery entices visitors. Unhappily, however, such an economic structure demands a flourishing world capitalism and active world markets. Swiss industry specialises in goods of high-class quality, even luxury articles, and many of her hotels, unlike those in the Tyrol, cater for luxury requirements. Such a specialised type of industry, like such an hotel standard, calls for open frontiers. Terrible harm has been done to her economic life by the efforts of modern autarchy, the strangling of tourist traffic by currency regulations, the depreciation of many currencies, and general impoverishment. The Federal railways are also hard hit. Since 1930 tourist traffic has steadily decreased, and so has goods traffic. As tariffs are very high already, recovery by raising them is out of the question.

As a creditor country, an exporting country—even her agriculture depending on cheese for export—and as a country of tourist travel, Switzerland was for decades a land of extremely active paying power. Her passive trade balance did

not matter. Accumulated capital could be distributed in considerable investments at home and abroad. This benefited the building trade. In addition to hotels and sanatoria, vast numbers of public buildings were erected, especially schools. The mortgage system developed side by side with the building trade, and, as the former is in the hands of the banks—that is, of the cantonal and savings banks—the banking and savings bank combine developed as well. At the same time capital from all parts of the world poured into the country with its gold standard; and, however much Switzerland paid out abroad, a considerable amount remained and fertilised the banks. Side by side with the old cantonal banks, big banking concerns arose, which, considering the smallness of the country, assumed unusual dimensions. The extent of industrialisation may be realised from the fact that the proportion of those engaged in industry is only exceeded by England and Belgium. This has increased the population enormously, and the growing population created an ever larger industry, as provision now had to be made for expanding home markets.

But when export trade declined and distress descended upon the hotels, unemployment began and purchasing power dropped. To-day Switzerland has, according to the season, 80,000 to 100,000 unemployed, a figure which, compared with that of other countries, does not seem very serious, but to which must be added the large number of part-time workers. The embroidery business of eastern Switzerland, which was carried on chiefly for export purposes, is nearly ruined. Basle's silk ribbon industry has also declined greatly. On the other hand, of course, new and lucrative branches of production have been created: for example, the chemical industry centred in Basle, whose fine aniline dyes and medicinal products find increasingly favourable markets abroad, and the aluminium industry, which is dependent on water power and therefore particularly suited to Switzerland. Certain old-established trades have also improved somewhat. The export of watches for 1935 amounted to 124·5 million francs against 109 million for 1934 and 96 million for 1933. Distressed trades have been assisted by Federal grants, and so has agriculture, the latter by high payments exceeding world prices. Foreign wheat, delivered at the frontier, costs 10 to 12 francs per 100 kilos, but the Federation pays the peasants 35 francs per 100 kilos. Thus, at a time when wages are falling, food

prices are rising. The subvention system cannot continue as it is; for it runs counter to Swiss ideology, which still continues to hold fast, in politics as in economics, to the freedom of the individual.

Export industry would fail to profit by the devaluation on behalf of which so much propaganda has been expended,* for Switzerland would no longer be able, with her high rate of exchange, to purchase raw materials and foodstuffs cheaply. Unlike England, neither prices nor wages could be kept steady. How could it be otherwise in such a small country, poor in raw materials and lacking colonies? This dislocation of the price level would only foster the unrest with which the country is seething. Farmers welcome the idea of devaluation, not merely because they hope it will benefit the cheese export and raise prices at home, and because they want to decrease their heavy financial obligations, but also because of their opposition to the towns. Above all, however, the farmers—and here they agree with the entire working class—fear the reverse of devaluation, namely, deflation, the adjustment of wages and prices to the world market. It is contended that cuts made in salaries and wages have already reduced purchasing power only too sadly. As a matter of fact, such a small country ought not to insist either on devaluation or on deflation, but must seek a middle way, that of careful adaptation, continually revised in view of the very different conditions prevailing in the various economic classes and labour groups. The expression, "differential adaptation," used recently in a document issued by the Federal Council, comes closest to the heart of the matter. A small country, in which good supervision by a central organisation is possible, can thus advance step by step with comparative ease. Of course, there must be a general plan—not economic planning, but a constructive programme.

There is one presupposition in such an economic reconstruction: resolute leaders for the State and the economic system combined with non-party authority. This does not mean the downfall of democracy; it does, however, involve more centralisation. Democracy, in the sense of the most far-reaching participation by the nation in the business of government, is deeply rooted in the Swiss, and this again is closely connected with their co-operation in local municipal and cantonal administration.

* For devaluation, see page 59.

The service of the State is built up from the bottom. If the cantons were abolished, the deepest Swiss sentiments would be hurt. The Federation is respected because it watches over the canton, but the canton is beloved. In cultural matters in particular the cantons will not surrender their autonomy, and this is justifiable, for their differences are enormous. To those of language and race must be added those of religion. There are purely Protestant and purely Catholic cantons, whilst in others that are "mixed" the denomination changes from valley to valley or even from village to village. Geographical differences must also be borne in mind; Alpine regions, the so-called central districts and the Jura, the outlying districts, Basle, the golden gate of Switzerland, and the canton of Schaffhausen, on the right bank of the Rhine. Never was there greater colour and variety in so small a space.

This, however, is precisely the reason why unified leadership in politics and economics is necessary. In an age of bitter competitive struggle, federation and democracy can only be preserved by making concessions to centralisation and strong State leadership—concessions tending, not to dictatorship but to wise, and, in case of need, drastic levelling of differences. Switzerland, moreover, is very well prepared for such a levelling process. If she has succeeded in the difficult task of reconciling German and French Switzerland, she has revealed thereby an inner strength which awakens hope for the future. She has also shown her mastery in restraint. When a movement towards Switzerland arose in Vorarlberg after the collapse of Austria, she did not allow herself to be tempted by the possibility of enlargement, for in that way the German portion would have grown at the cost of the French, and Catholicism at the expense of Protestantism. The balance of power erected with so much effort was not to be endangered.

The Swiss nation has grown in a strange manner from one particular space which cannot be made larger or smaller at will. This is the country lying round the central Alpine passes, that is, round the most central, the St. Gotthard: a land of intercourse, of passage from north to south, but also from east to west. The great pass does not separate, but links closely the lands on either side. Thus northern, southern, western and eastern Switzerland are intimately connected; and as regards culture, however far the German-Swiss is German, the French-Swiss French and the Italian-Swiss

Italian, just so far, again, do they all approach each other by the operation of space. For this reason the culture of the German-Swiss—and the same holds good for both other sections—is German only up to a certain point. It might even be said that at the point of transition from culture into sentiment it is no longer German, but specifically Swiss. Side by side with this, a specific Swiss national sense exists, its cantonal coherence showing still more plainly that it is deeply rooted in the soil.

This regional sense remains far removed from all national limitations and extravagances. The Swiss cheerfully stands by his nation, but does not bear her name continually on his lips. For this reason Switzerland has been able to assume many international characteristics, and to become the typical country of international congresses and organisations. But this complicated national-international character prevents her at the same time from inclining to excess towards any other nation, especially towards any of the States surrounding her. That is the source of Swiss neutrality, which has been so much discussed and, in reality, so little understood. This neutrality is in the interests of Europe, since it checks the Powers' eagerness to control the traffic routes of Central Europe; but it issues above all from the character of Switzerland herself. She can be nothing but neutral, because she is European, or, putting it more cautiously, because she, more than all the other States of Europe, is on the way to Europeanism. For this reason a very strong Europe Movement has arisen recently—a specifically Swiss Movement that has nothing to do with Count Coudenhove-Calergi's Pan-Europa.

Switzerland considered her entry into the League of Nations to be consistent with her neutrality. Since the League seemed to guarantee order for the world, and for Europe in particular, the Swiss nation voted, in a plebiscite, for entry. The less the hopes placed on the League have been fulfilled hitherto, the more does Switzerland recognise the necessity of developing her defensive system. New defence credits, to the large amount of 235 million francs, are about to be granted, a sum destined chiefly for technical equipment. The smallness of the country and the possibility of its swift penetration demand especially strong technical preparations.

This, of course, only makes the financial troubles more difficult and the burden of debt heavier—the means of raising

the defensive credits are to be created by a Defence Loan. Here—in the country's economic and financial life—lies the sore spot; but the economic problems are also pressing for political renewal. The feeling is general that party life is torpid. If resolute men are to rebuild the economic system, they must be assisted by new parties. But party reform, again, can only issue from democratic tradition. The so-called Front Movement, which coquets partly with National Socialism and partly with Fascism, has, after some early success, virtually collapsed, because Switzerland realised that her further existence can only be assured by her abstention from every form of Fascism. This explains the sharp note in the more influential Press when dealing with the Third Reich. It implies no enmity towards Germany, least of all in German Switzerland, the very place where efforts are being made to nourish the eternal values of the German soul. It is purely defensive: the desire to protect at all costs that which has been bequeathed to the present generation by their fathers.

The smaller the possibility of renewal through the Front parties, the greater is the responsibility of the old parties. In addition to the historic groups of the political and religious Conservatives on the one hand and of the Democrats and bourgeois Radicals on the other, there have been for decades the Social Democrats. Despite the acrimonious debates between them and the bourgeois parties, they have been silently admitted into the old order of society. Their Left wing is fairly influential, but it is by that very means that Communism is being kept down; moreover, by far the larger part of Social Democracy has recently accepted the idea of defence. Thus the class struggle is not very sharply defined in Switzerland: the cleavage runs rather through the individual parties. The young are rebelling against the old, and thus groups have arisen of Young Conservatives, Young Liberals, Young Democrats, who will be joined sooner or later by Young Socialists. One section of the peasantry calls itself the Young Peasants. These peasants, who are settled in the mountainous districts of Canton Bern, are engaged exclusively in cattle rearing, and represent, as a party, an interesting transition from a civic group to Social Democracy. Thus all party life is in flux. Everywhere there are new programmes, many meetings, violent discussions, but, so far, no fixed purposes. Last year the so-called Crisis Proposals were

rejected by the nation—a plan of the Social Democrats for the reconstruction of the economic system. The plan was rightly rejected, for it was fundamentally obscure; but something new ought to have been put in its place.

This point also illustrates Switzerland's position in the heart of Europe. That which affects Europe as a whole—uncertainty as to the future—affects Switzerland also. The Swiss, however, will always be able to renew his inspiration by lifting up his eyes to the hills—to those towering mountains, which for him take the place of the sea. An Alpine State such as this is no narrow inland State, for the streams that rise in those mountains unite the country with the sea, the source of greatness for all nations. During a recent visit to Basle the present Federal President claimed for the ancient city on the Rhine the spirit of the seafaring nations, because it stands on a traffic route of major importance and has furthermore fulfilled its mission by the enormous development of its port. It is to be hoped that Switzerland will thus again extricate herself from the storms of the future: in harmony with the world and with the heart of Europe, but also stubbornly preserving her own unique characteristics.

Since this was written, Switzerland entered upon a devaluation of about 30 per cent., though not in slavish imitation of France. The technical condition of the Swiss franc remained as excellent as ever; as a matter of fact, a great deal of fresh gold had actually flowed into the National Bank a short time previously. It may be formulated thus: the Federal Council used the French devaluation and the formation of a Franco-British-American gold standard bloc as a favourable opportunity of re-entering the field of international competition by means of devaluation. It was also anxious about the fate of the Defence Loan. State bonds were pretty low, even if they had recovered from the lowest standard, directly after Belgian devaluation; and it was to be feared that, despite all patriotism, the uncertain conditions of exchange would not be exactly favourable to a loan issued at par and yielding 3 per cent. Now, after devaluation and with the great improvement in the rate of former issues, not only the entire amount of 235 millions for the Defence Loan has been subscribed, but nearly 100 millions in addition.

The exchange in Switzerland has been put in order for some

time to come. As far as one can foresee, there can be no question of new devaluation. Fears that Switzerland has lost the world's confidence as an international savings bank are thus groundless; the position of the banks is actually better, because they have decreased their debts and current business has revived. But whether the other hopes cherished by the friends of devaluation will be realised is doubtful. If a return to economic Liberalism is expected from devaluation because, in order to keep prices steady, the Customs are reduced, there is on the other hand a sharp control of prices, which restores the influence of the State on trade. To this must be added the fact that Switzerland is so financially dependent on tariffs that only a partial lowering is practicable. In a country so dependent on the import of raw materials, even the strictest control of prices will never be able to prevent a rise in prices and tariffs. This increase will always be held in check by the devaluation quota, which is reckoned somewhat high in Switzerland, and in so far a certain permanent assimilation to the standard of living abroad will be brought about. On the other hand it will be so high that a struggle for wages will be inevitable. The workman usually only becomes restless when he realises that devaluation, owing to rising prices, means a bleak decrease of wages: till then he sees only the decrease of unemployment.

The Defence Loan was greeted all over Switzerland, in town and in country, by the display of flags. This financial success was looked upon as a triumph of the national spirit of sacrifice; and even if devaluation has helped this forward, at all events another proof has been given that Switzerland is determined to preserve her independence under all circumstances.

ADOLF GRABOWSKY.

RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN ASIA.

IN the West—that is to say in North-west Europe and North America—some thought is given at times to the changes in Christian belief that have taken place within living memory. Those who have no belief regard the Churches as merely vestigial, which is a tremendous act of faith on their part; those whose instincts forbid them to break with tradition and whose inclinations are towards piety minimise the amount of change that has taken place. How do the changes look from an Asiatic point of view? It is a commonplace remark that all religions had their origin in Asia—not quite all, perhaps, though certainly the most important of them; but of the great religions of the world, the one that was least successful in its own continent has been diligently propagated in that continent for a very long time by its Western believers. Christians in the West declare that there has been no change in any of the essentials of their belief, with a rather suspicious stress on the "essentials." But what is the attitude of Christianity towards other faiths? This is surely a point of some importance in the estimation of the degree to which Christian belief has changed.

As inheritors of the Hebrew tradition, however profoundly modified, Christians have a warrant that it is difficult to avoid, unless, like Nelson, they deliberately use a blind eye on occasion, for believing in the exclusive authenticity of their faith. It is therefore an obligation to believe that all other faiths are erroneous, though this may range from regarding it merely as a mistake on the part of the votaries of other cults to believe that their teaching has divine sanction, to a conviction that the teaching is definitely evil. Within this definition there is also room for a great variety in belief on the part of Christians as to the nature of other religions. The Hebrew tradition was somewhat indefinite. "Their gods are of silver and gold—the work of men's hands; eyes have they and see not, ears have they and hear not, hands have they and handle not. . . . They that make them are like unto them." On the other hand, the constant falling away of the Hebrews to follow after other gods indicated a very general belief on their part of the reality of supernatural powers other than their own God. And there were familiar spirits. Moreover, the ferocity with which the heathen gods and their followers were attacked

was not at all consistent with the idea that the worshippers of images were poor mistaken creatures whom reason might wean of their superstitions. As for any idea that "They also, like ourselves, are seeking the truth in their own way and are worthy of our sympathy," that laxity, according to the prophets, was Israel's besetting sin. There was a definite belief in the revolt in heaven when Satan and his followers fell away from their allegiance, though the position of the Satan of Job is as ambiguous as the identity of the angel who stood in the path of Balaam.

There was an ancient Christian tradition which gave a very real spiritual existence to the gods of the heathen. At the time of the Nativity was heard a great voice crying "Pan is dead," and at the same hour the ancient gods fled from their places. It is a favourite theme with the poets, and Milton embodied it in the *Hymn on the Nativity*, afterwards greatly elaborating it in *Paradise Lost*.

> . . . from this happy day
> The old Dragon underground,
> In straiter limits bound,
> Not half so far casts his usurpèd sway.
> And, wroth to see his kingdom fail,
> Swinges the scaly horror of his folded tail.
>
> The oracles are dumb,
> No voice or hideous hum
> Runs through the archèd roof in words deceiving;
> Apollo from his shrine
> Can no more divine,
> With hollow shriek the steep of Delphos leaving;
> No nightly trance or breathèd spell
> Inspires the pale-eyed priest from the prophetic cell.
>
> The lonely mountains o'er
> And the resounding shore,
> A voice of weeping heard and loud lament;
> From haunted spring and dale
> Edged with poplar pale
> The parting genius is with sighing sent;
> With flower-inwoven tresses torn,
> The Nymphs in twilight shade of tangled thickets mourn.
>
> Peor and Baalim
> Forsake their temples dim,
> With that twice-battered god of Palestine;

> And moonèd Ashtaroth,
> Heaven's queen and mother both,
> Now sits not girt with tapers' holy shine;
> The Lybic Hammon shrinks his horn;
> In vain the Tyrian maids their wounded Thammuz mourn.
>
> And sullen Moloch fled,
> Hath left in shadows dread
> His burning idol all of blackest hue;
> In vain with cymbals' ring
> They call the grisly king,
> In dismal dance about the furnace blue;
> The brutish gods of Nile as fast,
> Isis, and Orus, and the dog Anubis, haste.

This flight of the gods was never an article of faith, and as for the restriction of the old Dragon's "usurpèd sway," it was rather extended, for at a much later date we find Venus in the Horsel, and later still witches in New England in commerce with Satan. Venus, of course, was always more than the Church could stand, but for the Græco-Roman pantheon in general ecclesiastics with some classical learning had a much more kindly feeling than they had for those deities whose groves and high places erring Israelites patronised. One is tempted to wander off with Venus into an interesting digression. Some learned men have said that about the Mediterranean was a primitive worship of a Mother Goddess, whose images later became local Venuses, and, when the Church prevailed, were replaced by local Virgins. Some have even gone so far as to discover where the sway of the Queen of Heaven is least disputed a continuity of the tradition of the Mediterranean Mother Goddess.

At the time, then, when the burgeoning of Christendom lent a new force to the injunction to go into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature, the usual attitude towards the gods of the heathen was either that they were delusions of the ignorant and superstitious or that if they existed at all they were evil spirits, "permitted for a time" to wander over the earth. In a somewhat similar manner to-day, a belief is frequently expressed regarding spiritualistic séances that they are either impostures or that, if spirits are present, they are evil ones. There was never any doubt that the religions other than Christianity were, at their best,

grievous errors, deluding even those who aspired to be good into sin, and, at their worst, actively evil and abominable. Scholarship tended to soften severity of judgment, but Sale, in presenting the Koran to the English-speaking world, made out a case for its faults rather than its virtues; Monier Williams, in presenting Buddhism, had praise for the loftiness of some of its ideas, but was concerned mainly to show how far inferior they were to Christian doctrine, lacking divine inspiration as they did. As for the Hindus, Macaulay, that exponent of common sense, said that when science had shown them the childish absurdity of their cosmogony, their minds would be open to the reception of Christian truth. It was seldom considered necessary to spare the feelings of the heathen. A frontal attack on their beliefs was quite in order. It was always to be observed, however, that apostolic zeal could be less outspoken where the subjects enjoyed full political liberty.

In some degree the missionary takes on the colour of his surroundings. If he is among a simple people who believe very literally and objectively, his own teachings are apt to be of the same character—so much so that complaints have been heard that missionaries have taught a body of doctrine in which they hardly believe themselves and which those who furnish them with funds would not endorse. In some cases, no doubt, missionaries turn with a certain relief towards fundamentalism and away from the surrenders and the defensive attitude so often forced on them in Christendom. They find greater liberty *in partibus infidelium* to follow and to propagate a faith that they prefer. In the midst of a highly sophisticated people the missionary has a different problem. He finds an almost irresistible demand that he surrender the claims of his own religion to a monopoly in truth, and he learns that, quite contrary from the expectations of those who believed in the method of extirpating error before implanting the truth, the arguments that demolish the erroneous belief are capable of being used with equal effect against his own. Hence arises a pathetic desire that everybody should believe in some supernatural system or revelation—anything rather than nothing. He readily agrees that all religions are a search for God, that all of them have some good in them, or at least some spiritual truth. He finds, moreover, that the more highly educated professors of these religions are very ready to confess that

most of their teaching, especially that which savours of the miraculous, is allegorical, and discovers that he is expected to be broadminded enough to confess as much regarding his own beliefs. It comes down to a comparison of ethical qualities—a sorry substitute for the romantic inspiration with which the messenger to the heathen began. Even the word "heathen" is taboo. Its use is an unwarranted and arrogant assertion of superiority. The Moslem preacher may lump the idol-worshipper and the devil-worshipper together in a common damnation. The Christian missionary (except an obscure hick here and there) has outgrown such crudities.

There is another way of avoiding the unprofitable clash. In places where there is plenty of intellectual subtlety but little science, mission hospitals are maintained in the hope that gratitude will create a fruitful ground for the word in season to those who are invited to follow Him who healed the sick. In Mrs. Archibald Little's *Marriage in China* there was a practical American bishop who always wanted to know how much per head it cost to save souls. It is to be feared that the practice of healing the sick ranks rather high in the cost per head. Higher still, perhaps, ranks the educational method, which has been accused by some of its critics of making atheists. There is the view, sometimes advanced in extenuation, that the mission colleges turn out young men who, though not professing Christians, are of high moral character, which is well worth the effort.

The question of how much expenditure the saving of a soul is worth depends, after all, on just what we mean by that expression, and the whole mission problem is tied up with it. To the early Jesuit missionaries baptism alone made such a difference that all the toil and suffering one man could endure were profitably expended if he succeeded only in surreptitiously baptising one moribund baby, whose everlasting destiny was changed by that act from torment to bliss. People nowadays reject the Augustinian logic with horror, but are not always concerned with thinking out alternatives, so that we even find members of Christian churches expressing the opinion that every people has the religion that suits it best. This sounds rather like an echo of the saying that every nation has the sort of government it deserves, and it is probably used more often as a reason for not contributing to missions than as a serious argument. Linked up with the necessity for baptism is the

necessity for correct belief. Those who find it difficult to make up their minds about the niceties of theology applaud thankfully the recording angel who, according to the poet, put at the head of the list of the candidates for salvation an Oriental gentleman who was very dubious regarding his religious doctrine but loved his fellow-men. Slipping on the doctrinal necessity of correct belief has produced some strange results, among them being serious discussions as to the advisability of leaving a heathen tribe untaught, on the grounds that, in this benighted condition, they might escape damnation, but that they could not escape if they had heard the Word and rejected it.

We are so much in the habit of associating Christendom with prestige that we find it difficult to dissociate them. The Christian as a "dangerous thinker" (as they would say in Japan), a low-class fanatic, is an idea foreign to us. At the time when Islam was equal or superior to Christendom in the arts of civilisation, the two were generally bitterly opposed. It is, perhaps, the most interesting aspect of the political rise of Japan that missionaries who have grown up in the belief of the unassailable superiority of Christianity find themselves in a position where the prestige of their religion wanes as rapidly as the material superiority of their countries. It becomes socially impossible to declare that the accepted religions of the country are based on fraud or error. Indeed, the growth of scholarship and independence of thought all over Asia brings about a need for "sympathy" and for discovering what is best in other faiths, such as scientific researchers working on opposed hypotheses or even followers of different schools of art never think of according to their opponents.

A fresh complication is introduced by the fact that the Japanese polity has an entirely religious foundation. This was so of old, but with none of the present emphasis. The emphasis laid on it to-day has some interesting results. The right to abstain from collective worship at shrines has been denied officially on the ground that this is merely a mark of respect which does not interfere with other religions, and therefore not with religious freedom. A Catholic college in Tokyo was recently brought to heel on this point. The army supplies military instructors, whose ministrations enable the pupils to get off with a greatly shortened term of conscription

or with none at all. The fathers at the college in question took a passive attitude regarding certain anniversary shrine-visitings; but the military authorities informed them that if the visits were not made *en masse* the instructors would be withdrawn and the privileges resulting from their instruction also. There was no help for it. At the time of the Imperial Enthronement in 1928 the i's were dotted and the t's were crossed by an official of the Foreign Office, who came to the assembled journalists and told them that it had given great satisfaction to observe that the foreign envoys present, even those from Catholic countries, had bowed towards the Imperial Shrine, wherein were enclosed the Mirror, the Sword and the Jewel inherited from the Sun Goddess. The attitude of the majority of the Protestant missionaries is one of ready acquiescence. They argue that there is no harm in performing a purely ceremonial act which has no personal significance for them, and that it makes their ministrations more acceptable to the people, besides ensuring that their religious liberty is not circumscribed. One, questioned as to the resemblance that this bore to bowing down in the House of Rimmon, departed so far from tradition as to say that he considered that the example of Naaman was given to us as showing what, in such circumstances, a great and good man should do. And, when it was pointed out to him that it was on a very similar point that the Christians in ancient Rome resisted unto death, he said he thought they were mistaken and that this rash and hopeless conflict with Authority had hindered the progress of Christianity for hundreds of years.

Circumstances alter cases and Tokyo is not Rome. But there is another interesting parallel. Curiously enough, it is not ostensibly religious at all, but political. The attitude taken by the Christian in Rome is taken by the Communist in Japan. While Christian missionaries compound with their consciences, the Communist denies the Imperial divinity, incurring the hatred of authority and an implacable persecution. The Communist's denial is the same as was the Christian's; his affirmation is very different. He believes in no survival of a personality able to enjoy rewards and satisfactions. If the corrupt body which suffers unto death is raised a spiritual body, it is only in the ethereal sense that his beliefs and example become a part of the success and inspiration—a part of the living mind—of those who come after him; and he is

upheld in torment by his passionate belief in the fulfilment of prophecy. And this has proved sufficient many times.

While we find this identity of attitude between the modern Communist and the ancient Christian, we find a tremendous contrast between the missionary of the seventeenth century, who prayed that he might be found worthy of martyrdom and of the joy of leading even one soul out of heathen darkness into Christian light, and the modernist "rethinking of missions." The American committee who toured the Asiatic mission field earlier in the present decade laid it down very definitely that the missionary should make the sympathetic approach, and should discover whatever good he could in the religion which he was endeavouring to supplant. This principle reaches its climax in a little book by the Rev. T. T. Brumbaugh on *Religious Values in Japanese Culture*. Mr. Brumbaugh is a very determined seeker after uplift. There is no dichotomy in his spiritual values, and even in the degraded superstition of fox possession he discovers the universal human longing of the worshipper to identify himself with the deity he adores. The ease with which the Japanese believe in incompatible things he finds wholly praiseworthy, each belief softening the possible asperities of the other. He finds so much uplift and spiritual value in everything that the reader is left almost gasping with astonishment. Of course, if a belief may be spiritually beneficial though physically nonsensical, then such an attitude may be adopted; but the Christian missionary who takes this attitude is not far from applying the same standards to his own faith and may end by merely assuming that his own myth has a better working value than the one for which he would substitute it—or on which (unless we mistake Mr. Brumbaugh) he would superimpose it. In that case the whole matter seems to become merely a question of an unverifiable opinion as to the comparative values of myths and of the ethical principles that have come to be associated with them. It needs some more "rethinking." Meanwhile we find men prepared to sacrifice everything and to die for their faith in an atheistical economic theory. What place has that among religious beliefs and spiritual values?

Kobe. A. MORGAN YOUNG.

THE PHILIPPINES UNDER THE NEW RÉGIME.

THERE is a general misapprehension that the Philippines are already independent. Even in the United States many people think that the islands were set free last year. President Roosevelt himself, in an address in a Western State, said proudly but erroneously that his administration had given the Philippines their independence. When the congressional party invited to attend the inauguration of President Manuel Luis Quezon last November was passing through Japan, the local newspapers were under the impression that the Philippines were no longer United States territory. Typical was the statement of Baron Sakatani, who gave this gratuitous advice: "In order to safeguard the future welfare of the new republic, the United States should consistently abide by the high motives which led to the grant of independence. It should no longer act in a motherly fashion toward the Filipinos, meddling in their affairs and causing trouble." The fact is that the United States sovereignty over the Philippines remains absolute. The United States has complete control of the islands. The President of the United States, through the High Commissioner at Manila, has the power to annul laws, suspend executive orders and contracts, administer the customs in case of default, forestall government bankruptcy, and protect the currency reserves. The foreign affairs of the Philippines are still handled through the United States Department of State.

The most important structural change in the government is that the position of chief executive, which used to be filled by an appointee of the President of the United States, has been made elective. Inasmuch as all the officials of the Commonwealth are now Filipinos, the entire responsibility for the success of the local administration has been placed on native shoulders. This is the governmental set-up which will be in force until July 4th, 1946, when the Philippines are scheduled to go their own separate way. Meantime Filipino leaders are working for changes in the Philippine Independence Act passed by Congress in 1934. Some of them want the Commonwealth Government, with its security and trade advantages, to continue indefinitely. Others want the independence part of the bargain and at the same time free trade with the United States.

Although the United States is committed to set the Philippines free, there are many far-sighted Americans who believe that it would be extreme folly for their country to retire from the affairs of the Pacific. Even many of those who had advocated independence for the islands for selfish reasons are now wondering whether they are throwing away a valuable thing.

The Philippines are a group of 7,091 islands, roughly bounded on the north by the Japanese Empire, on the east by the Pacific Ocean, on the south by Borneo and the Celebes Islands, and on the west by the China Sea, the southern provinces of China, Great Britain's Hong Kong and French Indo-China. Little Bakkungaan Island, a British territory, is only about a mile distant from Great Bakkungaan, a Philippine island. The mainland of British Borneo is only eleven miles from the nearest Philippine territory. Y'Ami Island of the Philippines is sixty-one miles from Japan's Sho Antau Su. The Philippines Balut Island is forty-three miles from Ariaga Island of the Dutch. With a total land area of 114,400 square miles, the Philippines have a population of 14,000,000. Excepting 500,000 Mohammedans and 500,000 pagans, the Filipinos are Christians, mostly Catholics. The islands are so fertile and rich in natural resources that they can easily support 100,000,000 people. Areas of the two biggest islands, Luzon and Mindanao, are 40,814 square miles and 36,906 square miles respectively. Most of the islands are merely dots and a few disappear during high tide. In the treaty concluded between the United States and Great Britain on January 2nd, 1930, the latter country relinquished title to eight small islands. These were added to the Philippine archipelago.

For almost four centuries the Philippines were under Spain. The islands were named after a Spanish sovereign, King Philip II. For a short interval during the Seven Years' War the British snatched the Philippines from the Spaniards and occupied the islands.

The trade of the Philippines totals about $250,000,000 annually. The balance of trade is in the islands' favour by about $30,000,000. This is due mainly to the big free American market. Based on their average trade with the Philippines during recent years, the relative positions of the different countries are: first, the United States; second, Japan; third, Great Britain; fourth, China; fifth, Germany.

Annually Great Britain sells to the Philippines more than $2,000,000 worth of goods and buys from the islands about $2,500,000. Main export products of the Philippines are sugar, coconut oil, cordage and hemp, gold, tobacco, embroideries and woven hats. Great Britain has been the Philippines' big market for Manila hemp for many years. Practically all the Philippine sugar and coconut oil go to the United States.

The Commonwealth Government, which was a year old on November 15th, is progressing much more smoothly than anybody expected. This is probably due to the excellent financial condition of the government when the American Governor-General transferred his trust to the Filipino President. The budget was not only balanced, but there were extra millions of dollars in the treasury. Although it is still too early to make predictions about the Filipinos' administration of their home affairs, it can be said that if the United States continue to allow Philippine products to enter the American market freely, the Filipinos will manage their government as efficiently as the Americans have. The Filipinos are very eager to demonstrate not only to Americans, but to the rest of the world that they deserve their independence. President Quezon is the latest addition to the list of national dictators. An avowed admirer of Benito Mussolini, he has made himself his own Secretary of National Defence and Secretary of Public Works and Communications, his country's economic czar, the Pendragon of the unicameral Philippine Legislature and the undisputed boss of his party. He continues to amass powers which the Commonwealth's constitution-makers intended not for the President. Quezon, who has the majority of the people behind him, gets away with it because he succeeds in giving the Filipinos an efficient government.

General conditions in the Philippines will surely be different, however, when the trade restrictions provided for in the Philippine Independence Act, popularly known as the McDuffie-Tydings Law, go into full effect. The granting of Philippine independence was not so much a case of renunciation of imperialism by the United States as a measure to satisfy the demands of American farmers for protection from the competition of Philippine products, those of organised labour, which wanted to have Filipinos subjected to immigration

restrictions like other Orientals, and those of the high-pressure Cuban sugar lobby. Definite quotas were placed on the duty-free imports of Philippine sugar, coconut oil and cordage during the ten-year period of the Commonwealth Government. Also, the Philippine Commonwealth was required at the end of the fifth year, which will be on November 15th, 1940, to levy an export tax on all Philippine products shipped to the United States. The tax would begin at 5 per cent. of the United States tariff rate and would increase by 5 per cent. every year until July 4th, 1946, when the Philippine products would be subjected to full American tariff rates. Filipinos unanimously believe that unless the Philippines are given preferential treatment in the United States market, an independent Philippine government cannot go very far. In fact, Filipinos in the sugar trade would rather give up independence than see the main industry of the islands ruined. They have no hope of competing with Java or Cuba successfully.

With High Commissioner Frank Murphy as the spearhead, the Philippines are campaigning in the United States for reciprocal trade relations between the two countries. A Philippine-American trade conference will probably be held in Washington this winter. The Philippine Independence Act provides for the calling of this conference by the President of the United States "for the purpose of formulating recommendations as to future trade relations." In an interview with the writer, High Commissioner Murphy said: "Unless the conference is painstakingly prepared and its deliberations marked by an earnestness on each side to deliberate in the light of what should be best for the public interests in the United States and the Philippines, it will be difficult to make a success of it. Special encouragement must be given in Washington to the view that this is not a mere commercial arrangement to be made between the two governments, for this is one of those rare situations where appropriate emphasis can justifiably be given to large moral and sentimental aspects of our relationship. We must want independence to be a success."

Murphy's altruistic sentiments, however, do not jibe with the underlying economic philosophy of the McDuffie-Tydings Act. If any changes are to be made in that law according to the wishes of Murphy and the Filipinos, they would amount to an almost

complete repudiation of the philosophy upon which it was enacted. Whether or not the American farmer can be convinced that it is not to his disadvantage to have a free-trade or near-free-trade relation with the Philippines still remains to be seen. He has a strong lobby in Washington which is demanding immediate independence for the Philippines without any provision for preferential treatment of the islands.

If the efforts for better treatment of the Philippines fail, the best that can be expected for the Filipinos is that they will sink back to the level of Malayan peoples or other Orientals. They will certainly lose their present comparatively high standard of living. It will be impossible to maintain it. However, this is only one alternative. They can turn to Japan for economic salvation, but at the price of their independence. Whether the Filipinos like it or not, the Philippines, without the protection of the United States or some other great Power like Great Britain, will come under Japanese domination. Already well under way is the peaceful, persistent penetration of the Philippines by the Japanese. Although the American flag still flies over them, the Japanese have already cut out for themselves a large colony in Davao, the south-eastern part of Mindanao.

There are 20,000 Japanese in Davao already, and 250 arrive there every month to join their prospering countrymen. Immigration restrictions are useless, it seems, so far as the Japanese are concerned. Davao, which even Filipinos dub now as "Davaokuo," is extraordinarily rich in natural resources. It is a region free from typhoons and endowed with a spring-like weather all the year round. Its soil is most fertile and its mountains are covered with forests of hardwood. Such is the region selected by the far-sighted Japanese for their initial colony in the Philippines. There they grow the best kind of hemp in the world. Within a few years they have progressed to such an extent as to dominate the huge hemp industry of the country. They also raise rubber, coconut and outlandish plants, vegetables and trees. The Japanese in Davao are practically running an independent State. They have their own experimental stations, banks, schools, social centres and hospitals, all of which are supervised by men presumably sent over by the Japanese Government.

The Quezon administration is occupied with the Japanese problem in Davao. President Quezon has been making

inspection and first-hand study of illegal holdings of large parcels of land in Davao. Although the law of the Philippines prohibits the acquisition of land by aliens, Japanese have acquired 170,000 acres of agricultural land and many more acres of forest land. Investigators have found out that Japanese are acquiring land with the help of greedy, unpatriotic Filipino lawyers through the use of citizens as dummies. For the use of their names these dummies get 10 per cent. of the yearly produce. Filipinos feel that the Japanese are in Davao to stay. When the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce could no longer stand the gibes of the Manila Press for his failure to cancel illegal leases, he announced that he would cancel several thousands of them. Promptly President Quezon ordered him to take no action. Whatever will be the President's solution of the problem, Filipinos believe that it will not be expulsion of the Japanese—it possibly will be legislation validating existing leases of land, prohibiting new ones. President Quezon knows he cannot drive the Japanese away or scare them like Filipino mountain bandits. Assuming an attitude of defiance, the Japanese have announced that they are ready to raise a huge defence fund and exclaimed: "We will never step off our land. There will be trouble if anyone should drive us away."

In the Philippines is an organised Japanese propaganda. Tours to Japan have been subsidised by Tokyo. All over the Philippines lawyers are learning the Japanese tongue. A school has been established in Manila by the Japanese for those desiring to learn "the coming language of the country." A conservative estimate of the total Japanese population of the Philippines is 29,000. That number does not show their relative strength and influence. They are rapidly supplanting 80,000 Chinese as the islands' retail traders. They control now 35 per cent. of the retail trade of the islands. The Filipinos prefer Japanese goods to American, British or other foreign products, because they are much cheaper. This is especially true in the textile trade.

The pride of the Filipinos is their fishing waters, and yet 80 per cent. of the fish supply of the Manila markets is Japanese caught. Provided with fast motor boats, strong nets and scientific training, the Japanese dominate the Philippine fishing industry. The Filipinos have a law limiting the

entrance of Japanese in the fishing trade, which provides that no boats of more than three tons belonging to aliens should be licensed. But all the Japanese have to do to circumvent this law is to bribe Filipinos to register as the fishing boats' owners. The Japanese are also on their way to dominate the islands' lumber industry. Americans still control mining, but the Japanese are trying to buy some gold and chromite mines. John W. Haussermann, the gold and chromite king of the Philippines, has announced that under no circumstances nor at any price would he sell out to the Japanese. The Philippines ship almost $2,000,000 worth of gold to the United States every month. The Japanese have their eyes on a 300,000-ton deposit of high-grade chromite ore, a 10,000,000-ton deposit of lower-grade chromite ore, a 500,000,000-ton deposit of iron ore, and various deposits of copper, lead, zinc, manganese, coal, asphalt, asbestos, gypsum, guano, phosphate, sulphur and cement. Japan needs these materials not only for her industries but for war purposes. No wonder Japanese expansionists regard the Philippines as the answer to their fervent prayers.

There is no doubt that Japan moves in as soon as the United States gets out of the Philippines. Palau, one of the Japanese mandated islands which is less then three hours distant by plane from the Philippines, has complete command of the southern part of the archipelago. With the Philippines under Japan, the Japanese would completely command the coast of Asia, dominate the route from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, the route to India, and bring themselves nearer to the Dutch East Indies and Australia. Then, indeed, they would have a real island empire, with sure markets for their products, sure outlets for their surplus population, sure source of raw materials. The Filipinos, however, are determined not to meet Japanese invasion lying down. They are building an army under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, former chief of staff of the United States Army. Recently the general announced that he can make the Philippines "invasion-proof" with only $8,000,000 a year. Since the Philippines have a coastline twice as long as the United States', Americans took the famed general's announcement with a grain of salt.

When Japan's Foreign Office spokesman said the other day to foreign correspondents that his country would be averse

to any pact guaranteeing the neutrality of the Philippines, he shattered one of the strongest hopes of an independent Philippine government. Significantly the spokesman said: "The Japanese Government renounces the idea of great Powers concluding agreements guaranteeing the freedom, integrity, or neutrality of other nations." Upon Japan's willingness to a pact among Pacific Powers guaranteeing the independence of the Philippines have liberty loving Filipinos long relied unquestioningly. Upon it have banked also the United States' Senators and Congressmen who voted for the Philippine Independence Act, including those who did so with ulterior and entirely selfish motives. To help insure the independence of the Philippines and to allay apprehensions of a dark future, Congress inserted in the McDuffie-Tydings Act a provision requesting the President of the United States, "at the earliest practicable date, to enter into negotiations with foreign Powers with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the perpetual neutralisation of the Philippine Islands, if and when Philippine independence shall have been attained." However, it is barely possible that the President may make agreements with other Pacific Powers, like Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Russia, regarding Philippine independence, the conditional granting of which last year Franklin D. Roosevelt considers as one of his administration's greatest achievements. But even the Filipinos have long since lost faith in neutralisation treaties. There have been so many examples of their futility.

The Filipinos are spending much of the money they need for education and public health on national defence. They are organising an army, which even some of the most patriotic Filipinos believe futile against that which has furnished the excuse for its existence. A Philippine army alone, without the support of a major Power's navy like the American or the British, cannot stay a Japanese invasion. So the Filipinos are again placed in a dilemma. Some United States' Senators who want to get rid of the Philippines immediately have suggested that the Filipinos should ask for British protection when they become independent. The Filipinos at this time, however, are still confident that the United States will not leave them altogether at the mercy of Japan. Somehow they believe that the United States, in her infinite wisdom, will find a way to keep the Japanese at a safe distance from them.

JAMES G. WINGO.

TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, AND THE IRISH FREE STATE.*

ON the best site in Dublin stands the College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity, commonly called Trinity College. The city lies all round it, but at its foundation Trinity College was "juxta Dublin." It has been described as the one British institution in Ireland which has flourished, and to-day any ill will to which it may be exposed, is chiefly due to the fact that it is a British foundation. British and Protestant; and, to most Irishmen, as all know, neither term has a pleasant connotation. "British" reminds them of Cromwell, and "Protestant" recalls the Penal Laws. The Catholic Irishman, unlike the Dutch South African, who has much more recent wrongs to sting him, seems unable to forget past injustice, and "British" (or rather "English") and "Protestant," still stand for unloved portions of humanity, though individual Englishmen and Protestants can be well liked by Catholic Irishmen.

Trinity College is a British foundation, but Dublin, too, is British in essentials. There was a Norse Dublin, and for a short period, I dare say, the town might have been called Norman. Gaelic it seems never to have been. Irish language enthusiasts and our Free State rulers (who might have shown more sense) call the town Baile Atha Cliath, but the hamlet that grew up at the hurdle ford of the Liffey had no more to do with Dublin than the Red Indian encampment on Manhattan had to do with New York. Dublin grew from Norse and Norman foundations, but the Dublin of to-day bears the stamp of British rule in its main features. So does Trinity College. But that admission is not tantamount to saying that Trinity is un-Irish, or a foreign institution. One of the most notable characteristics of Englishmen as colonisers is their independence of the home country, and this characteristic showed itself early in the history of the English in Ireland. No doubt the sundering sea had something to do with the growth of a feeling of separateness and independence. Ireland was a long way from England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But, even if the English in Ireland had not been inclined to claim independence, the treatment they

* This article was not written on behalf of the Trinity College authorities, or even with their knowledge.

received from the home of their race would have forced them to become Irish patriots. It is true that their patriotism was of a limited kind. Ireland was the country of their birth, but the majority of its inhabitants were not regarded in any but the most limited sense as fellow-countrymen. Swift, who defended Irish interests in his *Drapier's Letters*, hated the thought of being taken for a "Teague"—or "Paddy," as he might have been called a century later. He must have recognised the fact that, despite the differentiation made by the Penal Laws, the lines of difference between the "planters" and the other inhabitants of Ireland—"Gaels" and the mixed race of "Gaels," Danes, and old English—were beginning to be somewhat blurred in the minds of his kith and kin in England. The lines, however, remained, and they could hardly disappear while the population of Ireland was divided into privileged and unprivileged. They must have been uncomfortably evident till the Catholics were emancipated, though the relaxing of the Penal Laws in the second half of the eighteenth century probably did much to bring the races together.

But the chief factor in bringing into existence something like a nation was without doubt the general use of the English language. (Even in the eighteenth century English must have been generally understood, if not generally used, though Irish language revivalists would have us believe something very different. It is hard to believe that those Catholic Irish who in the early Penal days were neither in Hell nor in Connaught did not do their utmost to acquire the language of their masters. And it is also hard to believe that the language of the peasants as given by Carleton and others was a translation from Irish into a patois of the writers' invention.) However all this may have been, we find friendly overtures on the part of the ruling caste before the end of the eighteenth century. In 1793 Trinity College admitted Catholics to its degrees—very many years before Oxford or Cambridge permitted even Protestant Dissenters to graduate. Moore the poet was one of the first who availed themselves of the concession. In 1873 Fawcett's Act put students of all denominations on an equal footing, all college offices (with the exception of those of the Divinity School) having been thrown open to those who were willing to qualify for them. If the Catholics of Ireland had then decided to make Trinity Catholic in

"atmosphere" there was nothing in law or university statute to hinder them from doing so. But the Roman Catholic Bishops intervened, and what is popularly known as a ban was imposed. At that date, however, even in Catholic Ireland, it was impossible for the Church to prevent some of her children from going out of bounds. Catholic boys entered Trinity College, not in great numbers, certainly, and a few—a very few—gained fellowships.

The ban was in accordance with the policy which had damned the Queen's Colleges as godless, and had thus deprived a large part of the Catholic middle class of higher education. It seems, however, hardly consistent with the policy which permitted English Roman Catholics to avail themselves of all the advantages that Oxford and Cambridge had to offer. But circumstances alter cases, and in England circumstances were vastly and essentially different from those in Ireland. In England the Church of Rome had the allegiance of not more than a tiny fraction of the population; in Ireland it dominated the minds of the great majority. In England, if it had put a ban on the existing universities, it would have deprived its young people of all university education. In Ireland the Church could have a reasonable hope, by a policy of intransigence, of getting the British Government (which was generally believed to rule through the Bishops) to give it the kind of university it desired—a university in which the "atmosphere" could be safely breathed by Catholic lungs. So the Church imposed its ban, and Trinity College has remained substantially Protestant to the present day. About thirty years ago the late Lord Bryce, then Chief Secretary of Ireland, outlined a scheme which would have given the College a Roman Catholic sister, but the opposition of Trinity to the proposal was so strong that the scheme was dropped; and, soon after (in 1908), the National University of Ireland was founded. The new university was undenominational in constitution, but from the first it has been almost completely Catholic in all other respects. There are a few Protestants among its professors, but the students are nearly all Catholics.

Trinity, on the other hand, is Protestant, though not as Protestant as the National University is Catholic. A quarter of the total number of students may be Catholics, but it is doubtful whether even the Fellows know what proportion one denomination bears to the other. And here, by the way, it

should be stated that Trinity's Protestantism is not of the ecclesiastical variety. Protestantism in Trinity stands for free thought and free discussion, not for dogmatic uniformity. Proselytism is unknown. If the Bishops' ban had its origin in fear of their flock being contaminated by Protestant surroundings, the record of the years has not done much to justify it. Time may even show that the Bishops had more to fear from the carefully shepherded young men of the National University than from the Catholic students of Trinity College.

In many respects, Trinity is more national than either of the other Irish universities. It still attracts students from Northern Ireland, and there is reason to believe that it will continue to do so. The Magee College of Londonderry (in Northern Ireland) is affiliated with it. Trinity has the prestige of age and achievement, and, of course, it can offer ambitious students advantages of a material kind which neither Belfast nor the National University can yet offer. It forms one of the very few links between North and South that have outlasted the political partition of the country. (Perhaps the only links that can be compared with it in importance are the Irish National Teachers' Organisation and the Irish Rugby Football Union.) On the other hand, as a Free State institution Trinity College represents the compromise on which political relations between Southern Ireland and Great Britain rested between the date of the "Treaty" and the advent of Mr. de Valera's government, a compromise which seems to the present writer to have been as near ideal justice as a human arrangement could be.

But compromise is not to the taste of Mr. de Valera and his followers. They came into power on the strength of a programme which excluded compromise. Nothing but an Irish republic—a Gaelic republic forsooth—would satisfy them. But an Irish republic, to be worth having, should include Northern Ireland, and Northern Ireland has not shown the least desire to be included. Even Mr. de Valera must have realised ere this that the six counties are to the rest of the country what *Italia irredenta* was to the rest of the peninsula from 1870 to the end of the Great War, and that some upheaval comparable to the Great War must shatter the power of Britain before the four seas of Ireland again enclose an undivided country. It looks, in fact, as if the present rulers of the Free State had provisionally accepted partition, justifying themselves, perhaps, by

a half mystical belief in the downfall of "the great robber Empire," or, more probably, by a wholly unmystical belief in the disappearance of the Northern majority through the refusal of that majority to breed. Certainly, unless they believed in an inevitable reunion of Ireland, they would have shown some desire to make reunion attractive. They have done nothing of the kind. All that the Northern majority values is flouted in the Free State, and what the North despises is declared to be the one thing needful to Irish nationality.

The outlook is not cheerful. While Mr. de Valera and his friends, relying on destiny or Providence doing for the country what they themselves cannot do for it, treat the Northern majority with studied indifference, there is not the least chance that the North will make any advances. Mr. de Valera gave the students of Trinity College some time ago a broad hint that a divided allegiance would not be tolerated in the Ireland of his dreams. Ireland, he said, took no pride in the British Empire, and one gathered that the sooner Trinity students ceased to feel pride in it, the better it would be for them and their College. The speech and its implications were no doubt noted in Northern Ireland. But I do not suppose that Mr. de Valera cared. To his mind, I dare say, Northern Ireland is bound, sooner or later, to unite with the rest of the country, which will no doubt then treat it, if it continues to show imperialistic tendencies, as England treated the whole country in the bad old times.

It seems as if in the Ireland of the future there is to be no fruitful union of races and cultures; Ireland is to be a Gaelic State, as exclusive as Hitler's Germany. Its racial composition will in reality be as variegated as Germany's, but, if the Gaelic fiction is accepted by the crowd, it will serve its purpose —the setting up of a barrier between Ireland and Great Britain. And this Gaelic State is to be a republic; partly, perhaps (an unsympathetic critic might say) because the republican form of government attracts people who desire equality rather than liberty, but mainly because the form differentiates Ireland from its neighbour. That Ireland has the same language as England is a regrettable fact, but no pains are being spared to give Ireland a language of its own. It is extremely unlikely that the new language will ever get outside the doors of the schools and colleges, but it is not necessary that it should. The half is not seldom better than the

whole, and the efforts to give reality to the article of the constitution which declares Irish to be the national language may well be more important than the success of those efforts. Bilingualism would not serve any useful purpose or supply any national want, and, on the other hand, it would lead to comparisons between Irish and English which would hardly favour the "national" language. Even from the Gaelic point of view, pursuit of the ideal, a Gaelic-speaking Ireland, seems preferable to attainment.

From the *Irish* point of view, the point of view of the older generations of Irish patriots, it is plain that even pursuit of the Gaelic ideal can easily be carried too far. One can find excuses for the Gaelicisers, but one need not shut one's eyes to the fact that the modern Irish, like the English, French, Germans and others, are a mixed breed, and that, as far as environment has had to do with it, their cultural development has been, for hundreds of years, not Gaelic but British and Italian. All that the country values in politics has come from England; its religion has come from Rome. A family that has come down in the world is inclined to make much of its ancestry; the humble descendant of gentlefolk is cheered by the thought that gentle blood flows in his veins, and he is usually eager to pass on the information to his neighbours. If his neighbours are kindly people, they will not grudge him his enjoyment, or spoil it by reminding him of a bar sinister in the family escutcheon or of the grandmother who "married beneath her." But, when a family that has risen in the world insists on public worship of its ancestors, the neighbours may be pardoned if they fail to conceal their feelings. In Ireland this ancestor worship has become a nuisance. The Irish majority, which lay crushed during the Penal régime, has risen in the world; patronage, the possession of the minority for two centuries, is now, as far as the Law has had to do with it, in the hands of those whose forefathers lost at the Boyne and at Aughrim. It is surely time that they found their self-respect in their own merits rather than in the doubtful achievements of supposed ancestors. It is true that the power which money gives is still largely in the hands of the Protestant minority, but, with patronage in their possession, the Catholics should be able to look without envy on their neighbours' money-bags.

One is reminded of the situation in France in the period

between the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the outbreak of the Revolution. The Protestants' privileges had been taken from them; great numbers had fled the country; those who remained were a tiny minority, even if they were, at the same time, as Mr. Hilaire Belloc says, "a powerful and ever watchful body . . . ready to take advantage of scepticism's first political victory." Scepticism will win no political victories in Ireland, such victories having been won already, and it would be foolish to prophesy victories of any other sort. But some day war will be declared—or break out without declaration—even in Holy Ireland, and the dominant Church will be forced to fight for its existence. (Perhaps the fight has already begun.) If the fight turns out to be between liberalism and rigidity in religion, and not between atheism and the Catholic faith, the friends of religion in Ireland, I think, will owe not a little to the scholars and thinkers educated in the coolly critical atmosphere of Trinity College, Dublin.

H. R. CHILLINGWORTH.

EDUCATION AND WAR.

SINCE a "craftsman's" qualifications for writing such an article as this are not very obvious, I should say that I am also a mathematician, and have spent a good part of my life in teaching mathematics, in and out of school, to boys and girls of all ages and standards. And since I have a very competent staff in my workshop (and no "labour unrest," because they not only see but keep my books) I am always free to pluck this, or any other, second string, as opportunity offers, so long as I can return to my workshop once or twice a week. Thus, I spent nearly two years as technical adviser to the woodworking shops, under the auspices of the N.C.S.S. and of the Rural Industries Bureau, in the occupational centres for the unemployed which were then springing up all over the country, and this was an experience which may have furnished some little heat to this essay, if not much in the way of new material—alas, that such material is not new!

Soon afterwards, and more to my present purpose, I was on intimate terms in an advisory capacity with one of those recently founded public schools which aim at educating useful and intelligent citizens rather than lords and gentlemen of the ruling class. The reputation of the school was high then, and is higher now, so that it can afford (if it likes) to ignore the following criticisms, to which I suspect that most such schools are equally open. I was told (not officially) that this school was founded on the post-war cry that all old men are rascals—since old men had permitted or caused the Great War. Had I known it, I might even then have attended a meeting of the school debating society at which it was proposed that every man over forty is a blackguard. The staff are therefore for the most part very young men. And what, I naturally enquired, are the young men doing to avert the next Great War? Well, of course they hob-nob a lot with foreigners, and they have no O.T.C., and they got Sir Norman Angell down to address a big meeting. This is all very typical, but what will it do to stop the next war?

It is not for lack of goodwill, but for lack of intelligence, that we are losing the fight against war. I was so busy making mathematics interesting to schoolboys that I did not hear Sir Norman Angell's speech, but next morning I saw

him signing many copies of his voluminous works for young enthusiasts who wanted to be up to date. I thought at first that I had stumbled on an impromptu prize-giving, but these were prizes for goodwill rather than intelligence, and presumably paid for.

England, though it is honeycombed with social injustice (which is the cause of war) is bursting with goodwill in all its classes. This at least I learnt in my wanderings through the distressed areas and my interviews with local and central committees. But with all this goodwill and all this social injustice, such pathetic and glaring examples of which are seen in the occupational centres, we have not the intelligence to operate the one against the other, and though we are suffering at the same time from a preposterous "problem of over-production," and from a very real and awful problem of poverty, we have not the intelligence to make these two problems cancel out, as they so naturally should do.

What, then, should be the main object of an up-to-date public school with high social ideals? Surely to educate a more intelligent next generation. Yet the school of which I speak was bursting with goodwill, like every other smallest section of English society, whilst the intellectual ambition of the masters, and therefore of the boys, was practically nil. The boys were beautifully behaved—lazy only because their curriculum was not made sufficiently interesting—and even in the masters' common room one never heard a swear-word or an improper story. But it was almost impossible to discuss the curriculum, to talk mathematics or poetry or art or politics, with these young men. The headmaster was more willing to be interested, and would have liked me to convert his staff, but he would confess with shame that a headmaster nowadays has no time for reading. He was broadminded, and he was very anxious, and rightly anxious, that the boys should learn handicraft, but the carpenter's shop on my arrival would have been a disgrace to an occupational centre. The mathematical classes were equally shocking. I found one boy in the school who had been well taught, surmised that he had come from a good preparatory school, and was told that he had had a year at Rugby. Alas, for the up-to-date school! There were pictures about, and large photographs of brainless modernist woodwork—furniture of that new urban simplicity which looks so nearly akin to the simplicity of the

village idiot, but if I had suggested that woodwork needs brains, and even a little geometry—if I had suggested the hanging of Blake's picture of the boy Christ using the compasses on the floor of his father's workshop—if I had suggested that Greek stonemasons, and therefore perhaps Greek woodworkers, were versed in the use of conic sections—well, I should have been made to feel that it was bad form.

It was characteristic of the school's ideals that secular readings were given by the masters three or four times a week at evening prayers, and characteristic of its practice that, if a master read a poem, which was seldom, he did not read it as if he enjoyed it himself, or expected anyone else to do. That would have been bad form. Which reminds me that the headmaster of a yet more " up-to-date " school, and one that is equally preoccupied with the moral problem (though with a different practical technique—that of allowing the boy to eat every kind of sweet till he is sick of it), has actually boasted in a recent book that his " appreciation of poetry is on a level with a slum-dweller's appreciation of Hegel's philosophy," whilst he also boasts a similar contempt for mathematics.

Now, what do we mean by a more intelligent next generation ? It would be easy to attribute most of our own troubles, our " problem of over-production," our fear of the horrors of modern war, to excess rather than defect of intelligence. But our real trouble is that every kind of high intelligence is nowadays so highly specialised that, having clothed itself in an awful robe of authority, it also clothes itself in blinkers. So that one specialist seldom even sees the egregious mistake of another, and if he does he thinks it bad form to correct his brother pontiff.

What we need, therefore, is a next generation of wider rather than higher intelligence, one less fearful of the pontiffs, and more capable of independent thought than ours. And to produce this kind of intelligence no subjects of the school curriculum are more important than these three : handicraft, mathematics and poetry. These are the germinal subjects—the keys to every art and science : reasonably well taught they cultivate the major faculties of intellect and imagination, whilst other school subjects must be extremely well taught to cultivate higher faculties than those of memory and quick-wittedness. Since Latin must go and war ought to

go, let mathematics take the place of Latin and handicraft that of the warlike exercises in the equipment of the modern gentleman ; some knowledge of poetry and some proficiency in the active recreations have been, and should be, amongst the hall-marks of the gentleman in all ages.

Of the educational value of handicraft the following is an interesting example, though I could give many that are more conclusive. In the woodworking shops of the occupational centres there are practically no " tradesmen " because of the prejudice of the trade unions, and the great obstacle to the instruction of amateurs is that directly there is the least improvement of trade it is always the best woodworkers who are the first to get jobs, though never as woodworkers. And since instructors are few, and the men have to teach one another, this is a most serious obstacle.

The educational value of mathematics is very much less at present than it might be and ought to be, because the subject so badly needs humanising. It is rightly recognised at the universities that mathematics is an " end in itself " ; but that is no reason why great tracts even of the non-specialist curriculum should be absolutely without an objective. Fishermen regard the art as an end in itself, but do not catch inedible fish : and a course sufficiently comprehensive for any non-specialist can be so devised that it is never without some fascinating objective, and is infinitely more instructive and stimulating for that reason. And poetry is as badly taught as mathematics. The schoolboy doubtless knows Kipling's " If," but does he know Chesterton's " Song of the Wheels " ? He possibly knows one of Keats's odes, but does he know the context to " Why in the name of glory are they proud ? " He probably knows Byron on Waterloo, and Tennyson on the Duke of Wellington, but does he know Byron on the said Duke ? And does he know who wrote " Ignorance is the curse of God, Knowledge the wings whereby we climb to heaven " ?

However, let these three subjects be no better taught than they are now at our best public schools, and no boy whose faculties of intellect and imagination have been thus cultivated, and who has not yet developed that worldly-mindedness that blunts their power, could be taken in, any more than Alaric before the sack of Rome could have been taken in, by that incredibly dull bottom-rock proposition of the pacifists

of a commercial age—the proposition that even a successful war cannot pay. And no such boy could do other than express his scorn, just as, in his cheerful, helpless way, the man in the street will express his scorn, for that edict of the pontiffs that "restriction of production" is the proper and only possible solution for our awful problems of poverty and unemployment. The scorn of the man in the street is good, as the shaft of a spear, but we need for its spear-head—and how seldom do we hear it expressed—the scorn of the educated gentleman for all such clap-trap, bred in him from his school days.

In my own youth the problem of war had not assumed its present proportions, nor even had that of over-production, though the Titanic laughter of Carlyle over this problem, "like that of genii in the horizon," should still have been audible to attentive ears. But I do remember my reaction as quite a young man to the cognate problem of dumped goods. Being a mathematician—knowing at all events that two and two make four—I could never understand the protectionist objection to dumped goods—not if they are "goods"—nor why they should be a thorn in the side even of the free-trader. Suppose that I am a householder, I used to argue in my schoolboy way, and that a friend, or a vanquished enemy, offers to supply me with all the vegetables I want gratis for the rest of my life. Why should I refuse this offer? Because, they say, if I accept it my gardener will starve. But why should he starve? I may be a brute, but I am not quite such a brute as to let my gardener starve because I am better off than I was.* It needs an economist, for whom two and two occasionally make three but oftener give a negative result, to know why dumped goods should involve the starvation of any human being.

And thus it seems to me that a successful war ought to pay, just as dumped goods ought to pay; and that anyway there should be a better reason for abolishing war than merely that it does not pay. And of course now there is a better reason, namely that the next war threatens death with all the tortures of the Inquisition to an indefinitely high percentage, not only of the forces but of the civil populations involved. And, though I should never call myself a pacifist, I think there should be better reasons still.

* As to what I shall do with my gardener, see below.

The typical pacifist, I take it, is a person who thinks that wars are caused by the natural pugnacity of man, and will cease when little boys are taught to be good and have done enough hob-nobbing with foreigners. But wars are not caused by the natural pugnacity of man; they are rather the cause of a pugnacity which is quite unnatural. Dr. O. W. Wilcox, in that extremely interesting and important book, *Nations Can Live At Home*, does us the honour to think that wars are still caused, as they usually have been in the past, by sheer "pressure of population on the means of subsistence"; and though he does not deny that war may sometimes pay, he proves very conclusively that in every case the study and practice of "agrobiology" would pay very much better. Agrobiology is a new science depending on the application to agriculture of the mathematician's mysterious epsilon, the most romantic symbol of the upper school course, which is absolutely meaningless to most schoolboys, but might be thus provided with another admirable objective. The agrobiologist "essays to spear the war-devil on an equation," which is "the most beneficent aggregation of mathematical symbols ever put together for the guidance of humanity": and he raises to the *n*th power Kropotkin's conclusions of thirty years or more ago.

But though Dr. Wilcox is obviously a man of high intelligence and a pacifist very widely informed, he cannot be wholly absolved of the use of blinkers. He notes "such bizarre proceedings as the burning of coffee in Brazil, the abandonment of sugar-cane fields ripe for harvest in Cuba, the ploughing-under of cotton, and the killing of brood sows and little pigs in the United States," attributes them to local over-production, and goes gaily on to pile up such astounding facts as these. If only half the actual area of pasturage in Britain were scientifically used it could be made to yield a quart of milk and a half pound of fresh meat daily to every Briton: and this (after certain capital outlay which, as he insists, would be infinitesimal as compared with the cost of armaments) with no extra labour other than that of harvesting the extra produce. But surely this huge access of cheap food would result in general starvation, and the enrichment only of those farmers who promised to desist at once from agrobiology.

However true it may be in certain cases that sheer poverty

is a cause of war, a much more widely effective cause, the cause of our universal lust for foreign markets, is our unassimilated potential wealth. It is because we have not the intelligence to assimilate wealth, because we cannot consume the equivalent of our own output, because we prattle of over-production, because we do not know what to do with dumped goods, because in a word we do not know how to make war pay, that we go on fighting.

Let it not be supposed (though I am naturally in some respects a disciple of Morris) that I am hinting at any type of communism. Given the goods, as we might be in such overwhelming abundance, any mathematician could devise fifty formulæ for the distribution of the goods, or of tickets for the goods, such as would not abolish the incentive to labour, nor even the incentive to profit-making, much less the distinction between rich and poor. Everybody might be well fed and decently housed and clothed, even the unemployed, even the incurably lazy: and yet in a world which is already bursting with good things of a sort, and is so ripe for producing so many more good things of a much better sort, no man need lack the incentive to labour. And the transition to this state of affairs, supposing it managed by a popular president, by a true king, by a royal dictator (with a mathematician as a beneficent demon at his ear) could be managed without the suspicion of a jolt to the existing system, by an easy motion of true progress, rapid yet imperceptible to sleeping passengers, like the acceleration of a well-driven car. It could even be done without inflation, that bogy of the people who do not want anything done, since inflation consists in issuing tickets for goods when the goods are not forthcoming. It could be done without interminable consultations at Geneva, since the problem is everywhere so pressing that if any great Power made a serious attempt to solve it others would follow suit immediately. It could even be done without permanent injury to whatever "vested interests" might thus appear to be threatened. Prof. Soddy, seeming to threaten the bankers, avers that the bankers themselves will be the first to erect a statue to his honour. If we add the testimony of the "agrobiologists" to that of the American "technocrats," it is clear that any system of distributing the goods which would enable our industrial and agricultural systems to run at full blast would soon increase

the output, or income, of any civilised people tenfold at a very moderate estimate: and what a contemptible creature must he be who fears that under such circumstances his own income would be reduced.

But perhaps it is not actual diminution of income that he fears. For though we are not committing ourselves to communism, nor abolishing the competitive system nor the distinction between rich and poor, it is possible that people who are at or near the top of the existing tree will be only halfway up the new tree, though otherwise better off than they were. To this objection one can only sorrowfully admit that there may be people who would rather crow on a dunghill than enjoy the scenery with their friends from halfway up a mountain-side. But it is not my business to solve the social problem. I only wish to insist that a social problem, the two main factors of which are poverty and over-production, *must* be soluble, and that my business and that of every elector is to insist continually that it *must* be solved.

It should be no additional reason for solving the problem, but it is certainly true, that by no other means can war be averted for long. The poet can see, and the logician can prove, that in these days of over-production, when social injustice is so much less excusable than it was, war is the direct result of social injustice. The mere prospect of war gives some relief at once to those awful sufferings of the unemployed to which, in these days of over-production, they should never have been subject. And, knowing the distressed areas as I do—where men faint at their voluntary work in the occupational centres, and it is then discovered that they have had no breakfast, having "left it for the kiddies," where men lose their wives, with frightful imprecations upon God and man, because they can only give them half a pint of milk a day when the doctor has ordered a quart, where doctors break down under the strain of prescribing useless remedies for patients who are suffering merely from malnutrition, where even the town clerks aver that if an unemployed man gets ill he never recovers—I would far rather their sufferings were thus relieved than not at all: and I know too that they would prefer it, even with the prospect of being called up and shot to pieces.

War is in fact a partial solution, however temporary, of

the social problem, and the only kind of pacifism which is honourable or even decent in an Englishman is the determination to solve the social problem by other means than war. Any other type of English pacifism is indecent, since we already have the lion's share of that which everybody thinks they want. I do not say that our gains were on the whole ill-gotten, or agree with Bertrand Russell who redeems his pacifism by counselling us to lay down the sceptre: for our Empire might easily have fallen, and may easily yet fall, into very much worse hands than ours. But our pathetic attempts to form a happy family of nations before we have formed our own happy families in England and Ireland and India, our invitation to the lambs to lie down with the lion, who promises to be good if they will help him to police his gains—the said lion turning his abject tail to Mussolini if a lamb begs to be excused—all this is surely rather indecent.

Emerson says that "men are strong by the oblique stroke": if they are merely galvanised into eleventh-hour action by horror of that which should have been long foreseen as the proper penalty of their sins, they cannot see and will not go to the root of the matter. The only sort of pacifism which is decent in an Englishman, and the only sort of action by which we can hope to save and enjoy our Empire, or even our island, in peace (and let us be armed to the teeth meanwhile) is that which will show the world that England and Ireland and New Zealand—each smallest area of the Empire—can be prosperous and happy in consuming the equivalent of its own unrestricted output—unrestricted so long as there is any citizen not supplied with the necessaries of civilised life: and that every other smallest area of the civilised world can therefore do likewise, we continuing our tradition of free trade by all means. After acting thus we shall look up to find that all other nations are following our good example, and that the spectre of war has received the fatal back-handed stroke, and is laid for ever.

A. Romney Green.

MYSTICISM IN FRENCH LITERATURE.

> The highest bliss
> That flesh can know is theirs: the consciousness
> Of whom they are, habitually infused
> Through every image and through every thought.
>
> Wordsworth.

I SHALL try in the following pages to trace back the origins of modern French literary technique to a source almost as suspect to established religion as French Symbolism, whose fiftieth anniversary has just been celebrated. I mean Mysticism, the free lance of religious experience. Before approaching the problem how Mysticism affected and still affects a certain type of French mentality, it will be necessary to kill a legend. The superficial student of literature is still repeating the old parrot-cry that French literary art is almost exclusively represented by names like Rabelais, Montaigne, La Rochefoucauld, Voltaire, Anatole France; that "what is not clear is not French" (Rivarol); and above all that the greatest period of French thought, the seventeenth century, was nothing but an incubator of unimaginative, mechanical artistry and formalism. The very reverse is true.

What is Mysticism? The Greeks had a verb *muein*, meaning, to shut one's eyes. This closing of the eyes, or rather this shutting out the world of realities in order to commune directly with the Deity, formed an important stage in Greek Orphism and the first step for him who desired to become a *mystes* or initiate. From this term is derived our word mystic. The striking similarity between Orphic practice and Christian teaching contributed largely to the evolution of the Greek cult into medieval and modern Mysticism with its literary side-issue, Symbolism. The Church of Rome reluctantly tolerates mystic tendencies without encouraging them. Their very lack of ritual, their pronounced individualistic character akin to free-thinking, spells danger for a dogma whose keynote is a definitely circumscribed nomenclature. Michelet in his book on Jeanne d'Arc admirably stresses this point: "In Jeanne's very sanctity, as in that of all mystics, there was one side open to attack: the secret voice held equal to, or even preferred above the teaching of the Church; inspiration, but untrammelled; revelation, but personal; submission to God, but to which kind of God? The God in us!"

But just this apparent vagueness regarding the infinite distance between the seeker after God and the Deity itself, forms the essence of Mysticism. The one great difficulty the mystic writer experiences lies in the expression of his sensations, for which he cannot use the technique current amongst authors of a purely realistic description. A unique experience calls for a unique expression, a fact which accounts for the lavish use of the symbol, growing spontaneously out of mystic contemplation, as e.g. in the conclusion the *chorus mysticus* in Goethe draws from Faust's evolution: "Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis," and for the evolution of a technique more related to music than to language. The occasional use of the symbol forms in all literature a precious means of ornamentation. The permanent use of this technique constitutes with the mystics and the French Symbolists the chief aim of poetical expression.

When speaking of Mysticism, let us remember three important points:

1. That the mystic is nearly always an eminently practical person: St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross, the two great reformers of religious orders; François de Sales; Stéphane Mallarmé who, apart from his leadership of the symbolist movement, was a conscientious professor of English and the editor of a fashion paper, or Paul Claudel, who efficiently represented his country as consul and ambassador in numerous capitals of the old and the new world.

2. That Mysticism is inter-religious, not confined to one particular cult, and that mystics are the great experimenters in religious sensations.

3. That the influence of Mysticism on philosophy, literature and art is so marked that the historian, whether believer or not, cannot pass it over in silence; the more so as even some poets of a strictly scientific training owe their reputation to it: Alfred de Vigny, Sully Prudhomme, in fact all the so-called *poètes-penseurs* of France.

Mysticism was the leaven which gave impetus and glow to Christian faith in all its stages up to our time. The notable decline of religious feeling in the sixteenth century, due to the pagan element pervading the Renaissance, was counterbalanced by the fervour of the Reformation which, by way of reaction, stirred up the slumbering mystic instincts of the Catholic Church. The end of the sixteenth and the beginning

of the seventeenth century witnessed the work of that charming director of souls, François de Sales (1568-1622) whose *Introduction à la vie dévote* combines a somewhat precious Mysticism with a truly Christian morality. In the words of his biographer, Strowski: "he has given Mysticism smiling and humane features." Speaking of mystical inspiration, he employs a metaphor recalling the loftiest passages in the Song of Songs: "Thus does the Husband knock at the door and speak to the heart of his Spouse, waking her when she sleeps, calling for her when she is absent, inviting her to share his honey, and to gather apples and flowers in his garden, to sing and to let her sweet voice resound in his ear."

François de Sales had prepared the way for the artistic expression of Mysticism. Port-Royal with its negation of freedom of will and the stress laid upon the necessity of grace, furnished the subject-matter to mystical writers like Pascal, Fénelon and Corneille in his *Polyeucte*:

> O world, to me thou holdest naught of worth!
> I carry in my heart of Christian fervour a flame divine.

Pascal (1623-62), the most enigmatic figure of the seventeenth century, could claim Montaigne as his spiritual father. In scientific achievements he ranked amongst the greatest mathematicians of his age, whilst his admiration for the author of the *Essays* predestined him not only to adopt his master's method of scepticism, but to carry it to its utmost limits. Bodily and nervous illness, coupled with an experience which made him lose all interest in social life, led him to mystic speculation, causing him to identify himself with the teaching of Port Royal. One might define his attitude towards esoteric problems briefly by stating that outside religious interests he was but another edition of Montaigne, only more brilliant and imaginative. But whilst Montaigne's scepticism was toned down by a complaisant philosophical indifference, Pascal became more and more depressed by the consciousness of *Ignorabimus*, a suffering which had to end either in utter despair or in constructive Mysticism. In his *Pensées*, those amazing fragments of an *apologia pro religione*, he sets out to prove that Reason must fail the moment that it leaves its proper sphere, tangible reality, and endeavours to fathom the problems of Faith. One might call this vast dialogue with the Invisible an anticipation of Brunetière's *faillite de la science*.

Pascal was a supreme master of style, combining the orthodox qualities of lucidity and precision we expect in a French writer with a glow and colour chiefly found amongst mystical thinkers. A few quotations may illustrate the author's personality.

Man and the Universe.

Man is but a reed, the feeblest in Nature, but he is a thinking reed.

I visualise the terrible spaces of the universe, this immeasurable infinitude which closes around me, the atom. The eternal silence of those boundless spaces terrifies me.

Reason and Faith.

Faith differs from conclusive proof: the latter is human, the former a gift of God. But this faith resides in the heart and makes us say *non scio, sed credo*. The heart has its reasons which Reason does not know. (Plotinus: The Good cannot be known by Reason.) If we submit everything to Reason, our religion will have nothing mysterious nor supernatural.

From the "Mystère de Jésus."

Jesus will be in agony to the end of the world; let us not be asleep during that time. Jesus has implored Humanity without being heard. Be comforted: thou wouldst not seek me hadst thou not already found me.

The seventeenth century in France is the epoch of at least outward submission to King and Church. But this spirit of subservience became undermined through a trait of French mentality which, although constituting the most brilliant feature of literature under Louis XIV, already foreshadowed the eighteenth century of Rousseau and Voltaire. I allude to the tendency prevailing amongst French thinkers and men of letters to analyse emotional life with the searching accuracy of the scientist; and that not only in dramatic literature, the supreme legacy left to posterity by Corneille, Racine, and Molière, but also in the dissection of religious problems when the thinker may run the risk of opposing established dogma, once he allows himself to be drawn into the magic circle of a movement outside the domain of the Catholic Church and yet affecting her teaching.

This happened in the case of Fénelon (1651-1715), Bishop of Cambrai, the author of *Télémaque* and one of the most delicate writers of the seventeenth century. A great divine and profound student of the classics, he combined all the brilliant qualities of a Jesuit Prince of the Church with a gentleness and broadmindedness not often found in his no less famous *confrères*, Bossuet and Bourdaloue. His versatile mind, leaning towards the more emotional side of religion, embarked on the hazardous adventure of mystical experience under the influence of Madame Guyon, the much maligned propagandist of Quietism, a movement akin to the Inner Light doctrine of the Quakers. One quotation from his *Traité de l'existence de Dieu* will show Madame Guyon's influence and illustrate his style:

> There is a spiritual sun that gives far more radiance than the visible one. He shines on us day and night. He is not outside us, but within each of us. No one need tell another: "step back to let me see the sun." Our fellow-men may try to teach us. But we can only believe them if there is a certain conformity between their words and what our Master within us proclaims. After they have exhausted all their reasons, we must always listen to His decision.

Fénelon, whom Louis XIV called "le plus chimérique des beaux esprits de mon royaume," became entangled in a serious controversy with Bossuet over his *Maximes des Saints*, in which he expounded Madame Guyon's new form of mysticism. Religion had become for him a kind of immolation, a complete union with God, a disposition in which lay the grave danger of eliminating the Church as intermediary between the believer and his Creator. A bishop who adopted the doctrine of grace extolled by the suspect community of Port-Royal, and who sided with the violently persecuted Madame Guyon, was bound to be attacked by the stern defender of Catholic dogma, Bossuet, to whom a religion of emotional aloofness, a *piété distinguée*, meant the very antithesis of catholicity, amounting to intellectual pride and pious romanticism, apart from the danger of increasing the already threatening number of heretical sects. *Il y va de toute l'Eglise*, was Bossuet's verdict in his celebrated *Querelle du Quiétisme*. Fénelon's book was submitted to the Papal censorship and condemned. But though bowing as a faithful son of the Church to her decree, he could not dissociate himself from the

lasting influence Mysticism had exercised upon his mind and style. He became with Pascal the most impressionist writer of the golden age of French literature. The mystic had learned that " Everlasting love doth burn ere it transforms."

Until the eighteenth century French Mysticism was a religious sideline which had, however, left its traces upon style and picturesqueness of expression.

During the eighteenth century it virtually died in the lethal chamber of free thought. Rational criticism, the beginnings of the comparative study of religions, the evolution of science in the widest sense, had stunted the growth of mystical contemplation. The nineteenth century, despite its long-drawn-out *Kulturkampf* against the Church of Rome, ended in a revival of religious speculation and its reaction upon art and literature. But in a modified form; French thought had become so saturated with the atmosphere of the Romantic school that, after a brief apprenticeship in Parnassian and naturalistic experiments, it turned to a similar but more spiritually coloured movement, Symbolism, a form which has apparently come to stay. The best definition of Symbolism can be read in Mallarmé's *Enquête sur l'évolution litteraire* :

> To name an object means to suppress three parts of the enjoyment of a poem, an enjoyment which consists in gradually guessing its meaning. To suggest it, that is its dreamlike function. The perfect unfolding of the mystery constitutes the symbol. The poet evokes an object degree by degree in order to lay bare the complex of a soul or, inversely, he may choose an object, deriving from it that same complex and deciphering its essence step by step.

The technique of Symbolism may be summed up under four headings :

1. Its aversion to clearly defined forms, the logical corollary to the fluidity of vaguely felt emotions.

2. A predilection for music as helpmate of verbal expression : " *De la musique avant toute chose* " (Verlaine). Joubert, the author of a collection of finely chiselled *Pensées* and one of the forerunners of Symbolism, wished he could express his ideas in notes instead of in words.

3. The *vers libre* whose rhythm is to follow closely the impulse of the thought.

4. This structure, so intimately related to musical form, differs from that of the Romantic school by the stress which

a Verlaine lays on the individualistic (*soloist*) expression, whilst Victor Hugo's verse shines in the full glory of orchestral treatment, a difference often linking up Symbolism with Mysticism.

> My first fruits will I make thee taste on earth,
> The peace of heart, the joy of being poor,
> Those mystic evenings when the spirit feels
> Attuned to hopes of calm and thinks to drink
> The cup of endless bliss, promised by Me.
>
> (Paul Verlaine : *Sagesse.*)

The urge which all great artists feel to be away from the " madding crowd " and to be absorbed in contemplation, an echo from seventeenth-century Quietism, finds exquisite expression in a passage from Maeterlinck's *Trésor des humbles* :

> It would be wrong to believe that speech alone serves as means of communication between us. Books or language represent a soul just as much and as little as a number in a catalogue stands for a picture by Memling. The moment that we really have something to say, we are forced to become silent; and if we, in such a moment, resist the commands of the invisible and pressing orders of Silence, we have lost something for ever, something which the greatest treasures of human wisdom will never be able to restore. For we have thus lost the occasion to listen in to another soul and to add one moment of real life to ours. And to many a life such an occasion does not come twice.

To what an extent Pascal's influence is still being felt, even by poets of a strictly scientific bent, can be gathered from two passages by Sully Prudhomme :

> Our reason tells our heart : despair!
> No kindly light does o'er thee shine,
> See, evil reigneth everywhere!
> The heart says : Faith and Hope are mine!

And after a crisis of intellectual despair, mystic contemplation guides him into a haven of calm resignation : " I saw and felt at once the divinity of Jesus, and all the clouds which had up till then darkened the dogmas, seemed to me to fade away."

In a similar vein, Paul Claudel, the purest mystical poet of the Symbolist school, continues Pascal's and Fénelon's attitude towards the Infinite :

> Light is within us and darkness outside.
>
> (*La maison fermée.*)

And in the magnificent *Cantique de Mesa* :

No, no, my God!
I ask no more of you!
You are with me, that is enough!
But only do not speak to me
So that your child may understand.
He whom your silence has enthralled,
He wants no words to teach his soul.

The affinity between Claudel and Coventry Patmore, whom he translated, is obvious.

In order to show how deeply Symbolism has penetrated the mind and moulded the technique of one of the soberest thinkers of France, I will quote from Renan's delightful *Souvenirs d'enfance*. The young Breton was destined for the priesthood. Whilst studying at St. Sulpice, he soon discovered that he could not combine historical and philological research with dogmatic belief. He left St. Sulpice. But he could never separate his life as a scholar from the memories left in his heart by the kind, courteous and erudite priests who had guided his first steps. And these haunting memories re-echoed in the following lines :

> One of the most widely spread legends in Brittany tells of a fabulous city called Is, engulfed by the sea. They still point out, on several places of the coast, the site of that ancient city, and the fishermen tell you strange stories about it. On days of storm, they assert, one can see in the hollow of the waves the top of the church steeples ; and on calm days one hears the chimes of bells arising from the abyss intoning in their different voices the hymn of the day. I often think I have deep in my heart a city of Is from which ring bells intent on calling to Holy Mass those whilome believers whose ears have grown deaf to their call. Sometimes I stop to listen to those faint vibrations which seem to come out of infinite depths like voices from another world. Above all, as old age approaches, I rejoice when resting on a summer day, in listening to those far-away sounds from an Atlantis which is no more.

Thus we see how the seeds of Mysticism have borne fruit, not only in minds and hearts already prepared for this spiritual outlook, but in all those who in the isolation of their Ivory Tower live their dreams and, disdaining to capture the plaudits of the masses, follow Lucan's saying : *Humanum paucis vivit genus.*

M. JOUBERT.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

EUROPE ADRIFT.

AT the end of 1936 the main diplomatic speculation still centred on the possibility of major war in Europe. That sentence could have been written with equal truth a year ago with the only substitution of " 1935 " for " 1936." Two years still earlier, at the beginning of 1934, the prophets were also talking with equal earnestness of possible war. Memories are short. How many people can recapture in its realistic proportions the atmosphere created in October 1933, when Germany gave notice of her intention to secede from the League of Nations ; in December 1933, when Russia repudiated any intention of joining the League and Italy, by a Fascist Grand Council resolution, decided to leave the League unless that body were radically remodelled to her own prescription ; in July 1934, when Herr Dollfuss was murdered ; in March 1936, when Germany tore up the Treaty of Versailles ? If memories were not so short the scaremongers would have less grist for their mill. None the less there are few features of the year's diplomacy now ending that can be looked back upon with serenity except by those who have reached the truly philosophic stage in their personal evolution : namely, by those who regard disillusion and misery as God's particular way to wisdom. During the year the fragile bonds that still bind the several European governments to the form of peaceful relations have visibly weakened ; and the preparations for war have correspondingly strengthened. Never in the world's history have armaments equalled their present strength. The fact that Germany could now immediately put a million and a quarter trained and equipped men in the field and Russia two million—both forces being merely subsidiary to fleets of aeroplanes numbered in their thousands—is the measure of Europe's demoralisation ; for Germany and Russia have become the symbolic cleavage in Europe. The worsened relations of those two countries have indeed been a subject of increasingly depressing interest throughout the year.

It was Herr Hitler who fixed the first main landmark in the year's diplomacy. On March 7th he addressed the Reichstag. He made a series of proposals of which the presumptive object was to settle European diplomatic quarrels and put an

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end to the quickly recurring crises. On paper his proposals were, some of them, excellent. He offered a pact of non-aggression to France and Belgium for a period of twenty-five years, to be "guaranteed" by Britain and Italy. He suggested that Holland should become a party to it, if she chose. He also offered an air pact to prevent the danger of a sudden air attack. He offered to conclude with Germany's Eastern neighbours a series of non-aggression pacts on the lines of the existing pact with Poland. He even offered to return to the League of Nations.

But he did not confine his action to the making of peace proposals. Even as he spoke his troops were marching into the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland to occupy Düsseldorf, Cologne, Coblenz, Mainz and Frankfurt. And he denounced the Treaty of Locarno on the ground that that treaty had already in effect been destroyed by the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact the year before.

The most important result, becoming clearer as the year advanced, of what was done on March 7th, was Herr Hitler's joining issue with the Franco-Soviet Pact. He did so with the most detailed and elaborate argument. He stated that the pact was a military pact; that its consequences could not be foreseen; that it introduced a new Eastern European factor, of incalculable military connotation, into the European balance of power; and that "the threatening military power of the giant empire" (Russia) was thereby introduced into Central Europe "by way of Czechoslovakia, which has concluded a similar treaty with Russia." He argued that the French pact with Russia differed from the French treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, both because the latter were concluded within the framework of the League of Nations and because the force to which France bound herself by the pact was not the national force of Russia, but the conspiracy of world revolution as expounded and led by Russia. In the event of France going bolshevik, he argued, the decision to launch an attack would be made, not "by two different States from independent and objective points of view," but by an organisation whose headquarters were in Moscow. He laid stress on the "vast and powerful army" possessed by Russia—"highly mobile, well led, and ready to go into action at any time"—and made the distinction that though Germany could not attack Russia, "Russia will at any time be in a position to bring about a conflict with Germany by way of her outposts."

Herr Hitler therefore combined three things in one. He made peace proposals. He sent nineteen battalions of infantry, thirteen brigades of artillery, complete with tanks, aeroplanes, anti-aircraft guns and searchlights (i.e. a full fighting force) into the Rhineland zone. He tore up the Treaty of Locarno and threw the blame on French relations with Russia. Of the three things thus accomplished, only one had any real effect. His peace proposals were not even considered in Paris. If his proposals were sincerely made, why did he make it impossible that they should be even considered? The reoccupation of the Rhineland caused little agitation, for the greater agitation excludes the smaller, and the general situation was already so bad that a German army in occupation of the Rhineland zone really was a small matter. The important thing was the tearing up of the Locarno Treaty and the German issue with Russia. It dominated the whole course of high diplomacy during the rest of the year. It led immediately to a feverish series of conferences in London, Paris and Geneva. Within twenty-four hours France formally appealed to the League of Nations, and M. Sarraut broadcast an uncompromising opposition to the whole purpose of German diplomacy. On March 10th the representatives of Britain, France, Italy and Belgium met hurriedly in Paris. They produced one of the bitterest scenes known to European diplomacy since the war. Mr. Eden, accompanied by Lord Halifax, represented Great Britain. He had crossed the Channel in the undisguised hope that he might mediate between Germany and France. The moment he saw M. Flandin he recognised his mistake. So rigid was M. Flandin that Mr. Eden decided to riddle his own hopes, as it were, by putting this test question: "Would you [he asked M. Flandin] go to the length of military sanctions to resist this thing of Herr Hitler's?" M. Flandin's emotion was such that after a moment's struggle with himself he hissed out the single word "Oui!" Mr. Eden thereupon concentrated his efforts upon gaining time and having the meeting transferred to London.

It was across that same meeting in Paris that first fell the shadow of another important fact which was to exert a powerful influence before the year was out. M. Van Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister, made an impressive statement.

Before the war, he said, Belgium had been " guaranteed " her neutrality. That guarantee had been proved in 1914 to be worthless as a protection. After the war, in 1925, she was given another form of protection, namely, that of the Locarno Treaty. In its turn that guarantee of Belgian integrity had been destroyed. Herr Hitler, he said, had made the excuse that the Locarno Treaty had already in effect been destroyed by the Franco-Russian Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Yet Belgium had not made any pact with Russia.

Seven months later, on October 14th, King Leopold outlined to his Cabinet a policy of reversal to Belgium's former state of independent neutrality: a neutrality, that is, not guaranteed by any Great Power. Belgium, he stated, must in the future be free of alliances with any other State, must take her own military measures for self-defence and must refuse to lend her territory to any Power as a means of transit. There were those who in October added surprise to dismay as their reaction to King Leopold's statement. So much had happened in the intervening seven months that even normally well-informed people had forgotten March 10th.

The juridical discussion of the question whether or not the Franco-Russian Pact did violate the Locarno Treaty leads nowhere. It could be argued, on the one hand, that as a result of the pact's operation France might conceivably be dragged into warlike action against Germany, whereby she would in strict theory cause the Locarno Treaty to operate against herself; but, on the other hand, it could be argued that such a contingency could arise only as a result of a German aggression against Russia. The only practical consideration is that the pact was seized on in Berlin as an excuse for repudiating both Locarno and Versailles and for still further increasing German armaments.

The extent to which European diplomacy in 1936 lost even the pretence of its theoretic purpose was illustrated in the aftermath of the Paris meeting on March 10th. The adjourned meeting reassembled in London on March 12th. Two days later the League Council met, also in London. France and Belgium had in effect arraigned Germany before the Council of the League of Nations for violating both the Locarno Treaty and Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty by reoccupying the Rhineland. On March 14th the Council, acting on Article 4

of the Locarno Treaty, invited Germany to be present at the Council meetings. Herr Hitler telegraphed his acceptance on two conditions, namely, that Germany be given a status of equality before the Council and that a clear commitment be entered into that his peace proposals of March 7th be discussed as an integral whole and *alsbald*. A first-class diplomatic storm, involving the British, French, Belgian and German Governments, was created by a series of quibbling translations of the word *alsbald*. It is short for *alsobald*, equivalent to the French *aussitôt*, and means " as soon as may be." There is no exact English equivalent. In the English translation it was rendered " forthwith." The whole complicated machinery of government in four countries was put out of gear by that word " forthwith." It had to be emended to " in due course " before the machinery could be restarted. It had become difficult for ordinary plain people even to take much interest in the absurdities of high diplomacy. The absurdities were too ponderous for any sense of humour to raise its head. Herr Hitler had telegraphed his *alsbald* on March 15th. On the very next day Mr. Eden telegraphed to Berlin, wishing to do his bit for the cause. What he telegraphed was that he would do his best to promote a settlement by discussing both the Hitler and the other extant peace proposals " at the proper time " (i.e. *alsbald*). Yet no one even suspected it to be flippant. It was not flippant. The jest was an accident. On March 18th Herr von Ribbentrop appeared before the League Council as Germany's representative. Out of its context such an event looks better than in fact it was. All that happened was that Herr von Ribbentrop repeated the German thesis that the Franco-Russian Pact had " terminated " the Locarno Treaty and that therefore the Locarno obligation to honour Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles no longer bound Germany. The non-German Locarno Powers decided to submit the German thesis to the World Court, thereby adding unreality to unreality, and submitted certain Four-Power proposals to Germany. In their turn the Four Powers made proposals which they knew Germany would not accept. One of them was that pending the discussion of the several sets of proposals then afloat an international force should occupy a strip of German territory along the French and Belgian frontiers. Herr von Ribbentrop flew to Berlin (March 21st)

and back to London (March 24th), bringing nothing but a repetition of his former thesis and a rejection of the proposal about an international force on German territory. He and Herr Dieckhoff were mostly engaged in flying to and from Berlin, but they did contrive to hold a further conversation with Mr. Eden and Lord Cranborne on March 27th.

The German elections having taken place on March 29th and Herr Hitler having obtained his 100 per cent., less 1 per cent. for appearances and for spoilt papers, Herr von Ribbentrop again flew to London on March 31st and rejected the Four-Power proposals. In his turn he submitted a grandiose peace plan, echeloned over wide stages, beginning with a diplomatic armistice, progressing to the negotiation of security pacts and ending with negotiation for disarmament and economic co-operation. No one really took any of the proposals seriously. There was some desultory recrimination over the rival advantages of achieving the common end by two stages (as suggested by the Four Powers) or by three (as suggested by Germany), but as no one had any intention of reaching the common end, by any number of stages, the arguments were all impartially unconvincing.

Appended to the Four-Power proposals aforesaid was an agreed letter to the effect that should the suggested negotiations not lead to agreement with Germany the general staffs of Britain, France and Belgium should consult about common military plans. But when Mr. Eden on April 3rd announced to the House of Commons that the letter had been delivered to the French and Belgian Governments he disclosed the fact that a covering letter had prescribed three provisos, one of them being that the staff talks implied no new commitment. Few episodes in the diplomacy of our time before or since the Great War have been more preposterously lacking in sense of any sort than what took place in the spring of 1936. In the middle of it, as if symbolically, Leopold von Hoesch, the German Ambassador, and one of the good men, died suddenly (April 10th). He had gone to Paris at the worst phase of Franco-German ill-feeling in 1921. He did much to improve the atmosphere from that of the Ruhr occupation of 1923 to that of the Locarno Treaty of 1925. He largely contributed to the Stresemann-Briand spirit. It seemed wholly right that he took no part in the hubbub that was being exhibited in the spring of 1936, and his passing seemed to have a ceremonial quality.

One of the few good things done during the year by the League of Nations was done on April 8th. France had demanded a formal meeting of the non-German Locarno Powers to "establish" Germany's default. That way lay danger. For that reason the British Government resisted the French demand. The accident that the League's Committee of Thirteen had to meet in Geneva on April 8th gave the opportunity for informal talks between the non-German Locarno Powers, whereby the formal meeting was side-tracked. But the good thereby done was somewhat modified by the circumstance that the Committee of Thirteen was theoretically concerned with the Italo-Abyssinian war; and one of the important European uncertainties was whether Italy was to be irrevocably driven into the German camp. The committee was charged with the duty of exploring the possibility of bringing the war in Abyssinia to an end by peaceful means, and was still intent upon that object when the war came to its own end. It was on May 5th that Marshal Badoglio ceremonially entered Addis Ababa, and Signor Mussolini announced in the Piazza Venezia that "Abyssinia is Italian." Italian sovereignty was formally imposed on Abyssinia on May 9th. For the rest of the year the British and French Governments were engaged upon an attempt to undo the harm done to Italo-British relations.

By the summer of 1936 another bitter wind blew across Europe from the East. It was felt in France, Belgium and Spain. Until May France had been untouched by the social revolution which for a generation had radiated from Moscow. At the beginning of May a French general election produced a majority of the *Front Populaire*, consisting of Socialists, Radical-Socialists and Communists. Thereafter France passed through an anxious period of strikes and quasi-revolutionary upheaval. Belgium went through a like phase. In Spain the *Frente Popular* had been returned to power in February, and democracy in that country survived for only five more months. The night of July 17th-18th, when a military revolt broke out in Morocco against the Republican Government of Spain, heralded a protracted period of civil war whose repercussions were to be felt throughout Europe. When in the last week of August a Russian Ambassador arrived secretly in Madrid, the die was cast for a bitter struggle which split Europe into two camps. Cleavages are seldom clear cut in their contour, but

in the main it was the case that one of the factions now revealed centred round the communists of Moscow and the other round the so-called anti-communists of Berlin. Little attempt at any rate was made either in Moscow or in Berlin to disguise the importance to themselves of what was taking place in Spain. On August 11th Mr. Stalin issued a decree whereby the age of military service in Russia was reduced from 21 to 19. On August 24th Herr Hitler countered by decreeing that the period of military service in Germany be doubled from one to two years. By the end of the year most of the diplomatic forces in Europe were trained upon the war in Spain. It had ceased to be a civil war. It had become an international war in disguise. Russia and France on one side, Germany and Italy on the other, were openly engaged in it. The fantastic microcosm of the Spanish war was fought out in the Locarno room of the British Foreign Office. The "International Committee for the Application of the Agreement regarding Non-Intervention in Spain" first met on September 9th. There never was any "agreement" not to intervene. Even if there had been, no one could say that it was ever applied. For four months, the while war raged in Spain with increasing fury, the Committee regularly met: wrangling, manœuvring, jockeying for position. General Franco started his assault on Madrid at the beginning of November. Señor Caballero fled from the city on November 7th. A week later, because Madrid did not promptly fall, he returned. During the following two months the military situation in Spain was caught in suspense, the nationalists subjecting the capital to incessant bombardment, the communists stubbornly refusing to evacuate even the ruins of the former city. By the middle of December one-third of the city had been evacuated. The rest was for the most part in ruins. General Franco gave warning by leaflets dropped from the air that the women and children should be concentrated in the north-east of the town so that they could be spared the shells and bombs. Instead, the defending strategists arranged that the military headquarters be transferred to the protected quarter and the women and children distributed through the danger zones. Such a tactic could cause no surprise except to those who are incapable of thinking realistically about war. There was nothing worse in it than normally takes place in war. The Russian Embassy was guarded day and night by sentries

with fixed bayonets: a fact which perhaps illustrated the true quality of Russia's "diplomacy" in Spain.

Only the British Government pursued its grim determination not to take part in the Spanish war. Russia had been the first to intervene. Germany and Italy followed. Next, France began substantially to contribute to the so-called international defence force fighting on the side of Madrid. In December the Merchant Shipping (Carriage of Munitions to Spain) Bill came before the House of Commons. It expressed the Government's persistent refusal to grant belligerent rights to either side. The dilemma was not merely one of form. The British Government had undertaken not to intervene in the Spanish war, and at the same time virtually refused to recognise that there was a Spanish war. That formal difficulty was overcome by the jurists (as almost any difficulty can be overcome by the jurists) in a quite simple way. They launched this sort of argument: "there is no war in Spain; but if there is, we won't intervene." In much the same sort of way counsel defending a client accused of murder is allowed to plead: not guilty, and in the alternative guilty, etc. But there was another sort of difficulty. British ships outside the three-mile limit were instructed not to concede the right of search to any non-British ship. If British ships refused such a right on the ground that the British Government refused to "recognise" the belligerents, what was to prevent a like refusal to British ships engaged on the high seas in the future contingency of a British war, especially when the new precedent in international war had been established by the British Government itself? The distinction between "civil" war and "international" war seems to be obliterated when outside governments are implicated and when those governments variously recognise one side or the other as the legitimate government of the country in which the war is taking place.

On November 18th it was simultaneously announced in Berlin and in Rome that Germany and Italy recognised the Burgos administration as the Government of Spain. It was nearly three months earlier that the Russian Ambassador arrived in Madrid, just a week before the Caballero camarilla was formed. Señor Caballero had no more democratic sanction behind him than had General Franco. Moreover in the prevailing circumstances of a no-longer disguised intervention

by Russia, Germany, Italy, and even by France, it seemed unlikely that the British Government could really contribute to whatever hope might remain of non-intervention by merely decreeing that munitions should not be carried to Spain in British bottoms. Indeed such a decree was bound to provide an incentive to virtual intervention by offering an indirect inducement to British ships to risk a racket on behalf of one side only in the war. Any ship carrying, say, munitions to Barcelona for the Reds would be liable to challenge by the Nationalist-Spanish, German and Italian authorities alike. But a ship carrying arms for Spanish nationalists would be liable to challenge only from Russian ships. A premium was thereby placed upon a one-way traffic. And the very fact of the international non-intervention committee sitting in London disproved the contention that the Spanish war was merely a " civil " war.

While Russia was incessantly engaged in landing tanks, munitions and men at Barcelona and Germany was sending " volunteers " to the other side—for instance, on December 1st it became known that 5,000 Germans had landed at Cadiz —the London committee pursued its stormy, but amusing, course. On November 23rd the Chairman's subcommittee met with the object (as had been generally expected) of submitting to the two sides in Spain an agreed plan of control over the admission of foreign supplies or personnel into that country. It was the German and Italian delegates who proposed that the plan be submitted to the two belligerents for approval in principle before it were elaborated in detail. That proposal seemed to be reasonable. But the Russian delegate, interpreting no doubt as his main general instruction the duty to resist anything that was done or said by the German or Italian delegates, strongly objected to the proposal. He demanded that the plan be elaborated in all its details before being sent to Spain for approval. Now it happened that although a detailed agreement had already been reached about the proposed methods of preventing ships from reaching harbours or of land supplies crossing the frontiers, the precise method of controlling the passage of aeroplanes into Spain had not been thought out. It was not an easy thing to do. On the Russian demand, however, the German and Italian delegates agreed to obtain their government's views on the matter of air-control, and hoped to receive an answer by November 27th. By

that date, however, when the subcommittee again met, neither answer had been received. Both Berlin and Rome claimed that so complicated a matter needed more than two or three days for consideration. Lord Plymouth for his part, speaking not as chairman but as British delegate, reported that the British Government in its turn was not yet ready with detailed proposals about control in the air. Thereupon to the general confusion (but not surprise) the Russian delegate changed his ground. He now demanded that the scheme as a whole be at once sent to Spain without waiting for its elaboration in detail. The subcommittee, however, decided that as the views of Berlin and Rome on the details of air-control had been invited and had been promised, it was better now to wait till they were received. Russia thereupon complained inside the committee and advertised outside that Germany and Italy (Britain ought logically to have been added, but it was no part of Russia's purpose to attack Britain) were blocking the proposal for the control of intervention in Spain. Yet the particular proposal now in question was in fact originally made by Germany and Italy and blocked by Russia. Certain newspapers of the British Left the next morning duly, almost dutifully, launched into criticism of Germany and Italy in that sense.

The committee did indeed draft an academic series of rival theories in the matter of air-control, and the resultant document became an element in the committee's routine agenda. On December 3rd at the committee's request the British Government transmitted to Spain a certain document about the proposed scheme of control, but it contained no reference to the factor of air-control. The document was addressed to the British Ambassador at Hendaye and to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid for transmission to Burgos and to Valencia. It invited the two administrations to approve in principle the notion of preventing the admission of foreign supplies and men by land or sea (not by air). But as the combatants were mainly foreign and their munitions and supplies equally foreign the ceremony of suggesting the exclusion of foreigners was not a performance which impressed anybody inside or outside of Spain. What was interesting was the behaviour of Senhor de Calheiros, the Portuguese delegate, when the committee on December 2nd debated the question of transmitting so innocuous a document to Spain. He refused

to vote. Lord Plymouth from the chair asked him if he had any objection to the proposal. The answer was no. Then did Portugal object to its being sent to Spain? Again, no. Was Portugal therefore not in favour of its being sent? No. In the end the committee had to accept the stern and rigid policy of Portuguese non-intervention in the affairs of the non-intervention committee.

The very weariness which afflicted European diplomatic thought at the end of the year was perhaps in disguise a blessing. Throughout the year European demoralisation had grown worse. On December 11th, for instance, the Council of the League of Nations met in Geneva to receive an appeal from the Madrid camarilla under Article XI of the Covenant. The unreality of the thing was expressed in the embarrassed silence in which Señor del Vayo, the "Foreign Minister" of Madrid, was heard, and in the weary tone of Lord Cranborne's recital of "the main, melancholy, unanswerable fact" that foreign intervention in Spain was a rampant reality on both sides.

The abdication of King Edward VIII and the accession of George VI in London gave an added respite to European troubles. While the nations of Europe were gazing in open-mouthed wonder at the unconcerned way in which these things are done by the British people, their thoughts were temporarily rescued from their more usual nightmares. The respite perhaps did good. But the really interesting fact about general diplomatic opinion at the end of the year was that though the condition of Europe had steadily worsened and was now almost one of chaos, yet there were not many people who in their hearts believed that the war was any nearer. The crises were too many and too unpredictable. Explosions occur when pressure meets counter-pressure and there is no outlet. But if there be a whole series of outlets? If Russia and Germany can blaze at each other across their frontiers in oratorical frenzy; if their delegates can abuse each other to their hearts' content in the Locarno Room of the British Foreign Office week after week; if they can send aeroplanes, "volunteers," tanks and guns to Spain in any quantity: why should they engage in any other sort of war? Thunderstorms are let loose, not in periods of foul weather, but in periods of settled calm and serenity.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

December 15th, 1936.

No. 424. *January 1937.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S FIFTH.*

The vital spark that sent Mr. Lloyd George into the world some seventy years ago is surely one of the most intense manifestations known to human experience. The fine head, firm mouth, and brilliant eyes seem to symbolise a dynamic quality that can never apparently be exhausted or even diminished. Here is the fifth volume of a monumental work which has now passed the 3,000-page mark and which is being turned out with a speed and a quality of writing which themselves put a hall-mark on the author's intellectual stamina. He unfolds his story with the particular detail which he alone can command. There is no evidence of tiredness or nausea. Most men who have been through what he went through in the last years of the war would long ago have been "gaga"; would have lost some of their grip; would have discovered their memory tottering under the appalling strain. Not so Mr. Lloyd George. He writes with all the verve, freshness and mastery of a virile mind in the very prime of its form.

No one can read this unending flow of Mr. Lloyd George's memoirs without falling for their fascination. But it is a horrible fascination. There is something deeply depressing about the energy, clarity of thought and zeal of work which has been trained upon the job of recording in such detail what Mr. Lloyd George experienced and knew of the greatest war in history. Indeed, the remarkable thing is that one reads

* *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*. Vol. V. Ivor Nicholson & Watson. 21s. net.

through each succeeding thousand pages of this work with increasing interest and increasing exasperation.

The present instalment of 600 pages merely covers the events of the early months of 1918. Those events, it is true, were probably as concentrated as any that have ever taken place in the history of the world. We are given the inside story of the critical military situation, of the Russian development of the Bolshevik element in European affairs, of the way in which the united command was achieved on the Western Front, of the part played by Haig in the disastrous events which preceded the unity of command under Foch, of Mr. Wilson's diplomatic effect, and of the military effect of the American armies.

In this whole series of volumes so far published nothing can exceed in its bizarre interest Mr. Lloyd George's criticism of the American military contribution to the progress of the war. He does not beat about the bush. He describes how bungling and incompetent was the organisation of the American armies, "though there were no braver or more fearless men in any army." He describes the appalling fiasco of America's attempt to manufacture aeroplanes, and comments, "The same tale of fussy muddle can be repeated in the matter of guns, light and heavy, for the new American army."

This passage exemplifies Mr. Lloyd George's style:

> "No American aeroplanes were sent across the Atlantic during the whole of 1917. Even during the great battles of April, May and June 1918, American aviators had to fly in French machines for they had none of their own. It was July 1918, before the paragon was fully developed and then it turned out no better than, in fact not as good as, the thousands with which the British and French aviators had already won the command of the air before the 'Liberty' machines had left the workshop or even the draughtsman's table.
>
> "When the Armistice was signed on November 11th, half the aeroplanes used by the American Army were of French and British make."

The author's capacity for impersonal detachment has seldom been better illustrated than in these few words about President Wilson: "He knew nothing about war. Why should he? It was not his training, nor his temperament. He certainly had no delight in it." Mr. Lloyd George is an

artist in the sense that his concern at any moment can be made by him into a complete obsession. That no doubt is why he won such a reputation as an effective prosecutor of the war. He can be equally effective as a militarist or as a pacifist. He can give his enthusiasm to whatever job of work he happens to have on hand whether warlike or peaceful. When writing of the war and the part he played in it he can, without any suspicion that he is being odd, write of someone not "having any delight" in it.

And then it happens to be the case that Mr. Lloyd George was directly responsible for the biggest financial muddle known to the history of the world. Mr. Lloyd George knows little and cares less about finance. There are those who claim ignorance of finance as a virtue, and that is interesting from many points of view. But it was Mr. Lloyd George who built the fantastic financial superstructure of the war which was destined to crash with devastating effect at a later date. In the present volume we read the almost blood-curdlingly light-hearted remark that America's "financial and economic assistance was from the outset invaluable"; nothing more than that about one of the most appalling and most disastrous things ever done by anybody.

Even now Mr. Lloyd George does not seem to appreciate his own financial handiwork. One is reminded of the story of the Englishman who, on the strength of a short visit to New York, received the impression that the American language contained only two adjectives, namely "swell" and "lousy," and that the adjective "swell" was a lousy adjective, but the adjective "lousy" was a swell adjective. There are only two adjectives that adequately describe Mr. Lloyd George's work: "fascinating" and "exasperating," and the fascinating part is as exasperating as the exasperating part is fascinating.

G. G.

* * * * *

MARLBOROUGH IN SUCCESS.*

The second volume of Mr. Winston Churchill's biography of Marlborough concluded with the main summer campaign of 1705, and now he continues his narrative down to the

* *Marlborough, His Life and Times.* Vol. III. By the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill. Harrap. 25s. net.

famous siege of Lille, at the end of 1708, which followed upon the victory of Oudenarde. Mr. Churchill had purposed to complete his work in this third volume, but the three and a half momentous years which it covers deserve the long and careful treatment which the author provides. The reader may enjoy with confidence the swing and eloquence of Mr. Churchill's style. His mastery of words, combined with his capacity for characterisation, analysis and description, and his erudition and selection of material, raises this work to the top rank of historical biography.

The years 1705-8 show Marlborough at the height of his reputation, both as soldier and politician. At home his statesmanship was continually exerted in the support of the Ministry, upon whose existence the successful issue of the war depended. The General Election of 1705 returned a Whig predominance in Parliament fully resolved to prosecute the war. Upon Whig support Godolphin and Marlborough became necessarily dependent, and unwittingly the protagonists in the constitutional issues which ensued from the Whig majority. The party system was still in its infancy, and the theory that the predominant party in the Commons should provide the members of the Ministry was a novel proposition. Whig insistence upon representation was the logical consequence of Parliamentary sovereignty, but it was strongly resisted by Anne. Mr. Churchill is at pains to show how decisive Marlborough's influence and position were in the appointment of Sunderland and in Harley's fall. In the latter event, Anne " was beaten by Marlborough's prestige without the slightest distortion of the Constitution, without a vote, without even an address. She submitted only with undying resentment. She never forgot and she never forgave." The Queen's latent Tory sympathy rose to a passion, inflamed by Harley and Mrs. Masham. The rise of Abigail and the decline of " Mrs. Freeman " are discussed at length by Mr. Churchill, who infers that the final and complete estrangement flowed more from the bitterness of Sarah than from the resentment of Anne.

In dealing with the campaigns, Mr. Churchill views comprehensively the whole area of the war, stressing the strategical importance of the Navy and describing in detail operations, such as Eugene's relief of Turin, the fighting in Spain and the Toulon expedition, in which Marlborough had no

personal share, apart from his great influence upon, and assistance in, the general strategic conceptions of the Allied campaigns. The operations of 1706 and 1708 are witness to his military genius equally as a tactician and strategist, as a manipulator of troops and as a supreme opportunist. With the battles of Ramillies and Oudenarde and the campaigns which succeeded them, particularly the operations round Lille, Mr. Churchill deals at length, with great care and the assistance of numerous maps and diagrams. But here and there, inevitably, some point of fact or emphasis, some matter of speculation, may be questioned. Ramillies was a fine example of Marlborough's favourite tactical manœuvre of a feint attack followed by a rapid transference of troops thence to another vital sector where an overwhelming pressure could be exerted. Marlborough had divided his cavalry between the wings, and the battle was opened by an Allied attack across a marshy depression and up a slope, westward, against the French left wing. To this sector Villeroi's attention was devoted, and at critical moments Marlborough ordered the transfer of his cavalry across to his left wing. Mr. Hilaire Belloc has pointed out that the success of this transfer was largely due to the cavalry moving along the *west* side of this depression so as to be unseen and unsuspected by Villeroi stationed above on the higher ground ; a point of which Mr. Churchill takes little account.

The battle of Oudenarde was, of course, the product of a brilliant strategical surprise ; and the nature of the engagement, including " the looseness and flexibility of all the formations, the improvised and wide-ranging manœuvres, and, above all, the encircling movement of the Allies," leads Mr. Churchill to regard it as " a specimen of modern war," unique in the eighteenth century and foreshadowing Tannenburg. Could Marlborough have possessed long-range weapons to cover the gaps in his net, as complete a victory as Hindenburg's might not have been forestalled by the fall of darkness. In any event Marlborough was favoured by the confusion in the French command. Speculation has followed from the failure of the Duke of Burgundy to execute Vendôme's order to attack in overwhelming force the Allied right wing before it had been sufficiently reinforced by the troops still crossing the river Eyne. Mr. Churchill wisely refrains from speculating on the consequences which " no one can pretend to measure,"

though Mr. Belloc boldly contends that at the most the attack would have only neutralised the issue by threatening the bridges and preventing the enveloping action of the Allied left wing.

Mr. Churchill carefully displays Marlborough's magnanimity, selflessness and loyalty during these years of success. "It is Marlborough's true glory that the higher his fortune, the higher rose his virtue." He had, for example, chosen a subordinate part in the 1706 campaign, and only "fortune's gift" threw Ramillies in his way. He declined the offer of Viceroy of the Netherlands and £60,000 a year to appease the Dutch and preserve the Alliance. He added his own principality of Mindelheim to the bait designed for Max Emmanuel of Bavaria's desertion from Louis XIV. In 1708 Marlborough's activities in frustration of the Jacobite Raid showed him a loyal and zealous supporter of the Protestant Succession. Generosity and loyalty in prosperity are by no means the highest tests of character, and later, as the author remarks, "Marlborough's conduct contracted with his power." We shall await with interest Mr. Churchill's estimate of his declining years.

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A GERMAN DIPLOMATIST.*

Writing in old age, but in full possession of his faculties, Count Bernstorff looks back on a lifetime of devoted service to his country. Diplomacy was in his blood, for his father was German Ambassador in London, and the family has a long and distinguished record of public work. He holds a high place in the comparatively short list of German Liberals who have combined ardent patriotism with democratic and international sentiments. He has had enemies and critics, but he can look them squarely in the face. Many apologies are at once too detailed and too strident in tone. The present volume, suitably dedicated to "my dear brave wife," is commendably brief and free from aggressive self-righteousness.

That the author was against us in the World War was his misfortune, not his fault. "Ever since I came to the use of my political reason," he writes in his opening pages, "it was my desire that Germany should live in amity with England. I considered an understanding was attainable, provided

* *The Memoirs of Count Bernstorff.* Heinemann. 21s.

Germany were content to be a Land Power of the first rank, and did not want to attain the same position as a Sea Power." This was the sound Bismarckian principle of limited liability, which the short-sighted Kaiser, Bülow and Tirpitz threw to the winds. All the more essential was England's friendship since an understanding with France appears to our author, as it appeared to Bismarck, impossible. Frederick the Great, Stein and Bismarck, he declares, are the only Germans who scored substantial successes, "politics being a sphere in which our country has been so unlucky." The chapter entitled "Years of Apprenticeship," which describes the writer's experiences in various capitals, is particularly interesting where he sketches the leading actors on the German diplomatic stage. Metternich, the fearless Ambassador in London, comes out best. Eckardstein, who "only by an oversight and very occasionally spoke the truth," and whom Metternich described as the greatest political mountebank he ever met, receives the hardest blows.

The chapter on Washington summarises his own well-known volume on his work in America during the war, and adds material on the six happy years before the breaking of the storm. If Germany's costliest error before the cataclysm was the estrangement of England by the *Flottenpolitik*, her greatest blunder after its outbreak, next to the attack on Belgium, was to compel the intervention of the United States. All that man could do to avert the calamity Count Bernstorff did, but his labours were in vain. Bethmann was weak as wax and the Kaiser had ceased to count. "It was our political inadequacy that led us into the abyss—a political inadequacy that left us helpless at the mercy of an incompetent military dictatorship." The Ambassador, who knew the boundless strength of the United States better than anybody at Berlin, fought against the launching of the unlimited submarine campaign at the opening of 1917. The soldiers and sailors promised salvation: the civilians knew that they were presenting victory to their foes. "The war was decided in Washington."

It is interesting to learn that Bernstorff was proposed by Bethmann as his successor in the Chancellorship when the Hamlet of German politics was evicted by Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The Kaiser was ready, but the military chiefs vetoed the plan, for he had the reputation of desiring to make

peace and reform the Constitution. He accepted the Embassy at Constantinople, where he learned to like and admire Talaat, the Grand Vizier, and where he dreamed of transforming Turkey into a German Egypt. But the Germans had made themselves unpopular during the war, and Turkey collapsed before her mighty patron. No one could foresee that, after the struggle was over, a smaller but far more homogeneous Turkey would shape her own destinies without external tutelage.

The end of the war was also the end of Bernstorff's diplomatic career. The remainder of the book is devoted to his activities in the Reichstag and at Geneva. He speaks with affection of Prince Max of Baden, who, had he been called to office a year sooner, might have secured a reasonable peace and preserved the monarchy. His task was hopeless from the start, for the army was beaten and the ruler could not see beyond the end of his nose. " If the Kaiser had abdicated in good time, his grandson would have been on the throne to-day." All books on modern Germany are a story of lost opportunities—not on one side alone—and the present volume is as depressing as the rest. " In my capacity as President for many years of the German League of Nations Union, which came into existence even before the League was founded, I can testify that the idea of a League was active in Germany when the League was formed, and that we were prepared to go considerably further in the realisation of the League idea than is done in the Covenant." The author worked in complete harmony with Stresemann till his lamented death in 1929. But no one could undo the mischief of a vindictive peace treaty, and when the Briand era began in 1924 it was, though we knew it not, too late. To-day we are all paying the penalty of the crimes and follies so vividly described in these pages.

G. P. G.

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THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS.*

This is one of the most important books about American foreign policy and about international affairs which has come out in recent years. The author was Secretary of State in President Hoover's Cabinet, 1929-33.

* *The Far Eastern Crisis : Recollections and Observations.* By Henry L. Stimson. New York. Harper & Bros. Distributed in Great Britain and Europe by The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 15s. net.

Mr. Stimson, a man of courage and determination, as well as of vision, made a sustained effort, during the Sino-Manchurian crisis of 1931-2, to associate the United States, within the utmost limits permitted by American opinion and tradition, in active co-operation with the League of Nations. In doing this, Mr. Stimson obviously took considerable risks from the point of view of American party politics ; for American public opinion is naturally highly sensitive towards any possibility of foreign " entanglement." The political situation was unfavourable because, in the economic depression which was developing, the question of the payment (or rather the non-payment) of European debt to the United States was inflaming public opinion there. The alarming circumstances of the economic depression in 1931-2 absorbed most of President Hoover's time and attention. Nevertheless he thoroughly understood the Far Eastern Question, and cordially supported Mr. Stimson's efforts for generous and active collaboration with the other nations in world affairs.

In Mr. Stimson's view, the governing facts of the situation in the Far East were that though the United States was not a member of the League of Nations, it was a signatory of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris of 1928. By the Nine Power Treaty, the United States, Great Britain, Japan and others (all, except the United States, members of the League of Nations) agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China ; and to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges there. The Pact of Paris was signed by practically all the States members of the League of Nations, as well as by the United States. In this treaty the signatories agreed that the settlement of disputes of whatever nature which might arise between them would never be sought except by peaceful means.

Mr. Stimson's active policy of collaboration began, after the opening of the crisis when the Japanese occuped Mukden on September 19th, 1931, with an American representative sitting in the Council of the League of Nations. Mr. Prentiss Gilbert in this case was not, as previously, merely an observer. He was instructed by Mr. Stimson " to participate in the discussions of the Council when they relate to the possible application of the Kellogg-Briand Pact."

On January 7th, 1932, Mr. Stimson proceeded to enunciate what has since been known as the "Hoover-Stimson Doctrine," to the effect that the United States would not recognise any situation brought about contrary to the Pact of Paris. This note of January 7th was communicated to the British and French Governments before being presented to the Chinese and Japanese Governments and being published in the Press. At the same time Mr. Stimson requested the British and French Governments to take similar action. The British Government declined. The French Government then informally told Mr. Stimson that, in view of the attitude of the British Government, it would not make the *démarche* towards Japan which it and other signatories of the Nine Power Treaty had been considering.

Mr. Stimson's next effort at international collaboration was made after the Japanese bombarded and attacked Chapei, a suburb of Shanghai, in January and February 1932. Mr. Stimson thought that this would bring the British Secretary of State round to his view. At the suggestion of President Hoover, Mr. Stimson called up Sir John Simon, who was at Geneva, and spoke with him over the telephone on February 11th and 12th. On that day, February 12th, at Sir John Simon's request (according to Mr. Stimson's account), he cabled a provisional draft for a joint declaration against the infringement of the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. Stimson adds: "I talked with the Foreign Minister on the same subject at London [by telephone] on February 13th and February 15th, and while no explicit refusal to my suggestion was ever made, I finally became convinced from his attitude in those conversations that for reasons satisfactory to it, and which I certainly had no desire to inquire into or criticise, the British Government felt reluctant to join in such a *démarche*. I therefore pressed it no further."

There is much more in this deeply interesting book, including a record of a visit which Mr. Stimson made to Geneva in order to arrange American collaboration. How the opportunity, so bountifully offered, for British-American collaboration, was let slip, or rather, as it seems, thrice declined, cannot be completely explained until the British side of the story is made public. We can be quite sure, of course, that it was not done without careful consideration.

R. B. MOWAT.

THE VINDICATION OF VOLTAIRE.*

Only an English Catholic like Mr. Noyes, and a poet, could have vindicated with such effect the memory of Voltaire. He shows how the latter, in self-defence, which grew to include that of his fellow-men, pitted against the *ancien régime* the learning and ironic wit which its supporters admired. In verse, essay, tale and epigram he conveyed scathing ridicule of its pretensions and attraction to ideals which endangered them. So individuals (like Frederick of Prussia) found themselves alternately adoring and detesting him. He was outrageously flattered one brief hour and more outrageously imprisoned, threatened with arrest or exiled during the next. The grimmest irony associated with his name was the nature of the revolution which immediately succeeded his death and liberating efforts. Mr. Noyes is rightly preoccupied with their permanent effects—*sub specie æternitatis*—but he appears to disregard temporary consequences of the Voltairean movement, on which "transformed and transfigured" he sets such high hopes. Its founder's genius was kindled by the resolve to destroy "persecuting and privileged orthodoxy in general" (*écrasez l'infâme*) and to scatter the darkness it engendered in diverse fields. In this contest between light and darkness evolved the sinister legend of Voltaire for which the enemy was largely responsible. In an illuminating appreciation of Voltaire's tragedies which once thrilled Paris, the author records innocuous lines torn from their context which served the purpose of vilifiers while they attributed to the same source the subversive utterances and vices of others. But Voltaire himself was also to blame. He could or would not restrain his cynical mockery. At times, as the author contends, it was to protect his inner self; at others it was reckless giving rein to a pugnacious exuberance which even "the characteristic humour of Catholicism" has not prevented the initiated from misinterpreting! Fascinated or repelled, men have refused to penetrate farther, like the contemporary critics of whom he complained; and he would have been more disconcerted by later reactions, in a different environment, to his method of discrediting the claims on which tyranny relied. He protested that he only attacked superstition—"car pour la religion, je l'aime et la respecte"; but to others the distinc-

* *Voltaire.* By Alfred Noyes. Sheed & Ward. 12s. 6d. net.

tion has seemed arbitrary or less clear although it would no to Old Testament prophets.

Viewed from the perspective of to-day, when intellectual join with those who would fetter them in stressing the in adequacy of reason and the light it sheds, Voltaire is seen tc be a conserver. His belief in a Supreme Being and the guidance of reason is illustrated by quotations and the author's enlightening comments. "His religion reduced tc its simplest terms was adoration and self-annihilation before the mystery of God."

> The theist, he wrote, is not rash enough to flatter himself that he knows how God acts; but he knows that God does act and that He is just. . . . We ought to say "our God," and by that we mean the Master and Preserver of our lives, and the object of our thoughts.

In refuting atheism he coined some of his most pregnant epigrams. "Either the stars themselves are great geometricians or the eternal Geometer has arranged them."

Unable to accept the divinity of Our Lord he sincerely professed Christian ethic, as he showed when he had a chance of practising it at Ferney. How that prayer of his epitomises a protest during centuries! "I am no Christian; but this is only that I may love Thee better." His passion for justice still scorches the conscience of men as it once did on behalf of Calas; and "his hope" was based upon "the development of our being into a new order of things" in a life to come.

His errors and limitations are obvious to our age, and to a large extent the author recognises them, stressing the blindness to the effects of Jewish religious genius; but on other occasions, such as the ignoring of Pascal's mysticism, he will not admit lack of vision. The motives of Voltaire's Communion at Colmar and listening to Mass at Cirey may well be as he suggests. It is significant that Voltaire loved and was grateful to the Jesuit teachers of his youth. His need of and constancy in friendship are shown; and the author's view of his relations with Madame du Châtelet seems more convincing than that of French critics. How imbued he was with the contemporary convenances is revealed by his fear of priests throwing his dead body "into the sewers" and the death-bed scene which that dread invoked. Mr. Noyes' enthusiasm for his faith and his subject may provoke dissent and qualification at times; but the portrayal it inspires is far more vital and penetrating than the art of biographers who lack such enthusiasm.

D. P. H.

GERMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT.*

We welcome Dr. Aris's notable book on two grounds. One is that it combines German political thought and history from 1789 to 1815 with pith and with power. A vital understanding of this history is required for a proper grasp of this book, and such understanding the author possesses and passes on to his readers. The second ground is that Dr. Gooch, in his appreciative Foreword, tells us that the author means to continue his studies to the eve of the World War. We hope with all our heart that the welcome afforded to his first instalment will be so warm that Dr. Aris will be induced to set before us the whole course of German political thought during the last century and a quarter. He has taken in hand a vastly important task, and his first volume attests his skill. His lucidity is at least as remarkable as his learning. From first page to last the English of his book runs with an ease difficult to believe. On two small points we offer slight criticism. The index is scarcely full enough. There is generally a bibliography at the end of each chapter. Can the author indicate in future volumes the worth or the worthlessness of some of the volumes in his bibliography?

Dr. Aris is of course acquainted with the writings of the different authors whose works he examines, but he is also as familiar with the general literature as he is with the history of Germany for the quarter of a century which he sets before us for our consideration. After a short introduction he deals with Enlightenment and Revolution in Part One. The actions and interactions of the French Revolution on Germany are fully considered, though he inevitably tends to regard it as rather a European Revolution than one simply French. Then comes a careful consideration of the political ideas of Kant, of Fichte in his Jacobin youth, of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and of the classicists such as Goethe and Schiller. Throughout this part we are conscious of the pervasive influence of the conception of Natural Law and all that it meant to German thinkers towards the close of the eighteenth century. Incidentally, it discloses the slight weakness of the index, for there is not a single reference to natural law in it.

In Part Two there is a discriminating survey of the diverse

* *History of Political Thought in Germany, 1789-1815.* By Reinhold Aris. Allen & Unwin. 15s.

effects of the Romantic Movement. There is a brief discussion of the Romantic attitude characterised by no little insight. Then come a study of such precursors as Möser and Herder, the influence of Burke in general and of Gentz, the Prussian Burke, in particular, Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, the organic theory of the State, and Görres. In some respects Part Two is the most enlightening section of the book, for here the author has allowed his pen the fullest liberty. Curiously enough, most of the Romantic writers were members of the middle class in financial straits, and of course with no practical experience of the problems with which they were supposed to be dealing. Throughout this book we realise that the authors, with the exception of men like Stein, are men of the closet, unfamiliar with the world of politics in which they are nominally living. For we must never forget that a man, by determined processes of study, can live in any age he pleases. Some of the Romantics knew far more about the Middle Ages than about the closing decades of the eighteenth century or the opening years of the nineteenth. The last part deals with the reconstruction of Prussia at the hands of Fichte turned Nationalist—a very different man from the Jacobin—Stein and his collaborators, and the opposition offered to them. It is a pleasure to read and re-read this book.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Those who recall Count Carlo Sforza's long and distinguished career as an Italian diplomat will be most interested in his "study in historical psychology and international politics," entitled *Europe and Europeans*.* Count Sforza was Liberal Foreign Minister in 1920-1; upon Mussolini's advent to power in 1922, he was ambassador in Paris and forthwith resigned, refusing to serve under a Fascist régime. In this volume he has written a discursive, and somewhat sketchy, commentary upon the characteristics, problems and policy of European peoples and nations during roughly the period of his career down to the present time. There are few issues of major importance which he fails to mention, and many questions receive a vigour and vitality which his own personal contacts and experience impart to them. Of most immediate interest are his reflections upon post-war Europe. He ascribes the growth and the

* Harrap. 10s. 6d. net.

foundation in power of the Nazis both to French policy and to the feebleness and sterility of the German Socialists. He condemns in particular the French failure to disarm and the "gross error" of the Ruhr. The German Socialists' single thought on reaching power was propitiation of the old reactionary elements, "to win over, by dint of moderation and humility, the masters of the Imperial era." Count Sforza's view of the future is at once hopeful and pessimistic. With the disappearance of the old monarchies and with the general disbelief, save by a "few crazy brains," in the advantages to be gained by war, the recognition and potentialities of European solidarity* are far greater than before the war. The bellicose air of groups, such as the French *bourgeoisie*, and of States like Germany, Italy and Russia is a "mere sham for reasons of home politics." Danger of war provides an additional excuse for the severity and enlargement of complete control over the life of the nation. In the meantime there is social anarchy in the absence of a common law and the nations move steadily and knowingly to their chaotic doom. The leaders in a new world are "thinking with old brains and feeling with old passions."

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Mr. W. Horsfall Carter has performed a most useful service in making available Professor C. van Vollenhoven's remarkable treatise, *Du droit de paix: De Jure Pacis*, in an English translation entitled *The Law of Peace*.* The bulk of the work is an historical survey of the bases of international law which leads up to Professor van Vollenhoven's pregnant analysis of the post-war outlook and the direction necessary for any progressive advance. He deals with the embryonic law of peace in the Middle Ages, the acceptance of war as the legal arbitrament with the rise of nationalism and the revival in the nineteenth century of arbitration as one mode of settling disputes. But submission to peaceful settlement was subject to the whim of the parties and to-day, when the conception of a general *jus pacis* is acknowledged universally, as exemplified by the Kellogg Pact, this same vital defect remains. In short, the logical lesson of history is the creation of an impartial sanction which is recognised as quite essential in municipal law; and Professor van Vollenhoven devotes the conclusion of his work to a vigorous argument in favour of an international police force enforcing the decisions of the League under a strengthened Article XI. Writing in 1932 he describes Article XVI as ineffectual and atrophied, because its execution rests upon the whim and self-interest of each League member; a view which is abundantly proved by the Abyssinian conflict. The case for an international force in place of national armies has been continually argued and its logic never refuted. The great importance of Professor van Vollenhoven's treatise is that it clearly demonstrates this conception as the natural and vital stage in the historical development of

* Macmillan. 10s. 6d. net.

international law. Whether, and when, this stage is reached is altogether another proposition.

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Chinese lyrics and drama, and some few of the older narratives, have been already translated into English, but *Living China** is the first collection of short stories from the vernacular, by Chinese, both men and women, of the revolutionary era. Their chief interest, as the Editor and translator points out, lies in the fact that they were not written for Western eyes; his version is intentionally a free one, seeking to convey the spirit rather than the letter. The short story appears to be a favourite literary form with these young intellectuals, in this time of unprecedented upheaval in their country; they have been largely inspired by Russian literature, and their political opinions have, in several instances, brought them to prison or death. Their names will probably be unknown to most English readers, who will accordingly be grateful to Mr. Snow for his introduction and biographical notes, and to Miss Nym Wales for her illuminating essay on "The Modern Literary Movement" in China. The first seven tales are by Lu Hsün (a pseudonym), and his portrait forms the frontispiece. Many throughout the book are painfully realistic, dealing with bitter poverty, war, revolution and brutality, physical and mental suffering, or calamities (e.g. "The Flood"). But brighter threads are inwoven, of heroism, faithful toil, beauty of Nature, and mother-love. The "Slave Mother" is supremely touching. "The Conversion" gives a Chinese impression of the Salvation Army.

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Miss Marta Bowerley has written an unusual and stimulating book for children in *Studio Picnics*.† The desire to draw and paint is inherent in most children, but unfortunately only a few survive the unintentional strangulation of formal teaching. They become ashamed of their own creative work in the pursuit of set design. Miss Bowerley's plan is to allow full play to the instinctive urge for expression by first telling a story and then encouraging the child to work out with brush, pencil, plasticine or other medium, the ideas suggested by the tale; "in short," as Mr. Martin Hardie puts it in an appreciative Foreword, "to get, out of a natural gift, the fullest amount of adventure and of fun." Each story is followed by a brief "studio talk" in which Miss Bowerley suggests medium, presentation and other points of interest to our young artist. Children will certainly derive much enjoyment and instruction from this pleasant volume with its attractive tales and sketches. The latter, however, may well tend to give the ready-made ideas which Miss Bowerley is so anxious to avoid.

* Edited by Edgar Snow. Harrap & Co. 8s. 6d. net.
† De La More Press. 5s. net.

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IMPRESSIONS OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

THOUGH the Orient Express, as it rushes from Constantinople to Ostend, gives a peep at many public squares glittering with illuminated Christmas trees, the statecraft of Europe shows little enough of peace and good will. It is less than twenty years since every frontier without exception, from the Black Sea to the Straits of Dover, was altered by force. This fact alone would account for a troubled Continent with the victors anxious and the vanquished bitter, but new disturbing forces are also at work radiating from the dynamic centres of Rome and Berlin. Europe is more than ever divided into states bent on defending the new order and others, though without any definite policy, eagerly hoping that something will happen to redress what they feel to be real injustices. The League is scarcely mentioned. The general technique seems to be to watch carefully for exhibitions of power from various quarters, weigh them shrewdly and turn them to advantage. This old plan is not confined to the beaten countries. Germany may seem to Yugoslavia a likely friend against Italian intrigue; to the Roumanian Right a counterweight to Soviet influence. Hungarian policy has no orientation at all. It certainly does not seem to be pro-German. One very practised student made the strange suggestion that after adjustment of differences she should form a military alliance with Czechoslovakia. The farther one goes East the quieter do things seem. It is odd that the Balkans show the least outward sign of disturbance. There is also, of course, something much deeper than a problem of frontiers. In the face of the noisily advertised claims of dictatorship, democracy is struggling to maintain itself. Its successes are not many.

At present the "key" situation is Czechoslovakia, the new Republic of fifteen million inhabitants, which stretches in a narrow band across Central Europe, having for its neighbours Poland, Roumania, Hungary and, most important of all, German Austria and Germany itself. Of her many problems three may be touched on here: her relations with Germany

and Austria, her internal unity, and her military security. The most that can be claimed for the notes that follow is that, while they are in no wise expert or complete, they record impressions gathered not only in Czechoslovakia itself, but corrected by inquiry over a field spreading from Prague through the Balkans to Bucharest.

First a word about the atmosphere in the Republic itself. It is essentially homely and even sedate. The very pictures of the heads of the State, past and present, Masaryk and Benes, which hang in the Public Offices, are not like those elsewhere. The common form is a mezzotint engraving in eighteenth-century style very beautifully drawn by a national artist. The quiet civilian clothes and setting are in soothing contrast to the gilded frames and self-bemedalled effigies which glare at you from every shop and café in dictatorial lands. Honour for the Founders of the State is deep and general. Masaryk, still living though sorely stricken, is passing into a legend. So is Stefanik, tragically killed in the moment of triumph. His military hat and medals are proudly preserved, and other personal relics have the chief place in the Museum at Piestany, near which spot he perished with his aeroplane. But President Benes is a very living figure, familiar in public places and easily accessible to all. In this land one receives somehow the impression of being in a family party. Not that there is any parochialism. That would be impossible amid so many citizens repatriated after long exile from distant parts of the world. This one collected the pence of the Slovaks in Pittsburg. This one accompanied the Legionaries from Vladivostock, and was wrecked on the coast of Japan. This one shepherded the wounded, and when at long last they reached their own land, saw them kneel down and kiss the soil. Dr. Srobar, the pioneer of Slovakia, is a cheerful septuagenarian, full of merry tales of old times. How he was a fellow-prisoner in Hungary with Bela Kun. How later the same Bela Kun invaded Slovakia. How every single soldier had to be sent out to stem his advance, leaving Bratislava denuded. How they collected youths, put them in uniform, blacked their faces, and paraded them round the town, so that public confidence was restored by the belief that Senegalese troops had been sent to their aid. All these proud stories of the past are sweetened by a liberal outlook singularly free from national hatreds.

Czechoslovakia's chief anxiety at present is her relations with Germany. About three million of her citizens are of German race. They were not, of course, German subjects before the war, but, like the Bohemians themselves, they formed part of the Austrian Empire. Some of them who belong to the Christian Social Agrarian and Social Democratic parties have co-operated for many years in the coalitions which are the usual form of the Republican Government. They represent all those Germans who dislike dictatorship. But very many, especially among the younger people, are dazzled by the swastika, seeing themselves as exiled and oppressed members of the great German family. Of the more material causes contributing to their discontent there are several. The Germans are largely engaged in industry, and industrialists have had a difficult time in a Europe which is still a network of tariffs, quotas and restrictions. Again, before the War, German was the language of the Government. The Czechs were in that sense inferiors. Now the position is reversed and Czech is the official language. Then there are general conditions of strain due to the sharp contrast between the democracy of Prague and the dictatorship of Berlin. The situation is not made easier when the Sudeten Deutsch party appear to shape their organisation on the Nazi model. They are fully represented in Parliament, but their leader, Mr. Henlein, refuses to become a candidate himself. The Government fear to concede the fuller autonomy demanded. They are thinking of the unity of a State which is only eighteen years old. What is possible, they say, is being done to relieve the economic distress. There are, for example, schemes by which Czech children are to help German children. It is hoped that with the passage of time and the success of the new Republic, the old order will be forgotten and a new patriotism will be born. The results of this policy are said to be promising, and it is claimed that Henlein is losing followers to the other German parties. There is, however, no intention on the part of the Government of yielding to threats, dissolving Parliament, or admitting extremists of any colour to office.

Everything turns, of course, on Berlin's attitude to this and similar problems among other of Germany's neighbours. This attitude was set out by Hitler in his famous speech in May 1935. The Führer then declared: " The German people and the German Government have . . . a very comprehensive

desire arising out of a simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed, not only for foreign nations, but to the German people everywhere . . . no régime which is not anchored in the people, supported by the people, and desired by the people can continue permanently." This is straight enough. The speech, moreover, contained a great deal of the usual denunciation of Bolshevism and warnings of the danger of its extension. Read together with the later German-Japanese agreement, and considered in the light of Hitler's Spanish policy, and the constant assertion that Czechoslovakia is an "advance base" of Sovietism, the policy becomes disquieting.

If Austria were to be assimilated to Germany, Czechoslovakia would be faced, along about half her frontier, by this hostile attitude. She has always, and naturally, opposed the *Anschluss*, and the statement of July last appeared at first sight to relieve her of anxiety. A closer examination of that statement and a glance at subsequent events will show, however, that the relief is by no means permanent. The actual declaration made by Dr. Goebbels on July 11th was as follows :

1. In the sense of the statement made by the Führer and Reich Chancellor on May 21st, 1935, the German Government recognises the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.
2. Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence.
3. The Austrian Federal State Government's general policy and its policy towards Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the principle that Austria recognises herself to be a German State.

The specific conditions of the so-called independence were therefore those contained in the passage from the speech of 1935 already quoted. Nazis both in Germany and Austria were bitterly disappointed by Dr. Goebbels's statement, but they consoled themselves with that passage in which Hitler indicated his conviction that the Austrian régime was not really supported by the people in the full sense of the term "self-determination," and that such régimes could not, in the long run, hold their ground. It may be remarked in passing that the Austrian Government patently does not rest on popular support ; but this does not mean that, were it to turn Nazi, such popular support would be forthcoming.

All this holds out no promise to Czechoslovakia that she is to have a really independent German neighbour in the south. The arrangement was a victory for Schuschnigg in so far as it left him free to deal with German agents, but beyond that it guaranteed nothing. It really represented a change of method, an abandonment of knuckleduster diplomacy, but in no sense a renunciation of the desire to make Austria, if not an integral part, at least a working member of the German group with a harmonious policy. Events, in fact, are shaping in this way. Since July Italian influence, always alien, has declined, and German influence has increased. Everything is more kid-gloved than in the days of Habicht. Austria is a Catholic state, and Hitler is not on the best terms with the Vatican ; so Papen, a true son of the Church, is sent to Vienna, and while other countries have mere Ministers, he becomes an Ambassador.

A few notes may be interpolated here on the question of a Hapsburg restoration. Towards this Hungarian opinion appears to be lukewarm. Admiral Horthy, the Regent, is a well-established ruler, and there seems to be no reason to change him—a view he probably himself shares. Then there is the question of candidate. A king of Hungary must be crowned in Hungary. The late Emperor Karl was so crowned, but there has been no coronation of Otto, and it was explained that there is in theory no reason why a Hapsburg should be the only recognised claimant. Further, any restoration of the Dual Monarchy which put Hungary in a secondary position would not be welcome.

Restoration is fiercely opposed in Belgrade for obvious reasons. Jugoslavia's problem is to achieve unity. The Serbs, the core of the State, are Orthodox, but the Croats and Slovenes are Catholic. Their bitterness was against Hungarian rule, not Austrian. An Austrian Catholic state, based on a Hapsburg Restoration, might attract them. As one Serb put it concisely : "Father Koroshetz was confessor to the Empress Zita." Restoration represents, therefore, for the Triune kingdom a real danger of disintegration. For Austria herself a Restoration would settle the question of *Anschluss*

once for all. The matter is, however, correctly to be described as " not ripe," which means presumably that it would raise more difficulties than she can at present face. For Czechoslovakia, the final exclusion of Hitler from Vienna by a Restoration would be to the good, but the arguments on the other side are stronger. Restoration probably means the reunion of Austria and Hungary, and Hungary would only willingly accept a monarch if he pledged himself to effect a revision of the Treaty of Trianon. He would have, that is to say, to interpret his Coronation Oath, to " enlarge and increase " the frontiers of the State, not as being aimed, as in the old times, against the Turks, but against Hungary's neighbours, and of these Czechoslovakia is more hated than all the others.

All this external pressure and anxiety is, of course, bound to have a consolidating effect on the Republic ; but this effect is not so direct as might at first be thought in helping to solve the problem of Slovak autonomy. Whilst in the old days the Czechs had their Diet and were ruled from Vienna, the Slovaks had no Diet, and were divided into separate counties, each governed directly from Budapest. All their bitter memories, therefore, are of Hungary. A menace reaching Prague from Berlin seems to them a remote affair, chiefly of concern to the Bohemians. Slovak activities are aimed against revision. One Sunday morning we were driving through the valleys in Slovakia and came to a small town. A large crowd had gathered in the market-place, a brass band was playing, and we were told that an anti-revision meeting was in progress. It was one of very many which were constantly being organised. It had just been addressed by the local M.P., a Czech, and it seemed to imply that if the Slovaks accept Czech leadership, it is to be leadership against what are assumed to be the dangers to Slovakia itself, that is leadership against Hungary.

The old Slovakia was a land of simple peasants. Among its villages are still found settlements of the Anabaptists (made into Catholics by Maria Theresa). Their highest industrial production is pottery—and very attractive it is—unless we remember that it was an Anabaptist called Pullman who gave his name to the international railway car. The peasants are devout Catholics. Their leader, Monsignor Hlinka, lives away up in the hills. He is a man of austere life, regarded by his

followers with a deep and enthusiastic reverence. He has been their champion against the Hungarians, and in his study, where a few mats hardly cover the bare boards, hangs a photograph showing his arrest by Hungarian police. He fiercely hates Bolshevism and the Bolsheviks, and whatever its necessity he cannot but resent any agreement with them. He thinks in terms of the old peasant Slovakia. His ideal is a humble state, " like Monaco," he said, free from the stresses and especially the expenses of the modern world. " We have a proverb," he went on, " don't stretch your feet beyond your blanket." But the new Slovakia is not like the old. Its valleys are being filled with factories. At evening the country roads are dotted with homegoing workmen. For greater safety munition factories have been moved thither, and provided with every modern protection against attack. Should danger threaten in the north the centre of gravity of the State would be moved to the south, and the Slovaks would realise that their own liberty is bound up with that of the whole Republic.

It only remains to say a word about the friends who would be looked to by Czechoslovakia in case of attack. The lessons of Abyssinia and Spain have not been overlooked, but it would be lamentable indeed if faith in the League had been entirely lost in a country whose head is one of the Prophets of Geneva. Nor is the Covenant quite discounted. But there are more precise defences. Czechoslovakia is the architect of the Little Entente, consisting of herself, Jugoslavia and Roumania. The ties between them are constantly being strengthened. A few weeks ago King Carol of Roumania, on a visit to Bratislava, gave his name to a regiment. The Entente, however, was founded first and foremost as a protection against Hungary and a Hapsburg Restoration. Its members have no mutual obligations in respect of other external dangers. For such protection Czechoslovakia relies in a military sense on her agreements with France and Soviet Russia. It is the latter which has given rise to the charge that she has become an outpost of Bolshevism. But though there is an air service between them, the two countries have no common land frontier. How, then, if Czechoslovakia were attacked by Germany, could Russia come to her assistance ? Only by passing through Poland or Roumania. Roumania is an ally of Czechoslovakia. She is, moreover, a member of the

League. Thus, should Germany be adjudged to have committed an act of aggression against Czechoslovakia, Roumania would be bound at least to allow the passage of troops to her assistance. That is the confident faith of Prague.

Yet even casual inquiries in Roumania itself give rise to considerable doubt. The country over which Russian troops must pass is Bessarabia, which was won from Russia by Roumania in the Great War and whose ownership was long a subject of dispute. It is true that to-day relations between the two States are quite friendly, but that is not to say that Roumania would willingly consent to allow Russian troops into Bessarabia. If they came in, for whatever purpose, when would they go away? As a safeguard for her frontier towards the east, she has long had an agreement with Poland, and this agreement was recently brushed up again. Roumania has at present a Liberal government. The chief opposition is the National Peasants' Party. If they were to come to power, they might possibly be more favourably inclined to the Soviets. But there is no reason why, if a change of Ministers were made, King Carol should not select from the Right, where there are several parties with strong anti-Russian feeling. I was told that the ex-Czarist Minister, still dwelling in Bucharest, had recently received a mark of Royal favour. Here, as elsewhere, the influence of Hitler has been felt. "He is to be reckoned with," said a very highly placed official. Further, the prestige of Germany has been enhanced on the general plan of making large purchases and paying for them in the ever-handy "clearing." The precise material value of direct Soviet support to Czechoslovakia has to be weighed in the light of these considerations.

Despite her agreement with the Soviets, Czechoslovakia has no desire to be drawn into what may be called the Eastern Front. On the contrary, she looks always to France and England, and wishes to remain in association with them. Any exhibition of unity of purpose between them is most welcome to her. Should they fail her, then of necessity she must make the best terms she can with Germany. What would those terms be? Some told me that they would be easy, and not even involve the denunciation of the Russian accord; but should Czechoslovakia go under and become a client of Germany, the whole European situation would be changed and the Balkans would become a high-road for German advance.

WEDGWOOD BENN.

REFLECTIONS ON SPAIN.

WHATEVER is the outcome of the conflict in Spain, it will I believe be found to be of major importance to the future of Europe. That such an international situation as now exists should be possible without European war, would have seemed incredible to diplomatists before 1914. "Incidents" that occurred in those days bear no comparison with the jungle of dangerous and provocative situations that are now developing almost daily. From which one conclusion seems to emerge, namely that no European country is willing to shatter the general fabric of peace. There may be countries who are willing to run great risks, willing to strain the forbearance of others almost to breaking point, in the pursuit of their national policies. But nevertheless, although the situation to-day in the second week of January has grown and still grows more menacing, this widespread reluctance to precipitate a major conflict no doubt varying in degree from one country to another should avert the catastrophe of a general European war.

Let us not be deluded by vague talk about ideological conflicts into thinking that the Spanish conflict has not very important bearings upon our own country as well as upon the rest of Europe; and let us not either be confused by the energies of rival atrocity-mongers into thinking that the issues for the Spanish people themselves are not of vital importance. At its simplest the issue is which of the parties in this bitter drama is going finally to assume control of the future of Spain—a struggle for power. Europe is tense to-day with economic, social, religious, racial problems, which are both national and international. In so far as these problems are reflected through the very special Spanish focus, quite apart from direct outside participation in the struggle, Spain's problems are Europe's. But at least let us hope that Europe may be spared an international civil war.

Some of us have considerable sympathy with those leaders of the Spanish Government who are at present suffering from an international campaign to paint them "red." When those leaders met the party of M.P.s on their return from Madrid in the first week of December, Senor Alvarez del Vayo, the Spanish Government's Foreign Minister, was preparing the case which he would shortly submit to the special meeting of

the Council of the League of Nations. When asked what were the outlines of that case, he replied that Spain had always carried out her obligations under the Covenant—perhaps a hinted reference to events of last winter—and that Spain expected others to do their duty by her; that the extent of foreign intervention in Spanish internal affairs amounted to serious aggression, and was a state of affairs which might easily lead to a wide extension of the conflict; Spain asked nothing, but expected that protection which the Covenant of the League was intended to afford.

To my mind this is a strong case, and the sort of case which an able democrat would advance. Be it remembered that the Spanish Government has never accepted the justice of the Non-Intervention Agreement. Their case is that a properly constituted and legal government, deriving its authority from the free will of the people, always has the right to obtain arms to maintain its authority, but that to supply rebels with such arms and assistance is a breach of international law. From which it follows that whether the Non-Intervention Agreement has or has not been broken in favour of the Government, if support has been afforded to the rebels, then that represents an act of aggression. In the hey-dey of pre-war Liberalism this might have been admitted, but to-day two considerations are opposed. The first is a widespread desire to localise the conflict, and the second the fear of Communism.

The early victory of either side in the struggle would be the surest way of avoiding further dangerous complications. The extreme right in France has not hesitated to advocate French support for Franco on the ground that otherwise Franco must be driven into the arms of Germany and Italy, and that in this way the awkward choice between a friendly "red" Spain and a Fascist Spain under German influence could be avoided. But are these the two alternatives? Is the Spanish Government "red"?

It seems hardly necessary again to repeat that the Frente Popular is made up of all parties from Left Republicans—who formed the Government when the rebellion broke out—to Socialists, Syndicalists, Communists, and includes many individual Catholics and the Catholic Basque Nationalists. The special meeting of the League Council produced no spectacular results. It reaffirmed the recognition by the

Members of the League (with the exception of Italy) of the Spanish Government as the legal Government of Spain. But perhaps the most significant action taken was the acceptance by Spain of League experts not only upon the immediate problems of the prevention of epidemics and the evacuation of the civil population of Madrid, but also upon the future economic reconstruction of the country. A Government that welcomes the League's co-operation in such reconstruction indicates thereby its willingness to be guided by the liberal democracies. Another proof, if it be wanted, that the Spanish Government has no illusions about the practicability of the theoretic application of Communist principles to the individualist Spanish character. When in Spain I met Communists who deplored what they considered to be deficiencies in the Government, especially in two things. First that no attempt was being made to establish the universal weapon of any dictatorship, an effective secret police. And secondly, that the peasants, particularly in the south and west, had never been aroused by the promise of land. The Spanish Government is not a dictatorship, but rests upon the enthusiastic support of a very large part of the population, organised behind a variety of political banners. The intervention of Germany and Italy was bound to have the effect of driving the centre of gravity of the Spanish Government further left. Senor Largo Caballero repeated again in the interview we had with him that he was not fighting for Socialism or Communism, but was fighting for the free democratic tradition which would allow the Spanish people to decide their own future. After all, the "rebels," "insurgents," or "nationalists," call them what you will, took up arms against the democratic Government, and no suggestion has been made from their side that a democratic system was one they proposed to establish by force of arms. On the contrary, General Franco definitely stated early in the struggle that he proposed to introduce a system similar to those of Germany and Italy.

There has been much discussion as to whether the insurgents can rightly be described as Fascist. It is not denied that the avowedly Fascist forces in Spain are supporting them. But doubtless many personal and political differences exist within the groups making up the insurgents' side. This is not the occasion to discuss a definition of Fascism, but there can be no doubt that the various elements making up the insurgent

forces stand for authoritarian government and are definitely anti-democratic. But if I had any doubt as to the essential Fascist character of the insurgents, those doubts would have been entirely removed by reading in an article from the pen of one recently returned from Franco's side, that even if their leader had offered no evidence yet, his Moorish troops at least were passionately devoted to children! And my mind travels back to the huddled heaps of children sleeping in underground and basements of Madrid, their homes deliberately wrecked by shells and bombs, to create in the minds of the civil population that degree of submissiveness which would induce the atmosphere in which surrender would be inevitable. My judgment that this bombardment of Madrid has been deliberately aimed at terrorisation of the working people is not based merely on the observable fact that it is working-class districts that have received the special attention of Junker bombers, but also upon the character of the propaganda leaflets dropped from those bombers. Threats to the civil population, and warnings that the wounded in the hospitals may be held responsible for the continued resistance of the defence, seem so inconsistent with a love of children that I am reminded of a man I once knew whose love of animals was the reason he gave as his choice of occupation—that of a butcher.

The picture of the Spanish Government as a "red" dictatorship attempting to force its will upon an apathetic if not actually hostile people, is entirely incorrect, and is moreover inconsistent with other and more justified charges that are made against it. The Spanish Government derives its authority and strength from a widespread mass movement. Its military forces are volunteers, and there has been no need to introduce a system of conscription such as is in force in the territory occupied by General Franco. In the early days of the revolt, the rebellious military in some centres were simply overwhelmed by the mass of often almost unarmed resistance which they encountered from the populace. Looking down on Barcelona from an Air France liner, the outskirts of the town were absolutely deserted, but the centre of the city was densely crowded with the tremendous demonstrations at Duruti's funeral. Granted that Barcelona is not typical of Spain, yet the atmosphere of the other parts of Spain, and the history of the conflict can only be interpreted by the existence of a mass of popular support often ill-disciplined and ill-armed, but ready

to make good those shortcomings by an intense and sustained enthusiasm.

