

POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. VIII. NO. 1

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THE KING, THE CABINET AND THE PEOPLE.

By A HISTORIAN

A YEAR ago the chief problems of a constitutional monarchy appeared to have been solved in this country and the Empire in a manner which, despite occasional objections from a few critical or republican spirits of the Left, was regarded by nearly everyone with satisfaction. King George had raised the prestige and popularity of the throne to a height which it had never reached in recent centuries, and had won esteem and affection at home, throughout the Empire, and even abroad. The Crown, in the person of the late King, provided that element of unity and stability in the community which it seemed specially desirable to emphasise in these times when bitter conflict or the menace of disruption is turning much of the world into a wilderness of blood and strife and tyranny.

In less than one year all this has been abruptly changed. At a single stroke we have been brought to the edge of a disagreement between King and Cabinet so acute that it contained within itself the seeds of a struggle between King and Commons similar in all essentials to that which was fought out in the seventeenth century. An odd assortment of people suddenly appeared upon the political horizon as the King's champions, and it seemed for a moment possible that some might see in the resistance of the Cabinet to the royal will an opportunity for the formation of an incipient party of "King's Men." The mere suggestion of a morganatic marriage by the King himself virtually ruled out the possibility of making Mrs. Simpson Queen of England and the only remaining alternatives were either that the King should renounce his intention to marry Mrs. Simpson or abdicate. The alternatives were never bluntly stated in Parliament; but when the

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Cabinet announced that it would not introduce legislation necessary for the morganatic marriage, this was clearly the issue, and was so understood by the House of Commons. The closing of the ranks in all parties in face of attempts to overrule the Cabinet's decision and permit the King to have his way was an extraordinarily impressive event. It was an indispensable movement if democratic government is to be preserved. When the projected marriage destroyed the unifying influence of the Crown, it was the Commons and the Parliaments of the Empire which presented a united front to the people. How different from that other United Front which had been discussed in Labour and Liberal circles during recent months! It was a front in which Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour united on the single issue: whether the views of the Government of the day should or should not prevail in the matter of the King's marriage. In form there was no issue at all before the House, but in substance this was the question which underlay the proceedings.

Although the issue was a single one and to some extent a simple one, it nevertheless raises a number of questions about the position of the Monarchy which had not previously been considered. In the first place there is the question of how far a King can today have a private life sufficiently removed from his public functions as to be a matter of political indifference. The answer is that the area of privacy is so small that it is almost negligible. The suggestion that the King's marriage was a mere domestic matter for him alone cannot be accepted by any intelligent person. The private lives of all persons holding high public office are in many ways subject to special scrutiny and the observance of conventional limitations and standards which ordinary citizens are not required to follow. Judges, diplomats, Cabinet Ministers, clergymen, civil servants, mayors and many other persons

THE KING, THE CABINET AND THE PEOPLE

are far more circumscribed than the ordinary run of men and women. In the case of a King, the special limitations and standards of behaviour extend much further, because public scrutiny is more intensely concentrated on every detail and because public expectation is fixed at a more exacting level. The mass of the people lead vicariously through a King or Queen supposedly perfect lives; and a failure to satisfy conventional notions of perfection destroys the illusion and thereby undermines popular support for the monarchy.

A great part of the success of George V's reign arose from the fact that the Monarchy combined in a remarkable way the solid bourgeois virtues of an impeccable family life with a generous display of the pomp and circumstance, the pageantry and ceremony, which are regarded as the outward forms of Kingship and are immensely popular with all classes of society.

It became probable quite soon after his accession that neither of these features of the last reign would continue during the reign of Edward VIII. On the first it is unnecessary to dwell. On the second, it is common knowledge that King Edward had small liking for public ceremony or official circuses; and substantial curtailments were soon put in hand. How far it is possible to obtain widespread popular support for a monarchy devoid of emphasis on these two features is open to doubt. What is not open to doubt is that the monarchy is unlikely to persist unless it remains rooted in the affections and esteem of every class in the community. The Crown can hardly be preserved as a mere political symbol.

Recent events have clearly brought out the distinction between the dignity appropriate to the throne and the mere snobbery which accumulates round the Court. A marriage between the King and a commoner would probably have met with great public enthusiasm as a step towards

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

greater social equality; but it is obvious that what the Americans call "the King business" cannot be run successfully on saxophone and cocktail party lines without becoming an absurdity. Dignity is essential and people who deny the necessity for the trappings of monarchy are usually persons who do not believe in having a monarchy at all.

But a large measure of democratisation of the Court is highly desirable. Hitherto the friends of the royal family and the entourage of the Court have been drawn exclusively from the narrow circle of rank and wealth; while those of humble birth and slender means seldom penetrate beyond the dim outer fringes of monster garden parties. Not only is there nothing in the Constitution which calls for this affiliation of the Court with high society; but, on the contrary, the political evolution of the people is making it a dangerous anomaly. Indeed, it has actually become contrary to the interests both of the King and of the people. It should be a convention of the Crown that the royal family does not discriminate in this invidious way. Only by a far greater approach to social equality at Court and in the selection of the entourage will it be possible to pave the way for a transition from the monarchy as we have known it so far, in a society containing stupendous inequalities of wealth and a tiny leisured class appropriating a huge share of the national wealth, to a monarchy as it will have to be one day—if it is to continue—when these vast inequalities have been evened out and the leisured class as such has disappeared.

In the meantime, the monarchy has to perform political and social functions of some importance in our semi-capitalist democracy. It can be a unifying, harmonising and steadying force, if its actions are informed by unselfishness, public spirit, common sense, and good judgment—which they have certainly not been in regard to the proposed marriage with Mrs. Simpson.

THE KING, THE CABINET AND THE PEOPLE

The monarchy could also, in certain circumstances, be a safeguard of democracy. It is obvious that the emotional and sentimental attitude of the British public towards the King and the royal family during the last reign would have made it very difficult to establish in this country a dictatorship founded on the sort of irrational outpourings which support Hitler and Mussolini. There is not room for more than one public focus for emotionalism of that kind; and if the public must have an outlet for its feelings there is a good deal to be said for the person of a constitutional monarch. But recent events have made one realise the large dangers inherent in that emotionalism if the object of it were inclined to use the power it brings for undemocratic or anti-democratic ends. The episode of the King's visit to the distressed areas, gleefully welcomed as an embarrassment to the government, not only by the popular press but also by some short-sighted politicians of the Left, was really a step away from constitutional democracy in a very different direction.

The Crown and the royal family are, as we have said, a convenient object for the emotionalism which nations and communities seem to find necessary not only in their private, but in their social and political lives. It may be that the time will never come when the films, the theatre, and sport provide a sufficient number of objects for communal worship, and that it will always be necessary to have somewhere in politics and the Constitution a representative of divinity. (The fate of Lenin's mummy confirms this conjecture.) A constitutional monarch and his family can obviously perform this function satisfactorily, but only with certain provisos. Their exaltation must not be carried too far, for, if it be, a small deviation from the ideal myth may bring about a catastrophic collapse. It is probable that the propaganda and publicity with regard to the royal family in the last reign, though in some respects extremely clever, was dangerously

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overdone. Even if Edward VIII had been a man of normal good judgment, the exaggerated elevation of his father would have made his task of living up to the ideal very difficult and failure unnecessarily dangerous. The moral is that the deification of a constitutional monarch must be kept within very definite limits, if the monarchy is to continue.

In a nation of civilised and educated people the republican type of constitution would have everything to recommend it, for it would avoid the evils which seem inevitable even with the best kind of constitutional monarch snobbery, the growth of political and economic vested interests under the wing of the Court, the encouragement of false political and social standards among the "common people." As things are today, however, something may be said for retaining constitutional monarchy for the British Empire, as a symbol of unity and a principle of stability. The events of December, 1936, show that if it is to be retained, the monarch must tread a very narrow path strictly marked out for him by the Constitution. If he lends himself, even unwittingly, to the political manoeuvres of interested parties or to those who are fishing for power in troubled waters, or if, either in private or public life, he acts in a way offensive to any large section of the people, he puts the very existence of the Crown in peril. As it is, the affair of Mrs. Simpson has done a great deal of harm to the monarchy, and it is doubtful whether it will ever recover the position which it enjoyed throughout the Empire under George V. Every aspect of the crisis was either ridiculous or lamentable except two. First, the sudden, rapid return of press and public to common-sense and self restraint as soon as it became clear that a dangerous situation was being created by the fomenting of ugly passions, in some cases for sinister ends, was a remarkable sign of political sanity. Secondly, something has been done to show us what conditions must be observed, if the Crown is to be a safeguard, and not a danger, to democracy.

PUBLIC ORDER

By W. IVOR JENNINGS

I

THE ordinary Englishman is law-abiding partly by social habit and partly because he fears the consequences. Social habit and fear are both produced by economic stability. It was not the Reform Act but constantly improving standards of life that made law and order the dominant characteristic of Victorian England. While half Europe was in revolution the Charter was brought to Europe in a cab. For half a century afterwards profits and wages were rising, and it was not fundamentally important to the individual that the proportionate increases were by no means commensurate. During the present century social insurance and other public services have prevented industrial depression from producing riot and rebellion. The result of a long development since the Industrial Revolution is a highly complex class structure in which the members of every class have something to lose by chaos. The middle classes are all for the *status quo*. The working classes do not unite because they have much to lose besides their chains. The threat of economic disturbance is enough to prevent even serious economic reform; it is even more effective where the fear is not of a confiscating government but of no government at all. Rebellion means, in the first instance, loss of salaries, wages, bank deposits, and perhaps even movable and immovable property. There may be loot; but who will loot whom?

These considerations are conscious to few, though their importance is demonstrated by the attempt of some politicians to associate reform and revolution. Nevertheless, the fear that changes may be for the worse is often conscious

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and otherwise always subconscious. A "red" among the middle classes—even a mild and pacific Fabian—is regarded as at best a crank and at worst a dangerous character. Communism had few adherents even among the working classes, and even during the depression; it becomes more influential as it becomes more law-abiding and more "respectable." Revolution in England is not practical politics. Though no doubt the Army considers that one of its tasks is to "keep order," it is significant that the words "throughout the British Empire" are always added.

Moreover, most people are not more than mildly interested in politics. In the modern sense of that word, man is not a political but a social animal. Indeed, if the phrase were permissible, it might be said that a political animal is a rare bird. Political enthusiasts are always in a minority. The representatives present at the annual conferences of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, or of the Labour Party, or of the Trade Union Congress, represent few save themselves. The ordinary man thinks primarily of himself, his family and his friends. His social sympathies are wide but not deep. He hates injustice and can be roused to indignation by oppression. He considers that something ought to be done about it but rarely thinks of doing anything himself. He can soon be induced to believe that it is none of his business. For his first task is to maintain and improve his social and economic status. The newspapers are aware of the comparative unimportance of politics. The *Daily Herald* achieved a two million circulation by developing its "features." The readers of the *Daily Express* will stand Beaverbrook so long as they can read Beachcomber. Even Mr. Garvin does not frighten away those who are willing to spend twopence on Torquemada and advertisements.

Successful dictators arise out of economic confusion.

PUBLIC ORDER

They secure a measure of popular support because it is believed that they can restore order and preserve economic advantages. Herr Hitler obtained his funds from big capitalists and his votes from the lower middle class. Once in power a dictator can maintain his authority because of the fear of change. He can pile up armaments at the expense of the standard of living because slow economic changes are not noticed and because order at least means stability. He can, too, suppress the politically minded minority, or distract its attention, or divert its enthusiasm. An elegant system of espionage, a little propaganda about the merits of concentration camps or the sinister activities of secret police, and an occasional dramatic flourish against some "common enemy," real or imagined, are soon sufficient to render politics as taboo as religion. If in addition some economic carrot can be held before the nose of hungry donkeys, such as the possibility of ousting a minority like the Jews from effective competition, acquiescence among the donkeys may be converted into enthusiasm. Opposition can then arise only from "intellectuals" or from what Charles Booth significantly described as "the semi-criminal classes." The former can be suppressed—"whenever I hear the word 'culture' I suspect treason"; the latter can be drilled in conscripted armies and labour corps. In such circumstances only an unmanageable economic crisis or a split in the higher command can give hope to the democrats.

The real case for Section 1 of the Public Order Act is not that political uniforms in themselves incite to violence, nor that disorders have occurred or might occur in Bethnal Green; it is, rather, that a disciplined body is one of the essential supports of a campaign of virulence against minorities and of appeals to economic greed that might, in time of industrial depression, obtain enough support to overthrow democracy. Uniforms are the symbol of discipline. They

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have psychological effects upon those who wear them as well as upon those who see them. They create on the one hand a feeling of security to those who wear them and of insecurity in those who see them. Both are necessary to the establishment of dictatorship. The prohibition of uniforms in section 1 of the Act hangs with the prohibition of organisation and training in section 2.

There may be a successful dictatorship where there is no successful dictator. In concentrating our attention on those who dictate by talking, we forget that a large part of the world is governed by tongue-tied military officers. Democracies must, or think that they must, defend themselves against external aggression. So they create armies and hope that political control will prevent them from becoming instruments of internal aggression. A soldier is an expert; and all experts tend to assume that the whole of knowledge is comprised in their *expertise*. General officers are apt to assume that discipline is justice and force the ultimate reason. To command an army in time of peace is the easiest task in the world. The commander commands and thousands obey. There is one right, the right to command, and one duty, the duty to obey. It needs a long democratic tradition, such as has so far persisted in England and in France, to persuade army officers that their right to command some proceeds only from their duty to obey others. Even in democracies they can easily acquire an extravagant idea of their own powers and their own importance. They are necessarily surrounded by yes-men. They are subject to no criticism save that of ignorant leader-writers and "fool politicians." There is only one promotion from the control of an army—the control of a nation. In the circumstances it is not surprising that so many of the nations who, in the first fine flush of liberalism, rushed into democracy, have since sunk into military dictatorship. The military dictator is necessarily

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unstable. Others, too, want promotion. He can be overthrown by the sword as he overthrew by the sword—though indeed the weapons used are far more deadly. But it is the dictator, not the dictatorship, that is unstable. It needs a great and courageous people to fight an army. What are many against a few provided with the arms that modern science has invented?

English law assumes rather pathetically that the generals need to be protected against common soldiers, not that the people needs to be protected against the generals. The notion that soldiers can be made revolutionaries by communist leaflets—the notion behind the Incitement to Disaffection Act—is simply ludicrous. Any army—that is, the people who fight—becomes politically disaffected only when economic disturbance among the civil population has reached such a stage that civil revolution becomes practicable. The real problem, as Spain and South America has demonstrated, is to prevent the incitement of generals. Fortunately, in spite of some disquieting tendencies between 1912 and 1915, this problem has not been actual in England since the overthrow of James II. So long as peace is maintained, and so long as Parliament can be relied upon not to pass the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act automatically, the danger hardly exists.

II

The problem of public order thus becomes, with us, simply a problem of preventing riot. Unless another war creates complete economic chaos, as it probably will, the chances of a revolution from below are negligible. So long as the state can maintain its social services through a depression and so long as the existence of trained gangs not under Parliamentary control is strictly prohibited (and the Public Order Act, in its initial provisions, provides additional

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powers for that purpose), a fascist revolution is not to be anticipated. So long as Parliamentary control of the forces is maintained, the possibility of a military dictatorship is remote.

It is obvious that any government must possess the means for suppressing actual disorder. Riots have no necessary connection with politics. They may arise merely from high spirits, as among academic and athletic "toughs." They may arise, though rarely in fact, from criminals intent upon loot. Normally, however, rioting is a political offence. A sense of injustice or inferiority, played upon by a skilful orator, may give rise to a sudden movement of disgust. Miners in the depressed areas, compelled to exist below the poverty line for reasons which they cannot understand and which cannot be explained to them, can easily be persuaded that there is a specific enemy and that he ought to be dealt with there and then. Men on strike may be convinced that the industrial weapon is ineffective. Where strong religious prejudices exist, oratory can turn peaceful citizens into frenzied mobs. Where economic motives can be combined with the ignorant man's dislike of "foreigners," anti-Jewish feeling is easily aroused.

Where social injustices exist, the most effective remedy is to remove them. Education is a cure for prejudice and ignorance. No reasonable person objects to the association with these prophylactic remedies of legal prohibitions against incitement to violence. There is, too, another kind of incitement to violence which consists in the use of insulting words and gestures. This is peculiarly a fascist technique, though it has also been used by religious controversialists. It might appear to be a double-edged weapon; but those who use it are careful to direct it against minorities and to provide an adequate bodyguard. The riot is stimulated not for its own sake but for its publicity value and for the feeling

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of uncertainty which all rioting tends to create. It is sought to expand the area of prejudice and antipathy. Those who attend meetings are few; those who read about riots are many. The minority tends to lose its sense of security; the prejudiced tend to lose their fear of economic disorder; and the feeling of bewilderment out of which successful dictators arise is stimulated and propagated. Provision is contained in the Public Order Act for strengthening the law on this point. It may be doubted whether it is necessary. Indeed, the strengthening of the law is essentially dangerous. For the notion of "insulting words" has been enormously extended in recent years. On one occasion the cry of "Give us bread" was, in the circumstances, held to be insulting; the distribution of pacifist literature in the neighbourhood of militarist displays has been prosecuted; and generally the law has been used as an instrument for repressing what some democrats, at least, regard as legitimate propaganda.

Uniform and drill are used partly for the same purpose of creating fear and uncertainty. If there are two kings in Jerusalem the individual whose primary concern is with himself tends to render allegiance to both. If there are two churches the millions of vicars of Bray must join in communion with both. If two political parties contend for complete domination the political neutral, like the big industrialist, must insure himself by subscribing to both. The result is to create a state of uncertainty, a psychological momentum that can readily be increased by some outside impulse. If there are two forces, the gang and the police, must I not make my peace with both if peace is what I most desire?

There are, however, subsidiary motives. As the Salvation Army has shown, much publicity may be obtained by a uniform and a band. Publicity is essential to true democracy. Burke's doctrine of representative government was no doubt

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adequate for a period when only certain "interests" were represented; it is inadequate for modern democracy. It is the business of the elected representative not only to forward the interests of his constituents and to take decisions on matters of public policy as they arise, but also to secure the carrying out of those views of public policy which are prevalent in his constituency and which he was elected to support. Since Peel's Tamworth manifesto the parties have appealed to the people to support their policies and to vote accordingly. It is essential, therefore, that the parties should have policies and the means of publicity for making them known.

The instruments for this purpose are varied. The press is perhaps the most important. It suffers from a number of defects as an instrument of political education. It is essentially partial. It relies primarily on advertisers who, even if they do not dictate policy necessarily give it a bias. It can be bought either directly by wealthy syndicates or indirectly by subsidies. It can, moreover, rarely devote the space to effective political discussion; for the circulation of most of the newspapers depends essentially upon "features." In the educative sense the press is much less valuable than the book and the pamphlet. These are the best of all methods because they can develop policies at length and because the reader has access to both sides. They are, however, expensive. Moreover, the primary problem is to induce the ordinary voter to take more than a mere passing interest, not to provide the material for the politically-minded who read books and pamphlets on political questions. The short and snappy leaflet is of little value because it is short and snappy. It says too much in too little space. No one would deny the importance of the freedom of the press; but it is not the only method of publicity.

Of the newer methods the cinema and broadcasting are the most important. The cinema is even more biased than

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the press and is, for practical purposes, in the hands of one party. Broadcasting has to make an attempt to be impartial; but, because of the difficulty of persuading the average politician that impartiality involves the possibility of somebody listening to the other side, it tends to fall into the safer atmosphere of the non-controversial.

We thus come to the oldest of the propaganda methods, the public meeting. Its proportionate efficacy has no doubt declined since the development of new resources of publicity. Yet its importance is not to be measured by the numbers who attend meetings; nor is its value to be deprecated because audiences usually consist of enthusiastic supporters and enthusiastic opponents. Politics in a democratic country is not taboo. There is more propaganda value in the private discussion, the casual discussion, and the sudden interjection than in the shrieking headline. It is not only the constant blaring of newspapers and loudspeakers but also the system of espionage which makes fascist propaganda so effective. No one can visit Germany without noticing the almost total absence of discussion of internal political affairs. A British Government may survive with all the newspapers against it; if the word goes round that its foundation is rotten, or its policy contemptible, or its personnel incompetent, it is doomed. The earnest party supporter, the man who voluntarily licks envelopes and stands on draughty doorsteps at election time, is he from whom there springs the fertile word. A party can survive if it has no money and no leaders; it cannot live if it has no members. The political meeting is the means by which the earnest party men are brought into contact with their leaders, are renewed in their faith, and are strengthened in their endeavour. It is, too, in the political meeting that interested doubters are turned into enthusiastic workers. No one can doubt the influence of the street-corner meeting in the development of the socialist movement. Here there were no favourable newspapers, no

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funds, and, for practical purposes, no national leaders. No one can doubt, either, the value of the great Conservative rallies which Disraeli used and Joseph Chamberlain elaborated.

Viewed from this angle, the public meeting holds a cardinal position in democratic government; and it is significant that in fascist countries the complete control of the press and of broadcasting has not prevented the leaders from organising bigger and better public meetings. Where two views of politics are permitted and opponents are not only expected to attend but are welcomed, a public meeting is a danger to public order because in a crowd both enthusiasm and opposition are infective. To prohibit or to destroy its utility by close restriction would be a mistake of the first order. It is, too, essential not to restrict too closely the means by which crowds may be attracted. A meeting summoned by poster has little appeal. The Salvation Army technique is interesting because it has been effective. Bands, uniforms, banners, cheerful tunes, attract the audience. A short street-corner meeting stimulates interest. The indoor meeting is for serious instruction. Uniforms apart, the Labour Party has used the same method. The speech at the street-corner is often the prelude to the formal indoor oration. Where no great funds are available, it is often the only means of propaganda available.

III

At a time when the English law of public meetings is being strengthened, it is wise to know what the law is and what it ought to be. As usual, it is easier to say what it ought to be than what it is. Dicey's classic statement is, like most of Dicey's statements, so partial as to be entirely misleading. The common law "broadens down from precedent to precedent"—which means that it is very often

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what the courts choose to make it. Moreover, most of the decisions have been rendered by the Divisional Court on cases stated by justices. As such a case necessarily deals with a "criminal cause or matter," no appeal has been possible, and the views of courts higher than the Divisional Court have never yet been expressed.

The first point is abundantly clear, though it is not mentioned by Dicey. Not only is there no right of public meeting in general, but it is definitely unlawful to hold a meeting in a public street and perhaps in any public place. The only right which a subject possesses in the highway is the right to pass and repass. Used for any other purpose is a trespass to the highway which is actionable by the owner of the soil. This is perhaps a small matter because even where the owner is known he never takes proceedings. In addition, however, it has to be remembered that any obstruction of the highway is a nuisance at common law. It is, moreover, an offence under section 72 of the Highway Act, 1835. It is immaterial that there is no effective obstruction to traffic. It has been so decided; and in any case any motorist knows that he may be liable for obstruction even if he leaves a car in a cul-de-sac. Usually the law is not rigidly enforced. Cars are permitted to remain parked for a period which the police think reasonable; costers are normally allowed to ply their trade subject to obedience to byelaws; and frequently street-corner meetings are permitted.

It is, however, entirely undesirable that the police should have a discretion to waive the strict requirements of the law. Either the law should be enforced or it should be altered. Under the present system if a police constable orders a speaker to take up his soap-box and walk, the speaker has no lawful answer. If he refuses to move he is "obstructing the police in the execution of their duty." Nor does it matter

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if ten yards away a fashionable wedding, or even a rival political meeting, is obstructing the highway even more effectively. The police should have as little discretion in these matters as possible, partly because they cannot always be trusted not to discriminate, and partly because the law falls into disrepute when they are believed to discriminate, even if they do not.

One can be somewhat less positive about processions. Dicey fathered the extraordinary idea that if A has the right to go down the High Street then "A, B, C, D and a thousand or ten thousand other persons" may also walk down the High Street. Statutory restrictions apart this is a very doubtful proposition (almost as doubtful as Dicey's statement that ten thousand people have a right to hold a meeting on a common: apart from the common law, see section 26 of the Commons Act, 1879). A's right is to pass along the highway in such a manner as not to interfere with the similar rights of others. If three undergraduates walking arm-in-arm after a bump supper had obstructed Professor Dicey's way to All Souls College he might have had different views about the common law—even if their purpose was the more effectively to discuss the treachery of the Grand Old Man in deciding to introduce the Home Rule Bill. In any case, though there is no decision on it, a procession of ten thousand people in column of fours (and Dicey says nothing about an orderly procession, so that according to him they might apparently straggle right across the road) would presumably come within the Highway Act. Nor, in fact, does the Highway Act matter much, because the police regulate processions either under the Metropolitan Police Act or under the Town Police Clauses Act; and where neither is in force the local police inspector passes his own Act.

Obviously there must be control. The Lord Mayor's Procession is, in ordinary language, a nuisance. A succession

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of long processions would try modern Oxford, if not the Oxford of Dicey's day, too high. The idea of a procession of ten thousand undergraduates marching down the High Street every day and in any sort of order, even crossing against the traffic lights, is ludicrous even if they were anxious to support the successors of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Edward Carson. If at the same time another ten thousand undergraduates (no doubt from another University) were to move in the opposite direction to support the successors of Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Asquith, it would be necessary to turn All Souls College and the Shelley Memorial into hospitals. The difficulty is to know who is to exercise the regulation. If the question had been raised in 1914, could the Oxford chief constable of the day have been trusted not to discriminate between the then Vinerian Professor and the then Attorney-General? Probably he could not: yet it is difficult to suggest an alternative. The local council would, in some cases, be better because it might contain at least some representatives of both sides; but the problem may arise at any moment, and it is not practicable to insist on the summoning of the council or even of the watch committee.

It is clear, however, that the right to prohibit meetings altogether, such as is provided by the Public Order Act, is a dangerous innovation. Neither the chief officer of police nor the local authority can be trusted with a power to prohibit for weeks, months or even years on end, all or any political processions. The fact that the consent of the Secretary of State has to be obtained is some protection; for, whatever his politics, he can always be heckled by the Opposition. Nor should the efficacy of such heckling be minimised. The function of an Opposition in such circumstances is to make a nuisance of itself, to give the Home Secretary a warm time. Ministers are all for peace unless

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war is inevitable ; and, except in extreme cases, no minister is prepared to fight long for a cause with which he is not immediately concerned. Above all, the appeal of the Opposition is to the constituencies ; and if they can make a case they are sure to find some support. A local injustice, properly presented, can be of substantial national importance ; and a Government exists, in the long run, by means of its majority. The provision is, nevertheless, dangerous to the (moral) right of public meeting. Combined with the impossibility of a lawful street meeting, it means that little is left of the right which is commonly regarded as existing. The fact upon which Dicey so much insists that a meeting which is not intended to become riotous is not an unlawful assembly merely because a gang of toughs proposes to break it up is of no importance. The youngest police constable has enough intelligence not to lay an indictment for unlawful assembly. He tells the meeting to disperse and, if it does not, summons assistance to arrest the leaders for obstructing the police in the execution of their duty. The right of public meeting, in other words, is a right to hold a peaceful meeting on private property if the necessary funds can be found or the necessary consents can be obtained. Meetings in the Carlton Club are still lawful provided that they do not put reasonable persons in fear that there will be a breach of the peace in the Reform Club.

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By LEONARD WOOLF

THEORETICALLY every one would agree that a country's armaments should depend upon and be dictated by its policy. In the happy days of the bourgeois Paradise under Victoria, our policy was isolation from European entanglements and the exploitation of our highly profitable Empire. This policy determined our armaments : an army adapted to keep natives in order whether on the Indian frontier or in the tropics of Africa, but not to meet European conscript armies on European battlefields, and a navy superior to the combined fleets of any two Powers and, therefore, sufficiently powerful to make invasion or starvation of the British Isles practically impossible, and so to secure ourselves and our Empire from "unprovoked" attack. For 50 years the policy was eminently successful ; we kept out of European entanglements and wars, and, whenever the test came, as for instance at Fashoda, our armaments were strong enough to deter any challenge to our Empire or to our imperialist adventures. The Boer War seemed to confirm the wisdom of our general policy and the satisfactory adjustment of military power to policy, for we beat the Boers, and the threat of a European coalition against us never got much further than the volatile mind of the German Emperor. But the suicidal and homicidal madness which was sweeping over the Continent crossed the English Channel in the early days of the twentieth century, and British statesmen rapidly reversed our traditional foreign policy. Instantly, therefore, they also reversed our armaments policy. We entangled ourselves in the conflicts of the Continent on the side of France and Russia. We abandoned the two-Power standard on the sea and built a fleet which would be overwhelmingly superior to that of

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Germany; we "reorganized" our army so that it could be thrown into France and Flanders as an expeditionary force to fight by the side of the French against the Germans.

These facts are worth recalling in the crisis which has now come upon us. It is a crisis once more of policy and armaments. Unfortunately we are facing it with none of the certainty and clearness of vision which seemed to come naturally to Gladstone and Salisbury, and even Lansdowne and Joseph Chamberlain. They had a clear conception of the general policy which they proposed to pursue and they made their army and their navy the servants of their policy. They not only put the horse before the cart, but were able to distinguish a cart from a horse. Today, our Government is feverishly trying to make the cart draw the horse. It is piling up its armaments, though it has no policy related to the arming, and therefore no measure of the amount of armaments required for "security," and at times it appears to have two policies inconsistent with each other and with its armament programme. The Opposition to most people appears to be no less muddled and inconsistent than the Government. One section of it has a perfectly clear policy which would require a very high measure of rearmament, but it strenuously opposes rearmament. A second section would have no armaments at all and a completely pacifist policy. A third section would have some armaments and some pacifism. A fourth section is almost indistinguishable from the Government in being in favour of no policy and a good deal of armament.

This confusion and vacillation of the political mind can be observed today in every party, and in every kind of person, from His Majesty's Ministers down to the, in normal times, least politically-minded man or woman in the street. If one reads carefully the speeches of political leaders or the spate of books upon peace and armaments,¹ which is continually

¹ The reader may be referred to the following selection: *Which Way to Peace?* by Bertrand Russell (Joseph. 7s. 6d.); *Alternative to Rearmament*, by Jonathan Griffin (Macmillan. 6s.); *The Struggle for Peace*, by Sir Stafford Cripps (Gollancz. 7s. 6d.); *The Alternative to War*, by Charles Roden Buxton (Allen & Unwin. 4s. 6d.); *The Private Manufacture of Armaments*, by Philip Noel Baker, M.P. Vol. I. (Gollancz 18s.).

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pouring out of the publishers' offices, one sees that the vacillation and confusion are due primarily to two causes: an inability to decide what the country's policy should be or fear of facing the consequences of any particular policy. In order to understand this it is necessary to be quite clear as to the origin of the present crisis. It originates in the destruction of the League as an effective instrument for preventing war. The object of the League was to provide an international system in which disputes between states would be settled without resort to war, and collective defence against aggression would be assured to all its members. It offered, therefore, to each of its members assurance of national security by collective defence rather than by national armaments. The League provided for those who believed in it, as for instance the Labour Party, a clear general international policy which necessarily determined the measure of armament required by the country, i.e., the army, navy, and air force of Great Britain were determined by the contribution required of it in the collective defence of itself or any other member against aggression.

In foreign policy at the present moment in this country all the parties and all responsible politicians are pursuing the same objects: peace and national security. Until the summer of this year the vast majority of ordinary people looked to the League as the one hope of peace and security. But the League cannot be an effective instrument of defence unless people believe that its provisions for preventing war and defending its members against attack will be put into operation, unless, in fact, they believe that the obligations of collective security will be fulfilled. No one believes that any longer, whether he be an ordinary private individual or a minister responsible for the security of his country. A government or dictator contemplating aggression no longer seriously regards the League or the obligations of collective

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defence as factors with which he might have to reckon; the government of a state, which, like Belgium or Czechoslovakia, has reason to fear that it might be the victim of such aggression, dare not continue to treat the League and the Covenant as serious factors in its defence. Thus the heart of the League as an organism for preventing war and contributing to security has been cut out of it. It is dead. The people here, who in their millions voted for the League and peace in the Peace Ballot, know or feel this; our Government, which has a considerable responsibility for its death, also knows it. And in every country of Europe governments and people know it too.

We are, therefore, back in a world without a League, without any effective international organization for ensuring that disputes between states will be settled without war. We are back, some people say, in the world of 1912. But it is worse than that. The international crisis is dominated by a second factor, the rise of the three fascist powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan. These states are not merely dissatisfied; they openly proclaim their intention to satisfy their international appetites by war or the threat of war. They are organizing the whole of their immense populations and the whole of their national life for war; the spokesmen of their governments deride the idea of peace; the expression of any pacifist views by their subjects is punished with imprisonment or death. There was no menace to peace like this in the world of 1912. There was, no doubt, fear then on both sides of many frontiers, fear of what the Kaiser might do beyond the Rhine or the other Kaiser on the Danube or the Tsar's armies on the Prussian marches. But it was fear tempered by hope that the next international dispute would be settled, like so many before it, peacefully. Today, such a hope scarcely exists; the fear which hangs over us is undiluted, for we know that at any moment any state in Europe may be treated by Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini

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as the Italian Government treated Abyssinia. And even this does not complete the tale of tribulation for the man or government seeking peace in the world of today. Fascism, which began as a party policy and developed into a policy of state, has now become a religion with a church, which is the state, and a living God, usually dressed in khaki and riding breeches, whose lightest word is absolute truth and a divine command to the millions of his true believers. And the church is conducting a crusade, a holy war, against the abomination called communism (which includes democracy, liberalism, and pacifism, except for purposes of propaganda in "democratic" countries like our own). This crusade is being conducted not only by an inchoate alliance of the three fascist states, directed against Communist Russia, but within the frontiers of non-fascist nations, as we see in Spain, where the German and Italian Governments have armed, supported, and to some extent directed a military revolt against a Liberal Government. The man or government, therefore, which values liberty, democracy, or socialism as well as peace, has to face the certainty that all are equally threatened by the fascist powers.

This is the world in which everyone in this country has to seek a common objective, peace and national security. I propose to examine in some detail the various policies which are being put forward as means for attaining peace and security, in order to see how they are related to the actual facts of this very unpleasant world. A study of the books mentioned in the footnote on page 22 show that the following are broadly the various policies which the British elector is being asked to choose from.

I. A VAGUE OR UNDEFINED POLICY COUPLED WITH REARMAMENT

This is the policy of the National Government and of a good many supporters of the Labour and Liberal Parties.

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It is a natural immediate reaction to the destruction of the League and the enormous increase in military power and prestige of Italy and Germany. The reaction takes the form of the frightened question: How can we make ourselves safe from attack? And the answer is: By making ourselves strong. The country therefore rearms precipitately, its immediate object being to make its air force stronger than the air force of any other Power and its fleet stronger than the fleet of any other Power. But the policy upon which the scale of rearmament should depend is left entirely vague and indeterminate. Part of its vagueness is due to the fact that lip-service is still paid to the League and collective security, so that we retain a shadowy assurance of an imaginary League umbrella to protect us from the bombs of the next war. An ordinary material umbrella would be as serviceable. How far we are in or out of the European system is not defined. Mr. Eden has explained that one foot is certainly still somewhere in Flanders, but where the other foot is, no one knows. Presumably we would defend the Empire against any act of aggression, but the scale of our armaments is clearly not being determined even by that policy; otherwise our rate of rearmament would need to be quadrupled. This policy or lack of policy may be, as is sometimes argued, in the British tradition, but it is open to great objections in the present state of the world. It enormously increases the dangers of the armaments race. The belief that British armaments are a guarantee of peace, though apparently sincerely held by British admirals, air-marshals, and Cabinet Ministers responsible for the Services, is not shared by Germans, Italians, or Japanese; it is not held by Frenchmen or Spaniards or Belgians, unless there is also a pretty solid guarantee that the armaments are going to be used on their side in the next war. This policy, therefore, increases the armaments race and the international uncertainty and in-

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stability. That is a situation in which, sooner or later, some dictator will inevitably be impelled to gamble with war or a threat of war, and then the guns will go off. Whether we are in the war or out of it will be determined by chance or even panic, not by our own considered decision.