That such a movement should at times get out of hand is not to be wondered at. The Government has to contend not only with the enemy at the gates, but with a mass of poverty-stricken and illiterate enthusiasts. Anarchism in its more negative and anti-social aspects is a creed born, like Russian nihilism, of years of repression. The Government has at all times been frank in its admission that atrocities have been committed in their name, but not with their approval. The great problem of all democratic leaders is to develop the technique of peaceful change. For a young democracy, the problem is intensified by the accumulation and urgency of the problems left over from a long period of inaction. The Republic was hailed with almost universal approval. But the problems of absentee landowners, reminiscent of eighteenth-century France, of a corrupt and inefficient civil service, of a Church hopelessly involved in politics, social affairs and even business, such problems, at no time easy to handle, almost defy a legal solution in times of civil war. Under the conditions of modern war the whole resources of a country must be mobilised. Where the destruction of property is so great, as in Madrid, Cartagena, Malaga, houses must be commandeered; industry must be kept going somehow to produce the necessities of war; when food is short, rationing systems must be applied. If the political and industrial organisations of the Frente Popular are used for these purpose, because they are relatively trustworthy, does this constitute a Soviet system or does it not merely mean that a people with their back to the wall must use the social organisations which are available? In England during the Great War measures of Government control amounting in some cases to State socialism had to be introduced.

Russia has supplied arms—so also have the international salesmen in munitions. But I have no doubt whatever that when the history of the conflict in Spain is written in retrospect, General Franco's own words with their full implication will be fully endorsed. "International help for the Reds came at the moment when final victory was imminent"—General Franco in his Christmas broadcast. The International Brigade came into action when the capture of Madrid was imminent, and effective Russian assistance in aeroplanes, tanks, and

technical advice arrived a few weeks later. But if British eye-witness reports are to be trusted, the long retreat from Badajoz to Madrid might never have taken place if the Government had been able to arm the men that they had at their disposal in such large numbers.

Sporting guns are still to be seen in the hands of the militia in Madrid. Russian infantry the Government has not got. Nor can the real volunteers of the International Brigade, many of them exiles from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, be compared with " totalitarian volunteers " that began to arrive in December, to take the place of the Moors who had been decimated in their unsuccessful frontal attacks upon Madrid.

The Spanish Government cannot be expected to withstand the assault of a determined attack by Germany and Italy. Fascism is on the offensive in the air, by land and on the sea. The naval attack was only beginning in December. But evidence was submitted by Señor Prieto, the Minister for the Navy and Air Force, that certain incidents could only be accounted for by direct intervention of German and Italian naval forces. The bombing of the harbour of Alicante in the early days of December took place over a period of eight hours, at night, the bombing being carried out by one aeroplane, arriving regularly every hour. No rebel aerodrome was situated near enough to permit of this, and the conclusion drawn was that the freedom accorded to German naval units had been used to make this singularly systematic operation possible. Since that date the operations of the German fleet have become ever more extensive.

Fascist assistance has gradually developed to a degree when it becomes no exaggeration to speak of a German and Italian expeditionary force. Italian participation seemed less noticeable in December, but with the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian " gentlemen's " agreement, has been renewed. The struggle may be long-drawn ; Madrid may fall, but even so Catalonia and the East Coast remain, crowded with refugees, in the hands of the Government, but exposed to naval and aerial attacks from the sea.

A policy for those Governments who wished to prevent further intervention and so to limit the scope and intensity of the war, seemed in the middle of December to be emerging. But events have moved too fast. The effective application of non-intervention both in materials of war and in

man-power can only be implemented through the use of sea-power. Once non-intervention had been established, mediation might have become possible. Some compromise might, though the difficulties are immense, have been arranged between the contending forces in Spain. The conquest of the East Coast and Catalonia, crowded with refugees from the south-west of Spain and Madrid, will provide the grimmest chapter of a war not lacking already in horror. Some regional arrangement could perhaps be made by which these regions might remain under a democratic government. The objections are economic as well as political, for the difficulties that Catalonia is suffering under now are a shortage of wheat and meat and milk, the latter normally supplied from the North and the former from the South of Spain, in exchange for the industrial products of Catalonia's industries.

But the major difficulty is that Franco's backers have declared that a " red " government will not be tolerated anywhere in Spain. British " neutrality " will have to be interpreted in a different sense from that which hitherto it has meant in practice. Great Britain banned the export of arms to Spain unilaterally before general agreement was obtained, thereby giving Germany and Italy a period of time in which they might legally continue their exports. Great Britain has made it illegal for British ships to carry munitions, a step other countries have not taken. Lastly, Great Britain has banned volunteers before other countries have agreed. Is British policy similar to that of the United States, which we may take as being completely disinterested neutrality ? It is clear that while we may or may not be neutral, we cannot be disinterested. The activities of the Non-Intervention Committee prove that much, and the statement of Mr. Eden that the integrity of Spain and Spanish possessions is a vital interest to Great Britain makes it clear that while we may abstain from assisting either side, the outcome of the conflict may be of vital importance to British interests.

Suggestions have been made that even if and when General Franco wins with German and Italian help, financial interests may have the last word, and that the City of London will be able to afford that help in the reconstruction of Spain which no other country can give. Exactly from what source General Franco draws his financial resources at present is a mystery. The theory that finance always has the last word, a

theory held equally strongly by financiers and by members of Communist parties, does not seem to have held good in recent events. In spite of financial difficulties, which we were told would bring about Japan's collapse, that country seems to have absorbed Manchuria and increasingly to threaten British trade in the Far East. Italy survived economic and financial sanctions, and Germany, though rationed as to food, continues her policy of rearmament at no slackened speed. If General Franco therefore wins, assisted by British neutrality and German men and equipment, I doubt if the City will accomplish the purchase of his friendship. Fascist prestige will have received a very notable increase. And German rearmament may have received very considerable assistance in the form of Spanish mineral resources.

British foreign policy is notoriously difficult for foreigners to understand. By an abject desire to be neutral and thus to give no offence to other countries, we shall, if General Franco wins, have allowed the foundations to be laid in Europe of strategic, economic and political positions of so menacing a nature as perhaps to change the course of European history.

WILFRID ROBERTS.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S SECOND TERM.

NO American President has enjoyed an experience comparable with that of Mr. Franklin Roosevelt, whose second term of office began on January 20th. He was elected in 1932, the darkest year of the depression, with a decisive majority. In 1934, contrary to the accepted rule of congressional politics, this great majority was increased. On November 3rd, 1936, the American electorate gave Mr. Roosevelt and his policy an endorsement for which no parallel can be found in the history of the United States. The public was continually assured during the campaign that the contest must be close, although a few political observers made predictions that were very near the mark. The Roosevelt vote was in fact overwhelming. The discomfiture of the Republican party was complete. The Socialist and other minority parties made a pitiful showing, and—a phenomenon everywhere regarded as surprising—the loudly advertised demagogues of the depression, particularly Father Coughlin and Dr. F. E. Townsend of the fantastic pensions plan, were altogether invisible on the polling day. The re-election of Franklin D. Roosevelt was an extraordinary example of the working of the American party system; it provided the most striking illustration so far of the newer forces now operating in democratic politics, and it revealed a vast electorate as, for once, unaffected by those deliberate scares which have, unhappily, become a familiar accompaniment of political democracy under adult suffrage. Before coming to the problems facing Mr. Roosevelt during his second four years it may be well, therefore, to glance at a few instructive points of the presidential campaign.

The re-election year opened with the tide apparently running against the President. The Supreme Court had destroyed both the elaborate structure built upon the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration—twin pillars of the New Deal. The evidences of economic recovery were unmistakable; but the total of the unemployed was still very great (as it continues to be); the schemes of Federal Relief seemed chaotic and were bitterly attacked, and the financial burdens they involved were staggering. Not only the financiers and industrialists but the

world of business generally was hostile, and as the campaign developed it was revealed that the hatred of Roosevelt among the well-to-do was deeper and more violent than the loathing of Woodrow Wilson and his policy before which the Democrats had gone down in 1920. To many of us it seemed a most disquieting symptom—irrational and malignant. This hostility was magnified to an enormous extent in the Press, although it is necessary to point out that the percentage of anti-Roosevelt newspapers did not reach the high figure of 80 which was constantly repeated. Whether at any time during the first half of 1936 it would have been possible for the Republican managers to have made a plan of campaign upon which they could hope to recover, no one can say, but it is certainly true that they made every possible mistake. They permitted the backers of Governor Landon to put their man into the field far too early; they accepted the guidance of the Hearst Press—always a fatal thing to do; they allowed the centre of the stage to be occupied by certain dissentient Democrats and their very wealthy friends; they appointed an untried party organiser; they relied in their publicity upon general invective and scaremongering, and in the final stage upon intimidation through the pay-envelope (a device specifically denounced by the President in his most effective campaign speech); and with a disregard of present-day actualities which no one can explain, they chose their candidate and made their dispositions without any regard whatever to the radio. It is this last point which must in the final account be noted as the most important and the most surprising. There is no commoner political maxim in America than this, that you cannot beat anybody with nobody. Mr. Roosevelt's opponents ignored the plain wisdom of this saying, inexplicably overlooking the President's record as a campaigner, while, with a blindness which we may guess will not be repeated, they gave no consideration at all to the all-important matter of the Republican candidate's speaking and his radio technique. In England we are still a long way from conducting our elections on the air. In America the great transition has already been made, and one great political party deemed it possible to ignore this revolutionary fact. Mr. Roosevelt is a triumphant performer at the microphone: among the public men now in high authority he has no superior in broadcasting. It is, no doubt, quite easy to argue

that the result of the November election was made certain in advance by the phenomena of Recovery and the policy of Relief; but we should still have to explain the character and weight of the Roosevelt victory, and in doing so we must put first the power of personality as conveyed through the radio. The fact has been admitted that the Republican party bought more time on the air than did the Democrats and paid more for it. The President's party might have economised still further, and that for a reason only in part concerned with the radio voice. Political oratory in America has in our generation undergone an important change. The speech-writer, the ghost, has become so ubiquitous an institution that an audience can no longer take it for granted that a speech is composed by the candidate or executive who delivers it—save in the case of a member of the chosen company to which Mr. Roosevelt himself belongs. And in this matter the radio is the revealer and provides the merciless test. The broadcast speech may be ghost-written like any other, but it will not be listened to if the reader is without a personal gift of utterance. The circumstance that the men who arranged the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt's opponent gave no thought to this most obvious fact of the new time may lead us to the emphatic conclusion that no future presidential election will follow the pattern of 1936.

The President, then, enters upon his second term amid conditions extraordinarily different from those which he may have been tempted to forecast in the troubled interval between the Supreme Court judgments of his third year and the smashing victory of last November. His enemies are scattered or silenced. He occupies a position of political dominance and personal authority far higher than that of any democratic ruler in the world. It is true that his positive power is much less than at the moment it appears to be, for, notwithstanding the enormous party majority in Congress, opposition in both Houses will arise and be organised as soon as the business of legislation begins. But the governing fact is that the American nation has no other leader, actual or possible, and the policy of the United States must during the next four years be the policy of Franklin Roosevelt. All his opponents, and not a few among his supporters, insist that "policy" is the wrong word to use. They have maintained that his opinions or notions are subject to incessant change,

that he is an experimentalist, no less reckless in "trying everything once" than he is in exchanging his advisers. An experimentalist, of course, Mr. Roosevelt is; since entering the White House he has announced himself in this character often enough, and the reasons for his variations in direction could hardly be plainer. A reforming President finds himself confronted along every road by the obstacle of the Supreme Court, and at almost every point of his administrative task he is held up by the scarcity of skilled administrators and expert advisers, or by the difficulty of securing their services under the unsleeping eyes of the politicians. The policy of the New Deal, we may perhaps say, was a good deal clearer in 1934 than it can be in 1937. It is impossible for anyone to say at the beginning of the second term what Mr. Roosevelt will be enabled to do in the larger matters, and it is certainly not easy to answer the question so continually asked in the United States: Will the President tend to go Left or Right?

To this important question the President cannot give the answer in his Messages to Congress, although he would undoubtedly wish to do so. The New Deal has been broken; its major measures had to be abandoned, and yet Mr. Roosevelt is wholly committed to the policy upon which in 1933-4 he built up his tremendous prestige. There is a painful irony in the fact that, with America swinging once again into a period of enormous business activity, it should still be necessary to make an earnest appeal for the abolition of child labour, for minimum wage-scales and a tolerable standard working-day, and the beginnings of a national system of social security. Yet so it is, and a citizen of conservative England can only marvel that an American President standing for such minima as these and favouring the recognition of union labour, should be regarded with suspicion as dangerously radical. It is necessary, however, to take note of the belief which prevails in Washington, that Mr. Roosevelt to-day finds it necessary to move with a caution he has not hitherto shown in the matter of his reform programme. He is believed for this reason to be losing many of the young Liberals to whose enthusiastic services the vigour and animation of the New Deal Departments have been due. It is difficult indeed to see how such losses are to be avoided, for the enterprises of the past three years have brought into existence a multiplicity of organisations mostly

bearing three-letter labels. The renewed demand for economy will enforce reduction and consolidation; there is naturally no friendliness towards these upstart bureaus in the regular departments of the Federal Government, and there looms over all of them the minatory form of the Supreme Court. The conclusion here would seem to be inescapable. A President who is resolved upon achieving a programme of reconstruction must first obtain an amendment to the Constitution. Few observers of the Washington scene in 1937 would venture a prediction as to the probabilities under that head.

With the opening of the Seventy-fifth Congress on January 4th and the inauguration of the President on the 20th, the United States enters upon the more rational arrangement of the congressional and executive term brought about by the Norris amendment. The long interval after the November election, unavoidable in the horse-and-buggy era, is now done away with. The new Congress meets in regular session at the new year; a new President comes in within ten weeks instead of waiting four months. Mr. Roosevelt makes his fresh start amid conditions extraordinarily unlike those of 1933. The American people have agreed to consider the depression at an end. Business almost everywhere is undeniably on the rise. The external evidences of recovery are everywhere apparent. Many industries are working close to full capacity; the volume of retail trading is enormous; the increase in railway travel and in hotel business, by which the average citizen is commonly led to form his rough estimate, makes a striking contrast to the state of affairs in the latter part of Mr. Hoover's term of office. But recovery so far has not brought a corresponding expansion of employment. Relief is still the central problem of the Federal Government, and the President will not be allowed to forget this as the new Congress addresses itself to the task of shaping taxation to meet a stupendous Budget which no ingenuity can avail to bring down much below the present figure. What can the President and Congress do about unemployment relief?

A first point in any attempted answer to this question has to be that Congress and the American people are still without any authoritative returns, similar to those of England and the older Germany, of men and women out of work. Shortly after the election the President was supplied with figures, more

or less official, showing a total of unemployed well below the four-million mark. It is assumed that in order to arrive at this figure we must reckon as employed the very large body —between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000—at present on Federal work-relief: that is to say, on the register of the Works Progress Administration, together with the youths and young men, not fewer than 300,000, in the Civilian Conservation Camps—the excellent American counterpart of the labour training camps of Nazi-Germany. Thus in order to show that the unemployed in the United States to-day make a total not more than double the British figure of registered unemployed, we must exclude all those who under the highly complex organisation of the New Deal are to-day in emergency Government employ, in training centres, or in receipt of work-relief, which is the American alternative to unemployment benefit without equivalent return in the form of labour done. Clearly, however, we do not reach an accurate statement of unemployment and public relief by subtracting the army of citizens who are dependent upon the Government for maintenance. Consequently the actual unemployment total is much larger than the figure above quoted. In the zero-year, 1933, the statement was repeatedly made that 15,000,000 was not an excessive estimate, and in this year of large and encouraging recovery it is probable that the total number of American men and women for whom work needs to be found should not be put at less than 8,000,000.

The President's first serious difficulty in domestic affairs will meet him here. After prolonged resistance to the Dole (persistently looked upon as an indefensible British expedient) the United States accepted the obligation of maintaining its unemployed. Under the Roosevelt Administration it has expanded the old American method of work-relief, formerly carried on by the cities and States, into a multiple provision of work and pay for the unemployed of every class (including artists, writers, actors and other professional workers), mainly under the spreading plans of the W.P.A. directed from Washington by Mr. Harry Hopkins, Federal Administrator. The cost has been prodigious, the demand for restriction and economy is clamorous, the President is pledged to bring expenditure somehow within the limits of a tolerable Budget; and yet it is exceedingly difficult to see how the thing can be done. At the time of writing we are being told that public

opinion in the States most affected is in favour of drastic cuts in federal relief, and no doubt members of Congress have gone to Washington virtuously resolved to aim at a reduction of Federal expenditure, and at least the approach to a balanced Budget. Yet relief, as every Congressman knows, is an explosive political subject; industry and commerce in recovery do not absorb the army of unemployed; the municipal and State authorities cannot carry the burden without large and systematic aid from the Federal Government. The W.P.A. if disbanded or materially curtailed, will have to be replaced by some other Federal agency. Nothing can be plainer than that.

Unemployment and relief make a problem of immense difficulty, but it appears certain as this article is being written that all the troubles of the Administration during the present winter will be subordinate to those arising out of the Labour situation. Unless all the signs are misleading, the American industrial world is rushing into a crisis of appalling danger. The creation last year of the Committee for Industrial Organisation, by Mr. John L. Lewis, of the United Mine Workers, marked the end of the period dominated by the American Federation of Labour and its rigid hostility to industrial unionism. John Lewis is the one dynamic influence to-day in Labour politics, and the advance of his organisation since the election, when its voting strength was given to Mr. Roosevelt, has been most remarkable. The strategy of the C.I.O. begins with the organising of those great industries which so far have resisted unionisation, or under the N.R.A. were drawn into the compromise of the company union—steel, automobiles, rubber and the rest. Pittsburgh and Detroit are the inevitable first battlegrounds. The new year opened with the threat of immediate war in the automobile region, General Motors, the greatest of industrial corporations, making the issue. Mr. A. P. Sloan, the president of General Motors, made on January 4th a declaration that may be taken as the keynote, and at the same time as an intimation that the great employers continue to stand upon the old ground. Mr. Sloan, indeed, affirms that the manufacturers are not enemies of unionism or collective bargaining: they are merely insisting upon the principle that the control of the plants is the responsibility of the management and not of the men. Here, needless to say, is the core of the old

dispute. No matter how the question may be stated, the issue is unchanged: the employing corporations refuse to alter their view that to recognise the independent unions is to surrender the citadel. Mr. Lewis and his allies, they hold, are aiming at control, and therefore the corporations will not deal with them.

The outcome in the automobile industry is grim, and if in the steel centres it is less immediately menacing, that is no reason for anticipating peace in Pittsburgh or Youngstown. The trial of strength is clearly approaching. It is made all the more certain by the reality of recovery, nor can we separate the demands of American Labour and the new confidence of the union leaders from the conditions prevailing in Europe and the world's mad absorption in preparing for mutual mass destruction. Whether President Roosevelt and his admirable Secretary of Labour will be able to wield any authority in this momentous dispute may well be the Administration's most serious concern during the coming half-year.

And what of the Roosevelt second term in respect of international affairs?

The President starts afresh in the glow of his South American journey, which, it is fair to assume, will bear in the record a few months hence a markedly different complexion from that put upon it in the Press reports of December. The positive results of the Buenos Aires Conference will in all probability enhance the reputation of Mr. Cordell, to whose practical application of the good-neighbour policy Mr. Roosevelt is greatly indebted. We cannot doubt that the affirmation of Pan-American unity *vis-à-vis* the restless Powers of Europe and Asia will have its due effect. But what of the movement in the direction of a full league of the Western Republics, and what of the bearing of President Roosevelt's Pan-Americanism upon the Neutrality controversy which cannot fail to be of cardinal importance during the first session of the new Congress? The question in America has reached a stage of extreme complexity. Mr. Roosevelt, naturally, is using his weight towards revised neutrality, legislation allowing the widest possible presidential discretion in the crucial matter of embargoes. He is resisted by the determined group of Senators, strongly backed by expert advisers and organised interests throughout the country, who look upon presidential discretion as the

gate of war and are working for a form of neutrality as strict as mandatory legislation can make it. The American people are isolationist as never before. They have yet to learn, they can learn only by experience, whether an overwhelming popular sentiment, reinforced by even the most rigorous of neutrality laws, could avail to secure the detachment of the strongest Power from a conflict involving the civilisation of the world. America to-day, however, says, We will keep out. And what citizen of Britain or of Europe can wonder that this should be the American resolve?

Meanwhile, the people of the United States are convinced of the reality of economic recovery, and the apparent willingness of the business world to accept the electoral judgment after a campaign of almost unexampled panic-mongering, afforded conclusive proof that confidence has returned to the land. There are in this connection a few points to be especially emphasised. The present confidence is far from being a healthy sign. The boom conditions which make once more so extraordinary a showing in New York and all other great cities are to a large extent illusory. The American public, it is to be feared, has not taken to heart any permanent moral from the great depression: 1937 may prove to be another perilous year. But President Roosevelt genuinely feels the confidence that rings through his speeches. And since the national tribute of last November was an event without a parallel in any political democracy, the assurance of the second inaugural is certainly not unjustified.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

New York, January 6th.

"POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT."

THE Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law makes to-day interesting reading. It is over a quarter of a century since it was published, and many if not all of the recommendations have reached fruition. The Poor Law has been broken up into many sections, the Guardians have disappeared, and the general mixed workhouse is, more or less, a forgotten institution. The Ministry of Labour, a particular pet of the Minority Commissioners, has become a reality, while the Labour Exchanges, an integral part of their scheme, have now been in operation twenty-six years. The Poor Law Children have gone to the Education Authority, the sick and infirm to the Public Health Committee of the County Council or County Borough, and what little remains of traditionally Poor Law work is being discharged by "Public Assistance Committees" of the appropriate Local Authorities, the very words taken bodily from the recommendations of the Minority Commissioners. In one respect the advice of the Commissioners has been departed from. They recommended Unemployment Insurance, but insisted that it should be confined to the well-organised trade unions, whose scheme should be subsidised, but the administration left to them. That was no doubt in the mind of the pre-War Liberal Government, as it appeared in their initial scheme, but in the pressure of post-War conditions it was extended to all industrial wage-earners.

Other legislation has helped to undermine the old Poor Law, and none perhaps more than Health Insurance, though Old Age and Widows' Pensions have made their contributions. Sickness was a constant factor which drove the workers over the poverty line, on to the tender mercies of the Guardians. Parliament has, during the last quarter of a century, passed under various Acts legislation that has completely superseded the old Poor Law. The Unemployment Act of 1934 can be regarded as the coping-stone of the new dispensation! For years the doctrine has been preached that poverty and unemployment should be a national and not a local responsibility. And the case for this has been strengthened by conditions arising out of the Great War. The districts that suffered most from unemployment were necessarily least able to bear the burden. Where factories or mines were closed

down, the money could not be raised by rates to help the sufferers, in fact the very high rates helped still further to drive away industry from the district.

The Chamberlain Local Government Act with its formula of assistance based on complicated factors was an attempt to distribute more fairly the poverty burden between the various parts of the country. But the whole problem was brought to a head by the breakdown of Unemployment Insurance in 1931 under the pressure of the terrific industrial depression and the great increase in the number of unemployed. The National Government decided to put the fund on a self-supporting basis, and therefore to limit its responsibility to covenanted benefits. The so-called transitional cases, i.e. those insured persons who had exhausted their rights based on their stamp contributions, became the responsibility of Public Assistance Committees acting as agents for the Ministry of Labour. Their instructions were to make payments not on an insurance basis but on the principle of needs. Then the trouble began. "Needs" is an elastic term, and its interpretation and the spirit of its administration varied from district to district. Public Assistance Committees were spending public money which they were not responsible for raising themselves, with the inevitable suspicion that they were dispensing it too generously. The Unemployment Act of 1934 transfers the responsibility for the whole of the able-bodied unemployed from the Local Authorities to one Central Board, nominated by the Government, but ostensibly independent of Parliament and working through its officers in each locality. With its establishment goes the last trace of the old Poor Law. Under Part I all unemployed persons come who are in the insurance category but have exhausted the right to benefit; under Part II come the able-bodied who need assistance but do not belong to the insurance class. All that is left to the care of Local Authorities are the old, the sick and the infirm.

The new Act has been subject to a fierce fire of criticism and has aroused hot political passions. The first regulations issued by the Board were so unpopular that they had to be withdrawn, and led to the transfer of the then Minister of Labour to another post. The new regulations have taken a year to hatch out, and they can hardly be said to have had a friendly reception. My own view is that it is next to impossible

to devise scales of relief applicable to the whole country, with conditions varying as they do in a highly industrialised country like ours. The regulations do hand over the very delicate and human duty of helping poverty to a great bureaucracy. However well meaning officials may be, it is inevitable that they will be bound by red tape. The old Poor Law Guardians had their faults, but they did bring to their work a personal knowledge both of the persons and the district under their charge. A bureaucracy can administer a fixed scale like those under the Insurance Act, but once a Need or Means Test was applied, there was bound to be profound discontent. An Englishman resents personal inquiries into his private life even though inevitable when help is asked for from the State.

But there is another, deeper, cause. When unemployment only affects a small section, any system has a chance of success. Since the War whole communities have suffered from it. A class of man that before the War could reasonably expect to be free from the need of applying for help from the State, now finds himself in the position of having to go cap in hand to the relieving officer. He has become accustomed to draw insurance money as a right, and he objects to the inquisitorial examination into the earnings of various members of his household.

Time will show how the new system works. Advisory Committees have been set up, and if these committees can be made operative, some of the acerbities of a centralised system may be smoothed out. The question naturally arises as to how far the new dispensation is a success. I believe if it had not been for the severe strain of the War upheaval, Unemployment Insurance would have so functioned that it could have met all but a comparatively small number, for whom it would have been easy to have devised a water-tight system. But the dislocation of the world economic system threw the labour market out of gear. We hear much of the distressed areas, and theirs is a real human tragedy. But it would be a mistake to be blinded by their more glaring need to the fact that, all over the country, there are pockets of industrial depression that has involved months, and even years of unemployment to thousands of honest and hard-working men.

The revival of trade and particularly the rearmament programme are both easing the situation, but an army of

1½ million unemployed does not justify complacency. In fact, the lull in the storm is the opportunity to refit the ship. It is a truism to say that no system of relief is a satisfactory substitute for work and wages either from the point of view of the individual or of the State. The long-term remedy can only be found in the revival of world trade, in the breaking down of tariff barriers, the abolition of quotas and exchange restrictions. That is being reiterated each year at Geneva, but with little result. Monsieur Blum made a gesture to the world when he became Prime Minister, but he has received very little response; in fact our Government has continued since to add to the restrictions on trade. There is no half-way house inside a protectionist policy, and it is almost impossible to devise a dividing line. We are therefore driven back on planning. The experiments of the Totalitarian State with their attempts at a planned economy do not appeal to us, with their inevitable interference with the liberty of investment and free movement of both master and man. But protection is an artificial economy, and with it State interference cannot be avoided.

Planning is a much abused word. If it is used in its simplest sense, it is what every business man does in his own organisation if he aims at large-scale production. Town-planning has been successfully operating in every continental country for the last half-century, in most parts of America and in our Dominions. We have only recently awakened to its importance, and even now recent legislation has been timid and largely inoperative. But sound town-planning depends for its success on the power to locate industry. Just as it is of direct concern to a community where a sewage farm is put, so it is of interest to the nation where a foundry or a munition works are located. On one side a pleasant residential and rural area is ruined by the construction of an aeroplane factory, while on the other side workshops on Tyneside or elsewhere are derelict. Public money has been spent on schools and social services in the latter, and of course will have to be invested in the former if the new factories mature. Is it unreasonable to sterilise the land, urgently required for amenities around London, and exercise gentle pressure on industry to make use of existing facilities in derelict areas in the North? That is the kind of question that is pressed home in the Third Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas.

But, incidentally, sound as this is from a planning point of view, it does not seem to add to the total number of persons employed or to decrease unemployment. It merely transfers employment and saves the national assets from wastage! Cannot employment be expanded to absorb surplus labour? Is modern industry elastic enough to utilise displaced workers? Isn't the tendency with the increased cost of labour units more and more to mechanise industry and utilise less man-power? I have never assented to the over-production theory. There is so much unsatisfied demand both at home and abroad, that the world has not yet touched the fringe of consumptive capacity. The free movement of goods between nations is the real remedy, but alas, the world is not ready for that yet. And it will have to go through many more periods of hardship before it sees that as the right way to prosperity.

In the meantime the Board of Trade should become an effective Board. I should like to see a permanent commission of Industry and Labour. On it should serve a representative of the great joint stock banks, of the railways, and some of the primary industries: labour leaders should be there, but the Commission necessarily should be small so as to be effective. I attach special importance to the banks which have, on the one hand, so much to lose by frozen assets and so much to gain in finding proper investments for capital. The railways are vitally concerned in the proper use of their great trunk lines. Over this delegation should preside the President of the Board of Trade, who would thus become a president in fact as well as in name. The Ministry of Labour would be the technical advisers of this commission on labour supply and employment needs. The commission would be in a position of great authority to recommend to investors opportunities for investment of new capital in particular industries. And the time is particularly opportune for such an experiment with the vast State money now being spent on rearmament. The commission should have power to recommend the complete derating of industrial property for a period of years on approved new developments in depressed areas. Of course the loss of rates would have to be made good by the Exchequer, and would in each case be subject to Treasury approval obtained after a certificate from the Ministry of Labour. This would always be dependent on satisfactory

evidence that the scheme could absorb enough surplus labour to justify the cost to the general taxpayer.

This brings me to the Special Areas Act. Mr. Malcolm Stewart when he was Commissioner, in his third report dated October 23rd, observing that "though there was evidence that the work done and the measures initiated are proving helpful to the areas," went on to say: "nevertheless it has to be admitted that no appreciable reduction of those unemployed has been effected. . . ." "Such increased employment as is likely to result from the operation of the many schemes initiated will prove altogether insufficient, in the absence of a spontaneous growth of new industries and the expansion of existing industries, to offset the release of labour brought about by increased mechanisation and rationalisation." The report has been discussed in Parliament and has been the subject of acute controversy. In the meantime, Mr. Malcolm Stewart has resigned and been replaced by Sir George Gillett, and we have had the magnificent gift of Lord Nuffield. Mr. Malcolm Stewart has consistently insisted on the need of a survey of the special areas by an impartial and independent authority "in order to ascertain as scientifically and accurately as possible what are the relative prospects of industrial revival in the different districts of the special areas." "Transference should be concentrated on those districts which obviously offer the least prospect of recovery."

This seems only common sense. There ought to be an industrial survey of all areas in which the Labour Exchange figures reveal from time to time abnormal and prolonged unemployment. It does seem waste to pour into towns Government money in mere relief without effective investigation into the root causes of the depression and the possibilities of applying remedies on economic lines. The danger of the transfer policy is that the young and more enterprising are moved out of the district, the middle-aged are left behind in some districts with little, if any, absorption into industrial life, while the whole fabric of the society in which they are living is being rapidly destroyed by attrition. There are small pockets of industrial life especially in mining districts where there is no prospect of industrial revival. Such places it would be wiser to treat as devastated areas and shift the whole community to new surroundings with some prospect of becoming self-supporting. Garden cities are no impossible dream, as

Letchworth and Port Sunlight bear witness. We read of an aeroplane factory being established near Windsor—not a very happy choice of location—which is likely to employ 5,000 hands. That must ultimately mean a total community of some 20,000 people. It does not want exceptional imagination to visualise the shifting of a Welsh mining village to form the nucleus of this new industrial unit, though not necessarily at Windsor. As it is, down near Dover have grown up mining villages, to work the local coalfields, where the language spoken gives ample proof of their Welsh origin. With the State so vitally interested in rearmament there is no reason why the Government should not organise the movement of population, not by single units but by communities, when it is in the national interest to do so. During the War new towns sprang up almost in the night, but the time factor then was so important that it did not lead altogether to satisfactory results. The Slough Estate has been often quoted, but there you have had industrial development with no proper provision for housing. The industrial estate is being experimented with in areas where there is still a prospect of salvage. I have more in view the shifting of population from districts that offer no prospect of revival. If I may offer another precedent for the guidance of the Government, I think inspiration can be found in the new housing estates round London and Manchester. At Becontree a completely new community has been created since the War by the L.C.C., with some 30,000 houses and a population of some 120,000 people, with churches, schools, and even a hospital. Sites were allotted for factory development, but for a time there seemed a prospect of industrial paralysis. Fortunately Ford came to Dagenham, in the immediate neighbourhood, and gave a start to industrial life. I don't say this is a complete analogy, but it does show what can be done if the Government will face up to its responsibility. I do not want it to be thought that I advocate transfer of whole communities except as a counsel of despair and only after it has been proved up to the hilt that the particular unit is beyond salvage. Not only are most industrial towns worth saving, but it is sheer waste to allow them to go to rot and ruin at the very time when in other parts of the country rural amenities are being destroyed to meet the needs of industrial development.

Space forbids my dwelling on the more conventional

methods of finding work for the unemployed, such as the completion of the new arterial roads, public works of all kinds, afforestation, and last but not least, agricultural settlement. Road works, I think, have often been over-rated as a method of surplus labour absorption. It is no satisfactory substitute for getting men back into factory and workshop. But at a time of tremendous road fatalities and with the ever-increasing expansion of motor traffic, in their road schemes particularly where there is surplus labour, the Ministry of Transport should be encouraged, instead of as at present hindered by the Treasury, to make full use of the Road Fund. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has seized for current revenue this fund, which was originally earmarked for road improvement. Agricultural settlement, on its merits, should be encouraged, as in the interest of the proper balance of our social economy, but to be a success it must be on the right lines and must necessarily take time, as it requires the careful training of the men concerned.

I have deliberately avoided exploring in detail the problem of the Special Areas. That has been neglected so long that it is only by immediate direct Government action that anything effective can be done. Lord Nuffield's intervention is a recognition of this. I have rather endeavoured to treat unemployment and poverty from the point of view of the country as a whole. Unemployment has created quite a literature of its own which would fill several bookshelves. This is the most hopeful sign. We must keep flogging away at it until we have broken its back, on the one hand finding palliatives that are effective, and on the other dealing with its causes, which are to be found in the artificial barriers of this mad post-war world.

PERCY HARRIS.

CHANGES IN NORTH-EAST AFRICA.

DURING the past two years great changes have taken place in the situation in North-East Africa owing to a first-class colonial war and the conclusion of three important international agreements. To the Italian possessions of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland has been added the whole of Abyssinia, thereby constituting a vast area under Italian sovereignty in the north-east corner of Africa. This great block of territory was acquired by conquest, and has in French Somaliland only one neighbour that is neither British nor Anglo-Egyptian. All three of the international agreements concerned are more or less intimately connected with this war of conquest, the Franco-Italian Agreement of 1935 being of an anticipatory nature, while the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Anglo-Italian Mediterranean Agreement of 1937 are direct results. Although the situation produced by these events is still in process of development, and will continue to be so for some time to come, it is important to appreciate how and in what direction things are likely to shape.

In January 1935 France and Italy signed an agreement which brought to an end a long period of bad relations. A reconciliation between these two Latin countries, so like and yet so different, took years of preparation. The outstanding questions were many and complex, the solution of which called for the pressure of external events of a third party nature. Fortunately, as far as these negotiations were concerned, the attitude of Nazi Germany supplied that pressure, while the situation that was developing between Italy and Abyssinia provided an opportunity for exchanges of considerable value. With the prospect of war in Abyssinia, Italy needed the friendship of France, especially in French Somaliland, where a French company owns the railway from Jibuti to Addis Abeba. She also wanted to be assured that France would not put obstacles in the way of her Abyssinian expedition. In exchange for this Italy was willing to make concessions to France with regard to her claims in Tunis. As the French saw an opportunity of settling the Tunisian question to their advantage, and realised that the Italians would be fully occupied outside the Mediterranean for many years, they gave the Italians more or less what they wanted in the

Red Sea. In other words, France gave Italy a small triangle of territory of military value in the north of French Somaliland, the island of Dumeira, and a block of shares in the Jibuti-Addis Abeba railway. France also, it is understood, gave Italy definite assurances that she would have a free hand in carrying out what military operations she thought fit in North-East Africa. As far as Britain is concerned, the most important aspect of this agreement lies in the transfer from France to Italy of the island of Dumeira, which can be fortified as an offset to the British island of Perim. These islands cover the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. That Franco-Italian relations were most cordial immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities was obvious in Jibuti. On an occasion when I dined with the Governor of French Somaliland on the eve of my departure for Egypt, His Excellency proposed the toast of " l'Angleterre et la France," and then added significantly, " et l'Italie."

The war took its course, and ended in May 1936, with the Italian capture of Addis Abeba and the occupation of a large part of Abyssinia, including most of the important strategical points. As the waters of the Blue Nile and Lake Tana, in respect of which Britain has treaty rights, form part of the vital water supply of Egypt and the Sudan, the control of Abyssinia by a European Power became a matter of considerable concern to the Egyptians and the Sudanese. Hence, Italy's occupation of Abyssinia not only facilitated a settlement of the outstanding questions in Anglo-Egyptian relations, but has made possible an agreement between Britain and Egypt on the question of the Sudan. The settlement of these questions led to the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in August 1936, thereby solving a problem which had baffled the governments of both countries since the unilateral Declaration of 1922.

Meanwhile, the Abyssinian War and its political ramifications left Anglo-Italian relations in a pitiful state. Here were two European Powers, with vital interests in the Mediterranean, more or less at loggerheads for the first time. Up to the time of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, and the intervention of the League of Nations, the friendship between Britain and Italy had been exemplary. The two nations fought side by side in the Great War and afterwards worked together in peace. The interests of one nowhere conflicted with the

interests of the other. In the Mediterranean mutual friendship was vitally important to both. Yet, there were occasions during the events of the last fifteen months when war with Italy was freely discussed in London, and the possibility of a hostile Britain was seriously considered in Rome. But, when the storm had blown over, it was quickly realised on both sides that an agreement on the question of the Mediterreanean was essential for the sea communications of both countries; and that such an agreement would also contribute to the maintenance of European peace. Hence, steps were taken to start conversations in London and Rome in order to clear the way for the assurances needed and the removal of suspicions. Towards the end of 1936, these conversations became official as result of the British decision to recognise *de facto* Italian sovereignty in Abyssinia. The means used for this purpose was the transfer to a Consulate-General of the British Legation in Addis Abeba. From this point the conclusion of the Mediterranean Agreement was a matter of days, and it shows how simple in general principle and fundamental in fact are the considerations underlying Anglo-Italian relations. There is no attempt to enter into specific detail, or to define spheres of influence, so that the document is conspicuous in its simplicity. The vital interests that lie behind its almost platitudinous phrases are too obvious to need their expression in a conglomeration of words. Apart from Italian assurances with regard to the integrity of Spain, the Agreement is practically confined to an exchange of assurances on the part of Britain and Italy to recognise and respect each other's rights and interests in the Mediterranean.

But what is of special interest south of the Mediterranean is the fact that Italy's vital transit interests are now extended from the Suez Canal to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. Before the Abyssinian War, Italian interests in the Red Sea area were confined to the protection of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, colonies of little value, and such Italian shipping as passed through these waters. Now the situation is completely changed. Italian East Africa (Abyssinia and the two above-mentioned colonies) comprise a vast territory, which will supply Italy with raw materials, minerals and foodstuffs, and at the same time absorb a large number of Italian subjects. It is, therefore, anticipated that with the development of this whole region Italian shipping and trade along the Red Sea

route will steadily increase. There is also every prospect that the Italians will develop air transport to the fullest possible extent, as it has already been found possible to fly from Massawa to Rome in one day. It must also be remembered that Italy now holds a most important strategical position behind Cape Guardafui. Although at present her only ports in this area are Massawa and Mogadishu, it will not be long before Assab is opened up and improvements are carried out in many of the lesser harbours and bays on the Eritrean and Somaliland coasts. It is also understood that negotiations are taking place between the Italian Viceroy and the Governor of British Somaliland, with a view to reaching a transit arrangement whereby Italy could use the British port of Berbera and bring transit trade to British Somaliland. This is a small but significant example of how Britain and Italy can help each other in these remote parts. The only Italian naval base at present in operation is at Massawa, but steps will be taken to strengthen Italy's shore defences in the Red Sea in proportion to the warships considered necessary to protect these waters. Of the two railway lines connecting the Red Sea with the interior one belongs to Italy (Massawa-Asmara) and the other to France (Jibuti-Addis Abeba). With regard to the latter a friendly arrangement has been reached for the operation of this line in accordance with Italy's needs, and it is likely that for some time at any rate no change in the railway *status quo* will take place. Italian interests in the Red Sea area are, therefore, confined to the assurance of free lines of transit, protection of Italian East Africa, and facilities for developing the country. Let us see how these compare with British, French and Egyptian interests.

Britain's most vital interest is that of free transit from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal, Red Sea and Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. The integrity of Egypt is essential for the protection of the Suez Canal. The Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb are protected by Aden and its opposite number in British Somaliland, together with the island of Perim. But, if these lines of communication are to be secure, it is now obvious that friendship with Italy is essential. This friendship once firmly re-established, our position will be doubly secure. On land, Britain's special position in Egypt and the Sudan make the waters of Lake Tana and the Blue Nile a matter of considerable importance in so far as they contribute to

cultivation in Egypt and the Sudan. The water of the Nile is life or death to these countries. Yet there has been much mis-statement of the position with regard to Lake Tana, the extent to which its waters contribute to the needs of Egypt and the Sudan, and the danger of that supply being cut off. Some information on this question is, therefore, not out of place.

As far back as 1902, the Egyptian Government were authorised by the Emperor Menelik to send an expedition " to visit and collect all possible information concerning Lake Tana, in Abyssinia, with a view to deciding whether it could be effectively utilised as a reservoir for the Nile, should such a proposal ever come within the range of practical politics." Then in 1920 it was arranged that the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works should send another mission to make further studies of the lake. The outstanding results of the 1920 Mission were definitely to confirm the conclusions reached by the expedition eighteen years earlier. In normal circumstances Lake Tana makes its greatest contribution to the waters of the Blue Nile during the period when the river in Egypt and the Sudan is amply supplied from other sources, and produces the least volume of water at the time when the main river is low. If the outflow from the lake were controlled by a regulator, the water which now adds to the surplus in the main river when there is already more than enough could be kept in the lake, and released during the period when the Nile is low and water is most needed in Egypt. In average years the total discharge of water from Lake Tana may be estimated at 3,500 million cubic metres, and this is the volume that could be stored for use when the Nile is low. In normal years the discharge of water varies according to the season of the year from almost nothing to a maximum of about 350 cubic metres per second. But the discharge from the lake at the highest flood-time does not exceed one-fiftieth part of the total volume of water entering Egypt; and water control at Lake Tana can make no appreciable difference either to the amount of silt or to the volume of water passing Assouan. Furthermore, it is estimated that, during the period when the proposed Lake Tana reservoir was discharging, 90 per cent. of Tana water would reach Roseires, 85 per cent. would reach Makwar, and 68 per cent. would reach Assouan. If 3,500 million cubic metres reached Assouan from Lake Tana, the additional quantity reaching that point from this source would be about 2,400 million cubic metres. If, on the other hand, this water were used in the Gezireh district of the Sudan, the Lake Tana supply would amount to a volume of about 3,000 million cubic metres. A comparison of these figures shows the advantage of using this water for the irrigation of the Gezireh. With the reservoir discharging at the rate of 350 cubic metres per second, the water would take about eight days to reach Makwar (for the Gezireh), and about thirty-two days to reach Assouan (for Egypt). Such is the position of this contribution to the Nile waters, which shows that control of Lake Tana cannot threaten Egypt; and I have it on the highest Egyptian authority on this subject that physical conditions make it impossible to prevent the water of Lake Tana reaching the Nile in the Sudan. This bogey is, therefore, psychological rather than real, and there is no longer any doubt that the Italian authorities in Abyssinia intend to respect British treaty rights in this direction.

There are various other British interests shared with Egypt, such as the protection of the frontiers of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt. Hitherto, raiding over the Sudan frontier by bands of Abyssinians in search of slaves and plunder has been a constant source of trouble, and the same applies to the northern frontier of Kenya. There is every reason to suppose that this will henceforth greatly diminish, if it is not altogether prevented. This is one way in which Abyssinia's neighbours are sure to benefit by the change that has taken place. Where the Capitulations are concerned, Italy's position in Egypt must be taken into account, although there can be no question of discrimination in her favour. The Italians probably have now the largest foreign community in Egypt, where their economic interests are increasing from year to year. Italian tonnage now takes second place in the returns of ships passing through the Suez Canal, and Italy will soon expect to be represented on the Board of Directors.

But Italy is not the only European Power which now has to face the abolition of measures devised long ago to protect their nationals in Egypt—measures which are fully recognised to be no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times and the present state of the country. France has economic and cultural interests of long-standing in Egypt, and Greece has

for generations participated in Egyptian economic progress. British subjects, let it be remembered, in this case are also foreigners who stand to lose their capitulatory rights. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty provides that Egypt will, with British support, approach the Capitulatory Powers with two suggestions; first, that the existing restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty in applying legislation (including financial legislation) to foreigners should be discontinued; and secondly, that a transitional régime should be introduced for a reasonable period, during which the Mixed Tribunals would remain and exercise, besides their present jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts. At the end of this period the Egyptian Government will be free to dispense with the Mixed Tribunals. When the conference meets at Montreux in the spring, some resistance is expected from some of the Capitulatory Powers, but it is hoped that they will realise the benefits to be derived in other directions from following the British lead. It is in the interests of all that the Egyptians should not be compelled to resort to the expedient of unilateral action in the matter.

It is also as well to remember that, on the economic side, Egypt has some good cards to play. As a completely independent nation, her friendship has become a necessity to those Powers with interests in the Suez Canal, and in territories bordering on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Italy has much to gain from a friendly working arrangement with Egypt, and *vice-versa*. The Lake Tana scheme would bring economic benefit to both countries. Tranquillity of Abyssinia's frontier with the Sudan depends on mutual co-operation. There are many possibilities in the improvement of Italo-Egyptian trade relations. As the Italians contemplate developing commercial aviation throughout their overseas possessions, Egypt stands to benefit from her geographical position in this respect. But her transit value to Italy is not confined to the air. It may be assumed that Italian shipping through the Canal will increase, and a road is in course of construction along the coast from Tripoli and Benghazi to the Egyptian frontier. This will connect Italian Libya with Italy's communications with North-East Africa. There is also the possibility that later on there will be a desire to connect Libya with North-East Africa by a desert route with a transit arrangement through the Sudan. In view of these considerations, there is on both sides a definite desire to reach some kind of agreement which will regularise the new situation for their mutual benefit.

Apart from France's economic and cultural interests in Egypt, she has at Jibuti an important link in her sea communications with a considerable part of her colonial possessions. The chief significance of French Somaliland lies in the port of Jibuti itself and the Jibuti-Addis Abeba railway. Although Jibuti is a coaling station and port of call for vessels trading with the East, particularly with France's Asiatic possessions, East Africa and Madagascar, the place relies entirely on the Abyssinian trade. It is, therefore, a matter of considerable importance to France that this railway and the trade it carries should remain in French hands. Although the distance by rail from Jibuti to Addis Abeba is 492 miles, only fifty-six miles are in French Somaliland. While maritime interests along this Red Sea route affect the shipping of all nations, there are certain Powers which are likely to become interested in the development of Abyssinia. Japan opened a legation in Addis Abeba about a year ago, with a view to establishing a definite footing in the trade of the country. The sale of cheap cotton piece-goods was the first object in view, and the Japanese had been carrying out the most systematic investigations on this subject for some years. Whether this will be allowed to continue on the strength of the German-Italian-Japanese front against Communism remains to be seen.

But there are other Powers, such as Germany and Hungary, which have practically been invited to participate in private enterprises in Abyssinia. In this vast area there are openings of all kinds. A great variety of agricultural produce can be grown, including grain of most kinds, vegetables, fruits, cotton, coffee and tobacco. Certain districts contain large quantities of timber. There are good conditions for the rearing of cattle and sheep, and for the development of many agricultural industries. Although the country is known to possess large quantities of mineral ores, the details of this and of oil resources will not be available till technical experts have finished their systematic survey, and the same applies to gold and precious stones. In order to find out what Abyssinia can produce, and how to make the best use of the country's natural wealth, various joint-stock companies have been formed, and others are in the process of formation. When

this work has been completed, and it has been decided on what lines development by foreigners will be approved, it is expected that selected European Powers will be encouraged to participate in private enterprises under the control of the Italian authorities.

When the foregoing group of situations are taken into account as constituting the changed position in the Mediterranean, Egypt, the Red Sea, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and Abyssinia, it is obvious that the tranquillity and prosperity of the whole of North-East Africa depends on the friendship and co-operation of Britain and Italy. The only alternative is chaos on the most vital and vulnerable part of Britain's whole imperial system. It is, therefore, in the highest interests of these two great Powers to see in what ways they can help each other, for their mutual benefit and for the happiness and prosperity of those native races over whom they rule.

E. W. Polson Newman.

GERMANY TO-DAY.

WHEN you ask a German to-day how things are progressing in his country, you will always hear the same story. No matter whether he be a worker, a farmer, an office employee, a doctor or an official, he will tell you, in essence: "Everything is progressing splendidly. Our leader has performed miracles. Unemployment has almost disappeared. We are a strong, united nation now. We have broken the hold which the despicable Jews had over us, and we have ousted the Communists." This is the standard story, varying only in length and intensity, and it leaves one amazed at the unanimity of public opinion. Is this, then, a really united country and are all these things we have heard actually and wholly true? Perhaps Germany really has made the enormous progress claimed; the German people may be solidly behind Hitler after all, and Fascism may not, despite everything we have heard, be as bad as we had thought.

But if you pursue your inquiries a little further, you will begin to hear another story. You will find that the people are literally afraid to speak the truth in case they are overheard or you are a spy; that the country is run by a system of terror which sounds almost incredible to English ears. For the slightest uttered criticism of the régime a German citizen may be picked up by the Gestapo and taken to a concentration camp for a few months, or years. And the Germans know only too well what that means, so it is little wonder that they will not talk openly to a stranger. This undoubtedly accounts for the good impressions which many recent visitors obtained of Germany, even distinguished people. The magnificent buildings and the superb organisation behind the recent Olympic Sports were enough to impress anyone favourably, and when visitors came back without having heard a single word against Hitler or his régime it is no wonder that they had a glowing tale to tell.

I was fortunate in having some good connections in Germany and was able to probe beneath the surface to a considerable extent. I met quite a number of people who told me what the real situation was: there are many of the intellectuals in Germany to-day who consider it a form of patriotic duty to tell foreigners the truth about their country, as long as they know they are safe in doing so. As I expected, the

rosy Nazi statements are far from supported by actual facts and figures. I found that there was apparently widespread discontent and disillusionment, and ample evidence that the country is in a far from sound condition economically.

Let us take the case of the workers first. The Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment will gladly give you official figures and information. According to them, unemployment has been reduced from 7 millions to 1 million, the irreducible minimum of pre-war days. There is no forced labour; the men working on the new auto roads get low wages, admittedly, but at least they are working, many of them for the first time, and they have good living conditions, good food and clothes. There are three quarters of a million men employed on the roads, this being the largest project undertaken by the Government. Armaments, you will be told, are employing great numbers of men all over the country. The Olympic Sports buildings and new buildings in Nuremberg and other places have kept many men employed. The lot of the working man is very little better, they admit, but the saving in the dole now benefits everyone indirectly. Wages, they claim, are higher now, but very little higher than three years ago. A working man now belongs to one organisation—*Arbeitsfront*—which takes care of all social services, whereas previously these services were scattered among the forty-eight political parties. He pays 12 per cent. of his wages for all services, unemployment insurance, sickness benefit and old-age pension. Taxes, you are told, are definitely lower by 10 per cent. or more.

But this story was modified considerably by an economist friend who had access to official statistics. The lowest unemployment figure was 1·3 millions, in June 1936, having dropped from 2·5 millions in January. This will inevitably rise again this winter, but probably not as high as 2·5 millions. In published statements the highest unemployment figures in one year are often compared with the lowest in another, thus giving a distorted idea of progress in this direction. Unemployment now seems to depend on armaments, and the production of these depends on the money available. Some people maintain that armaments must continue to be made as long as unemployment exists, regardless of cost. On the other hand, one well-known economist declares that Germany cannot afford to eliminate unemployment. Due to the loss of foreign trade, he argues, there should be between 4 and 5 million unemployed in Germany; any less than this infers that artificial means, for which Germany cannot afford to pay, are being employed to reduce the number, creating an unhealthy economic condition. An interesting theory, especially from within Germany.

Wages, my friend showed me, are no higher than in 1933; 90 per cent. of the workers in Germany earn less than M.120 per month, which is equivalent to about £8. The buying power of the workers has dropped disastrously, by 30 per cent. to 40 per cent. Most food products are much dearer than three years ago: fish, potatoes, beef, 100 per cent.; margarine, 350 per cent.; butter, eggs, pork (by far the most popular meat) are up 50 per cent.; other things in proportion. Herr Darré, the Nourishment Minister (the under-Nourishment Minister some call him), recently admitted that the country faced a 20 per cent. food shortage; it would require 1½ billion marks' worth of food imports immediately to bring food supplies up to the level of the very poor year 1932, and would require a billion marks' worth of food imports annually after that to maintain the level there.

Taxes, direct and indirect, are definitely higher, and the tax-free salary is now lower than it was. Winter help is a considerable item on everybody's budget. This is the special money which is raised to supply the unemployed with the necessities of life during the winter. One is not bound to subscribe, but it is highly imprudent not to do so! A fairly wealthy family in Hamburg told me that they did not mind doing their share, as it was in a good cause, but great numbers of the people curse this drain on their incomes most heartily, if inaudibly. The dole used to be about M.82 per month, now it averages M.50. One unemployed man whom I met in South Germany is getting M.60, out of which he pays M.26 for rent, and is expected to keep himself and his family, including several children, on the rest. He was most bitter, and even though he did not know me well he expressed his discontent very freely, declaring that most of the workers were equally dissatisfied. He disliked intensely the anti-Semitic campaign and told me many ways in which the people were helping the Jews, against all regulations.

The organisation *Kraft Durch Freude* (Strength through Joy) has, admittedly, done much for the workers in the way of providing cheap trips both within the country and abroad.

But, as some of the people say, what is the use of holiday trips if you are short of food? They have no freedom now, comparatively, no trades unions nor collective bargaining powers and they feel that they have given up all these liberties for nothing in return.

Now let us see what the intelligentsia think of Nazi rule. Almost universally, whether they express their views or not, they deplore the destruction of culture, the extinction of free, unhampered thought, the reduction in higher educational facilities for boys leaving school, and the regimentation of thought along specified, and narrow, lines. They wonder where the clever men are coming from for the next generation: the doctors, scientists, research chemists and mathematicians. A great number of clever and skilled Germans have left their country in recent years, quite apart from the Jews who have been forced to leave. In Russia I came across a Jewish scientist who had been welcomed there from Germany; the Soviets had built a special laboratory for him equipped with everything he desired. His assistants were almost all Germans, but few of them were Jews. There is admitted to be a shortage of skilled labour in Germany to-day in many different lines.

The intelligentsia also deplore anti-Semitism in their country. Even granted that there was some justification for dealing harshly with certain Jews, there was no excuse for such widespread persecution, they state. One man told me that in his opinion the Jewish persecution would eventually lead to the downfall of Germany. Such was the antagonism aroused abroad that other countries would not come to Germany's help now. He said that he and a number of the younger intellectuals in Germany would like to form a new government, and that if they did, the first thing they would do would be to abolish all recent Jewish legislation. Then they would approach foreign countries for credit on the basis of a new gold currency. They believe they could still save their country by these means, but there seems little chance of their being in the position to do so.

My economist friend told me that Hitler does not by any means know all that goes on. Important steps are often taken during his absence. But everyone admits that he is himself sincere, that he is firmly convinced that it is his destiny to save Germany. There are various cliques in the government; first one will be in favour, or out of it, then another. Those out of favour will be unable to see Hitler for days or even weeks on end. Dr. Schacht, the financial wizard who has been able to keep the country going this long time, has had frequent differences of opinion with Hitler and has many times tendered his resignation. But Germany literally could not get along without him, so his resignation has always been refused, even though Hitler will not speak to him at times. His position has been likened to that of the passengers on the Berlin buses, who are warned by two notices not to talk to the driver and not to get off the bus while it is in motion.

How has the farmer fared under the Nazi régime? His income has risen from 6·4 to 8·2 billion Marks since 1933, and his expenses only from 4·9 to 5·2 billions. The widespread loss of farms has been stopped; farmers cannot even give their farms as security for loans now. But this, although it ensures the possession of the farm to the farmer and his family for all time, has resulted in the banks refusing to grant the usual loans to him for seed, etc., a situation which has become acute. He is forced to sell all his produce through official buying agencies and cannot even sell to his friends in town a dozen eggs on the side. So although the farmer is pretty well off as things are in Germany to-day, having plenty to eat, more money and security, he is actually one of the biggest grumblers, and declares himself to be sadly disillusioned. One hears many tales of how the farmers, and the meat packers, dairies and others, too, scheme together to outwit the buying and selling laws.

With all this discontent, then, and with the continuous urge from Nazi headquarters to make more and more sacrifices for Germany, to tighten the belt still another notch, why do not the people rebel? First, because they are a thoroughly disciplined race and, as one lady said to me, they like to be disciplined; they have been used to it now for so many years, and because of it they accomplish many things that England cannot do. Then it must be admitted that the Nazis have much to show for their term in power. They came in at a time when Germany was demoralised and despairing; the Versailles Treaty was reducing her to a chaotic state, and Hitler seemed to be about the only man left with any faith in the country. He has certainly dragged her out of the mire, made her a strong nation again, united as she has never been before. He has created much work, unquestionably. He has broken

the shackles of the Versailles Treaty. The rearming, conscription, reoccupation of the Rhineland, regained control of the rivers—all these things meet with approval. Next it will be Danzig, some of them think, and as one of the militarist type of Germans said: "Then we will go on and take Lithuania. We must be strong." Then perhaps they will be strong enough to regain some of their colonies. While these possibilities remain, many Germans will stand by Hitler.

But this does not include all Germans by a long way. The horror of war, and more—the belief that it is unnecessary, which is becoming so noticeable among the masses of the people in many countries, particularly the workers, is also present in Germany. The reaction from Fascism is Communism, and in spite of official statements that Communism is dead in Germany, there is ample proof that it is far from so. If there is no danger from Communism within the country, why all the outcry against Russia, a country which everyone knows to have no imperialistic aims whatever? This outcry serves two purposes. It tends to retain support for Hitler of those Germans who really fear Communism and is an excuse for sacrificing so much to rearming.

A German showed me recent copies of seven or eight Communist papers and pamphlets which are being distributed among workers, the army, navy, and police, in spite of the fact that possession of these things is punishable by instant death. In one of the papers, which can be obtained by subscription at 15 pfennigs per copy, there was a long article comparing recent speeches by Hitler and Stalin, under the title "Who really means Peace?" Needless to say, the article showed that it was not Hitler. I heard from one source, not of Communist sympathy, that "the German army and navy are seething with Communism." The traditional good relations between the German and Russian armies have not been broken, and much exchange of ideas and visits is reported to be taking place as in pre-war days. I heard many stories of how Communist organisation goes on behind the scenes. Driven underground, it has become increasingly dangerous from the Nazi point of view. Actually it often appears aboveground, cleverly camouflaged, and it seems to be gaining more and more adherents. One worker told me that 58 per cent. of the German workers favoured Communism, but he was probably somewhat over-enthusiastic.

The ignorance of many Germans on the other hand about Communism and especially about Russia is simply unbelievable. Time after time I was told by intelligent men and women in Germany that Russia was in a state of imminent collapse, that unemployment had reached unheard-of proportions, that rioting took place in all the bigger cities almost every day, and that the whole socialist plan was a failure. I had just come from a long trip through Russia myself, but it was almost impossible to convince these Germans that they were very far from the truth. How could I be correct, even if I had been there, when all their papers told the same story?

Even my economist friend, who has access to much information from abroad, did not know that the new Soviet Constitution was being discussed all over Russia, and suggestions for amendments were invited from everyone. When I showed him a copy of it, and also copies of Russian newspapers full of information about it, he was amazed. "Well, there's nothing like this here," he exclaimed. "Our laws are made for us, and we have to obey them and like it." He gave me much information on the economic state of Germany, and later, by a curious chance, I saw a long, confidential report to Dr. Schacht by a well-known economist which confirmed all that my friend told me, and went even further. This man stated that, in his opinion, the economic collapse of Germany was inevitable and unavoidable. Among his many reasons were that Germany's supplies of raw materials, considerable two years ago, are now almost exhausted, and that she is unable to replace them in anything like sufficient quantities. Foreign credit has been destroyed to such an extent that Germany can no longer force manufactured goods on other countries in exchange for raw materials. To save the situation it would be necessary to increase foreign trade, which has fallen from 12 billion marks per year to 4 billions, to 10 billions immediately, and maintain it there, clearly an impossibility.

Food is becoming desperately short, the report went on, and large increases of imports are essential but unobtainable. The manufacture of armaments cannot go on at the present rate much longer for financial reasons, and this will throw many people out of employment. Almost all sources of capital have been tapped and drained. Savings accounts have been taken and long-term loan certificates given in their place. Insurance companies have likewise been "bled," and now

industry is being attacked. The huge public works programmes have been carried out on short-term credits, which have risen from 8 billion marks to some 24 billions. It has been impossible to repay these when they came due and they have been extended time after time and finally converted into long-term loans. These conversions have reached the figure of 2 billion marks, which is stated to be the limit possible.

Recent events bear out the statements in this report very clearly. The food shortage, the four-year drive for self-sufficiency, the confiscation of Jewish property to raise more funds, the corporation tax raised from 20 per cent. to 30 per cent—one desperate measure after another is taking place. How much longer can it go on? Germany's only hope, if she remains peaceful, would appear to be a large foreign loan, and the only possible source the Bank of England. A slender hope indeed, when England distrusts her warlike aims so much. Then she must lash out into war as a last desperate gamble, and this she is extremely likely to do. What could Hitler lose by such a move if the country were on the verge of collapse? Men of his type do not just admit defeat and hand over the reins of office to someone else. There is always the slender hope that by war he could make some rapid conquests which would enable him to repair the ship of state just in time to prevent it sinking. He would not be troubled to find an excuse for war. His anti-Russian campaign would easily take care of that, whether it was for an outbreak over Spain or a direct attack on Russia through Czechoslovakia.

But would the German people follow him into war? That is a vital question on which, perhaps, the peace of the world hangs. Many would, of course, but there is no doubt that an aggressive war would find extreme disfavour among great masses of the German people. Such a war might precipitate revolution in the country; certainly defeat would, and almost equally certainly a long-drawn-out affair would do so. Possibly Hitler knows this and will not be too rash. On the other hand, the recent Italo-German-Japanese line-up has immensely strengthened his hand, and he may feel that, even without the British support for which he has been angling these past two years, he is now in the position to launch out into an imperialistic war. We shall probably not have long to wait to find out.

J. Allan Cash.

PIRANDELLO.

LUIGI PIRANDELLO'S death is something more than a mere event, something more than the disappearance from the human scene of one of the three representative Italian men of letters and of thought—D'Annunzio, Croce, Pirandello—who, since the achievement of Italy's unity, succeeded in acquiring international fame not merely among small select cultural *côteries*, but among decently educated ordinary people. Pirandello's achievement—in so far as it was an achievement—has been the expression, in an astonishing number of brilliant as well as deeply original short stories, far better than his novels and plays, and later on in powerful though often puzzling dramas, of a great deal of the tragic sense of emptiness in modern life.

Giosuè Carducci had been the last and greatest representative and *vates* of the classical, pagan, serene, ideal life and of the grandeur of Rome, not less than the singer of the *Risorgimento* and its heroes exalted to an almost mythical height. With D'Annunzio an altogether new cycle begins. D'Annunzio enters the arena of Italian literature as a lyrical poet, he, too, in rebellion against the mediocrity and petty-mindedness of the Umbertian period, which Carducci had labelled as *Bisanzio*; but quite soon he imports into Italian literature, and not merely echoes but also originally magnifies and expands, the life-intuitions of Nietzsche, Ibsen, Tolstoi, Walt Whitman, Baudelaire, Dostoiewski. D'Annunzio imports Europe into Italy and, in a way, though nourished to the full with classical food, is the first non-classical poet and novelist of Italy, the asserter of the autonomy of literature and art in respect of history, ethics and religion and the challenger of the traditional, self-complacent *bourgeois* tastes and ideals.

Especially as a disciple of the Nietzschean Gospel of Zarathustra, D'Annunzio, in his novels and in his dramas expresses, in the movement of Italian literature, the reaction against mere naturalism and *vérisme* in art and introduces the celebration and worship of the Life-Force, of Life as a pure *energeia* finding in itself its only and adequate justification, of Life ever engaged in creating and in overgrowing what has ceased to become and merely goes on being. He is the *vates* of action understood as *élan vital* and joy of inexhaustible self-overcoming even unto death. Goethe's *Stirb und Werde* is

Nature's law in the D'Annunzian life-intuition, a law including within itself the truth of the Christian " die to live " and of the Hegelian self-realisation through self-giving and self-sacrifice. Hence D'Annunzio's tragedies are tragedies of the will to heroic living. Luigi Pirandello is the greatest among those who endeavoured to express the other side, the negative side of the Life-Force intuition of things. While D'Annunzio celebrates Life as Power and Victory, Sem Benelli, Morselli and Pirandello expose Life as a failure and as a vain pretence.

Sem Benelli as well as Morselli share with D'Annunzio a more lyrical than dramatic temperament, whose poetic experience remains this side of drama; their heroes collapse even before they engage in fight. Benelli's tragedy arises from the strife between the irresistible longing to live the heroic life and the powerlessness to live. Man is a fallen god mindful of the heavens, an angel expelled from Paradise and hurled into mud, vainly trying to conquer the homesickness of the lost heavenly native country through the joy of an ever more subtle and satanic perfidy.

On the contrary, the tragedy of Morselli is born of the contrast between the huge ambition of Life as a divine all-overpowering energy and the fact that the stinging power of an insignificant scorpion may hurl to catastrophe even a demigod. The three have in common the inability to create *dramatis personæ* who should be bearers of conflicting and at the same time developing spiritual experiences: they can only create one single character, ever the same; instead of a dramatic situation they give us the lyrical projections of their subjective experience.

With Pirandello we are beyond this powerlessness. He shares with these three and their so-called *teatro di poesia* the same intuition of the world, the same essentially irrationalistic, voluntaristic view of things, but differs from them in being endowed with real dramatic power and, moreover, with a penetrating critical awareness pessimistically tuned. In a certain sense Pirandello might be said to be at the antipodes of D'Annunzio. While D'Annunzio's tragedy begins when Life's power of self-exaltation and of triumph (of which such tragedy is a nostalgic and dilettantistic celebration) has already reached its acme, leaving behind, smashed and battered, all hindrances from social law, ethics and religion, Pirandello's drama is born of the act and moment in and by

which the life-force knocks against these same obstacles and their claim to dictate to it its only lawful course.

Pirandello is Sicilian and, obviously, has made his own and found true the philosophy of life of his countryman, the absolute actual idealism of Giovanni Gentile, in which Hegel's rationalism and modern irrationalism seem to meet and to interpenetrate one another; hence Life appears to both something like a huge and subterranean stream running under all laws, customs, traditions and rules, underneath all distinctions and limits which thought sets between things, individuals and even the very states of mind of each single individual; a stream which those distinctions and limits may provisionally canalise and dam up, but which never lets itself be finally locked in, and ever threateningly chafes within its banks, till, sooner or later, a day comes when the waves swell and irresistibly carry away dykes and bridges, and rage in all the wild fury of their nature.

Underneath the superficial distinctions between individuals, things and soul-experiences Pirandello's watchful and oversensitive ear takes notice of the ceaseless roar of an *élan vital* of which individual things and soul-experiences and their distinctions are only limits doomed to be transcended and overcome by it; of an *élan vital* which holds them all and reabsorbs them all in the boundlessness of its bosom and flows forward endlessly, with no pre-established goal, ever defeating every human forecast, ever overcoming every human scheme and therefore appearing to human reason as something irrational and mad, hysterical and drunk.

When Pirandello bows to listen on the abyss at the bottom of which the blind stream of life runs and gurgles in the darkness of unfathomable mystery, he feels seized by a shudder, at once dismayed, awed and charmed by a living mystery which simultaneously draws him to itself and hurls him back, by such a living blind stream at once giving to itself at every step a thousand bounded and bounding forms and destroying and overcoming them. Before such living and active mysterious unity enwrapping everything in the night of its inexhaustively creative bosom, conscious awareness, mind, reason, logic stand self-revealed as powers of negation and of death, as the powers compelling us to take phenomena and our own spiritual moods as really objective entities and thus engendering the illusion of a world distinct from ourselves, of an ego

distinct from other egos and from the world it beholds and of a Life in us severed from that of the only reality, the reality of the One Whole, pure formless Life beyond all forms, limits, negations and affirmations of abstract intellect. Hence the panic emotion, the Schopenhauerian Gorgon-like emotion, the peculiar mystical touch given us by the Pirandellian view of life, as we penetrate beneath the bitter irony and the disgust, by which he shatters and dissolves one by one the miserable, mean and pompous constructions of man, who deludes himself, ever toils to enchain within defined immovable bounds the river of life running in and through them, and maker of them.

Pirandello's art is born of this intuition of life, is humour at the service of this intuition as its instrument of self-elicitation, a humour which bursts out whenever we cease to be merely going on living and look at life, whether in ourselves or in others, to see what it is and how it goes on; viz. whenever we practise our humanity, our spirituality over our mere instinctive, passion-moved animal nature. A humorist is a man endowed with power to transcribe faithfully what he sees when he stops merely living and beholds himself and judges himself in the act of living; a man able to look at life —at the life of single individuals in their mutual relations not merely from their respective standpoints—but also and even more from that of one who has succeeded in placing himself at the centre of the life-stream as a whole.

And Pirandello has been enabled to become a master humorist by his Sicilian origin, upbringing and nature, no doubt enriched by reading, by a not uncommon gift for introspection and philosophical and psychological analysis. In the Sicilian character, in which mix Italian, African and Greek blood, we can discriminate at once a peculiar impetuous readiness to yield to instinct and passion unreservedly, and a kind of quick, piercing, swiftly diabolical mind rushing to judge everything and to explain everything and given to pass with lightning and disconcerting rapidity from one mood to the most opposite one, so that each moment of life is almost a world in itself, independent of what comes before and after, just as every individual is at once a world in itself, closed to all others and yet more than ready to judge them all. The early short stories of Pirandello are all specimens of humour born of the study of the mutual incomprehension and radical inability to mutual comprehension among Sicilians. This

Leitmotiv was enriched later on, especially owing to a long protracted period of unhappy life caused by his wife's jealous mania and by financial disasters, with others derived from reflection on the loneliness of each soul in its depth, on the instability of the personal consciousness, on the problems raised by the change in our sense of personal identity in ourselves and in others.

Pirandello has, that is to say, been compelled by circumstances to become a life considering itself and trying to understand itself in himself and other people and to find that all evil in life comes from the conflict between the irresistible tendency to assume a form and the impossibility to rest satisfied in it. His stories and his dramas are all stories of crises arising at the same moment: either when the form yields to passion, impulse and, in a word, to Life as pure energy, or when Life lingers or stops in expectation of being given a form. Usually men seem to Pirandello to be prone to rest in a fixed idea of themselves and therefore are doomed to be expelled by the energy of Life from such an illusion, while usually women appear in his plays as centres of impulse doomed to look for or to be given a form. The crises arise inevitably, because Life is always on the move, while the forms of thought tend to be static; hence we are never really what we think we are, nor are we what we look to others; hence, also, they are not so much crises of action as crises of knowledge. Pirandello's dramatic art aims at moving our hearts not through any deed or gesture but through some discovery; it is a tragedy of conscience. Usually it is in the first act that we behold all the action of the play and are seized with the sense of the existence of some problems; in the second act there is the discovery of some peculiar case of conflict between form and Life, between appearance and reality; in the third act—more often than not a very short one—some frequently brutal deed brings about the *dénouement*. Thus, against classic tragedy with its fatality of action, Pirandello gives us a tragedy characterised by the emotion of fatality.

Of course, to say this does not imply that Pirandello always reaches this level of excellence. We merely mean to call attention to what constitutes Pirandello's tendential originality, in spite of some undeniable monotony with choice of themes, of frequently too complicated situations, of not too rare lapses in

didactical (or philosophical) disquisitions; of the fact that the *dramatis personæ* too often tend to be merely symbols of ideas and that too often the man Pirandello indirectly intrudes himself and his private fate too much to remain an artist.

Such is, fundamentally, the artistic and cultural individuality of Pirandello's work, an individuality most difficult to be really enjoyed by foreign and Northern readers and audiences, because its universality is built on a strictly regional foundation. His art springs from an emotion and a view of life definitely and radically not only pessimistic but anti-religious even in the broadest meaning of the word religious. There is no room in it for anything we may wish to bow to, nothing to which we may wish to reconcile ourselves, no room for any rational hope of a better fate, in heaven or on earth, for the individual or for the race. We are all victims of the inevitable duel between Life and Form, Reality and Appearance. Even reason is only a tool of the Life-Force for weaving in us the illusions necessary to carry on living. The very pity which Pirandello's art should enkindle in all Life's victims for one another will only promote new life-forms doomed in their turn to be smashed and superseded by others not necessarily richer in pity.

Alfieri, Foscolo, Leopardi, Carducci, D'Annunzio, Pascoli, Croce, Gentile . . . Pirandello! In the course of almost two centuries the greatest representatives of Italian literature, art and thought are all either no longer adherents or are hostile to the world-view and faith of St. Francis and of Dante! In spite of all the virulent and coarse rhetoric of Papini and in spite of, or rather through, the recent formal reconciliation between Church and State in the circumstances we all know, modern Italy stands out, in the light of literature as well as of recent political events and especially of her clergy's attitude to them, as, in essence, religiously indifferent to or forgetful and contemptuous of Christian values. And why? The explanation is still the one put by Giusti, himself a Catholic poet, on Italy's lips:

> Il piú gran male me l'han fatto i preti,
> Razza maligna e senza discrezione.*

ANGELO CRESPI.

* The greatest injury has been done to me by the priests, a most malignant and merciless race.

THE REVERSAL IN FINLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY.

A JOURNALIST who, some years ago, visited Ludendorf in his quiet Munich villa, found the old soldier studying intently a high-scale map of Finland. "Why Finland?" he asked. "Because Finland is the lock to the Russian door," the General replied. "Give me the key to Finland and I will unlock the door into Russia." That, of course, is a slight exaggeration. There was a time when German Freecorps and White Russian armies, their seaway guarded by not unfriendly British cruisers, held the whole of Finland and used it as operations base against Leningrad; but they failed to get Leningrad. Still, there is a great deal of strategic truth in Ludendorf's observation, and no man who seeks to estimate the chances in the next European war can afford to ignore that vast country that stretches out along the Eastern shores of the Gulf of Bothnia, commands the main sea route to European Russia and the frontier posts of which are almost within sight of the second city of the U.S.S.R.

Where does Finland stand to-day? Up to a few weeks ago, the reply to this question would have presented little difficulty. The country owes its freedom from Bolshevik rule to German assistance; for years past its peasantry has been almost fanatically anti-Red; the chiefs of its army were, and for the matter of that still are, on the closest terms of intimacy with the leaders of the Reichswehr; and in the field of internal politics a Fascist movement with many points of spiritual resemblance to National-Socialism, has long been a very potent force. As late as the first days of October of last year, grave incidents took place on the Russo-Finnish border; frontier guards of both countries fired at each other and there were two dead and a number of wounded; as usual both sides investigated and found that they were respectively innocent of blame, but the *Pravda* was inspired to write: "Those in Finland who imagine that the U.S.S.R. will tolerate any further acts of violence on the Russo-Finnish frontier, are committing a grievous mistake." So deplorable were the relations between Finland and her Eastern neighbour, so close the ties that linked her up with Germany, that the late General Goemboes, who dreamed of a great Central European block composed of Germany, Italy, Poland, Austria and

Hungary, reckoned confidently on the adhesion and active assistance of Finland, which he once in the course of a private conversation described as the ideal advance base for a future combined offensive by air, land and sea against a vital part of Soviet Russia.

Officially the Finns were not perhaps ready to go so far. They did not underestimate the dangers such an adventure under the leadership of Berlin might present. The policy of the Kiwimaeki Government, which held office till October of this year, was, very reasonably, inclined to look upon neutrality as a better investment than war. The example of the Scandinavian States that preserved neutrality during the last world war was adopted as pattern by Mr. Kiwimaeki who, being anxious to join the Scandinavian States in a policy of prudent reserve, did his best to cultivate close economic, political and cultural relations with Sweden. However sound this policy might be, it encountered the hostility of a very large section of Finnish public opinion. For Finland, like so many other countries created as the result of the world war, has language and nationality problems of its own. The chief of them consists in a sharp and ancient rivalry between the pure-blooded Finns and those of their countrymen who are of Swedish origin. A foreign policy based on close association with Sweden was felt by many to give an unfair advantage to that part of the Finnish people that looked to Stockholm as the source of culture and inspiration. The true Finn, it was pointed out, is no Scandinavian, but forms with the Esthonians, and one or two other smaller tribal remnants living on the shores of the Baltic, the last refuge of a non-European race that bears no sort of relation either to Slavs or to Scandinavians.

The situation, then, might be summed up as follows up to recent weeks: officially, Finland pursued a policy aiming at neutrality, but the circumstances were such that there was a strong likelihood of the country being swept over to the German side in the event of a European war.

There were elements in Finnish political life who were opposed to both these courses. They did not favour the Swedish connection, neither did they feel impelled towards a pro-German policy. On October 2nd, 1936, Mr. Kallio, who at that time was President of the Chamber, delivered in Helsingfors an arresting speech that was broadcast over all the Finnish

radio stations. He did not directly attack the Swedish association, but stressed with an unusual warmth of language the close racial ties that, throughout the ages, have united the Finns and the Esthonians. He pointed to a close similarity of interests of these kindred nations in the present international situation. "Our destiny," he stated in effect, "is bound up with that of our Southern brothers, who are in a very similar economic and political situation, and are threatened by similar dangers and animated by similar hopes."

The Kiwimaeki administration was at that moment in a critical state. Mr. Kallio's speech, with its bugle call to national sentiment, acted somewhat like the trumpet of Joshua before the walls of Jericho. The Government fell. On the same day, the President of the Republic, Mr. Sviuhufud, asked Mr. Kallio to form a government. On October 6th this task had been smoothly accomplished, and on the very next day the new ministers took the oath and entered upon their offices. The new Cabinet was a coalition of three groups: the so-called Gathering Party, definitely national and conservative in character, the Agrarians, who command the support of most of the peasants, and the Progressives, who in Finnish politics may be taken as the representatives of English liberal traditions. The Kallio Cabinet was dependent for a parliamentary majority on the support of the Social Democrats, and this fact is of great importance in determining the trend of Finnish foreign policy. The presence in the Government of such staunchly conservative elements as the Gathering Party, whose leaders Mr. Puhakka and Mr. Oksala hold in the Cabinet the key ministries of the Interior and of War respectively, made it improbable that the administration could ever find itself in a position to buy Social Democrat support by serious concessions in the field of home affairs. To conciliate the Social Democrats, their advice must be listened to in Foreign Affairs. Now, being a party of the Second International, the Finnish Social Democratic group obviously sympathises with the democratic Powers as against the Fascist countries.

This tendency was clearly illustrated in the choice of the man to whom the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was entrusted: Mr. Holsti, who had up till then been Finland's representative in the League of Nations. Mr. Holsti belongs to the Progressive Party. He is known to be a fervent adherent of

the Democratic block, a warm friend of England and France, and an admirer and student of parliamentary institutions. To the instinctive dislike for Fascist policies that is to be expected from so stalwart a democrat he adds, and in the course of his Geneva activities never made a secret of, a wholesome fear of German ambitions in the Baltic. In 1922 he held the Foreign Office for a short period, and already at that time he had tried to lay the foundations for a Baltic block that would look for inspiration and, if necessary, for support, to the great liberal States of Western Europe. Mainly as the result of his efforts, a treaty of mutual amity was signed in Warsaw in 1922 between Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Poland. The treaty was still-born, because there was at that time a pro-German majority in the Finnish Chamber, which refused to ratify an agreement with Poland, the then close ally of France.

Later on Poland, led by Colonel Beck, gradually drew away from French influence, and it looked as if she had irretrievably committed herself to the German camp. The death of Marshal Pilsudski, however, paved the way for the advent to power of General Rydz-Smigly, which led, in the summer of 1936, to the return to the old French connection. Rydz-Smigly, though primarily a soldier, has a political tradition; in his younger days he took an active part in the illegal activities of democratic parties; to-day his political position may probably be best described as near akin to that of Edouard Herriot in France. Colonel Beck, the friend of Germany and the advocate of the Fascist block, is still in office, but no longer in power; and there are those in Warsaw who believe that even his days of nominal office are counted.

The way is therefore clear for Mr. Holsti's dream of a Baltic block, closely knit with Poland, and in general sympathy with England and France, that is, with those Powers that stand for the preservation of peace and for democratic ideals.

As compared with 1922, the block will probably be larger. At that time Lithuania was still smarting under the loss of Vilna, which had been snatched from her by a buccaneering Polish general; Lithuania remained adamant to all suggestions of an understanding with Warsaw. To-day things are different: time has done its work in mitigating the memories of the Vilna incident; Lithuania has begun to realise that she is too weak and too exposed to stand alone. She has three

dangerous neighbours: Germany, Soviet Russia and Poland; she must seek support. The natural quarter to look for such support would be a Baltic block. There seems good reason to hope that Mr. Holsti will succeed in building up such a coalition composed of Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia. Such a combination might well be called a sort of Little Entente of the North and, loosely linked up, as it would be, with the Scandinavian States on the one hand, with the Western Powers and their friends of the Little Entente and the Balkan League on the other, it might well play a not unimportant part in the consolidation of political conditions in Europe. There are still many obstacles in the way of the attainment of this ideal, and some time will probably elapse before a formal treaty is concluded between these Baltic States. But from now on, the spirit of such a treaty will be that of the foreign policy of Finland.

This news has been received in Germany with positive dismay. The Press, of course, remained silent on the subject. The Press is merely there nowadays to convey to the public just what it suits the Government to have the people know; events in the outside world that are unfavourable to the Reich are either ignored altogether or else gently distorted. But in the Wilhelmstrasse the significance of the change in Finland's attitude is very clearly realised. After a period of unhoped-for successes, largely due to the pusillanimity of French policy under Laval and Flandin, Germany appears to have struck a lean patch. The "desertion" of Poland, the failure of somewhat tactless efforts to rope in Great Britain for a gigantic anti-Soviet crusade *ad majorem gloriam* of Hitler, the falling away of Finland, are serious portents. They are felt to more than offset the detachment of Italy from the Western Powers, the sterile success in Greece and the not very convincing results of intrigues in Bucarest and Belgrade. The Finnish move does not affect Finland alone; it is obvious that it will fortify the rulers of Poland in their tendency to return to their erstwhile Franco-British friendship, and it rudely dispels newly awakened dreams of coming glory for the German Baltic barons. And, when everything is said and done, the Baltic is more vital to Germany than the Danube, and Polish armies closer at hand and possibly of sterner mettle than Italian legions.

Very slowly, confusedly, a new grouping of forces is

COLONIES: THE ECONOMIC CASE EXAMINED.

THE problem of colonial expansion is coming to a head. Dr. Schacht, as well as Herr Hitler, has specifically demanded a settlement of the "Colonial Question," whilst the British Government is clearly hedging on the subject of handing back some at least of her former colonies to Germany, to the extreme disgust of Mr. Churchill: "A door should be either open or shut. It should not be flapping to and fro to see whether there is anyone pushing or whether he is pushing hard enough." In the circumstances it is natural to recall Sir Samuel Hoare's attempt in September 1935 to concentrate attention on the economic aspect of the claim for colonies.

Both Germany and Italy have powerful political motives in demanding colonies. Germany is determined to expose the "colonial guilt thesis" which was used to justify the seizure of her colonies. Italy is soured by her failure in 1919 to secure new territories in Africa equivalent to the gains of Great Britain and France, in spite of the promise given to her in the secret Treaty of London of 1915. But both these countries and Japan also argue that they need colonies as sources of raw materials, as markets, and as population outlets. It is a plausible argument, and it is widely accepted. But does it bear serious investigation?

So far as raw materials are concerned the first point to note is that the colonial areas of the world—a term which obviously excludes the self-governing Dominions and India—are very much less important than is commonly supposed as sources of raw materials or foodstuffs. Indeed, the only important materials of which more than half the world supply is provided by the colonies are rubber (which is virtually a colonial monopoly), tin, cocoa, and palm and coconut oils. Even supposing, for purposes of argument, the "colonial raw materials" to be those of which the colonies produce even as much as 20 per cent. of the world supply, the only other materials to qualify for inclusion would be copper, phosphates, groundnuts, sisal (used chiefly for binder-twine) and vanadium (a steel alloy) and—of the foodstuffs—tea and bananas.

Particularly striking is the relative unimportance of the

African dependencies. The whole of Africa accounts for less than 4 per cent. of the world's raw materials and foodstuffs. The former German colonies (in the Pacific as well as in Africa) are relatively of quite negligible importance. Even before the war Germany drew from them a mere fraction of 1 per cent. of her materials. It is simply ridiculous for the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce to argue that " the return of Germany's colonies would materially contribute towards the restoration of economic prosperity in Germany." The fact of the matter is that the " basic materials of modern industrialism," as Dr. Goebbels has called them—coal, iron, oil, cotton, rubber and copper—are (except for rubber) almost entirely derived from sovereign States. Precisely the same is true of the basic foodstuffs—wheat, meat and dairy products. In fact, the world's chief sources of raw materials and foodstuffs are the United States, the U.S.S.R. and (thanks chiefly to the self-governing Dominions and India), the British Empire. Thus it is quite beside the point to argue that any redistribution of colonies would seriously remedy the raw material deficiencies of the dissatisfied Powers. But even if it were, would their nearer approach to self-sufficiency be of any real value to these Powers, apart from the prestige attaching to imperial expansion? Is the political control of resources of any economic significance?

The usual answer to this question is that, whatever the position in time of peace, in time of war the advantage of such control is undoubted. In fact, the desire for political control of raw materials sources is commonly attributed simply and solely to strategic considerations. But this is a very shallow view of the matter. For the possession of colonies is of no strategic value without control of the communications with those colonies. Either the country in question possesses sea power or it does not. If it does not, its colonies have to be abandoned, as Germany found in the last war. If it does, then it can just as easily draw its supplies from neutral sovereign States. But though the " strategic " argument in favour of colonial empire is based on a misconception, the application of purely economic sanctions—with no attempt at a blockade—in the Italo-Abyssinian War has made clear the value in certain circumstances of the political control of resources. In raising the question, however, of " access to colonial raw materials " at Geneva, Sir Samuel Hoare was

clearly only concerned with access in time of peace. The point which he desired to raise was: Does the suzerain Power enjoy any advantage over other nations in securing access to the resources of its own colonies?

That certain advantages of this sort do exist is unquestionable. The first type of such discrimination is the preferential export duty. Straightforward export duties represent a normal means of raising revenue in backward countries, and as such are not open to criticism. But in certain colonies export duties are used not only for the purpose of raising revenue, but also, by the granting of preferences, for the purpose of diverting trade in favour of the mother-country or other units in the same empire. The chief colony-owning countries to employ this weapon are France and Portugal. The preferences in the case of Portugal are usually fairly moderate, being primarily designed to benefit Portuguese shipping; but in the French colonies some of the export duties are prohibitive unless the materials are destined for France. In the British Colonial Empire discrimination of this sort only applies to one material—tin ore; but in that one case it is made extremely effective, the duty on tin ore exported from Malaya or Nigeria to be smelted outside the Empire being quite prohibitive. The object of the preference in this case is primarily strategic, the Malayan duties having been imposed in 1903 in order to prevent tin smelteries in the United States from putting out of business British smelteries in the Straits Settlements and Great Britain.

Discrimination of this kind is undesirable, but it cannot be suggested that it seriously affects the ability of the dissatisfied nations to purchase raw materials. For in no case do the colonies imposing these duties possess anything like a monopoly of the materials concerned. Even Malaya and Nigeria between them do not produce more than 40 per cent. of the world's tin. Thus, even though they may be effectively cut off from this part of the world's supplies, other countries can purchase instead from the remaining 60 per cent. of the world's supplies. It is only when an effective monopoly is created that the supply or price of a raw material can be seriously affected.

It is this danger of monopoly which renders international producers' restriction schemes potentially far more serious barriers to access than discriminatory export duties. These

producers' schemes are obviously liable to abuse, and the most famous of the earlier schemes—the Stevenson rubber scheme (1922-8) and Copper Exporters Incorporated (1926-32)—undoubtedly had little consideration for the consumer. But by raising prices to quite unjustified levels both schemes precipitated their own failure. The Stevenson scheme stimulated the low-cost production of the natives in the Dutch East Indies and the " recovery " of used rubber in the United States. Copper Exporters Incorporated stimulated the low-cost production in Canada, Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo. The first international tin restriction scheme of 1931-3 caused some substitution of aluminium for tin. But the mistakes of these earlier schemes are not necessarily a reason for condemning all international restriction schemes as such. For where there has been a sudden contraction of demand which may reasonably be regarded as purely temporary, there is a strong case for assisting the whole body of existing producers " to weather the storm so that there may be no destruction of capacity which will again be required when the demand recovers to its former level," as Mr. Rowe has put it. Moreover, there are signs that in the new governmental schemes for tin (1933) and rubber (1934) some lessons have been learnt from the failure of earlier schemes. Thus special provision is made in both these schemes for the representation of the chief consuming countries on advisory councils and also for research into new uses for the materials. On the other hand, there is no such provision in the other schemes working at present—covering, notably, tea, copper, potash, nitrates, and lead.

One final point should be noted in regard to restriction schemes. It is sometimes suggested that they are designed to benefit producing at the expense of consuming countries. This complaint was levelled with particular bitterness by the United States against Great Britain in connection with the Stevenson scheme. Actually there has been no question of price discrimination as between domestic and foreign purchases except in one case—Copper Exporters Incorporated, and in that case the preference was a factor which contributed to the break-up of that organisation.

Export duties and restriction schemes both only affect ability to *purchase* raw materials. But the dissatisfied Powers are just as concerned to *exploit* colonial resources themselves.

A common answer to this claim is that these countries do not possess the capital with which to embark on such exploitation—that they are, indeed, importers of capital. Since the War this has certainly been true of Germany, whose imports of capital in the period 1924-9 reached unprecedented dimensions. But Japan and Italy do export some capital. Japan has invested considerable sums abroad, notably in China, Manchukuo, the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya. Italy has petroleum interests in Rumania and Iraq and other investments in South America.

But, granted their capacity to export some capital, do any obstacles prevent these countries from investing in the world's colonial territories under their existing owners? In the British and Dutch colonies, at least, there is little ground for complaint. There are Japanese-owned iron and manganese mines in British Malaya, and rubber estates there are owned by Italians, Japanese and many other nationals; whilst American interests have considerable control of the manganese in the Gold Coast and of the bauxite in British Guiana. The only raw material whose exploitation in the British Colonial Empire is usually reserved to British subjects is petroleum. In the Dutch colonies even this reservation does not apply, American interests indirectly controlling a considerable share of the oil production in the Dutch East Indies. In addition, over half the rubber estates there are in foreign hands, and a third of the tea and palm-oil production —rubber and tea being chiefly under British and palm oil chiefly under French and Belgian control. There is also foreign capital (chiefly British, American and French) invested in the Portuguese colonies and the Belgian Congo. The only colonial empires where the investment of foreign capital is seriously restricted are the French and the Japanese.

But the real problem is not one of access to colonial raw materials: it is one of payment; and this is particularly the case when payment has to be made in foreign currency. For so long as international is so much more restricted than domestic trade there must be a certain advantage in having the raw materials which one requires within one's own frontiers. Hence it is frequently suggested that, though the colonial Powers may not directly restrict the access of other countries to the raw materials in their colonies, they do so indirectly by erecting preferential tariffs which keep out the

other countries' goods, and so prevent their obtaining the foreign exchange which they require in order to purchase those materials. The extent to which this argument is valid depends, firstly, on how far colonial markets are reserved for the goods of the suzerain Powers and, secondly, on the relative importance of colonial markets.

"Economic imperialism" has not by any means a free hand. For in something like half the world's colonies the Open Door is guaranteed by an international treaty. The Open Door is not a synonym for Free Trade, but it does mean a complete absence of preferential import duties. These Open Door colonies include the A and B Mandates, the "Congo Basin," Morocco and (until 1936) West Africa. In the A and B Mandated territories complete commercial equality for all members of the League of Nations is required by the terms of the mandates (and in the B mandates by the Covenant itself). In practice this commercial equality has been extended to non-members like Japan and Germany. The "Congo Basin" covers not only the Belgian Congo, but also the whole of British East Africa and parts of French Equatorial Africa, Portuguese West Africa, the Sudan, Abyssinia and Northern Rhodesia. In this extensive area the Open Door was guaranteed in 1885, by the General Act of Berlin, the provisions of this Act being revised by the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919. In Morocco the Open Door guarantee was part of the solution of the international crisis in 1906 effected by the Treaty of Algeciras. In West Africa the position was governed by an Anglo-French Convention of 1898, by which each party guaranteed not to erect any preference against the entry of the other's goods. The benefit of the provision was not confined to Great Britain and France, but was automatically extended to the numerous countries having most-favoured-nation clauses in their trade treaties with these countries.

The maintenance of the Open Door is thus already guaranteed in a large part of colonial Africa, and also in Palestine and Syria. But outside these areas it no longer exists in any colonial territory. Japan and France, where they have a free hand, tend to "assimilate" their colonies into customs unions with themselves, or at least to establish very high preferences for their own goods; preference is also the general rule in the non-Treaty British, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and

American dependencies, and in the C mandates of the British Dominions; and even Holland, after preserving the Open Door for sixty years, erected an import quota system in the East Indies in 1933 in an attempt to check the inflow of Japanese goods.

This Dutch example was soon followed by Great Britain. In the summer of 1934 specifically anti-Japanese duties were imposed in the West African colonies. In other parts of the Colonial Empire the discrimination was slightly less obvious, quotas being established regulating the import of textile goods on the basis of their sources in 1927-31—well before the pressure of Japanese competition began to be felt. The serious effect of this action on Japanese exports was shown by Mr. Thomas in a recent Parliamentary reply: the import of Japanese cotton piece-goods into British dependencies where quotas were applied fell from 51 million yards in the first quarter of 1934 to 10 million yards in the first quarter of 1935; by contrast, Japanese imports into British dependencies where quotas were not applied rose from 20 to 27 million yards.

But even where no direct action of this kind is taken, it is quite clear from the statistics that the suzerain Power tends to secure the major part of the import and export trade of any colony. This is even the case in the technically Open-Door territories—the only exceptions to this general rule being two B mandates—the British Cameroons and Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian), where Germany and Japan are respectively the chief sources of imports.

In any circumstances, therefore, colonies provide a fairly certain market for the goods of the suzerain Power. But even so their purchasing power is so low that their value as markets is definitely limited. The whole of the world's colonies put together take less than 10 per cent. of the world's exports. Great Britain's colonies take only 11 per cent. of her total exports, though the French and the Japanese colonies in each case take 25 per cent. of the mother country's total exports.

The "foreign exchange problem" of the dissatisfied Powers is thus very much more than a purely colonial problem. First and foremost it is due to the shrinkage of world trade, which has hit the exporting industries in all countries. Even to-day, in volume world trade has only recovered to four-fifths of its 1929 level, and in value it is considerably

lower still. Fundamentally, therefore, the problem of ensuring access to colonial raw materials is the problem of reviving international trade. But there are at least three important ways in which the dissatisfied Powers intensify their own foreign exchange difficulties. Germany and (until October 1936) Italy erected elaborate exchange controls in order to maintain their currencies at quite artificial levels. In consequence German and Italian goods were too expensive to find a wide market abroad.

All three countries have also obstructed their markets by their political action; Italy's invasion of Abyssinia led to the exclusion of her goods by all the "sanctionist" countries. Germany's persecution of the Jews provoked the boycott of her goods by Jews all over the world. Japan, too, has suffered from the Chinese boycott of her goods in protest against her aggressive policy in China. The third factor is rearmament. In all these countries the most intensive demand for foreign exchange comes from the armament industries, which in each case depend very largely on imported raw materials. General Goering is quite frank on the subject: "Iron has always made an empire strong; butter only makes people fat. . . . Either we bought butter and went without freedom or we achieved freedom and did without butter. We decided for iron. That is one cause of the butter shortage."

As dumping grounds for surplus population the value of colonies has been more exaggerated than in any other respect. Colonies provide some openings for the planter with capital of his own, and for the man holding a responsible executive or administrative post. But for the labourer type of emigrant they offer nothing at all. All the colonies in the strict sense of the word lie in tropical areas. If the labourer wishes to migrate he must go to the United States, the British Dominions, or the South American Republics. But, of course, in all these countries the door has been closed, so that the stream of Italian emigrants, which rose in 1913 to just under a million, is now reduced to a mere trickle or even a reflux. However, in the British colonies at least there is no restriction of immigrants on grounds of race or nationality. It is true that anyone entering a British colony must deposit between £20 and £50. But this is simply to guarantee that the newcomer will not immediately become a charge on the colonial Government concerned; and it applies equally to British

and foreign subjects. In any case even the transfer of whole Dominions to the dissatisfied Powers would never solve the problem of an expanding population. The real solution for that problem has and always will be found in industrialisation.

The one conclusion which emerges without question from this survey is that the colonial areas of the world are not of any major economic importance. The only materials for the production of which they are chiefly responsible are rubber, tin, cocoa, and certain vegetable oils; and access to colonial raw materials is not seriously restricted by discriminating export duties or producers' restriction schemes. The colonies take less than 10 per cent. of the world's exports; moreover the Open Door is already guaranteed in about half the world's colonies. Colonial territories are not suitable as avenues for large-scale migration and, in any case, in the British colonies at least, immigration is not restricted on grounds of nationality.

But even though the material consequences of removing such restrictions as do exist on access to colonial raw materials and markets would not be great, the moral effect might be considerable. It would be a constructive measure of "peaceful change": and even the mention of such a possibility by Sir Samuel Hoare had a remarkable effect in September 1935.

B. S. KEELING.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE SMALLER NATIONS.

NEARLY two decades have passed since President Wilson, in his Fourteen Points, raised to a political issue the century-old ideal of a League of Nations. The fourteenth point reads as follows :

> A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

Wilson specially stresses the principle of integrity of the small States and later this principle was put forward as one of the strongest arguments for establishing the League of Nations. The fate of Belgium, declared " eternally neutral " in 1831, yet nevertheless drawn into the war in 1914 and declared no longer " neutral " after the war, illustrates this need.

In the spring of 1936, contrary to Wilson's fourteenth point, the " political independence and integrity " of another of the small States, namely Abyssinia, even a member of the League of Nations, was entirely destroyed. Though Abyssinia does not belong to Europe, this event gave the nations of Europe a severe shock, accentuated by Germany's sudden re-entry into the demilitarised Rhineland Zone without any warning to her partners in the Locarno Treaty. By this sudden action she showed clearly her disregard for international treaties. Her pretext, of course, was that she looked upon the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact as a threat to herself. But this argument could not be used against Belgium, for Belgium had not concluded any such treaty with the Soviet Union. Yet Germany must have felt a threat from Belgium also since she took the same military measures as against France.

According to Article 2, Para. 1, of the Locarno Treaty, Belgium would have been justified in taking military counter-action *without consulting any of her partners in the Locarno Treaty*. But such action would have looked merely ridiculous, as Belgium is a small State. In the autumn of 1936 Belgium solemnly announced her return to the former neutrality status, which represents a further indication of the pressure of Germany's rearmament on her neighbours.

The Law Court of another of the small States has made a frank comment on the attitude of Germany towards smaller States. In condemning the German agent, Wesemann, for depriving the journalist, Berthold Jacob, of his liberty, the court of Basle in their verdict of May 6th, 1936, said :

> This brutal infringement of Swiss sovereignty is a very grave matter. It should be stressed that the Gestapo deliberately chose a small nation, as they have done also in previous cases. Small States, never the big powers, are selected for these plots.

Since the events of the spring of 1936 almost all confidence in the League of Nations as protector of the small States has gone. But this loss of confidence has been more and more apparent for some years. The small nations have been endeavouring to evade threatened annihilation by concluding regional pacts. The former neutral States, Switzerland, Holland, Scandinavia and Spain, have sought means of remaining outside the quarrels between the big powers.

But all such devices are inevitably futile, since the technique of modern warfare has reduced the possibility of national defence to a mere illusion. There are to-day more than a hundred treaties which in the form of neutrality, non-aggression, mutual assistance and friendship pacts all pursue the same aim : protection against war. All these treaties, individual or collective, are superseded by one general non-aggression pact, the Kellogg Pact, which solemnly outlaws war as a means of national policy, declaring it to be a crime against the common weal. These hundred treaties may have inspired confidence temporarily, but to-day they merely indicate war tensions, which are expressed at the same time in rearmament figures. In Europe to-day, while there are about 8 tons of food per head of the population for an average lifetime, there are about 10 tons of armaments and war materials. The problem as to whether the danger of war is created by armaments or armaments by the danger of war is as impossible of solution as the problem of the scholars of the Middle Ages as to whether God made the hen before the egg. The solution lies in recognising that that is not the question in point. Only when nations, as constituents of the League of Nations, have become conscious of the fact that " national " defence is no longer possible, at any rate in thickly populated industrial areas, and have adjusted their national institutions

and international relations accordingly, can a reliable system of security be organised in place of their systems of national defence which have become obsolete.

While the big powers can still maintain an illusion of it, national defence has become mere romanticism for the smaller States. To show that the initiative for a renaissance of the League of Nations may come from the smaller States of Europe at this critical and historical hour, the following table attempts to give a picture of their military and political development and their world significance.

For the present purpose the States may be classified as follows :

	Size Classification
Small States	up to 10 million inhabitants.
Medium-sized States ...	10 to 40 million inhabitants.
Big Powers	40 to 100 million inhabitants.
World Powers	over 100 million inhabitants.

THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE SMALL STATES IN EUROPE IN COMPARISON :

(Figures according to Statistics of Whitaker, 1937, and other Statistics)

Country	Population in millions	Forces in thousands	Colonies : Population in millions	Colonies : Forces in thousands
Neutral States :				
Denmark ...	3·7	12·0	Valuable colonial possessions in the Polar regions. Number of population without significance.	
Norway	2·9	6·8		
Sweden	6·3	30·0		
Scandinavia (total)	12·9	48·8		
Switzerland ...	4·1	42·5		
Holland	8·3	26·8	60·9	42·0
	25·3	118·1		
War States :				
Belgium	8·3	90·0	13·0	18·0
Bulgaria	6·0	20·0*		
Greece	6·6	67·0		
Portugal	7·1	70·0	8·2	10·7
Albania	1·0	13·0		
	29·0	260·0		

* See note on next page.

Country.	Population in millions	Forces in thousands	Colonies : Population in millions	Colonies : Forces in thousands
Post-War States :				
Esthonia	1·1	12·0		
Latvia	1·9	25·0		
Lithuania	2·4	20·0		
Finland	3·7	32·0		
Austria	6·7	50·0*		
Hungary	8·8	35·0*		
Ireland	3·0	7·0		
	27·6	181·0	82·1	70·7
Medium-Sized States :				
Yugoslavia ...	14·1	190·0		
Roumania	18·7	180·0		
Czechoslovakia ...	14·8	180·0		
Little Entente ...	47·6	550·0		
Poland	33·4	264·0		
Spain	24·2	200·0		
Turkey	13·6	200·0		
Big Powers :				
Italy	42·6	800·0		
France	41·9	650·0	64·0	
Germany	66·6	1,000·0		
World Powers :				
Gt. Britain and Col.	164·0	800·0		
U.S.S.R.	164·0	1,300·0		

The conceptions "nation" and "people" by no means always correspond (Switzerland, Czechoslovakia) and some of the smaller States with their colonies exceed the 10-million mark, thus coming within the ranks of the bigger powers. And the network of a hundred treaties also helps to bring the smaller and medium-sized States into the ranks of the big and even world powers, as for instance in the case of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente.

* Reserves have not been taken into consideration. Their size is generally proportionate to that of the forces on service. The three states whose armaments are limited, viz. Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, are following more or less the example set by Germany. Austria for instance has called up 50,000 men on October 1st, 1936, instead of the 30,000 granted her at St. Germain.

The following survey indicates how the system of national defence by rearmament and alliances has changed the structure of Europe from the point of view of defence politics. Through armament alliances the small States are bound as follows (though these bonds are weakening) :

Belgium : by treaties to France and England.

Greece, *Portugal*, *Ireland* } politically or economically to England.

Albania : by treaties to Italy.

Austria, *Hungary*, *Bulgaria* } vacillate between Italy, Little Entente and Germany.

Esthonia, *Lithuania*, *Latvia*, *Finland* } also vacillate between the big powers; the Baltic States are endeavouring to become independent by alliances between themselves.

The former neutral States, Switzerland, Holland, Scandinavia, have refused commitments other than those of Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant, which reads :

> The High Contracting Parties recognise the principle that the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations having special regard to the geographical situation and circumstances of States. . . .

From the military point of view the following groups have been formed among the medium-sized and the big powers :

	Million population
Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Roumania, Czechoslovakia)	47·6
Balkan Entente (including Greece and Turkey) ...	20·2
Total ...	67·8
France, Belgium	50·2
Total ...	118·0
Germany	66·6
Poland	33·4
Total ...	100·0

These surveys show that (*a*) the five neutral States, Switzerland, Holland, Scandinavia, with 25 million inhabitants, maintain armies of 108,100 men; (*b*) while the war States such as Belgium, etc., with 29 million inhabitants, have armies of 260,000 men, and (*c*) the post-war States, such as Esthonia, with 27·6 million inhabitants, have armies of 181,000 men.

Thus, in relation to the neutral States, the small States which took part in the War keep two and a half times the number of troops in service and the States created after the War approximately twice the number.

The fact that the economically weak war States maintain far more troops than the wealthier neutral States, surprising in itself, becomes still less understandable when we consider these differences in forces in relation to national wealth and culture which are supposed to be protected by national defence. Most striking is a comparison of the two big European peninsulas, viz. Scandinavia and the Balkans. Whether we take statistics of infant mortality, of crime, of education, of temperance movements, of the achievements of science and art, or of the average standard of living, in every case the small Scandinavian States show better results than the Balkans though the latter keep many times the number of soldiers.

Since 1815, the end of the Napoleonic era, the group of neutral States has turned more and more away from the pursuit of power-politics. The histories of Switzerland and Holland show that these small States have practised a highly developed sense of independence in their fight against the Habsburg Monarchy. And yet, in 1815, Switzerland was the first European State to try a new form of national defence by letting herself be declared "eternally neutral," with the reservation that she might protect her neutrality with arms. That was possible at the time of flint-locks when the longest cannon range was less than a mile. But—and here we get to a crucial point—the technique of modern warfare has rendered such national defence impossible. In Holland, for instance, every corner of the country is within the range of modern guns, either from the land or from the sea, without it being necessary for the enemy to cross any of her frontiers. And, as a German general has said, the most modern weapon, the air weapon, "multiplies many hundred times" the aggressive power of armaments and makes it impossible for neutrality

pacts to be honoured. Yet as the air weapon directs its attack immediately on armament factories and the civil population, the ancient ideal of national defence has come to be worshipped as an idol. But even the world powers, who have, or can buy, anything they require to build up independent national defence, can only succeed in maintaining effective protection of their frontiers by the upkeep of a level of armaments which would reduce their countries to a state of economic poverty previously only experienced after defeat in wars. " Rearmament creates more illusion than security " is not a pacifist's slogan, but a statement by Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves (in the *Observer* of February 9th, 1936).

That national defence can no longer be more than a romantic dream to the small States is illustrated by the fact that Switzerland, the classic country of militia, cannot even produce field guns or ammunition for them. The Danish Foreign Minister, Dr. Munch, when Chairman of the Security Committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1932, summarised the situation as follows :

> If war came, the small States in particular would be faced by complete annihilation. It is impossible for them to buy or make a sufficient number of war machines especially as costs are always increasing. Moreover the small States have only a few big cities and industrial centres and these few are necessarily situated near the frontiers. Therefore, they could easily be destroyed in the first aggression.

In the face of these facts should the small States resign themselves to their fate ? Only absolute pacifists believe that at the present rate of rearmament anything else than a complete victory of war madness could be achieved by unilateral disarmament. Another crucial point is that it must be recognised that the original aim of national defence, the protection of the civil population, is only attainable through the organised co-operation of all nations who wish to keep the peace. Aggression must be made impossible! The question is not one which finds its solution in a simple defence preparation for a war, but aggression as such must be ruled out of all possibilities. Modern weapons of war, above all the aggressive potentialities of the aeroplane, force upon us measures which are more than a display of armed strength : all weapons of

aggressive nature must be made international and ultimately abolished altogether.

Careful estimates show that the military effectives, i.e. the trained troops and war materials, of the " defence " powers in Europe are twice as strong as those of the " aggressive " powers and their total war potential is even five times greater. To force the " aggressive " powers to give up war and armaments, therefore, it is not further rearmament that is needed. This end could be achieved by automatic action by an alliance of the defence groups including the small States. And such an alliance could face the aggressor States with any ultimatum. It must be realised that this is the only possible way of preventing an outbreak of war which has long been latent.

But its success depends upon the help of the world powers. As there is no hope of these taking the matter up themselves, the initiative must come from the small States, in particular from the five former neutral States. These have a total of 25 million inhabitants. They are not bound by military alliances, but nevertheless have a very strong political position. If they form an alliance the group would then have an important position because of the sources of war material and the industrial war potential.

Article 21 of the League of Nations Covenant would allow the formation within the framework of the League of such a group for the preservation of peace. If war broke out the small neutral States in Central Europe would in any case lose their military sovereignty. Why therefore should they not sacrifice this beforehand, placing their individual forces under the sovereignty of the League of Nations ? They can only win the next war by preventing it, and that is only possible by reminding the " defence " world powers in Europe, namely Great Britain, France, the Little Entente and the Soviet Union, of their original pledges to the small States, thereby compelling them to undertake the measures which would effectively stop war. These measures would have ultimately to be based upon a Federated States of Europe.

But success is the best argument for an idea. Little Switzerland, who in 1815 succeeded in carrying out a new form of national defence, won a splendid victory over the Third Reich in handling the Berthold Jacob case. Yet at the

same time the world powers France and England were forced to suffer the violation of international treaties.

In 1905 the defection of Norway from Sweden presented an ideal case of high treason. A similar situation brought about by the defection of Belgium from Holland in 1831 led to war. In Scandinavia the dispute was settled by turning the danger spots into a demilitarised zone, all the fortresses being razed to the ground. In 1921 a serious dispute between Sweden and Finland about the Aaland Islands and another in 1933 between Denmark and Norway about colonial possessions in Greenland were settled by arbitration. This form of procedure has only strengthened the unity in the North and has led to progressive disarmament. Unfortunately this tendency towards disarmament has been unavoidably delayed by Germany's rearmament.

At the League of Nations meeting in September 1936 little Holland took the initiative, and with the very active support of Argentina drawing in her trail the majority of smaller League nations, they were able to prevent the dissociation of Abyssinia as a Member-State, to which retreat France and Great Britain were already decided. The Nobel Peace Prize Committee honoured this firm stand by awarding Señor Lamas, the Argentine Foreign Secretary, the Peace Prize for 1936, whilst Italy was left to ventilate her anger against Holland and Argentina.

The most impressive demonstration for the "*Potentiel de Paix*" or "Peace Potential" of the small powers has been expressed by the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Carl von Ossietzky. We owe that chiefly to the energy of two small powers. In the beginning of 1936 the majority of the Swiss Parliament's members proposed that the Peace Prize should be awarded to Carl von Ossietzky, then imprisoned in a concentration camp. The Nobel Committee, which is appointed by the Norwegian Parliament, agreed to the proposal on November 23rd, 1936. The German Government was extremely upset. Switzerland and Norway showed, thereby, stronger determination against the mighty Germany than the world powers have done on many other occasions.

While Europe is facing Armageddon, Norway and Sweden are living at peace, for in their "danger zones" no trenches may be built and no soldiers may be seen. War in Spain is

going on and offering ever more sinister aspects as the big powers fail to help effectively. It is the duty of the small States to take the initiative at this critical moment of history in order that the example set by Sweden and Norway may become an established principle throughout Europe.*

OTTO LEHMANN-RUSSBÜLDT.

* The author has developed these ideas in a study published under the title of: "*Wer rettet Europa?*" *Die wehrpolitische Lage der kleinen Staaten* (published by the Schweizerische Zentralstelle für Friedensarbeit, Zürich 4, 1936).

LIBERALISM AND FAITH.

THE rise of Liberalism in Europe is forming the subject-matter of an unprecedented number of modern books, and local Liberal Associations throughout the British Isles are at present engaged upon a stocktaking purge of party policy and organisation. Only the ungenerous will bestow upon one half of this activity the title of *laudator temporis acti*, and upon the other the taunt of being a piece of optimistic wish-fulfilment. The true significance of this strikingly widespread examination does not yet appear. That it is more likely to be a pre-natal rather than a post-mortem investigation is suggested by the very obvious spontaneity of the movement, which has sprung into existence at the time when both Liberalism and Liberal parties are in eclipse all over Europe.

The essence of the problem which has to be faced is the paradox that whereas Liberalism is necessary for the salvation of Europe, yet it is the philosophy which more than any other is generally detested. Most of Europe to-day is an organised repudiation of it. Whenever a Communist or a Fascist leader makes a speech he is pretty sure to turn aside from his course to denounce the old corrupt Liberalism from which his audience have been mercifully delivered by his efforts. The hatred is exercised against a philosophy rather than against the human upholders of it. But since ideas have to be personified before they are understood, it is the Liberal parties and leaders themselves who have had to bear the brunt of persecution or repudiation. This may be regrettable, but it is natural enough and we cannot complain about it.

Any speech by a dictator will suffice to make plain the reasons why Liberalism has been repudiated over so large a part of this continent. It is supposed to stand for democratic government, and democratic government is generally identified with corruption in the manner of its election and in the performance of its programme, and for fumbling inefficiency in action. Because Liberalism is dedicated to the proposition that all men are free by their own birthright, it is naturally an object of hatred to all dictators, who see in its programme the only possible obstacle to the wrecking of their will upon the human material which they have persuaded to trust them. Because it is dedicated to Liberty, it must follow that its

ideals are consistently misunderstood, since Liberty is in fact the most difficult of all political achievements. Over and over again Liberalism is accused of searching, not for the constructive Liberty upon which alone any lasting order can be based, but for the anarchy in which every man is his own unchecked master. There are multitudes to whom Liberalism seems nothing more exalted than this scornful account of it which T. S. Eliot gives in his *Essays Ancient and Modern*, "The forces which we denominate Liberal embrace all people who believe that the public affairs of this world and those of the next have nothing to do with each other; who believe that in a perfect world those who like golf could play golf, and those who like religion could go to church."* Finally, Liberalism appeals throughout to Reason, and since the exaltation of Reason is a part of its *raison d'être*, Liberalism as a political philosophy stands or falls upon the accord that is given to Reason in any particular generation. It has, therefore, fallen with the fall of Reason to-day. Events have made it more difficult than at any time for the last five hundred years to accept the force of Reason as an arbiter of human affairs. These events have most of them taken place within the realm of the human mind. The newest of psychological theories, such as Behaviourism, which totally deny free will, and the recent discoveries of astronomers which emphasise only the cosmic insignificance of the world and human life upon it, have all made it difficult for the ordinary man to suppose that his Reason can any longer be regarded as an efficient guide to his conduct, or criterion of the human destiny.

It is indeed perfectly easy to see why Liberalism is the most despised and detested faith, and in order to understand it we need not even postulate any special human wickedness. It is the direct result of the profoundest of all revolutions, that which has taken place within the human mind during the last fifty years. If, however, we can easily understand how it comes about that Liberalism is in eclipse, the fact is none the less patent that the world stands in the danger which threatens all our lives precisely because of the repudiation of the Liberal principles which alone can keep the different aspects of civilisation in equipoise, and make them fruitful for peace. All the forces which make for disorder and impermanence of life in the modern world are in themselves the opposites of the

* Page 113. Faber & Faber.

things for which Liberalism stands. It stands for Liberty, and war is brought nearer and nearer by unchecked tyranny. It stands for a sane international co-operation, and it is therefore execrated by the prophets of hysterical nationalism. It stands for economic co-operation among the nations, whereby the riches of the world are made available to all, and it is faced by a repudiation of this in the economic self-sufficiency of tariff walls and the race for exclusive national possession of raw materials, whereby the world is brought daily nearer to the precipice of war. It stands for the supremacy of Reason in human affairs, and the dethronement of Reason, due initially to causes outside the control of any human leader, has brought people to the position where they have yielded their power of choice to unworthy leaders who are leading them and everyone else to destruction.

Its philosophy has been repudiated, and it is the very philosophy which the world needs. The remedy is therefore to be sought more in a reconsideration of the philosophy of Liberalism than in any reorganisation of particular Liberal parties. Because the rot set in first in realms of the human mind, it is in the same sphere that we must search for the cure. As the hatred is directed primarily against a creed, and only incidentally against the upholders of it, so Liberalism can survive only by making its creed attractive again. To this the work of reorganising its methods of propagation is purely secondary.

When we contrast the philosophy of Liberalism with those which have ousted it from its old primacy, we are at once struck with the fact that the difference between Liberalism and Dictatorship does not merely lie in the separate programmes they propose, but in the whole atmosphere in which these programmes are commended. The supreme asset of illiberal creeds is that they are held and expounded with passion. The fatal weakness of modern Liberalism is that while no thinking person doubts that its spirit is essential to human happiness, it is the rarest thing to hear it urged with any passion. If we think of this country alone, it is quite clear that Conservatism owes its success not to the excellence of its creed, but to the fact that it is passionately held; and that Labour has temporarily overcome the Liberal party not because it points a better way to human happiness, but because Socialism as a creed is held and commended by those

whose whole ethos is built on passionate faith in the object which it seeks. Liberalism and passion do not go easily hand in hand, because neither Reason nor Liberty are concepts about which it is easy to feel as profoundly as one thinks. Both of them are abstractions. Reason is of its nature lucid and cold, and Liberty is in fact the most difficult of all abstract concepts to grasp and define. Conservatism with its passionate belief in its own country, and Socialism in its equally passionate belief in the liberation of the oppressed, both have that to which passion naturally attaches itself. Liberalism is no less patriotic, and no less determined that the dispossessed shall be released, but as yet it has not succeeded in commending those ideals with the fervour by which other parties surround them. Thus, in the popular mind, Conservatism stands for patriotism, and Labour for socialism, but Liberalism for nothing in particular. The average person will hardly vote for a party whose only *raison d'être* is that people should behave reasonably and be free.

There are still many Liberals who give the impression that they regard these rather chilly abstractions as the sum total of the message they are commissioned to deliver to humanity, and the Liberal temper which has been repudiated all over Europe is finely expressed by the last sentence of a long and admirable book, *The History of Europe*, by a distinguished Liberal, Dr. H. A. L. Fisher. His reading of the long tragedy of European History makes him at the last look forward to the day when future generations may "replace our squandered treasury of Humanity, Toleration, and Good Sense." Humanity, Toleration, and Good Sense are all of them inescapably necessary to human happiness, but they are not concepts which you can put on your banner when you go crusading.

Neither Reason nor Liberty will serve as an expression of what Liberalism exists to bring. The chief thing needed is to find another concept which men can hold with passion, and to which the ordinary voter can respond. Perhaps the word that is required is Civilisation. It is perfectly clear that although in one sense Civilisation is a concept as abstract as Liberty, yet in another it possesses a remarkable power for stirring the emotions of the ordinary man. Of all the abstractions for the sake of which men were herded into Recruiting Offices in 1914, Honour, Glory, King, Country, Freedom, and Civilisation, the

last is the only one which has survived unimpaired, and still commands the allegiance of the man in the street in every country in Europe. Even such nations as seem to be repudiating everything for which civilisation stands, are vehement in their protestations that they are serving the civilised ideal. It is in fact a concept which still has the power to stir the ordinary man, and more than that, it has a pedigree as ancient as humanity itself, for, as Professor Arnold Toynbee has struggled to teach us, civilisation is the impalpable hero of history itself.

Civilisation is a concept which it is not possible to hold for long until we bring to it the faculty of faith. Its ideal of life is, of course, inconceivable as apart from the victory of humanity, toleration, and good sense, but it is also inconceivable if it is urged only because it crowns them. The whole idea of civilisation is utterly dependent upon such sanctions as are imparted into human life by the supernatural interpretation of life in the world. The civiliser is a person who cannot live for long without Faith. And since Faith is the basis of passion, Faith is what Liberalism supremely needs. Faith, in the most famous of all its definitions, is the belief in things that are not seen, and apart from some form of the spiritual interpretation of the universe neither faith nor progress is possible. If Liberalism were able to add to its rather intellectualised concepts the passionate faith pointing to the triumph of the thing not yet seen, the perfect civilisation of the world, then it might be that the world might be saved, and the Liberal party regain its kingdom. This is not to suggest any kind of alliance between a political party and any of the Christian churches. Such alliances always do far more harm than good to both sides. It is to suggest that the gateway to Liberal revival is faith in a worthy object, and that such an object is not Liberty, is not Reason, still less Dr. Fisher's chilly trinity of humanity, toleration, and good sense, but that which all of them come together to serve, the civilisation of the world, a concept quick with passion since it depends on Faith.

ROGER LLOYD.

SHANGHAI'S WHITE RUSSIANS.

IN 1914 there were, perhaps, 100 Russians living in Shanghai; by 1918 the number had risen to over 1,000; at the end of 1924 it was 8,000; early in 1936 it was 22,000; and it was predicted that before another twelve months were out the 22,000 would have become 30,000. The story behind these figures is one of the tragic epics of the Great War. It is the story of a people's flight before a conquering and intolerant ideology, and how, penniless, in a strange land among a strange people they struggled and struggled successfully to maintain their national identity and self-respect, and to save themselves from the abyss of destitution and economic and social degradation which threatened to engulf them.

A disorganised mob gathered together into Shanghai from all parts of Russia—that is how local Russian leaders saw the Russian population of Shanghai in 1923. According to a report rendered to the League of Nations in the same year, out of the total number of 8,000 at least half were destitute, living on the one meal a day of soup and bread supplied by community soup kitchens. To-day, out of a total of 22,000, the number of indigent unemployed is placed at 2,000, while the incoming Russian finds an organised Russian community ready to absorb and assist him, a community which has its own schools, hospitals, shelters and other benevolent institutions, its own social clubs and churches, its own Light Opera Company, its own newspapers. It has, too, its own official body to see to his registration with the Chinese.

The Chinese Government, sympathising apparently at the moment with the Russian refugee's natural desire to retain Russian nationality for himself and his children, has set up a system of registration which, while ensuring that a proper check is kept on Russians in view of the fact that they are subject to Chinese law and the Chinese law courts, allows them to remain Russians. Every Russian entering Shanghai is obliged to register within ten days with the local Bureau of Public Safety and to renew his registration at certain intervals. To obtain visas and a passport he has to have a certificate of identity, which he can obtain either from the Russian Emigrants Committee or the Council of the United Russian Public Organisations. This latter body has been officially

recognised by the Chinese authorities, and is looked upon by them as the proper medium through which local Russians should approach them, especially where failure to register has involved a fine which the delinquent wishes to be excused. It is also authorised to solemnise and register marriages, to issue birth certificates, to grant divorces, to register business agreements, to draw up wills, in fact, it fills for the White Russians *vis à vis* the Chinese Government very much the same place that his consulate does for the Englishman or Frenchman.

The Russian Emigrants Committee also grants identity certificates and assists Russians to register and to obtain passports, but its main function is to co-ordinate the community's social and charitable activities and to act as a focalising point for local Russian opinion. It has fifty-two different Russian societies affiliated to it—charitable organisations, unions of ex-soldiers, social clubs, mutual help societies, schools, cultural societies, study groups, trade and professional organisations. The Council of United Russian Public Organisations (or S.O.R.O. as it is generally known) has only seventeen affiliated organisations. On the surface this would appear to weaken its position in its relations with the Chinese, but in reality it is a convenience. As an officially recognised body it has to be extremely careful of the propriety of its actions, and indiscretions on the part of any of its constituent bodies, or members of those bodies, might prove a serious source of embarrassment. China, it must be remembered, has recognised Soviet Russia and maintains friendly relations with her. Shanghai's White Russians, on the other hand, are far from being reconciled to Soviet institutions; are, if not actively, certainly passively, opposed to the existing régime in Russia, always looking forward to some miraculous turn of fortune's wheel which will bring back the imperial Russia of their recollection and allegiance and enable them to return home. If they do not plot a counter-revolution, they talk of one and drink to one. As long as this is confined to private individuals and clubs the Soviet authorities can hardly complain, but if indulged in by members of a semi-official Chinese body, such as S.O.R.O., it would become a legitimate cause for protest. The fewer societies and individuals S.O.R.O. can be held responsible for the better it is pleased.

When the White Russians began to arrive in considerable

numbers in 1921 and 1922 they provided a very serious problem for the local foreign population, on whom devolved the responsibility of assisting them. The vast majority arrived practically penniless, and there was grave danger of the creation of a class of "poor whites," driven down by sheer destitution to the level of the Chinese coolie. The newcomers had first to be kept alive, and then to be found employment. Charity could and did do the first, tiding many thousands over the especially bitter years of 1923 and 1924. To find them employment was a far more difficult task. For any community to absorb such a sudden influx would have been difficult; for Shanghai the task appeared at first almost insurmountable. The newcomers had to be accorded, if possible, foreign status, to be employed in tasks compatible with that status. The type of employment open to foreigners was, however, strictly limited. The foreign community, including Japanese, did not exceed 40,000—if it even reached that figure—and it is obvious that posts for another five or six thousand could not be found at once. Every month, too, saw new arrivals from the North. Manual and casual work, for example, in the factories or as day labourers at the docks, was debarred the refugee. This work in Shanghai is done by Chinese coolies for wages on which the refugee could only exist by sinking to the coolies' level and living among and as them to the complete sacrifice of his national identity and self-respect.

The language difficulty was an additional bar, for the greater number of the refugees spoke neither English nor Chinese. It was very, very slowly that the ever-growing Russian community managed to become self-supporting, and even then it had to be content with a standard of living far below that demanded by other foreigners. Russians became chauffeurs and garage mechanics, bus drivers and tram inspectors, bodyguards for wealthy Chinese in fear of kidnapping, and night watchmen. In time a number found employment in the foreign municipal services as park-keepers, sanitary and health inspectors, in the public works department, in the municipal orchestra, as policemen. Both the International Settlement and the French Concession also maintain paid Russian detachments which to-day have between them 600 men on their rosters. The women became nurse girls, cinema attendants, shop assistants and professional dancing partners in the city's

numerous cabarets and dance halls. This last was only too often a polite camouflage, for in the early days the sale of her favours was the only thing that lay between many a Russian woman and starvation for herself and her family. Thus arose a problem which still remains in spite of the improved conditions of recent years. Though there are far fewer Russian dance-hall hostesses than there were, there are still too many, and the position of Russian women in the Far East has been thought to demand a League of Nations inquiry.

Self-help and mutual assistance have from the beginning distinguished the attitude of the Russians to their situation, and the provision of funds to allow individuals to set up in small enterprises of their own has been one of the principal means of helping each other that they have adopted. To-day there are hundreds of small Russian business undertakings, especially in the French Concession, where the majority of the refugees have made their home. The growth and development of that Concession in the last decade has been to a considerable extent the work of the Russians. Avenue Joffre, its principal shopping street, is practically two long rows of Russian shops —cafés, dressmaking, millinery and hairdressing establishments, shoe stores and small drapers' shops, provision stores and photographers. Russian signs are everywhere, Russian is as commonly heard as French or English ; " Little Moscow " is its local nickname.

With the growth of a Shanghai-educated generation, speaking and writing English and possibly Chinese as well as Russian, the Russians are now making their way into offices and in professional circles. This has been assisted by the depression, which has compelled foreign firms drastically to reduce expenses. One way of doing this has been (in less responsible posts) to replace men brought out from home by local products, and this has been the Russian's chance. He is willing to accept a quarter the salary demanded by the man from home, and at the same time does not expect home leave, with his passage paid by the firm. In the same way Russian stenographers are replacing English and American girls in offices, because of the much lower rate of pay they ask. The depression has helped, too, the Russian professional man— the doctor, the dentist, the architect, the engineer. Many of these had been struggling for years to establish themselves, and now, with their lower scale of charges, they are attracting

patients who formerly patronised the more expensive English, French or Americans.

Thus the Russians have made a place for themselves in Shanghai, though admittedly not too comfortable a place. The pay of the bodyguard, the watchman, the chauffeur, the garage mechanic ranges between $30 and $60 a month— that of the Russian stenographer, cinema attendant and shop-girl from $40 to $60. The Russian male business employee earns from $100 to $200 a month. The Russian shopkeeper's profits are on the same scale. According to the Russian Emigrants Committee the average family income lies between $100 and $300 a month, but other observers are of the opinion that this estimate is too high. In any case the figure indicates a standard of living far below that of other foreigners. The average Englishman would give $400 a month as the very lowest income for a married man compatible with decency, while twice that amount only allows of modest comfort. Many a Russian family, however, has still to live in a single room, off the cheapest of food.

That they have managed, in spite of the hardships and privations they have endured during the past twelve years, to retain their national consciousness and identity, and have gained from all sources a reputation for orderly conduct and decent behaviour in the face of great temptations to the contrary, speaks very highly of the character and determination of these Russian refugees. Despite the hard times Russian beggars have been remarkably few. Through the various societies adults keep alive their national spirit and at the same time see that the children get, in Sunday and night schools, if nowhere else, an education in Russian culture to supplement the more Western training they must have if they are to gain a livelihood in Shanghai. There has been no tendency so far for Russians to intermarry with Chinese.

So much for the present, but what of the future ? The Russians have established themselves ; can they maintain their present status and position ? As one surveys the situation one is bound to feel doubtful. Both politically and economically the scales would seem to be weighted against them. Everyone to-day admits, though with a hope that it will not happen in their lifetime, that ultimately the system of extraterritoriality must end and the foreign settlements and concessions be handed back to the Chinese. At the

moment the Chinese do not press too hard on the Russians, being content apparently to allow them to retain their Russian national consciousness, indeed, they refuse to grant Chinese nationality to the occasional Russian applicants for it. As long as the present régime exists this will probably remain the case, but ultimately the Government can hardly continue to tolerate, still less to further, as it now does, the existence of a separate group in the State, not only not Chinese but priding itself on the fact, whose institutions are alien, which feels no sense of loyalty to the country or kinship with its people. China must strive to assimilate such a group, to break down its racial distinctiveness and to convert Russian refugees into loyal Chinese citizens.

Economic forces, too, must operate in the same direction. As business and administration fall more and more into Chinese hands so the foreign community must dwindle, and the support, not only political and moral but economic, which the Russians have derived from the presence of other foreigners will be withdrawn. The present tendency is for Russians to replace the Europeans from home, the next stage will be when Chinese replace Russians. As it is, it is the considered policy of the Shanghai Municipal Council to employ Chinese where possible even in the higher posts, and when the Chinese take control the inevitable result must be the steady ousting of all foreigners in favour of a purely Chinese personnel. The Russian shopkeeper gets most of his custom from the general foreign community. As that community dwindles, so will his business, unless he can attract Chinese custom in competition with Chinese traders. While there is a place for the Russian in the International Shanghai of to-day, there will be no place for him in the Chinese Shanghai of the future —as a Russian that is. There may be, indeed, most certainly will be, one for him as a Chinese citizen.

The White Russian has to face the fact that the future, though possibly the distant future, holds for him three choices —leaving Shanghai, becoming Chinese, or starvation. To leave Shanghai is for the vast majority hardly possible. In their present mood they cannot return to Russia and emigration to other lands requires more capital than they possess. Since, therefore, no one willingly starves, sinisation is the only thing left. Ultimately the White Russian will have to merge himself in the ranks of the Chinese people.

E. H. ANSTICE.

ON AN INDIAN RIVER.

MOST water-birds in India breed during the "rains," but the terns form an exception, as they select the earlier part of the hot weather—from the end of March to the middle of May—in which to lay their eggs. The Whiskered Tern (*Hydrochelidon hybrida*), however, follows the general rule, and breeds from June to August, making its slight nest amidst the rushes and aquatic plants in marshes, and I have found numbers in the Wular Lake in Kashmir, as well as in certain *jheels* in the United Provinces. The majority of the terns, and some of the plovers, choose the sandy islands in the big rivers. Here they collect in colonies, large and small, laying their eggs in a mere scraping in the ground.

Many years ago I was staying at Fyzabad, and as the Gogra, one of the largest tributaries of the Ganges, flows past the city, I took the opportunity to visit the birds' breeding places. My host was the late Mr. Alec Bryson, of the Opium Department, and a very keen naturalist. He was a most interesting companion, not only on account of his extensive knowledge of the fauna in his part of India, but because as a boy he had formed one of that gallant company of youngsters who had held the "Martinière Post" during the siege of the Residency in 1857, and could tell many a story of the terrible times our people went through in that "year of sorrow." The opium bungalow at Fyzabad, with its offices and godowns, had originally formed part of the old Palace of Dilkhusha, where the Kings of Oudh resided before they moved their capital to Lucknow. It was built on the right bank of the river, and in some years during the "rains" the high wall with which it was surrounded stood in the water. These great streams, meandering as they do over wide beds with an almost imperceptible slope—the difference in height above sea-level between Fyzabad and Calcutta is only some 400 feet—are constantly changing their course. During the "rains" the whole country is often one vast expanse of swirling water, but, when the cold weather comes and the floods go down, the river divides itself into numerous channels between which lie sandy islands—some bare, some covered with *jhac* (tamarisk) and tufts of coarse grass—swamps and *jheels* swarming with bird life, wild pig, *para* (hog deer), hares, jackals and foxes, together with not a few leopards. All this

is known as the " Khadir," and it is in the Meerut " Khadir " that the famous pig-sticking " Cup " is run.

For the naturalist the great plain of Northern India is a most fascinating country. It may not hold vast herds of game, as do some parts of Africa, while the botanist perhaps will find it somewhat lacking in variety as regards the genera and species of its flora, but as a sportsman's paradise it is unequalled. The only fault from the ornithologist's point of view is that, with the general exception of the birds of prey, most of the feathered race breed during the terrific heat of April, May and June, or in the steamy atmosphere of July and August. In the year preceding my visit the main stream of the Gogra had come right up to the wall of the old palace, but on this occasion it was away on the farther side, necessitating a drive for the best part of three miles over a rough road across the sand and over numerous improvised temporary bridges.

We arranged to start early so as to complete the first part of the journey before the great heat came on, and shortly after sunrise we were perched precariously on an *ekka*—a small canopied box on wheels drawn by a diminutive pony with the shafts standing right up in the air above its withers. However, the pony did not seem at all troubled, but stepped forth gallantly, towing us along, together with our tiffin basket, a rifle in case we came across crocodile, a collector's gun, egg-blowing tools, and boxes filled with cotton-wool. Our driver drew up at length under a mighty pepul, where our coolies were waiting to transport our things to the boat, which was still some distance away.

As we strolled about to stretch our legs, which were a bit cramped after our ride in the *ekka*, we caught sight of a kite (*Milvus govinda*) on her nest at the top of a dead tree on the farther side of the road. It was very high up and a nasty climb, and, as I had taken dozens of these eggs at one time or another, I did not trouble to send a man after them. Moreover, it was more than likely that by this time the young were on the point of hatching. Just then I noticed a mass of sticks and old rags in the main fork not ten feet from the ground, and as I approached a hen *Neophron ginginianus*, the eastern form of the Egyptian vulture, shuffled off. By standing on Bryson's shoulder—my hobnailed shooting boots must have made me a painful burden—I was able to reach the two richly marked eggs. The curious thing about

the eggs of this species, which are often so heavily blotched as to be almost crimson, is that the colour is liable to be washed off if treated carelessly. I once had a most magnificent specimen, which, being somewhat dirty, I proceeded to clean with soap and water. Before I realised what I was doing I had produced a pure white patch as big as a half-crown. I found the egg of the huge Lammergeier (*Gypætus barbatus*) equally liable to disfigurement. After that experience I was always careful as to how I treated the eggs of the Raptores. While I was at the nest a rose-ringed parroquet (*Palæornis torquatus*) flew out of a hole at my elbow, and I could hear the young birds a foot or two below me. Numbers of nestlings of this species are brought into the *Nakhas*, the bird-market in Lucknow, during the months of March and April and sold for a few pice. The habitations of all the vultures are most evil smelling, and that of the Egyptian bird is particularly objectionable. He is always to be found round latrines and similar localities, and he brings a large amount of dried remains to decorate his home.

Having blown the specimens, and wrapped them safely in cotton-wool, we started for the boat. We hadn't gone more than twenty yards when I caught sight of something slipping away head stretched out, and walking towards the spot almost trod on a couple of eggs of the Norfolk plover (*Œdicnemus scolopax*). Shortly afterwards a pair of red-wattled lapwings (*Sarcogrammus indicus*) came circling round us, uttering their well-known cry " did-ye-do-it, did-ye-do-it." The nest as usual was just a scraping on the ground lined with a few blades of grass on which lay the four well-marked eggs, while round the edge were placed little bits of *kunkur*. We also flushed a crested lark (*Galerita cristata*) off her clutch of three evidently very hard set. The mother bird was very distressed, and dropped quite close to us running to and fro. Hardly had we left the spot than she returned and immediately resumed her maternal duties.

I used to be told as a boy that if one took only a single egg from the nest the parents would not desert. My experience leads me to believe that this is only partially true. If the eggs are fresh the slightest sign of interference often causes the birds to leave and start building a new nest, but, as incubation proceeds, they are far less liable to do so, while, if there are young, or even if hatching has not yet actually taken

place, it is extraordinary how much observation they will put up with. Many cases have been reported of a family of young birds being removed, nest and all, which, provided the distance has not been too great, have continued to be fed by the parents.

The boats used on the great Indian rivers, though varying slightly in different localities—those of the Beas in particular having very blunt high bows—are all extremely broad and flat bottomed, as might be expected when one is constantly encountering sandbanks and shallows. They carry large square sails, usually red in colour, which are hoisted when there is any wind directly aft, for, as can be imagined, such vessels cannot tack, and I have never seen anything in the nature of either centre or out-board. Our boat was just the type for our purpose. Planks stretched across formed a steady table, and empty kerosene boxes made admirable stools. Pushing off we floated steadily downstream. From time to time one or other of the harriers (*Circus æruginosus* and *C. macrurus*) would go by with its easy gliding flight; above us we could see both Bonelli's and the crested serpent-eagles; and above them, just specks in the sky, circled numbers of vultures. The Indian pied kingfisher hovered over the still pools, and we saw one making for its hole in the bank, where its hungry family were awaiting its return. Sandpipers, stints and redshanks were running along the water's edge, evidently on the look-out for a good meal to sustain them on their flight to the North, which they had to undertake in the next few days, while, from the top of a gaunt bare tree, came the characteristic scream of the great Pallas's fishing-eagle (*Haliætus leucoryphus*). Every now and again we would catch sight of a crocodile or a *gharial* slipping into the water. They have long ago learnt the danger they run from man and his rifle. It was on such a craft as ours that many of my friends had escaped as children from the mutineers, and it was on these that the ill-fated remnant of the garrison, men, women and infants, started on their last journey from the fatal *ghat* at Cawnpore, only to be treacherously massacred as soon as they had pushed off.

Presently we came to an island in mid-stream, and, as there were a number of birds about, we turned up our trousers—the terrific heat of the sun made it inadvisable to wear shorts—and waded ashore. As it turned out, most of

the terns were breeding on some islands a few hundred yards farther down, but we found a few clutches of the beautiful little swallow-plover or Indian pratincole (*Glareola lactea*), while on a hard ridge of *kunkur*, that curious nodular lime-stone formation, were a pair of the great Indian stone-plover (*Esacus recurvirostris*) standing beside their two eggs, which were about the size of a turkey's and were quite fresh. They did not seem to worry themselves much about the loss of their treasures, since they only ran a short distance and began to feed, but it was otherwise with the pratincoles. These swooped around our heads uttering plaintive cries, and flinging themselves literally at our feet, dragged themselves along as though they had a broken wing. We constantly stooped down to see whether it was possible to catch them, but they were far too wily, and would limp out of reach. The terns did not appear to practise this trick to the same extent, but with the pratincole it was almost universal, so that the ground looked as though it was covered with wounded birds. Under some drift-wood was the nest of a spurwing plover (*Hoplopterus ventralis*), the four eggs exactly like those of the English peewit.

Re-embarking, we drifted down to the islands already mentioned—two large ones separated by a shallow strait a few inches deep. Here the eggs in some places were so close together that one had to be careful not to tread on them. The same species generally nested together in colonies, which again were only separated from one another by a few feet. In one corner were a number of pratincoles, while near by was a colony of the large river tern (*Sterna seena*). Farther away a collection of the skimmer or scissor-bill tern (*Rhyncops albicollis*), and beyond them again on the second island was a group of the eastern variety of the little tern (*Sterna sinensis*). What the skimmer lives on is difficult to say. Hume recorded a solitary example of a small fish being found in the stomach of one he examined, but, with this exception, nothing, so far as I am aware, has ever been obtained beyond an oily substance. Presumably it feeds upon minute animalculæ, which it collects as it skims gracefully over the water, its curious bill just cleaving the surface. Its eggs, moreover, are usually four in number, while the terns lay three, and their shape is more like that of the sand-grouse. We also found several nests of the black-bellied tern (*S. melanogaster*).

These for some reason had not formed themselves into colonies, but had laid their eggs indifferently among those of the pratincoles, and, less frequently, the river terns. They were not nearly so numerous as the other species. The spur-wings usually nest under the shelter of a bit of drift-wood or a tuft of grass, while the terns and pratincoles select the sand nearer the water, where it is damp.

As the day advanced the scorching "loo" got up, causing the dust on the parched plains to rise in such clouds that the sun could only just be seen as a yellow brass ball. On the islands where the sand was damp it was not so bad, but, even so, we had every now and again to run into the water to save our feet from being blistered. The late Mr. Cockburn, a friend of that great Indian ornithologist and founder of the Indian National Congress, Mr. A. O. Hume, told me that on one occasion he found a skimmer's egg baked hard. All species almost invariably lay their eggs on islands to prevent them from being devoured by jackals and small rodents, but we did come across one nest of the spurwing, together with one of the ringed-plover (*Ægialitis dubia*) on a sandspit, on which also were a few eggs of the pratincoles, but in this case it was pretty certain that the water had suddenly fallen, and had destroyed its isolation. We found the spur-wings usually sitting on their eggs, but the terns, which make their nest-scrapings nearer the water, where the soil is damp, seem to leave much of the incubation to the sun, and, should the level of the stream go down, with the resultant drying of the ground, it is quite possible that an odd clutch may suffer the fate of Mr. Cockburn's skimmer.

It was now time to return, as we had come some miles, and it is a slow business poling up stream. We had several shots at "mugger," but, though we registered more than one hit, we did not recover any. Unless a crocodile is killed instantly, which rarely happens, he will slither into the water, and as often as not is never seen again. I think when badly wounded they usually struggle to their lairs, which they dig underneath the banks below water-level, and, if they do not recover, die there. It was dark and the temperature had dropped by the time we reached the bungalow, and we were both thankful to sink into long chairs with a tall gin and tonic, well iced, by our sides before going off to our baths preparatory to changing into our white dinner-jackets.

WILLIAM JESSE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE COMEDY OF "NON-INTERVENTION."

THIS matter of non-intervention is worth looking at from the curious point of view. There are those who take it seriously, who see in the Spanish muddle the danger of European war. Others regard it as a safety-valve and argue that so long as Russians, Italians, Germans, Frenchmen and Englishmen are able to let off their squibs in Spain, they may be saved from the temptation of letting off anything bigger elsewhere. Others again regard it simply as a typical unimportant example of diplomatic muddle. Inasmuch as war in its origin is a nervous thing, deriving from fears broken loose from control, there is something to be said, on the ground of pure wisdom, for the flippant view. It is even arguable that those who foretell war help to produce war. Moreover it does become more difficult to maintain an attitude of unbroken solemnity before the spectacle of six European Powers, including five "Great" Powers, talking endlessly about non-intervention while themselves intervening on an ever-increasing scale.

Even the virtuous English people, who in this particular matter are far less inclined than any of the other culprits to plunge into the Spanish mischief, are not wholly blameless. There are English volunteers in Spain; up to January 11th, when by virtue of the 1870 Foreign Enlistment Act such volunteers were stigmatised as illegal, there was a Red recruiting office in London; there are organised bands of English spinsters sewing socks for Spanish soldiers—provided they be Red soldiers. One of the oddities is that the warm-hearted people in England, those who are capable of feeling an urge towards sympathetic action on behalf of good causes, for the most part assume that the good cause in Spain is the bolshevik cause. If ever the heart of English spinsterdom be really roused, and if the welling spring of its pity be diverted exclusively to the Reds in Spain, the cause of non-intervention would be irrevocably lost even as a diplomatic pretence. Not all the armed legions of Germany or Italy could hold out against the spate of woolly comforters that would fortify the other side. So far the English factor has not been felt in Spain, except as an uncertain moral ally to the combined

bolshevism of Moscow, Valencia and Paris. Not that M. Blum is himself a bolshevik, or that France is ever likely to fall a willing victim to the bolshevist graft. Yet for his own other purposes his diplomatic effect has undisguisedly been ranged behind the international bolshevik forces in Spain. The muddled diplomatic struggle has from the beginning centred on Moscow's attempt to use the Spanish struggle as a means of compromising Great Britain as well as France as Russia's ally not only in the diplomatic field, but also in the economic ideology of the world revolution. These men of Moscow do still talk and try to propagate their bolshevik ideas. It was Russia that intervened first in Spain. Her agents abroad have ever since been busier than any other diplomatists in their interventionist object. Germany and Italy have answered the challenge with increasing alacrity. The war in Spain has become more and more a sort of international war on a small scale. A recent complaint made by General Faupel, the German Ambassador at Burgos, that the Spaniards were not doing their bit in the war, no more than crystallised the now clear fact that the issue has become international rather than Spanish. Yet there seems to be no reason why that issue should be taken in a tragic spirit. Indeed, the simple tale of the latest diplomatic manœuvres makes reading more suitable for idle pleasure than for serious concern.

Even the length of the tale does not spoil it. It was as long ago as August 27th that Moses Rosenberg secretly reached Madrid as Russia's "ambassador," just a week before the Caballero camarilla was formed. His true function ever since has been far more military than diplomatic, though the distinction may not be great. On November 18th Germany and Italy simultaneously recognised the Burgos administration as the Government of Spain. The so-called International Committee for the Application of the Agreement regarding Non-intervention in Spain has been in regular session since September 9th, adding farce to farce. By the end of the year Russian and French volunteers on the one side, German and Italian on the other, had become the backbone of the war. On December 18th Mr. Eden spoke in a House of Commons debate about the "shortcomings" of the attempt to organise non-intervention and of the "blatant breaches" of what he called the "agreement" not to intervene in Spain. It is odd that we should still be hearing about that alleged

"agreement." There never was any such thing. It was found impossible last August to reach such an agreement and the committee was constituted for the purpose of encouraging non-intervention in practice. Nor did that attempt ever come within measurable distance of achieving its object. On December 3rd, three months after the committee had been in being, the French and British Governments, at the committee's request, asked the Burgos and the Valencia authorities if they would agree to a system of control over the admission of foreign supplies and personnel through the Spanish seaports or over the land frontiers. On the following day Britain and France invited the co-operation of Germany, Italy, Portugal and Russia in an attempt at peace by three stages, namely by: (1) the achievement of effective non-intervention by an agreed exclusion of volunteers and money as well as munitions; (2) the acceptance of an armistice by the two sides; (3) international mediation.

Russia promptly (December 10th) endorsed that project while redoubling her supply of tanks and men through Barcelona. Germany, Italy and Portugal refused to take the suggestion seriously. It was in effect killed by Valencia. On December 17th Señor Caballero gave his answer to the Anglo-French proposal. His very first sentence ran thus: "There is no such thing as two belligerent Powers in Spain." The way of the mediator is indeed hard. How is it possible to mediate between two parties when one party denies the very existence of the other? Señor Caballero's second sentence was even more forbidding: "Only one legitimate Government exists—formed as a result of the elections of February 16th last." Up to a point one can sympathise with Señor Caballero. In war time facts are normally regarded as useful only if they can be used as propagandist ammunition; and in so far as they are inconvenient in that sense, they are simply replaced by other, more convenient, statements. All governments in war time lie, not like troopers (for theirs but to do and die), but like governments. In the case of Señor Caballero it was simply not true that his government derived from the elections of February 16th. The government that did derive from those elections resigned as soon as the first news was received in Madrid of the army revolt in Morocco (July 18th). The government that succeeded it in its turn resigned within a few hours, and was replaced by an equally unstable third.

Such was the death agony of democracy in Spain. Within one week the whole of Spain was plunged in civil war. When at the beginning of September Señor Largo Caballero, communist, formed a Cabinet in Madrid, he had no more democratic sanction behind him than had General Franco. The government formed by Largo Caballero on September 4th was a communist government. At the elections of February 16th the communists won only twelve seats out of 473. It is true that six of Caballero's Ministry, including himself, called themselves socialists while admitting their communist sympathies, but even the socialists won only eighty seats at the elections of February 16th. On September 4th the situation in Spain was one of civil war, in which two contending parties were fighting for mastery. No constitution was in operation. One side was communist, the other side anti-communist. The communist headquarters were in Madrid and that fact only was the basis of the claim to be " the government " of Spain. The very suggestion of the British and French Governments on December 3rd and 4th that intervention from the outside be stopped and mediation within Spain should be attempted, presupposed the lack of an established government in Spain. In the note he handed to Mr. Ogilvie Forbes, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid, on December 17th, Señor Caballero wrote of " the so-called authorities at Burgos, authors of the vandal destruction of Madrid, plunged in dishonour and crime," etc. He wrote of the " shameless violation " of the non-intervention agreement by Germany, Italy and Portugal ; but claimed that the " Spanish Government " by virtue of its " legitimacy " had every right to procure arms openly " for the purpose of suppressing revolt." On the other hand, for any foreign government to supply arms to General Franco was, he argued, " a violation of international custom " and " a new method of aggression." None the less, concluded the Caballero note, the Madrid Government accepted the Anglo-French plan " in principle," reserving the right to reject it as a whole or in part if it thought fit ; and suggested that the first thing to do would be to control the Portuguese harbours. The Caballero answer to the suggestion made from London that foreign intervention in Spain be thwarted and the war ended by mediation amounted to this, that only such intervention as helped General Franco should be excluded and such intervention as helped Madrid should be accepted as a right.

On December 23rd M. Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, received in audience the German Ambassador in Paris, Count von Welczek, and lodged a formal protest against German intervention in Spain. He stated roundly that France would not tolerate the landing of German armies upon Spanish soil, that already too many " volunteers " had reached Spain, and that if Germany persisted in her intervention, France could no longer be bound by the London agreement. By " London agreement " he meant the famous non-intervention agreement. By no longer being bound by it he meant that France would begin intervening, putting his blind eye to the well-known fact that France was already intervening in a substantial degree. At about the same time General Faupel, the German Ambassador to Spain (not the same Spain as the one to which the Russian Ambassador was paying his court), returned to Berlin to report the progress of the loyalist cause. In German diplomacy " loyalist " as a label denotes not the same, but the opposite meaning to that denoted by the use of the word in Russian or French diplomacy. While General Faupel was in Berlin, French and Russian gossip was making disclosures about the inferior performances of the German tanks and aeroplanes in Spain, as contrasted with the Russian tanks and aeroplanes. Herr Hitler retired to his Berchtesgaden retreat for Christmas.

But the London committee was beating up to its own crisis. It held a plenary meeting on December 23rd. It had before it the answer of the Burgos Government to the Anglo-French proposal for mediation, but Valencia's answer, though it had been widely published in the Press, had not reached London. In his note, published on December 23rd, General Franco asked a series of questions, the answers to which, he said, would be necessary before he could decide whether to accept the plan for land and sea control. The questions were : " Who are the observers who will exercise supervision at points of entry by land and sea to be ? Where are they to perform their functions ? What precisely will those functions be ? Will there be observers on the French side of the frontier ? What guarantees are there, in view of the wild indiscipline of the Valencia Government's forces, that the observers will not be exposed to interference in the execution of their duties ? "

It is doubtful if any member of the committee any longer took its business seriously. The main interest of the meeting

of December 23rd was the Russian delegate's reiterated opinion of General Franco. He spoke warmly of the General's "folly" and "insolence," and referred to him as "this pocket general." Inasmuch as the theory of the committee's purpose was to organise non-intervention outside of Spain and mediation inside Spain, the Russian delegate's conduct merely illustrated the unlikelihood of the committee's doing anything of the sort.

The French and British Governments on Christmas Eve therefore attempted to achieve the end by other means. They instructed their representatives in Berlin, Rome, Lisbon and Moscow to suggest simultaneously and in identical terms that those four countries should agree to the veto of any further volunteers for Spain. They asked that the four governments should state what legislation they were prepared to introduce to ensure that no further volunteers should be enrolled from among their nationals for service with either side in Spain. It was explained that if the answers were promptly given, it would be possible to arrange for a fixed date half-way through January on which the veto should become effective. Russia as usual gave the first answer (December 30th). It was also the usual sort of answer. It consisted in the first place of an attack on nationalist forces in Spain. This sort of thing: "The Soviet Government consider it an indisputable fact that the forces fighting against the Spanish Republican Army consist in the overwhelming majority of foreign elements, among which Spaniards play a most insignificant part. Since the very beginning of the struggle the forces of the rebels have consisted mainly of Moroccans and the so-called Foreign Legion. The rebellion of the Spanish Generals from the very beginning constituted an attempt to overthrow with forces of Moroccans and other non-Spanish elements the existing Parliamentary democratic system created by the expression of the will of the entire Spanish people."