II. ISOLATION

There is no doubt that the imminent danger of war and the destruction of the League have turned many people during the last year towards a policy of isolation. But there is a great deal of confused thinking on the subject. A policy of isolation would mean that this country withdrew from all entanglements and commitments to other states which might involve us in war. People often talk as if you can have a policy of isolation with limited commitments, for instance, an agreement to defend Belgium and France. But that is not isolation; it is either a strictly limited alliance or a severely restricted kind of collective security system. There is a perfectly feasible policy of complete isolation for this country, a definite withdrawal from all general or particular commitments or guarantees which we could only fulfil by entering into a European war. The object of it would be to keep us out of the war which we consider to be inevitable. But it is inconsistent with a policy of partial alliances or restricted commitments. The international situation in Europe is so complicated, the entanglements are so entangled, that it is a delusion to believe that we could obtain the advantages of isolation and at the same time undertake restricted commitments, such as the defence of France and Belgium. Commitments far more restricted than any conceivable today were held in 1914 to make it inevitable that we should take part in a war which had its origins in the murder of an Austrian Archduke by a Serb in the Balkans. The last few months have shown that, with any

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commitments to a European Power, the murder of a Spanish fascist in Madrid might easily once more involve us in a European war.

Isolation means, therefore, a withdrawal from all guarantees or understandings involving defence of another state against attack or aggression. If one believes war to be inevitable or practically inevitable, there is much to be said for such a policy. But if one adopts it, one must face its implications and its consequences. It implies the abandonment of any attempt of this country either to prevent war or to stand by France and the other democratic countries against fascist aggression. It is exactly the policy which Herr Hitler desires this country to pursue, for he has always worked to divide Britain from France. It would, therefore, enormously strengthen the fascist Powers and make them more reckless even than in the last two years, more unrestrained in violent and aggressive actions. It might well precipitate a war. Nevertheless it remains a reasonable policy, provided that one believes that (1) war cannot be prevented, now that the League has been destroyed, and (2) a defence of liberty and democracy and of the democratic states against fascism and the fascist Powers is not possible by means of war.

But that is not the end of the matter. Once having decided upon a policy of isolation, you still have to face the question of national security and so of armaments. And here the isolationists split into two completely contradictory halves, the pacifists and the imperialists. The best defence of the complete pacifist position has been made by Mr. Bertrand Russell. He argues that after Manchuria and Abyssinia the prevention of war by collective security or alliance is clearly impossible. The overwhelming superiority of attack over defence in aerial warfare has made the defence of liberty and democracy against fascist aggression impossible, for a European war would lead to the bombing, burning,

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and gassing of the great cities on both sides, and the most appalling slaughter, savagery, starvation, and chaos would inevitably end in military dictatorships. But these facts not only force us to adopt a policy of isolation, because they render any attempt to defend a democratic state like France against a fascist attack useless, they also make any attempt upon our part to defend ourselves against aggression by armaments useless. It is only by disarming, whether other states do so or not, and by being prepared to abandon our Empire, that there is any prospect of our being able to avoid unprovoked attack upon ourselves by states like Germany and Italy. Mr. Russell argues for this policy with extraordinary clarity and cogency. But I do not believe that it is a practical policy today, even if theoretically it be sound. In politics the existing psychology of the mass of humanity is a fact or factor which has to be allowed for in formulating a policy no less than the destructive power of bombs, the speed of aeroplanes, and the barbarous brains of dictators. The whole of Mr. Russell's argument and policy rests upon the premise that the defence of large centres of population against aerial attack is no longer possible. I incline myself to believe this to be true, but it is not nearly as certain as Mr. Russell maintains. There are, no doubt, many "experts" who assert it, but there are as many who deny it. It is not a fact which the great mass of people believe to be true, and there is insufficient evidence for convincing them that it is true. To expect, therefore, that you can get millions of ordinary men and women to take so revolutionary a step as complete disarmament in the face of a militarized and aggressive Germany, and on the top of that to "abandon the empire," basing this colossal revolution on a hypothesis which is not and cannot be certain, is to believe in political and psychological miracles. I know of no event in the history of the human race which shows that that kind of

large-scale, sudden, miraculous conversion is possible. The vast mass of people will have to be destroyed by airplanes in the next war before they believe it and draw the obvious conclusion that war is an anachronism.

There is, however, another armaments policy which might be combined with pacific isolation and answer the legitimate demand of ordinary people for some assurance of security. It is put forward in Mr. Griffin's book. It proposes that we should concentrate solely on defence, building, for instance, not bombers to bomb Berlin, but only fighters to defend London, constructing bomb-proof shelters and storing food. In this way we should make it clear that we would under no circumstances take part in an offensive war and that our armaments were useless for attack, but that we would and could defend ourselves against attack. To what extent this kind of defensive armament policy is capable of ensuring security is not clear, but Mr. Griffin shows, I think, that much more could be done in that direction. It has much to recommend it to pacifists who are prepared to defend themselves, but not the rest of Europe, against the fascist Powers.

The position of imperialist isolationists, like Lord Beaverbrook and Mr. Garvin, is entirely different and is to me, I must admit, inexplicable. The psychology of this new British imperialism was admirably analyzed by Sir Norman Angell in a recent issue of this journal. The policy is one of no commitments and continual retreat before the demands and aggressions of Italy, Germany and Japan, but it is combined with a policy of enormous rearmament and the organization of the country and its industries for war. It certainly envisages the defence of the empire from any attack, but it is prepared to abandon in advance, as in the Mediterranean, every position which the imperialist has hitherto considered to be the keys to that defence rather than oppose

a fascist Power. The idea behind this policy seems to be an attempt to buy off the fascist Powers by concessions, by giving them a free hand in Manchuria, against Russia, in the Mediterranean, against Abyssinia, in Spain, or in Austria, as the case may be, in the hope that they will leave the British Empire alone. I do not understand how anyone can believe that the British Empire can be made permanently unpalatable to the appetites of dissatisfied Powers, and, if the imperialist's philosophy be accepted, it is shortsighted for a potential victim of the famished tiger to strengthen him by throwing to him other victims rather than to combine with them in the hope of driving him off. It should be noted that the Government and a good many other people inconsistently try to combine this policy with one of limited commitments to the victims and even with the tattered umbrella of "collective security"—a good instance of the confusion and vacillation, the fear of facing the consequences of a particular policy, which were referred to above.

III. A POLICY OF SATISFYING DISSATISFIED POWERS

In Mr. Roden Buxton's book will be found a detailed policy which aims at satisfying the legitimate grievances of the fascist Powers and so of weaning them from war. As a programme of international justice, both in the political and economic fields, it is admirable, and unless many of its proposals were adopted, there could probably be no permanent basis for peace. There are many such programmes of international reform, admirable and sensible in their way, now being put forward by private persons and even by members of the Government. They are all based upon the assumption that some action on the part of our Government might prevent war; they all assume the existence of an effective League or even of an effective system of collective security. They are all five years too late. If they had been

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adopted when the League was still alive and there was still time to lay the economic bases of peace, when the tigers had not yet tasted blood, and when the next victims were not yet completely panic stricken, they might have prevented war. But they are long-term programmes and proposals. The refusal of Italy to be satisfied with anything less than the military conquest of Abyssinia shows that they have nothing of any attraction to offer to statesmen in Hitler's or Mussolini's frame of mind. Our problem is a short-term problem: how to prevent war in the next two years or even the next six months and whether, if it cannot be prevented, we are to keep out of it. There is no answer to that problem in proposals for satisfying the "legitimate" demands of Germany and Italy.

IV. ALLIANCE

There are various possible forms of alliance which this country might enter into today, ranging from an alliance with the fascist bloc to an alliance with those states prepared to resist attack from that bloc. At present only a very small minority would seriously consider an actual alliance with Germany and Italy, though a much larger minority might favour some "understanding" with those Powers and might actively encourage their crusade against communism and Russia. For practical purposes, then, the only kind of alliance which needs to be considered is one with France, Belgium, Russia, and the other states of Europe menaced by Germany and Italy. The arguments for this policy have been stated with admirable lucidity by Mr. Brailsford in the following sentences:

"The new phase of the European situation revealed by the Spanish affair is the alignment of forces on the pattern of an international class war. The main strategy of Germany is to isolate the Soviet Union, so that

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Hitler shall enjoy a free hand for a future attack. Partly from pacifism, partly from a sense of class solidarity, the capitalist democracies are playing into his hands; thanks to their monotonous retreats the prestige of the fascist Powers is so enhanced that the conditions for a successful attack on the Soviet Union may soon be realised. The only strategy to meet this situation is to unite in a firm defensive alliance the states in which the working class is still free—our own country, France and the Soviet Union, with Scandinavia and Spain, if the Republic survives."

Those who put forward this policy must believe that it can obtain one or both of the following results: (1) the prevention of a European war, (2) in the event of war, the defeat of the fascist Powers and a successful defence of liberty and democracy or socialism. Mr. Brailsford seems to maintain that it might prevent war, for he argues that such a coalition "could negotiate without weakness, and even, on terms, satisfy some of the legitimate grievances of the have-nots." The question is obviously highly speculative, for it is arguable that the formation of a strong coalition of this kind might easily precipitate war, for Germany and Italy would feel that time would certainly turn the balance of military power steadily against them, and that therefore it was better to strike while the enemy is still at his weakest. The policy can, however, be defended by anyone who believes that it will not prevent war, but that (1) the coalition could defeat the fascist Powers when attacked, and (2) Mr. Russell is mistaken in asserting that the results of aerial warfare would be so devastating both to victors and vanquished, that war would destroy civilization and with it liberty, democracy and socialism, even in those countries "in which the working class is still free."

It should be noticed that this policy is often combined

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or confused with a policy of what is called collective security. Even Mr. Brailsford says that it "should not be conceived as an old-world defensive expedient. It should endeavour to realize an ideal of constructive peace and co-operation, unattainable within a mixed League of sovereign states. Starting from a measure of identity in their social outlook, these allies should aim at something approaching a federal structure." Others talk of it as the nucleus of a new League and collective security system, which would be open to all, even the fascist states, provided that they accepted its obligations and abjured their fascist doctrines for those of democracy and socialism. It is conceivable that, if this kind of coalition succeeded in preventing the outbreak of war for a considerable period of time, it might gradually transform itself into an organ of "constructive peace and co-operation" and tame the tigers so that they would voluntarily become sheep and enter the fold. But it would begin as an armed alliance of democratic and socialist states against the fascist states in a Europe where, as Mr. Brailsford sees, forces are already aligned on the pattern of an international class war. To sit down and cover oneself in the mantle of the pacifist and so watch the destruction of all liberty piecemeal in one country after the other may be more than the human nature of the most pacific democrat or socialist can stand. That, in my opinion, is the reason why this policy of a coalition of non-fascist states must, at the moment, reluctantly be adopted by the pacific democrat or socialist. I have already explained why the complete logical isolation and unilateral disarmament of Mr. Russell, Mr. Lansbury, and others is impractical. A policy of defensive isolation accompanied by defensive armaments is not open to the same objections, but it can only be adopted by people who feel that they can answer satisfactorily two other objections, one rational and the other emotional. A wealthy empire like ours which withdrew from

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all commitments might for a time, if well armed, escape the attention of the fascist states while they were engaged in other directions, but history shows that sooner or later our turn would almost certainly come. But if we shall be forced to fight Germany and Italy in the end, it would be wiser to do so in alliance with France and Russia than allow those states to be crushed and crippled and then fight alone. The other objection is this. Europe is being ranged, as was said, in the pattern of an international class war. Behind that war is a crusade of ideas, a struggle between two opposed types of society, the one a society of slaves, savages, and supermen, the other of civilized free men. I do not believe that it is psychologically possible to stand aside from that conflict and watch in isolation in nation after nation at one's very doors the destruction of everything which one values in society. And in politics nothing is more disastrous than to base one's policy upon what is psychologically impossible.

There remains then the policy of alliance. Those who adopt it must face its implications and consequences. It requires for success a resolute government in all the chief allied states, backed by resolute people, prepared to satisfy all legitimate grievances of fascist states, but also to oppose them in any attack, such as we are now witnessing in Spain, on non-fascist governments. And it requires armaments capable of resisting such attack. Unless those conditions are fulfilled, the policy of alliance would be a policy of suicide.

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By DAVID THOMSON

MR. H. N. BRAILSFORD'S pamphlet, *Towards a New League*,¹ is a most valuable contribution towards clearer thinking about the League of Nations. It is a plea for Federal Government, "with a general staff for economic planning, and a strong executive responsible to a democratic legislature," and as the necessary corollary to this, the formation, within the League, of a smaller League of like-minded democratic states, which may provide the real springs of co-operative movement and action so lamentably and fatally lacking in the past sixteen years. The pamphlet is a lucid statement of the arguments, historical and practical, which lead irresistibly to this conclusion, that "we who confess a common social faith shall attempt the first decisive steps towards a federal system of peace." The purpose of this article is to examine, from a wider and more philosophical point of view, the international implications of this "common social faith," and to suggest further possible devices whereby democratic institutions might be better adapted to the international expression of public opinion: so that it is in every sense supplementary to Mr. Brailsford's pamphlet.

So much attention has been devoted to the particular problems of sovereignty, security, disarmament, and the rest, in discussions of the nature of the League, that the one great glaring truth about it has usually been overlooked; that the League is, in the last analysis, the projection into the international sphere of the tolerant, secular state which was born at the Renaissance, and reached adolescence in the seventeenth, and maturity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

¹ Published by the *New Statesman and Nation*, July 1936.

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However widely one may disagree with Professor Laski's materialist interpretation of *The Rise of European Liberalism*, it must be admitted that he gives a clear and convincing impression of the secular state and the philosophy which accompanied it. When society became detached from its medieval theological basis some other source of authority had to be found: this was found—by men like Machiavelli and Bodin—in the sovereignty of secular power. This secular authority, placing the efficiency of political unity above the value of theological conformity, developed into a tolerant power. Professor Laski urges that tolerance came because it paid; "tolerance came because intolerance interfered with the access to wealth." It may have paid the bourgeoisie—though, if it so obviously did, why was tolerance so slowly accepted outside England, Holland and France? But it certainly paid princes, for purposes of political unity, to be tolerant. And, as Professor Laski admits, liberal capitalists took with them in their rise ideas and principles which they did not consciously seek to promote. "They required a secular and tolerant state. But to achieve this kind of state they had to undermine the theological framework of unity upon which it had been erected, out of whose slow erosion it had emerged. To effect this erosion they had to accept a new philosophy fatal, in the end, to the religious principles they themselves held." Then came seventeenth-century science, with its rationalist and secularising tendencies; then the fierce attack of the eighteenth-century *philosophes* on intolerance, fanaticism and superstition. The preservation of order became the highest political good, and the supreme aim of the state. The keynote of the secular state is the argument of the *politiques* of sixteenth-century France, that civil society must not perish for conscience's sake; common citizenship replaced religious belief as the cement of society, and political right no longer needed ecclesiastical sanction.

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The new heresy is treason, and though society may tolerate religious beliefs that are wrong, it will tolerate belief only so long as it does not lead to a breach of the peace. Universalism has gone as a religious ideal, and unity has replaced it as a political hope. A new universalism is created in the totality of the Great Leviathan. Christendom may be split, but Caesar lives. The King of Kings is dead ; long live the King !

Now the experiment of the League of Nations is an attempt both to remedy the defects and to universalise the principles of this secular polity. It was found that when the king's peace had been safely established within the borders of united nations, they became bedevilled of a restless spirit of nationalism, which carried them into conflict with one another, and order perished on a grander scale than ever before. And so, by an inherent logic of their own, the principles of the secular state were extended to comprise the society of nation-states. Once again, the supreme aim was political order and peace. Once again, religious differences were ignored in face of political necessities, and the *cuius regio eius religio* principles of 1648 were again applied. A Christian country might, after signing the Covenant, be committed to take military action in conjunction with Buddhist, Mahomedan or atheist states, against another Christian state for a breach of secular order. Race and colour, civilisation and culture, were likewise ignored. One recalls how often it was eagerly urged, when Mussolini first invaded Abyssinia, that we ought to support the imposition of sanctions *because* the Abyssinians were Christians : a totally irrelevant consideration, in the light of the Covenant. One recalls how others, like Mr. Bernard Shaw, urged that we should leave them to their fate, as black barbarians. And so, in crisis, such differences come to seem of prime importance ; but the highest good recognised by the Covenant is the maintenance of world

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peace, and that such was the most immediately desirable good seemed to most of us in 1919 painfully self-evident. We have yet to make up our minds whether we really do want peace at any price, or whether the price that the Covenant rightly insists we must pay—absolute tolerance of differences of race, colour and religion—is more than we can bring ourselves to pay. I believe we have no alternative here. But must there, therefore, be no limits at all to the tolerance of those who would build a secular world order ? Are there, in short, no differences between states which *are* relevant considerations in the maintenance of secular order ?

I believe that there is one supremely relevant consideration ; the political structure and political philosophy of the member states. And that we have scarcely considered. At this moment it is wise to examine the real foundations of the existing machinery. It is here contended that these foundations are essentially those of liberal democracy ; that in so far as the League has failed it is because it has strayed from these basic principles ; and that only in its reconstruction and reinterpretation on the lines of a rejuvenated democracy can hope of its salvation be found.