Not a word, of course, about Russia's contribution to the forces of the other side, although there is ample evidence for the fact that the Russian intervention was not only the first, but has ever since been the biggest. After its routine attack upon General Franco, delivered in the name of non-intervention, Mr. Litvinov proceeded to accept in principle the proposal for a veto on volunteers, but made four conditions, thus: "(1) The signatories of the agreement should express their consent to the establishment of effective control over the observance of this agreement; (2) These or other measures of control should be adopted as early as possible, regardless of the consent or dissent of the rebel generals; (3) The signatories should undertake the moral obligation, pending the introduction of the control, to watch through their official and unofficial agents on the spot the arrival of so-called volunteers, and that reports about them in such cases should be published for general knowledge; and that (4) The earliest possible date should be fixed for the conclusion of the agreement, in order that the period elapsing before this date should not permit the increase precisely now in the dispatch to Spain of so-called volunteers; in this connection clause 3 (above) should enter into force at once."

Germany and Italy delivered their answers on January 7th. In their turn they accepted the proposal in principle, but with conditions. In their substance the German and the Italian answers were the same. The German may therefore be taken as typical. It began with a few routine and long-winded protests about Russia, etc., but did make this sound point: "the German Government must seriously inquire whether the proposed prohibition at the present moment would not in practice involve a one-sided advantage to the elements fighting against the National Spanish Government. Now that for months past there has been an unrestricted flow of bolshevist elements, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the prohibition now would be to the advantage only of the Bolshevist Party in Spain, which is manifestly filled up to a sufficient extent with foreign volunteers." The three conditions of acceptance were reasonable enough: (*a*) that the other States concerned decide to take up the same attitude; (*b*) that the solution of the other questions connected with indirect intervention is taken in hand immediately; and (*c*) that all Governments concerned agree to an unreservedly effective control of the prohibitions agreed upon, to be carried out on the spot. Equally reasonable was the demand that the prohibitions of intervention be retrospective as well as comprehensive: "the best solution of the volunteer problem would, in the view of the German Government, be achieved if it became possible to remove from Spain all non-Spanish participants in the struggle, including political agitators and propagandists, so that the state of affairs of August last year

would be restored. The German Government would very much welcome an immediate consideration by the London Committee of how such a measure could be carried out effectively. For their part they are ready to collaborate in this matter in every respect."

The Anglo-French proposal made on Christmas Eve had in its turn failed to arrest the quickening process of general intervention.

The Anglo-Italian Agreement.

The text was published on January 4th of a new agreement between Italy and England. It will constitute one of the historical curiosities. Since May 5th last, when Marshal Badoglio entered Addis Ababa, it had been inevitable that something would have to be done to regularise Italo-British relations. A vague state of tension was of all the absurdities the most absurd. On May 9th Italian sovereignty was formally proclaimed over Abyssinia, which thereupon became Italian East Africa. But the British Government was committed by its Geneva policy not to recognise the fact of Italian East Africa. In diplomacy it is a permissible, even an honoured, practice to refuse to recognise the existence of something that exists. On November 1st Signor Mussolini, speaking at Milan, said that the state of Anglo-Italian tension existing in the Mediterranean could be eased only by "a sincere, rapid and complete understanding on the basis of the recognition of mutual interests." On November 5th Mr. Eden said: "In years gone by, the interests of the two countries in the Mediterranean have been complementary rather than divergent. On the part of His Majesty's Government there is every desire that those relations should be preserved in the future."

Within a week Signor Grandi, the Italian Ambassador, made contact with Sir Robert Vansittart at the Foreign Office, and began a course of negotiation which was to last exactly two months. Why? What was it all about? Ingenuity could not discover any conflict of interests in the Mediterranean between Italy and Great Britain. Mr. Eden on November 5th had referred to the "deterioration" in Anglo-Italian relations resulting from "our obligations under the Covenant." But there was no particular problem to discuss. The only problem was how to save the two faces and to

restore a normal state of friendliness. The initial difficulty was that Signor Grandi presented himself as the envoy of the "King-Emperor." Sir Robert Vansittart could not deal with him except as the representative of the "Italian Government." That childish phase lasted several weeks. Indeed, it was the crux of a whole diplomatic conference lasting two months. How was so absurd a dilemma to be obviated? The answer was simplicity itself. The British Government should recognise Italian East Africa *de facto*, but not *de jure*. Signor Mussolini is a realist. He took the view that if you gave an apple to somebody, it did not much matter whether you gave it *de facto* or *de jure*. The apple was duly given on December 21st. On that day the British Ambassador in Rome, Sir Eric Drummond, informed Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, that the British Legation at Addis Ababa was to be transformed into a Consulate-General. The deed was done. For seven months a British Chargé d'Affaires had remained in Addis Ababa, accredited to a non-existent Abyssinian Government. His presence was lacking in strict correctitude, for Addis Ababa during those months was in fact the capital of an Italian colony. But if the deed itself was now done, there remained the formula of face-saving. There would have to be a diplomatic document recording the fact that Britain and Italy had agreed to "make it up": nothing more. How was "Italy" to be described? The titular heads of the two States, who normally would be the formal parties to such an agreement, were the British King-Emperor and the Italian King-Emperor. But the title "King-Emperor" could not be conceded to the Italian party because the League of Nations resolution still stood, the British Government was committed to it and it could not be rescinded till next autumn. The solution again was simple enough, and Signor Mussolini being a realist had no objection. The agreement was solemnly concluded between "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom" on the one hand and "the Italian Government" on the other. The content of the agreement, inasmuch as it amounted to precisely nothing at all, deserves to be quoted as a laconic curiosity:

"Animated by the desire to contribute increasingly, in the interests of the general cause of peace and security, to the betterment of relations between them and between all the Mediterranean Powers, and resolved to respect the rights and

interests of those Powers; Recognise that the freedom of entry into, exit from and transit through, the Mediterranean is a vital interest both to the different parts of the British Empire and to Italy, and that these interests are in no way inconsistent with each other; Disclaim any desire to modify, or, so far as they are concerned, to see modified, the *status quo* as regards national sovereignty of territory in the Mediterranean area; Undertake to respect each other's rights and interests in the said area; Agree to use their best endeavours to discourage any activities liable to impair the good relations which it is the object of the present declaration to consolidate. This declaration is designed to further the ends of peace and is not directed against any other Power."

A Chinese Comedy.

The daily life of the Chinese generals has for many years given endless pleasure to the Western student, though it may sometimes have been hard for the generals themselves. One of the many recurrent crises in that particular form of life came to a head on December 12th when no less exalted a person than General Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo and President of the Republic, himself was captured, not by an enemy without the walls, but by an enemy within, a fellow general. His captor was the so-called "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang, who commanded a force of about 100,000 troops in Shensi, one of the north-west provinces of China. His troops were in the main recruited from among the dispossessed inhabitants of Manchuria. Since 1931, therefore, their bitterest feeling has been that of hatred against the Japanese who drove them from their homes. But their practical hypothesis was war upon the Chinese communists. After all, the various parties to the Chinese civil war, which has lasted intermittently for twenty-five years, must have an enemy within China, if the civil war is to continue. But the Chinese communists are as agile and as temperamental as any other Chinese faction. They informed their Shensi enemy that there had been a misunderstanding and that what they really wanted more than anything was a war with Japan. Now the Shensi troops could not be expected to resist so clear a gesture of a community of feeling. The Young Marshal had no alternative but to stage a violent entente between his own Shensi followers and the communists who were his recent enemy, the entente being given a specific anti-Japanese bias.

Nanking being puzzled, and a lack of understanding being the most potent *casus belli*, General Chiang Kai-shek decided that Chang Hsueh-liang must be punished. He immediately set out with an expeditionary force to punish him. When he reached Sianfu (or delightfully enough "The City of Western Peace") he discovered that he had under-estimated the strength of an expeditionary force needed for such a job, and instead of punishing Chang, was himself promptly taken and imprisoned by Chang. His captor announced that the President of the Republic would be held prisoner until the Nanking Government changed its ways by declaring war on Japan and recovering the territory lost by China. Only thus could Chang hope to maintain his own authority under the combined Shensi-communist forces inspired by an anti-Japanese fervour. There followed a fortnight of active diplomacy, conducted by agents of the two parties who travelled between Sianfu and Nanking. The upshot was that on Christmas Day General Chiang Kai-shek was released in the best possible spirit. Before leaving Sianfu he made a statement to his captors, thus: "As you have shown regard for the welfare of the nation and have decided to send me back to Nanking, and as you no longer try to make any special demands or to force me to give any orders, it marks a turning-point in the life of the nation. . . . It is an ancient Chinese saying that gentlemen should correct mistakes as soon as they are realised, and, as you admit wrongdoing, you are entitled to remain my subordinates."

General Chang Hsueh-liang was not to be outdone in generosity. He issued a public statement saying that the whole episode had been due to a misunderstanding, followed Chiang Kai-shek to Nanking and wrote to him this delightful letter: "I am naturally rustic, surly, and unpolished. Because of this I have committed this impudent and criminal act. Now I have penitently followed you to Nanking in order to await a punishment befitting the crime. I shall accept even death if beneficial to my country. Do not let sentiment or friendship deter you from dealing with me as I deserve."

Next, on December 29th, Chiang Kai-shek resigned, but the Political Council refused to accept his resignation. He resigned again on December 30th, and again it was refused.

On December 31st Chang Hsueh-liang was sentenced by a special military court to four years' imprisonment and to five years' loss of civil rights. On January 4th a full pardon was granted to him and the incident was closed.

Vilna Again.

Since General Zeligowski in October 1920 annexed Vilna, the Lithuanian capital, the course of Polish-Lithuanian relations has been anything but smooth. Yet in the past ten years at least a genuine attempt has been made by Lithuania to forgive, if not to forget. The Copenhagen conference of September 1925 where the bitter problem of the Niemen traffic was discussed, and the Königsberg conference of March and April 1928 where a *modus vivendi* in Vilna itself was discussed, illustrated the returning spirit of peace and goodwill. But the old Adam now again threatens to disturb the relations of the two countries and to introduce an apparently unnecessary new complication in the general relationships of Eastern Europe. The long history of Polish discrimination against the surviving Lithuanian traditions and culture in the old Lithuanian capital seems not yet to be ended. The present campaign of repression has caused greater concern in Lithuania than has been known for many years. It has been reported in the Polish Press that the Lithuanian cultural association of St. Casimir, on the ground of its menace to Polish security, has been virtually suppressed, and the Lithuanian daily newspaper, the *Vilniaus Rytojus*, has been confiscated. On a charge of having violated the Polish currency law, leading Lithuanian persons and organisations have been subjected to police search. It is alleged by Lithuania that the Polish authorities have already closed more than 130 Lithuanian schools and more than seventy reading-rooms, and as many branches of the several Lithuanian societies. The evidence points to a systematic attempt to eliminate the Lithuanian element from Vilna. The real cause for anxiety is the mysterious contradiction between the normal Polish contention that the Lithuanian element in Vilna is negligible, and the drastic steps now being taken to counter what is alleged to be a danger to the State.

George Glasgow.

January 15th, 1937.

No. 425. *February 1937.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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JAPAN'S FEET OF CLAY.*

It is difficult for anyone who has not spent a considerable time in Japan to form definite conclusions in face of the great variety of opinions that have been expressed and are still held with regard to that country. The tourist thinks of Japan in terms of cherry blossom and pagodas, of kimonos and kakemonos, of charming little smiling women and of delightful scenery pictured in prints and silk paintings. He thinks of Nikko with its wonderful temples and its sacred lacquer bridge and of the general artistic quality of the people. The merchant, on the other hand, knows Japan as a great competitor in silks, artificial silks, cottons and pottery. The competition of Japan, not only in China but also in India and Africa, is felt by every British trader. The statesman again looks at Japan from an entirely different point of view. He thinks of her growing army, and air force; of her production of iron, steel and machinery. He thinks of Japan's occupation of Manchukuo, the formation of that quasi-independent or vassal State, her inroads into China and the constant pressure upon that country to obtain from her exclusive rights to the detriment of other countries. This recent contribution by Freda Utley, with its amazing array of facts and carefully collected statistics about agriculture, armaments, manufactures

* By Freda Utley. Faber & Faber. 15s. net.

and politics, is stamped by a tone of definite hostility to that country and of friendliness to Russia. The book conveys the impression that it was written with an object in view. This may seem an unfair judgment, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Miss Utley had determined to prove a certain thesis, i.e. that Japan is bluffing the West, that she has only adopted western methods to insure her power in the East and that at heart the Japanese rulers are still as oriental as they were a thousand years ago. I use the term rulers advisedly because there is clear evidence throughout the book of deep sympathy with the peasants and the working-classes.

In the chapters dealing with "Civic Rights and Liberties" and the "Imminence of Social Revolution," an attempt is made to show that although the subjection of the working classes to their masters is a reality, yet the growing discontent of the peasantry and the working-class organisations is leading to a revolutionary movement which may threaten the existing social order. The powerful military element and the big landowners are at present content to conciliate the big industrialists. They care little for the ruined lower middle class and for the mass of the people who are oppressed and down-trodden. It is not altogether an untrue picture, this story of half-starved peasants, of little children working long hours, of women in subjection, of workers deprived of their right to form trade unions and so to improve their standard of life. Nevertheless, when all this is admitted, it is impossible to deny that as a people the Japanese have shown an immense capacity for industry, great intelligence and devotion to their own ideals. They have successfully imitated the best of other countries as regards armaments, and at the risk of impoverishing the country they have made Japan far the strongest power in the East. The great danger is that Japan in the hands of the militarists who have Russia and China always in mind, may make life so unbearable for their own fellow countrymen that an uprising is more than a possibility. Nearly half her budget is spent on armaments and a very large proportion of the remainder goes on paying interest on loans. She is seeking expansion in China because China has iron and coal and cotton and a huge population, potential consumers of her manufactures. It is not altogether true to say that Japan's imperialism is primarily a military rather than an economic imperialism. No doubt her expansion on

the mainland of Asia is in large measure a predatory expansion, for the Japanese are not a great colonising power, but on the other hand she does need and must have markets for her goods and raw materials which are not found in her own country. To forecast the future is not easy. Miss Utley does not believe that Japan can afford to go to war, and says that even her Manchurian expenses have been met not out of income but by taxation. All Japan's threats she regards as bluff. Not in so many words, but implicit, is the view that Soviet Russia will one day call Japan's bluff and so solve the problem both of Chinese interests and the fears of the Western Powers.

The book is packed with information of great value to any student of the Far Eastern problems, and its documentation is a proof of intensive study on the part of the author.

P. A.

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DOUGLAS HAIG.*

Lady Haig has written a really charming story of her husband's life: all the more charming because of its naïve simplicity. She makes no bones about it. "Douglas" was her hero. From cover to cover of the book he is just magnificent. It really is an unusual comfort in life to meet something wholly good and engrossing. Of course Lady Haig is a woman. She has a deliciously glancing hit at Mrs. Asquith, as she then was, though Herbert Asquith is featured in the *beau rôle*. As for Mr. Lloyd George, the whole world knows about the strained relations and prolonged controversy between the head of the political and the head of the military organisation during the last part of the war. Without mincing matters Lady Haig plunges into the fray and says quite roundly and quite boldly what she thinks of Lloyd George. The matter is not necessarily so simple. Most soldiers fail to see even the need for the existence of politicians. On the other hand it does happen that it would be hardly practical to allow the soldiers to conduct their wars in a purely objective and scientific spirit. After all, in one sense the generals ought to feel some sort of crooked obligation to the politicians because it is the politicians who make the wars. None the less, most readers will feel a welling sense of sympathy with Lady Haig about the shabby

* *The Man I Knew.* By the Countess Haig. The Moray Press. 18s.

treatment that was given to the British Commander-in-Chief by the British Prime Minister. The sense of sympathy will be fortified a thousandfold by the really humiliating rôle thrust upon the leaders of the proud British army by the appointment of a Frenchman as the Generalissimo in a united command.

Even if Lady Haig's narrative were wholly fictitious (and, in fact, it stands almost at the opposite extreme) this book would place us all under a deep sense of gratitude. It is a fine picture of a really fine man. Moreover, it performs the inestimable service of disclosing the simple, unadorned story of the Great War in its purely military aspect, as set down by the daily diary written by Lord Haig for the private eyes of Lady Haig. She uses the diaries with discretion, but quite obviously allows them in the main to tell their own unimpeded story.

We see Haig as a young man, very much a " man's man," hating women and falling for his future wife at first sight. We see him as a young cavalry officer, good at his job, hard-working, level-headed and shrewd. We see him commanding the British army in the greatest war in history. We are given an insight into the appalling confusion, intrigue, jealousy, and stupidity that went into the hotchpotch of the greatest muddle of all history. All war is muddle, in its origin, in its course, in its end. By the time one side in a war consists of heterogeneous allies, driven by their own selfish motives, we begin to see what a miracle it was that so strong and so centralised a fighting organisation as that of Germany was in the end defeated. Much of the credit obviously went to the single-minded, impersonal sense of duty that inspired Lord Haig.

Lady Haig has a neat sense of humour and her book contains many delightful stories, some of them against herself. And that is the true test of a sense of humour.

G. G.

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A HUNDRED YEARS.

Mr. Guedalla's latest work* combines brilliant craftmanship with solid knowledge of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The times are past when he was regarded in some quarters as a clever amateur. He has worked hard and long

* *The Hundred Years.* By Philip Guedalla. Hodder & Stoughton. 12s. 6d.

at modern English, European and American history, and those who know most of this spacious field will best appreciate his range and insight. His travels, from Russia to Mexico, enable him to paint the background of decisive or memorable events ; for it is an essential part of his method to study the *mise-en-scène* with the same elaboration as the drama and the actors. He has his mannerisms, and some of his readers may grow a little restive at times as the dawn creeps through the trees and similar phenomena of nature occur at frequent intervals. But many of his word pictures are works of art and linger in the memory. He could not be dull or commonplace if he tried.

The hundred years beginning with the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 are presented in a series of *tableaux vivants*. A comprehensive history, as he reminds us, would require a syndicate of centipedes with a pen in every hand, and a briefer record would be a mass of colourless detail. His task is " to describe the leading moments of the century as they affected the leading units of the western world—Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany and the United States. For as the ancient world consisted principally of the shores of the Mediterranean, its modern counterpart lies on both sides of the Atlantic." He has tried to see each of his scenes through the eyes of contemporary witnesses, and in almost every case he has visited the stage of the event that he describes. Even with this selective method it is, as he says, a considerable undertaking, for great events tumble over one another and clamour for inclusion in his list. The chief novelty of the book to English readers, and one of its outstanding merits, is the survey of American history in the making, from Van Buren in 1837 till " Mr. Roosevelt smiled his way into the White House one gusty afternoon in March 1933." None of the thirty-three sections is more thrilling than that headed " Charleston, S.C.," in which we witness the bombardment of Fort Sumter by South Carolina and the beginning of four years of civil war. " The whole life of the South hung by a thread of cotton," and both sides fought with the dogged bravery which steels antagonists equally convinced of their good right.

Talleyrand's words : *Je ne blame ni n'approuve : Je raconte*, appear on the title page. It was just as well, for the greatest of French diplomatists was no moralist. Mr. Guedalla, a thoughtful Liberal, has his weights and measures, but he is

sparing in his judgments. When they come they are rather in the nature of impersonal generalisations than of moral verdicts. In the section entitled " Kennington Common," which describes the Chartist fiasco of 1848, he mentions the " happy inability of the people of England to apprehend general ideas " among the causes which saved us from a ducking in the revolutionary wave. In the section on Tangier he describes the German mind as " congenitally incapable of estimating the effects of their proceedings upon other people." The coalition of 1931 was " the nearest England came to the strange contagion of dictatorship, by which the stature of more backward races was stunted. . . . But, through it all, the British mind remained as incapable as ever of absorbing those explosive generalities that exercised a fatal fascination upon more receptive Continental intellects." The most striking personal judgment in the volume is that of Bonar Law during his brief Premiership. Asked by Asquith what he thought of Mussolini, he replied : A lunatic. A series of maps and a select bibliography increase the value of a book which ranks high among its author's achievements.

G. P. G.

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A GREAT FRENCH KING.

In 1927 appeared M. Pierre Champion's full-length portrait of Louis XI in two monumental volumes, *Louis Dauphin* and *Louis Roi*.* Now, after further extensive researches among documents since published by other scholars as well as his own, chiefly among the Sforza papers at Milan, M. Champion gives us another study of this sovereign, whom he is inclined to consider the greatest of French kings. In this shorter work† of some three hundred intensely living pages, Louis is regarded chiefly in relation to the difficult problems he had to face, *problèmes d'une singulière actualité*. Lovers of historical romance will be loath to relinquish the cruel tyrant of *Quentin Durward* and the ogre of guides to the dungeons of Loches. They may learn with reluctance that Louis was no more cruel, perhaps less so, than his contemporaries. He may have devised chains for prisoners, weighted with iron balls ; but the famous *cages de fer* were not his invention. They came

* An abridged English translation by Winifred Stephens Whale. Cassell. 15s.

† *Le Roi Louis XI*. Flammarion. F. 15.

from Germany to be placed in châteaux, " where nothing would shut."

Years ago, on visiting Abbotsford, M. Champion exclaimed : " history is not a magazine of accessories." This is his opinion to-day. Neither must chroniclers be relied upon. Ordinances, deeds, letters, diplomatic despatches—this is the most reliable evidence. These witnesses reveal the true spirit of a period, the real heart of a man. One of the most interesting traits in Louis' behaviour and outlook on life is his modernity. Even his choice of a home shows it. His favourite dwelling was no strongly fortified mediæval castle like Amboise, where for safety he kept his son, the Dauphin, but a pleasant Renaissance house on the banks of the Loire. There at Plessiz-les-Tours, broad, high windows lighted spacious rooms and long galleries. One thinks of Compton Winyates and of Montacute. Louis, more like a burgher than a monarch in his dress and his unostentatious way of living, was essentially the people's king. We see him towards the end of his life, cap in hand, his bald head bare, receiving delegates from the towns, bidding them " be covered." Always he had the interests of the towns at heart. He encouraged their trade, introducing the silk industry into Tours. He overwhelmed Paris with privileges and benefits. He could always be relied upon to protect the towns from the barons' cupidity and turbulence. The towns in their turn were the purse whence Louis drew supplies for his struggle against the disintegrating influence of the great lords.

The order he must have maintained in those tempestuous times is astonishing, for Burgundian ambassadors could write in 1463 that while travelling up and down the country for five months they " had neither seen nor heard of any risk to those who carried gold on their heads." Towards this peaceful organisation of France, Louis' system of posts, described by M. Champion in one of his most interesting chapters, must have contributed. In the newly invented printing press he was quick to discern an instrument of propaganda. References in some of the earliest printed French books to the overweening pride of Louis' great rival, Charles le Téméraire, suggest one of the King's favourite sayings : *Quand Orgueil chevauche devant, Honte et Dommage le suivent bien près.*

In foreign as well as in domestic policy Louis struck the modern note. *Le premier*, writes M. Champion, *il a placé la*

politique de la France dans la voie qu'elle suit encore de notre temps, politique d'équilibre européen et de frontières naturelles. During his reign came the first duly accredited ambassadors. Though a good soldier, he abhorred war and avoided it whenever possible, always preferring a good treaty to the most brilliant victory in the field. By means of a commercial treaty, advantageous to both sides, he rid France of Edward IV, who had arrived with an imposing force, equipped with all the latest munitions of war and destined for a triumphal march to Reims for the English King's coronation. "Leave the English in peace at Calais," was Louis' dying injunction to his son Charles. It would have been well for France had Charles and his successors followed Louis' example of making himself an umpire in the disputes between the different Italian states and refusing to press the demands of his clamorous relatives for Milan and Naples. Louis' alliance with the Sforzas of Milan is one of the keynotes of his foreign policy. It sometimes brought him into conflict with his sister Yolande of Savoy, a remarkable woman, whom M. Champion, in his last book, presents to us for the first time. She must have been one of the earliest in that "Monstrous Regiment" of women rulers against whom John Knox blew the blast of his trumpet, and which was to culminate in Queen Elizabeth. The unification of France which was the result of this shrewd and cautious foreign policy, appears in the frontispiece to this book, in a map of *La France de Louis XI.* If only France had been blessed with more kings like Louis XI and Henri IV, who resembled one another in administrative gifts, might she not have developed gradually into a democratic state without the upheaval of the French Revolution?

WINIFRED STEPHENS WHALE.

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PAX ROMANA.*

The eleventh volume of the Cambridge Ancient History opens with the accession of Vespasian in A.D. 69 and carries the History to the murder of Commodus in 192. While the period lacks the glamour of the preceding age, it marks the

* *Cambridge Ancient History*, Vol. XI. *The Imperial Peace, A.D. 70-192.* Cambridge University Press. Edited by Dr. S. A. Cook, Professor F. E. Adcock and Mr. M. P. Charlesworth. 35s. net.

zenith of Roman rule when men looked to the *Pax Romana* as an eternal guarantee of security and peace. A final volume is to cover the subsequent decline as far as Constantine, with whose reign the Cambridge Medieval History opens. The scope of the new volume is immense and the advantages of a composite work are manifest where the topics are so diverse and specialised. The Editors have done well to secure the collaboration of an international band of scholars whose contributions are of the highest authority. Their task is the more difficult for the scanty literary sources, though fortunately the epigraphic records are more abundant.

The core of this work is to be found in two chapters by Professor Hugh Last, who, in dealing with constitutional development and the nature of Imperial administration, stresses the continuity with the Augustan principate. The latter had relied for its authority less upon legal powers than upon the support of public opinion. In this "the most essential quality of all the principate of Vespasian and the principate of Augustus were indistinguishable." If upon the former's accession, the princeps' *auctoritas* received full legal expression, the basic character of the Augustan system was retained for the next century and a half. While as an executive organ the Senate became increasingly submissive, futile and inefficient, it represented effectively through the wide diversity of its members the content and movements of responsible opinion. As Professor Wilhelm Weber remarks in his estimate of Hadrian's reign, the Senators were become "a reflection of a new upper class of the Empire, divergent in their interests, world-wide in their horizon, united by the influence of a uniformly political and intellectual culture." This representation of opinion became the Senate's constitutional significance, and its relations with the princeps were, in Professor Last's words, "the measure of the extent to which this emperor or that was departing from the Augustan version of the Principate in the direction of Autocracy," exemplified, for instance, in the reigns of Domitian and Commodus.

Similarly, in the sphere of Imperial administration, "to the end of the Antonine age the character of the Roman control was still under the predominant influence of traditions inherited from the Republic." In the dyarchy of local government, reserved subjects remained few and local

customs and institutions were accepted and encouraged. Rome imposed unity without uniformity; and this diversity in local life and the degrees of romanisation are made apparent in the separate surveys of provincial conditions. The old provinces of Africa, Spain and Gaul are described by Professor E. Albertini; Britain is dealt with by Professor R. G. Collingwood, whose recent work on *Roman Britain* should be added to the bibliography. The Greek provinces are treated by Professor J. Keil, while Dr. Franz Cumont, Dr. H. Idris Bell and Professor P. Romanelli discuss the Eastern regions. The penetration and influence of the religious cults are to be considered generally in the final volume. Meanwhile, Dr. B. H. Streeter, in an erudite and closely knit article, examines the rise of Christianity in the sub-apostolic period.

Professor Weber, who is also responsible for the account of the Antonines, describes the century succeeding Trajan's reign as one "of external brilliance but full of grievous tragedy, a period of transition to a new world-order." For long the disease was more latent than apparent, and contemporaries looked gratefully to Rome for its reign of stability and peace. "The keynote of the period," remarks Professor Adcock in his final estimate, "was loyalty to Rome" which richly deserved it. The frequent wars, both of conquest and defence, demonstrated successively the supremacy and virility of Rome, in face of increasing pressure on the frontiers. In two valuable contributions the history of the bordering nations is surveyed. Professor M. Rostovtzeff discusses the origins of the Sarmatians and comprehensively reviews the Parthian empire. Professor A. Alföldi deals with the Getae and Dacians, while the development and civilisation of the Germani are treated by Dr. G. Eckholm, who pays tribute to "the inestimable value" of Tacitus' *Germania*. "The results of archæological research," he claims, "more often than not, confirm its statements with surprising emphasis." Vespasian's advance in Germany, Agricola's conquest of Britain, and the general frontier consolidation by the Flavians are outlined by Mr. Ronald Syme. Trajan's conquest of Dacia and his brilliant, if transitory, triumph over Parthia, are dealt with by Mr. R. P. Longden, who is also responsible for the internal history of the reign.

It is not difficult, in retrospect, to discover in this, as in other ages, seeds which grow to influence the character of a

succeeding epoch. Measures justified by the moment recoil in their expansion. There was, for example, the recruitment of provincials and frontier tribesmen as regular legionaries, and the separation of civil and military careers, which were eventually to play a large part in rendering the principate impotent against the domination of the army. Similarly, the intrusion of the *curator* in local affairs, at first as an occasional adviser, developed into undermining the great system of local autonomy. But the remarkable fact is not that the principate and its system collapsed, but that it secured for so long and so widely the blessings of firm government with a large measure of freedom, justice and peace, contentment and prosperity.

Among other contributions must be mentioned Professor Wight Duff's survey of social and economic conditions in Italy. Mr. F. H. Sandbach writes on Greek literature, philosophy and science, while Mr. E. E. Sikes appraises Latin literature in the Silver Age. A survey of art comes from Professor G. Rodenwaldt, who includes the great revival of building from Nero to Trajan. Finally, a valuable review of Roman law at the time of its classical maturity has been contributed by Professor W. W. Buckland, the most eminent Roman lawyer in this country.

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TEN AFRICANS.

Ten Africans,* edited by Margery Perham, tell their own stories. All are men or women who have achieved position. Among the earlier ones are chiefs who have fought and struggled in tribal wars and raids, and with animals in the wild. Their impressions of contact with the white man and the first effects of his coming are invited: "The young people of to-day have no respect. They don't listen to the words of their chiefs. I tell you it was better in the days before the white man came. But then sometimes I think in my heart, 'But where could we find the clothes and the salt and the matches that we buy at the Stores?'" So says Bwembya of Northern Rhodesia. Udo Akpabio of Southern Nigeria has many comments to make on the strange ways of the Englishman, his love and care of flowers, of his house,

* Faber & Faber. 15s.

of his one wife. He gives a humorous account of the work required of his people and the commissioners' contrary orders. "Some of these changing ways of the white men used to make us laugh, but we did not let them see us laughing." Indeed, the sense of humour of the African is everywhere evident. It stands him in good stead, too, when on coming to England he finds himself shunned, refused admission to hotels, and generally avoided.

From Nigeria also hails Miss Koforoorola Aina Moore, who came to England at the age of ten, and has recently graduated at Oxford. She goes back to teach in a girls' school. Ndansi Kumalo is the man of the Matabele tribe from Southern Rhodesia who was brought over to London to act for the film *Rhodes of Africa*. There is a fine photograph of him dressed for the part of Lobengula. Miss Perham, who here contributes a Foreword, speaks of the deep impression he made "by his beautiful manners and his dignity."

From the early wars with other tribes and with the English the stories pass on to the Great War, the fighting and change over in Tanganyika from German to English, the varying fortunes of African workers from jobs in Zanzibar to porterage, road-making, hospital work in Kenya, sometimes as prisoners of war, sometimes as soldiers. There is a long account of Martin Kayamba, M.B.E., and his visit to England to give evidence before the Joint Committee on Closer Union of the East African Territories. His admiration of England and his wonder at all he saw quite overwhelm any sense of humour. Then follows Gilbert Coka with a long story of the I.C.U. "If the European is so superior and the African so inferior, why fear him and restrict him so much?" "Such a state is against history, science and common sense. . . . The proverbial patience of the Africans will snap, and then revolution, stark, grim and terrible."

To return to the patient view of things, there is the "Story of Nosente, the Mother of Compassion," a charming picture of a good wife and mother who fulfilled all her tribal duties and who records the differences made in the tribal ways by the coming of Christianity. The general impression left by the reading of this book is of loyal, steady, reliable people, keen on learning, inured by early hardship and much thrashing at school, to work and adaptability.

E. M. B.

THE GROWTH OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION.*

It is only four years since Dr. Jordan published his massive volume on the growth of toleration from the beginnings of the English Reformation to the death of Queen Elizabeth; and now we have before us his equally massive volume on the continued growth of toleration from the accession of James I to the meeting of the Long Parliament. Had he been an English author we should have declared that he betrays an acquaintance with the pamphlet literature of the period that is astonishing, but he is a Harvard man. Good as the library of that great university is, it cannot be quite so good as the footnotes to this volume indicate, and we congratulate him on the sureness of his knowledge and the freshness of his insight. He sets out with a careful account of the general religious policy and the problem of Protestant dissent as it existed in the reign of James I. Of course he is quite right in maintaining that Puritanism became the symbol of English Protestantism. At the same time it was confronted with the peculiar problem of the Church of England. The Reformed Churches abroad threw off all pretence of the continuity of the new Church with the old Church to which they used to belong. On the other hand, the Church of England boldly maintained that the Church of Cranmer was the Church of St. Augustine and indeed the Church of the Apostles. A Church occupying this position was inevitably peculiarly open to attack when the Puritans delivered their assault. Mill used to hold that the men of the eighteenth century lost much of their effectiveness by their absence of an historic sense, and exactly the same may be said of the Puritans. They were largely devoid of the historic sense, and while they gained a victory in the seventeenth century, the good sense of the average Englishman refused permanently to accept their attitude to life. In the nineteenth century the most vigorous exponent of this attitude was Matthew Arnold. Yet there always have been Matthew Arnolds in the sense that there have been men who would not or could not adopt the Puritan angle of approach.

Dr. Jordan is aware of the fact that the unity of Church and State during the first half of the seventeenth century was

* *The Development of Religious Toleration in England.* By W. K. Jordan. Allen & Unwin. 21s.

a vital matter for both institutions, and the vitality of this unity goes far to explain the position of the able Anglican with respect to the problem of dissent. It also explains in no small measure his attitude to the Roman Catholic, who was much more dreaded on political than on religious grounds. In our perusal of seventeenth-century pamphlets we have been much impressed by the fact that the opposition of men of the calibre of Andrewes and Jeremy Taylor to the Roman communion is not in the least on doctrinal or casuistical grounds. None of them adopts the method of Pascal in his *Provincial Letters*. What weighed most heavily with them was the deposition of Elizabeth by the Pope in 1570. It was not to be borne for a single moment by a patriotic Englishman that the head of a foreign State—for the Pope was a temporal prince—should think he had the power of binding or loosing his political allegiance. Such an idea was abhorrent to the last degree to his patriotism.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

It is a pleasure to commend to our readers two little books that are specially suitable for their meditations during Lent. The first is by the Bishop of London, and is entitled *Everyman's Problems and Difficulties*.* In this little volume, Dr. Winnington-Ingram deals characteristically with some of the great problems which are confronting the minds of ordinary, and especially of young, people. He does so as the result of his large experience and with a directness that is all his own. The book is to be heartily commended for the purpose that it is intended to serve.

The second is by Canon Peter Green, and is entitled *Some Gospel Scenes and Characters*.† The author is well known, not only for his social work, but for his devotional writings. This little book is worthy of those that have gone before. J. S. L.

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The Spanish Marriages, 1841-6,‡ by Dr. E. Jones Parry, is a contribution of the first importance to the diplomatic history of western Europe in the nineteenth century. As Professor Webster observes in an interesting Foreword, his conclusions are unlikely to be seriously

* Longmans. 2s. 6d. net. † Longmans. 3s. 6d. net.
‡ Macmillan. 18s.

disturbed by fresh evidence, for he has used the private papers of Aberdeen, Peel and Guizot, as well as the official documents in London and Paris. One of the most complicated problems of modern history has at last been solved, and in the light of an authoritative record we can now, with a good deal of confidence, allot praise and blame. Of the principal actors, Aberdeen, the British Foreign Secretary, comes out best; for, having given his word, he kept it. He once described his opposite number, Guizot, as the most honest man in France; but Guizot disappointed him, and on several occasions our author speaks with severity of his actions. No less than Bismarck and Cavour, we are told, he was "in the last resort a realist, who, like them, permitted his code of private morality to govern his conduct of public affairs only when it did not interfere with success in politics and diplomacy." Thus Guizot and his master, Louis Philippe, having fewest scruples, won the game, though their victory in Madrid destroyed the Anglo-French entente. The only excuse for breaking the agreement was the fear that the rough-handed Palmerston, on succeeding Aberdeen in 1846, would pay no attention to French interests and would favour the Coburg candidate. Had Aberdeen remained in office, Guizot would scarcely have broken his word. It is an unsavoury story, for the Court of Spain was not beyond reproach. Cristina, the Queen Mother, set a bad example to her daughters, and the candidates for the hand of the young Queen were a poor lot. The simultaneous marriage of Isabella to a cousin whose virility was doubtful, and of a younger son of Louis Philippe to her sister, created intense indignation in England and helped to shake down the French throne two years later. Dr. Jones Parry has performed his difficult task with conspicuous success.

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It is peculiar that the life work of Lord Mansfield should have received so little attention, since Lord Campbell's partial biography. In his *Fourteen English Judges*, the late Lord Birkenhead included a short estimate, but it has remained for Mr. C. H. S. Fifoot in his new book, *Lord Mansfield*,* to write a long and detailed study of his contributions to the development of English law. For more than thirty years, 1756-88, the great Chief Justice dominated the King's Bench, seeking to incorporate within the existing legal system principles and rules suited to the requirements of the age. To-day when the law has attained a far higher degree of rationalisation and embodies many of Lord Mansfield's views, his efforts can be regarded with a full measure of sympathy and admiration. He was active, for example, in simplifying and shortening procedure, in endeavouring to apply rational rules of interpretation in real property law and in fusing the application of equitable and legal rules. But failure was inevitable in the face of an archaic and rigid system of jurisprudence. In new fields, however,

* Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 15s. net.

outside the tyranny of relentless precedent, Lord Mansfield could display his matchless and constructive genius. In particular, his incorporation of mercantile practice within the common law remains his lasting and outstanding achievement. Even in contract, however, he was not always faultless, and it was well when the House of Lords stamped out his heresy over the doctrine of consideration. Lord Mansfield's judicial activity in so many fields is discussed in detail and a little laboriously by Mr. Fifoot, who quotes from innumerable cases in support of the argument. Much of it is necessarily technical and unsuited for the average layman. A general impression, however, of his achievement may easily be gleaned from the introductory chapters, which also include the main events of his life.

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In *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1936*,* the Information Department of Chatham House has published a very welcome paper which sets out in characteristic fashion, impartially and objectively, the historical sequence of events and other material relevant to the long-drawn dispute. The paper is in no way exhaustive and contains a minimum of information upon which anyone can claim fairly to judge the prospective Report of the Royal Commission. The survey starts with the rival war-time promises which are still the centre of a vigorous if academic controversy. It is sufficient to note here that no mention is made of a Jewish contention that the early pledge to the Arabs was conditional upon military support, which never came from the Palestine Arabs. The material presented in this paper induces a general sympathy for the Arabs' case, although they have clearly overstated some of their grievances. Upon the burning question of land settlement the paper deals carefully and includes a summary of the controversial Hope Simpson Report. It concludes, from Mr. Lewis French's investigations in 1931, that the extent of land dispossession of Arabs through Jewish purchases has been greatly exaggerated. It notes, however, that there is no guarantee for the future. The paper makes clear, in its comparison of the two communities, the overwhelming superiority of the Jews in their political and economic organisation, in their wealth and in intellectual capacity. The immigration figures are well known. Since 1919 the Jewish population has increased from 35,000 to 370,000. Moreover, more than half of all the immigrants since 1919 have arrived after 1932; the year 1935 accounting for more than 60,000. The Jewish percentage of the population has risen in fourteen years from 11 per cent. to 28 per cent. The paper stresses the great quantity of capital introduced in recent years by Jewish immigrants; a factor which has largely contributed to the economic prosperity of the country. But, it is noted, the Arab's appreciation is mitigated by "Zionist exclusiveness, both economic and cultural." A large part of

* Royal Institute of International Affairs, St. James's Square, S.W.1. 2s. 6d. net.

the paper outlines the continued but ineffective efforts of the Government to satisfy both sides, culminating in the civil strife of 1936.

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The publication of *Selected Essays** from F. W. Maitland's *Collected Papers* has been prompted by reason that the original three volumes have long been out of print and are difficult of general access. Short of re-editing, in the light of more recent research, the whole collection, it was considered best to republish such of the essays as are likely to be of most value to the present generation of students in law, history and politics. The Editors, Professor H. D. Hazeltine, Mr. G. Lapsley, and Professor P. H. Winfield, confine "all that is of practical use" to four papers upon aspects of the corporation and to the essays "Moral Personality and Legal Personality" and "The Body Politic." Maitland's text has been left untouched, but edited by way of extra footnotes. In addition, the volume contains, usefully, Maitland's "Introduction to *Memoranda de Parliamento*, 1305," which, till now, has only been accessible in the Rolls Series. To this paper Mr. Lapsley contributes a short introduction.

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In writing his popular volume on *The King's Crowning*,† Canon Robert H. Murray had in view particularly the coronation of Edward VIII and consequently omits to deal with the crowning of the Queen. It may be hoped that he will publish a revised edition. But apart from this omission, the reader will find a quantity of useful material upon the history of the coronation and a descriptive explanation of the ceremony itself. Dr. Murray discusses each of the six historical forms or "orders" of coronation and properly points to the analogous ceremony of a bishop's consecration. He writes with great enthusiasm for his subject, as is evident, for instance, in his opening chapter with its unrestrained eulogy of the monarchs since 1837. The book shows much erudition, although some of Dr. Murray's historical and constitutional views may be challenged; and it carries the warm commendation of Dr. Foxley Norris, the Dean of Westminster.

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A valuable catalogue of all the parish churches in Norfolk has been compiled by Mr. Claude J. W. Messent, whose knowledge of the county's architecture is unsurpassed. *The Parish Churches of Norfolk and Norwich*‡ provides a bare historical note, in alphabetical order, of some thousand churches, of which less than three hundred are in ruins. Mr. Messent aims to describe succinctly the styles and dates of each church with notes on its most important features, such as brasses and rood screens. In some instances, drawings are added. For a small book,

* Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

† Murray. 3s. 6d. net.

‡ H. W. Hunt, 14 Orford Hill, Norwich. 7s. 6d. net. Limited edition.

undoubtedly a wealth of knowledge is included. But there is a lack of information and precision on matters such as stained glass and church furniture, which perhaps only a larger work can supply fully.

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A most interesting bibliography of eighteenth-century books will be found in *The House of Longman, 1724-1800.** At the date of his death in 1934, Mr. Charles Longman had collected with laborious care and assiduity a record of volumes which bore the imprint of this famous publishing firm from its foundation in 1724 up to the beginning of the nineteenth century when detailed records are available. This annotated bibliography, covering more than four hundred pages, together with a valuable list of the signs used by booksellers in the period, has now been edited by Mr. John E. Chandler, who adds a chapter on the firm's history during these years. This book is much more than a mere domestic record; it indicates the reading matter of the time, mentions famous names and books and discloses, as is shown in the Preface and by Mr. Chandler, something of contemporary publishing methods, particularly the practice of co-operative publishing. The first edition, for example, of Dr. Johnson's *Dictionary* bears the imprint of five firms, while the names of twenty-eight booksellers appear in the title-pages of the eighth edition, 1799. Mr. Charles Longman's work is a valuable contribution to the history of publishing.

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In its fifty-first issue, *The Constitutional Year Book, 1937,*† sustains its wide reputation as a non-party handbook, embodying a mass of information upon matters of constitutional and political interest. The latest facts recorded occurred in November, so that none of the changes consequent upon the abdication of Edward VIII are included. The volume contains, in addition, a large selection of statistics upon social and economic questions relating to this country and also to the Empire and foreign States.

* Longmans. 30s. net. Limited edition.
† Harrison & Sons Ltd., 44-7 St. Martin's Lane, W.C.2. 5s.

Printed in Great Britain.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.
MARCH 1937.

THE OUTLOOK IN EUROPE.

AN admirable brochure published twice monthly by Chatham House dissects in its leading article the contemporary item of foreign events which is affecting critically the relations of the four or five important European governments to each other. A mere recital of the names heading each article reminds us of the number, and confounds us by the complexity, of the problems with which the Government and people of England are daily confronted in their search and desire for quiet security. In quick succession during the present year have followed announcements, disputes, or demands as to Danzig; the Danubian economic problem; Belgian foreign policy; the domestic and external orientation of Austria; the revolt in Spain; Palestine and Jewish migration; German commercial policy; Freedom of the Mediterranean; Colonies and Mandates; China and Japan, Japan and Russia; and, least noted hitherto but as important as any, American neutrality policy in time of war certainly, but in time of peace just possibly. None of these issues can we afford to overlook, nor can one of them be treated entirely on its own merits, or on its direct value to us. On each we must have an informed opinion, and on each we must be willing to take action, positive or negative, if we are to keep that place in the world which history and geography assign to us, and which Mr. Eden the other day assured us we had partially regained. If we are properly to play an adequate part on the stage we are largely responsible for setting, we must have a clear conception of our interests, our duties and our powers as well as of the dangers and obstacles in our road. At present we seem so much obsessed by the latter as to have lost sight of the former. In attempting to define our policy I should wish to be thought a supporter rather than a critic of the present Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, whose conduct of policy has been in general essentially sound, and whose difficulties cannot be fully known to his critics.

Our first and greatest need, to which only national safety cannot be subordinated, is a tranquillity of atmosphere in

which can be re-created that foreign power of purchase which is essential to the restoration of our export trade. On that in turn depends the maintenance of our social legislation, our freedom from internal disturbance, and the disappearance of our depressed areas. It is not merely the absence of actual warfare which is needed, for there has not been any armed collision in Europe for the past sixteen years. It is not the fact but the fear of war, the universal unrest and suspicion, alike in religion, in industry, in politics, and even in social life, which paralyses enterprise, which prevents the adventure of capital, which lays an embargo on the expression of thought, which enforces a watch for personal security, and denies continuance of legitimate and necessary commerce. It finds particular expression in economic nationalism, carried to extremes in Italy and Germany under dictators, and yet is present under more democratic forms of government such as our own. In Europe it has created, maintained and subsidised unnatural and unprofitable industries. In America by the destruction of commercially superfluous food and commodities it has denied them to European peoples desperate from privation. In certain countries it assails religion and religious organisations or asserts the infallibility of one single political doctrine. It drives dissent underground and so in half the countries of Europe the opposition, at present silent because muzzled, is rehearsing revolution instead of devising reform. In an atmosphere tense with apprehension, education and poverty, we are called on both by our own necessities and by the wishes of the remaining European democracies to give a lead to a world in which at present we hold a foremost position, but which a modicum of courage and a sufficiency of vision could convert into a beneficent and dominant authority. To any entity, nation or individual, aspiring to leadership must belong certain attributes such as sincerity and impartiality, consistency and determination, willingness to run a worth-while risk, ability to see the other point of view. Can anyone maintain that either the English people or their Government have exhibited such a sufficiency of these qualities during this past year as to enable them to lead Europe, much less a League of Nations, along the path of wisdom? A year ago the previous Foreign Secretary committed the supreme act of folly for which Europe is still making atonement. The people of England indeed demanded and the

Government conceded his instant resignation, yet a little later they acquiesced in his reappointment to the Cabinet. Such episodes render difficult to Continental minds a belief in our trustworthiness and sincerity.

At this moment we have a second chance of giving a strong lead to Europe in that economic co-operation of which a month ago the present Foreign Secretary spoke so strongly and so justly to Germany. If our people and Parliament, exercising their paramount authority once again, will insist on the Government's acceptance of the opportunity afforded by the proposal of the Dutch Prime Minister, Dr. Colijn, to reassemble the Oslo Conference, we can give a practical illustration of the benefits to be gained by taking our own advice. We shall also take a second step on the road of financial recovery of which the first was the joint declaration by France, U.S.A., and Great Britain of "Exchange" solidarity. Not long ago the low-tariff governments in Europe—Holland, Belgium and Scandinavia—got together to see if they could create in a continent riddled and ruined by quotas, tariffs, currency restrictions and embargoes, a group of countries prepared to restore freedom of trade, to themselves and to any others who would join the group, by mutual reduction of tariffs and like restrictions. The project was wrecked on the British "most favoured nation" clause, an examination of which is out of place in a survey such as this. Within the last few weeks the Dutch Prime Minister has reopened the question, and a vigorous inquiry has been set on foot with the object of cutting free from the bonds by which "self-sufficiency" is strangling the world.

Owing to recent devaluation of the franc France has announced her association with a lower tariff policy, and M. Bastid, Minister of Commerce in France, has expressed his confidence in a general improvement in world commercial relations. He had already, at the moment of devaluation, stated the necessity for lowering French tariffs in order to keep down the cost of living. On January 19th, he went on to declare that not merely commercial but external policy and friendship for Britain and the United States must encourage France to remove obstacles which restrict international trade. To such an invitation and challenge a British Government ought not to turn a deaf, mechanical ear. These daring protagonists of a return to sanity are all neighbours of

each other and our own, maritime powers well able without difficulty or delay to give each other substantial support by sea or land. While none of them are separately of the first importance, Norway has the fourth largest mercantile marine in the world, Holland has great colonial dominions and wealth, and collectively they are not only our best customers, but their total trade exceeds that of any single country save Great Britain and the U.S.A. If France joins her star to theirs the new group becomes an economic and commercial force of the first rank. Nothing but those mysterious and menacing "interests" to which Mr. Morrison referred so timidly at Geneva in December seems to stand in the way of England once again pointing out the road, and leading the attack on the fiscal follies which have checked commercial development and fostered international ill will. The evils which have arisen from the deliberate segregation of nations by their own rulers are the consequence of the revival of economic doctrines which every finance minister in the world admits to be wrong. The chance has come to examine the obstacles built up by the ingenuity of chauvinist governments, to lay bare the poverty these barriers have caused, to advise as to the speediest means of removing them, and to exercise for their reduction all the power so strong a combination of wealth, territory, transport power, and raw materials can command. There must be difficulties as to production, distribution, manufacture and transport of commodities at any conference of nations possessing such varied resources, primary and secondary, as do the Oslo group. Otherwise there would be no need for a conference, for mutual concessions and adjustments. If our Government have the will to co-operate, they have greater power than any other to adjust. They have urged others to consider the general good, they should set an example of action themselves. At the end of January Mr. Runciman visited the President of the United States. Commercial co-operation for freer international trade was "unofficially" discussed and seems in principle to have been agreed to. Presidents of the U.S.A. are notoriously uncertain. The torpedoing of the Economic Conference is not forgotten. If, however, Parliament and Congress contain sufficient common sense, they have now the chance of giving expression to it without delay. Treaties of low-tariff commerce, on which Scandinavia, Holland and Belgium, France, Britain and the United States

had agreed, would have a decisive effect on the customs duties of the rest of the world.

The path of co-operation is not so clear in political as in economic problems. For one thing Great Britain has not the same proportion of power. But we possess in real prestige an asset more valuable and more usable than we seem to know, not indeed to be constantly brandished as a club, but to be utilised on occasion. No continental government will permit itself the luxury of an irretrievable quarrel with Great Britain, none who have done so during the last two hundred years having profited by their experiment. Since the time of the elder Pitt, England has never deliberately sought war, though more than once she has become involved in war. The declaration of Herr Hitler that there has only been one war between Germany and England, and that there will never be another, represents, I believe, the profound conviction of the German people and army. This conviction does not imply fear, but does denote respect. It would not force Germany to commit some act of which she disapproved, but it would, I am assured, hold her back from actions or from a policy to which we had expressed real objection. How could it be utilised at the present time? I recited at the beginning of this paper a list of issues responsible at the moment for the disturbance in Europe. Nearly all can be traced back to Germany, some to her fault, some to her misfortune. But over all hangs the sword of Germany, sheathed for the time, but with the hilt conveniently near Herr Hitler's hand. It is almost as if the "shining armour" had been left behind in the move to Doorn, and was now being refurbished for the new All Highest War Lord.

Yet there is in truth a very real difference between the circumstances of 1914 and those of 1937. About the time of the Agadir crisis German bankers informed the Kaiser that German trade could not finance a war, so there was no war. After a brief period of financial preparation, including a capital levy, Germany thought herself ready for, and accepted at the hands of Austria, what she intended to be a short war. She had committed herself instead to a prolonged war, financed on accumulated wealth, on foreign securities, on good financial credit, and on the Spandau treasure. To-day she has no credit, no treasure, no free foreign securities and practically no gold. She is notoriously unable to buy foreign, or herself to produce, fat or wheat sufficient for her civil population,

or raw materials for her industries. Her export trade, falsified by statistics rendered inaccurate by her system of barter, is insufficient to make good these necessities. The new American doctrine of neutrality is certain to refuse supplies to any belligerent even on the "cash and carry" principle. We can ask ourselves in considering German power of offence on land and sea, from what source she can draw a *sustained* power of mobility. Germany will be very hard put to it to give an answer satisfactory to Nazi diplomacy. Nor has she amongst her domestic resources many of the natural products essential to modern warfare. Between those things she cannot buy, and those things she cannot produce, Germany is far from being the danger to a clear-minded opponent that she wishes herself to be thought. If England said plainly to-morrow that no more foreigners should reach Spain by sea, we should provide the Führer with material for vigorous oratory, Dr. Schacht with cause for gratitude which he could not express, and the German General Staff with reasons for very real thankfulness. When Germans eventually were permitted to know that they were no longer liable for Spanish service, not even General Goering could stir them to resentment against such intervention. If Russians were at the same time held back by France, Italy would not interpose to prop up single-handed General Franco's enterprise. The fact is that all this Nazi oratory is for home consumption. Germany is profoundly grateful to Herr Hitler for dragging her out of the slough of contempt into which France at and after Versailles had stupidly, indeed wickedly, thrust her. He has raised her from the depths of despair and abasement to be the apparent arbiter of destiny in Europe. He has protected her from France and he has saved her from anarchy. His methods are, most probably, less alien to German mentality than to ours. While his position is therefore very strong, it is not impregnable. The army has not forgiven the murder of General von Schleicher, the Catholic and Protestant Churches are deeply moved by the new State paganism. Taxation is crushing, and food for man and beast is insufficient. Only an iron control of the Press keeps discontent ignorant of its strength, and provides such a picture of foreign perversity and ill will as enables the country to remain thankful that a strong man keeps guard over the frontiers of a threatened homeland.

If this account of German conditions is accurate, and I have

taken some pains to verify it, the course which a British Government can and ought to pursue seems plain. It need not be afraid of a Germany confronted on the east by the solidarity of the Little Entente, and of the Balkan Entente numbering 65 millions of people in all; of a Germany which has just wasted £20 millions on the Spanish revolt; whose sole ally in Europe is almost as hard up as herself for cash, and greatly preoccupied in Abyssinia; and whose sole client is the Government of Greece recently come into power after the customary biennial *coup d'état*. We can speak much more plainly to Germany as to the limits of our patience, while we accept without any reserve her legitimate desire and intention to resume her position in the front rank of world powers. We can remember that the cause of all, and the word is used deliberately, the disturbance in Central and Western Europe is the policy of France during the interval between the Ministries of M. Briand and M. Blum. We were afraid to speak frankly to France ten years ago on behalf of Germany: now we hesitate to speak frankly to Germany on behalf of Europe. German correspondence with other countries before the war reveals the freedom of language of German statesmen. They understand and accept blunt realism. We might now and then take a leaf out of their book. After M. Blum's speech at Lyons, the German Press, which is almost the German Government, attacked him as suggesting a set-off of French economic concessions against German political collaboration. Yet that is precisely the meaning of Herr Hitler's speech on January 11th, 1937, to the Diplomatic Corps at Berlin. If Germany will not take into immediate and effective consideration the delay and injury caused to world economic recovery by rearmament expenditure, and come to the international council table with sincere and friendly intentions, what treatment does she deserve but that of an unbenevolent neutral? The form and conditions of Government in Germany are the concern solely of Germany. But if her policy endangers our commercial and political safety, we have a right and a duty to Europe to warn her of possible consequences. Germans believe that, if England had spoken bluntly before the war in 1914, there would have been no war. It may be so, though then, as now, they were afraid, not of England, but of Russia. But for lack of foresight, of courage, of Cabinet unity, do not let us again be chargeable with untimely reticence. This

Cabinet has advantages over that of 1914. They know the certain dimensions and results of any quarrel. They know the cost to civilisation. They know much of the difficulties in Germany. Such knowledge enlarges their responsibility, which becomes a responsibility of rejection quite as much as of acceptance.

The list of hazards is still long. There is trouble as to colonies and mandates, and there is also Spain. Some acquaintance with the country and its people makes me certain that Spain will not permit a successful General Franco to give away or loan or alienate any square yard of Spanish land. If the Government win I think they will withdraw from all Moroccan territory save the presidios of Ceuta, Melilla and Alhucemas (which are Spanish freeholds). This leased territory would lapse to France, whose occupation of the Mediterranean littoral would raise serious questions for England and Italy. The employment of Moorish troops in Spain itself during the Civil War leaves no alternative, save evacuation, to perpetual bloodshed between the Republic and the native population.

The International Brigades in Spain are fairly matched on either side, Russians and French against Italians and Germans. Their joint numbers are almost certainly smaller than excited partisan reporters tell us, while the German and Italian desire for their withdrawal *in toto* suggests that it would be more detrimental to the Government than to the insurgents. The insurgent forces are quite as really Spanish as those of the Government and a better fighting force collectively. In this internecine struggle we have assumed it is our duty to keep the ring, and to let Spaniards fight Spaniards to the death. It is difficult to see what other course is open to any nation. We are all suspect to each other. The replies of Italy and Germany to the British Note are satisfactory enough, if they submit their supplementary suggestions at once, and will pass the necessary legislation forthwith. If, as they imply, Russia will find reason for delay, their own speed in fixing an early date for " control " will establish their good faith. Both replies lay stress on the withdrawal or removal of all foreign participants from Spain. With the disappearance of Italians from the Balearic Islands, of German airmen from Melilla, of the International Brigades from Spain, and the Russian Ambassador (so called) from Valencia, the probability of

peace elsewhere in Europe will have greatly increased. The peace of exhaustion may even descend on Spain, and she will sink back into international obscurity. If " control " has been established and been successful, its authors will make haste to close it down, for nothing is so trying to international tempers as military international co-operation.

On the supposition that disarmament is *hors concours* for the moment, German claims for colonies are the next on our list. Herr Hitler, like a pyrotechnist at a fête, lets off his squibs one by one. He retains public attention and applause longer than by a simultaneous discharge. Expansion of the Army, Anglo-German Naval Treaty, Reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Kiel Canal, the War Guilt Clause, each keeps Germany guessing. Colonies are not actually on the carpet, but their imminence is certain. English advocates of retention or of rendition have all the arguments before them. It shortens discussion if we acknowledge that Dominion Mandates will neither be given up to the League, nor to the Empire, and certainly not to Germany. Japan has already flatly refused to give up any of her Mandates. The only territory which even seems to come within the scope of real discussion is Tanganyika. But the map of Tanganyika shows the strategic value of an air force stationed in that central region in Africa. Any country intent on territorial expansion would of course give the most stringent pledges of inaction, abstention, etc. How long would these be observed, how long could they be observed? The first internal disturbance would demand, perhaps justify, an air force of the first quality and size. Equally justified would be the new suspicion and alarm. On the other hand, Germany, if and as a Member State, is entitled to attend any League Conference on freedom of access to raw materials, freedom of purchase on terms of equality, and currency validity. If necessity and not arrogance is the urge, membership of the League will affect her purpose. The League has begun its function again in its proper capacity of a political clearing-house. Our foreign policy, we are told, is a League of Nations policy. This is but a catchword unless we give it an orientation of co-operative action towards economic and military disarmament. We are expected to lead. We can lead, our lead is ever welcome. But how often have we failed Europe because we leant on others, instead of relying on ourselves?

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

THREE SPANISH LESSONS.

LESSONS are never likeable at any age. And, to-day, Spain is to us as much a word of fear as it was to our ancestors in the age of the Armada and Inquisition. We see in nightmares Spain as an advanced base for armadas of Mussolinian airplanes over-running our country or for " cells " of Muscovitic inquisitors undermining our Constitution. But such nightmares are the retribution for daily doping ourselves with partisan newspapers. Go to Spain and you will find the revolution a revelation.

That sounds as though I had gone there and had got an attack either of scarlet fever or of rose rash—of which the other name is German measles. But both Spain and I have outgrown those childish disorders. My first acquaintance with Spain was as a diplomatist at Madrid when we were nearly blown up by an anarchist bomb on marrying the King to a British Princess. My latest was last Christmas, when as proprietors of the village manor house the Anarchist Committee appeared in the *patio* to congratulate us on the Roman Catholic marriage of our daughter.

Moreover, I am using the word " revolution " as equally applicable to the result whichever wins of the conflicting camps in the present civil war. While the revelation comes from a realisation of the ideals inspiring either side. For though the ruthless destruction by either side is horrific, the reckless devotion is no less heroic. Heroism such as the desperate defence of the ruined Alcazar at Toledo for weeks by a handful against a host, or such as the audacious charge of cars up the broad Rambla of Barcelona hurling militia armed only with knives and pistols against a field battery of regulars, is more deserving of our attention than denunciations of Bolshevist or Fascist bogies. The Nationalist *Campeadors* are far fewer in number than either of their opponents—the Socialist *Cameradas* or the Syndicalist *Campaneros*. Moreover, they are supported by big battalions of German and Italian mercenaries. But we had better not hold up hands of horror at this, for those hands are not clean. Gibraltar is ours, thanks to Hessian mercenaries and to the Italian immigrants with which we replaced the native Spaniards. It was the British and French navies who suppressed the Southern Communes in 1873. And that the Nationalists are very few in number

need not deprive them of our sympathies. Democracy means majority rule as between voters, but not necessarily as between votaries whose platform is the firing-step and whose polling booth is the grave.

Why then do most of us British and many Spaniards condemn this civil war and incriminate whichever side we do not support? Because murderous and mercenary campaigns for material interests, camouflaged as crusades for moral ideals, have made us reluctant to risk our livelihood, still less our lives, for any cause; and we fear lest Spain may infect us with its heroisms and hecatombs. So we turn from the "atrocities" of the Spanish war, thanking our Seven Stars, like " old Tom Baddleham, down at Long Caddleham " :

> Number seven, number seven,
> Some volks likes t'other place, but I likes Heaven,

and forgetting the Mayor of Chicago who said, on arriving in the other world : " Why, heaven is just like Chicago," upon which his neighbour observed : " But this isn't heaven." Indeed, anyone who should go straight from the back streets of North England or South Wales to the front trenches of Madrid or Malaga would learn that life can be worse than death, and that death can make life worth living.

But I am not preaching war, I am only protesting against the presumption that because creeds and causes have occasioned war therefore there is nothing to learn from them. And a comparison of my conclusions come to from inside insight into Spanish, Portuguese, Irish, Turkish and Russian revolutions, suggests that they are instructive to us English in that order; and that the Spanish should be for us the most instructive of all. For the personal temperament and political tradition of the Englishman is more like those of the Spaniard than any other race. Both are ingrained individualists. Both have a firm faith in traditional trends of public opinion that can be overlaid, but never undermined by Press propaganda or other ephemeral influences. And both will fight to a finish for their faith in their own laws and in their own liberties, though the Spaniard fights more recklessly and ruthlessly because he is as passionate and precipitate in action as the Englishman is patient and prudent. It is, moreover, interesting to note that the philosophies and procedure of the principal Spanish parties are examples, however extreme in their

expression, of the corresponding parties in Great Britain. So much so that our parties can learn from them the lines along which they may be led either to civic work of reconstruction or to a civil war between revolution and reaction.

In a book on Spain published in 1933, I argued that the Republic had in two years effected a reconstruction by means of parliamentary party government that showed democracy, as we elaborated and exported it, to be capable of making the ethical and economic, constitutional and collectivist developments indispensable nowadays, if a country is going to compete and co-operate with other communities. The Republican reconstruction was, in my opinion, a most encouraging example for us. But that experiment has now failed, possibly finally; and both the reasons and the results of that failure contain lessons for the British people in general and for British party politicians in particular.

Let us first learn what lesson Spain has for our Conservatives. The Spanish Republican "revolution" of 1931 was merely a shift of the centre of political power to a lower level in the social pyramid; a shift comparable to that which gave us a Labour Government on sufferance in 1923. And the Republic made a far better start in reconstruction than either of our Labour Governments. But, like them, it was disunited, and dissipated its initial impetus. Like them it was misrepresented and maltreated by a Conservative Press and by capitalist pressures. So that it was, after two years, thrown out by a conservative-clericalist reaction. There ensued two years of a moderate Centre government, not unlike our National Government, being constructive in its professions, but conservative in its proceedings. Moreover it alienated conservatives by not venturing on any real reaction, and antagonised progressives by suspending all reconstruction. Thereby the rhythm of reconstruction was broken and the old incompetence and corruption crept back. What then was the result in Spain, a country less patient and passive than Great Britain? In October 1934 an attempt at a general rising ended in the rebellion of the Asturian miners and their repression by Moorish troops. This subjection by Moors in the cause of the Church of the only region in Spain where Christianity had never succumbed, followed by the imprisonment of some 30,000 workers, deprived the egregious Lerroux, the emollient Gil Robles and the ebullient Primo de Rivera of all popular

support other than that of convinced clericalists, conservatives and capitalists.

The clericalist centrist, Gil Robles, nevertheless claimed the Premiership as leader of the largest party in the Cortes. But the President, Alcalá Zamora, would not concede it, as clericalist acceptance of the Constitution was doubtful. And as there was no doubt at all in this respect as to leaders of other Right factions and as the Radical leader, Lerroux, was compromised by monetary scandals, eventually the President—after an abortive attempt to form a new Centre Party which should amend the Constitution in a clericalist and conservative interest—dissolved the Cortes. Azaña, the successful Premier and promoter of reconstruction, then returned to power at the head of a united Popular Front of reformers and revolutionaries (February 1936), and though the Government consisted wholly of radical reformers and contained no socialist even—let alone syndicalist or communist—the two years' stoppage caused reconstruction to start off again at a revolutionary rate of knots.

What did the Spanish Conservatives then do? Co-operate constitutionally and cordially with the Spanish reconstructionists in restraining the dare-devils, repressing the disorders, and in relieving the distresses? No, they treated an outbreak of strikes and the atmosphere of storm and stress, which were really the consequences of their own inactive reaction, as the commencement of an activist revolution, and as the collapse of all constitutional government. Plans for a militarist *coup d'état*, which had been long prepared, were at once proceeded with and promoted not only by Royalists and reactionaries, but by conservative and clericalist Moderates. With the result that last July the army and navy officers, with a few exceptions, called out their commands in insurrection. There was no intention of starting a civil war. If only because control of the whole military, police and naval forces, as well as of all arsenals and supply centres seemed secured. But the unexpected and apparently impossible happened. Though the army and navy recruits were young farm and fishery workers, the least politically conscious of the population, many regiments deserted or destroyed their officers; while the majority of the new Guards of Assault and a minority of the old Civil Guard and most of the Air Force, obeyed orders from the Government. In a few days the Insurgents were either

defeated or driven from urban centres onto the defensive in country districts.

Thus ended the first phase of the civil war. The second phase was the invasion of Spain by the Moors and other mercenaries of the Foreign Legion in Morocco. These were marched north from the Straits of Gibraltar, and after some fighting, made contact with the southern advance of the regiments retained by the insurgent officers, and of the volunteers recruited from the middle and upper classes and from the clericalist regions of Navarre and the north. These Nationalists were, moreover, powerfully reinforced by German Junker and Italian Caproni airplanes. This combination secured control of the less populous and prosperous western half of Spain, with the exception of the northern coastal strip of the Basque Socialist proletariat and the southern coastal strip held by the Andalusian anarchist-syndicalist peasantry. An advance was made by the Moors and other Nationalists against Madrid, but repulsed by the militia. For the militia were by then beginning to get munitions in spite of the non-intervention embargo, and military organisation in spite of their guerrilla traditions. This second phase of the war would have been won in a few weeks by the Government but for its entering a third, the "foreign" phase.

Just as the Insurgent officers had no intention of involving Spain in civil war, so the Insurgent politicians had no idea that they would involve Spain in an invasion by German and Italian armies. This invasion led to the Government forces becoming dependent on the supplies and services of sympathisers abroad. But this support of the Government was individual in respect of personnel and international in respect of policy. The German and Italian on the Nationalist side came under orders, often without knowing where he was or why he was there. The Germans and Italians on the Government side came freely to fight internationally for liberties which they had lost nationally. The Spanish civil war was thus rapidly developing into a European class war with a capitalist and communist world war to follow.

But what, you will say, has this cautionary tale to do with our Conservatives? Yet this catastrophe might repeat itself in England. Because once a party, even for the most patriotic motives, commits itself to *coups d'état* and power politics, it must, whether it wins or no, lose contact with the traditional

spirit of the community and control of the true course of events. Our Conservatives have already committed themselves more than once to this dangerous divergence from their responsibility as a ruling class. That an Irish civil war was avoided in 1914 and an English class war in 1926, was not owing to a Conservative control either of proceedings or of propaganda. There is nothing absurd in an analogy in which Scottish Home Rulers would replace the Catalans, Welsh the Basques, Irish the Portuguese and a British Labour-Socialist Government the Liberal-Radical Government of the Popular Front. Troops and ships rashly used for police purposes against a general popular movement and against the policy of the Labour Government would be resisted and would become unreliable. Red local organisations would appear. The Commander-in-Chief in India would embark Sikhs and Gurkhas and land them at Devonport and Portsmouth. The local militias of armed workers would come into conflict with them. International finance and fascism would launch foreign navies and land foreign armies in a war for civilisation against British Communism. For the main international menace to-day is not Communist; and a fanatical fascistic Nationalist who exploits his political creed in the interest of his propertied class will end by exposing his country to foreign Imperialism.

What about Labour? Has the Spanish civil war any lessons for a party that has developed from being a Forlorn Hope for the Rights of Man into becoming a Finishing School for Trade Union officials—a party occupied with heresy hunts that only reinforce an incipient Communism and with a hate *Hetze* that only advertises an insignificant Fascism—and with a whole-hoggish herding that will reanimate a moribund Liberalism? Like them, the Spanish reformist Republican Government was haunted and hag-ridden by nightmares due to an indigestion of unassimilated authority too hastily acquired. In a vain attempt to base itself on the non-political middle mass, the Republican Radicals enfranchised the women who voted against them, and excommunicated the Socialists of the Left and the Syndicalists in a lump, who in consequence did not vote at all. The result was the anti-reconstruction reaction of 1933 which ended in the insurrection of 1934. By the next election (1936) all Spanish progressives had united in a "Popular Front" that returned them to office. But it was too late. Wherefrom we Labourites may learn that unless we

can now for purposes of constitutional reconstruction unite all progressives from the Centre to Communism, both inclusive, they will in due time unite themselves, without our assistance or authority, for purposes of coercive revolution. It is true that one or two minority Labour Governments cannot remake society, any more than one swallow can make a summer. But in this country, whether summer comes or no, winter does, and where will the swallow be then, poor thing?

Last, and, in this connection, not least, come the Liberals, and for them Spain has a message of hope. For Spain is their spiritual home whence they got their name, and where their nature has taken a more drastic growth and a deeper root. Spanish Liberalism in the lower class has not been smothered by the propertied interests of a large *laissez-faire* middle class. Rather it has been toughened and spread through being cut down again and again by persecution and impoverishment. Sprung like our Liberalism from seed sown by Rousseau, Godwin and Bentham, it put out under Bakhunin, the opponent of Marx, the first red flowers of local anarchist autonomies in the Southern Communes of 1873. Now, as the Anarchist Syndicalism of the F.A.I. and the C.N.T., it is bearing for the first time a fruit that like the oranges of Syndicalist Eastern and Southern Spain is suitable for export. It is only occasionally a blood orange, and though somewhat sharp flavoured could be made into a good British marmalade.

For the principle of Syndicalism, like that of Liberalism, is that it is the individual that matters not the institution, that the less government the better, and that democracy should be rebuilt from the bottom up, brick by brick—not filled in from the top down like the steel structure of a Communist constitution. It is interesting to note that the economic and defence organisations of the Syndicalists on the Southern front, organising from below, are as vigorous for their particular purposes and more vitalised than the Socialist organisations on the Central fronts. Moreover, the Syndicalists, partly because they can be more individually aggressive, have more appeal for the lowest and least organised class of workers and for the land workers. They are consequently more numerous than the Socialists; and no reorganisation of Spanish society can take root unless it represents their requirements. The new régime will be a Federation of Republics, each of which will be a frame for more or less autonomous *Ayuntamientos*, which again will be a façade for active individuals. It will be as remote from Muscovitism as from Mussolinism.

Here then is a lesson for British Liberals. They need not throw bombs at royal coaches, but they will have to throw an occasional squib under the chariots of the proud. They need not lead Norfolk labourers in raids on the land or hoist the red-and-black flag over village churches. But they will have to realise that voluminous paper programmes of milk-and-water socialism mean less to the farm worker than Three Acres and a Cow.

These then are the lessons of Spain. And if they interest you at all, you can pay for them to Viscount Churchill, 19 Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, W.C., for the "University Unit" ambulances in Spain. You will save some wounded men from having to be left to die of exposure, gangrene or the more merciful bayonet.

> Such men of old
> Were England's native growth; and throughout Spain
> Thanks to High God, forests of such remain.
> Then for that country let our hopes be bold;
> For matched with these shall policy prove vain
> Her arts, her strength, her iron and her gold.

GEORGE YOUNG.

GERMANY AND GENEVA: A NEW SETTLEMENT.

THE drift towards war in Europe can only be averted and reversed by a change in German foreign policy. The standard of life in that country is so low that Herr Hitler must either find means to raise it, or try to distract attention from it by adventures abroad. An adventurous foreign policy must, sooner rather than later, lead to war. If, however, poverty in Germany began to be replaced by plenty, Herr Hitler could afford to suspend his restless search for honour and glory by way of territorial expansion and an "independent economic existence." He might be glad to accept a general settlement including among its terms that the League of Nations would be equipped with effective machinery for promoting justice as well as for protecting peace; that Germany would return to the League with complete equality of rights and obligations; and that German armaments would be reduced, along with the armaments of other Powers, to however low a level would suffice for the uses sanctioned by the Covenant. In return for such a redirection of German policy, coupled with sufficient guarantees that the new general settlement was going to last, it would be well worth while for Britain, France, Russia and other loyal Members of the League to restore the economic and financial situation in Germany; and this, with Germany's help, they are well able to do. The co-operation of the United States of America would, of course, ease their task enormously, and would probably be forthcoming.

But an offer from the League—perhaps in conjunction with the U.S.A.—to effect the economic and financial rescue of Germany as part of a general settlement ought to be accompanied by a reminder that the apparent sacrifices involved for Germany and the other Powers concerned in a peaceful settlement are immeasurably less than must result from the use of force as an instrument of German policy. The point would be brought home by Britain, France, Russia, and other Members of the League reaffirming their determination to maintain their preponderance of power and (in the words of Annex F of the Locarno Treaties to which some of these States are already committed) to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any

act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with the military situation of each of them and takes its geographical position into account. This formula limits the *share* of each League Member in the common effort against aggression, particularly at the outset of the struggle. It does not, however, give the aggressor any reasonable ground for imagining that the League Members form a limited liability company over which he may hope to win a victory by the use of unrestricted violence. The *total* collective effort knows no limit except what is necessary to stop the aggressor. If, nevertheless, he is so ill advised as to resort to arms, the Members of the League, once engaged on its behalf, must inevitably go on to use more and more of their resources until the law-breaker is eventually overwhelmed.

The League's communication should make it clear to the German Government that, in so far as it is seeking the real advantage of the German people by a forward policy, that object can more surely be reached by peaceful means. The proposal for a peaceful settlement, if it is to capture the imagination of the German people, must be, obviously as well as really, to their advantage. The Members of the League must therefore offer not only generalities, moral advantages, enhanced prestige and expressions of goodwill, but concrete blessings that will be of immediate value to the German people in their economic distress. The sense of encirclement felt by them may or may not be justified; but it certainly exists and has to be taken into account. The belief that their economic and financial difficulties are due to foreign States who will do nothing to help Germany is widespread among her people. If we are to overcome that belief, we must make an appeal that will recapture the spirit of the Fourteen Points—but this time to avert a war, not to end one—the spirit that in 1918 could surmount the war censorship and that to-day could do so again.

Just as this offer must be real and seem to be real, so it must clearly be made out of strength and not out of weakness or fear. It must be, and must seem to be, not an instalment of Danegeld to avert disaster, but an attempt to restore a limb of the living body of the world, so that the limb may regain its vigour and the whole body recover fullness of life. That is why the offer must be made, not by one country whose motives might be misinterpreted, but by a Concert possessing

a preponderance of power; and that combination should be none other than the League, whose concern indeed it is not only under Article 11 but also under the League's wider obligations to promote international co-operation.

What then should be the terms of this offer? It must clearly reaffirm our determination to allow to Germany the benefits that should be the heritage of the whole world since the signing of the Covenant, the benefits that we may describe as Justice, Liberty and Truth. Justice here implies a determination to make Article 19 effective, and, by a process of peaceful change, to give to States great and small just redress for proved wrong. Liberty means freedom to fulfil a common purpose for the welfare of the whole society of nations, and especially freedom from the menace of war; freedom founded upon a reliable system of collective defence and upon disarmament. Truth includes the removal of disputes of all kinds from the arena of assertion and counter-assertion by the provision of Commissions of Inquiry set up to receive particulars of all grievances and proposals relating to such problems as access to raw materials, the opening of markets for trade, colonial questions, movements of populations and territorial readjustments.

Besides these general or prospective advantages, the League Powers should (as we said) offer particular and immediate material benefits. These should include both a loan to Germany and the lowering of tariff barriers against foreign, including German, goods. Germany would then be provided with the means of purchasing food supplies and raw materials from League Members or from colonial territories under their control. Participation on equal terms in the capital development as well as in the trade of mandated territories should be open to Germany; and this equality of economic opportunity should be extended until it applies to all non-self-governing colonies.

It is true that this will seem to some a high price even for world peace. But in the first place such material losses as would fall upon League Members, and particularly upon the great colonial powers among them, would be far less than the damage they would suffer from war. In the second place such losses would only be temporary. They would indeed be quickly transformed into considerable gains. A world-wide or even a League-wide economic union is capable of producing

far greater wealth for all its constituent parts than can possibly result from the sub-division of the larger unity into smaller sections each aiming at an independent economic existence.

A general settlement with Germany must extend beyond material interests to include equality in matters of honour and prestige. The war-guilt clause of the Versailles Treaty should first be repealed. Then Germany must be enabled to look forward to a process of peaceful change, giving her the means to become the equal in all respects of the great world powers of to-day. A start should be made by transferring the sovereignty of Germany's former colonies and the other ("A" and "B") mandated areas from the Allied and Associated Powers to the League itself as trustee for the inhabitants of those territories until they are able to stand alone. By rejoining the League, Germany would then be able to share the sovereignty and the trusteeship. The process need not end with the mandated territories. Why should not the sovereignty over such non-self-governing colonies as might some day become Members of the League follow suit and be vested in the League in trust for the inhabitants until they can stand alone, govern themselves, and take over the sovereignty of their territory? They would then be free to link up again with any other State or group of States. Thus the League's exercise of trustee-sovereignty need not impair nor hardly interrupt the development of the British Commonwealth of Nations, while it would open the door to a peaceful evolution of other groups of a similar kind.

Meanwhile there is the problem of equality of opportunity for Members of the League in the administration of the territories placed under League sovereignty during their adolescent phase. Two different solutions present themselves. One is an extension of the present mandate system whereby individual nations administer on the League's behalf and subject to a certain amount of supervision by the League. If that plan were followed, Herr Hitler's government would no doubt be entrusted with responsibility for the ex-German colonies. But where would there then be room or opportunity for Scandinavians, Poles, Swiss, Czechs and others to exercise whatever gifts they may possess as colonial administrators? And are we anxious to transplant into Africa and Asia all the conflicting ideologies that characterise the governments of Western Europe?

A more complete solution of the equality problem is to be found in international administration. It is true that the sudden replacement by an untrained international personnel of the present British, French, Dutch and Belgian colonial services would be almost the worst that could happen to an African or Asiatic colony. The interests of the inhabitants require that the administrators should possess a tradition and an *esprit de corps*. The transition from the present régimes would therefore have to take place gradually over a long period of years. During that time Scandinavians, Swiss, Germans and others might gradually be introduced into the administrations until, after the lapse of some fifteen or twenty years, a League corps of colonial administrators would have come into being. There is, however, no sufficient reason why Germany's equality of rights in the field of colonial administration should not be acknowledged from the outset by transferring to her the administration of, say, Togoland, a former German colony now administered, without greater advantage to the inhabitants, partly by Britain and partly by France.

The conflict of policy between Nazi Germany on the one hand and the loyal Members of the League on the other is too sharp to admit of any hope that inaction will result in anything but catastrophe and chaos. The policy of Germany is clear enough—no collective engagements, certain bilateral alliances, the alienation of Great Britain from France, and the break-up of the League; then *die Vernichtung Frankreichs* and Europe in the possession of the German race. Inaction means for Britain the same as isolationism and has all the marks of a typically disastrous policy. At every crisis it advocates the easy course with certain destruction at the end, when the British Empire is left alone without a friend and rightly despised by the friends it has betrayed.

Thus the present conflict between the policy of Germany and of the League can be resolved only by action, and action may take the form either of persuasion or of fighting it out. A conditional offer by the League to Germany on the lines here suggested might, if made promptly, solve the conflict by persuasion and save the world from war.

MAXWELL GARNETT.

FURTHER THOUGHTS ON PLANNING IN INDUSTRY.

THOSE who oppose the proposals usually known as Planning are greatly handicapped by the widespread misunderstanding of what the economic controversy of our time is really all about: a misunderstanding which greatly increases the dangers into which the world is being led by the great army of "Planners" of all kinds in all countries. It is urgently necessary to emphasise that there is no such thing as an "Anti-Planner." There is not, never has been, and never could be for twenty-four hours, an economic structure that was not planned. All economic activity in England, just as in Russia, is planned everywhere and always and in all its details. And, funnily enough, it is just because those who call themselves "Planners" do not sufficiently realise this that they are so dangerous. It is because none of them have yet begun to plan *enough* that the economic results are so disastrous when they dislocate the delicate, though not perfect, planning machinery we already possess. The essential choice before us is not between plan and no plan, but between Monetary Planning and Planning by Decree. The first, our present system, is essentially decentralised, elastic, and leads to liberty and enterprise; but, unless checked, it leads also to inequality, and to instability. The latter implies autocracy, rigidity and bureaucracy; but it also makes it very easy to satisfy non-economic ends (good and bad) and to avoid great extremes of wealth. But all these points are secondary. So is also the whole question of the motives which inspire economic action, which can be completely altruistic or completely selfish in either régime. All these points, however important, are secondary to the vital economic question posed above—namely what is the method by which the economic processes of society are to be planned? Are they to be planned by price in a market or by quantitative decisions by an authority?

Now the more one reads the proposals of the planners, and such accounts as that by Mr. Webb of Russian experience, the more one is struck by the fact that they simply have not begun to appreciate what it is that they have got to plan, nor have asked themselves how anyone is to plan it. Economic planning, properly considered, has so far not been

seriously attempted even in Russia. So far from the threat of war, etc., making their task more difficult, it alone makes it quite simple, because it renders irrelevant the really important task which our monetary machine is set to solve, and which must be solved ultimately somehow. Anyone with a fair amount of administrative drive can organise a nation for a single end, regardless of whether that end represents the most valuable use of the nation's resources, and the most economical way of so utilising them. In that simple sense England in 1918 was infinitely more of a planned society than Russia has ever been—and so is Germany to-day. But it was not planned as an alternative and superior way of achieving economic ends. Far from that being so, we and they nearly ruined ourselves economically, for non-economic reasons which seemed sufficiently imperative.

The appalling economic wastes arising from these proceedings are not by any means solely nor mainly due to the disorganisation of what I may call ultimate consumption, nor can they in the least be remedied by allowing money to circulate in the hands of ultimate consumers. It is in the intermediate calculations and processes that the really serious results pile up cumulatively. Let the reader picture to himself industry operating under a system where, not here or there but everywhere, the supply and demand for every intermediate process—from a steel girder or crude copper to the output of a public works contractor or a motor haulage firm—were determined quantitatively according to a prearranged schedule; however honestly, expeditiously and wisely drawn up and however easily modified. The evil is not at all to be found in the appalling practical difficulties (though we may well think of the old priority lists and rationing schemes of the war controls). It is the cumulative real economic costs in waste, due to uneconomic use of resources, in a world where the homely analysis and measurement of competing estimate, at every stage and day by day, is deliberately made impossible. The fundamental failing of the planners is that economic planning in their sense of the word as against, say, strategical planning, is a contradiction in terms, because economic aims are not one but many. And in the absence of the only common measure—money—not only in the hands of ultimate consumers, but at every stage in the process, and commanding all the factors of

production, from risk-bearing to labour, there is no meaning in economic planning. You are trying to decide which is the better, a pound of butter or four o'clock—with the result that there is no butter and you are always late. We are not here concerned, the reader will note, with any question of illegitimate gains to anybody. We will assume (another large assumption!) that a quick and practical check is available on prices and profits as far as cost-accounting after the event is concerned. The real snag from the national point of view is that no one may be making undue profits—or any profits at all. In fact they may all be (and probably will be) depending on Government subsidy to carry on at all, and yet the resources of the country will be more and more diverted into uneconomic uses owing to the impossibility of knowing what the really economic uses are. A steady fall in the standard of life and a steadily increasing dependence of all industry on the State are theoretically inevitable and do in fact happen. This is what had to be destroyed all over Europe in the eighteenth-century movement of economic liberation which made modern standards of life possible. It is this which is being reconstructed in Central and Eastern Europe to-day, and the intolerable pressure of it on all society is, before our eyes, rapidly leading to an explosion.

Now let us consider the question a little further and as dispassionately as possible on its merits. The least important point, though it seems to be the only one which enters into the mind of the extreme collectivist planners, is the question of motives. In the remarkable, though often disgracefully unfair, work of the Webbs on Soviet Russia, there is to be found a clear statement of the advantages which may accrue (and exactly the same thing, though they do not say so, can be seen at work in Fascist countries) when a whole nation can be given a clear goal at which to aim; to which all the arts of propaganda and mass enthusiasm can be directed. It cannot be denied that there must be a definite, though not easily measurable, loss in a country condemned by its economic structure to a comparative national aimlessness as against those other systems. The reply is twofold. First, in actual economic fact, the real as against the spectacular and superficial effectiveness of the individual motives at work in our society seems so far the greater, whether measured by our standard of production or by our standard of life.

Secondly, it is not necessary to do more than refer to the dark side of these other motives: the unhealthy, hectic atmosphere which has to be perpetually fed—in which every economic decision runs dangerously near to high treason. Life is punctuated by more or less fantastic accusations and counter-accusations of "sabotage." We must also remember the effect that fear must have on managerial and inventive capacity, the progressive subordination of the courts to the administrative machine necessitated by the complexity of the task, together with the loss of the rights of all such bodies as trade unions and minorities of all kinds, and so on. So much for the possible advantages in economics of non-economic motives.

Next, let us turn for a moment to the question of non-economic aims. It is perfectly obvious that attention must be given to these in all societies. A purely economic society has never existed, nor will. But we need not exaggerate the weakness of our present system in this regard. In fact it is arguable that its very superiority in dealing with purely economic problems makes it easier for our society to see where the shoe pinches, and, therefore, to deal with non-economic matters. And it is an obvious fact that its greater production gives it the means to do much more if it wants to. The vast structure of the voluntary and statutory social services surely disposes of the allegation that "capitalism" is unable to escape from the narrowest interpretation of desirable objectives in a community.

There are three other aspects of this part of the problem which require a word or two because they are the sort of consideration most potent here and now, in recommending some sort of planned intervention in industry. The first is the class of problem conjured up by the words Distressed Areas. Here political, sociological and humanitarian considerations quite palpably (though exceptionally) begin to take precedence over the deductions apparently to be made from the working out of the industrial machine. Yet there is no departure in principle in applying ourselves to relieve these exceptional areas any more than in paying unemployment benefit. Such experiments as trading estates under Government encouragement and so on are obviously taken within a framework constructed on other lines. The point is, what do we take as our normal from which we make exceptions? It

is the normal and the ideal which gives any society its distinct colour, not the occasional and reluctant deviations. A danger we always have to watch for and to guard against is lest in the process of dealing with this or that exception we do such damage to the normal as to defeat our own object. The lesson of 1931 only needs to be referred to, and the whole vital question of business confidence comes once again here to the forefront.

Two other subjects present themselves which are related to these non-economic judgments which we pass upon different economic systems. First, the apparent injustice of the great inequality in incomes, and the even greater inequality of capital wealth, that result under our system. This is often felt to be sufficient in itself to condemn the practical working out of our system. Many statements on this matter, when allowance is made for taxation and savings, etc., are of course exaggerated and misleading. But much remains after all allowances have been made on this score. But it should be remembered that the extent to which incomes can be levelled, if so desired, without damaging the working of our industrial system is largely a matter of custom and public opinion and is obviously variable. For those who attach vital importance to greater equality, the extension of the recent process of ever-increasing taxation of large incomes and ever-increasing social services like pensions and unemployment benefit, as may be found from time to time practicable, are at any rate as promising a line of advance as reconstructing the whole productive process. Moreover, it is of great importance to appreciate the extent to which even in order to make their creaking machinery go sufficiently fast to avoid actual famine, the Soviets have had to introduce inequality of income. These inequalities are already about 1 to 20, and if we take the much higher standard of all incomes in England that would allow, at twenty times the unskilled labourer's rate of, say, 50s. a week, an income of some two to three thousand a year in the higher ranks of industry. And the usual Russian argument here turns against themselves, for they have only allowed the Stakhanov systems, piece work, etc., to operate for the last three or four years. After a generation it remains to be seen whether the "spread" in collectivist Russia will be so very different from what is rapidly becoming the normal in capitalist countries with high rates of taxation.

The second subject is the alleged possibility under a completely planned system of abolishing unemployment. In a sense this is obviously true: it is merely the other way of saying that independent trade unions, like independent employers, are a contradiction in terms under a planned society. At any given moment there is a certain amount of the wealth being produced which is available for current consumption. If the consumers *qua* workers agree, as in Russia, that the standard rate of wages is to be the quotient obtained by dividing this among those who wish to work, there can clearly *ex hypothesi* be no involuntary unemployment. Of course, we are not concerned here with the unemployment due to changes of jobs, malingering, illness, etc. But is that what is commonly understood by abolishing unemployment? It would be as true and as reasonable to claim that a prison or an army had no unemployment. There is surely here the same trick being played on us as in the similar question of reduced hours of labour: are wages to remain unaffected? Involuntary unemployment can only arise because the standard rate of wages demanded (probably quite wisely—this argument has nothing to do with any criticism of trade union policy) is *not* calculated solely as a proportion of current production. On the contrary, under our system, while that is taken into consideration in reasonable negotiations, the labour representatives also consider the preservation of old or the acquirement of new standards of living for the employed. And this is done even at the expense of concentrating the cost upon a minority in the shape of unemployment. If it were found that the Russian method led to a higher standard of living than ours, then indeed there would be substance in the claim.

Having briefly considered non-economic aims and motives we return to the purely economic problem. And we are at once faced with a problem which is very difficult to deal with, either theoretically or practically: the extent to which a monetary economy such as ours may, whether we like it or not, be destroyed by the impact of foreign totalitarian structures, planned more or less completely on a non-monetary basis. This goes much deeper than any mere question of dumping, to use that much abused word. Probably, only history will be able to decide. Suffice it to say that old-fashioned Conservatives, with their own frequent leaning towards economic

nationalism, seldom seem to appreciate sufficiently how closely the breakdown of international exchange is related to the consequent progressive transformation of the internal industrial structure into something indistinguishable from State socialism, not only in Russia but equally in Germany and Italy. It would be an exaggeration, but one enshrining a very important and neglected truth, to say that the urgent choice before Europe to-day is between the reconstruction of an effective gold standard and universal economic dictatorship, whether it calls itself Communism or Fascism.

There are thus grave economic, sociological and political dangers in the totalitarian planning of society, while the ever-increasing British conception of industry as a social service in itself does now, and will still more in the future, allow us to gain most of the alleged advantages without the disadvantages of such a change. On top of all this, the practical difficulties and cumulative economic derangements are far more serious in a highly developed society like ours, where the higher standard of life and the dependence on world markets and savings makes rapid change desirable and, indeed, necessary. It would be unwise and it is unnecessary to go so far as to say that the difficulties in complete planning of industry are insurmountable. Though the dangers are greater here, on the other hand our skill and experience and resources in every rank of society and in all the organs of government are also much greater. And the two might cancel out. But it is certainly true that the dangers are far greater and more fundamental than the happy planners have ever realised, and all the theoretical objections can be seen coming rapidly and urgently to the surface in every society controlled by decree in all parts of Europe.

So much for the general problem. There remains a more immediate but narrower suggestion to consider. Is there a half-way house within the capitalist system, directed to partial reconstruction of our monetary planning in favour of administrative planning? It is the view of a small number of Conservatives that such an alternative does exist. It goes by various names, but its essential characteristic is that, abandoning with more or less completeness and understanding the monetary planning of the economic machine, they desire to substitute producers' control, made effective by statutory powers. This is usually, though quite improperly, summarised

by the phrase "self-government in industry"; the whole to be facilitated and accelerated by some sort of Enabling Act. The opponents of this policy submit that, so far from being an acceptable half-way house, it has all the vices of complete State socialism, as well as some purely economic objections of its own.

The production of wealth cannot be planned or controlled by producers: for the old homely reason that, just as you can take a horse to the water but you cannot make him drink, so you can take his rider shopping but you cannot make him buy. British farmers please copy! If there is one thing quite certain it is that if and in so far as non-monetary planning in industry becomes operative in England, it will be taken out of the hands of the producers and put into the hands of the only tolerable bodies for the purpose, namely the elected State and local authorities, possibly acting in part through the consumers' co-operative societies. Why is such a development inevitable? Before going into general arguments it is rather amusing to see that the very parts of England from which the archpriest of planning, Mr. Harold Macmillan, descends upon us, those very depressed areas in whose favour it is so often advocated, have at once discovered the truth of it by bitter, practical experience. The Jarrow steel-works controversy is still recent history and the desperate appeal to the Government against the semi-official Statutory Producers' "self-governing" ring. In passing, this also exposes the whole misrepresentation of that precious phrase, "self-government in industry," for what these people are governing is not themselves but the lives of whole districts and the purchases of whole nations. We have so much experience by now that it is sufficient to summarise the case in a series of categorical statements. Producers' control by statutory monopoly is vicious, first because, like all monopolies, wherever it can it reduces production; secondly, it therefore increases unemployment; thirdly, it hinders development, especially by new and small men; fourthly, it raises prices to the detriment of the consumer; fifthly, it always raids the Exchequer for subsidies, open or concealed; sixthly, as a consequence, it opens up grave opportunities for electoral corruption; and seventhly, it encourages economic nationalism and currency disorganisation by the most mischievous devices such as quotas, and strengthens the worst, while weakening the best, forces arising

from a tariff system. Finally, these results are so unassailable in theory and so universally experienced in practice, that the experiment is always short-lived. Either the insufferable jungle of blood-suckers is swept away, or it is transformed into a socialist machine under public control.

The deduction from all this is not that there are no new fields in which, whether by public utility society or by State ownership or in any other way, an advanced community such as ours may decide to take the task of planning the provision of certain services into the realm of authority as against the monetary decision of purchasers. We might, for example, decide to provide milk through the Metropolitan Water Board—or beer. The true deduction is, however, that we are compelled to make up our mind in each particular case exactly what we are planning for and how far we are prepared to go: if we are not on a balance of considerations prepared to communalise a given industry, or at the very least limit its profits and control its prices and production, we must not put the country into the intolerable position of having exactly its most important economic processes taken out of its own hands as expressed by the homely present method of purchasers' control and put into the hands of statutory monopolies without effective check.

I. M. Horobin.

JAPAN'S POLITICAL CRISIS.

IT is not easy to explain the recent political crisis in Japan to those unfamiliar with that nation's traditions and history. With regard to Japan it is one thing to know the facts and quite another thing to interpret them. The crisis of January last is only one of the many through which Japan has been passing in the last six years. With the rise and fall of Cabinets as an almost annual event since 1931, when the military bureaucracy took the bit in its teeth, the nation has been in a constant state of crisis, that word being the most common on the lips of leaders and in the press during the period named.

It would be a mistake to suppose, as there is a disposition to do in Western countries, that in the latest crisis the Hirota Cabinet was overthrown by the revolting political parties, by their refusal to hear ministers in the Diet and their increasingly critical attitude toward the whole administration. The largest political party, the Minseito, or liberals, have a membership of 205 in the Diet, and the next largest party, the Seiyukai, conservatives, number 171, influence outside these being of no importance. Though these parties accused the Cabinet of failure in diplomacy, especially in negotiations with Russia over the Fisheries Treaty, and with China over the North China question, they were in no mood to invite a dissolution of the House, precipitating a general election, in which the Government would be returned at the polls in spite of them, and they would nearly all lose their seats in the Diet, and hence their salaries, a matter of importance to men who are not well off.

No, the real cause of the latest crisis was the refusal of the War Minister, General Terauchi, to tolerate a Cabinet led by a civilian who had, with the sympathy of most of his colleagues, refused, or failed, to carry out the terms on which the War Office nominated a Minister of War when the Cabinet was hastily created after the assassinations of February 1936. These terms were vague, but everyone knew what they implied. The Administration was to create a new committee, or authority, that would tend to legalise the attitude of the military bureaucracy in approaching the Throne directly without reference to the Cabinet, and thus seem to countenance the action of the army in taking a free hand in

Manchuria in 1931 when it set out upon a conquest of the country, and drove out the Chinese Government and created an independent State. The army had been indirectly responsible for many of the assassinations perpetrated to cow statesmen into approving this independent attitude; and the War Minister could not afford to allow the Cabinet to ignore his policy.

In overthrowing the Cabinet the military bureaucracy had two main objects: to force upon the Diet the largest budget in the nation's history and to eliminate the civilian Prime Minister, who not only tried to curb the ambitions of the army but was not in sympathy with a policy that tended to isolate Japan internationally. By forcing the Cabinet to resign, an easy thing to do simply by refusing to function as War Minister, General Terauchi was enabled to assist the General Staff in creating a Cabinet, with a general from the War Office at its head, and a nominee from the same source as War Minister, thus giving the bureaucracy complete control of the Government. Having disrupted the Cabinet, General Terauchi could not have retained his post without losing face, but, with a general at the head of the Government and a nominee from the War Office as Minister of War, the change meant implicit gain to the military element. Having thus forced military control over the Cabinet, the Government will be able to function even independently of the Diet, unless that body is reckless or patriotic enough to risk a dissolution and a general election by passing a vote of impeachment.

The Cabinet could carry on in spite of the Diet's refusal to sanction the colossal budget, simply by adopting the usual tactics in such cases, and falling back on the budget of the previous year; but, as that is much less than the budget presented this year, the army and navy could not accept it. The budget compiled by the army and navy, or under their direction, amounts to the unprecedented sum of 3,038,591,000 yen (nearly £180,000,000), which is 727,000,000 yen more than that of last year. About 1,400,000,000 yen of this was to be sunk in army and navy; and some 900,000,000 yen of it would have to be raised by flotation of loans at a time when loan issues were reaching a point of saturation. Not only the Diet, but all Japan, is seriously alarmed at the way in which the national debt has been increasing since the military hand

appeared in national politics. The debt has risen from 7,000,000,000 yen four years ago to over 10,000,000,000 yen to-day, involving an outlay in interest of about 550,000,000 yen annually. Still more alarming is the spirit in which this enormous debt is regarded by the military bureaucracy who argue that, even if failure to meet the interest leads to confiscation of capital, capitalists and financiers are as much in duty bound to suffer sacrifices for their country as are soldiers and sailors, a view in which, needless to say, practical business men are not inclined to acquiesce. It is probable that the new Cabinet will proceed cautiously in order to win public confidence, until the new budget is passed and the nation's finances and external policy are more stabilised, if that be at all possible ; but with the nation opposed, the future must remain problematical.

To render the situation still more acute there is a great degree of social as well as political unrest throughout the country. Heavy taxation and low prices leave the agrarian population in distress, and the Government has been too slow in granting relief. So much of the national revenue going to war purposes, with no war in sight, creates general dissatisfaction. Only the merchants and munition-makers are prosperous. There is fear of fascism and communism, between which the average man sees little difference. Many thousands of young Japanese men and women have been arrested on charges of communist propaganda in the last six years, and a large proportion of them have been sent to prison. It is believed that considerable numbers of these are not guilty, especially the young women. Owing to poverty, many farmers have had to dispose of their daughters. When General Araki was Minister of War he suggested that the farmers had as much right to suffer for their country as the army and navy men ; and shortly afterwards a conspiracy was unearthed among rural folk for the assassination of the War Minister.

For other reasons, too, the Cabinet has been made the butt of public censure. Being suspected as an instrument of military chicanery alone would have been sufficient to condemn the Cabinet in public opinion, but it was frequently accused of being reckless in finance and failing to stabilise Japan's external relations. Prince Konoè, President of the House of Peers, openly charged the Government with having neglected to ameliorate Japan's international isolation since her defiance

of the League of Nations ; and also with having blundered in negotiating with Russia, and bringing negotiations with China to a deadlock. The new agreements with fascist Powers in Europe, he contended, were prone to compromise Japan's relations with her old and tried friends, Britain and the United States. He admitted that these agreements were intended only as checks to communist propaganda and the influence of the Third International in the Far East, to which Britain and America are equally opposed. But the Cabinet's sudden and mysterious method of action tended to prejudice relations with the non-fascist nations. Then, Dr. Ogawa, Minister of Trade and Commerce in the last Cabinet, declared that Japan's isolationist propensity was reducing her yearly exports by prejudicing foreign nations to raise quotas against them. These criticisms were supported by both of the great political parties. These parties will now be more restless than ever, since the new Premier has practically ignored them and seems bent on the exclusion of party politics from the Japanese Cabinet.

It will doubtless appear something of a mystery that the late Cabinet should have been blamed for failing to negotiate successfully with Nanking, not only over North China questions but in regard to the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Chinese Republic, by the so-called " Young Marshal," Chang Hsueh-liang, former war-lord of Manchuria. Ever since the Japanese army drove Chang out of his country it has been trying to win his confidence in vain. Even after he succeeded his father, the notorious Chang Tso-lin, as viceroy of Manchuria, he was constantly playing off Japan against Nanking to gain his own ends. These tactics ultimately so incensed the Japanese General Staff that it resolved to root him out altogether. His bribery of Japanese officials had been securing him greater freedom ; but when this was discovered by the army it led to the assassination of the Japanese Prime Minister in May 1934, and the overthrow of the Cabinet. The secret of the bribery came out in this way. When Chang was driven out, and his mansion at Mukden was searched by army officers, actual receipts for the bribes were found among his official papers. Some suspect that there is still a tendency on Chang's part to play off Tokyo against Nanking, of which the capturing of China's President was a symptom. But it is too much to suppose that Japan will ever be willing to allow the " Young Marshal " to succeed Emperor Kang Té on the

throne of Manchukuo; but Chang might further Japan's cause by being made a sort of viceroy in North China, where he could more easily play off one country against the other. When war-lords are in the saddle no one can tell what may happen, in any country.

It is not too much to say that, with the assumption of power by a new military Cabinet in Tokyo, the nation's unrest will not be allayed, and fear may prove a menace to peace. The public mind is ever conscious of the fact that this military revolt is against constitutional government; that the military bureaucracy has been indirectly responsible for the assassination of two Prime Ministers in the last six years, and an attempt on the life of a third, as well as for the assassination of several of Japan's greatest statesmen, and the exiling of all the rest to retirement. Poverty of leadership is a weakness of all countries: in this Japan is not singular; but Japan suffers more from it, since wise and efficient leadership is more imperative in a country without long political experience. One of Japan's most distinguished scholars, the late Dr. Hiroyuki Kato, wrote: "Public opinion is not necessarily wise or correct, nor can it be otherwise so long as there are no more than fifty or sixty men of distinguished ability in the whole of Japan." After so many assassinations, there are still fewer to-day, and even these are muzzled.

Since the assassinations of February last year, the Tokyo régime has been in all but name a military government: its policy has been formulated and enforced under impetus of the War Office, and the national budget compiled under its direction on a war basis. That the bureaucracy attempted to camouflage the real nature of the Government by placing a civilian at the head did not deceive the public in the least. Each member of the Cabinet had to be a mouthpiece of the General Staff or quit, and finally all had to quit together. But in spite of its audacious manipulation of government, the War Office hesitates frankly to take over full responsibility for inviting from the nation the accusation of fascism by proclaiming a military régime and undertaking all the intricate details of State administration. The dastardly tragedies of the last three years were, on the admissions of those tried and executed, for the purpose of establishing a military government; and consequently a military government is associated in the public mind with some form of

terrorism, the goal of which is fascism. As that would be plainly a violation of the Imperial Constitution it could only be legalised by winning consent of the Throne, by fair means or foul, as in Italy.

To most friends of Japan, who know the country well, it will seem unfortunate that the first name the Emperor was advised to nominate for Premier, General Kazushige Ugaki, should have been rejected by the War Office. His marvellous transformation of Korea while Governor-General proved him in possession of the character and ability equal to presiding over the Cabinet. He was, moreover, the popular choice of the nation, which had been expecting him to be raised to this office for some years. Distinguished both as a soldier and a statesman, he ought to have commanded the confidence of the bureaucracy. But the army could not forget that, while Minister of War in 1930, he had approved the London Naval Treaty; that he was in the Cabinet which tried to curb the army in Manchuria and that he approved a policy of friendly co-operation with the old friends of Japan in Western countries. Such a man would have proved a thorn in the side of unconstitutional militarists. The right of the War Office to nominate the Minister of War gives the bureaucracy the power to wreck any Cabinet at will. Like Baron Shidehara, one of Japan's greatest Foreign Ministers, Ugaki was driven into exile after the army gained the whip-hand, and so he retired to Korea. His recent surrender of the post there was understood to mean that he was destined to be the next Prime Minister of Japan. The War Office made sure that this was not to be.

It must not be supposed, as some have intimated in England, that this was discourteous to the Throne, whose nominee General Ugaki was. The Emperor is a personage wholly removed from the sphere of politics and all such mundane things. His Majesty never selects a Prime Minister. He asks the *Genro* (Elder Statesmen) to nominate a man, and then summons the nominee to form a Cabinet. If the name thus submitted proves unacceptable to the political parties, or the nominee unable to form a Cabinet, the *Genro* submit another name. In this instance, General Hayashi was the only name that the War Office would accept. This was indicated by the refusal of any general of the army to accept the post of Minister of War under any other leader than General Hayashi.

The new Prime Minister was Commander-in-Chief of the army in Korea at the time of the Manchurian incident in 1931; and, without waiting for the consent of the Tokyo Cabinet, sent reinforcements to assist in the conquest of Manchuria. He returned to Japan to assist in purging the army after the assassination of Premier Inukai in May 1932, when Admiral Saito became Prime Minister. He succeeded General Araki as War Minister in the Saito Cabinet in 1934, and continued to retain his post in the Okada Cabinet which came into power some six months later. He remained Minister of War until the assassination of the Inspector-General of Military Education, General Nagata, in the summer of 1935, when he resigned over that unfortunate affair. This was supposed to put a stop to the Cabinet's attempt to meddle in army affairs. But the murderer was brought before court martial and, after a protracted trial, was on the eve of being sentenced to death when the Tokyo regiments, thinking that the Cabinet had not sufficiently learned its lesson in spite of the assassinations, rose in revolt on February 26th last year and assassinated several Cabinet Ministers and attempted the lives of several other statesmen. In due course the leaders of the mutiny were placed on trial before a military court and sentenced to death or imprisonment, fourteen of them facing a firing squad in the Tokyo military prison yard.

Smarting under this humiliation and disgrace the military bureaucracy was expected to lie low and keep in the background; but it assumed an attitude more challenging than ever.

The most serious aspect of this reinforcement of the military bureaucracy in Tokyo is the difficulty it will have to face in ensuring the economic stability of the nation and still to pursue a policy of enormous armamental expansion. It will also have to maintain amicable relations with nations interested in the peace of the Pacific, by maintaining a policy of isolation while promoting a race in armaments. A leading spokesman of the Japanese navy, Admiral Suetsugu, formerly Commander-in-Chief of the combined squadron, recently declared that Japan needs more than a defensive navy: she must command a force capable of ensuring her supremacy in the Far Eastern Pacific. All parties must be given the same number of ships of the same size. As this claim overreaches anything Japan has advanced until now, and tends to challenge British and American interests in China, the Philippines

and the South Seas, it may eventually develop tension in international relations.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, in the speech from the Throne at the opening session of the Imperial Diet, evinced an interest in the nation's international relations that was considered rather significant: he spoke of the "joy of intimacy in relations" with foreign countries, a statement that might be taken to suggest that this "joy" seemed in need of safeguarding. The statement may have meant little or it may have meant much. In Japan Imperial suggestion meets with immediate and positive response, and may have reacted in some measure against the Cabinet that has fallen, as its foreign policy was regarded as one of its most unsatisfactory aspects. The new Cabinet will be expected to deal gravely with this hint from the Throne.

It is difficult to anticipate very clearly what may be expected from the new Cabinet recently inaugurated in Tokyo. Apart from the veteran warrior, General Hayashi, who has been entrusted with its formation, the Cabinet has no one that would lend distinction to its personnel, which is what Japanese politicians would regard as rather mediocre. But, as has been indicated, it is distinctly a military government, under domination of the General Staff. It is somewhat ominous that the new Prime Minister, at the time of writing, has not succeeded in securing a suitable Foreign Minister, nor is the new Minister of Finance, Mr. Yuki, a financier that might be expected to deal with the problem of national finance, which seems almost insoluble. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance are the most important members of the Cabinet next to the Prime Minister and the Minister of War. As both will be under the direction of the military bureaucracy it will not much matter who they are; and this is what makes it difficult for the Prime Minister to find the right men for these portfolios, since the right men will demand freedom to pursue a policy of co-operation with foreign countries and retrenchment in military expenditure. Mr. Sato, Japanese Ambassador to France, would prove an able minister with a wide experience. He had much to do with the conduct of Japan's case before the League of Nations at Geneva, and would be expected to pursue the policy that severed Japan from the League, though greater moderation will be essential to retrieve Japan's position in international

councils. The new Minister of Finance has to face the formidable task of reducing the budget in order to gain the approval of the Diet and the financiers, but as it is a military budget the War Office will have the final word. The new War Minister is simply an understudy of the Prime Minister. Admiral Yonai, who holds the naval portfolio, seems to be little known outside Japan, but he will be expected to stand firmly for the policy of naval expansion upon which his department is launched. The other members of the Cabinet will have the easier task of simply proceeding with the routine affairs of their departments, carrying on where their predecessors left off, the main work being in the hands of the permanent officials in office. If it be said that this is true of all Cabinets, let it be remarked that it is not true of Japanese Cabinets in regard to the ministries specifically named in this paragraph.

Those of us who have known Japan intimately for the past thirty years or more are not so much surprised at the present preference for military premiers ; for it is only in recent years that civilians have gained favour in that office, owing to the growth of democratic ideas and party government. Progress here was halted when party government proved the greatest obstacle to military expansion, for the political parties controlled the purse-strings ; and several statesmen had to be assassinated before party government could be disrupted. In the good old days when such men as Prince Yamagata, Prince Katsura and General Terauchi presided over the Tokyo Cabinet, great generals all, there was not the slightest suspicion of military domination, or a whisper of disrespect for the Imperial Constitution. These men never tolerated any reflection on the Imperial Rescript forbidding army and navy men to meddle in politics ; and as for assassins, they got short shrift. Why, then, should the present powers-that-be be driven to the anachronism of reverting to the tactics of the Shogunate days when Japan was practically under a dictatorship ? The influence of European dictatorships cannot be ruled out. Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini have made despotism hopeful, to say nothing of the Japanese bureaucracy having got away with free action in Manchuria. But, given enough rope, the end is certain. With the sincere sympathy of England and the United States, government in Japan may recover its poise, and the good old days be eventually resumed.

J. INGRAM BRYAN.

A RELIGIOUS ANTINOMY AND ITS SOLUTION.

THE Student Christian Movement Press has recently published an important and arresting book by Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr of New York, entitled *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*.* The substance of the work was originally given as the Rauschenbusch Memorial Lectures, an American foundation for the investigation of the social significance of the Christian religion. The editor describes Dr. Niebuhr as " one of the prophetic voices of modern America," and says that " his challenge will leave few of us undisturbed." The book is, indeed, from every point of view remarkable. It is the fruit of extensive learning and deep reflection. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that almost every sentence is pregnant, profound and searching. The volume demands the careful attention of all who are concerned with the vital problem with which it deals. If its immediate object is the criticism of contrasted types of Christian outlook that are prevalent in the United States, it is of wider significance, since these types exist with certain modifications throughout the Christian world, and not least of all in this country. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the book will receive adequate consideration by British theologians and social teachers.

Dr. Niebuhr's polemic is directed equally against what he terms Christian Orthodoxy and Christian Liberalism.

> Orthodox christianity, with insights and perspectives in many ways superior to those of liberalism, cannot come to the aid of modern man, partly because its religious truths are still imbedded in an out-moded science, and partly because its morality is expressed in dogmatic and authoritarian moral codes (page 14).

On the other hand,

> the religion and ethics of the liberal Church is dominated by the desire to prove to its generation that it does not share the anachronistic ethics or believe the incredible myths of orthodox religion. Its energy has been devoted to the task of proving religion and science compatible, a purpose which it has sought to fulfil by disavowing the more incredible portion of its religious heritage and clothing the remainder in terms acceptable to the modern mind (page 15).

* *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*. By Reinhold Niebuhr. Student Christian Movement Press. 6s. net.

In contrast to both these types, " the distinctive contribution of religion to morality lies in its comprehension of the dimension of depth in life " (page 15). Its effect is " to bring the whole of reality and existence into some system of coherence."

> This straining at an ultimate coherence drives high religion into depth as well as breadth, for the forms of life are too various and multifarious to be ascribed easily to a single source or related to a single realm of meaning if the source does not transcend all the observable facts and forces, and the realm does not include more than the history of the observable world " (page 17).

Hence there is tension between what is and what ought to be, a tension which must not be prematurely resolved. The attempt of liberal religion to do this results in its " thinness " and superficiality. " Failure to recognise the heights led modern Christianity to an equal blindness towards the darker depths of life " (page 26). Higher religions are of two types, " mystical " and " mythical." The former in seeking to be rational ends in such abstraction as to posit " an ultimate reality beyond all rational forms " (page 34). Prophetic religion, just because it finds meaning and purpose in history, becomes mythical, and for the most part mistakes the truths embodied in the myths for events in history.

The ethic of Jesus, which " is the perfect fruit of prophetic religion," sets forth " the ideal of love." " God is, therefore, love " (pages 47-8). It is, therefore, brought up against the inexorable fact of self-love, which is " the natural will to survive " (page 51), and this collision produces the sense of sin, which, while essentially bound up with man's finitude, is interpreted by religion as consisting in " an evil will." The consciousness of sin becomes " the tension between the principles of love and the impulse of egoism, between the obligation to affirm the ultimate unity of life and the urge to establish the ego against all competing forms of life " (page 77). Yet, in consequence of the actual conditions of human life, the perfectionism of Jesus is practically impossible, and attempts to apply it in the realm of human life reduce its meaning and lead to the subtle substitution of lower and less meaningful principles, alike in politics, economics, and personal life. It remains, therefore, " an impossible possibility,"

which has relevance to human life, but cannot be fulfilled in it. The Kingdom of God, as set forth by Jesus,

> is always a possibility in history, because its heights of pure love are organically related to the experience of love in all human life, but it is also an impossibility in history and always beyond every historical achievement. Men living in nature and in the body will never be capable of the sublimation of egoism and the attainment of the sacrificial passion, the complete disinterestedness which the Ethic of Jesus demands (page 42).

Perhaps the essential meaning of this book may be found in Dr. Inge's statement in his recently published anthology of the Christian Life (*Freedom, Love and Truth*).

> Christianity is a revolutionary idealism which estranges revolutionaries by its idealism, and conservatives by its drastic revaluation of earthly goods. Its function in social struggles is to take the sting out of such conflicts by setting its own standards before both sides.

What is to be said of this apparently fundamental *impasse* and of the antinomy between spirit and nature, with its outcome in contrasted types of religion, which are equally inadequate? To begin with, the hard-and-fast division of religious types into Orthodoxy and Liberalism, in emphasising extremes ignores the great intermediate realm in which both types, if not blended, qualify one another, not artificially, but in a living way. True catholicity of faith avoids both the rigidity and the fluidity, both the remoteness and the " thinness," which are justly criticised. In the next place, Dr. Niebuhr's account of mystical religion is too purely intellectual to do justice either to its hidden springs or to its ultimate objective. His description may, on the whole, be true of Neo-Platonism, but only imperfectly represents typical Christian Mysticism. It is more important to note that the book leaves the ethic of Jesus in a somewhat uncertain and indeed precarious position. Is Jesus the spiritually authoritative revealer and interpreter alike of the highest, inmost and ultimate Reality? Or is He the supreme idealist, the absoluteness of whose teaching is out of true proportion, being, indeed, incompatible with complete sanity, because out of keeping with the fundamental nature of the universe? If the latter, why does the idealism of Jesus so persistently press itself upon mankind and set up a permanent standard of what ought to be? Is not its relevancy

the sign that it manifests a higher and real order of being, which because it is the highest and most real, will eventually be fulfilled in human history, either under terrestrial conditions, or in a succeeding order, which will be at once the fruit and the transformation of the present? All this is left, to the mind of the present reviewer, in uncertainty, though this may possibly be due to the fact that the book is limited to an interpretation of Christian ethics and does not attempt such a philosophy of the Christian religion as would integrate ethics in a consistent and satisfying whole.

The question, however, goes deeper. The author apparently cannot accept what he calls "St. Paul's Christ-mysticism," because, according to him, it borders "on the very edge of the magical" (page 226). Yet without the consentient Christology of the Church, which is more than Pauline, the absoluteness of the ethic of Jesus remains doubtful, because it is insecurely based. Moreover, the New Testament is in accord with Dr. Niebuhr in treating the Christian ethic as "an impossible possibility" apart from the new birth, "the birth from above" of St. John, or the equivalent "resurrection" of St. Paul. This possible transformation of human nature is left out of the picture by Dr. Niebuhr, yet no account of the ethic of Jesus can be complete without it. When this is admitted, and indeed insisted upon, the limitations of existent human nature may well be transcended, men may yet rise to the sacrificial heights which Dr. Niebuhr treats as impossible, and even the supposed rigidity of cosmic conditions may yield to the transforming influence of the Spirit, exerting its power as perfect love.

The contrast between what Dr. Niebuhr terms mystical and mythical religion has been recently treated by Dr. Joseph Needham as the opposition of Greek neo-platonism and Hebrew apocalypticism in an article on "The Common Ground between Christianity and Communism" (*Spectator*, October 30th, 1936.) In regard to this Dr. Needham emphasises the importance of "the philosophical evaluation of Time."

> If Time is illusory, unimportant, or evil, the trend of other-worldliness in Christianity becomes fundamental, earthly affairs lose their significance, and the Kingdom of Heaven is interpreted as a realm of mystical experience unconnected with concrete human relationships.

If, on the other hand, Time be treated as significant, "The Kingdom of God is no unearthly conceptual realm, but a just and happy social order," which draws towards it "to work for its realization men of the most diverse types from all the peoples of the world." "These two widely divergent trends," Dr. Needham says, "have existed side by side in an uneasy union in the Christian religion since the first few centuries." Here again we are presented with two unreconciled extremes to the neglect of intermediate positions in which they are more or less completely harmonised.

In face of this antinomy, pressed upon us by two thoughtful and influential writers, it becomes necessary to examine the classic sources of the Christian religion in order, if possible, to discover an underlying unity, out of which both of these extremes have arisen, and by means of which the truth underlying both of them may be brought into organic spiritual coherence. It should be remarked at the outset that throughout the New Testament the mystical and the apocalyptic elements of the Christian religion are found side by side, and that the apostolic writers had no sense that they stood in "an uneasy union" with one another. For example, St. Paul in writing to the Church at Philippi and with the relationship of imperial Rome with its colonies in his mind, declares in the same sentence that "The state of which we are citizens [πολίτευμα] is in heaven, from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ" (Phil. iii, 20). Here the mystical and the apocalyptic are treated as the inseparable parts of one spiritual whole, and this is characteristic of the general tenor of his teaching. Moreover, the Apostle's practical injunctions are so closely bound up with both these aspects of the Christian religion as to form a vital bond between them and to dismiss any conception of an *Interims-Ethik* as entirely foreign to his belief. In consonance with the prophetic teaching of the Old Testament, Christian ethics rest upon the character of God, and are therefore unaffected, save in their application by the changes of the Cosmos. While their application is relative to the order of the world, in principle they are absolute and eternal, because they spring out of relationship, not so much to the creature as to the Creator.

On closer examination it will be found that there is a third element of which due account must be taken, namely the

Inward. " The Kingdom of God," St. Paul declares, " is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit " (Rom. xiv, 17). Thus the inward, the mystical, and the prospective are treated as three essential and mutually consistent parts of Christian faith and life. A more intimate study of the New Testament will reveal the nature of the bond that unites them.

1. In the first place must be set the inwardness of the Christian religion. Our Lord is reported to have said : " The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation : Neither shall they say, Lo, Here! or there! for lo, the Kingdom of God is within you " (St. Luke, xvii, 20, 21). It is, of course, possible to translate the Greek preposition as meaning " among " you, but this is seriously to weaken the force of the contrast that is so obviously intended. As Dr. Niebuhr remarks, the ethic of Jesus " has only a vertical dimension between the loving will of God and the will of man " (page 49). The Kingdom of God means His effective rule in the hearts of men and, therefore, throughout their life and conduct. It involves such spiritual union between God and man as makes, and can alone make, the sovereign authority of God the immanent spring of a response which makes " All's Law " to be " All's Life " because " the Love of God is shed abroad in our hearts." Yet throughout the teaching both of our Lord and of His apostles, this union between God and men in love is not left in this formlessness. It is everywhere set forth as the union and fellowship of the Father and His sons. Our Lord's life, teaching and spirit are throughout governed by this conscious relationship between God as His Father and Himself as the Son. This conscious experience is His specific gift to His followers. It is by the experience of this fatherly-filial relationship that the inwardness of the Kingdom of God must be explained. It is the inmost secret, the vital meaning, of the Christian religion. Theology, religion, ethics are all transformed, throughout the New Testament, by the illumination and inspiration of this supreme and all-embracing relationship. The human relationship of fatherhood and sonship is everywhere treated as so constituted in God that it is the most adequate representation of a mystic relationship in which the most intimate fellowship is enjoyed on the basis of personal distinction, divine creatorship, and such human subordination as contains within itself the sense of kinship and affinity with God.

2. This divine sonship gives to the inwardness of the Kingdom of God two essential characteristics. It is both transcendent and forthgoing. Its " treasure " is in heaven, but its immediate objective is on earth. It brings together the supreme values of the eternal order and the importance of the historic process in time. This twofold reference is the essential meaning of sonship. It seeks at once to pursue and to enjoy the highest and to manifest it by uplifting and transforming the terrestrial order. Only in this combination is the integrity and wholeness of spiritual life to be realised and displayed. Heaven is the sphere of absolute values that are realised and active in the living God and are participated in by those who are in fellowship with Him. Yet these values are implanted in true human life, are organic with it, and can only be pursued in so far as they gain practical expression in character and social conduct.

The typical example of this fundamental combination is to be found in our Lord, Who " went about preaching the gospel of the Kingdom " and " doing good." Hence His consciousness was at once mystic and apocalyptic because it was perfectly filial. The relationship of eternity to time remains a philosophic problem. Yet each is real, and God who " inhabiteth eternity " comes forth as Creator to fulfil an eternal purpose in time and history. He is both transcendent and immanent because He is Love. So, also, it is with His Son. Hence the life of His followers is also essentially twofold. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says, almost in the same breath, " Ye are come unto Mount Zion, the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem " and " to do good, and to communicate [that is to share], forget not, for with such sacrifices God is well pleased." This practical temper and conduct alone corresponds with the " vertical " relationship that exists for men with " The Father, from whom every family constituted by fatherhood [πατρία] is named " ; that is, derives its nature.

3. Yet it is the characteristic faith of the Christian religion that, in thus combining the mystic and the apocalyptic, the followers of Christ are neither supreme nor alone in playing their part in human history. Christ is for them the supreme actor in human history. The world will finally be judged by the spiritual values of His perfect life. The age-long conflict of human history is between Christ and Anti-Christ, between self-giving and self-love. Human life, and even the cosmic

order, will eventually be transformed by the Spirit of Christ, and the discord between them will be finally harmonised, after the conflict has played its part in evoking and perfecting the eternal values of Divine Love. This final consummation will be the triumph, not of men, but of Christ.

This final triumph can for the present be only scenically depicted, if at all, with the inherent imperfections and externality by which such picturing must needs be marked. Yet even this picturing, though misleading when treated with fundamentalist literalism, enshrines great spiritual truths. Its " treasure " is held " in earthen vessels," for " we know not yet what we shall be." Owing to their limitations, men have presented as irrational alternatives what are to be held together in a spiritual whole. This whole, when truly apprehended, accepts " the one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves " as the goal of ethical conduct, and does so just because of the filial spirit, which " seeks the things that are above, where Christ is seated at the right hand of God."

J. Scott Lidgett.

FRANCE IN SYRIA.

RECENT developments in the French Mandate for Syria are of special interest in view of the Franco-Syrian treaty of October 22nd, 1936. The Treaty provides that the *status quo* is to undergo a radical change in the direction of independence. The country is passing through the same historical processes as Iraq, Egypt, and, to a certain extent, Palestine. It deserves all the more notice because it is the most advanced of the Arab countries. The Syrian nation adapted the principles of European culture sooner and at a more rapid rate than the other Arab nations. Even in Egypt, Syrian publicists, doctors, lawyers and intellectuals in general held a front-rank position for many years. Unlike the other Arab countries, Syria has a very strong Christian minority, composed of Maronites, Orthodox Greek Christians, Melchites, Greek Catholics, Armenians and so forth. Of the total population of 2,600,000 over half a million are Christians. France's strange policy has divided the Mandate territories into five " independent states "—Syria, Great Lebanon, Djebel-Druse, Alauiten and the Sandjak of Alexandretta.

The first period of Mandate government comprised three and a half years of General Gouraud's rule. On his appointment as High Commissioner in November 1919 he declared his principal task to be the economic restoration of the country. As he himself related, the words of the creator of present-day Morocco, Marshal Lyautey, hovered before him like a guiding star : " As long as the French flag floats over the country it remains our duty to protect it, not only by military force but also by increasing the contentment and prosperity of its inhabitants, as well as by strengthening its economic position." Fine words, without doubt. Unhappily they remained on paper. The High Commissioner's programme was to revive the exhausted agricultural system, whilst paying special attention to the interests of France. During the World War France was completely dependent on other countries for her cotton supply. Gouraud therefore took up the cultivation of the cotton trade, especially as the district around Aleppo is suitable for cotton plantations. What was the result ? After three and a half years of activity his report could point only to very poor success. Of the 15,000 square miles of cultivated land, only one-fifth of the soil was being cultivated at

the time when he left the country. Despite the great interest which France professed for cotton plantations, the area under cultivation in 1924, a year after his retirement, amounted to only ninety square miles.

Serious difficulties, of course, both economic and social, stood in the way. For example, tens of thousands of young people were forced to emigrate for lack of the means of existence; great expanses of country, including some very fertile districts, either lay fallow or were under superficial cultivation; the war caused a catastrophic drop in agricultural production; many mulberry and olive trees were uprooted, causing a great decline in silkworm breeding and oil production, the most important branches of agriculture in Lebanon; finally, the country was suffering from lack of capital. But instead of finding ways and means of overcoming the difficulties, instead of pursuing a national economic policy, Gouraud relegated these serious economic problems to the background. The ambitious General, who had had a distinguished career in the war, devoted himself to sternly political aims. On September 1st, 1920, he proclaimed in Beirut, " in the name of the French Republic," the creation of the state of Greater Lebanon. Such was the fulfilment of France's efforts to extend her colonial rule to the eastern Mediterranean basin. As was to be expected, the creation of the new state came as a heavy blow to the Syrian Nationalist movement. Riots broke out in protest and spread.

The policy of Gouraud's successors, Weygand, Sarrail, de Jouvenel and Ponsot, followed, more or less, the programme of their predecessor, the pupil of Lyautey. The division of the country was continued, and by the summer of 1924 the five " States " already mentioned were in existence. The present High Commissioner, Count de la Martel, was unwilling to stop short at this division. By a decree of January 23rd, 1936, he ordered a further parcelling out of Syria into six, indeed eight, new " independent " provinces with independent financial and administrative organisation. The carrying out of this reform, however, was hindered by a rising in Syria in January-February 1936. The division of the country cannot be justified either on economic or administrative grounds. Precisely for reasons of economic and administrative usefulness, unity is a necessity. Every " State," every " Republic," has its special apparatus, the upkeep of which

is a heavy burden on a poor community. Political motives dictated the division, namely the desire to weaken the power of the nation as a whole; the " States," parties, religious denominations, minorities, were played off systematically one against another in the interest of French colonial policy.

According to the status of the Class A Mandates, the mandatory power enjoys no economic privileges, being placed on an equal footing with other members of the League. In reality, France deliberately attempted to gain a monopoly in the Syrian markets. One convincing proof is the fact that in the economic programmes of the High Commissioners, particularly those of General Gouraud and Count de la Martel, the need of native industry is never mentioned. The Customs Office in particular paid no heed to the requirements of the nascent industrial production of the country. French capital alone controlled the most important economic factors, such as the water supply, transport, electric power and the tobacco trade. The results of these monopolies, among others the very high prices, weigh heavily on the population. It is not without interest that, on account of the high prices, the inhabitants of Damascus in 1935 boycotted the trams and the electric light supply for several months.

An extensive system of irrigation—a crying necessity—was not carried out. The taxation of agriculture amounts to between 20 and 30 per cent. of the proceeds. Hardly any provision was made for the creation of normal means of credit, such as co-operative credit associations, for the smallholder, who predominates in Syrian agriculture. To-day the rate of interest for the peasant alternates between 12 and 50 per cent. or more. Nothing is done to substitute for short-term credit, usually limited to a year, one more rational and fair which would be as much in the interest of agriculture as in that of the poor farmer. Finally, no steps have been taken to spread expert agricultural knowledge. In such circumstances it is not to be wondered at that trade has been in a hopelessly stagnant condition for years. The poverty of these districts cannot fail to strike every foreigner.

Syria, as a Mandate country, was placed in Class A, and should therefore be granted all the advantages of self-government. In reality the French Mandatory administration followed a policy of autocracy. The Syrian people had, *de facto*, no right to shape its destiny. The Parliaments, Ministers,

Presidents, and all the native machinery of the "States" existed only on paper. French advisers, with the High Commissioner at their head, ruled everywhere. By his own decision Parliaments were dissolved for an indefinite period, constitutional measures and political liberties were suspended; even the minimum guarantees of personal liberty were rendered illusory. The French political secret service (*Service des Renseignements*) established a pitiless system of supervision. It is noteworthy that the secret service posts were held by officers who were also advisers to the District Governors, that is, local representatives of the Mandate Government. The worst abuses were rife.

With the exception of de Jouvenel, the High Commissioners pursued a policy, not of understanding and co-operation, but of the strong hand. Heavy responsibility for the steady deterioration of conditions rests with the French advisers, who, through their knowledge of the country, understood how to exercise decisive influence on the High Commissioners. It was especially in these officials' interest to treat Syria as a colony. The High Commissioners went away, but the advisers remained and ruled in the country as in a conquered fortress.

The Mandate policy achieved exactly the reverse of what was desired, namely the union of the national elements in the various "States." Generally mistaken were the tactics of employing the Christians as allies against the Moslems; for the Maronites, and also most of the other Christians, feel closely united with their Syrian home. They have proved this unity conclusively more than once. As already intimated, the dissatisfaction found expression in risings. The following major riots took place: The rising of Emir Faour in 1919 in the Huleh district; the rising in the Alauiten district under the leadership of Sheik Salih ibn Ali, which lasted from 1919 to 1921; the revolt in Northern Syria under the leadership of the recently deceased national socialist leader from Aleppo, Ibrahim Hanano; the insurrection in 1922 under Sultan el-Atrasch in the Hauran district; risings under Sheik Ismail Hariro in Hauran and in Damascus in 1922; the rising in 1923 in the Baalbek district, led by Melhem Kasim; the great rising under the above-named Sultan el-Atrasch in 1925; finally, the Syrian general strike, January-February 1936. It must be repeated that only great risings are included

in this catalogue. Less important outbreaks were much more frequent. Not only for months, but for years, French troops waged war against the Syrian people. The population was particularly embittered by the ruthless methods of suppressing the insurrection of 1925-6, when Damascus was bombarded by artillery and aeroplanes. This terrible bombardment, which lasted from October 18th to the 20th, reduced entire districts in the city to ruins. The impression left by the ruins is heart-rending.

Owing to the frequent riots and smouldering discontent among the population, France was compelled to maintain large military forces. Thus the expenses for the French army in Syria for 1929 amounted to 271 million francs. According to the statement of Pertinax in the *Echo de Paris*, the French budget has been burdened of late years by 160 million francs annually for the French troops. *Œuvre* also holds the view that the Mandate over Lebanon and Syria costs France a very great deal and requires 13,000 French troops. According to this paper the French commitments for these two countries amounted to about 350 million francs, whilst the troops alone devoured the gigantic sum of 160 million francs.

The last period under Count de la Martel failed to bring either order or peace into the country. Like General Gouraud, a man of the old diplomatic school, he planned great economic schemes, but soon abandoned them in order to devote himself to "high politics." In the sphere of internal policy, he started his "approaches" to the representatives of the nation with the dissolution of Parliament, without summoning it again. His rigorous police system led, finally, to the above-mentioned January rising. In the critical days he assumed an aggressive attitude which aggravated the situation. Almost the whole time he held office in an atmosphere of suspicion. In political circles in Syria it was considered practically certain that he would not return to Beirut. This, however, was not the case; but it is to be hoped that he will now pursue a conciliatory policy in the spirit of the new treaty.

The basis of this policy is the idea of employing Syria's geographical and strategic conditions as a bridge between West and East. At the time when England's chief task in the Near East, even after granting internal independence to Iraq, was to guard the route to India at the strategic points between Suez and Basra, France's rule in Syria and Lebanon

bore a more localised character. It arose from historical and cultural motives and from a basis of prestige, rather than from France's political and economic interests as a colony-owning country and from the necessities of her world policy in general. This " omission " is now to be made good.

The scheme drawn up by Count de la Martel in 1934 contains two important points, a road between Damascus and Bagdad, and the extension of the railway between Aleppo and Tel Suan as far as the Syrian-Iraq frontier. The Damascus-Bagdad road means, besides the connection between Syria and Iraq, access to the Persian Gulf and thence to India, Indo-China and the Far East ; the railway from Tel Suan to the Iraq frontier opens up the route to Northern Persia and thence to the Russian Caucasus. France has great strategic interests in these new roads. Moreover, Syria is the most important station on her air service between Indo-China and the Far East. This connection is to strengthen the vital nerve of the traffic between France and Indo-China, by the development of the landing places in Beirut and the improvement of the other aerodromes existing in Syria.

In endeavouring to take advantage of the political tendencies in Iraq and Iran, which aim at liberation from English influence, France is seeking to divert the commercial traffic of these countries from the harbour of Haifa to Beirut, from the Haifa-Bagdad road or railway to the contemplated Aleppo-Gabo-Iraq railway and the Damascus-Iraq road. While Great Britain develops the harbour of Haifa and Italy is strengthening her influence on the Eastern Mediterranean coasts, France desires to secure a share of the Middle East and above all to utilise her position in Syria. This plan is to be brought into harmony with Syria's economic interests. Will it succeed ?

Syria's demands have been made known on various occasions. They were clearly formulated, for example, in the petition of the Syrian delegation to the Mandate Commission of the League on February 11th, 1927. " Above all the Syrians demand their full independence, like other civilised countries. They also demand the full exercise of their national sovereignty. They ask, therefore, to be admitted to the League of Nations, that is, they wish to be in possession of all the results of real juristic independence. In recognition of the

sacrifices made by France in Syria and Lebanon, the representatives of the Syrian and Lebanon people will recognise France's right to certain economic advantages, which may be summed up as follows : the issue of loans, the development of the Syrian army, the creation of a French naval base on the Syrian coast, and, finally, the drawing up of a treaty of mutual defence in the event of danger." These demands included all the items brought forward by the Syrian delegation at the treaty negotiations in Paris. The chief points were the restoration of the constitution ; abolition of the Mandate, the failure of which has become obvious ; a declaration of the absolute independence of Syria and recognition of the unity of the country in the territorial post-war divisions when the Mandate was introduced ; the concluding of a treaty with France after the pattern of the treaty between Iraq and England. These demands were accepted by Count de la Martel, after the fifty days' strike of the Syrian people in 1935, as a basis for negotiations.

After several months of negotiation the treaty was at last concluded. All the questions concerning the relations between Syria and France have been regulated. The chief clause contemplates the dissolution of the Mandate in three years' time, when Syria, supported by France, is to enter the League. Meanwhile direct French rule is to yield to native government. Syria is to be awarded the most far-reaching rights in administration, law, finance and customs. The management of the so-called mutual interests, which rested in the hands of the Mandate government, is to be transferred to the Syrian Government. Special clauses regulate the rights of the French and of French undertakings in Syria. French military occupation is to be maintained to defend the frontiers, but the troops are to be decreased and limited to certain districts. A committee has been appointed to raise money for the future army and navy. This organisation has decided to exact from every able-bodied inhabitant a minimum subscription of a franc per month ; no provision is made for a maximum subscription. Simultaneously, groups are being organised for military training.

It is recognised that the presupposition of the restoration of a relationship of confidence between France and Syria is the strengthening of the principles of a legally recognised State ; the Lebanon and Syrian Parliaments must be

summoned again; constitutions of the districts and political liberties must be restored; a general amnesty is also in prospect. One of the first duties of the Parliament, that is, of a National Assembly, is to be the ratification of the Treaty which opens a new chapter in the history of Syria.

The Blum Cabinet, needless to say, has no responsibility for the Mandate policy of its predecessors. On the contrary it has inaugurated a new era for the Syrian nation. It is regrettable that the Alexandretta question has arisen to complicate the situation. Historically, geographically and ethnically, the Sandjak is an Arab territory with a Turkish minority. The Syrians regard it as a portion of their homeland, which they are ready at any cost to defend. In this endeavour they count on the effective support of France.

PAUL OLBERG.

THE STORY OF THE SCARECROW.

FOR some time past historians and economists have been nibbling at various scientific theories of the social development of an earlier age, but like the knowing mice in their studies or class-rooms, they have not allowed themselves to explore these tempting baits too far. From time to time, too, less august persons may have had recourse to an impressionistic study of some neglected or forgotten analogy of old-world life, and one such adventure, though trivial, may amend the credit of the countryside as well as the meaning of a symbol of one of its activities through an unmeasured span of years.

Now that the "village museum" is attracting serious attention in the learned world, it might seem that among its typical exhibits the village scarecrow should be adequately represented and correctly labelled. The cult of the crow may be found among nations of the East and West, and a rustic patter of prayers and spells with a display of rude symbols, to ward off evil spirits or pests, may recall some earlier superstitions; but we shall not find here the inspiration that we are seeking, though a trace of it appears in Chaucer's malicious story of the caged crow, whose depravity provoked a curse of tuneless melanism, and reappears in Lafontaine's delicious fable. For already in the Tudor period the futile scarecrow of the fields was cited in the forum as a mere illusion. Indeed our dictionaries might have told us that, in those days, a guardian could suggest that a ward's importunate demands were "making a scarecrow of his studies"; while our publicists might be surprised to learn that then a statesman could justify a Turkish treaty as being meant "to make a scarecrow against Spain." Finally, the gaunt spectre of the scarecrow itself may remind us of the reproach and danger that beset a nation whose workers lack the means of securing their daily bread.

A somewhat austere definition of the "scarecrow" has been given in the dictionaries, and some further particulars seem desirable to complete and elucidate an outline of the evolution and devolution of this familiar spectacle. Even from a conventional definition it is obvious that the scarecrow is an object that inspires fear, and its display is commonly associated with the defensive operations of farmers and market

gardeners, whose wheat or walnuts may be attacked by flocks of feathered raiders among whom the crow family predominates in numbers, cunning and voracity.

It might seem that here we have traces of a hereditary feud between the cultivators of the soil and the denizens of the local rookery, a relic of that vendetta being the "scarecrow" itself as a forlorn feathered "object," suspended from a stake or flaunted among other exhibits in the keeper's "larder." This rustic object-lesson may have been needed, but it might be urged that the conventional scarecrow of the dictionaries was not meant to be presented in this obscene form.

In the course of time, improvements on a scarecrow of bones and feathers have been attempted and such devices as invisible entanglements and mystifying reflections of light or inflections of sound have been effective so long as the illusion was favoured by sunshine or wind. Occasionally too the effect of such "scares" has been sustained by mechanical contrivances, but in every age it must have been found that the terror inspired by an inanimate scarecrow is gradually succeeded by contempt, and even the illusion of induced movement is necessarily ephemeral. The next device, therefore, was for the terrorist, when not present in person, to display a sartorial effigy which became the conventional "scarecrow" of modern times. The real and only effective scarecrow was, however, the scarer of crows in his own proper person, animated by a sense of the duty of protecting his employer's crops by terrifying predatory birds and putting them to flight. And so we come to one who may once have been a hereditary scarer of crows as a "farm-hand" on the manorial staff, armed with sling, crossbow or shotgun (according to the period), and equipped further with a hand rattle, as an accompaniment to raucous shouts. From which it will be seen that the scarer of crows may have been confused with a victim or dummy by those who have not realised that the scaring of crows was contrived by means of counter-attacks, and not by a vindictive display of battle trophies as in savage warfare. But it was in the uncivilised borderland of North Britain that starving peasants discovered a means to save their crops by a parchment pouch containing pebbles, carried on a pole, and for the last two centuries the roar of gunpowder has helped to solve that problem once for all.

The writer of this article has preserved, besides an oral family tradition going back to Napoleonic times, a clear recollection of a "tenting lad," an envied companion of his boyhood (more than seventy years ago), as the bearer of a "tenting gun," a flint-lock fowling-piece of prodigious length firing a blank charge of gunpowder, without which the crows would only flap from one end of the field to the other, ignoring an artistic effigy, which should have reminded them that its original was also the fearless raider of the rookery nests. The gun itself, however, was sometimes useless, when the weekly allowance of powder doled out by the bailiff had become exhausted; and then the tenting lad fell back upon a sling, from which he discharged pebbles with astonishing force and accuracy.

Seventy years hence our own great-grandchildren will probably know better than to shoot wild birds or to steal their eggs, while the manor house and its rookery may by then have become as rare as the wreckage of motor cars and aeroplanes in a generation which has learned to fly in air more easily than it can swim in water. However this may be, we should not allow the well-known objects of the countryside during our youthful days to be thrown on the scrap-heap of unremembered things without leaving any surer memorial than oral tradition to assist the scholarly and patriotic labours of the learned compilers of dictionaries and glossaries of our national and provincial speech or customs.

It is perhaps due to this neglect that the above conjectural reconstruction of the devolution of the scarecrow as a familiar institution of the English village needs to be qualified by more definite confirmation from manorial records. This can now be furnished, thanks to the interest that is being shown, up and down the country, in their preservation and use; but it will also show that our scarecrows may have a rather tragic origin. It might seem that the very name of the rookery (*rokeria*) has a feudal flavour and, though the scarecrow can have no analogy with grim exhibits *in terrorem* of mangled remains of traitors in the "Four Quarters of England" or of felons left to rot in chains at the "place whence they came," the rookery may have been included among the "issues of the manor" and the rooks' nests in the lord's "grove" counted, like the hawks' nests in the King's forest.

The amenities and profits of the rookery continued to be

tacitly reserved to the gentry until modern times, but actually control of its inhabitants was transferred to the countryside when the industrial, social and religious lives of the subjects were regulated by the statutory injunctions of Tudor sovereigns and their obsequious Parliaments, with the result that stringent measures had to be taken to ensure provision of bread and beer, even at famine prices. This economic position was largely due to the conversion of cornfields into sheep-runs, and a schedule of ground vermin and "noisome fowles" (including the crow family) was issued for the information of manor stewards and leet juries. However, the rewards for heads or eggs of crows were less easily earned than those for hedgehogs or mice; and so the "crow-net" hung from the church tower unused, except in famine years, while the rook boy and mole-catcher were employed by progressive farmers as of old; and so "rook pie" was still a delicacy for the parlour when "Mr. Pickwick" visited "Dingley Dell" in the days before the repeal of the corn laws.

In still earlier days a plausible devolution of the "scarecrow" from an animate to an inanimate protection of the seed and crop may be deduced from the minutes of the manor court and vestry. The organisation of the medieval manor farm has been well described, as far as the hierarchy of the "courtyard" is concerned, but there is perhaps still something to be learnt about seasonal employment which kept the dairy woman occupied with poultry and dairy work in summer and winnowing in winter. The carter harrowed the ploughed land and the ploughman who "held" the plough also kept it in repair. The team was "driven" by a youth who "tented" the patient oxen less by the goad than by vociferation; and when the seed was sown he "tented" it in turn by "driving" off the crows with that same practised voice; in which capacity he has come down to us as the "tenting lad" or "rook boy." It might happen, of course, that the "driving" or "tenting," like the ploughing and carting, were largely performed by the customary service of the village, which had produced in course of time a professional craft of "drovers"; and so if the service of "tenting" rooks were due, it would often be commuted for "crow silver" with which the very modest stipend of the "rook boy" could be paid.

In spite of this elaborate organisation by means of which

the communal officers of the village and a permanent staff of skilled farm-hands were drawn into the headquarters of their lord's demesne, one serious problem remained unsolved. The experiences of modern small-holders will perhaps account for the scarcity of medieval fruit and vegetables within reach of the winged or subterranean pests of the jungle, though grain crops were largely protected by concentration in a central plain, intersected by thoroughfares. The corruption of "moth and rust" was, however, a far less serious evil, in a famished countryside, than a diminution, through incorrigible thieving, of grain which was the staff of life as "meat and drink" and also the basis of commercial values. This all-important seed of the nation's prosperity or very existence, whose reproduction in an unkind soil or climate could only be counted as threefold, was a constant temptation to hungry peasants and their herds, unless it were closely watched until it rooted, ripened and lay in measured heaps on the floor of the locked granary. An explanation afforded by unfavourable weather conditions or other damage to the growing crops might be accepted, though the risk of loss from wild birds had been eliminated by the precaution of the rook boy's vigil. In the last resort, however, a test might be imposed whereby one or more of the lord's officers would be charged with a fixed return from a certain quantity of seed.

We must not regard the elaborate test of the "wainage," or profit of the arable cultivation of a manor, as merely a desperate remedy against thieving. It was a deliberate expedient, in advance of the times, induced by the pressure of taxation, fixed rents and a rising standard of living, as well as by the increased costs and reduced profits of farming. To these losses the mismanagement and dishonesty of the manorial household and farm staff had materially contributed, and such "misdeeds" as the stealing of grain and maiming of live stock were symptoms of a servile mentality, which survived abroad in the *sabotage* so graphically described by Balzac in *Les Paysans*.

We find that little attention has been paid to these leakages, which were, however, a matter of the deepest concern to the manorial administration. Economic and social historians have indeed hinted darkly that the medieval villager was not so simple as some writers suppose, since he disdained the black bread beloved by monks and hankered after the

flesh-pots of the lord's kitchen, to the eventual embarrassment of the manorial budget. The pilferings that resulted from these aspirations have been ignored in recent instructive discussions on the respective uses of black bread and white, and thus the psychological problem has been obscured. Now this will not do, because the allegations of widespread dishonesty made by medieval and post-medieval writers appear to be confirmed by the evidence of official records. But though this evidence may seem damning, it will not enable us to understand the real mentality of early labourers settled on the manors or drifting into the towns, or even into the wilderness outside these cramping havens.

In the medieval story of the *Green Children* the two little visitors from another hemisphere, emerging presumably from some "Wolf Pits," appear suddenly in an Essex harvest field, where they are unable to eat the corn offered to them by the villagers, craving beans instead. This might seem to be a subtle allusion to their æthereal hue, but the reference to the beans may be still more significant. We are reminded of cases in those evil times in which beans were no sooner planted than they were dug up by thin trembling fingers groping through the night, even of that fearful but true story of crime in which the lord, watching by night with his officers to catch an outlying tenant who had uprooted the lord's beans "with his pigs," is lured to bed and drugged by a neighbour's wife and then slain by her son with an axe—the crime of parricide, for here we may see, incidentally, how a lord might be the father of his people.

The manor lords and their officers, finding their efforts to put a stop to the pilfering of grain ineffectual, were forced to take further measures to that end. All workers in the harvest field, in the stack-yard and barn, and in the granary itself, were watched and searched—as negroes, miners, ships' passengers and the guests of millionaires are even now liable to be searched, for nuggets, diamonds, matches, jewelry, or contraband. For we are told that thrashers more especially could carry off much corn in their long boots, gloves and "deep purses." The winnowers (women) were suspected of secreting corn in "great bags" hung under their skirts. And so after due allowance had been made for every possible issue and even for losses of grain in sheaf from vermin, if the total yield accounted for fell short of a previous estimate

per acre from given seed, some further cause of loss might be sought for as the result of this exhaustive scrutiny by manorial officers and auditors.

It might seem that we have here, at last, material for a full explanation of the origin and survival of our rustic scarecrow, but actually this is by no means the case. We are still unable to decide whether the "object" displayed was in fact a dead crow or merely some discarded garment suggesting the proximity of man; or again whether the "scarecrow" was in fact anything more than the "scarer" of crows, usually employed for that purpose under another title. Also there is the confident objection that the rook does not in fact steal seed corn in the spring, when scarecrows were and are much in evidence. Finally, what we know about the policy or husbandry of the medieval manor and village does not favour the supposition that rooks were generally displayed as scarecrows or that this device would have been regarded as an adequate protection for the crops, even if the killing of rooks for that purpose were feasible and permitted by general consent or by the lord himself as owner of the rookery.

It is useless to insist that we ought to know exactly what was done by the custom of the manor or of the "country" in such matters. Unfortunately this is one of the common incidents in the "Life of the Fields" that would seldom, if ever, be directly recorded and here we shall have to read between the lines of court-rolls and accounts: but, in the first place, it may be worth while to inquire whether the mentality of our forefathers could throw any light upon this matter. We have many notices of the kindliness that saintly men and women extended to the beasts and birds which they had charmed and tamed, and in medieval illuminations and frescoes the crows are seen helping themselves from the sower's seed-lip or solemnly listening to a sermon by a friar.

It is likely that the mentality of that age was not so acute and practical as this of ours in which the small-holder, with eager self-reliance, seeks to avert every danger to his crops, though he may have to pay a heavy price for this devotion in "Killingworth" or in any other soil where the spring brood of insects is the spring food of birds. A further hint may perhaps be furnished by the relations of the village with the forest and the rookery respectively. Our ancestors, who had to pass long winter nights in darkness listening for the wolf

at the door of the adjacent byre, or to keep watch lest their poultry should be scattered by the falcon's swoop from a blue sky, were more concerned with the ravages of forest beasts and birds than with the pilfering of parasites. Here then we may find an explanation of the toleration of the village rookery which would have been more significant if we had remembered that the village itself was once the appanage of a manor, and that their common institutions might be governed by Nature in her sternest mood.

The result of this attempt to investigate the cryptic origin of a familiar if unsavoury feature of the English countryside will at least justify one satisfactory conclusion. The medieval landlord, farmer and cottager would seem to have been guiltless of the slaying of rooks to serve as scarecrows since they had scarcely the time or means to obtain such trophies, while cheap labour made it unnecessary to experiment with a dead bird, a waste of food, moreover, which was almost as unpardonable as discarding old clothes. At the same time, it would be futile to suggest that our ancestors spared the rookery for æsthetic reasons, for even we who might prefer to display a disreputable coat and hat instead of a dead bird, merely to save trouble, would be incapable of wantonly chasing crows with idle hawks or (as in a recorded case) of employing farm-hands during Lent to banish the crows from their nests because their clamour disturbed the "Lord Bishop."

The moral of this inquiry may be that the townsman might perhaps take pains to acquire a better knowledge of the countryman's environment if only to further a common interest in the welfare of the countryside. The success of a movement during recent years for the protection of wild birds must be a matter for general congratulation, but that reform does not necessarily imply the reckless preservation and multiplication of birds whose depredations might cause serious damage to more than one depressed industry of this country. For some of us this will be the crux of the matter. Unfortunately many charming birds are destructive to food crops as parasites of man, all the more elusive because their proximity quickens the instinct of self-preservation by observation and suspicion. At the same time we must not forget that these denizens of our nearest groves and gardens have put themselves under our protection, and even if they

may abuse our hospitality, they can be valuable allies against some insect pests and may also help to repay us by graceful movements and cheerful song.

Since this was written the instinctive humanity of the countryside has been once more revealed by an outcry following the alleged poisoning of rooks in a Southern county. Myriads of "vermin," including suspect members of the crow family, are openly trapped or secretly poisoned every year without public disapproval; but when after the customary thinning of the new-fledged nestlings, to prevent a disastrous overflow, sacrilegious hands are laid upon the village rookery, this is, and we may believe has been and always will be, resented by virtue of the communal sentiment that still abides in us as the remote descendants of some ancient manorial community.

HUBERT HALL.

THE MYSTERY OF COLUMBUS.

AFTER more than four centuries floods of ink and heaps of paper have been expended by thousands of writers in discussing the problem of the origin and life of Christopher Columbus and the discovery of America. Why has such an extraordinary interest arisen? I think that the history of geography owes much more to Henry the Navigator —the Portuguese Prince, son of an English Princess—than to Columbus, and that the exploit of Fernão de Magalhães is much more wonderful than the first known voyage to the Antilles. Notwithstanding, though Prince Henry and Magalhães have been duly praised and much written about, no other navigator, traveller or discoverer, has caused such huge interest and curiosity, which main reason, besides the importance of the universal knowledge of the discovery of America, is the mystery in which Columbus always involved his personality.