The secular state may clearly take one of two forms. In its desire for unity and social solidarity it may, in panic, create the Great Leviathan of Hobbes ; or it may, laboriously and slowly, build up the contractual state of Locke and Burke. It may seek the uniformity that comes from submission to a despotic prince ; or it may elicit unity of consent by means of a parliamentary system. There may be infinite varieties of intermediate kinds, but these are the two main contrasting types. Parliamentary democracy is often curiously denounced as a method of counting heads to save breaking them ; which is surely a better method than breaking heads and never counting them at all. It is based on the belief that

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heads ought to count for something, and that they certainly count for more than arms ; and that the breaking of heads is, in fact, the breakdown of all politics in that it is the breakdown both of reason and of reasonableness. So little did this belief seem contemptible to the men who made the Covenant of the League that they applied the principles of liberal democracy to the creation of the new international machinery. And if the League, in one aspect, is the logical culmination of the tolerant secular state, it is also, in another, the apotheosis of the liberal democratic state.

It was the democratic states of Britain, France and America which seemed to have triumphed in 1919 ; it was the pre-war autocracies of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary which crumbled and fell. Liberal democracy seemed to have survived a world war, and it may well have seemed the most hopeful basis for world-peace. The new succession states were so much in harmony with the mood of the time that their constitutions, as well as that of Germany, were modelled on democratic lines. For a moment it seemed that the world really had been made safe for democracy. Into this environment was the Covenant born—the child of that supreme democrat, Woodrow Wilson. The general deliberative assembly of all members, the rule of one state one vote, the right of secession after two years, the general rule of unanimity for decisions, all reflect the liberal ideas of free discussion and individual self-determination. The very faith in the power of reason as a solvent of disputes, which underlies the whole conception of the League, is also the basis of parliamentary democracy. “Descartes, Burke and Jefferson,” says Sir Alfred Zimmern, “were not members of the committee that drafted the Covenant of the League of Nations ; but their ghosts were an active influence throughout its proceedings.” I am concerned to suggest that these same ghosts should be co-opted on any redrafting committee.

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The fatal defects of the League were threefold : first, that it had to include, from the first, non-democratic states like Japan ; second, that no provision was made for reconsideration of the legitimacy of the membership of any state which subsequently underwent a fundamental revolution of political structure ; third, that the clause of Article I (“any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony..... may become a member of the League”) was interpreted to mean “self-governing” only in the sense of “free from foreign control.” It is perhaps a pity that “national self-government” can mean both civil liberty and national independence ; for the two may well be mutually hostile. And so the League of Woodrow Wilson was stillborn, and the League as we know it is at best a supposititious child. The combination of all three defects meant the sacrifice of the essential liberal democratic nature of the League to the universalist ideal of the League as the extension of the secular state. Clearly, the two aspects of it had to be harmonised. The very life of the League depended upon its being a synthesis of the two principles of secular universalism and political group-responsibility ; of the two-fold ideal of world order *by means of* liberal democracy. It was assumed that world order could be attained only by all-inclusiveness ; experience has since indicated that all-inclusiveness is at present unattainable ; and so there is widespread disillusionment. But the original assumption is by no means self-evident. The tragedy is that the qualitative content of the League was sacrificed to the quantitative, and liberalism was lost for the sake of soothing totalitarian sovereignties which have been ready to abandon the League that they helped to paralyse.

It is ludicrous to have within the democratic structure of the League powerful members whose whole basis is positive hostility to the principles of democracy. Mussolini has never scrupled to express such antagonism. “Fascism has taken

up an attitude of complete opposition to the doctrines of Liberalism, both in the political field and the field of economics." Because dictators are in some ways easier men to deal with internationally than liberal politicians, he has long been accepted as a good internationalist. But the irreconcilable conflict between the two philosophies has at last emerged, and the Italian invasion of her fellow-member is simply the descent of that conflict from the realm of ideas into the world of bloodstained facts. It must always be a handicap for the League to include any state not "fully self-governing" in both senses, but the inclusion of states which are an active and living contradiction of the very idea of political liberty has led to paralysis. These incompatibilities have a habit of working themselves out in practice in this way; which may not be altogether regrettable—for has the League not tended to reform itself?

The full import of the reshuffle of membership of the League is seldom realised. Before the Japanese dispute it was a congeries of "respectable" capitalist states, and the chief outcast was Soviet Russia. Since the entry of Russia and the successive departures of imperialist Japan, Nazi Germany and now, virtually, of Fascist Italy, it has become a clear alignment of the states with more democratic and international ideals as against those excessively authoritarian and nationalistic. The issue between democratic internationalism and national sovereignty of the Leviathan type is tending to become materialised in this alignment. The balance between secular universalism and democratic liberalism has thus been in some measure rectified by the historical process. But has it been rectified too late? Can the existing League be so readjusted now along the lines of true liberal democracy as to give it coherence of character and decisiveness of action and make it at last a political reality?

Sir Alfred Zimmern writes, "Representative democracy

depends for its successful working above all on confidence—confidence between the executive and the legislature and between the legislature and the electorate, confidence between the group of men at the centre of affairs, whether in Cabinet or in Parliament or in the executive departments, and the millions of men and women at the circumference, removed from immediate contact with day to day political happenings, who constitute the element of public opinion But in the sphere of international affairs it is precisely this indispensable element of confidence which has been lacking."¹ All of which is very true. But perhaps it is worth remembering that the devourer of confidence has been the excessive nationalism rampant in such states as Japan, Italy and Germany—those big Powers which Sir Alfred would seek above all to placate and negotiate with, to restore the "concert of Europe." Confidence can only grow slowly, and must be the product rather than the immediate basis of secular order. Confidence will indeed be necessary for the successful working of the international system; but its first necessity is rather a definite common purpose—the maintenance of order—combined with the free self-expression of all members. Democracy, as Mr. Bassett remarks, is not a particular kind of civilisation; it is rather "a civilised way of taking political action."² And so, when Herr Hitler claims, as he claimed at Frankfurt last March, "No, I have not done away with democracy, but merely simplified it," he is simply claiming to have uncivilised it. When Mussolini claims that "Fascism may write itself down as an organised and authoritative democracy," he is likewise distorting it as a political method. As Mr. Bassett points out, the only "fundamental" upon which men must agree in democracy is the democratic method; then other "fundamentals" cease to be dangerous to the system. The method is free discussion by responsible repre-

¹ The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935.

² The Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy, 1935.

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sentatives, culminating in voluntary agreement upon joint action for the common good.

Fascism and Nazism cannot partake usefully in such discussion, not only because they do not believe in free discussion but above all because they do not want the same end. "The creativeness of discussion," as the Master of Balliol has said, "assumes a common purpose animating those who take part in it." The supreme purpose of a League would be the maintenance of world peace; but Mussolini emphatically declares that he believes "neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace.....War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy, and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it." Hitler and his colleagues have repeatedly made similar statements. I believe that nothing but paralysis of politics can result from attempting to comprise this outlook within the League. It is better that the doctrine should be repudiated from the first than that its incompatibility should emerge in the bitterness of political experience. There is little to be gained by renouncing war as an instrument of national policy if it is retained as an ideal of nationalist philosophy. It is clear that universality and effectiveness are not at the moment attainable together in international affairs. Hitherto effectiveness has been sacrificed to universality, with the result that universality, too, has perished. It is time that we tried the alternative method, in the hope that then universality, too, may eventually be added unto us.

It may well be urged that an attempt to reorganise the League on a liberal-democratic or any other basis is doomed to failure so long as the United States of America remains aloof from it; which I believe, in the long run, to be true. But I believe that the only basis for the effective co-operation of America is a truly democratic League—the formation, as modern jargon would have it, of a democratic *bloc*, a

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"Geneva front," to which America can feel that she is acceding to strengthen democracy in the world, and not merely to confirm an alliance of the Versailles Powers which may well embroil her in the age-long childish quarrels of the old world. I believe that, in the long run, the balance of the old world can be redressed only by calling in the new; but it has been clearly writ in recent experience, for all who care to read, that the new world will feel the call only of political principle, and not of the political convenience of the European Powers. The world still has to be made—if not safe—at least habitable for democracy; and this cannot be done by armaments and nationalism and war.

Democracy, I would repeat, is essentially a civilised way of taking political action. It is the way of free discussion by responsible representatives. Given a League whose members have unreservedly accepted this method, the problem of revision is the problem of responsible representation. The precise nature of representation is an eternal issue between radical and liberal democracy. The one, insisting upon the direct sovereignty of the people, distrusts and seeks to restrict the elected representative; the other, believing in the immediate sovereignty of parliament, entrusts the representative with freedom of judgment. The issue first arose clearly in England at the end of the eighteenth century, between parliamentary liberals like Burke and radical reformers like Wilkes and later Charles James Fox. In the new democratic constitutions of post-war Europe it was the radical which tended to prevail over the liberal: and in the international assembly the hands of national representatives were most clearly tied by "instructions to representatives." Yet the considerations which Burke urged against such previous instructions all apply, with much greater force, to international representation. Article X of the Covenant enshrined the principle of national self-determination and independence,

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and made it permanent ; though cynical reflection that such permanence is purely theoretical may well be occasioned by the fate of Abyssinia. Statesmen meet in the Assembly not as national representatives but as agents of national interests and as spokesmen of the politics of power. They go with hands already tied by their respective governments ; they are given "instructions" to which they must conform. The Assembly is thus precisely what Burke declared a parliament must never be—"a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests," and not a "deliberative assembly.....with one interest, that of the whole." At bottom, it is a confusion which comes from thinking in terms of will rather than of reason and judgment. The fallacies of power politics have been carried forward into the League structure, and frustration is then inevitable. If government, as Burke pointed out, were merely a matter of *will* upon any side, then the will of the represented ought certainly to prevail. "But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination ; and what sort of reason is that in which the determination precedes the discussion ; in which one set of men deliberate, and another decide ; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments ?" Within the parliamentary state it is, of course, the device of organised political party which secures that deliberation and decision are responsibly linked together. In international deliberation there is no such device and no such liaison. The evolution of the League cannot be vouched for because there is this missing link. Popular passion for peace is thwarted because political science has not yet invented a device for securing that international decisions shall be the result not only of will and inclination, but of reason and judgment ; or even of securing that the will exercised in foreign affairs shall invariably be today's opinion of the majority

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of nations, and not merely yesterday's opinion of the foreign offices. Both reforms are necessary. What prospect is there of any such devices being invented ? Is there any way of combining responsible representation with independence of judgment and initiative ?

This country has tried the experiment of a Minister for League of Nations Affairs, freed from the direct control of the Foreign Office, and much scorn has been poured upon the failure of the experiment. Undoubtedly it fails if it merely gives us two Foreign Secretaries, who are likely to be at sixes and sevens with one another. But I believe that it could be strikingly successful if all negotiations with all members of a reconstituted democratic League of Nations were entrusted to the Minister for League of Nations affairs, acting through the League machinery and quite independently of the Foreign Office ; and if the Foreign Secretary—the subordinate official—were left to superintend such diplomatic contact as were necessary with "foreign" states outside the League. The distinction itself would be significant of the change of attitude desired, in that it would make membership of the League mean something. To objections of impracticability, I would reply with two considerations ; first, that a geographical division of foreign affairs between two secretaries was in fact the normal method in this country until 1782 ; second, that such a division would not be haphazardly geographical, as then, but would be an organic division of functions necessitated by the revolution of belonging to a reconstructed and effectual international system. Moreover, there is the hope that it may eventually be eliminated by the real universality of the League. That membership of the League has not already involved some such change is the most bitter commentary on how little the international system really means.

It was a shrewd political instinct that made the foreign

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policy of this country for so long the jealously guarded monopoly of the Crown rather than of Parliament, for a foreign representative must be essentially a national spokesman rather than a party man. Given a League of Nations which has asserted its right to require all members unreservedly to accept the supremacy of reasonableness in international affairs, and to demonstrate that acceptance by applying that same principle within its own borders—then each national representative could be and should be given much greater independence of judgment. Moreover, his tasks would be more technical, and comparable to those of our present foreign ambassadors who are already freed from the fluctuations of domestic party conflicts. But he must not, of course, become a glorified civil servant unaffected by national public opinion; he must be readily responsive to national decision as regards the general lines of policy. If he is not to be subject to public opinion through the regular machinery of party control, I would suggest securing his direct responsiveness and responsibility by means of a limited system of recall. With adequate safeguards to prevent a mere ramp—such, for example, as a time-interval—he should be subject to recall, in the last resort, by a direct majority decision in the country, and a suitable successor whose policy is more congenial to public opinion should be appointed by parliament. For the recall never to be exercised would be the strongest evidence of its efficacy. Such a system would be a permanent guarantee to other nations that the national spokesman really did represent the attitude of his country. International conferences would be no longer a setting for the manoeuvres of irresponsible politicians. And the citizen would be given a direct and personal voice in determining the basis of his country's international activities. It would at last be possible to feel a real loyalty to the League; for loyalty is impossible without a personal freedom to decide.

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But I believe that such a device as this would lose half its value unless it were accompanied by the establishment of something in the nature of a "Ministry for Peace." Clearly, public opinion is laid unduly open to influence by a sensational press and other irresponsible forces which distort it and use it for sinister ends; and this is even truer of France than of Britain. The only adequate recognition of the moral responsibility of a democratic government for maintaining peace is the establishment of a national organisation which may counteract excessive jingoism and other forces antagonistic to peace; which may devote at least as much enterprise and energy to research into the psychology of war-fever and war-mentality as is at present devoted to the negative business of military defence against attack. The extent to which such a notion seems quixotic is the extent to which democratic thought has yet to develop before it can be internationalised. Every politician knows that he is not in fact the mere agent of a ready-made public or "general" will, in the formation of which he can play no part or take no responsibility. Apart from a government's duties of leadership, the intensive advertising of the present government is a tacit recognition of a government's ability to foster a public opinion congenial to its own policy. Yet no state has carried this process to its logical conclusion, and set up a Ministry of Peace.

In short, the trend of progressive thought in this country seems to be towards the conviction that reform of the League must take some form of restriction, either of its membership or of its sphere of action. All schemes which pin their faith on a general acceptance of "Christian morality" seem to me to miss the point, in that the *immediate* need of an effective political instrument is imperative, and such universal conversion would take an indefinite time. I reject, too, the arguments of General Smuts and others in favour of limiting

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League activities to humanitarian work and the mere expression of moral disapproval, on the similar grounds that whilst such a long-range policy may be invaluable for creating peace, the immediate necessity is the more negative task of preventing war, and there is every evidence that unless that is done there will not be "a long run." Likewise I reject the predilection of Sir Alfred Zimmern for a species of international feudalism, whereby the community of nations is apparently to commend itself to the safe-keeping of a group of Great Powers, acting by right of their superior strength; for experience shows that Great Powers, as such, are more apt to be robber-barons than Knights-errant. I believe that the most practical and hopeful principle of exclusion is refusal to accept the democratic method of free discussion, in both internal and external politics; for so intimately are the two connected in the modern world, that it is impossible for one scheme of thought to prevail in internal politics, and an opposing scheme to dominate external. As Mr. Brailsford suggests, there are several states which logically exclude themselves—indeed, most of these have already done so. There is little doubt that pooled financial and economic advantages must accompany pooled security. But both must be preceded by pooled wisdom, in the process of free discussion and the experience of free decision.

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By FREDA UTLEY

GERMANY has now definitely called in the East to redress the balance of Europe. Although the open proclamation of an alliance is new an understanding has undoubtedly long existed, and the real alliance between the greatest dictatorship of the West and the great autocracy of the East was probably concluded long before this. In September, 1934, in the columns of *Die Tat* Von Leers wrote with cynical frankness:—

"In politics we cannot expect all our friends to acquire blue eyes and to become blondes to please us. Politics are a matter of the real interests of nations and have little in common with race kinship. From the standpoint of our position we are interested in the prosperity of every non-European Power. Every such Power will bind the forces of our neighbours and this will release the German forces."

So now we have the pleasant spectacle of the Aryan persecutors of Jews pursuing a policy designed to bring the dominant Yellow race of Asia into European politics. The Nazis whose sacred mission it was to establish the "Nordic Race" as the rulers of Europe are today in alliance with Franco's Moors in Spain and with the Mongol-Malayan Japanese in Asia. Dictatorship does indeed make strange bedfellows.

It begins to look as if the next world war were more likely to break out in the East than in the West. How much safer for the Germans to start the war by coming to the assistance of their Japanese allies, when the latter are ready to turn a Manchurian border incident into a Russo-Japanese war, than it would be for Germany to attack Russia first. In the former event the Germans may consider it pretty certain that England would say the war was no business of hers and keep out of it. Whereas an unprovoked attack on the U.S.S.R. in Europe, where there are a thousand eyes to see and papers to report just what has happened, might arouse

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too strong a feeling in England and in France for the Governments not to come to the assistance of the victim of aggression, a "border incident" in Manchuria or a "fishing incident" off the coast of Kamchatka would be seen by no one and could be represented to the world as though the Japanese were the innocent victims. A war begun in the Far East would no doubt be presented to us by our present Government as a remote affair which did not concern us and would be hailed in certain quarters in Britain as a most useful occupation for the Japanese militarists, likely to keep them from doing further damage to British interest in China.

Most of our statesmen would refuse to see the further implications and would shut their eyes to the future dangers. The Dominions, or at least Australia, would breathe a sigh of relief, believing that for a generation at least Japan would be unable to turn south. In September, 1935, Sir Frank Clarke, President of the Victoria Legislative Council, said at a State Luncheon given in honour of Debuchi (Japan's "goodwill" envoy and late Ambassador to the U.S.A.) that "Australia wished Japan well so long as she confined her expansion to the north and west."