There are not many documents prior to 1492 referring to Columbus, and still fewer whose authenticity we can trust; even among those dating after that year some are definitely recognised as apocryphal, and many others, of the greatest importance, are not considered as authentic for all the colombists. Yet at the last Congress of Americanists held in Seville in 1935, an Argentine professor tried to demonstrate that a famous letter of Columbus attributed to 1501 is simply a copy, and even this apocryphal. From the end of the fifteenth century until present times, the forgery of documents referring to Columbus has not stopped, being more intensified after his death—during the dispute of the inheritance of the majorate and the admiralty—and more recently when several writers have disputed the honour of being a countryman of the famous navigator. Many countries have been ascribed as his birthplace, such as Italy, Greece, France, Corsica, Estremadura, Galicia, Catalonia, Portugal, etc., even Denmark and Switzerland! It seems that after many centuries no historical question has been treated with more passion and dishonesty than the problem of the birth of Christopher Columbus.

Thousands of books and studies have been published, and hardly can there be found two authors agreeing with each other's opinions. The main reason for all this confusion was the deliberate intention of Columbus to veil with mystery his

origin and first years of life. He succeeded so well that even to-day the point of the veil can scarcely be lifted! And nobody can make any affirmation about his origin, birth or life before 1492 without being contradicted. Why did Columbus do this? What reason had he to hide his origin in such a dense mystery? Nobody can yet answer satisfactorily this question, which might illuminate one of the most important features of modern history: the discovery of America, not yet made fully clear. A very illustrious colombist, Henry Vignaud, who dedicated the greater part of his life to the study of Columbus, and who cannot be accused of partiality, arrived at the conclusion that Columbus was a middling cosmographer, a sailor without experience, liar, vain, avaricious, quarrelsome, revengeful, without any "*de ces traits de bienveillance qui sont la parure des grandes âmes.*" In great part this severe judgment is a consequence of the net of lies with which Columbus entangled his life. How could we believe a man who presented himself as a great sailor and cosmographer, saying in 1501 that he had passed forty years of his life at sea, when we remember that he made an error of 14 degrees in the latitude he had observed in Cuba, although the determination of latitudes was already fairly accurate at that time among the Portuguese sailors with whom he had lived?

Although he never said that he was a Genoese, it is admitted by the majority of his biographers that he was a native of Genoa, and after he appeared in Portugal and Spain he was so considered. His son Ferdinand, though considering him a Genoese, says that he did not know where his father was born. Pedro Arana, an intimate friend of the Admiral, brother of Beatriz Arana, the mother of Ferdinand Columbus, said that "he heard it said that Christopher Columbus was a Genoese, but he did not know where he was born." And how can we admit or explain a man of regular culture, who came from Genoa in about his twentieth year, never speaking or writing Italian, and when he addressed his friends at Genoa he wrote in Spanish? Also why, being a Genoese, he sought for help in Portugal and Spain, even in England and France, and never asked his native country? Henry Harrisse found at least 124 persons called Colombo living at Genoa in the fifteenth century, but not one of them could be a relative of the Admiral; and during the process of the majorate not any of the Italian pretenders was a native of Genoa, nor could they prove

relationship with the navigator. Many other objections can be found.

Although there were some documents which referred to Columbus as a Genoese, they were later discovered to be forgeries. Nevertheless, not long after the Congress of Americanists assembled at Paris in 1900 had settled on 1451 as the date of Columbus' birth, the Italian General Assereto in 1904 discovered in the Archives of Genoa a document of 1479 in which Columbus himself says that at this date he was 27 years old. It clears up many other doubtful points. It was an extraordinary coincidence, so great that several colombists consider it a forgery. It is amazing that such an important document had never been noticed before in the archives of Genoa, which had been searched by hundreds of investigators; and that a notary document like this was not in a book, but in loose sheets. The skill of forgers is so great, especially in Italy, that one is not surprised at another forgery. This document has not been duly and scientifically studied. I do not contest the Genoese origin of Columbus for pleasure; I simply want to show that in spite of the majority of his contemporaries, biographers and commentators considering him as a Genoese from the fifteenth century until to-day, there is serious ground to believe that this is untrue. He deliberately wished to hide his nationality, allowing it to be believed that he was from Genoa, but always avoiding any statement on the subject. Some of his biographers say that he wanted to conceal his plebeian and modest origin, but although he was vain and conceited enough to do so, the argument is rather precarious.

There are many other sides to the Columbus mystery. Shortly after his appearance in Portugal, Columbus married D. Felipa Moniz, a lady of the highest nobility and a distant relative of the royal family. How can we conceive that a young foreign adventurer, poor and of humble origin (it is said that he was a weaver in Genoa, belonging to a very modest family), could dwell in the splendid house of João Esmeraldo, a distinguished friend of the King, and marry such a noble lady, at a time when the prejudices of blood were even greater than to-day? And how can we understand that the King of Portugal allowed this plebeian adventurer to be seated in his presence, when talking with him—an honour granted only to persons of the highest rank—and treated him as his "special friend," in the famous letter of 1488, when

Columbus was a simple pretender, four years before he sailed for his first voyage? What is hidden behind all these astonishing contradictions of history?

It is known that the Portuguese chroniclers kept a surprising reserve about Columbus, or distorted the truth in some events connected with him. Barros says that this man, "talkative, conceited and impertinent," was only "considered as a Genoese." In the *Diario* Columbus describes his arrival at Lisbon in 1493, after he returned from his first voyage to the Antilles, and the interview he had with the King of Portugal, referring to the cordiality of John II and the honours and favours he had received. Nevertheless, two contemporary chroniclers, Pina and Resende, paint the scene with quite different colours. They say that the King sharply reprimanded Columbus for discovering, in favour of Castile, regions which belonged to Portugal, and the navigator was so insolent to the King that some noblemen intended to slay him, which John II opposed because he was very God-fearing; he, who did not hesitate to stab his brother-in-law the Duke of Vizeu, and beheaded his cousin the Duke of Bragança, when he thought it convenient to his policy of defending the Crown from the power of the nobles. In view of the friendly letter of 1488, the version given by Columbus seems more reasonable. Possibly the chroniclers had instructions to relate the events as more convenient for the "policy of secrecy," which was a characteristic of this King's reign.

My brother, Dr. Jaime Cortesão, has for the first time especially dealt with this problem of the policy of secrecy applied by the Portuguese rulers to navigations and discoveries during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Besides several documents which reveal how carefully the Portuguese authorities defended this secrecy, such as royal orders forbidding foreigners to go to Guinea on pain of death, and the cartographical representations of some of the newly discovered countries, the most important evidence is given by the study of the contemporary chronicles. In the *Cronica da Guiné*, of Zurara, we see references to some chapters dealing with the division of the eastern countries and their importance for the Portuguese, though in the sole copy known—from the fifteenth century, but not the original—we cannot find them; they have obviously been eliminated from the original. We also know of the early existence of other contemporary

chronicles of Fernão Lopes, Cerveira, and Zurara, but they have disappeared. Other chroniclers, like Pina, are clearly remiss in the matter of contemporary discoveries; it is enough to remember that Pina makes no reference to the voyage of Dias to the Cape of Good Hope and that of Covilhan to the East. The great Barros, when describing the discoveries and navigations of the Portuguese during the reign of Alfonso V, said that there were many others, but he did not describe them because he did not know the dates and the captains' names. The limited space does not allow me to go further, and I can make but a brief résumé of the vast evidence accumulated by Dr. Jaime Cortesão in order to demonstrate the pre-Columbus discovery of South and North America by the Portuguese.

Ferdinand Columbus and Las Casas, the principal contemporary biographers of the Admiral, reproduce in several chapters of their works many of his notes about the voyages of the Portuguese to the West. These chapters, of the greatest historical importance, though Ferdinand Columbus did his best to corrupt the truth, thinking that to diminish the exploits of the Portuguese would magnify those of his father, had never before been duly studied and criticised. Las Casas, more honest, in spite of his natural enthusiasm for Columbus, headed his Chapter XIII " Many and several indications and signs that Christopher Columbus was informed by several persons, who made him very certain that there was land in this part of the West." The evidence of the pre-Columbus discovery of America by the Portuguese is seen by the following: (*a*) the notes of Columbus transmitted by his two biographers; (*b*) the diaries of Columbus' three voyages and several autograph notes; (*c*) the documentation assembled in the *Pleitos*; (*d*) many Portuguese documents of the fifteenth century unpublished or incompletely studied; (*e*) several other documents, such as contemporary maps, treaties, etc. From this we can arrive at the documental and scientific conclusion that the Portuguese had been in the South and North American continents before Columbus; also there is some evidence, though not so positive, that they were in the Antilles.

There are several documentary indications that after their first discoveries the Portuguese continued and extended their navigations towards the West during the fifteenth century.

We know of three of these voyages in the middle of that century and several documents granting the newly discovered western lands. In 1470 Alfonso V conceded the monopoly of " precious stones, tints of Brasil and laque " in the " parts of Guinea " which could hardly exist on the known coast of Africa, but could be found in South America.

The map of Bianco, dated London 1448, shows south-westward of Cape Verde an " *Ixola otinticha longa a poniẽte* 1500 *mia.*" Several writers identify this island with Brazil, which really lies 1,520 miles south-west of Cape Verde. Bianco undoubtedly obtained this information when travelling in one of the Venetian galleys which called yearly at Lisbon. This should correspond to the island of St. Brandon on Behaim's Globe (1492) or the " *isola descobierta por Portugal* " of La Cosa's map (1500). There is also the old map referred to by Bisagudo in his letter written in 1500 from Brazil to King Manuel, in which that land (Brazil) was already represented.

The policy of John II in the treaty of Tordesillas, requiring that the line of partition should pass 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde islands, comprehending a great part of the eastern coast of South America, is but one more proof of the knowledge of this continent's existence. Columbus himself reminds us in the *Diario* of his third voyage that " the King of Portugal was sure of the existence of famous lands there (South America) and so he sent to discover towards the south-west."

Estevão Frois coming from Brazil had to call at the Antilles. Sent to prison by the Spaniards he wrote in 1514 a letter to the King of Portugal saying that he came from near the Cape of St. Augustin, which had belonged to Portugal for more than twenty years. In 1531 a French ship attacked the Portuguese factory of Pernambuco; in the documents of the dispute which followed between Portugal and France we find the declarations of four sailors saying that the Portuguese had had there a factory and houses for more than forty years. All these documents agree in date and place. In 1527 Robert Thorne wrote from Seville to the King of England about the treaty of Tordesillas, saying that the King of Portugal knew of a southern continent which he wanted to include in his zone of partition.

The voyage of Antonio Leme in the middle of the fifteenth century and what Las Casas says, that the natives of Cuba told him that before the arrival of the Spaniards at Haiti

other navigators, white and bearded, had been there, are also indications of prior visits of the Portuguese to the Antilles. As much more evidence I could present showing the pre-Columbus voyages of the Portuguese navigators to North and North-East America.

Another side of the problem is the rivalry between Portugal and Spain in the fifteenth century in the matter of ocean discoveries. Since the first Portuguese navigations, Castile disputed their discoveries, beginning with the occupation of the Canary archipelago, a naval base for future expeditions. During the reigns of Duarte and Alfonso V of Portugal, Prince Henry tried to obtain from Castile the cession of the Canary Islands, but as he could not succeed he organised four military expeditions against the islands, which provoked two appeals of Castile to Alfonso V, in 1452 and 1454, and had it not been for the death of John II a war would have broken out on that account. However, Portuguese chronicles keep absolute silence upon these important events which the Spanish chroniclers Palencia and Las Casas largely describe. As a consequence of the war between Castile and Portugal, during 1475-80 the Castilians intensified their attacks on the Portuguese possessions. In 1476, for example, a Spanish fleet of thirty ships attacked the Cape Verde Islands, taking back to Seville the "*donatario*" and many Portuguese inhabitants as prisoners. During the reign of John II of Portugal the struggle was only more intense and the treaty of Tordesillas was the result.

In brief: (*a*) during the period of discoveries the Portuguese rulers adopted a strict policy of secrecy; (*b*) there is evidence enough to conclude that the Portuguese were in America before Columbus; (*c*) there was great rivalry between Portugal and Spain, which reached its climax during the reign of John II and conduced to the treaty of Tordesillas. In my book on early Portuguese cartography published in 1935, when dealing with the problem of Columbus (Vol I, Cap. IV), I already presented the thesis that he was a secret agent of John II. This king knew of the existence of the American continent, and possibly that his navigators could not find a passage through it towards the West; hence the impossibility or difficulty of reaching Asia from that side; he knew that this continent, inhabited by savages, was not the rich Orient from whence came the spices, and about which he

had exact information; in view of the rivalry of Castile he had the utmost interest in letting the kings of Spain "discover" America and keeping them convinced that this was the Far East, thus remaining free of competition (which he had every reason to fear) to proceed his way around the Cape of Good Hope, which possibility he knew already after the voyage of Bartholomew Dias, if not before. As a matter of fact the Spanish kings were furious when they knew of the successful voyage of Vasco da Gama and protested to the Portuguese Court. And Columbus always affirmed that he had reached the Asiatic continent when he went to Cuba, threatening his sailors with the cutting of the tongue if they dared to deny that this island was not a continent. Haiti would be Cipangu (Japan). Though many say that Columbus was always convinced that he had reached Asia, Vignaud wrote, shortly before his death: "Le résultat d'études poursuivies toute ma vie, c'est que Christoph Colomb ne cherchait pas à atteindre les côtes orientales de l'Asie et les îles des Epices par la voie de l'Ouest."

Whatsoever was his nationality and birth, there is no doubt that Columbus was an adventurer of not very high esteem, quite fitted to perform that role in the Portuguese king's play. Besides his ambition and tenacity, he was a man of regular culture, and with some sea experience, though had he been a great sailor or cosmographer it would have been more difficult for him to disguise his real origin. The mist which veils this origin, the first coming to Portugal, his marriage, flight to Spain, the letter addressed to him by John II in 1488, the silence of the Portuguese chroniclers, his fight to convince that he had reached Asia though he knew himself that he had not, disguise of his name in a cabalistic signature (he never signed as Christopher Columbus), the ignorance of the Italian language of this so-called Genoese, the impossibility of finding in Genoa any of his relatives, in short—the mystery of Columbus begins to clear through this hypothesis. The preparations of the voyage of 1492 cost about two million maravedis, one million being supplied by the Crown of Castile however, nobody knows whence came the other million; it is supposed that one or another Italian or Jewish banker or Spanish nobleman lent the money. But how could we admit that none of these generous lenders appeared afterwards to share the splendid benefits of the great enterprise? Perhaps

John II supplied that money whose origin, most extraordinarily, nobody yet could trace.

I have strewn my thesis with too many queries, perhaps, to which I am unable to answer, but maybe I have brought some new light into the darkness of the problem. The history of John II, the " Perfect Prince," the most remarkable king of Portugal, and certainly one of the most extraordinary men of the world, is still to be written. And I can hardly say otherwise about Columbus. There is a huge mass of documents in Portuguese and Spanish archives connected with Columbus which have never been observed or properly studied, and I am convinced that when this formidable work is undertaken the history of the famous and mysterious man will have to be rewritten from the first line. I think that the connection between John II and Columbus was very close, and that we cannot study one without studying the other. Only when this study is done jointly will there be a possibility of satisfactorily unveiling the mystery which still lingers over the famous so-called discoverer of America.

ARMANDO CORTESÃO.

A VICTORIAN MAGAZINE.

THE appearance of *Bentley's Miscellany* in January 1837 was the first great literary event of that year and the story of its inception is worth recalling. The two Bentley brothers, Samuel and Richard, born in the latter years of the eighteenth century, were Londoners by birth and nurture, and from infancy were steeped to the eyebrows in printer's ink. Their father was part owner of the *London Evening Post*, which he printed, published, and practically edited. They had the good fortune also to be nephews of John Nichols, the printer antiquarian friend of Dr. Johnson, and compiler of the celebrated *Literary anecdotes of the Eighteenth Century*. Nichols was " Sylvanus Urban," editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, and his son John later became the sole owner, printer, and editor of this magazine, as well as being a Government printer and Master of the Stationers' Company. He inherited to the full his father's antiquarian interests, an inheritance which he handed down to his eldest son, a third John, who founded the Camden Society, and edited his grandfather's works, thus completing a family triad of antiquarians.

It was a foregone conclusion that, when school-days at St. Paul's ended, Samuel and Richard Bentley should proceed to the setting up of type, and they were severally apprenticed to their uncle John Nichols. Samuel, nine years the elder, was in partnership with his uncle when his brother Richard finished his apprenticeship in 1819. At Richard's desire Samuel surrendered his partnership, and the brothers set up a printing office in Dorset Street. Their successful work for the next ten years did not satisfy the restless energy of Richard, ever bent on progress.

Among the books the firm printed were those for Henry Colburn, publisher of the fashionable novels of the day, the names of which sound but faintly in the ears of twentieth-century readers. Colburn, once a bookseller and possessor of a Circulating Library (" that tree of diabolical knowledge," according to Sheridan), had resigned the mere distribution of books for their production. The Bentley firm printed for him in 1824 Theodore Hook's *Sayings and Doings*, and its success fired Richard Bentley with envy and determination to advance from printing to publishing books. Samuel, more interested in

typography, preferred to remain only a printer, so the brothers separated business relations, and Richard joined Henry Colburn in New Burlington Street as partner in his enterprises. The partners, with widely discordant tastes, did not long agree, and in 1832 the partnership was dissolved, and Bentley was left alone in New Burlington Street to begin his personal career. Here was his great opportunity and he did not neglect it. He obtained many works by well-known authors by making good offers in advance of other publishers, and his real genius showed itself in his ability to gauge latent talent. With far-seeing acuteness he secured as clients a number of unknown writers whose powers he recognised. Alive to the coming value of the writers of the New World, he made special terms with American authors, so was able first to introduce to English readers in the pages of his Miscellany Longfellow's *Wreck of the Hesperus* and the *Village Blacksmith*, Poe's *Fall of the House of Usher*, and others.

By the year 1836 his position as a leading publisher was secure, and he began to consider starting a periodical to further enhance it, the usual practice of publishers of the time. The "*Maga*" of Blackwood went on its majestic way, a little perturbed by the rise in 1830 of *Fraser's Magazine*, with Maginn's inimitable character studies, and Maclise's sketches; *Chambers's Journal*, started in Edinburgh in 1832, was to the front with its informative articles; and Bentley saw that there was room for an illustrated magazine of lighter character, staffed by the attractive band of humorists, American and English, that were at his command. He got together a nucleus of writers; his old school-fellow Barham, Minor Canon of St. Paul's, offered help; Tom Moore also proved amenable; and Hook, editor of Colburn's *New Monthly*, promised contributions. An editor was the chief desideratum. Early in 1836 Bentley, through his friend George Hogarth, had made the acquaintance of a young man of parts, then reporter to the *Morning Chronicle*, and was watching his career with interest. The publisher thought highly of the *Sketches by Boz*, and still more of the early numbers of the *Pickwick Papers*, and in August 1836 completed a contract with Charles Dickens for a novel, name unsettled, for the copyright of which he agreed to pay £500, and £500 for the novel, next written. Further, the young writer was offered the editorship of the yet-to-be-started magazine. Chapman

and Hall were by no means assured of the success of Pickwick, and Bentley, more skilful in appraising genius, obtained his editor without difficulty. The text of the agreements with Bentley, recently published by Mr. Walter Dexter in the *Dickensian*, show more to the credit of the publisher than is generally supposed.

Bentley had already definitely secured for the magazine George Cruickshank, the foremost illustrator of the day. Before the production of his first number the enterprising Bentley had determined to call the new venture the *Wits' Miscellany*, and it was advertised as a forthcoming magazine under this title. With fortunate prevision that the "wits" might not be self-evident, he changed the name at the last moment. "I have decided," he said to Barham, "to change the name of the Magazine from the *Wits'* to *Bentley's Miscellany*. "Why go to the other extreme?" said Barham. Bentley, unaffected by its spice of malice, passed on the jest with a good humour posterity has not failed to remember to his credit. This change of name occasioned some confusion when the *Miscellany* actually appeared. It was got over by the happy prologue to No. 1, by Wm. Maginn. "The fact is undeniable that we originally advertised ourselves—or rather our work—as the *Wits' Miscellany*, thereby indicating beyond a doubt that we of the Miscellany *are* Wits.—We massacred the title as ruthlessly as ever were massacred its namesake (De Witts) in Holland. Our path is distinct, a path of turf and flowers."

> Come round and hear, my public dear,
> Come near, and judge it gently,
> The prose so terse, and flowing verse,
> Of us, the Wits of Bentley!

The honours of No. 1 rest with three brilliant Irishmen, Francis Mahony ("Father Prout"), William Maginn and Samuel Lover, with Barham, the Englishman, as their able seconder. The editor's contribution, *The public life of Mr. Tulrumble*, was hardly up to standard, and other contributions were unimportant. These included verses by Haynes Bayly and Peacock, and sketches by W. H. Maxwell, Fenimore Cooper, Morier, Hook, and others. *Handy Andy*, the amusing tale by Lover, song-writer, novelist, and artist, began in this first number, illustrated by its author. "Father

Prout " gave some of his best work. The first page contained his *Bottle of St. Januarius*, to introduce the Month; a few pages on came his *Sabine Farmer's Serenade*, an amazing rendering into Latin verse of Hudson's Irish song, *Barney Brallaghan's Courtship*, as supposedly written by a rustic of the Augustan Age, and disinterred by an antiquarian. Later in the number appeared the amusing alleged discovery of the French original of the *Burial of Sir John Moore*. The authorship of the poem was causing contemporary discussion. Mahony's French version, "*Ni le son de tambour, ni le marche funèbre*" was explained as "*Les funerailles de Col. de Beaumanoir*," brought to Ireland by Wolfe-Tone!

These delightful parodies would alone have ensured the success of No. I of the Magazine. They were supplemented by Barham's verse. He started on his long connection with the Miscellany as the anonymous author of the *Monstre Balloon*, describing the ascent of Charles Green, the aeronaut, from Vauxhall in November 1836 in a balloon inflated with coal gas. It landed safely at Nassau in Germany with Green and his passengers, Mason and Holland. In the same number Haynes Bayly versified the flight, but his effort is tame beside Barham's racy poem, with its tale of " portable soup," " pressed beef with the fat cut off, nothing but lean," and the final apotheosis at Vauxhall :

> There on a beautiful transparent screen,
> In the middle you'll see a large picture of Green,
> Mr. Holland on one side, who hired the machine,
> Monck Mason on 'tother, describing the scene ;
> And Fame, on one leg, in the air, like a Queen,
> With three wreaths and a trumpet, will over them lean ;
> While Envy, in serpents and black bombazine,
> Looks on from below with an air of chagrin!

No. I of the *Miscellany* was approved by the public, No. II even more so, and with No. III it became an assured success, every succeeding number for years to come consolidating its position. Cruickshank's cover illustration obtained special praise as a then unusual magazine adornment. In No. II, Dickens came to his own with the first chapter of *Oliver Twist*. A leaflet bound in with this number had a parody by Dickens of the King's Speech at the opening of Parliament, with a woodcut by " Phiz," showing Bentley weighed down

by huge bales of the magazine, " Boz " by his side, and crowds round holding out hands for copies. In this same February number, Barham made his first appearance under his famous " Ingoldsby " pseudonym, in the *Spectre of Tappington*, which obtained conspicuous success.

At the close of the first volume its editor was able to give an optimistic address as from a theatre manager opening a new season : " Mr. Cruickshank was to continue to supply the scenery, the beautiful machinery would still be superintended by Mr. Samuel Bentley of Dorset Street, Mr. R. Bentley would preside over the Treasury Department with his usual ability, and the stage manager would be your humble servant Boz." At the end of the year Boz becomes even more jubilant : " Every successive number has experienced a warmer reception than before—so that like the heroine of the poem descriptive of the faithlessness of Mr. John Oakham of the R.N. we look both ways at once." The allusion is somewhat cryptic.

The feature of the *Miscellany* during Dickens' control was *Oliver Twist*, and in addition there were valuable articles, notably the fine series of Shakespeare papers by Maginn. " Father Prout " gave each month an appropriate metrical introduction, and other contributions. That little *jeu d'esprit*, *An Austrian army awfully arrayed*, an historical reminiscence of 1837, generally attributed to Alaric Watts, appeared anonymously in an early number. " Ingoldsby " continued to supply his incomparable legends month by month, and so, adapting Dr. Wolcot's couplet,

> Dick's Magazine all magazines excels,
> And what's still better too for Dick—it sells!

Little intimacy apparently existed between the editor and his chief contributors. Barham states that he never met Dickens till long after the magazine had started. " Boz," all the world knows, was a sensitive man and, in this case, there is ground for supposing that he resented Barham's friendship with Bentley, with whom he was becoming dissatisfied, and also the power of gentle satire possessed by the Minor Canon. He was a Tory and a cleric, and Dickens, at that time, had no use for either. The irreverent clergyman in Chapter V of *Oliver Twist* may have originated in this underlying resentment. Barham belonged to the Cathedral clique that Moore describes in April 1837 : " Conversation turned on Boz, the

new comic writer. Was sorry to hear Sydney Smith cry him down—whereas it appears to me one of the few proofs of good taste of 'the masses' that they like him. Hayward was the only one of the party that stood by me in this opinion." Moore's *Diary* gives us another glimpse of the editor in 1838.

> Dined at Bentley's. The company all very *haut ton* of the literature of the day. First, to begin *low* on the scale, myself, then Mr. Jerdan of the *Literary Gazette*, then Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Lover, Luttrell, and lastly, "Boz," and Campbell.—Forget, by the way, one of the cleverest fellows, Barham, my friend Hook's friend."

These dinners, in the Red Room at New Burlington Street, often occurred, Bentley, stout, rosy, with hair *en brosse*, presiding as a genial host. Moore realistically sketches him. "Talk with Bentley—Was amused at the sanguineness with which he seemed to consider the whole settled. The imagination of these matter-of-fact men beats poets hollow." The matter-of-fact, and imaginative, Bentley had cause for sanguineness in his successful *Miscellany*. Its editor was becoming daily more uneasy. He chafed at not being allowed full editorial control and his complaint here was justified. There was something to be said on the other side. The *Miscellany* was a monetary speculation; Bentley was paying the piper, and thought he had a right to call the tune. Dickens, in 1837, was a new writer, and it is possible to conjecture that Bentley was disappointed with his editor; humour did not seem to bulk as largely in the sombre "Mudfog" tale, *Oliver Twist*, as had been hoped for from the author of *Pickwick*. Later on, with Oliver's popularity, Newgate stories became the vogue, and *Jack Sheppard* was a welcome successor. For the moment the Irishmen and "Ingoldsby" led, in Bentley's opinion. Dickens' complaint that he was badly treated in monetary matters cannot be sustained. The original agreement was quite a fair one; Bentley had largely increased his editor's monthly salary, and also the original offer for a second novel, now definitely named *Barnaby Rudge*. Actually, Dickens was overworked, the quadruple strain of editorship; finishing *Pickwick*; writing *Oliver Twist*; and beginning *Barnaby Rudge*, was too great. He had also promised Bentley to edit the *Memoirs of Grimaldi*. Withdrawal from the *Miscellany* was an evident necessity. The Bentley quarrel was finally settled by dissolution of all the existing agreements and

payment of £2,250 by Chapman & Hall to Bentley for the copyright of *Oliver Twist*.

The *Miscellany* now found its second wind under the editorship of Harrison Ainsworth. In the number for March 1839, Dickens bade farewell in an epistle as from a parent to a child. "I contemplate your fair appearance, robust health, and unimpeded circulation with delight." Unable to refrain from bitter allusion, he closes: "I reap no gain from parting with you, you have always been *Bentley's Miscellany*, and never mine." This epistle included a topical paragraph:

> I returned by the Mail Train with the dejected Post-Office Guard, who sat, pistol in hand, ready to shoot the first man who should stop the horses, now *inside*. There may come a day when the mail-coach guard shall never have seen a horse.—Unlike the guard of the Manchester Mail, your new guard (Ainsworth) is quite at home with roystering highwaymen at call.

The first two issues of 1839 contained the conclusion of *Oliver Twist*, with Cruickshank's celebrated picture of "Fagin in the Condemned Cell." Cruickshank's illustrations, admirably printed by Samuel Bentley, had been an approved feature, and gave rise to the delusion of the artist in his old age, when he claimed to have suggested to Dickens the incidents of *Oliver Twist*. He made the same accusation as to Ainsworth's *Jack Sheppard*, which he illustrated with equal vigour. His connection with the *Miscellany* closed in 1843: and John Leech succeeded him as principal illustrator. The new editor was welcomed in a little poem, hailing the Three (Literary) Graces, the three leading magazines of the hour: "Madge Ebony, strictly called "Maga" (*Blackwood's Magazine*); 'Regina, a dame of pretensions and style" (*Fraser's Magazine*); and then:

> Here's to our Missy, the Missy of Mirth,
> In her habit of buff, with a quaint pattern graced;
> She flirts unrestricted with Tories and Whigs,
> And is only exclusive to prosers and prigs.

Under Ainsworth the *Miscellany* continued a successful career. The editor followed up *Jack Sheppard* with his historical tale *Guy Fawkes*, and excellent articles were contributed by American and English writers. "Ingoldsby" continued his series of *Legends*, and also proposed to Bentley

the whimsical idea of a novel, the *Modern Rake's Progress*, to be written in sections by different authors, and illustrated by Leech. It never took shape as intended, but John Hughes, one of the collaborators, whose son Tom was at Rugby, got him to write the school chapters, which are said to have been the germ of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*. The incomplete *Rake* was finally handed over to Henry Cockton, who embodied it in a tale in the *Miscellany* called *Stanley Thorn*.

1841 brought another change in the fortunes of the Magazine. Ainsworth, like Dickens, became restive under Bentley's control. He wrote: "Bentley is the real editor. The veto rests entirely with him. I am more restricted even than Dickens." He decided to start a magazine of his own, *Ainsworth's*, and resigned editorship of *Bentley's*. This action had a curious sequel. On the first page of *Ainsworth's* appeared an article by George Cruickshank, "A few words about Richard Bentley," in which he accused Bentley of describing his magazine as "illustrated by Cruickshank" when only one etching a month was supplied. He added various remarks derogatory to the publisher. That Ainsworth allowed this notice to appear was injudicious, to say the least of it, and Bentley's friends rallied round him. "Father Prout," from Genoa, rushed into the fray, and sent a humorous ballad to the *Miscellany*, *The Redbreast of Aquitania*, making Bentley the murdered cock-robin; Ainsworth, the delinquent sparrow. John Hughes, as "Mr. Buller of Brazen-nose," retorted in *Ainsworth's* with *The Magpie of Marwood*. The Homeric duel of bards continued some time, and ended with a mock-heroic poem in the *Miscellany*, *The cruel murder of Old Father Proutte, by a Barber's apprentice, Mr. Duller of Pewter-nose.*

The *Miscellany* by 1846 had ceased to be a special preserve of "wits." The illuminators of its early numbers had departed, and left no equivalent successors. "Butterfly Bayly" died in 1839; Theodore Hook in 1841; "bright broken Maginn" passed away in 1842; Hood, Barham and Sydney Smith in the same year, 1845; Tom Moore at Bromham had sunk into decrepitude; Mahony was permanently settled abroad, and on Lover had fallen the curse of blindness and other ailments. Shirley Brooks as editor, with Albert Smith and Cockton, produced readable serials, and there were good illustrations by Leech and "Alfred Crowquill." During the

'fifties, Ainsworth, its former editor, bought it, and with political and topographical articles of a solid kind it took a short fresh lease of life. It issued some historical novels of Ainsworth, illustrated by Gilbert, then beginning his brilliant career. Mrs. Henry Wood and "Ouida" were Ainsworth discoveries. A rollicking Oxford novel, *Vincent Eden*, by Dickinson, began publication and abruptly ceased, owing to pressure, it is said, from the University authorities.

The Magazine was no longer financially a success. There were now many of similar type, and it paled before the rising star of *Cornhill*, under Thackeray. Ainsworth resold it to Bentley, and in 1868 it was absorbed into *Temple Bar*, another Bentley periodical, and so faded into oblivion. Of its old brown volumes the early years are the only ones worthily to support that hopeful Bentleyan title, the *Wits' Miscellany*.

L. M. Littlewood.

THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMAMENTS POLICY.

THE military tension in Germany, the enthusiasm shown at the breach of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno, the jubilation over the march into the Rhineland, present no element of surprise to anyone acquainted with recent German history. Time and again in the course of the recent past has the world experienced an outbreak of German militarist mass enthusiasm of striking intensity—in 1813, 1840, 1859, 1870, 1914, that is to say in the years of the Wars of Liberation, of the Eastern crisis, of the war between France, Italy and Austria, and of the Franco-Prussian and World wars. It is usual to presuppose the existence of like causes behind similar phenomena, and therefore it is natural to inquire into the social foundations whereon this "war spirit" and "will to war," flaming up ever and again, has been enabled to spread itself.

The history of the German army is indissolubly bound up with that of the Prussian nobility. The Prussian nobility, a nobility of the sword occupying conquered colonised territory, was at first more powerful than the Hohenzollern dynasty, which only began to rule in North Germany in the fifteenth century. As a result of the absence of important cities the dynasty did not possess, as elsewhere, allies who might have permitted it to break the social power of the nobility. In these circumstances the Prussian crown tended more strongly than other princes to concentrate on the continual acquisition of new territories, a policy that was readily supported by the Prussian nobility, which was glad to be free of the king in home affairs and to see its younger sons provided for as officers in the army. A condition of this support was naturally that the Prussian aristocracy remained master in its own house. Whenever the crown sought to attack, it always suffered a defeat. The efforts to reform Prussia into a modern state after the defeat of 1806 in the struggle against Napoleon foundered for the most part on aristocratic resistance, or—as in the case of the liberation of the peasants—were deflected to serve aristocratic interests. The attempt of German democracy and liberalism to erect, in alliance with the crown after the revolution of 1848, a German liberal unitary state foundered likewise on the Prussian aristocracy. In the long run, of course, Prussia was unable to avoid participating in the national development. The Prussian crown's policy of power had, amongst other things, brought under its sway the industrial and bourgeois Rhineland, which involved the obligation to give some sort of expression to the bourgeois desire for German unity. Despite this, however, it still remained bound to the wishes of the Prussian aristocracy, above all in military matters. The Prussian army fulfilled for the Protestant Prussian nobility the same function as the monastery for the Catholic nobility of the middle ages; it formed, as we have already said, a kind of employment institution. At the same time the privileged place at the head of the Prussian army guaranteed an absolute right to the foremost place in the state and society. The creation of the German Reich by Prussia was necessarily bound up with the condition that nothing was to be changed in principle in the position hitherto enjoyed by the Prussian officer in the state and in society. The policy of Bismarck, who himself belonged to this aristocracy, did in fact achieve this end. He succeeded, in vigorous struggles with the Prussian bourgeoisie at the beginning of the 'sixties, in ensuring that the Prussian aristocracy, the Prussian officer, should remain master of the Prussian army, in destroying the plans for the creation of a bourgeois officers' corps, and in making the army itself, by the system of the three-year service period, acquire or rather retain the character of a reliable professional army with conservative ideas. Workers on estates, cottars, artisans and other "socially reliable" elements were to form the backbone of this army, so that the politically doubtful consequences of the arming of the masses, the possibilities of a revolt on the part of armed bourgeois and workers, might thereby be prevented.

Strangely enough it was through this policy—the first great achievement that made him famous—that Bismarck, at the beginning of his career, dug the pit into which he was finally to fall. Not long after the founding of the new empire it turned out that a continual expansion of the army—necessarily involving democratisation—could by no means be avoided in the social and international conditions that prevailed. The political situation grew continually worse; Germany broke with Russia and concluded the alliance with Austria. Already a group of members of the general staff and younger officers, moved by strategic considerations, began

to work for a permanent increase—but thereby simultaneously also for a social change—of the army. The struggles of Bismarck with these officer circles, which belonged only in part to the aristocracy, and amongst which were many non-Prussians, appear throughout the whole ministry of the great Chancellor. The officers' party, led by the Chief of Staff, Count Waldersee, finally brought about the fall of Bismarck in 1890 through its influence on the young Kaiser. In this struggle Bismarck defended the old Prussia ; the victory of the " new school " over the Chancellor signified at the same time the victory of the party advocating the increase of the army. One must not allow oneself to be deceived by the fact that immediately before his fall, just as in the last act of *Hamlet* the adversaries exchange rapiers in the heat of the duel, Bismarck finally demanded an increase of the army in order to set up a kind of sword dictatorship, whilst the opposition party, in order to bring him down, remained darkly silent.

The great expansion of the army of 1892-3, introduced by Caprivi, who was mortally hated by the old Prussian aristocracy, was an immediate consequence of Bismarck's fall. The anger with which the fallen giant greeted the new armament programme of his successor will only be fully understood if one realises that the increase of the army—and the shortening of service involved in it—aimed at the foundations of the old Prussia and threatened to engulf the Prussian officer corps' monopoly of predominance in state and society in a democratic mass rule.

Of course matters did not go so far as that. The broad masses of the German nation, instead of amalgamating, dissolving and absorbing the Prussian officers' corps within themselves, became its willing myrmidons. Modern armies are indeed in themselves, from the social point of view, usually far too mixed for a social revolt to develop in them. But three factors have decisively contributed to the especial pliancy of the German pre-war army and of the modern German army, to the extension of Prussian discipline (so to speak) over the people as a whole.

Firstly : The German people has never experienced a successful social revolution. The feeling of independence acquired by the English people as a heritage of the revolution of the seventeenth century, and by the French as a heritage from the great Revolution, has been lacking in Germany. In

the middle and lower middle class there still lived the spirit of bygone times, the respect for the aristocracy and the " lord of the estate " who has always remained the ideal of the ever-dependent German bourgeoisie and also, in recent times, of that part of the working class that is amalgamating with the bourgeoisie.

Secondly : As far as the German middle class, and the Prussian middle class before it, is especially concerned, its desire for emancipation was finally throttled at the beginning of the 'sixties by Bismarck's struggle with the Prussian Chamber. The independent middle-class officer of the territorial army (*Landwehr*), such as the Prussian liberals wanted to create, became the royal Prussian reserve officer who knew of no higher aim than to emulate his aristocratic model in dash and doughtiness.

Thirdly : The existence and increase of the German army was of immense importance for the progressive development of German industry, of an importance that possibly far exceeded the corresponding relationship in other European states. Germany was poor, but the instruments of production were powerfully developed. She was far inferior to the other Great Powers in colonies and markets. The idea, therefore, of creating zones of influence with the help of military power was obvious. A second cause was that the armaments preparations financed by the State contributed also, if not to remedy the above-mentioned incompatibility between the expansion of German productive machinery and the possibilities of markets at home and abroad, at least to counterbalance its effects for a time.

The way to the marriage between German industry and the strengthening of the German army based on this social combination was prepared quite consciously. The man who took over this task was, as may be understood, a bourgeois and not an aristocrat, a member of the party advocating increase of the army, of whose struggle against Bismarck's cautiously conservative policy we have spoken. The person in question was the then Major Keim of Darmstadt, an officer who became of outstanding importance for the history and sociology of the German armaments policy, and who in some ways may be regarded as a forerunner of the " *Führer.*" Keim, like his comrade von Liebert, was hated by Bismarck as one of the moles who had undermined his position, but he was the

darling of the War Ministry. In 1892-3 he carried on successfully at Caprivi's behest the official propaganda for the great Arms Bill. To ensure success, as he writes in his memoirs, he had deliberately attracted great business and industrial circles with his propaganda.

In conservative officer circles people, it is true, often turned up their noses at the gigantic propaganda developed by Keim, but he was never allowed to be completely overthrown. Such fellows were useful in ensuring the support of the heavy industries for the Arms Bill; besides, it was through a man like Keim and through the spreading of the necessary will to war and war spirit that there could most easily be avoided the unpleasant social consequences that might result from the army expansionist plans at a time when social democracy and the other political parties were still of some significance in Germany.

The alliance between the army-expansionist wing and industry, prepared by Keim, seemed more like a betrothal than a marriage. Shortly after the first organised co-operation between expansionist propaganda and industry in 1893, relations visibly cooled. A competitor to the army entered upon the scene to woo for industry's favour: under the ægis of the enterprising naval captain, Alfred von Tirpitz, a "department diplomat" of high rank, preparations were begun in naval propaganda. In the same way as Keim, Tirpitz fostered with conscious calculation the alliance of his department with heavy industry. Before the second Navy Law of 1900 he visited the most important foundries in order to assure himself of their support. In this race for industry's favour the naval department naturally had the advantage: it was a question here, as in our own days, of the building up of a completely new power involving gigantic contracts for ironclads.

We are well informed of the interplay between industry and the navy up to 1901 by a too-little known work by the late Eckart Kehr (*Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik*, 1930). But Kehr failed to notice a detail that is symptomatic of the whole German armaments question. Keim must sorrowfully have realised that there was not much more use in the land army in this period for his specialised knowledge of industrial and military co-operation, and that on the other hand the hopeful naval department already possessed a

competent expert in this sphere in the person of Tirpitz, who was a departmental and propaganda chief in one. In these circumstances Keim, now promoted general, but retired from active service, could make use of his specialist qualifications only if he supplanted Tirpitz in the race for industrial favour and overtrumped his naval plans. In some extremely interesting letters which he sent to Essen by a middleman soon after the acceptance of the Naval Bill of 1900, and whose genuineness he afterwards admitted in a press controversy, he offered to rehabilitate the reputation of Krupp, which had suffered through scandals in the course of the armaments propaganda, by exercising influence on the Reichstag and the public. The General simultaneously had himself elected to the presidency of the German Naval Association (*Flottenverein*); he reorganised the association into a huge propagandist weapon, undertook advance after advance in co-operation with heavy industry and its press, and finally forced his rival Tirpitz, half against his will, to the famous naval innovations of 1908, which brought the tension between Germany and England to its zenith.

It may strike one that the land army suffered the Wilhelm predilection for the navy without overmuch grumbling. The riddle is not difficult to solve. The conservative shyness of overmuch expansion of the army—with its democratisation—still continued. The development of the navy was viewed even in some feudal circles—despite understandable competitive envy—not without pleasure. It directed attention away from plans of increasing the army. Of course, immediately before the world war international differences became so tense that, just as in the 'nineties, an expansionist party was formed in the General Staff. This time it was under the leadership of the then Colonel Ludendorff, a Prussian, but not an aristocrat. The new increase of the army—the great Bill of 1913—had also, like its predecessors, to be wrung from the Prussian nobility and its representatives, the Prussian War Ministers, by dint of hard struggle. A social radicalisation of the army through progressive democratisation was, however, as little desired by the General Staff party as by the old Prussian aristocracy. And so it was with pleasure that there was found, in the person of General Keim, against whom his rival Tirpitz in the meantime had stolen a march by suddenly increasing the fleet, a proved agitator able to fulfil

a twofold task, viz. to force the old aristocratic Prussia to an army increase by demagogic incitement of the masses, but simultaneously to instil into the masses of the people the spirit of the old Prussianism and so paralyse the social results that it was feared the Arms Bill might produce. It was through the great Arms Association (*Wehrverein*), founded but a few years before the outbreak of the war, but rapidly attaining to a great importance, and through its "*Führer*," General Keim, that for the first time the spirit of the old Prussianism was spread beyond Prussia and planted deep in the German people.

The Keim movement was destroyed by the World War and its outcome. The royal Prussian army was replaced by the Reichswehr, formally commanded by the republic. General Keim, now old, died; but the social function that he had fulfilled for the development of the old army, the implanting of subserviency and militarism in the masses, now possessed increasing importance, since these masses had in the meantime become inordinately rebellious and withdrawn themselves politically as well as spiritually from the control of the old Prussianism. In the eighth chapter of *Mein Kampf*, Hitler describes how he began his political career as the propaganda emissary of the military power. His political task corresponded therefore, in the beginning, to the position of Keim. Around Hitler, however, there swarmed figures like Captain Roehm, militarily of the first rank, but socially inferior—that is to say, people whom the wielders of military power could—just as in the case of Keim—drop and repudiate whenever it served their needs. Naturally there were also marked differences. The new military weapon was after all, at least formally, the army of a republic, and indeed of a state that was pledged by international agreements to disarmament. The relations, therefore, between the military power and its new propaganda machine, the Nazi Party, were necessarily still looser than were in their time the bonds between General Keim and the superior departments, which had often enough already been extremely tense. Further, the social situation had changed. The tasks of the new propaganda machine were far greater than those of the old one, and so it was driven by absolute necessity to become a new, independent political party.

Herein lay the problem. In 1923 the Reichswehr and the

Nazi Party fired on each other in Munich. The propaganda machine of the military power had made itself independent and flew off on its own. The whole history of the Nazi Party in its essentials is a history of the attempt of the military power to catch again this propaganda wing that had flown away. This task was complicated by the fact that the functions of the propaganda machine were becoming ever more important for the continuance of the military power and its ultimate rearmament. Without the gigantic political labours of the Nazis the problems would never have been solved in favour of the military power. Only when the republic was overthrown, the way made clear for rearmament, tottering industry saved from socialisation by an armaments programme, and the masses of unemployed swept from the streets by armaments programmes and relief work schemes, could there be any approach to a final solution. In this matters did not proceed without some concession; in order to draw from the rival propaganda machine the poison fangs of its own claims to political power, the *Führer* of this machine had to be retained and separated from his troop. The S.A. chiefs, the choice troops of the party, and also General von Schleicher, who was aspiring to govern the Reich, fell in the shootings of June 30th, 1934, and Hitler became Hindenburg's successor.

Since that day harmony has again been established in Germany, in the sense of the military power, which if it is no longer, as it once was, completely controlled by the Prussian aristocracy, still preserves the best relations with it. The official introduction of conscription has to-day lost its horrors for the Prussian junker; for political opposition parties, that might have been able to exploit on their own behalf the arming of the people, no longer exist. In any case, the Reichswehr's old kernel of 100,000 men, which the introduction of conscription has suddenly raised—partly formally, partly in fact—to the rank of officers, would forbid objections to the military system. In the present-day German army, "Arms Psychology" has been raised to the rank of a science to which the greatest attention is paid. Any kind of a "disruption" of the army seems, therefore, to be practically excluded, even if armaments should swell so high as to embrace the whole people.

Thus, from the social point of view, the further and unhampered development of rearmament has been facilitated

and ensured in every way. One of the chief factors in this is the tremendous importance of armaments for the further development of the present-day German economic system. The "marriage negotiations" between industrial and military interests, once an outstanding feature of the Keim period, are merrily in progress, and one can hardly conceive any "relief work programme" that might replace or excel the importance of armaments. If one also realises the importance of conscription for the abolition of unemployment, and remembers that the German masses have been roused to white heat by the gigantic machine of Nazi armaments propaganda, which has obediently returned to the service of the military power, one must ask oneself with justifiable anxiety whether the *Führer* will be able to get rid of the spirits he has summoned from the deep.

WOLFGANG HALLGARTEN.

THE WORLD-WIDE SCOURGE OF MALARIA.

A RECENTLY issued survey of *Malaria in Ceylon* by Colonel C. L. Dunn,* formerly Director of Public Health in the United Provinces of India, must remove any lingering doubt that may still be harboured in political and medical quarters as to the urgent necessity for a widespread extension of the approved methods of malaria control. Sir Malcolm Watson in his Preface reminds us that the terrible epidemic which swept Ceylon from October 1934 till April 1935 cost the government £350,000 and the people an incalculable amount in sickness, misery and cash. At least 100,000 people died, but it has been estimated that more than a quarter of Ceylon's population of 5,313,000 caught the disease, which means at least much danger of minor epidemics still to follow.

Not the least valuable feature of Colonel Dunn's impressive survey is in his moderately worded remarks upon necessary health organisation by central government and local authorities, from which it is evident that the disaster of 1934-5 was to some degree inevitable owing to the inadequacy of the measures already adopted. He is very conscious of the financial difficulties in the way of ideal schemes of malaria control, but in the light of his own experience in India and that of many other malariologists the Ceylon Government is confronted with evidence that cannot be ignored of the immediate need for more effective mass therapy and a greater reliance upon efficient anti-mosquito measures rather than drugs. In irrigation work and the reclamation of jungle breeding-grounds a very great deal obviously awaits organised planning.

While we may justly take Ceylon as an object-lesson which is receiving special attention just now from the experts, the problem of malaria is urgent elsewhere. Indeed, to call it world-wide is scarcely an exaggeration, for more than one-third of the world's population is malarious. The British people must be especially concerned, since in respect of population the Empire is so largely subtropical and tropical. The holocaust in Ceylon forced itself upon the attention of the British public and every popular newspaper reported it with big headlines. This, however, was quite exceptional, and

* Baillière, Tindall & Cox. 1936. 6s.

the unpleasant truths about malaria want bringing home forcibly to the people in England, who, while they read of such a disaster as that which overtook Ceylon, should be made to realise two terrible and disgraceful truths. One is that epidemic malaria in thickly populated countries can be almost completely prevented, and that the total figures for the extraordinary ravages of the disease in Ceylon are vastly exceeded every year in India alone, with scarcely a word being said about it in the British press at home. Certainly the size of the figures for India may be put down to the vast population, but no reasonable defence is possible of the failure to reduce malaria progressively by methods that are within the cognisance of the authorities.

Malarial fevers were first distinguished from others when it was discovered that quinine served as a good prophylactic against them. The commercial production of this drug began last century, but the use of cinchona bark (from which quinine is derived) spread to Europe through the Spaniards, during their South American conquests in the sixteenth century. The efficacy of the bark had long been known to the Peruvians. Any scientific knowledge of the nature of malaria, beyond this useful fact that it could be held at bay by a drug taken regularly in sufficient quantities, had to await the efficient microscope and the development of bacteriology. In 1880 a French army surgeon, Laveran, observed the parasite of malaria in human blood. The worm-like parasite of elephantiasis had been discovered by Bancroft in 1876 in human blood, and in 1877 Patrick Manson, acting on a suggestion of Bancroft that the worm could be carried by mosquitoes, examined mosquitoes that had fed on the blood of a patient, and found the parasite. These were outstanding among several notable discoveries of last century. The process, which Sir Ronald Ross subsequently named "metaxeny," by which the parasite changed its host was not yet understood. Manson's suggestion was that mosquitoes after feeding on blood died on the surface of water. The developing embryos of the parasite then left the dead insects for the water, and were so swallowed by human beings. The truth, that the parasite (*Filaria bancrofti*) was transmitted to other human beings through the mosquito's proboscis, was discovered in 1900 by G. C. Low and S. P. James, who had studied the work which Ross had meanwhile accomplished.

Ross, as an obscure army surgeon in India, was stimulated and encouraged by Manson to pursue his researches into the secret of malaria. How he at last discovered the malaria parasite in the tissues of certain anopheline mosquitoes is one of the epics of medical research. Between August 20th, 1897, which he afterwards celebrated as "Mosquito Day," and the summer of 1898, Ross had not only demonstrated the "metaxeny" of malaria but had thrown light upon the transmission of other diseases, such as elephantiasis, which has been referred to, and yellow fever, carried by other species of mosquitoes. To call Ross's discovery "epoch-making" is to use a threadbare phrase which in its full meaning is both ironic and no more than adequate. It did seem as if the discovery were going to usher in a new era of tropical hygiene and the development of vast fertile countries long moribund in the grip of endless fevers. Ross lost no time in studying the practical application of the new knowledge, and though it made him unpopular with the authorities in India and elsewhere, he pleaded unceasingly for sanitary measures to be directed principally against mosquitoes in crowded areas.

The desire to complete his work by demonstrating how malaria could be suppressed—the great work which India of all countries most badly needed—possessed Ross so soon as he started to make plans in England for his future. He went to British West Africa with the object of organising mosquito control work. But although the mission was going out to a region which had earned its popular name of "the White Man's Grave," Ross's aims and efforts were received at Freetown with amused incredulity and contempt. At Lagos, where the governor, Sir William MacGregor, was already cognisant of the mosquito theory, the mission received every possible assistance, and much valuable work was accomplished. After the Sierra Leone expedition Ross was requested by the Suez Canal Company to investigate the malarious conditions at Ismailia, and as a result the town was subsequently freed of the scourge. A few years later the most important British effort in malaria control was begun by the Federated Malay States, Ross's disciple, (Sir) Malcolm Watson, being in charge of the work. The task was difficult and long, and much more was to be learnt about the habits of malarial mosquitoes, which vary according to the nature of the *terrain* and climate.

The most complete and dramatic confirmation of the importance of mosquito control was due to the Americans. The story of the investigations which followed upon an outbreak of yellow fever among American troops at Havana early in 1900 is an example of the grandeur of human courage applied to humanitarian research instead of to warfare. A commission was appointed to study yellow fever, especially the possibilities of transmission by mosquitoes, in the light of Ronald Ross's work. Doctors and volunteers among the troops subjected themselves to nerve-trying experiments to see if they could catch the deadly fever, and by what means. Several men died of it to secure the proof that the culprit was a mosquito, the *Stegomyia*. Repressive measures against mosquitoes were decided on. The result was not merely the conquest of yellow fever in Havana, but the dramatic success of a new Panama Canal scheme. On the site of the ruined schemes of de Lesseps, where heaps of derelict machinery testified to the conquest of mosquitoes over man, the Americans decided to put hygiene before engineering, and under the supervision of Colonel Gorgas established a mosquito-free zone as a preliminary to cutting the Canal. Even to-day the Canal zone is but a healthy oasis in an extensive region of mosquito-borne disease, proving the efficacy of mosquito control and answering the pessimistic arguments of those who complain that mosquitoes cannot be exterminated throughout a whole country.

Unfortunately such pessimism is not ancient history and claims have been made since the war in favour of using quinine instead of mosquito control in India. Even the chief protagonists of quinine in India have been silenced by hard facts, and the British and Native governments are now faced with the necessity of more energetic measures against malaria. In India as elsewhere increasing transport adds greatly to the risk of infection spreading from one crowded region to another when an epidemic begins, and there is no hope in quinine, though the drug is a great boon to Europeans in malarious countries.

In Ceylon, when the great epidemic was sweeping the country, the authorities quickly learnt the truth of certain remarks made to the writer by the late Sir Ronald Ross :

> " Drugging is a hopeless expedient," he said, " for the general reduction of malaria. For one thing there is not enough quinine, and the cost of wholesale dosing of big populations would be prohibitive. Moreover the dosing must be continuous if it is to keep down the fever throughout a given area. If it is given up for a time and the mosquito carriers remain plentiful the epidemic begins again. I say nothing about the difficulties of compelling a big population of ignorant natives to take the requisite doses. Many a British Commissioner in tropical countries could tell amusing stories of such attempts. Since we learnt how to cope with malaria not one-tenth of the necessary measures have been taken by the authorities concerned. I can only explain the lamentable slackness of the British authorities in applying the approved methods of mosquito control by the immunity and indifference of the people at home."

According to the *British Medical Journal* (September 1935), Colonel James, in opening a discussion at a meeting of the Chemistry Section of the British Association on September 9th, 1935, stated that we disbursed annually nearly £500,000 on the purchase of quinine, yet our expenditure for malarial research amounted to barely a two-hundredth part of this sum. In Ceylon recently, said Colonel James, £20,000 was spent on atebrin, the German synthetic drug.

The latest available figures underline Sir Ronald Ross's most outspoken comments upon governmental apathy in dealing with humanity's greatest scourge as it can be dealt with. The latest statistics collected by the League of Nations Health Organisation* show that increased incidence of malaria is world-wide. The registered cases of malaria for 1934 were as follows, compared with the preceding years of 1933 and 1932 :

	1934	1933	1932
Africa	265,558	198,836	187,938
America	441,580	423,258	456,822
Asia (without India) ...	1,042,517	1,118,111	956,975
Europe	230,412	175,213	203,219
U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R.:			
In Europe	1,896,559	1,457,122	1,284,222
Ukraine	658,159	318,681	260,596
White Russia	4,031	9,081	2,932
Railways and Waterways	203,549	36,763	55,267
Oceania:			
Australia	1,090	72	66
New Zealand	1	1	—

* *Annual Epidemiological Report: Malaria.* Geneva. 1936.

By far the heaviest figures in the American totals are those for Peru (home of cinchona) and Mexico. The European total is almost entirely due to Italy's 222,171 cases for 1934, which figure has probably much increased since the Abyssinian campaign. The heaviest Asiatic figures are accounted for by the Uzbek Republic and the Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia, but we may surmise that the Chinese figures would be much higher if they were more reliable. In European Soviet territory, however, the figures reveal a dangerous state of affairs that calls for extensive and organised measures under difficult geographical and social conditions.

The picture of a malarious world which the League of Nations statistics offer is gloomy when we consider that the actual incidence of malaria is much greater than these totals of notified cases indicate, but we have to look at India to realise the appalling nature of the scourge. The 1936 annual report of the Public Health Commissioner with the Government of India supplies the figures for 1933. We learn that over 12½ million diagnosed cases of malaria were treated in hospitals and dispensaries in 1933, compared with less than 11 million cases in 1922. Most provinces recorded increases, the largest being Punjab (plus 1,186,544), Bengal (plus 633,020), and North-West Frontier (plus 188,814). The well-cared-for British troops in India suffered from an increased incidence of malaria amounting to 19·2 per 1,000 compared with 1932, but 1932 was climatically a better malaria year than 1933. The 1933 figure for the British troops, of 103·3 cases per 1,000, has only been improved on in one other year prior to 1932. That was 1929, when the figure was 91·3. There is here a warning of the danger to Europeans of widespread malaria among natives of tropical and subtropical countries.

An important problem in India which has recently been investigated is the relationship between malaria incidence and rice cultivation. Since the 1931 report of the Commissioner in India was issued the breeding of anopheles mosquitoes in relation to rice fields has been investigated in Lower Bengal by Mr. Purnondu Sen, Entomologist of the Public Health Department of Bengal. In the 1936 report he is quoted as saying:

> There has been a tendency during recent years among certain malariologists to associate the paddy fields in the proximity of human habitations with the malariousness of a place. That is to say, the rice fields have been considered by many as the chief source of anopheline output in a locality, the water accumulating in these fields furnishing the necessary breeding surfaces for these mosquitoes. This suspicion has naturally induced certain municipalities and other corporate bodies responsible for public health to prohibit wet cultivation within a mile of their jurisdiction.

The non-committal note of the official entomologist is maintained in his further observations, which are the fruit of five years' consideration by the authorities. He points out that, as rice is the staple food of the province, municipalities should beware of causing hardship to the people by such prohibition, since

> unfortunately we are not fully aware what exact rôle is being played by the rice swamps under normal conditions on the life and distribution of these carrier species of anophelines. Wide divergence of opinion on this point exists amongst different workers, some claiming their dissociation in the causation of malaria while others consider the rice fields as the main source of troubles.

Comment upon this official statement of ignorance is hardly necessary. One can only wonder how frequently elsewhere short-sighted views of the economic interests of rich provinces will prevail over uncomfortable conclusions and the ample experience of malaria control measures and the habits of anopheline mosquitoes already available to health authorities.

In India especially the gravest problem is the paralysis of native life. Thousands of villages are moribund every year. The most fertile districts, gifted apparently with every blessing of Nature, are often almost inaccessible to Europeans except at great risk of infection. "Those who have never been out of England," said Ross, "can scarcely credit the pictures of misery presented by populations in an epidemic of malaria."

Human history has been more influenced by malaria probably than by any other human or natural cause. There are good grounds for assuming that the decay of many ancient civilisations was due to the unchecked increase of the disease. It has been shown by W. H. S. Jones (*Malaria and Greek History*) that such an explanation is more than plausible applied to ancient Greece, and it has been advanced also to account for the decay of Rome. The lethargy of Spain after its rise to wealth and culture in the sixteenth century can also

be explained by malaria, which is known to have been prevalent there when the Napoleonic troops invaded the country.

The modern world suffers from economic depressions, mostly due to want of enlightened collaboration, but none the less injurious to prosperity, yet by far the greatest potential increase of world wealth is neglected by the failure to combat man's greatest affliction. Nearly forty years after the secret was laid bare and the means of controlling malaria placed in our hands, about a third of the world remains in the grip of the disease. It is not using words carelessly to declare that if mankind will make full use of the knowledge gained by medical science vast deserts of misery and want can be made to blossom into prosperity and great new civilisations at present undreamed of may rise up again from "darkest Africa" and the rich Orient.

R. L. MÉGROZ.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MR. STALIN AT BAY.

IT may not be true that Russia is the only country to have attracted recent attention by indulging its taste for ritualistic confession as a political rather than a religious exercise. China, for example, whose national genius is never far behind in any competitive exhibition of the oddities in political life, has given us the fair analogy. When the "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang kidnapped and then released the Generalissimo and President of his own country he followed his liberated victim back to Nanking and voluntarily—in this case there was no doubt that the act was voluntary—wrote to him a letter of apparently morbid self-abasement. He confessed that he was "naturally rustic, surly and unpolished"; that he had committed an "impudent and criminal act"; that he was "penitent"; he invited death as a punishment and begged his judges not to let "sentiment or friendship" deter them. Or rather it appeared to be morbid. It was probably a put-up job designed to impress the Japanese enemy with a sense of the recaptured Chinese unity.

An immediately striking difference between the scenes enacted in Nanking and in Moscow is that Zinoviev, Kamenev, Piatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek and the rest need hardly have worried about the danger of any sentimental weakening towards mercy on the part of Vyshinsky or Stalin or the G.P.U. There is a grim element in Moscow that is not to be found in Nanking.

There have been so many of these Moscow trials that certain of their attributes are now accepted by general opinion outside. Revolutions, of course, devour their infants; dictators are driven by fear to the very technique of murder that may, probably will, one day rebound against themselves; and "Trotskyism" is the most convenient bogy available to Mr. Stalin as a pretext for killing off his former colleagues and present enemies and as a method of frightening the peasant masses into continued loyalty towards himself. In every case the standardised method has been, first, the identification of Trotsky intrigue with foreign intrigue; second, the unanimous confessions of the accused, their

spontaneous resultant desire to be shot, and the prompt satisfaction of that desire.

In China, whose customs rest upon a long tradition of civilised and humane intelligence, no one expected, least of all General Chang Hsueh-liang himself, that he would be shot. In the event he was perfunctorily sentenced to a few years' imprisonment; that sentence, of course, was immediately rescinded and the culprit was freely pardoned and released.

In Moscow these men confess and demand to be shot, knowing that they will be shot. Few things more curious are known to students of modern history. Why these abject confessions and how are they engineered? Everybody knows that since the first great Moscow trial was filmed and broadcast throughout the country, each succeeding pantomime has been as carefully prepared as any pantomime at Drury Lane: if pantomime be the right word for a play that ends in the wholesale murder of the principal players. But it seems reasonable to assume that a man who knows he is going to be shot does not publicly debase himself and demand to be shot, unless there be some strong inducement for such behaviour.

Drugs? The suggestion is absurd. Seventeen drugged men are no more capable of unanimous self-abasement than of unanimous or coherent anything else; and men not immediately under the influence of drugs, but demoralised by a cumulative course of drugs, would be as likely to throw something at Vyshinsky as to cringe in unison before him. Torture? That theory in its turn does not fit all the facts. It probably did explain the "confessions" of the British engineers tried in 1933; but not any of the Russian confessions. The Russian prisoners have for the most part known that they were to be shot forthwith after the trial. If they had been tortured, were now in no fear of further torture, and knew quite simply what was at last coming to them, their attitude would be almost anything but the sprightly unanimity of remorseful confession we know so well. Can it be that Zinoviev and the rest were not shot after all; that they were deported under other names and under the most rigid control to some isolated Siberian prison as their reward for complying with the Stalin stage directions at the trial? It seems a far-fetched and unconvincing theory.

If any fact emerges more indisputably than another from these bizarre performances it is that Stalin is himself in mortal terror, and that in his panic he shoots his way to what he imagines will be the security of isolation. Such a man must kill, not imprison, those he fears. What then is the explanation of the system of confessions? The answer must be left obscured in its impenetrable mystery. No one outside the Kremlin can throw light on it.

Yet something may be gained by recalling the main common features of the many "trials" that have already been staged in Moscow. It was at the beginning of 1929 that the even then chronic personal quarrel between Stalin and Trotsky came to a head. Trotsky was banished for what were called his "anti-Soviet activities" unearthed by the G.P.U., and his followers were rounded up in large numbers. In Moscow alone 150 arrests were made, including prominent stalwarts of the communist party. Trotsky and his family were put aboard a Russian steamer at Constantinople.

In the early days of the "purge" the simple expedient used was the shooting of Stalin's enemies. On May 24th, 1929, for example, it was officially announced in Moscow that three well-known Russian engineers (by name Meck, Palchinsky and Velichko) had been shot the day before by order of the G.P.U. on the charge of conspiracy against the Soviet Government. Even before the technique of the trials themselves was fully evolved, the practice of elaborate confession began to be cultivated. At the end of 1929 the conference of the Central Committee of the Communist party formally expelled Bukharin from the Political Bureau and administered a "first warning" to Rykov (President of the Council of Peoples' Commissars) and Tomsky. Those three men wrote, or in some way were made to write, a public confession and recantation. They promised in the future to abandon their tendencies towards the "Right" and to revert to true Leninism according to the gospel of Stalin.

An experimental trial, as it were, of another kind was held in Kharkov in the spring of 1930, the prisoners being forty-five Ukrainian "separatists" alleged to be plotting for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian Republic on non-Soviet lines. But it came to be recognised in the Kremlin that a xenophobe element was indispensable to the full propagandist value of the trials. In December 1929 several

of the Russian employees of the Lena Goldfields Concession were arrested on charges of wanton damage together with economic and political espionage in the interests, and at the instigation, of the British owners. The trial started on April 18th, 1930, at the Supreme Court in Moscow. The sentences were announced on May 8th. Two of the accused—Kolyasnikov and Muromtzev—were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, but the sentence was ostentatiously reduced by virtue of the prisoners' "sincere repentance." The third culprit was in the first instance sentenced to death and was let off with ten years in the like sense.

The perfection of the technique of trial and confession was not, however, achieved without setbacks. In September 1930 the G.P.U. ran amok and dispensed again with even a trial. Forty-eight specialists employed by the food supply organisation were suddenly arrested and shot without more ado. They were accused of disorganising the supply of meat, fish and vegetables with the ulterior object of undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the end of 1930 the G.P.U. even discovered eight Russian experts who were planning a foreign intervention in Russia's affairs involving no less dramatic an element than action by the British naval forces. A solemn trial was staged in Moscow. Something like a war scare was being fanned from the Kremlin at the time. The most fantastic allegations were made at the trial. MM. Briand and Poincaré and the French General Staff were featured as the chief agitators for the overthrow of the Russian régime. Mr. Winston Churchill and Colonel Lawrence were represented as having undertaken that the British fleet would attack Leningrad and would land an expeditionary force on the shores of the Black Sea.

At the trial itself the prisoners indulged in an orgy of self-accusation. They competed with each other in heaping abuse on their own heads and in demanding punishment for themselves without mercy. They gave a terrific description of the ramifications of their own treachery, so that by the end of the trial every industry in the country appeared to have been systematically undermined for several years past, and the number of the traitors ran into thousands. Meetings were held all over the country passing resolutions that the traitors be shot. Five of the eight experts were duly sentenced to death and the other three to ten years' imprisonment. The

naïve motive in that particular case was at once made apparent. The sentences were commuted to ten years' and eight years' imprisonment respectively, the Kremlin explaining that the prisoners deserved to be rewarded for having by means of their confessions disclosed the serious nature of the general plot against the U.S.S.R. and that "the Soviet Government cannot be guided by a spirit of revenge."

The trial was followed by an intensive propaganda urging the people of the U.S.S.R. to prepare for an imminent war of defence against an encircling attack about to be launched by the massed forces of all the "imperialist" Powers.

By the spring of 1931 trials had become a regular feature of Kremlin politics. Groups of wreckers were discovered almost as a routine in every industry and in every walk of life. In March 1931 fourteen Socialist experts were tried for plotting a foreign intervention, this time the outside villain of the piece being the Second International in the place of the French General Staff.

A slight modification was introduced into the Kremlin's practice in the early months of 1932, when a new series of trials was begun, this time the victims being alleged "wreckers" in the timber industry. Their particular offence was that their wrecking activities had been conducted in the interests and at the instigation of "foreign capitalists." The bogy had been changed from a diplomatic to a financial form. Concurrently the normal series of trials was proceeding against wreckers in the meat and vegetable trades.

The fact that in the spring of 1932 the government for the first time admitted that there was a shortage of bread partly explained the prevailing obsession with wreckers in the food industries. At the Trades Union Congress held in Moscow at the end of April Mr. Molotov openly admitted that until the next harvest was reaped food shortage would be one of the chief difficulties to be faced. Only in the December before, however, he had protested, when addressing the Z.I.K. (Central Executive Committee) that the partial failure of the crops could not affect the food supply.

It simply does happen to be the case that in all the dictatorship countries the ruling authorities have to be constantly on their guard against any loss of prestige, no matter how small. The dictator's power appears always to be absolute, because it must be maintained at such a pitch the whole time

if it is to continue. The slightest crumbling of prestige may at any moment mean the total immediate collapse of the whole structure. While Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini have maintained their authority by " hitting the high spots " in their foreign relations, the ruling authorities in Russia have concentrated on sidetracking the peasants' suspicions by the continuous legal tracking down of " wreckers " who, to the alleged prescription of the foreign enemy, have deliberately ruined the peasants' food supply.

During the first half of 1932 the government had to issue solemn appeals to " the workers " not to rely exclusively on the State distribution of foodstuffs, but to organise their own kitchen-gardens, and to breed their own rabbits in the factories to meet the shortage of butchers' meat. To encourage the peasants to produce food in quantities large enough to enable the town workers to live, the dictators of the proletariat threw to the winds another batch of their bolshevik principles. By a decree of May 20th, 1932, all peasants, except " kulaks," were permitted to sell as much of their produce as they chose, direct to the consumer in the open market at current market prices, their profits to be free of taxes of all kinds.

In their panic the bosses of the communist racket were forced to invoke capitalist practice in a fantastically exaggerated form to save their own skins. They had reduced the country to such straits that they had to concede not only the incentive of private gain, but to promise that capitalist profits would be wholly sacrosanct even against State taxation. In that summer decree after decree was issued to induce the peasant, by more and more attractive baits of private profit, to supply the towns with food.

It was during the 1932 phase of the Kremlin's own crisis that the Central Executive Committee relieved Mr. Sokolnikov, Russian Ambassador to Great Britain, of his post, appointing Mr. Maisky (then Minister to Finland) to succeed him. It was announced of course that Mr. Sokolnikov had been recalled at his own request. At the beginning of October a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist party and the Commission of Control drew up a list of about twenty members who were then and there expelled from the party for " counter-revolutionary activities," for advocating " surrender to the capitalist régime " and for making friends with

" class enemies " outside the party. The list included the names of Zinoviev and Kamenev. The " purge " had become a weapon of gigantic range. In 1921, in 1929, in 1932 good old communists were expelled from the party in incredible numbers. At the end of 1932 the Central Committee announced that a " general purge " was about to be undertaken which would take twelve months to carry out. During those twelve months no new members were to be admitted and existing members were to be tested for loyalty before disciplinary tribunals which would investigate the members' lives down to the smallest detail. A system of internal passports was introduced into all cities, towns and industrial centres. Those who were refused passports for any reason were deported, and every single person's every movement was strictly controlled by the G.P.U.

The G.P.U. was by far the hardest-worked organisation in the U.S.S.R. It worked ever harder and harder. At the beginning of March 1933 the G.P.U. arrested seventy persons whom it accused of " wrecking " the agricultural industry; on March 12th the G.P.U. announced that it had shot thirty-five of those persons; on March 24th the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., filled presumably with the spirit of the chase, issued a bloodthirsty decree " on the responsibility of employees in state institutions and enterprises for acts of wrecking." The decree urged the G.P.U. to act " with the utmost severity " against all state employees " convicted " of sabotage or wrecking.

The excitement was apparently so intense that it produced a first-rate incident with the British Government. On March 11th, 1933, four British engineers, by name Monkhouse, Thornton, Cushny and MacDonald, employed by the Metropolitan-Vickers firm, were arrested in Moscow by agents of the G.P.U. and conveyed to the G.P.U. prison in Lubianka. The Moscow and Leningrad offices of the company and the private residences of the men were raided for documentary evidence. Two days later two more engineers of the same firm, by name Gregory and Nordwall, were arrested, as well as a large number of Russians, including six women typists, employed by the same company.

On March 15th Mr. Baldwin announced to the House of Commons that the British Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed vigorously to protest against the retention in

prison of British subjects against whom no charge had been made. On the same day the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. declared a state of emergency and invested the G.P.U. with powers of summary punishment without trial. Mr. Litvinov saw Sir Esmond Ovey on March 17th, and with his typical taste for dialectical quibble informed him that British browbeating could not save British subjects from compliance with Russian law, adding the observation that if Sir Esmond were so certain of the innocence of the prisoners, what was he afraid of? It happened that the existing Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement was due to expire on April 17th, and negotiations were in progress for a new treaty to take its place.

That circumstance suggested to the British Government that the Trade Agreement might be used as a lever for forcing Moscow to release the prisoners. On April 3rd Mr. MacDonald announced in the House of Commons that on April 5th the Government proposed to pass through all its stages an enabling bill to give the Government power to issue Orders in Council prohibiting all Russian imports except under licence. The bill duly passed its second reading on April 5th and its third on April 6th, both Sir John Simon and Mr. Runciman having emphasised the point that its only purpose was to safeguard the "life and liberty" of British subjects in Russia, and having given an undertaking that it would not be used for any other purpose. The bill was to be valid for only three months in the first instance.

In the meantime Mr. Monkhouse, manager of Metropolitan-Vickers, had on April 1st been formally charged with economic sabotage, military and economic espionage, and bribery. Mr. Litvinov has said and done so many things that have betrayed in him a certain light-hearted contempt for consistency that one hardly any longer noticed new examples: but he seldom contradicted himself so gaily as when on March 28th, 1933, he told Sir Esmond Ovey that the operation of Russian law in Moscow was no concern of the British Government, and then within a week (on April 3rd) himself formally protested to the German Ambassador against the arrest of Russian subjects in Berlin.

The trial of the engineers began on April 12th and ended on April 19th. The proceedings were "talky-filmed." The judge acted undisguisedly as a sort of second prosecutor,

and showed his hostility against the prisoners by a stream of flippant insults. He knew, of course, that what he said was being recorded and would in due course be relayed throughout the provinces. Moreover, it was proved during that particular trial that the prisoners were subjected to something like mental torture. At one point, when one of the prisoners refused to confess his guilt, the court was suddenly adjourned. When it reassembled some hours later the said prisoner, looking physically distressed, at once confessed. During the adjournment he had been confined in his cell with officers of the G.P.U.

By July 1st the hot air was deflated, the prisoners were released, the embargoes lifted, and arrangements made for a prompt resumption of the negotiations for a new trade agreement.

The chief charge against the engineers had been that of "sabotage." Sabotage of what? Of their own work. The charge, of course, was absurd. In the Kremlin the absurdity of the charge was beside the point. All they really wanted was a "confession" of sorts, such as would prove to the peasant masses of Russia that the foreign enemy was plotting against the Soviet system and that the Russian Government was doing its heroic best to defend the Russian peasant and to provide him with food.

Food shortage indeed became so acute in many parts of Russia during 1933 that the digging up of seed potatoes just planted, the gleaning of half-ripe corn and such desperate acts were punished as "counter-revolutionary activities." Picked bands of communists from the towns were stationed in country districts and given punitive powers against "grain thieves." It clearly was not possible for the G.P.U. to shoot every one of the thousands of "wreckers" who were being unceasingly arrested. It was equally impossible simply to let them starve in concentration camps. They were made to work. The dogmas and practices of the "world revolution" is clearly not the most promising breeding ground of a sense of humour. In July 1933 "the Comrade Stalin White Sea-Baltic Canal" was opened for navigation. It was 227 kilometres long. It had been built wholly by convict "wreckers." It was an immense enterprise and took twenty months to carry out. Even the engineering staff were "convicted wreckers," the workmen were a medley of wreckers,

counter-revolutionaries, political offenders, kulaks, financial speculators, saboteurs and the like. As a reward for services rendered, about 75,000 of the convicts who had done the work were released from the convict camps, whereby the pressure on the accommodation of those camps was somewhat relieved.

By the end of 1933 the communist party had been " purged," according to the official estimate of that party, by about 20 per cent. As the membership was over 3,000,000, the expulsions numbered about 600,000. Sabotage or wrecking is probably the last charge that will ever be laid against the industry of the G.P.U.

The full bloom of the period of trials dates from July 10th, 1934, when a decree of the All-Union Central Executive Committee incorporated the G.P.U. in the newly created Commissariat for Internal Affairs. The G.P.U. was thereby deprived of its power to shoot people out of hand. It was to continue its detective work, but was to hand over the culprits to the judicial authorities for punishment. As if to show that the change was not intended as an indication of relaxing severity, the series of trials and death sentences continued unabated. Three engineers, for example, employed by the Kusnetsk Metal Combine were promptly sentenced to death, and shot, for alleged espionage in the interests of foreign countries.

Yet in its new form the punitive organisation was less convincing than in the days when the G.P.U. could themselves shoot anybody without trial. A spirit of laxity, almost of freedom and defiance began to stalk abroad. On December 1st, 1934, a wayward communist, Nikolaiev by name, formerly employed by the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate, went and shot one of Stalin's chief henchmen, Sergei Kirov, in the Smolny Palace itself, the headquarters of the Leningrad Soviet. Kirov was a member of the Political Bureau and of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, or Red Parliament, Secretary of the Central and Leningrad committees of the Communist party and in general a big shot himself.

The Kremlin became so alarmed that it started a purge of the Commissariat of the Interior itself. The chief officials of the Leningrad department of that Commissariat were arrested and sent for trial for neglect of their duties. Wholesale

other arrests were promptly made among members of what were alleged to be " white-guard terrorist organisations." New decrees were promulgated to the effect that terrorists must be tried without delay, must not be allowed to be defended by counsel, nor to appeal against the death sentence, and if convicted were to be shot without delay. Within a fortnight 103 such alleged terrorists were shot in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk and the charge against them was the uniformly comprehensive one of having been " preparing to organise terrorist acts " against Soviet officials.

Zinoviev, Kamenev and other old guard bolshevists were arrested at that time. Zinoviev had been President of the Communist International. Kamenev had been one of the ruling Triumvirate set up after the death of Lenin. Nikolaiev and thirteen other members of the " Leningrad terrorist centre " were tried before Vyshinsky and sentenced. They were all shot on December 29th, 1934.

The trial technique was by then complete. The prisoners were alleged to have received money from a " foreign consul " and to have been intriguing with Trotsky. They all abjectly confessed. Outside indignation meetings passed resolutions describing the culprits as " counter-revolutionary vipers," demanding their death, and protesting eternal loyalty to Stalin.

Zinoviev and Kamenev were both sentenced to imprisonment for " ideological " connection with Kirov's murder and with the " anti-Stalin " plot. By the summer of 1935 those two old guards were accused by a member of the Political Bureau of being the real organisers of the Kirov affair and of being in full agreement with the " traitor Trotsky." They got what was coming to them a year later. On August 19th, 1936, they and fourteen others were tried before the Supreme Military Tribunal in Moscow on the charge of plotting terrorist acts against Stalin.

They confessed that in the period 1931-6 they had been the real organisers of the " Moscow and Leningrad terrorist centres," had organised attempts against the lives of Stalin and other Soviet leaders, had worked under directions from Trotsky, whose orders had been conveyed from abroad into Russia through the agency of his son and other emissaries travelling under false passports. The " foreign power " this time that was put up as a bogy before the Russian peasant

was Germany, it being alleged that Trotsky was in touch with Herr Himmler, of the German secret police. The abject competitive confessions were duly made. After a five-days' trial what Vyshinsky, the All-Union prosecutor, exultantly called " the sixteen mad dogs " were all condemned to death and were shot.

Preparations were at once made for the next big trial. Partly as a result of denunciation by the confessing August victims several prominent old Bolsheviks were promptly arrested. Among them were Rykov, Commissar of Postal Communications, Sokolnikov, former Ambassador in London and Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Bukharin, former President of the Comintern and Editor of the *Izvestia*, Karl Radek, foreign leader writer of that paper, and Piatakov, Assistant Commissar of Heavy Industry. Tomsky, former Chairman of the Central Trade Union Council, shot himself rather than wait inevitably to be shot.

The new batch of " Trotskyist wreckers " faced their trial in Moscow on January 23rd of the present year. The Russian Press and public meetings clamoured for their death, as by rote. On January 30th the sentences were announced. Radek and Sokolnikov were surprisingly let off with ten years' imprisonment, and two others with eight years. The other thirteen were shot. Of the well-known names connected with the original Lenin revolution there now remain at large only three: Trotsky (exiled in Mexico), Rykov and Bukharin. After the Zinoviev trial Rykov and Bukharin had been exonerated from complicity.

The day perhaps approaches when Stalin will have shot his way through to the security he imagines will result from the total isolation of himself within the Kremlin and the total extermination of his rivals. By that very process he places even himself at the mercy of the G.P.U. The very achievement of isolation proves his danger. The G.P.U. may yet, for lack of other game, turn upon him. What then? For nearly twenty years this Russian revolution has been devouring its children. There are not many left.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

February 15th, 1937.

No. 426. *March 1937.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE EXECUTIVE.*

Dr. W. Ivor Jennings' new work, *Cabinet Government*, will be welcomed as a valuable contribution to the study of the Executive Power in the British system of government. He is concerned particularly with the growth of Cabinet control during the last century as a guide to the functions and practice of " His Majesty's Government " to-day. Being primarily a work on political structure, the book contains only a general survey of the actual administrative machine, its distribution of functions and inter-departmental relations. It is, however, unfortunate that Dr. Jennings can give no systematic examination of the encroachment of the administration upon the legislative and judicial spheres; a process which is of the utmost significance in constitutional development. In viewing the constitution from the angle of government, the function of Parliament is treated simply as providing " a forum for the criticism of the Government," an organ of public opinion and the means through which a party achieves power.

* *Cabinet Government.* By Dr. W. Ivor Jennings. Cambridge University Press. 21s. net.

The basis of the administrative system, with its apex in the Cabinet, is not, of course, founded upon any comprehensive enabling law. It is spread over a complex mass of statutory provisions and constitutional conventions. Dr. Jennings remarks that " the conventions are not really very different from laws." It is true that both ultimately are supported by sanctions, but there remains a vital distinction which gives to the constitution a flexibility which the average legal rule forbids. The American constitution is notoriously rigid and President Roosevelt is having extreme difficulty in avoiding restrictive and out-of-date provisions. In theory conventions are based on precedent, but in reality they are closely related to the prevailing political idea of government, and as the latter is modified by events, so the precedent is discarded. As Dr. Jennings says, " precedents create rules because rules are necessary; and the rules are established by precedents which accord with the developing principles of constitutional government. It is necessary to justify a constitutional convention not merely by precedents but also by reason." He thus properly omits most precedents prior to the Reform Bill of 1832, and indeed many of the instances given since that date are of little immediate value to-day.

Dr. Jennings appreciates fully the influence of imponderable elements, such as personality and intellectual and physical capacity, in determining at any particular moment function and practice within the corners of the constitutional edifice. The author has extracted from published records, biographies and memoirs a great quantity of material which illustrates these variable factors. A knowledge of contemporary Cabinet practice is, of course, limited by the strict rules of secrecy, but Dr. Jennings has been able to add something to our general information " by casual conversations with persons possessing special knowledge." He discusses at some length the position of the Prime Minister whose actual relations with his colleagues, his supervision of administration and his direction of policy have inevitably ebbed and flowed with the holder of the office. Sir Robert Peel, according to Lord Rosebery " the model of all Prime Ministers," was conversant with, and in control of, all important departmental questions. While the vast development in the sphere of government has made such supervision physically impossible, the degree of interference varies, and in this respect

Dr. Jennings has reason to compare Mr. Baldwin with Mr. MacDonald. Again, the Premier's control of policy has varied enormously. Disraeli dominated his colleagues; while the author points to a contrasting situation in the Coalition Government of Mr. Asquith. " It is said that, when a discussion in which he was not interested was proceeding, he would proceed to write letters until the discussion appeared to have worn itself out. He would then remark, ' Well, gentlemen, as we are now agreed, shall we pass on ? ' Whereupon it would be asked on what they were agreed, and a new discussion would arise over this question."

Similarly the influence of the sovereign in the exercise of his constitutional right to warn and advise his ministers inevitably varies with each particular monarch. Dr. Jennings remarks that " the King can, if he so wills it, become a mere cipher. He can, on the other hand, take an effective part in government; if he desires to do so, he must devote himself to the business of government like Queen Victoria." But, of course, any interference beyond the limits of Bagehot's definition, as in the partisan intrigues of Queen Victoria, is to-day clearly unconstitutional. Democratic political theory requires, and the security of the Throne demands, an attitude of independent impartiality; and impartiality ends where political responsibility begins. " If he is to become," says Dr. Jennings, " a definite supporter of a particular party, then the Constitution must provide alternate monarchs as it provides for alternate Governments." The danger of an apparent, even though unintentional, partiality, arises in particular relation to the sovereign's rights to dismiss his ministers and to dissolve Parliament against advice. This question has already raised acute controversy in the Dominions, particularly in Australia when in 1932 the Governor of New South Wales dismissed the Lang ministry while it retained a majority in the popular assembly. The successive appointments of Governors favourable to the party in office have been pointed to as the ultimate result of such initiative. In the Mother Country the consequences would be disastrous to the Crown. As Dr. Jennings points out, " a king who insists on a dissolution or, what is really the same thing, compels the resignation of ministers, will be attacked as a partisan in the House and in the country." The solution urged by Mr. Justice Evatt, of the Australian High Court,

deserves the closest consideration. He argues that the exercise of the reserve powers of the Crown, including Dominions Governors, which are not subject to any precise and generally accepted conventions, should receive statutory formulation, in accordance with democratic principles. Here is an instance where certainty becomes a valuable safeguard and outweighs the advantages of conventional flexibility.

* * * * *

A GERMAN BOOK ON QUEEN VICTORIA.*

It was not a bad idea to present letters and diaries of Queen Victoria to the German public of to-day because it is high time to interpret impartially her life and personality to German readers as that of a great and good friend of Germany and her best traditions. This well-bound bulky volume includes many reproductions of contemporary pictures and engravings, among which Winterhalter's water-colour portrait of the young Queen is of special interest. The original is in Emperor William's palace, Unter den Linden. Unfortunately, the favourable first impression of the book cannot be maintained after more intimate study. Three hundred and ninety-one letters and 170 extracts from the diaries are published, but I believe only 145 items are new. It is well known that the Queen's papers are carefully preserved at Windsor. Up to the year 1861, the date of the death of the Prince Consort, there are 600 volumes. The new letters from German archives seem comparatively unimportant. Some few to King Frederick William IV obviously drafted by Prince Albert, and some to King William I, drafted by ministers, discuss political matters such as the Crimean War, the Neuenburg affair, and King William's conflict with his Crown Prince. All letters addressed to the Princess of Prussia, later Queen and Empress Augusta, which comprise most of the new material, are of a private character. The two royal ladies became friends long before the marriage of their children. After the death of her half-sister Feodora, there was nobody except Augusta who was equal in rank and congenial in ideas. It is known from

* *Queen Victoria—ein Frauenleben unter der Krone—eigenhändige Briefe und Tagebuchblätter 1834-1901.* Herausgegeben von Dr. Kurt Jagow. Verlag Karl Sigismund. Berlin, 1936, xvi + 539 pp.

other sources that Queen Augusta occasionally tried to play the rôle of a mediator between England and Prussia in the interest of a political rapprochement.* Towards such attempts Queen Victoria behaved as a correct constitutional sovereign. She was very fond of the Prussian Queen, but did not hesitate to cancel her usual visit to England when politically inopportune, as in the spring of 1866.

After the Franco-German war the Empress became more reserved. Queen Victoria was quite right to write to her daughter during the war scare in 1875: "As for anyone working upon me in the sense Bismarck thinks, it is too absurd. I am not worked upon by anyone; and though I am very intimate with the dear Empress, her letters hardly ever contain any allusion to politics, certainly never anything which could be turned against her or me. . . ."† Travels and theatre, visitors and country life, personal and family health, marriages, baptisms, births and deaths—these are the usual subjects of the letters exchanged between the two royal ladies. Augusta, the more sophisticated, displays more learning and sharper criticism. Victoria admired her, this born princess of Weimar, who reminded her of her own Thuringian memories. Her melancholy resignation found an echo in the mind of the German Empress, whose resignation had different and more bitter causes. After all, Queen Victoria's indefatigable practical interest, her simple instincts, her motherly care for a great empire, give her a higher position in history.

The editor's introduction and commentary are obviously dependent upon the well-known English biographies of the Queen. Some of the notes reproduce those of the great English edition without adaptation to the German point of view; others are superficial and unreliable. Some mistakes are absurd, for instance the invention of "Lord Naplan." This is no misprint, for the same unknown peer is to be found in the index. Was it so very difficult to guess Lord Raglan's existence? There are some regrettable mistakes in the translation into German, and even the royal pedigree is not free from blunders.

VEIT VALENTIN.

* *Horst Michael, Bismarck, England und Europa, 1866-70.* München, 1930, p. 72.
† *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 2nd series, ii, p. 405. Balmoral, June 8th, 1875.

THE NILE.*

The most celebrated literary portrait painter of our time has chosen a new and unexpected theme for the practice of his art. It is, as the dust cover informs us, the biography of a river—the greatest and most historic in the world. Books on Egypt abound, but Emil Ludwig is the first to describe the river which gave it birth from its sources to the sea. No one has a more eager or many-sided interest in life—the life of forest and lake, of flower and tree, of bird and beast, of man civilised and uncivilised. He has been over the ground, not as a globe-trotter but as a student with plenty of time to take it all in. It is an entrancing story, brilliantly told, excellently translated and lavishly illustrated, glowing with the opulent colours of the East.

By far the larger portion of the book is devoted to the two streams, the White and the Blue Nile, before their meeting at Khartum. We witness the first rising in the heart of the Dark Continent, tumbling out of Victoria Nyanza, threading its way north through regions inhabited by wild animals and primitive tribes. Nowhere in the world is the contrast so arresting between the rise and the outflow of a river as in the case of the Nile, with its pigmies at one end and cosmopolitan Cairo at the other. And nowhere has a mighty river a more romantic cradle than Lake Tana, in the highlands of Abyssinia, whence the Blue Nile emerges with its life-giving silt to sustain the millions who crowd its banks thousands of miles away. The wilder brother, as our author calls it, is more difficult to follow, and there are gorges which are likely to remain unexplored. He writes with greater sympathy of the primitive folk of the Great Lakes than of the Abyssinians with their veneer of civilisation. Among the animals he speaks with particular affection of the giraffe—a creature without enemies.

> When two giraffes affectionately lay their necks together and stroke each other, it looks as if a giant toy has come to life. When they raise their heads and run, they are a miracle of grace. When they drop their heads, they look as pedantic as professors of philosophy.

No part of the narrative is so thrilling as that which tells the familiar tale of the rise of the Mahdi, the annihilation of the

* *The Nile from the Source to Egypt.* By Emil Ludwig. Allen & Unwin. 16s.

Egyptian army, the long siege of Khartum, and the heroic death of Gordon. Was our author thinking of somebody nearer home when he wrote the following sentences ?

> Mohamed Achmed was poor in his childhood, and had suffered humiliation in his youth. . . . When he discerned the stupidity of the authorities, the disputes of the party leaders, and the growing distress of the masses around him, when he saw that he only needed to believe in himself to make the others believe in him, he resolved to ordain himself Mahdi. . . . Hundreds were ready to believe in him at once, but he needed a million to lead his party to victory. In Arabic Mahdi means " The Leader."

He lived long enough to take Khartum, and his successor ruled the Sudan till his power was destroyed at Omdurman in 1898. A cruel and devastating régime, born out of suffering and fanaticism, came to an end a year later when the Khalifa and his chiefs, refusing to surrender, were killed by machine-gun fire as they said their prayers on a carpet in the desert.

The closing section is entitled " The Struggle with Man." " The Nile's struggle with man was decided in Assouan : only so mighty a work could conquer the mighty river." No dam in the world can compare with it in the quantity of water stored. If the English have done nothing else of an enduring character during the half-century of the Occupation (amicably terminated since this book was written by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty), they have harnessed the swollen waters to the service of man. Thus

> the old Nile, at the end of all its adventures, conquered yet wise, calm as an aged philosopher, becomes a source of help to the human beings swarming on its banks, and with carefully hoarded strength achieves more than was granted to it in the fire of its youth.

G. P. G.

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POLICIES OF THE POWERS.*

The author has for many years been a student of foreign affairs in general, not specialising on one country or one continent. Circumstances have given him a rather unbiased outlook. He was born an Austrian, brought up a German, and naturalised an Englishman. England he calls his second home

* *Zero Hour.* By Richard Freund. Methuen. 10s. 6d.

and third nationality. His book starts with the words, printed in tall capitals, " " WAR IS NEAR." If one's flesh begins to creep, one soon realises that the author's own beginning is unfair to the book. It is nothing like so crude as that. It is indeed a rather well-balanced and well-informed survey of conditions and policies in Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and in America.

There is nothing startlingly new in the book. How could there be? The facts of the present-day world are too well known. What the author does claim he thus expresses:

> The object was to provide a compressed guide to the present world crisis; and though I believe that the outline is accurate, I do not pretend that the picture is complete. Dealing with almost the whole of the political world, I was compelled to reduce the story to its essentials. And the essentials, in my view, are the national policies of the principal powers.

He attains that object with commendable skill. His judgments, his perspectives, his sense of values are as good and true as his writing is clear and simple. He explains the original argument of *Mein Kampf* in this way:

> "To a certain extent, Herr Hitler's scheme was undoubtedly determined by the strength of the West and the weakness of the East. He took the line of least resistance"; but in a later chapter he adds this interesting rider: "Under the Nazi régime the German people are being trained in a collectivism which has many points in common with that of Soviet communism. As long as Hitler remains Dictator of Germany, his intense hatred of the communist doctrine must prevent a close approach to Soviet Russia. Hatred, however, often yields to convenience. A future modification of German policy towards Russia, and perhaps a slow return to the early Bismarckian tradition of co-operation with Russia, should not be entirely ruled out."

In his survey of world conditions he touches upon all the countries whose problems or controversies may have an effect on world peace; and he gives us two good maps, one of Europe and one of Asia. He omits any consideration of the League of Nations as a factor in the world's destiny on the typically level-headed argument that the League in the future will be what the nations make it, and before they make it anything they must first shape themselves. "I decided to exclude [he writes] a chapter on the League of Nations which was already written. Personally, I believe that a revival of the League holds out the best hope of continued peace in Europe. But whether or not the League can rise from the ashes of defeat depends entirely on the working out of national policies, and to these I have confined myself." The book is a thoroughly reliable quick guide to contemporary conditions throughout the world.

G. G.

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POST-RESTORATION LETTER-BAGS.*

Mr. Bryant, already known as an authority on Charles II and his time, here fills in the background for a study of latter seventeenth-century England by this anthology of letters dealing with private and domestic life. Correspondence relating to public affairs is reserved for a later volume. In the present collection, some series of letters come from family Memoirs, such as those of the Verneys and Shakerleys; they recall the Pastons of an earlier day. Others are by famous persons, for example Pepys and Evelyn, Sir Thomas Browne and Dryden, Ken and Baxter, William Penn, Nell Gwyn or Rochester. In some, the interest lies chiefly in the subject, whether it be childhood or university life, religion, sport and good fellowship, social and family events, recipes or prescriptions, or the discomforts of travel by sea and land—the public stage-coach had been recently introduced. Evelyn advises Pepys what he should see in Paris, and is himself consoled in bereavement by Jeremy Taylor. Dress and other commissions are executed in town for country friends; marriages are arranged, often on a mercenary basis. One young man, looking for a bride, tells his uncle "£6,000 is not so much as I could wish. . . . I have heard of a young lady near Nottingham worth £10,000," and asks him to find out more about her. Much true affection is, however, shown in letters between husbands and wives. Smallpox is an ever-present terror, and Sir Thomas Browne gives advice for preventives in the Great Plague. The conduct of Winchester and Westminster schoolboys is reviewed; the pranks of a fast girl are detailed by her indignant stepmother. The less reputable side of the life of the period is represented by the section headed "Men of the World." Several instances prove how completely a father's

* *Postman's Horn.* By Arthur Bryant. Longmans, Green & Co. 1936. 10s. 6d.

power over the family descended, on his death, to the eldest son. In the correspondence between Peter Shakerley and his half-brother at Oxford the elder reproaches George for being "so excessively expensive" and for his "ridiculous treats in chambers"; after a series of nagging letters one's sympathies go out to the undergraduate, who at last tells his senior roundly that his "continual chiding" has been "one of the greatest obstructions" to his own application. A familiar note is struck by young Verney, who has excellent reasons for cutting lectures, but cannot explain them to his tutor! In sharp contrast to the typically English topics comes the pathetic despatch from "a poor Plymouth captive in Algiers."

The spelling throughout has been modernised: the squires and gentry of the day were apparently beginning to come into line on orthography, but their ladies were still hopelessly and erratically individualist; it must have taken all their editor's ingenuity to decipher them. Sprightly or serious, affectionate or worldly, these letters well repay study, and all will be grateful to Mr. Bryant for bringing them together.

E. G. S.

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THOMAS SHERLOCK.*

Mr. E. C. Carpenter has written a notable biography of Thomas Sherlock (1678-1761). He has been successful in handling new material, and he has not allowed this material to master his biographical skill. In particular he has been fortunate enough to consult the family records of Sir Thomas Gooch, containing thirty letters of Sherlock, and he has also made extensive use of the reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission. The author has been so considerate as to append a helpful bibliography to each of his ten chapters. Sherlock is of course an eighteenth-century bishop, and his biographer affords strong reasons for believing that he could have lived more agreeably under Laud. With this view we are disposed to agree. The eighteenth century is commonly described as an age of cold calculation, of selfish aims, of contracted interests. It indulged, we are often told, in no enthusiasm; its religion was without ardour, its politics

* *Thomas Sherlock, Bishop successively of Bangor, Salisbury and London.* By E. C. Carpenter. The S.P.C.K. 15s.

without aspiration, and even its poetry never sought to express deep feeling. There is only a measure of truth in this. The spirit which Walpole typifies in politics, which Warburton typifies in religion, which Shenstone and Gray typify in poetry, could not satisfy the needs of human nature in any age. A reaction was certain because it was necessary. Passion was beginning to assert its sway in poetry, however the prevailing fashion might run in favour of stateliness and formality. The first stirrings of romance were making themselves felt, and breaking through the reserve of convention and common sense. It is from a background like this that we can best understand the career of Thomas Sherlock, and grasp why he endeavoured to escape from his own time to the mid-seventeenth century. The very limited aims and ideas of the Common Sense School of moral philosophers were being displaced by a bolder and more critical school of metaphysics, and Sherlock approved of the change. The cold and rationalistic attitude of the religious apologists was exchanged for the wider and more comprehensive efforts of a religious revival, which in its higher forms was scholarly, imaginative, and poetical. In short, the outer coating of formalism was a mere husk, useful, indeed, as representing a protest against uncurbed and irrational fanaticism, but in no way crushing out the warmth and impulse of the national genius. So Sherlock felt, and so he harked back to the past.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Dr. Mackinnon has followed up his book on *Luther and the Reformation* by a volume on *Calvin and the Reformation*,* in commemoration of the four hundredth anniversary of the beginning, in 1536, of his career as a Reformer. He has fulfilled his task with the same fulness of knowledge and impartiality as marked his work on Luther. It may be well that so competent a scholar should have dealt with both outstanding leaders of the Reformation. Otherwise, Calvin has surely received adequate treatment in other authoritative works. Of course, Dr. Mackinnon's treatment sets forth the impressive greatness of Calvin's personality. He makes the most of the amiable traits which undoubtedly existed in his character. At the same time, such more

* By James Mackinnon. Longmans. 16s. net.

attractive features cannot disguise his intolerant dogmatism and its consequences in ruthless persecution of those who differed from him. With French logic, Calvin intensified the rigour of the Augustinian theology which he and Luther held in common. Luther, however, took refuge from this severity by magnifying the tender humanity of the Manger of Bethlehem. No such tempering of inexorable logic is to be found in Calvin. Dr. Mackinnon's book deserves careful study, not merely as the biography of a great religious leader, but for its careful outline of the Calvinist system as it was enforced in thought and applied in practice during its author's supremacy in Geneva.

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Dr. Prestige has published a work on *God in Patristic Thought*,* which is marked by fulness of learning and lucidity of exposition. His book traces the doctrine of God throughout the early centuries of Christian thought, culminating in the work of Athanasius and the Cappadocians. The volume is a valuable handbook on this important subject which may well find a place in the library of such theological students as seek to be well informed on the subject without devoting to it the close study of the writings of the Christian Fathers.

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It would be difficult to overpraise Professor William Langer's massive volumes, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*.† Continuing his previous work, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890*, it presents the fairest and most authoritative picture of the period that we possess. It describes with a wealth of fresh evidence the disintegration of the Bismarckian system and the reappearance of the Balance of Power in Europe. For when the Iron Chancellor fell in 1890, his successors were unable to keep France in quarantine, and in the very next year the foundations of the Dual Alliance were laid. One of the outstanding merits of this masterly survey is the author's knowledge of Russian sources such as the Lamsdorff diary, which compel us to revise a good many accepted notions. Fresh light is also thrown from Armenian, Serbian, Bulgarian and Japanese materials on movements and events not hitherto fully understood. The Armenian massacres in particular take on a new complexion. Standing aloof from our European quarrels and ambitions, the Harvard Professor brings a singularly calm intelligence to bear on the most controversial issues. He has no love for the outburst of overseas expansion which we call Imperialism, but his narrative is never polemical or partisan. The story ends with the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the opening of 1902, and a closing chapter contains the author's reflections on the country through which he has travelled. The value of the book, in which there is not a superfluous page, is enhanced by ample bibliographies in many languages at the end of each chapter and by a series of serviceable maps.

* By G. L. Prestige, D.D. Heinemann. 12s. 6d. net.
† Alfred Knopf. New York and London. 1935.

*India Recalled** is a further series of reminiscences by Cornelia Sorabji of her visits to the women of the Zenana in her office as representative of the Court of Wards. It is a delightful account of the old customs and ceremonies in connection with birth and death, with the growing-up of children, adoption, friendship, garlanding, head-shaving and "thread," ear-boring, rice-taking, the feast of lights, all interwoven with pretty stories and real human joys and sorrows. "Beloved and important children-people they were, all of them; the performance of Hindu religious ritual . . . taking the place, in their day, of games and fun in the life of the normal English child." One of her characters is Prithivi Maharani, placed "at the high-water mark of possibility among the keepers (as opposed to the flouters) of the law of Hinduism." Her story in this book opens at the age of fifteen, when she was expecting her first baby. Her husband idolised her. Later we see her with her three children keeping all the old ceremonies that were not harmful, skilfully avoiding others. "There came a day when her gay little world lay in ruins around her. Her Maharaja . . . was stricken with a sudden illness, and lay dead in a night. 'God's rod makes no noise,' said Prithivi, quoting an Indian saying." Years later we see her again, arranging for the marriage of her daughter, "watching through a hole in the purdah . . . the absurd 'march past' of likely bridegrooms put forward by the priests, and saying in confidence at the end: 'I have already chosen my son-in-law and—he is none of these.'"

In a brief chapter the subject of widow remarriage is discussed. An example is given of a boy aged twelve on his way home from school coming upon a marriage procession of a widow. "He stumbled home almost blind with horror and emotion, and was physically sick. He would speak to none of the family about an experience which he said was devastating; death was all that was left for him." Miss Sorabji, after advising and helping him to a new school course in the attempt to cure him "after so profound an experience," says: "We dare not lightly dismiss the thrills or shudders of any single person born with inhibitions and raised in circumstances to which we ourselves are strangers."

In contrast with the poetry of *India Recalled* is a little book by D. K. Karve, called *Looking Back*.† In a Preface Mr. Frederick J. Gould says: "If I wanted to stir lazy lads by a tale, I would tell them of the youthful band, of which our D. K. K. was the leading spirit, who tramped 110 miles from Murud by the sea to the examination-room at Satara in a four-days' pilgrimage, and on the third night slept uneasily under the stars in a rocky glen where wild beasts perhaps growled. The narrative is a parable of his career. He saw his goal, he walked, he persisted, he achieved."

Professor Karve developed first a great concern for widow marriage. He himself married a widow for his second wife and wore down a mountain

* Nisbet. 12s. 6d. † Aryabhushan Press, Poona.

of opposition. Then he started a Widows' Home at Poona and spent all his spare time from his profession as a teacher in collecting funds for it and for a girls' high school. Later in life he saw a vision of a women's university and rested not till he established one in Poona. In looking back over his career, with its sudden inspirations and its fortunate happenings, he says: "I cannot but feel gratitude for the help I received from seen and unseen sources to make me happy and successful in life."

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*Far East in Ferment** is the most recent work of Mr. Guenther Stein, whose able exposition of the Japanese industrial system in *Made in Japan* is widely remembered. He now covers a larger field in an analysis of the international situation in the Far East, with Japan as the focal point. If his book contains little new material, it provides a vigorous and valuable estimate of the aims and outlook which influence the policies of Japan, Russia and China. As a guide to this he pays particular attention to internal conditions. Recent events in Japan have clearly demonstrated the predominance of the military leaders, and it is evident from Mr. Stein's lengthy survey that the whole life of the nation is directed to the attainment, through armed strength and expansionist fervour, of a free hand in China and a general hegemony in the Pacific. In her claims to be "the only stabilising factor in the Far East" Japan regards Russia "at least as a dangerous competitor" and is fearful of Sino-Soviet co-operation. The incorporation, or control, of North China is regarded as a strategic necessity as well as an essential requirement for Japanese economic self-sufficiency. Mr. Stein notes the disillusionment over Manchukuo. The country has proved a poor market for Japanese products, while becoming a competitor of the farmer in Japan. Her raw materials are insufficient, and few immigrants have been absorbed. To offset these disadvantages North China is claimed to be essential. Meanwhile China itself is awakening. Mr. Stein was much impressed by the rapid growth and cohesion being achieved by Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, with whom he enjoyed an interview. The author's general conclusions are, inevitably, pessimistic. A Russo-Japanese conflict remains "a constant possibility" while mutual distrust continues; and there is no sign that this bitter antagonism is likely to end.

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The British Empire before the American Revolution† is a remarkable contribution by an American historian, Professor L. H. Gipson, to the study of the old Empire in the eighteenth century. As the product of extensive and detailed research, this work reviews the principal political, economic, religious and social features which characterised the various units of the Empire during the six years following the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Professor Gipson has selected this

* Methuen. 10s. 6d. net.

† In three volumes. Caxton Printers Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho, U.S.A.

period as being the last one of tranquillity prior to the final upheaval of the American Revolution. The first volume is devoted to Great Britain and Ireland; the second and third, which include surveys of the West Indies, the American plantations and settlements, Newfoundland and the African slave trade, contain a mass of material which the student will appreciate. The author's conclusions are reasoned, balanced and sympathetic to the general nature of the mother country's policy. For example, he regards the economic regulations imposed upon the colonies as a courageous attempt at a planned economy of imperial self-sufficiency. Upon this ground he defends the famous Iron Act of 1750. It was, he concludes, an imperative rule of British statecraft in the eighteenth century that the welfare of England itself depended upon the prosperity of the Empire. "For every demand made upon the dependencies an attempt was made to provide a reciprocal return of benefits either direct or indirect." The text of the work is annotated but is without a bibliography, which the author intends to publish in a separate volume.

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Old Nurse,* by Barbara Barclay Carter, tells the story of a noble woman who found perfect happiness in the service of others. Her love for her nurseling was fully returned while she was alive, and now that she is gone it has inspired a very tender and touching memorial. "An early life of quiet, rich experience," writes Viola Meynell in a Foreword, "is quietly and beautifully recorded here." That Miss Carter knows how to write was discovered by readers of her Dante novel, *Ship Without Sails*. There are passages of quiet beauty, of intimate revelation, in every chapter. Brecon and its bare hills, the life and characters of the little Welsh town, the echoes of the World War, Nanna's glimpses of Germany and America, her homely wisdom, her uncomplaining fortitude, her utter fidelity—these things go to the making of a portrait painted in delicate colours by a skilled and loving hand.

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A final definitive estimate of Hindenburg's life is not possible in this generation; but Mr. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett effectively shatters the "Hindenburg legend" in his recent work, *Hindenburg, the Wooden Titan*,† which is remarkable for its grasp and analysis of the crowded and critical events during the last twenty years of the Marshal's career. The author approached his task as a genuine believer in the myth, but exhaustive research among available official documents, memoirs and biographies and particularly personal contacts with some of the leading German figures, brought disillusionment as to the real character of Hindenburg, which is here unfolded in all its dramatic and tragic intensity. The will to serve was the mainspring of Hindenburg's life, but was unfortunately coupled with a simple and pliable intellect

* Jonathan Cape. 7s. 6d.

† Macmillan. 21s. net.

which allowed itself to be controlled successively by dominating partners; first by Ludendorff and subsequently by such men as Meissner, von Schleicher, von Papen and finally by Hitler. Once persuaded of his duty, and persuasion became easier in proportion to his years, Hindenburg could abandon without a qualm the very personality upon whose achievement his own reputation had been enhanced; as Hoffmann, Ludendorff, Gröner and Brüning successively found to their cost. The story of Hindenburg's life is thus largely the unravelling of policies and plots which circled round his person, a figurehead too often blind to reality. For example, in the High Command with Ludendorff he became "a greatly respected zero," ignorant even of the situation of his army corps. In dealing with Hitler's advent to power in 1933, Mr. Wheeler-Bennett remarks that "the Old Gentleman had no conception of how terribly he had betrayed his trusteeship." It is remarkable that, in spite of the vicissitudes of his erstwhile associates, it was not until then that the popular belief in his strength and leadership was severely shaken. Yet there were, as the author shows, noble moments in his life as when, for example, he retained the command after the Emperor's abdication; and his continued support of Stresemann for five successive years, albeit at the instance of Meissner, deserves the utmost praise. The tragedy of the whole story is what might have been had the President lived up to the height of his reputation.

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The particular interest of the new fourth and cheap edition of Mr. and Mrs. J. L. Hammond's life of *Lord Shaftesbury** lies in a new Appendix relating to the mutual feelings of Gladstone and Shaftesbury for each other. The great philanthropist thought hardly of most politicians, and his bitter opinion of Gladstone's conduct and motives was revealed clearly in the extracts from his diaries published in Hodder's biography of 1886. Mr. and Mrs. Hammond discuss briefly some of these attacks, and have printed by way of contrast a memorandum and notes composed by Gladstone after reading the biography and which hitherto have remained unpublished. In these Gladstone combined self-defence with a remarkably generous tribute to Shaftesbury's work and "noble character," showing a combination of conviction with tolerance and appreciation which Shaftesbury so signally failed to display.

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A short version of Lord Tweedsmuir's four-volume *History of the Great War* has been compiled by Mr. Adrian Alington in *Episodes of the Great War*.† He has selected passages which cover mainly the chief phases on the Western Front. The extracts, which are published without revision, are so arranged as to provide a complete and continuous narrative within four hundred pages. The volume includes maps and portraits of the great war figures, but omits an index.

* Longmans. 6s. net. † Nelson. 8s. 6d. net.

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REARMAMENT.

IN the White Paper issued last month the Government offered, as an indication of the scale on which rearmament is proceeding in this country, the figure of £1,500 millions as the estimated expenditure during the next five years. It is not easy to appreciate the magnitude and implications of this colossal figure. Past expenditure on armaments in times of peace affords no parellel with expenditure on this scale. The only parellel is with war-time expenditure, and £1,500 millions is about seven times the cost of the Boer War. Or take for the purposes of comparison our expenditure from 1914 to 1918. The total cost of the Great War up to March 1919 (to the end of that financial year) was about £8,400,000,000. Of that sum we had lent £1,800,000,000 to our allies, but we had borrowed £800,000,000 for ourselves. Subtracting the difference between these two amounts from the total cost of the war, we find that the net cost was £7,400,000,000, or an average annual expenditure for four years and eight months of £1,500 millions. So, allowing for the higher level of war prices, it would be an understatement to say that we have to contemplate the expenditure over the next five years of a sum of money equal to the average annual net cost of maintaining the huge and exhausting effort of the country during the Great War. At the same time the Government are careful to assure us—or to warn us—that £1,500 millions is a very rough estimate. The programme is flexible and the cost will expand or contract in relation to changing conditions—the price level, technical developments or alterations in the foreign situation.

Ministers argue that the necessity for expenditure on this scale is imposed upon us now by their neglect of our defences in recent years. Mr. Chamberlain, for example, said at Edinburgh on March 6th: "We are making up in a few years for deficiencies that have accumulated over a long period." Yet the expenditure of this country on armaments during the ten years 1925-6 to 1934-5 was £1,122,551,000 as compared with £655,688,000 for the ten years before the Great War.

Indeed, before embarking upon the policy of the White Paper, Ministers had already spent £78,000,000 in the two years 1935-6 and 1936-7 on "filling gaps." The estimates for 1935-6, without including Supplementary Estimates, were 20 per cent. higher than in 1932-3; and, whereas during the five years immediately preceding the Great War British armament expenditure had increased by 20 per cent., in the five years between 1932-3 and 1936-7, it increased by more than 50 per cent.—two and a half times faster than in the five years before the War. All this was done before we started to put the new policy of the White Paper on Defence into operation.

In these circumstances it is almost disingenuous for Ministers to describe their programme of rearmament expenditure as merely "filling gaps" or "supplying deficiencies." It is an armament programme on a scale unprecedented in peace time, and the first question to consider is whether a substantial increase in British armaments is imposed upon us by the facts of the present international situation. Never was it more difficult than it is now to ascertain the truth about the armaments of foreign countries. Even in the Great War experience showed that the number, calibre and mobility of German and Austrian heavy batteries, as also the number of their machine-guns and the rapidity with which the German reserves of man-power could be mobilised, had been underestimated. Now the veil of secrecy which the dictatorships have wrapped about their military preparations makes it hazardous to attempt any estimate of the size of their forces. There can, however, be no reasonable doubt that, as Dr. Dalton said at the Annual Conference of the Labour Party last autumn, German rearmament is "the central brute fact in Europe."

The rulers of Germany and Italy are making their preparations for a world conflict on the principles enunciated in Germany of "the total war." Alike in internal and external policy they rely on force and have trampled upon law, treaties and liberal and pacific opinion. Signor Mussolini proclaims his belief that "war alone brings all human energies to their highest tension and sets a seal of nobility on the peoples who have the virtue to face it." Military training and drill with dummy weapons starts in Russia, Germany and Italy when children are six, eight and ten years old. The

man-power—and the women too—the industry and finance of dictatorship countries are being organised in peace time so as to develop the maximum war potential almost at the outbreak of war and to sustain the conflict to the full extent of their resources. A natural development of the conception of "the total war" and of such weapons as aeroplanes and mechanised land forces is the knock-out blow. No longer can any nation hope for a year or two or a few months or even weeks in which to complete its defensive preparations, or to consult with other countries on the measures to deal with a sudden act of aggression, deliberately calculated by surprise and by weight of men and material to overcome the victim so that a *fait accompli* can be registered before the conscience of the world can be aroused and resistance organised.

Are the people of Germany and Italy less peace-loving than those of France and Britain? Would such unscrupulous aggression be supported by public opinion in those countries? Can we not set them an example of friendship, trust and unilateral disarmament and appeal to them in the name of humanity and peace? The answer to these questions is that in those countries pacifism is a crime, for which the swift and certain punishment is the concentration camp, that the dictatorship is master of the whole life of the country and of all the means of moulding and expressing opinion, that it works in secret, tolerating no opposition and recognising no law but its own interests. It does not lie within the compass of this article to attempt to forestall the verdict of history on the respective responsibilities of French, German, British and other Governments since the war for this tragic situation; nor to apportion its proper share of the responsibility to our present Government. Here we are concerned only with the situation as it now exists, and in that situation a substantial measure of British rearmament is clearly an evil and dangerous but inescapable necessity.

Armaments, however, are not the only weapons of war, and the industrial, economic and financial strength of Britain has long been a powerful factor in compassing the defeat of those who have sought by war to acquire the hegemony of Europe. Effectively to employ great modern armaments in war demands immense reserves of financial strength which, owing to our sound Free Trade economy and finance we fortunately possessed at the beginning of the last war and were able to

share with our protectionist allies. Then our National Debt was £640 millions; to-day it is £7,901,631,689. Then we were steadily paying it off; now the Sinking Fund has been suspended for four years, and we are proposing deliberately to unbalance our Budget and add £400 millions in five years to the dead weight of our huge national debt. Then our income tax was 1s. 2d. in the £ and surtax 6d.—total 1s. 8d. Now the standard rate of income tax is 4s. 9d. and is likely to be raised to 5s. in the next Budget, while surtax on the highest range of incomes is 8s. 3d. Then a revenue of under £300 millions was collected in rates and taxes. Next year there can be little doubt that the tremendous sum of over £1,000 millions will be contributed by ratepayers and taxpayers. Even before the increase in armament expenditure began Mr. Chamberlain had found himself unable to reduce the income tax below 4s. 6d. in the £ or to budget for a Sinking Fund. Indeed, the policy of stimulating industry by protection and subsidies had required substantial increases in indirect as well as the maintenance of a high level of direct taxation. Now it is proposed to unbalance the Budget to the extent of £400 millions in the next five years. But if taxation is kept at concert pitch in time of peace, there is no margin for war; and if we cannot pay our way now, and have to resort to loans, it is difficult to see how we shall be able to do so when industry is dislocated either by war, or, as everyone hopes, by disarmament. We are piling up burdens for the future, uncertain as that future is, and Mr. Chamberlain is bequeathing an unenviable heritage to his successor who, in the chain of our defensive measures, will have to give urgent attention to the vital link of finance.

In these conditions the need for economy in public expenditure and for the creation of new sources of revenue is apparent. It is difficult to imagine any more fruitful source of revenue than a revival of overseas trade; hence the urgency of seizing the opportunity presented by the efforts of Mr. Cordell Hull, Mr. McKenzie King, General Smuts, M. Blum, M. Bastid, Dr. Colijn and the Scandinavian Powers to get a wide measure of agreement on the necessity for abolishing quotas and reducing tariffs and other obstacles to trade. For this new burden of £1,500 millions may well prove insupportable unless we can restore that resiliency of which the economic blizzard and five years of protection and subsidies have deprived our national finance.

To insist on economy—and by economy I mean the elimination of waste or superfluity—in expenditure on defence is no easy task, especially at a time of admitted emergency. Mr. Chamberlain gleefully invites the Opposition to point to one single item in the Government's programme which they think excessive, knowing full well that he is on unassailable debating ground, because the answer to the criticism of any item must be that, in the opinion of the expert advisers of the Government, who alone possess all the relevant information which bears upon this problem, such expenditure is necessary. There are, however, two broad criticisms from the standpoint of economy of the Government's handling of the problem of rearmament to which they have not so far given any effective reply.

In the first place, the Government seem to be concentrating on the problem of stimulating the production of armaments and subordinating to this consideration the inconvenient and, as they sometimes seem to suggest, inconsistent duty of preventing profiteering and ensuring that for every pound spent we get twenty shillings' worth of defensive power. Ministers obviously share the view which Mr. Churchill expressed on the Third Reading of the Defence Loans Bill, when he said: "The sole question of interest from the point of view of security is, not the amount of money which Ministers will ask or which Parliament will vote, but what the 'contractors can earn in the next two years'"; and in the White Paper on Defence which was issued in March of last year we are warned that "the work is not to be delayed by the over-elaboration of financial safeguards." This paragraph was strongly criticised in the debate which took place on the White Paper on March 9th last year and the fears which were then expressed, that the Government's financial control was inadequate to prevent the armaments manufacturers from making inflated profits or to ensure full value for the expenditure of public money on defence, have been justified by the Report of the Royal Commission on the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms. The Royal Commission found that to prevent profiteering, it was not enough that "the defence departments themselves are satisfied that the profits allowed to private manufacturers under particular contracts are fair and reasonable," and that "nothing less is required than control by the Government in peace time of

all arms manufacture and arms manufacturing capacity in the country." Their Report has been in the hands of the Government for about four months, but the Government have not yet made up their mind what to do about it. Pressed in the House of Commons by Sir Percy Harris to come to a decision, the Prime Minister replied: "That is not the only problem we have before us."

Yet adequate financial control over expenditure amounting to £1,500 millions in two years is not a question that can be shelved. The recommendations of the Royal Commission were received by public opinion with marked approval. The Government should therefore be pressed to accept and carry out the Report of the Commission before it is too late to stop profiteering and waste.

In the second place, there is no lack of evidence to suggest that we have been spending more on armaments and getting less defence value for our money in recent years than before the war. Having spent a thousand million pounds in the ten years ending 1934-5, we are told in a Government White Paper, as well as in Ministers' speeches, that this amounts to "unilateral disarmament"! Moreover, for the past fifteen years the growing importance of air power in our scheme of defence has been increasingly apparent; yet the Air Ministry has always had to take third place behind the Admiralty and the War Office in the annual allocation among the Services of the money available for defence. It was for these among other reasons that under strong pressure from both Houses of Parliament the Government eventually appointed, at the beginning of last year, a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence.

From the first, however, it was clear that the new Minister was not going to be given the wide field of activity which Parliament intended him to possess. It was obvious that the Minister who was to be responsible for carrying out the Defence Plans ought to have prepared them; yet he was not appointed till after they had been framed and published. Then it was stated in the White Paper on Defence that it is not proposed that the meetings of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee should normally take place under the presidency of the new Minister, although Lord Milne with his great experience had expressed the opinion, which was widely shared, that the Minister should always take the chair at the meetings of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee.

In practice it is abundantly clear that the new Minister has not attempted to "co-ordinate defence" but has contented himself with functioning as a Minister of Supply. The old scramble for money between the defence services has continued, and the rearmament plan seems to proceed on the principle of giving to each defence ministry all it asks. If not only the three Services, industry and transport, but also finance are effectively to be co-ordinated for the purpose of defence, and if economy is to be regarded not as the foe but as an indispensable guarantee of efficiency, the Minister must be given power to combine the principles of naval, military and air force doctrine into one strategic whole to which each of the Services will make its appropriate contribution.

After years of debate, the question of the Fleet Air Arm is still the subject of an official investigation; while it is difficult to believe that an arrangement which allows responsibility for the defence of London from air attack to be divided between the War Office and the Air Ministry will endure. The question of the battleship against the air bomber has been settled by ordering the number of battleships which the admirals demand and the number of bombers which the Air Ministry wants. The Fleet Air Arm is being greatly increased, but apparently the fact that cruisers are now equipped with aeroplanes is not considered to diminish the number required for patrolling trade routes. Authority and initiative in matters of strategy must be attributed to the Minister if defence is really to be co-ordinated and economy secured.

The question recurs, to what purpose is this colossal expenditure? Victory in war? Yet we know that war would be a catastrophe which would engulf victors and vanquished alike. Indeed, it is far from certain that our civilisation will stand the strain of unproductive armament expenditure on the present scale, and there was a striking passage at the close of Mr. Chamberlain's speech in moving the financial resolution to the Defence Loans Bill in which he said that no one could see "this growing accumulation of burdens without a feeling of disgust and shame that civilisation is trying to break its own back instead of settling its differences by give-and-take."

No, the only justification of British rearmament is that it will serve to buttress the rule of law against force, that it will contribute to the creation of a system of collective

security under the League of Nations which will deter other heavily armed powers from aggression against Britain and other law-abiding and peace-loving members of the League, and that in the meantime a constructive policy of economic and military disarmament will be resolutely and consistently pursued. It must be made abundantly clear to the world that we are willing to stop our rearmament programme the moment other nations are willing to join us in general disarmament, and that we are firm in our loyalty to the Covenant of the League. Nor should the Government hesitate to tell the electors plainly that, while the armaments of Great Britain will only be used in resistance to any act of aggression " to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account" (to quote Annexe F to the Treaty of Locarno), and while force will always be the League's last resort in settling disputes after, first, conciliation and then economic and financial pressure have failed or, when in the circumstances of the aggression, such measures are obviously inadequate, we cannot as a loyal member of the League be neutral in the face of aggression, but that we shall perform our obligations under the Covenant to the full.

This, however, is not enough, for the *status quo* will never provide a secure foundation for peace. We must make it clear to Germany and other nations who are still outside the League that, if they will return to the League, accept third-party judgment in all international disputes, and, as the acid test of the sincerity of all members of the League, join in a measure of general disarmament, no grievance, whether political, economic, or colonial, will be regarded as undiscussable, but, on the contrary, that it will be regarded as the main objective of the League to promote the revival of international trade and the economic prosperity of all its members. Nations are suffocating in the strait waistcoats of tariffs, quotas, exchange restrictions and colonial preference. Armaments cannot be a permanent solution of the problems of German unemployment or French deficits or British distressed areas. The ultimate solution, towards which we must work, of the problem of world impoverishment, insolvency and unemployment in an age of abundance is the restoration of the free movement of goods, capital and men over the face of the globe. Economic despair may yet goad nations into war. Peace and relief from armaments will come with a return to commercial freedom and goodwill.

ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR.

THE PROBLEM OF THE SPECIAL AREAS.

THE White Paper which has just been issued dealing with further proposals with regard to the Special Areas, while it outlines new measures for the relief of those districts deals at the same time with what has already been achieved in the past two years while Sir Malcolm Stewart was Commissioner. Sir George Gillett, who has been appointed Commissioner in place of Sir Malcolm Stewart, with somewhat larger powers, has entered upon this work with great enthusiasm, and has already visited many of the worst centres of unemployment. The late Commissioner, in his final report, pointed out the difficulty that he had met with in trying to attract new industries to the areas, and his offer to large industrialists to come to the assistance of these areas met with many refusals and created rather a depressed atmosphere. He did not content himself with merely inviting industrialists to come to his aid, he indicated that some reduction of the burden of public assistance to the local authorities must be made, or otherwise it was unlikely that new enterprises would be attracted to any region where the rates and taxes imposed so heavy a burden. The writer pointed out over a year ago that the obvious way of making it easier for factories to be established in the Special Areas was to reduce the rates and taxes, and he suggested that no rates should be paid for at least five years on any new undertakings. The White Paper now recommends that the life of the present Act should be extended from May 1937 to March 1939, and that rate and taxation relief for five years should be given.

Apart altogether from the Special Areas, " certified " areas are to be added, chiefly in Lancashire, and some assistance will doubtless be given to any fresh industries which are started in such areas. It is undeniable that a good deal of improvement has taken place as a result of the provision which has been made, and the various enterprises that have been set on foot. No doubt it is a fact that Commissioners have found themselves blocked by Government Departments in certain proposals that they have put forward. It is useless to appoint a man if you tie his hands too closely, and no idea can come to fruition if the practical steps are hampered by administrative difficulties. Nevertheless, it is absurd to say that the steps which have been taken have proved futile. Not less

than £5,000,000 has been voted by Parliament for these Special Areas, and although the whole of it has not been spent, yet all of it has been earmarked. Nearly £11,000,000 in all will be forthcoming, and definite promises have been given which imply the expenditure of this considerable sum of money. If we add to that the armament orders of some £35,000,000 up to last January, we cannot deny that this must mean a reduction in the number of unemployed and a considerable relief to the areas under discussion. As a matter of fact the number of unemployed up to January 1937 had been diminished by 26 per cent. in two years, and although this reduction was not entirely due to new enterprises it is an indication that some relief has been given. Whether the further relief which will take effect as a result of a change in the block grant system should be credited to the Government in this special connection is perhaps open to doubt since the money is provided to enable the statutory proportion to be maintained that was fixed by the Derating Act of 1929 between the total grant and the total expenditure of the combined rate and grant borne by the Local Authorities. Some of this £2,500,000, of course, does not go to the Special Areas, but Merthyr would get a reduction of 5s. in the £ in its rates and some other districts in South Wales would be helped quite substantially.

It is admitted in the White Paper that exceptional treatment is required for places beyond the Special Areas, since in many of these areas there is severe unemployment and no likelihood of an immediate improvement of the depressed industries. In such cases there will be no remission of rates, taxes and rent, but sites and factories will be assisted by the Government, which offers to subscribe a quarter of the capital of any Public Utility Company, and moreover to assist with loans any enterprises settled on the provided sites. These loans will be forthcoming for the new areas which are certified by the Ministry of Labour as suffering from severe and chronic depression, and a sum of £2,000,000 is made available for this purpose. The Commissioner will now have power not only to help in the new trading estates, but also to give assistance to an industry in his area which is outside these estates. The object is, of course, to provide employment in places like Wigan, where it is most needed.

There will be general assent to the Government's scheme by

which the relief of rates authorised by the Commissioners will not be at the expense of the Local Authority. The Commissioners have power to give this relief, and also to contribute to the rent payable by new undertakings. It is no doubt a new departure which may seem startling to those who have not accurately measured the magnitude of the need. These new industries must in their early years receive the greatest amount of help available. When they are established and flourishing aid may be withdrawn, but for the time being the condition of success in such areas is the removal of every possible burden and the provision of generous encouragement. No doubt the Loan Fund will be worked in collaboration with the trustees of the Lord Nuffield Trust, and this is important if we are to prevent overlapping. So far as our information goes the trustees are keenly anxious to establish new industries, because it is in industry that we have a more or less permanent remedy for unemployment. Already it has been decided in conjunction with the Low Temperature Carbonisation to start a plant for producing oil from coal in South Wales. We are not forgetting the new assistance to these districts afforded by the armament programmes, but armament work is not necessarily permanent. It will help materially to revive old industries, but there is a danger that when the armament orders are finished the industries may collapse and the economic improvement disappear. No money will be wasted if side by side with the carrying out of armament orders new Government factories can be established and new industries located not subject to the same vicissitudes.

As a guide to Government action we now have an important and comprehensive Industrial Survey of South Wales. This Survey is so complete that we cannot any longer say that we lack material for coming to conclusions. The Survey was undertaken for the Industrial Development Council of Wales and Monmouthshire, and is the result of a grant given by the Commissioner for the Special Areas. It furnishes us with information on three special points. First it gives us the present state of employment in the various South Wales industries, and draws some conclusions as to the probability of future employment in those industries. In the second place it indicates the special facilities which the whole area may offer to new industries, and thirdly it suggests certain new industries that could be profitably established in this region.

The places that the Survey regards as most suitable amongst others for these new industries are Pontypool, Tredegar, Cardiff, Merthyr Tydfil, Newport, Neath, Port Talbot, Bridgend and Swansea. A variety of trades are suggested for new industries and certain others already in existence in the opinion of the authors are capable of expansion.

Some of the suggestions made advised a further inquiry with regard to Low Temperature Carbonisation and the distillation of oil from coal by hydrogenation, synthetic nitrogen and synthetic ammonia. As an aid to such industries it was thought desirable to improve the roads, to erect a new Severn Bridge, to electrify certain railways and to create a gas grid. The population question has become important since there has been a net loss by migration from four counties of 242,000 between 1921 and 1931, and it is estimated that some 70,000 have left the area between 1931 and 1935. It looks, therefore, as though the male population by 1943 at the same rate of migration will have declined by another 79,000 and the total population by a quarter of a million. If this estimate is correct and this migration is allowed to continue, the whole of the surplus unemployed labour with the exception of old men will have disappeared by that date.

The Report speaks of the causes of the decline in employment in coal-mining, and iron and steel production, and also deals with the possible employment capacity of all the other forty smaller industries. It is agreed on all hands that the coal trade does have a claim on the country for some form of assistance, but short of a revival in exports abroad and a reduction of tariff barriers, there is very little hope of any increase in this industry, apart from a subsidy which the authors consider would only be justified if a European Coal Cartel could be established. Some conclusions are given in the Report and briefly they support the decisions of the Government as stated in the White Paper. These conclusions may be summed up as further state aid in the encouragement of new industries, some further transfer of labour presumably not on a large scale, the creation of new industries in special locations, where assistance would hardly be required apart from a reduction in rates and taxes and the establishment of trading estates. Since there is likely to be a shortage of labour in certain industries, the figures of the men wholly unemployed are significant. Taking the figure of 115,000 men as wholly

unemployed 45,300 were between the ages of 18 and 34, and 48,000 between the ages of 35 and 54. It is true that, perhaps, the greater part of this labour would be unskilled so far as new industries are concerned, but it would not be long before with the help of key men the steel and tinplate industries might be increased, and with such key men there seems to be no impossibility in the building of one or two hydrogenation plants which would supply the oil which has so greatly taken the place of coal in both our navy and our mercantile marine. If these hydrogenation plants could be located near coal fields great economies could be effected, and judging from the evidence available all the oil that we could produce would have a ready sale at present prices, providing that the Government still continued to allow these plants to escape the duty placed on imported oil.

The time has gone by for merely experimental measures. If ever the depression in the Special Areas is to be overcome, and new life imported into industry and commerce in these districts, no line of attack must be neglected. Emergency measures, whether of rearmament or of temporary assistance, must be backed by a real attempt to build up a permanent industrial structure once again. My own belief is that these new industries can be created and that every measure if pressed to its furthest limits will bring a revival of industry. It may be that some change in location is required, but no wholesale transference of population to other parts of the country ought to be necessary, and certainly not to the districts round London where the problems are already almost unmanageable. This new Survey of South Wales takes into account the whole of that large area including the more prosperous districts. Iron and steel and tin-plate manufactures are linked up with coal, and development along regional lines should be carefully considered. It is useless to deal with this question in piecemeal fashion and to say that if a new industry is located in the Special Area that is sufficient. New industries that are started outside the Special Areas, if not too far away, ought to be of great value in absorbing some of the idle labour, and the only condition of assisting these new industries should be that they help to absorb the wholly unemployed men such as the 42 per cent. in South Wales of unemployed who are all over 35 years of age. The danger is that if migration of labour to distant parts of the

country is greatly encouraged the population of the Special Areas will gradually disappear with the result that in times of depression we shall have created another problem equally difficult of solution. One of the somewhat nebulous gains of modern civilisation is this rush of industries to the big cities like London. There is no doubt a ready market for their goods, but eventually the population is increased to such an extent that the whole balance of industrial and municipal life is overthrown. This lack of equilibrium may be fatal in the near future. There is one aspect of labour transference to which no objection can be taken. The Government has, through the Commissioner, assisted largely in the development of land settlement and cottage homesteads, and further assistance may be forthcoming. Such help is on the right lines, for though its magnitude is not commensurate with its value, both in matters of nutrition and health, it would do much to give hope and encouragement to the older men who will probably never again find gainful employment in their own industries. We cannot, however, agree with Mr. Lloyd George that huge numbers of unemployed can be placed on the land except at enormous cost. Experience shows the impossibility of the task.

Now that the whole problem has been carefully examined and facts and figures are forthcoming, we have sufficient evidence upon which to base vigorous action. This action should be many-sided, but in the main it should mean that exceptional powers are given to some authorities enabling them to take measures, however unorthodox, to deal with the situation. Since the Commissioners are limited in their powers it would be as well to give to a Cabinet Minister an over-riding power. A Minister with real administrative ability, with experts at his disposal and information already available, would never be contented solely to give relief. Relief even on a large scale is no solution, and this the Government now recognises. Constructive measures must be devised, first of all to save the existing industries from decay, secondly to attract to these areas new industries, and to create the condition of permanence. Already six new industries are to be started. Finally, some of the large works that have been suggested like the new bridge over the Severn, the reconstruction of Maryport Harbour and the improvement of traffic communication in Cumberland ought in whole or in part to be carried out.

PERCY ALDEN.

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS.

DURING my service at the Peace Conference in Paris in the winter of 1918-19 and a considerable number of years' residence in England later, I found a surprising amount of misunderstanding of the American constitution, not merely among ordinary men, but among those officials and newspaper men and others who might have been supposed to know something about it. In this brief article I can touch upon two misconceptions only which bear directly upon what we may call our present crisis here in the United States.

A few weeks ago, in a very sympathetic editorial on our great flood disaster, the London *Times* stated that the national effort required for flood control " seems more than can be hoped for under the limitations imposed upon the central Government by a Constitution drawn up 150 years ago, when the problems which have arisen could not possibly have been foreseen." This belief that America is trying to live within the straight-jacket of a document drawn up five generations ago is the first misconception. It contains a partial, but only a partial, truth.

It is true that we have a written constitution drawn up in 1787, but it is misleading to give the impression that it is unalterable or has remained unaltered. A Constitution is a living thing which conforms itself to the character and needs of a people. It is often said that the American Constitution is written, with the inference that it is therefore rigid, in contrast to the unwritten, and therefore flexible, one of Great Britain. It is a matter of degree and circumstance. The British is also partly written, if such documents, among others, as Magna Charta, the Act of Union, the Act of Settlement, the Dominions Act and so on may be considered as parts of it, and in some cases the rigidity of British custom and vested interests has proved harder to overcome than written words. For example, both countries have had to face the problem of modernising the Upper House along democratic lines. As soon as public opinion was ripe for it, the change in the method of electing Senators in the United States from that provided in the Constitution of 1787 to election by popular vote was effected more quickly, with

greater ease and with less danger, than was even the moderate change in the veto power of the Lords accomplished under the supposedly so much more flexible British Constitution.

How, then, is the American Constitution altered? We can touch only briefly on several ways. First by formal amendment. It is true, as *The Times* said, that those who drew up the original document could not foresee the future, but they did see that they could not foresee, and so they provided two methods of amendment. To date there have been twenty-one formal amendments. Partly because after the first twelve were early adopted there were few more until this century, and partly because when public opinion was more or less evenly divided some of the later ones were slow in being passed by the State Legislatures, the belief came to be held that the method itself was cumbrous. This is not so. The speed with which an amendment can be put through depends solely on how far public opinion is behind it. The whole process, for example, of getting the Twenty-first Amendment (repealing Prohibition) through Congress and the requisite number of State Legislatures took only ten months. Since 1900 there has been an amendment on the average about once in every three years. The increasing rapidity of communication throughout the country, the use of the radio and other means of mobilising public opinion, all tend to increase the speed with which amendments really desired by the people can be enacted.

Another method of change is to use the old machinery in a new way. The most notable example of this is the mode of electing a President. According to the Constitution of 1787 the people were to have no direct voice in his election. Electors were to be chosen in the several States and they were to choose a Chief Magistrate. The simple device of having the people elect the electors but pledging them in advance to vote for certain candidates has enabled the people to vote directly for President without amendment. Another mode of change is interpretation by the Supreme Court. On the whole, and in an era of incomparable social and economic change, the Judges have been extraordinarily successful in so interpreting the words of the fundamental law as to enable them to fulfil the needs of new generations. When they find that impossible, the way is open for the formal amendment of that law, as noted above. There are other minor methods

of change, such as usage as in England. It is true we once had a civil war over the Constitution, but so had England.

It may be asked, why a written Constitution at all that gives this bother? The answer is simple. America started as a new nation made up of thirteen sovereign States. In all such cases, as in that of the Union of England and Scotland, a written agreement is necessary. The United States is a federal union, not a single unified state like England. It is a government of limited powers. Some belong to the Federal Government, some to the States, and some are reserved to the people, including among the latter the power of changing the fundamental law of the Constitution. We are more like the British Empire than we are like England alone.

This brings us to the question of the Supreme Court. Many British seem unable to comprehend this institution, which is reverenced by the great mass of Americans in spite of occasional annoyance with it. That the British do not understand it is the more remarkable because they themselves have almost precisely similar courts. There is a Supreme Court, for example, in Canada, another in Australia, and the Privy Council acts as a Supreme Court for the Empire to a great extent. It was only the other day that the Council decided that certain Canadian New Deal legislation was unconstitutional in precisely the same way that our own Supreme Court has done. In fact, unless there is going to be chaos or disunion in a federal state or a federated commonwealth, it is hard to see how such a court can be avoided. Our own is the lineal descendant of the English Privy Council of colonial days which pronounced on the legislation of the American colonial legislatures.

In the formation of a new state such as the United States a written fundamental law is necessary to, so to say, "get the thing going." In case of conflict between the Executive, the Legislature, or the several States in the Union, who is to decide what the fundamental law is? There must be an umpire of authority. After many suggestions and experiments, we decided that the best umpire on the whole is a Supreme Court made up of presumably the most learned judges in the land, men appointed for life (though there is no objection to a late retiring age) and aloof from the strife of politics. According to the American view, to make the Executive, who is an individual with far more power in any

case than the King or Prime Minister in Great Britain, supreme judge of the fundamental law would be to erect a dictator. We have forty-nine Legislatures. To make the Legislatures the umpire would be to paralyse government and perhaps have a fight of Kilkenny cats. What device, then, can be better than a Supreme Court, just as they have in the British Empire?

A useful part of governmental machinery, it may be said, but why the special reverence for it in America? There are several answers. This country is vast beyond the knowledge of most Europeans. The interests of its different sections vary greatly and often conflict. We are young, but we have on the whole the Anglo-Saxon belief in a government of laws and not of men. We have not a millennium behind us broadening down from precedent to precedent. We cling to the fundamental law instead. Our population is extremely mixed. We have foreign groups equal in numbers to the entire populations of many European nations. Our life is still in flux. Our moods change quickly. Movements rise and fall. Our people have not the British temperamental resistance to change nor have we some of the bulwarks which England possesses against sudden change, such as an Established Church, an aristocracy, county families, a governing class or a highly trained Civil Service. Our one bulwark against hasty action is the Supreme Court. So we have clung to it like a rock in a flood. Our Constitution, although considered as a unit, is really made up of two parts. One deals with the machinery of government, the division of powers, the system of checks and balances, the other with fundamental rights, such as freedom of thought, religion, speech, press, exemption from unlawful searches and seizures. It is these that the Supreme Court is also called upon to defend, as it has done over and over again and only recently did. Under the temporary dictatorship of the fantastic Huey Long in Louisiana the people of that State had no other defence but the Supreme Court, which in a resounding decision, running over all the long history of freedom in England, upheld the freedom of the Press.

Thus most of us feel that any attack on the Supreme Court, any effort to make it subservient to the Executive or Congress, is a possible attack upon our fundamental liberties. Many of us agree with certain of Mr. Roosevelt's objectives,

but we feel that these should be attained by changing the Constitution, if necessary, in the ways provided by it and not by packing the Court. If that can be done by him as President it could be done by any President with such control of Congress as he possesses, and there might be an end of free government if we had a President with the dictator complex. It has been claimed that an amendment would take too long. Not if the people are sufficiently united to desire it. If they are not, should we go on with policies opposed by the majority? It has also been claimed that no amendment could be drawn to accomplish all Mr. Roosevelt wishes done without making it so broad as to change our form of government. But if this be true, which I doubt, is not Mr. Roosevelt attempting to gain the same end by making the Supreme Court his puppet? If our form of government is in fact to be altered, the people have the right under the Constitution to say how. If the President is afraid of an amendment to be voted on, have we any longer a Constitution and a democratic form of government when he tries to force on the people that which they would reject if they had the chance? These are questions which millions of serious, patriotic and forward-looking Americans are asking. Our Presidents have had powers, such as the gift of hundreds of thousands of political offices, of which no English Premier dreams. Allow that Mr. Roosevelt has only the most benevolent intentions, can we afford, as a precedent, to give him control of all branches of government? He himself, in a speech some months ago, said that the government under him had built up such instruments of power as in the wrong hands would shackle the liberties of the people. In the election last November he refused to say what he intended to do, though challenged to do so. Senator Reed, of the President's own party, said openly that he had proof which he could produce that the President, if elected, planned to pack the Supreme Court. Mr. Roosevelt did not deny it, but ran on a platform calling for an amendment to be submitted to the people. Now he refuses to submit an amendment to vote on, and instead asks a subservient Congress to pack the Court. That is what has so alarmed the country. That is our constitutional crisis.

JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS.

TOWARDS BALKAN UNITY.

IT is well over thirty years since Lord Noel-Buxton and Mr. Charles Roden Buxton founded the Balkan Committee.* It was at the time when the Macedonian population had risen against the incompetent rule to which they were subjected under the Sultans; and the Committee concerned itself not merely with bringing the state of affairs in Macedonia to the knowledge of the public in this country but it sought at the same time to bring home to the British Government and to the Governments of the great European powers the moral responsibility in the matter which attached to each and to all of them. The Committee put forward certain proposals many of which later were pressed upon the Sublime Porte and accepted in principle; but quite apart from the proposals put forward to meet the needs of the moment the Committee advocated as the only really satisfactory solution of Balkan troubles "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples." These words of Mr. Gladstone have inspired its policy from that day to this, and the Treaty recently arrived at between Bulgaria and Yugo-Slavia represents the fulfilment of one of its highest hopes.

It is to-day clear that quite apart from oppressive and inefficient administration in the past, the Balkan peoples have suffered heavily from interference by the Great Powers. In Bulgaria the more conservative elements were naturally Russophile in the years between the liberation of the country and the outbreak of the Great War, while the more advanced and progressive parties tended to be suspicious of Russia and to look rather to Western Europe. In Serbia the Obrenovitch dynasty was under the influence of Vienna, and when they were succeeded by the Karageorgevitch dynasty, Serbia looked no longer to Vienna but to St. Petersburg.

Nearly twenty years after the close of the Great War it is possible to realise the immense difficulties with which Greece has been faced so long as the Great Powers were divided into

* The first President of the Balkan Committee was the late Lord Bryce and among those who have associated themselves with its work whether as regular members or from time to time, have been the late Viscount Gladstone, the late Lord Gladstone of Hawarden, the late Lord Aberdeen, Mr. H. N. Brailsford, Sir Arthur Evans, the late Mr. G. K. Chesterton, the late Viscount Grey, Dr. G. P. Gooch, the late Viscount Haldane, Sir Oliver Lodge, Mr. H. W. Nevinson, Lord Ponsonby, Sir Herbert Samuel and the late Lord Stanmore. The present President is Lord Noel-Buxton.

two groups. Had she supported the Allies, there was nothing to prevent the Germans and Bulgarians pouring down over the purely geographical frontier into Greek territory. Had she on the other hand supported the Central Powers, the British and French fleets in command of the Mediterranean could have blown to pieces all her chief cities. The state of affairs in which some sections of her population supported one side and some the other, though it involved much internal strife, was possibly on the whole the best solution that could have been found. As regards Albania the policy of Italy and the influence which she is able to exert on the policy of that country must continue to be a source of anxiety to her neighbours. The conclusion of the Bulgarian-Yugo-Slav Pact one may hope opens a new chapter not merely for the two Powers primarily concerned but for all the Balkan peoples. In both countries the Treaty has been received with immense enthusiasm, though it is right to remember that in no Balkan State is there at present free expression of opinion. For all that, nobody can read the reports of the ceremony which attended the signature of the Treaty and the scenes in the streets, both in Belgrade and in Sofia, without being convinced that the Treaty has behind it in both countries an enormous mass of popular approval. When it is remembered how atrociously in both countries the peasantry have suffered from war in the last generation, this is not surprising. There is widespread feeling that the Great Powers, whether intentionally or not, inflamed Balkan rivalries, and the movement for *entente* has been a movement between the peoples as well as between the Governments. They see in the Treaty the first step towards a solution, on the basis of justice and fraternal good-feeling, of the questions which are still open between them. It is fair to point out also that the Treaty has after some hesitation been welcomed by Bulgaria's neighbours. The Treaty has been well received in Prague, where the fact that the Balkan Slavs have come to an understanding is regarded as a guarantee against the continuance of intrigues from outside, and as a basis for Slav solidarity. In Roumania it is realised that this new move may well open a new phase in the political relationship of all the Balkan peoples with one another, and that the best hope of peace in South-Eastern Europe is in an active endeavour among the various nations of the Near East to find bases of agreement.

The Turks have been noticeably friendly ; and although some of the old party leaders in Greece have shown a certain anxiety, public opinion in Athens on the whole has shown itself to be sympathetic.

The question of course suggests itself, even though the people in each country may welcome the Treaty, how far are the statesmen sincere ? It is quite clear that on the Bulgarian side great credit attaches to King Boris, who has consistently done his best to put his country's relations with Yugo-Slavia on a better basis. His interview with King Alexander as he passed through the country in 1933, was the first step. The Prime Minister, M. Kiosseivanov, was until he came to power a diplomatist, and it may be said that to bring about an understanding with Belgrade, where for many years he was Bulgarian Minister, has been the work of his life, though it is fair to remember that the first overt steps towards the *entente* were made during the period of office of his predecessor, M. Mushanov. On the Yugo-Slav side the Prime Minister has only been carrying out a policy which lay near to the heart of the late King Alexander. Dr. Stoyadinovitch has shown himself to be a man of peace and of moderation, for at the very time that he has succeeded in making a treaty with Bulgaria he has been continuing his conversations with the Croat leaders. It is clear that, thanks to his high abilities, prospects of an accommodation between Serbs and Croats are better than they have been for many years past. And in his efforts to secure internal peace and better relations with his neighbours, Dr. Stoyadinovitch, like M. Kiosseivanov, has been able to count on the warm support of the head of the State, the First Regent, Prince Paul.

In the Treaty there is no mention of Macedonia ; or of what Dr. Stoyadinovitch has called " Bulgarian minorities." It is this Macedonian question which has so long poisoned Serbo-Bulgarian relations. But because the question is not referred to in the Treaty, it would be ridiculous to infer that it was not very much in the minds of the negotiators on either side. It is the Bulgarian belief that an important part of the Bulgarian race are to-day, and will no doubt remain, under the rule of Yugo-Slavia. On the other hand it has to be recognised that Yugo-Slavia obtained her present frontiers after a war in which her adult Serbian population was almost literally decimated. It is probably true to say that no country which

fought in the Great War suffered more heavily than Serbia.

As to Macedonia the Press, like the Treaty itself, remains silent. But if the Treaty is to be real, and as it claims to be, perpetual, the question must be faced. The fact that the question of the Bulgarian minorities in Yugo-Slavia is not mentioned in the Treaty, may, however, even be of fruitful augury. Bulgaria has welcomed an understanding with her brother Slavs because she feels that the general European situation is much too grave to enable her to remain permanently surrounded by Powers who are potentially hostile. Yugo-Slavia recognises the immense value it would be to her in certain contingencies to have a friendly Bulgaria by her side. Both nations realise that if the difficult questions which call for solution between them still remain unsolved, that solution can more easily be found to their mutual advantage in an atmosphere of friendliness and of goodwill than in an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility. A friendly onlooker may express the opinion that the price which Serbia will have to pay for lasting Bulgarian friendship is no very heavy one. The bulk of the Macedonian Slavs have consistently believed themselves to be Bulgarian. At the time when the Macedonian question was convulsing Europe it was never suggested they were anything else. The Turks regarded the Macedonians as Bulgarians and persecuted them as such. If the right is accorded to them to use the Bulgarian form which their names have hitherto borne ; if Macedonian-born priests are ordained and allowed to preach in their own idiom ; if the Serbo-Bulgar frontiers are opened and books and papers (so long as they are not seditious) are allowed to pass freely to and fro ; if passports are freely granted to the citizens of each country ; if Serbising is given up in the public schools ; and if the higher posts in the administration are thrown open to Bulgarian-speaking citizens, then we shall hear little more of the Macedonian question. One may hope that a beginning will be made along such lines as these in the near future by a wide political amnesty. If so, Yugo-Slavia will be repaid again and again for a political generosity which will indeed link the Bulgarian people to her in lasting friendship.

This Pact, therefore, may be regarded as a very important step towards Balkan unity. But it is after all no more than a step, and those who believe in the Balkans for the Balkan

peoples, are anxious to see Greece too playing her part in the new phase which is now opening. There is no suggestion that an understanding between the Slav peoples need cause Greece anxiety. Like Yugo-Slavia and like Bulgaria, Greece is passing through a prolonged constitutional crisis, but for all that her position to-day is a strong one. She is a compact State and has been immensely fortified by the arrival of the Greeks from Anatolia, who form a highly capable and hard-working element of her population. The last ten years have shown wonderful developments in Athens, which now claims to cover an area almost equal to that of Paris, and no one can visit Greece to-day without coming away with the impression that given internal peace she is on the eve of a marked economic revival.

These facts make it all the more permissible to hope that the question of the Bulgarian economic outlet to the Aegean may once again be taken up and finally settled. The question, strictly speaking, is not one between Greece and Bulgaria, but between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers; and in regard to this outlet, Bulgaria is not asking for a privilege, but is claiming a right secured to her under the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly. What has been possible between Sofia and Belgrade may not be impossible between Sofia and Athens. The excellent relations which now exist between Greece and her hereditary enemy, Turkey, should prove a helpful factor. The recent history of Greece's relations with Turkey provides lessons which their neighbours might indeed learn to their advantage. The exchange of populations, one of the greatest undertakings of the kind of which history has record, undoubtedly involved at the time much suffering. But the passage of the years has enabled both Greeks and Turks to adjust themselves to their new environment among people of their own race; and for their respective governments, as Mr. Matthew Chrussachi has recently pointed out, it has at long last solved the question of minorities. Friendship between the Governments of Greece and Turkey is welcomed as heartily by their respective peoples as is the friendship between Sofia and Belgrade; and Turkey as a Balkan State may yet play a helpful part in assisting the Greeks and the Bulgars, with each of whom her relations to-day are excellent, to the final liquidation of whatever still stands in the way of a complete understanding between them.

Where there is goodwill, indeed, nothing is impossible. Not long ago friendship between Athens and Ankara seemed at least as unthinkable as a settlement between Athens and Sofia, or between Sofia and Belgrade.

If the Treaty between Bulgaria and Yugo-Slavia leads one to hope for a solution of the question of the Aegean outlet, it is to be hoped also that a new chapter may open for Albania. Albania is a Balkan State, even though much of her trade must always be with Central Europe. Nobody can deny that she lies under considerable obligation to Italy; but for all that, Italian intervention in the Balkans is no more to be desired than that of any other of the great Powers; and it will be a happy day alike for Albania and her neighbours, when Albania can fund her debt to Italy, and feel herself to be a Balkan people among Balkan peoples, with her frontiers guaranteed by the goodwill of her neighbours. Finally, if the Yugo-Slav-Bulgar Treaty is only the first, as one may hope, of other Treaties that may follow, it would be desirable that side by side with political there should be economic understandings.

Pessimists, of course, may insist on seeing in the Bulgarian-Yugo-Slav Pact a perpetual danger to their neighbours, but it is perhaps wiser to regard it rather as an opportunity, as a chance for statesmanship in all the Balkan countries to show itself imaginative and large-minded. In having at long last taken the first step towards securing the Balkans for the Balkan peoples, Yugo-Slavia and Bulgaria have given a lead to Europe. They will find strength in unity, and they will find prosperity in peace. For many years the Balkanisation of Europe has been a threat. It may yet become a hope.

EDWARD BOYLE.

COMMON SENSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

TOO little attention has been paid, either in this country or elsewhere, to a notable article published a few weeks back in the official Czechoslovak journal the *Prager Presse*. No doubt we may take it as M. Benes, the President, speaking himself and, as everyone knows, he is one of the best informed and shrewdest men in Europe. His country too has good claims to be, if not the hub, at least the pulse, of Central Europe. We are apt to think of Germany as pre-eminently the "Central Power," but this is really a relic of the terminology of the Great War. The "Central Powers" are not now as they were then, and a glance at the map will show that Czechoslovakia has at least the better geographical claim. She is also better qualified by her racial composition for being the testing-place of general European feeling. She has boundaries with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Poland, and her population, though mainly Slav, has a large German minority—about a quarter of the whole. The latter, though they have their grievances, are not in revolt against the state and do not wish to be separated from it. Masaryk, the first President, one of the greatest war-time statesmen, was immensely respected and did his work wisely and with fair tolerance. He is succeeded, in M. Benes, by a practised diplomatist, closely in touch with Western opinion. It will be seen therefore that the weight of Czechoslovakia in the councils of the nations is considerably beyond that of its mere size and numbers, and that the views of its government are worth attention. In the article referred to they set out to allay unnecessary panic, and go on to criticise the folly of dividing the world on a basis of "conflicting ideologies."

We will reserve the latter object, and the discussions which it suggests, till we have put on record the heartening message from Prague in its immediate international bearing. The New Year needs it badly, and no one in the world will rejoice more sincerely than the British, if M. Benes' reading of the situation is borne out by the end of 1937. The general purport of the message is given in its first paragraph:

> Serious though the European situation is, adequate grounds for fearing a European war do not present themselves and panic is unnecessary. In the past eighteen years new wars have often seemed almost inevitable, now from Communist efforts to bring about a world revolution, now from the German-Polish dispute, now from Balkan dissensions with Italy; but these fears have been belied and this experience dictates a level-headed judgment of the present situation.

Here is common sense, arguing calmly from the past to the present, and though it may be answered that, since the time referred to, fresh causes of dispute have arisen of an even more menacing kind, we are certainly justified in saying, "These things were all thought to be, and were in fact, extremely dangerous in the past. These dangers have been averted and the causes which averted them are still in operation, probably operating more strongly than before." This is true most obviously of Russia. That country, by all the available evidence, is more quietly and prosperously settled than it was, and its influence in promoting violent revolutions elsewhere is by that fact diminished, and diminished still more by the presence of Russia at Geneva and her better relations both with ourselves and especially with France. Again it may be rejoined that the very facts of the Franco-Russian pact and English acquiescence in it, have exasperated Germany and produced a deep division in Europe, recalling to many minds the conditions preceding the Great War.

Prague has a double answer to this.

> Germany is certainly rearming, but even for her there are limits and she too needs time and peace to consolidate her new system. Dr. Goebbels has truly said that Germany could gain nothing positive from a war and that a war would cost so much that it would in any case end with a loss. A new war would bring such material devastation and social changes that no reasonable statesman, politician or soldier can accept responsibility for one.

Again the critic replies: "True enough; but they are not reasonable. Nor will anyone in the event of war accept the responsibility for himself. He will always put it off on to the other side." But Prague remains eminently reasonable throughout. "No disputes exist between Germany and the rest of Europe which are incapable of a reasonable solution." To which we shall all breathe a fervent "Amen," reserving, however, for the next Prague judgment a less complete unanimity.

> If England had in 1914 so clearly assured the world (as she has done in Mr. Eden's speeches), that she would support France and

> Belgium in case of aggression, the World War would have been avoided. Mr. Eden's last speech ensures peace in Western Europe and is also an important factor in the efforts to preserve peace throughout Europe. Its importance is the greater in that England is rearming methodically and with all her energy in order to be able at need to make good her word.

We will not traverse again the often traversed ground of British action just before the War. It is the later and contemporary reference in the Prague message which calls for a word of comment. Englishmen will generally sympathise with it. They see that friendship and co-operation with France are dictated by history and are necessary for the peace and progress of the world. But they would wish to base their attitude on the widest and most unshakable foundation. History and policy dictate co-operation with France, but they have also a far wider scope. The ultimate general peace of the world, in which every man of vision must believe, will be gained not by any application of sanctions or by the creation of an international police—though these might well be necessary intermediate and temporary steps—but by the natural extension of that area of the inconceivability of war which we hope exists between ourselves and the United States and between ourselves and France. This is a slow growth of history, quickened lately by overwhelming reasons of safety, but essentially similar to the growth of the same spirit which puts a civil war in any well-established country practically out of the picture. There is no reason why in time the same sort of feeling and relationship should not arise between Frenchmen, Englishmen, and many others, as now exists between English and Welsh and Scots. A different state and laws, you may say, in the first case, and the same in the second. This is by no means an insuperable bar, and one should remember that all the time, in the first case, fresh legal bonds in the shape of treaties and international undertakings are being formed, while, in the second, there is an equally constant tendency towards differentiation in local affairs, Home Rule for Ireland or Scotland, Regionalism in Spain, and so on. Both these tendencies lead away from war. Humanity does not, or should not, wish its units to be identical, but to avoid injuring, still more exterminating, one another.

One must see therefore in the growing solidarity of Great

Britain, France and the United States—the three great democracies of the West—the most hopeful augury for the future. They are gathering round them a larger and larger number of smaller nations, at present formally on a basis of currency agreement, but aiming as soon as possible at closer agreement in trade. Belgium, Holland and Switzerland are already in this group, and are being joined by others for various purposes every day. A similar process is in full swing in the Americas. There the United States plays more easily off her own bat the game which France and England try, with much more difficulty and some awkward breaks in the past, to play in Europe. But Prague is certainly right in applauding their present unanimity, and when, from the world point of view, we add the United States, we are only strengthening their argument, from similar premisses. "*Elargissez Dieu*" was a famous philosophic motto of the eighteenth century. "*Elargissez le cercle de la paix*" should be the corresponding cry of humanity to-day.

But one must pass on to the ideologies. One recalls with sorrow the hope which J. S. Mill expressed nearly a hundred years ago in his *Logic* that he might have persevered to the end in the same abstinence which he had observed hitherto from ideological discussions. Far from abstaining, the world since his time has plunged still deeper. Two great nations have inscribed an ideological slogan on their banners. In most other countries they have fierce adherents. Even in peace-loving Britain a writer of a recent book declares that, "If Britain is to live, Bolshevism must die." This was a hot convert from the Communist party, with all the fervour of the newly turned. But though one may smile or stare at such ravings, the ruins of Spain, the deadly shapes which haunt the frontiers of Germany and Russia, or their ugly though feebler imitations in some of our great towns, must command some serious notice. What does it mean? Is it quite outside the range of the gospel of common sense preached so persuasively from Prague? Is it—speaking from an English point of view—purely for foreign consumption, or may we expect to have to deal with it as a practical issue at home?

There are some strange puzzles and contradictions in the matter, both from the philosophical and the historical point of view. But, before examining them, one ought to state, as clearly and as fairly as possible, the basis of theory on which

each rests, the sacred principles for which—as one often sees—adherents of both sides are ready to die. There have, of course, been many cases in the past of hosts of men eager to give their all for abstract causes which would seem to common sense to have little to do with the world they lived in. Such were the hordes who followed Mahomet or the hosts of Crusaders who sought the Sacred Places of Palestine. Our ideologists of to-day profess closer contact with realities: it will be seen later how far this is true.

The two of these "ideological" terms most in use at the moment are of course Fascism and Communism. These are the battle-cries under which forces are joined, sometimes in the East End of London, sometimes more tragically in the streets of Madrid. There must clearly be something which appears vital to those who are thus prepared to make the supreme sacrifices for their belief on either side. We may discover it on the Fascist side in that conception of the national state which has played so large a part in the political philosophy of Germany. The state became to many of these thinkers the highest thing they knew in practice, the embodiment of the divine on earth. It is this thought which inspires the language which appears to us so nauseating and ridiculous in the press of Italy or the habitual conversation of Germany. In so far as it involves the conception of some greater being to which the devotees are prepared to sacrifice themselves, and in so far as this conception of the state does not divide it up and set class against class, we must be ready to admit some virtue, even nobility, in it. It fails however completely to satisfy any philosophic idea of the whole. It elevates a part into dangerous isolation and opposition to all the rest. If the German state is to be supreme for the German, and the English state for us, is there nothing superior to both which may command a united loyalty and restrain the rival attachments and activities which are bound to compete? This side of the Fascist or extreme nationalist position has been so often exposed that it is unnecessary to pursue it further here.

It should, however, also be noticed that the idealisation of the national idea tends naturally to embody it in one person, the actual head of the state. Hence the Fascist is by virtue of his principles more naturally dictatorial than the Communist. On the Communist side also one may distinguish both an element of important truth and a grave deficiency.

It too fails completely on the philosophic side by offering to our passionate adherence—another part for the whole. The wholesome truth which it presses upon us is that the work of the world depends on the activities of the mass of workers, and that, broadly speaking, these have not in the past received the recognition which they deserve, and that from the human point of view there can, or should be, no discrimination, between the need for life and happiness of all who work. The deficiency on the Communist side is not of a national kind. It has on the contrary always proclaimed itself international and striven to make good the claim. But it is also and quite as seriously sectional as the Fascist, by treating another part as equal to the whole. The cultivators and manual workers of any community, though always the majority, are never in any case the whole, except in the simplest forms of society, long extinct in the West. In any industrialised modern state a vast variety of social elements contribute to the whole, and it is quite impossible to rule out all except the manual workers as parasites. We may well think that certain persons enjoy too much of the world's goods or that certain occupations are positively harmful to the common weal. But the mass—and not only the "masses"—co-operate, and so far the Fascist or the National Socialist has a truer or more complete idea than the Communist, of the social being. One is speaking of course of the embattled hosts who have imposed themselves upon Russia and are now striving to do the same in Spain. The creed of an individual Christ-like idealist is in another sphere.

Now both the rival ideologies are not only defective in theory but both make an appeal to history which it is possible to check. The Fascist or nationalist refers you to the glories secured in the past by loyal co-operation within his state, the battles won, the territories gained, the achievements, even in art and science, of those who kept their race pure or the right banner flying. What other nations have done, or whether the first of nations was not itself indebted to others, are questions left obscurely in the background.

This is all commonplace enough in nationalist controversies, but there is an historical criticism needed on the Communist side which does not seem to have received the attention it deserves. We will turn to that for a moment, leaving the more hackneyed lines of the debate as incomplete as they

must ever be. History has a striking comment to make on the Communist, i.e. Marxist, doctrine that capitalist industry must end in the absorption of all means of production by the state and the rule of the proletariat. It is on the contrary precisely those countries which are most completely industrialised in which a communist revolution is least possible. Communists established themselves in Russia, and are in control of certain parts of China and Spain, just because those countries had not been organised and consolidated by scientific industry. Had Communism been the necessary and logical sequence of the industrial revolution it would have shown itself first, or at least most strongly, in those countries where these circumstances prevailed. England was the first and for long the leading country in organised and scientific industry. She has always been and still is the country where a Communist revolution is least conceivable. The same may be said in varying degrees of all the countries mentioned above, as standing rallied to the cause of peaceful progress in the world. And even Germany, which for other reasons is to-day a centre of unrest for Europe, cannot be said to be torn by internal class-warfare. She rode the storms of possible proletarian revolution after the War with little trouble. Her social organisation had been strengthened and not weakened by the industrial development of the last century. The fact is so general and so striking that it is worth looking below the surface for a moment to detect the causes. If, contrary to the Marxian prediction, what is called " capitalism " tends rather to stability than revolution, why is it ? Perhaps there may be an even wider application of the doctrine of common sense which we saw above was being preached from Prague in its political bearings.

It is indeed the wider view which is needed not only in current politics but in the interpretation of history. The transformation of industry in the last two hundred years by the extension and applications of science was only a part of a much larger process. At the same time that science began in the seventeenth century its triumphant career, the leading Western states were entering on a parallel course of internal organisation. That was the age in which national governments began to overhaul the machinery by which their activities have been made so marvellously more effective for the needs of all their citizens. Army, navy, roads, posts, finance,

began from that time on to be arranged in an orderly and efficient way by a central authority in each state. The facts may be found in many histories of the time, but most clearly set out in Professor G. N. Clark's *History of the Seventeenth Century*, which has the great merit of showing side by side the corresponding evolution in the realm of abstract thought. For one cannot doubt that both events were internally connected, both were manifestations of the same new spirit, an impulse to bring both men and things into more ordered relations. Society was becoming a more efficient collective concern, just as the scientists were discovering more harmony in the universe. It is no idle fancy which would find a real connection between the work of Galileo, Newton, Boyle, Harvey and the rest, and the task of organising the nations which began about that time and has increased in momentum ever since. There was a great burst of mental energy released from the unworldly logomachies and constant feudal warfare of the Middle Ages, and this was turned to practical problems —the world we live in and the society which we have made. How to understand the former and improve the latter ? Better order was the keynote of action in both spheres.

One can realise the process best by comparing sharply contrasted cases ; say, England or Holland on the one hand, where the modern tendencies were most marked, and unhappy Spain on the other, where they were most wanting. In the former cases where scientific industry and national organisation, progressing side by side, made the people rich and social structure strong, a violent revolution became more and more difficult and unlikely. Such is the answer of history to the Marxian Communist diagnosis. But it is by no means the whole of the answer.

It would not be true in any modern country to say that the mere action of science on industry or of the state in organising its machinery, had been sufficient, either to stave off a revolution or to make the condition of the workers satisfactory. We are in England only too well aware of this, and men like Shaftesbury have spent devoted lives in securing some alleviation of horrible and admitted evils. Mere organising skill, either in science or in government, does not suffice, and it has not been left unaided by other human factors to mould the life of the present. For it is equally true that in the same countries where science and organisation have been most

forthcoming, there is found also the strongest development of common sense in another and wider meaning. There is a common sense which appreciates the need of all for the common decencies of life and revolts against injustice and private greed and self-indulgence. It would be absurd to suggest that such evils have not often flourished in highly industrialised countries, but there can be no doubt that general benevolence and an effort to see the claims of others can be found more abundantly in those countries than in others which have stood outside the movement. Was not this deficiency the most potent cause both of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the present horrors in Spain?

One may well describe the desirable frame of mind as common sense, but it must be a common sense kindled by sympathy and enlightened by science. Where it prevails, and in proportion as it prevails, the members of any community will be unwilling to pull down their social system and try to work it upside down. Where it prevails, the burning questions of industrial organisation take a subordinate place. It is a detail and not a vital matter, whether the state or a corporation or an individual should legally possess and direct a given industrial undertaking, if the thing itself is useful and well run and those who run it live decent and happy lives. A vigilant community will very properly take all such details under review, but if they have common sense as well as vigilance, they will not attempt to settle them all on a preconceived and stereotyped plan, any more than they would listen to Mr. Bernard Shaw and decree a uniform income all round.

The foregoing argument will appear so simple and unanswerable in domestic affairs, within a settled and well-governed country such as Great Britain, as hardly to need elaborate statement. The reason is that common sense as defined above is the accepted rule in such a case, the result of centuries of practice and experience. When we look abroad, as the Prague statesmen were doing, different as the prospect is, one cannot feel that there is any difference in the principles which are needed to deal with it. Unfortunately here it is the application which is deficient, for principles in the abstract lead to the ideologies which divide and afflict those unreconciled by common sense. But there is no solution except by perseverance in the very practice which is

wanting. But one may, even in the worst cases, gain a glimpse of what the solution would be, were there the will to persevere. In the most acute case of Spain, a leading, well-informed and well-balanced Spaniard, Professor Castilejo, has been giving us advice both by speech and writing for months, while the devastating conflict has gone on. The ultimate solution, as he sees it, must come in some form of federalism, recognising the ancient differences of the various provinces of Spain which are now accentuated by cultural and industrial developments. Freedom and difference in these and a certain common front for order and trade purposes within and defence without. This must somehow be secured, and the question for the rest of Europe must be how far and in what way they can best co-operate to obtain it. Are we compelled, either by expediency or fear of worse results, to adhere to that purely negative policy of non-intervention which Mr. Eden has so emphatically announced? It is a supreme and testing case for the exercise of common sense.

F. S. MARVIN.

THE CENTENARY OF ATHENS UNIVERSITY.

ON April 18th the University of Athens will celebrate its centenary. The Greeks have always been noted for their love of letters. Down to the time of Justinian Athens remained an academy town, and it had scarcely become the capital of free Greece in December 1834 when the Bavarian Regency began to form plans for the foundation of a University, naturally on German lines. But it was not till 1837 that the "Othonian" University, as it was called, was founded and inaugurated in the house of the famous architect, Kleanthes, who designed the former British Legation with its beautiful marble staircase, recently abandoned for the tasteless, if more roomy, mansion which was built for Mme Venizelos and sold by her to the British Government last year. The house of Kleanthes, the first University of Athens, still stands in Tholos Street, on the northern slope of the Akropolis, and it is proposed, on the occasion of the Centenary, to convert it into a museum of "old," as distinct from "ancient" Athens, that is, of the relics of the Turkish period, always connected in the minds of Athenians and lovers of Athens with the name of the octogenarian but evergreen historian of the Turkish domination, Demetrios Kampouroglous. Otho, in tears, attended the inaugural ceremony.

The first Rector, classically styled *Prytanis*, was Constantine Schinias, while the tutorial staff, besides Germans like Ulrichs and Ludwig Ross, the famous archæologist and author of *Recollections* of a stay in Greece, included such eminent Greeks as Neophytos Bambas, the learned Archimandrite who had taught in the school at Chios before the massacre of 1822, George Gennadios, father of the well-known Minister in London (who founded in 1926 the "Gennadios Library" at Athens), and already known to his compatriots as "the Schoolmaster of the Nation." A little later the chair of history, at the suggestion of Stratford Canning, was occupied by that many-sided Scottish Philhellene, Edward Masson, who, after being also secretary to Lord Dundonald, "Attorney-General for the Morea" and a judge of the Areiopagos, as the High Court of Justice is still called, became Professor of New Testament Greek at Belfast

and died a publicist at Athens. Lovers of Aristophanes will note with pleasure that the first lecture at this first University building was by Ross on *The Acharnians*—a hopeful sign, for Aristophanes gives us a truer picture of the ordinary ancient Greek character than the tragic poets, the philosophers and the ceremonial orators. But the home of Kleanthes was soon too small for the requirements of early Othonian Athens.

Even in the first academic year there were fifty-two students and seventy-five "auditors"—for modern Athens dearly loves lectures on any subject. In the winter season there are sometimes three different public lectures in the same afternoon, sometimes by rival experts on the same subject—a rather embarrassing choice. Accordingly the second Rector, Rhalles, father of the future Premier of 1897, issued an appeal to the Greek race and Philhellenes for funds to construct a larger building. An influential committee was formed, including the chief survivors of the War of Independence, among them the grandfather of Admiral Kountouriotes, the first President of the Greek Republic of 1924. In view of the historic friendship between Greeks and Serbs, who had helped each other during their respective struggles for independence, who fought together against the Turks in 1912 and in the Second Balkan war of 1913, it is pleasing to record that one of the subscribers was Prince Milosh Obrenovich of Serbia. Such was the altruistic enthusiasm of poor Greeks for the boon to others of that education which they had never enjoyed, that an old Cretan insurgent—the Cretans are the Scots of Greece—sent his yataghan and pistols to be sold in the cause of the higher learning, while a "needy knife-grinder" bequeathed his whole fortune to the University. The Danish architect Hansen designed the new building, which stands in the thoroughfare called after it, University Street, now flanked on the one side by the National Library and on the other by the Academy.

In 1839 Otho laid the foundation-stone, and it is recorded that old Koloktrones, the famous "Klepht and Warrior," who was present, pointing first to the site of the University, then to the Palace, said prophetically to the King: "This building will eat up that building"—a prophecy fulfilled in 1862, when the generation which had studied at the University dethroned Otho, whose bust is, however, preserved there, though the name of the institution was changed from

"Othonian" to "National" after his expulsion, just as that of the public garden from "Royal" to "National" after the departure of George II in 1923. After the annexation of the Ionian Islands in 1864, the University received its first extension by the amalgamation with it of the "Ionian Academy," founded by our compatriot, Lord Guilford, during the British Protectorate in 1824. A further extension occurred in 1911, when the money left by Domboles, a Greek merchant established in Russia, to accumulate for fifty-seven years for the foundation of a University in the Greek capital —the donor meant Constantinople which in those days ardent adherents of the "Great Idea" hoped would become Greek—fell due. Two Universities in Athens were obviously undesirable, though there are two Byzantine Societies, so an amalgamation took place, and as Domboles had wished his foundation to be called after Capo d'Istria, the President of Greece, who was assassinated at Nauplia, the combined institution was henceforth styled the "National and Capodistrian University." After the enlargement of Greece by the Balkan and following wars, a second University was created but at Salonika, in 1925 and began to function in 1926 in the Villa Allatini, where the dethroned Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, had lived in exile.

Mark Pattison said that a University should be "neither wholly in the world nor wholly outside the world," in other words neither in a capital nor in a remote provincial town. The "National University" of Greece was, perhaps inevitably, founded in the capital, with the natural result that the students being Greeks and, therefore, as Aristotle said, "political animals," did not confine themselves exclusively to their academic studies, but occasionally took an active part in politics. When Oxford or Cambridge undergraduates pass revolutionary resolutions, British Governments remain unmoved. When, fifty years ago, an Irish leader, invited to an Oxford college by a politically minded undergraduate, was screwed up behind his host's sported "oak," the college was temporarily closed but Parliament went on its even way. But in 1859 the disturbances known as the *Skiadiká* (from the Siphniote straw hats worn by the demonstrators) and organised by the Athenian students, were the prelude of the Anti-Royalist movement of 1862. In the interregnum which followed Otho's expulsion and the election of George I,

Epaminondas Delegeorges, who had played a leading part in the dethronement, formed a National Guard of University students. When in 1901 the "Gospel Riots" broke out in Athens, in consequence of the indignation aroused by a translation of the Gospels into a very vernacular form of Greek—for there are in Greece two languages, the "purist" and the "vulgar"—the students intervened, demanding the prohibition of the offending translation, and forming a "central committee" and a military staff for garrisoning the University building under a commander appointed by them. Such was their influence that both the Premier and the Metropolitan resigned. A less serious agitation broke out in 1903, when the then Premier, Rhalles, was forced by the students to stop the performances of the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus, because certain phrases in the version of the translator did not please the purists. But during Venizelos' last Premiership, when the students protested against the increased stiffness of the examinations, they found the Cretan statesman, himself an old student of Athens University, adamant, and quietly resumed their studies. During his undergraduate life there he had presented to Joseph Chamberlain, then visiting Athens, a memorandum on the Cretan question so statesmanlike that Chamberlain said to his son when Venizelos left the room: "That young man will one day unite Crete with Greece and become Premier."

The University has, indeed, played a great part in the promotion of Greek patriotism in what used to be called "outside Hellenism." Young Greeks from Turkey came to Athens to study and returned to their homes in Epiros, Macedonia, Thrace, Crete, Cyprus or Asia Minor, fervent apostles of the "Great Idea." Even Roumanians were among the early students. The University may thus be said to have prepared the way for the Balkan war of 1912 and the concentration of Hellenism in an enlarged state—a work in which it was aided by the Greek bishops in Turkey, many of whom had studied theology and patriotism at Athens. For one Rhodes Scholar who came to Oxford from the Dominions a hundred Greeks of the *Diasporá* flocked to Athens University. Practically every prominent Greek statesman was educated there, and among its professors there have been men like Andreades, who did not live cloistered lives but, in the intervals of profound economic and historical studies, went

out into the great world and became unofficial ambassadors of their country abroad. Andreades had friends among the leading statesmen of London and Vienna, and his writings and lectures on Gladstone, Salisbury, Rosebery and Snowden made modern English political history known to the studious youth of Athens. Demertzes, a recent Premier, had been an Athenian professor, another Premier was Professor Lampros, one of the most distinguished produced by modern Greece. Unfortunately there have been times when politics have interfered with the staff of the University, as when, after the revolution of March, 1935, several professors were removed from their chairs because of their political opinions, even when their particular subject had apparently nothing to do with contemporary politics. But in South-Eastern Europe political arguments are often drawn from medieval, or even ancient, history, whereas in England politicians regard as "ancient history" anything that happened before the last General Election. Consequently, a lecture on a Byzantine Emperor may contain allusions to contemporary events.

The organisation of the University consists of a Rector, elected annually, but re-eligible, a Vice-Rector, Pro-Rector, the Deans (Kosmétores), of the five faculties and four Senators, chosen from among the professors, now a numerous body, who, together with a dozen lecturers, form the teaching staff. The present Rector, M. Papamichael, informs me that during the current academic year there were inscribed in the theological faculty 100 male and 2 female students, in the law faculty 1,899 male and 118 female—for Portia is becoming an Athenian figure, though in Greece, even when there was a parliament before August 4th, 1936, women enjoyed only the municipal suffrage—in the medical faculty 654 males and 33 females, in the philosophical 110 and 95 respectively, in that of physico-mathematics 323 and 56, and in the school of dentistry 130 and 68, making a total of 3,216 male and 372 female students, in all 3,588. To these must be added about 1,000 students, who had not yet renewed their registration entry because they had not passed the examinations in their special faculty during the previous year. The Senate of the University has recently adopted a resolution that one subject lesson of each faculty be regarded as essential, e.g. ancient Greek for the students in the philosophical school, and that every student, irrespective of

the number of marks which he obtains in the examinations in other subjects, must attain a certain degree of excellence in this.

The above figures suggest comment. For a small country the total number of University graduates going out into the world every year to earn their living seems large, especially when it is remembered that Greece has two Universities, though that of Salonika has far fewer students. This phenomenon, more noticeable when the students wore distinctive caps, is all the more remarkable when it is observed that the law school is the most popular, alike with men and women. How all these budding lawyers are to find clients seems to be a difficult problem, especially to residents in Athens who see the addresses of lawyers on so many doors. Similarly the number of physicians is already large. Greece is mainly an agricultural country, and what is most needed is the cultivator of the soil. But the farmer's son who comes to study in Athens—a city which, with its suburbs and its port, now contains about one-seventh of the total population of Greece—does not usually want to go back to provincial life. The Greek is by nature a townsman; country houses are the exception for the rich; coffee-houses and cinemas attract all classes, although, under the present system of government, there are no political questions to discuss over the café tables. Another interesting aspect of Greek University life is the increase of female students, of whom the first were admitted in 1890. Seven years later medical degrees were conferred on two Cephalonian ladies—and "the Cephalonians," as Andreades said, "are the Yorkshiremen of Greece." The present Premier is a Cephalonian, and during the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands the sturdy Cephalonians were the backbone of the opposition to our rule. Dentistry, as well as law, seems to appeal to Greek ladies; there are several distinguished lady dentists in Athens. In 1926 the first Greek lady barrister made her first appearance in court, and Mme Nikoloudi, wife of the Under-Secretary for the Press and tourist activities, studied law. One of the most brilliant Greek journalists, Mlle Jeanne Stéphanopoli, editress of the oldest Athenian newspaper, the semi-official *Messager d'Athènes*, is a graduate of Athens University, which, of course, like Oxford, has turned out numerous editors and leader-writers. Thus, alike to science and scholarships, to

politics and literature, to the cause of Hellenism and to the spread of culture not only in Greece but in those lands of the Levant where Greeks lived, the University of Athens has made valuable contributions. Greeks learn rapidly, they are more critical than imaginative, and, though Greece has produced a great poet in Palamas, a former law-student and then secretary of the University, they excel in works of erudition rather than in imaginative creations.

Invitations have been issued to British Universities and other learned bodies to send representatives to this celebration, and it is to be hoped that, on this occasion, Great Britain will be adequately represented. When the Byzantine Congress was held at Athens in 1930, numerous delegates represented all the other Great Powers and several of the small states, while the British Empire did not send a single representative, but was personified in the inadequate individual who writes this article, because he happened to be resident at Athens. Hitherto, since the days of Masson, Great Britain has taken no part in the work of this University. While France, Germany and Italy have there chairs of their contemporary literatures, endowed by their Governments and occupied by their nationals, Great Britain has none. Nearly two years ago, when the writer was in London, he was assured that the British Council for Cultural Relations with Other Countries, working with the Foreign Office, would endeavour to found such a chair. But nothing has been done for Athens, whereas a similar chair has been founded at Bucharest, where there was already a lady long resident in Roumania and knowing the language and psychology of the people, who was giving lectures in English literature. Furthermore, whereas last season Miss Rebecca West came out to Athens under the auspices of the Council, and delivered a most successful lecture on contemporary English literature, this year a lecturer was sent to Belgrade, Sophia and Bucharest, but not to Athens—the Cinderella which waits in vain for a patriotic Britain to endow this chair in the University before which stands the statue of Gladstone.

Time presses, for German propaganda in Greece is so rampant that it has attracted the attention of our Foreign Office. A swarm of German governesses, Gretchen supporting Goebbels, has descended upon Athens; and the writer,

walking in the Zappeion, the resort of governesses and nursemaids, never hears any language spoken there save Greek and German. German newspapers crowd the bookstalls; the recent German loan and the fact that Germany, by taking nearly all the Greek tobacco crop, is now Greece's best customer and that consequently Greece finds it convenient in return to buy her arms from Germany, are all signposts marking the road from Berlin. Yet the Greeks and the British have always had much in common, whereas the Greek and the German characters are widely different, as was shown during the Bavarian regency a century ago. But the Germans work hard and send out influential emissaries to Athens, whereas we remain apathetic. There is, accordingly, all the more reason for making a good show at this Centenary, at which Great Britain should be fully represented in memory of her past relations with Greece and as *auspicium melioris aevi*.

WILLIAM MILLER.

P.S. Thirteen British Universities and the British Academy have appointed representatives. The British Council has just given £50 to the Junior Branch of the Anglo-Hellenic League.

FLAGS AND NAMES.

"We may not speak of England; her flag's to sell or share.
What is the flag of England? Winds of the world declare."

KIPLING.

"Banner of England, not for a season, O banner of Britain, hast thou
Floated in conquering battle or flapt to the battle cry!
Women and children come out
Kissing the war-harden'd hand of the Highlander wet with their tears!
Dance to the pibroch!—saved! we are saved! is it you? is it you?
And ever aloft on the palace roof the old banner of England blew."

TENNYSON.

WHAT is the flag of England? We have asked many Englishmen. The reply almost invariably was "The Union Jack." And this is the reply that Kipling gives to his own question; for under the title of his poem *The English Flag* he quotes "above the portico a flagstaff, bearing the Union Jack, remained fluttering in the flames." But England has no exclusive right to the Union Jack; she shares it with the rest of the United Kingdom. Has she, then, no flag of her own? If she has, where is it to be seen?

"The old banner of England," to use Tennyson's much quoted phrase, was the Dragon of the House of Wessex, the flag under which the predominantly Teutonic, partly Celtic inhabitants of England were welded in the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries into one state and one nation. Under it King Harold II fell fighting on the site of Battle Abbey. His conqueror, who constrained the English to elect him as their King, rejected the old flag and introduced the banner of the Normans, the banner of their patron St. George, a Christian martyr, who, tradition tells us, had given his life for the Faith in the great persecution of Diocletian's reign. The flag of St. George, a red cross on a white ground, is the historic flag of England, the flag which has braved (nearly) a thousand years the battle and the breeze. It may still be seen floating

on many Anglican church towers on saints' days. It is still the basis of the White Ensign, the flag of the Royal Navy. But it requires some skill and a little imagination to pick it out from the Union Jack.

When James VI, King of Scots, succeeded his cousin Elizabeth as James I of England and so united in his person the crowns of the two lands, he insisted on a flag which should represent this personal union. The Cross of St. George was superimposed on the white cross (on blue) of St. Andrew, who has been, according to tradition, patron Saint of Scotland ever since 730 when relics of him had reached the Scottish town that bears his name.

King James's Ordinance of April 12th, 1605, states the "difference" which "hath arisen between our subjects of South and North Britain, travelling by seas, about the bearing of their flags" and orders the new Union flag to be flown henceforth at the maintop by all, while at the foretop the English should continue to fly St. George's, and the Scots St. Andrew's, flag. The Scots indeed at first disliked the new flag; during their short-lived separation from England after the martyrdom of Charles I they abandoned it; between 1654 and 1660 other experiments were tried (e.g. an Irish harp added to the two crosses) but the Restoration brought back the Union flag and at the Union of 1707 the Scots finally accepted it.

The English soon became content with a flag in which they had incorporated the Scottish cross with the same sense of proprietorship as the Kings of England felt in quartering the French lilies on their Royal Standard. In 1800 the fateful Union with Ireland was pushed through by the British Government and on January 1st, 1801, the Red Cross of St. Patrick (the old banner of the Geraldines, which since 1783 had been the badge of the Order of St. Patrick) took its place in a new more complicated Union Jack.

The Union Jack of 1801 has had 133 (the old Union Jack had 196) years of vigorous life and for ever-increasing areas of the world in which to fly. The British Colonies as they became self-governing claimed and invented their own flags, but these were generally used to supplement rather than supplant the Empire Flag, and flown side by side with it.

The Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand have moreover kept a small Union Jack in the left-hand top corner of their own flags—Blue Ensigns with the Southern Cross represented in the fly. South Africans of British descent and sympathies clamoured for the same treatment of the flag of their Union, but they were unable to move their Dutch compatriots to do more than allow a small Union Jack on the badge in the centre of the new tricolour. The Dominion of Canada has not finally chosen her flag (though she has the Blue Ensign with the armorial bearings of the whole Dominion in the fly), but the Union Jack is much in evidence in Canada, especially along the United States frontier, as a wholesome, if at times blatant, reminder that Canadians do not wish to become mere Americans.

In Ireland on the other hand the Union Jack has always remained the symbol of the detested Union which corruptly deprived Ireland of her own Parliament (such as it was). Repealers and Home Rulers proscribed it as a party symbol of "Unionism" and disloyalty to Ireland; Unionists and especially Ulstermen on the contrary hoisted and flaunted it on all occasions. Home Rulers favoured less the Cross of St. Patrick (which was really merely the banner of the Geraldines) than the Harp on a green ground, the Royal Standard of Ireland. With the Sinn Fein election victory of 1918 both these flags gave way to the tricolour of the new party, green-white-orange, which is now the official flag of the Irish Free State. Hostility to the Union Jack remains so unabated that during the Eucharistic Congress of June 1932 in Dublin, not even in honour of the large contingent of prelates and priests from Great Britain and other parts of the British Commonwealth was the Union Jack allowed to fly side by side with the flags of other countries represented.

It was presumably as a fierce protest against union of any kind with Great Britain that Irish "patriots" assailed the Union Jack. But even in Great Britain this historic flag has latterly been attacked—and in unexpected quarters. We all remember *Punch's* "Jock" depicted in a captured German trench laboriously altering "Gott strafe England" into "Gott strafe Grossbritanien." We all have our Scotch friends who carefully insist on altering "English" to "British," with or without justification. We can sympathise

with their protest against the carelessness with which most foreigners speak of an "Ambassade d'Angleterre" or even some Englishmen speak of "English Ambassador" or "English Government," though experience abroad shows that in translating titles for foreign ears "English" is both more intelligible and more impressive than "British." It is surely, however, going a little far—in view of the Jeanie Geddes footstool and other painful incidents!—to speak of the "British Church" and "British Chaplain" when "Anglican" is meant. But our Scotch and Welsh friends are not content with altering "English" into "British" wherever they come across it. They are not content with changing the world-wide mark "Made in England" to "Made in Britain" and with insisting on such terms as "British art" and "British literature." Only the "English language" has hitherto escaped—is not "Scots" a separate language?—but apparently, judging from letters to *The Times* (December 22nd and 29th, 1933), schoolgirls are being taught to speak of "British grammar" and J. R. Green's famous Short History is being quoted as that of the British people.

Yet not content with the elimination of "English" our friends add to "British" their own national adjective. The other day there were advertisements in the Press exhorting American visitors to sample "British and Scottish" resorts. In the International Chess Tournament at Folkestone in June 1933 "there were separate teams for 'British Empire' and 'Scotland.'" And to return to flags. On Royal birthdays every official building flies the Union Jack except the Scottish Office in Whitehall; the Scottish Office flies the Scottish Royal Standard—the Lion Rampant of Scotland. On June 25th, 1932 (the anniversary of Bannockburn), there was great excitement at Stirling. About 200 members of the Scottish National Party, led by a Miss Wendy Wood, rushed into the Castle, hauled down the Union Jack and hoisted the Scottish Standard. Soldiers eventually replaced the Union Jack and probably no notice will be taken of the incident. A Stirling cinema proprietor has incurred the displeasure of Lyon King-of-Arms by flying the Lion Rampant, but the Scottish Office take a more favourable view.

The controversy about flying "the Scottish flag" at last evoked a notice from the Lyon Clerk, Court of the Lord Lyon,

Edinburgh, to the effect that the Scottish national flag is the St. Andrew's Cross, " azure, a Saint Andrew's Cross Argent, this being registered as the arms and badge of the Scottish nation in the Public Register of All Arms and Bearings in Scotland (Vol. I, page 20) in terms of the Act of Parliament, 1672, cap. 47 "—and that patriotic Scots should fly it or the Union Jack but not the Treasured Lion Rampant banner which is the King's property (*The Times*, June 21st, 1933).

Similar Welsh demonstrators have already carried their point. On St. David's Day, 1931, Welsh Nationalists forced their way into Caernarvon Castle, pulled down the Union Jack and hoisted the Red Dragon of Wales ; when the Union Jack was rehoisted fifty students again pulled it down, carried it to the Castle Square and tore it to bits. After cogitation and negotiation the authorities compromised and now on St. David's Day the Union Jack and Welsh Dragon are both to be flown from the Castle towers. His Majesty the King commanded that the Union Jack and Red Dragon flag respectively shall be flown from the corner towers on either side of the entrance gateway to Harlech Castle on the King's birthday and on St. David's Day. On July 11th, 1932, the two flags were hoisted on the same pole on the summit of Snowdon to remain there for the summer.

And what of the English flag ? On St. George's Day, as on various saints' days, the Cross of St. George may indeed be seen flying from towers of some Anglican churches. But what flag, for instance, does the London County Council building fly ? The Union Jack, of course. When England meets Scotland or Ireland at Twickenham in Rugby International, when " England " (including, it must be admitted, sometimes Scotsmen and Indians) meets Australia or New Zealand in a Test Match at Lord's or the Oval, what flag flies as England's, side by side with the Scottish, Irish, Australian, New Zealand flag ? The Union Jack, of course! Some authorities indeed hold that the Union Jack ought not, properly, to be flown by individual Britons. " It is an official flag." So wrote Lord Edward Gleichen in *The Times* of June 20th, 1933 (a letter in *The Times* next day, however, quoted a statement in the House of Lords on July 14th, 1908, by Lord Crewe to the effect that the Union Jack should be regarded as the national flag and might undoubtedly be flown on land by all British subjects).

Lord Edward's suggestion is the revival of the use of the St. George's Cross, but, though he has doubts "whether a Scotsman or Welshman should fly it," he ends up by recommending " the ordinary Briton " (an extraordinary term in this connection) " to fly it on ordinary occasions." The English have forgotten their own flag. It seldom appears at great English assemblies, though it was flown with others at Epsom Grandstand at the 1933 Derby. The only territory where the flag of St. George is still officially flown is in the Channel Islands. It is the recognised flag of the old Norman island of Guernsey. And the English have forgotten their patron Saint. All over the world Scotsmen, Irishmen, Welshmen hold their rallies, their demonstrations, their dinners on St. Andrew's, St. Patrick's, St. David's Days. St. George's Day passes almost unnoticed except for a small dinner or two of the Royal Society of St. George and a service in St. Paul's Cathedral for the select Order of St. Michael and St. George. Liverpool Cathedral, in its doctrine of all things for all men, overlooks the possibility that Englishmen as such might deserve recognition. St. Patrick's Day indeed it leaves to the Papists ; and to them it leaves also St. George's Day to celebrate worthily. And yet on St. Andrew's Day, 1931, 19,000 Scotsmen, on St. David's Day, 1932, 12,000 Welshmen—most of them, no doubt, dissenters from the Anglican Communion—held their national thanksgivings in what will be the largest English Cathedral. A Sunday in June is set apart for a service for the Juvenile Orange Lodges, dear to Ulstermen. But St. George's Day is not thought worthy of any special service in Liverpool Cathedral, nor is it even *mentioned* in the Cathedral calendar. Even St. George's Hospital thought fit in 1932 to sell its " roses " in the streets of London on April 15th, not on St. George's (or Shakespeare's) Day as that happened to be the day of the English (!) Cup Final at Wembley and it was strangely thought that sellers and buyers alike might not be so forthcoming on that day. In 1934 they were rightly sold on April 23rd, but only about 5 per cent. of Londoners bought them or even wore the English emblem of a rose. On the other hand the English County Societies' Conference did not eat their " dinner in celebration of St. George's Day " till May 7th!

Even the Archbishop of Canterbury does not appear to

associate St. George's Day peculiarly with England. (True His Grace is a Scotsman.) He writes in the *Canterbury Diocesan Gazette* (quoted in *The Times* of April 4th, 1933): "Now Sunday, April 23rd, is St. George's Day. The fact that this year the day falls on a Sunday makes it natural and right that we should then remember, in private and public prayer the great and inspiring responsibilities of the British Empire. . . . Let there be special remembrance of India. . . ." But, however excellent such injunctions are, it does seem a pity that England should not be made the main theme of St. George's Day. (It is a curious fact that the only regiment in the British Army that has the right to fly the St. George's Colours is an Irish one—the 27th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.) But in fairness to the Archbishop, it should be added that his address, when blessing a new block of flats in St. Pancras in 1934 on St. George's Day, was quite admirably appropriate.

But is not all this quibbling, pedantry? What's in a name? Does it matter whether the English are called British or whether they are content to share a flag with others and alone of peoples claim none for themselves? No, it is not all this that matters; it is what it represents. Flags are but symbols; but the loss of a symbol often means the loss of a vital idea, the loss of an historic entity. England—the England of Alfred, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Johnson, Wordsworth, Masefield—"this dear, dear land, dear for her reputation through the world," is now being submerged in a vague, loose complex called Britain, which means what anyone chooses it to mean. Within the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland has her own government, Parliament, educational and religious system; Scotland has her own Established Church, laws, educational system, separate Secretary of State and special Government Departments; Wales (including Monmouthshire which, as we have seen, is truly Welsh) has secured a special religious, educational and liquor-licence system. (The Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey are not part of, though subordinate to, the United Kingdom; they have their separate Parliaments, their own official languages, laws, fiscal and administrative autonomy.) But as for England! When after twenty years of labour the Bishops, clergy and laity of the Church of England produced in 1927 an alternative permissible Prayer Book and (unnecessarily and ill-advisedly, many thought)

asked Parliamentary approval of it, what happened? The late Sir William Joynson-Hicks in a vehement Protestant attack on the Book declared that "To-day, the final right lies with the Commons of England" to reject or accept the measure. The Commons of England, however, were not allowed to exercise this right. They indeed provided a majority of 33 (197 to 164) *for* the Bill. But the Commons of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were of another way of thinking. All these countries have their separate religious systems; to none of them would the measure have in any way applied. But the non-English British are not content with their own spiritual independence; they must control English religion too—it is an old tradition; and "Englishmen in their turn were willing to seek British aid against their countrymen" in the twentieth as in the seventh century. Wales (by 19 to 2), Scotland (by 36 to 7), Ulster (by 11 to 0) combined to alter the English majority of 33 *for* the Bill into a total British majority of 25 *against*. A similar situation has embarrassed the passage of the Sunday Cinemas Bills of 1931 and 1932. In the voting on this latter question, while English members voted by 220 to 160 in favour of the Bill, Welsh members voted against it by 23 to 6 and Scottish and Ulster members (even though it did not apply to Scotland or Northern Ireland) by 29 to 8 and 6 to 1 respectively. Is not the case for "Home Rule for England" at least as strong as the case for Scottish or Welsh autonomy? For England means much to everyone interested in the higher enthusiasms of humanity. Britain indeed connotes industry, wealth, political adaptability, a world-wide commonwealth. But England implies higher values, not indeed in contradiction with the meaning of Britain but the very soul of it. It was round England, as a core or kernel, that Britain took shape. If ever England ceased to live, Britain would cease to be either vital or interesting.

Besides, what is meant by "Britain," by "British"? The words apply historically to these islands before the Romans conquered most of them and during the Roman time. The Angles and Saxons made the chief parts of Britain "English." The last 300 years have witnessed by slow processes the British reconquest of England. But meanwhile England, as it was being reconquered by the British, was, in conjunction with non-English Britain, engaged in conquering a quarter

of the world. A quarter of the world gladly or reluctantly acknowledges King George as Sovereign. True, many of the Irish, many of the South Africans admit His Majesty's sovereignty not as that of a British, but of an Irish or South African King; they would argue that at least seven Kingships (apart from that of India) meet in the person of King George. What common adjective and nouns describe this partnership, the citizenship of this Commonwealth? No one has yet decided. The British Commonwealth of Nations, British subjects, British ships—these historic phrases seem to claim the word "British" as common to all King George's territories and subjects. To emphasise this fact the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland painstakingly try to describe themselves as the United Kingdom Government and request others to do so. This pedantic and ugly phrase wins little recognition. To most people in this country, to almost everyone in other countries the Government in London is the British Government, responsible directly for the government of Great Britain, less directly for that of Northern Ireland, less directly still for that of the Channel Islands and Isle of Man and so, in varying degrees of directness or indirectness, responsible for the government of scores of colonies, protectorates and mandated territories, for that of the vast Indian Empire. All this is politically British. But what of the Dominions of equal status beyond it? They are indeed "British" by race (Australia and New Zealand claim to be 98 per cent. British). But are they technically within the British Empire or do they, together with the British Empire, make up the British Commonwealth? If so, why not another noun and adjective to distinguish the King's *Empire* subjects from the total of his *Commonwealth* subjects? The first are British *par excellence*, "British subjects," Britishers, till we can find a better word for this ugly Americanism. For the second, the whole number, why not "Britannic," subjects of His Britannic Majesty, *Britons*? The distinction is useful, is necessary, if there is to be a little clear thinking about our complicated responsibilities. One word more would be needed. Why not the Shakespearean "Britishman" for a man of British-Isles descent? It is properly formed, it has high authority, it is badly needed.

Englishman—Britishman—Britisher—Briton: all four of

such names are needed. But it is not the names themselves, it is what they signify that matters: Shakespeare—the Union Jack—the Empire—the Commonwealth. A grand conception: but, widen the circle as you will, do not forget the centre on which it depends.

ALLEN LEEPER.

N.B. This article, written in 1934, was intended for a book on England and the British, which the author did not live to complete. (ED. C.R.)

CASTLES IN THE AIR.

IT is customary to talk about the " homes " of wild creatures much as one would use the expression when referring to the domestic life of mankind. In the majority of cases, however, the term is inapplicable, for only in a limited sense does the wild animal possess a home. Brought up on the simple truism that foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, one is perhaps inclined to regard these works of bird and beast as serving a more permanent purpose than is usually the case. The main strongholds of many burrowing animals, such as foxes, rabbits, rats and mice, can scarcely be regarded as individual " homes," being rather communal refuges at the disposal of the entire race. Indeed, the term can only be applied to the specially excavated or constructed dwelling of a hibernator, badger, dormouse or squirrel, for example, occupied for the lifetime of the animal and serving as a home in almost every sense.

Few birds use a nest more than once, and then only as a nursery. Even those spots to which they return annually to rear their young cannot as a rule be regarded as genuine places of abode, migrant species being the most conservative in this respect. The loft which the swallow occupies during the summer months could scarcely be regarded as the bird's home, and in those instances where one brood only is raised the tenancy may be a mere matter of weeks. There are, of course, birds such as robins which appropriate prescribed areas and remain in possession for a period of years. Here, however, it is a matter of acquiring a " pitch " rather than a dwelling. All wild animals possess a range, the extent of which may be world or garden-wide, according to the creature's disposition. The nomadic tendency is entirely relative.

Upon the other hand, an example of a true home-maker is the owl, who establishes himself in a certain old chimney or hollow tree, which becomes the centre of his universe, serving alike as residence, refuge, nest and nursery. An old owl's hole is, indeed, his castle, in which he shelters, snores, and secretes the relics of his feasts, like a collector of antiques. Deprived of this *pied-à-terre*, he is as helpless as a human being without a house, being literally a resident. In some respects birds of the latter description curiously resemble human beings, for even as man occupies both isolated dwellings and crowded

cities, so birds are either gregarious or solitary. The tower or ruin tenanted by jackdaws, or the crowded rookery, constitutes an avian settlement, and is in more or less perennial occupation. Jackdaws, indeed, inhabit their quarters throughout the year, returning to them nightly, while rooks, even when they roost elsewhere, spend a considerable part of each day in the trees which they have appropriated.

The heron is mainly solitary in his daily pursuits, occasionally roosting " out " like a human fisherman taking lodgings to facilitate his sport, yet usually returning each night across many miles of darkening country to his " village," where, in the proper time, his family affairs are conducted. And, most interesting of all, perhaps, there are the aristocrats of the air, birds who monopolise some great crag or tree, making of it a castle indeed, jealously defended like a feudal stronghold, and occupied for long periods of years, one régime succeeding another by virtue of inheritance or conquest.

Of these " castles in the air " the most remarkable is the immense structure of the osprey, built in the crown of some lofty tree, the life of which, for some reason still unexplained, it gradually but surely claims, sapping the vitality that supports its weight. One has known such a tree develop a distinct " list," like bowed shoulders beneath a load, a circumstance which is not remarkable when one considers the disproportionate size of the structure to its apparent requirements. So huge is it that other birds, grakles, nest securely in its solid foundations, like dependants lodged in a medieval fortified palace.

Whether this remarkable example of an arboreal home will ever again be seen in Great Britain seems more than doubtful. The nearest approach to it in England to-day is provided by a long-established " raven-tree," a rare enough spectacle, since few birds live long enough for the place which they have adopted to assume the imposing character and dimensions which many years of occupation alone can impart. After his extermination as a branch-building species had almost been effected, as far as England was concerned, the raven has slowly fought his way back to comparative abundance in the wilder parts of the south-western peninsula. His great nest, much resembling that of a buzzard in size and position, may now be seen in many Devonshire woods or, more frequently, in some outstanding group of trees surmounting a hillock.

Like most of the larger and wilder birds, he is particularly fond of a Scotch fir, in which respect he displays a characteristic conservatism, this tree being our only indigenous pine. The nest is rarely accessible without the aid of climbing-irons, and the birds usually enjoy a measure of protection, their presence still constituting something of a novelty as well as imparting distinction to the estate upon which they nest. Yet, despite the increase of the species as an inland builder, raven-trees in the full sense of the term remain comparatively rare.

This is unfortunate, since a more interesting acquisition to any property could scarcely be desired. Like a rookery, however, it is a matter of evolving rather than acquiring, and even as rooks cannot be induced to settle anywhere excepting in those places which they select for themselves, so the raven, though making shift for a year or two with the best that he can find, is slow to establish himself until he discovers a tree which he considers suitable in every respect. A pair of birds may take possession of a wood soon after the New Year, build a nest, and by the end of March produce a brood which is reared successfully, only to disappear into the blue. The return of the old birds is vainly awaited the following year. Neither they nor their offspring take any further interest in the place, which is annexed at last by a tawny owl, a sparrow-hawk or a kestrel. Although everything appeared to go well with the ravens, the place failed to win their entire approval. Like a human family that rents a house for a while but is dissatisfied, they move on and try elsewhere—possibly with no better success. One could cite numerous instances of one-season breeding-places, and might be led to believe that the historic trees described by old writers were nothing more than picturesque myths, and that the great sombre-voiced birds in truth differed little from others of their order, merely using their nests once and then abandoning them after the customary manner of crows or magpies. Actually, of course, it is the old story of making a rule where none exists, the ancestral raven-tree being the outstanding example of a racial tendency which does not always develop.

In highly individualised animals purely inherent characteristics are less general than among creatures whose actions are governed entirely by habit, and even as some dogs are more faithful than others, so certain birds evince a conservatism

which does not necessarily apply to the species as a whole. It seems probable, therefore, that a genuine raven-tree is the outcome of tenacity upon the part of the founders, combined with some peculiar advantage which the locality possesses, according to avian standards. A remarkable example was the comparatively recent reoccupation of a patriarchal pine, which, according to old accounts, had been famous for a similar distinction fifty years before. Untenanted through five decades, the old family stronghold must have attracted a descendant of the former occupiers—probably in obedience to some atavistic homing instinct, which prompted the bird to rebuild upon the original foundations. In another instance within personal experience—this time an example of rigid adherence to individual selection—the spot chosen was obviously regarded as particularly advantageous, but there appeared to be difficulty in finding a suitable site for the nest. Its position was changed three times, although the previous ventures had been successful and entirely free from molestation, a fresh tree being tried upon each occasion. The third position, apparently, satisfied requirements, and has now been used for many years, nest after nest surmounting previous structures, the general pile gradually acquiring an enormous bulk.

The latter case is interesting from various points of view. The choice of that particular tree was curious, since, unlike the other two which were unscalable without special equipment, this one—an immense spruce—presented no difficulties to any climber of ordinary ability. Upon the other hand, had permanent occupation of the site been anticipated, it could not have been chosen more judiciously. The first nest was built high in the crown, where the main trunk finally divided to form a strong fork, both stems of which, while throwing out supporting branches, continued to ascend, more than keeping pace with the great pile of the nest also mounting year by year. In either of the other trees, which were oaks, the crotches first occupied were too broadly divergent to keep a steadily accumulating mass of sticks in position, and the "building" would have blown over for lack of side support, as the birds seemed to realise. The existing structure remains immovable, firmly wedged between two great natural pillars, in just such a position as a carpenter would choose if erecting a tree shelter, and those who saw the founding of this now

famous eyrie have witnessed the somewhat curious phenomenon of the spruce gradually growing away from the nest, so that the great erection, actually higher than in its early stages, is now some fifteen feet below the summit which it originally occupied. With its upward growth the under branches and foliage of the gigantic tree have thinned considerably, and the ravens' castle, once invisible from the foot, now stands forth as the most conspicuous and interesting feature of the wood.

The tenacity displayed by these birds has been remarkable, proving that an established raven-tree, while the occupiers survive, is as ineradicable as a rookery. The spruce stands in a Dartmoor coombe, or "cleave," actually upon private ground, but only separated from common land by the River Taw, and since the valley is highly popular in spring the huge nest attracts a measure of attention which is far from desirable. Egg-collectors of every description, from the schoolboy to the confirmed clutch-snatcher, cast covetous eyes upon it, and despite an almost perpetual watch, robbery regularly took place, and for a considerable number of years no brood could be reared. The ravens persevered, however, with undaunted optimism. Success or failure appears to make no difference in such circumstances. Rooks which have seen their fledglings shot almost to the last bird, are not deterred by tragic recollections the following season, and the swan builds again upon the island or mudbank from which floods have washed every trace of her first effort.

So the ravens continued to build and their eggs to disappear until the landowner conceived the idea of barricading the tree with barbed wire. This, incidentally, is an excellent plan for the protection of a rare nest. The entanglement should not be arranged around the base of the tree, for if placed within reach of the ground it can usually be negotiated by a resolute raider. The most effective barrier consists of a loosely coiled network of wire encircling the trunk and all possible ways of ascent at a considerable height. This proves singularly discouraging even to an expert climber, who is compelled to tackle the obstacle at a distinct disadvantage. If strategically constructed, it renders further ascent practically impossible, for even if the raider is equipped with nippers, the task of cutting his way through is a difficult and lengthy proceeding. In the case of a nesting-place which requires annual protection, a

permanent defence of this character saves perpetual trouble, and for several years has proved an effectual safeguard to the eyrie described.

Like a rookery, again, an established raven-tree does not merely constitute the annual breeding-place of the occupiers. Rather it is treated as their headquarters, and if not used as a regular roost, scarcely a day passes upon which it is not visited. During the bright days of early autumn when many birds experience a recrudescence of the "spring feeling," they resume possession of the place for a while. The male may then be seen at times carrying sticks to the nest—a course of action which helps to strengthen it against winter wear, although such is certainly not his conscious purpose, and, incidentally, at this season one may witness that curious proceeding known as the "raven's kiss." This may take place in air when the great dark birds, solemnly wheeling and somersaulting after the manner of their kind, approach one another during their evolutions, the male thrusting forward his formidable curved beak—a terrible weapon when employed for more sinister purposes—and momentarily taking that of his mate within its grasp, like two people shaking hands. The ritual is also enacted when the birds are perched a few feet apart upon a rock or stone wall, the old black knight sedately hopping the intervening distance, delivering his caress, then as demurely returning to his former position.

Even when the occupiers are not in residence, the eyrie is guarded with almost equal assiduity as during the breeding season. Upon one recent occasion in late September I climbed to a raven's nest built on a crag, for interest's sake, having been unable to visit the place before the young had flown. There was no reason for supposing that the proceeding would be resented or even observed. None the less, I had barely reached the spot when the swish of big wings sounded overhead, and round the rock there swept the angry châtelaine, as jealous of interference as though eggs or young had been in danger. She was less clamorous, indeed, but evidently held decided views upon the rights of property.

The raven undoubtedly prefers a rock eyrie to a tree-top home, and when precipices are available he takes advantage of them. Upon cliffs, however, even as in timber, one notices the same irregularity of habit. There are century-old breeding-places, others that are abandoned after a short tenancy. This

probably indicates that the most desirable positions are held by old pairs whose descendants are obliged to experiment. Upon rocks, however, one seldom sees the huge nests which annual additions produce in trees. Presumably they would be swept away for lack of frontal support, and when the same precipice is permanently adopted alternative sites for the actual nest meet this obvious difficulty. In the choice of ledges upon which to build this most intelligent of birds displays a curious mental limitation. He possesses sufficient acumen to realise the strategic value of inaccessibility, but, fearing no winged enemy, only anticipates danger from below. As long as a dizzy abyss yawns beneath, the raven considers his fortress unassailable, even though a sheep path may pass within a foot of the spot. A nest to which one may walk with comparative ease from above is not unusual, for the bird lacks the instinct of the eagle which eliminates such a possibility by building under a projecting boulder.

It should be remembered that the jackdaw, scarcely less shrewd in most respects than the distinguished head of the clan Corvus, is subject to a corresponding weakness. He takes the utmost care to place his nest well beyond reach of the entrance hole, but omits to consider the possibility of access from any other quarter. He takes possession of an apparently impregnable position under the iron framework of a railway bridge, for example, and is so careful to penetrate a sufficient distance that he almost emerges upon the top, from which the nest can frequently be reached. He commits the same error when he appropriates a ruinous cottage, entering under the eaves and building upon a ceiling, through an aperture in which the nest as often as not protrudes. Inconsistency, apparently, is not only a human attribute.

Before the days when the equipment which modern bird-study requires facilitated climbing, to reach a raven's nest was the blue ribbon of the naturalist or collector—synonymous terms a hundred years ago. Life and limb were freely risked —and not infrequently lost—nor is it remarkable that the status of the raven dwindled almost to zero in face of the persecution to which the bird was subjected. Writing in 1852, one naturalist deplores the fate of " a fine accessible raven's nest, full of eggs, wantonly destroyed by a boat's crew of blackguard fishermen." Reading farther, however, it becomes apparent that his regrets were intensified by his own failure

to be first in the field, for, after calling down curses on the fishermen, in a subsequent passage written a year later he triumphantly proclaims his own successful raiding of the next season's clutch. Point of view usually alters outlook.

Happily for the raven, or rather for his preservation as an existing species, his nest is not always " accessible." There remains many an eyrie which no plunderer has ever reached, and it is to these impregnable fortresses that the bird owes his considerable measure of success in the long unequal struggle with mankind. South of the Tweed, his main stronghold in Great Britain to-day is along the western seaboard, particularly the coasts of South Wales and the Cornish Peninsula, where towering headlands washed by wild seas provide sure sanctuary to any creature seeking their protection. The strongest representation of ravens to the mile is to be found on the Pembrokeshire cliffs, though actually the birds are most numerous in North Devon and Cornwall, their principal breeding-line extending, roughly, from rugged Hartland to Tintagel. Their foraging range, however, reaches far inland, mileage troubling such powerful fliers very little, and in the vicinity of places like tanneries or shambles where abundant flesh can be obtained, they assemble in numbers which seem incredible to people who inhabit parts of the country where the species is unknown. The huntsman of the Eggesford hounds recently told me that it is nothing unusual to see from twelve to twenty prowling like vultures round the kennel larder, and a naturalist living in the same neighbourhood once counted forty-three, winging their way homewards after the feast, as might a flock of rooks.

Even the latter number will surprise nobody who knows the Arthurian country, for it would be difficult to name a headland upon this wild, magnificent coast where the raven's voice is not a familiar sound. Casual nests may be found almost anywhere, and at varying intervals along the cliffs, usually miles apart, occur the ancestral eyries from which the stock emanates. These strongly suggest fastnesses of tribal chieftains—tyrants, yet bulwarks of the race—and are usually occupied by some grim old warrior who enacts that part by virtue of long right inherited or seized. Singularly characteristic in this respect is a grand old bird who haunts an outstanding promontory near Trevalga, known as The Lady's Window. His favourite perch is a dizzy eminence which,

mounting in conical formation from the cliff's summit, terminates in a 300-ft. drop sheer to the Atlantic. Here his sinister profile may frequently be seen as he stands, the most conspicuous living feature in the landscape, looking across a watery expanse towards the once "lone Tintagel"—comparatively lone even in his day, for the raven of The Lady's Window was regarded as an institution before the nineteenth century had completed its course.

"The wrinkled sea beneath him crawls,"

a vast sheet of viridian green over which wind-ripples play and slowly drifting cloud-shadows cast reflections, violet, purple, ultramarine, in a continuous colour pageant, fading into a deeper consistent blue where ocean and horizon mingle. Eastwards and westwards stretch the cruel coast, the iron cliffs, and around the old raven's lonely post thrift and sea-campion bloom, with the perennial gold of the gorse, and heather to lend its pink as summer wanes.

Since Arthur took the form of a raven, this bird might well be the great Pendragon himself contemplating the changes that time has wrought. But whatever may be the gist of his actual meditations, they find vocal expression now and again in a sonorous croak, for the articulation of which his head shoots forward like that of a turkey, his great bull throat swelling with the effort. Presumably he is asserting his right of supremacy. This, however, remains unchallenged, no other bird venturing near while he remains in possession. He seems curiously jealous of relinquishing his post even at the approach of human intruders, but surmounts this difficulty by hopping to a slightly lower perch on the cliff's face in order to escape notice. If one watches quietly for a short while, however, his cautiously advanced head reappears over the skyline in effective silhouette as, believing himself unseen, he reviews the situation. Even his mate never aspires to the dignity of sharing this exalted throne, although she occasionally appears at his side upon an adjoining rock—a striking picture—or participates in his aerial circlings.

The question as to how long a wild raven can live has never been satisfactorily answered, and is one that suggests strange possibilities as one notes the evolutions of the bird over mighty Hennacliff which rears its 450-ft. wall of rock to overshadow the Morwenstow valley where Hawker—ignored in life, now

ranked among the great literary figures of his generation—worked, wrote, and, after the manner of the birds themselves, studied the ever-changing sea from his eyrie-like hut on a neighbouring headland. He, too, watched similar circlings over Hennacliff, and with the thought there arises an inevitable question: Was the far-sounding, impressive voice which to-day awakens the echoes of those terrible precipices in truth the same that inspired the well-known ballad bearing the great cliff's name?

> Then said the rushing raven unto his hungry mate,
> Ho! gossip for Bude Haven, there are corpses six or eight.

The idea is not as fantastic as it might seem, since estimates of raven longevity range from Hesiod's astonishing figure of 7,560 years to several instances, recorded by Buffon, of birds which reached the tenth decade, whilst Rennie places the average at 108 years—accepted nowadays as at least possible.

Here is food for reflection, since the heedless gun, discharged at the Corvine king by some irresponsible loafer, not only deprives a splendid creature of joyous life that may far exceed the average of human existence, but also effaces a natural ornament which, if allowed to remain, might conceivably survive three generations of men. Not least of earth's tragedies is the ease with which the irreplaceable can be wantonly destroyed.

DOUGLAS GORDON.

NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

NOTHING surprised the world so much as the *Gleichschaltung* of the German Universities. Nowhere did the freedom of learning appear to have such devoted guardians. The world-wide esteem in which their Professors were held rested to no small extent upon their position of independence which made them utter the demands of humanism without regard for party politics. How German scholars had abused this humanism during the war had long been forgotten. It was thought that the representatives of learning, as well as the whole race of "Philosophers and Poets," had become wiser through the experience of the war, and a relapse into the countless delusions of that time was considered impossible. Then came the burning of books, the dismissal of democratic, socialist and Jewish Professors, and all the propaganda which was to put an end to the objective study of the humanists. This, moreover, met with immediate success. Without resistance, the Universities yielded to the "Absolute State." The resignation of a Nobel prizeman and the suicide of a Jewish archæologist were but slight flaws which did not change the general effect of the picture. There was in reality only one person who effectively commented on the Universities: the man who forced upon them his idea of unity. It has been little noted in Germany, and not at all abroad, that Hitler refused the honorary degree of Doctor which was offered him at the beginning of February 1933 by the School of Engineering at Stuttgart. He refused it not for himself alone, but for all whom he needed or would be likely to need as leaders of the new State. The gesture emphasised something that had become obvious as early as 1918—that the Universities were no longer either capable of giving a lead or expected to give one.

Before laying bare the roots of this development, it is necessary to show the effect upon Universities and learning of the "Absolute State" during the four years of its existence. It may be true that certain Professors use their positions to deliver criticism, a report which seems to be confirmed by occasional unofficial accounts in Germany. This, however, is unimportant, for, with the exception of Barth the theologian, who went back to Switzerland, all have taken the oath

demanded of them, which makes impossible the application of learning as they had previously understood it. For the students learning has passed altogether into the background. To escape starvation they are obliged to live shut up in newly established hostels, where their task is to be drilled and is called "hardening." On the other hand a number of students, who were financially in a position to do so, have left Germany, thus implying a criticism of the bearing of their Professors.

What has been substituted for humanism through this "Ideal Unity" will most easily be found where the humanistic ideal seemed to be most eagerly cultivated—in the Faculties of Arts. It will be seen that in the exclusively academic periodicals there is hardly any change. Indeed there are occasional passages which leave no doubt as to the real opinion of some Professors. In the *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, edited by Professor Petersen, who was among the first to assure the new authorities of his "patriotic" convictions, another philologist and scholar of high rank, Professor Burdach, who died recently, published an article on the great edition of Gottfried Keller produced by Jonas Fränkel, a Jewish Professor. In welcoming this edition as an example of the German national spirit, Burdach gave voice to a judgment which would have been impossible in a paper with a larger circulation.

It is difficult to form an adequate idea of the time-serving in those periodicals which have the task of establishing contact between the Universities and the secondary schools. Within a month scholars enjoying great esteem in their faculties have burned what they previously worshipped, for the sake of a teaching which is intended above all things to make the rising generation of teachers amenable to unification. In 1933, the April number of the *Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde*, printed before the *Gleichschaltung*, contained a long article in praise of Franz Werfel. The May number, under the same editorship of notable philologists, contains an article expressing satisfaction that such writers as Werfel no longer have a hearing in Germany. Professors and authorities of pure and non-political learning, which they have always held to be a "refuge for the peace-loving citizen," have suddenly discovered their enthusiasm for the very opposite, and would make of learning a "base for men of action." What was still regarded as the extreme of dilettantism on January 29th,

1933, now passes in the journals which are to form the minds of teachers and of the coming generation as "fundamental knowledge." In fact "the new spirit of learning demands an entirely new mentality."

Professor Korff of Leipzig wrote a book on *The Spirit of Goethe's Age*, a glorification of civic humanism. He now writes: "The night is past, and as we look about us in the daylight, we know that a new epoch of German history has begun, and we are privileged to witness it." A few years ago a biography of Goethe, which had become a household book in Germany, by Bielschowsky the Jew, was republished. The publisher is now the responsible editor of the *Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde*. To make amends for this mistake of "times long past," he now pointedly issues an article maintaining that "the forces of psychic defence" must be directed against the Jew—the very Jew who had for the first time presented Goethe to a wide German public amid the applause of "Aryan" authorities.

The philologist Naumann gave the cue when he dedicated a critical work written after January 30th, 1933, to Stefan George and Adolf Hitler. The author of the German Bible *My Struggle* is thus celebrated by no means only as a political example. This might be attributed to the well-known political innocence of German Professors. But it seems curious that a German philologist, a guardian and interpreter of the German language, should hinge German history and the German future on a book written contrary to the laws of the German language. And Naumann is by no means the worst case. He believes all he says. He is one of those scholars of "German Nationalism" who, in a desire quite right in itself to revise the methods of literary criticism, have created the obscure metaphysics of a no less obscure "Folklore," behind which all the terrors of the Third Reich, both material and intellectual, could hide long before it came into existence.

Some Professors actually afforded Hitler metaphysical justification before he came into power. It is against these that Alfred Rosenberg, the theorist of the Nazi Myth, tilts when he attacks the numerous prophets who endeavour to win from the members of the Party their historical fame as the real builders of Hitler's "superstructure." This jealousy is comprehensible when we read this phrase in the *Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde*: "Yet we are not a race devoted to music alone, but to metaphysics as well, and in this we are distinct from France and England"; and this metaphysic enables them "to forget themselves and to take Heaven by storm." This Heaven-storming appears thus: "But this everlasting Germany has one, perhaps really only one, deadly enemy—the Jew—because he himself must hate Germany in which he rightly sees his deadly enemy." It is strange that this metaphysic of deadly enmity did not prevent Gundolf, the Jew, from bearing witness to this enmity for Germany in books like *Shakespeare and the German Spirit*, and his work on Goethe. Still stranger is it that Stefan George, whom Naumann finds worthy to be named with Hitler, found in Gundolf his most passionate herald, and took his point of view in its essentials from the Jew Wolfskehl. It is strangest of all that not one of these heroes who were so suddenly transformed into Knights of Wotan has uttered a single word against another Leipzig Professor, Witkowsky, who made of learning a commercial enterprise of the worst sort. His colleague Korff, it is true, considers that it is "presumptuous to attempt to outline in a few words the meaning of the new epoch." Perhaps this presumption may be traced back to his recollection of having dedicated his first book to his instructor, the son of an ennobled Galician pig-farmer who was certainly not of Aryan origin.

Meanwhile Korff's reserve is quite superfluous. The meaning of the "New Epoch" is seen daily in the world. But what it means to learning and therefore to German culture is far less widely known. To understand how the Universities could so easily fall a prey to the Third Reich, it must be remembered that in Germany they have a far greater importance than elsewhere. Germany's Universities correspond to England's Parliament. Germany has never known the guidance of an independent parliament, not even after 1870, and for that reason has expressed all its longing for freedom in its Universities. Its teachers became its leaders, not only in the intellectual sense, until one day the youth of Germany discovered that the reputation of the Universities was not warranted by their achievements on behalf of the nation as a whole. The National Socialist movement was able to make use of this dissatisfaction, which also existed among a small number of the younger University Readers. Hitler sent into

the lecture halls men who had been officers in the old army and who were particularly skilful in this field; and thus he succeeded in convincing young Germans that National Socialism alone was capable of producing the new University which would reform learning.

It is thus comprehensible that shortly before the advent of the "Third Reich" a "Third Humanism" was heralded. A new myth of humanistic leadership preceded the myth of the "Leader." What was the aim of this humanism? It aimed above all at making learning a matter of experience and not of the desk, and at proving this to be so. Platonic ideals were mingled with those of Sparta and Ancient Rome. But while Platonic thought, for example, was proper to certain tendencies of classical University teaching, the new Leader-Humanism sought an insight into the poet of the present. In this it became definitely opposed to learning as a whole. In quoting Goethe, Hölderlin and Nietzsche, the student world was, or thought it was, anti-Liberal and opposed to the progressive "enlightenment" belief, without which it is impossible to pursue learning according to the principles of the pre-Hitler University. This Third Humanism confesses with Nietzsche to a philosophy of pessimism and tragedy. But as opposed to Nietzsche it allows but one escape from this tragedy, and that is the belief in community as a whole. The expression of this theory is the State—not a state in the sense of the Athenian democracy, but of Sparta or Rome. In sharp contrast to the youth movement in the first decade of the century, which denied a life bound up in the State, and in strong contrast to the parallel movement of romantic individualism, the Third Humanism aims at being the political humanism of a politically-minded generation. Unhampered by a genuine knowledge of the Classics, the *salto mortale* from the humanism of the State to that of folk-lore and race was easily performed. Yet it is wrong to identify this new teaching, which, incidentally, had no practical results, with the National Socialist teaching. The conviction that every man is a Greek, possessing the Greek spirit, could not be shared by any true National Socialist. On the other hand the separation of Humanism from the Humanities is connected with certain National Socialist catchwords, inasmuch as for the new teaching the Humanities correspond to the normal while the new Humanism demands the norm; the norm of

people bound up in the State and in the State alone. While the first humanism was a child of learning, the second, at the time of the Classic German writers, a child of arts, the third is to be a child of the State.

National Socialism has fulfilled none of its promises to the students. The pursuit of learning continues as before, or is altered only in so far as there is now less time for work. Furthermore, all reports agree that National Socialism as an ideology is coming to an end in its own realm as well as in the Universities. The hazy National Socialist ideology serves only to degrade the old University system without putting anything in its place. In practice the results are not what were expected. A reaction is becoming evident which Metternich would have regarded with envious admiration. The new conditions of appointment have put an end to independent private teaching, which was, in fact, the backbone of all German Universities, in spite of the disadvantages it may have had in the economic conditions of the last few years. It is this backbone which the Universities and affiliated bodies are to lose. That is why the Ministry of Education has formed a group of so-called "official teachers," from which all future University teachers are to be chosen. Anyone attaining the degree of Doctor is entitled to call himself "Dr. habil." But the right of teaching, which used necessarily to follow this appointment, will only be granted after he has sworn loyalty to the dilettantism of the National Socialist *Weltanschauung*.

SPECTATOR.

STORM OVER NORTHERN EUROPE.

STRANGE things are going on in the Highest North. If only one-tenth of the sensational rumours referring to them tell the truth, Europe's " quietest corner " would seem to be to-day as much on the verge of war as any of the less privileged regions of our globe. Soviet Russia and Germany, a good many people contend, will never be able to go to war, simply because they have no common frontier. History dealt this simplest view a first blow when Russian and German airplanes clashed over the roofs of Madrid. Another surprise will come to the sceptic the day—presumably not too far off—they learn that the two Powers have chosen the North Cape for their next, or one of their next, battlefields.

For the time being both parties still content themselves with training their airmen and naval personnel for the coming fight in the Arctic. Frequently in recent months and weeks, German and Russian warships (submarines, torpedo-boats and destroyers) have been observed manœuvring off the north Norwegian coast, particularly around Lofoten Islands and near Tromsö. On one occasion (January 28th, 1937) a foreign submarine, according to the report made by three men of the crew of the Norwegian ship *Hammerö*, was observed right in Ofoten-fjord, at a three miles' distance from Narvik. The course of the submarine being towards the sea, there was good ground to presume that she must have been right in the harbour of this important shipping centre.

Concurrently the much talked-of " phantom-flyers " materialised into very real, presumably Russian airplanes, many of which have been observed in recent years over various points of Lapland and duly chronicled by the military authorities of the countries involved. Already the report made in July 1936 to the Defence Department in Stockholm, by General Nygren, chief of the Swedish general staff, established forty-six appearances of unknown airplanes over North Scandinavia in the years 1934-5 as authentic, while several hundred other cases of " phantom-flying," it is true, were ascribed to hallucinations. After that for a year or so all was quiet on the " phantom-flying " front, but this winter 1936-7 has proved more lively than any period before. And for the first time the military authorities of Norway and Sweden have now publicly abandoned their reserve (whereas the Finnish general staff

in January 1937 still expressed great scepticism in the matter). On February 11th, 1937, it was officially announced that General Pontus Reuterswärd, commandant of Boden, Sweden's strongest fortress near Luleå, and military governor of Norrland, in a report to the Defence Department in Stockholm had urged strong measures to check the " phantom-flying " over the fortress and the surrounding military district. Two days later General Nygren, commander-in-chief, told the Press that he regarded this report as absolutely reliable and that defence measures, now under consideration, would shortly be put into effect. A similar view was expressed by Herr Nilsson, Minister for Defence.

Almost concurrently there came a sensational warning from the highest Norwegian military authority in the extreme North. It had long been rumoured that the German War Minister, Field-Marshal von Blomberg, had performed last October an astounding tour of " inspection " along Norway's northernmost coastline. According to *Aftenposten*, the biggest Oslo daily, of October 16th, 1936, von Blomberg, travelling on board Der Führer's personal yacht *Grille*, visited Tromsö, Hammerfest, Masöy (at a few miles' distance from North Cape!), and other god-forsaken places in the Arctic. Though notoriously a pro-German paper, *Aftenposten* made no bones about the fact that such an expedition, at that time of year, could have but one significance : to seek potential bases for a German naval and air operation in the Arctic Ocean.

What scepticism may have survived, in international quarters, as to the authenticity of this startling story must have suffered a severe shock, when the Norwegian general Carl Johan Erichsen, commander of the sixth division at Harstad and military governor of North Norway, on February 15th, 1937, publicly and literally declared (in an interview with *Aftenposten*) :

> Not merely for pleasure's sake did Reichswehrminister von Blomberg late in autumn travel along North Norway's weather-beaten coast and Germany dispatch warships to us up here. For it is an official fact that Germany in winter last year sent warships here, which went without notice and without pilots into our northern fjords.

The German Press, daily inspired as it is by official instructions, has been unusually zealous of late in denouncing

alleged Soviet plots against Scandinavia. Moscow, we are told, is burning to invade Northern Europe, where—a child knows that—Russia really has no interests. In the hopeless attempt to accredit that story in and outside Germany, *Völkischer Beobachter*, *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, *Lokalanzeiger*, and other Nazi dailies, combined their resonant attacks with the more subtle demonstrations of the scientific mind in *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, *Osteuropa* and other distinguished reviews. On November 17th, 1936, *Der Angriff* emphasised the " black clouds over Northern Europe " and directly summoned the four Nordic governments to pay proper heed to the " red lightning " over their heads. Three hundred Russian airplanes, *Der Angriff* shouted, were stationed along the Carelian frontier, ready to swarm at a moment's notice into peaceful Scandinavia, which, as the Nazi review *Volk und Reich* recently put it, " positively calls for the thief by its sonorous snoring." Which thief ?—that is the question.

In contrast with the more reserved attitude of the Norwegian Press many Finnish and some Swedish dailies, headed by the two Stockholm evening papers *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* and *Aftonbladet*, joined with fervour in this Soviet scare campaign directed by Berlin. Although only a very slight portion of the Scandinavian public actually believes such blatant propaganda, it is nevertheless giving cause for concern. Sweden, in particular, remembers with a shudder how exactly the same sort of Russophobe propaganda inspired by Germany brought her, on the eve of the world war, within an inch of armed Russian intervention. Germany's policy obviously tends to attain now what in 1914, thanks to the prudence of the Swedish government, had failed : to work up, by means of a vast campaign of deliberately false news, such mutual distrust between Moscow and Stockholm as would bring the latter, at the hour of crisis, into line with Berlin. Fortunately, and in spite of certain too markedly pro-German tendencies in the Swedish army and navy, there is good ground to think that the present Swedish government will not more easily than its predecessor of 1914 allow itself to be manœuvred into a war with Russia.

If Moscow's fiendish schemes against Scandinavia are a myth, her war readiness in the Arctic is not. The " phantom-flyers " are, in part at least, good Russian airplanes and they mean business as much as Field-Marshal v. Blomberg. The

influential Oslo paper *Tidens Tegn* very adequately described the situation when it wrote, on November 20th, 1936 : " These Russian air-raids into North Norway are not primarily aimed at our country. They are before all exercises to hit enemy warships off the coast of Norway." But why on earth, one may ask, should Germany and Russia think of waging war in this area ? First, there is the problem of Russia's sea communications in the West. Montreux did away with the unlimited freedom of the Dardanelles, making thereby the Black Sea a problematic asset in times of war. Nor is the Soviet sure to retain her liberty of movement in the Baltic.

For a long time, and particularly since 1935, Germany has been intriguing for the refortification of the Åland Islands (at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia), which are demilitarised under the International Convention of 1922. A first step in this direction has already been taken by the Finnish authorities. It is an open secret that the newly built aerodrome at Mariehamn, chief town of the archipelago, serves primarily strategic, not commercial, purposes. German capital and German engineers played a leading rôle in this construction. With the Åland Islands refortified and a sympathetic government at Helsingfors—not a very unlikely assumption—it would be an easy matter for the German Navy and Air Force to bottle up the Red Fleet in the Gulf of Finland. It is, however, fair to say that the latest developments in Finland, viz. the election to the presidency of Kyösti Kallio, a good democrat and virtual ally of the Labour Party, and the journey to Moscow of Foreign Minister Holsti, have somewhat altered the picture to the advantage of peace. But even if this well-prepared scheme should fail, Germany would still retain control of the Belts and the Sound, for her means of pressure on Denmark are such that, in the event of war, no Russian ship could hope any longer to be allowed free passage through these waterways.

At all events there are reasons for believing that Russia no longer counts upon either the Black Sea or the Baltic as secure assets in a coming war. For several years her eyes have been turned towards the Arctic Ocean. Here, on the peninsula of Kola, are located the only two ports of the gigantic empire which remain open all the year round : Alexandrovsk (with Poljarnoe) and Murmansk. A centre of the greatest commercial and strategic importance has grown, during the last

decade or so, out of what had been in Tsarist times a bunch of half-forgotten, ill-conditioned villages. Murmansk, in 1925 still a small town of some 2,500 inhabitants, is now an industrial city teeming with a 100,000 population, connected with Leningrad by a double-track railway which is said to be one of the best existing in the Soviet Union. Twenty-five torpedo-boats and fifteen submarines, besides important air forces, are permanently stationed at Alexandrovsk.

The full importance of these Arctic strongholds, which the Soviets have done their utmost to develop and fortify, became evident after the completion of the " Stalin Canal " in 1933. Now the Soviet Admiralty is in a position, in summer, to move smaller vessels of war, such as submarines and torpedo-boats, from their Baltic bases to the Arctic and *vice-versa*, without leaving Russian territory. Once the reconstruction of the " Maria Canal," between Lake Onega and the Neva, is finished, it will be possible to move even cruisers through the vast system of canals, lakes and rivers extending from Leningrad to the White Sea.

To make the blockade of Soviet Russia complete on the Western front, Germany would be compelled, therefore, to send a fleet up to the extreme North with a view to intercepting the Arctic communications of Russia somewhere near North Cape, and possibly to attacking the naval and air bases on the Murman coast. The chances of success in any such enterprise would certainly be small, unless the German fleet were operating from bases on the coast of North Norway. That Berlin is attentive to the problem and making preparations in good time was strikingly demonstrated by von Blomberg's trip to the Arctic.

There is, on the other hand, the question of Germany's supply of Swedish iron ore. This is perhaps the crucial point of Herr Hitler's present war preparations and it deserves, therefore, special attention. In 1935 Germany imported 14,064,000 tons of iron ore (against only 8,268,000 tons in 1934), while her native output amounted to 5,000,000 tons. By far her biggest suppliers were France with 5,830,000 tons, and Sweden with 5,510,000 tons. Quantitatively, then, the Swedish shipments to the Reich were slightly inferior that year to the amount of iron ore exported there by France. In value, however, the relation is different. In fact, the bulk of the ore that Germany receives from France is low-grade

Lorraine " minette " (33 per cent. of iron), while Sweden ships to the Reich the choice of her mineral wealth, viz. the high-grade Lapland ore (60 to 70 per cent. of iron!). Accordingly, the German cast and steel production was dependent, in 1935, upon Sweden for about 54 per cent. of its import needs and only for little more than 25 per cent. upon France.

But that is not all. While the French minette primarily feeds the more inoffensive Saar industry, the big munitions factories of the Rhine and Ruhr basin work almost exclusively on Swedish iron ore. The dependence of Germany's armaments industry on the supplies from Sweden is still enhanced by the fact that any change on a large scale from the highly phosphorous Lapland ore now in use there to other minerals would necessitate such expenditure for the change of plants as Germany could hardly now afford. In 1936, according to preliminary figures, shipments of Swedish iron ore to the Reich amounted to approximately 7,500,000 tons (out of a total of German imports estimated at 18,800,000 tons). The dependence of the German war industry on Swedish ore, it appears, underwent a new increase.

Now the chief mining centres in Sweden, Kiruna and Gällivare (Malmberget), are both situated quite near the northern frontier. They are, therefore, within easy reach (about two hours' flight, say the military experts) of the Soviet air bases lining the Carelia frontier to Finland. Likewise, the chief export harbour for this ore, port Narvik in Norway, one of the places visited by Field-Marshal v. Blomberg, can easily be blockaded by the Red Fleet stationed on the Murman coast. Nor is the other shipping centre for the Lapland ore, port Luleå on the Gulf of Bothnia (Åland Islands!), quite secure against possible Soviet attacks by air or from the sea.

Taking all these factors into account, the situation in the extreme North can be presented, in a nutshell, like this : In the event of war, both Russia and Germany would be in a position to strike at each other a serious, maybe a fatal blow in the Arctic, the former by cutting off German war industry from an essential source of supplies ; the latter by throttling the last free waterway of the Soviets on the Western front. Success will probably lie with the Power that strikes first and is prepared to trespass most unscrupulously on the rights of

the small neutral countries involved. Which one that will be, only the future can decide.

That the Russian "phantom-flyers" over Lapland are actually training for a swift destructive attack on the iron-ore mines and that the Soviet and German warships manœuvring near Tromsö and Narvik, or even right in Ofotemfjord, are sent to rehearse respectively the blockade and the disengagement of the ore traffic to Germany, is as sure as was the military significance of the von Blomberg expedition. This is, at all events, the prevalent opinion, in both the military and the political quarters of Scandinavia, though the whole business is not, of course, too openly discussed.

How serious the situation has grown may be gathered—besides the military utterances quoted above—from two important conferences. On November 28th, 1936, the Swedish Government urgently convened a secret council of the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The day before, the Swedish Admiralty had urged immediate reinforcement of the Fleet, in view of the alarming political situation. On February 16th, 1937, the Norwegian Prime Minister Nygaardsvold took the extraordinary step of convoking all party leaders of the Storting to a conference scheduled for March 1st, for the purpose of discussing the problem of maintaining Norway's neutrality in the event of war, and—presumably—adopting a large extra appropriation for the Defence budget.

JOACHIM JOESTEN.

THE FRENCH SYMBOLISTS.

IN the history of literature it is possible to attach overmuch importance to exact dates. Nevertheless there was sufficient justification for choosing the year 1936 as the *cinquantenaire* of the Symbolist movement. Although Verlaine, Mallarmé and Rimbaud, the three pillars of symbolism, wrote the bulk of their work previously, the years 1885-6-7 marked the first diffusion of their ideas among the lettered public. The revelation came through critical articles, newly founded reviews, and the less precise but equally important medium of the Bohemian cafés. A younger generation of poets and prose-writers grew at that time conscious of common methods and aims. A rallying point was provided when, in September 1886, the name *symboliste* was launched by Jean Moréas in an article in the *Figaro*. Before defining symbolism, it is necessary to see it against the background of the preceding poetry. Only thus can it stand out in its true perspective near the summit of that astonishing nineteenth century—a century which, when it opened, was as bare of poetry as an auctioneer's catalogue, yet closed in a cloud of poetry as heady and as pervading as incense, with traditions vital enough to rule for another hundred years, unless the reactions of man towards life should change entirely.

The lyric tradition had been well and truly established by the Romantics. Though poets of widely different quality and achievement, Lamartine, Vigny, Hugo and Musset had this much in common: they vulgarised poetry. They expressed with splendid eloquence feelings which can be immediately apprehended by the cultured and uncultured alike. Their poetry, accessible to practically everyone who could read, was exciting, colourful, triumphantly emotional. Its intellectual content was small. The theme of their great lyric poems can be stated satisfactorily in a few lines of prose. When their stock of explicit emotions ran dry, they either ceased writing or, like Hugo, continued to flounder about in a morass of high-sounding verbiage. Their virtue, and at the same time the limit of their art, was to render fully simple emotional conceptions.

After the Romantic heyday came Baudelaire. In a restricted sense he is the ancestor of the Symbolists. Both Verlaine and Mallarmé read him extensively, and there are

many echoes of his verse among theirs. But without him they would have been the same poets. Whereas they belonged—and knew they belonged—to the beginning of a new epoch, Baudelaire stood at the close of an old one. He, and not they, is the only true Decadent in French literature. He was in essence a *romantique attardé*, endowed with a subtler sensibility than the genuine Romantics, but with the same emotional reactivity. The Romantics had sucked vitality from disillusion itself. Baudelaire was too disillusioned even for that. The feeling that he had been born too late is expressed very typically in his *Coucher du soleil romantique*, with its closing lines :

> But I pursue in vain the retiring God ;
> Irresistible Night affirms its sway,
> Damp, dark, deathly, and full of shivers ;
> A smell of the grave in the darkness floats,
> And my fearsome foot brushes, on the edge of the marsh,
> Unforeseen frogs and cold water-snails.

The new star in French poetry was not that of the solitary Baudelaire, whom the conservative society of the Second Empire branded as a half-mad immoralist, but of the Parnassians. Leconte de Lisle, J.-M. de Heredia, and a number of lesser poets reacted against both the subjectivity and the looseness of Romantic verse. Poetry for them meant a ruthless exclusion of the ego, and a quest for faultless form. They were like orderly-minded grown-ups arriving in the nursery after the children had gone to bed, leaving all the toys strewn about the floor. This had to be put away, that mended. They were, however, grown-ups with a sense of beauty. They did not undervalue the best of the toys, they objected to their careless use. In their process of tidying up French poetry, the Parnassians might have been expected to behave in much the same way as those other great tidiers-up, the Classics, after the hurly-burly of the Renaissance. They did not do so, partly because they lived in an age of greater colour, and partly because one of them at least, Leconte de Lisle, was a man of much wider genius than the Classic verse-makers. Like these, he felt discipline to be necessary and made a god of form—not, however, for its own sake, but in order to display more effectively the richness of content. In the pomp of words, and especially in the choice of rhyme, Parnassian verse

is frequently richer than Romantic. But it is an ordered richness. It shows a sense of selection and of craftsmanship. It deliberately seeks its effects and draws its material not from the personal experiences of the poet, but mainly from history and legend. It is the work of scholars endowed with high powers of imagination. Ultimately, for all its pictorial qualities, it is intellectual. Its virtues are a glittering stateliness, its inevitable defect lack of spontaneity.

Hardly had Parnassianism won acceptance than the new conception of poetry with which we are concerned had grown up to supersede it. To Paul Verlaine, that vagabond of genius, the careful and massive chiselling of the Parnassians was repellent.

> For we want ever half-shades,
> Not colour, nothing but shading!

Precision, eloquence, tinselled rhyme, these were things to be avoided at all costs. Let your verse come as it will, he wrote in *L'Art Poétique*. Let it be light, airy, fantastic, perfumed with the mood of the moment. Such is true poetry, " And all the rest is *literature*." Literature! The great canvases, the studied effects, the glowing colours lovingly laid on, how stiff, how heavy, how dead they appeared to this new Ariel. So Symbolism was born, in fact if not yet in name. It was more than a reaction, a new school or movement like so many others. It brought into French literature something that had never been there before, something that had always appeared alien to the genius of the race. This new element was the imprecise.

Symbolism is the poetry of the subconscious. Like Romanticism it is subjective, but that is as far as the resemblance goes. It eschews grandiloquence and refuses to recognise simple, isolated emotions. In this consists its un-French quality, for the French mind has a natural tendency towards simplification. Descartes' first principle of analysis reveals the instinct not of one man, but of a whole race. French literature rarely leaves space for rêverie. *All* the author's meaning is accessible to the reader who will take the trouble to study the text. It is as though, all through French letters, has run the dervish's advice : " Begin nothing of which thou hast not first considered the end." Start no hares that you will not pursue to the death. Know where you are going and arrive there. Be clear, and not only clear, but circumscribed.

For the Symbolists it was inadmissible that the contours of thought or feeling should be clearly cut. They found them, on the contrary, vague, shadowy, interwoven. Reality, in a word, is complex, and to single out is to kill. That being accepted, the next step was to find a means of expressing the subconscious without fatally distorting it. The Parnassians had ignored the subconscious. The Romantics, by isolating commonplaces of feeling and translating them in terms of metaphor, had falsified it. The right way was not by images, but by symbols. Reduced to its most elementary terms, this means that the Symbolist does not speak directly out of himself, but comes through the object which, superficially, he appears to be describing. He may seem to be giving a soul to inanimate things, but actually he is using them to represent his own moods. Thus: *Cette colline est belle, inclinée, et pensive* is a poor description of a hill as such, but excellent as an indication of the feelings which it awakens in the poet. The same may be said of a line such as this from Verhaeren's *Le Moulin*:

The old mill which turns, and weary, turns and dies.

Keats was more than half descriptive when he wrote: "Season of mists and mellow fruitfulness," but Verlaine was wholly a Symbolist in

Les sanglots longs
Des violons
De l'automne . . .

The more satisfying a symbol is for the poet who uses it, the more it is charged with personal association, the less will it be comprehensible to the reader. The true Symbolist writes "I" not as a convenient abbreviation of "typical man," not as a glowing bridge of sympathy between himself and his audience, but for the subtle, secret flavour which he alone fully discerns in it. And usually he does not write "I" at all, but substitutes "the mill," "the clock," "the garden," or "the rain." To realise this is to avoid lengthy discussion of two irrelevant points. The first is the "obscurity" of Symbolism. Of course Symbolist poetry is obscure. If it were clear, i.e. capable of one definite interpretation by every reader, it would cease to be Symbolist. The whole purpose of the symbol is to represent, more truly than the most carefully-worded analysis of feeling, an inner mood. Through the symbol the reader may catch the same mood, but his response to the suggestion of the poet can never be exactly predicted.

The second point is the relation between Symbolist poetry and Impressionist painting. A false parallel is often drawn, based primarily on the assumption that artists working in different mediums at much the same date are likely to have a similar outlook. The assumption grows when it is found that painters and poets shared the same cafés and exchanged views. But attempts to establish analogies between the arts are rarely illuminating. In this case they are quite fruitless, as a glance at the results will show. Symbolist poetry, we have seen, is obscure as a condition of its existence. Impressionist painting is vague—which is not the same thing—because of a deliberate choice in the manner of execution. Symbolism is the denial of materialistic realism. Impressionism is shatteringly realistic. Renoir, Manet, and the rest painted without line because they felt that, having a true vision of the objective world, only thus could they communicate it in its entirety. They took immense pains to render what they saw. They blurred detail because they found that in real life detail is blurred. The Symbolists, on the other hand, by exalting detail and giving it a spiritual significance, projected it beyond the focus of the realist's eye.

Of the three poets who stand at the origin of Symbolism, Paul Verlaine will ultimately, I believe, be considered the greatest. He is a true Symbolist in that he makes no attempt to simplify the complex. He tries in his verse to throw in everything: fugitive feeling, half-glimpsed perspective, vague remembrance. The miracle is that he succeeds, and yet remains clear. Because of this he is also a universal poet. Perhaps it is his choice of everyday words, perhaps his lightness of touch which saves him from turgidity. The fact remains that, without ever treating a definite "subject" or dealing with one of the great commonplaces of sentiment, he achieves again and again the poignant simplicity of folk-poetry. Indeed, if his name was lost to-morrow, much of his verse would survive in that form. What could be more direct, and more destined to last, than this from *Sagesse*:

Le ciel est, par-dessus le toit,
Si bleu, si calme!
Un arbre, par-dessus le toit,
Berce sa palme.

—Qu'as-tu fait, ô toi que voilà,
Pleurant sans cesse,
Dis, qu'as-tu fait, toi que voilà,
De ta jeunesse ?

Verlaine, who began as a Parnassian, is also a descriptive poet. The fact is sometimes overlooked because his descriptions are suggestive rather than conclusive. Yet many of his lines, if not whole poems, can be enjoyed in themselves, without seeking a Symbolist intent. Some idea of them can be given even in translation :

Wisps of smoke in form of fives
Came thin and black from the high-pointed roofs,

and from the same poem :

The winking eyes of the blue street lamps,

or this :

. . . two hundred and twenty-five halberdiers
On the march, and their spikes straight as the spikes of a portcullis
Gleam cross-wise against the lances of the rain.

For Verlaine the office of poetry was to suggest. Free and supple rhymes, verses floating on over the rhyme instead of ending on it in a gaudy florescence, the use of low tones rather than high, were the technical resources of this quietly supreme verse-maker. His symbols, which he used with telling effect, were always simple and restrained. This simplicity, cultivated and classicised by Henri de Régnier, employed a little ponderously by the Belgian Verhaeren, remains in Verlaine delightfully unforced. He can be read with ease and pleasure, for however unsubstantial his thought he does nothing to conceal it from the reader.

The same cannot be said of Mallarmé, who speaks a language which is the despair of the uninitiated. For him " a poem is a mystery whose key the reader must seek. Three-quarters of the enjoyment of a poem lies in the pleasure of guessing little by little." There is a powerful fascination in his work, from the comparatively easy early poems to his masterpiece *L'Après-midi d'un faune*, the second half of which, according to an eminent French poet and critic, Fernand Gregh, " takes on the appearance of a Latin text of extreme difficulty."

Here are words familiar to any Frenchman. Yet the words are often used in a special sense ; nouns, adjectives, and verbs lie down in unaccustomed fellowship, and their juxtaposition produces a sense of strangeness. The word-order has not merely been changed to suit metre and rhyme, but has been calculated to give combinations never used before. Mallarmé considered that to yield all your meaning at once to the reader was to be limited and hence dull, but there is a second reason why his work is difficult. He had evolved a poetic idiom, comparable to the idiom of music, in which words were used for their sound and association-value, and hardly at all for their meaning in familiar speech. In his knottiest poems, therefore, he is using a language which requires study just as musical connotation requires study before a page of music can be read. In Mallarmé, French poetry has moved very far indeed from the emotional accessibility of the Romantics and the impassive realism of the Parnassians. It should not be thought, however, that Mallarmé is closed to the casual reader. Even his most obscure-seeming poems are shot with vivid and brilliant phrases which leap out by contrast, and haunt the memory for long after. He has not even yet come fully into his own, and his immediate influence was largely personal. He was the master in the flesh of an exceptional generation.

The third member of the trinity is Rimbaud. If such a character appeared in fiction he would be denounced as incredible. At sixteen he was writing poetry of genius. At seventeen he wrote *Bateau Ivre*, which is more than a landmark—it is an event—in French literature. At nineteen he had finished with poetry, and had written as well the strange prose of *Une saison en enfer* (the record of his year with Verlaine) and of *Les Illuminations*, works which contain half the Cubist doctrine. After this, except for the cryptic annotations of *Le Reliquaire*, he turned his back for ever on literature, and after roaming in half the countries of Europe, in Java, Egypt, and Cyprus, he settled at Harrar where he made a small fortune by his trading enterprises among the Abyssinians. At the age of thirty-seven he was forced home by a tumour on the knee, and he died a few months after amputation.

The wonder of Rimbaud is not in his life, though that is amazing enough, but in the fact that at seventeen he had

written poetry unique not only in colour, force, and imagination, but also in sureness of touch and technical perfection. It is easy to conceive of a youthful prodigy, extravagantly inspired and throwing off verses of uneven brilliance. Rimbaud was not that. *Bateau Ivre*, to quote again his finest poem, is firm and vital in every one of its hundred lines. Each strophe bursts on you with a new revelation of the splendour of words, with lines unsurpassable in their power of suggestion or evocation, with more than a hint of the experience of maturity. Rimbaud's poetry commands admiration not relatively, as the work of an adolescent, but absolutely as being the best of its kind. When Verlaine and others had it published it opened up new vistas of literature which have not been fully explored to-day. Rimbaud, moreover, is entirely original. He despised the poetry of his contemporaries. Verlaine had no influence on the composition of his work. Mallarmé's poems were anterior to his. Without models, without apprenticeship, he created an art whose excellence is beyond question.

The influence of the first Symbolists cannot yet be properly assessed, for we are still dominated by it. They established for literature the right and the means to treat of that delicate shadow-land of human consciousness which before them had seemed too intangible for expression. They disproved completely the dictum : *Ce qui n'est pas clair n'est pas français*, and their spirit overflowed into English literature. A host of poets, all gifted, some great, Maeterlinck, Verhaeren, Rodenbach, Kahn, Régnier, Valéry, T. S. Eliot, Edith Sitwell, and how many others, are in their debt. Their innovations, particularly that of the *monologue intérieur*, have created a line of prose-writers from Huysmans through Gide and Proust to Gertrude Stein and James Joyce. Surrealism is only a development, or an offshoot, of their doctrine. It is very certain that their moral place is not at the end of the nineteenth century, but at the beginning of the twentieth.

GEOFFREY BRERETON.

LONDON LIFE A CENTURY AGO.

IT is in years like the present when great events are toward, that one takes occasion by the hand to cast a backward glance at men and things, and seeks to find out under what conditions of life and in what an environment Londoners demeaned themselves a century ago.

Well, in the first place, what of the city itself at this period which is so remote and yet which a single reign seems to link up with our own days ? In a sense it was even then largely, if not a rebuilt area, at least one which, particularly on the north and west, had extended its boundaries in a remarkable way. You have only to examine a plan of London of about 1837 and compare it with one dating from the earlier years of that century to realise what a considerable extension of the city had taken place during the interval. The fact is that it was under the Regency and the reign of George IV that such men as Nash and Burton began those building developments which resulted in the creation of the fashionable areas known as Belgravia in the west and the Regent's Park, with its splendid series of surrounding houses, on the north. Indeed, Tyburnia and Stucconia, names applied at the time, indicated the region as well as the use of the material with which the new residential quarters were clothed, and which arose in places till then open fields or, if developed, only developed in the simple direction of market gardens and allotments.

Hitherto westerly London may be said to have begun at Hyde Park Corner, and to have extended in the north no further than Somers Town and Camden Town, the very names of which indicate their being almost separate civic entities. Then St. Pancras was merely Pancras Vale ; Chalk Farm was only what its name indicates, and Kentish Town was little more than a collocation of small houses spread along a highway which ran through practically open country. Such resorts as Copenhagen House and other places of recreation were reached by an exiguous roadway known as Maiden Lane, which started its urban and more sophisticated career at Battle Bridge, at the top of the Gray's Inn Road, and rapidly became a mere rustic highway, after crossing the Regent's Canal. That waterway, indeed, divided the northerly part of London from what were merely nurseries and market gardens, or in some portions nothing but open ground, but

which to-day have long since become an integral part of the metropolis. North of Balls Pond Road the map-maker of the day found practically nothing to make it worth while extending his investigations.

Hampstead and Highgate and Kensington were then outlying villages, and such immense districts as South Kensington (then known as Brompton) and Earl's Court were, as they were destined to remain for nearly another half-century, merely a congeries of market gardens, which practically surrounded the London of the budding century. Here and there among these were to be found large country mansions, and Coleherne House (whose site is now covered by the flats of Coleherne Court) and Earl's Court House, where the great surgeon Hunter lived, may be taken as examples of yet others whose rurality has long since been swallowed up by the growth of what Cobbett not inaptly called "The Wen."

If on the other hand we place a plan of the London of 1837 beside one of 1937, we shall see what an incredible increase has occurred in building development during the intervening years. It was in 1828 that the Cubitts began their structural operations on what was then known as The Five Fields (where the late Sir Algernon West's mother remembered going to partake of syllabubs!) but which under their ægis became Belgrave, Eaton and Chester Squares with their intersecting streets which were then regarded as fashionable, but yet slightly rural abodes. During the 'fifties and 'sixties of the last century a still greater residential increase took place and initiated that large and inchoate part of London known generically as South Kensington.

But if the architectural changes in the metropolis during the last century have been so marked, the conditions of life generally have changed equally. Imagine a city without railways, without telegraphs or telephones, with houses to the top storeys of which hot water had to be carried, where lifts were non-existent, where servants were relegated to small, ill-lighted attics, where even the owners had to climb many stairs in search of their beds, and where baths were limited to the circular tin affairs of an almost mediæval archaicism. Gas fires were as unknown as was the telephone, and the practical obliteration of those fogs, which we used to call "pea-soupers," is largely due to this new form of heating, and the consequent lessening of the use of coal. A better

picture of London under its earlier conditions cannot be found than in the first chapter of *Bleak House*, where Dickens, in a famous description, has pointed out the many *désagréments* due to the older order of things.

Taxicabs and motor omnibuses seem an almost recent innovation to many of us who for years were exposed to the chances of falling cab-horses and the relatively slow progress of horse omnibuses, whose drivers were first-rate Jehus and not infrequently masters of repartee, but whose journeys were slow and not always sure. Before the coming of the taxi, the hansom and the four-wheeler, or growler as it was termed, had certainly become greatly improved as to their internal fitments, and were very different from those earlier ones, the glasses of which rattled to the complete obliteration of conversation, and the floors of which were covered with the dirty straw which gave their fares a sensation of being imprisoned in some ill-kept stable. To go still further back into what have been facetiously called the good old days, think of making journeys from the Bull at Holborn, or the Saracen's Head on Snow Hill, even to what were then but the environs of London, to say nothing of those further-flung and almost daring excursions into the remote country, when it took as long to get to Enfield as it now does to get to Brighton.

And what of the amusements with which the Londoners of a century back diverted themselves? The theatre then, as it had been for two centuries, was the chief form of recreation. But between the play-houses of Queen Victoria's early days and those of these times there is almost a greater difference than existed between the former and those of the age of Elizabeth. Sadler's Wells in the north and the Coburg on the south side of the river were, with the little Globe and Olympic, the more impressive Haymarket and the St. James's, to speak only of these better-known centres, the chief places of dramatic activity. From some of the seats in the Old Vic. (once the Coburg) before it was reconstructed, it was impossible to see the stage unless one rose from one's seat and leaned perilously over the railed edge of the gallery. But theatrical display was by no means the only form in which our grandfathers took their pleasure. It was an age when instruction was rampant and the powder oftener than not was hardly disguised in the jam. People became excited over the wonders of the diving bell. Panoramas were greatly

in vogue, and exhibitions masquerading under names borrowed from a Greek source were as the sands of the sea. People went to the Panopticon with the same delight as they did to Burford's Panorama or Miss Winwood's Needlework pictures. Scientific matters were in the air and Faraday's words had weight. Had we lived in those days we should have found the centre of Leicester Square filled with Wyld's Great Globe, and the British Institution crowded with an attentive and sedate audience in which paterfamilias and his progeny appeared to take an equal interest.

For it is curious how the young in those days did not seem to be young at all, but in manner and dress replicas of their parents of whom they were (epistolarily at any rate) "the dutiful and affectionate" offspring. In their dress, too, these little ones seem to have forgotten to be natural, and look for all the world like miniature copies of their fathers and mothers. They may have trundled their hoops or flown their kites, as children do to-day, but they then indulged in these delights garbed like little old men and women whom sartorially they resembled as a miniature resembles a full-length portrait. Innumerable pictorial representations have made us familiar with what these elders appeared like in early Victorian days. There was a stiffness and formality about the men's attire, which was not inappropriate to their mental attitude. Sir Leicester Dedlock and Mr. Rochester, Mr. Tulkinghorn and Mr. Dombey, were examples of different types all moulded, however, in much the same pattern, and all stiffened in the closely buttoned frock-coats of an amazingly angular respectability. As they walked the streets, or rode sedately in the Park, or passed in their barouches or tilburys, so they were apparently in the bosoms of their families the undisputed masters of the universe from whose decisions there was no appeal and whose lightest words bore the semblance of an almost divine inspiration. There were, of course, many exceptions to this rather dreary picture. But there is no doubt that the prevailing type was that, if not exactly of Mr. Barrett, at least not remotely approximating to that unpleasant personality. The ladies were, as always, far more decorative. The large Leghorn hats, the elaborate shawls, the flowing robes, and the *fichus*, and such-like lesser forms of adornment, together with the plain but often so becoming habit of hair-dressing,

gave the fairer portion of the population an advantage over the mere male which they hardly followed up by an adequate expression of their own personality. For they were the "dear and dutiful wives" of their spouses (that appropriate word), and were the rather dominated possessions of the sultans who owned them.

One visualises a typical early Victorian family in a typical early Victorian house. Mamma with her crochet-work or her household book; the daughters engaged with their tambour-frames or their painting (flowers with any amount of stippling); or playing the simple airs of Sterndale-Bennett or the easier songs of Mendelssohn on the upright piano, with its fluted silk front and its exiguous keys. There they sit surrounded by the heavy furniture of that period, with fire-screens, and the wax-modelled fruit (under glass), and on the walls Papa and Mamma (probably by Pickersgill). If tea be brought it will be carried in by a sedate footman or a "neat-handed" maid; and its solid silver apparatus will doubtless be borne on a papier-maché tray on which painted flowers and inlaid mother-of-pearl fight for mastery. There they sit until the Master returns from his club or his counting-house, and solemnly informs his attentive family that "Her Majesty" is again "expecting" or that the Duke was seen walking in white ducks and blue brass-buttoned coat in Piccadilly. Or if he thinks that the mental attitude of his women-folk is sufficiently alive to such mundane matters, he may talk a little of the Corn Laws or the rise and fall of stocks, or of "what the Swede intend and what the French." And then they all go up to change for dinner—at six o'clock!

It was, when compared with our hectic life, a rather dull, even drab existence. But then how safe it seemed, and was. Income Tax a mere nominal incident in one's debit account; Death Duties unheard of; industrial unrest, especially in that baleful year 1848, was much in evidence, but it had not become consolidated in the way it was later to be, and it was rather the rumbling of a distant storm than the storm itself. Those who speak of the Victorian Era sometimes overlook the fact that that era was so extended a one, that modes of life and thought, manners and customs, the very face of the country and the very appearance of its great towns, had during that period so changed that when Queen Victoria died there was practically nothing resembling what it had

been when she was awakened on that historic May morning, and found herself receiving allegiance as the ruler of the world's foremost kingdom.

It is always difficult to be precise in such matters where changes of thought, like changes of fashion, overlap each other. But roughly one may perhaps venture the suggestion that the early portion of Queen Victoria's reign covered the period from 1837 to 1860; that its Middle Age, so to speak, synchronised with the years from 1860 to 1880; and that the last twenty years were that late period, a sort of Indian Summer in which conditions of life as we were to know them for nearly another couple of decades, had more or less consolidated themselves. To borrow a feminine sartorial and capillary analogy: the first was exemplified by the shawl and the treatment of the hair in its simplest form; the second by the chignon, the cap and the bustle; the last by the fringe, the attenuated skirt and the disdain of the corset.

One has only to look at contemporary portraits to judge what changes in men's attire took place during that pregnant sixty-odd years. Compare, for instance, the habiliments of such diverse personages as Mr. Peel and Count D'Orsay, with the be-whiskered, peg-top trousered gentlemen who appear in Doyle's pictures of society; and again with those who figure in the later work of Du Maurier and Charles Keene. *Punch*, that microcosm, shows us better than most sources how the subtle changes took place, and how drastic in course of time they eventually became. Here and there the London perambulator might have seen wonderingly a survival of a period which else seemed to have passed with the snows of yester-year; men like General Brabazon, "the Beauty Bwab" of many a story, or Montague Guest or Lord Chesterfield, kept the flag of an ancient tradition flying gallantly, and even the collars (as different in shape as were the personalities of their wearers) of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Spencer seemed like the oriflammes of a past which but for such diehards might have appeared as the museum-pieces of a dead age. Could this same perambulator be transferred to the London of a century ago what outward changes would he witness. He would enter the city at Hyde Park Corner, a spot without its Burton screen, with Apsley House still in its initial red brick dress; he would pass through a Piccadilly of a few great houses looking on to a Green Park enclosed in a

wall; he would reach the spot which is now Trafalgar Square, but which was then an open space rail-enclosed, with the splendid Northumberland House looking toward The Golden Cross which stood where Nelson now communes with the stars. Along the Strand and Fleet Street he would have passed such places as Hungerford Market (the Charing Cross railway station stands on its site) and the Adelphi, with Coutts' Bank where the Tivoli Cinema is; and he would reach St. Paul's, perhaps relieved to find at least one relic left to remind him of a still earlier day.

If he wanted to stay in Town, he would have to rely on the archaic hospitality of such hotels as Long's in Bond Street or Almond's in Clifford Street; and he would take his midday meal in a chop house, where he would sit in a mahogany compartment, and probably tread on a sanded floor. He would find no picture galleries, save in private houses, and no museums save that rather awesome one in Bloomsbury which even then was but a pigmy in comparison with its present immensity. He would, in wet weather, be the victim of ill-kept roads and indifferent pavements, and would be a source of income to that now defunct race, shoe-blacks and crossing sweepers. On the other hand he would have found a Regent Street of unostentatious dignity, Park Lane devoid of communal dwellings and immense caravanserais, Hyde Park innocent of the Albert Memorial, and Gore House receiving its mixed but decorative society on the site of the Albert Hall. He would have found the Palace not yet guarded by the façade which Blore added, but with the Marble Arch in front of it. Coming back from that long journey into the past, our hypothetical traveller would no doubt miss much that he might regret. But how many things would he find in compensation! For in spite of its noise and rush, in spite of the headlong omnibus and the unexpected taxi, in spite of what has been destroyed and above all, what has been substituted, one wonders if he would be willing to change the city of to-day for the city of a century ago.

E. Beresford Chancellor.

VIENNA LIFE.

THE general conception of the Viennese is not that of an industrious, nor even that of a serious, people. However, it is obtained mostly from musical comedies and from the films, which really give the impression that the Viennese spend their lives in tippling, singing and dancing, in making love and in wasting money. There is no doubt that they are in general an easy-going and genial lot and that they like to be merry. But their pastimes always keep within the limits of seemliness and even of charm. The cheerfulness and joviality of London crowds has often been remarked upon, and the Viennese behave somewhat similarly when they are gathered in large numbers. But I believe that their motives are different. The English sense of fairness prevents even the bully from too openly intimidating his less vigorous neighbours. He wants to be looked upon as a gentleman, and will do all he can to maintain this reputation. It is the foremost desire of the Viennese to avoid trouble, to enjoy their lives without any interference, and this keeps them good-humoured even in rather trying circumstances. They have a remarkable ability for looking on the brighter side of things, an ability which brings joy and happiness even to the poor. It is astounding with what skill in economy these people, who do not even earn enough for their mere living, manage to set aside a little money for their pleasures. Literally nobody spends Sunday at home, or the very many feast days of the Roman Catholic Church. Their amusements are most varied, from lying on the grassy slopes of the Danube to making cheap excursions all over Europe, from enjoying street-organs and strolling musicians to attending cinemas, orchestral concerts and theatres, from bowling in the garden of any suburban inn to playing football, watching polo or crowding the racecourses. And everywhere you meet the same smiling faces, the same chatter and laughter, as if they were living in paradise and not in the poorest country in Europe. A hundred and fifty years ago Schiller called them the Phæacians of the Danube :

Immer ist Sonntag, es dreht immer am Herd sich der Spiess.
(It's always Sunday, and always the spit turns on the hearth.)

They like good cookery indeed, but the everyday routine of their meals is rather homely. You find practically in every house at noon the same dinner, consisting of boiled beef, which also provides the broth, vegetables richly seasoned and floured, and a great variety of rather solid hot sweets. Certainly the bill of fare in an average restaurant will give extracts from all the cuisines of Europe, thus proving once again the internationalism of this town. There are no bakers in the world to compare with the Viennese. All sorts of rolls and of brown bread, always fresh and crisp, are eaten without butter, as dainties, by themselves. And there is another delicacy cheaper even than that : drinking water, which is obtained from the fresh springs in the mountains and conducted to Vienna by huge aqueducts, keeping its chilly temperature and refreshing taste even in the hottest summer.

The quantity of water drunk the whole day through is amazing. This can be seen in no place better than in the world-renowned cafés. You get your coffee on a tray together with a glass of very cold water and after your cup is cleared away another tray with two glasses of water is placed on your table and renewed every half-hour. For this is another remarkable feature of the coffee-houses, that you are allowed, nay—made welcome, to sit there hour after hour, reading the newspapers and magazines provided by the management, writing letters or talking to your friends, after you have consumed your cup of coffee for which you have paid about sixpence. The furniture of the cafés is most comfortable. The marble tables have no cloths, and are kept extremely clean. You are seated on soft settees, each table being in a kind of three-sided box so as to give an impression of separateness and privacy. These coffee-houses, many of them in recent times unfortunately converted into a kind of restaurant, are the rendezvous of the Austrians. You will find them even in the smallest towns, but nowhere so many as in Vienna. The bachelors take their very frugal breakfasts there, from noon on they are crowded with people having their cup of black coffee after lunch, in the afternoon the *Jause* (something like the English "afternoon tea") is served, and the quiet playing-rooms of the cafés are opened for customers, who enjoy their billiards or their bridge. In some cafés the chess-players meet, and in the suburbs dominoes are played, and the most popular of the card

games—*Tarok*. But these coffee-houses, which to a great extent take the place of the English club, are also the meeting-places of business men, even serving sometimes as a sort of illegal stock exchange. They have very often been the head-quarters of new artistic movements, and a literary prophet like Hermann Bahr, or a bohemian genius like the great lyric poet Peter Altenberg, assembled their neophytes and admirers in their own particular cafés.

Everywhere the coffee is most excellent, especially when drunk with milk and whipped cream. It is said on good evidence that the first coffee-house in Vienna was opened in 1683 by a Slav spy, whose services during the siege which Vienna withstood against the Turks were rewarded by the gift of a hundred sacks of coffee left in the Turkish tents and a licence to run a coffee-house. I wonder whether he realised that he was changing the social life of the capital for centuries to come?

A total abstainer, viewing Viennese café life, would be very pleased. But his satisfaction might be considered rather rash. For it must be frankly admitted that the number of teetotallers, though increasing, is not at all overwhelming. But neither the very light excellent beers nor the home-grown dry wines are easily intoxicating. Although the licensed innkeepers are subject to no restrictions, you very rarely meet drunken people. The only place where sobriety is not the rule is the famous *Heurige* (which means the current, i.e. the new wine, fermented in the current year). Vienna is surrounded by vineyards, mostly owned by small proprietors, who get a temporary licence when the new wine is ready. Picnic excursions are made into the courtyards and orchards of the tiny cottages where this draught wine is retailed, everyone carrying some cold supper wrapped in paper and adding to it some bread and cheese bought on the spot from small boy hawkers. In some of these private inns, an instrumental quartet will play popular songs, accompanied by the singing of the customers, who keep to the old saying:

Wer nicht liebt Wein, Weib, Gesang,
Bleibt ein Narr sein Leben lang.
(Who likes not wine, women and song,
Remains a fool his whole life long.)

It is a pity that some ingenious innkeepers have, for the sake of the foreigners, invented a sort of fashionable *Heurigen* which seem to be modelled on the "Vienna" of the films. There is little enough left of the characteristic charm of these homely places where the landlord and his family are the only waiters and where you can see the modest merriment of the true Viennese.

There is another place where the Viennese like to gather in the warm summer, the much extolled "Prater." This one time hunting ground of the Imperial family has been the pleasure resort of Vienna for more than two centuries. When Goethe's Mephistopheles wants to praise the amusements of the witches' sabbath, he finds no better commendation than: *Hier ist's so lustig wie im Prater.* (Here it's as jolly as in the Prater.) It is part of a huge island formed by the Danube, and though in recent times a whole town district has been built there, it is still large enough to provide space for two big racecourses, for many playing grounds, including the famous "Stadium," for the *Rotunde*, a kind of Crystal Palace used for exhibitions, and for many square miles of woodland, grove and meadow, with riding-tracks, footpaths and avenues, and with, finally, the *Wurstelprater* or Prater of Hans Wurst (the Viennese Jack Pudding or Punch), which is the Coney Island of the town. The Danube and its many arms provide every possibility to hundreds of thousands for swimming, boating and fishing; while on the left bank of the river another island, the Lobau, a beautiful deer forest, is ready to welcome those who do not shun a wilderness of untended scenery.

The loveliness of the surrounding hills and valleys, the nearness of high mountains, ranging up to seven thousand feet, account for the popularity of "hiking" among the Viennese, and especially for that of mountaineering. Austria offers every opportunity for ski-ing and accordingly this sport becomes more and more the favourite exercise from autumn to early spring. Gymnastics occupy a large part in the Austrian educational system, and the Austrians are taught by excellent teachers, a fact which explains the high standards found in all sports, particularly in swimming, football and skating. It has been one of the great achievements of the Austrian Socialist Party to train the workers in all sorts of bodily exercise, fighting in that way against drunkenness and

shaping at the same time a healthy and joyful youth. The improvement of the sanitary conditions of the working class in Vienna is well known. The infant mortality rate has been greatly reduced by the exemplary foundling institutions and the building of homes for poor children. Gymnasia and public baths, the many large parks with their playing grounds and swimming pools, and the green belt around the city, are so many weapons in the war against tuberculosis, which in former years was known as the " Viennese disease " and which has now been reduced by the efforts of the municipal government to normal figures. Vienna's housing schemes have won the admiration of the whole world and are models for every municipality at grips with the problem of slum clearance.

A lot has also been done to improve the intellectual and moral level of the working classes. Toynbee Hall and other institutions of the kind, first founded in London, have served as the prototype of Viennese foundations. Settlement work has been begun in the poorer districts of the city, and university extension schemes, which began in 1903 with a few evening classes held in a dark cellar in one of the suburbs, are now responsible for a dozen colleges situated in all parts of the town. Concerts and theatrical performances for workers are a commonplace, and there are hundreds of public libraries, controlled by the Board of Education, at the disposal of the poor.

As is usual on the Continent, the children are educated at home. Even in rich homes there are no nurseries on the upper floors, as, with the exception of some garden cities lying out of the town, nearly everyone lives in a flat. The children are near to hand, and share the life of their parents. They continue living at home when they go to school. There are very few boarding schools and there are no residential colleges at the universities. There is accordingly less independence and even less comradeship among the Austrian youth than is the case in this country. Perhaps this over-long thraldom to the apron-strings is one of the reasons for that unruliness of mind which is responsible for the sudden changes of Austrian politics. But on the other hand the bonds of the family and the influence of the parents upon the children are strengthened.

The religious feeling of the Austrian people, deeply rooted and hardly threatened by the anti-clerical tendencies of the Socialists and Austrian Nazis, contributes to the maintenance

of these bonds. The Roman Catholic Church, adorning their religious services with all the colour of medieval pageantry and with all the beauty of the fine arts, is well suited to a people as sensitive and artistically gifted as the Austrians. Sunday mass attracts not only thousands of believers but in many churches the outstanding musical performances draw people of all denominations and many who are indifferent in matters of religion, to hear, for instance, the famous Philharmonic Orchestra and the *Wiener Sängerknaben* who regularly play and sing in the *Hofkapelle*. The different churches vie with each other in presenting the best music, and many associations have been formed to help them in this endeavour.

These musical performances reach their highest pitch of excellence at the celebration of the great religious feasts. What a garland of beauty the ecclesiastical year of the Roman Catholics winds even through the dreary lives of the poor! There is first of all the Holy Week, so closely connected with the beginning of the springtime by the fluffy catkins carried to Church and blessed there on Palm Sunday; with its climax from Maundy Thursday (remarkable in Imperial days for the ceremony of the washing of the beggars' feet) when the bells are hushed—" they are flown to Rome "—and boys stroll through the streets carrying huge rattles and striking out the hours; to the " Lamentations " sung at the Holy Grave erected in each church on Good Friday; to the Resurrection, when in the afternoon processions wind around the churches, when the air resounds with the ringing of bells and happy crowds stream through the streets; and last but not least to Easter Sunday, when the High Mass is resplendent with all the beauty of ecclesiastical display, bright with the pealing of organs and with the singing of triumphant chorales.

After Easter thousands of boys and girls are busy preparing for their confirmation. In the weeks before Whit Sunday the streets are thronged with cars and cabs, the distinguished *Fiaker* (carriage and pair) noticeable among them, all decorated with flowers, often forming a kind of bower or canopy, carrying those who are to be confirmed and their *Göden* (god-parents) to St. Stefan's Cathedral, and after the ceremony to the Prater, crowded in these happy days by white-ribboned young people celebrating their arrival at the age of discretion.

The most spectacular of the ecclesiastical feasts is that of Corpus Christi. From early morning the air resounds with the din of gun-fire from the surrounding hills. Every church is the starting point of a brightly coloured procession, in which nearly everyone takes part, either as an onlooker, or walking behind the Eucharist which is carried by the priest. The ruler of Austria and the officials of the country march in the main procession through the city, and in the days of the Emperors this was a spectacle of amazing beauty, made even more splendid by the uniforms of the Life Guards and the magnificent costumes of the Hungarian and Polish noblemen.

The year's end is dedicated to the children. Santa Claus, rather unpleasantly accompanied by the bogy-man who carries the birch rod, places, in the night of the sixth of December, his apples and dried plums inside the children's shoes which have been left on the window-sill, and leaves his own and his dark assistant's wooden images behind as a souvenir. He is but the forerunner of the Christ-child, Who Himself prepares the Christmas tree and the presents which are piled underneath it. On Christmas Eve the children wait in their own room until they hear the little bell ringing that tells them that the Holy Babe and *Knecht Rupprecht* with his big sack have left the house. Now they throng into the room, where the candles on the tree have been lit and where apples, oranges and chocolates are hanging under the glittering decorations of silver and gold. Many people, especially in the smaller towns and villages, attend the midnight service on Christmas Eve, when the birth of the Saviour is celebrated; and on the next day all assemble in the churches, the children gathering round the crib, where ox and ass are to be admired, looking down at the Holy Child in the cradle. All these features of the ecclesiastical calendar are common to both rich and poor and constitute another link in the democratic chain that unites the whole country. It is customary for wealthy people to stand god-parent to the children of their dependants and to spend their confirmation day with them; and at Christmas time the servants are called in to see the tree and share the happiness of their master and mistress.

Certainly the average family must manage without any servant, and even rich people keep often only one. The bulk

of the housework falls therefore on the shoulders of the mother, and as there are not so many labour-saving devices in the Austrian home as there are in England, her work keeps her busy for a good part of the day. But this fact does not diminish her wish to enjoy life; she likes to dress up; and there is perhaps no town in the world, with the possible exception of New York, where one sees so many well-dressed women as in Vienna. But the Viennese housewife is very clever in saving expense by tailoring, stitching and knitting herself. In recent years she has come to share her husband's taste for the coffee-houses, where now the ladies, too, meet at tea-time, instead of at each other's houses. She busies herself with social and artistic activities, frequents lectures, concerts and theatres, while her husband, tired with his routine work, often prefers to sit at home or to join his friends at the café. Vienna's traditional interest in music and art is maintained to-day mostly by the women.

This predominance of the fair sex is disclosed to the attentive observer if he just rambles through the streets and looks at the shop windows. In London things that will interest men are given the best display, suits, coats and hats, pipes and cigarettes, golf clubs and fishing rods. In Vienna the scene is dominated by the arts and crafts. Industrialism has nowhere done so much harm to the handicraft worker as in Austria. In bygone days thousands of skilled workmen earned their living by carving amber and meerschaum, by working in mother-of-pearl; and the Viennese turners were famous throughout Europe. In that vanished time, the district in Vienna where the silk manufacturers used to have their workshops was known as the *Brillantengrund* (diamond district). Viennese suit-cases and bags and vanity cases stood foremost in the list of exported goods. All that has now come to an end, and even the manufacture of ladies' dresses, of musical instruments, of glassware and of furniture, those greatest achievements of the Viennese handworker, have their golden age in the past. For this decline the war and the post-war depression and foreign trade policies that reflect economic nationalism must be held responsible.

The maintenance or revival of the old traditions of craftmanship was due to only a few men, influenced in part by English forerunners, who founded the Vienna *Kunstgewerbeschule* (School of Arts and Crafts), an organisation which

has taken the lead during the last forty years, especially in creating a generation of *Innenarchitekten* (designers of furniture and interior decorators). This movement was based on the tendency to combine the manual skill of the handicraft worker with the personal originality of the artist, and its fame was spread throughout the world by the products of the *Wiener Werkstätte* (the Vienna workshops), an enterprise which unhappily has come to an untimely end since the Great War.

But their work lasted. There is a general feeling in Austria that bungling work does not pay, and that the fine arts are not a mere entertainment but an important part of everyone's everyday life. Not a tree may be planted or cut down in Vienna until the question has been put and answered: Will the aspect of the town be improved or impaired by so doing? There is a special board to which is entrusted the guardianship over all kinds of works of art. No building can be erected or demolished without this board's consent; no ancient monument, no old sculpture or painting, is allowed to be taken from the country unless the permission of this board has been granted. Every Austrian feels that the moral power of this small and weak country is based upon her immortal contributions to the world's treasure house of the fine arts.

STEFAN HOCK.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

GERMANY AND COLONIES

"GERMANY," said Herr Hitler in his Reichstag speech of January 30th, "has never demanded colonies for military, but exclusively for economic, purposes. To-day Germany lives at a time of fierce struggle for foodstuffs and raw materials." He emphasised his point thus: "Adequate import is possible only if our exports continue to be increased. That is why a country so densely populated as ours must as a matter of course go on for ever demanding colonies." Thirdly he posted his demand, as it were, to London. "Germany," he said, "has no colonial claims against countries which have taken no colonies from her." If Herr Hitler's reference to the need of raw materials should contrast oddly with his abstinence from the League of Nations inquiry into the world's distribution of raw materials, despite the fact that other non-League Powers such as Japan and the United States agreed to participate, it should be remembered that dictators do not take part in international conferences of such a kind. It is the curse of their lives that they must demand things arrogantly and be given them meekly if their prestige is to be kept keyed up to the pitch necessary for their own continuance in power.

The demand was promptly and clearly answered from the floor of the British House of Commons, not on one but on several occasions. On February 15th, for instance, Lord Cranborne, asked if he could state in an unmistakable formula that the Government would not contemplate the cession to Nazi Germany of any territory administered by Great Britain, answered: "As has been previously stated, His Majesty's Government have not considered and are not considering such a transfer." Mr. Eden reaffirmed that declaration on March 2nd, Herr von Ribbentrop in the meantime having visited the Foreign Office and submitted a claim in general terms to some form of colonial compensation for the pre-war colonies taken from Germany as a result of the war. Unofficial speculation in this country has centred on the possibility of offering back to Germany some part of her pre-war colonies in Africa with the status of a League of Nations mandate. For such a purpose it would be necessary both for Germany to return to

the League of Nations and for the agreement of France and the other members of the League to be first obtained. But equally there has been no discoverable inclination on the part of any representative of the German Government to encourage any expectation that Germany would accept colonial compensation under such conditions. In London it is recognised that Herr Hitler's need of a constant renewal of prestige in the eyes of his own people makes it necessary for him to request nothing less than the outright restoration of one or more of Germany's colonies. It has already been announced as a principle of British policy that Germany's lack of raw materials might be remedied in some other form than that of the restoration of colonies. The offer made by Sir Samuel Hoare at Geneva in the autumn of 1935 still represents the policy of the British Government. The difficulty is that Germany needs not only raw materials but some dramatic, spectacular success in the field of diplomacy.

A question has been recently raised about the possibility of allowing Germany to exploit the mines of Angola. The explanation of that speculation is that when the war broke out in 1914 there was in existence the text of an agreed treaty between Germany and Great Britain. It was negotiated by Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, and Sir Edward (Lord) Grey. It is worth while recalling the circumstances of that treaty because it may still become a practical question in relation to Germany's present demand for colonies. There had been many years of negotiation between Germany and Britain, as a result of which the British Government had decided to be sympathetic to German expansion in Africa, provided it was limited to the economic sphere. By the 1913 treaty nearly the whole of Angola was to be recognised as a German economic sphere, together with the northern part of Mozambique. On the other hand the remaining part of Mozambique, including Delagoa and the Zambezi valley, were to become a British economic sphere. The signature of that treaty was delayed because the British Government made certain conditions which Germany did not agree to till the very eve of the war in July 1914. It was then too late. It happens that nearly the entire products of Mozambique are already monopolised by Great Britain. The products of Angola would be extremely valuable to the Germans. As Germany has credits in Portugal for munitions, the suggestion is that

Portugal should repay in the form of an economic concession in Angola. So far, however, the Portuguese Government has refused.

An Agreement on Spain.

On the Ides of March it looked as if we were to be given the spectacle of four European Great Powers co-operating in a common cause. An agreement had been reached after many months of failure by the London Committee, which had been trying to organise a scheme of non-intervention in Spain. The governments of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy were to co-operate in a scheme now agreed on for supervising the coasts and frontiers of Spain. As this paper was written the scheme had not actually come into operation. There had been last-minute hitches which prevented that event at the time arranged, namely at midnight of March 6th-7th. None the less it seemed certain that the scheme would in due course begin to function. At any rate an agreement had been reached about the scheme itself. Such an achievement is so unusual in modern Europe that even an exaggeration of its value would be forgivable.

It was on December 2nd that the non-intervention committee requested the British Government to transmit to Burgos and to Valencia a suggestion that a scheme be drawn up for controlling the admission of foreign volunteers and supplies into Spain. The suggestion was confined to the supervision of the land frontiers and the seaports, for not even a shadow of an agreement could be reached in London about the far more complicated problem of supervising ingress by the air routes. The attempt to substitute peace for war in Spain had an exciting effect on most of the interested parties. Señor Caballero was as indignant as General Franco. The diplomatic representatives of Russia, Germany, Italy and France staged a scene of frantic animosity against each other. On December 11th Mr. Eden spoke of the "shortcomings" of the attempt at non-intervention and of the "blatant breaches" of the original agreement of last summer not to intervene. Mr. Eden at least seemed to think that there had been such an agreement. On Christmas Eve the British and French Governments decided to make a separate attempt of their own to do what the committee as a whole had failed to

do. They instructed their representatives in Berlin, Rome, Lisbon and Moscow to appeal for an agreement in the sense that the nationals of the several non-Spanish countries be forbidden to enlist in either of the armies in Spain. A further appeal was made that the answers be sent promptly enough to enable a date to be fixed about the middle of January for putting the embargo into practice.

That hope was destined not to be fulfilled. Moscow, Berlin and Rome alike showed little inclination to welcome the proposal. It was made clear that the Anglo-French initiative could not be more effective than that of the full committee. Could something like a six-Power concert be attempted? That question was discussed at a British Cabinet meeting held on January 8th. In answer to the Anglo-French proposal, both Berlin and Rome had stipulated that any agreement to stop intervention must involve the withdrawal of existing non-Spanish forces from Spain. That stipulation went beyond the proposal itself. The real question now to be decided, therefore, was whether and in what degree any agreement could be reached by the five Powers and Portugal to adopt a truly neutral attitude towards the Spanish war. The British Government on January 9th addressed a new Note to the other five non-Spanish governments interested in Spain: the German, French, Italian, Russian and Portuguese. The suggestion was made: (1) that the detailed scheme for supervision of imports at points of entry by land and sea, already under consideration by the two parties in Spain, should be extended to cover volunteers and military personnel; (2) that in the meantime each government should at once adopt within their own territories the prohibitory measures required for the exclusion of foreign volunteers and military personnel from Spain, even in advance of the establishment of a complete control system; and (3) that, if the other Powers agreed, the whole correspondence, with the replies to the British Note, should be sent to the non-intervention committee in order that it might fix a date for the prohibitory measures to take simultaneous effect.

It was officially made known in London on January 11th that by virtue of the 1870 Foreign Enlistment Act it was illegal for British volunteers to go to Spain. The small, but not still, voice of British bolshevism promptly construed that order as an attack on the toiling masses throughout the world,

and an outcry went up to the effect that it constituted an outrage upon humanity that volunteers should be forbidden to shed their blood in the holy cause of the Spanish Reds. That same week France, too, manifested her willingness to ban her volunteers; with this difference, that M. Blum sought power to ban volunteers only in the event of a general action in that sense. The Chamber adopted the Bill on January 15th by 591 votes to none.

Even while so pacific an enterprise was now being vigorously prosecuted, a deliberate propagandist scare was engineered on the subject of Morocco. There was not much doubt that the scare came from Moscow, as a routine form of attack on Germany. It is equally obvious that Morocco offered to the propaganda-addicts of the leaders of the world revolution a wholly irresistible temptation. It is a standing source of anxiety to both France and Britain that Germany should never be allowed to obtain a footing in north-west Africa. The thing is self-evident. That particular bit of coast is vital to French communication with her African possessions, and it lies opposite Gibraltar. Morocco, therefore, has taken its share in responsibility for diplomatic nerve-storms on several well-known occasions. The news sent out anonymously from Moscow made the simple but appalling suggestion that barracks were being erected in Morocco for German troops. A first-class scare blazed forthwith throughout France. On January 8th the French Government made a formal complaint to General Franco and reminded him of the treaty of November 17th, 1912 (whereby France and Spain agreed to prohibit the harbouring of foreign troops in Morocco). Moscow, seeing the success of her experiment, lit a few more fires. It was put about from Casablanca that Germany had established an almost complete trade monopoly in the Spanish zone, that she had obtained control of the iron mines of Melilla, that Ceuta was in the hands of German engineers who were rapidly converting it into a German fortress, that German destroyers and submarines were concentrated at Melilla, where large contingents of German troops also had been landed.

On January 9th (so quickly did the crisis develop) the French Ambassador in Berlin delivered a warning to the German Government about the dangerous situation that would result from any interference by Germany with the

status quo in the Spanish zone of Morocco. It was on the same day that the French Ministry of Marine announced that " the Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets will leave in the middle of the month for a series of exercises along the Mediterranean coasts and the western coasts of Africa respectively." Such an exercise takes place annually at the turn of the year in the practice of the French navy. But the announcement being made on January 9th added to the general sense of emergency. On January 11th the Quai d'Orsay made known the further fact that on January 9th the French Consul at Tetuan had seen the High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco and reminded him of the treaties of 1904 and 1912. The 1904 treaty stipulated that if either Spain or France took any action in Morocco, the other party should be informed, and that neither party should invoke the assistance of any foreign Power. The French Consul at that same interview drew the High Commissioner's attention to " reports of the arrival at Melilla and the impending landing at Ceuta of foreign contingents in the service of General Franco." The High Commissioner at once answered that " no organised unit of foreigners nor any contingent of the Foreign Legion is either stationed in Spanish Morocco or expected there " ; and he added spontaneously that the authorities at Tetuan were well aware of the " grave consequences " that would follow the landing of foreign forces anywhere in the Spanish zone. On January 12th, M. François Poncet, French Ambassador in Berlin, saw Herr Hitler and was given the specific assurance that Germany had no designs upon Morocco.

On the face of it the hubbub was too silly. It was a perfectly simple matter to establish whether or not any German troops had landed in Morocco or any fortresses were being built. Fortresses, destroyers and armies cannot be hidden. Moscow suddenly saw that the propaganda was being overdone and might rebound upon its authors by establishing the fact that Germany had not taken any of the measures alleged. We did indeed witness the remarkable spectacle of a sudden Franco-German rapprochement as the myth was exploded. On January 13th the French and German press seemed to be vying with each other in featuring the importance of a rumoured impending visit of Dr. Schacht to Paris, Dr. Schacht being Minister for Economic Affairs as well as President of the Reichsbank. Some unbalanced French spirits even began

speculating upon the miracle of a French gift of colonies to Germany. Within twenty-four hours that myth in its turn was exploded. It was announced simply that Dr. Schacht was not going to Paris anyhow.

The Moroccan breeze having expended itself, the Powers returned to their pacific enterprise. Portugal, as always, supplied the humour. On January 14th Lisbon answered the British Note of January 9th. She intimated her intention of waiting for the other five Powers to promulgate their measures first " in order to draw inspiration from them." From that ironic preamble she went on to confess that, in view of the probabilities elsewhere, she was " not interested " in the question of control. The committee in London, however, doggedly pursued its purpose. On February 12th a new sub-committee met for the first time, composed of representatives of the six Powers—Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Portugal—to discuss an actual plan for controlling the frontiers and coasts of Spain. As the Portuguese delegate had not received his instructions from Lisbon, the sub-committee had no alternative but to adjourn.

Suddenly, after six months of persistent failure, something was achieved. On February 15th the sub-committee announced that the representatives of the United Kingdom, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the U.S.S.R. had agreed to recommend the International Committee to adopt the following decision : (1) From midnight of February 20th to extend the Non-Intervention Agreement to cover the recruitment in, the transit through, or the departure from, their respective countries of persons of non-Spanish nationality proposing to proceed to take part in the war ; (2) To furnish the International Committee with particulars as to the measures taken to give effect to the foregoing ; (3) From February 20th to adopt the system of supervision prepared by their technical advisory sub-committee ; and (4) to bring into operation the scheme of supervision referred to under No. 3 from midnight of March 6th. The Portuguese representative agreed to recommend to the International Committee the adoption of Nos. 1 and 2 of the Agreement, but reserved the position of his Government in regard to Nos. 3 and 4. The delay in completing the scheme of control was due to Portugal's delay in agreeing to the supervision of her frontier. Portugal was in the peculiar position that her

interests were more directly affected than those of any other Power by what was taking place in Spain. It was not easy for her to throw open her frontier to an international body of supervisors. On February 18th, however, she agreed to a proposal that, instead of an international supervision of the frontier, the work should be done by exclusively British observers attached to the British Embassy in Lisbon. It was thereupon agreed provisionally that in the full scheme of control the Bay of Biscay should be patrolled by British and Portuguese naval forces; the east coast of Spain by Italian and German; the southern coast by British, French, Russian and Portuguese; and the north-west coast by French and Russian. At the meeting of February 26th, however, the Russian Ambassador announced that his government would not make use of its right to be represented among the supervisory naval forces off the coast of Spain. He objected to the zone allotted to Russia. Thereupon Portugal also withdrew from participation in the scheme, having taken the consistent line that it should be confined to Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

A meeting of the full committee was held on March 8th. It had before it for final ratification the detailed scheme that had now been worked out. As there is no precedent in diplomatic history for such a scheme of international control of the frontiers of another country technically engaged in civil war, the details are worth recording. It was agreed that there should come into existence an International Board for Non-Intervention in Spain. That body, which would consist of a chairman nominated by the International Committee and representatives nominated by the British, French, German, Italian and Russian governments, would administer on behalf of the twenty-seven participating States the schemes of land and sea observation to establish whether or not the international agreement on non-intervention was being respected. As regards the Spanish-Portuguese frontier, the British Government had accepted the invitation of the Portuguese Government to watch over the carrying out of the agreement, and for this purpose would appoint 130 observers to be attached to the staff of the British Embassy in Lisbon. The British Government assured the committee that the facilities provided were fully adequate from every point of view to enable them to discharge the responsibilities they had agreed

to assume. The Franco-Spanish frontier would be watched by an international body of observers, also numbering 130. Five observers would exercise similar control along the short Gibraltar-Spanish frontier.

The control of the Spanish coasts was to be exercised under schemes which provided for: (*a*) embarkation in specified ports and roadsteads, upon all ships bound for Spanish ports which had the right to fly the flags of the participating countries, of observing officers whose duty it would be to supervise the unloading of those vessels in Spanish ports and to ensure that they did not carry arms and war material, or volunteers, in contravention of the non-intervention agreement, and for which it was estimated that 550 observing officers would be required; and (*b*) naval supervision effected by war vessels of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy.

In order to provide the funds required for the scheme, the participating governments agreed to establish an international fund to which they would contribute in certain agreed proportions. Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the U.S.S.R. would each become responsible for 16 per cent. of that fund, and the remaining 20 per cent. would be contributed by the other twenty-two States. The cost of the scheme for land observation and sea supervision was estimated at a maximum of £900,000, if it were to continue in operation for a full year. The cost of supervision of the Portuguese frontier would be borne by Great Britain, whose share of the total expenditure would be proportionately reduced. The four naval Powers taking part in the naval patrol scheme would each defray its own cost.

The observers would enjoy the immunities normally accorded to diplomatic officers, and full facilities would be granted to them to discharge their duties, namely the right of free entry at any time into docks, railway stations and similar premises; the right of making such inspections as they might think proper to ensure that the non-intervention agreement was not being violated and the right to call for documents relating to the nature of particular consignments and to examine the passports of persons proceeding to Spain.

The Chief Administrator would report any suspected irregularity to the International Committee and to the Government of the country in which he was stationed, and

when called upon by the International Committee to do so would investigate any particular complaint submitted by a Government to the Committee. Administrators would also be empowered to communicate at all times direct to the Committee on any matter connected with the discharge of their duties.

That part of the scheme which referred to the observation of vessels having the right to fly the flags of participating countries and proceeding to ports in Spain or Spanish dependencies entailed the passage of legislation in Great Britain and many other countries, each of the governments concerned having agreed to take the requisite steps to ensure that masters of merchant vessels flying their respective flags should comply with the terms of the international agreement. The main provisions of the measure would impose upon masters of, say, British merchant vessels the obligations : (*a*) To call at certain specified ports and there take on board the Committee's supervisors ; (*b*) to give these supervisors adequate accommodation, etc., on board ; (*c*) to grant them certain rights and facilities to enable them to carry out their duties ; (*d*) to disembark them again after leaving Spanish waters at certain specified ports ; and (*e*) to submit to interrogation and, in certain circumstances, to being stopped and boarded (but not searched) off the Spanish coast by the naval vessels of the government carrying out the naval patrol part of the scheme—i.e. Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

It would be one of the duties of the Chief Administrator of this part of the scheme to allocate observing officers as between one observation port and another in the light of day-to-day requirements. The names of vessels picking up such officers at the observation ports would be conveyed to the patrol vessels of the zone in which their ports of destination were situated. Observing officers would have authority to examine the passports of passengers and identity papers of the crew ; and when the vessels were being unloaded to inspect any package which they had reasonable grounds for believing to contain war material sent in contravention of the agreement.

The ports and roadsteads where ships bound for Spain would pick up their supervisors were provisionally fixed as Gibraltar (for all ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar before calling at a Spanish port, and for ships from the

Atlantic seaboard of Morocco), The Downs (for ships passing through the Channel from ports lying north of The Downs), Cherbourg (ships leaving Channel ports south of The Downs), Brest (ships from Ireland or the Irish and Bristol Channels), Le Verdon (ships from French Atlantic or Biscayan ports south of Brest), Palermo (ships approaching westward through the Mediterranean or from ports in the Mediterranean east of long. 12 deg. E.), Oran (ships from North African ports west of long. 12 deg. E.), Marseilles (ships from ports on the French or Italian coast between Marseilles and long. 12 deg. E., or from Corsica or Sardinia), Cette (ships from French Mediterranean ports west of Marseilles), Madeira (ships approaching from west of long. 15 deg. W., or in the Atlantic from south of lat. 28 deg. N.), Lisbon (ships coming from Portuguese ports). Observing officers would be disembarked by the vessels they had accompanied to Spain at any port required which did not entail unreasonable deviation from the intended route. Shipowners engaged in regular trade with Spanish ports might arrange with the Board for observing officers to be stationed continually on their vessels, the additional expenditure involved being defrayed by the shipowners concerned.

The Spanish coasts were divided into zones in which naval observation would be undertaken by the warships of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. The zones were as follows : United Kingdom : the north coast of Spain from the French frontier to Cape Busto. The south coast of Spain from the Portuguese frontier to Cape De Gata. The Canary Islands ; France : on the north-west coast of Spain from Cape Busto to the Portuguese frontier. The Spanish Moroccan coast. The islands of Iviza and Majorca ; Germany : on the south-east coast of Spain from Cape De Gata to Cape Oropesa ; Italy : on the east coast of Spain from Cape Oropesa to the French frontier. The island of Minorca.

The war vessels patrolling the zones would have the right to verify the identity of any ship proceeding from a port of any of the participating countries or having the right to fly the flag of one of them that approached any Spanish port, and the right to order such vessels to stop, to board them and to examine their papers. No right of search was accorded to vessels engaged in naval observation. When the commanding

officer of such a vessel found that the master of a ship had not complied with the prescribed procedure he was to draw the latter's attention to his obligations under the Non-Intervention Agreement to which the Government of his country was a party, and to point out that he would be committing an offence against the laws of his own country unless he submitted to supervision before reaching a Spanish port. The officer in command of the naval vessel would submit a report on the incident to his Government so that it could be reported both to the International Committee and to the Government of the country to which the ship in question belonged, with a view to legal proceedings in the courts of that country.

The governments agreed that it was essential that the scheme should be brought into operation by stages. The first stage would be the appointment of the higher directing officials and their personal staffs. Those officials would at once enter into close relations with the national officials of the countries in which they were stationed. The second stage would begin when a sufficient number of subordinate officials had been despatched to enable the supervision scheme to be brought into operation on a skeleton basis. The third and final stage would be reached when the full complement of officials from each branch of the scheme had reached their posts.

That scheme was adopted by the full committee on March 8th, when the British, French, German and Italian Governments gave notice that they would be in a position to begin naval patrol duties on March 13th. Having thereby provided a scheme to control the entry into Spain of arms, war material and volunteers, the Committee decided that it would next consider an extension of the scheme " to prohibit other forms of direct intervention, including the grant to either party in Spain of any form of financial aid, and the entry into that country of persons of non-Spanish nationality for any purpose likely to prolong or embitter the present conflict." The committee proposed also " to consider as soon as possible whether, and if so in what manner, it might be possible to arrange for the withdrawal from Spain of all non-Spanish nationals engaged, either directly or indirectly, in the present conflict in that country."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

March 12th, 1937.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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LORD GREY.

If the length of an official biography were to be adjusted to the importance of the events it describes, the life of Grey would demand the usual two or three volumes. For he played a leading part in a drama which the world will never forget, and the consequences of which it is impossible to undo. Why then does Professor Trevelyan content himself with a single volume* of less than 400 pages? Because Grey has told his own tale, so far as public affairs are concerned, in his *Twenty-five Years*, and because the full story of his work as Foreign Secretary from 1905 to 1914 is enshrined in the massive volumes edited by Gooch and Temperley. What needed doing, and what the author has done with his usual mastery, was to provide a portrait of the man himself and an authoritative summary of his achievements. Those who knew him will rejoice to possess a portrait so true to life. Those who knew him not, and those who come after us, will be grateful for a revelation of one of the noblest figures on the political stage.

The early chapters tell of the young north-country baronet, the heir to a great name, at Winchester, at Oxford and in the House of Commons. Entering politics and Parliament

* *Grey of Fallodon.* By G. M. Trevelyan, O.M. Longmans. 16s.

at the age of 23, Grey suddenly grew up, and there was little surprise when Gladstone appointed him Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in his last Ministry in 1892. He had hitherto displayed no particular interest in foreign affairs, but his even temper fitted him for the greater tasks that lay ahead. Three years of office were followed by a decade of opposition, filled not with politics alone, but with the rapturous joys of country and domestic life. He was not what is called a clubbable man. He shunned receptions and house parties, finding his happiness in his two country homes, his birds, his fishing, his Wordsworth and above all his wife. There are no more touching pages in this narrative than those which describe the coming and going of Dorothy, who shared all his tastes and distastes, and who called forth the deepest emotions of a man as affectionate as he was outwardly reserved. No husband has ever been more sorely stricken than was the childless Grey when, in his forty-third year, his adored wife was thrown from her dog-cart and died three days later.

The central and longest part of the volume is naturally devoted to the anxious years from 1905 to 1914, when Grey was at the helm. His biographer has no shadow of doubt as to the rightness of his policy, though he has a few minor criticisms of method to offer. He is continually reminding us how disastrous it would have been had he pursued a different course. We only just won the war as it was, and without the military conversations with France, which began a month after his accession to office, we should not have won it at all. That is Professor Trevelyan's retort to the critics, at home and abroad, who complain that he committed the country without its knowledge to a policy of continental entanglements. Grey was not the author of the *entente cordiale*. He inherited it from the Unionist Government, and cherished it with unremitting care to the end.

To stand by France, first in regard to Morocco as by treaty bound, and later over the whole field of international politics, so long as her policy was unaggressive; to complete the *rapprochement* with Russia which Lansdowne had begun; to strive for a naval agreement and neighbourly relations with Germany; to maintain our traditions of an invincible navy and a small voluntary army; to be friends with the United States; to keep the alliance with Japan in repair; to carry

on the humanitarian efforts of his predecessor in Macedonia and the Belgian Congo; to labour for peace without for a moment forgetting the dread possibilities of war; here were the outlines of a programme that is easy to grasp, however difficult it was at times to apply. Professor Trevelyan emphasises the continuity of policy, the steadfastness of purpose, the identity of attitude in August 1914 and January 1906. If the intervening years, with their Bosnian, Moroccan and Balkan crises, are sketched with a brevity which some readers will regret, it is owing not merely to considerations of space, but to the conviction that the key to the whole story is the Franco-German and the Anglo-German antagonism.

When the long-expected crisis arrived of a character too acute to be solved by the customary methods of mediation and compromise, Grey worked harder than any man in Europe to avert the rush of the avalanche. His will to peace is no longer in doubt in his own country or elsewhere. What is still under discussion is the question whether he might have taken other and more successful steps. The alternatives were reviewed by Grey himself in his impressive apologia, and they are surveyed once more in these pages with brevity and vigour. Our author argues that the methods were as right as the aim, and that he is free from any responsibility for the catastrophe. His reasoning will not convince the German scholars, to say nothing of certain critics nearer home, who complain that the departure from isolationism was a tragic blunder; that we were too tightly bound to the chariot-wheels of France, and consequentially to the ambitions of her Russian ally; that after the Serajevo murders he should have spoken earlier and in firmer tones at St. Petersburg, Vienna or Berlin; that he should have played the Belgian card at the outset, as Gladstone and Granville had done in 1870. Such issues will not be decided by this or any other book. We are still discussing the responsibilities of the long struggle with France which began in 1792, of the wars of 1854, 1866 and 1870. It is part of the tragedy of the World War that each of the belligerents can make out a case entirely convincing, at any rate to itself. The ultimate cause of the conflict was the European anarchy, the absence of international machinery, the crazy doctrine of the sovereign national state, the universal assumption that the graver disputes must be settled by the sword.