Apart from the fact that Japan is most unlikely to be able to tear off Eastern Siberia from the U.S.S.R., what both Australian and English Conservative opinion ignores is that neither Siberia, nor Manchuria, nor North China can satisfy Japan. Her "destiny" as her "patriots" have proclaimed, must lead her South to the rich warm lands of the Pacific and Indian oceans to acquire possession of their oil and rubber and iron. The Roman Empire did not save itself by allowing the barbarians to occupy some provinces and calling them allies. Eventually the barbarians overran the whole Empire. Yet British statesmen believe that Japan can be conciliated and kept from a direct attack on British interests by always giving way to her and by flattering the "sister Island Empire." The effect on Japan is to make her daily more aggressive and confident. The following extract from a Japanese newspaper is typical of what the Japanese public is being told:—

"British civilisation is falling into the background, and taking advantage of this opportunity the European Powers are beginning to lift their heads. At any rate

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Britain has lost its weighty power in the world since the Manchurian incident. The Powers have begun to start free actions since Britain has fallen into the background. Britain will gradually be forced to re-adjust its overseas branch offices as it has lost its fighting spirit." (*Nagoya Shinaichi*, August 1, 1935.)

Japan, of course, believes that she can continue to take advantage of the European situation to work her will on Asia and the alliance with Germany is invaluable to her for this purpose.

Those people in England who see in the new alliance merely a threat to the U.S.S.R. may suffer a rude awakening. Japan may well consider that the main advantage she derives from the pact is the immobilisation of the Russian armies, giving her a free hand in China and the rest of "East Asia." It cannot be doubted that it is mainly fear of the Russian army in her rear which has prevented her from gobbling up China more rapidly than she has done so far. Japan discovered the useful pretext of a fight against Communism as a cloak to cover wanton aggression long before the Germans thought of it. Japan has for years been calling on the Chinese Government to let it help her to exterminate Communism and using the Communist bogey as an excuse to extend her conquests. For Japan the alliance to combat Communism is far more likely to be the prelude to further attacks on feeble China—which further attacks must inevitably jeopardise British interests—than on the strongly armed U.S.S.R. Germany, taking a leaf out of Japan's book, wants to turn Czecho-Slovakia into a second Manchuria as a jumping off ground for an attempt to get possession of Ukraina's food supplies. War on Communism provides a convenient excuse for trying to acquire the food reserves which would make her invulnerable to any second naval blockade by the Western Powers, and therefore bring her nearer to her goal of acquiring the hegemony of Europe. That Czecho-Slovakia is the designated approach to the Ukraine is clear from the fierce press campaign now being waged in Germany against "Communist" Czecho-Slovakia.

The pact between Japan and Germany is paralleled by the German-Italian agreement made by Count Ciano in Berlin

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last November, and these two Alliances are rounded off by the Italian-Japanese politico-military agreement which obviously exists. The quiet and unobtrusive way in which this latter agreement has been concluded, the absence of Italy when the religious class war was proclaimed by Japan and Germany in Berlin, are undoubtedly due to the Italian desire not to prejudice the Anglo-Italian negotiations concerning the Mediterranean which are now proceeding. The Dictators, unused to the necessity of convincing their own peoples, as distinct from "telling them," are apt to display a certain crudity and naive confidence in their ability to hoodwink other Powers. Thus Italy no doubt imagines that if she keeps quiet about her understanding with Japan and is very polite about the "British Constitutional Crisis" in her newspapers, no one is going to see anything more than appears on the surface in her recognition of Manchukuo and Japan's recognition of the Italian Empire of Abyssinia. Germany, having less to gain immediately in Spain by an outward consideration of British interest, is less careful than Italy.

There is little doubt that the terms of the German-Italian agreement are based on a division of spheres of interest which gives Germany a free hand with regard to Austria and Czecho-Slovakia in the preparation for an attack on the Ukraine; and gives Italy paramount rights in the Mediterranean and Spain and a free hand in acquiring Hungary and Jugo-Slavia as allies. Hungary's claims for the revision of her frontiers are to be supported by Italy, even though this entails some sacrifice of territory by Jugo-Slavia. Jugo-Slavia is to be compensated by a military alliance with Italy and with commercial privileges including a free use together with Hungary of the port of Fiume.

The circle is now complete and the terrain of expansion marked out for each of the "have not" powers. Japan's interest in German and Italian aggression is obvious; to her in Asia is left the largest and freest field for expansion available to any of the three, provided Britain can be immobilised in Europe and the U.S.S.R. kept busy defending her European frontiers. Italy at the highest point of military preparedness which she can hope to reach with her present

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resources is anxious not to delay until British rearmament has gathered momentum. She will certainly risk a European war now rather than let Franco be defeated. Germany, whose war preparations are not yet complete, may wish to delay a year or two longer at least until her food supplies are more adequately arranged for. But Germany may also consider that an opportunity as favourable as the present may never occur again. Wars cannot be declared according to time-table, the favourable moment must be taken advantage of whatever the risk.

Japan, whose economic strength is already strained to the utmost by the past four years of undeclared war against China and by the armaments race with the U.S.S.R., might well share Italy's point of view were it not for the fact that if she can wait a little longer the shortcomings in her armaments can be made good by technical assistance and the supply of aircraft, automobiles and tanks from German and Italian factories.

Although Germany's new ally in the East is as near to bankruptcy as herself, although neither the one nor the other can give the financial assistance which both desperately need, Germany can supply what Japan most lacks industrially and also instructors to train pilots for Japan's immature air force; whilst Japan can supply Germany with Manchurian soya beans with which no doubt "ersatz" butter and confectionery will be made for the German people. But the soya bean, whose oil can be used for so many purposes, useful as it is, cannot remedy all Germany's food deficiency. Moreover, as a Japanese writer in the semi-Government organ *Contemporary Japan* remarked last September, "The geographical position of Germany and Japan will make it rather difficult for them to help each other when an emergency arises."

At present Japan imports 109 million yen's worth of goods from Germany and exports a mere 71 million. The largest item of imports is machines and parts and the second largest is iron. The only other goods of importance are ammonium sulphate, synthetic dyes and dynamos and transformers. Germany receives from Japan vegetable and animal fats, isinglass, silk fabrics and toys. All things considered it would appear that Japan gains more than Germany from the alliance

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although the value to Germany of being sure that the U.S.S.R. must divide her forces between Europe and Asia cannot be exaggerated.

From the military and political point of view Japan has a much freer field in China than Germany in Europe. Economically Japan is totally unfit for the strain of war against a first-class power and badly needs Germany's assistance. Japan's heavy industry is poorly developed and her industry as a whole is too dependent on human muscles instead of on mechanical power, for it to be capable of supplying her armies in a real war. Up to now Japan has never fought a first-class power and her victories over unarmed Chinese peasants are no test of her real capacity. Modern wars are won by weight of iron and steel and by economic staying power; technical capacity and raw materials are more important even than man power. Japan's maximum output of pig iron is less than Luxemburg's and her steel production, although it has been doubled since 1929, is only $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons against Germany's 18 million, and Britain's 10 million. Japan has only two million workers in factory industry and only 20 per cent. of these are in metallurgy and engineering.

As regards man power and food resources the technical backwardness of Japanese agriculture would constitute a fatal weakness in war. So primitive are the methods of cultivation that a peasant family only produces enough rice to feed itself and two other families. Japanese agriculture is indeed so over-manned and under-capitalised that her 14 million peasants produce only the same total value of agricultural produce as 2 million farmers and labourers in England and Wales. Moreover, far from being the world's masters in rice cultivation, as is usually imagined, the Japanese produce only half as much rice per acre as is produced in plantations in Spain. Any attempt to mobilise a large army would therefore lead to the same breakdown of agriculture and starvation in the towns as it did in Tsarist Russia in the last war.

At the same time as production would decrease so demand would increase. The present standard of food consumption of the Japanese people is terribly low—much lower than that of any other "civilised" people. The peasantry in particular are always under-nourished. Of recent years famines have

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been frequent in the North Eastern provinces and have also occurred in other districts. The Government, with almost the whole revenue earmarked for armaments and debt service, has failed to provide money either for undertaking necessary preventative engineering works or for keeping existing dams and irrigation works in repair. Hence the frequent floods and droughts which have devastated the countryside.

The consumption of cereals in Japan (rice, wheat, barley and rye) works out at only about 187 kilograms per head. Even Tsarist Russia before the War had a per capita consumption of 241 kilograms of the main cereal crops. This peace time standard of consumption proved quite inadequate for soldiers on active service and had to be raised substantially. Not only were more cereals consumed but meat, sugar and fats had to be added to the diet. In Japan similarly more and better food would have to be given to soldiers, sailors and munition workers in war time than they had ever consumed as peasants or fishermen or as casual labourers and artisans. Yet civilian consumption could not well be pushed down below its present level of severe under-nourishment. Already the tale of starvation and disease is paid in the low standard of health of the people. In the summer of 1935 the War Minister General Terachui made a statement showing that 40 per cent. of the recruits had to be rejected as unfit.

Thus although Japan's allies may think that she is self-sufficient in food and has abundant man power, a real war would soon show the falseness of these notions. Production would sharply decline and consumption increase. The obvious fallacy of imagining that you can take millions of men away from the villages into the unproductive labour of fighting, in a country of primitive agricultural technique, without causing a complete breakdown of the national economy was clearly shown in the last war. The Russian steam-roller failed to roll for lack of steam.

Again, as in Tsarist Russia, an unsolved agrarian problem makes Japan's social structure a foundation built on sand and totally unfit to weather the storm of war. Nearly half the population works on the land under a semi-medieval system of social relationships. The peasants, two-thirds of whom are

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tenants, pay rents in kind to a million landowners. These rents—which constitute a fixed quantity of rice per acre—amount to between 50 and 60 per cent. of the yield even in years of good harvest and the landowners are entirely parasitic since they supply neither seed nor stock nor manure, nor undertake repairs, drainage or irrigation works. They provide no capital to develop the land and modernise the technique of agriculture—they just draw their certain quantity of rice from the overburdened peasants. The latter, whilst thus subject to a feudal form of exploitation by the landowners, are at the same time forced to pay tribute to large scale modern industry in the shape of the big monopoly business houses which control the production and distribution of chemical fertilisers. The cost of fertilisers now comes to about a quarter of the selling price of rice even for peasant proprietors. Those peasant proprietors have such heavy taxes to pay (local and national), and bear such a load of debt at usurious rates of interest, that the position of the majority is little if at all better than that of the tenants. Ever since Japan started on her era of development as a Great Power, taxation has been crushing for the purpose of subsidising large scale industry and paying for armaments and wars. The burden of taxation, in addition to the medieval system of rents in kind, has prevented the development of capitalist farming methods. The double burden of an obsolete land system and of maintaining armaments on the scale of a Great Power always prepared for aggression keeps the people at a medieval standard of life and prevents capital accumulation for the general development of the country. For all Japan's up-to-date textile factories, shipping yards and armament factories the general level of industrial development is very backward. Three million persons work in non-factory industry (i.e., in establishments employing less than five workers) as against two million in factories. So colossal is the waste of labour in organising small workshop and domestic industry that four and a half million are employed in commerce as against 5.3 million in industry and mining.

Although a motor worked by electric power is sometimes in use in the little establishments, production still depends mainly on human labour. Hence the waste of man power in

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industry and commerce is, though not as great as in agriculture, very serious from the point of view of ability to stand the strain of modern war.

The social consequences of all this are the black discontent and revolutionary sentiments, not only of the mass of the peasantry and the working class, but also of the "petty bourgeoisie." The small master or artisan, however hard he works his own family and his apprentices, can never accumulate the capital necessary to expand his business along modern lines. The internal market, as a result of peasant poverty and the antiquated land system, is too narrow; and the great family business houses (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, etc.), whose capital resources equal those of American trusts and whose interests are far more diverse, as merchants or bankers take all the profit from the small industrialist. The "small business men and industrialists," whose call for assistance is so frequently voiced in the Japanese press, are little more than the foremen or agents of the giant monopolists. Japan has never known an era of free competition and liberalism during which a section of the petty bourgeoisie could develop into a middle class. There has never been capital available for them, or markets, or free access to raw materials. The feudal bureaucracy, and their allies the giant family business houses (whose fortunes originated in usury, rice speculation and cheating the state or bribing the bureaucrats in order to obtain state subsidies), have always blocked the road to prosperity for the small manufacturer and trader. An investing middle class hardly exists in Japan and loans can only be obtained from the banks and big merchant houses at excessively high interest rates.

There were only 369,079 income tax payers in the country in 1931 although all incomes above 1,200 yen (£120 at par £70 today) are taxable, and only 20,524 had incomes of £1,000 a year (at par). Even those small business men who are sufficiently "prosperous" to be liable to the business profits tax for individuals have in most cases incomes much smaller than those of the working class in Western Europe. In 1931-32, when the yen was at par, there were only 730,229 persons paying this tax, although it is levied on all businesses making a net profit of £40 a year. Yet besides the tiny incomes

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of the petty bourgeoisie there are some fortunes which would be deemed colossal in any country. Baron Hisaya Iwasaki (Mitsubishis) had an income of nearly two and a half million yen in 1935 and Baron Mitsui in 1934 had an income of four million yen.

The centralisation of capital in a few hands has proceeded so far in Japan that her social and economic structure is from one point of view peculiarly fitted for aggression. It facilitates the smooth and rapid mobilisation of financial resources. On the other hand it gives Japan a much smaller degree of social stability than the countries of Western Europe. The absence in Japan of a large investing middle class of the medium *rentier* elements which give stability to the capitalist system in other countries, and the presence of an enormous petty bourgeois class which has little besides its chains to lose, constitute a grave social weakness and keep Japan on the brink of revolution. Hence military fascism, i.e., the reactionary, ultra-chauvinist, loyalist, and anti-big-capitalist movement in Japan, has so far been held in check by the plutocrats who control the political parties, and by the high military officers and civil bureaucrats. In Japan the fascist movement is too dangerous—too potentially anti-capitalist—to be made use of except as a motive force for conquest on the mainland of Asia. The “young officers” and professional patriot-gangsters, sprung mainly from the petty bourgeoisie and landowners; the mystic philosophers of a “Second Restoration” and the terrorists who represent the aspirations of the peasant proprietors; not only really imagine that they can destroy the “plutocrats and corrupt politicians” and establish “Imperial Socialism,” but have given the latter some violent shocks. The murders of 1932, the subsequent series of plots and assassinations culminating in the insurrection of a whole battallion of soldiers at the instigation of its officers in February, 1936, have all shown that this fire is a dangerous one to play with. There being no middle class to act as a buffer between the big-capitalist interests and the petty bourgeoisie there can be no hope of using Blackshirts to crush Brown shirts as in Germany; no element is available to suppress the future Rohms. It is beyond the scope of this article to deal in detail with the military fascist movement

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or with the manner in which it has been utilised, but kept in check, by the high military and civil bureaucrats to re-establish their power against big business, and by the plutocrats in furthering their aggressive Imperialist designs. Here I am concerned only to show the existence of deep social cleavages and of a spirit of revolt and discontent which effects all classes except a small circle of wealthy men.

The fact that in Japan patriotic slogans and fervently expressed loyalty to the Emperor are the first refuge of all who want to change the social system, need not obscure the issue. Let us remember that, up to 1905 at least, the masses in Russia believed that if only the Tsar could be made to hear he would save his people from the tyranny and oppression of bureaucrats, landlords, and capitalists. It would not take long to convince the Japanese people of their mistake in regarding the Emperor as “above classes” if they once experienced even a small military defeat, or were subject to the cruel strain of modern war, in addition to the fierce struggle for existence which they are already waging.

Up to now the flood-gates have been held back against revolution by the false hope of relief through foreign conquest. Once let the falseness of that hope become apparent—and it becomes more and more difficult to keep it alive—and most of those who now support the fascist movement would make an abrupt *volte face* to the Left.

First the Japanese people were told that the conquest of Manchuria would bring prosperity for all, cheap raw materials, new markets, an area for mass emigration. Then when these things all failed to materialise they were told that Manchuria alone was no use—North China, which is economically closely bound up with Manchuria, must also come under Japanese domination; and, since North China could never be securely held, with an independent or Soviet Mongolia in the rear, Mongolia must also be conquered. So now it is the wicked Russians in Siberia and Outer Mongolia who prevent Japan from fulfilling her “destiny.”

But the Japanese now “have a plan,” for the success of which the pact with Germany is essential. If Chiang Kai Shek can be pressed harder and harder so that he comes to a point where he must resist Japan or succumb to the fury of

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his own people, he—or whoever supplants him as head of the Chinese Government—will have to make his stand in the west of China in or near Mongolia.

Already it is being said in China that the war against Japan will begin in Suiyan (Inner Mongolia) where Chiang Kai Shek has concentrated troops and fighting has already occurred. The continuance of this fighting is being given in the Japanese press as the cause for the failure of the Japanese negotiations with Nanking.

It is here in the North West that Nationalist China approaches the Soviet Chinese districts and Suiyan itself borders on Outer Mongolia. The districts in and around Inner Mongolia are now "Red" and Inner Mongolia has already been claimed as a Japanese preserve. In addition to these Chinese Soviet districts—which are quite distinct from Soviet Russia—the influence of the U.S.S.R. is said to be paramount in Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan). It is interesting to note that this is largely due to the neighbouring Turk—Sib Railway in Russian Turkestan which provides the merchants of Sinkiang with the only available outlet for their trade and draws them closer to the U.S.S.R. whatever their political sentiments.

The Chinese Soviet districts now form, for the first time in 10 years, a more or less compact territory and have a unified army command and a centralised administration. They have for some time been proclaiming, not only the need for a national united front against Japanese imperialism, but their readiness, if only Nanking will resist Japan, to submit both militarily and politically to the decisions of a Supreme War Council for all China, provided only they are allowed representation on it.