Grey's policy during the first half of the war had to be co-ordinated with that of his allies, and Professor Trevelyan is right to treat it in less detail. His greatest disappointment was the failure to save Serbia. His greatest triumph was to win the confidence of Walter Page, Colonel House and President Wilson, and to prepare the ground for American co-operation in the war and the settlement. His greatest sacrifice was to pay Italy's price for her adhesion to the cause of the Allies in 1915. "Asquith and he were responsible together. Both thought that the Italian claims were most extortionate, but both held that a treaty must be made or the war would be lost. It is a dreadful thing to be responsible for the survival of your country in war." That is precisely what poor Bethmann felt when he confessed that the invasion of Belgium was wrong, but that, where national survival was at stake, necessity knew no law.

Grey had neither the desire nor the health to continue in office when Lloyd George succeeded Asquith at the end of 1916. He was worn out by his labours and anxieties, and his eyesight was nearly gone. He applauded the vigorous prosecution of the war, for he had no wish to live in a world dominated by Prussian militarism. But when he heard how things were going at the Peace Conference in 1919, he said to a friend: "I am glad I am not there: they are out for loot." He regretted the retention of the whole of the German colonial empire, the fantastic reparation demands, the refusal to allow the German delegates to be heard. The foundation of the League of Nations was the one rift in a dark sky, and the waning political energies of his later years were dedicated to the majestic ideal of an organised world. His disappointments and losses, public and private, were bravely borne. His second marriage, which brought him quiet happiness for six years, ended as suddenly as the first. "It is very hard," he wrote, "but I lived alone for more than sixteen years and I can do it again, though I am very stricken." To lose two wives, to lose two brothers by violent deaths, to lose his two homes by fire, to lose the eyes which feasted on the pageant of birds and trees, to lose his fight for peace—here was a sum of suffering rarely equalled among the sons of men. How he bore it all we may read in his exquisite letters.

Professor Trevelyan summarises the character of his hero in his brief Introduction and his closing paragraphs. "His nature grew under the pressure of private sorrow and public care. . . . Merely to be with him was a heartening experience, because there emanated from him a sense of power in repose, a strength of personality unequalled in any other man whom I have met. . . . At the news of Edward Grey's death, men felt that something spacious and noble had gone out of life." His devoted secretary and friend, Lord Tyrrell, once described him to the reviewer as the most impersonal statesman he had known, meaning of course that the thought of self never entered into his calculations. He was not a superman, and in ability he was surpassed by many of his contemporaries. But in sheer nobility there is none above him, and very few are worthy to stand at his side.

G. P. G.

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THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT.*

The recently published volume of the *History of Parliament* will be widely welcomed as the first instalment of a huge and invaluable undertaking planned under the auspices of members of both Houses of Parliament. The aim of the History is to "describe the people in Parliament, their ideas, standing and politics," and to trace the growth of Parliamentary representation and control from 1264, when the writs were issued for the famous Parliament of Simon de Montfort in 1265, up to the Representation Act of 1918. These 650 years are to be classified into seventeen or eighteen periods, to each of which two or three volumes will be devoted. Of the latter, one is to contain biographies of Members of the House of Commons, along with a commentary. A further volume will provide lists and analyses of all Members of both Houses in each Parliament of the period. In addition, possibly in a third volume, a survey of Parliament's work and development will be prepared, largely based on all the material abstracted. Finally, there is to be a series of general volumes including documents and reports of debates illustrative of constitutional growth. The History, which is expected to

* (1) *History of Parliament.* Biographies of the Members of the Commons House, 1439-1509, by Colonel the Rt. Hon. Josiah C. Wedgwood, D.S.O., M.P., in collaboration with Miss Anne D. Holt. £2 net. (Subscribers to be charged three-quarters of the published price.) H.M. Stationery Office. (2) *English Constitutional Ideas of the Fifteenth Century.* By S. B. Chrimes, Ph.D. Cambridge University Press. 21s. net.

comprise eventually some forty volumes, owes, in great measure, both its conception and birth to the inspiration and labours of Colonel Josiah C. Wedgwood, to whom historians and all appreciative of our constitutional heritage owe a deep and lasting debt.

The first segment of the History chosen for treatment runs from 1439 to the death of Henry VII in 1509, and in this volume Colonel Wedgwood, in collaboration with Miss Anne D. Holt, has compiled biographies of Members of the Commons during these years. The period is of great importance in the history of representation because it marks the turning point when the latter had ceased to be a liability, and was becoming a sought-after right and privilege. For example, the boroughs represented in 1442 numbered 94, and by the end of the century had increased by at least 16. The time had passed when a borough like Torrington would rejoice in its perpetual exemption from sending Members to Westminster. Colonel Wedgwood estimates that during the whole seventy years the persons elected, on an average each to two Parliaments, numbered some 3,800 of whom the names of 2,600 are known and included in this volume. Information at present is lacking particularly between 1477 and 1529 for which years the official returns are missing. For example, in the June Parliament of 1483 only thirty names are known out of a probable total of 296. "Nevertheless in our 2,600 we have a fair sample of the fifteenth-century rulers," as is evident from their biographies which, though they "cannot be sure statements of certain fact," represent the most valuable fruit of immense labour and research. Half the material gleaned is from the Calendars of Patent Rolls, and Colonel Wedgwood has "for the first time . . . 'roped in' for biographical research the MS. Pardon Rolls, Sheriff Returns, Issue Rolls, Fine Rolls," among the other sources investigated. However, he has been admittedly forced to neglect a number of records, including the Plea Rolls. There is also much work needed to be done among local archives. This is, of course, no reflection upon Colonel Wedgwood, but rather an incentive to others to add by their research to this noble work so ably begun.

In an undertaking of this magnitude space is inevitably a restrictive factor, so that the average biography is curtailed to some 150 words, allowing more space for outstanding

Members. Each entry is designed to include, in summary form, *inter alia*, particulars of the Member's parentage, marriage and heirs, his profession, with a short account of his public career, and occasionally additional remarks of a personal nature, drawn perhaps from an examination of his will. For the fullest appreciation of all this material we await the lists, analyses and general deductions in the companion volumes. However, some indication of their value and interest is given by Colonel Wedgwood in an Introduction which loses little by its slightly informal touch. He discusses, for example, the types of Members, their public offices, the growth of non-residence and the popularity of seats. The biographies themselves suffer nothing by an infrequent expression of humour, as in the entry of Nicholas Larwood. There are, incidentally, a number of references to sport, including the designation of John Combe as a cricketer and Member for Marlborough, who died in 1460.

The Introduction, which of course contains no sustained arguments as to constitutional growth, is on occasion rather misleading. For instance, to describe the period as one in which "the authority of Parliament waned," though "the status of the member waxed" is to forget that the fifteenth century witnessed a fundamental change in the political conception of Parliament; from that of a High Court, with an authority emanating from the King, it emerged in the sixteenth century as a popular legislative institution, acting upon its own inherent power. A theory to account for this political, more than formal, change is argued by Dr. S. B. Chrimes in an erudite work, *English Constitutioual Ideas in the Fifteenth Century*, where he examines the spirit animating the principles of government, relating particularly to kingship, Parliament and the attitude of the courts towards legislation. It is Dr. Chrimes' opinion that this dichotomy of ideas in the conception of Parliament is bridged by the notion of "the estate theory." He is not concerned to challenge Professor Pollard's contention that "the theory that Parliament was organised upon the basis of three estates" is a historical myth. His thesis is that the contemporary belief in a natural threefold division of society into clergy, barons and commons "moulded and worked themselves into the history of the very thing which they at first misrepresented." This belief was given particular weight

when, after the Revolution of 1399, Henry IV sought specifically the sanction to his accession of "the three estates" sitting in Parliament. Dr. Chrimes quotes evidence to show that the identification of the three orders with Parliament steadily progressed during the century; and it became increasingly common to regard Parliament itself "as an assembly possessing an authority innate in the natural social orders as well as an authority inherent in the king's court." Dr. Chrimes' argument is of extreme interest as accounting for a change in constitutional theory, itself impelled by the growth of a national political consciousness.

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LIFE HERE AND NOW AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.

It is much to be regretted that Lord Ponsonby refuses to compile his reminiscences and does not succumb to a "vice" he deplores. Recollections of his contacts with many diverse human beings and conditions at home and abroad, would add to a public service that has been inspired by noble and generous ideals. But he decided after stifling many doubts to publish what he calls "a very odd book," which at first he had no thought of writing. "I wrote to formulate and tidy my impressions and conclusions derived from an incorrigible habit of philosophic observation throughout a busy life."

His contention is that "the plain man," to whom the passing moment is a vital reality, has as much right to register his observations as the astronomer and philosopher; and in considering the obvious problems of time and duration, he happily allies the plain man's deductions with those of the experts. But when in stating his conclusions he attacks aspects of the Christian faith, there is lack of equipment for such a major task despite his effort to provide it; and subjective reactions impair the balance of his judgment. The Christian religion, whether accepted or rejected, is a heritage that deeply involves the mind and heart. It is, therefore, very complex, with contradictory manifestations; and, according to a principle of the author's earlier survey,

* *Life Here and Now (Conclusions derived from an Examination of the Sense of Duration).* By Arthur Ponsonby (Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede). Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

one type of observer from a particular angle should relate his impressions with those of others from differing angles, nor will the latter be challenged to any effect unless they realise that their conclusions have been as appreciatively estimated as possible.

The motive of the author's attack commands respect, namely that churches, by concentrating their members' attention on a future life and allied "fruitless speculations," have rendered them regardless of present crying ills and duties. The charge ignores considerable evidence to the contrary and the fact that many contemporary members are much concerned with personal salvation here and now and little, if at all, with the hereafter. Such omission does not dissipate the accusation. But the remedy proposed is based on a speculative assumption that recalls the servants in the Gospel parable, who thought that a good harvest would be assured by rooting up wheat and tares together. Christians, like their critics, may often fail to distinguish a spiritual anchor from its surface encrustments, but that does not impair the anchorage. It holds us; we do not hold it, whatever the nature of certain connecting cables and however dim, faulty, even lamentable our realisation of Christ may be. If we could sever ourselves in the manner suggested, we should be worse, not better, more infected with megalomania, mass suggestion and the mechanisation of life; and contemporary happenings seem to support our conviction.

Nicholas Berdyaev, the Russian thinker, is surely nearer the truth when he depicts modern man as incapacitated to control the here and now because he has lost conscious contact with a sphere of existence that transcends his own. The "supernatural," as the author insists, has often been confused with the spiritual; but a genuine spiritual revelation often appears supernatural to those who experience it; and to regard certain phenomena as inexplicable by known natural law may be honest and rational.

Ecclesiastical authority certainly unduly weights the *status quo*, and often seems exercised to maintain its injustices; although the witness of German Christians and fellow Christians elsewhere against tyrannous impositions by the mighty should be admitted as an atoning factor. But implicit in the Christian faith as implied by its revolutionary revaluations is that transformation of our social, economic and international

relations which the author desires. Roman Catholic apologists may welcome certain of his conclusions as depicting an approved cross roads for good heretics; either Rome, he says, with its stark doctrines and refusal to modify them in accordance with the modern mind, or resolute denial of such doctrine. Dismissing the premises of thinkers past and present which lead to another conclusion, he reveals, in urging his own, certain estimates of human experience which other assessors as unfettered by Christian orthodoxy do not accept; nor would they admit, as he apparently does, that " reverence for what is intelligible " can be a substitute for religious worship.

With more urgency and insight than many professing Christians, he advocates the application of their ethic in various spheres; and he shares their conviction that false values engender a darkness in which men like sheep go astray. Some of their hymns, as he alleges, may be " opiates," but others are tonics. Many of his injunctions, indeed, modified to suit their temporal setting, have been given for centuries by unrecorded members of Christian communions—and still are. Few of those who apparently mould human destiny seem to have profited by them; but as the author mystically observes, the really great may not be those who impress journalists and historians. The service he prizes is unreported and he strives to demonstrate its abiding value. Depicting a starless night when men acknowledge no illumination on their path save that which they themselves can discern and provide, he urges them to develop their spiritual faculties and enjoy at last, as they ought, " the beauties and glories " around them. Among the latter cathedrals are mentioned—monuments, surely, to men whose speculations concerning a light of light enabled them to defy human prudence by proving that, if pounds are looked after, pennies will take care of themselves. Conserve supreme recognitions (even though it involves wrapping them up in dogmas) and the pennies, the fleeting moments, will be spent to benefit posterity.

D. P. H.

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COMTE.*

This is a timely book. There can be no question that Comte has a message for our times, and that he has hardly of late

* *Comte: The Founder of Sociology.* By F. S. Marvin. Chapman & Hall. 6s.

years received his due meed of recognition in Great Britain. In France there is the notable work of Lévy-Bruhl. In his own lifetime Harriet Martineau competently summarised his Positive Philosophy, John Stuart Mill wrote a book on him, and in the Victorian days there was a Positivist Church with Frederic Harrison, Dr. Bridges and Professor Beesley as its prophets.

But the latter movement, notable though it was in its own time, developed what was probably the weakest and most bizarre side of the Comtean philosophy—its so-called new religion or religious synthesis. For example, Mr. Marvin has pointed out that probably the finest and most penetrating treatment of Comte in English was originally written for the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW—the book by Prof. Caird, the late Master of Balliol, on *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*. It was at the religious side of Comte that Caird slung his most pointed darts. From the Hegelian point of view a merely subjective synthesis is pretty much a contradiction in terms. If you aim to give your worshippers a peace which is based on knowledge, and you admit the possibility at the same time of unappeased hobgoblins lingering in an unknown section of the objective world, your peace which is based on knowledge can hardly be perfect or secure.

Fortunately Mr. Marvin, as the title of his comprehensive little book shows, has to deal with Comte as a sociologist and not as a religious teacher. Here Comte is like Antæus on his mother earth. The name itself was his, and the works of many notable sociological writers in France and the United States testify to the continuity of his inspiration. Indeed, Comte as a philosopher has many contacts with the moderns, and Mr. Marvin has brought this out with firmness and precision. Comte himself had great mathematical ability, and he saw in Mathematics an abstract symbology which was also based on concrete reality and (in this way anticipating Einstein) he beheld its results verified in astronomy, the next science to Mathematics in simplicity and generality. As against the further complexities of Spencer, it seems certain that his more simple scheme of the sciences has better stood the test of future investigation and research.

But it is on the sociological side that Mr. Marvin, who is also a synoptic thinker, descants most lovingly. The main merits of Comte in this field he takes to be three. In the first

place he based his results on science and not, like Hitlerism, on emotion. Secondly, he saw the main sociological advance in the growth of sympathetic co-operation, not only between man and man, but as between nation and nation. And in the third place he never faltered in his recognition that there must be a final synthesis, that the weary struggle of the ages must come to a successful close. "Humanity, Science, Synthesis, Faith in the Future; this is the final chord, with Humanity as the dominant note." And Mr. Marvin has no difficulty in showing how opportune is the slogan for the age we live in. His book was evidently written before Mussolini's final victory in Abyssinia, and the situation has worsened for world co-operation since then; but Comte would still have gone on striking his clarion notes.

J. H. H.

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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.*

Mr. Gough has written an admirable account of the historical growth of the Social Contract from the ancient world to its place in American thought, and the spice of criticism he adds enhances its worth. For those who associate the beginnings of this conception with Hobbes, it comes with a shock of surprise that the author has written a hundred pages before we reach the great Leviathan. The first chapter on the ancient world is too short. As Plato knows that Glaucon holds the social contract theory, so Aristotle knows that Lycophron also holds it, and both philosophers resolutely turn away from this conception. Neither of them uses the phrase social organism, but both believe in the idea. For the State is no mere alliance which the individual can join or leave as he pleases. There is a careful account of the contract conception held by such mediævalists as Manegold, John of Salisbury, and Aquinas. The last in his "De Regimine Principum" has an astonishingly modern version of this famous theory.

There was a rival to the social contract, the Divine Right of Kings, which receives illuminating treatment. It is plain that if the Pope claimed by right divine, the Holy Roman Emperor must make the same claim. From the Middle Ages

* By J. W. Gough. Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d.

onwards this divine right appears in manifold form, and Mr. Gough shows how seriously and how long our ancestors held to this rival conception. Once disposed of by the Great Civil War, the contract conception was bound to hold the field. The belief in the King's touch for the healing of disease is a curious proof of the popular hold on the Divine Right of Kings. St. Edward first touched for the king's evil in 1058. As the belief in the Divine Right of Kings waxed strong, increasing numbers came to be touched. Under the Stuarts, such large numbers came that Charles II, of all people, touched no less than ninety thousand sick folk. The touching was always accompanied by a religious service. As the belief in the Divine Right of Kings waxed faint, fewer came, and it was finally dropped by George I. Queen Anne touched Samuel Johnson. This is but one proof out of many of the opposition encountered by the contract theory upon whose genesis and growth Mr. Gough has added so much to our knowledge.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

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FOUNDRESSES OF CAMBRIDGE COLLEGES.*

Almae Matris almae matres! So one is tempted to describe the Royal or noble ladies whose benefactions to Cambridge are piously chronicled by Mrs. Sorley. Her own connection with the University and her intimate knowledge of medieval life make her well fitted for the task: her vivid narrative unrolls for us a turbulent, variegated background which sometimes, it must be confessed, tends to submerge the Lady of the moment and to recede a very long way from the grey town on the Fens. We are led down alluring bypaths and through family ramifications which have little concern with the main theme. The writers' names of passages quoted are rarely given, they would have added interest, as also would one or two portraits, or a reproduction of the illumination, charmingly described, which probably represents Countess Marie. The pedigrees supplied are very useful.

Cambridge benefactresses had been anticipated by the Lady Dervorguilla at Balliol. The earliest of them, Queen

* *Kings' Daughters.* By Janetta C. Sorley. Cambridge University Press. 1937. 7s. 6d.

Eleanor of Castille, left the poor scholars of Cambridge fifty marks in her will, being "the first royal person to make such a gift." (Might not the fact have been recorded without retelling her whole life story?) The remaining six ladies of this book were actual foundresses of Colleges: Eleanor's granddaughter, Elizabeth de Burgh, daughter of Gilbert de Clare, of Clare; Marie de St. Pol, Countess of Pembroke, of Pembroke "without the Trumpenton Gate," both in 1346. Queens' College, originally founded by Margaret of Anjou, had for second foundress Elizabeth Woodville (here somewhat pedantically called by the alternative form Wydville), queen of Edward IV. In enumerating the purposes of her foundation, Margaret had inserted "to laude and honoure of the sexe feminine," showing herself, remarks Mrs. Sorley, "the first self-confessed feminist in our history." But probably the most famous, as the most generous, benefactress is Lady Margaret Beaufort, mother of Henry VII, and friend of Fisher, the only foundress known to have resided within College walls; she endowed Christ's and St. John's. In 1588 Lady Frances Sidney, Countess of Sussex, (aunt of Sir Philip), left in her will a sum for founding the College which bears her name. Several of these Colleges superseded Halls which had existed under other titles. Special provision is made for poor scholars, and plate and books are bequeathed by the foundresses, who seem to have felt a personal concern for "my Hall," "my scholars"; with Margaret Beaufort, this extended to the smallest details of their welfare. It is impossible here to do more than indicate some of the wealth of interest contained in this book.

E. G. S.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

*The League of Nations and World Order** is the title of a New Commonwealth Institute monograph by Dr. Georg Schwarzenberger, who considers the principles upon which membership of the League has been based. He concludes that the Covenant was drafted upon the theory of "homogeneous universality" under which members must display certain common characteristics. In practice, however, this barred the way to a membership of States strong enough to secure peace and became modified in favour of "heterogeneous universality." For

* Constable. 6s. net.

example the definition "fully self-governing State," first interpreted to mean a nation's system of government, has come to indicate its status *vis-à-vis* the outside world. That this change, however, in the basic principle of admission to the League has failed in its purpose, is due to the absence in the Covenant of adequate provision for peaceful change. In short this treatise presents an argument in support of the New Commonwealth Society's objective, namely the creation of an international equity tribunal. The essential jurisdiction of such a court is that it shall have power to modify existing national rights and duties. The principles of its exercise are discussed briefly by Professor Gustav Radbruch, as a contributor to another short monograph *Justice and Equity in the International Sphere.** Decisions should be guided by international law except when it is expedient to act otherwise in the general interests and common good of the international community. Upon the basis of precedent and the case system will be built up an all-embracing legal structure with "the right proportion of continuity and elasticity." The analogy of English equity is not altogether convincing, for it acquired in its final growth a rigidity which Parliament alone could mitigate. A better comparison is found in the practice of that quasi-international court, the Privy Council, upon which Professor Norman Bentwich has a useful chapter. Neither it nor the American Supreme Court, as Professor H. A. Smith points out in his contribution, are true equity tribunals, though both retain a wide discretion in their interpretation of legal rules. Professor A. S. de Bustamante has a brief illuminating article on the short-lived Central American Court of Justice; and an interesting chapter on international justice and equity from the Roman Catholic viewpoint comes from Professor Donald A. McClean.

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The Pace of the Ox.† This "first full-length life of Kruger to appear in English" is written by Miss Juta, a member of a well-known South African family. It is lively in style and full of incident. The earlier part makes attractive reading as one sees the young Paul Kruger in the Voortrekker days, moving north with his people to escape the interference of the British, gradually getting into his stride and working his way up to the leadership of the Transvaal Boers. There are accounts of hunting feats with lions and rhino. There are long and fierce struggles with native chiefs. The author insists again and again that the Boer reputation for oppression of the native is not justified. But when both parties are fighting for the grazing for their cattle and the Whites gradually push the Blacks off the plains into the mountain districts, the subject takes on a wider aspect. The problem of space for the native is still acute.

The account of the first Boer War with the British follows. But the

* Constable. 4s. 6d. net.

† Constable. 10s. 6d.

turning-point of the whole story is the discovery of gold on the Rand and the advent of foreigners of all descriptions. " Oom Paul's " failure to meet the growing demands of money-makers and of the larger South African schemes of Rhodes, the Jameson Raid, the Boer War, are vividly described. The pathetic decline of the old man, still striving to the last to prove to his burghers from the Old Testament scriptures that they are the Lord's people and are bound to have the victory, carries the sympathy of the reader to the end. Paul Kruger died in exile in Europe, two years after the Peace of Vereeniging was signed, accepting " the inevitable," in the " hope and expectation " " that the end of all that work will be good."

* * * * *

Miss Nora Hudson's *Ultra-Royalism and the French Restoration** is a monograph of exceptional merit on a period of great interest. The problem of the restored Bourbons after the fall of Napoleon was to reconcile the old and the new France. It was a difficult task, and it is not surprising that they failed. The author has read very widely, has used fresh material, and succeeds in bringing to life the leading actors on a crowded stage. She is a merciful judge, tempering her blame with excuses or recommendations to mercy. Her portraits of Louis XVIII and Charles X are not wholly unfriendly ; Polignac and Chateaubriand emerge in a better light than in many other books. She is as successful with her minor figures, such as Vitrolles, Fiévée, Baron d'Eckstein (from whom Lord Acton learned a good deal as a young man), as with kings and ministers. She explains how the Charter served as a rallying cry to both Left and Right, because it admitted of different interpretations. The bibliography is worthy of the book.

* Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.

A Correction.

We have received the following from Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves :

> On page 206 of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for February 1937 there appears, in an article by Mr. Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt, the following assertion :
>
> " ' Rearmament creates more illusion than security ' is not a pacifist's slogan, but a statement by Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves (in *The Observer* of February 9th, 1937)."
>
> This is indeed a curious rendering of a statement which runs as follows :
>
> " But rearmament—unless it be in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare—will merely create an illusion of security."

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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MAY 1937.

CROWNING THE KING.

THE great pageant we are witnessing this month has many facets, many different elements of popular appeal. The long bustle of preparation is over. Subjects of the British Crown from every Continent have filled to overflowing the old grey city by the Thames. Many people constitutionally shy and rather averse to self-advertisement and adulation have set themselves to treat the coronation as a festival, a high day and holiday in which everyone can share. An Empire not over-fond of the name or the trappings, and half unwilling to think about its greatness, takes breath and stands and watches while two young Sovereigns, embodying the spirit of it all, pass by.

Why is Republicanism out of fashion in England ? Why is it that so few citizens of this vast, democratic Empire would lift a finger to upset the Throne to-day, when more than half the thrones of Europe have fallen and left ours on a lonely eminence of security and power ? The instincts of equality and self-assertion are certainly as dominant as ever. Liberty may have gone sick for a time among nations who, we thought, had grown up to understand it. The voices of Parliaments may have been sharply silenced. An astonishing readiness to immolate themselves before Dictators—not quite ignoble in its willingness for sacrifice—may have seemed to some the only remedy for depression or despair. But it is impossible to believe that the love of individual freedom is in the twentieth century wholly extinguished even in " totalitarian " States. The theory that men are born the equals of their fellows and the masters of their destiny, whatever be their rank or training, may or may not be founded in experience ; but it is not going to be unlearned or forgotten by modern nations in the years ahead.

There must surely be something in the English brand of kingship which gives it a vitality not known elsewhere. Whatever criticisms may be brought against it, its history is undeniably picturesque. Its pride of antiquity impresses. Its colour and romance attract. Others besides genealogists

can find pleasure in remembering that King George VI is the direct representative, not in office only but in blood, of those remote and shadowy Saxon Princes whose dust still lies in coffers ranged round the choir at Winchester, the earliest English capital if not the earliest English church. Cerdic and Alfred are among his ancestors, and Norman William and Angevin Henry, and many an unremembered chieftain of French and German, Scottish and Scandinavian stock. For two or three hundred years, of course, the English Court was far more French than English. A round dozen of our Kings in the Middle Ages had French fathers or mothers or wives. Cœur de Lion, for example, a national hero born at Oxford, was French upon both sides. From their mixed blood they drew the gifts and resources which kept the vigour of the line alive. They held their crown, in spite of notorious faults, because so many of them were men of force and character, efficient and successful alike in government and in war.

The Plantagenets, for all their foreign blood, became incontestably national leaders. They adventured greatly to make themselves also masters of France, and came near to ruining themselves in that attempt. The Welsh Tudors, who absorbed and displaced them, were no less representative of England. Henry VII indeed, in youth a hero of romance, who won his crown upon a battlefield and overthrew a notorious usurper, developed into something like an old fogey later. But the Henry VIII who looks down on us from Holbein's canvases with so sinister and formidable a sense of power, was accepted all his life as typically English. The nation loved him, bore with him, obeyed him, and, do what he might, refused to desert him. And his great daughter, Elizabeth, at her best the incarnation of her England, realised better than most monarchs "how genuine glory was put on." King George cannot claim Queen Elizabeth in the strict sense as an ancestress, although he sits upon her throne; and some perhaps would be prouder—it is a debatable opinion—of inheriting the blood of Mary, Queen of Scots. But the Stuarts at any rate brought into the story such vivid elements of misfortune and adventure, of human charm and human failings, of gallant endeavour and pitiful defeat, that they have left behind them memories which to this day Englishmen and Scotsmen fight over but do not forget.

No one who counts his own forefathers with affection can fail to feel an interest in a race like this, "of Earth's first blood" with "titles manifold" such as no new-made chiefs of States can boast. Things rooted in our national past have weight with us despite ourselves. Try as they may, the heirs of the ages cannot strip their inheritance off.

The difficult problems of last year, solved as they were with a dignity and wisdom which did honour to all concerned, have led some eager minds to discuss again the question whether a Monarchy or a Republic be the best form of State. The republican ideal will always make a strong appeal to men who love simplicity and freedom, and who dislike the display, the false sentiment, the vulgarity of spirit, which too often gather round a Court. There is a nobility about a man like Washington, stepping into fame to defend right and liberty as he understood them, called on inevitably to rule the nation he created, and quietly laying down his burden when his task was done, which justly conquers the admiration of mankind. Taking circumstance and character together, the work he did, the mind and nature of the man who did it, and the magnificent dominion which he founded, can any career in history stand comparison with his? Can Cæsar's or Napoleon's eclipse it if personal nobility is allowed to count? Again, there is a homely and irresistible splendour in the story of Abraham Lincoln, the uncouth Western lawyer, plainly even roughly bred, exposed in a position of supreme authority to tests such as few rulers have endured, and by sheer force of heart and character proving equal to them all. A few men of that stamp outshine many Kings. But the fact remains that leaders of that quality among elected Heads of States are very rare. Taken as a whole the men who have ruled over the world's republics in the last century and a half, whether raised to power by the free votes of their fellow-citizens or by some vigorous self-assertion of their own, have no superiority over the hereditary monarchs in interest or achievement. In all that is meant by tradition they have obviously no share at all.

It may seem strange at first sight that in our own country, which judged by every test of practice is, for all its conservative and monarchical associations, the freest in the world, Republicanism has never yet been able to take root. Once and once only, for a few years in the seventeenth century, it

found a footing here under a soldier of surpassing force, who struck the Monarchy down because his army urged it, who not improbably repented of his action, and who then, in his own perplexed and mystifying fashion, did what he could to build it up in his own family again. There are few such curiosities of oratory as the speeches in which Oliver Cromwell refused to wear a crown. And there is no doubt that the only successful leader of a revolution ever seen in England believed that the hereditary principle offered something continuing and stable which the English people both needed and desired. The reaction which rendered possible the reckless loyalties of the Restoration, when the most genial of Princes brought private morals and public duty down to a level rarely touched before or since, is proof that the great Protector judged his countrymen aright.

The truth is that the hereditary principle has never been unpopular among us. It is a part of our family system and ingrained in our habits of mind. Even in the case of the House of Lords, indefensible as it seems for a democratic country to make the sons and grandsons of eminent men hereditary legislators for ever, it was not so much its hereditary character which made that House unpopular thirty years ago—it is much less unpopular to-day—as the claim of one political party in it to thwart the Government and to block legislation whatever the majorities in the House of Commons against its views might be. In the House of Commons the hereditary principle has always been popular. What a welcome it gave to the son of Chatham, would have given to a son of Charles James Fox, has given more lately to Gladstones and Peels, to Cecils and Harcourts, to Chamberlains and Churchills! Personal gifts are after all the secret of authority, and few of us can help desiring to see those gifts inherited and handed on.

It is perhaps as a symbol of unity that the Monarchy has the greatest part to play to-day. One asks, suppose it disappeared to-morrow, what would there be to hold together the almost boundless dominions of the British Crown? It is difficult to find a satisfactory reply. Parliament has now definitely laid down its authority so far as the government of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand is concerned. Ties of kinship alone cannot make or keep an Empire. Our fellow-subjects in the great Dominions left without a King might well drift into a cousinship little closer than our

cousinship with the United States. Their sense of unity with us would be weakened, and their sense of security too. In India the position would be even more difficult. One cannot easily picture the Princes of India, with their vast territories, their multitudes of subjects, their ancient and hereditary pomps, paying homage contentedly to an elected President in London, however successful a party leader he had proved himself. There is a glamour still in the tradition of kingship, in illustrious, long-inherited descent: though, when one looks at some Kings' portraits—there is a Titian of Philip II in the Corsini Gallery in Rome, stamped already with the gloomy degeneracy which he bequeathed to his heirs for the ruin of their people—one is driven to wonder whether the glamour may not be a mirage. But there is more in it than that. Loyalty to a personal chief has always been the root of our success in India. Our way there was won, and our astonishing supremacy established, not by democratic theories nor by paper constitutions, important as these things may be, but by the unflinching use of personal authority by leaders who excelled in courage and understanding, able to inspire the followers they appealed to, and determined to establish new standards of fair dealing in an ill-governed and disordered land.

There have been faults, no doubt, in our Indian administration, especially in its early days. We have admitted them repeatedly with a candour not always shown by other nations. We have often indeed rubbed them in and dwelt upon them, since Burke let loose his noble passion and splendid rhetoric against Warren Hastings, and Macaulay, studying, as he sailed home from India round the Cape, only the charges brought by Burke and Francis and their colleagues, stereotyped them in a memorable essay without realising how largely they were inaccurate and unfair. Yet when every charge against our rule in India is sifted, it remains a proud record of single-hearted work. The Government of India may have become a great machine, and other hands than ours may be called in to work it. But the machine has succeeded because it embodied a personal, human and monarchical tradition. Could we expect the Indian States to remain contentedly within the Empire, if the Emperor to whom they owed allegiance disappeared?

India is a case apart. But the same sense of something missing would probably make itself felt in the Dominions

if the Monarchy ceased. Sentiment does not diminish as democracy grows old. No one who heard some years ago the first faint cry upon the wireless "Australia calling the Mother Country," followed by the singing across thousands of miles of ocean of "God Save the King," could fail to realise what an expression of unity that old song was. To part with a sentiment so deeply rooted must mean the breaking of links which men value, must, one would think, strengthen the tendency to break away. It is difficult to feel sure that the help to be expected from British fleets and armies or even from British finance would suffice to bind Australia and South Africa to us once the ancient and visible bond of unity had gone. The perils which might threaten these young States, with their immense territories, their fine and complacent self-confidence, and their inadequate white populations, in a world of highly armed and highly populated Empires fiercely demanding space for expansion, are already visible enough. If Japan determined to find new outlets for her people in the great empty Southern Continent, if Germany resolved to recover her outpost in South-West Africa, could these young Dominions say them nay? We should be foolish not to realise how heavy a strain it may impose upon us to prevent such demands arising while our Empire holds together. It would be impossible to defeat them if our Empire broke up.

Apart from its political significance the British Monarchy has a very special social value for us all. We may set off as evils the false sentiment, the flatteries and adulation, the lavish expense and display which Courts often entail, and which were found in polished perfection in the Court of the *Grand Monarque*, and to some extent in the semi-Oriental arrogance of the German Empire just before the War. But it is right to remember, when speaking of expense, that the Sovereigns of England have handed over great private revenues to the State, and, when speaking of flatteries and adulation, that those weaknesses are largely inherent in mortality. The desire to cringe before superiority of some kind survives probably in two-thirds of the human race. It is found at times in an exaggerated form even in the highest circles. Mankind must have its figureheads. Free democracies are glad to choose and test their fighting leaders in the warfare of Parliament, in the clash of politics, in the give and take of public life. No institution in the world gives such a training

in the art of government as our House of Commons. No constitution in the world compares with ours in adaptability to all the purposes of freedom. But above the conflicts of parties, which are essential to the free play of Parliament, it is of real value, when passions run high, to have some representative figure, some detached, impartial keeper of the peace, able, if consulted by the controversialists, to survey the situation coolly and to appreciate the different points of view, some disinterested figure rooted in tradition, unassailable in dignity, and sure of the respect of all.

It is difficult to set a limit to the influence which a constitutional monarchy like ours may wield. Lapses of conduct in the Tudor and the Stuart Courts had scarcely the same publicity, though neither Tudors nor Stuarts can be accused of concealing their peccadilloes. The Hanoverian monarchy was accepted at first as an uninteresting necessity, and was only preserved by the Whig oligarchy for the sake of securing Parliamentary freedom. But George III, an Englishman, with certain obstinate English qualities deep-rooted in him, rallied the old loyalty of the people chiefly by his homely, kindly, decent private life. And when the flamboyant failings of the First Gentleman in Europe had again made the Crown unpopular, Queen Victoria and her husband restored its prestige by setting an example which has not been allowed to fail. The throne of England owes much to the ideals of conduct, the liberal temper, the grave and simple sense of duty, which the Prince Consort stamped upon a Court scarcely accustomed to standards such as his. And King George V not only kept up this tradition; he showed in times of crisis and of danger a readiness to welcome new men and to identify himself with new conditions which deepened the sense of obligation and the affection gathered round the throne.

Our constitution, as established now by practice, asks a good deal of our Kings. To allow democracy to have its own way under its own elected leaders, to make its own mistakes and to work out its own salvation, and all the while to stand by watching with kindly, helpful self-restraint, trusting to the sure instinct of a people which has never in the long run lost sight of sobriety and common sense, is a task of extraordinary difficulty, requiring rare qualities of temper and of mind. It needs the widest sympathy and patience, the strongest

self-command. But every year that a Sovereign can exercise such qualities successfully, he will gain immeasurably in influence and respect.

If we ask much of our Kings and Queens as Sovereigns, we ask much of them as individuals too. For them, for us, and for the world at large, there are difficult days, it may even be perilous days, ahead. The old standards everywhere are being fiercely challenged. The old loyalties may be sharply strained. But the things which stand, irrespective of fashion or rank or revolution, are after all the old and homely virtues, possible alike for Princes and for lesser folk. There is no denying the temptations which beset every man brought up to be a King. It needs strength of mind in an atmosphere of adulation not to become selfish or spoilt. For the heirs of Kings and Emperors there will always be risks of deterioration which a Washington or a Lincoln may escape. Republican austerity, no doubt, makes easier the path of virtue. But, on the other hand, the self-mastery learned under difficult conditions is one of the greatest qualities which fit a man to be a King. The secret of Royal influence in England is to be simple, self-sacrificing and sincere. It is, if we may be allowed to say so, because our people believe that their new Sovereigns have already learned that secret together, that the welcome offered them is so unaffectedly genuine to-day. They are ascending a throne which we are not alone in thinking the greatest in the world, a throne founded on the securest consciousness of freedom and the widest sense of human fellowship the world has seen. To guard that freedom and to keep alive that sense of fellowship is as noble a task as can be committed to man. Our Sovereigns know, none better, the demands which it must make upon them. To those demands they will respond. It is for this reason that their subjects so warmly and unanimously wish them well. It is for this reason that, when George VI puts on the crown of his ancestors at Westminster, we shall one and all echo with devotion Edward VIII's last words to his people, "God Save the King."

CHARLES MALLET.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM.

TWENTY years ago Mr. Edwin Montagu paid his famous visit to India, and received a Deputation from the Congress and Home Rule League.

> "The Deputation had brought me," he wrote, "a terrifically big casket representing the Juggernaut car (*absit omen*) in which their Address was enclosed. . . . We were face to face now with the real giants of the Indian political world. We had not these dupes and adherents from the Provinces, but we had here a collection of the first-class politicians.
>
> "Gandhi is a social reformer; he has a real desire to find grievances and to cure them, not for any reasons of self-advertisement, but to improve the conditions of his fellow-men. . . . He dresses like a coolie, forswears all personal advancement, lives practically on the air, and is a pure visionary. He does not understand details of schemes; *all he wants is that we should get India on our side.* He wants the millions of India to leap to the assistance of the British Throne. . . . Revolutionary or not . . . *none of these Indians show any sign of wanting to be removed from connection with the British Throne.*"

Twenty years later the Congress Party have won majorities in six provinces on a programme of independence, they refuse to take office and seem likely to drive us back to sheer autocracy. The question that should occupy the mind of Parliament is not, Is the Congress reasonable? but Why have we ourselves failed?

The British are not without experience in extending self-government in the Commonwealth. There is the great example of Canada, and the even more brilliant success of South Africa. In both of these countries there were large populations of other races. But as regards India there is no one who can deny that the prospects of Anglo-British understanding become gloomier as the years pass by. And yet the principles on which we are professing to act in relation to India are the same as those which have been employed with success in the other cases. Mr. Montagu's declaration of August 20th, 1917, included the following words:

> The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-government institutions

with a view to the progressive realisation of *responsible government* in India as an integral part of the British Empire.

Some doubt was raised at one time on high authority as to the meaning of the words "responsible government." There was mistrust and misunderstanding and, in 1929, in order that all doubt should be removed, a statement was made by the then Viceroy in the following terms :

> As I recently pointed out, my own Instrument of Instructions from the King-Emperor expressly states that it is His Majesty's will and pleasure that the plans laid by Parliament in 1919 should be the means by which British India may attain its due place among His Dominions. Ministers of the Crown, moreover, have more than once publicly declared that it is the desire of the British Government that India should, in the fullness of time, take her place in the Empire in equal partnership with the Dominions. But in view of the doubts which have been expressed both in Great Britain and India regarding the interpretation to be placed on the intentions of the British Government in enacting the Statute of 1919, I am authorised, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to state clearly that in their Judgment it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status.

A debate arose in Parliament after the issue of that statement and criticism was levelled against the Government, but neither during the course of the debate nor during any of the subsequent proceedings was it denied by any authoritative speaker that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress is the attainment of Dominion status.

"Dominion status," of course, is not a legal definition. The status of the Dominions has grown enormously in the lifetime of us all, and the Imperial Conference of 1926, followed by the Statute of Westminster in 1930, established them as true partner nations. This development, so far from dividing, has united the British Commonwealth. Since there have been set up in different parts of the world democracies enjoying the benefit of free self-government it is only natural that, when freedom and self-government are challenged, as they are to-day, by dictatorships, such free democracies, even were they not linked by common blood, should draw together. I may add, in passing, that the one danger to Commonwealth unity is a system of preferential tariffs which, in imitation of

Germany and Italy, is attempting to set up some form of Imperial economic autarchy. The offer, therefore, of Dominion status as the goal of British policy in India is not a niggardly thing. It is something which any member of Congress, without any renunciation of his beliefs, might accept.

I notice that Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, in his presidential address to the Delhi Conference of Congress, makes the following statement :

> To talk, therefore, of Dominion Status, in its widest significance, even including the right to separate, is to confine ourselves to one group, which of necessity will oppose and be opposed by other groups, and which will essentially be based on the present decaying social order. Therefore we cannot entertain this idea of Dominion Status in any shape or form ; it is independence we want, not any particular status. Under cover of that phrase, the tentacles of imperialism will creep up and hold us in their grip, though the outer structure might be good to look at.

This is a real misconception, though some justification for such a statement might be found in the scheme already referred to for setting up a closed Empire. In point of fact the British Commonwealth may, and in course of time probably will, comprise Socialist Dominions like New Zealand, and possibly Governments internally Republican, like the Irish Free State.

If what I have said is right, and if British policy is as I have stated it to be—and this has never been denied—why is it that we are faced in India with opposition from the mass of public opinion more bitter than we have had elsewhere, except in the sole case of Ireland ? It seems to me that the fundamental cause is a mutual failure not only of understanding, but also of information. I do not know how far the Indian public follows the trend of opinion in England, but I do know that, as far as this country is concerned, it is very hard indeed for the average reader to get a proportioned view of Indian opinion. The links between Great Britain and India are largely official and the records of the splendid work done by British officials in India are plentifully at the disposal of Parliament, but beyond that, for the assessing of the movement of Indian thought, we seem to be ill-served. What we read, even in important newspapers, is what is thought by a small section only, and when the strength of popular movements compels attention, then the news is presented in a way

which distorts its perspective and exaggerates hopes, fears and difficulties, often baseless, which are in the mind of the writer. The result of all this is that the average man in Great Britain seems to have no notion of the growing momentum of the Indian national demand and its implications.

That being so, we find a perpetual lag, things done the wrong way, important opinion ignored, things done too late. Government spokesmen in the House of Commons are so busy meeting the criticisms of Members of Parliament that they forget India. It is not a difficult task, especially with a party majority behind you, to persuade Parliament to enact a constitution, particularly when you are prepared to solve every difficulty with a paper concession. But the real measure of success is not the majority in the lobbies of the House of Commons, but the measure to which you win the assent of the Indian peoples. There was, for example, the exclusion of Indians from the Statutory Commission and the subsequent and most effective boycott of that inquiry. The Report is an historic document. It explored the ground in a way that was in every respect exemplary. But, politically speaking, the Commission was a failure. In the nature of things it could not interpret sympathetically the state of Indian public opinion, and therefore it could not put forward the sort of proposals which might establish a willing partnership between Britain and India.

It was in these circumstances that the Labour Government took office in 1929 and, if I refer particularly to this period, it is because I believe that a return to its spirit would be the most helpful thing at the present time. The first thing which the Government in 1929 did was to authorise Lord Irwin to make the pronouncement already quoted. That is to say, it defined clearly and, as I have pointed out, without challenge, the goal of Indian policy in India. But there was a second point in Lord Irwin's declaration. It announced that a Round Table Conference would be held. Just as the first announcement had been intended to clarify policy, so the second was intended as a change of method. It was, in fact, a negation in spirit of the preamble of the Government of India Act, which declared that " the time and manner of each advance can be determined only by Parliament." It was an attempt to substitute partnership and discussion for delegation and decision.

At the outset the effort to win co-operation was successful. The *Observer* Delhi correspondent remarked :

> Lord Irwin's announcement has transformed the Indian political scene.

The *Sunday Times* said :

> From the many columns of interviews and opinions in Indian newspapers . . . one salient fact stands out : Lord Irwin has won over all but the extremists, although even in their case the departure from the usual acrimony is significant."

More remarkable still was the announcement following a meeting of Congress and other progressive leaders. There were present, among others, Mr. Gandhi, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, Sir Tej Sapru, Mr. Sastri, Mr. Vallabhai Patel and Mr. Sen Gupta. The motion they passed used the following words :

> We hope to be able to tender our co-operation with His Majesty's Government in their effort to evolve a scheme for a Dominion Constitution suitable to India's needs.

It is true that the statement went on to demand that the Conference should forthwith frame a Dominion Constitution. This promise could not be given, first because it was desired to await the Commission's recommendations, and secondly because of the minority position of the Government. It was remarkable that, though the Indian leaders knew that the Government was in a minority in both Houses, they were prepared to co-operate in the framing of a Dominion Constitution, for the most that the Government could have hoped, had such an agreement been reached, was to place it before Parliament and take the consequences.

About the time of this meeting of Indian leaders a debate took place in Parliament which did much damage to Anglo-Indian relations. In consequence of this, and of the failure of the Government to give the assurances asked for, the Congress was not represented at the First Round Table Conference and launched a campaign of civil disobedience. The following was a year of conflict. But the effort at co-operation was continued. The representatives of British India at the Conference were in close touch with Indian opinion, and every week reports were reaching them of demonstrations and arrests. Yet, despite that, their influence at the end of the

Conference was sufficiently strong to change the course of Congress policy. That is a point well worth remembering. It is true, of course, that there are leaders of the Indian Congress who do not desire co-operation and understanding and with whom such will probably never be achieved, but there is a mass of opinion which does desire co-operation, and would welcome signs of it on our side.

At the beginning of 1931 Lord Irwin saw Mr. Gandhi. That meeting in itself was an outrage to the feelings of those who measure success in the mechanical terms of prestige. I notice that *The Times* correspondent quite recently declared that the agreement "was interpreted by many elements . . . not as a token of strength on the part of a great statesman, but as a sign of weakness on the part of the British Government. This erroneous interpretation did immense harm in this country." However much the Conference may have offended those who think thus, it is a fact that it was the means of bringing the civil disobedience campaign to an end and it was the means of bringing Mr. Gandhi as sole Congress representative to London.

By the time he arrived political circumstances had greatly changed. The economic crisis had destroyed the Labour Government and the Round Table Conference steadily degenerated into something that was more of a deputation than a Conference. A Bill was passed through Parliament which set up a Constitution in India heavily weighted on the Conservative side, a Constitution under which that social and economic emancipation, which is undoubtedly India's greatest need, will be very difficult to achieve. One of the most unsatisfactory features of the Act was the failure to provide any way by which India could develop her own Constitution according to her own desires. In the Preamble to the Act of 1919 words had been used to the effect that Parliament alone could decide the time and manner of each advance and that Parliament must be guided by the extent to which it found that confidence can be reposed in the Indian sense of responsibility. That may have been very suitable in an Act of 1919, but in spirit it is totally out of harmony with our conception of Commonwealth development in the last twenty years. Instead of letting the Preamble of 1919 be decently interred, the Government passed an extraordinary provision, specially exempting from repeal those words. Moreover, they took a

step which removed from executive control the Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governors and the Governor-General. I believe I am right in saying that previously the Government of the day had, through the Secretary of State, been able to shape the spirit of administration in accordance with the policy of the Government, but under the new Act the Instrument of Instructions to the Governors was made subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament: that is to say that, should there come into power a Government not favoured by the House of Lords, they would not be able to amend or liberalise these Instruments of Instructions.

Side by side with this extraordinary exhibition of caution, the Government of India Bill created a vast Indian electorate. At the same time the spirit of the administration in India was changed. The old conception, so simple, so defensible, so stupid, that by a simple process of arrest and imprisonment you can alter the course of a political movement, was given full scope. The non-co-operators, tired out physically and perhaps financially by their long campaign, were soon quelled, and the explosive charge which was to be fired in the Elections was soundly tamped by the authorities.

Then came the Elections a few weeks back. The programme of the Congress was unmistakable. It was Indian independence and the complete abolition of the Constitution, combined with an extensive programme of social changes. On the basis of this programme the Congress won six of the eleven Provinces. That is the situation to-day.

Now, when the strength of Nationalist opinion in India is pointed out to Conservative critics they often retort that the issue as between Britain and India is of small importance compared with the great provincial questions which must occupy the time of Indian ministers governing provinces as large as European states; and, therefore, they go on to argue, the force of these considerations will gradually undermine the strength of the national spirit and reduce the importance of the Anglo-Indian issue. In my judgment this is a complete misconception. So long as the present conflict between the two peoples continues not only will it unite men of all opinions in India (just as Redmond and Devlin, men of widely divergent political beliefs, worked together in the Irish party), but it will also be used as an explanation by popular speakers of the economic plight of the masses of India. That, shortly, is

the lesson that we have learnt from our experience in other cases. Whatever course is decided on, it is certainly very foolish to base our policy upon delusive hopes of this kind.

The parties in a position to take office in the six provinces have declined to do so. Those on the left would have wished to decline in any case. But there is still—and that is the remarkable thing—a large body of opinion even in Congress which desires some appeasement of the Anglo-Indian quarrel. Mr. Gandhi, not for the first time, has come forward with a compromise proposal, the exact meaning of which it is very difficult to understand. In any case it has been rejected and minority ministries are being formed. These ministries will have to face the vote of the Assemblies. Ordinary party conflict will no doubt rapidly destroy them, but something else may happen. Issues may be raised in which they will find themselves in agreement with the Congress majority and in conflict with the Governor. What will happen then? The Governor will be driven to use his extreme powers. Once this has happened all the cards will be in the hands of Congress. They can lie quiet, or they can make public demonstrations according as the Governor's policy is popular or unpopular. The outlook is indeed a very gloomy one. It is true to say that the problems of India are not fundamentally the conflict between races. They are economic, and it is essential that the party representing the mass of Indian opinion should take responsibility for dealing with them. It is essential, that is to say, that such terms should be made as will induce the majorities to take office. This they decline to do unless the Governors give certain assurances. As to the exact nature of these assurances we are in the dark. The Secretary of State has defined quite clearly the responsibilities of the Governors. They have no power of their own. They are the servants of Parliament. Their Instruments of Instructions are indeed an act of Parliament. But Mr. Gandhi has declared that the Congress does not desire the "slightest abrogation of the Constitution." He speaks of a pledge by ministers to act in a constitutional way in return for which they appear to seek what they regard as a normal undertaking, under a self-governing constitution, that the special powers shall not be used. There the matter rests, with the prospect of a break-down.

What is to be done? A few things must be remembered.

First: Parliament has deliberately assumed responsibility and the issue is really between Parliament and the majority ministers. Second: Congress or any other party has a right to demand the abrogation of the Constitution and promote this aim in every proper way. Third: This is an All-India problem and any attempt to break up the All-Indian Congress organisation by forcing separate provincial settlements is a mistake. Fourth: It is idle to speak resentfully of Congress "attempting to set up an alternative Government." The majority party in any province ought to be not an *alternative* Government, but *the* responsible Government.

It is not only Congress but, so far as reported, all sections of the public who desire at this stage Conference concession and agreement. Once it can be made clear that responsibility conceded and accepted is the straight road to full self-government, difficulties should disappear.

W. Wedgwood Benn.

CATALONIA IN ARMS.

SOONER or later, far distant as that event may seem at the moment, the Civil War in Spain must come to an end; and either the end itself, or the beginning of the end, is likely to come in Catalonia. If, with Madrid taken, the armies of General Franco push eastwards, it seems probable that the first effective resistance with which they will meet beyond the capital will be on the border of that region which has most to lose in the event of his victory—the one region which was given Home Rule by the Second Republic. If, on the other hand, the Valencia Government is going to turn continual disaster and apparent defeat into eventual victory, this will be attributable in great part to Barcelona. For since, after a two-day struggle, the rebellious Barcelona garrisons were put down in July 1936, and the "proletarian revolution" which had been rehearsed so often under the Republic was consummated, the factories of the largest city in Spain have been continuously employed in the production of war material, and no other city can be working so feverishly and so effectively to this end.

The seizure of power in Catalonia by the Workers' Unions and the creation of a collectivist State, almost independent of the rest of Red Spain, are by now matters of common knowledge. The purpose of this article is to trace the history of Catalonia since the capture of Málaga by the Nationalists on February 8th and to show how this—one of the most important events of the war—has modified the temper of the Catalan people.

Why, it may well be asked, should the fall of a city on the south coast of Spain have any great effect upon a quasi-independent State in the north-east? Why Málaga? Why not Badajoz, Irún, San Sebastián or Toledo? Partly because the capture of Málaga is of far greater consequence than that of the foregoing: it is both a larger city in itself and of greater importance in that its possession gives the Nationalists a more effective control of the Mediterranean. But partly also because the attitude of the Valencia Government to its numerous defeats changed with the loss of Málaga. Previously it has said nothing of disasters and done its best to hide them. On the day after the fall of Irún, the Government press *communiqué* had simply remarked that the enemy were

"attempting" to take the town, but that their attacks were "shattered by the courage of the loyal troops." On the day after the fall of Toledo, the official report ran: "Our troops have been obliged to give ground, which they have done in perfect order." But on the day after the fall of Málaga the Government press everywhere rang with cries for new effort, denunciations of defeatist policy and demands for a more efficient prosecution of the war. And nowhere were these cries more vibrant than in Catalonia. *Tothom al costat del Govern!* "Each and all must rally to the Government!" was the slogan of the day. "They shall not win!" was the main headline, on February 11th, of the staid old *Vanguardia*. "Never again!" exclaimed the Socialist paper *Treball*, and other organs of the proletariat took up the cry.

> The loss of Málaga is not an event that can be disregarded because it was inevitable. Quite the contrary: we must speak of it and speak of it again and again, so that we may learn its lessons. —*Treball*, February 11th, 1937.
>
> Let us hope that the fall of Málaga will give us what the people are demanding vociferously. . . . Unity, discipline, and—to the front!—*Diari de Barcelona*, February 10th, 1937.
>
> Even if we had lost Madrid the war would not have come to an end. We have lost Málaga, after a heroic struggle which has been the admiration of the world, and international Fascism has not abated a jot of the courage of the workers in arms.—*Solidaridad Obrera*, February 11th, 1937.

What were these things which the people were demanding with such insistence and these lessons which it was so important to learn? Principally three: unity of command; cessation of strife between the parties composing the Popular Front and the immediate creation of one great unified, popular Catalan army.

Party unity was achieved first of the three—achieved, that is to say, as far as is ever likely to be the case when parties of absolutely antithetical ideals are collaborating. Nowhere had the strife between the four chief Left groups been fiercer than in Catalonia, for here not only were both the centralising influence of Soviet Russia and the strength of the decentralising Anarcho-Syndicalist groups greater than in most parts of Spain, but the bourgeois supporters of "pure Republicanism," who deprecated extremism in any form, including the new collectivist State, were numerous, though temporarily

deprived of influence and power. Time and again during the latter months of 1936 the parties had neared the condition of open warfare and their dissensions had produced one political crisis, either public or private, after another. But since the December reconstruction of the Government of the Generalitat the parties had come nearer to sinking their differences than ever before, and, two days after Málaga fell, a round-table conference between Syndicalist, Socialist, Unified Socialist and Anarchist Unions, convoked " to study the general political and military situation in the country," produced the following rather academic but highly significant resolution :

> That, inasmuch as the strictest and most loyal unity is necessary among us, as also between us and the other organisations of the anti-Fascist front, we agree to ratify our unity on the basis of the pact already established between our four bodies . . . urging the Government to take the measures necessary for a rapid and definite organisation of the Popular Army and to intensify war production so that the Aragonese front may speedily meet the exigencies of the moment.

So much for the situation as between the extremist Unions. A much more serious question, however, was that of the relations between the Unions, the Esquerra (or Catalan Left Republican party), and the great mass of Catalan opinion, which during the seven months of extremist rule—less tolerable, thought many of them, than the seven years of Monarchist Dictatorship—had gradually realised that its position was becoming hopeless. Whichever side won the war, the dream of Catalonians of their country's development and prosperity under the Home Rule they had won for themselves was vanishing. Both General Franco and the Communists repudiated anything approaching regional autonomy ; the Anarcho-Syndicalists laughed at what they called bourgeois federalism and proposed, if they triumphed, to establish a very different kind of federalism of their own. Could anything be done to bring these elements more closely together ? At the least, attempts could be made.

The first attempt was the foundation, by the Anarcho-Syndicalist Union (C.N.T.), of a new daily " regional organ," written wholly in Catalan, and called *Catalunya*. This, in a country where daily papers spring up like mushrooms in a night, and are as soon forgotten, may not seem very important, but in reality it was symptomatic of a genuine *rapprochement*. The Anarcho-Syndicalists are easily the most important extremist force in Catalonia—both by their numbers and because they have more in common with Catalonian ideals than any other body. President Companys and his Esquerra party, since the disappearance of the Conservative Lliga Catalana, are the sole organised representatives of genuine Catalonian opinion. Each of these groups has long desired to make itself master of the other, and this seems to have been the aim of each in joining forces. The first number of *Catalunya* appeared on February 22nd. It was indeed a weird medley of fervid Catalanism and ideals completely irreconcilable with those of an autonomous Catalonia. " For anarchists," wrote one C.N.T. official, " there is no such thing as a native land—only the world." Yet " anarchism was born in Catalonia, and Barcelona is its home." " Long live Catalonia! " cry the headlines and the leading article of this first number. Yet, writes Federica Montseny on the front page, " we are universalists, free from all taint of regionalism." What was the Catalonian in the street to make of all this, especially as this paper which renounced age-old Catalonian ideals and employed the Catalan language to do so, bore also on its front page the image and subscription of Catalonia's President, accompanied by an article of commendation ? Obviously, this was a mere emotional appeal to Catalonian sentiment, which lost its force immediately one began seriously to think about it : evidently it was launched with the idea and hope that Catalonia had ceased to think. For those who had not, the Generalitat issued an imposing *communiqué* at the end of the same month, reporting that President Companys had urged upon it the imperative necessity for a united front both for winning the war and for " completing the social transformation which constitutes the aspiration of our people." It was clear that, whatever the future, unity was to be the watchword for the present.

This accomplished, the next thing was to transform the Catalan army, established in the preceding December, into a genuine " army of the people." Within a fortnight of the loss of Málaga, the Government of the Republic had decreed the mobilisation of all men belonging to the 1932 to 1936 classes, and throughout Catalonia, as elsewhere, the decree

had been acclaimed as a " fulfilment of the will of the people, spontaneously manifested all over loyal Spain."* But in Barcelona, at least, the popular will had outrun Governmental measures. Early in February the employees of General Motors, engaged on war production, had announced their intention of meeting daily after hours for military training. Their example was infectious. The Barcelona employees of Ford, Pirelli and Hispano-Suiza, gas and electricity workers, telegraph operators, bank clerks and all kinds of other men engaged on necessary service formed similar bands. They began their work on the third Sunday in February with parades in all the large open spaces of Barcelona, and at six o'clock on the following evening passers-by were amazed to find the great Plaça de Catalunya and the centre walks of the long plane-lined avenues known as the Rambles filled with companies of workers drilling under instructors from the barracks, their total number being estimated as fifteen thousand. This was the first event of the *Setmana pro Exèrcit Popular*—a week devoted to recruiting throughout Catalonia for the " Regular Army of the People."

On the last day of February, a Sunday that will long be remembered, a successful week came to a grandiose climax. The daily sight of bands of eager young men training in streets and squares in order to qualify for admission to the Army of the People had been more effective than weeks of oratory. Further, the new understanding between Esquerra and Unions had resulted in the giving of a new prominence to Catalan ideals ; the *bandera barrada* or striped flag of Catalonia had for a time taken the place of the Socialist and Communist red flag and the Anarchist red-and-black. For months, Catalans who were inspired by the ideals of none of the Unions had been almost in the position of that much-talked-of but possibly fabulous " Fifth Column," composed of supporters of General Franco in Madrid who were reputed to be ready to rise as one body, from all parts of the capital, and slay their oppressors, upon his victorious entry. There is little doubt that, had some leader in Catalonia arisen in support of genuinely Catalonian aspirations during the first seven months of the war, his fellow-countrymen would have flocked to him from all sides. But now the symbol of Catalan liberty had been unfurled in the service of the Republic and (though the

* *Treball*, February 23rd, 1937.

fact was not obvious) in that of the " proletarian Revolution." And for the first time the people responded with a single voice. " Never until last Sunday," remarked the Socialist organ *Las Noticias* (February 23rd) of the day on which the Army Week began, " was Barcelona really moved by the war. It was not a question of isolated groups coming together. It was a meeting of the entire youth of Catalonia."

What an imposing spectacle the great demonstration which closed the recruiting week must have been only those familiar with Barcelona can adequately imagine. From half-past ten in the morning until a quarter to three in the afternoon the long procession, consisting chiefly of soldiers of the " new Army," marched through the central square of Barcelona, the Plaça de Catalunya. Flags and banners were carried aloft, together with placards bearing life-sized representations of Macià, Azaña, Largo Caballero, Companys and heroes of the war (described as the " General Staff of the Army of Liberty "). The crowd, estimated at 300,000, lined a route over four miles long. As a climax to the march-past came an act of dedication, made in the presence of President Companys by the immense crowd which flocked into the Square and completely filled it.

> " With to-day's manifestation," said the President, " the New Army Week comes to an end and there begins a new period of discipline, iron will and stern resolution."
>
> " Victory will be ours because we will it so, because we merit it, and because fate has decided it in the name of the eternal forces of civilisation and progress."
>
> " Catalonians! Do you promise, for the honour of your regiments, to endure every sacrifice and put forth every effort in order to conquer Fascism ? "
>
> " Do you promise this also for the lives and the future of your children ? "
>
> " Do you promise it for the sake of your own dignity and of your rights as individuals and as a people ? "

After each question the President paused and the great crowd sent back to him a clamorous *Sí*.

> " Catalonians! " concluded the President. " Your promise has ascended into the infinite spaces, has made itself heard throughout the world and will penetrate into the future to be judged by generations yet to come. Remember this, Catalonians! *Visca la Llibertat!* "

So, with *visques* for the Republic, for Catalonia and for the Generalitat, the demonstration came to an end. Theatrical it may perhaps sound to a soberer race, but it struck the right note, and there is no doubt that the determination of the Catalonians is firmer, and their morale higher, than at any time since the war began. From the point of view of the Valencia Government, too, it came very opportunely, for only two days earlier Sr. Largo Caballero had published a long and extremely frank statement threatening resignation if there were any more suggestions of compromise with the enemy. Though "really satisfied" with the progress of the war, he was profoundly uneasy at the manœuvres being carried out in loyal territory by the "agents of Fascism" and at the common talk of "intervention with a view to terminating the struggle." Lip-service was being paid to the ideals of democracy, but loyalty and obedience were not what they had been. "We must fight on bravely and carry sacrifice to its utmost limit. . . . We must crush, with iron hand, all in our ranks who take the standpoint of the enemy." To all this the Barcelona demonstration provided an effective answer, as well as producing an invigorating effect all over loyal Spain.

In the "rearguard," too, Catalonia is preparing for more sacrifices. With the increased and increasing efficiency of the new police forces, public order has greatly improved, and a joint manifesto issued by them at the end of February not only forecast a tightening up of discipline, but revealed, by implication, a vastly healthier public spirit. Food shortage has also been taken in hand, and throughout Catalonia bread rationing came into force at the beginning of March, each person being allowed only 250 grammes daily.

The progress of the Government's troops during March and early April gave an added zest to the voluntary training movement in Catalonia and the tone of letters received from Barcelona, as well as that of the press, has been much more cheerful than during the winter. Confidence in an eventual victory for the Government seems quite to have revived, especially since the defeat of the Italians on the Guadalajara front in mid-March. Only one disturbing feature has occurred —a recrudescence of that party strife which one had thought to have been more nearly under control, but which will probably reappear yet again, since the settlement announced on April 5th can hardly be permanent. The trouble first

blazed up early in March between the Unified Socialists and the P.O.U.M. (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification), which has suffered from its supposed affiliation with the Moscow Trotskyists, and has been said, on its own part, to have done a good deal in stirring up the disaffection towards Russia which has increased during the spring. The slightness of the new quarrel between these two parties only emphasises the degree of tension which everyone feels to be existing. The political parties and Unions had drawn up a document renouncing the use of violence and calumny in their press and propagandist campaigns. The document, a typical gesture of the times, could have had little effect, but a sensation was caused when the Unified Socialists refused to sign it. On top of this came a much more serious crisis, which on March 26th caused the resignation of the Catalonian Government. This was due to a variant on the same theme—the continual clash between the two groups of parties with antithetical ideals, on this occasion between the Socialists and the Anarcho-Syndicalists. For three and a half months the last Government had managed to hold together, and at first it seemed as though a slight reshuffling of portfolios would ease the difficulties. After a week had passed, however, Sr. Terradellas declared that no formula had been found and on the next day the President of the Generalitat announced that the numbers in the Cabinet had been reduced, by a combination of portfolios, from eleven to six, and that Socialists, Syndicalists and Esquerra would have exactly equal representation. There seems no guarantee in this arrangement that the rivalry will be any the less fierce, and we may certainly expect further crises before the summer.

E. Allison Peers.

AUSTRIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

AT the time of writing the rumours of a *rapprochement* between Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia cannot be taken very seriously. Between Hungary and Czechoslovakia not only the Habsburg question, but the territorial problem stands as a formidable obstacle. Yet the new perspective is the consequence of circumstances of a weighty and possibly permanent character. Some years ago an Austrian visitor to M. Laval, then Foreign Secretary of France, referring to a *rapprochement* between France and Italy, expressed the opinion that it would be welcomed in Austria. M. Laval observed : " Not if it were effected *sur le dos de l'Autriche*." A similar observation might be applied to the present situation. Austria certainly had reason to be gratified at the re-establishment of cordial relations between Rome and Berlin, which, in view of the recognition of Austrian independence by Germany, eliminated the danger of a serious conflict between Austria's neighbours. However, this country can hardly welcome the construction of an " axis " which is bound to impart an element of rigidity and of exclusiveness to the whole system. For nations living between the poles of such an axis there is an evident danger of being impaled on it, if they are not very strong. There is no question of Austria's and Hungary's desire to stick to the Rome Agreements—for political, economic and psychological reasons—but they equally desire to keep a certain liberty of movement to the west.

Events which have taken place since Herr von Neurath was in Vienna have confirmed them in these intentions. A prominent diplomat is reported as having said : " A few more such visits and the Agreement of July 11th, 1936, is a thing of the past." Conversations began in an atmosphere dangerously close to the freezing point. On the Austrian side Herr von Neurath's attention was drawn to certain newspaper prohibitions in Germany and to appointments made there which were felt as an insult here. Herr von Neurath, doubtless in perfect good faith, disclaimed any knowledge of such things ; but this drew the sharp rejoinder that in such circumstances a conversation was nearly useless. The inference is that party influences behind the scene of the Berlin Foreign Office, which frequently interfere with the conduct of official business, had

again put a spoke in Herr von Neurath's wheel. However, neither such differences as there were, nor the noisy demonstrations of Hitler sympathisers on his arrival would be worth recording if in important problems of a general nature a feeling of estrangement after the honeymoon of reconciliation were not growing apace.

To mention the most recent events only : Austria could not remain entirely indifferent when in Hungary radicals of the right, in an atmosphere of cordial relations with Germany, prepared a revolutionary attempt to apply their racial prejudices. The revolt was nipped in the bud, and the Hungarian Government was able rapidly and without apparent exertion to make the adventurers turn tail. But events of the kind are a warning. Another circumstance is the fight against communism. In Austria severe penalties are meted out for attempts at communist activity. However, neither Dr. von Schuschnigg nor any of his henchmen have ever fallen into a crusading spirit against communism, or have been tempted to engage in an ideological warfare and the outlawry of the Soviet Union as systematically preached from Berlin. On the contrary, the Chancellor only a few weeks ago cautiously but plainly let it be understood that Austria feels herself quite strong enough to keep any communist tendencies under strict control without special and violent exertions. A third fact of importance from the point of view of Austro-German relations is that a country essentially Catholic like Austria was bound to react sharply when the Papal Encyclical revealed the religious distress of German Catholics. At a time when the Sovereign Pontiff himself in a moving pastoral letter impugns Nazi loyalty to treaty obligations, and feels compelled to contemplate the necessity of a spiritual fight in defence of religion, Austria could not let her political conduct be guided by the self-styled " Builders of the Bridge," who are to be found even in some ecclesiastical quarters of Rome.

In these circumstances the position of the Nazis in Austria has deteriorated rather than improved. Disguised as " pronouncedly nationals " they had two representatives in the Cabinet, Herr von Neustädter-Stürmer in charge of public security and Herr von Glaise-Horstenau at the head of the Ministry of the Interior. The former proved himself woefully lacking in skill and stability of purpose, but his readiness to revise his political tenets held out no hopes of a development

towards a higher form of statesmanship. Originally a nationalist, he later became an adherent of Prince Starhemberg and faithfully followed his leader into all the latter's blunders. At Starhemberg's fall he left him and consented to remain Austrian Minister at Budapest, before he was appointed to the Cabinet again. There he tried to acquire a nuisance value by grouping around him camouflaged Nazis who were to be organised in a German Social Popular Union at Graz. This would have meant for all practical purposes the resurrection of the National-Socialist party in Austria; the Patriotic Front would have ceased to be the sole instrument of the political will of the population; and Austria would again have become the plaything of party coalitions. In that case the political legacy of Dollfuss would have been lost, and German recognition of the independence of Austria become an empty word. However, the heyday of Nazi ambitions was short. Public opinion became alarmed and protests were voiced in the provinces. There was some plain speaking in the press and the project was quickly dropped. What remained was the unpleasant taste of the fact that a few hundred persons, some of them prominent in public life, had consented to act as sponsors of the proposed union. But no seditious intention can be imputed to them since the plan had the active support of a Cabinet Minister.

Herr von Neustädter-Stürmer was discharged from the Government on March 21st, his place being taken not by another exponent of the Nationalists but by the Chancellor himself, who chose as his adviser in matters relating to public security the President of the Police, Dr. Skubl, whose impartiality and unreserved loyalty to the State have never been in doubt. Dr. Skubl's personality is forceful without a hint of brutality. He has authority without resort to the clenched fist. His complete command of the apparatus of public security, his broad intellectual interests, his conciliatoriness which, however, never leads him to gloss over things, make him the worthy heir of Schober. The new State Secretary of public security is not the man to pave the way for the accession of Hitlerism. To propitiate the Nationalists who lost a Cabinet office, the Chancellor promised the organisation within the Patriotic Front of a bureau in charge of their interests; but this is considered as a mere gesture without great importance. Austria has thus been able to reap

the benefits of the agreement with Germany while avoiding its dangers. She has no more let herself be enmeshed in the net of the new friendship than she submitted to bullying before. She has gradually found herself, and it would perhaps be apt to apply to her case the words of the mother of Napoleon, *Pourvu que cela dure*.

A short visit to Czechoslovakia provides food for absorbing reflections. There you have a country surrounded on three sides by inimical neighbours, an island as you might say in a sea of hostility, with deep ethnical, political and social cleavages. Yet great progress has been made towards the goal of internal pacification by the compromise with the Germans. Czechoslovakia, as the Prime Minister Dr. Hodza put it in a conversation with the writer, has passed her matriculation. The agreement is not mere make-believe designed to impress public opinion abroad. On the contrary, as the writer was assured by the German Minister Spina, Dr. Benes has made himself responsible for the scrupulous fulfilment of the compromise, and the first batch of important appointments has already been published. The pact was made between the Government and the German parties which are for active co-operation. For Dr. Benes as for Dr. Hodza, it was a well-deserved satisfaction that their own radical nationalists intimated approval, and especially that from so strong a personality as Dr. Kramars, a passionate critic and fierce opponent of the Government, came the words: I do not protest. Dr. Hodza is right in interpreting this attitude as a symptom of the fact that in Czechoslovakia as in England the parliamentary opposition, notwithstanding severe criticism of the Government, is never oblivious of its responsibilities to the nation as a whole. The Government declined to include the Henlein party in the negotiations, holding the not unreasonable opinion that in a democracy a totalitarian group has no claim to be treated on the same footing as the constitutionalists. A party which refuses every kind of co-operation has no right to a share in the credit for results which the loyalist German parliamentarians had obtained through sacrifices and disdain of demagogy. There is some justification for the hope that the by no means homogeneous German opposition will be weakened by the agreement, the moral and material benefits of which may well cure many of Herr Henlein's supporters of their Hitler sympathies. The fact

that the extensive rearmament programme and the devaluation of the Czech crown increases employment in the German-speaking districts with their highly developed industry is also likely to play an important part.

In regard to foreign policy the prevailing note in all statements from responsible quarters is one of strong confidence. As far as relations with England are concerned, the growing comprehension manifested in London of the importance which Central European affairs may have for the Continent as a whole is noted with great satisfaction. A clearer formulation of British interest in this part of the world would naturally be welcome. But a general conflagration is not anticipated. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak Premier the chances of the preservation of peace, which were 50 : 50 in December, are now 90 : 10. In British rearmament above all he sees one of the decisive safeguards which will make an aggression against peace-loving countries too risky. Another reason why Dr. Hodza does not believe in the imminence of war is his settled opinion that France, under the leadership of Léon Blum, in spite of occasional disturbances, has successfully passed the acute phase of political and financial danger. Further, authoritative quarters in Czechoslovakia rightly or wrongly hold the view that there is a growing conviction in Germany that little can be gained and much might be lost by a continued resort to surprise tactics.

The darker spots in the picture are the relations with Poland, which still leave much to be desired, and the lack of an agreement with Yugoslavia in regard to the Soviet Union. In conversation with the writer, Dr. Hodza reacted with great energy against plans for the restoration of the Habsburgs in Austria, which in his opinion would be a catastrophe. In unequivocal terms he pointed out the grave risks from another quarter which Austria would run in the case of a surprise action. Regret was expressed at the Belgian attitude, as it might to some extent hamper French liberty of movement. But it is hoped that an agreement will eventually be arrived at between Belgium and France whereby in given circumstances, say in the case of an unprovoked aggression against Czechoslovakia, the full observance of the Covenant will be guaranteed. The charge of a bolshevisation of the country is rightly described as ridiculous. President Benes is known to be the sworn enemy of a "popular front"

experiment, and he would not appoint any government of an extremist character, whether right or left. The greatest care is bestowed on the scrupulous avoidance of anything that might be made into a cause of an external conflict. Czechoslovakia's policy in this respect is shaped on the English model. While she proceeds with an extensive rearmament programme as rapidly as circumstances permit, she endeavours to remove all pretexts for interference and agitation. Co-operation with Germany would be welcome, but no "axis" and no hegemony. Collaboration with the Danubian countries is the thing most earnestly desired. It may be easier to achieve now that the tension between Yugoslavia and Italy has been removed.

In the economic field the progress in recent months has been imposing, amounting on an average to about 22 per cent. over the preceding year. The production figures of 1929 have almost been reached. In the iron industry the previous high record has even been exceeded, and employment is two and a half times what it was at low-water level in 1932. Conditions in the textile industry which had long been distressed, and in the glass industry, have also greatly improved. The one fact which is apt to cause a certain alarm is the rapid rise of the prices of industrial raw materials ; but so far the cost of living has not been greatly affected thereby.

Austria has also lately made considerable economic progress. Public subscriptions to the Investment Loan produced 160 million schillings, of which over 100 million was in small and medium-sized amounts, and no artifices were required to secure this gratifying result. The loan has no gold clause, and its yield is somewhat lower than the present yield of other Government securities. Interest at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. is a rate not far removed from pre-war days, and so was the price of issue. The proceeds of the loan enable the Minister of Finance to fund part of the floating debt, to defray the costs of urgently required military equipments, and to finance capital expenditure, chiefly of the road and railway systems. The electrification of the Salzburg–Linz section is being undertaken, and many roads are to be repaired and modernised. By State guarantees and subsidies about 100 millions will be mobilised to promote building activity, which has so far been depressed. The number of unemployed is at present about 17,000 below the figure of a year ago, and exports have risen despite

devaluations in other countries, as the iron and steel industry, the paper mills and some lines of the textile industry have benefited by the world economic improvement. If to these forces of recovery the public works undertaken by the Government are added, it is perhaps not too sanguine to hope that Austria is heading for a moderate prosperity.

Much remains to be desired, in both politics and economics. The corporative organisation has not quite proceeded at the rate it should, and Dr. von Schuschnigg has now appointed as his adviser in matters of the kind Dr. Ender, a former Chancellor and now President of the Court of Audits. As regards the corporative system Professor Messner, a prominent expert on the subject who is close to the clericals, has pointed to two grave dangers inherent in the idea. One is that the State reserves the right of appointing the delegates of the guilds, and grants to the latter an insufficient measure of autonomy. The other is that the self-interest of the guilds might overbear their public spirit. Professor Messner urges the necessity of allowing the people a larger share in the control of the State, and suggests direct elections to the Leaders' Council of the Patriotic Front instead of nominations by the guilds only. The latter in his opinion must at present be defined as mere organisations for the defence of corporate interests, while they should strive to become unions for collective work in the interest of the State. Warnings of the kind, inspired by undoubted patriotic sentiments, go together with demands for greater publicity of the deliberations of legislative bodies, a reduction of taxes, encouragement for private enterprise, and a more liberal credit policy. Consumption has not progressed on the same scale as production, and in this respect the situation is not altogether free from misgivings.

ERNST BENEDIKT.

Vienna.

THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION.

IN Mussolini's speech at Milan, on November 1st, 1936, we had an unusually clear and definite statement on the Magyar Question. What so many people had thought, and muttered privately, for so long; what even statesmen had occasionally hinted; what most had feared even to suggest in public—the Italian Dictator said right out, *more suo*. And however bitterly and deeply British public opinion may be opposed to the Duce in various matters, great and outstanding matters among them, however grieved we may often feel by his policies and his words, in this subject there may well be some response from any and all British observers and students of international affairs. "Until justice is done to Hungary there can be no final co-ordination of interests in the Danube basin. Hungary is truly the great mutilated nation. Four millions of Hungarians live beyond her present frontiers." And Mussolini added that, in claiming to pursue abstract justice in the said Danube basin, other injustice, perhaps greater, had been committed. The Italian people, he continued, recognised the manly qualities of the Magyars, their courage, their spirit of sacrifice. Soon, it might be, there would be a "solemn opportunity" for those Italian sympathies to find public and striking manifestation.

Everyone in this country at all interested and informed as to South-Eastern and Central Europe—its history, its racial values, its present conditions—has known, or suspected, or feared, all along, that the treatment of Hungary by the Peace Settlements of 1919 (like the treatment of Germany) was remarkably harsh and punitive. Terrible but just, said apologists of Versailles and Trianon, at the time. But now a far wider circle would surely question the justice, while more and more regretting the terror.

In the case of Germany the extreme advocates of punishment and vengeance in 1919, baulked of their hopes of absolutely crippling territorial mutilations (at least in the West), trusted in the efficacy of another weapon which was to be no less effective—the economic. ("Here"—with Indemnities and Reparations—"we come to the really solid framework of the treaty. Here is the network from which Germany will never be able to escape.") But in the case of Hungary it was less possible to extract, or hope for, enormous payments—it

was more possible to carry out sweeping territorial alienations. And especially in the name of the new little nations which were being created or aggrandised—which in any case claimed reward as allies of the triumphant Cause. Were not the Magyars, had they not been for many years (said French detractors) *les hobereaux des Allemands* ?

The great political architects and map-makers at Paris, therefore, proceeded to deprive the Realm of St. Stephen of more than two-thirds of its land (say 72 per cent.) and of almost two-thirds (say 64 per cent.) of its population and economic wealth. Pre-War Hungary was a land of 325,000 square kilometres (or about 125,000 English square miles)—counting its Croatian and Slavonian lands. By the Peace Settlement she has been deprived of 232,000 square kilometres, and left with less than 100,000—93,000 would seem to be about the figure. From an area almost the same as that of Britain-with-Ireland she has been reduced to the size of England without Wales. Within her territories she had in 1913-14 nearly twenty-one millions of people. She was left in 1919 with 7,500,000. Rumania alone has received more area at the expense of *Magyarorszag* (102,000 square kilometres) than has been left to that diminished and impoverished state. Thus Hungary lost most of her forests—more than four-fifths, indeed 88 per cent., of her total forest area. Of her pine woods she has only retained a still more insignificant fraction (less than one thirty-fifth)—for she has lost almost all her mountains. With all this sacrifice of timber and timber trade she has naturally been deprived of her paper material. Her iron-ore production, her principal mineral wealth, has been reduced by four-fifths, or even a little more. All her salt-mines, which were famous and valuable, have been taken from her. It is the same with her (less important) mines of gold and silver.

By President Wilson's axioms, and by the settlement which still—in territory, frontiers, and the content of states—regulates our Europe (though otherwise that settlement has been completely unsettled) it was declared vital that Poland should have access to the sea. And so a way to the sea was cut, for Poland, through the very body of Germany—an operation of political surgery from which even Napoleon had recoiled. But Hungary (being under sentence of political excommunication, interdict, and deposition) was now not

only cut off from the sea, but carefully and distantly removed from it. And all these losses (the Hungarians cry) are accentuated and embittered by the fact that Hungary is economically isolated, or almost isolated, from the rest of the world by the customs-duties of the Succession States that surround her. These States, by their very formation or expansion, are in a very difficult position. Either they must accept considerable (perhaps profound) modification—beginning with a far kindlier treatment of their Magyar, German, and other minorities—or they must rigidly continue their policy of uncompromising adhesion to the *status quo* as given by Versailles, Trianon, and St. Germain. And if they hold to the latter they must still be deeply hostile to Hungary's recovery; they must watch her every movement as cat watches mouse; and they must continually raise their armaments, if not their tariffs, against the Magyar danger—as against other perils.

Seldom was anything more riskily and more one-sidedly done in recent history than the aggrandisement of Poland, Rumania, Great Bohemia, and Great Serbia in 1919. Instead of consolidating truly national entities, the peacemakers here formed dominions with very composite characters and very questionable features. Millions of people of alien race, proud of their race and their culture (their own higher race and culture, as they often passionately believed), were, without mercy or appeal, swept into these new states. No self-determination, no plebiscite, no really adequate safeguards of minority rights—in so many cases. Was Lord Newton quite wrong when he declared in the House of Lords that the Peace Treaties had pushed down some twelve millions of Europeans from Higher to Lower Civilisation? Might he not have put the figure even higher?

We may all sympathise with the recognition—within truly Slavonic limits—of a Bohemian-Czech nationality, which has so often and so unsuccessfully attempted to express itself in earlier centuries. And we may also sympathise with a desire to give a new start in political life (if they themselves really demanded such) to the Croats, the Rumanians of Transylvania, and others. The Slovaks had every right to break away from Hungary, if such was their determined wish. But in every case the future was surely to be settled in accordance with an unfettered, definite, and considered vote. Otherwise there was no true settlement. Civilised mankind should not

be driven from one pen to another—like oxen—by the sheer will of a herdsman.

We all now condemn the eighteenth-century Partition of Poland—so far as it absorbed truly Polish lands. But the treatment of Hungary in our own days seems to go, we may say, quite half the way to absolute partition, and to be only in degree a less shameful violation of the rights of nations. And as in the case of Poland, Hungary had a glorious past, giving her perhaps some title to the gratitude rather than the vengeance of Christendom. If the Poles could point to John Sobieski, the Magyars could bring forward their John Hunyadi. The Magyar State in the thirteenth century was engulfed and desolated (like the old free Russia) by the Turco-Tartars of the Mongol deluge. And early in the sixteenth century, in the last years of Wolsey, and in the triumphant first years of Luther's Protestantism, Hungary for the most part perished as a martyr-nation, sacrificed to the Ottoman Turks, whose advance she had stemmed so long. That sacrifice lasted for nearly two hundred years—in its dreadful fullness. And when restored (by 1699) to something of a free, civilised, and Christian life, the Magyars still suffered, till 1867, the loss of complete independence and even of Home Rule.

Things have turned out even worse than the Treaty promised—complain the Hungarians. By the provisions of 1919 the free use of their language and religion was to be permitted to all subjects of the Succession States. Racial rights were not to be infringed. No laws or official instructions were to be issued or enforced contrary to these obligations. In towns and districts containing pretty large national minorities the new Government was to ensure that the children of such minorities should be taught in their mother-tongue.

In many ways and in thousands of cases (it is claimed by the Magyars) these provisions have been weakened, evaded, and even nullified. The Hungarian language—is it allowed free course in the annexed regions? Has not the Hungarian Press in those lands been cowed and broken by censorship and confiscation? Are not Hungarian notices and signs severely restricted? Are not persons harassed in many ways who speak Hungarian? In particular, is not the stage in many parts of these alienated lands almost closed to Hungarian players?

In education have not the New Governments constantly refused to allow the parents to decide what was the mother-tongue of the children, thus forcing the latter into schools which were abhorrent to their parents? Strong attacks have also been made (by the spokesmen of these National Minorities) on the conduct of the examinations, in which, it is asserted, Magyar candidates have been "failed" with suspicious frequency. Why should one in four, one in three, or even one in two, among these young folk, in certain years and in certain districts, be rejected, while among the little ones of dominant races failures are so much more rare?

In religion, especially, strong condemnation has come from external observers. Thus the American Unitarian Association and the Presbyterian World Union, through their Commissions of Investigation, gave very substantial support to many of the Hungarian grievances, the Presbyterians even declaring that none of the treaty rights provided for minorities in the annexed or "detached" territories were respected. Brutality and even terrorism, these Americans thought, often characterised the new rule.

Once firmly established in power and possession (which is nine-tenths of the law) the Succession States (it is said) discharged, rendered homeless, and often expelled, the old Hungarian officials, even those who took the new oath of allegiance with all possible circumspection. And they usually refused (a measure of especial harshness) to continue pensions to Hungarian pensioners, even to widows. Such, at least, is the *gravamen*. The Hungarian landowners, once so important and powerful a class, complain bitterly of the cruel cunning with which they have been extruded. In one and all of the Succession States (they protest) an initial process of harassing and squeezing was applied to them. Then by a Land Reform Act the law was skilfully brought into play against them, and in most cases they were only too glad to dispose of their properties, though often with ruinous loss. On the land thus acquired veritable Plantations of Ulster were carried out, and Czech, Serb, or Rumanian military settlers were put in occupation—frequently of districts historically and strongly Magyar in character.

No less ruthless in many cases was the treatment of Hungarian banks and factories, financial, industrial, and commercial undertakings, in the detached territories. By the

Minority Contracts the Succession States were forbidden to deprive the dwellers in the detached territories of their citizen-rights. But Trianon itself (at the instance, it is said, of these very Succession States) gave a loophole for evasion by the provision that only those were entitled to the new citizenship who belonged to the commune of a town or village. Taking advantage of this and of the vague, complicated, and even equivocal character of only too much Hungarian legislation, the new governments succeeded in excluding from citizenship many thousands of Magyars. In many of the annexed regions, as in Slovak-Land, the Hungarian Minority really extended far beyond Magyar speech and blood. In Slovakia indeed, as in certain parts of Transylvania (if we reckon by sympathy, the "citizenship of the heart"), it is no Minority, after all, but the great bulk of the people of the soil.

I have known some enthusiastic leaders of Czech nationalism, and I well remember how they deplored, away back in 1902-3, the Magyar affinities of those Slovaks, racially cousins or brothers of the Bohemian Czechs, but politically and culturally inclined (for the most part) to cling fast to the Hungarian connection which had so long, and on the whole, so happily and so prosperously subsisted.

Since their separation from *Magyarorszag* the Slovaks appear more and more to regret it; to deplore any spurts of ill-temper against their old allegiance in the past; to reaffirm their essential Hungarian sympathies; and to demand a free plebiscite. "For a thousand years the Slovaks loved their Hungarian home. . . They were always loyal to their [Magyar] Sovereign. . . . They never shewed any political consanguinity with us Czechs, and even in their literature they severed themselves from us." So wrote a prominent Bohemian, decades before Trianon or the Great War. And it is just the same now. The Czechs (says a representative foreign journalist) insist that they and the Slovaks are one and the same nation: the Slovaks deny it. Yet surely Slovak consent is essential to this marriage?

In Transylvania—as in the Banat, and some other districts of the south, though not in Croatia—there also appears to be a formidable Hungarian case, although the details of the problem are here so different. In this Erdely (at the time of Trianon; about 1928; and at the present date) there was and is a majority, but surely only a small one, of the Rumanian

race. The great block of Szekely (Szekler) Hungarians and the lesser block of Saxon Germans (34·3 per cent. and 8·7 per cent.) together accounted for 43 per cent. of the population. These facts hardly entitled peace-dictators and map-makers, without plebiscite, to hand over the entire region to Rumania. When and where could you get a clearer case for a vote?

But considerable regions to the west of Transylvania or Erdely were also alienated from *Magyarorszag*, and presented to the Bucarest Government. And here the Rumanians had less than their Transylvanian preponderance. So that, looking at the whole area of Rumanian annexation from Hungary, the Rumanian race could claim only 43 per cent.—as against 35 Hungarian, 11 German, and some 10 per cent. of Ruthenians, Serbs, and Slovaks. Hardly a position for sweeping detachment and sweeping absorption of the whole of this vast block—except on the principle *No Pity for Hungary*. There was one way, and surely only one way, of settling matters justly, solidly, and peacefully, in the lands of the Dual Monarchy, at the end of the war. And that was self-determination. "He is of age, ask him. Let him speak for himself." An American observer bluntly expresses what almost inevitably springs to the mind of so many as a hope, a fear, a sad reflection, or an impartial concession to irrefutable evidence: The Little Entente Nations did not dare to submit to plebiscitary decisions.

Yet such decisions were vehemently urged, from the Hungarian side, and from others, in 1919. And a French statesman, Millerand, as the official spokesman for the Trianon decisions, gave a typical answer. The Allied Powers "perceived with certainty that this consultation" (of a plebiscite) "would not give results substantially different from those . . . arrived at after . . . minute study. . . ." Hence the Powers considered it "superfluous to consult the population in this direction." The Hungarian objection was declared groundless, and was set aside, with great composure. How much more frankly, intelligently, and honourably does Tardieu, an enemy of shams and side pretences, go to the heart of the matter. "We had to choose between a plebiscite and the founding of Czechoslovakia." We had to choose between a plebiscite (he might have added) and such aggrandisement of Rumania and Serbia as we desired.

According to Trianon the Hungarian army was not to exceed 35,000 in peace time—or in war. But the armies of the three Succession States (Great Bohemia, Great Serbia, Great Rumania) lately numbered half a million, it is claimed, on a peace footing, and over four millions when mobilised for war. "Upon the ruins of Austria-Hungary a new Europe was built up." While "Germany accepted the Peace, France, through the instrumentality of that Peace, continued her military action. She responded to the allegiance offered by Prague . . . Belgrade, Bucarest. Under her leadership a reorganisation of Europe is being effected. . . . There must be no pity for Hungary." So wrote André Tardieu, joyously, in 1921. And Tardieu was one of the chief architects of the Treaty of Trianon, and so of the final partition and disarmament of Hungary.

But territorial deprivations are one thing. Internal restrictions, limitations of the rights of sovereignty, are another. And the people of the shrunken Magyarorszag could hardly be blamed for especially bitter protests against the military restrictions of 1919-20. As Robert Lansing protested, when he broke away from Woodrow Wilson and the whole system of the Paris Dictates (Versailles, Trianon, St. Germain, and Sèvres), these Treaties, if unmodified, were sources of new dangers, of lasting trouble, and probably even of new wars. This was as certain as day following night.

Together with M. Clemenceau and President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George was admittedly one of the chief architects of the Peace Settlement. Let us hear what he said about that settlement, and its sacro-sanctity—and especially about Trianon—in 1927. "In reference to the whole of the Treaties of 1919-20 I can state emphatically that their authors never claimed for them such a degree of perfection that they held them to be immutable. . . . We all distinctly contemplated the possibility of certain clauses and provisions of the Treaties themselves being made the subject of discussion, adjudication, and possible revision by the great tribunal set up in the first clause of those Treaties, the League of Nations." So the British statesman wrote to M. George Földiak, the Budapest banker, in September 1927. And somewhat to the same effect he spoke in the Queen's Hall in London on October 24th of the same year.

Happily the present moment is not without some brighter indications, even for the suffering minorities of the old Dual Monarchy. On February 19th, 1937, an Agreement was concluded dealing with the rights of the German element in Czechoslovakia. And by this Agreement most important concessions were made. The Germans were henceforward to participate in the administration in proportion to their numbers—a proportion fixed at 23 per cent. In public expenditure the Germans would now be considered proportionately, and in this connection German Ministers of State in the Czech Government would have powers of supervision. Special provision was made for aiding German cultural institutions, and for checking unemployment. And the law prohibiting the official use of the German language in Czechoslovakia virtually disappeared. May such an understanding be soon concluded also on the Hungarian side of the Great Bohemia Problem, and may it be imitated in Rumania and Great Serbia. "Four millions of Hungarians live outside the present frontiers of Hungary." And more than half of these live only just outside, and could be restored to their native land by slight adjustment of the border zones.

RAYMOND BEAZLEY.

CORONATION MUSIC.

"Zadok the Priest and Nathan the Prophet anointed Solomon King. And all the people rejoiced and said, God save the King. Long live the King. May the King live for ever."

IF tradition is followed, these words will be sung at the most solemn moment of the Coronation, the anointing of the King by the Archbishop, to Handel's music. Handel wrote four anthems for George II's Coronation, and one of the most inspired of them is *Zadok the Priest*, so that no Coronation since has seemed complete without his setting. But the use of these words at this, the supreme moment of the ceremony, is of immemorial antiquity, for they appear, together with the psalm *The King shall rejoice*, which was also set by Handel, in the Pontifical of Egbert, who was consecrated Bishop in 732. In this ancient service book there is an order for the Coronation of Kings, and here is found the direction for anointing with oil while an antiphon and psalm are sung:

Hic verget oleum cum cornu super capud ipsius cum antiphona: "Uncserunt Salomonem" et Psalm "Domine in Virtute tua."

The plainsong notation for *Uncserunt Salomonem* (*Zadok the Priest*) can be seen at Westminster Abbey in Abbot Litlyngton's great Missal, which was used at the Coronation of Richard II in 1377, the psalm following, as in the ancient service, immediately after it. The *Liber Regalis*, a smaller but even more richly decorated book, made at the Abbey by one of the monks for the use of the King at the ceremony, sets forth the whole ceremonial in detail, and is of great importance, for it set the standard for all Coronations afterwards.

The Coronation ceremony, or more correctly the Hallowing of the King, has changed little in all this passage of centuries. The King is solemnly consecrated to his high office by the Primate, and publicly dedicates himself before God to the service of his people, with all the rich and symbolic ceremonial of the Mediæval Church. The anointing is the central fact of the service, the crowning being but the chief of many investitures. The first change, if change it can be called, from the full Latin ritual, which had been used even for the Coronation of the "protestant" boy-king Edward VI, was

made by Elizabeth, who directed that the Epistle and Gospel should be read first in Latin and then in English, as a sop to her protestant subjects. Elizabeth was welcomed at the West Door of the Abbey by the clergy singing *Salve festa dies* (*Hail thee, Festival Day*), the plainsong melody of which may be found in the English Hymnal beside Vaughan Williams' fine modern tune. The *Veni Creator* was sung, no doubt, to the ancient and lovely tune which is still sung to-day, the notes of which are clearly indicated in the Litlyngton Missal, and as at Mary's Coronation, "the quire sung and the organs did play *Te Deum*" before Mass was sung.

But during Elizabeth's reign many things happened to make the next Coronation a momentous one. In 1559 she published injunctions to her clergy, in which she said there were to be no alterations in the services, but added, good musician that she was, "Nevertheless, for the comforting of such as delight in Musick it may be permitted that . . . there may be sung an hymn, or such like song, to the praise of Almighty God, in the best melody and musick that may be conveniently devised, having respect that the sentence of the hymn may be understood and perceived." A little later we learn that "the hymns were sung after a more melodious manner, with organs commonly, and sometimes with other musical instruments, as the solemnity required."

This was the period when secular music invaded the Mediæval Church, bringing a flood of new inspiration into her services, now first set to English words. At the Chapel Royal the names of Tye, Tallis, Byrd, Blitheman and Bull appear as organists, Bull who has been aptly called "the Liszt of his age." Settings of "Morning and Evenyng prayer and Communion, set forthe in foure partes, to be sung in Churches, both for men and children," appeared in 1565. Tallis set the Litany, Morley the Burial Service, while Weelkes at Chichester, Tomkins at Worcester, and Gibbons at Westminster, among a host of musicians, vied with one another in pouring out a wealth of fine music for the services in English. William Byrd, the most versatile and gifted of them all, went on writing for both the English and the Latin Rites throughout his long life, and was a member of the Chapel Royal from 1569 till his death in 1623. He was one of the Royal Organists for more than thirty years, and earned the title, even in his lifetime, of "the parent of British music."

When James I arrived from Scotland to be crowned, the Coronation service was hurriedly translated into English and punctuated with anthems. The book used may be seen at Lambeth Palace, written in manuscript in a florid hand, no other changes being made. It was usual for the King to go in procession from Westminster Hall to the Abbey, and it seems probable that Weelkes' anthem, *O Lord, grant the King a long life*, was sung on this occasion during the procession. It is a fine anthem, beginning in six and ending in seven parts, an extra bass part appearing towards the end. It became traditional for an anthem to these words to be sung during the procession, and settings exist by Tomkins, Child, Purcell, Church, Croft, Greene, Nares and Attwood, covering the period up to William IV's Coronation, when the procession was given up.

The King was greeted at the Abbey with the anthem, *Behold, O Lord our Protector* (which was later set to music by Blow for James II's Coronation, and used down to the time of George III). After acclamation, *Let thy hand be strengthened* was sung (later set both by Blow and Handel). Of the *Veni Creator* we read "the Archbishop beginneth the Hymn and the Quire sing it," which suggests that the old plainsong melody was sung, but the Litany may well have been Tallis' now familiar setting. At the anointing, *Zadok the Priest* was sung as always, followed by the *Te Deum*, while at the crowning *Be strong and of good courage* and *The King shall rejoice* were sung. All these anthems were translated out of the *Liber Regalis* and have been set and reset for later Coronations, their place in the service varying from time to time. Nothing is more remarkable about the Tudor School than the speed with which it attained to its zenith, the galaxy of composers it produced and the rapidity of its decline. Conspicuous among the later composers is Thomas Tomkins, one of the three organists of the Chapel Royal, who received forty shillings for music composed for Charles I's Coronation. This was the anthem, *O Lord grant the King a long life*, for four voices, which was printed in his *Musica Deo Sacra* in 1668. Tomkins has written many fine anthems, which are marked by grand, rather daring, progressions.

Charles I, we learn, often appointed the services himself, especially "that sharp service composed by Dr. William Child, being of his knowledge of Music a competent judge therein, and would play his part exactly well on the base viol,

especially of those incomparable fancies of Mr. Coperario to the organ." Mr. Coperario had been instructor to James I's children, and was an Englishman of the name of Cooper, who had studied in Italy, and transmogrified his name on his return. Dr. Child lived through the civil wars, not only till the Restoration, but to the accession of William and Mary, becoming Eldest Gentleman of the Chapel Royal. He left a great many services in the old traditional style, and with his long life he acted as a sort of bridge between the old music and the new.

For we now stand on the threshold of another change, as great perhaps as that which Elizabeth had initiated and encouraged, in the direction which music was to take in England. With the coming of the Commonwealth, something was lost which never came back. For a time music was banished from the churches, and we read that in 1643 soldiers were quartered at Westminster Abbey who "brake down the organ and pawned the pipes at several ale-houses for pots of ale." At Winchester they made a fire "and in that fire burnt the books of Common Prayer and all the singing books belonging to the Quire." At Chichester "they brake down the organs and dashing the pipes with their pole-axes, scoffingly said, 'Hark how the organs go!'" But not only were the organs and the part books destroyed, the very art of singing contrapuntal music was lost, and Philip King, writing in 1656, speaks of "all Church music, my highest content, is abandoned among us."

At the Restoration the Choir of the Chapel Royal was reconstituted and the Cathedral services were started again. The first organ to be rebuilt was that of the King's Chapel at Whitehall. But of the large musical establishment of Charles I only five Gentlemen came forward to claim their places. One of these, Henry Lawes, was to set *Zadok* for the Coronation the following year. Matthew Locke, who wrote the music "for sagbutts and cornets" for the King's Royal Progress from the Tower to Westminster the day before the Coronation, which earned him the title of Composer to the King, writing in 1673 notes that "for above a year after the opening of His Majesties Chappel, the orderers of the musick there were necessitated to supply the superior parts of the musick with cornets and men's feigned voices, there being not one lad for all that time capable of singing his part readily."

The Master of the Children of the Chapel Royal appointed was Captain Henry Cooke (he had fought for King Charles in the Civil Wars, and kept the rank). He had been appointed a bass just before the dissolution of the Chapel Royal, and now proved himself, not only "the best musician of his time to sing to the lute," but a most able choirmaster. Under his direction the children were encouraged to compose, and in four or five years' time some of "the forwardest and brightest children of the Chapel, as Pelham Humphrey, John Blow, etc., began to be masters of a faculty in composing." So writes Dr. Tudway, himself a Chapel Royal boy of no mean note. He tells us also that "His Majesty, who was a brisk and airy prince, coming to the Crown in the flower and vigour of his age, was soon, if I may so say, tired with the grave and solemn way which had been established by Tallis, Bird and others, ordered the composers of his Chapel to add symphonies, etc., with instruments to their anthems, and there upon established a select number of his private music to play the symphony and ritornellos which he had appointed." In this way was the genius of Henry Purcell, who became a chorister at the Chapel Royal in the first decade of Charles' reign, nurtured and formed on different lines from that of the Tudor composers.

Many things had to be done before Charles II could be crowned. The Regalia had all been seized and melted down by the organ-breakers and music-burners. Not only the Imperial Crown of massy gold, but every part of the Regalia, including the ancient crown said to be King Alfred's "of gould wyerworke, sett with slight stones, and 2 little bells," had been destroyed. The Regalia realised little more than £2,000, but it cost Charles more than £31,000 to replace it, and it took a year to make. There is at this time another entry in the Lord Chamberlain's records which is touching in its simplicity: "£2. 16. 0. for torches and lights for practising the musick against his majesty's coronation." What a picture this calls up of the newly-enrolled choristers, the lutenist-choirmaster training them as fast as he could, the midnight oil burning merrily, the viols, cornets and sacbuts helping out the voices! All the special music, with the exception of *Zadok*, was composed for the Coronation by Captain Cooke, and Evelyn notes in his diary that at the crowning "anthems and rare musiq with lutes, viols, trumpets, organs and voices were then heard."

For the next Coronation, that of James II in 1685, we have a very full contemporary account. The music was almost entirely of the new sort. The veteran Dr. Child it is true provided the music for the Procession to the Abbey from Westminster Hall and the *Te Deum*, and Lawes' *Zadok* was sung again; but William Turner, one of Captain Cooke's clever boys, now a Gentleman of the Chapel, wrote the music for *Come Holy Ghost* and *The King shall rejoice*, while John Blow, another of Captain Cooke's apt pupils, now Master of the Children and organist at the Abbey, wrote three new anthems for the Coronation, *Let thy hand be strengthened*, *Behold, O Lord our Defender*, and *God spake sometimes in visions*. This Coronation is chiefly memorable for two wonderful anthems which Henry Purcell composed for it. He was now 27 years of age, and had held the appointment of organist at the Abbey since he was 22. From the age of 11 Purcell had produced anthems with string accompaniments, and the so-called Verse Anthem, in which solo, choir, organ and strings are blended, is one of Purcell's chief contributions to music. The anthem *I was glad*, which was first heard as James II and Mary of Modena came into the Chancel of the Abbey for their Coronation, opens with a symphony for strings and thereafter is divided in the most subtle and beautiful way between the soloists, the instrumentalists and the choir. This writing has a delicacy of treatment and feeling for the words which was to be lost when the more formal music of the eighteenth century came in. Here are no meaningless repetitions, but a direct setting of the words, readily audible in the Abbey, the only reiteration in the whole anthem being that of the full choir singing unaccompanied and softly at the close *Peace be within thy walls, and plenteousness within thy palaces*, a most beautiful effect. The mood of the anthem belongs to the best devotional music of our own day and is in another world from that of the intervening centuries.

My heart is inditing of a good matter for the Queen's Coronation is a longer anthem, set for choir, strings and organ. The choruses are for six or eight voices, the "verses" being accompanied by the organ. It ends with a fugal chorus for eight voices to the strange, archaic lines from Isaiah, "For Kings shall be thy Nursing Fathers and their Queens thy Nursing Mothers." This verse must have fascinated Purcell, for we find him using it again in the anthem *Praise the Lord*,

O Jerusalem, scored for five voices, strings and organ, which was sung at the Coronation of William and Mary. Purcell was to die young, but *I was glad* was sung for the next hundred years as each new Sovereign entered the Abbey. The second anthem for the Queen Consort was not suitable for William and Mary's nor for Anne's Coronations, while George I was crowned alone, and for George II's Coronation Handel wrote a new setting. So does Purcell, the greatest of our English composers, pass from the scene, for he died in 1695.

For William and Mary's Coronation Blow wrote a new anthem, *The Lord God is a sun and a shield*, which was also sung at the next two Coronations. *Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem*, was reset for Anne's Coronation by Blow's pupil Jeremiah Clarke; and William Turner, who had the distinction of serving seven Sovereigns as a Gentleman of the Chapel Royal, wrote a new setting of *The Queen shall rejoice*, which was sung after her Recognition.

We now reach the spacious regality of the Four Georges and the advent of Handel; but although Handel was in the service of George I, he was not called on to compose any music for the Coronation, for the King took little interest in it as he knew no English, and had, indeed, to be prompted in Latin at the ceremony. Croft, who had served under Blow and succeeded him as Master of the Children and organist at Westminster in 1708, wrote two anthems for it, *O Lord grant the King a long life* for the Procession, and *The Lord God is a sun and a shield*. Croft will always be remembered for his splendid tune, *St. Annes*, now happily wedded to the hymn *O God our help*, and for his setting of the Burial Sentences. It is interesting to note in passing that he also drew his salary as a lutenist. He died just before George II came to the throne, and so it came about that Handel was given a free hand to compose the Coronation music.

He had but a month in which to do it, yet his four great anthems, *Let thy hand be strengthened*, *Zadok the Priest*, *The King shall rejoice*, and *My heart is inditing*, great in length as well as in conception, were ready for that autumn day in 1727 when George II and Queen Caroline were crowned with the utmost pomp and splendour. It is interesting to compare Blow's setting of *Let thy hand be strengthened* with Handel's. The first is a straightforward four-part anthem in the major key, following the rhythm of the words. But Handel,

beginning with a symphony for strings, and a brilliant opening chorus, follows this by a Larghetto in the minor key, which at the words "Let mercy and truth go before thy face" strikes a deeper, more majestic note, which he was to sound again in the *Messiah*. *Zadok the Priest* has a restrained, almost mystical fervour about it, the arpeggios of the strings forming a background to the opening note of the choir, which gives a veiled effect, very beautiful to hear. Handel's music typifies in a noble way the spaciousness of the Georgian age, but the intimacy of the seventeenth-century music is gone.

The anthems were performed by Handel's own choir of nearly fifty singers and were heard again at the Coronation of George III in 1761, Purcell, Blow and Turner still figuring in the Coronation music list, while Boyce's *Te Deum* was added. But at the next Coronation the names of the older composers disappear, for George IV was a patron of music (had he not sent young Attwood abroad to study with Mozart?) and the music chosen reflects his personal taste. Handel's music for *Zadok* was used, but Attwood was commissioned to write a new anthem to the words *I was glad*, and Knyvett, the organist at Westminster, to *The King shall rejoice*. Boyce's *Te Deum* was sung, and wind parts were added for the occasion to Kent's *Blessed be thou*, an anthem which the King admired. In addition to this, the Sovereign suggested at the Dress Rehearsal that the *Hallelujah Chorus* should be sung at the beginning of the service. He also arranged for the singing of *Already see the Monarch of the Lord advances* (to music from *Saul*), to be sung at his entry, and *God save great George our King* at his departure.

A study of contemporary engravings reveals the fact that the special organ was at the east end of the choir, above and beyond the High Altar, while the Peeresses were arranged in rows above the Altar, the singers sitting to right and left of them. The religious significance of the ceremony had been so much overlaid that it had become merely an opportunity for pageantry and display. The banquet which followed proved so costly that the next King, William IV, entertained serious thoughts of doing away with the Coronation altogether. He was dissuaded from this extreme course and merely did away with the procession and the banquet. In so doing he brought to an end the picturesque ceremony of the King's Champion, who used to ride into Westminster Hall

in full armour during the banquet and challenge any man to combat. This time it was the Members of Parliament who sat in tiers over the Altar, while the trumpets were put in a gallery behind them. Two of Handel's anthems and the *Hallelujah Chorus* were sung, while Attwood's *I was glad* and *O Lord grant the King a long life* were heard. It was a Coronation distinguished by nothing but its economy, and was spoken of satirically at the time as the "Half-crownation."

Queen Victoria's Coronation had a different atmosphere, though the choice of music was much the same. A choir and orchestra of 400 persons were placed in a gallery behind the organ, which was over the choir screen. Sir George Smart was organist, and two of Handel's anthems, amongst others, and the *Hallelujah Chorus* were performed.

For the last two Coronations Sir Frederick Bridge was in charge, and planned to make the music representative of all that was best in English music. Tallis, Merbecke, Purcell and Handel represented the past, Parry, Elgar, Stanford, Parratt, Bridge and Alcock the present. Parry's fine anthem *I was glad* and Elgar's Coronation Offertorium *O Hearken thou* showed that the new music was not unworthy of comparison with the old. It is to be hoped that some of the music of Vaughan Williams and Holst, imbued as it is with the religious spirit of the great Tudor composers, will be heard at the next Coronation ceremony.

JANET LEEPER.

SCOTLAND'S INDUSTRIAL PROBLEM.

IN London 6 per cent. of the insured working population are unemployed. In England as a whole the percentage is 11 per cent. In Scotland the percentage is between 19 and 20 per cent., and Glasgow and Dundee each has an unemployment rate at the present time of 23 per cent. Scotland is a depressed area. Glasgow's poor relief burden is the heaviest in Great Britain. One in every seven of the population of our second city is in receipt of public assistance, and the total is equal to a quarter of the total for all England and Wales. Glasgow's expenditure on relief services in 1936 was greater than the corresponding expenditure of London, Manchester and Birmingham combined.

A general knowledge of Scotland's industrial structure and balance is needed to understand her problem. She is primarily an exporting nation—more so than England; and she is mainly dependent on a few great industries engaged in heavy manufacture and primary production. Iron and steel, engineering and shipbuilding; coal-mining, agriculture and fishing; these are the industries which are vital to Scotland's economic well-being. All except agriculture are exporting industries. If Scotland is to recover and become prosperous again, these six industries must revive and flourish or new industries must grow up and take their place. If reliance is placed on the growth and development of new industries, the recovery process will be long drawn out.

New, light industries should, of course, be developed; and Scotland has awakened to her failure to nurture such industries in the past. The Scottish Development Council are performing a great service in promoting enterprise in this direction. A permanent Economic Committee was appointed last April under Sir James Lithgow's chairmanship, and the possibilities of new industries are being closely examined, along with the potentialities of tourist traffic services, which must figure in any plan for the economic regeneration of Scotland and the Highlands. We have had too many eggs in one basket in the past. We must produce a much wider range of commodities which our own people want and can afford to buy. To this end we must improve our scientific research and technical training.

There are difficulties of finance. It has become the habit—

and a bad habit—during recent years to look to the State for help. Dr. J. A. Bowie, Principal of the Dundee School of Economics, and one of the brave pioneers of a new Scotland, has attacked state interference in industrial matters. " They [the State officials] throw on management's back," he said a short time ago, " a host of difficult problems." Developing his theme in an address at the annual meeting of the Scottish Business Clubs, he said :

> Scotland needs a plan to protect herself against the improvisations of the central government. The State has for many years interfered with the free play of economic forces. . . . Inevitably the Government favours one area as against another, one industry or group of industries as against others. . . . Recent State enactments affecting industry have been determined by emergencies, by the political pressure of sectional interests. Many of them have been gravely injurious to Scottish interests.

This State intervention has encouraged industrialists to look to the Government for aid. Mr. Wallace Cowan, President of the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, has warned the interests that there is no easy state-way to prosperity. At the annual meeting of the Chamber in April 1936, he declared that if the creation of new industries was to follow the lines of the sugar-beet plan or the milk-marketing scheme the Scottish Development Council would be wise to leave new industries to individual or collective enterprise. " New industries," he said, " should be begun and financed by those who believe in them."

The movement to develop new industries in Scotland is in its infancy. It will not extend far unless Scottish industrialists are loyal to their heritage of virile independence. If the tendency to rely upon the State proves a passing one, new industries will spring up and flourish ; and some of them may, in time, come to rank with the still great industries on which Scotland's welfare has so long rested. But it is to be doubted whether they can grow quickly enough to lift Scotland out of depression before 1950 if the heavy manufacturing and primary-producing industries remain depressed.

Most of Scotland's chief industries require a high level of capital expenditure. This vital condition has been lacking in recent years, although credit has been less expensive and less inaccessible than it was before 1932. The Scottish Bank chairmen have had occasion to deplore the lack of demand for

loans—" due," as Mr. Henry Allan of the Clydesdale Bank pointed out at the 1936 annual meeting, " to want of confidence in the future." The failure of Scottish industrialists to take full advantage of the cheap credit facilities is explained mainly by their dependence on export trade, partly by the continued depression of internal purchasing power for high-quality products, and partly, no doubt, to change in habits. A revival in export trade would bring about the desired revival in capital expenditure, and the lesser difficulties would tend to dissolve. Meanwhile, the industrialist will not borrow extensively on the strength of a patchy recovery in home trade which cannot fill the gap caused by the loss of overseas trade and which, he shrewdly suspects, will not be lasting.

The building boom, assisted by cheap money, undoubtedly relieved certain sections of Scottish industry ; and when the building boom showed signs of deflation the rearmament programme served to maintain the partial buoyancy. But, as every authority on the Scottish problem recognises, this kind of activity will not bring real and lasting prosperity to Scottish industry. Speaking in Edinburgh on April 6th, 1936, the late Sir Godfrey Collins described the position as " disturbing." Seven months later his successor at the Scottish Office, Mr. Walter Elliot, stated that Scotland had not enjoyed her full share of the internal recovery. Emigration has declined from 30,000 a year before 1931 to almost nothing. Scottish agriculture has been paying men off. Employment in the fishing industry continues to decline. Scotland's national revenue has fallen by 30 per cent. in fifteen years. Yet the Scottish industrialists and workers, traditionally expert in heavy manufacture, enjoy a good and cheap coal supply (only now becoming dearer) and an efficient electrical service. These heavy and primary-producing industries must revive if Scotland is to recover her place among the leading industrial nations.

Government policy helps Scotland as it helps these industries. It hinders and may prevent Scottish recovery as it hinders these industries. In one direction some help has been given. The export credits system has been a boon to the traders who have taken advantage of its facilities. The Glasgow branch of the Export Credits Guarantee Department, for example, which directly assists exporters by insuring them on easy terms against loss, has stimulated business

valued at over £3 millions since it began its operations in 1935. This scheme, of course, enjoys the backing of the Exchequer. But while the Government has in this way helped Scottish exporters to surmount their difficulties, it cannot be said that other state policies have done anything but increase the difficulties; and no amount of state-backed credit on the easiest possible terms can bring about the revival of Scotland's export trade to the level of the prosperous days. Nothing—as leading chambers of commerce, bankers, economists and other authorities have repeatedly told the public—can restore Scotland's export markets but a revival of international trade. In spite of the trade agreements, it is hardly open to question that the policy of Protection has hindered the revival of those overseas markets on which Scottish exporters formerly depended. "Restrictions by one nation," Mr. Henry Allan reminded the shareholders of the Clydesdale Bank, "are apt to lead to reprisals, which take the form of more restrictions."

Scotland's coal industry, which has served other industries so well, depended in its more prosperous days on selling large quantities of good-quality coal in overseas markets. Many of these markets have dried up, and the industry is seriously distressed. State intervention has not helped. Protection for other industries, in so far as it has restricted imports, has reduced foreign purchasing power for Scottish coal, and, as Sir Robert Horne noticed in the House of Commons on November 16th, 1936, the trade agreements have not helped the Scottish exporters. In 1935 the British coal output increased by over 2 million tons, but the Scottish output declined; British exports rose by nearly 6 per cent., but Scottish exports declined by 6 per cent. The Government-sponsored scheme to regulate production and sales (in order "to eliminate competition and raise prices," as the Conservative *Glasgow Herald* frankly put it in a leading article) has proved unpopular. The coalmasters have adopted the scheme under thinly veiled pressure. If they had refused, the Government would have done the job for them. One leading member of the industry, Dr. R. T. Moore, chairman of the Niddrie and Benhar Coal Company, spoke out strongly at Edinburgh on May 22nd, 1936:

> "We hate compulsion," he declared. "Political interference has done nothing but harm the coal trade. A horde of Government officials have been created, and to justify their existence they have brought forward schemes which have harassed everybody and kept those running the industry from attending to their proper business, which is to supply the public with cheap coal."

The company whose destinies Dr. Moore guides has shown that it is possible to supply coal at low prices, without state intervention, by entering into a voluntary distributive association whose object is to eliminate unnecessary costs between the minehead and the consumer. Such voluntary methods are clearly preferable to state-sponsored policies designed to restrict production and raise prices.

Scotland produces one-seventh of the whole British coal output. Its production is economical. It employs only one-ninth of the number of hands employed in the whole British industry. In Durham 25 per cent. more labour is required, and in Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and South Wales even a greater excess of labour is required to produce the same quantity of coal. Yet, under state influence, direct or indirect, by means of export quota arrangements, regulation of production, sales and prices, the more economic Scottish coal industry has suffered in comparison with the English industry.

Scotland's iron and steel industry is a section of the greater British industry. It has adopted all the regulations which apply to the industry in England and Wales. These regulations closely concern us, because the whole cost structure of Scottish industry depends to a great extent on Scottish iron and steel prices. In this respect the industrial community of Scotland is more dependent than any comparable area in England and Wales. The Scottish iron and steel producers, like their English colleagues, have displayed as much zeal in forming price rings as they displayed lack of zeal in putting their own house in order at the behest of the Tariff Committee. Sir Herbert Austin's outspoken warning against using Protection as "an umbrella to keep the wind off a worn and tattered industry" has, it would appear, gone unheeded. As Lord May, chairman of the Tariff Committee, has declared, "the using industries are very largely export industries and can only maintain and develop their trade if they can be assured of getting from the iron and steel industry the requisite material of the right quality at the lowest possible price." These conditions apply with particular force in Scotland. Prices have risen, and if, as appears likely, the tendency continues, the Government's intervention to assure the iron

and steel industry that they would not lose their protection will prove expensive and will raise the whole cost structure of Scottish industry.

The recovery in the Scottish industry has lagged behind that of the English industry. Not only are the Scottish producers more dependent on overseas markets, but they are more dependent on foreign supplies of scrap steel. The price of heavy scrap steel has risen steeply since 1931, and users estimate that the rise represents an increase of nearly £2 a ton on finished steel products—a serious handicap to the exporters at a time when raw material costs in Germany and the United States were not rising. The shortage of raw and semi-raw materials which was a feature of the market in 1936 bore heavily upon Scottish users. By March they were short of supplies, and in the end it was the United States industry (which is not in the international ring) that came to the rescue of the Scottish users.

The whole British iron and steel policy has changed radically since Protection was introduced, and Scottish policy has been to keep closely in step. It may not be long before the public and the public authorities, from the Government downwards, become seriously apprehensive of the power the protected interests have secured. Every iron and steel firm in Scotland must be a member of one or more of the price rings which have been formed under the wing of the Iron and Steel Federation. If a firm has a varied production, it may be a member of a dozen or more rings. If it refuses to enter the rings, it must be prepared to suffer the penalty of increased charges for essential supplies or a curtailment (with the threat of absolute cessation) of supplies. I have seen documents instructing Scottish firms to curtail or withhold supplies to users who had refused to submit to the control, and documents giving firms authority to renew supplies on the customary terms to users who had been coerced into entering the rings. I know of Scottish producers, formerly fearless opponents of state intervention, who have been silenced by lost orders or dearer supplies.

How long can such a régime last without imposing enormous burdens on other industries? Armament orders have brought activity, employment and increasing profits to the Scottish iron and steel industry. The vital questions of how far this movement can go and how far it is economic have hitherto

received little attention in Scotland. Industrial booms, it would appear, disarm all but the shrewdest students of market trends. The warnings of such close observers as Dr. J. A. Bowie are like voices crying in the wilderness. The policy of expediency prevails, even among our reputedly hard-headed Scottish industrialists, and there appears to be a genuine danger that British and Scottish industrialists are moving slowly towards a fascist régime in industry. The iron and steel industry is not far from this undesirable goal.

Scotland's agriculture, unlike her iron and steel industry, retains its distinct national character and some, at least, of its sturdy national independence. It employs about 170,000 hands—about 9 per cent. of Scotland's working population—and provides annually about £40 millions' worth of foodstuffs and feeding-stuffs. A healthy Scotland depends upon a healthy agriculture. But the industry is seriously depressed after five years of state aid. A flourishing live-stock industry would solve the problems of Scottish agriculture in most of its branches. But live-stock farming remains depressed. "Subsidies," declared the *North British Agriculturist* on May 14th, 1936, "have put more money into circulation, but those who are benefiting most from them are English farmers. . . . It is a pity that the agricultural industry is not in a position to scorn a subsidy of any kind."

The policy of "quantitative regulation of supplies," with all its boards and schemes, has proved definitely unpopular in Scotland. It has cost the community £5·7 per acre of farming land, but the bulk of the Scottish farmers are no better off, and they have found the controls to which they have had to submit irksome. Scottish live-stock farmers, it is true, have got one-quarter of the amounts doled out under the subsidy scheme, but they discovered that the method of paying the subsidy according to weight favoured the heavy cattle of inferior quality, with the anomalous result that the owner of a rough beast might receive 70s. while the owner of a better-quality animal got only 45s. This practice operated to the disadvantage of the high-quality Scottish production. The Scottish producers, however, have contrived to place their faith in state protection. They have called for price-fixing, a subsidy sufficient to fill the gap between the price the consumer will pay and the high standard price suggested, and increased restrictions on imports.

The efforts to secure better prices for the Scottish pig producer have been laboured and unsuccessful, although they have raised the price and lowered the quality of the bacon supply to the consumer. The contracts between the pig producers and the bacon curers have broken down, and hopes that the latest scheme will succeed where the others have failed do not run high either in the industry or in the trade. In April 1934 the Scottish Provision Trades Association announced that the bacon scheme was inflicting " widespread hardship and injustice on many sections of the community, and most severely and harshly on the great mass of industrial workers." At the annual meeting of the same Association in January 1936 the new methods of control were no less firmly criticised by the President, Mr. George Hollingshead :

> " Trading conditions," he declared, " are to-day subjected to confusion and interference such as we have never before experienced. We have yet to learn that the various marketing schemes have provided employment or other benefits to offset the harm done to trader and consumer alike. . . . Neither the producer nor the consumer derives any benefit in proportion to the vast sums spent in administration. Many who have been in the trade for a lifetime are being steadily forced to the point where business is so restricted as to be almost negligible. . . . Manufactured scarcity of the necessities of life bears harshly on the consumer. The consumption of bacon and ham is declining. How can the conditions be improved ? Not by the introduction of a further levy-subsidy scheme plus quotas, which would further restrict demand."

The pigs and bacon control has pleased no section of the industry or trade. There has been no effort to improve the relations between the producers, the curers and the traders. Their relations have, in fact, deteriorated. The producers and the curers, and their respective Boards, have publicly blamed each other for the failures. A well-known Edinburgh trader summed up the situation at the annual conference of the Scottish Grocers' Federation at Peebles last June when he declared that the Boards had tackled the problem from the wrong end. The Government's efforts to assist the Scottish milk, potato and poultry producers have all proved disappointing up to date ; and the efforts to assist the very depressed herring industry have been ill-adapted to Scottish conditions and, as a result, ineffective.

Apart from the iron and steel industry, whose present buoyancy is due to the rearmament programme, Scotland's chief industries, then, remain in depression, and the overseas markets on which they formerly depended, and to which they still look for orders, show no signs of recovering. The Government's policies hold out no hope of producing the conditions which are essential to Scotland's industrial and commercial well-being. They have restricted the freedom of internal trade and transgressed the fundamental laws of supply and demand, seeking to improve the producer's lot by creating conditions of artificial scarcity which will bring higher prices. Their schemes have failed, because the consuming power of a community largely dependent on export trade is depressed and incapable of expanding sufficiently to meet rising prices.

Yet something could be done to improve the producer's lot and tide him over the period—let us hope a temporary period —of depressed export trade. Something could be done to help him without subsidising him out of the taxpayer's pocket and without increasing the cost of living to the consumer. It would be something totally different from the policy of regulation and restriction which has operated with increasing intensity since 1931. It would be a policy of economic marketing based, not on restriction of production and sales, but on voluntary co-operation, through approved representative trade associations, designed to eliminate excessive costs between the producer and the consumer.

The price of fish landed and sold at Scottish harbours often increases 700 and 800 per cent. by the time it reaches the consumer. Other primary and industrial products experience the same price inflation. There is either excessive profit-taking or inefficient distribution, or both. Scotland's industrial problem would not be solved by economic marketing reform ; but the burden on her producers and consumers would be eased, and Scotland would be better equipped to recapture her lost markets when international trade revives.

RANALD M. FINDLAY.

THE EMPEROR JOSEPH II.

A NEW biography of the Emperor Joseph II has just been published.* In a time like this when tyranny, brutality and contempt of humanity seem to reign we do well to think of the Austrian *Volkskaiser* (democratic emperor) who was a despot too, but a benevolent one. Nobody but a good Austrian could have written this book on " the good Emperor Joseph," a subject which may be vital for the future of Germany and Austria, and even of Europe. It is a delicate book, full of tones and shades. In the preface the author says : " Beethoven's Sonata, the *Appassionata*, is the true accompaniment for the Emperor Joseph's work and its decay." The conception is a fine one.

The historian will first express his gratitude for a large amount of new material which the author has unearthed from the archives of Vienna and Paris. We hear the real voice of the Emperor, impetuous and indefatigable, always engaged in reminding and exhorting. Joseph is for reorganising the army, for alleviating the unhappy lot of the soldiers. Always in uniform, he is no strategist, even no general ; but he needs soldiers for his daring plans, and it is his will that they should live as human beings. He determines that their standard of existence shall be raised and care be taken of their wives and children. He was the first royal traveller in modern times. Very often incognito, he rushed through his provinces despite fatigue and bad roads, made sudden inspections, and did his utmost to abolish abuses. It is pathetic to read his manuscript notes, full of impressions, complaints and orders. They contain sharp observations and sound reports occasionally spoiled by exaggeration and hastiness of language. He lived on impressions and always needed new impressions. He was driven by earnest impatience and probably by a presentiment that the time given to him by destiny was short. He was both a genius and an amateur, always obscuring his own light with his shadow. As a son of the transition period he felt in his own heart the struggle between absolutism and revolution.

The Emperor's unstatesmanlike qualities, his vacillation between harshness and kindness, make it difficult for the historian to be quite fair to him ; but the author of this book

* *Kaiser Joseph II.* By Ernst Benedikt. Wien, 1936. Gerold & Co.

has succeeded. There is no flattery, no palliation ; certainly such an approach would not correspond to the Emperor's own sincerity. The weakest part of his government is criticised with all possible frankness. His foreign policy is a series of ventures with inadequate means, lacking clear ends and solid foundations. He defied and irritated his enemies without defeating them, old friendships were lost for little profit, anger and distrust rose up round about him. Yet two of his ideas were sound and should be appreciated even more warmly than they are by the author. The first was the winning of Bavaria for Austria as a compensation for lost Silesia, in order to build up a compact position in South Germany on the basis of the united Bavarian tribe. His various steps in that direction were spoiled by wrong tactics, but the idea remained as an important historical vision. Much later it became clear how disastrous for Germany was the growth of the Bavarian middle state, the interests of which throve by every conflict between Austria and Prussia. Joseph, strong champion of Germanism, would have liked to transform his whole monarchy into a German province. Yet it was this ruler who was to fail in strengthening the South German position of the imperial state. His second important idea was diplomatic and military co-operation with Russia. Prince Eugene's old legacy, a creative policy in the Balkans, could be achieved only by an agreement with the aggressive aims of the greatest Slav power.

Joseph's lively intuition caused him to inaugurate the meetings of princes as an instrument of political work. His sense of the dramatic and of improvisation was fascinated by the prospect of personal interviews with Frederick the Great. He respected highly the wicked old enemy of his mother, that curious man of destiny who ruined Austria's European and German hegemony. A strange feeling, this inquisitive veneration of a youth who wanted to take his revenge by amicable conquest. From such a courtship what could be expected save disillusion ? What result could it have other than the young Emperor's humiliation, the collapse of his warm-hearted extravagant impulsiveness before the icy irony of the great king ? Maria Theresa had often warned her son, unfortunately in vain. Her frankness, her simplicity, her natural instinct were to experience anxious times with such an impetuous co-regent.

All these political episodes have died with the Emperor. Yet there is something essentially permanent, even prophetic, in his humanistic conception of the royal power. An offspring of absolutist princes, and himself an absolutist, he nevertheless became the first democratic ruler in modern history, for the reason that he was capable of loving his people, really and sincerely loving them, with all his generous heart. He knew the highest and the lowest of his subjects in country or town, he helped the poor, he was concerned for adequate care of the sick and the insane, he abolished certain social evils, he comforted the humble and gave satisfaction to those who had suffered offence. The powerful, the ruthless, the frivolous, he kept in subjection, and visited with his anger all lazy or selfish officials. Indolence, slackness, weakness and surrender to compromise, of old so typical of Austrian political life, he sternly suppressed. In spite of all mistakes and insufficiencies the Emperor Joseph was in his way thorough. He was never satisfied with cheap and easy resolutions. He did more work than his health would stand and may be said simply to have been consumed by it. After the death of his first wife, whom he loved very dearly, his personal life became more and more unhappy and lonely. He permitted himself very little leisure: some music by Mozart perhaps, a chat with some aristocratic ladies, a few moments of hasty pleasure at the theatre or elsewhere. Work became ever more absorbing. It towered over him, he felt his deficiency, he was harassed by the anxiety to get to a dead stop before he had well begun. His work was so exhausting simply because he made so many fresh starts. First steps were always easy and promised great things, but he was afraid of the concluding stages which always seemed so much more difficult. Frederick the Great's famous epigram on the Emperor Joseph's custom of "doing the second step before the first" is therefore not correct. Joseph's mood and humour were changeable, but not his will. This was undoubtedly a symptom of his fatal illness, tuberculosis. Joseph was a friend of humankind, but he did not know men. Still the richness and strength of his love were such that his feeling was hardly ever converted into bitterness though here and there he bursts out with occasional extravagant, perverse and sometimes cruel judgments.

Amid so much that is noble and fine one unselfish action

stands out even to this day. His contemporaries found it quite incredible. Joseph's father, the Emperor Francis I, was neither a general nor a diplomat, but the ideal type of a tactful Prince Consort, who used the privileges of his distinguished position for engaging in very profitable business affairs. The son found himself heir to a private fortune of 20 million florins, the result of the old emperor's activities. The inheritance disgusted Joseph, who, by one stroke of the pen, gave this money to the treasury. He never desired personal advantage and knew no private interests, considering himself only a part of the state in which he believed, and to which he gave his whole being.

The Emperor Joseph was a practising Roman Catholic. All the wisdom of contemporary thinking occupied his interest but did not fulfil his personal need for a creed and philosophy of life. Thus his famous *Toleranzpatent* was in no way intended as an attack upon the Christian faith as it is represented in the Roman doctrine. On the contrary, it was meant as a manifestation of real Christian spirit towards the egotism, narrow-mindedness and mismanagement shown by certain ecclesiastical institutions. In the period of Maria Theresa it was possible for Protestants to be condemned to hard labour for their beliefs alone. The toleration edict as well as the abolition of serfdom are entirely the personal achievement of the Emperor, the result of his personal will and knowledge, realised in spite of stupidity and selfishness. Both actions are complementary and lay the foundations for the building of modern Austria. They make an immediate and permanent appeal to the human being hidden in the subject. Freedom was thus given a dynamic and creative consciousness, the revolution was anticipated and its principles were inserted into an unbroken commonwealth. Joseph, the democratic Emperor, remains the princely liberator of souls and bodies in Austria. Therefore, even to our own day, "Josephinismus" still exists in Austria. The Emperor's monument is erected at the spot where the Hofburg and the town of the old burghers have grown together. When Archduke Francis in 1848 had to choose an imperial name, he wisely agreed to adopt that of the democratic Emperor and thereafter styled himself Franz Josef. In the teeth of the reaction during the Metternich period a certain "Josephinism" has never disappeared in the imperial state as well as in Southern Germany. There have always been in Austria governors and *Sektionschefs*

(heads of departments), writers, clergymen, financial leaders, and aristocrats who were able to soften the severity of administration and authority by human feeling. Thus "Josephinism" does not mean only a tuning of Roman Catholic doctrine to the needs of government. It also means something different, some sense of general pleasure in generosity and kindness for its own sake, a mild readiness to be helpful which is as pleased to satisfy some small requests as it is incapable of solving all great questions.

VEIT VALENTIN.

THE AFRICAN PRISONER.

PRISON reform is a subject which has attracted considerable attention of late years in most countries and especially in Britain. Commissions have sat, treatises have been written, and societies formed, to improve the lot of the criminal, and considerable progress has undeniably been made. Not only is the actual treatment of the prisoner more humane and more rational; the whole attitude towards crime is altering.

If, however, we turn to Africa, matters will be found to be deplorably behindhand. The actual jail accommodation will prove to be primitive and unsuitable in the great majority of cases; the treatment of the prisoners can make little claim to be methodical or scientific; and the whole system will be seen as little better than a primitive effort at punishment which largely fails even as a deterrent. That the problem is a considerable one the figures for committal to prison for 1934 will show. The total for the African Crown Colonies and Territories will be found to be some 90,000—admittedly small when compared with England's half-million, but nevertheless serious.

The size of the countries and the sparsity of population serve to introduce difficulties, which are increased by the lack of transport; hence any great measure of centralisation becomes impossible, and all but long-term prisoners tend to be accommodated within a reasonable distance of the place of trial. In consequence, each government station must have its lock-up, dignified by the description of third-class prison; from there all other than short-term prisoners are sent to the nearest second-class establishment, while a few first-class prisons receive the most serious cases. Such transfers as these may entail considerable journeys by rail, motor, or even on foot, and when the necessity for sending the escort as well as the prisoner is remembered, the difficulties of the position will be realised. So jails will be found to vary from considerable and substantial stone buildings at headquarters, to the up-country wood and thatch makeshift which would not restrain for an hour any criminal less amenable than the African.

Such being the variety of buildings, let us now consider the inmates. Firstly, some review of former conditions is necessary. It must be remembered that primitive African society

had virtually no criminal law. In the great majority of cases the object was reparation rather than punishment, and as long as compensation was made for the damage done the offender was allowed to go free. Murder, for instance, was the removal of a useful member of a family, requiring payment in satisfaction, either by the killer or by his relations; with the corollary that a stranger without relatives to raise a claim could be slain with impunity. Theft was also an injury to a social group, and the loss had to be made good; but if it were carried out at the expense of some hostile or alien community, it became a useful contribution to tribal wealth and thus a meritorious act. Only in cases of anti-social practices such as dangerous witchcraft was capital punishment inflicted.

The underlying principle is therefore seen as the rule of civil, rather than criminal, law, with the welfare of the social group rather than the punishment or reformation of the offender as its object. The latter element was, however, not by any means absent. The traditions of the tribe as expounded by the elders represented the original divine instructions to ancestors, and any infringement of them entailed spiritual dangers far more efficacious and alarming than any physical penalty. Retribution followed without any necessity for detection, and family disasters, hunting accidents, and other calamities, dogged the footsteps of the guilty. Small wonder then that the ancient laws were scrupulously obeyed, and that infractions when they occurred were speedily expiated. In contrast therefore with the European's idea of justice as of universal applicability, there was not so much an abstract moral standard to be respected as a communal fellowship to be maintained.

The African consequently finds the greatest difficulty in understanding the point of view of the white man's law. He in some way infringes its provisions, and is therefore arrested and tried, and subsequently informed that he is guilty. So far he can follow the proceedings fairly well, even if he should disagree about the criminal nature of the act. The next stage, however, is completely unintelligible. He is not called upon to make a payment in compensation for the injury done, but he is informed that he will be locked up for a considerable period, and will have to work for the white man's government. Why the latter should benefit by his services is naturally incomprehensible, the more so since the party whom he is supposed

to have injured receives nothing. He and his friends remain completely bewildered by the European's logic. Still worse is the case if a murder is involved, with a capital sentence to follow. Here a valuable member of society has been destroyed; instead, however, of doing what may be possible to repair the injury, the white man insists that a second valuable life must be sacrificed, thereby inflicting still further loss!

Such an attitude is perhaps almost inevitable; it is also most unfortunate, since it precludes any genuine respect for the law. Modern legislation is admittedly based on the support of the community; if not honoured by the bulk of the people, it is unlikely to succeed solely owing to the efforts of the police. The African, however, is having his laws thrust upon him by aliens whose mental processes he entirely fails to understand. The situation is made far worse owing to the confusion which must arise between real and technical crimes. We can all appreciate that cycling on the footpath is less blameworthy than robbing a blind man, and we deny to veterinary or agricultural regulations the respect that we feel for the criminal law. To the African they are all in the same category. He has somehow offended the white man's code; he must go to jail, since even if given the alternative of a fine he probably cannot or will not pay it.

His reaction is perhaps somewhat as follows. He abandons any effort to understand the ethical or logical basis for laws, and he contents himself with learning the rules of the game. In this he is greatly helped by his early experience with wild animals. With them any sort of alliance or conciliation was out of the question; but it was possible to observe their habits and learn their most dangerous tricks. Similarly the European's code of requirements can be studied with a view to avoiding clashes as far as possible. Here the best friend is obviously the most accomplished student; in other words, the successful criminal is the most valuable adviser. No doubt it is possible to instil into the African an appreciation of moral values, and once this has been done he will learn to respect the law rather than merely comply with its demands. At first, however, he cannot be expected to change his outlook abruptly, and in the meantime he is dangerously liable to be led astray.

A further difficulty lies in the treatment to be accorded in jail. The European prisoner is nowadays studied with care;

his sentence is in the first place adapted to his particular case, and while undergoing it he comes under various influences calculated to have a wholesome effect. Much is done to lighten the lot of the well-behaved, and painstaking visitors devote time and care to helping the responsive. Furthermore, there is the prison library, to which so many criminal biographies pay tribute. Letters and interviews keep the prisoner in touch with his home and relatives, and various organisations exist to help him on his discharge. For the African hardly any of these resources exist. Welfare workers are scarce, if only on account of the language difficulty, and friends are probably too distant or too timid to venture on visits. Illiteracy usually debars him from books and the interchange of letters, so he has no distraction of an intellectual sort, and no means of keeping in touch with his family and village. As a rule also the prison with its scanty staff scarcely admits of any teaching of trades, or education; probably some unskilled manual labour is the occupation of the bulk of the inmates.

Only when leaving prison does the African have an advantage over the white man. The European may well find that he has yet to face the worst part of his punishment, and the slur of a criminal past will handicap the best efforts at reform. For the black man such troubles scarcely exist. His friends regard him with real sympathy, as one who has had the misfortune to collide with the white man's law; his spell in jail is comparable with a disaster such as a prolonged period in hospital. So there is very little difficulty in his resumption of normal life in his home.

The majority of prisons in the African Crown Colonies now attain a very fair standard of treatment. Warders are kindly and indulgent; clothing is suitable and the almost invariable increase in weight on discharge testifies to the adequacy of the rations. Work is light and its circumstances admit of ample conversation and exchange of experience, usually unedifying. Buildings are primitive, but probably an improvement on the native hut. Only in the deprivation of female society and the periodical dance and beer-drink does the inmate suffer much, and then mainly when the sentence is of some length. Such an experience can have but little useful result, either deterrent or reformative. The discharged prisoner is unlikely to have learnt much which will be of

value to him, and he is almost sure to have formed some demoralising acquaintances. In other words, he has probably been definitely helped along the road to a criminal career. The degree to which this is the case is indicated by the steady increase in recidivism which will be observed in the annual reports. In 1934 this reached 12 per cent. in Tanganyika, 15 per cent. in Nigeria and 24 per cent. in Kenya; somewhat similar figures appear in other countries. Not only is this a serious threat to the good order of the communities; it is also a heavy expense.

Coming now to lines of advance which offer some improvement, it must be admitted that the difficulties are considerable. Nevertheless, certain reforms do seem promising and could at least be tried. From what has been said above, the extreme undesirability of the short sentence will be obvious; particularly does this apply to the case of the juvenile or the first offender. There would seem to be a possibility of making better use of the native authorities in such instances; the old tradition of tribal responsibility might well be utilised for supervision of the delinquent, even though the African is very ready to profess himself quite unable to control an unruly boy or other culprit. Reformatories for juveniles are another conspicuous want, and unfortunately they are but few in the African colonies; some countries indeed have not yet established even one, and in the remainder it will usually be found that one central establishment has to serve the whole of an enormous area.

A matter of conspicuous importance is the separation of real from technical offenders. The use of detention camps and similar devices as an alternative to prison will serve not only to save the minor misdemeanant from prison contamination, but it will help to emphasise the distinction between the classes of offence. Consultation with native authorities as to the desirability and purpose of proposed fresh legislation would encourage these to interest themselves in upholding and respecting the laws when introduced, thereby adopting an attitude which might in time influence the rest of the native community.

Improved transport should render the transfer of prisoners easier, and this would facilitate the virtual abolition of the small prison, leaving minor stations with only a lock-up. The staff might then be given an improved status and pay, while

expenditure could be better directed towards the establishment of industries and training on up-to-date lines. The pernicious laxity of the present easy-going system might be tempered by the introduction of modern conditions. Stricter rules would limit evil communication—a reform salutary in practice and deterrent in effect.

The invaluable services of the Court Missionary in England suggest that it might be possible to find some equivalent in Africa, even if only at important centres. Similarly, the few prison visitors at present to be found might be augmented; a real act of charity would be performed by any influential Africans who undertook such work. The claim will no doubt be made that many of the foregoing reforms would be generally introduced, were it not for the need for economy. This may be so, but it suggests a short-sighted attitude. The criminal is a very expensive as well as a most inconvenient member of society, and parsimony at this stage is likely to entail a great and increasing burden in future.

G. B. Orde Browne.

EDWARD GIBBON: THE MASTER BUILDER.

EDWARD GIBBON was born just two hundred years ago: since then the story of his life has often been told, though never so well as by himself; his style has been dissected, but seldom rivalled in majesty or precision; his scepticism has been condemned and condoned, so that the prejudice of Mrs. Montagu, who had the first volume of the *Decline and Fall* bound up omitting the two famous chapters on the rise of Christianity, is rivalled only by the pride of the Rationalist Press, which publishes the two chapters, omitting the rest of the history. Much—perhaps too much—has been written about Gibbon. Yet curiously enough there has hardly been adequate treatment of Gibbon as an historian; of his technique of production, his methods of writing history. Perhaps this is partly because his lesser known writings, where evidence of this technique is to be found, have been completely overshadowed by his *Autobiography* on the one hand and by the *Decline and Fall* on the other. Yet surely the craftsmanship of so great and original an historian is of both general interest and first-rate importance; surely Gibbon is a writer of history before he is a philosopher, and even before he is a stylist. It is on this simple assumption that this article is based. Let us look at the historian at work in his study, rather than at the wayward son indulging in calf-love at Lausanne, or at the "infidel," alleged to be concentrating all his energy upon discrediting the Christian religion. Perhaps that is the most sympathetic way in which his bicentenary can be celebrated.

A distinction must first be drawn between the historian proper and the historiologist; between the man concerned with telling the story as a story, and the man concerned with philosophising about the story so told, attempting to draw moral maxims from it, or to pass judgments upon it. History is a branch of literature, historiology a branch of philosophy. It has been well said, that:

> The ideal historian would first collect and sift all the evidence until he had reached an assured basis of facts; holding all these facts in his mind at once he would then be able to relate them to each other in such a way as to see the relationship between them and so to arrive at their inner meaning; finally, he would set down

> that interpretation in such a way as to convey it most clearly to his readers, selecting for that purpose such facts as were most significant and most representative of the whole.

It is only necessary for the historian, as historian, to relate the story; it is not necessary for him to relate it to anything else. The real greatness of Gibbon lies in his systematic adoption of this method.

The mere acquiring of the material was no inconsiderable task at a time when there were no adequate research libraries in this country, and few public libraries anywhere. In 1779, we find Gibbon lamenting that:

> The greatest city in the world is destitute of that useful institution, a public library; and the writer who has undertaken to treat any large historical subject is reduced to the necessity of purchasing, for his private use, a numerous and valuable collection of the books which must form the basis of his work. The diligence of his booksellers will not always prove successful; and the candour of his readers will not always expect that, for the sake of verifying an accidental quotation of ten lines, he should load himself with an useless and expensive series of ten volumes.

But abroad, as he points out, "the public libraries of Lausanne and Geneva liberally supplied me with books"; and this borrowing may even have had its technical advantages, for in October 1763 he notes in his journal,

> before returning Nardini, which was wanted for the public library at Geneva, I this morning again went over it carefully, endeavouring to impress its principal contents on my memory. Human infirmity always loses a part; but I see with pleasure that much remains, and will continue to remain, with me.

This must have considerably helped the process of mental saturation. But a large private collection prevented too great a loss due to "human frailty." In the *Vindication* of the "infidel chapters," he is able to boast:

> I cannot profess myself very desirous of Mr. Davis's acquaintance; but if he will take the trouble of calling at my house any afternoon when I am *not* at home, my servant will show him my library, which he will find tolerably well furnished with the useful authors, ancient as well as modern, ecclesiastical as well as profane, who have *directly* supplied me with the materials of my history.

Gibbon's method was to make notes as he read, and compose a paragraph at a time, whilst walking up and down his room. Then he would commit it to writing and add the references. "It has always been my practice to cast a long paragraph in a single mould, to try it by my ear, to deposit it in my memory, but to suspend the action of the pen till I had given the last polish to my work." Possibly the "pedestrian" method of composition helped his accuracy of reference; for David Hume, who wrote with his feet on the sofa, was wont to find it "*unco fashious*" to remove them, and get up to verify his facts and references. Folios are much easier to handle when one is standing up. All was grist that came to his mill. He had the true scholar's mania for collecting potentially relevant detail of all kinds; from the climate of Siberia and Iceland to the plants of Switzerland, from ancient weights and measures to the habits of fishes. "Let us imitate the botanists," he said; "all plants are not useful in medicine, yet they are continually discovering new ones."

The mental attitude of the historian, whilst allowing the assimilated evidence to form itself into a pattern, must presumably be as objective as possible. The ideal condition would be for the will of the historian to act merely as a catalyst, precipitating the fusion of appropriate elements, yet neither contributing any elements thereto, nor being itself altered thereby; just as a strip of platinum, by its mere presence, effects the chemical fusion of gases. In Gibbon's first publication, the *Essai sur l'étude de la Littérature*, the germ of this idea may be found. "Pay more regard to the facts that spontaneously form themselves into a system, than to those which you discover after having devised the system."

The famous dictum of Voltaire, *il faut écrire l'histoire en philosophe*, is usually misinterpreted, for it is seldom completed. It continues, *mais qu'il ne faut pas l'écrire en précepteur, et qu'un historien doit instruire le genre humain sans faire le pédagogue.* The eighteenth-century historians did not mean that history should be written with a didactic purpose, nor that every historian should be an historiologist. The "philosophic historian" is the antithesis not of the true historian, but of the mere chronicler and annalist. Gibbon mentions Tacitus as his ideal of the "philosophic historian," who has "risen above the raw compilers who see no more in facts than facts." He meant that the historian must have a

mind penetrating enough to see the interconnection of events, the hidden springs of the historical process.

> History is to the philosophic mind what gambling was to the Marquis de Dangeau. It sees a system, connexions and consequences, where others can discern only the caprices of fortune. . . . Those [facts] which prevail in the general system, which are intimately connected with it, and which move its inner springs, are very rare; and it is rarer still to find minds that can distinguish them among the vast chaos of events, and draw them thence, pure and unmixed.

Far from Gibbon being himself an historiologist, the famous controversy over his "infidel" chapters is the first historic and dramatic clash between the new historian and the old historiologists. He had to bear the brunt of being the first great historian to deal with the growth of Christianity and of the Roman Church as parts of the whole historical process, and to exclude from his story all supernatural explanations, all reliance on miracles as a concern of the serious historian. His opponents made a grievous mistake, which was the cause of their futility. Filled with righteous indignation at his "infidel tendencies," they proceeded to attack him on the one ground on which he was practically unassailable—his methods as an historian. They were moved by something with which Gibbon was not greatly concerned, and they attacked him on grounds which he really understood. The historian was well able to defend and consolidate his own limited territory; and he had ample revenge, for he was sure of his ground.

To the modern reader, it seems that Gibbon does not halt often enough to analyse causes and indicate important tendencies. Yet his contemporaries were wont to criticise him for doing it so much. The truth is that he is little concerned with analysing and tabulating causes, but is usually content to let the story speak for itself. His fifteenth and sixteenth chapters are one of the notable exceptions, and perhaps even this attempt had been better left undone. Even so, it must be remembered that he pretends to give no more than five suggestions of "secondary causes" for the growth of Christianity. He expressly admits from the first that the "obvious but satisfactory answer is the convincing nature of the doctrine itself, and the ruling prudence of the great Author," and in

his *Autobiography* he refers to his "inquiry into the *human causes* of the progress and establishment of Christianity." That is why he was provoked by the attack of Mr. Davis upon "not the faith, but the fidelity of the historian." The secondary and earthly reasons he had suggested were the intolerant zeal of the Christians, the "important truth" of a future life, the miraculous powers ascribed to the Church, the "pure and austere morals of the Christians," and the union and discipline of the Church within the Empire. There is nothing obviously illogical here. His attitude is, roughly speaking, "let those who will deal with supernatural and incalculable considerations; the task of the historian must be limited to less ambitious but more earthly and tangible circumstances." No one—least of all Gibbon—would pretend that the suggested causes are an adequate explanation. That could be given only by telling the full, detailed story of the "triumph of barbarism and religion." The real objection is not to the falsity of the causes but to the inadequacy of the suggestions; but all lists of causes, abstracted from the context of the story, are an inadequate explanation. It is ironical that the charge of inadequacy should be brought against the man who told the story better than anyone else before or since. And let who will give an "adequate" explanation of the rise of Christianity.

Let who will attempt to give an adequate explanation even of the causes of the fall of the Roman Empire. When all theories have been examined and balanced one against the other, and a synthesis attempted, he will not be able to better these four sentences of Gibbon, on the fundamental paradox of the city-state which became an Empire.

> The rise of a city, which swelled into an empire, may deserve, as a singular prodigy, the reflection of a philosophic mind. But the decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of the conquest; and as soon as time or accident had removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight. The story of its ruin is simple and obvious, and instead of inquiring *why* the Roman Empire was destroyed, we should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long.

But even so, Cotter Morison comes very near the truth when he writes that "Gibbon was much more an artist than perhaps

he suspected, and less of a philosophical thinker than he would have been willing to allow." Gibbon was the master builder far more than the *philosophe*, the master craftsman rather than the doctrinaire. And therein lies the essence of his greatness.

The idea of progress dominated the minds of many historians in the nineteenth century, and often falsified their interpretation of history. The historians of the eighteenth century were dominated by the converse idea of decadence. They took a pessimistic view of the past. Now it is Voltaire screaming, "I tell you that it were better for the whole human race if you were to throw all civil and ecclesiastical history into the fire; I can find in it nothing but records of crimes." Now it is Rousseau, in his first *Discours*, asking, "What would become of history if there were no tyrants, wars or conspiracies?" Now it is Burke, declaring that "history consists, for the greater part, of the miseries brought upon the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all the train of disorderly appetites." Now it is Gibbon himself, remarking that history "is, indeed, little more than the register of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind." The past was a bondage to be escaped from rather than a heritage to be enjoyed. It was Shelley's "record of crimes and miseries." This pessimism existed partly because the chronicles had tended to concentrate upon the lurid side of history; partly it was the cult of the "noble savage" popularised by Locke and Rousseau which made history seem, by comparison, retrogression; and it was important that the noble savage was "pre-historic." Partly, it was because the history of Christendom was the history of Christianity, and religion meant fanaticism and intolerance; and to the Age of Reason, the ages of faith seemed a wilderness of unreason, misery and strife. Both the idea of progress and the idea of decay, it should be noted, imply a certain weighing of the past in the scales of the present, a passing of moral judgments. The importance of Gibbon is the rarity and the isolation of such judgments. They are, indeed, interspersed throughout his story; but his story is not modelled on them. They are purely incidental, and separable from the story. He has not cut his story according to the previous pattern of his philosophy. He has simply taken "decline and fall" as his

theme, and told the story of that theme as accurately as he could.