The movement to resist Japan's exorbitant demands is, according to all observers, rapidly gathering strength in China, and if Japan pushes the Nanking Government too far it may be forced to offer resistance to avoid being swept away. When that moment comes, taking into consideration that it is in the West that the stand is most likely to be made, it would appear impossible that hands should not be joined with the Chinese Soviet army. The Chinese Soviets are already "at war" with Japan, for, with an originality most

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refreshing in the present age, they "declared" war on Japan early in 1932. Once such a "United Front" confronted the Japanese in a part of the world where the Russians are the nearest neighbours, the holy war on Communism (meaning in fact the war to crush Chinese Nationalism) could be proclaimed with some show of reality. Germany would then attack the U.S.S.R. in support of her ally and in the sacred cause of "destroying Bolshevism." In that event the world war would have begun, not in Europe, not even on the Manchurian border, but in Sinkiang or Mongolia, in some province in these remote parts of Central Asia of which most British people would never have even heard. That all the protagonists in the Far East are preparing is obvious. That Nanking is ready to abandon the sea board of China and resist in the Far West is the prevailing view. The Chinese reckon that unless Japan can gain a speedy victory she will break under the strain and that in the interior she cannot win a speedy victory. Chiang Kai Shek in November, for at least the tenth time, refused Japan's demands for co-operation "to oppose Communism" and a formal recognition of Japan's "sphere of influence" in North China. No spoon can be long enough to sup with the Japanese. Japan is reported to be buying vast quantities of Chinese rice and other foodstuffs with the double purpose of accumulating supplies and draining China of her reserves before the coming war. China has countered by stopping shipments to the sea ports and establishing provincial granaries. In the second week of November the Japanese Foreign Minister told the Cabinet that Japan "may recognise Franco's regime in Spain at an opportune time" and said it was expected that Madrid would fall in a few days. Is the resistance of Madrid causing Japan to pause? Suiyan and Seville may never have heard of one another, but can it be doubted that Japan before her war begins wants to be sure that Italy, through control of Spain, has become too great a menace to Britain in the Mediterranean to allow of British warships coming to the Pacific to defend British interest in China? Since Britain sent Sir Frederick Leith Ross to China and since China's currency reform and the subsequent extension of the Exports Credit scheme to China and the rumours of a loan, Japan has lost

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her former hopes of getting Britain to bless her war on China and open wider the gates of the British Empire to Japanese manufactures. It has been reported in Japan that Britain has undertaken to assist Nanking in defending South China and the Japanese newspaper *Jiji* remarks in pained surprise :—

“The present loan to China seems to have been arranged in a manner showing that the participating countries did not take into due consideration the position of Japan as the stabilising force in the Far East. We regret that in conducting the loan agreement, Britain and China gave the impression that the former was opportunist and the latter self-seeking.”

Obviously from the Japanese point of view if Britain can no longer be counted upon, not indeed as an ally, but as a very sleepy sleeping partner, if the British lion shows signs of opening an eye and putting out a paw to defend its interests in China, then it is time to join hands openly with Germany and Italy to immobilise the British fleet in Western Waters.

It is true that there are other voices in Japan. It is true that there has for some time been a growing conviction in business circles that it is time to call a temporary halt to aggression and consolidate the gains already won. These circles, being better informed than the militarists and also very comfortable as they are, do not relish the prospect of a possible conflict with the British Empire or even with the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the burden of armaments has become so heavy as to threaten their profits; the whole cost can no longer be laid on the peasantry, the working class, the small industrialists and the landowners. Taxation on the rich has been slightly increased, although indirect taxes still remain the main source of revenue. Japan now faces the prospect of having to spend twice her national income annually until 1948, and the creaking of her economic and financial structure has become too loud to be ignored. Hence the unfavourable reactions to the German-Japanese alliance on the part of most of the Japanese press and the sighs of the big industrial and financial interests for an understanding with Britain and even with the U.S.S.R. But if this is the attitude of big business the “military” dare not turn back. The “young

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officers” and the urban petty bourgeoisie are blinded by chauvinism, ignorant of the forces they are up against, and maddened by the economic *impasse* in which the people find themselves. They are determined to go on with the conquest of “East Asia” at whatever risk. Indeed they dare not stop, for peace and reorganisation can only mean their own ruin and destruction. The landowners know that only foreign aggression can keep up the price of their rice revenue, provide their sons with gentlemanly employment in the army, and prevent an agrarian revolution by deflecting the despair of the peasantry into fascist channels, and by keeping before the whole people the mirage of prosperity through conquest. The agrarian problem is the black care which sits behind the military and political leaders of Japan as they ride desperately forward on their course of military aggression for which a new avenue is now being opened for them by Germany into the outskirts of Europe.

Although Japan is in reality a very weak ally the fact that the Japanese army is ready to strike at the U.S.S.R. in the East, when Germany is ready in the West, is of tremendous and sinister importance to the future of Western civilisation. Three bluffers united are much more powerful than three bluffers playing each for his own hand. Events have shown that Germany, Italy and Japan can bluff the world into terrified acquiescence even when playing a lone hand. United they hope to be able to rivet a fascist system on Europe and Asia. Germany, Italy and Japan stand together possessing neither the necessary economic strength nor political stability for a real war, yet able to blackmail the democratic Powers, which possess such economic strength and relative political stability that Britain and the U.S.A. alone could put an end to Japanese aggression in a week without war, just as England and France could, by calling the fascist bluff, prevent Germany and Italy from strangling Spanish democracy.

The democratic Powers have all the cards in their hands—are they never going to play them?

SOVIET CURRENCY

By SIDNEY WEBB

IT is not easy for the citizens of the Western world to comprehend the position and the effects of the system of currency and banking of the Soviet Union. We were helped by a meritorious essay by Mr. W. B. Reddaway in 1935.¹ A more complete and more penetrating survey has now been made by Mr. L. E. Hubbard² which should do much to clear away current misapprehensions.

How difficult it is to go to a foreign country with an open mind! We most of us try to do so, and even deliberately resolve to do so. But how rare is the capacity to escape from the tyranny of the prepossessions deeply embedded in our minds by the environment in which we have grown up, by the philosophy of our own set, and by the necessarily inaccurate information that we have acquired prior to our visit. Mr. Hubbard is exceptionally well qualified for his task. With an ancestral connection with banking and merchanting in St. Petersburg itself; with unusual proficiency in the Russian language, and with lifelong interest in the commercial developments of the past half-century, he has been in a position to get the fullest advantage from his recent visits to the U.S.S.R. The outcome is a thoroughly honest, candid and doubtless accurate statement of the present facts, so far as they can be ascertained. It will be long before the English reader gets a better account of Soviet money and finance. Yet Mr. Hubbard cannot escape from his prepossessions. He does not seek to hide that he writes entirely from the standpoint of the Bank of England and the London money market. He cannot get away from

¹ *The Russian Financial System* by W. B. Reddaway (Macmillan & Co., 106 pp., 1935); reviewed in *Political Quarterly* for April-June, 1936.

² *Soviet Money and Finance* by L. E. Hubbard (Macmillan & Co., pp. xix and 339, 1936)

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a fervent faith in the dogmas of the economic orthodoxy of yesterday. He is firmly persuaded that "natural laws" must inevitably compel a continual "equalising of supply and demand" through changes in the price on the market. He has his own definitions of what Socialism is, and what Communism; and whenever he detects in the U.S.S.R. anything different from his definition of the one or the other, he hastens to welcome it as a "reversion" to the "natural" system which he assumes to be that of complete freedom of competition. All this will make his book the more popular with those accustomed to the current ideas of the British banking world and of the London money market, and may even facilitate their own understanding of money and finance in the Soviet Union. The persistent prepossessions, of which the author is plainly quite unaware, make all the more impressive his conclusion that the Soviet system of currency and banking is working with quite a reasonable measure of success; that it actually does free the community inhabiting one-sixth of the earth's surface from the alternating booms and slumps and periodical mass unemployment which the rest of the civilised world has not yet been able to overcome; and that the greatest likelihood of its failure in the future is not any fundamental error in the system itself, but "human faults and imperfections, such as jealousy, avarice, intolerance and lust for power," to which he thinks that "the directors of the Soviet economy" may eventually be found to be just as liable as "the political and industrial leaders of capitalism" (p. 288).

Let us look at the actual circumstances of the issue of currency and the grant of bank credits in the Soviet Union as they may be extracted from Mr. Reddaway's essay and Mr. Hubbard's more elaborate treatise, and fortified from the published accounts and explanations of various governmental organs of the U.S.S.R.; examining these data without

any assumption of suppositions, natural laws and academic orthodoxy. What happens in fact is that the People's Commissar of Finance, with the concurrence of the Sovnarkom (Council of Ministers) provides from time to time whatever currency, in the form of rouble notes and subsidiary coins, he thinks desirable for the convenience of the Government and the public. The U.S.S.R. enjoys, in fact, like all other great nations today, a "managed currency," though this is "managed" on a system of its own. Incredible as it may seem to the bankers and economists of the Western world, the fluctuations in the aggregate amount of this currency, or its velocity, have no discoverable effect upon the price level of commodities and services, either within the U.S.S.R. or elsewhere.

The explanation of this paradox is to be found, not in the nature of the currency itself, but in the peculiarity of the economic structure of the U.S.S.R. The common idea that the volume of money, combined with what is called its velocity, must inevitably affect the price level, depends on the assumption that the market is everywhere as free as it is in Threadneedle Street. But instead of Threadneedle Street being typical of the universe, the fact is that, over the greater part of the earth's surface, the market is not by any means free. We need here say nothing of the power of custom. In the U.S.S.R. the prices of commodities are for the most part simply fixed, much as those of water and gas are elsewhere fixed, not by the chaffering of buyers and sellers, but by a superior authority, the government decisions in the U.S.S.R. being arrived at on a whole range of considerations unconnected with currency. The possible influence of other currencies upon prices in the U.S.S.R. is definitely and permanently excluded by the legal prohibition of both import and export of Soviet currency, and by a rigid monopoly of all foreign trade and of international

banking transactions. Equally, the amount of the Soviet issues of currency has no effect whatever upon either the aggregate amount of capital investment in new undertakings, or the choice of industries in which such investments shall be made, because these decisions are made irrespective of currency considerations. It seems, therefore, that the Soviet authorities are justified in their constantly repeated claim that their currency, though varying from time to time in aggregate amount and presumably also in velocity, does not produce either inflation or deflation, in so far as these terms denote either rises or falls of the price level, or alterations in the aggregate volume of employment or of capital investment, or changes in the direction either of capital investment or of employment. It may be said, indeed, that the Soviet rouble notes operate, over the whole range of buyers' transactions, almost precisely as Soviet postage stamps operate in the single commodity of postal service. An unnecessarily large supply of postage stamps in the pockets of the people does not raise the postage rates, nor cause any greater number of letters to be written, nor letters to be sent to certain places rather than to others.

Can we not say the same about bank credit? The various branches of the State Bank grant credits to the various enterprises, strictly for such purposes only as have been specifically approved by the State Planning Department (Gosplan), as the outcome of a whole range of considerations into which the aggregate volume of currency and credit, or the velocity of either of them, enters not at all. The dates and conditions on which these advances are to be made, and how they shall be repaid, are in every case, precisely determined without regard to the volume or velocity of the currency in circulation. The usual case is that of a factory requiring credit for the amount of wages and cost of material and components, the rates of all these being fixed,

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to enable it to produce the commodities commanded by the legislature at the instance of the State Planning Commission. Such an advance involves, in practice, the issue of rouble notes and subsidiary coins for the payment of wages; and the advance will be repaid when the finished commodities are delivered at prices so fixed as normally to cover all the direct and indirect costs including taxes. It is accordingly not the aggregate volume or amount of bank credit and currency that determines the action of the factory director, or the amount or kind of commodities to be produced, or the prices that will be obtained for the finished product, or the surplus (which the Western world would call profit) that will normally be made by the industry. There will, indeed, sometimes be a loss, due to breakdowns of machinery or failures of the human factor, in workman or director. Gosplan knows well that nothing can be done without the three D's, deficiency, damage and delay. In due course those who caused the failures will be carpeted, and perhaps demoted or punished. The loss will be made good from public funds, but will have nothing to do with credit or currency.

This is, as Mr. Hubbard would probably agree, the general picture. But some additional explanations are required. What about the ubiquitous "bazaar," the "free market," in which all sorts of commodities (though a tiny minority of the aggregate turnover) are sold to customers at whatever price the sellers can get? The Soviet Government soon discovered, like other governments, that it is futile to impose a legal maximum price for anything of which it does not control the supply. But this does not mean that the price level in the free market escapes government control. Whenever the People's Commissar of Internal Trade hears that the price level in any particular free market is substantially above that fixed by the Government for other

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retailing, he opens a Government Shop in or next to the free market, and offers for sale, at an attractively low price, quite irrespective of the cost of this tiny fraction of the huge turnover, the commodities in which profiteering has prevailed. In this way the peasants have been compelled in innumerable instances, without any imposition of a maximum price, to reduce their demands by as much as 20 or 30 per cent. at a blow.

What about the influence, upon the internal price level, of the rates of exchange of other countries? By the government monopoly of both importing and exporting, and of all international banking transactions, no one even knows what the rates of exchange might be if they were left to be freely settled in the respective money markets of the world. These hypothetical rates of exchange do not affect even the decisions of the Soviet Government as to what it will import and export. It is the imports that control its exports, and not conversely. It finds that its various departments consider desirable the purchase abroad of certain commodities which it is inconvenient or impracticable to produce at home. These have to be paid for, not in roubles but in sterling, dollars or francs. To obtain these, in the absence of foreign loans, the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade is driven to export timber or furs, wheat or flax, manganese or gold, to be sold abroad at world prices up to an aggregate that will equal the cost of the imports. The choice among things to be exported is made, principally, according to the relation between the cost of production in the U.S.S.R. and the world price of each of the available commodities. It is always possible to increase the production of timber or manganese, if these are fetching good prices abroad. But it may seem preferable to export native gold, even if this costs more to produce than additional timber or manganese, if the gesture of "payment in gold" is

calculated to impress the London money market, and thus raise the credit and the political influence of the Soviet Government! It will be seen that only a *differential* change in world price level (such as a greater rise in manufactured articles than in primary products) affects the Soviet choice of commodities to be exported. A universal rise in world prices leaves the Soviet Government unconcerned.

How then, asks the pertinacious enquirer, did it come about that there was always in Moscow and Leningrad, Kharkov and Kief, the so-called "Black Exchange," where native speculators illegally offered to the tourist, for American dollars or British pound notes, five, ten or even twenty times as many roubles as the State Bank would give? This means that there were always Russians desirous of obtaining foreign currencies, in order to remit by post to relations or friends living abroad, perhaps to pay their passage money to Russia; or to pay for books or newspapers published abroad; or (and this was until 1936 perhaps the most important demand) to make special purchases at "Torgsin," the government shops offering a large range of commodities at tempting "New York prices," but payable exclusively in foreign valuta, or in gold or platinum, which the Government wished to collect in order—strange though such a proceeding sounds to capitalist ears—to diminish the country's export trade. It is always convenient for the Soviet Government to be able to lessen the amount of commodities that it needs to export in order to pay the bill for the imports required. It may be added that, with the recent changes in the arbitrarily fixed rouble prices in the U.S.S.R., and the new government valuation there of the dollar, the franc and the pound sterling, the Black Exchange is reported to have nearly ceased to exist.

An interesting explanation may be given of the way in which, when there seems to be too great an amount of currency in the pockets of the people, the Soviet Government

relieves this inconvenience. There is, at all times, a perpetual flow of rouble notes to the State Savings Bank, by way of excess of deposits over withdrawals. In addition, the Government raises, from time to time, an Internal Loan, by asking the people to subscribe, in roubles, for bonds of conveniently small amounts, repayable at fixed dates, either with interest or with lottery prizes. These loans—virtually deferments of the people's spending on consumption goods—help the People's Commissar of Finance to pay the wage-bills of great enterprises of capital construction. Meanwhile, the loans, like the constant increase of Savings Bank deposits, withdraw great blocks of paper roubles from circulation.

But, it will be asked, how does the Soviet Government, with its universal fixing of prices, and its deliberate management of the currency irrespective of the volume of sales and purchases, contrive to bring about the "equalising of supply and demand?" When there is a falling off in the harvest, or a breakdown in industrial production, or any of the innumerable cases of short supply, so that much less is produced than suffices to satisfy the would-be purchasers, what happens? There can be, for the moment, no genuine equalising of demand and supply. In the Western world we are accustomed, in such a case, to let the problem be solved by a rise in the price of the scarce commodity. The demand, we say, shrinks with every rise, until a point is reached at which every would-be purchaser can be supplied. This means, not that the supply of the commodity becomes equal to the desire to possess it, but only that the richer persons get the whole supply, whilst the poorer persons get none at all. In the Soviet Union rich and poor are on an equality in the matter. The practice may be "First come, first served"; and we have the phenomenon of queues. Or a preferential supply may be afforded at a low price to particular sets of workers; and we see the phenomenon of

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"closed co-operative societies," confined to the workers (of all grades from the director down to the gate-keeper) in favoured key industries. Or whatever is available (as with milk in short supply) may be wholly reserved for the young children. We in England dislike such preferences, and prefer selection by ability to "pay the economic price." It is true that in the Great War we resorted to the rationing of sugar, meat, etc., in order that the very poorest might not be deprived. The present writer vividly remembers the disgust with which a millionaire shipowner (and his wife) received the first proposals of rationing, first of freight space so as to ensure transport for the indispensable imports, even at the cost of excluding those on which a higher rate would gladly have been paid for carriage; and then of sugar and meat. Why not, they exclaimed, leave the equalising of supply and demand, as the economists advise, to be effected by a change in the price level? The Soviet Union has, it thinks, the better plan.

To sum up, in the U.S.S.R. currency and bank credit are not dynamic agencies, but merely instruments to be used as required, for the purposes expressly desired. They act, in fact, exactly like postage stamps. Money is, as elsewhere, a convenient medium of exchange, saving the people the trouble of barter. It is also a unit of account requiring (as elsewhere) strict definition when used in comparisons. In its paper form (now almost universal) it is not a good store of value, because paper is fragile; but this defect is cured by depositing the notes in the Savings Bank. To some people the chief advantage of Soviet money and finance may seem to be that it escapes the complications and mysteries that bewitch our various currency cranks and credit reformers.

THE NEXT STEP IN THE COAL INDUSTRY

By G. D. H. COLE

THE nineteenth century was the age of coal: the twentieth seems to be the age of unemployed miners. Over the world as a whole, despite the very rapid advance of coal output in the U.S.S.R., production has not nearly recovered to the peak point of 1929. In Great Britain the coal industry has never again produced as much as it produced in 1913. The nearest approach was in 1923 and 1924, when the German coal industry had been thrown out of gear by the occupation of the Ruhr. But even in 1924 output was twenty million tons less than in 1913; and thereafter it fell grievously away. In 1913 the British coalfields supplied 287 million tons of coal, and in 1924 267 millions. By 1933 output was down to 207 million tons; and even in 1935, despite the revival of the iron and steel industries, it had only recovered to 222 millions. It was at much the same level in 1936 as in 1935. But even the present boom in the steel trade leaves total output nearly a quarter below the level reached in 1913.

The causes of this decline are well known. They affect all the three principal outlets for British coal—the home market, exports, and ships' bunkers. The proportional decline has been much larger in the two latter cases; but the decline in the home market is also an important factor. Indeed, at the bottom of the slump in 1933, the absolute decrease in sales was greater in the home market than in exports. Since then, the recovery at home—especially in the steel trade—has altered the situation. If we compare 1935 with 1913, home consumption had fallen by nearly 19 million tons; exports were down by 35 million tons;

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and the demand from foreign and coastwise shipping had declined by about 9 million tons. These decreases measure the approximate magnitude of the problems which the industry has to face today.

Begin with exports. France was both in 1913 and in 1935 much our largest export market. But French purchases were 12,776,000 tons in 1913, and only 7,130,000 in 1935. Italy came next, with 9,647,000 tons in 1913, and only 3,189,000 in 1935 (of course, much less since the Abyssinian quarrel). Germany took 9,000,000 tons in 1913, and 2,885,000 in 1935. South America absorbed 6,959,000 in 1913, and only 2,895,000 in 1935. Even Sweden, Norway and Denmark, despite intensive efforts to increase their intake of British coal, bought nearly 10 million tons in 1913, as against seven millions in 1935. Total exports fell from over 73 million tons in 1913 to under 39 millions in 1935.

This decline in exports is, of course, largely a consequence of the development of competitive coalfields abroad, either for supplying the domestic markets or for export. World coal production rose, though not very much, between 1913 and 1929, whereas British production declined. Poland and Czechoslovakia became important exporters: Russia began to develop production for the home market on the grand scale. The United States competed more actively in Central and South America. But increased competition has been by no means the only factor making for the decline of exports. The foreign demand for coal is affected by the same forces as have been depressing demand in the home market—improved methods of coal utilisation in industrial processes and the use of alternative sources of power both in industry and in the consumers' markets. Sometimes these alternative sources of power are wholly apart from coal, and are based on oil or hydro-electricity. But even when they continue to depend on coal as their ultimate source, the consumption of raw coal is greatly reduced.

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This can be seen most clearly from the experience of the home market. Between 1913 and 1933 gas undertakings increased their output of gas by 36 per cent., and their intake of coal by only 2½ per cent. Electricity generation nearly doubled over the same period; but the consumption of coal in making it rose by less than 45 per cent. In the United States it was calculated just at the beginning of the depression that, over industry as a whole, it took only two-thirds of a ton of coal to do as much work as a ton had done before the war. In Europe the economy was not so great; but it must reach an average of at least 20, if not 25 per cent.

Meanwhile, the demand for coal for shipping has been doubly hit—by the increased use of oil fuel, and by the sharp decline in foreign trade. For foreign and coastwise shipping together, the demand for British coal fell from 23 million tons in 1913 to well under 14 millions in 1935.

To a great extent these trends are irreversible. Fuel economy will continue, probably at an increasing rate as old capital plants are renewed and new technical inventions mature. Oil fuel will certainly not yield back most of its new conquests in either sea or land transport; and in the air it has an inevitable monopoly for some time to come. Consumers will continue to use more electricity and gas for heating and cooking, because of the saving in labour, if not from considerations of cost. Coal will to an increasing extent be used not raw, but converted into other forms of energy; and the efficiency of the processes of conversion will continue to improve, so as to yield further economies in the use of coal. The railways will go over increasingly to electricity, and thus reduce their consumption of coal. Finally, as long as the existing trends towards economic nationalism remain in being, countries will endeavour to develop as far as possible their own sources of power; and the demand for coal will be further depressed because

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economic nationalism restricts foreign trade, and therewith the demand for shipping.

In any realistic study of the coal problem these facts have to be faced. In view of them, there is no prospect at all of a recovery in demand—even if the world were to enter on a period of dramatic boom—sufficient to absorb as much coal as the British mining industry is in a position to produce, or to get the unemployed British miners back to work in their old callings. Only one situation could possibly abolish mining unemployment in the near future—the outbreak of a European war which would call all the younger miners away to serve with the armed forces.

This means that, in effect, the mining problem in Great Britain is not a single problem, but twofold. There is the economic problem of so reorganising the coal industry as to make the best of what is in any event a bad job; and there is the social problem of deciding what to do with the unemployed miners and derelict areas which any plan of reorganisation is bound to leave behind. These two essentially different problems demand separate, though not unrelated, treatment. One of the difficulties today is that, until the problem of reorganisation has been thoroughly surveyed and at least a good beginning made with tackling it, the second, the social, problem cannot be clearly seen apart. Not least among the reasons for the hopeless muddle that has been made over the distressed areas is the failure to envisage the coal problem as an economic problem and to lay down clear principles for dealing with it. For until that has been done it is impossible to lay sensible plans for tackling the general problem of the depressed areas. Until we know what is to be done about the coal industry, which is basic in most of these areas, we cannot possibly decide how best to set about handling their residual distresses.

This constitutes an additional very strong reason—apart

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from the pressing problems of the industry itself—for taking the reorganisation of the coal industry firmly in hand. But, if there is one thing obvious, it is that this reorganisation, while its general lines can and must be laid down in advance, is going to take a considerable time. The nature of the industry is such that it cannot be reorganised quickly or at a blow; and there are in addition strong social reasons for making the process gradual. To let the technicians loose on the coal industry, and tell them, regardless of all other considerations, to make it technically as efficient as possible in the shortest possible time would be to create more problems than such a reorganisation could solve. It would add a vast number of miners to the ranks of the unemployed, and at the same time utterly ruin a considerable number of towns and villages without providing any opportunity for absorption or readjustment. It would thus be immensely destructive of social as well as economic values. It is, in fact, wholly out of the question.

But, unfortunately, the very fact that thorough and speedy reorganisation would have these disastrous social consequences serves, under present conditions, as a powerful weapon in the hands of those who are hostile to any sort of reorganisation under public control. It enables them to oppose any and every step towards improving the efficiency of the industry by pointing to the social disturbances which technical improvement will set up, and to the obvious fact that the Government, if it enforces reorganisation, will be held responsible for these disturbances. These enemies of public control do not, of course, contend that no reorganisation is required. That would be too barefacedly absurd. What they claim is that they had better be left to carry through reorganisation piecemeal, in their own time and in their own way, because in that case disturbance will be minimised by gradualness, and in any event the Govern-

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ment will not be held to blame for the distresses occasioned by it. If the Government, or an agency set up by it, closes down the pits on which an area depends for its means of life, there will be a hullabaloo, and the Government will be pressed hard to take redressive action. If colliery companies, or individual coalowners, decide to close these same pits because it is more profitable to put them out of production — well, that is the hand of God, or fate; and no one can really hold the Government to blame.

Naturally, such a view of the situation appeals strongly to a Government which has shown few things more plainly than its desire to evade its industrial responsibilities. It squares too with the familiar view that, economically, the State should do nothing which capitalists can be persuaded, or left, to do for themselves. It upholds the sacred principle of private enterprise; and it saves the Government from having to dip its hands into a very nasty mess.

Small wonder, then, that no comprehensive lines for dealing with the coal industry have ever been laid down with Government support, or that the economic and social aspects of the coal problem remain hopelessly mixed up, and the problem of the distressed areas hopelessly mixed up too, because it cannot be disentangled until the economic side of the coal problem has been squarely faced.

If, however, the facing of this problem involves a process of reorganisation which will need to be spread over a considerable time, that does not mean that it need be faced without a general plan laid down in advance. Broadly, the economic problem of the coal industry, as it appears today, is one of scaling down on economic, instead of uneconomic, lines. In order to produce coal at the lowest prices consistent with good living conditions for the miners, it is necessary to concentrate production upon the most productive pits and areas, to provide for each pit to work with the best

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possible equipment and as nearly as possible to *optimum* capacity, to secure the most efficient methods of grading and distributing coal, including the elimination of all unnecessary transport and handling charges, and to shut down in due course all pits which cannot justify their continued existence on economic grounds. For this selective and recreative process to be undertaken on any satisfactory basis it is essential to unify coal royalties, both in order to secure a fair and equal basis for judging the worthwhileness of keeping a pit in being, and in order to eliminate causes of inefficiency which arise out of the breaking up of the coal industry into awkward and often unsuitable units according to the chances of surface ownership. It is also indispensable, in considering survival, to regard as a unit not each pit as at present worked, but each group of workings that can conveniently be operated as a unit, whether it is now under unified control or not.

The carrying out of an economic policy based on these principles demands the existence, over a considerable period of time, of a co-ordinating authority for the whole industry capable of planning ahead, and of securing conformity to its general directions for the development of the coalfields. The creation of the Coal Mines Reorganisation Commission, with a limited reference confining its competence to questions of colliery amalgamation, was a mistake. It was based on the wrong assumption that, if only the coal undertakings could be persuaded or coerced into larger units of management and financial control, they could thereafter be left to run the industry in accordance with their own devices. It is true that the Commission was completely hamstrung by the further limitations placed on its powers under the 1930 Act. It could, as the Railway and Canal Commission, to which was given authority to pass judgment on its schemes, has since ruled, deal only with amalgamation proper, and

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not with any form of partial unification; and, even in cases of amalgamation, it had the impossible task of proving, before its schemes could take effect, that no damage would be caused by them to the financial interest of *any* of the affected businesses.

But even if the Coal Mines Reorganisation Commission had been accorded ample power to enforce amalgamation, it would still have been the wrong sort of body to establish. For, when once amalgamation had been achieved between any group of colliery undertakings, the Commission's work would have been done, and it would have had no more to say. What is wanted is not a body to deal merely with amalgamations, or even with partial unifications as well, but a *general* supervising authority for the whole protracted business of putting the coal industry on a sound economic basis—an authority therefore which will need to remain in being for a long time, and to exercise a continuing control over all collieries, amalgamated and unamalgamated alike.

The need can perhaps best be illustrated by the analogy of the permanent Commission recently proposed in the Milk Reorganisation Commission's Report. In the milk industry, as in coal mining, there exists already a marketing scheme, administered by a system of producers' Boards with practically unfettered power to regulate prices and output. In the case of milk, this method of producers' control has been found so unsatisfactory that the Reorganisation Commission proposes, not to abolish the producers' Boards, but to superimpose upon them a statutory controlling authority, with power to fix prices and to plan output. This body would consist not of interested persons, but of impartial public servants; and it would be responsible to Parliament for the development as well as the current organisation of the trade in milk.

The coal industry needs almost exactly analogous treat-

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ment. There is no need, at the moment, to disturb the various producers' boards set up under the Coal Industry Act of 1930. They can be left, for the present, reformed so as to incorporate effective central selling schemes for both export and home consumption, to administer the actual trade in coal. But it should not be for such interested bodies to lay down either how much coal is to be produced, or at what prices it is to be sold to different classes of consumers. These should be matters for a body representing the public, and armed with sufficient powers to insist on measures of reorganisation which will reconcile prices acceptable to consumers with a reasonable standard of living for the producers—or in other words, measures which will reduce costs, but not at the expense of wage-standards.

Such a proposal as this assumes that, for the time being, the coal mines are not to be nationalised. Full nationalisation is, indeed, obviously for the present outside the range of political practicability. But even if there came to office in the near future a Government capable of nationalising the mines out and out, it is by no means certain that, in present circumstances, that would be the wisest thing to do. There would be all too much risk, if the mines were nationalised just now, of the industry being saddled with charges for compensation to the existing owners on a scale which would lastingly depress the miners' standard of life—that is, if compensation payments were charged, as they should be, against future revenue from coal, and not against the community as a whole.

The reasons for this danger are clear enough. In the first place the 1930 Act, with its monopolistic system of price control and its transferable quotas saleable by collieries which do not themselves produce any coal at all, has created artificial values, for which the colliery owners would undoubtedly demand compensation. Secondly, until the industry

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has been extensively reorganised, it is impossible to see behind these artificially created values the real values on which any grant of compensation ought to be exclusively based. A period of control and planning, under the authority of a public body empowered to regulate prices and output and to insist on necessary measures of reorganisation in both production and marketing, would smooth the path for full public ownership, and at the same time enable the community and the miners to gain most, if not all, of the immediate advantages to be expected from it.

Clearly, the control of colliery leases, unified by means of the transference of mining royalties to the State, should be placed under this co-ordinating Commission, which would thus acquire a large influence in promoting both amalgamations and pooled schemes for the drainage of colliery areas and for other forms of co-operation in working neighbouring mines. Clearly, again, the Commission should take over all the powers of the existing Coal Mines Reorganisation Commission in respect of amalgamations—powers which would need to be greatly extended and simplified, and strengthened so as to include the promotion of partial as well as complete unifications of every sort and kind. No less clearly it would be most undesirable to provide, as the Government proposed to do in its abortive 1936 Bill, for referring the proposals of the Commission to yet another public body for scrutiny and approval. There is a case for two bodies where, as in the electricity supply industry, one draws up technical schemes which the other then directly administers. But it is not proposed that the permanent Coal Commission should be an administrative body like the Central Electricity Board. Administration would be left for the present in the hands of the colliery owners and their various boards and committees under the 1930 Act. There is accordingly no case for setting up a second impartial body

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to scrutinise and correct the Commission's proposals, which will in any event have to be approved by Parliament in all major respects. One impartial authority is enough: a second would be needed only if it were proposed to take the actual management of the industry into public hands.

Under the scheme here envisaged, that is not in mind. The primary purpose of the Commission will be to make a plan for the future development of the coal industry, and to supervise the carrying out of that plan over a period of years. Now, as we have seen, the future of the coal industry cannot, for some time to come, be envisaged on purely economic lines from the standpoint of the industry itself. In practice, the body making the plans cannot plan solely with a view to producing coal as economically as possible up to the point at which further production becomes unprofitable, and beyond that point not producing at all. A purely economic plan, involving a considerable further reduction in the already contracted volume of colliery employment, would create, if it were introduced all at once, too much suffering and dislocation to be tolerable from a social point of view. The planning authority would have, therefore, to ease the transition; and, from the standpoint of the community, it would be economically as well as socially desirable that it should be eased. For, while the coal industry on a whole might profit by going the whole hog, the effect would be to destroy a great mass of economic as well as social assets not belonging to the industry, but no less valuable from a commercial point of view—to wit, houses, buildings of all sorts, public utility undertakings and other established enterprises catering for the local markets in areas in which it was decided not to continue working the pits.

The existence of these assets is an economic reason, to add to the cogent social reasons, for easing the transition.

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But it is essential, if the Coal Commission is to do its work properly, that, wherever it has on these wider grounds to delay adopting a course which would be preferable from the narrowly economic standpoint of the coal industry alone, any financial burden resulting from such deviations shall fall, not upon the industry, but on the state. It should be among the first tasks of the Commission to draw up a plan for the industry based on the narrower economic considerations, and to work out what the wider economic and social consequences of its full adoption would be likely to be. It should then consider what modifications could reasonably be made in its first plan on these wider grounds, and what costs to the industry their adoption would involve. Having done this, it should report fully to Parliament the results of all its deliberations, and ask the community to pay the difference. But it should not be expected to shoulder the burden of any uneconomic action (from the narrower standpoint of the industry), of which Parliament showed itself unwilling to meet the cost.

Only on some such rational basis as this should the state offer any sort of subsidy to the mining industry. Assuredly, the state should not subsidise mining wages in such a way as to allow colliery owners to maintain their profit-margins on invested capital in face of the industry's decline. It would, indeed, be one of the Commission's duties, in conjunction with the fixing of prices and output, to create, under its own supervision, national machinery for the adjustment of wages and conditions, and to make the National Wages Board, set up under the Act of 1930, a reality instead of a sham. But the payment of a reasonable living wage should be regarded, not as constituting a claim to subsidy in aid of profits, but as a prior charge affecting the value of the invested capital. Invested capital which cannot yield a dividend without employing sweated labour has no economic value that ought

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to be recognised by the state in determining either compensation or assistance.

Given planned control by a permanent, impartial, supervising Commission, there is every reason to believe that the coal industry could before long be restored to prosperity, though it would employ many less miners than it employed in its period of maximum expansion. Between 1924 and 1935, average costs of production per ton fell from 18.7½ to 12.11½. Wages per shift averaged 10 0½ in 1928, and 9 3½ in 1935; but over the same period wages per ton fell from 9.5½ to 8.6½. Wages per ton were as high as 13.3 in 1924. Costs other than wages have fallen from 5.4½ per ton in 1924 to 4.5½ in 1935. Thus, despite the maintenance of uneconomic units of production under shelter of the 1930 Act, very large improvements have been brought about.

Apart from the effects of lower wages and longer working hours, the fall in costs is due chiefly to increasing mechanisation. In 1925 only 20 per cent. of the coal produced was cut by machinery: in 1935 the percentage had risen to 51. In 1928, the first year for which figures are available, only 12 per cent. of the coal was conveyed mechanically underground: in 1935 the percentage was 43. In 1927 only 20 per cent. of the coal was cleaned before sale: in 1935 it was 41 per cent. This growth of mechanisation, which is still proceeding rapidly, has had very great effects on the miners' conditions of work—by no means all to the good—and on the re-employability of the older miners. But we are not here attempting to consider these aspects of the mining problem, important as they are from a social standpoint.