It is important to realise this truth, because so much criticism has been based upon misunderstanding of Gibbon's purpose. He did not intend to write a history of the Middle Ages; still less, a history of the Roman Church, or of Christianity. His theme was quite simply the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, and he was concerned with medieval history only in so far as it was immediately relevant to that theme. When one critic says that "with the design of overthrowing the Christian faith, it had become a matter of principle to aim, like the youthful Erasmus, at compassing the entire round of human learning," he reveals a complete misunderstanding of the whole importance of Gibbon. His eyes are fixed much more on the Capitol than on the Vatican. And just because his theme was decay, and he was always looking back rather than forward, he did not need to weigh the past in the scales of the present, and he was not greatly concerned with new growth. He has been criticised by Dean Milman for the inadequacy of his account of the Crusades, by Morison for his account of Charlemagne and feudalism, by Bury for his comparative neglect of the Byzantine Empire, by all for his account of the Church. Perhaps to restrict his theme to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire was artificially to limit his aim; but such was his theme, and it is unjust to criticise him for not being irrelevant—however much he may be criticised for being irreverent. He did not, like his critics, conceive his subject as starting from the Roman Empire and radiating outwards in ever-widening circles into the modern world. He conceived his subject as tapering gradually towards a point. It was like a stalactite, a triumph of slow acquisitiveness, resulting in a similar shape. That is why he is careful to end not with the crash of Constantinople, which might herald a new dawn, but harking back to old Rome makes his narrative fade away amidst the ruins of the Capitol, where it was first conceived. The work of the master builder must taper towards its top, like a tower, not blossom out luxuriantly like a plant. So, when Mr. Belloc writes that "This great work is profoundly unhistorical. It presents a thoroughly warped view of the whole vast Revolution which turned Pagan into Christian Europe. That Revolution is Gibbon's very subject . . .", the only answer is that this was

not Gibbon's subject; and Mr. Belloc is grumbling because the master builder who built a tower did not become an artist and paint a plant.

His avowed aim was "to render to posterity a just and perfect delineation of all that may be praised, of all that may be excused, of all that may be censured." When refusing a copy of Priestley's book in 1783, Gibbon refers to himself as "the Historian who, without interposing his own sentiments, has delivered a simple narrative of authentic facts." He certainly regarded himself as a pure historian, having no pretensions to be an historiologist. One of our greatest modern historians, Professor G. M. Trevelyan, has expressed it thus:

> Round the story, as flesh and blood round the bone, should be gathered many different things—character-drawing, study of social and intellectual movements, speculations as to probable causes and effects, and whatever else the historian can bring to illuminate the past. But the art of history remains always the art of narrative. That is the bedrock.

Gibbon would have agreed very readily with these remarks.

He was, indeed, a man of his age. His rationalist scepticism, the universalism of his outlook, the Gallicism of his culture, all savour of the eighteenth-century *philosophe*. But he was not a man of the world; and that is the secret of his supremacy as an historian above all his contemporaries. From the first he had "a blind propensity for books," then his "indiscriminate appetite subsided by degrees into the historic line." "I *know*, by experience, that from my early youth I aspired to the character of an historian." Throughout his life direct contact with the world of affairs was but slight. He fell in love—but when his father objected, he "sighed as a lover, and obeyed as a son." He joined the militia—as Captain of the Hampshire Grenadiers. He entered Parliament in the great days of Burke—and never spoke. He lived through the most exciting period of the century—but when the French Revolution burst upon Europe, he could regard it chiefly as it affected the comforts of a fat historian in his library armchair. The picture, in short, is that of a studious, pondering man, always thrown back upon the resources of his own native genius, and enjoying great freedom in following his own inclinations. He records, characteristically, that instead of attending the public course of lectures given by M. Vicat

at Lausanne, "I preferred in my closet the lessons of his masters, and my own reason." In England his "philosophic walks" usually ended at the nearest seat, with further reading or meditation. And he adds, "I was never less alone than when by myself." The process of writing history could scarcely find more congenial circumstances. Little wonder that he was able, as Horace Walpole phrased it, "to melt his materials together and make them elucidate and even improve and produce new discoveries."

The misfortune of Gibbon is that his greatness has led men to expect even more than he offers. His greatness has four corner-stones, and further claims are unnecessary. First, his work is a permanent mine of accurate information. Secondly, he is of value in so far as each generation sees some aspect of the original evidence which it alone can understand; for no man was more truly a son of his age. Thirdly, he marks the climax of a conception of history and a method of writing history, which emerged from the philosophy of the enlightenment, and which have lasting significance even to-day. Finally, his work has the unique and permanent value of a work of art, the masterpiece of a master craftsman; and the Captain of the Hampshire Grenadiers who carried Horace in his pocket has himself left a monument more lasting than brass.

DAVID THOMSON.

THE RIVER OF LONDON IN HISTORY.

MR. HILAIRE BELLOC has shown in his book *The River of London* how London came to be built at the precise spot on the River Thames where it has stood for so many centuries, and how it grew of necessity to be the capital of this island kingdom.

> "The Thames," he tells us, "was so situated that a crossing place of a permanent sort had to be established as far down the stream as possible. This place was found where the stream was still broad, tidal and a port. Once bridged, the same spot could mark the terminal of sea-borne traffic and the place of exchange between foreign and domestic produce, while the roads radiating north and south from such a crossing would further establish its pre-eminence."

It must be remembered that stretches of marsh-land impeded the crossing of the river in early days to a much greater extent than they do now. The river was not confined within its present banks, and eyots or islets studded the stream for a large part of its course. Their names meet us to-day in a corrupted form over and over again, as for instance in Chelsea (Chesil-eyot), Battersea (St. Peter's-eyot), Bermondsey, Moulsey, Romney, etc. The termination *ey* or *ea* has ordinarily this signification. Chesil is equivalent to the modern English shingle, and we get the same word in Chesil Beach, a shingle beach which unites Portland with the mainland. Westminster Abbey was built on what was then an island in the course of the Thames, Thorney Island (or Thorn island).

It is mainly in relation to its historical interest that we are dealing with the River of London in the present article. The names with which the course of the Thames are dotted are historical landmarks. They confront us more especially in London and in the most unique and traditional of its suburbs, Richmond. The nobles of an earlier day had their mansions and palaces on the River Thames. In the name of Old Palace Yard we are reminded of an ancient palace of the kings of England on the site of which to-day stand the Houses of Parliament. On the opposite bank of the river still stands Lambeth Palace, the residence of the Archbishops of Canterbury, originally built by Archbishop Morton towards the close of the fifteenth century and restored by the munificence of

Archbishop Howley between 1828 and 1848 at a cost of over £60,000. The adjoining church was rebuilt as recently as 1852. In the churchyard is the tomb of John Tradescant, who formed the first museum of consequence in this country in the reign of Charles II. It passed at his death to Elias Ashmole (whose tomb is also in the churchyard) and now forms part of the well-known Ashmolean Museum at Oxford.

Whitehall, associated with so many Government Departments at the present day, was formerly the site of a Royal Palace, and its extensive gardens abutted on the banks of the River Thames. It extended from the south corner of Richmond Terrace to the north side of the Horse Guards Parade, where its main entrance was situated. Here Henry VIII died and also Oliver Cromwell, in the midst of a tempestuous storm and fearful of the fate awaiting him in another world. The Palace was destroyed by fire in 1698 and was never rebuilt, but many houses of the nobility arose on its ruins, among which may be mentioned Rutland House, Fife House, York Place and Dover House. Of these the only one still standing is Dover House, now transformed into the headquarters of the Secretary of State for Scotland.

Somerset House, now occupied by Government offices, stands on the site of the town house of Lord Protector Somerset, regent of England in the brief reign of Edward VI. Surrey Street, Howard Street, Norfolk Street and Arundel Street recall the extensive mansion of the ancestors of the Duke of Norfolk, Earl Marshal of England. Essex Street tells the tale of the ill-fated favourite of Queen Elizabeth and occupies the site of Essex House. Villiers Street and Buckingham Street remind us of the no less disastrously terminated career of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, favourite of James I and Charles I. Here originally stood York House, once the town residence of the bishops of Norwich, but transferred later to the Archbishopric of York, from which it took its name. It subsequently passed into the hands of Lord Keeper Sir Nicholas Bacon, who died there in 1597, and it was here that his more famous son, Lord Chancellor Bacon, was born in 1560. It is recorded that the Duke of Lennox proposed to the Lord Chancellor to sell it, to which he replied: "York House is the house where my father died and where I first breathed and there will I breathe my last breath, if it so please God and the King." It was in the reign of

Charles I that it became the residence of his favourite, George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham. Thereafter it was granted to General Fairfax during the times of the Commonwealth and, his daughter having married the second Duke of Buckingham, the property reverted to the Villiers family. The dissipated habits of Charles II's minister necessitated its sale when the mansion was pulled down and streets were built on its site.

Durham House adjoined York House, and stood on the spot occupied by Adelphi Terrace, a place rendered memorable by the sojourn there of David Garrick, who lived at No. 5, and died there January 20th, 1779. Durham House itself was memorable in history. It was an ecclesiastical residence till the times of Henry VIII, and is stated by Stow to have been built by Bishop Hatfield in 1345. Henry converted it into a Royal Palace. In the reign of Edward VI it became the residence of John Dudley Earl of Northumberland; and here took place the marriage of his fourth son, Lord Guildford Dudley, to Lady Jane Grey, eldest daughter of Henry Duke of Suffolk, an alliance which subsequently brought husband and wife to the scaffold. Queen Mary returned the mansion to the See of Durham. In Elizabeth's reign Sir Walter Raleigh was allowed to make use of the house, but it was restored at his death to the Bishopric of Durham once more. Later on it was purchased by the Earl of Pembroke but pulled down early in the eighteenth century. Worcester House, eastward of Durham House, was also originally an episcopal residence, having belonged to the See of Carlisle. It passed thence into the hands of the Earls of Bedford, from whom it was purchased by the Earl of Worcester. On the son of the Earl of Worcester being created Duke of Beaufort the name was changed to Beaufort House. Beaufort Buildings in the Strand took its place after its destruction by fire.

The Savoy Palace further to the east was founded by the Earl of Savoy in the reign of Henry III and had the appearance rather of a fortress than a mansion. It is celebrated in history for the imprisonment of John, King of France, after his capture by Edward the Black Prince. Like other historical sites on the Thames it had a chequered history, having been burnt by the mob in the insurrection of Wat Tyler and afterwards rebuilt and turned into a hospital and sanctuary. All that now remains of it is the Savoy Chapel which formerly stood within its walls.

We may pass over other buildings of historic interest on the banks of the Thames, but a reference, however brief, to the Tower cannot be omitted. The oldest part, the White Tower, was erected by the architect Gundulph to the order of William the Conqueror, the building being commenced in 1078, twelve years after the Norman Conquest. Doubtless it was intended in the first instance to keep in subjection the unruly and turbulent element in the Saxon population. For many years it served as a sort of political prison and witnessed in this character many deeds of darkness, of which the most celebrated is the murder of the young princes, sons of Edward IV.

Many of the local names on the Thames have reference to hythes or landing-places. These we find embedded in Rotherhithe, Greenhythe, Queenhithe, Lambeth (Lamb-hythe) and Hammersmith (Ham hythe or Hamar's hythe). We meet with the term in Maidenhead, formerly called Maydenhythe, and again as far up the Thames as Bablock Hythe some ten miles above Oxford, and it is of course familiar as the name of a watering place on the coast of Kent.

So, too, we have reference to ferries, an evidence that no bridge was in existence at the part of the Thames in question, as in the case of Horseferry Road, the ferry being used for conveying horses and probably passengers also across the river where Westminster Bridge now stands. The Church of St. Mary Overy (St. Mary of the Ferry) has been cited as another instance of the same kind, but the derivation has been called in question and is possibly incorrect.

English sovereigns had a peculiar partiality for the Thames. Before ever Windsor was a Royal residence, they had a palace on the banks of the Thames at Richmond. Later on there was the Palace built by Cardinal Wolsey at Hampton Court, and presented by him, doubtless unwillingly enough, to King Henry VIII. At Richmond, too, Charles II had an extensive park laid out for his own diversion, which passed eventually after much strife into the hands of the Richmond municipality. The history of the Palace at Richmond is one of very special interest. The first of England's monarchs to occupy it was Edward I, and all the first three Edwards resided successively at this Palace, then termed the Palace of Sheen. For the name of Richmond was unknown in the locality until the reign of Henry VII, who rebuilt it on a much more magnificent scale, and in compliment to whom the inhabitants of Sheen

adopted the name of Richmond, Henry having been Earl of Richmond in Yorkshire. We may well regret the abandonment of the simpler and more picturesque name of Sheen for one that is liable to lead to confusion with another place, and has indeed done so in a very notable instance as the lass of Richmond Hill, there is strong reason to believe, hailed originally from Richmond in Yorkshire, though Sheen (or Richmond, Surrey) has adopted her as its own without valid justification. It is curious that the original name of the borough survives in East Sheen though West Sheen has ceased to exist, at least under that appellation. Edward III died at this Palace of Sheen (or Sheene), his death hastened, as it is said, by grief for that of his son Edward the Black Prince, his long and at first successful reign closing in gloom and popular discontent of which his grandson Richard II became the unfortunate inheritor. Edward III is said to have had a shooting-box, it may be noted, at what is now Ravenscourt Park, the place being associated with his amour with Alice Perrers. However this may have been, King Richard, his grandson and successor, as stated by the historian Walsingham, kept regal state at Sheen Palace, his establishment consisting of no less than three hundred retainers. Here his Queen, Anne of Bohemia, to whom he was devoted and whose popularity was a mainstay of his throne, died after a brief illness, and after her death the clouds rapidly gathered which led within six years to the final catastrophe.

It is recorded that the custom of ladies riding side-saddle was introduced by this Queen, a fashion only recently abandoned after a period of upwards of 500 years. It appears that Richmond Palace was left to fall into a state of decay after Queen Anne (of Bohemia)'s death, but in the reign of Henry V, Shakespeare's celebrated Prince Hal, it underwent restoration and again became a royal residence. A new and brilliant chapter in the history of the Palace began, as already stated, in the reign of Henry VII. This first of the Tudor monarchs made it his residence and held here, as the chronicler relates, "great triumphs of jousting and tourney." But in December of the year 1497, while the king and his court were in residence, a great fire broke out at the palace and the whole edifice was reduced to ruin. In spite however of his reputation for thrift Henry rebuilt it on a scale of much greater splendour than before, the new Palace and grounds extending along the

frontage of the River Thames from what is now Asgill House to Queensberry Lane, where recently artistically designed flats have taken the place of the old residence of the Marquises of Queensberry.

From that time forth Richmond Palace became the favourite country residence of the Tudor kings. Here Henry VII, its second founder, if we may so term him, died on April 21st, 1509, leaving his second surviving son, Henry, to succeed him, his elder brother Arthur having died of the plague within six months of his marriage to Katherine of Aragon, the youthful couple having been only fifteen at the time of their marriage. Here Henry VIII held high festival in the early years of his reign in company with Katherine, his brother's widow, whom he had married after a dispensation from the Pope had been obtained, though he was some five years her junior. Here he delighted to disguise himself as some stranger knight or even as the counterpart of Robin Hood to the amusement of his Court and his Queen, and here, too, he loved to indulge in jousts and tilting, in which the elegance of his deportment was much admired. For Henry, whom we so often think of in his corpulent middle age, had the reputation of an accomplished athlete in his youth and early manhood. But it is probable that the Palace was never so merry as in the heyday of his daughter Queen Elizabeth's auspicious reign. At her court at Richmond she was wont to be attended by a gay and brilliant retinue, and herself indulged in dancing, music and singing as part of her regular morning's occupation. Here she loved to entertain foreign princes and ambassadors or hold revelry in company with her favourite, the Earl of Leicester. Hence she journeyed from time to time to Mortlake to visit the celebrated Dr. Dee and to be told of strange visions in his crystal mirror. Here, too, like her grandfather, she died in circumstances of gloom and tragedy heightened by mysterious hints of uncanny apparitions.

Prince Henry, the ill-fated heir of James I, resided at Richmond, and thereafter his brother Charles, who was created Prince of Wales on November 4th, 1616, and on the occasion journeyed by river from the Palace to Whitehall where the ceremony took place. King James, it is recorded, stood on the gallery stairs at Whitehall to see the Prince arrive in the Royal Barge from Richmond attended by the Lord Mayor and

all the City Companies of London, also in their barges, who, we are informed, " came in very good order and made a very goodly show." The Duke of Buckingham, the Prince's favourite companion, was frequently his guest at Richmond Palace, where, says the chronicler, " there was nothing to write about but dancing and feasting " Here Charles when he became king made a very valuable collection of pictures and works of art; but these and the contents of the Palace generally were sold up and dispersed during the Commonwealth to the great indignation of the inhabitants of the royal borough, and thereafter the Palace never regained its former splendour. Henrietta Maria, the widow of Charles I, lived in it for some years after the Restoration, but it is spoken of at the time as " being in part plucked down." Charles II's preference was for Windsor Castle, and gradually the noble edifice was allowed to fall into ruin and disrepair. Adjoining the Green at Richmond is all that now remains of the Tudor Palace. It consists of a stone gateway with a postern gate beside it which is believed to have been the entrance to the Wardrobe Court. There are also some rooms on the left-hand side of a quadrangle turned latterly into two residences, the major portion of which was till recently occupied by Lord Chancellor Cave, but of the handsome frontage of the Palace not a stone remains. The tradition of the palmy days of Richmond is recalled only by the " Maids of Honour " cakes for which it is celebrated, once the favourite delicacies of the Maids of Honour of the Royal Court, and Maids of Honour Row, the name given to a row of Queen Anne houses facing the Green and built over what was once a portion of the Palace grounds. Not only did the preference of the British Sovereigns for Windsor Castle compete with the popularity of Richmond Palace, but the proximity of Hampton Court (at a later date enlarged and specially favoured by William III) offered an alternative Royal residence in the near neighbourhood. Henry VIII spent much time at Hampton Court and added considerably to the edifice that Cardinal Wolsey had begun. Here Edward VI was born and Jane Seymour died. Here, too, Oliver Cromwell frequently stayed. It was abandoned by the Royal family after the reign of George II.

Kew Palace, a much less ambitious structure, long since demolished, was purchased in 1781 by George III and is specially associated with his Queen, Charlotte, who spent much of her leisure at Kew and eventually died here. Many fantastic objects and miniature temples still visible in the Gardens, since the accession of Queen Victoria thrown open to the public and devoted to botanical research, bear witness to Queen Charlotte's fantastic tastes, and notably the Pagoda, a tower designed in imitation of a Chinese building by Sir William Chambers. Sion (or Syon) House on the opposite side of the river occupies the site of an ancient religious establishment, the original grant having been made to a Convent of Bridgetine nuns by Henry V in 1414. The convent was dissolved along with so many others by Henry VIII, and the site was granted by his son and successor, Edward VI, to the Lord Protector Seymour, Duke of Somerset, and after his attainder to the Duke of Northumberland, in whose family it still remains.

The popularity of the banks of the Thames in the proximity of London is witnessed by many other historic dwelling places. Chiswick House, now thrown open to the public, Pope's Villa at Twickenham, and Strawberry Hill, the residence of Horace Walpole, may be cited among the most noteworthy of these.

Chiswick House, until recently a residence of the Dukes of Devonshire, with its charming grounds and gardens, was originally designed and laid out by Richard Boyle, Earl of Burlington. It was modelled on the Villa Capra, near Vicenza, the designer of which was the celebrated Palladio. Here Charles Fox died in 1806 and here also George Canning passed away. Orleans House, on the Twickenham bank, was once the residence of the Princess of Denmark, afterwards Queen Anne. It obtained the name of Orleans House through its having been rented by the Duke of Orleans early in the nineteenth century. Kingston, less famous as a resort of rank and fashion, is noteworthy as having been the place of Coronation of a number of the Saxon Kings before the Norman Conquest. The King's Stone whereon they were said to have been crowned is still an object of interest in the centre of the town.

In such a brief sketch as the above it is only possible to outline the main points of interest which link up the Thames with the history of the Empire in whose life it has played so important a part. Truly England without the River Thames would resemble *Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark.

R. Shirley.

THE SMITH IN CULTURE-HISTORY.

IN Ancient Egypt the smith forged in copper, and later in bronze, the magical chisel which gave power to the hands of the sculptor and so enabled him to fashion from stone the portraits of the kings who were themselves divine beings; hence the smith-craft of Egypt was closely allied to the priest-craft. Mesen was the blacksmith god; Mesniu was "the blacksmith of Horus," and the word Mesenti, besides being the title of the high-priest of Apollinopolis, indicates a sculptor, a metal-worker, or caster of metals: and further, the Heru-shemsu were, according to Sir Wallis Budge, "a group of mythological beings of the last divine king of Egypt, with whom later were identified the blacksmiths of Edfu, and the beings who assisted in the embalming and burial of Osiris."

The Greek Hephæstus (Rom. Vulcanus) was himself a smith. He was born lame and weak, and his disgusted mother flung him down from Olympus. Crippled in the legs, but mightily compensated in the power of his arms and shoulders, he acquired the magical handicraft. On his return to Olympus he inhabited a palace-smithy wherein his roaring forge received its blast from twenty bellows. Here he wrought the armour of Achilles, the necklace of Harmonica, and the fire-breathing bulls of Aeetes, King of Colchis. On earth active volcanoes were his subsidiary workshops, where, with the assistance of the Cyclopes, as hammermen, he forged thunderbolts.

From Ancient Greece to Rome, and from Rome through Europe, spread the convention of the lame, crippled, or dwarfed blacksmith. The youthful Siegfried was nurtured by such a one, Mime, who incessantly grumbled, growled and cursed at the impossibility of welding the broken parts of the hero's sword, Nothung. This task was reserved for one who knew no fear, and at length the blond, gigantic apprentice seized the steel and successfully married the broken parts, thereby proving himself the knight chosen to slay the dragon, Fafnir, and recover the Niebelung Ring, Hoard, and Tarn-helmet. Here is myth, saga and folklore combined, used by Wagner to its fullest dramatic advantage; but the significance of the theme from our point of view is Mime's foster-parentage of Siegfried, his possession of the magic sword, his evident earlier familiarity with Siegmund and Sieglinde (the noble

parents of Siegfried), and his dealings with Wotan and Alberich.

Theodric the Ostrogoth, in a letter to Thrasamund, King of the Vandals, thanks his brother-in-law for the gift of a sword, the edges of which were so true that it seemed "to have flowed like liquid from the furnace: and in the hollow centre of the blade one can discern an appearance as of twisted worms that gives the effect of changing light as if the steel were of many colours." In short, the blade was damascened, that is, built up from laminated strips and plates of steel, each piece of a different temper, and the whole welded together throughout, so that the pattern remained true to the core. This was the most exquisite form of smith's work, for damascened swords were frequently so finely forged and so highly flexible that they might be rolled from point to pommel, much like a leather strap. Swords and armour, buckles and harness-plates, endeared the smith to kings and princes. They concealed their contempt and reduced the swagger of their manner before this unprepossessing, begrimed and sweltering creature, "Sir Smith," who, in the tradition of Tubal Cain, "a man of might in the days when the earth was young," supplied the implements by virtue of which rulers held sway and tyrants triumphed. But Tubal Cain, who "fashioned the sword and spear," saw the evil wrought thereby, and after a period of pained cogitation he rekindled his fire and, filled with a new spirit, "fashioned the first ploughshare." This, too, did the medieval European smith, and while he enjoyed the friendship of kings he none the less commanded the awed respect of peasants.

In Norse legend the smithy of the Æsir is tenanted by Thor. The lightning is his hammer-flash, and the thunder is the diapason of his blown fire; while here below the trolls, hidden in the fastness of the hills, have their forges; and though no trolls are beautiful, the duergar, a dwarf with long arms which reach to the ground, is chosen to fill the rôle of smith, and, despite his simian and formidable exterior, his artist spirit is expressed in the invincible weapons, the agricultural implements, and the fine filigree ornaments that his hammer creates.

The Faustian soul is time- and history-conscious. We men of the West may look back and see how thought has shifted its centre of gravity from age to age, and above all how the

torch has been handed on as culture after culture has reached its maximum of development, sloughed into the twilight of its decadence, then died. These oscillating tides of history are governed by a law, and Oswald Spengler, in his *Decline of the West*, has given us a very clearly defined morphology. To him a culture is a living thing having both a soul and a body. The soul is expressed through the arts and crafts which, while robust, expanding and progressive, signify that the culture is "becoming," and when starved, stagnant and stereotyped, that the culture has "become." The lifeless body of a culture is "civilisation." Spengler is irritated by fallacious comparisons such as "Christianity and Buddhism," "Napoleon and Cæsar"; and he is at pains to make it clear that Buddhism may more correctly be equated to Socialism, Napoleon to Alexander, and that Wagner's music is a re-expression of Gothic cathedral architecture. "Eras, epochs, situations, people, are ever repeating themselves true to type," he says; and by meticulously analysing every aspect of divers cultures, he lays bare the fundamental theme beneath each expression-form. Nevertheless, he fails to point out that the cult-craft of the smith has survived unchanged through all the vicissitudes of history. Actually the smith-cult has been a primal current of vitality; for states and empires rose and fell but always the happy melody of hammer on anvil rang from the forges. The iron-working artist-magician's services were ever in demand—sword or ploughshare, spear or pruning-hook. The living pulse of the blacksmith-cult throbbed and throbbed, now weak, now strong: culture-conscious as sword and armour master to the mighty of the great aggressive epochs; humble and idyllic, serving a pacific fellah population; yet intrinsically unchanged from the inception of the age of metals until well into the expansion period of the modern machine age.

In the early Victorian era an English rural community's welfare was largely dependent on the industry of the village blacksmith, who not only forged horseshoes and repaired the ironwork of wagons and wheels, but made many of the farm implements and carpenter's tools used locally. Besides this very practical importance the smith was a personage with not a little social significance, the forge being a centre of attraction for the male gossips of the village, a sort of unofficial club-house where women and children were not encouraged

to congregate. Men lounging away a friendly leisure hour sat anywhere except upon the anvil. That object remained strictly tabu. The fact that it was generally too hot to afford a comfortable resting-place had nothing to do with its sanctity, for it was also tabu on Sunday, when the fire was extinguished and the anvil itself cold. This respect for the anvil was more than merely a yokel's superstition, it invaded the somewhat prosaic Deritend of Birmingham, where there were many smiths at work, proud men, conscious of the peculiar status of their unique trade, and of their supremacy as master craftsmen. The beginning of the end of the smith's independence came in the mid-Victorian era. The machines had grown in girth and immense forgings were needed in mighty beam-engines, and in pumping-plant for hydraulic power. It was then that the steam-hammer was introduced to deal the superhuman blow required, the smith, through the medium of pulley-block and chain-tackle, manipulating the metal beneath the monstrous mechanical vulcan. The smaller forgings he continued to beat out entirely by hand. Nevertheless the canker had settled upon the smith's craft, and slowly but very surely it bit deep. Lighter steam-hammers came into use to facilitate the manufacture of medium-sized articles; spring-hammers followed to enable the smaller work to be accomplished without the aid of a hammerman, and with the exit of the "striker" half the life was gone from the forge.

One of the most remarkable sights in the old days of craftsmanship was smith and hammerman working together. The master turned the steel upon the anvil and with a hand-hammer indicated where, when and how hard the blow was to be dealt; the music of the signal-code, beaten like a peal of bells from the anvil, was the symphony of the smithy. Magic departed with the tune, and the lonely smith stood before a foot-operated spring-hammer—a soulless machine to the requirements of which even the hitherto sanctified anvil was sacrificed, a square steel block being mounted in its place. However, this latest mechanical "striker" could deal only a "blind" blow and the smith's skill was necessary to shape the material by means of swage-irons; but his morale suffered. The output of the machines was "repetition work," devoid of ornament, and therein lay the grave of craftsmanship. "Speed of production" was the slogan of the period: the single flat-faced

hammer proved but a forerunner of a row of mechanical hammers, each with the face slotted to hold a shaping-tool, leaving the smith nothing to do but carry the hot iron from mould to mould. His skill was now reduced to the possession of an eye sensitive to the glowing colour of heated metal—if a piece grew too dull for working he passed it back to the furnace instead of forward to the next process-hammer. Eventually the pyrometer was introduced and the skilled eye was out of work.

The total extinction of the smith might have dated from the complete mechanisation of the manufacturing industry; but mass-production forgings have a greater tendency than hand-forgings to crystallise and so snap in use: repairs demanded skilled workmanship; hand-smithies revived, and with the anvil before him, hammer in hand, he was once more invested with the insignia and the antique dignity of his calling. But the robot named "Progress" produced the oxy-acetylene blowpipe and the electric-arc welding process: prejudice was overcome; gradually the blacksmith's weld came to be regarded as cumbersome. Nowadays articles for repair, or separate parts requiring to be joined, as for instance the iron rim of a cart-wheel, are clamped in the terminal-grips of a high-power electric circuit. The gap offers resistance to the flow of energy; the blinding arc leaps across, the metal glows, sparkles, fuses and runs together; and even a mentally-deficient schoolboy can switch off when the dial indicates "enough." It needs no magic and little skill to apply the oxy-acetylene blowpipe. The "mighty man" with his leathern apron is not required. The garage boy, wearing blue dungaree overalls, can do the job without removing the cigarette-end from his pendulous lip. The culture-pulse has ceased to beat: the wizard-smith is dead and the village forge is tenanted by a farrier who buys machine-made horseshoes by the ton-lot in assorted sizes and finishes them to fit the hoof. There are few, if any, farriers left who can make a horseshoe from the flat ingot. In Britain's Black Country there is not a half-dozen smiths who thoroughly know their trade, and Sheffield and Coventry are deafened by the drop-hammer's dull boom, boom, boom. The anvils ring no more.

The modern West's conception of causation is based on science; there is no room for magic beside mechanism, and myth long since surrendered to Christianity. But Mesen, the

Egyptian blacksmith-god, passed his cult southward, as well as north and westward. The white man, when he penetrated the African hinterland, found, much to his surprise, that there were native smiths who followed a technique very similar to that of the European smith. Their equipment consisted of a stone anvil, a clay tube through which they blew either by lung-power or by means of crude goat-skin bellows, the hammer and the tongs. In Europe, however, tabus were but trade superstitions; in Africa they were vital social institutions, the smith being regarded as the familiar of either deity or demon. In Somaliland a native never entered a smithy and never shook hands with a smith. These craftsmen formed a strictly endogamous group. In Masailand tabus went even deeper. No man dared touch an implement direct from the smith's hand, nor yet pick up a new tool without first taking the precaution of anointing his own hand with oil. Further, the smiths had set a seal upon their exclusiveness by having evolved a language of their own. This was based on the current Masai tongue, but was sufficiently different to prevent ordinary members of the population from eavesdropping. Among the Nandi, the smiths had originally migrated from the Masai. In the Nandi smith's forge, not only was it dangerous to sit on the anvil, but to so much as step over the bellows or any other tool was fraught with grave risk; and to steal anything from the smithy was a crime even the bravest warrior feared to commit, because the smith, on discovering his loss, had but to mutter a suitable imprecation as he worked the bellows for the thief to experience all the torments that would be his, were he sitting on the glaring "eye" of the fire. The natives of the Lower Congo, according to Mr. J. H. Weeks, had their blacksmiths who were honoured and respected among the dignitaries of the village. "It is unfortunate that the introduction into the country of trade knives, hoes, guns, etc., has practically killed smithing as one of the skilled arts of the people, and the native blacksmith to-day [1905] is gradually passing away into what will soon be the forgotten past." Over thirty callous years have hurried on since then and the dismal prophecy has come true, not only among the Bakongo, but among the Masai, the Nandi, the Somali and others.

The last of the cult-smiths were to be found in Abyssinia: there the Falasha were indeed a race apart, isolated by both

their calling and their religion. The Falasha were the black Jews, inter-marrying, and absolutely alien in all their ways to the rest of the population. They were feared, referred to as *Bouda*, or "devil," and accredited with divers magical powers including that of shape-shifting. The Abyssinians were wise enough to give little or no encouragement to European traders, hence the Falasha held their own up till the present. However, a "civilisation" that has advanced upon the land under cover of a poison-gas cloud and a machine-gun fusillade, is not likely to be slow in bringing the oxy-acetylene blowpipe and the electric arc along with it; and even if the Falasha have survived corporeally, their spiritual death is imminent, and with them goes the last link with "the blacksmith of Horus."

Our modern achievement is vast and admirable. Plywood plus glue ex machines equals a dining-room suite. Yet while one mourns over the loss of a Thomas Chippendale one realises that a dining-room suite is a matter of no moment in the ultimate breakdown of a culture, for the fellah, desiring something portable to sit upon, requires only a tree and an axe. Sheffield would need a high-power, mental microscope to enable her to think in terms of *an axe*: her unit is so many tons of axes *per diem*; and Sheffield, under the canopy of an incarnadined night sky, ringed round with her raging furnaces, presents a magnificent spectacle—the burning badge of titanic ability. But hard as it may be for us to realise it, one day those fires will be cold, and the mountainous slag heaps grass-grown. Western culture has already stiffened into Western civilisation, which is wrapped in a shroud of rectilinear art-forms, atonality music, juvenile enfranchisement, and general hedonism. With the fall of the West goes a World Era—the age of metals. A steel axe will be as far removed from the mentality of the new age, when and if it dawns, as a stone axe is from our own.

JULIAN FRANKLYN.

ARTHUR SCHNITZLER.

ONCE upon a time—it sounds almost like a fairy tale—there was a gay city called Vienna. Here there lived four young poets, friends, very young, very modern, and quite unknown. But since the world was later to hear much of them, their names may be given straight away. They were: Hermann Bahr, Richard Beer-Hoffmann, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Arthur Schnitzler. This literary quartet was at that time known everywhere as "Young Vienna." Whether they had christened themselves thus, or whether this name was bestowed upon them a little ironically, it is impossible to ascertain exactly after half a century. But the fact remains that the name "Young Vienna" took root, and was used by both friend and foe in many a literary battle. Long since then young Vienna has grown into old Vienna; and of the four friends only one is still living, Beer-Hoffmann, relatively the least known.

Vienna fifty years ago was a gay and haughty city where fashion was set by the aristocracy and middle classes together, bound to each other by countless threads of art and amours. Town and *Burg-Teater*, Court and Art, throve in the stormy economic expansion of those years, the seed-bed of modern development, whose motto was: "Live and let live." Vienna was still living on the fame of its musical tradition; where Haydn, Gluck, Mozart, Beethoven and Schubert had lived, there indeed the sky was still "hung with golden harps," and the inns and wine-booths for miles around the Imperial City still bore witness to those great days. From all parts of the great Empire energy and talent poured in together. People worked hard, yet the atmosphere was always lively and happy. In the many faculties and academies of the University one could learn much. Body and soul were given the best of care in the great city. People had no specific purpose or particularly useful standards in life. They gave each day its due, and cared not a jot for immortality.

To this Vienna of the eighties came a young man from the provinces, with all the force of a whirlwind. Hermann Bahr, of Linz, a sleepy provincial town, brought something like an American tempo with him in his gay self-sufficiency. Always on the move, always full of excitement, for ever enthusiastic, he launched modernism into the city of tradition. All his life

this man, who died but a short while ago, had an exceptional instinct for people and movements. Thus he soon had a circle of young poets gathered about him, with whose help he wanted to haul this vulgar, *petit bourgeois* world out of its rut. With Bahr the new era had made its entry into Vienna. In Hofmannsthal and Schnitzler it unfolded its first blossoms.

Arthur Schnitzler was the eldest of the circle of friends. He came of one of those cultured middle-class families in which Vienna already abounded. His father was a doctor, university professor and specialist in laryngology. His grandfather came from Hungary. His name and his trade was Zimmermann (carpenter). But this professional name was later in Vienna changed to Schnitzler (wood-carver). The mother's maiden name was Markbreiter. She came of a famous lawyer's family. Arthur came into the world on May 15th, 1862, in the Leopoldstown quarter of Vienna—a typical Jewish ghetto. He attended the High School and at seventeen entered Vienna University. After four years' study he graduated as Doctor of Medicine, and became, at first, house physician at the general hospital, later, assistant at the psychiatry clinic, and finally, at the clinic for skin diseases. Then in 1888 he became his father's assistant. But after five years of medical practice, during which he was also editor of a medical review, he ended his career as a doctor and dedicated himself wholly to literature, at first under the pseudonym " Anatol " and later under his own name.

At eighteen he wrote his first literary work for the *Bavarian State Messenger*, on the theme of " Patriotism." Here already are to be found those utterances which defined his whole future life : " To be a patriot it is not necessary to love your country ; it is enough to work." A wonderful sentence which holds the whole wisdom of his life, and which anticipated the problem of Jacob Wassermann's famous book *Mein Weg als Deutscher und Jude* (" My path as German and Jew "). Several decades later, with his *Weg ins Freie* (" Path to Freedom "), he won his way through to that high recognition which to-day rejoices us like a bright light in the night. He says there : " Each race as such is naturally offensive ; only individuals can sometimes through personal merit atone for the offensiveness of their race."

Instead of dedicating himself to politics and the fight against the stupidity of the world, Schnitzler withdrew to the

world of the theatre. Even as a boy he had, with his father, learnt to know the great actors and actresses of the period, Sonnenthal and Wolter and others, who came to the famous throat specialist as patients, and left him as friends. So works by the young poet soon reached the Vienna stage. If *Märchen* (" The Fairy Tale ") was a failure, *Liebelei* (" The Love Affair ") brought early fame and recognition. This piece, and later others, also opened the stage throughout the Empire to the young poet. Into this period too falls a short visit to England, accounts of which he wrote for several different papers. He was especially struck by the spirit of the hospitals ; with surprise, and much shaking of the head, he studied the inscriptions on the walls which read : " Whom the Lord loveth, He chasteneth," and " Each man shall bear his own sin." He could scarcely contain himself at such remnants of puritanical thought.

Schnitzler was famous. But how little this could make him stable and at peace within, how greatly he still doubted himself, comes out most vividly in that astounding letter which he wrote, at 30 years of age in 1892, to his friend Theodor Herzl : " . . . while you have long been a famous man, I, not sure of myself or of my calling, or of either, not taken seriously by anyone, have tried to calm my ambition to be a good fellow and man of the world." Perhaps in that Werther mood which he so brilliantly portrayed in the one-act *Anatol* plays, the experiences he had undergone as hypnotiser were also worked out. Schnitzler was an exceptionally good hypnotiser, and as a doctor had prided himself on being one of the first to make use of Freud's discoveries. But then he left this secret landscape between dream world and science, left medicine behind him, and finally exchanged the stethoscope for the pen. Here he differed from his poet-colleagues, the doctors Gottfried Benn, Alfred Döblin, Axel Munthe, Ludwig Schleich, Albert Schweitzer and others who stuck to the double calling without completely giving up either.

The problem of hypnosis had captivated the poet for life. From his first plays in the *Anatol* cycle, the *Frage an das Schicksal* (" Question to Fate ") and *Parazelsus*, in which he actually used hypnosis, to his last novels, *Traumnovelle* (" Dream Novel "), *Fräulein Elsa* (" Miss Elsa "), and *Flucht in die Finsternis* (" Flight into Darkness "), in which

medical hypnosis resolves into the problematical soliloquising of a hypnotic, the world of dreams never left him. Schnitzler, who was called a poet of Eros, might with far more justice be called a poet of hypnosis. The shadowy dream-world, weaving its strange veil between birth, love and death, never again left him before his life and his work together came to an end.

Schnitzler's world is large and thickly populated. One of his biographers has counted nearly 250 vivid and individual characters. It is astounding how he knew the way to gain a reputation and to get on in this world; how, to name three examples, in *Kakadu*, in *Medardus* and in *Bernhardi*, he made the dozens of characters talk and gain colour, painting persons so realistically in one or two sentences, that we never forget them. This bears witness to a really great art, or perhaps even more, to a rare gift of observation which the poet had developed as a doctor. That is surely because Schnitzler never lost interest in individuals, never neglected to look at what was close in order to see with the perspective of eternity. Here he differed sharply from his doctor and poet-colleague, Gottfried Benn, who once openly declared that the individual case no longer interested him. The individual case always interested Schnitzler. He was never interested in the masses and their problems. Thus he could never be a Socialist like Dr. Victor Adler, nor a National Socialist like Dr. Gottfried Benn, nor a Zionist like Dr. Alfred Döblin. He was ever an individualist, an outsider to the end. He placed a barrier between himself and other people. There was not a single person whom he addressed in the brotherly second person, not even his friends Hofmannsthal and Wassermann with whom he spent every summer by the wonderful mountain lake in Alt-Aussee. There the quiet, often dreamy and almost shrouded person, came out of his shell a little. Schnitzler was a wonderful listener, even in the later years of his life when increasing deafness seized him. An affectionate friendship bound him to the thinker Joseph Popper-Lynkeus, almost a generation older than himself. While the clouds of war lay like a burden upon us all, the poet visited the philosopher, who for a long while had lain paralysed. For a few hours they sat silent, thinking of all the young persons who in those same hours were dying, and knew not why.

Schnitzler's attitude in the war, the great testing time for

all of us, was worthy of him throughout. He had kept silent both in defeat and in victory, as Karl Kraus, who had not been silent, but who by his daily attacks on the human carnage had saved his country's honour, has said in acknowledgment of him. After the war he turned almost entirely to prose. For what he had to say the stage was too glaring, too loud. Dissecting with the anatomist's careful hand, he wrote of the fates of those problem natures whom the war had uprooted. It was, if one may say so, Casanova's return. Forty years before he had killed the pleasure-seeker, the romantic hero, the Casanova in himself, when under the pseudonym "Anatol" he had written the episodes of "Anatol," and so had spiritually freed himself from them. Now, almost half a century later, there was no Casanova, no romantic hero there, only a crowd of people who were afraid of life, and who passed from it either in a mania of persecution or in the murk of intoxication. Often this was portrayed in the established form of the monologue as in *Leutnant Gustl*, in *Fräulein Else*, in the *Traumnovelle*. Jealousy and persecution, those two dark brothers of love and hate, take up a prominent place in Schnitzler's world. Much of it may have been based on the poet's personal experience. The persecutions which he had to suffer in an over-prudish Austria, especially because of his plays *Freiwild*, *Gustl*, *Kakadu*, and *Bernhardi*, did not rouse him. They made him more sceptical and more solitary.

In all his works Death is a familiar guest. This Death was in truth a guest, often seen with pleasure, often even welcome, when he showed a way out of a hopeless situation. This Death, Friend Hain, was often conjured by the kindly poet. But one day he awoke, and saw another Death, ugly, meaningless, cruel, who plucked not the fruits, but the buds. It was the Death of the war. And against this Death, who changed the city of songs and of gaiety into a city of hunger and of sighs, against this Death the poet drew his sword, his pen. What he wrote after the war was the rearguard action of a genius in a world robbed of its soul. The same thing happened to the other friends, who, with him—a short eternity before—had formed "Young Vienna." Young Vienna had in its time made merry over "Old Vienna." Now both of them, young and old Vienna, lay in their coffin like puppets in the box of his *Grossen Wurstel*, a play closely

resembling a marionette show. Loris and Anatol were dead long since, and now their fathers followed them, Hofmannsthal and Schnitzler.

The poet had forbidden all funeral ceremonies, and orations, and wreaths; in a simple wooden coffin of unplaned boards he was brought to his last resting place, not far from the graves of his old friends Peter Altenberg, Joseph Popper, and the others who had gone before him. His life had covered seventy years, and in that biblical span the poet had seen, and gained, and given much. That which he sang, the Vienna of lovely maidens, was past, gone for ever. What remained, the bitter end, needed no singer. The strings fell from the tired player's hands. No one would play on them again.

FRITZ GROSS.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE NEW BELGIUM.

THE general interest attracted to the Belgian election of April 11th was a measure of the rising importance in Belgian foreign policy of the Flemish element. M. van Zeeland, the Prime Minister, had accepted the challenge of M. Degrelle, the Rexist or quasi-fascist leader, in what we should call a by-election. That fact in itself proved the concern felt by the supporters of M. van Zeeland. The bold acceptance of the challenge ended in triumph, as boldness often ends in triumph. M. van Zeeland polled 275,840 votes against M. Degrelle's 69,242, the Rexist vote being actually lower than it was at last year's general election.

None the less the new Belgian foreign policy, largely deriving from the increased post-war importance of the Flemish element, is an established fact. During the past few weeks, British opinion has been made to face it. King Leopold was in London from March 22nd to March 25th. Although in form he came on a three days' private visit, he nevertheless took the opportunity to discuss with British Ministers, including Mr. Anthony Eden, the conditions which had prompted the promulgation of the new Belgian policy of full neutrality, independence and freedom of action. British opinion had been well prepared for it. Even before King Leopold made his famous statement in October last, M. van Zeeland had on several occasions explained the circumstances which had brought about the change. Neither King Leopold, however, nor M. van Zeeland in their public declarations have referred to the importance of the Flemish question in Belgium. It happens that the Flemish population has rapidly increased since the war. It does unfortunately also happen to be the case that M. Degrelle and his Rexist party do derive much of their support from the Flemish population and that an association of ideas has developed between Nazi influence on the Rexist side and democracy on the Walloon side. Those circumstances have made it inevitable that Belgian foreign policy should be more evenly balanced as between France and Britain on the one side and Germany on the other. It is an open secret that the British and French governments have been given a private assurance that in the event of a German

aggression the most prompt facilities would be placed at the disposal of France and Britain on Belgian territory. But outwardly it has now to be recognised that Belgium adopts an impartial attitude to each of the three Western European Great Powers. The new Belgian policy of full neutrality, independent of any external obligation, presents to the Western European Powers a single isolated new factor in diplomacy, having no relevance to the more general diplomacy centring on what is known as the project for a Western European Pact.

For a whole year the diplomacy in which Belgium is particularly interested has been at a standstill. It was on March 7th, 1936, that Germany reoccupied the Rhineland and repudiated the Locarno Treaty. Since then the theoretic purpose of Western diplomacy has been to substitute another instrument of security in the West for the pact thus invalidated. But Belgium is not prepared to enter any similar pact. She now demands to be recognised by the Powers as a neutral territory on the analogy of Switzerland. Her concern is that she shall not again be made the battlefield of European Great Powers. Her case rests upon the proved failure of past juridical guarantees. The old status as an " independent and perpetually neutral State," not guaranteed by the Powers, which dated from 1831, had been proved valueless as a safeguard. The post-war Locarno treaty of mutual guarantee had been proved equally valueless.

What, therefore, Belgium now demands is that she shall be wholly independent ; that her independence and neutrality be guaranteed by the Powers, but that she shall not herself be a guarantor in any treaty system. The Belgian object now is to separate the question of Belgian neutrality from the general question of Western security as based upon a pact of juridical mutual guarantee. She asks for a simple disconnected assurance from Britain, France and Germany alike that her independence is unconditionally to be respected. The development of the air arm in war is used to fortify the argument. " Aggression " henceforth will be a matter of frontier transgression by aeroplane. Any system of mutual guarantee which gave the right to any neighbour, or to Britain, to counter an air aggression on one side by defensive air measures on the other would, it is argued, merely result in Belgian territory being bombed from both sides. The demand

in short is that Belgium shall be free to decide her own action in any emergency that may arise. France and Britain promptly decided to give to Belgium the assurance she demanded, though the text of the declaration had not been published when these lines were written.

Diplomacy and Commerce.

We are threatened with the possibility that another world economic and financial conference may be convened. Not that such an event would be likely to do harm. Indeed, the history of our time, if it proves anything, proves that economic conferences never have much effect of any kind. The Genoa Conference of 1922, though it failed to reach an agreement on any of its economic or financial agenda, was followed by a world boom in finance and economics. The Geneva Conference of 1927, though it equally failed in its own object, had no effect on the boom still raging. The London Conference of 1933, though in its turn it registered nothing but disagreement among the delegates, at any rate did not arrest the then incipient world recovery from the biggest slump known to financial and economic history.

The proposed new conference emerges from the assembly in London of the delegates of twenty-two countries attending an International Sugar Conference. The sugar conference met in the Locarno Room of the British Foreign Office on April 5th. In itself sugar as a subject of international discussion had its importance. Mr. MacDonald, for example, opening the conference said : " To-day the position is much better than it was, say, four years ago. But production in some of the greatest sugar-producing countries remains at only about 50 per cent. of its former level. In many others production has been sustained only by special measures of assistance which remain a heavy burden on Government finances or on sugar consumers. There still is in the world a capacity to produce far in excess of present demand. The improved world price is still only just remunerative to the cheapest producers, and, while unused capacity exists and is ready at any moment to be freed, there can be no security of obtaining even that modest return." But it was obvious that to most minds the sugar conference was important mainly as a possible step

towards a more general economic conference. France, for example, though not much interested in the international sugar market, sent to the conference no less eminent a delegate than M. Spinasse, Minister of National Economy. Within twenty-four hours of the opening of the conference it was made known that the British and the French governments had invited the Belgian Prime Minister, M. van Zeeland, to explore the preliminary ground for the holding of a world conference. M. van Zeeland is himself an economist of repute. Belgium has taken a leading part in advocating the reduction of political barriers to trade by international agreement, and has herself followed a restrained policy in the competitive folly we know as economic nationalism.

There would be some excuse for a flippant attitude towards these conferences, and not much harm could be done by such an attitude. Ten years ago the Geneva conference recorded its view that "the time has come to put an end to the increase in tariffs and to move in the opposite direction." When Herr Stresemann reported the "results" of the conference to the Council of the League of Nations he referred to the "momentous words" enshrined in the sentence above quoted and described the conference itself as "one of the most remarkable and successful conferences ever convened by the League." But it certainly was not in the least successful. To-day the general height of tariff walls is such that, as the *Economist* neatly expressed it in its issue of April 10th last, "the tariffs of 1927, if they could be reintroduced into the world of 1937, would seem almost like free trade."

The tactical use of uplift and the protestations of optimism as a political means to the political end in conferences of such a kind ought by now to be discredited. But politicians pass, and their successors either forget or wilfully persist in the beaten track. We have had so much experience since the war of conferences starting off in a blaze of oratorical exuberance and ending in dismal failure, that something more sober would perhaps be a better, and certainly a truer, form of approach. Those who as students followed the politicians, first to Cannes and then to Genoa and who grimly continued their pilgrimages on the subsequent and similar adventures, became tired of the cheap and shallow pretences with which each adventure was heralded. One can still recall the thrill of Mr. Lloyd George's resonant voice as he opened the Genoa Conference in 1922.

One vividly recalls the inspiring words put into the mouth of His late Majesty King George V as he opened the world conference of 1933 in the brand new building of the Geological Museum in South Kensington. One cannot forget the subsequent slow relapse into the single business of discovering formulæ for winding up the conferences with a minimum display of the truth in failure.

It surely cannot do much harm to recall frankly the former landmarks in the post-war diplomatic treatment of commercial problems. The programme for the Genoa Conference was drawn up at the preliminary Cannes Conference held at the beginning of January 1922. But it immediately became doubtful if M. Poincaré, who had succeeded M. Briand as Prime Minister of France, would even attend the conference at Genoa. He objected to Russia's taking part in it. Inasmuch as the main purpose of the conference was to attempt some sort of economic reconstruction on the ruin that was Europe after the war, it obviously was impossible to make the attempt unless both Russia and Germany took part in it. One Saturday morning (February 25th, 1922), Mr. Lloyd George dashed over to Boulogne in his usual dramatic way, held a three hours' argument with M. Poincaré in the house of the Boulogne Sub-Prefect, and crossed again to England in the evening with M. Poincaré's "yes" in his pocket. One vividly remembers the excitement that accompanied such an achievement. I happened to be with Mr. Lloyd George both on the boat going out and on the boat coming back, and can recall the boyish glee with which he told me that now the Genoa Conference would indeed take place. It did take place. For seven weeks beginning April 10th, 1922, the delegates of twenty-nine European States behaved like the denizens of the primeval jungle. The Russian delegation stayed at a hotel in Rapallo twenty miles away, with the result that incredible energy was expended in wild dashes by car along the dusty coast road between the one place and the other. The whole essential purpose of the Genoa Conference was to put into effect the plan of a general European reconstruction as laid down in the Cannes resolution of January 6th. Various commissions deliberated upon the detailed implications, in finance, commerce, transport and general economics of such a scheme in the event of the scheme being adopted. But it was not adopted. The only thing that happened was that the

Russians and the Germans made a separate deal between themselves. By the famous Rapallo Treaty of April 16th, 1922, Russia and Germany agreed in their own separate case to achieve the theoretic purpose of the Genoa Conference by mutually renouncing war reparation claims and by resuming normal diplomatic and consular relations. They thereby incidentally wrecked the Genoa Conference itself.

The next main ecstasy of economics by conference took place under the auspices of the League of Nations. On May 23rd, 1927, fifty nations were represented at a conference that began at Geneva. M. Theunis (Belgium) who presided, announced at the opening that the main matter of urgency to be considered was the problem of tariffs, and the real ambition of the conference was to "lay the first stone of a structure which would serve the general interest and cause of peace." At the end of the conference M. Theunis had to take refuge in generalities, such as that the conference was only a first step in the work of economic reconstruction, and that the conciliatory spirit shown might mark the beginning of a new era in which international commerce might resume its normal functions. Of practical results he had none to show. A "final report" was indeed drawn up. It gave an eloquent description of the problem to be solved, of the harmful effects of high tariffs and the need of increased facilities for international trade; uttered the truism that all countries are interdependent in all that makes for prosperity and peace, but gave it as the opinion of the conference that the method of industrial agreements might be of great benefit, if they were entered into in the right spirit of general interest, not of monopolistic action. There was not a glimmer of understanding among the 200 political delegates who attended the conference, or apparently among their 150 "experts," that the only hope for international trade was to leave it to its own devices, untrammelled by political agreements. Indeed the sense of the conference was to advocate precisely a whole body of new political agreements as a method of obviating difficulties themselves created by political interference. It is true that the conference in one breath postulated the abandonment of tariffs; but in another breath it called for international industrial agreements of which the effect would be to perpetuate the political power over commerce. In detail what the conference advised, in conformity with its view that "the

time has come to put an end to the increase in tariffs and to move in the opposite direction," was that the end be achieved by these four methods: (1) Immediate action by separate States to remove or diminish barriers that hamper trade, starting with those imposed to counteract war disturbances; (2) Bilateral action in the form of commercial treaties; (3) The abandonment of the practice of imposing *tarifs de combat* in advance of negotiations; (4) An effort by the Economic Organisation of the League of Nations "on the basis of the principles enunciated" by the Conference to secure "further action by the respective States with a view to promoting the equitable treatment of commerce by eliminating or reducing the obstructions which excessive customs tariffs offer to international trade." There were many other subsidiary recommendations, relative to the penalising of imported goods by means of differential internal taxes, the free movement of raw materials, the mutual granting of "most-favoured-nation" treatment as the foundation of long-term commercial treaties, the reduction to a minimum of "dumping" and "rationalism," by which was meant the adoption of methods of organisation and technique to ensure the minimum waste of effort or material.

It is a depressing thing on which to dwell. The political representatives of fifty nations had thus engaged themselves upon an academic discussion of economic difficulties without recognising the essential fact that liberty for commerce to make its own running was the obvious need, and that new political agreements could have the effect only of worse confounding the confusion. But the drab and sombre spectacle was relieved by one delicious act of irony. Herr Stresemann when he reported on the conference to the Council of the League of Nations on June 16th, was so buoyed up with a sense of achievement and of hope that he proposed a resolution inviting all governments "to give these principles and recommendations their close attention and the active support necessary to facilitate their adoption and application." Sir Austen Chamberlain was thereby disturbed. He took the view that it was going too far to ask governments to give their "active support" to the recommendations. The Council thereupon meekly emended the resolution and the governments were asked merely to give the recommendations "close attention."

So the world and its governments went on increasing tariffs and stultifying all the attempts of the merchants to do business with each other across frontiers.

Next in 1933 the curtain rose upon what was heralded as a real world conference. For the first time the great United States was to pull her weight. She had refused to go to Genoa, had not taken a very active part at Geneva. She was now engulfed in the general financial and economic depression, and was desperately anxious, as every other country in the world, to do something about it. The Monetary and Economic Conference that met in London on June 12th, 1933, really did look as if it was world-wide in its competence.

But on July 27th it adjourned *sine die*. This time the valedictory speeches in a chastened spirit did not attempt to hide or to palliate the fact of failure. Mr. Neville Chamberlain said : " Let us not attempt to attribute blame to anyone. Let us rather recognise that circumstances beyond our control have been too strong for us and that we must await more propitious conditions before resuming our labours." Mr. Colijn (the Netherlands) said : " We have certainly no reason to congratulate ourselves on the results obtained. This is undoubtedly highly disappointing, and what is more, it is dangerous as well, because the reaction on the hopes fostered may well lead to an aggravation of the present situation." In less than seven weeks disillusion had gone full circle. The spectacle that met one's eyes when the King and the Prime Minister made the opening speeches on June 12th could not fail to stir one's imaginative sense. One felt the irony of it, yet one could not suppress a hope that those men would do something reasonable before they dispersed. Sitting in their rows of green-painted benches, like an enlarged class of schoolboys, were the governments of the world : American, European, Asiatic ; Western and Eastern ; all " civilised," in varying degrees. They were in the same room. They had been forced there by a common adversity, which began in 1929 and continued with increasing intensity through 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933. By 1933 the world's trade had fallen in value by more than one-half. Measured by volume the fall was not so great : but the practical criterion was the price paid for the commercial products. As the world's delegates sat by each other, they knew that there were 30,000,000

unemployed in the world, although one-half of the world could produce but could not sell what the other half wanted, but could not buy. " The markets are there," said Mr. Ramsay MacDonald on June 12th, " the labour to supply them is there, but the labour is not employed and the markets are not filled." It had all been said before, many times. Moreover the politicians there assembled were not free agents. Mr. Cordell Hull, for instance, the United States Secretary of State and chief United States delegate at the Conference, had to be guided, not by his own opinion whether it was good for nations to prevent each other from doing trade, but by what he imagined would be the " reaction " of Congress to what he said or did. One of the reasons why the machinery of international politics is difficult is that its constituent parts are made by separate agents working on unco-ordinated and even irreconcilable principles. The crude fact that in our time the nations of the world have for nearly a generation been engaged first in a physical and then in an economic war suggests that there is something singularly evil (though the evil may have some mysteriously divine purpose) in what we know as " civilisation."

On June 12th, Mr. MacDonald also said : " When we had a less efficient equipment for the making of wealth, our national incomes were greater." What presumably he meant was that in the old days, when fifty carpenters took a week to do what one carpenter and one machine can now do in a day, the world was better off ; but why in that case describe the old method as " a less efficient equipment for the making of wealth " ? Clearly it was more efficient. The condition of general prosperity is that money should pass uninterruptedly from one person to another and thence to still another. That happens in the maximum degree when everybody can be given work which somebody else needs him to do. The combined effect of socialism and science is to damage the equipment for the making of wealth, for the one interferes between those who want work to be done and those who can do it, and the other tends to reduce the necessity for unskilled work. Masses of people need unskilled work, if they are to have any work at all. When instead they are left unemployed, the demand for other people's work is also lessened by the spreading inability to buy it, and a vicious circle is started.

We have reached a time in the world's history when

governments are destroying the reserves of wealth by engaging in both physical and economic war on a devastating scale; are crippling commercial enterprise by the resultant political obstacles of too high taxation, tariffs and the rest; are attempting to substitute State regulation in industry for the more elemental and direct play of supply and demand; and when science is adding to the disservice of politics by reducing the sum of human work that needs to be done. Yet all history teaches that changed economic conditions produce their own redress, for man's invention is born of man's necessity. In the present instance, for example, it was possible to diagnose in many countries a growing distrust of the political method in all its aspects. In the spacious corridors of the new Geological Museum in Exhibition Road, delegates and commentators in June 1933 were more openly sceptical of the chances of success by diplomatic conference than one ever before remembered in comparable circumstances; and the credit of governments as foreign borrowers had been "blown to pieces," to recall a famous phrase. The effect of that scepticism was to suggest that the initiative in commerce must again revert to private enterprise; and the effect of that discredit was to suggest that money was not likely soon again to be diverted from commercial use to political waste.

Another four years have passed. Tariffs are still as high, or higher. Political interference with commerce is still as rampant, or more. And again the nations of the world, or their politicians, are toying with the idea of solving their economic problems by diplomatic action. High tariffs, quotas, unstable exchanges still militate against the normal functioning of international commerce. Can there be any more hope than before that diplomacy by conference can remove those barriers? It is true that the Anglo-Franco-American currency agreement of last September constituted an exception to the general rule that international agreement in any sphere lies beyond the bounds of practical politics. That agreement may even give encouragement to those who engage in the new world conference, if it be duly arranged. But the baffling difficulty remains that the obstacles to trade are of political origin and that unless the politicians frankly face that fact and bend their purpose to the simple undoing of their own handiwork, it is not clear what basis there can be for any better result than before.

Stubborn Spain.

As these lines were written the scheme of control against intervention by the foreign Powers had not yet been put into operation, though it looked as if it really would come into operation at midnight of April 19th. The scheme itself was described in detail in last month's Contemporary Review. It was adopted by the London non-intervention committee on March 8th, when the British, French, German and Italian Governments promised that they would be able to begin their naval patrol duties on March 13th. But these duties were not then put into operation. For a whole month the scheme was held up.

In the meantime the war in Spain itself has prolonged its stubborn course. To dispassionate people it has become evident that on both sides the war is regarded as an exclusively Spanish affair. Neither the so-called Reds of Señor Caballero nor the so-called Nationalists of General Franco are likely in the long run to tolerate in perpetuity the foreign influences now pressing upon them. The Reds in essence are anarchist and disruptive of the social order rather than bolshevist in the Russian sense. They are composed of different sections fighting against the same enemy but for different ends. If they win it seems likely that Spain will be split into several regional independent entities. Russian influence would not be likely long to survive such an outcome. General Franco for his part, fighting in theory for a unified Spain, has shown that in the event of success he would no more tolerate Italian or German influence than Señor Caballero would tolerate Russian influence. When he decided in the middle of March to halt his operations pending an improvement in the weather, and the Italian forces, differing in temperament and mistaking General Franco's temperament, insisted on advancing by themselves, their discomfiture was due as much to Franco sabotage behind their lines as to Caballero counter-attacks from in front. The British Government throughout has sternly followed the policy of true disinterestedness, a policy which seems to be justified twice over by the now apparent fact that neither side in Spain seems likely to attain a decisive victory. The prospect rather unfolds itself of a long-drawn-out indecisive guerilla war on the true Spanish model. But so far as public opinion is concerned even in Great

Britain, it seems impossible to prevent the warm-hearted people from taking sides in the most violent spirit. Newspapers of the Left do not conceal their glee over what the superior news service of the Reds succeeds as featuring as Red victories, and newspapers of the Right equally believe that Franco embodies everything good in human nature. The Comintern is unrivalled as a propagandist organisation. Its particular service to Señor Caballero has been the establishment of a first-rate news service. Foreign correspondents are encouraged to visit the front lines and are given good telegraphic and telephonic facilities. General Franco despises such things. No correspondent is allowed to visit his front lines. Telegrams are charged at excessive rates. A letter was published in *The Times* of April 2nd from Sir Walter Maxwell-Scott of Abbotsford, who had made a three weeks' tour of Western Spain. In it he showed that the rival news services resulted in the Red version of, say, Sunday's events being published in the British papers on Monday, but the Nationalist version not till Tuesday or even Wednesday. His letter itself threw valuable light on the less well-known facts of Franco Spain.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

April 15th, 1937.

No. 428. *May 1937.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE LAST HALF-CENTURY.*

After winning the highest reputation in the field of journalism, Mr. Spender has scored a second resounding success as biographer and historian. The lives of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, his own recollections, his *Fifty Years of Europe*, and now his detailed survey of the fortunes of Great Britain during his own time, will continue to be read as long as the story of a dramatic half-century retains its interest. For he has enjoyed exceptional opportunities of knowing the *Arcana Imperii* and the men who have made history. This massive volume of 900 pages, published at a surprisingly low price, should be very widely read. For it is not only a careful summary of events, but a thoughtful commentary by a highly trained observer. The veteran Liberal publicist has always possessed an enviable capacity to present his views with such skill and moderation as to secure the attention and respect of those who disagreed with him on the majority of issues. The *Westminster Gazette*, which Sir Austen Chamberlain used to call " the sea-green incorruptible," was a national institution, and we are the poorer for its loss.

To readers of Mr. Spender's generation who remember every thrill as it occurred, the chief interest of the book lies in its portraits of men and its judgments of events. He defines his object as an effort to bring home and foreign affairs into one

* *Great Britain: Empire and Commonwealth, 1886-1935.* By J. A. Spender. Cassell. 10s. 6d.

framework of British history written from a British point of view. Thus, though great foreign actors from Bismarck onwards continually cross the stage, we are mainly concerned with British performers, and it is on these that Mr. Spender can tell us most from personal knowledge. Gladstone and Chamberlain dominate the first portion of the story, Asquith and Lloyd George the second. He does not cultivate purple patches, and he never treats his readers to an elaborate analysis of character; but he often brings the dead back to life in a few vivid sentences. Here, for instance, is Parnell after the divorce case and the ruin of his career. "Day by day he was seen striding through the Lobby of the House of Commons, his hair streaming, his eyes blazing, a ghastly pallor on his face, the very image, pitiful and tragic, of despair and defiance." The titanic energy of Chamberlain and Lloyd George is freely recognised, but the type of supermen which they represent is not at all to his taste. A Trimmer in the sense of Halifax, he detests extremes, despises demagogues, distrusts brilliant and risky improvisations. If the book has a hero it is Asquith, who never let his tongue run away with him, and who throughout life regarded public affairs as best served by an appeal to reason and argument. Campbell-Bannerman, the first democratic Prime Minister we have had, is justly praised, and Grey's foreign policy is once again vindicated by its most persuasive contemporary interpreter in the press. Yet he finds something to regret in his method. "Grey's modesty and shrinking from publicity were useful qualities in winning public respect and confidence; but he concerned himself too little with the education of the public and his colleagues in these years."

The pre-war world is so remote, psychologically if not chronologically, that it is now fairly easy for a Liberal to write dispassionately of such gladiators as Chamberlain and Milner. But the embers of the war period are still hot, and in this chapter of his long story it is at present too much to ask him to stand above the battle. He is frankly for Asquith against Lloyd George, for Haig and Robertson against the self-confident Premier who overrode or attempted to overrule the experts. We note with interest his verdict that the first coalition was the least efficient of the three War Governments. On the fall of Asquith he has already written in the official biography, and he has no love for the men who turned

him out. Bonar Law comes in for his share of the blame, particularly as the main author of the attack on the Asquith Liberals in that "orgy of chauvinism," the "coupon" election of 1918. The catastrophic defeat of the party which Mr. Spender has adorned for half a century is deplored, not only for the sake of the party itself, but from the standpoint of national and international interests. It has been at once the intellectual strength and the electoral weakness of the Liberals in the last twenty years that their creed lacked the class appeal both of Conservatism and Labour.

Mr. Spender's treatment of the Treaty of Versailles will command general agreement. It is unjust to blame its authors for certain outstanding results, such as the dissolution of the Austrian Empire, which had already been registered by victory and defeat. The fantastic miscalculation of Germany's capacity to pay reparations; the crazy demand for the trial of the Kaiser, his Ministers and his Generals by their victorious enemies; the refusal of oral discussion with the German delegates, and the insistence on a dictated in preference to a negotiated peace; the unexampled meanness of the confiscation of the private property of Germans living in the territories of their victors: here are some of the counts in the indictment. He does not speak, like Mr. Keynes, of a Carthaginian peace; but in his quiet way he is almost equally severe.

> When all the details have been examined, it remains to be said that the worst vice of the Treaty of Versailles was the spirit in which it was concluded. That was harsh, vindictive, unsparing.

Inevitably, it was

> a Peace of Conquest requiring the maintenance of force to uphold it, and inviting recovery of force to redress the grievances that it inflicted. This was to make any fair scheme of disarmament by general consent extremely difficult, if not impossible, in the coming years.

After reviewing the post-war period Mr. Spender concludes with a series of chapters covering the half-century which he has surveyed in detail. Among his themes are the growth of population, birth control, the results of Protection, planning, dictatorshop, art and literature. *The Hound of Heaven*, in his opinion, has the best chance of immortality among the poems of the time. De La Mare's verse, we are told, has the sound

of bells under water. Samuel Butler is held mainly responsible for " the habit of turning things upside down." It is interesting to compare Mr. Spender's attitude with that of Mr. Herbert Fisher in the closing chapters of his *History of Europe*. Both men have seen much and have helped to make history. Both are impenitent Liberals. Both find much to praise and much to blame in the new age, so different in its intellectual climate from that in which they won their spurs. Both end on a quiet note, surrendering neither to pessimism nor to the unprofitable pastime of building castles in the air. Mr. Spender finds encouragement in the persistence of the deeper characteristics of our race.

> These years have brought trials and ordeals on a scale undreamt of in former days, and the story of how the British people bore them and rose above them will, I believe, seem to future generations one of the bravest chapters in their history.

From a man who knows so much and weighs his words that is a compliment worth having, and most of his readers are likely to agree that it is not undeserved.

G. P. G.

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SIR THOMAS MORE.

It is well that a Portrait of Sir Thomas More* should be furnished for us by so typical a Catholic humanist as Mr. Algernon Cecil. There are other lives of this great and saintly man, but Mr. Cecil's treatment of his subject has distinctive merits of its own. The width of the author's knowledge, the breadth of his sympathies and the wisdom of his reflections shine out, despite certain limitations, in every page of his book. The " Portrait " is, indeed, a vivid and comprehensive biography in which the commanding personality of the hero is displayed against the background of the age in which he lived and acted, taught and suffered. The picture that is painted is, in every feature of it, decorated, but not overlaid, by the writer's views on all the events and all the personalities which determined the tragic drama of More's career in a momentous age. His outstanding qualities as scholar, statesman and saint are amply displayed, and

* *A Portrait of Thomas More, Scholar, Statesman, Saint.* By Algernon Cecil. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 16s. net.

illustrated by copious extracts from his writings, speeches and correspondence. It may safely be said that this book will take a permanent place in the literature which depicts both the history of the age and the character of one of the greatest and most venerable of its actors. So long as the record of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and English history endures, the story of Sir Thomas More will be studied and the outstanding greatness of his character will be recognised and treasured.

Sir Thomas More stands out with Erasmus as typical of Catholic Humanism at its best. Yet he outshines his compeer in this respect that whereas Erasmus, with all his merits, carefully avoided the risks of martyrdom, More cheerfully laid down his life for conscience sake, neither rashly courting nor weakly avoiding the fate that awaited him from the cruel monarch, whom he both served and withstood. That, in his character and conduct, More was marked, and even disfigured, by some of the outstanding blemishes of his age, should be recognised. As a controversialist he lapsed, from time to time, into the violence and rudeness unhappily common in his age. Mr. Cecil is somewhat tenderer to these faults in More than he is in dealing with others, for example with Luther and Tyndale. But these blemishes on his greatness need no such special pleading as occasionally Mr. Cecil uses. They are the defects of a great character and may well be not only extenuated, but forgotten in view of the serenity and kindliness, as well as the courage, by which his closing days were transfigured as he waited, not only bravely but cheerfully, for the martyrdom for which he steadfastly prepared.

It is when he deals with the Reformation, as a religious movement, and with Luther as its protagonist that Mr. Cecil fails. As a supporter of Erasmus, in his attitude towards the crying evils of the Church and towards the Reformation, he concentrates his attention on the glaring faults of Luther and the sombre features of his philosophy, if philosophy it may be called. The faults of Luther are manifest and are growingly recognised by all Protestants who have knowledge of history and are candid in acknowledging the facts. Yet the strictures of Erasmus and of the other humanists, More included, were insufficient for the reformation of the manifold evils of the Church. It needed the vehement protest of Luther effectively to combat them, and if in the process the unity

of Western Christendom was destroyed, yet to Luther the Roman Catholic Church is indebted for the beneficial reaction that brought about the Counter-Reformation.

In regard to Luther's doctrine Mr. Cecil's treatment is also seriously defective. He concentrates attention upon its background, on what is indeed an irrational magnifying of Divine Sovereignty, with its doctrine of predestination and its consequent denial of human freedom. He omits to point out that this doctrine was inherited in substance from St. Augustine. Nor does he recognise that this background, while exposed and insisted upon by Luther, was used by him to magnify the grace of the Gospel and its joyous reception by faith. Just as St. Augustine must be understood not only by the awful rigour of his philosophy but by the modifying influence of his refuge in the Catholic Church, so Luther must be interpreted as taking refuge from what he termed "the Majesty" of God in the homeliness and graciousness of the Manger, in the mercy of the divinely-human Christ.

It was not the metaphysical, but the evangelical in Luther that made the spiritual appeal of the Reformation. In the dogmatic and religious process that has followed, Protestants have learnt and are learning to transform the Metaphysics of St. Augustine, Luther and Calvin by the grace of the Gospel. The antithesis of the Majesty and the Manger, of the Sovereignty and the Saviourship, have been transcended, and Luther, despite his grievous faults, is honoured not as the stern teacher of predestination, but as the re-publisher of the Gospel of the forgiveness of sins through the alone merits of our Lord Jesus Christ—a gift to be accepted by faith as the secret of reconciled fellowship with God.

Mr. Cecil's comments on Tyndale are also open to criticism. But the available space for this review has been occupied and it must suffice to recommend this book, notwithstanding its limitations, as a worthy and delightful memorial of a very great and noble man.

J. S. L.

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MOSCOW IN THE MAKING.*

Here is the record of a personal investigation of the greatest Russian city in its recent development, by Sir

* Longmans. 7s. 6d. net.

Ernest and Lady Simon, Mr. W. A. Robson and Professor Jenkes, each of whom applies expert knowledge to a selected field of government and administration. In a long introductory chapter Mr. Robson describes the somewhat intricate machinery of city government. "There is a well-articulated and closely knit organisation which combines in a remarkable degree the advantages of concentrating power and leadership in a small group of executive chiefs with the benefits of widespread popular participation in the subordinate parts of the administration. The methods by which responsibility, decentralisation and multiformity have been obtained are at once novel and successful" (p. 66). Enthusiasm for a common cause is, however, accompanied by a fanatical intolerance of free criticism outside all minor issues.

Professor Jenkes shows the dependence of national development in Moscow upon a finance which is largely imposed on the consumer-citizen in the prices he is called upon to pay for goods and services. The consumer acquiesces in a vast expenditure upon the Metro and the Palace of Soviets for the glorification of the city, when this money would have been more usefully applied to housing schemes.

Lady Simon shows the extraordinary efforts made, not only in Moscow but all over the country, for child and adult education, technical and cultural, and the immense enthusiasm for reading. But since all publishing is done by the State, all reading on social and other controversial topics is ordered from on high and is devoted to ensuring the "right views." The science of "pedology" is widely applied through tests of physique and intelligence for the grouping of children in classes and for vocational training.

The housing and building problems are well handled by Sir E. Simon, who describes the measures taken to overcome the deplorable overcrowding in the rapidly growing city. Flats are preferred to small houses, partly as expressions of the sociability of the people in a communist society. But though great efforts are being made, the progress of housing falls far short of the progress in most other industries. He sees great advantages for town-planning in the fact that all the land and buildings are publicly owned and that the Mussoviet has full architectural control over new buildings. Not only are there no private interests to interfere with public policies, but there is no political opposition. This

secures ease, economy and a certain sort of efficiency and speed. But whether these facilities are consistent with positive constructive actions that proceed from and demand free questioning and opposition, is a matter about which doubt is expressed both by Sir Ernest and his collaborators. It is agreed that the dictatorship in Soviet Russia differs favourably from other one-man dictatorships. But are there not certain essentials of personal and public efficiency which are only to be found in democracy? Our writers here, while doing full justice to the public spirit of the governing groups and to the enthusiastic assent of the masses, leave this wide question open.

J. A. HOBSON.

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THE ABYSSINIAN WAR.*

In his new book, *Italy's Conquest of Abyssinia*, Major E. W. Polson Newman has produced a comprehensive account of the whole campaign which will interest both the lay and the expert student of military operations. He makes full use of official Italian records, supplemented by some British and French information. He has discovered no material of any value available from the Abyssinian side. While this narrative is offered as a statement of the facts, it is written sympathetically from the Italian viewpoint; and Major Polson Newman would characterise the conquest as a victory "against almost desperate odds" over a "formidable enemy making the best use of an extremely difficult country." He praises to the utmost the qualities of the Italian soldiers and airmen who "have both stood the most exacting test in a war on modern lines." Such statements, which are certainly not supported by the narrative, must be discounted in a writer who was an ardent champion of the whole Italian case against the League and Abyssinia.

In several preliminary chapters the author discusses the vital part played by the Navy and gives a brief indication of the preparations prior to hostilities, mainly after the Wal-Wal incident when Italy became "really alarmed" at the so-called Ethiopian "mobilisation." This account must be read, not

* (1) *Italy's Conquest of Abyssinia.* By E. W. Polson Newman. Thornton Butterworth. 12s. 6d. net. (2) *Waugh in Abyssinia.* By Evelyn Waugh. Longmans. 10s. 6d. net.

only in conjunction with the course of political events, but also in relation to the long-prepared schemes revealed in Marshal de Bono's recent book.* Major Polson Newman deals successively with the well-defined stages of the war; first the advance to Adowa and Makale, followed by three months of Italian consolidation and counter-attacks by the Abyssinian forces. By February 1936, however, the latter had forsaken their effective guerilla tactics and their three main armies in the North allowed themselves to be outmanœuvred by a brilliant stroke of strategy, and destroyed in turn by Italian forces equipped with all the modern implements of war. These shattering defeats were followed by the final phase, including the Emperor's last desperate resistance at Lake Ashangi and the subsequent advance to Addis Ababa. The operations in the South are dealt with concurrently at the end of each chapter. Much of the narrative is concerned necessarily with detailed movements and its clarity would be greatly enhanced with additional maps and diagrams.

Major Polson Newman concludes that the reversion of the Abyssinians to their traditional methods of mass attacks was the main contributory factor in their defeat. On the other hand the Italians made the most of their opportunities, displaying a great rapidity and "continuous intensity" of offensive action. Their native Askari troops, in particular, showed a remarkable mobility which, with their peculiar knowledge of the country and love of the offensive, brought them frequently into the first line of attack. This accounted for the high proportion of their casualties. "The main burden of the fighting," the author insists, "was shouldered by the Italian metropolitan troops." He also points out that "the greatest care was always exercised to consolidate well before undertaking any further advance." It may be noted with interest, however, that the recent collapse of the highly mechanised Italian force in Spain was largely due to the failure to consolidate a very rapid and reckless advance. Major Polson Newman gives full weight to the value of the air arm, which filled most vital and varied rôles in the Abyssinian campaign. In addition to reconnaisance, securing communications, diffusing propaganda, breaking up enemy concentrations and destroying morale, it played a novel part in supplying with provisions and ammunition columns advancing in

* See *Anno XIIII: the Conquest of an Empire.* Cresset Press. 12s. 6d. net.

inaccessible regions. Co-operation with ground troops was particularly effective and the air force showed its full strength in exercising a traditional function of cavalry, the conversion of defeat into an irretrievable rout. Its ruthless and devastating effect in this respect was more recently demonstrated by the Spanish insurgent warplanes after the capture of Malaga. But in general, as the author shows, the Abyssinian campaign "does not provide an adequate object lesson for aerial warfare in Europe, where conditions are entirely different," as is evidenced in Spain.

Upon those features of the war which shocked the conscience of the civilised world, Major Polson Newman has little to say. The use of "diluted gas" is acknowledged; but treated as "a controversial" question with "probably comparatively little influence on the military aspect of the campaign," the subject is quickly dismissed. Bombing Red Cross units is also outside the author's scope, but the topic receives some reference by Mr. Evelyn Waugh in *Waugh in Abyssinia*. The latter visited the country in the summer of 1935 as the war correspondent of a "realistic" London newspaper. In fact, he was unable to reach the front, and this volume contains his personal experiences in seeking news principally in Addis Ababa, Harar and Jijiga, and his impressions of the Abyssinians. His aversion to them as a barbaric, tyrannous and sterile race is apparent in a loose, racy narrative, written with great self-assurance, which would carry greater weight if its language were less contemptuous and dogmatic. He attacks the "humane humbug of Tafari's régime" which was efficient only in playing off foreign States and in clever propaganda. For example, the Abyssinians had no use for ambulances until they "suddenly saw the vast possibilities for propaganda in the presence in a dangerous situation of a genuine Red Cross hospital." The Emperor lost all because he appealed to "the peevish whinny of the nonconformist conscience" which the world almost fatally confused for the voice of the English nation. Last August Mr. Waugh was the first Englishman to revisit the country under Italian rule. He found Addis Ababa nervously apprehensive of attacks, but we are left with the impression of the natives "being humanely treated" and the subservient races thankful for emancipation from Amharic tyranny. He concludes with a panegyric on the colonising genius of the Roman people.

MILTON AND WORDSWORTH.*

Professor Sir Herbert Grierson, by printing his lectures on Milton and Wordsworth delivered at University College, London, and the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, has enabled a wider public to enjoy the fruits of his long and discerning study of those poets. Both dedicated themselves to high prophetic tasks; both experienced bitter disillusionment in the frustration of their political hopes; each, in his own way, won through to a conviction and faith to which he gave noble expression. Most people have some general idea of the association of Milton with the Commonwealth régime, and of Wordsworth's youthful enthusiasm for the French Revolution, but all will gain fresh insight and knowledge from this valuable work, which covers more ground than its subtitle suggests; the greater part of it is concerned with Milton.

Professor Grierson refers to points raised in other recent books on Milton, Mr. Belloc's and Dr. Tillyard's, for example, and is skilled to meet the disparaging criticism which a modern group of poets have levelled—not at Milton's heterodoxy, or abusive pamphlets—but actually at his verse, a structure hitherto deemed unassailable! Space compels us to leave aside the Professor's discussion of the great poems and their protagonists, of Milton's estimate of Cromwell, and other topics of intense interest, and to give only a brief indication of his main theme. This is to enquire how far *Paradise Lost* represents the epic "doctrinal to a nation" which Milton had set before himself as his contribution to a regenerate England. He had felt compelled to delay embarking upon this by the prophetic call to contribute, in prose, to "the religious and political warfare of the day"; in his First and Second *Defences* he "had in a way fulfilled his first intention of a poem on the exploits of the English people," so that (about 1654) he abandoned its proposed connection with national history. Increasingly isolated from his former allies by his views on marriage and religion, convinced at the Restoration that his political and ecclesiastical ideals would never be fulfilled on earth, Milton makes *Paradise Lost* "an arraignment of mankind," "an indictment of human weakness." Finally, with a revulsion of feeling, in *Samson* he

* *Milton and Wordsworth, Poets and Prophets.* A Study of their Reactions to Political Events. By Sir Herbert J. C. Grierson. Cambridge University Press. 1937. 8s. 6d.

depicts himself and his cause, though in men's eyes "fallen on evil days," yet vindicated by God.

Milton was republican to the last. Nor did Wordsworth lightly surrender his republican sympathies, in spite of the excesses of the French Revolution. Professor Grierson quotes from the *Prelude* his account of the painful, relentless scrutiny to which he subjected his early beliefs and judgments, and shows how it was the strength of his affections, his trust in the instincts of "faith, and reverence and love," together with the healing and joy-renewing influence of Nature, which saved him. For, though a lesser poet than Milton, he had a fellow-feeling for human nature which the other lacked: "his heart goes out to humanity like that of the great prophets . . . his Nature is in profoundest sympathy with the nature of the human spirit." He came to see that a man's true happiness must spring from fulfilling, as Nature does, the law of his own being. And himself attained this serenity.

E. G. S.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Among recent Batsford publications are two attractive books on English towns and villages. Mr. Clive Rouse describes historically the architectural features and peculiarities of the former in *The Old Towns of England*.* While agreeing that most provincial towns have their own peculiarities of appearance, due to their particular growth and environment, the author has classified them all, for the sake of convenience, into the broad categories of cathedral cities, market and country towns, ports and harbours, and spas and resorts; illustrating his colourful survey by many of the well known, and some lesser known, places. No less fascinating is Mr. Sydney R. Jones' review of village architecture and country buildings generally in his *English Village Homes*.* His descriptive study, born of an unrivalled acquaintance with the countryside, covers the historical development and local peculiarities of building styles, and the setting of the village amid the pattern of the landscape. In a foreword Sir William Beach Thomas warmly commends "this most sympathetic survey of English villages by an architect and artist who reaps the harvest of his eyes in words." Sir William himself is responsible in *Hunting England** for a vivid picture of the sport and for accounts of the chief hunting areas and their celebrated packs. In all these volumes the photographs in their profusion and excellence form integral records of the subjects in hand.

* Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

An appreciation of the countryside from another angle will be found in *English Cavalcade** in which Mr. W. J. Blyton interprets through the words of great literary figures the beauty and spirit of the scenery with which their works are particularly associated. This "scamper through the shires in their company" is in effect an anthology of quotations woven harmoniously together in an appreciative and skilful narrative. It is both representative and comprehensive, although inevitably the reader will question the inclusion of some quotations and regret the omission of others. Personal taste must play a considerable part in composing this type of book. It is not inappropriate here to welcome a penetrating and vigorous account by Mr. Thomas H. Mason of *The Islands of Ireland*.† The author has constantly explored these remote and barren outposts where the inhabitants wage an indomitable struggle to eke out a bare subsistence. Mr. Mason has a lively and expressive picture, reflected in his own experiences, of the lives of these people and the magnificent scenery around them. He has also much to say about bird life, including in particular an account of the bird sanctuary on Saltee Island. One hundred and fifty photographs enrich and complete a delightful book.

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One of the most important additions to the Oxford History of England is the recent volume on *Roman Britain and the English Settlements*.‡ Two-thirds of the work is contributed by that great authority, Professor R. G. Collingwood, who surveys the state of Britain and its inhabitants from the time of Julius Cæsar's invasion until the final Roman withdrawal in the fifth century. The country is treated as an integral entity with its own personality rather than as a mere imperial appendage. Particular attention is given to social and economic conditions. In the remainder of the volume, Mr. J. N. L. Myres traces the course of the Anglo-Saxon conquest and the disappearance of Roman-British civilisation during a century and a half which is the darkest and least charted in our history. His reconstruction is based on a most skilful analysis of the scanty evidence, which allows only a broad outline, with little precision in detail. Indeed, as he points out, continual discovery of new material renders dogmatic assertions untenable. A greater degree of certainty is possible in the Roman period, although of course numerous problems remain to be solved; as for instance the exact extent and character of Agricola's conquest in Scotland, upon which Sir George MacDonald has done so much work. The great value of this book is that it contains objective interpretations of all the evidence as yet available. Professor Collingwood agrees, for example, with the probability of a short Roman reoccupation after 410 which at one time was generally considered to be the date of the final

* Murray. 7s. 6d. net. † Batsford. 10s. 6d. net.
‡ Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d. net.

evacuation. In the course of a particularly interesting chapter dealing with the subsequent fate of the Roman-Britons, Professor Collingwood is inclined to identify King Arthur as the historical victor at the battle of Mons Badonicus where, about the beginning of the sixth century, the invaders were crushed and remained at bay for more than a generation. The authors are in general harmony where their subjects overlap, although naturally there are some points of divergence noticeable. For example, they appear not to be quite agreed upon whether the Roman towns disappeared through evacuation and decay or wilful destruction. Doubtless no general rule is possible. This work is eminently one which the general reader, as well as the student, will enjoy and appreciate for its vigorous and scholarly treatment.

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Mr. H. Wilson Harris has edited in *Christianity and Communism** a series of seven articles, contributed by well-known writers, along with some relative correspondence, which originally appeared in *The Saturday Review*. The subject admits of wide interpretations and in each contribution the issue is approached from a different angle. Father M. C. D'Arcy vigorously attacks as anti-Christian the character of Russian rule. Christianity is entirely disregarded by the only communist contributor, Mr. John Strachey, who, in defending the Soviet-Russian system, betrays a number of self-evident contradictions. Dr. W. R. Inge finds communism irreconcilable with the Christian tradition; while, on the other hand, the existence of some common ground is admitted in varying degrees by Dr. Ernest Barker, Dr. Joseph Needham, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr and Canon F. R. Barry. They are, however, for the most part concerned with communist theory rather than Russian practice. Canon F. R. Barry's "Revolutionary Christianity" is an excellent statement of the Christian viewpoint.

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Honoria Lawrence: A Fragment of Indian History,† by Maud Diver, is based on diaries kept by the wife of Sir Henry Lawrence (Lawrence of Lucknow) and is a contribution to the literature on that great man essentially from a woman's point of view. In the first seventy-three pages we have the preliminary journey out to India in the sailing ship of those days, and all the thoughts and hopes and fears of a charming, cultured and imaginative young woman going out to be married. The marriage was an ideal one, and the development of his character and public spirit and devotion to duty are largely inspired by her love and loyalty and broadmindedness. In the course of their early career they read and wrote together, contributing many articles to the *Calcutta Review*, and were never so happy as when alone in some remote place, such as the Residency in Nepal, free to indulge their own tastes. As time goes on the diaries become intermittent. Children

* Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 2s. 6d. net. † John Murray. 16s.

are born to them and there are frequent separations, as she goes to the hills for health's sake and he becomes deeply involved in his work. The best work of his life was in the Punjab, settling the many disputing chiefs and laying the foundation of a lasting peace after annexation. As their home was at Lahore, and Honoria Lawrence came and went, often ill and at one time in England, the interest grows in the politics in India. Sir Henry Lawrence was all for conciliation, and his brother John, who had to act with him, was for discipline. The joint management worked out for the good of the province, but the differences of the brothers were too trying and Henry finally resigned and was appointed to Rajputana. Their home here was on Mount Abu, and Lady Lawrence writes to her son in England a charming description of her surroundings. She is described as "a gracious woman of five-and-forty, already assuming the prescribed Victorian dress and habits of early middle age . . . a tempered Honoria, who had 'warmed both hands at the fire of life' and had many times confronted death. Yet the same unconquered spirit looked out of her blue eyes; the quick response to beauty, outward and inward, was still a lamp to her feet; her religious faith and undimmed love a light to her path." But alas, she was struck down by illness and died a few months later.

The remainder of the book shows Sir Henry Lawrence more concerned than ever at the Government policy of annexation. He finally is put in charge of Oudh and begins his work of conciliation once more. Mrs. Diver ends with a vivid description of the Indian Mutiny and the Siege of Lucknow up to the death of Sir Henry from wounds.

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The Animated Word. It is, generally speaking, only the epicure in words, the scholar, the etymologist, and the lexicographer himself, who will sit through hours on end reading the Dictionary, but Eric Partridge's new work* should make dictionary-reading a delight to the average man who normally only consults the "Dicker" when he is in a quandary over spelling.

Slang is strong wine that wields a fascination over all of us. To the uncultured masses it lends that colour to speech without which a sentence would seem to be lacking in sincerity and force; and at the same time it puts a hall-mark upon the speaker. The Cockney who, among his peers, avoided the correct (and natural) slang expression, would be ostracised as a "sop" or a "ninny." The animadversion might go further and the accusation be made that he was "too big for his boots." This law extends from Bethnal Green to Mayfair, from the Elementary School to Eton, from the Public Bar to the Pall Mall Club; throughout the Navy, Army and Air Force—speak the language of your kind or, ill-fated as the albino sparrow, be pecked to death. Oaths, cursing, and swearing are in an altogether different category of

* *A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English.* Routledge. 42s.

speech, for though the majority of people do swear, the non-swearer in their midst is not singled out for persecution, indeed, on the contrary, he (or she) may even be treated to a certain secret admiration.

In some respects, slang is as important as poetry and folk-song. A people's character may be read in the quality of their slang, and from this point of view Mr. Partridge's book is a most valuable addition to literature, and should be closely studied by everyone engaged in social work, or interested in sociology. Designed as a companion to the great *Oxford English Dictionary*, it by no means falls short, for it embraces all slang dictionaries that have gone before, and includes many vulgarisms that have not hitherto been elucidated or commented upon. Definitions are both concise and brilliant; historical data adequate. We learn when the term originated as well as how; we are informed upon the social status of the people who most usually employ it, in which circumstances it is employed and, perhaps of greatest importance, we receive a hint concerning the direction in which the words are moving—that is to say, since slang is largely the forcing-house of a language, we learn whether the word is becoming obsolete, or advancing into general usage. The *argot* of yesterday may be spoken from the pulpit to-morrow; and in recent years the promotion of words has taken place more rapidly than ever before in the history of language.

J. F.

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In *The Gardener's England** Mr. Eric Parker writes in the main of his own garden. Starting with twelve acres of woodland—ten larch and two hazel coppices—he had first to "grub up" most of the larch and all the hazel before building a house and laying out his ground. After twenty-five years there are now lawns, herbaceous borders, roses, flowering shrubs, a kitchen garden, an orchard, a topiary, and a bog. He has, as he modestly remarks, "made a beginning." So the labour of love continues, and "that is the happiness of a garden." Birds and other creatures flit pleasantly through the pages. But why, among several other minor points, does he say that no book mentions the fact that water-shrews kill frogs? Even the popular Wayside and Woodland Series records it. The book is written with charm and will appeal to garden lovers.

* Seeley, Service. 8s. 6d.

A CORRECTION

In Sir Archibald Sinclair's article "Rearmament," in our April issue, the first sentence of the first paragraph on page 390 should read: "Yet adequate financial control over expenditure amounting to £1,500 millions in five years is not a question that can be shelved."

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THE
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THE ARMAMENTS BUDGET—THE DEFICIT—THE PROFITS TAX—AND THE FINANCIAL FUTURE.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S sixth and last Budget marks another stupendous growth of expenditure on armaments, an unparalleled addition of one hundred millions to the National Debt, and an increase of taxation which, though miserably inadequate, is upsetting business, and has played havoc on the Stock Exchange. Already the rise of prices, the shortage of iron and steel, and labour unrest have announced the mischievous consequences of diverting a vast volume of industrial energy into unproductive channels. The fictitious prosperity of this artificial boom, caused by a flood of Government orders for armaments, will be temporary and disastrous.

An ominous and indefensible feature of our public accounts is the general rise of expenditure. As the Public Economy League points out in its latest pamphlet, there is an increase this year in Civil and Revenue estimates, starting with the Treasury itself and spread over dozens of departments, amounting to a grand total almost equal to the yield of sixpence on the income tax. Unless this general laxity in regard to public money, for which Ministers and the House of Commons are responsible, is speedily corrected, the outlook for British taxpayers is indeed desperate. The only other remedy is a change of imperial and foreign policy.

Listening to Mr. Chamberlain's sixth financial statement in the House of Commons on the afternoon of April 20th, I was struck—until he sprang his unwelcome surprise on a startled House of Commons—by the matter-of-fact tone and pedestrian quality of the survey. Yet to anyone conversant with public finance the bare figures were staggering and appalling. He told us, to begin with, that last year's Budget had ended with a realised deficit of £5,597,000, due to the excess of armaments expenditure over his estimates. The total realised revenue was about a million less than the

estimate, but forty-four millions above that of the previous year. The yields of income-tax, sur-tax, and death duties fell £5,750,000 short of his expectations, but customs, excise, and stamp duties exceeded them. The "capital" of the National Debt increased by £1,296,000, but owing to conversion of war debt there had been a saving in interest since 1931 of about forty millions sterling; and there had been a further temporary saving of twenty millions owing to the low rates of interest on Treasury bills. As for the Exchange Equalisation Account, it remains, as he said, "wrapped in mystery." We were told that it still shows a profit, but not whether this profit is over and above the cost of keeping an immense hoard of gold, which depreciates when prices rise.

Turning from the old to the new Budget, Mr. Chamberlain started with the Fixed Charge on our gigantic debt. Before the War, the charge for interest was less than twenty millions; during the last four years it has stood at two hundred and twenty-four millions, and he did not propose to alter it:

> The Defence Estimates have shown that I am proposing to borrow for this purpose a sum estimated at present at eighty millions for this year. In view of that fact it would be absurd at the same moment to attempt to start a Sinking Fund for the redemption of debt. I propose therefore to keep to the old figure of 224 millions . . . and to ask for power to borrow for the payment of the contractual Sinking Funds.

For the same reason he set aside the law which requires the Chancellor of the Exchequer to include the previous year's deficit, if any, in his expenditure for the following year, and by so doing "saved" over five millions. Next he excluded from his estimated expenditure the eighty millions to be borrowed under the Defence Loan Act. After this deduction the amount of expenditure to be covered by taxation within the year came to £862,848,000. He put down £429,080,000 for the Civil Votes (including a margin of no less than ten millions for supplementary estimates) and £198,268,000 for Defence (Army, Navy, and Air Force), though the real expenditure was to be eighty millions more. Omitting this loan expenditure there is an addition of over twelve millions on Defence and almost twenty millions on the Civil estimates as compared with the previous year.

What, then, would be the revenue? Would last year's expansion be continued? The Chancellor was very optimistic

—probably because the armaments boom is causing a big rise in industrial profits and in the values of imports. It is values that count for customs; and the value of imports is growing much faster than the volume owing to the rise of 20 per cent. in wholesale prices since last year. Consequently the Chancellor estimated for an addition of over twelve millions to the receipts from Customs and Excise, the chief contributories being beer, tobacco, oil, and spirits. He also looked for nearly eighteen millions more on income-tax and over four millions on sur-tax. Against these additions he had to set off a sharp decline in miscellaneous revenue. There has been some further juggling with the self-balancing items, which need not detain us. His total expectations of revenue rose to £847,950,000, and he was left with a prospective deficit of £94,898,000, of which, however, thanks to borrowing, he had only £14,898,000 to cover by additional taxation.

At this his supporters heaved a sigh of relief, which seemed to be justified, when, after abolishing the Male Servants Licence Duty, and describing one or two proposals to deal with tax avoidance, in the shape of "bond washing" and one-man companies, he announced the anticipated increase of threepence in the income-tax which would yield thirteen millions in the current year and fifteen millions in a full year, so that the remaining deficit was "reduced to the trifling figure of £1,748,000," or, to be quite precise and veracious, of £81,748,000. He described the smaller figure, however, as "the gap which I now have to fill," and proceeded to fill it in a fashion which spread dismay among his supporters, glee among the Socialists, and consternation next day in the City. He introduced his proposal by saying that the defence programme means that "we have got to prepare ourselves for expenditure of a very special and exceptional character, which will rapidly increase and then, later, fall, until it reaches its new level." Of the rapidity of the increase there can be no doubt; but if the programme is fulfilled and 400 millions are borrowed on the same terms of repayment as the new loan (to be described later), I for one see no prospect of a fall in expenditure during the next ten years. However that may be, Mr. Chamberlain said he had been searching for means to provide "at least a major part of the expenditure that would be required by some device capable of growth in itself, but easily adjustable." Thereby he hoped to relieve

his successor from imposing a series of new taxes which "would be likely to cause the maximum amount of uncertainty and disturbance." He had already increased the income-tax, and he declined to resort to indirect taxation because the cost of living already showed a tendency to rise and he did not want to push up prices any higher. Besides, as he told the House last year, it is no use raising the protective tariff because that would only decrease the yield; in fact from the point of view of revenue it would be better to reduce it.

Mr. Chamberlain then remarked that he had been struck by the reports of trading concerns with their "almost monotonous story of increased business, record turnovers, and larger profits," adding what seems a curious confession as coming from a rigid protectionist: "I suspect that on the whole those profits still fall far short of the level of 1928 or 1929," when British commerce still enjoyed free trade. Admittedly the present trade revival is largely due to the "golden shower" of armament orders placed by the Government:

> In those circumstances it does not seem to me to be unreasonable to ask that this growth in business profits should be made the occasion of some special and temporary contribution, on the part of those concerns which have benefited, towards the cost of National Defence. Accordingly, I am going to propose the imposition of a tax upon such growth, which—in order to emphasise its purpose—I call the National Defence Contribution.

A long explanation of the levy followed, from which it became clear that it was to be on all profits, not merely on profits derived directly or indirectly from the armaments expenditure. Profits not exceeding £2,000 were to be exempt; but it soon appeared that no fair provision was made for new enterprises or for companies whose shareholders have only just begun to receive dividends after a long depression.

Poor Mr. Chamberlain was almost overwhelmed by a flood of adverse criticisms and bitter reproaches from big company directors like Sir Robert Horne, from the Stock Exchange, from business men all over the country, from City editors, and from the financial press. There has been nothing like it since the Land Taxes in Mr. Lloyd George's People's Budget, which were a mere bagatelle by comparison. The scheme is already in the melting-pot, and it would be useless either to describe what it was intended to be or to forecast its ultimate form when the House of Commons reassembles.

In the absence of any adequate control of armaments profits by the Treasury or by an independent expert commission, there was good reason for a special tax on the profits arising from this sudden flood of Government orders which have created an artificial and unwholesome boom. But no criticism can be too severe on the vagueness and uncertainty of a project which, without adequate study or prevision, was thus suddenly launched upon City markets already top-heavy and reeling under the effects of the Gold Scare.

The total fall in the market value of the securities listed on the London Stock Exchange during April was estimated at over five hundred millions sterling, and the losses suffered by speculators and investors were prodigious. One old-established firm on the Stock Exchange went out of business, and many others suffered irrecoverable losses. The revenue is likely to suffer far more from this collapse than the paltry two millions which the Chancellor expected his tax to yield in the current financial year. Next year's estimated yield of twenty to twenty-five millions may be more than realised; but it will obviously reduce the productivity of income-tax and sur-tax; and unless the framework is improved, it may cause so much unfairness and trouble that its advantages will be outbalanced. Doubtless the accountants will benefit; but their profits are exempted from its operation.

On the third day of the Budget discussions (April 22nd) Mr. R. C. Morrison offered the House an entertaining collection of epithets applied to the Budget and to the "Gradgrind" Chancellor in the financial columns of newspapers. Among them were Bludgeoning, Disastrous, Erratic, Height of Folly, Knavish, Malignant, Oppressive, Ramshackle, Unwarranted, Unfair, Vicious, Wicked, and Wanton. This recital was amusing enough; but there was also substance in Mr. Morrison's objections to the tax. "It falls," he said, "on the just, and largely misses the unjust." He might have added that it falls on the efficient and largely misses the inefficient. It is also true that "investors in home industries will suffer loss of capital and decreased dividends, while holders of foreign stocks will escape free." Shareholders in companies located abroad or in the colonies are untouched. "How long," he asked, "are some of these companies going to go on paying the new tax?" He replied, "Just as long as it takes them to transfer their English domicile somewhere else." Rubber

companies, for example, can transfer their registration from London to Malaya, "just as when the old Excess Profits Duty caused Aramayo, Burma Corporation, and De Beers to shake off the dust of London and migrate to Geneva, Rangoon, and Kimberley." A Chancellor who does not foresee such consequences as these cannot claim credit for perspicacity.

At the end of the month (April 29th) Mr. Chamberlain dined with the London bankers and tried to justify his Budget, while promising to reconsider the details of the Profits Tax. His argument was strangely inconclusive, inconsistent, and even incoherent, as will be seen from the following epitome given as nearly as possible in his own words;

1. The National Defence Contribution is only a ripple on the surface of the Budget.

2. It is the expenditure on National Defence which dominates our finances and must do for a number of years.

3. We are already getting a good return from our money through the strengthening of confidence in the maintenance of peace; but "while we are straining every sinew to accomplish it, we are being forced down the road to the end in deep dust and ashes."

4. "The Bill for Defence this year is one hundred and forty millions more than it was two years ago." That is equivalent to about three shillings in the income-tax; but "the burden is not excessive, since we are providing eighty millions of that amount by borrowing, and since revenue is expanding so rapidly that I have only had to find fifteen millions out of new taxation."

5. "It is no use kicking against the pricks, and for the present we must follow the path upon which we have entered"; but there are other countries where the weight of armaments is pressing down the people, and "I do not even now despair of a return to a saner state of things," if only we could find some way of removing that fear of attack" which is almost universal, but which yet may rest on nothing more solid than imagination."

6. To promote such a return to sanity this Government will do all it can to see that the day comes earlier rather than later and "to introduce some general agreement on the cessation of armaments."

7. "That brings me to another refreshing point. At present our armaments programme is pouring a golden shower all through the country, especially to distressed areas. We see new factories being erected everywhere, equipped with costly machinery."

8. At the same time "I must say we see a certain unavoidable displacement of ordinary commercial industry," and people are asking what is going to happen when this rearmament programme comes to an end. Shall we see a sudden and serious reversal of this upward trend? To this Mr. Chamberlain made the soothing reply that such dangers are easily exaggerated. Recent experiences demonstrate the remarkable adaptability of enterprise. "We seem to pass without apparent embarrassment from one form of industry to another." Nevertheless, "we should do well to be looking round and taking stock for the future, and searching to see whether we may find some substitute for this great volume of armaments which is occupying so much of our activity to-day."

9. In taking such a survey we should naturally look for a source of further recovery in international trade, where there has been the greatest contraction. Here he saw "a very definite and perceptible lightening of the tension." If the political knots are still hard to unravel, "may we not perhaps find an easier and more fruitful approach on the economic side?"

Such were the main points of a very queer speech by one who is expected to become Prime Minister before this article appears. Its concluding sentences left a loophole for escape. But in the main it is a prophetic announcement of doom—of that rapid descent into the financial abyss which is marked out for this country as well as for other competitors in the armaments race, by our official programme of expenditure. Let us suppose it to be carried out. Since the Budget, the first Defence Loan has been issued, but instead of asking for eighty millions the Chancellor asked for one hundred millions. It took the form of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. National Defence Bonds, issued at $99\frac{1}{2}$ and redeemable at par by annual drawings of not less than 20 per cent., beginning on September 15th, 1944, so that the whole loan will be repaid by 1948. During those years, therefore, from 1944 to 1948, in addition to the $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions put into it, the taxpayer will have to find twenty millions per annum; and if the programme is completed by three more hundred million loans, the call upon him will mount to forty millions in the next year, sixty millions in the next, and so on till one hundred millions is reached, representing about two shillings in the income-tax, after which the repayments will decline by twenty millions a year. But that is by no means the worst. The most hopeful of us can hardly expect the cost of armaments to decline as rapidly as it rose, or the rate of interest on future loans not to exceed $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The public, indeed, has only subscribed a small fraction of the present loan—the bulk of it having been taken by

Government departments and financial institutions. Unless, therefore, there is a rapid change in the foreign and fiscal policy of the Government, with a strong and successful move towards the pacification of Europe, our prospects are black; our path, as Mr. Chamberlain said, leads to dust and ashes.

So far as borrowing is concerned, it would surely have been far better to have followed the precedent of Naval Defence Loans by providing a Sinking Fund from the first while the armament boom is in full swing. That it can last very long without pernicious effects for commerce and industry I very much doubt. Already manufacturers of finished goods are crying out at the rising costs of their raw materials—iron, heavy steel, base metals, etc.—and at the same time the increased cost of living is naturally causing unrest and demands for higher wages from the working classes, who suffer while the profits of favoured industries are expanding.

When we come to ask ourselves what is the justification for this vast and ruinous expenditure on preparations for war and destruction—on huge battleships, on barracks, aerodromes, bombing planes, etc., etc.—the reply of the Government is that they went in for unilateral disarmament, thereby exposing the country to grave dangers, and that this immense acceleration of expenditure was urgently necessary. The pace was first forced by Mr. Churchill early in 1935; and then the Chancellor of the Exchequer took up the running, leaving Mr. Baldwin, on the eve of the last General Election, to reassure the people by stating, on October 28th, 1935: "I give you my word there will be no great armaments."

To the plea that the whole of this huge addition to Great Britain's expenditure on armaments can be justified by imminent danger and dire necessity an answer will be found with chapter and verse in a book of mine published a few weeks ago.* Here I can only say, first, that there was no unilateral disarmament on the part of Great Britain. In the last ten years our total expenditure on Army, Navy, and Air Force was always above its maximum just before the Great War. Secondly, before the huge expansion of our Navy estimates to one hundred and five millions there was no threat to our sea power from Germany, Italy, or any other European state; nor is there the least cause for anxiety in the present naval expenditure of France, Italy, Germany, or Russia. As for the

* See *Armaments: the Race and the Crisis.* Cobden-Sanderson.

Army, is this enormously increased outlay to be explained by Mr. Eden's guarantee of the French frontiers? Increased expenditure on the Air Force, in the absence of any agreement or attempt to obtain an agreement with Germany and France on this subject and in the absence of trustworthy statistics, is more difficult to criticise except on the ground of efficiency and of getting full value for money. But it is to be observed (1) that both the French and Russian Governments claim to have more powerful air forces than Germany, and (2) that within the last few weeks an American estimate has been issued which places the British Air Force at the head of the list, followed by Russia, France, Italy, and Germany. A second answer to Mr. Chamberlain takes the form of the question: "Why has our Foreign Office during the last few years persistently evaded or ignored the German overtures for proportional disarmament such as the offer to limit the German Army to 200,000 and afterwards to 300,000 in parity with the French, and the proposal of an Air Pact on a parity with France and Great Britain? Again, why was Hitler's offer of a peace plan on March 21st of last year shelved by Mr. Eden, though it was welcomed as a promising overture by *The Times* and other newspapers?"

My conclusion is that but for the Churchill hoax, with the fictitious and demonstrably absurd figures of German expenditure on armaments, and but for Anglo-French foreign policy since 1935, Mr. Chamberlain's last two Armaments Budgets might have been prosperity budgets enriching all classes by a general reduction of taxation; and in particular the income-tax, instead of being raised to five shillings, might have been reduced to three shillings in the pound.

It is a sad and bitter ending for Mr. Baldwin's last administration, and for Mr. Chamberlain's six years at the Exchequer. These frantic preparations for another Armageddon are depleting a financial reserve far below that which enabled us to survive the Great War. With a heavily unbalanced Budget and taxation at concert-pitch, another war, however successful, must cause a general confiscation of property and a general decline in the standards of living. Mr. Baldwin's foreign and fiscal policy has set the nation on a path which, as his successor truly tells us, terminates in "dust and ashes." Will Mr. Chamberlain change the route, or will he continue to be a pacemaker in the world's race to ruin?

F. W. HIRST.

HAS CAPITALISM BROKEN DOWN?

IT is generally asserted or assumed in Socialist writings and speeches that Capitalism has broken down; and many non-Socialist writers make the same assumption. The proof is supposed to be provided, without need for further argument, by the present state of the world, by the existence of poverty amid plenty, by the widespread prevalence of unemployment in all the industrial countries, and by the cruel contrast between lavish wealth and grinding poverty. The proof is anything but convincing. It is not free enterprise, but misconceived and misdirected government interference that is the main cause of these distresses; it is not Capitalism but Economic Nationalism that is impeding the distribution of the abundance which the earth is capable of producing to the peoples who need it and want it.

Nevertheless the question deserves examination. Has Capitalism broken down? There is no use discussing the subject until we are agreed as to the meaning of the word "Capitalism," which is one of those words ending in *ism* that are traps for loose thinking. Some of the critics of "Capitalism" would say that they use the word to describe the existing economic system. But the existing economic system is certainly not an "*ism*," since it is not governed by any definite theory. It includes examples of every form of economic organisation, many of which the critics of "Capitalism" would not dream of condemning. It is the outcome of an infinite variety of experiments, not dictated by any rigid doctrine; and it is constantly changing. Others, again, would define "Capitalism," in a worn-out *cliché*, as "production for profit rather than for use." But this is a meaningless phrase. It is impossible to make profits except by producing things that people will use; and the earning of a profit is the best proof that this has been done.

Perhaps the most useful working definition of this elusive word is that Capitalism is a system in which private persons are permitted, under regulations laid down by the State, to undertake enterprises, providing or borrowing the necessary capital, and taking the profits, if any, after all the costs of the enterprise have been met. There are, however, important spheres within which freedom of enterprise is either prohibited or greatly restricted by the State: these spheres are

either reserved by the State for some sort of public control, or are placed under the control of monopolies (such as the railway companies) which the State has authorised and which in some degree it controls or regulates. As yet the greater part of productive activity has been left to free enterprise, and to the competition which it involves; but even here the State imposes many regulations through Companies Acts, Factory Acts, and so forth. *Regulated private enterprise* is still the main driving force of our system of production; and this, it must be presumed, is what is meant by "Capitalism."

Has this system broken down? It certainly has not broken down on the side of production. The enormous expansion of the world's productive power which has taken place during the last century is unquestionably due to the infinite fertility and inventiveness of private enterprise, perpetually and restlessly engaged upon the quest for new materials, new methods of cheapening production, new means of transport, new markets, new ways of stimulating and satisfying human wants—always in the hope that profits may thereby be earned. It may be said that all these achievements are mainly due to the progress of science and of mechanical invention, and this of course is true. But scientific progress itself, and still more its eager exploitation, are due to private enterprise, and are constantly stimulated by it. The result has been an immense increase of productive power; and the resources of every part of the earth have been made available for the use of all the earth's inhabitants. We even hear complaints of "over-production." And it would be quite illegitimate to assume that equally good results would be attained if private enterprise were prohibited and the whole process of production were placed under the control of governmental organisations, whose officers, freed from the stimulus of competition, would inevitably be unwilling to take risks or to expose themselves to the criticism that they were wasting public resources.

If the unlimited abundance which has thus been made available for the use of men has not brought them prosperity, a large share of the blame rests with the governments, which have deliberately impeded the movement of trade, partly in the belief that their peoples ought not to draw upon the resources of the world, but ought to strive after an unattainable self-sufficiency; partly in the belief that each nation

can enrich itself at the expense of the rest by cutting off its trade with them. It is government interference which is mainly responsible for the failure of the earth's peoples to enjoy the abundance which private enterprise has created.

Assuredly, then, "Capitalism," in the sense in which we have defined it, has not broken down in the sphere of production; and it would be folly, in this sphere, to abandon the system which has brought about such marvellous results. There has been a breakdown; but it has been in distribution, not in production. At a time when the earth is producing, or can produce, enough to banish poverty and drudgery among its inhabitants if this wealth were well distributed, we have the spectacle, in all countries, of millions unemployed and living below the level of decent subsistence, and of tens of millions who, in spite of hard and exacting labour, cannot earn enough even to secure adequate nutriment for themselves and their families. This clearly points to a serious failure in the distribution of the abundance that is available. Who or what is to blame?

John Stuart Mill suggested long ago that distribution, not production, is the proper sphere of action of the State in the economic field. Is the State, then, to blame for the existing maldistribution of wealth? Or is this maldistribution an outcome of Capitalism? And if this is so, is it inherent in Capitalism, or can it be amended by State action without destroying or weakening the productive power of Capitalism? We must find the answer to these questions before we can decide whether Capitalism, which is so successful in the field of production, has irremediably broken down in the field of distribution.

There are two aspects of the problem of distribution. In the first place, there is the distribution of the world's available wealth among the world's peoples; in the second place, the distribution of each country's wealth among its citizens.

On the first point, it cannot reasonably be argued that the maldistribution of the world's wealth among the world's peoples is due to Capitalism. On the contrary, the inexhaustible energy of private enterprise has opened out the world's resources, and by the development of new methods of transport, finance and marketing has made them available for all its peoples. The existing maldistribution between country and country is due partly to differences of climate and of

natural resources; but the disabilities due to these causes have been largely overcome by the restless energy of Capitalism, utilising the discoveries of science. Thus the suffering, impoverishment and loss of life that used to result in large regions of India from a failure of the monsoon have been greatly mitigated by the substitution of a world-market for a local market in foodstuffs: the moment famine begins to loom ahead, food supplies pour in from many parts of the world. Thus, again, the energetic peoples of the temperate zone have been enabled to draw the materials for their industry from every part of the globe, and to purchase with the products of this industry whatever they may want. All this has been due to the fertile and unflagging activities of private enterprise.

To prevent abuses and oppression, it has of course been necessary to subject these restless *entrepreneurs* to legal restraints enforced by efficient governments. But if, apart from these necessary restraints, Capitalism had been left free to operate, it would probably have brought about an efficient distribution of the earth's products among all the peoples who wanted them and were prepared to pay for them by their own productive labour. The action of governments has prevented this. In the first place the governments of particular States have established their authority over large regions of the earth's surface, and have used this authority to reserve the trade of these regions for their own citizens. In the second place, the governments of all countries have set themselves to direct the flow of world trade out of its natural channels, and into channels which they imagine to be advantageous to their own nations; and in doing this, they have so reduced and restricted the movement of trade that the earth's abundance is not permitted to reach those who need and want it. The maldistribution of the earth's abundance among the earth's peoples is certainly not due to Capitalism. It is due to the misconceived policies of governments. These policies have not even succeeded in enriching some nations at the expense of others. They have impoverished all nations by restricting the life-giving flow of trade; and have reduced the volume of wealth available in each nation for distribution among its citizens.

We have still to consider the maldistribution of wealth among the citizens of individual countries. It is, in all the

Capitalist countries, gross and flagrant. Everywhere we see the cruel contrast between immense wealth enjoyed by the few, and largely wasted by them in luxurious living and vulgar ostentation; and, on the other hand, poverty, straitened living and inadequate nutrition, which are everywhere the lot of the majority of labouring men and women. At one end of the social scale a few thousands of the idle rich waste a large part of the nation's substance upon useless but costly devices for killing time; at the other end of the social scale, hundreds of thousands of the idle poor, equally unproductive through no fault of their own, must also waste a part of the nation's substance in killing time in misery and penury.

It is necessary to form a general idea as to the extent and character of this maldistribution. In this country it appears that about two-thirds of the nation's annual income goes in payments for work—salaries and wages; while about one-third goes in interest on capital. In itself this distribution does not seem unsatisfactory. When we reflect how great a part machinery and other capital equipment play in the process of production, one-third of the product does not seem excessive for the rent and upkeep of this equipment.

It may be that the two-thirds which go in salaries and wages are unfairly divided, and no doubt there is room for improvement in this direction. But the main cause of maldistribution is that most of the capital is owned by, and therefore most of the income that goes to capital is enjoyed by, a very small proportion of the population. Two-thirds of the British nation's capital is owned by two per cent. of the adult population; less than one-fourteenth of it is owned, among them, by seventy-five per cent. of the adult population; and between this handful of the very rich, and this great mass of the propertyless, comes the middle class, constituting less than one-quarter of the population, and owning rather more than 25 per cent. of the nation's capital. It cannot be denied that this is an extremely unhealthy distribution of the ownership of capital and property. If it could be amended, so as to secure that almost everybody owned or could readily acquire "a bit of property," and therefore a stake in the country, our society would be much more stable and contented, well-being would be more evenly diffused and the institution of private property would be justified. For, as Bacon said, "property is like muck, good only if it be spread."

Is this grossly unequal distribution of property a necessary consequence of Capitalism? Would it be cured by Socialism? It is certain that Socialism would provide no remedy. For the Socialist plan is to buy out all the existing owners of capital with government bonds, bearing a fixed rate of interest, and guaranteed by the State. The object of these arrangements is to take control out of the hands of those who now wield it, and to place it in the hands of groups of officials, managing gigantic monopolies which would be exempt from competition and would be armed with all the powers of the State. We are not here concerned to consider whether these arrangements would lead to greater efficiency in production, or whether such gigantic power can safely be placed in the hands of small groups of persons, over whom no Parliament could possibly exercise effective control. What we are concerned to note is that these arrangements would do nothing to amend the gross inequality in the distribution of property. For the owners of these bonds, now deprived of all responsibility, would be functionless *rentiers*. The disparity between their wealth, enjoyed in idleness, and the poverty of the propertyless man, would be as great as ever; indeed, it would tend to increase, because the superfluity of the rich would still be the main source from which the State would have to draw the new capital which it would continually require.

Socialism, then, offers no remedy for the maldistribution of capital, unless it were carried out by means of wholesale confiscation, as in Russia. That would be impossible without a ruinous civil war. And even if it were successfully achieved, it would not bring about a distribution of property, but a concentration of it in the hands of a ruling group, who would thus have in their hands a very dangerous power.

Is there any other means of reducing this gross inequality? The answer to this question depends upon the answer to another. Does Capitalism necessarily involve, not only inequality of wealth, but such gross inequality as exists to-day? Does the blame fall wholly to Capitalism? Or does the State share the responsibility?

The Capitalist system, in its present form, rests upon the assumption that every industrial concern is the absolute property of those who have invested capital in it, and that those who work for it with brain or hand are merely the

hired servants of the capital-owners, to be engaged at the lowest rate they will accept, and to be discharged when they are no longer wanted. It is this assumption which accounts for the hostility which Capitalism has aroused. The assumption was reasonable enough when an individual or a group of partners found the capital to erect and equip a mill, risked their whole fortunes upon its success, and gave all their time and thought to its management. But this form of private enterprise, with unlimited liability, is now exceptional. To-day the normal owner of capital risks only the amount of his investment, and contributes nothing beyond this to the concern. Yet it is assumed that if the concern is successful, he has an unlimited right to his share of the profits; his capital holding may be greatly increased by the issue of bonus shares which he has done nothing to deserve; and he gets all the advantage of capital appreciation which he has done nothing to bring about. It was the State which conferred upon the owners of capital the boon of "limited liability"; yet the State has done nothing to limit the extent of the profits they may receive. To limit losses without limiting profits seems to be indefensible.

Again, the fortunes of the "idle rich" are largely, perhaps mainly, due to inheritance; that is to say, their owners have done nothing to earn them. It is the State that guarantees and defends inheritance, and determines the conditions under which it may take place. In recent years the State has been taking, in Death Duties, a large share of all big fortunes on the death of the owners. But this is a very crude way of dealing with the problem of inheritance, and it has done little or nothing to bring about a healthier distribution of wealth. These are merely examples of the way in which the maldistribution of wealth is encouraged by the action of the State, or its failure to act. It is impossible, at the end of a short article, to discuss how these difficult problems might be dealt with. Nor would such a discussion be relevant to the question with which we are dealing—the question whether Capitalism has broken down.

The conclusions of our argument would seem to be, first, that Capitalism has not broken down in the field of production, but that misconceived State action is preventing the peoples of the world from enjoying the abundance which private enterprise has created; second, that there has been

a breakdown in distribution—both in the distribution of the world's abundance among the world's peoples, and in the distribution of each nation's wealth among its citizens. The first aspect of this maldistribution—as between the peoples of the earth—is mainly due to the policy of governments, and it can only be amended by the action of governments in co-operation. Unless it is thus amended, it is likely to lead to incessant friction, and, in the end, to war. The second aspect of maldistribution—among the citizens of individual countries—is, no doubt, partly due to the principle hitherto regarded as axiomatic in the capitalist world—the principle that all the profits of an industrial concern belong as by right to the owners of the capital invested in it. But this principle could be modified (for example, by a system of profit-sharing) without seriously affecting the vital principle of private enterprise. In a far higher degree, however, maldistribution is due to the action of the State; and, in particular, to the rules regarding inheritance which the State upholds, and to the laws which it defines regarding the rights of the owners of capital.

It follows that the maldistribution which is one of the most crying evils of our social system, could be amended by political action, without any revolutionary upheaval, and without destroying or even weakening the vital principle of free enterprise. Indeed, the flagrant contrast which our social system presents between great wealth and grinding poverty is likely sooner or later to produce revolutionary changes unless the means of amending these evils in a more rational way are seriously undertaken. The Socialist doctrine, in its various forms, is in the main a protest against this gross inequality; and, if revolutionary change comes, it is likely to take a Socialist form, though this (as we have seen) would do nothing to redress the root evil. In short, the distribution of wealth, both as between nations and as between individuals within each nation, ought to be regarded as the root problem of politics. So long as this problem is not seriously studied by those who believe in free enterprise, the Socialist plan, which offers no solution, will continue to lead men astray.

RAMSAY MUIR.

THE BELGIAN PROBLEM.

ON October 14th last, King Leopold, addressing his ministers gathered in council, urged the necessity of strengthening the Belgian forces in order to enable his army to oppose an effective resistance to an aggression. At the same time he insisted on the fact that Belgian foreign policy " should be directed not to prepare a war as the result of a coalition, but to remove the theatre of war from Belgian territory." This speech was followed by a series of official declarations and negotiations which are not yet ended, but which have at least brought about one concrete result : the Franco-British declaration of April 24th, guaranteeing Belgian independence and releasing Belgium from her Locarno obligations. How are we to interpret this declaration ? Is it inconsistent with Belgium's past policy ? Is it the outcome of a change in Belgian public opinion ? Can it be suggested that Belgium is drifting away from France under the influence of the Flemish section of the population ? None of these questions can be answered without surveying the Belgian problem as a whole in its historical perspective.

It is an axiom of British policy not to allow any big Power, friendly or unfriendly, to obtain a hold on the Belgian coast which might threaten British security. In the same way, it is an axiom of Belgian policy not to enter any system of alliance with any Power or group of Powers, friendly or unfriendly, which might alienate the country's independence or entangle her in conflicts in which her vital interests are not concerned. It is for this reason that Belgium applied loyally the system of guaranteed neutrality imposed upon her by the treaties of 1831-9, and remained scrupulously faithful to it for eighty-four years. After the abrogation of her neutrality at Versailles, she hoped to find herself secure as a member of the League, and supported every measure which aimed at strengthening the new international order, such as the projected treaty of mutual assistance of 1923, and the Geneva Protocol of 1924. Her representatives welcomed the Locarno Treaty because its very character excluded all idea of a one-sided alliance dividing Europe into two opposite camps. They found in its preamble a justification for the policy which they pursued at Versailles. The treaty of 1925 was the " natural consequence of the abrogation of Belgian

neutrality " and aimed at ensuring peace " in the zone which had been so frequently the scene of international conflicts."

Thus, from 1831 to 1936, at the time of the reoccupation of the Rhineland and of the denunciation of Locarno by Germany, Belgium had never entered a system of foreign alliances. Even during the war, when his troops were fighting side by side with British and French units, King Albert always insisted on the special position occupied by his country as a neutral defending her independence. He refused to consider himself as a belligerent and to join the various diplomatic arrangements made by the Allies.

On one occasion only did Belgium seem to depart from this traditional policy, when she signed in 1920 a military Convention with France. In spite of the fact that this defensive Convention was registered with the League, it was for long believed that it contained some secret clause implying a one-sided alliance. In this country, Belgium was frequently referred to as a " satellite of France " and Belgian opinion, especially in Flemish circles, looked upon the arrangement with a certain amount of suspicion. The prejudice was so deeply rooted that, in March 1936, M. van Zeeland deemed it necessary to make a fresh statement, confirmed by an exchange of letters between the two Governments, revealing the true character of the Convention of 1920. The latter provided, first, for common measures to be taken during the occupation of the Rhineland, and, secondly, for preparations to be made by the two General Staffs in view of an unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany. The first part had become obsolete since the withdrawal of the Allied troops from German territory, so that the arrangement was now limited to the conversations pursued between French and Belgian military experts. The interpretation given by previous Governments to the Convention was thus fully confirmed. In a letter addressed to the Belgian Premier, M. Laroche, the French Ambassador in Brussels, pointed out that the much criticised military conversations " could not involve any political engagement or any obligations concerning national defence for either nation."

M. van Zeeland's statement was made in Brussels four days after the reoccupation of the Rhineland and the denunciation of Locarno by the German Government, and a week before the adoption in London, by the representatives of the Locarno

Powers, of a series of measures aiming at restoring International Law in Western Europe. France and Belgium obtained confirmation of the British and Italian guarantees and it was agreed that, pending the result of further negotiations with Germany, the General Staffs of the Locarno Powers should immediately consult with each other in order to prepare plans for common defence. The effect of the provisional resolutions taken in London on March 19th was first to isolate Germany and later—after Italy's change of attitude—to divide the signatories of Locarno into two rival groups. After that date, Belgium no longer belonged to an international system suitable to her military and geographical situation. She was bound by her treaty obligations not only to associate herself with France and England, but also to collaborate in the defence of the Franco-German frontier in certain eventualities. In case of conflict, she would be once more the first to suffer from the consequences of a policy which she could not control.

When the representatives of the Locarno Powers met in London, they hoped that the international situation which had been disturbed by the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact and by the denunciation of Locarno could be restored without delay. The agreement of March 19th, 1936, contained concrete proposals to that effect. If these proposals had borne fruit or even if the negotiations had proceeded in a peaceful atmosphere, it might no doubt have been possible for Belgium to remain for some time in the abnormal position in which she had been placed. But neither the German Peace Plan of March 31st, nor the French Peace Plan of April 8th, nor the British Questionnaire of May 6th produced any appreciable result. The Western Powers were compelled again and again to recognise that no progress could be achieved on the basis of their agreement of March 19th. They finally decided, on July 23rd, to extend the field of negotiations and to invite Germany and Italy (which, by that time, had drifted away from the Stresa front) to join in a general conference aiming at the consolidation of peace in Europe. This invitation was accepted by both Powers a week later, but circumstances have proved so unfavourable that it has hitherto been found impossible to realise this new project.

Meanwhile, the international situation became more and more threatening owing to the failure of the League to prevent

Italy from conquering Abyssinia, and to foreign interference in the Spanish Civil War. The system of collective security, already shaken in the spring, suffered a series of serious reverses during the summer. Rearmament proceeded apace all over Europe, international rivalries were aggravated by the conflict between Fascism and Communism, and it became more and more evident that Belgium—who had no sympathy for these political doctrines—could no longer remain without danger in the ambiguous position which she occupied. Such are the facts which should be borne in mind when reading the preamble of the Franco-British Note of April 24th, recognising the legitimate desire of the Belgian Government

> to have the international rights and obligations of Belgium clarified in certain respects where this is rendered necessary *by her geographical position and by the delays which may still occur before the negotiations and conclusions of the general act intended to replace the Treaty of Locarno.*

As a first step towards this clarification, Belgium, while retaining the Franco-British guarantee, is released from her obligations towards England and France resulting from Locarno or from the agreement of March 19th, 1936. This does not mean that Belgium does not remain faithful to the Covenant of the League—a paragraph of the Note confirms her obligations in this respect—neither does it mean, as M. Spaak observed in the Chamber, on April 29th, that she is unwilling to collaborate with the Powers in their efforts to consolidate peace in Western Europe. The main purpose of the Note is to remove the immediate danger threatening the country during the intervening period, and to allow her to recover her freedom of action. She wishes for the time being to be placed in the position of any other small Power, such as Holland, which enjoys full sovereignty within the League of Nations in internal and external affairs. She considers that in present circumstances her security can only be ensured if her complete independence is recognised by the Powers. The future remains open. It may imply either neutrality, if circumstances remain unfavourable, or membership in some new regional system, if the negotiations for the framing of a new Peace Pact can be resumed. The only part which Belgium cannot play, owing to the position she occupies on the map, is that of a small partnership in a one-sided alliance. It is not enough to say that, as far as she is concerned,

security is a condition of independence; it must be added that independence is an essential condition of security.

Whatever criticism may be directed against the present policy of Belgium, it cannot be taxed with inconsistency in the light of modern history. Neither can it be considered as a nationalist reaction against the international spirit fostered by the League of Nations, or a return to the pre-war system of permanent or conventional neutrality. From the first Belgium proved an active and loyal supporter of the principle of collective security. It was only in the last resort, after long delays, that she asked to be released temporarily of certain obligations which she could no longer undertake to fulfil. Her present situation as a voluntary neutral must not be confused with the status imposed upon her in 1831. She does not wish to restore a system which gave her during the first years of this century a false sense of security and hampered the efforts of her Kings to provide her with efficient defences. We do not yet know the exact terms of the guarantee offered to Belgium five months ago by the German Government, but it is an open secret that this guarantee has hitherto proved unacceptable because in its present form it implies a return to the pre-war situation. While welcoming in the Belgian Chamber on February 11th the peaceful intentions expressed by Germany, Mr. Hymans pointed out that " a return to the régime of conventional neutrality," which no longer corresponds with Belgian aspirations, " was out of the question."

A few critics have remarked that Great Britain and France in the Note of April 24th confer an advantage upon Belgium without obtaining anything in return. If however we examine the document as a whole, we realise that their " undertakings of assistance " in case of aggression are granted " in consequence " of assurances given repeatedly by Belgium concerning her determination to defend her frontiers and to " prevent Belgian territory from being used for purposes of aggression against another State." The speech of King Leopold in October was delivered on the eve of the introduction of a new military Bill extending the period of military service and increasing the credits required for military preparations. The Sovereign wished to reassure a large number of his subjects, who in the present disturbed state of Europe feared that Belgium might be involved in a war, owing to France's undertakings to Soviet Russia, or to other

unforeseen circumstances. There is a natural reluctance in this country to take part in a conflict originating from political rivalries in Eastern Europe. Opinion on this question in Belgium is practically unanimous. If the Franco-British guarantee is linked up in the Note of April 24th with an efficient defence of Belgian territory, the efficiency of this defence, that is to say the vote of the necessary defensive measures, is also intimately connected with the foreign policy adopted by the Government.

The allusion made in the Note to the country's " geographical situation " is significant. Belgium is not in the position of other small countries who can afford to take risks in the belief that they will not be drawn into a European conflict. She stands at the cross-roads, a bridge-head between Germany, France and Great Britain. Her efficient protection is to the immediate advantage of the attacked party and acts as a check against the aggressor. But she cannot protect herself efficiently unless she makes sacrifices out of proportion to her size and her population. Her determination to do so is the guarantee she offers to the Powers in exchange for their promise of assistance. This fact and the memory of the stand made in 1914 should not be overlooked if the advantages of present arrangements are to be estimated in an equitable spirit.

The satisfaction which greeted the publication of the Note of April 24th in Belgium has been practically unanimous. It has to a great extent allayed the apprehensions felt in all political parties, among the French-speaking as well as among the Flemish-speaking sections of the population. The Rexist movement which is mainly concerned with internal politics cannot be connected with them. I happened to be in Brussels on April 11th, and took this opportunity of following the electoral campaign. I heard and read a great deal about the defence of the Middle Classes crushed between powerful financial and socialistic organisations, the dangers of atheism and communism, the urgent need for reforming a corrupt Parliamentary system—but foreign politics were practically ignored. Apart from vague allusions to the evil of internationalism fostered by super-capitalism and marxism, and a general distrust of foreign influences, M. Degrelle and his followers did not concern themselves with external affairs. Even if some of them feel a certain sympathy for the fascist Powers, they abstain from venting it in public. Nothing

could be more misleading than to represent the recent developments in Belgian foreign policy as the result of their agitation.

This idea has no doubt been fostered by the knowledge that the Rexists had allied themselves with a group of Flemish Separatists, or Frontists, hostile to France. Incidentally the publication of this compact, on the eve of the election, did more harm to M. Degrelle's candidature than the most violent attacks of his opponents, for it showed the contradictions existing between the claims made by Rex, on the one side, and by the *Vlaamsch National Verbond*, on the other. The latter is active and well organised, and succeeded in returning sixteen deputies to the Chamber at the last elections, but it only represents a small minority of the Flemish electorate, divided between the three principal parties supporting M. van Zeeland. Altogether, Rexists and Frontists mustered 438,000 votes in May 1936, out of a total of 2,300,000. It must be remembered that the Flemish question has lost a great deal of its bitterness during the last years owing to the adoption of a series of linguistic reforms concerning public education and administrative and judicial questions. After causing some uneasiness in French-speaking circles, these reforms have done a great deal to remove the old antagonism between the two sections of the population. The first effect of the critical situation which has developed during the last months has been to bring together all the loyal elements and to develop a new national consciousness all the more anxious to define its responsibilities that it is determined to face them. A visit to Belgium will persuade the most casual observer that, as far as foreign affairs are concerned, the present policy is supported in the Southern as well as in the Northern provinces. It is neither Flemish nor Walloon, but purely Belgian. There is a certain distrust of communistic activities in France, but there is a far greater distrust of nazist activities in Germany. The feeling toward England is warmer to-day than it has been for many years; but since the break-up of Locarno England is no longer the arbiter holding the scales. As long as the Berlin-Rome axis is opposed to a Franco-British Entente, Belgium must necessarily preserve her independence. It is not for her a question of choice, it is a question of geographical and political necessity. Every event in Belgian foreign relations from 1830 to the present day confirms this statement.

It is scarcely necessary to point out that Belgian statesmen do not wish to spare their efforts in restoring order and friendly relations in Europe. During his visit to Brussels last month Mr. Eden discussed with M. Spaak and M. van Zeeland a new programme of negotiations. The latter is engaged besides on an economic enquiry which may have far-reaching results. History may repeat itself. Just as in 1831 the old diplomacy succeeded in preventing a general war by establishing Belgian independence on a legal basis, so the new diplomacy may achieve the same result by what has already been called " a network of balancing non-aggression pacts," ensuring the security of the cockpit of Europe. But if Belgium is going to render any service in this constructive work, she must no longer be looked upon as the partner or the agent of one Power or group of Powers. Neither must she feel bound, in any way, by one-sided obligations. Her disinterestedness, apart from the preservation of her own security and integrity, must be above suspicion.

The Note of April 24th is only a first step in the right direction. It raises certain questions which are no doubt in process of elucidation. In the same paragraph Belgium undertakes first to prevent " Belgian territory from being used for purposes of aggression against another State, *as a passage* or a base of operations by land, by sea or in the air," and secondly to remain faithful to the Covenant of the League of Nations " and to the obligations which it involves for Members of the League." Now one of these obligations, according to Article 16, is to " *afford passage* . . . to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League." These undertakings can only be reconciled in case unprovoked aggression can be clearly established, but the difficulty disappears if this particular provision of Article 16 is interpreted in the light of Annex F of the Treaty of Locarno. In answer to a question in the House on April 28th, Mr. Eden seems to have endorsed this interpretation. Annex F, while maintaining the obligation of giving loyal and effective support to the Covenant and of resisting aggression, adds that each State Member of the League is only bound to act " to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account."

In a letter published in *The Times* (March 31st), Sir John

Fischer Williams pointed out that this Annex had been drawn up at the time to reassure Germany as to the nature of the obligations which might result from her entrance into the League. Giving an account of the negotiations in the Reichstag, Dr. Luther argued that in no case could any member of the League compel Germany to take measures of sanctions in any form, e.g. to allow the transit of troops. Every argument put forward by the German negotiators in 1925 in order to obtain a clear interpretation of Article 16—the military weakness of the country and the vague character of the obligations expressed in the Covenant—can be put forward with greater force to-day on behalf of Belgium. Germany, a rearmed Germany, is no longer a member of the League and the geographical position of Belgium is such that a right of way implies necessarily military collaboration. The moment she allows a Power to enter her frontiers without meeting with any resistance, she will be considered as a belligerent on the side of that Power, and may be attacked as such by its enemy. In this particular case, it seems difficult to make a distinction between the obligation to afford passage to League troops, and the faculty of collaborating with the other Members in military measures recommended by the Council.

It goes without saying that if a balance is to be re-established in the threatened area of which Belgium occupies the key-position the "network of non-aggression pacts" must include an agreement with the Reich as well as with Great Britain and France. We are told that one of the main obstacles in the way of such an agreement is the fact that, being no longer in the League, Germany is unwilling to take part in an arrangement in which she would not be placed on the same footing as the other interested Powers. She considers apparently that the responsibilities undertaken by Belgium, as a Member of the League, are incompatible with her complete independence, in spite of the fact that she has been released from her Locarno obligations. The political difficulty may prove a stumbling block, but the legal difficulty does not appear insuperable in the light of recent discussions. The Belgian case is a test case. Its solution appears to-day as a golden opportunity of removing a great deal of the hostility and suspicion which has for so long thwarted the efforts of sound statesmanship.

EMILE CAMMAERTS.

AGRICULTURE AND THE SPANISH WAR.

THE enchanted paradise of Moorish poets had become a desert at the time of Cervantes. The gardens disappeared, the irrigation system decayed, the forests which keep the soil moist gave way to deserts, the *pueblos*, once scattered all about the country, contracted into villages near the oases, where people crowded. The Christian Conquest had degenerated into the ousting of the peasants by feudal "grandees." When the heroes became slaves who did not know how to defend their parish plot and suffered their primitive democracy to become rotten, the soil, too, deteriorated. History—i.e. changes in the organisation of labour and in the distribution of landed property—has changed the climate and the soil. The social conditions of cultivating have altered its natural conditions—and may alter them again, as experts agree. Economic progress depends on this change, which is the very problem of the Civil War. Its solution will be of greater consequence than the form of government.

Spain might be a rich country; it is a poor one. Half the land is covered with steppes, and the output is small. Five million hectares, or 10 per cent. of the surface, are still a paradise with tropical vegetation around artesian wells or natural oases. Another 10 per cent. is totally sterile. Average European climate with rainfall enough prevails only in a strip along the Portuguese frontier where wheat is grown, at the mountainous Atlantic coast where cattle are bred, and in the Pyrenean valleys. Levante has a Mediterranean climate with orange trees, rice and even spices when irrigated, particularly in the *huerta*, the garden of Valencia. But thirty-two out of the forty-eight provinces, covering 68 per cent. of the surface, suffer from shortage of water; 17 million hectares are entirely dry (*secano*); *secano* yields but 9·3 qu. of wheat per hectare, which is little more than half of what irrigated land (*regadio*) produces and about half the average European wheat yield. Moreover, 7 million hectares are not under the plough every year. Some regions are so poor by nature that the peasants are obliged to carry humus mould some miles away to the riverside. Since the soil does not feed cattle enough, the ground is insufficiently renewed. It is estimated that some 40 per cent. of the soil is not at all or insufficiently cultivated. The first problem, therefore, is artificial irrigation. The five

great rivers furnish water enough for 3-4 million hectares, but hardly half are irrigated. The great projects of Primo de Rivera led to financial disaster, and had to be interrupted or left to monopolistic companies which sell the water at prices not available to the peasants. Speculation and abuses skim the cream off the water business, when and where the use of water is not bound to the soil and special "water bills" markets are kept. There the soil remains sterile.

Social conditions are not abreast of technical possibilities. Either the people or the land or the money is wanting to turn the water supply to account. Only where the State is in charge of the water and the water is bound to the soil, or where ancient democratic institutions assure a fair distribution, does the irrigation serve the tenant. In Valencia the "water judges," peasants themselves, sit in court every Friday before the Cathedral and distribute the water through their own administration. In other regions a broadly conceived forest policy might better the water conditions and the climate. But who is to finance the amelioration and who is to make use of it? Intensive cultivation presupposes farmers equipped with modern technique and interested in greater yield. Strange to say, the actual owners are neither, which is due to the régime of property prevailing in Spain.

History has created alarming differences in the distribution of landed property. In the north the land is divided into small parcels, 90 per cent. of Galician and Asturian farms are *Minimofundios*, i.e. 1 hectare or less. In the centre, on the contrary, *latifundia* are the rule, and in the south you could walk, some years ago, from Granada to Cordova without leaving the monster estate of one grandee. The later a province was conquered by the Christians, the greater was the share of the great vassals in the booty: the farther to the south, therefore, the bigger the *latifundia* and the fewer the villages. Thus "Spain is the country with too many people without land and too much land without people." In Andalusia, 2 per cent. of the inhabitants own 75 per cent. of the land, but 75 per cent. of the inhabitants own 5 per cent. of the land. In the eight southern provinces where land registers are available, 1½ million families have to live on 800,000 hectares, 0·5 hectares each; they are obliged to look for work on the great estates. Seven hundred thousand families have plots of 1-5 hectares each, which is by far too little on *secano*.

Only 150,000 peasants own farms of 6-50 hectares, and 10,000 only are well-to-do. Sixty per cent. of the land belongs to 9,000 absentee landlords, the greatest of which—as the greatest shareholder and house-owner—was the Church, in particular the Jesuits. Hence social hatred and hatred against the religious orders.

This unsound distribution of land hampers technical progress. Small tenants cannot afford modern equipment; big landlords will not and are not obliged to do so. For the standard of life of the country people is so miserable that hands are cheaper than tools. The productivity of labour on the great manors is mediocre. The workers have often been charged with indolence and indifference towards progress. Indeed, they take little interest in their work; but "this is only the behaviour of landless men; the same people will change their mind as soon as they are given land in property" (Madariaga). In fact, whenever the workers were given poor land, they made it fertile.

Hence the struggle for land. Hence social unrest, thieving, sabotage, laziness; hence the gulf between the natural riches of the country and the scanty yield it is allowed to give those who till it. Nor is there a free yeomanry to make for progress. Since the time of the *Riconquista*, the landlords coveted the parish plot. The various forms of lease are juridical sediments of these struggles for land. In the north the peasants resisted, but had to pay the *foros*, feudal dues in kind, money and service. Henceforth if they wanted to keep their *fincas*, they must oppose any further land clearing. Thus the peasants themselves cling to the ancient constitution of the family and to the disadvantageous customary rights and division of property—even the *Minimofundios* are often divided among the owner of the soil, the owner of the trees, and the owner of the crop. Thus, feudal law forbids progress even where its strict application protects the tenant from further abuse.

In the south, where the land was given to grandees, peasants in want of land must apply for a lease. After long struggles the tenants were glad to force upon the landlord a law that no lease should last less than four years. After that the tenant has no claim to redemption of ameliorations of the soil. This system is incompatible with progress—the tenant must even be forced by law to grow trees. In Catalonia, wine growers obtained security against notice as long as the root they had

planted was alive. In Levante, the metayage had practically developed into a kind of hereditary tenure. But in all cases the tenant has to pay labour wages and ameliorations, but the harvest is shared with the landlord. When the Republic tried to give the tenants a right to buy land they had held for more than twelve years, thousands were driven out, for fear they might claim vested interests. The law was boycotted by the administration officers themselves, and the Madrid authorities under the influence of landlord unions struggled with the Barcelona magistrates, who inclined to back the tenants. This struggle coincided with the autonomist movement in 1934 and was renewed in 1936. The Union of *Rabasseires*, with its 35,000 members, including the Catalonian President Companys, claims the complete repeal of metayage, the establishment of family homesteads with the aid of a better credit system, and municipal self-government. Such are the political reactions of the struggle for the soil.

The landlords stick to the patriarchal character of their manors ; the workers, on the other hand, strive for settlement. In this war, leased land is lost land. The landlords, therefore, do not want tenants who know how to defend their plots and might back developments affecting their social position as a caste. Even though letting the land would increase their income, they prefer to keep it and to have it worked by worker companies who are entirely dependent on the favours of their *labrador* or manager and are kept ignorant of modern equipment and illiterate. The number of agricultural wage workers, therefore, is relatively higher than in any other European country. They number 3 million, half of the total of agricultural population and more than half of the whole number of wage workers. Their wages were as low as 3-4 pesetas a day in 1931. The mixed juries established by the first Republican government granted them 6-9 pesetas (about one shilling). But when a conservative majority was returned in 1934, wages fell below their former level. Moreover, unemployment lasts 100 days in the year and sometimes the landlords let the land lie fallow. There have been strikes where the workers stayed in and worked against the will of the landlord! In particular the "*Yunteros*," workers owning a draught-ox to hire out, would not suffer lock-outs to starve their capital.

Worse than the absentee is his administrator, the village boss or *cazique*. Dependent himself on the landlord, he

combines feudal, political and capitalist power to exploit the worker. In 1934 it was stated in Parliament that *labradors* had withheld the whole wages from their men in payment of "nourishment" : they oblige the workers and tenants to frequent the inns or shops they keep ; their methods recall the worst examples of early capitalism, and the political corruption proceeding from this class has often been denounced as the very ruin of the country. It is true that caziquism has always been the secret constitution of Spain ; but caziquism will not be broken until the social structure which backs it is changed. Indeed, at the top of the social pyramid there is parasitic absenteeism. Then, instead of a solid working middle class, the intermediary people overflowing business, rural and political life with their corruption ; at the bottom, instead of independent farmers and skilled workers, there are tenants kept under almost medieval conditions, and workers too near pauperism to give any other contribution to social life than continuous revolts, and unable to think of a better life except by a complete revolution. Neither of these classes can constitute democratic centres. *Latifundia perdidere Hispaniam.*

Under such conditions the soil cannot be managed on modern lines. Progress is impossible with metayage, where the harvest is divided and improvements are not compensated, and with short-term leases, where investments cannot be written off. It is incompatible with division of property, with unpaid labour, with absenteeism and caziquism. Each class thinks mismanagement a measure of self-protection and defends its interest on feudal lines. Moreover, Spanish agriculture, instead of nourishing the country, has to be fed. It produces too little even compared with the modest need of the population ; it produces too expensively. High tariffs protect landlords and retrogression and the scandal of wheat storage measures is too long and too subtle to be told here. Political and economic caziquism are one. On the other hand agriculture does not furnish purchasing power to industry. Landlords who do not buy modern machines and who squander their rents in foreign countries ; workers who live in troglodyte caves—cynically shown to foreigners as a romantic feature of the country—and work with primitive tools ; peasants who hardly make both ends meet to restore their physical strength—all these are no customers of industry. Progress depends on the complete abolition of feudalism. A

bold land reform must free the soil and the peasant from customary dues and usurers ; the land must be given to those who till it.

After the 1931 revolution an Institute for Agricultural Reform was created. It registered the land and announced that 4·5 out of 5 million of the agricultural population were insufficiently provided with land, that 3 million tenants were waiting for relief from heavy duties, and that usury would continue unless the state provided cheap credit. It declared 266,000 hectares susceptible of immediate expropriation. In truth, 90,000 hectares were given to 8,500 workers for settlement, and the credit opened to the Institute was hardly enough to cover the cost of preliminary inquiries. In 1932 a Bill was passed which fell far behind the promises Azaña—then Prime Minister—had made. But in Spain law is always rather a promise than a rule. The law abolished feudal dues and property and entitled redemption of estates exceeding certain limits. But since there were no provisions for farm credit, the tenants could not pay redemption and the law was never applied. Nor was the wheat revalorisation policy of the Republic a success, except for speculation. Caziquism boycotted the reform legislation, and the peasants had to present the bill themselves.

The country people took to self-defence : *rabasseires* and *foreroes* paid no rent, disposed of the harvest as though it were their property, pulled out or grew plants as they would ; workers occupied the fields and began to work them in defiance of the landlord. They behaved as though a revolution in the régime of property had been accomplished. They had to learn that it had not. Police summoned them to restore the fields, to evacuate occupied town halls, to pay rent or to leave if they would not or if they were given notice. Thousands of old leases were repealed for fear of Republican laws in favour of the tenant. Only in some places, where workers' unions had occupied fields designated by the Reform Institute, even the Lerroux administration did not dare openly to refuse legalisation, but tricked the workers by delaying the discussion until it was too late for seeding. In October 1934 the Catalonian, Asturian and Galician workers and peasants lost the causes of both autonomism and land reform, when Moors were sent for the first time to subdue the people and the Left leaders were unable to hold their ground.

Yet the fight had approached the points of view of the workers and the peasants. The guerilla continued in the country, and a union was built among the rank and file of the workers and tenants. This union was the origin of the electoral victory in 1936. The people, however, interpreted that victory in quite another way than the parties. Whereas the Prime Minister of the Popular Front Government—himself a great landed proprietor—declared that he would not suffer strikes to break out nor land to be occupied, he could not prevent either. Ninety thousand workers on strike urged the Ministers of both Agriculture and Labour to resign ; in Badajoz trade unions occupied farms ; in the east rents were not paid. The Government had to make the best of it in order to avoid bloodshed. This split between the parties and the people was of the utmost importance in the Civil War. The peasants did not feel obliged to support a Government which had disappointed them, and even in the most critical hours of the war, the Government refused to proclaim the agrarian revolution. The Government, therefore, lacked support from the rear of its enemies. Only twice, in Seville and Galicia, where the political union of workers and tenants had taken its origin, did the nationalist troops have to fight with peasants.

Meanwhile the country people saw their chance. When the police was either in revolt or fighting the revolt, they simply took the land, occupied fallow land, expelled the bosses, and began to organise production. In Catalonia the anarchist *milicias* organised the peasants, and wherever they conquered the country the popular slogan triumphed : THE LAND TO HIM WHO PLOUGHS. The Government had to legalise the *fait accompli*. In order to maintain the fiction of law, it declared the expropriation of land belonging to rebels and their relatives, which meant practically total expropriation. The land was given in charge to trade unions, peasants' co-operatives and other associations which took a semi-official character. At last the legislation of 1932 was applied through the people's own initiative.

It is evident that the political Left movement, which led to Civil War, merely coincided with a class war that is much deeper rooted in Spanish society. The peasants themselves are fighting a war of their own which will last until they are assured the full profit of their work. Politically they are indifferent to either side, but they incline to those who respect their

municipal self-government and their federalist views. They are neither for nor against collectivism. They are in favour of technical and social progress, and have recently given a good many examples of constructive thinking.

Now, owing to Franco, the revolution is on the march. The political success of the Republicans depends on the success of the new economic organisation of the country. For the sake of war economy, the Government has to go far ahead in planning on the one side, but to be careful lest production or political unity might suffer from rashness. Anarchists plead for immediate organisation of collective or co-operative production. Communists and the Left bourgeois parties emphasise the necessities of war and the difficulties of certain problems: how to provide the farmers with credit, electrical power, water; how to reconstruct normal relations between the town and the countryside, etc. To which arguments the others oppose the propagandist value of radical measures and the necessity to act now if ever. They can even point to some spontaneous experiences of local associations, to plans drawn by regional conferences, etc. A communication to the Press of the communist Minister of Agriculture seems to acknowledge that "the country people sometimes do not understand the prudence of our politics." Whatever may be the outcome of this war, the agrarian revolution is already so deeply rooted in national life that the actual progress cannot be undone.

HEINZ PAECHTER.

P.S.: The recent nomination of Señor Domenet as Catalonian Minister of Economy confirms the tendencies pointed out above. Domenet is known as a supporter of "planning" ideas.

ORIENTAL FASCISM.

ANXIETY is sometimes expressed in Japan as to whether Japan is becoming Fascist or not. The question is only raised to be answered emphatically in the negative. In the Diet or outside, officially or unofficially, the decisive denial is always forthcoming. But the recurrence of the uncomfortable question indicates a consciousness that there is a departure from tradition, and that people feel uneasy at a change that they do not quite understand. Nobody, however, asks whether Japan is going Nazi. In England we are apt to use the words as though they were almost synonymous, partly due to the fact that, "Fascism" being a much better word than "Nazi-ism," we are inclined to adopt it for whatever the two phenomena have in common. In Japan, however, Socialism is a word of such dread that, even when made national, it is unthinkable as a national policy. What we really want to know in these days is what political developments in Japan and China have in common with contemporary movements in Europe. In Europe we find a number of dictatorships, divided into two classes, Red and White, Bolshevik and Fascist, hating each other the more bitterly the more closely they approach in their methods. They are all the outcome of revolutions, and their chief common characteristic is the adoption of a one-man rule. Japan's changes have fallen short of revolution, and her strongest men have failed to become dictators.

What change, then, has there been such as to raise the question whether Japan has "gone Fascist"? Perhaps the development by which a comparison may be best instituted between Japan and Europe is the revolt against democracy. This development exists in its mildest forms in England and France, with the "National Government" and "Popular Front," but always there is the revolt against democracy, with lip-service to the democratic principle. The democratic idea is newer in Japan, and the hostility to it is probably greater than in either Italy or Germany, though the method of dealing with it has been less dramatically revolutionary. After the murders of February 26th, 1936, military and civil leaders were quoted as declaring that there must be no more liberalism in Japan—which amounted to an endorsement of the murders. In due time, however, the Diet met, and went through the

motions of legislation. The parties still function as parties, and the Government can still ensure that the one for whose support it has bargained is returned with a majority at the polls.

Much used to be heard of the Constitution granted by the Emperor Meiji; and, in spite of its obvious defects and the common knowledge that the Emperor had had no hand in its composition, there was a tendency to make it sacrosanct and unalterable. During the past few years, however, Kokutai has been much more heard of. General Araki for some time advertised Kodo, the Imperial Way, but with his own fall from office Kodo declined rapidly. What the one contained that the other lacked it would be hard to say, for both were supposed to include the whole principle and practice of patriotism; but Kokutai was the older word and was less associated with a faction. What it is the English language is incapable of expressing. An English publication emanating from one of the patriotic societies undertook the task of explaining it, but it proved to be ineffable. Fortunately it was not embodied in any sacred text, so there was no opportunity for a dominant faction to lay claim to a monopoly in its interpretation, in the manner in which the Russian dictatorship claims to interpret Marx.

In one word Kokutai could only be interpreted as patriotism, and any good Japonophil will be ready to agree that patriotism means much more to the Japanese than to other people. It hardly means unanimity, however, for the patriotic societies number themselves by thousands, and there are many of them whose practices and personnel lend confirmation to Dr. Johnson's definition of patriotism as the last refuge of a scoundrel. Professing patriots include the noblest and the most rascally in the land. To be illiberal and reactionary in one's actions and ideas and to boast loudly of one's patriotism are all the qualifications needed. Naturally, those of the greatest nobility of character are often less inclined to boast; but one finds some astonishing examples of high-minded men associating themselves with movements whose whole claim to respectability lies in their patriotic label, while their activities are deplorable. As with many popular ideals, Kokutai is insisted upon as a faith obligatory on all Japanese, while at the same time it shapes itself upon what leading men consider should be the characteristics of such a faith. In the

summer of 1935 a hundred and fifty professors of the universities attended a five-day course of lectures on Kokutai delivered at the Department of Education. This might seem a work of supererogation in a country whose patriotism is so greatly extolled at home and abroad, but it is natural enough. With all religions it is when orthodoxy is most insisted upon that there is the greatest searching of heart as to what it is and the liveliest activity in defining it.

Japanese patriotism might well be called Fascism in so far as it is an attempt to make the country strong by the binding of its citizens together; but while the democratic spirit has never matured, there is a curious reluctance to set up dictators. From time to time men come to the fore, and seem to be incarnations of the popular patriotic spirit; but they disappear, and seldom "stage a come-back." At one time General Araki seemed to be almost a dictator, and hardly a day went by without his photograph appearing in the newspapers; but he found it expedient to resign after the unpleasant surprise of finding that he lacked support for his more impulsive schemes, and the years pass without any suggestion that he is a great man still. Araki was generally regarded as the idol of the "young officers" (who were often not so very young), and he regarded himself as an economist. He rashly promised that Manchuria would cease to be an expense after the first year of Japanese direction, and he talked at large about preventing the capitalists from getting the profits accruing from its independence; but when it was found that the cost of the venture increased, and that when he made pronouncements on matters beyond the scope of the War Office they were simply ignored, an illness served as a sufficient reason for his resignation, and General Hayashi (later to become Premier) succeeded him.

So far as Japan approaches what we usually have in mind when we talk of Fascism, it is almost entirely a military movement, carried on by those generally spoken of as the "young officers." Their economic ideals are almost Socialistic. There is a fanatical attachment to the Throne, but otherwise there is quite a Marxian hatred of capitalism, and a strong desire to follow the Russian example of nationalising all industry. As a rule officers who have climbed high come to the conclusion that, whatever may be the merits of the Socialistic organisation of the national economy, it is hardly a task which the

army can undertake by itself, and they realise the solid advantages of being on good terms with the great financial houses. The Socialism of the younger officers is inspired very largely by the fact that many of them are themselves very poor and are drawn from an agrarian stratum only a little above that which supplies most of the rank and file. They practise a somewhat Spartan code, sympathise frankly with the hardships of the class from which their men spring, and grow wrathful at the spectacle of luxury and waste which they sometimes see in the great cities. Pamphlets are issued under the ægis of the army in which military ideals of the more radical sort are frequently set forth, and their circulation may reach half a million. In such pamphlets the hardships of the agriculturists are set forth and the necessity for relieving them is emphasised; luxury is denounced and the accumulation of wealth decried. But it always appears that the needs of the army in order to provide a reasonable degree of security for the nation are even more imperative than the relief of the farmers.

As an economist the soldier-politician breaks down at critical moments. The "young officers," whose acquaintance with the machinery of finance and commerce is slender, naturally simplify things too much, and are apt to suppose that only the will is wanting. When they get older they realise that economic problems are a mystery beyond their comprehension, and that some understanding has to be arrived at with the strategists of finance. So successful was a man like General Baron Tanaka in negotiating such an understanding that, though he was the son of a poor samurai and never had more than an official salary, he lived in a mansion and died a millionaire. And when feeling was becoming strained between the War Office and the great Finance Minister, Mr. Takahashi, the War Office took refuge in a division of functions, and told him that it was the duty of the army to defend the country, and that of the Finance Minister to find the money for that purpose. After all, the Socialism of the young officers and the airy promises of such as Araki have very little constructive content, and hardly deserve the name of Fascism.

Japan shares with the totalitarian States the disposition to solve national economic problems at somebody else's expense. Perhaps this differs little from the classic expedient of seeking adventures abroad to divert attention from difficulties at

home. Germany's passionate plea for colonies as an economic necessity for a modern State looks back to the time when she had an empire overseas, and is not altogether stultified by the fact that they did not pay her. Italy's claim hardly bears criticism at all. It is hardly too much to say that Japan's whole economic structure rests upon her freedom to exploit or plunder China. She exploits Formosa at a profit, Korea at a diminishing loss. With Manchuria she was to form an economic unit. It proved chimerical in a few months, and it was hoped that the Northern Provinces of China would complete the self-contained unit. It is beginning to be realised that extensive preference over the whole of China is necessary, and that even then Japan cannot afford to make herself responsible for China's economic equilibrium. The totalitarian State cannot, apparently, be satisfied with a free entry to markets for buying and selling: it must have territories wherefrom to draw economic sustenance. It will develop them, enrich them, civilise them—but it must have them. In this sense there is nothing new in what we may call Japan's Fascism, except its reinforcement by the new European examples. The spirit of Hideyoshi, who conceived the ambition of conquering China, inspires Japan to-day; and since the war with China over forty years ago, there has been one policy pursued steadily throughout all changes of purpose and statecraft—the establishment of the right to deal with China directly, without any other Power participating. Japan, like Britain, is an island Power, but isolation is never dreamed of. Always there is China. From the moment when China ceased to be the fountain of culture and civilisation she became the reservoir from which the losses of the new scientific economy must be recouped. And so we came, in 1934, to the conception embodied in the Amau Statement, of Japan as the protector of China, protection meaning a monopoly in exploitation and a veto on Chinese foreign policy.

The part that the patriotic associations play in Japanese Fascism would be difficult to define. They are generally not specially military. The Roninkai, of which the notorious Mitsuru Toyama is head, specialise in mischief-making in China, and the Head Ronin has on occasion offered the services of his followers to the military authorities, not as soldiers but as spies. Some have lost their lives on espionage expeditions. Of the patriotic societies the most respectable

was probably the Kokuhonsha, presided over by Baron Hiranuma, once Procurator-General and now President of the Privy Council. In endeavouring to avoid another military premiership, it may be recalled, Prince Saionji proposed Hiranuma for Premier; but Hiranuma, while always ready to lay down the law on points of patriotism, seems to have been conscious of a lack of administrative capacity. The Kokuhonsha was dissolved when he became President of the Privy Council. With much more driving power is the Seisanto, or "Production Society," a name which conveys a hint of its pretensions to understand economics. This society is derived from the Black Dragon Society, which again has close associations with the Roninkai, Mitsuru Toyama being a sort of patron saint of all of them. There are, on each side of the conscription period, the Young Men's Societies and the Ex-Soldiers' Societies, both, of course, with a military outlook; and patriotism penetrates so far down in society that gangs of racketeers give themselves patriotic labels, and even the pimps of the licensed brothels boast of their patriotism and of their services as pillars of society.

There is comparatively little either of co-operation or rivalry between the military and the civil patriotic societies. Extremes meet, and it was extremists among the young officers and among the patriotic civilians who combined to commit the political murders of the spring of 1932. But the civilians came off a good deal worse in the subsequent trials than the army men, and political murder in February 1936 was an army monopoly. It was a purely military gang (and officers at that) which hauled Dr. Nitobe out of sickbed and made him apologise to a hall full of military men for having said that in some circumstances militarists could be as dangerous as communists; but ordinary cases of assault and battery are much more commonly committed by civilian patriots. In speaking of Japanese Fascism, however, there is generally a vaguely comprehensive idea which includes the doings of the patriotic societies, civil and military, and the encroachments of the army on the domain of the civil power. Similarly, when dictatorship is spoken of, the meaning is military rule rather than one-man rule. It was an attack on "dictatorship" that brought about the downfall of the Hirota Government.

Though democracy had never attained its full stature in

Japan, the political parties did not willingly surrender their constitutional rights when the extremists murdered the Premier on May 15th, 1932. They made but little protest against the allegations that party corruption had prompted the murder, but looked forward to an early restoration of constitutional government. They were working towards this end when the murders of February 26th, 1936, once more set back the clock, and again the people who professed to deplore the murders saw to it that their object was attained. In a country where patriotic murders are much admired and inadequately punished, it took no little courage on the part of Mr. Hamada, a leading member of the Seiyukai (roughly corresponding to the Conservative party), to stand up in the Diet and speak for constitutionalism. He began by complaining of the ruthless suppression of free speech, and went on to say that of late years the military authorities had been claiming the initiative in all policy, being "imbued with the political ideology of dictatorship," this resulting in a danger of the embankment dividing civil and military functions being washed away by a flood of militarist ideas. The Hirota Government, believing that it was a pioneer in Totalitarianism, was, in reality, the passive log propelled by militarist forces, and was allowing the functions of the Diet to be captured by Fascism. It disregarded the tax-paying capacities of the nation and had produced the most stupendous of budgets, to say nothing of a deadlock in international relations, which was the direct result of military diplomacy.

General Count Terauchi, the Minister for War, was very wroth, and demanded a dissolution of the Diet. It was suspended for two days, and at the end of those two days the Government resigned, leaving the choice between a military Premier and the arch-Fascist Baron Hiranuma. In the Far East there seems to be considerable faith in military experience as an apprenticeship in the art of government. The leadership in thought but reluctance in grasping power which Dr. Sun Yat-Sen displayed is often seen both in China and Japan. It deterred Baron Hiranuma from accepting the responsibility of the premiership, and it was notable that in the trials of the murderers of the spring of 1932, the civilian fanatics disavowed all constructive intent; their immediate intention was to get martial law proclaimed, and they presumed that a patriotic form of government would be devised

by one or two elderly scholars associated with them. With such ideas prevailing, a military government is almost inevitable in any serious crisis, especially when it is military folly that has brought the crisis about.

Yet an open dictatorship is avoided. When Mr. Hamada talked of a dictatorship ideology, he evidently meant military rule; but though General Araki for a time made the Ministry of War look like the precursor of dictatorship, the army itself much prefers to have power rest in a triumvirate—the Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Inspector-General of Military Education. These naturally have their differences, and it is supposed to be the forced resignation of an Inspector-General which led direct to the military revolt of February 26th, 1936. But Mr. Hamada was right: there is a strong movement towards a military dictatorship. One of its indications was the persecution of that great jurist Dr. Minobe. Asked his opinion as to whether the right possessed by the Chief of the General Staff to seek an Imperial audience and tender advice did not give the army an undue advantage, Dr. Minobe replied that the Imperial acceptance of the advice of the Chief of Staff only made that the will of the army, not the will of the nation. This was followed by a stormy denunciation of a doctrine of Sovereign and State which Minobe had been preaching for thirty years, but which was now found to be disloyal, and the learned loyalist was forced into surrender of honours and retirement, while the doctrine was propagated that the army and the nation were one.

These considerations may seem somewhat irrelevant to the question of Fascism in Japan. But they are features of the situation which must be taken into account in estimating the growth in Japan of those forces which have made so much progress in the West during the past few years, and which, though bearing some general likeness, extend unduly the original scope of the word Fascism, when it is used to describe them. Historians may, of course, use the word in this general sense, and the political developments in Japan therefore deserve consideration as symptomatic of a widespread tendency in the world to-day. They may even help us to discover just what that tendency implies from the point of view of political philosophy.

A. Morgan Young,
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RELIGION IN GERMANY.

TWO recent events have again drawn the attention of the world to the Churches in Germany, the announcement by the German Government of general elections for an Evangelical Church Synod, and the publication of the Papal Encyclical. Wherever the relations of Church and State in the Third Reich are discussed, interest is focused on two questions, the nature of the opposition and the character of the compromise which has been effected. Under the former we ask: Has the opposition merely spoken *pro domo*, e.g. because its social and psychological sphere of influence has been diminished, or because an intransigent spirit still alive in its ranks is ready to fight for a cause extending beyond and possibly contrary to its own specific interests? Does it raise its voice for the cause of an independent conscience and the right to preach freely the message of Christ? And, if so, why did the Church not raise its voice before? On the other hand, how did the spirit of compromise arise which, for three years, has marked the process of the *Kulturkampf* in Germany?

These questions cannot be answered in the same way for the Roman Catholic and for the Protestant Church. What is common to both is the struggle not against a State only, but against a competing religion, which distinguishes it sharply from a *Kulturkampf* in the historic sense of the term. It is not a struggle, therefore, in which an adjustment of the Churches to the new State is the primary issue. Neither in Germany itself nor abroad has it been made sufficiently clear that the conception of the State in National Socialism is entirely new. The Totalitarian State is not merely the axis of a political system, such as Conservatism, Liberalism and even Socialism provide; it is not a central power, established by common consent, the purpose of which is to guarantee to a nation freedom and security. The striking fact is that, though its supporters represent only a minority of the nation, they have succeeded in transforming the State into a divine entity. They are not mere politicians but crusaders for a new faith. The "blood" of the people and the "soil" of the land are proclaimed principles of divine revelation, entitling the "faithful" to suppress any organisation or individual standing in their way. For this purpose the

divine entity is being equipped with all technical, political and military powers of a modern government, so that it may completely absorb all spheres of life into the totalitarian body.

When Hitler came to power neither of the Churches could foresee that spiritual religion would be confronted by race fanaticism. For in 1933 the wolf appeared in sheep's clothing. The Government declared that it stood for "positive Christianity" and invited the Churches to co-operate in the preservation of a Christian state and nation. In these circumstances, it was inevitable that both Churches should willingly follow the call of the State.

A. The Protestant Church.

The origin and essence of Protestantism—in spite of its name—makes it more inclined than the Roman Catholic Church to compromise with "the princes of this world," precisely because they are of this world and cannot, therefore, in the last resort damage the community of Christ. When Luther placed the Protestant communities of Saxony and Hesse under the protectorate of the respective princes, he deliberately planned to give his young congregations a stronghold against the political powers of the Vatican and the Catholic Hapsburg monarchy. He never intended to establish a "State Church" in the modern sense, and would have fought the Führer's pretensions to totality just as he fought those of the Pope in his days. At that time Rome, rather than the small capitals of German princes, was the seat of a totalitarian power.

The crucial point in Luther's methods of compromising must be kept in mind. His religious conscience was clairvoyant and a wellnigh infallible guide to the material *chances* and spiritual *limits* which should not be transgressed in a situation calling for compromise with political forces. The tragedy of the Lutheran Church, as far as Germany is concerned, lies in its gradual loss of that instinct. German Lutheranism throughout the centuries and particularly in pre- and post-War time, lacked the sense of *Kairos* (Paul Tillich), of the Divine character of the "given moment." Protestants forgot that their faith was essentially dependent on an understanding of this *Kairos*; for theirs was not a

Church such as the Roman, based on the timeless and unchangeable dignity of natural law and infallible doctrine. It was—and still is—a spiritual attitude which has to be born anew in every historical situation. Dependent on temporary political and social conditions, and guided by its religious conscience only, Protestantism always stands in danger of becoming a System or an Institution. It has to manifest itself in earthly forms, yet any such manifestation tends to petrifaction. By the grace of God the mystery of *Kairos* continually offers its twofold path, with its respective danger zones: the decline into material conditions, and the emergence into amorphous spiritual regions. Protestantism, in its essence, is the "protest" against either of these possibilities in isolation. A true Protestant has constantly to balance acceptance and repudiation against each other and to discover the possible compromise.

How unspiritually have the followers of Luther administered his heritage! They established the relationship of "throne and altar" as absolute, and proclaimed existing political and social conditions as the "divine order of things" (*Göttliche Schöpfungs-Ordnung*). Hence the attitude of aloofness, if not of hostility, of the Protestant Church towards the Weimar Republic, where the traditional alliance of the Church with the conservative strata of society was shaken. Hence, on the other hand, its ready adherence to the Government of 1933, which, in the beginning, attracted many traditionalists by promising them to re-establish a pre-war conservative order of things. With the exception of the more democratic Calvinist congregations of the Rhineland and Westphalia, where a broader political and social outlook continued to be upheld, the Protestant *Landeskirchen* of various persuasions welcomed Hitler as the heaven-sent leader. The *Kairos* of the year 1933 was experienced by the Church as a whole without that subtle and yet indispensable discrimination being made between acceptance and repudiation. The tragic consequences only emerged in the years that followed.

Even after doubt had arisen of the essentially Christian character of the present State, an important section of the Protestant Church, the so-called "Moderate Lutherans," continued to pursue a line of more or less undiscriminating compromise. Yet behind this attitude was no lack of

personal courage, nor was there a striving for influence "for power's sake." Partly it was a nebulous loyalty to Hitler; but mainly a growing recognition of the power of the new State, only in friendly relations with which could the necessary freedom for the preaching of the Gospel be secured. But opposition developed along with compromise. From 1934 onward the "Confessional Church" took an ever more definite stand: "We must obey God more than Man." The "German Christians," on the other hand, by their attempt to fuse the racial with the Christian religion, became more and more the victims of the anti-Christian propaganda.

It must be borne in mind, however, that not before the latter part of 1936 did the State "officially" drop the Christian mask which it had assumed largely for foreign consumption. Anti-Christian propaganda, although inherent in racial religion, was camouflaged during the first years and could be easily denied and counteracted by semi-Christian gestures such as the temporary prohibition of anti-Christian periodicals, e.g. the *Durchbruch* of the Germanic Faith Movement or the Ludendorff publications.

In spite of growing radicalism the threads of compromise continued to be spun. Three times the Government tried to entice the Protestant Church into the network of the totalitarian state: first in the summer of 1933, when a National Synod of the United Evangelical Church was elected under the auspices of the Government; next in 1935, when the Minister for Church Affairs, Kerrl, set up moderate Church Committees in order to revitalise the phantom of a United Church that had collapsed through the persistent opposition of the Confessional Church. The third attempt was made after the breakdown of the Church Committees in February 1937: general and free church elections for a new National Synod were announced by the Government.

Under the leadership of Dr. Zoellner, one of the Lutheran theologians most inclined to compromise, and after eighteen months of patient and humiliating negotiations, the Reichs Church Committee declared that the preaching of the pure Gospel could no longer be secured by the work of the Committees. This sober statement of the least militant body in the Protestant Church marks the end, for the time being, of its endeavours for a compromise. It represents the climax of opposition and reveals, once again, the twofold nature of

true Protestantism. The original Lutheran attitude has been regained: a conscientious balancing between the "Yes" and the "No," and, after this discrimination, a courageous resolution to "protest." Now, in the spring of 1937, it has become clear to German Protestants that the Will of God can be realised only by an absolutely firm stand against the forces of godlessness which are indulged, supported and even proclaimed by the Government. No doubt is left: the Minister Kerrl has openly declared that the belief in Jesus as "The Son of God" is "ridiculous and negligible" (*lächerlich und nebensächlich*). Moreover, Hitler has reconciled himself with General Ludendorff; contrary to the previous attitude of cautious aloofness on the part of the Government, it now lifts the ban from the fanatical publications of the Ludendorffs, who consider Christianity one of the sinister "supernatural forces" which "undermine the new Germany."

In the face of these facts the recent announcement of Church elections loses considerably in significance. The Government's manœuvring is recognised as such. The ground is cleared and the various groups have made up their minds. The German Christians, according to their statement, feel themselves more closely related to the Germanic movements than to "the obsolete confessions which begin already to disappear from the horizon." The separate sections of the Confessional Church have drawn together, and have set up a Working Committee which has drafted the *sine qua non* conditions for the participation of the Confessional Church in the general elections, among them the elimination of the "German Christians" from the body of the Evangelical Church.

The essential point is not whether and when this ultimatum will be considered by the State, but whether—with or without elections—the United Front stands and is ready to suffer the consequences of its intransigence. The latest arrests of the pastors at the "Evangelical Week" in Darmstadt would seem to confirm this impression. A "Cryptical Church," as it were, separated from the visible life of its own people, creeps up on the horizon. German Protestantism, then, must perforce counterbalance what it lacks as a force in moulding history by an ever-renewed outflow of spiritual energies.

B. The Roman Catholic Church.

Very different is the struggle of the Roman Catholic Church. Under the Protestant Hohenzollern dynasty there had never been a close relationship between the State and the Catholic Church. The tight hierarchical system with its head residing in a foreign country gave the Catholic Church a status far more independent than that of its sister Church. Moreover the theological doctrines and the spiritual and historic outlook emanating therefrom had welded into an almost united body the members of the Catholic Church. There was—and is—in Roman theology no room for a "new" revelation of God in profane history. The Church stands as the guardian of the one Apocalypse in Christ and the one order of Salvation. Consequently there cannot exist other than hostile relations between the Catholic and the National Socialist philosophy which considers history a medium of divine revelation and Hitler the saviour of the Aryan race.

Already in the years before 1933 the Catholic Church had often sharply criticised the excesses of the rising Hitler movement. It was therefore a clever tactical move of the National Socialist Government, as soon as it came to power, to conclude a Concordat with the Holy See. The Treaty of July 1933, taken together with the Führer's general assertions of religious tolerance, seemed at first to bridge the gulf between the two systems. Although the responsible leaders on both sides knew from the beginning that their creeds were incompatible, the lower clergy and Catholic laymen at first maintained a certain optimism as to the machinery of the Concordat. It soon proved to be a delusive truce.

In spite of minor and even major breaches of the Treaty on the part of the Government, the Church manœuvred fairly well through the first year of the régime. Europe's oldest diplomatic corps made the best possible use of the art of compromise. In Catholic quarters, however, compromise is a strategy rather than a spiritual attitude, such as has been manifested in the theology of *Kairos*. Compromise in Catholic hands is used in full consciousness of the other party's enmity. Consequently it aims not at an inner adaptation but at finding a *modus vivendi* between two enemies on the same territory. History seems to suggest to the Roman Church that, with a certain amount of adaptability, it can maintain

its position in any country and under any form of government. "Although in the past the leaders of our Church have been stoned, hanged and beheaded, the Church has always lived on. Many figures of the moment have tried to wrap her in her winding sheet and put her in the grave. But in spite of their wiles and snares and their temporary power, it has always been the Church which has finally wrapped the others in their winding sheets." (From a sermon of a German prelate in March 1937.) Historical analogies, however, are always dangerous and not applicable in view of novel phenomena such as totalitarian states.

No assurance of loyalty to the new state, which the Catholic Church willingly offered, could stop the currents of persecution directed against her. Nothing was left untried. Catholic organisations were dissolved and their property was confiscated, priests were imprisoned and publications suppressed, currency smuggling and immorality trials were staged. The last and most catastrophic blow is the extinction by the "voluntary" vote of the parents of the Confessional schools. This, together with the anti-Christian education in the "Hitler Youth," actually constitutes the de-Christianisation of the next generation. Against this anti-Christian flood the Church threw up one more dyke: its readiness to join the anti-Bolshevist campaign if the Government, in return, would put an end to the neo-pagan propaganda. This last attempt at a compromise proved as ineffectual as the former. Only a short respite was gained. Oddly enough, this was largely due to the situation in Spain, where the Roman Catholic Church was persecuted by the Spanish "Reds." The German Government, being engaged in an anti-Red campaign, had to pretend at least not to pursue the same ends as its Red adversary.

Radical tendencies from within, however, soon became stronger than any check from without. In view of the hopelessness of further diplomatic steps, the spirit of opposition, long since alive among the lower clergy, gained the upper hand among the higher Episcopate also. Even prior to that some of the German bishops, in their pastoral letters, had made most courageous utterances. Almost simultaneously with the climax in the Protestant opposition the head of a South German bishopric declared: "The fight against our religion only redoubles our activity. . . . The controversy assumes proportions of a great national catastrophe."

The signal for "fight on the whole line" is now given. The Pope has spoken at last. The Papal Encyclical is an uncompromising call to battle. No Government nor diplomat, with the exception of Russians, has hitherto dared to address the German Government in such incisive terms: ". . . The language of stern reality has torn away the last shreds of camouflage which hid and still hides the attacks against the Church. . . ." A few passages in the Encyclical offer a small loophole for negotiations; a return to the basis of the Concordat is mentioned. But the Roman Church, unlike all its previous pronouncements, now unconditionally claims its rights and stresses its readiness "to oppose a mental attitude which attempts to throttle written law by open or veiled violence."

The date for the publication of the Encyclical was well chosen. The Protestant Church had just broken away from its conciliatory methods and stood ready to fight. In other than ecclesiastical quarters, too, the leaven of opposition is breaking the crust of tactical prudence. German Universities, though far from open revolt, harbour political and scholarly criticism. Economic stress is bound to undermine what is left of loyalty to the present régime. In the international background threatens British rearmament. Thus a declaration of war by the Holy See is a serious signal to the German Government. Will the Catholic Front in Germany stand? Will the courageous spirit of the Encyclical be maintained? The shadow of the Pope's benediction of the conquest of Abyssinia dims the light in his powerful words addressed to the rulers of the Third Reich.

F. MOULDER.

MUST BRITAIN STARVE IN WAR?

THERE is one form of national defence to which even the most convinced pacifist is not likely to object: the accumulation in this country of adequate reserves of food in the event of war. The ordinary forms of rearmament, be they an increase in our military, naval, or air force, can possibly be construed as a challenge to other nations; but the laying in of an adequate store of food is the surest form of defence, yet contains in it no suspicion of defiance. As Mr. Jonathan Griffin, the author of *Alternative to Rearmament*, has pointed out in the March number of *Headway*, it would further discourage attack inasmuch as it would reduce our "present extreme vulnerability to a point when it will promise no chance of a quick victory to a sudden aggressor," especially if it is coupled with the building of really up-to-date anti-aircraft guns—a matter that the Government has until recently entirely neglected. Again, the matter is not a political or party question but a national one; it affects in fact the welfare of every one of the 46 million inhabitants of this island, men, women and children. We are all vitally interested in knowing that, if this country is unhappily involved in another war, the daily bread of everyone is reasonably secure, whatever else may befall. Moreover, it is a matter which concerns the population of our crowded cities even more than those who live in the country. However strictly rationing may be carried out, the country people will suffer less, thanks to their gardens and allotments.

Although food is our first and last line of defence, the Government have been amazingly slow in taking up the question, especially if one compares their conduct in the matter with what they have already done in relation to the Army, Navy and Air Force. They have indeed appointed a sub-committee of the Co-ordinating Defence Committee to consider: (1) the storage of all kinds of food for use in emergency; (2) an increase in the production of food at home; (3) the protection of food supplies from overseas. They subsequently announced the appointment of a committee of the Board of Trade to work in conjunction with the above-mentioned committee for the formation of plans for the supply, control and distribution of feeding stuffs. But, as Mr. Elliot drily informed a correspondent, the scheme was

simply an elaboration of the planning which had been going on all last summer. Since the beginning of the year the Minister for the Co-ordination of National Defences, Sir Thomas Inskip, enlarged on "the need to increase agricultural production so that the claims upon the Navy and Mercantile Marine might be reduced in the event of war." He went on to say: "The Government had such an obvious motive to encourage the agricultural industry to grow more that it would be surprising if the Minister of Agriculture and his colleagues were not very active in considering measures to that end." One would have thought the motive was so obvious that it would have occurred to the powers that be that something should be done at least fourteen months ago. Yet up to the date of writing this article, no attempt has been made to implement the carrying out of a single one of these schemes, or to encourage an increase in the home production of food. How urgent is the need for immediate action should be clear for the following reasons:

1. The next war, if it comes, will come like a thief in the night. Europe is full of dynamite, an explosion may occur anywhere at any time, and we may possibly be dragged in. "The running sore" of Spain, which caused the downfall of Imperial France, may well cause the downfall of Europe.

2. The last war showed only too clearly the dangers of an inadequate food supply. We had at the outset five months' stocks of wheat, yet at one time we were down to fourteen days' supply, owing to the depredations of the U-boats.

3. Our position to-day is much more precarious. We have four million mouths more to feed and two million acres less under corn, while much of the land (some say 16,000,000 acres) which was impoverished owing to imperfect cultivation in 1918, has, owing to the agricultural depression, never recovered its fertility. Moreover, since 1921 120,000 labourers have left the land, and the exodus still continues.

4. As Lord Strabolgi has pointed out, we have now to import oil as well as corn, not only for the Navy but for a large portion of our Mercantile Marine, and practically all this has to come from over the seas. Much of it, indeed, would have to run the gauntlet through the Mediterranean, which, owing to our difficulties with Italy, might become something like a *mare clausum*. For the same reason, our supplies of wheat, meat and butter from Australia and New Zealand might have to take the longer route by the Cape.

5. We have fewer merchant ships with a smaller tonnage than in 1914 (14 million odd tons against 16 million), with little more than one-third of the cruisers available for convoy in comparison with 1914.

6. The U-boats with their far greater range will be more dangerous, while with the aircraft bombers, which to-day have a radius of 750 miles, our unarmed and unarmoured merchant ships are liable to be attacked not only in the neighbourhood of our ports or in the ports themselves, but on the high seas.

7. Finally, as Mr. Griffin and others have pointed out, our vulnerability to-day is far greater than in 1914, London being especially vulnerable. Much of our oil is stored in tanks on the banks of the Thames, while many of our flour mills are situated in ports on the East Coast, which renders them particularly exposed to attack by air raiders.

What are we to do? Sir Arthur Salter has urged in *The Times* a careful investigation of the desirability of keeping a year's food supply in the country. Two of the greatest authorities in the country, Sir Charles Fielding and Sir Herbert Matthews, who were both in the Ministry of Food during the War, have written or spoken about it. Sir Herbert has studied the question for over thirty years. Suppose we err on the moderate side and take ten months' supply as the bare minimum. An official census last year of the holdings of millers and bakers estimated their present holdings at three months' supply. One Sunday paper has recently stated it amounted to only eighteen days. With their mills, silos and flour-bins full they could probably hold four to five months'. This they could easily be induced to do, by giving them a small bonus over and above their average for the last three years.

Extra storage accommodation could be provided by the Government building granaries and silos to hold four months' supply. The cost of the silos would in expert opinion be about £10,000,000, much less than the cost of two modern battleships. Of course they should be built in the west, in order to render them less exposed to air attacks. Some saving might be expected if the small disused country mills, which were closed under a system of rationalisation, were utilised, and probably some of the derelict cotton mills in Lancashire could

be adapted for the purpose. The wheat would have, of course, to be purchased abroad, preferably from the Dominions. It is heartrending to think that had this been done only eight months ago the Government would have saved at least 50 per cent. of the cost and started with a handsome balance in hand. But with Germany and Italy in the market and the world shortage of wheat we shall have to pay through the nose. But if it is a question of national starvation, bread is more important even than guns and ships. It is useless to be armed to the teeth if your molars have nothing to chew.

The remainder of the wheat required could be found by raising the wheat quota from 6,000,000 to 8,000,000 quarters. Had this been done last autumn, eight months after the scheme was mooted, it would have cost, owing to the present rise in wheat, far less than the wheat quota has cost in previous years. As it is, owing to the fearfully wet season (the worst for over 120 years) it has been possible to sow comparatively little spring wheat this year, and we are faced with the disquieting prospect of a comparatively moderate harvest, even if the weather becomes satisfactory. Even if the world price of wheat had not risen, the quota would have cost only a tithe of the £1,500,000,000 it is proposed to spend on armaments. Moreover, one cannot exaggerate the moral effect of the adoption of such a plan on the nerves of the nation. Only those who were behind the scenes in 1914-18 know the haunting terror felt at the lurking danger of starvation. On the next occasion it will be impossible to keep the truth from the man in the street. With our silos full, and the land producing larger crops, we should all, politicians and others, sleep soundly in our beds. Lord Hailsham has stated that if we lost the command of the sea for two or three weeks we should lose the war. But there is even more at stake than our existence as an independent nation. The whole of our 46 millions would be faced with starvation, especially if we had exhausted the miserably inadequate supply we are supposed to hold to-day. Would our victorious enemies feed our half-starved inhabitants, when they themselves were probably on short commons? The prospect is literally terrifying.

I have said nothing about the need to increase our supplies of home-produced meat; but with the Pig Marketing Board in ruins and the meagre subsidy for bullocks of 5s. a hundredweight, totally insufficient in view of the rise in feeding stuffs,

there seems little incentive for farmers to launch out on any large scheme for increasing their stock of pigs or bullocks. The outlook is indeed ominous. Moreover, few people seem to realise that apart from the 46,000,000 human beings for whom food has to be found, there are 27,000,000 horses, cows, bullocks, sheep and pigs to be fed, and 67,000,000 head of poultry; and a large portion of their food and fodder has also to be imported. It would not be an unfair comparison to say that the food supply of the country resembles an inverted pyramid of which the home production represents the point on which it is balanced.

In view of the prolonged and inexplicable procrastination of the Government, it might be worth while suggesting to the housewives of this country to take up the idea of laying in an extra store of non-perishable foods, such as flour and tinned productions of all kinds, milk, meat, vegetables, jams, etc. The idea of doing one's bit, so popular in the last war, might well have a wide appeal. If they would gradually accumulate such supplies for a week, or a fortnight, or even longer, they would at least ensure that their own families and children did not suffer so severely from the drastic rationing which would have at once to be imposed if a war unhappily broke out. I particularly wish to stress the children; for as every doctor and teacher knows, they were the ones who suffered most in the last war from the effects of insufficient nutrition. Hoarding in time of war is a crime. In time of peace under such present conditions it is a civic virtue.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

THE VATICAN AND THE WORLD WAR.

DURING the World War the religious question played but a small part. Both sides had Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox, Moslems. During four years the clergy of the various faiths invoked the same God Almighty for the most opposite aims. One fact, however, shocked Catholic Western Europe in July and August 1914. That war was let loose just by the most Catholic of Emperors and Kings, the decrepit Francis Joseph; when he declared war on Serbia millions of pious souls in Italy, France, England, Ireland, Belgium, hoped that the Pope might try and prevent the disaster. The hope created the legend. It was said, at first, that Pius X had enjoined the Nuncio in Vienna to admonish the Emperor as soon as the violent ultimatum to Serbia was known. When the war broke out, it was said that the Austrian courtiers had prevented the Papal Nuncio from speaking to His Majesty. Last act of the legend: when Pius X died suddenly on August 20th, during the first month of the war, it was said that he had died of a broken heart as he had been unable to avert the disaster. In reality, all had happened quite differently.

As soon as the danger of war became imminent the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires to the Vatican, Count Palffy, came and lectured repeatedly the Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, about the vital necessities and—so he said—duties of the Monarchy. The documents published after the war by the Austrian republican government have given the proof that the Vatican eyed with favour, at least at the beginning, an undertaking which would have meant the humiliation of Orthodox Russia, which the Roman Church considered not without reason as one of the main obstacles to the Union of the Oriental Churches to the Roman See. Enough to quote the following passage from a dispatch Count Palffy sent on July 29th to Count Berchtold:

> During the visit I paid two days ago to the Cardinal Secretary of State, the latter naturally led the conversation to the great problems that are to-day engrossing Europe. It was impossible to feel in his remarks any particular spirit of conciliation or indulgence. He characterised our note to Serbia as very sharp, but he approved of it unreservedly, and he expressed the hope—indirectly—that the Monarchy would see the matter through to the end. Undoubtedly, thought the Cardinal, it is a pity that Serbia could not have been humbled sooner—as it might have been done without bringing into play such tremendous possibilities. This declaration also corresponds to the Pope's manner of thought, for during these last years His Holiness has several times deplored that Austria-Hungary should have neglected to punish her dangerous Danubian neighbour. One might wonder why the Catholic Church shows such a warlike spirit at a time when she is directed by a Chief who is a real saint. The answer is very simple: the Pope and the Curia see, in Serbia, the gnawing evil that has, little by little, eaten into the very marrow of the Monarchy and that would end by disintegrating it. Now Austria-Hungary remains the greatest stronghold left to the Church in our century. The fall of this bulwark would mean, for the Church, the loss of its firmest support. In the struggle against Orthodoxy she would see the fall of her most powerful champion. Thus, just as it is for Austria an immediate necessity to eliminate the disintegrating evil, so it is for the Catholic Church an indirect necessity to do, or approve, anything toward that aim. In this sense one can easily establish a link between apostolic feelings and spirit of war.

When this document became known, and I commented on it in my *Makers of Modern Europe*, the Vatican remained silent. It is only last year that Cardinal Canali, who, as a young Monsignore, belonged to the staff of Pius X's *Segreteria di Stato*, gave to the Fascist Press in Italy three "personal papers" of Cardinal Merry del Val, papers proving—according to the comments of the Fascist Press—that the Vatican had been wrongly accused of favouring the Austrian *coup* against Serbia. I translate literally the three documents, not from Fascist organs but from the *Osservatore Romano*, the paper of the Vatican (May 22nd-23rd, 1936).

The first and most important is a memorandum which—I quote from the *Osservatore Romano*—"Cardinal Merry del Val wrote for himself immediately after the conversation with Count Palffy":

> Conversation with Count Palffy (Hungarian), Councillor to the Austrian Embassy—July 27th, 1914.
>
> Came to me to know my impressions about the ultimatum to Serbia. I said that it seemed to me very hard. "Does Your Eminence think that Serbia will accept it?" the Count asked. I answered: "I doubt it very strongly, especially about certain points." "All or nothing," exclaimed the Count. "But, then, it is war," I said. "Yes," replied the Count, "and I do hope that

Serbia will not accept." "But then," said I, "there is a danger of a general conflagration." And the Count: "Better the catastrophe than to go on with the present situation." I answered only that this seemed to me very serious. It is true that after the horrible crime of Sarajevo I said to Count Palffy that Austria was bound not to compromise, and that she was entitled to the most solemn reparations and to safeguard her life, but I never expressed the hope or the opinion that Austria should go to war. Nothing else was said by me. This, for the truth. R.Card. Merry del Val.

The second document, as it was published by the *Osservatore Romano*, says:

Declaration. October 22nd, 1923. The recollection of the atrocious days from June 29th to August 1st, 1914, is still so living with me, that I remember exactly all I said in my conversations with Baron Ritter and with other diplomats, and the care with which I measured my words. It is quite true that after the horrible crime of Sarajevo I declared at different times that Austria was entitled to the most solemn reparations and to the defence of her life. But I never used the expressions attributed to me by Baron Ritter in his telegram. And I never expressed the hope of Austria resorting to war. This constitutes an interpretation which I cannot admit in the least. R.Card. Merry del Val.

The Baron Ritter the Cardinal complains of in this note was in 1914 Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires to the Vatican. We shall see later his telegram to Munich. But let us first translate the third and "*consimile nota in data* 18 *gennaio* 1926" about which the *Osservatore Romano* does not say by whom it has been written (probably by Canali, who was in 1914 a secretary to Merry del Val):

The Cardinal flatly (*recisamente*) denies what is said in Count Palffy's letter concerning an instigation to war. Such ideas belong to the author of the letter, not to His Eminence. The Cardinal retains a very exact memory of this conversation, as well as notes, and he is still able to repeat verbatim the said conversation.

After having given these documents the *Osservatore Romano* adds its explanation, which is simply this: Austrian diplomacy wanted to have the Emperor rallied to the war idea; what would have helped more than to make him believe that even the Pope was in favour of a war on Serbia?

Unluckily for the organ of the Vatican there is the telegram of the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires, Baron de Ritter, which was

sent to Munich on July 26th, 1914, a day before the conversation between Cardinal Merry del Val and Count Palffy. The following translation of this document shows that another diplomat, who was not writing to influence the old Catholic Emperor, related almost the same expressions communicated to Vienna by Count Palffy; with the addition of a phrase showing that even a general war had been foreseen:

The Pope approves that Austria proceeds severely against Serbia. He has but small consideration for the French and Russian armies in case of war against Germany. The Cardinal Secretary of State hopes that this time Austria will not give in. He does not see when Austria will wage war if even this time she is going to hesitate to crush with her armies an agitation which has led to the murder of the Thronfolger and which, after all, menaces the very existence of the Monarchy. All this proves also the great terror which the Holy See feels about Panslavism.

The history of this document is rather interesting. It was first given to a Swiss newspaperman by the secretary of Kurt Eisner, the murdered communist dictator of Bavaria. The newspaperman sold it to the Paris *Journal*, which published it on April 29th, 1919. It was at the time when *à propos* of everything it was "the fault of Germany." But on the publication of his telegram Ritter observed, not without reason, that it was foolish to consider it as a new proof of the German responsibilities; had not the Vatican admitted that it was Austria's interest to declare war on Serbia? A few days later the Bavarian diplomat changed his tactics—and declared that the text given by the *Journal* did not correspond to the original. In saying so, he was right to a certain extent, since the *Journal*—with the lack of respect for its readers which characterises so many Paris newspapers—had suppressed the phrase about the lack of consideration Pius X had for the French and Russian armies. But on May 11th, 1919, a perquisition at the house of Kurt Eisner's secretary discovered the original of the telegram which is just as the *Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegs-Ausbruch* gave it a few months later.

When the official publication took place, the Catholic newspaper *Germania* admitted that it was authentic, but declared that Baron Ritter had certainly misunderstood Cardinal Merry del Val's words. The same happened with the Palffy dispatch which became known later on. The writers who rose for the defence of the Vatican began by claiming the

lack of authenticity of the document. And they ended—we have seen it with the *Osservatore Romano*—by suggesting that Palffy had altered the expressions he had heard. This might have been the case for the Austrian diplomat. It is more difficult to believe when one knows the two documents and their history.

The elementary duty of Cardinal Merry del Val, when he felt how excited Count Palffy was, was to repeat to the Papal Nuncio to Vienna the point of view of the Vatican. This is the simplest and most usual precaution in the diplomatic world. One must also add that the perusal of the first memo written by the Cardinal shows that it is not in the least one of those short notes which a Foreign Minister writes, as a rule, after having received an important visit from an Ambassador. Each line of this document proves that it was written much later. The Cardinal himself gives the proof of it, with his last four words: "This for the truth (*Tanto per la verità*)". These words prove also that the Cardinal was a very honest man and that he did not even think of giving a different colour to the paper he wrote. From a higher historical point of view the interpretation of the Vatican newspaper offers us a much more important proof: that even at the Vatican they have ended by admitting that Austria-Hungary was so decided to make war on Serbia that her representatives did not hesitate—in spite of their official Catholicism—to "falsify" the thought of the Pontiff on the essential issue of peace or war.

SFORZA.

THE VITALITY OF THE LITTLE ENTENTE.

FOR years past the group of states known as the Little Entente has been a corner-stone of European peace. One of the factors that have contributed most to nervousness of late has been the widespread impression that this little bloc is falling to pieces. In order to arrive at an accurate estimate of the chances of preserving peace, it is therefore of interest and importance to ascertain the truth regarding this threatened dislocation of the Little Entente.

So far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, there is no problem at all. Prague is vitally interested in the maintenance of things as they are and will do nothing to imperil the *status quo*. Yugoslavia is in a different position. For several years past German influence has been actively at work in Belgrade. To a large extent it has permeated financial and industrial circles. It has revived a certain professional pro-German instinct that has never been entirely absent from the Serbian corps of officers. It has been aided by the numerous Russian monarchist exiles who live in Yugoslavia and hold high positions at court and in the army. How successful German intrigues have been is shown by the fact that they have managed to do that which everyone deemed impossible, namely, effect a *rapprochement* between Yugoslavia and Italy. M. Stoyadinovitch, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, has allowed himself and his government to fall, consciously or unconsciously, under the ban of German blandishments. He commenced a series of flirtations outside the charmed circle of the Little Entente—that is to say, with Bulgaria, with Turkey, and even to some extent with Hungary. To crown all, he concluded with Italy—that is, with one of the Great Powers belonging to the opposite camp—another of those bilateral pacts which Herr Hitler never tires of telling the world are preferable to collective security. And when at the meeting of the Little Entente chiefs in Belgrade he was pressed to give a more definite form to the vague agreement between France and Yugoslavia, he adjourned the decision *sine die*. But M. Stoyadinovitch's administration is no more eternal than any other. From the points of view of peace, of collective security, of the League of Nations and of general adherence to the economic bloc, the heart of Yugoslavia is

sound. When in April M. Benes paid a state visit to Belgrade, the rapturous popular enthusiasm with which he was received was a very clear demonstration of the nation's distaste for M. Stoyadinovitch's recent departures from the traditional Yugoslav foreign policy.

In such circumstances the attitude of the third partner, in other words of Roumania, acquires capital importance. If Roumania breaks away from Little Entente traditions, a new situation will have arisen and the danger of an "Italo-German Protectorate over South-Eastern Europe" will be a very present one. The quoted phrase is not that of the present writer; it was coined by the *Velten Briefe*, that exceedingly important press correspondence of German commercial and financial circles, in its issue of March 11th. If, on the other hand, Roumania remains true to Little Entente ideals, Yugoslavia in all probability will take the line that she too must respect the integrity of the Entente, even if in having to do so she must sorrowfully dispense with M. Stoyadinovitch's services. Roumania's situation is complicated by her confused internal crisis. It may be useful to recall the development of that crisis. Though latent for a long time, it may be said to have become apparent in December 1933, when M. Duca, the then Prime Minister, was assassinated by alleged Fascist extremists who were reputed to be favourable to a pro-German policy. M. Titulesco, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, compelled a very reluctant King to dissolve the Iron Guards who were alleged to have carried out the murder.

King Carol was not content to reign: he wanted—and he still wants—to govern. In the complacently weak Premier, M. Tataresco, he found a suitable instrument for the realisation of that purpose. More and more governmental authority abdicated before the constant onslaughts of the Roumanian admirers of Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini. In foreign policy, however, the King found himself steadily and firmly opposed by the strong personality of M. Titulesco. For over three years a kind of dualism prevailed; a dualism which the monarch was only biding his time to end. The impotence of the League of Nations to prevent Italy's invasion of Abyssinia was one of the first and most formidable blows at Titulesco's policy. France's failure to react on March 7th, 1934, when German troops walked into the Rhineland in defiance of

treaty obligations, weakened Titulesco's position still further. When it became clear that Titulesco was about to follow France's and Czechoslovakia's example and conclude something approaching a defensive alliance with Soviet Russia, King Carol decided that the moment had come for him to act. Taking advantage of his absence through illness, he dismissed him from office.

So far as internal affairs were concerned, this implied a further strengthening of the Fascist elements in Roumania. But fortunately for the democracies, Fascist political methods are not invariably intelligent. When all is said and done murder or attempted murder is not an intelligent substitute for full ballot-boxes. The Chairman of the Liberal Students' Association was grievously wounded. The Rector of Jassy University, M. Trajan Brato, was brutally assaulted. General Gabriel Negri, in the course of a lecture tour on behalf of a foreign policy favourable to France and Great Britain, was fired at and severely wounded. Then the Roumanian peasant masses reacted. At by-elections the Fascist candidates—even candidates who enjoyed the distinction of being known as "the King's Friends"—were crushingly defeated. Even M. Jorga, a former Prime Minister, who had slavishly followed the King for years, stood up in Parliament and denounced Fascist intrigues, and even old conservatives joined in raising their voices in protest. Thus the King was compelled to yield, or at least to make a semblance of yielding. The Minister of the Interior, who had tolerated the Fascist disorders, was forced to relinquish office. True, as a counterpart, two Generals close to King Carol entered the Cabinet. But all the same M. Tataresco was obliged, in order to save his dwindling majority, to declare solemnly that any attempt to disturb established order would be repressed with implacable severity. The "Liberal" Government, which appears to be so only in name, in the opinion of shrewd observers can only continue on condition of ceasing to close its eyes to the activities of such men as M. Cuza and M. Goga, whose avowed aim it is to destroy democratic institutions. The success these strange "Liberals" obtained in the April municipal elections in Bucarest was at least partly due to a popular hope that this would be the case. It is significant that, at these elections, the Fascist groups were at the bottom of the poll and failed to secure a single seat.

Meanwhile in the provinces and in New Roumania—the districts won as a result of the war—the democratic National Peasants Party is reported to be gaining ground daily. And if in home affairs the attempt of the King to impose his policy has been partly checked, in foreign affairs it may be said to have been wholly unsuccessful. M. Antonesco, who had been appointed Foreign Minister for the purpose of carrying out a policy diametrically opposed to that of M. Titulesco, has been forced by the irresistible pressure of events to conform to his predecessor's general principles. That he has done so with less ability, efficiency, firmness and force than M. Titulesco is not astonishing in the circumstances. Here again such good results as have accrued to the cause of peace and democracy have been due to the clumsy methods of the Fascist elements. The German and Italian Ministers deemed it wise to offend against every diplomatic tradition by taking part openly in a public Fascist demonstration, thereby outraging Roumanian national sentiment. Mussolini's strange Milan speech, in which he appeared to give his benediction to Hungarian irredentist appetites, spread dismay even in Fascist circles in Roumania. His subsequent efforts to repair this error have not been convincing or successful. The "New Deal" in French foreign policy, the firmer tone, for instance, adopted in the Moroccan affair, has gone some way to restore France's prestige, which indubitably had been severely damaged under the régimes of M. Laval and M. Flandin. The resolute rearmament policy of Great Britain, the fact that the triple financial entente between England, France and the United States, is from month to month pulling a greater weight in international affairs, have also contributed to the re-enforcement of Western traditions. The stubborn resistance of the Spanish Government to the organised attacks of trained troops, and particularly the defeat of Mussolini's legions at Guadalajara, have certainly weakened faith at Bucarest in the all-powerful might of Fascist countries.

Thus it came about that in April M. Antonesco made the following declarations to M. Stanislas de La Rochefoucauld :

> "This diplomatic instrument [*the Little Entente*] has stood the test. After eighteen years of peace, Hungarian revisionism has met only with reverses. Now the question is how to broaden the basis of the Little Entente and conclude a treaty of mutual assistance between the three countries. That is the problem which demands our consideration. These are questions that interest more especially the Danubian Basin. Roumania for her part strives to strengthen her intimacy with Czechoslovakia. Cultural and economic relations have been drawn closer. We have signed with her three armaments conventions. It is not a matter of chance that Czechoslovakia holds first place in the military dispositions of Roumania. . . . The Roumanian-Polish alliance has been the object of my special care, and the *rapprochement* between France and Poland has facilitated my task. This policy towards Poland, common to France, to Roumania, is proof of the concordance of our views in foreign affairs. At the moment we only have a treaty of amity with France. The strengthening of our diplomatic ties is a question for the future."

That is language which, in regard to France, might be more definite, but it is not the kind of language which would fall from the lips of a man who contemplates a pro-German or a pro-Italian orientation of Roumanian foreign policy. It is clear evidence however that M. Antonesco has been compelled to deviate from the line of conduct which on his appointment was expected of him.

If we turn to the National Peasants Party, which, if elections were held in Roumania at the present time, would probably command a large majority, we get even more precise avowals. Take for instance the unequivocal declaration just uttered by the General Secretary of that party :

> "British rearmament has had a most salutary effect. Unfortunately Britain does not seem very much disposed to engage herself in Central European affairs. But I desire to state my firm conviction that one single word from Britain would suffice to avoid the storm. . . . The Berlin-Rome axis has made the danger even more threatening than before. The National Peasants Party is convinced that the first duty of a government conscious of its responsibilities is to prevent the violent clash within its territory of two ideologies strange to our country, namely Fascism and Bolshevism. The aim of a patriotic government must be to prevent by all means that foreign influence and assistance should foster such strife among our people and lead to fratricidal war.
>
> "We believe therefore that the first article of faith of foreign policy must be to preserve security; to strengthen alliances and pacts of friendship with all those States determined not to allow a war of rival ideologies. We are convinced that Roumania must seek to reinforce the Little Entente which is the keystone of our foreign policy.

"We further demand the strengthening of our alliance with France, of our relations with Poland and of our ties of friendship and good-neighbourliness with Soviet Russia. . . .

"The realisation of this plan, which would ensure permanent peace, depends upon two things: the rejection of Hungary's Revisionist ambitions and the respect of the political independence of Austria by both Germany and Italy."

Thus a review of the facts goes to show that Roumania's attitude regarding the Little Entente and the Western Powers is such as to inspire confidence. Even the present administration, suspect though it be from many points of view, has had to bow to the inevitable. The Roumanian Government of to-morrow would carry out the same policy with greater vigour because it would be actuated by faith, and not merely by the enforced but somewhat reluctant recognition of national necessities. It may be that before long M. Titulesco will return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, either as an independent member of the National Peasants Party's Cabinet or as the delegate of the new Democratic Party, which he is believed to be contemplating at the present time. Such a consummation could only be welcomed in the circles which care for ideals of peace and collective security, since it would offer the valuable guarantee that this policy of devotion to peace and democratic traditions in foreign affairs would be pursued not only with faith but with that skill, authority and experience which the name of Titulesco connotes. One cannot do better as some assurance of this than quote M. Titulesco's recent speech at Cap Martin, which may be taken as heralding his early return to active politics. It unfolds a programme of League of Nations procedure reform that is certainly not without interest:

"Experience has shown that economic sanctions unaccompanied by military sanctions are ineffective. On the other hand, President Wilson's conception of the whole planet embarking on war to prevent some local aggression would create an impossible situation. No one will fight where his own interests are not at stake.

"But if one were to divide up Europe in geographical zones from the point of view of security, and if in every case of aggression the duty of rendering military assistance to the victim were confined to Powers directly interested in the region in question, one would find oneself on solid ground.

"Universal economic sanctions plus regional military sanctions, with close co-operation of both kinds of pressure on the aggressor

—such are the three commandments that would in a short time bestow upon Geneva real political efficiency.

"It is to a League of Nations thus amended that would fall the task of realising a world economic settlement, the *sine qua non* basis of the maintenance of peace. May the nations set to accomplish this work as soon as possible.

"I should like to see France in the lead of this work—but an active France, a France that leads and does not merely follow."

It would be impossible to define more tersely and yet more completely the practical realisation of the principles for which the Little Entente stands.

The whole question therefore boils itself down to this: will the Titulesco policy get the upper hand within a reasonably short time? For, let it not be overlooked, the King has by no means abandoned hope of keeping a tight grip on the reins of office. He has been obviously encouraged in this resolve by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Beck, whose influence in Warsaw, after having been rudely curtailed by General Rudz-Smigly, appears inexplicably to be once more in the ascendant.

In the course of a series of conversations with Colonel Beck during April, King Carol took a number of commitments which, under a Titulesco or a National Peasants' Government, he would certainly not be able to meet. Some of these have transpired in the public Press. Others have been hitherto kept secret. The four promises which King Carol then made —or at least the four most important of them—appear to have been the following:

He undertook, first, to abandon the plan of a closer military alliance between France and Roumania. Secondly, he agreed to sign a treaty of amity with Italy which would be tantamount to bringing Roumania within the Italian sphere of influence in South-Eastern Europe. Thirdly, he was prepared to weaken the hitherto very strong ties that unite Roumania to the League of Nations by causing a public declaration to be made in Geneva to the effect that Roumania no longer considers herself bound by the Treaty for the protection of national minorities. And fourthly, he is said solemnly to have promised, so long as he remains on the throne, to refuse to sanction the conclusion of any pact of any kind whatsoever with Soviet Russia.

The honouring of these promises would quite definitely

range Roumania in the ranks of the Powers which stand for bilateral arrangements as opposed to collective security; that is to say, for national political autarchy as against European co-operation, and in the wider issue for authoritative government against democracy. Few observers in Roumania, however, believe that the King will be able to carry through this programme which is not only distasteful to the bulk of Roumanian public opinion but runs contrary to certain historic traditions and political and economic facts that no statesman can afford to set aside with impunity.

When Titulesco returns to active political life in Bucarest in the autumn, the vital contest between the two tendencies will commence. A dualism, such as I have described as existing before, is unthinkable. The encounter can only end in the defeat of one or the other of the opposing policies, and unless the King is prepared to risk all on a gambler's throw, and to upset by violent means the parliamentary constitution of the country, the issue can hardly be in doubt. That King Carol in his heart of hearts fears the result of such a clash is shown by the fact that, the day after he had pledged himself to Colonel Beck, he granted to the representative of a Paris newspaper an interview enunciating opinions exactly the reverse. It was clearly a case of *force majeure* for he was genuinely alarmed lest public opinion, which he knows is resolutely opposed to his views, should be aroused and should commence to express itself openly.

To recapitulate: while the situation in Roumania is at the moment still unsettled and uncertain, there is no reason to apprehend the final results. The Little Entente is a combination dictated not by the passing fancy of the rulers but rather by clear-cut facts. It is, and will remain for years, an imperative rule of conduct for all three of the States which it comprises. Despite Italo-German hopes, despite Colonel Beck's tortuous and subterranean intrigues, despite King Carol's or M. Stoyadinovitch's diversions, the Little Entente is neither dead nor even dying. There is only one thing that could destroy it. That would be a failure on the part of Great Britain to realise that world peace is indivisible, or a failure on the part of France to assume that active part in the defence of peace and liberty, that alike her traditions and her national interests demand.

W. Walter Crotch.

LEOPARDI.

On June 14th, 1837, there died at Naples Giacomo Leopardi, the greatest Italian poet since Tasso, a poet whose influence is little less under Fascism than it was during the Risorgimento, when young patriots came to identify his tragedy with the tragedy of Italy, whose enslavement to the foreigner no one felt more bitterly than he. Indeed, his loneliness and melancholy seem to be something more than personal, permanent characteristics that continue to be marked in the work of leading Italian writers to-day.

The delicate boy belonged to an old family of the lesser nobility. Encouraged by his father, who was pardonably proud of his abilities, he ruined his health by overwork before he was out of his teens. He became, it is true, a first-class scholar, and his notes, had they been published during his lifetime, would have won him high rank in the world of learning. The complete breakdown of his health before he was twenty, when he could not even read, and the inevitable opposition between the two generations combined with other circumstances to make his home hateful to him. His father's extravagance had seriously impaired the family finances and his masterful mother sacrificed everything, including the happiness of her children, to restoring them. When one of them died in infancy she rejoiced openly, since it went straight to heaven and cost her nothing to educate. The old Count stood by his rights as head of the family and, like others of their class, his sons suffered in consequence. He refused to give his first-born an allowance.

So when a Milanese bookseller offered Leopardi work, he jumped at the chance. Thenceforth his main object was to keep away from home, whither he returned only when compelled by lack of money. Ultimately, his father, with his mother's consent, did make him a small allowance. The last seven years of his life were comforted by the friendship of Antonio Ranieri, who later took him to his own Naples. Though the intellectual atmosphere, which he satirised in *I Nuovi Credenti*, was unfavourable and he enjoyed little of the recognition that made Pisa and Bologna dear to him, he was compensated by the devoted admiration of his friend, who gave him the love and sympathy which were essential

to him. Here he died in Via Capodimonte, when the carriage was waiting at the door to take him to the villa on the slopes of Vesuvius, where he had written *La Ginestra*. Cholera was raging, but Ranieri saved his body from the common grave and buried it in S. Vitale di Fuorigrotta, whither young patriots later made pilgrimages, repeating under their breath lines from his *All'Italia*.

This is the material out of which Leopardi made his poetry. Just as his life was one long struggle with ill-health and poverty, so his best poetry is inspired by the contrast between the present and the happy promise of childhood. Leopardi's tragedy is a personal tragedy. He shed tears on seeing the grave of Tasso, but experienced no emotion at that of Dante. And in this touching passage he gives perhaps the best explanation of his own case.

> In Dante we see a strong-willed man, able to bear and endure misfortune . . . standing up to it and fighting it. . . . The more admirable, certainly, but so much the less lovable and pitiable. In Tasso we see a man crushed by his misery, sinking and beaten to the ground, who had surrendered to misfortune and suffers unceasingly. . . . However imaginary and unreal his calamities, his unhappiness is real. . . . If he is less unfortunate than Dante, he is much more unhappy.

Yet it was the revelation of truth to him, the coming of which upon earth, as he describes it in his *Story of the Human Race*, shattered the " dear illusions," that made Leopardi a poet, the greatest poet of pessimism since Lucretius. Not that he had read Lucretius, for there is no copy in the Leopardi library. And a poet Leopardi remained. His education had been literary and philological. Neither by temperament nor by training was he a philosopher. He dates the change in his outlook from the year of his breakdown, when, he says, he began to think seriously, to become a philosopher instead of a poet. But he proves that he was still a poet by saying that he began " to feel the undoubted unhappiness of the world instead of knowing it." The poet feels, the philosopher knows. At heart he realised this, for he bade an inquirer turn for his views on life to his poem, *Bruto Minore*. The system that fills many pages of his note-books finds its true expression in his poems and in the *Operette Morali*,

where it is a poet who pens the most beautiful passages, such as the coming of Heavenly Love upon earth when all other illusions have fled, or the dialogue in which Plotinus dissuades Porphyry from suicide, or the praise of birds, which Leopardi considered the happiest of all creatures, since they are in continual movement, have the liveliest imaginations and therefore are less subject to the crushing boredom, the *noia* which was for him the greatest curse of existence. The irony and the satire may not always ring true in the dialogues dealing more directly and rationally with the misery of life, though his sister could hear him talking in them, but they awakened unbounded enthusiasm in pessimists like Schopenhauer and James Thomson. Schopenhauer found in them an anticipation of all his philosophy.

Leopardi felt that his health cut him off from life and above all from love. He suffered agonies when the boys called him hunchback on account of his curvature of the spine. It is difficult to imagine a young man of nineteen who felt himself capable of being a lover analysing his feelings and describing the progress of his first passion with the amazing truth and detachment of the *Diario d'Amore*. This absolute honesty with himself was, indeed, characteristic of him : it greatly increases the value of his note-books. Women pitied him, they could not love him. He was glad to be allowed to visit the beautiful Fanny, who called him her little hunchback and upon whom he turns so bitterly in *Aspasia*, in order to talk to her about handsome Ranieri, and Ranieri tells us that Leopardi's loves were one-sided and generally unknown to their objects. Like the Sappho of the poem in which he set himself to describe the fate of " a delicate, tender, sensitive soul encased in a young, but ugly body," he felt himself shut out even from the beauty of Nature.

Leopardi is essentially a lyric poet and he regards the lyric as " the zenith of poetry, which is the summit of human utterance, true and pure poetry in all its range." His best poetry is inspired by a poignant regret for the past, even in his patriotic *canti*, where he contrasts the Italy of his day with the vanished glories of Rome. Naturally, he is at his best when writing of aspects of life from which he was not excluded, as in the earlier idylls, where he first came into his own after the crisis that ruined his health, but made him a poet—in the beautiful *L'Infinito*, for instance, where,

on the hill behind the hedge that shuts out the distant horizon,

tra questa
Immensità s'annega il pensier mio
E il naufragar m'è dolce in questo mare ;

or in *Alla Luna*.

His brother was right in saying that his best work was done at Recanati, where the influences that inspired him were most keenly alive in a setting familiar from childhood. *A Silvia*, the first of the great idylls, written after the reawakening of his poetic powers, by many considered his most perfect poem, was composed at Pisa, where he spent a rarely happy winter. Leopardi was never at home in a place till he had gathered round it a cluster of memories, and he had there his Street of Memories, where, he tells his sister, he could dream with open eyes. *A Silvia* recalls the memory of a peasant girl whom he used to hear singing at her weaving in the cottage across the square while he was working in his father's library, and with whom he may have exchanged a few signs. She interested him, like all people who died young, as he himself expected to do. Leopardi brings these Recanati peasants before us in their daily life with admirable vividness in these great *canti*—*La Sera del Dì di Festa*, *La Quiete dopo la Tempesta* or *Il Sabato del Villaggio*—steeping it in the haunting beauty of his poignant melancholy. To my mind he touches high-water mark in *Le Ricordanze*, which recalls the happy memories of his childhood in contrast with the present, notably in the famous passage beginning,

O speranze, speranze ; ameni inganni
Della mia prima età . . .

These wonderful lyrics were, with the exception of *A Silvia*, all written during his last visit home, when he was in the lowest depths of despair, seeing no means of escape. They were his only relief. At Recanati, too, he wrote most of the note-books, finding in them, doubtless, the outlet he would elsewhere have found in the companionship of friends.

His last great poem was *La Ginestra*, where he turns scornfully on the optimists, bidding them see how Vesuvius destroys man and all his works as easily and indifferently as an apple destroys an ant-heap. Man should rise up and curse

his real enemy, Nature, the cause of all his misery, his mother at birth, his stepmother in purpose. It has been said that he himself here rises up in his indignation like a rival peak to Vesuvius, but the poem lacks the perfection of the best of the idylls. We have a truer Leopardi in the earlier lines praising the humble broom spreading its sweetness on the arid slopes of Vesuvius, as on the desolate Roman Campagna, and meekly accepting its fate. In this outburst against Nature he is reasoning, and, in spite of the passionate feeling that inspires the lines, they are not really fused into poetry, because, as Zottoli points out, they deal with a problem which Leopardi could not solve ; he could only revolt. Even the idea that man should band together in love against the common enemy, Nature, finds a better and more poetical expression in the dialogue between Plotinus and Porphyry, where it first occurs. The troubles and ills of life, however numerous, should not be beyond the power of a wise and strong man to bear. "And life is a thing of such small moment that man for his part should not be over-anxious either to preserve or to lose it. . . . Let us go on our way encouraging each other, giving a helping hand to each other so that we may endure as best we can this burden of life." Suicide is a monstrous act, the meanest, the most ungenerous display of selfishness possible. The whole dialogue should be read. But the truest antidote to the doctrine of despair that Leopardi often preaches is the beauty of the poems in which he preaches it. They inspire the reader, just as they brought something like happiness to himself.

No poet had higher ideals of his art than Leopardi. His system of the Fine Arts may have no more philosophical value than his other system, but his criticism and the views on poetry scattered up and down his note-books are always worth reading—for instance, his remark that Dante's style is the strongest that can be imagined and the most beautiful, because with him every word is an image. The idea a poet has of his art, he says, varies in inverse proportion to the idea he has of his success in it. If an artist habitually compares himself not with his rivals, but with the art itself, the greater his skill, the lower will be his esteem of himself, because he has a better understanding of its difficulties. Hence, nearly all great men are modest.

Leopardi never wrote except in obedience to an inspiration

or frenzy, under which he planned his poem in a couple of minutes. Then he waited for another moment of inspiration, "when I set myself down to compose, but so slowly that I cannot possibly finish a poem, however brief, in less than two or three weeks. This is my method and, if the inspiration does not well up spontaneously, it would be easier to get water from a tree trunk than a verse out of my brain." It is the method of Chopin, except that the second part of the process was painful in the extreme to the musician. For Leopardi the hours of composition were among the happiest he knew. Hence the effect of his saddest poems upon us. "Happiness experienced by me in composition, the best time I have known in all my life, a time I should be content to have last as long as I live—passing the days without noticing them, the hours seeming to me of the shortest, and I often marvelling that they could slip by so quickly."

Leopardi is perhaps the only Italian poet to whom works of art and the monuments of antiquity seem to have meant nothing, possibly because, with his eyes and his health, sight-seeing was too great a strain. On the other hand he differs from almost all other Italian poets and joins hands with our own in his susceptibility to the beauty of Nature, which was not only a comfort but a source of inspiration to him. Mr. Bickersteth has drawn a good parallel between him and Wordsworth in this respect. Anyone who knows Recanati, the little walled town in the Marches perched on its high hill, and the walk under the walls that passes Mount Tabor, the "*ermo colle*" of *L'Infinito*, with its glorious views right across to the Adriatic—

> Primavera dintorno
> Brilla nell'aria, e per li campi esulta,
> Si che a mirarla intenerisce il core—

will understand this passionate cry: "When I behold Nature in these parts that really are beautiful (the one good thing my home can boast), especially in spring, I am so transported out of myself that I should feel guilty of a mortal sin, did I not appreciate it." Nature was the one consolation his home gave the lonely lad, driven in upon himself by character and circumstance, shrinking from his fellows, at least at Recanati. He regretted his loneliness, as he admits in *Il Passero Solitario*, where he likens himself, left alone in the palace on the feast

day, to the blue rock-thrush he sees sitting alone on the tower. Not that Leopardi had the detailed knowledge of Nature of a Tennyson. Pascoli, the one Italian poet who has, laughed at him for giving a girl a nosegay of roses and violets. The first sign of the return of his poetic powers was, he tells us in *Il Risorgimento*, his once more becoming alive to natural beauty, and his love for it remained with him till the end. Some of his best natural descriptions are in the *Paralipomeni*, the long and not very successful satiric poem upon which he was engaged at the time of his death. Not too detailed, they bring the scene beautifully and clearly before us. Nothing appealed to him like the magic of a moonlight night; and where is it more splendid than at Recanati? "*Vedendo meco viaggiar la luna*," a line in his note-books, is the germ of the *Canto Notturno di un Pastore Errante*, which can fairly challenge *Le Ricordanze*. No less than eight of the *canti* are set in moonlight, including the last, *Il Tramonto della Luna*, which is a fitting and characteristic close to his work.

L. COLLISON-MORLEY.

GOVERNMENT TRAINING CENTRES FOR INDUSTRY.

BEFORE the war it was the general assumption that those entering an industry came in at the bottom, on leaving school or at an early age, worked their way up to the grade for which their capabilities fitted them and remained there for the rest of their working lives. There were, of course, exceptions; men did move about and change their trade from time to time. But the general idea of a stable world with "a place for everybody and everybody in his place" was probably as true as any such generalisation can be. Craft traditions were jealously guarded and the idea of any large-scale migration of labour from one trade to another never occurred to anybody. There was no need for it.

The war completely shattered this picture. Millions of men left their own trade and, after undergoing intensive courses of training, were metamorphosed in record time into tolerably efficient soldiers. At the same time there arose an urgent and unprecedented demand for labour in those industries associated with the manufacture of munitions and other special war-time needs. The bonds of habit and custom were everywhere loosed by the urgent need to win the war, and something like a "general post" took place. In the industrial field new factories had to start mass-production with the minimum of delay on work demanding a high degree of precision, and there was an acute shortage of suitable labour—much of that available consisted only of raw girls. The difficulty was met in three ways. A number of skilled men were exempted from military service or brought back from the army: everything that science and ingenuity could devise was done to speed up machinery and factory processes and to make both fool-proof: and training establishments were set up by the Ministry of Labour where a nucleus of the new hands could be given intensive courses to qualify them to fill the indispensable semi-skilled posts.

The industrial training of adult workers was a new departure and, as the present Government Training Centres owe their origin to these war-time establishments, it is interesting to see in what the secret of their success consisted. The training of an apprentice had always been a lengthy process, much of which was designed to break in the young worker to the

routine and discipline of industry. In the case of an adult, who already had some years' experience of working life, this part of the process could be drastically curtailed. The first trainees, too, were volunteers, inspired with a sense of the urgency of the work they were undertaking, and it was reasonable to suppose that they would tackle the task of acquiring the necessary knowledge and skill far more whole-heartedly than the average youth who embarks in normal times on an apprenticeship that he knows will last for several years.

Further, in a commercial factory or workshop production must always remain the first consideration; whereas, in a specially equipped training establishment it is possible to reproduce the working conditions of a factory in a modified form that will permit of production and instruction going forward together. Trainees can be taught the why and wherefore of each operation simultaneously with its actual performance, and hand and head co-ordinated to aid the work of the instructor. If these, in their turn, are allied to an urgent will to master the business in hand, experience shows that the rate of progress can be surprisingly rapid. The product of a training centre never was, and is not now, a finished craftsman: but he has had a sufficient grounding to enable him to take on a job as "improver" and, at this stage, he can be assimilated without seriously impairing either the *tempo* of production or the quality of the product, whereas any large influx of completely raw hands would seriously interfere with both. After that, his progress depends on his own efforts and capabilities. By dint of hard work, supplemented by attendance at technical classes in the evenings, many have become fine craftsmen and a credit to their industry. In the last two years of the war no less than 50,000 munition workers passed through these courses, and it is no exaggeration to say that without them the industry would have been unable to cope with the demands made upon it. A similar scheme was employed by the Ministry of Labour to cope with another training problem arising out of the war—that of fitting numbers of ex-soldiers partially disabled by wounds to earn their living in civil life. More than 100,000 of these men passed through the hands of the instructors, and a high proportion of them made good.

With the Armistice the first thought of an incorrigibly individualist nation, that had submitted for four years to

much dragooning and discipline in order to win the war, was to get back to peace-time conditions as rapidly as possible. The army was demobilised and the soldiers returned to their homes. Some were able to pick up the threads of their former vocations where they had laid them down, others were less fortunate. Various schemes were evolved, to assist the latter, meeting with varying degrees of success, but it was not long before the bulk of the war-time administrative machinery was scrapped and the Government Training Centres were put out of commission. If it had been consulted on the subject, public opinion would probably have been unanimous that training for industry was not an appropriate province for the activities of a Government Department.

Curiously enough, it was at this moment that the Army decided to take a leaf out of the book of war-time practice in an effort to solve its own age-old problem of the settlement of the time-expired soldier in civil life. A Vocational Training Centre was opened at Aldershot soon after the war, where men in the last six months of their army service could be given courses in various trades. In spite of many difficulties, including shortage of equipment, opposition on the part of trade unions and the scepticism of employers, the scheme succeeded. Gradually equipment was got together, other centres were opened and the scope was enlarged. Even to-day there is only accommodation in the Vocational Training Centres for some 10 per cent. of the men leaving the Colours each year, but these are the pick of the Army and a good connection has been built up with industry. Close on 90 per cent. of the trainees can now be sure of obtaining employment.

Meanwhile, as soon as the short-lived post-war boom was over, it was apparent that the process of converting our national economy back to a peace-time footing was not proceeding smoothly. The comfortably stable world that some of us still remembered was gone past recall. There is much evidence that former wars have occasioned similar upheavals but, unfortunately, our ancestors have left us little in the way of statistics by which to measure their troubles against our own. But in 1920, for the first time, almost every important industry was included in the National Unemployment Insurance scheme, and it was possible to collate the reports and figures obtained from a network of Employment Exchanges throughout the country. The figures over a term

of years bring out quite clearly the salient facts of the revolution that has been taking place. Our main group of exporting industries—coal-mining, cotton, general engineering, iron and steel, shipbuilding and marine-engineering, woollen and worsted—were hit by the world-wide tendency towards national economic self-sufficiency, and suffered a drastic decline. In 1932 they were employing a million fewer people than in 1923. The grim spectre of unemployment brooded heavily over many homes in Durham and Tyneside, South Wales, the industrial districts of Scotland, and Cumberland and the North-west coast.

At the same time, another group, consisting mainly of lighter industries and services, and having their seat for the most part in the South and Midlands, has been expanding. These more fortunate trades include building, construction and repair of motor vehicles, cycles and aircraft, electrical trades, miscellaneous metal industries, distributive trades, printing, publishing and bookbinding, public works contracting, road transport, silk and artificial silk and various services. In 1932 this group was employing one and a quarter million more people than in 1923.

Conditions of employment, and now also of unemployment, differed widely between the two groups of industries. In the first, which had constituted the basis of our pre-war prosperity, working conditions had formerly been relatively stable, the craft-sense strong and trade unions highly organised. Now, once a man fell out of work, it was unlikely that he would get back again into his former trade; and there were comparatively few subsidiary industries in the Special Areas to which he could transfer, even had his craft-sense and his rigid trade union principles permitted him to try his luck elsewhere. The bulk of the whole-time unemployment throughout the country was concentrated here. In many of the trades in the second group, where business depended to a considerable extent on the fluctuations of popular taste and demand in the home market, the worker's tenure of his job was less certain. On the other hand, except in times of general depression, where men were being laid off in one direction, they were generally being taken on in another. The total amount of employment available was, and is still, on the increase: there have been numerous instances where employers have complained of a shortage of suitable labour. It

is estimated that, to-day, the total turnover of jobs each year amongst the insured population of thirteen million people amounts to the amazingly high figure of more than eight millions. The average duration of unemployment is short.

Under these unsettling conditions it can readily be imagined that parents were inclined to think twice before binding their sons as apprentices to a trade. After the war Technical Instruction Committees had been set up to supervise the completion of apprenticeships interrupted by war service; but it was not long before the problem of the young entrant into industry became an urgent one. In many cases employers co-operated with local authorities in setting up and working training schemes. The Ministry of Labour also opened Instruction Centres for juvenile unemployed. Attendance at these was voluntary and the training given was necessarily somewhat spasmodic. The Unemployment Act of 1934 developed this last scheme still further by making attendance at a Junior Instruction Centre a condition of benefit in the case of all persons under eighteen years of age.

So much for the young entrant, but where the adults were concerned a state of affairs had arisen analogous to that which obtained during the war. On the one hand, there was a group of industries clamouring for suitable labour and unable to obtain enough of it: on the other, numbers of men who had been hit by the change in industrial conditions no less severely than many a soldier had been disabled by his wounds a few years before. The outstanding difference between now and then was that, whereas in war-time public opinion had readily accepted the principle of Government action to meet a national emergency, popular sentiment was by no means prepared to apply the same principle to a peace-time problem. Party politics entered into the question: there were those in all political camps who clamoured for action, but the remedy that the one would have seen applied appeared anathema to the other, and *vice versa*. The difference was further exacerbated by a series of bitter industrial disputes culminating in the General Strike of 1926.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that progress was slow. It was not until 1925 that the first post-war Government Training Centre was opened to volunteers from the Special Areas. This was designed to give a course of training to men intending to migrate south, with a view to fitting them

to take up posts in one of the industries where prospects were good and where there was a shortage of suitable labour. The principle of training and the instruction given were based on the experience gained in the war-time centres—an intensive six-months' course designed to turn out men up to the "improver" standard, fit to take on suitable work in a particular industry. The scheme has developed gradually until the present time, when there are twelve such centres throughout the country, turning out some 12,000 trainees annually, close on 90 per cent. of whom make good.

The range of trades taught has been governed by two factors: in a positive sense, by the knowledge of the Ministry of Labour of where labour was required and, negatively, by the willingness of employers and trade unions to co-operate. The following trades are now fairly well covered by courses: building, the motor industry, electrical trades, various metal industries, cabinet making; and a certain number of hairdressers, cooks, waiters and so on are also turned out by the centres. The Ministry of Labour also co-operates with various special training schemes run by local authorities and private bodies which, between them, place a few thousand men each year.

Confusion has sometimes arisen—for which officialdom has only itself and its unfortunate choice of nomenclature to thank—between the Government Training Centres and another type of establishment run by the Ministry of Labour—the Instructional Centres. Where the object of the former is training for a particular job in a given industry, these last are designed to rehabilitate men who have become unfit through prolonged unemployment. The courses last three months: they were originally confined to volunteers from the Special Areas, but are now open to the whole country: and they consist of carefully graduated work of a rough nature such as road-making, land-clearance and the like. While rehabilitation alone appears, on the face of it, less constructive than training a man for a definite job, it must be recognised that there are numbers of men who for various reasons would never stay the course in a Government Training Centre, and for whom this is the best that can be done. The Instructional Centres are now accommodating 40,000 men each year, and are clearly meeting a need.

The whole question of industrial training for adults has

been further confused of recent years by the action of a number of local authorities, administering public assistance under the Poor Law, in setting up training centres of their own and, in some cases, making attendance a condition of drawing benefit. This was a return to the practice of Tudor times, and a great deal more sensible than much that was done between then and now: but enlightened public opinion to-day insists that the problems of unemployment have nothing to do with the Poor Law or poor relief and should be dealt with independently. This complication will no longer arise now that the majority of the people in question are being transferred to the administration of the Unemployment Assistance Board, set up under the 1934 Unemployment Act.

The Ministry of Labour has now had some twenty years' experience in the field of industrial training and the Government Training Centres have proved their worth to both employers and workpeople. There are many who hold the view that the benefits accruing from the payments of both sides to Unemployment Insurance should not stop short at relief, but should go on to provide the means by which the worker who becomes a casualty in the industrial field can be brought back into the line in fighting condition and not left to moulder on a pittance until he is no longer fit for service. The moment has clearly come when the various existing schemes for the training and retraining of adults for industry should be co-ordinated under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour, the only body that has the necessary practical experience combined with the means of estimating the needs of the country as a whole.

But the training and retraining of adults must be regarded as an exceptional measure, rendered necessary by fluctuations in the fortunes of various industries. Many of these could be foreseen and might be allowed for in advance. Some of the present trouble could certainly be avoided by careful supervision and co-ordination of the supply of apprentices entering the various branches of industry. It is worth considering whether this might not be an appropriate field for a further extension of the activities of the Ministry of Labour.

B. T. REYNOLDS

THE HABSBURGS.

"THAT accursed race!" "Never again the Hapsburgs!" "The Hapsburgs mean war!" We read it and hear it over and over again, not only in Little Entente papers. It appears even more frequently in the German Press and German books. It is a strange company that has banded together against the Hapsburgs: Czechs, Serbians, Roumanians, Germans of the Third Reich, besides Socialists and Communists. The only point of unity is a common hatred and fear lest the family should return to its home. In considering this phalanx the question arises: Why this hatred? What crime has it committed? For after all, if a reason—let alone justification—is to be found for such an attitude, the Habsburgs must be guilty of some grave offence, such as would make their restoration to the throne a danger to Europe.

Does this danger really exist? Is the House of Habsburg indeed so fraught with peril? Do they really intend to threaten the peace of Europe? There are not the slightest grounds for such an assertion. Only fanatical hatred or blind stupidity could suppose that the youthful head of the House would inaugurate his reign by a European war. He must detest war, which has deprived him of his father, his home and his fortune, and has imposed on him the tragic fate of exile. What then is the reason for saying that the Habsburgs mean war? If the restoration really means war, it would not be they who caused it, but their enemies who desire to prevent their return at any price.

So far as the Little Entente is concerned, its hostility can be explained very simply. It was the members of the Little Entente that gave the old Habsburg monarchy its death blow, which came from within, not from without. Both the Western Powers agreed only reluctantly to its dissolution, and statesmen were not lacking either in London or Paris who saw further and more clearly. Wilson had only the most elementary notions of political and racial conditions in Austria-Hungary, and he saw the Empire through the coloured spectacles of Czechs and Jugoslavs. The French Minister de Monzie called the break up of the Habsburg Empire "the greatest stupidity" of the century, and Lord Newton described it as "monumental madness." The Succession

States, he declared, acted like oriental hucksters, and were themselves surprised that the High Commission in Paris granted their demands, which were out of all proportion to the services they had rendered the Entente. All these States based their breach with the monarchy on the principle of nationality. Austria was declared to have been an unnatural conglomeration, towering, so to speak, like a huge misfit above our age of national self-determination. But what of the States which they have tinkered together with high-flown nationalist phrases from the wreckage of the monarchy? Do they meet the demands of the nationalist principle which they have exalted as a dogma?

In Czechoslovakia the ruling Czechs live amongst Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, Ruthenians (Ukrainians) and Poles. In Jugoslavia the ruling Slavs live amongst Croats, Slovenes, Germans, Albanians, Turks, Bulgarians and gipsies. In Roumania the Roumanians are amongst Magyars, Germans, Ruthenians, Bulgarians and gipsies. All three States are mosaics gazing with a kind of Mephistophelian scorn at the nationalist principle proclaimed by them so magnificently as a political gospel. In addition to all this, in Czechoslovakia the Czechs constitute only 45 per cent. of the total population, in Jugoslavia the Serbs only 42 per cent., in Roumania the Roumanians only 63 per cent. Thus all the three States of the Little Entente are anything but national unities.

In view of these facts the question must arise why the Czechs, Serbs and Roumanians destroyed the ancient monarchy, since they themselves created nationalist conglomerations such as that had been. And there was this tremendous difference that the racial heterogeneity of the Habsburg Empire was the result of hereditary, historical, economic and military conditions, which had arisen out of a natural urge for common defence against attack, and had been sanctioned by the course of centuries, whereas the Succession States are artificial structures concocted at the green tables at St. Germain and Neuilly, devoid both of an historic past and of inner unity. They are probably well aware of this artificiality, though of course they will never admit it; but their resistance to the Habsburg restoration betrays their fear of the dynasty and of the historic halo surrounding it, which neither exile nor poverty can diminish. This halo gives the Little Entente a nightmare, because they

fear its attraction for their discontented citizens, who are beginning to realise that life under the ancient monarchy was better.

Why do these States refuse to hear of the Dynasty? A Habsburg Austria, with its 6½ million inhabitants, could as little contemplate a war against its far stronger neighbours as could a Republican Austria; and common sense alone would prevent a future Habsburg ruler from again imperilling his newly-won throne. Whether the Succession States fear the Habsburgs or not, they have no right to forbid their restoration, which is the affair of Austria and Hungary.

This applies, of course, not only to the Little Entente, but in a greater degree to Germany, the Habsburgs' far more dangerous enemy, who loses no opportunity of sullying their memory. For the Third Reich sees in this House the final but also the most difficult obstacle to the attainment of its goal, the annexation of Austria. Nothing would be more naïve than to believe that Germany has renounced that goal because she signed an agreement on July 11th, 1936, which was to restore the harmony which had been violated so incredibly for two years. The Third Reich does not dream of keeping the points laid down in this agreement: it has only chosen new tactics. No more bombing and assassinations are planned, which would proclaim Germany before all the world as a criminal, but a less noisy and noticeable propaganda has been started—a systematic undermining of Austrian feeling and an equally systematic poisoning of the population with the venom of National Socialism. These tactics have already made alarming progress, because the agreement of July 11th has opened all avenues to agitation. The politicians of the Third Reich could reckon on the enthusiastic co-operation, not only of the Austrian Nazis but in particular of those circles which are known as "emphatically national," and which now feel themselves masters of the situation in Austria because they have found powerful supporters in the Government. If the latter's tendency was hitherto definitely clerical, it has also become nationalist since July 11th, so that its flag to-day may be described as clerico-nationalist. That Germany has always backed up the Nazis in Austria in their criminal designs and has always given shelter to their criminal fugitives; that she has provided them with instructions for assassinations, money

and bombs; that the German Press, and above all the wireless, has slandered and attacked Austria; that the utmost pains have been taken to ruin her economically: these are facts that Austria's leaders appear to have forgotten.

Though the gentlemen of the Third Reich have not dreamed of an apology for all the grievous wrong done to Austria, official circles in Austria to-day profess delight at the "good" relations between the two nations who are united by such fraternal ties, and watch with satisfied smiles the rapid progress made by Nazism in the country. The gentlemen of the Third Reich, however, are rubbing their hands with pleasure and only waiting for the moment when Austria, like a ripe apple, that is in this case like a rotten apple, shall drop into their lap. This moment has drawn appreciably nearer since July 11th.

Whether the Western Powers, who for so long have looked on indifferently at the Nazification of Austria, will be able at the last moment to prevent the catastrophe appears questionable. Have London and Paris really failed to grasp the trend of German activity? Has it occurred to no one that Hitler's sole object in making this Pact was the friendship of Italy, and that Fascism, a spiritual relative of Nazism, created a bridge between the two Powers which led through Austria? Mussolini's *protégé* was faced with the evil choice of turning her powerful protector into an adversary or adapting herself to his orders and offering her hand to the Third Reich, her deadly enemy. If the Austrian Government had been able, when thus constrained, to count on support from England or France, she could have been spared this humiliation.

The Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, is a convinced Austrian, and for that reason no friend of Nazism and of the *Anschluss*. His intentions as regards Austrian independence are absolutely sincere, and we have too good an opinion of his gifts as a statesman to suppose that he did not recognise the dangers of the Pact of July 11th. But he found himself in a position of constraint in which nobody was willing to help him except Mussolini, who, however, was precisely the person who demanded this sacrifice of him. To the pressure from without was added the pressure from within at the hands of the "emphatically nationalist" Austrians, those double-faced Austrians who on the one hand continually reassert

their love of Austria, but on the other set heaven and hell in motion to barter it to the Third Reich. Moreover they are in a great hurry, for they are beginning to realise that the Legitimist movement, which for so long they smiled at as mere reactionary sentimentality, has made very noticeable progress of late, and that Otto may yet ascend the throne of his fathers. This, however, would push the *Anschluss* they desire so fervently far into the background. Hence their pressure and their haste. *Travailler pour le roi de Prusse*—such is their motto, even if the present "roi" is only a Führer and they are working not for Prussia but for the Third Reich.

What is going on in Austria at present is a kind of race between Nazism, wearing the Austrian cap of darkness, and Habsburg Legitimacy. It is a race between ill-matched competitors, for Nazism has abundant means at its disposal (money is still available for this in the Third Reich, although the population has to tighten its belt), whereas the Legitimist movement, being poor in money, only possesses the Austrian idea and the legitimate rights of the dynasty. Austrian independence depends on the result of the race. If Legitimism wins, Nazism is played out in Austria. If the victory falls to the Nazis, London and Paris will wake up one morning to discover that Austria has disappeared from the map.

OBSERVER.

BACK FROM KENYA: BY A KENYA FARMER.

BEFORE going to Kenya, some years ago, I shared the views of those who see in the East African highlands an outlet for European emigration. A delusion, which has been the origin of the so-called white policy in Kenya, has provided the Fascists with a justification for the Abyssinian enterprise and to-day provides Nazi propaganda with a claim to some mandated territories.

To the man in the street the question of white colonisation of the African tropical highlands is a simple one. Some European countries are overcrowded; in tropical Africa there are vast territories wholly uninhabited or with a very thin native population. Heat and tropical diseases prevent Europeans from settling in the lowlands; on account of the altitude the climate of the highlands is temperate and there are no tropical diseases. Europeans can easily settle there. For the most part there are no natives in the highlands, or there were none before the arrival of the Europeans. Reserves can be put aside for the few who are there. Should they increase, more land can be given to them in the lowlands where the climate also suits them better.

I had read many books about Kenya and any amount of those pamphlets which are widely distributed by associations apparently interested in attracting new settlers to that Colony. I knew everything about the wonderful climate of the highlands, the fertility of the soil, the beauty of an easy life in a place where social conventions are not so suffocating as in Europe, the advantages of cheap native labour. I cannot say that I was disappointed. I found the climate of the highlands cool and pleasant. Soils, though not particularly fertile, even in the best districts, gave quite fair results. Neighbours were on the whole kind and hospitable. Economic prospects were not bad: a careful and hardworking farmer can easily make a living out of crops and livestock. I admired the way in which the newcomer is helped during the time when he is looking for a farm, from the moment he lands in Mombasa. The farming community is better organised, through very well run co-operative societies, than in most European countries.

But I had not come to Kenya only to farm. I was genuinely

interested in the country, its people and the problems which confront them. My first reaction to the impression which the country gave me was that I frequently thought of the possibility of those huge plateaux being developed on the lines of a European agricultural district. They seemed to me to be able to support tens, hundreds of thousands of white families, mainly earning their living by agricultural activities on small holdings. The present state of affairs, characterised by the division of land into big farms, owned by Europeans and worked by natives, must, I thought, be temporary and due only to the paucity of settlers. People who have never been to Kenya have the idea that Europeans have stolen land from the natives and that therefore European colonisation is fundamentally wrong. Such is not the case, as at least six-sevenths of the alienated land was, before the arrival of the Europeans, unoccupied by natives, except for a few temporary incursions of nomadic herdsmen. Besides, the Kenya natives have plenty of land on which to settle in the warmer districts. The biggest tribes in Kenya, those around the Kavirondo Gulf, would hate the idea of settling on the highlands. Only small tribes (the Nandis, Lumbwas, etc.) occupy part of the plateau, on its western edge, and their lands on the whole have not been touched and there is no reason to touch them. The Wa-Kikuyu who live on the eastern edge of the plateau can easily spread eastwards in lower districts.

Closely related to the problem of white colonisation is the problem of self-government. Most Kenya settlers are convinced of the suitability of the highlands for white settlement and want to make their permanent home there; it is no wonder that they agitate for self-government. As British people in England and the Dominions govern themselves, there is no reason to suppose that those settled in Kenya would not be able to do the same. But the problem of self-government is complicated by the existence of over 3,000,000 natives against only 18,000 Europeans (not more than 13,000 or 14,000 excluding officials and their families). Kenya natives are undoubtedly still very far below the social and intellectual standard required for self-government. If autonomy is granted to Kenya, all the political power would rest in the hands of the settlers, who unfortunately tend to exploit the natives and keep them in a state of inferiority.

Settlers need cheap and submissive labour. The lower the standard of living of the natives, the lower the wages. The lower their intellectual development, the less the risk of labour troubles. No one can suppose that the British Government would hand over the natives to the settlers and so there is no chance of autonomy for Kenya as a whole.

Some people have thought of another solution. Those parts of the highlands which were unoccupied before the arrival of the Europeans form a " bloc," 200 miles long, from Mount Kenya to Mount Elgon. Roughly it consists of the Rift Valley Province (which also includes a few small districts inhabited by various tribes on the edge of the plateau) and the North Nyeri district of the Central Province. To the west is the small Nyanza Province with over one million natives, and to the east, north and south the vast territories of various other tribes. The Nyanza Province should be reunited to Uganda, from which it was separated in 1902, and would so enjoy the excellent administration of the Protectorate. The eastern and northern territories, together with the Masai Reserve in the south, might constitute a Crown Colony, in which a " black " policy aiming at the development of the natives would be followed, as in Tanganyika and Uganda. Most of the highlands, reserved for Europeans, might form an autonomous territory. It would include only land unoccupied before the arrival of European settlers; all the alienated land would be included, except Nairobi district and two small areas in the east and south of Nairobi which should be given back to the Wa-Kikuyu and Wakamba tribes, to whom they formerly belonged. Comprising the Rift Valley Province—minus the districts of Baringo, Elgeyo and Nandi inhabited by various small tribes—the North Nyeri district of the Central Province and small areas of the Londiani and Kericho districts, the autonomous territory would have a surface of about 15,000 square miles. On this area, at the end of 1936, about 7,000 white people were living.

Not until I had been in the country for some time did I realise why this solution—which at first seemed very practicable—could not be adopted. It would have meant a complete separation of blacks and whites; which is impossible to effect because the white man in Kenya cannot live without the native. In Canada, New Zealand, most of Australia and of South Africa, every activity required by our social organisation

can be fulfilled by Europeans. In Kenya they can rule, administrate, supervise other people's work, do anything which comes within the scope of an intellectual activity; they cannot do regular manual work, with the exception of any skilled work which does not require much muscular effort. The European can own land but cannot till it; can own a mine but cannot extract the ore; can organise a factory but cannot work in it; can drive a lorry or a train but cannot load or unload it; the white woman is unable to do the entire work of the house, scrubbing, cooking, washing, etc.

In any society peasants and workmen form the majority of the population; a white man can settle in Kenya only if he is rich enough to pay natives to do all the manual work. That is why in the Rift Valley Province and North Nyeri district, which forty years ago were practically uninhabited, there are now more than 120,000 natives, seventeen to each European. All these natives are living on the wages which Europeans pay them: 90,000 are squatters with their families and the others mostly casual labourers or houseboys.

Some time ago I was asked whether Europeans are not to be found doing manual work on the highlands because they do not want to do it or because they cannot. According to my view it is for the latter reason. It is a commonplace to say that Europeans can settle on the Kenya highlands because the climate is temperate and there are no tropical diseases. But what of the effects of altitude itself? There is no temperate climate until one reaches 5,500 or 6,000 feet; living continually at that altitude imposes a great strain on the organism of people meant to live in much lower countries. And what of the effects of the vertical rays of the sun and of certain radiations which are much stronger in equatorial than in temperate zones? Other climatic disadvantages are the great difference of temperature between day and night and, during the dry season, the continual wind and dust. Various Kenya doctors told me that if a European wants to keep fit, he should go at least once a year for a month to the coast and every three years should pay a six months' visit to Europe. Forty years' experience shows that only people who do not strain their physique too much, who can afford really nourishing food and expensive holidays, can settle in Kenya.

Interesting is the case of a small farming community,

mostly composed of poor settlers, on the Laikipia plateau. What with locusts, drought and fall in prices, their economic condition during the last few years has been so bad that they could not afford to pay native labourers and so they let their houses go to pieces, left their fields uncultivated, did not attend to their cows. They lived on maize meal, the food of the natives, and at last the Government had to come to their aid. By a little manual work they would have been able to improve their way of living: but poor as they were they never did any, simply because they could not. This fact is more remarkable if one considers that those poor whites come of a stock which has been on the African continent for many generations.

There are people in Kenya and in England who, while agreeing that climatic conditions on the highlands are quite unsuitable for European workmen or peasants, seem convinced that in one or two generations the descendants of the same Europeans will be sufficiently acclimatised to be able to do any kind of work. I doubt that this can be. There are other examples of European settlement in tropical highlands, chiefly in central and southern America. The number of Europeans there is very small, they usually belong to the upper classes and, except in rare cases, never do any manual work; even if statistics call them pure whites, they usually have a certain amount of native blood which of course helps them to stand the climate. In Kenya there are many young people born and reared in the country who have never been to Europe; some have never been even to the lowlands. Most of them look pale, anæmic, weak; without necessarily being stupid, they are undoubtedly slow. They are not a very encouraging example.

European capitalists who exploit the resources of the country with native labour; people who live by a professional or commercial activity; clerks, shopkeepers, skilled labourers such as mechanics or electricians; and a few others: these represent the white colonisation in Kenya. No workmen, no peasants. There is not even place for the small farmer; perhaps he can afford to employ native labour, but a farm of only a few acres will not provide him with enough income to allow him to live up to the standard which the climate necessitates. The economy of the white highlands can support only a small number of capitalists. In the commercial and

professional classes the number of Europeans is not likely to become very high: not many of them are required and for the few posts available they must compete with Indians. The same applies to shopkeepers. Clerks and skilled labourers are still fairly numerous but Indians and educated Africans are gradually taking their place. Can the Kenya highlands be called a White Man's country just because a few wealthy people, who need legions of natives to work for them, can settle there? Of course I don't say that a white man can do no physical work at all on the highlands. A farmer is often seen repairing his tractor or plough or combine; big game hunters and polo players often make a considerable physical effort. But this is only occasional and is not to be compared with the effort made by those who earn their living by the continuous use of their muscles.

Agriculture and stock raising are the most important activities of the European settlers. To white farmers and planters over five million acres of land have been alienated, of which more than half a million are under cultivation and two and a half million are developed for livestock. According to the census of 1931, nearly 2,600 persons were engaged in agricultural activities and a total of about 4,400 persons lived on the profits given by the exploitation of nearly three million acres. Unless there is an increase in alienated areas, it is not likely that the number of white people living by agriculture and stock raising will ever be considerably more than it was in 1931. The two odd million acres already alienated and not yet exploited are not much good and the process of splitting the existing farms cannot be carried far, a very small farm being, as I have already said, of no use to the white man.

Supporters of white settlement often forget that the agricultural activity of the Europeans does not seem to be economically sound. I do not allude to the numerous people who during the last thirty years went to Kenya to farm and lost more than they made. It was probably more the fault of the men than of the country. There is something more serious than that. It is a well-known fact that natives, except in a few controlled cases, are not allowed to produce coffee, which is by far the most important industry of the Colony. When I asked the reason for this, I was told that it was necessary to protect European producers from the competition

of native growers, so as to avoid what had happened in Uganda and Nyasaland where European coffee and tobacco planters had been ruined by the increase in native production. In 1936 European maize farmers were granted a subsidy from the Government of the Colony which helped them to receive an average price of 4·42 shillings per bag; in the Rift Valley the native crop had been sold at prices varying from 1s. to 2s. per bag. The wheat required by the European and Indian communities in the whole of East Africa (natives are too poor to use wheat flour and must remain satisfied with the far less nourishing maize meal) is provided by about 350 wheat growers in the highlands. A heavy import duty keeps the price of wheat in Kenya at 6s. per bag more than the average world price. In spite of cheap labour, Kenya wheat growers cannot produce wheat at the same cost as Canadian or Australian farmers. In order to protect the white settler, natives are not allowed to produce coffee and are therefore deprived of what would be for them a very useful source of income, and to help a few hundred farmers the whole of the Kenya community is taxed and flour and bread must be expensive.

There is something ridiculously feudal in the idea of reserving the ownership of land to people who are unable to work it. The maintenance of the present state of affairs would inevitably result in the creation of a caste system, the population of the highlands being divided into two main groups: a small minority of European landowners and an enormous majority of native labourers for whom there would be no hope of attaining that freedom which only ownership can give.

The introduction of the "white" policy in Kenya at the beginning of this century was due to various causes. The then Commissioner for British East Africa genuinely believed that Europeans could become acclimatised in the highlands; the building of the Uganda Railway had involved a huge expense; the income of the territory was less than one-third of its expenditure. If white settlers could be persuaded to come, they would buy from the Government the empty Crown lands of the plateaux, would stimulate trade, and the transport of their crops would become a profitable source of income to the railway. At the same time, extensive propaganda for attracting settlers was made by a few speculators who had bought land for a few shillings an acre from the Government and wanted to sell it at a good profit to the newcomers.

The "white policy," together with a very few advantages, has brought many evils to the natives. In most African territories the imposition of a heavy tax has been found an excellent means of inducing natives to work for the Europeans. In Kenya the Hut and Poll Tax on the native is twelve shillings a year, and as there are quite a number of young natives who are not rich enough to pay it, the only alternative to prison is to work for the settlers. In most agricultural districts an adult native labourer receives from six to eight shillings for thirty days' work, sometimes only five or even four. (Besides that he only receives a ration of maize meal which is worth two to three shillings a month.) The native must work for forty-five to sixty days in order to be able to pay his Poll Tax. I would add that during the last few years a few small tribes have been allowed to pay less Poll Tax. But the reduction has not affected the three great agricultural tribes in Kenya who represent more than five-sixths of the total native population and from whom the settlers recruit their labour.

To the same three tribes have been allotted reserves which are not big enough to allow an increase in population (in the reserves of the Wa-Kikuyu the average density is about 300 persons per square mile). More land, unsuitable for European agriculture and at present held as Crown land, could be given to them. It has not been given because if the reserves are small, an increase in population obliges a number of people to migrate with their families to the "white" highlands where the farmers allow them to cultivate little plots of land (usually from half an acre to two acres). In exchange they must work for a certain number of days in the year for wages even lower than those quoted above.

The present difficulties of Kenya are chiefly due to the conflicting influence of two policies. The "white policy" which favours a colonisation which will never be a success as no part of Kenya will ever be a white man's country, and the only result of which is to keep the natives backward. And the "black policy," according to which all the resources of the country should be used for the well-being of its original inhabitants. This is the policy which has been so successfully applied in Uganda and Tanganyika.

Until a few years ago only the " white policy " was followed in Kenya. Now things are changing. The British Government is probably realising that white settlement does not pay and that the white policy in Kenya is the greatest obstacle to attaining the end which East African territories should have in view: the formation one day of a great black dominion stretching from Lake Rudolf to Lake Nyasa, in which Bantus, under the protection of the British Empire, will be able to develop according to their capacities and in the particular way required by their own nature.

A change of policy in Kenya would not imply the immediate breakdown of European colonisation. If settlers are able to maintain their position without the protection and privileges which they enjoy at present, there is no reason why they should not remain in Kenya. Probably they will have to renounce an agricultural activity which is a burden for the community as a whole; their services will still be required for a long time, not only as administrators, but also as middlemen, in which capacity they will be more useful to the natives than Indians are. It seems to me that to-day the best way of promoting native welfare—and therefore bettering the social and economic conditions of Kenya—is by co-operation between blacks and whites, and that no co-operation is possible so long as settlers enjoy unjustified privileges.

M. W. SALVADORI.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

CIVILISATION IN OUR TIME.

THE history of what has taken place in Europe since the international scheme of control over the Spanish coasts and frontiers came into operation is of some interest to those who take the philosophic view of human nature in its prevailing political aspect. The scheme itself took many months to draw up and to be agreed. After two false starts it was put into operation on April 15th. The interesting question is whether in practice it has made the slightest difference to the international complications and ramifications of the Spanish civil war. It may, probably has, slowed down the entry of foreign troops into the country. It clearly has not removed any of the causes of diplomatic recrimination between the non-Spanish European governments who have identified their sympathies with one side or the other in the war itself.

Those causes have by contrast multiplied. An allegation that German aeroplanes, pilots and bombs were the exclusive agent in destroying the old Basque centre of culture at Guernica excited a general diplomatic nerve-storm that quickly gathered force and widened its range. The British Government's offices in helping the non-combatant old men, women and children of the Basque country to escape by sea from the war areas led to allegations in the German and Italian Press as well as on the part of General Franco of British partisanship in the war.

At one moment we saw Signor Mussolini ordering the exclusion from Italy of all British newspapers except a chosen few (badly chosen) and ordering the return to Italy of all Italian journalists stationed in London. The Italian Government has such power over its subjects. At another moment we were given the spectacle of Lord Plymouth, chairman and British delegate to the non-intervention committee sitting in London, proposing to that committee that all bombing from the air in the Spanish war be totally prohibited.

What does " non-intervention " mean? If you try to impose conditions upon the conduct of a given war, are you " intervening "? If you try to " humanise " a war (that odd notion did again specifically gain currency in the mouths at

any rate of British politicians), are you intervening in that war? And what is meant by "humanising" a war? Is there any means of humanising war short of stopping it? Is it worse to be bombed than to be bayoneted? Is it worse for women and children to be gassed than to be starved to death?

The details of this present grotesque manifestation of European civilisation are given below. But it seems worth while for honest serious people to face the hardening facts. The muddle itself, the growing complication, fear and chaos produced by organised international diplomacy, goes on without pause. There are many men and women who will not look at the thing. Why, they ask, should we be harrowed by the contemplation of something so monstrous? Why not dwell upon some aspect of life less calculated to destroy one's faith in human nature? Ostriches may have more sense than to bury their heads in the sand, but the figurative tactic is indeed pursued by many human beings as a means of escape from unpleasant facts.

Every month, almost every week, brings new evidence of the increasing havoc in human affairs that is wrought by what we know as civilisation. It is perhaps because its havoc goes unchallenged that the evil thing goes on unchecked. It has come to be taken for granted. Yet there is probably no more vital concern to human beings in our time than the quickening cancer of political activity. No voice is raised in warning. By contrast earnest, warm-hearted people allow their enthusiasms and sympathies to be drawn into partisan engagement in the evil itself. Confronted with the monstrous manifestations of political activity as conducted by the "dictatorship" practitioners—whether Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini or potentially General Franco—the warm hearts of a differing temper extol the virtues of democracy and are prepared in their exuberance to plunge into the fray to show how exalted a thing democracy is. There is no such thing as a cool detachment, a level-headed recognition that the antithesis between democracy and, say, fascism, is merely one particular bone of contention between two sets of mad dogs.

It is the political practices of our time in general that have run riot. What seems to be needed if the world is to be saved from a threatening cataclysm such as human imagination can hardly measure, is some reversion to simple first principles, some elementary thought about what really matters in life.

What after all is civilisation in its origin? It is merely the urge of a community to safeguard by reciprocal sanction its communal interests. If, instead of each individual in a community building his own house, making his own clothes, hunting his own food, a method of specialisation be developed whereby one man exclusively builds houses, another exclusively makes clothes, etc., and receives in return for his services a negotiable token, or money, which will enable him in exchange to obtain the products he needs of another set of such specialists, then it becomes necessary for honesty to play its part. It becomes an elementary wrong that a man's "money," the measure of his work or service, should be stolen by another who thereby would cheat his victim of the due exchange. Therefore "property" must be safeguarded.

These things are all so simple, if allowed to remain simple. In a community thus embarking upon the benefits of "civilisation," it is clear that the first and only essential postulate is that a man be enabled in security to work and to keep the reward of his work. Hence the simple sanction of a communal undertaking to guarantee each other's personal inviolability and the safety of his property. The sanction equally simply is the weight of the whole against an individual aggressor; in other words a police system. But the point is that the whole and only purpose of any government in its logical evolution is the protection of life and property.

The ghastly discovery is that human beings cannot remain logical. Politics, the process of constituting a "government" for the purpose of safeguarding life and property, has become a raging uncontrollable fever in the blood of man. What do we find? The British Government, to take a case, for the theoretic purpose of safeguarding 40,000,000 men, women and children from murderers and robbers within the country and from marauders outside, has a budget turnover of nearly £1,000,000,000 a year. Income-tax alone extracts the incredible sum of about £250,000,000 a year from a population of 40,000,000 in order theoretically to save that population from highway robbery. What organisation of robbery would be needed to extract what the British Government extracts annually from the pockets of the people hypothetically safeguarded thereby? Government, the theoretic guarantee of the security of property, has become the greatest single menace to property.

By the organisation of "defence" against the foreign marauder, the government in the like manner perverts its own theory. What is the theory? The protection of human life. In the last great war a million men in this country, or one out of every four men in the prime of life, were killed. Government, already proved to be the greatest single menace to property, is equally demonstrably the greatest single menace to life. The practice not only defeats, but perverts, the theory.

Such is the nervous nonsense of the diplomacy that aims at a country's self-defence, that it not only, by piling up armaments, makes war with other countries certain (*si vis pacem, para bellum* being reasonable only on the short view, the long-view certainty being *si vis bellum, para bellum*), but as the case of Spain so absurdly shows, must needs seek any and every excuse for making war, even when no question of self-defence arises. The moment the rival politicians in Spain go to war with each other in their own country, for their own purposes (namely for the competitive protection of life and property in Spain) Russia, Germany, Italy and in a smaller measure France lose no time in rushing into the war in the most preposterous disregard of the whole theory of national armaments.

Russia having manufactured the world's greatest supply of armaments for potential use against Germany and Japan as a means of defending Russia, fires them off in Spain, though no argument engendered even in the mind of a politician could possibly conceive any *casus belli* between Russia and Spain. Italy has 70,000 men fighting in Spain. Who knows, does Signor Mussolini know, what cause they are fighting for?

It is difficult to escape the sense of madness about these things. Every politician in the world as a daily routine protests loudly that his purpose and his desire is peace. On April 19th last Mr. George Lansbury, a British politician, held a conversation with Herr Hitler, having gone to Berlin for the purpose. He had advertised his purpose in advance as that of asking Herr Hitler whether he really did want peace. It was not obvious why all the fuss. Anybody could have told Mr. Lansbury that Herr Hitler's answer would of course be yes. But the very circumstance of a politician's life seems to frighten him from saying anything which he cannot afterwards escape from. Did Herr Hitler want peace?

"Yes, but . . ." That was the answer. So terrified was Herr Hitler of answering simply yes and allowing it to be known that he had so answered, that it was necessary for the two men solemnly and carefully to agree on a joint "formula" to be given out to the Press afterwards.

Mr. Lansbury duly and carefully gave the agreed sentence to the Press, not departing by a syllable from the written text. It read thus: "Germany will be very willing to attend a conference and take part in a unified effort to establish economic co-operation and mutual understanding between the nations of the world, if President Roosevelt or the head of another great country will take the lead in calling such a conference." *Parturiunt montes!* It would be just incredible, on any exclusive ground of common sense, that Herr Hitler could not simply say, yes, he wanted peace.

But even the fishy formula printed above, hedged round with every sort of avenue for escape, was in the quick event proved inadequate to the tortuous dictates of a politician's career. Four days after Mr. Lansbury had seen Herr Hitler, it was judged necessary by the propaganda department of the German Government to correct certain misapprehensions that had arisen as a result of the sentence which enshrined the joint goodwill of the seekers after peace. It was therefore given out in Berlin that Herr Hitler's declaration about a willingness to participate in a conference had not by a long way been made without conditions, verbally added. The chief condition was, as Herr Hitler plainly told Mr. Lansbury, that Germany would consent to be drawn into some form of international co-operation only if "the prospects of success were present."

If these lines by chance be read by some backwoodsman into whose consciousness the facts of political life have never penetrated, he will just not believe what is here written. Whatever other "wisdom" must be counted folly, an ignorance of politics must certainly be counted bliss. When the panic-stricken Dr. Goebbels made that egregious correction of a misconception, he further explained in what was called in Berlin a "semi-official" Note what the proviso in its turn really meant. It meant apparently that before Germany could enter any conference the event must be preceded by the most careful and detailed preparation. Everything being now quite clear, the *Angriff* contentedly

expressed its satisfaction that the false impressions resulting from the interview had been dispelled. Panic in short is so constant an element in the politician's motive, that he is equally afraid of a sheep as of a tiger. He cannot say that he wants war ; he dare not say that he wants peace.

The Spanish Cockpit.

To the mind of any mature person therefore it is difficult to take any interest in Spain except as a somewhat macabre cockpit. The scheme of supervision and control over the Spanish frontiers and coasts duly but after prolonged difficulty and uncertainty came into operation at midnight of April 19th and 20th. An elaborate organisation was therefore at last operative to the end that no further foreign troops should enter Spain.

Now it happened at that time that the war itself had reached the stage where the forces of General Franco were investing Bilbao. His purpose was to starve the town into submission. The town is on the coast. In the Bay of Biscay there were British ships carrying foodstuffs to Bilbao. The Basque Government was fighting on the side of the Valencia Government against General Franco. The British Government by an accidental chain of circumstances recognised Valencia and therefore Bilbao as "Spain," and did not officially recognise the fact of war in Spain. Belligerent rights were therefore not conceded to either side.

There was no logical reason according to the theory of British policy why British ships should not land food supplies in Bilbao. But in fact, as distinct from theory, a war did rage in Spain. The traditionally general convention of the three-mile limit assigned to Spain a national sovereignty over the three-mile belt of sea from the coast. General Franco claimed the traditional Spanish six-mile limit. That six-mile belt was patrolled and mined by Franco's navy. If British ships entered those territorial waters in an attempt to land supplies at Bilbao they ran the risk of being sunk by General Franco's navy or the mines it had laid. What then ?

The juridical position was muddled by the circumstance that whereas Germany and Italy recognised General Franco's organisation as the government of Spain, the British Government recognised that of Señor Caballero as the government,

but granted belligerent rights to neither of them. Moreover, the British navy did not recognise Spanish territorial waters outside the three-mile limit.

It was not the first time that the British Government had had to face that particular conundrum. Last August when the Caballero navy was trying to blockade Ceuta and Melilla, the British Admiralty warned British ships to avoid those ports, and to proceed instead to Malta and Gibraltar. So now British ships were warned to avoid Bilbao. But at the same time (April 14th) the British Government sent a message to General Franco to the effect that no interference with British ships would be tolerated and that he would be held accountable for any damage done by his ships to any British ships which should happen to ignore the British Government's warning.

In the House of Commons on April 14th Sir John Simon was asked whether, in the event of a British merchant ship being fired on by Franco ships on the high seas, that is, outside the three-mile limit, British warships would protect them. Sir John's answer was "yes, certainly." At the same time the British Government put on record its warning to all British ships that "we cannot guarantee, in view of the conditions there, that those ships would be safe in the territorial waters round Bilbao."

On April 20th, that is within twenty-four hours of the international scheme of non-interventionary supervision and control coming into operation, a British steamer, *Seven Seas Spray*, set out from St. Jean de Luz and successfully ran the blockade. She sailed at night without lights, was met outside the port by Basque destroyers, and landed 3,600 tons of foodstuffs. On April 21st the Caballero Government virtually repudiated the supervisory scheme of non-intervention. That government's Minister of Marine on that day issued an order to the Caballero fleet to the effect that it must prevent any Caballero ship from being detained or deflected from its course by any ships of the international supervising fleets. He described the non-intervention scheme as unjust, and announced that the Government of Señor Caballero would not consent to its operation so far as that government's ships were concerned.

On April 22nd three more British ships (*Hamsterley*, *MacGregor* and *Stanbrook*) left St. Jean de Luz for Bilbao.

They safely entered Bilbao with an aggregate of 8,500 tons of food in the early morning of April 23rd. Franco warships had stopped them and fired over their bows, but had been headed off outside the three-mile limit by H.M.S. *Hood*. It was no doubt one of the thrilling episodes of the sea; but gave no thrill of pleasure to any one who knew from diplomatic experience how easily big calamities can develop from small causes. On the occasion of April 23rd the Franco warships that stopped the British ships claimed that territorial waters extended six miles from the shore, a claim summarily rejected by the British destroyer which had intervened, and which therefore called for the assistance of H.M.S. *Hood*. The Spanish ships then gave way. Thereafter British ships ran the blockade with food supplies in increasing numbers.

The inevitable diplomatic activity was called into play. On April 26th General Franco sent a note to the British Ambassador at Hendaye protesting against the action of H.M.S. *Hood* on April 23rd on the reiterated ground that territorial waters extended for six miles from the coast. The British Ambassador countered with a protest against the action of the Franco ships in stopping the British ships outside the three-mile limit. General de Llano on the same day broadcasting from Seville made bitter comment on the transport of foodstuffs to Bilbao in British ships. "Maybe," he hinted, "some Spanish gentleman-sailor belonging to the Nationalist navy will carry out his duty, in which case someone will be responsible for the outcome." He went on to prophesy the speedy dissolution of the British Empire. The real question thereby raised was how far in practice it could be regarded as possible to localise the so-called civil war in Spain.

Next came, in the last week of April, the total destruction by air bombing of Guernica, the oldest town of the Basque country and the traditional centre of Basque culture. The allegation at once appeared in the British Press—with what precise justification could hardly be established—that the atrocity was the exclusive work of German aeroplanes, German pilots and German bombs. At once the German Press resounded with unbridled attacks on Great Britain.

As one bad turn always provokes another, equal mischief resulted from the British Government's offer to help in the evacuation of refugees from the Basque country. The Italian joined th German Press in the bitterest attacks upon the

British Government for having violated the non-intervention agreement. Yet the bare facts seemed innocent enough. It was the Basque Government that took the initiative in asking the British Government for its services in the evacuation of old men, women and children from the war zone. The British Government's first answer was to ask for a specific assurance that the Basque request implied no distinction in political allegiance. That assurance being received, the British Government suggested that the Basque Government should co-operate with Mr. R. C. Stevenson, British Consul at Bilbao, whose own services would constitute a guarantee that the object was exclusively humanitarian and in no sense partisan. It was assumed in London that General Franco would agree, although he had not been asked, and that he would accept the person of Mr. Stevenson as an adequate proof that the British policy of non-intervention and of strict neutrality was fully operative.

The Basque Government was informed that it must, if necessary, provide its own ships for the evacuation up to the three-mile limit, but that British warships would give protection on the high seas. It was emphasised in British official quarters that the step taken was merely a continuation of British efforts to save the lives of non-belligerents. Those efforts had in fact already resulted in the saving of tens of thousands of such lives.

The Caballero Government demanded an international inquiry into the bombing of Guernica—a demand which Mr. Anthony Eden on May 6th incautiously welcomed. On May 7th Lord Plymouth, in fulfilment of the policy thus initiated by Mr. Eden, proposed from the chair to the members of the non-intervention committee that they should agree to recommend that all bombing in Spain be prohibited. How unpractical was such a proposal was shown by the complete silence in which it was received. Not a single comment was made on it by any member of the committee: not even by the Russian delegate. On May 8th it was announced in Rome that the introduction into Italy of every English newspaper, with the ill-assorted and from the Italian point of view extremely stupid exception of the *Observer*, the *Daily Mail* and the *Evening News*, was thenceforth banned; and every Italian correspondent in England of Italian newspapers was forthwith recalled to Rome.

Mr. Eden in Brussels.

Belgium's new international status of complete independence was ritually celebrated on April 25th when Mr. Eden flew from Croydon for a two-days' visit to Brussels. He made friendly contact in the new background with Belgium's leaders —King Leopold, M. van Zeeland, Prime Minister, and M. Spaak, Foreign Minister.

His journey had been immediately preceded by the publication in the morning newspapers of April 25th of the text of an Anglo-French declaration about Belgium. Its main points were these: (1) France and Belgium appreciate the effect upon Belgium of the delay in negotiating a Western European instrument to replace the Locarno Treaty and are therefore anxious to give her the assurances for which she asks. (2) They take note of Belgium's publicly expressed determination to defend her frontiers and to arm for that purpose. (3) They also take note of Belgium's publicly affirmed fidelity to the League Covenant. (4) They therefore release Belgium from all her obligations to Britain and France resulting either from the Locarno Treaty of 1925 or from the Arrangement of March 1936, while maintaining their own obligations to Belgium as incurred under those instruments. (5) Nothing in this declaration affects the obligations of France and Britain to each other under those instruments. Appended to the document was a Belgian Note of acknowledgement expressing gratitude for the assurances thus given.

Even before King Leopold made his famous statement last October, M. van Zeeland had on more than one occasion explained that neither the mutual guarantee of the 1925 Locarno Treaty nor the neutrality guaranteed by the five Powers before the war had been proved in experience to be of any practical value. Belgium was invaded in 1914, and in 1936 Germany repudiated the Locarno Treaty for reasons connected, not with Belgium, but with France and Russia.

When King Leopold came to London in March last he made the specific request that Belgium for the future must be wholly free to act as she might choose in any emergency. He asked that such freedom be guaranteed by Germany, Britain, and France, but stipulated that Belgium should have no corresponding obligation herself, either to maintain her

"neutrality" (as was the implication of the 1839 guarantee by Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) or to lend assistance in a system of mutual security (as defined in 1925 at Locarno). The situation now is that France and Britain have recognised Belgium's new status and that Germany has informally promised (though not yet carried out the promise) to do so.

Reform of the League.

An interesting letter was published in *The Times* of April 14th over the signature of fifteen public men in this country, differing in political outlook, but agreeing in one central thesis. The thesis was that any attempt to strengthen the present League's coercive machinery was to invite final destruction for the League itself; but that the ideals of the League could be safeguarded and put into practical use by making of it "an effective instrument for reconciliation." The signatories gave it as their unanimous view that "to strengthen its sanctionist system is merely to increase the probability of war, to turn every local war into a world war, and in the end to destroy the League altogether."

The present fact is that the League has had, in effect, to suspend its entire activity until such time as a revised interpretation of its purpose can enable it again to function. The attempt to put the existing Covenant into coercive operation in the case of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict had the effect, first, of producing the danger of general war; secondly, of discrediting the Covenant itself. In the parallel case a few years earlier of Japan and Manchuria circumstances enabled common sense to prevail. But the mischief was destined only to be postponed. After the Hoare-Laval proposal of December 1935 was rejected, and the League thereupon was given no alternative but to make a public exhibition of the folly committed in its name, one of the great questions launched has been: Can the League itself survive?

The controversy centres on the feasibility of sanctions as a safeguard against war. Obviously, a sanction is effective only if it does in fact prevent or stop a war. In the case of Italy and Abyssinia the present League did neither. No further proof is needed of the fact that the present League offers no sanction at all. How could it? In a national State a police sanction depends for its efficacy upon the universality

of its operation. It works because the whole weight of the nation backs it against the individual aggressor.

In the analogous international field equal universality is necessary if there is to be any sanction against aggression. That is so obvious a truth as to mock the need of saying it. Yet it was not, and is not yet, everywhere recognised. When four out of seven great Powers in the world stand aside from the League there can be no League in a sanctionist sense. What then, can there be? An ineffective sanction is worse than useless. It is itself a danger to the peace, as experience has proved, if proof were needed.

But the pacific ideals of the League are not only right and valuable. They can be made to serve the cause of peace even in the hands of an incomplete League. But on one simple condition. The condition is that the means as well as the end be recognised as pacific. Geneva could be made into the world's centre for avoiding war by conciliation between the parties, by the open examination of grievances, by the agreed removal of the causes of war. It might not, would not always succeed. If it succeeded once it would justify itself; and success once achieved would breed further success. The alternative thesis of a coercive incomplete League is a proved means, not of peace but of war. Moreover, it seems possible that American sympathy might start flowing to Geneva if the League became a focus of conciliation, instead of, as it is now, a virtual alliance for war. The sympathy and later perhaps the participation of America at Geneva would by itself go far to ensure the full ultimate triumph of a true, because universal, League of Nations.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

May 15th, 1937.

No. 429. *June 1937.*

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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AUGUSTINE BIRRELL.*

No biography or autobiography can do full justice to the wit and charm of Augustine Birrell. He won considerable distinction in the three fields of law, literature and politics, without obtaining front rank in any of them. His supremacy was in the field of personality. There was no more brilliant conversationalist, no more successful after-dinner speaker, no more welcome guest wherever the things of the mind are treasured and discussed. His posthumous reminiscences are so modest that they need to be supplemented by personal knowledge if we are to recreate the image of the living man.

The son of a Scottish Minister resident in Liverpool, Birrell carried into mature years something of the stamp of nineteenth-century Nonconformity—its political liberalism, its interest in theology and churches, its serious view of life. Cambridge was followed by the Bar and the Bar by Parliament, but it was as an essayist that his name first became known. For over forty years he poured forth those little studies and biographies that we learned to love, beginning with *Obiter Dicta* published in 1884 at the age of thirty-four. He never wrote or desired to write a big book, for he was a very busy person, by profession a lawyer, not a man of letters. But it is as difficult to write a short essay as a long one, and

* *Augustine Birrell, Things Past Redress.* Faber & Faber. 15s.

Birrell's brief appreciations have something of the sparkle as well as the finish of certain French literary critics.

We are more than half through the book when the author enters the new Liberal Cabinet as Minister of Education in 1905, exchanging his office in 1907 for the even more difficult task of governing Ireland for nine years. Beginning with the skilful solution of the problem of University education for Catholics which had baffled all his predecessors, the Irish Secretary won the confidence and affection of the Irish Members from the outset and carried through several much-needed reforms. That his rule ended in the tragedy of the Easter rebellion of 1916 was due not to his own shortcomings, but to the long delay in the granting of Home Rule caused by Unionist opposition, to the intransigence of Carson and his Ulstermen, to the uncomprehending military mind of Kitchener in dealing with Ireland at the outbreak of the war. It was the old story of the Sibylline books. Having refused to listen to Redmond, a landlord, a Conservative, and an Imperialist as he revealed himself in 1914, we were confronted by Sinn Fein, and after a sanguinary struggle were forced to yield Dominion status in 1921. Birrell promptly resigned, and his political career ended at the age of sixty-six. The chapter on Ireland is one of the most interesting in the book, and there is not a trace of bitterness. The whole volume, indeed, written at the end of a long life, is singularly mellow.

To those of his readers who remember the closing decades of the Victorian era and the dramatic events of the twentieth century, the most attractive pages are those which record the author's judgments on men and books. Grey's character is justly praised and the limitations of his power in 1914 are neatly described. "He was not Jove wielding Heaven's thunderbolts. Unless his country was going to be behind him, how could he take it upon himself to threaten France with neutrality or to bluff Germany with war?" Campbell-Bannerman is portrayed with affection, and Asquith's abilities receive due praise. He never pushed himself, but whatever he had to do he did so well that his ascent to the top of the ladder was inevitable. It was a mind of great power and clarity, but it had its limitations. "There was nothing metaphysical about him. He was the least speculative of mortals." And he was not a pilot to weather the storm. "So when the hellhounds of war began barking, he was easily outyelped." The society of Lord Morley and Lord Rosebery is rightly described as "exceptionally delightful." Lord Loreburn's only fault, we are told, was jealousy.

Birrell's verdicts on literary celebrities are equally arresting. An omnivorous reader throughout life, like so many of our leading statesmen, he knew most of the lions of his time. The three poets who meant most to him were Tennyson, Browning and Matthew Arnold, and in each case he could compare the writer with the man. While Tennyson was impressive, Browning was disappointing. "It often struck me as passing strange to find myself sitting cosily at dinner with a man whose thoughts had interpenetrated into the interstices of my life, and whose verses had given representation in unforgettable words to some of my most deep-rooted feelings, and yet to have nothing to say to him, or he to me, of the slightest significance." Of Matthew Arnold's poetry he never tired: "He is an indoor and out-of-door poet; for Sundays and week-days; at home or abroad; on foot or in bed; in sorrow and in joy; in moods grave or gay." To surviving Victorians it is refreshing to read such glowing tributes from one of the most attractive figures on that historic stage.

G. P. G.

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ETHICS AND COSMOLOGY.

Mr. Gerald Heard has written a brilliant book* which should arrest his generation and not least the professing Christians whose faith he unintentionally misrepresents. He shows how ethics are "a deduction from religion, from beliefs as to the nature of reality"; and that the ethicist who still considers religion an "imagination" to which conduct is only accidentally related, rests on sinking sand that the tempest is blowing about his ears. "As men believe the universe to be so they will and must behave"; and elders who derived their morality second-hand from religious parents should not be surprised because their children refuse to accept it third-hand. Tracing the fissure between morality and reality from Galileo to Freud, the author reveals how scientists separated allied data for purposes of investigation, and that the division was rendered permanent by the Church who feared the effects

* *The Third Morality*. By Gerald Heard. Cassell & Company Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.

of Galileo's new cosmology. So the world of astronomy and physics was divorced from that of biology and psychology. Newton could prove the cosmos a blind machine and thereby destroy mind's place in the universe, as Blake complained, without abandoning deism.

> " Man is naturally good," said the deists, " as Nature is naturally mechanic," and " it was on this basis of Natural Theology—God in man's heart and mind and the machine in all the rest—that Liberalism arose."

But the ancient connection between Man and Nature was reasserted by Darwin, who destroyed Natural Theology by establishing Natural Selection as the explanation of life. Hence life too was deprived of an ideal sanction.

> Man must go back where he belonged and once more go down into the battle if he and his stock were not immediately to become obsolescent.

Liberal rationalists acknowledged their retreat by advocating utilitarian ethics, but one ideal sanction still remained, that of their conscience—the inner light. Yet this too was desecrated by Freud, who reduced such sublime defiance of a mechanistic universe to " an illusion produced by appetites twisted from their natural purpose and satisfaction."

" To-day then we see the mechanistic cosmology completed, brought home to roost in the soul." By

> " an immense achievement of co-ordinated argument and carefully selected illustration—not of proof," it " has banished religion first from the universe, then from life and now from the very soul of man."

But " ethicists, like all other specialists, cannot keep up to date." Physicists have now reduced matter to charges of electricity, i.e. an invisible force ; and Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy reveals the calculation of probability, of averages, by which physicists have actually worked. Because biology was dominated by the supposed mechanism of physics, Darwin assumed that blind Natural Selection had determined the process of evolution which is now revealed as far more elaborate than he imagined. Evolution is a moral conception although its alleged method was immoral ; but modern biologists (as well as the author in his *Source of Civilisation*) have shown how " the human stock is derived

from a creature not characterised by fierceness and cunning but by sensitiveness, awareness, sympathy and affection. The meek have inherited the earth." Freud by " dredging the mind " has sought in vain to establish the opposite conclusion, and his claim to cure neurosis by psycho-analysis is far from being vindicated. Moreover, by admitting that certain evidence may be telepathic, he assumes that the mind can function apart from sensory communications—a fact to which psychical research provides abundant testimony.

> Consciousness cannot be destroyed by the destruction of the organism which it spins for its temporary manifestation in this space time continuum. . . . We are being made to act as though we are immortal because we are immortal.

But as greed and fear have captured and exploited the curiosity which science seeks to satisfy, we have formed a false, mechanistic picture of the universe and attributed an amoral power to States which leads to humanity's destruction. In order to transform that picture we must gradually transcend our personalised consciousness by merging it in the super-personal consciousness around us, which is similar to but not the same as our own ; and so act and think " that we become increasingly aware of our extra-individuality—that is, the common life which unites us with our fellow creatures, with all life and the universe."

The above summary is necessarily inadequate and needs supplementing by recourse to the author. His argument inevitably suffers from simplification of the issues involved ; and not least by an abstraction of data which enables him to label holders of certain conclusions as " anthromorphist " or " mechanomorphist " and to make assumptions which the labelled would justifiably dispute. But some simplification of current thought and its ethical implication is urgently needed, as the author pleads, when most people cannot see the wood for the trees ; and that he has provided. He challenges and enlarges our thinking, however conscious we may be of certain omissions and the extreme nature of his pacifist bias. Revering " the idealism deduced by Jesus from paternal monotheism," he hails the Sermon on the Mount as " the greatest of all Songs before Sunrise " but deprecates the forcible method by which Jesus is reported to have cleansed the temple!

Western religion may need a contribution from that Eastern thought to which the author is indebted, but needs it adjusted to Western foundations, the highest conceptions of Judaic, Greek and Christian seers. He aims at such adjustment by striving provisionally to indicate " the intellectual system " and " the way of life " that will ultimately transform our cosmology. His counsel often recalls that of Christian mystics who are more convincing and intelligible to many of us ; but Mr. Heard is addressing those whose quest he shares, who repudiate the phraseology of current Christian teaching and its assumptions and require transformed sanctions for their conduct, in the light of new knowledge. They demand a better understanding of human relations and of sex in particular and the motives which should control it. The religion which sanctions his Third Morality has yet to be revealed, as he admits, because the Third Cosmology is only beginning to dawn on man. But how can there be an ideal sanction for ethics without such recognition of Transcendence as that implied, not necessarily by the extreme insistence of Karl Barth, but by the highest type of Christian prayer and meditation which the author refuses to countenance despite his sympathy with the effort ? Immanence, he insists, is the Third Cosmology's conception of the highest because it views the universe as constructed unconsciously and to an unsuspected degree by ourselves. Such admissions, however, are qualified by others.

> The fuller reality we apprehend can only gradually dawn on us. It cannot be utter reality but only a wider construction, a more exact approximation to the truth. . . . Our completed nature will give rise to a completed cosmology.

The author's reluctance to admit Transcendence is understandable ; having encouraged Christians by maintaining that " the human heart, when it seeks the good of others and attempts to apprehend with detachment, is following the pattern and purpose of the universe," he will not make any admission that can be twisted into justifying their "anthromorphism " and a retreat to " blind, rigid and persecuting traditionalism." Yet Von Hügel when he insisted on " adoration, the sense of God, His otherness through nearness," was affirming an essential element of religious consciousness and a conviction which enables men to attain moral sanity. But

those who dissent most from certain of the author's judgments and provisional conclusions should be grateful for the vista of thought and incentive he has opened and the deep, contagious sympathy for fellow creatures which inspires his effort.

D. P. H.

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IMPERIAL PROBLEMS.

At a moment when Empire problems are under consideration by the Imperial Conference, the appearance of a report on *The British Empire** by a study group at Chatham House is of particular interest and value. It has been prepared under the editorship of Mr. H. V. Hodson ; and the other members of the group include Sir Philip Chetwode, Prof. F. Clarke, Mr. J. Coatman, Commander Stephen King-Hall, Messrs. R. T. E. Latham, B. K. Long, R. W. G. Mackay and Sir Frederick Whyte. In addition the work has been subject to the comments of an " outer group " of eminent authorities. The volume provides an objective and impartial survey of the existing state and structure of the Commonwealth and Colonial Empire, and an examination of the issues pressing for solution. It is a work which will be much appreciated by all interested in Imperial affairs.

Specific parts of the Empire are first discussed in turn, with particular emphasis on their constitutional, political, economic and other peculiar characteristics. The report then proceeds to analyse and explain the constitutional fabric of the whole structure. The outstanding development in the post-war period has been, of course, the devolution of authority upon the Dominions culminating in the legal recognition of equal status and self-determination by the Statute of Westminster in 1931. The constitutional position remains, in some respects, one of great complexity ; and while this account may be relied upon in the main with confidence, there are passages which must be read with caution. There is, in particular, the statement that the United Kingdom Parliament " will, without question, enact any amendment of the Canadian constitution requested by the Parliament

* *The British Empire*, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press. 15s. net.

of Canada." The Statute of Westminster in granting legislative sovereignty to the Dominions expressly exempted amendment of the British North America Acts from the purview of the Canadian legislature. The constitution is in effect a compact between the Federal and Provincial Governments and the power of alteration is reserved to the Imperial Parliament. To recognise as binding the suggested convention would be to stultify the whole purpose of the statutory provision which is regarded as a protective safeguard by the provinces. The latters' assent is necessary where their interests are affected, a point which seems to be recognised by several members of the outer group.

Considerable attention is given to analysing the vital question of foreign relations and the closely allied problems of defence, trade, colonies and immigration. The local outlook of the Dominions, with their desire to be free from European obligations, is compared with their interest in the security of Great Britain which is bound so closely to Europe. The discussion on economic issues centres round the principles involved in the Ottawa agreements, with the future choice of greater national exclusiveness or freer channels of trade. While this report is deliberately non-committal, two members of the study group Mr. B. K. Long and Mr. H. V. Hodson, along with Sir Arthur Willert, have asserted their personal views in *The Empire in the World.** The material embodied in this composite work has been co-ordinated by the editor, Mr. E. Thomas Cook. The constitutional, political and economic background receives much the same emphasis as in the other volume. Mr. Long, who deals with inter-imperial relations, quite properly brushes aside as immaterial purely theoretical restraint upon a Dominion's freedom of action. What a Member does "is thus utterly beyond regulation by any restrictive constitutional law of the Commonwealth." This is universally recognised, and it is thus pointless for Mr. Long to consider at length whether in law the Imperial Parliament has divested itself irrevocably of legislative sovereignty over the Dominions. That it clearly cannot legally limit its own powers does not make equality any less real in fact. It is, of course, the Crown which remains the great formal bond, symbolic of a common partnership. But

* *The Empire in the World.* By Sir Arthur Willert, B. K. Long, and H. V. Hodson. Edited by E. Thomas Cook. Oxford University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

as Mr. Long says, cohesion is "weakened, not fortified, if allegiance to the Crown is insisted on as the one connecting and inviolable link." It must be upon the basis of united aims and common policy that the structure of the new co-operative commonwealth will be reared; and the lead in striving for this end must come from the United Kingdom.

In the field of foreign policy, the nations of the Commonwealth have already found a common basis in adherence to the principles of the League: and now the failure of collective security has rendered co-operation at once more vital and more difficult. The core of the question lies in the need for Great Britain's commitments on the Continent, and this justifies Sir Arthur Willert in devoting so much space to the course of post-war development in Europe, an analysis of the existing situation and to consideration of the varying attitudes held in this country towards participation in European affairs. He concludes that a common Imperial policy must remain founded on the collective system, although, as now, obligations of Commonwealth Members may vary. He would have Great Britain join, for the sake of European peace, "an alliance open to all countries in defence of the international system which the League of Nations was meant to inaugurate," balanced by an undertaking to meet the grievances of the dissatisfied Powers, as justified by impartial investigation. In Sir Arthur's view the Dominions being intensely interested in the security of Great Britain and Europe, would applaud this policy, without having necessarily to commit themselves to any action.

The close relation between foreign policy and economic questions is reflected in Mr. Hodson's argument for freer Imperial trade as a step in the promotion of world trade from which the Empire will gain the greatest advantage. No system of Imperial preference will be successful which raises the barrier to foreign goods. He concludes that the growth of Dominion industrialisation and the maintenance of the United Kingdom market must be secured by a system of planned development on the principal of specialisation of production. He would apply this principle also to primary products, although "the foundation stone of Imperial economic policy" should be the achievement of "all-round free trade in primary products." Mr. Hodson's treatment of this huge and intricate problem will be widely appreciated.

CONVERSATION PIECES.*

It would be difficult to overpraise this most attractive book; all concerned in its production are warmly to be congratulated. From cover to cover it is a sheer delight. The 130 pictures, chosen by a true connoisseur, have been beautifully reproduced, some in colour. The letterpress gives a delightful description of them, and of the painters concerned, ranging from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, while Mr. Sevier's admirable notes supply all necessary details.

What is a Conversation Piece? Mr. Sitwell sets careful limits to it, defining it as a picture of "modest dimensions" portraying "definite personalities in their intimate surroundings." He claims that the Dutch School is the provenance of such pieces, though they took on a typically English character here. (The name is, of course, derived from the *Sacre Conversazioni* of the Italian Masters, groups of saints in converse.) He distinguishes them from pictures of sport or landscape pure and simple, though both these favourite English features are found in them; there may be a group of people with horses and carriages, in a park or garden, or by the water. Often such groups are seated round that very English institution, the tea-table, or form a musical or card party. The accessories are treated with great care—architecture, furniture, carpets, china and silver, pictures on the walls, dress; these Conversation Pieces thus throw valuable light on the domestic life of wealthy and leisured families of the day. One can think of many scenes from Jane Austen which they would appropriately illustrate. Some of the most charming examples are of children, with or without their parents; Copley's "Children of George III," which forms the frontispiece, is full of childish grace and glee. Many of the pictures are by well-known artists, such as Hogarth (claimed as the English originator of this genre), Gainsborough or Zoffany; others are by more or less obscure painters. Some gain added interest from their sitters, e.g. Zoffany's picture of the Garricks entertaining Dr. Johnson in their garden at Hampton. In another, unusual in character, Hogarth depicts Lord George Graham in the cabin of his ship. But perhaps

* *Conversation Pieces.* A Survey of English Domestic Portraits and their Painters. By Sacheverell Sitwell. Batsford. 1936. 21s.

the most perfect instance is one which our author and others "believe to be . . . the most beautiful painting ever done by an Englishman," Gainsborough's portrait of Robert Andrews and his wife seated in a lovely autumn landscape of harvest fields and trees. Mr. Sitwell considers that the vogue of the Conversation Piece came to an end when, in mid-Victorian days, it was considered necessary for every picture to tell a story or point a moral.

E. G. S.

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BISHOP BUTLER AND THE AGE OF REASON.*

Against the background of the early eighteenth century Mr. Mossner sets the outstanding figure of Butler from the angle of the history of thought. It would indeed be supremely difficult to regard him from any other angle, for of the Bishop's own life we know but little, and that little is at least as much public as private in its ultimate bearings. Take his famous question to his chaplain as they were indulging in a constitutional in the grounds of Auckland Castle. He asked the agitated chaplain, "Can a whole nation go mad?" It was a strange question in the early eighteenth century when nations were conspicuous by the presence of sanity of outlook and the absence of enthusiasm in action. Accordingly, the author passes by the man and comes at once to the thinker. He presents competently the place of the sovereign court of reason, the case for and against the Church, the remarkable decline and fall of reason, and last of all, important estimates of the place of Butler in thought from his own day to ours. We are in touch with a sympathetic interpreter, and we understand better than before the place Butler occupies and why he continues to occupy it. True, the younger Pitt was right when he thought that the *Analogy* raised as many problems as it solves. Nevertheless, it leaves on us precisely the same impression as Pascal's *Pensées*. There are grave sayings of Christ, such as "He that findeth his life shall lose it," or of St. Paul, "As dying, and behold we live." These sayings are the expression of an essential feature of Christianity, perhaps of its central secret and mystery. No one who is really a Christian escapes the consciousness that

* *Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason.* By E. C. Mossner. The Macmillan Co. 15s.

he is called on to give some meaning to them. It is one of the differences between Butler and other divines of his day that, believing as firmly in reason as they did, and disliking extravagance and "enthusiasm" almost as much as they did, he yet everywhere conveys the impression, which so many of them never convey at all, that he was aware of something grave, deep, and difficult in the religion he professed; aware, above all, that in that religion, living and dying are inextricably interwoven, and the highest living is reached by what must seem to the world a perpetual dying.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

It is not unnatural that an immense quantity of coronation literature should relate to the private lives of past and present members of the Royal Family. Among the publications of some endurable value may be counted a concise sketch entitled *Royal Progress, 1837-1937*,* by Mr. Hector Bolitho. The author is already well known for his biography of the Prince Consort and a work on the relations between Queen Victoria and Edward VII when Prince of Wales. In his new volume the reader will peruse a graphic portrait of Queen Victoria's married life and widowhood in the knowledge that it is drawn by a writer with a wide reputation. The second half of the book deals in particular with the career of Edward VIII as Prince of Wales, and also describes the early life of George VI, "growing up as heir to his father's character." Comparatively little attention, however, is given to the life of George V. Mr. Bolitho omits any discussion of the abdication, which is fully considered in his recent life of the Duke of Windsor. If there is considerable overstatement and some excessive adulation it will be excused in a writer whose sympathy for his subject is so patently sincere. The collection of 141 illustrations is an outstanding feature of the book.

Another book of no less interest will be found in *Four Generations of the Royal Family*,† by Lord Holden, whose "light survey of royal circles during the mid- and late-Victorian era" is temperately written with little embellishment. The Queen is the centre of a volume which contains a series of sketches of various of her descendants and relatives. As a biographer of Leopold II of the Belgians, his account of that monarch's private life and character may be given especial weight. Another interesting sketch discusses the Empress Augusta's position in Germany, and in particular her relations with her son, the ex-

* Batsford. 7s. 6d. net. † Allen & Unwin. 10s. net.

Kaiser, who, at least in this respect, "is probably the most maligned figure living in Europe to-day." In this volume, too, the illustrations are an added attraction.

A different style of work on royalty is contained in *The Royal Letter Book*,* which is an anthology of letters written by every British monarch from the reign of William I, as well as by other royal figures. Some of these letters are printed for the first time, but the collection is not intended as a contribution to historical research. As the editor, Mr. Herbert van Thal, points out, the letters have been selected primarily for their personal interest as indicating private joys and cares in family life, individual tastes and character. As such they have a great appeal, whether we read love letters between Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn or the tragic correspondence of Charles I. An official entry included is of great interest, being one of the few documents signed by Lady Jane Grey as "Jane the Queen," namely the appointment of a sheriff. Little space is given to Queen Victoria's correspondence, which is now widely known; the entry in her journal describing her coronation is included. There is a varied selection of letters written by Edward VII and his sisters. The only private letter attributed in this collection to George V is a charming little note written at the age of six. The volume includes reproductions of many well-known portraits.

Much that needs to be said on the subject of constitutional monarchy is expressed with vigour and respect by Mr. Kingsley Martin in *The Magic of Monarchy*.† It contains in effect a reasoned argument against irrational adulation of the King "who deserves the tribute of respect and not the insult of flattery." The author traces the chequered course of monarchical sentiment during the last century and points to the steady growth of popularity from the time of the Prince of Wales' illness in 1871 and culminating in the final years of George V's reign. The latter displayed to perfection the twin postulates of a democratic monarchy, a high standard of conduct approved by his subjects and strict impartiality and constitutional propriety in political affairs. Unfortunately rational respect for the Crown as the head and symbol of our liberties was transformed by incessant propaganda in the press, pulpit and on the platform into a cult of superstitious reverence and awe for royalty. "The danger of Monarchy," says Mr. Kingsley Martin, "lies in its magic, in the ease with which the deep-seated tendency to substitute worship for respect, to substitute personal homage for rational acceptance of a symbol, may be utilised for class or party purposes." Under its influence a rational approach to political and social problems becomes increasingly rare and difficult, and the Crown itself must eventually suffer by reaction. The Abdication, however, though tragic in many ways, did a good service to the monarchy and democracy by restoring a sense of proportion. Mr. Kingsley Martin

* The Cresset Press. 15s. net. † Nelson. 2s. 6d. net.

analyses at length the development and hardening of public opinion. To-day new attempts are being made "to try to build up the new King into a god." Many people, along with the author, view with apprehension mystical theories of the coronation which confer supernatural benefits on the Throne. But the lesson of the Abdication has been learnt and, in the author's view, will not be easily forgotten.

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*Poor Fred, the People's Prince** contains a brilliant piece of writing in which Sir George Young rehabilitates the character of George II's eldest son and points a moral for the present age. His approach to this study is apparent in the Introduction which appeals for the appearance of Bolingbroke's Patriot King adapted to contemporary conditions. He would see the creation of a non-party committee of the Privy Council charged by Parliament with creating and directing a policy of national reconstruction and presided over by the King in person, who would lend to its support the full political authority and popular appeal of the Crown. That this was the aim of "Poor Fred" is the theme of Sir George's argument. But for his premature death in 1751 he might have cleaned and reformed the constitutional system, allayed the rigours of the Industrial Revolution through social reform, "saved the Empire from losing a secessionist America, a separatist Ireland, and a seditious India." Until now the historical reputation of the Prince has been derived largely from the letters and memoirs of Lord Hervey and Horace Walpole, "the most vindictive and venomous of partisans," who characterise him as dissipated and venal, vicious, treacherous and irresponsible, with a "nuisance value" with which to blackmail the King and Walpole. Examination, however, of Lord Egmont's diaries and the Marchmont Papers revealed to Sir George a very different picture by two peers at once loyal and independent and closely in touch with the Prince's life. Their opinion is followed by the author who treats "Poor Fred" as a cultured social leader of average morality for the age and persecuted by his parents. But it is as the political idealist influenced by Bolingbroke and attempting to create a united patriotic or "Country Party" that Sir George would view him. With such apparent support he defeated Walpole only to find that for "Old Brazenface" had been substituted that master of political management, the Duke of Newcastle. Eventually the Prince covered his following but was robbed of success by death. That he had not succeeded before was due, in Sir George's opinion, to a defective political system, diversion of wars, the feud with his parents and his own lack of determination. For example, he might have established himself in power in 1736 when George II was feared drowned at sea; but he was "too constitutional to be unconstitutional in defence of the Constitution." This is a most interesting study which merits close attention.

* Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

Most people know how Sir Richard Grenville died, if only from nnyson's *Ballad*. Few know much of his life; his fame has been ershadowed by that of Drake and Raleigh. We are, therefore, ateful to Mr. G. H. Bushnell, who, in his *Sir Richard Grenville*,* scribes his varied and remarkable career, as soldier, explorer and lonist, landed proprietor, Deputy-Lieutenant of his native county rnwall, as well as recounting in spirited style his exploits on the gh seas. The name was spelt in several ways, and is so still, a disguished living member of the family being Grenfell of Labrador. . Bushnell shows the date of Sir Richard's birth to be 1542, not 40, as often stated. Grenville took part in the last crusade against e Turks, though it is not certain if he and his first ship, the *Castle of mfort*, were actually engaged at Lepanto. After playing an important rt in the Irish troubles, where he successfully defended Cork, he sat Parliament for a time, and then did some fruitful privateering in the ne ship. Grenville's scheme for the discovery of the N.W. passage om the Pacific side, and for establishing an English colony in South nerica, in 1574, though unrealised, anticipated Raleigh by some ars. Ten years later, he commanded an expedition which did start ch a settlement in Virginia, though it was destined to ill-fortune. enville had been knighted in 1577 for his zeal in harrying Papists in rnwall, and was entrusted with the defences of that county against e expected attack from Spain, and with strengthening Dover Harbour. ough contributing largely in ships and men to the fleet which feated the Armada, he could not win personal fame in that great counter, having been deputed to guard the Irish coasts. In 1591 he is despatched, with Lord Howard, to intercept Spanish treasure lleons off the Azores; his ship, the immortal *Revenge*, of 500 tons, d 250 men. In his account of the final action, Mr. Bushnell justifies enville for ignoring Howard's signal to retreat. A fervent patriot, ring, choleric, with a strain of cruelty, he was a typical Elizabethan, *nigno ai suoi ed ai nemici crudo*. The book is enriched by excellent istrations and maps.

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India: To-day and To-morrow,† by Margarita Barns, is a journalist's count of things modern in India, and especially of the three Round ble Conferences and their personalities as viewed from that angle, th subsequent experiences of newspaper work in India among dians. Pioneering a news agency in a country of such different ideas, d over such vast distances, was bound to be pretty difficult; but led to unique experiences of Indian city life. Mrs. Barns gives many teresting and vivid sketches of leaders; there is much about Mr. ndhi of whom she saw a good deal, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, "walking cyclopædia on everyone's affairs," Dr. S. K. Datta, Sir Purshotamdas

* Harrap. 1936. 10s. 6d. † Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

Thakurdas, "the Bombay multi-millionaire," and others. The most novel part of the book consists, perhaps, in chapters on the press, the cinema, and the radio. The conditions for newspaper production are difficult, the "news-sense" is very immature and "stodginess" is usual. "The Indian reader often chooses quantity in preference to quality, one reason being that the paper he buys for one anna can be re-sold for half an anna in the bazaar as wrapping paper!" Moreover, a single copy can be shared round, the larger the more readers. With regard to the film, "the advent of the talkies has to a large extent limited the all-Indian potentialities of films and led to the development of the industry on a provincial basis." "A very attractive field of service lies open in the equipment and running of village-cinema units, which would tour within a certain area, aiming at the stimulation of the villagers from their age-long mental torpor." The radio is not so effective. That again, owing to the fact that pictures appeal more readily than the spoken word alone, and owing to differences of musical taste, language, etc., is of slow growth.

This is an interesting book.

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The Davos Murder, by Emil Ludwig,* tells the story of the shooting of Gustloff, the leading Nazi agent in Switzerland, by David Frankfurter, a young and sickly Jewish medical student. With his accustomed skill the author paints the background of personal suffering and racial humiliation out of which the crime arose. For a crime it was, despite the provocation. This striking little book gives more than its title suggests, for it deals at length with the history and ethics of political assassination. "How could you do it?" exclaimed the widow of the victim; "you have such kind eyes!" "I am a Jew," was the reply; "that ought to explain." Dr. Ludwig regrets that Frankfurter, who at first defended his action, lost courage during the ten months in prison before his trial, and declared that he had acted without premeditation. His recantation deceived nobody, and it is precisely the symbolic character of his deed which makes the story worth telling and worth reading.

* Methuen. 3s. 6d.

695.72

A CORRECTION.

In a review of a book edited by Mr. H. Wilson Harris entitled *Christianity and Communism* it should have been stated that the series of seven articles, contributed by well-known writers, originally appeared in *The Spectator*.

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