In making plans for the future output of the mining industry, the most controversial technical issue which the new Commission would have to face would be that of "oil from coal." If we are likely, in the near future, to produce from coal a large part of our supply of oil-fuel, obviously

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the Commission can afford to budget for a considerably higher level of output and employment than seems possible if oil continues to be mainly imported from abroad, or produced here, if at all, independently of coal. It has, of course, already been shown that, by more than one method already in use, the production of oil from British coal is perfectly practicable on a large scale. But it is also clear that the cost, by any process hitherto devised, is considerably above that of imported petrol—so that the existing output of oil from coal has been made possible only because a heavy tax is levied on the imported, but not on the home-produced commodity. Evidently, under these conditions, large-scale production at home must involve the Exchequer in serious loss of revenue. Some expansion of output may nevertheless be felt to be desirable on military grounds, or additionally as a means of helping to meet the specially intractable problems of the South Wales coalfield. But it seems unlikely that the Exchequer will face the loss involved in production on a scale sufficient materially to affect the output of the mining industry as a whole. The situation might, of course, change, if the cost of making oil from coal could be greatly reduced, or if the price of petrol were to rise sharply. But for the present it would be wholly unsafe to reckon on either of these events.

This article does not profess to treat the coal problem from more than a very few of its many aspects. Its principal purpose is to urge the importance of creating a public regulative authority with wide enough powers, and strong and impartial enough in its membership, to envisage the coal problem as a whole, and set to work to plan its future, in relation to market prospects and technical possibilities, while taking such account as the Government will allow it to take of the wider economic and social aspects. Its purpose is also to stress the point that, until the coal industry has

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been re-planned, at any rate in principle, it will be impracticable to devise satisfactory methods of dealing with the troubles of the distressed areas; for the right policies for them depend to a great extent in what is to be done about coal. When once we know approximately the future employing capacity of the coal mines, area by area, we shall be in a position, as we are not now, to measure up the character of the residual problem in South Wales, Durham, and the other distressed districts in which the coal industry is of major importance, and to devise means of dealing with their difficulties. But it would be wildly optimistic, in view of the Government's record of evasion, to hope that even the essentially moderate proposals here advanced stand any good chance of adoption while it remains in office. The coal problem, like most others that matter, seems destined to stand over until we get a Government that will at least recognise the planning of industry as an integral fraction of the modern state. Between Mr. Runciman and the colliery owners, no such recognition is, I fear, to be expected in the Government's forthcoming legislation.

SURVEYS

CURRENT SOCIAL STATISTICS: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

UNTIL 1857 matrimonial cases of all kinds were under the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts in England and Wales, and divorce, in the modern meaning of the word, was not obtainable. Marriages could be annulled by these courts on various grounds, and after annulment the parties were free to re-marry, but divorce, which could also be granted, was nothing more than formal separation, carrying no right to re-marry. If the parties to an ecclesiastical divorce wished to re-marry their only procedure was to obtain a special Act of Parliament for their individual case. From 1701 until the Act of 1857 the House of Lords was virtually the Divorce Court where Divorce Bills were tried by judicial process, though the form of the judgment, if the application succeeded, was an Act of Parliament. The number of cases so dealt with was naturally small, and in the main represented difficulties in regard to the inheritance of titles and properties resulting from matrimonial troubles among the owners of land.

By the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 jurisdiction in matrimonial disputes was transferred to the Civil Courts, and it was laid down that if a couple obtained a legal divorce either party was free to contract another legal marriage. The grounds on which a divorce could be obtained were different if the petitioner was the husband or the wife, the husband having the right to seek divorce on the ground of adultery only, and the wife having to prove not only adultery but also either cruelty or desertion for two years or more.

This law was in force until 1923, and, until the abnormal war years, about five to six hundred divorces were obtained annually under its provisions. The normal cost of undefended proceedings was about £40-£50, and a contested suit might cost ten times as much. In the early years of this century much criticism of this state of law was current, both in regard to the inequality of the law as between husbands and wives,

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and in respect of the practical inequality as between rich and poor which resulted from the costs of divorce proceedings. A Royal Commission was appointed in 1909 to enquire into the whole matter, and its report was presented three years later, after the taking of a mass of evidence. By a majority the Commission recommended that the law should be changed, both by putting husband and wife on the same footing, and also by extending the grounds of divorce to include desertion for three years or more, incurable insanity after five years, habitual drunkenness and imprisonment for life. They also recommended changes in the legal procedure to simplify the bringing of petitions and reduce the cost.

Considerable opposition to any extension of the grounds for legal divorce was expressed by sections of the community, and no action was taken upon the Royal Commission's report. During the war, and the years immediately following it, the number of divorce proceedings increased, no doubt in some relation to hasty war marriages. The average number of divorces granted in the years 1916-1920 was 1,481 per annum. Criticism of the inequalities of the law continued and intensified, and in 1923 an Amending Act was passed which equalised the law as between men and women, but did not otherwise extend the grounds for divorce.

Although this Act did not alter the theoretical basis of divorce, it did materially alter the practical effect of the law, since it was now open to injured wives to obtain divorce on proving adultery only, without having to establish cruelty or desertion as well. This, in effect, gave wives facilities for divorce, and the natural result was the doubling of the number of petitions brought. The average number for the years 1926-1930 was 3,284 per annum.

In addition to the Act of 1923, which remedied the injustice between husbands and wives, efforts have been made to remedy that between rich and poor, mainly through the action of the Poor Man's lawyers. It is now possible for a divorce to be secured without the expenditure of a great deal of money, and without the bringing to London of witnesses; but it remains true that the matrimonial disputes of the poor are not normally resolved by divorce proceedings, but by an action before the Magistrates for

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judicial separation. Judicial separation carries no right to re-marry. Of the cases before the High Court in 1934 there were 5,479 divorce petitions and only 114 petitions for judicial separation, while of those dealt with under the Poor Persons procedure there were 6,200 for judicial separation and only 45 for divorce.

The number of divorces granted since 1931 has been slowly increasing, as follows:

1931	...	3,668	1933	...	3,934
1932	...	3,802	1934	...	4,201

As, however, the adult population has also been increasing during these years, there is nothing in these figures to show a change in the social habits of married people, and it would seem improbable that, unless the grounds of divorce or the method of obtaining it were to be changed, any widely different figures need be anticipated in future.

There is, however, possibility of a change in the law, as a Divorce Bill, introduced by a Private Member in 1936, is now before Parliament. This Bill seeks to extend the grounds on which divorce may be sought very much on the lines recommended by the Royal Commission in 1912, but with the proviso that no divorce at all shall be granted until a marriage has lasted for five years. The Bill further proposes to abolish the six months interval which now elapses between a Decree Nisi and a Decree Absolute, and to simplify the possibility of cases being brought before Courts of Summary Jurisdiction.

One of the chief tests to be applied to prospective legislation is the actual practical effect which it would produce, and in this instance many sections of opinion are concerned to know whether a change in the divorce law would, in fact, increase or reduce the number of divorces secured. From this point of view the detailed analysis of the cases in 1934 is relevant.

Of the Petitions brought, 78 per cent. resulted in undefended suits, and 94 per cent. were successful. The King's Proctor (whose intervention would be reduced under the proposed new law) actually intervened in the course of only $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the suits, and also intervened to prevent the making absolute of a Decree Nisi in $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the cases.

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An examination of the persons bringing petitions shows that 35 per cent. of the suits were brought by wives and 45 per cent. by husbands, and that (taking both these together) 83 per cent. refer to marriages of over five years' standing. 42 per cent. of all cases concern families in which there are no children, 30 per cent. families in which there is only one child, and only 10 per cent. cases in which there are more than two children.

The implication of these figures is that the limitation of divorce to marriages of five years' standing and the reduction of the intervention of the King's Proctor would not very greatly affect the numbers of divorces; but, of course, the effect of an extension of the grounds on which divorce may be secured is the most far reaching of the contemplated changes.

On this point the only available guide to the result is the effect of similar laws in other countries; but this is by no means a reliable indication, since the social and religious habits of different races materially affect the case.

Divorce laws vary greatly in all countries, and often vary within a country. In America each State has its own laws, and in Austria different laws are in force for Protestants and Jews. In Greece different grounds justify divorce by wives or husbands, and in no country is there found a law exactly corresponding with what the position would be if the proposed Bill were to be enacted in this country.

It is, therefore, difficult to make any attempt to judge from the divorce statistics of other countries what would be the effects of a change of the law here. But the figures are in themselves of some interest. The latest figures available show that there is little exact correspondence between the width of the basis on which divorce may be obtained and the extent to which it is, in fact, sought. In the order of number of divorces, per 100 marriages, the list is:

Divorces to every 100 Marriages:					
United States	...	16.3	Denmark	...	8.6
Austria	...	14.4	Germany	...	8.3
Japan	...	10.1	New Zealand	...	7.5
Latvia	...	9.5	France	...	6.6
Switzerland	...	9.4	South Africa	...	6.4

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Netherlands ...	5.2	Czechoslovakia ...	3.9
Finland ...	4.9	Portugal ...	1.8
Jugoslavia ...	4.7	Scotland ...	1.5
Norway ...	4.4	Canada ...	1.4
Belgium ...	4.0	England and Wales	1.3
Australia ...	3.9		

When it is remembered that in the Scandinavian countries divorce can be obtained by mutual consent after a year or two of separation, it seems extraordinary that the figures for Norway and Finland should be so low, while on the other hand the high figure for Austria, where so many of the population are Catholic, and debarred from divorce altogether, is difficult to understand.

So great indeed are the divergencies in this list from what would be expected if the grounds of divorce alone affected its frequency, that it is obvious that there must be many other factors of the utmost importance. Religion is no doubt one of these factors, affecting the degree to which a people care to take advantage of an easy divorce law; and another undoubtedly is connected with the economic position of the people. In a peasant population divorce is probably more difficult and less likely to be prevalent than in an urban community where family concerns are not known in such detail by the neighbours. Climate may well play a part in this problem, as may nutrition, or the prevalence of the cinema, and there is perhaps nothing in modern life which does not affect the problem.

Whatever the other factors may be, and however much weight may attach to them, one thing at least is clear. If we, in England, had a legal system which was not so costly and so cumbersome that poor people preferred judicial separation to divorce, our position at the bottom of the list would not be maintained, even under the existing law. Whatever the fate of the proposed changes may be, and however the controversy as to the grounds of divorce may go, it is to be hoped that the scandal of a procedure which makes, in effect, one law for the rich and another for the poor, may at last be ended.

RAY STRACHEY

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAWS

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAWS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATION:

FRANCE—HOLLAND—PARAGUAY—GERMANY—
LITHUANIA—SPAIN

THE French law providing for the nationalisation of armaments factories, promulgated on August 12, 1936, and the subject of bitter argument for several years, deserves careful study. For some time public opinion in more than one country regarded such a law as a means of affording supplementary guarantees for the preservation of peace. It was gravely exercised because of the fact that the manufacture of armaments was the monopoly of a few privileged persons who acquired wealth as a result of international conflicts, and both in Europe and in America parliamentary commissions had provided the press with material to sustain the campaign for nationalisation. How often, particularly in the radical press, was this step declared to be a necessary one for the safeguarding of peace and public morality and even for the really rational defence of a country! The French law lays down:

Art. 1. Decrees issued by the Council of Ministers on the proposal of the Minister of National Defence and War, the Minister of Marine and the Minister for Air will make possible before March 31, 1937 the total or partial expropriation of firms whose business it is to manufacture or trade in munitions of war.

Munitions of war include:

- (1) Firearms and their ammunition;
- (2) Munitions whose function is to bring to and utilise in battle firearms (fighting planes, warships, tanks);
- (3) Munitions whose function it is to afford protection against gas in wartime.

Failing amicable agreement within one month from the notification of the decree providing for expropriation the indemnity to be paid will be thus determined:

The indemnity will be calculated on the basis of the value of the factory at the date of expropriation reckoning solely the loss caused by expropriation in such a manner as to make it impossible for the firm expropriated to make a profit on the indemnity.

It will be fixed by 2 arbitrators, one appointed by the Minister, the other by the firm to be expropriated. If the latter fails to appoint its arbitrator within 15 days of receipt of the notification of approaching expropriation, an arbitrator will be appointed by order granted on request by the president of the civil court of the locality in which the factory is situated.

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The 2 arbitrators will give their decision within three months of their appointment; the parties concerned may extend this period.

If the 2 arbitrators cannot reach agreement on the indemnity to be paid, they will appoint a third arbitrator.

If they cannot agree on the choice of a third arbitrator, a third arbitrator will be appointed, on the request of whichever side takes the initiative in so doing, by the senior magistrate of the court of appeal for the locality in which the factory is situated.

The third arbitrator will give his decision within one month of his appointment.

The arbitrators need not observe the usual rules of procedure.

Their decision which it will be the duty of the Minister to convey to parties concerned may be made the subject of an appeal to the Council of State in the form provided for by the decree of July 22, 1806 as amended by Art. 24 of the law of April 13, 1909.

The administrative authorities will have the power to take possession of the expropriated property any time after the decree of expropriation is made public. It will proceed to draw up an inventory on its own account and make a provisional payment to the original owners.

The arbitral award will be registered without payment of tax and will bear the seal of the senior president of the court of appeal.

Art. 2. From the date of the promulgation of the present law concerns existing for the manufacture or sale of munitions of war as defined in Art. 1 will no longer be permitted to carry on work and their intermediaries or advertising and publicity agents will be permitted to function only with the authorisation and under the control of the state.

(Art. 3 deals with methods of carrying out the law.)

II

Although these surveys deal only with laws already promulgated and as a rule do not deal with bills, I should like to make brief mention of the bill for the revision of the Dutch constitution tabled in August last because of its importance. The bill first deals with amendments to the present position of the revenues of the Crown.

The Civil List of the King or Queen, at present amounting to 1,200,000 florins, will be reduced to 1,000,000 florins. The consort of a queen or of a princess who is heir presumptive to the Crown for whom up to the present no provision has been made, will be granted an annual subsidy of 200,000 florins. These amounts may be modified by a law which as a bill has been passed by both chambers by the statutory majority of two-thirds of the members.

The bill provides also for a change in the salaries of members of the Chamber:

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The salaries of members of the Chamber of Deputies will be reduced by 1,000 florins to 4,000 florins per annum. Pensions will be reduced from the present level of 3,000 florins to a maximum of 2,800 florins per annum. These amounts can also be altered by a bill voted by a two-thirds majority in both houses. The salary will not be paid to members who under the rules of procedure of the Chamber have been excluded from its sessions.

A later clause contains the following interesting provisions:

Provision is made for the designation of ministers without portfolio. The functions of minister and member are declared incompatible. None the less a minister who has been elected a member of the States-General can hold both positions for a period of three months after his election to Parliament.

This is in evident contradiction to the principles which are generally admitted to be the basis of the functioning of the parliamentary régime. That the functions of minister and deputy should be declared incompatible does not seem to me to be a very practical suggestion for the better functioning of the parliamentary régime, when we consider that under that system a ministry ought to be composed of members belonging to the party, or group of parties, having a majority in Parliament; this declaration of incompatibility will only embarrass the functioning of Parliament. It creates a gulf between the personnel of the Ministry and the personnel of Parliament. And that gulf will be purely artificial. The whole essence of the parliamentary system is in the phrase: the majority governs. When the cabinet is composed of members of Parliament the application of this principle is easy, and the ministry is only the executive committee of the parliamentary majority. Under the proposed bill for the revision of the Dutch constitution one can only expect difficulties to arise in working the parliamentary system. Instead of strengthening that system and stabilising it, it may be feared that it will only make cabinet crises more frequent. A cabinet composed of members of Parliament in my opinion is more sure of a majority than a collection of personalities who do not form part of Parliament. A similar tendency to create this incompatibility is seen in other countries as well. It may be explained by the criticism which has been directed in the last few years against the manner in which the parliamentary system functions, but it

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is in my opinion not very practical and is itself incompatible with the whole theory of parliamentary government.

Restrictions are also suggested in the matter of parliamentary immunity :

Any representative of the people who advocates or favours illegal procedures and methods may be expelled by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the House of which he is a member. Seats thus made vacant will not be filled. Parliamentary immunity will not apply in cases of subversive agitation or the betrayal of state secrets.

The bill also provides for the creation of special organs of a professional character which will be qualified to regulate professional life and practice.

III

Among the constitutional laws of the New World we may note rather as a matter of curiosity than of importance the constitutional manifesto of the revolutionary committee in Paraguay, a manifesto which was promulgated after the recent *coup d'état*.

The manifesto announces a series of reforms, but the real innovation which it brings into the public life of Latin America is the introduction of racist principles, which so far have not been accepted in that Continent. As we shall see it contains clauses which are definitely anti-Semitic and it is clear that we must ascribe this to European, and particularly to German, influence. The manifesto lays down :

The people, the ex-combatants, the students and the national army have opposed the late government :

1. Because in the state of Paraguay it was not the state which was in power but the business class and the great landed proprietors.

2. Because the government was the servant of the business class which exploited the people and not the servant of the Paraguayans who have been sacrificed during three years of war :

3. Because this business class which is the master of the country had been supported by the politicians, and that was why they did whatever seemed good to them and made mock of the starvation and misery of the real Paraguayans. . . .

26. Because the government made itself the valet of the Jews who invaded the land to wring the last drop of blood from our people who were outraged by the infamies committed by its governors.

27. Because the government allowed anyone—Jew, thief or assassin—to enter the country, own land and receive credits.

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The manifesto ends thus :

Such are the reasons for the revolution which has just freed Paraguay from a government of bandits, assassins and traitors. The Republic repudiates these scoundrels who have shed the blood of its citizens in their own defence and have made off with the gold of the nation.

The country can be calm and confident. The revolutionary movement, the army, the students and the people will never allow the government of the party of thieves, bandits and traitors to return. The whole nation is on the side of the triumphant movement of the army, the union of ex-combatants and the people.

IV

In recent German legislation we may note the decree of June 11, 1936 unifying the police forces. The decree is only the logical consequence of the authoritarian organisation of that country and it contains provisions unifying the whole police system. The police in Germany—the apparatus of repression—is the technical basis of the violence of the dictatorial state. The decree lays down :

Art. 1. With the object of centralising and unifying the functions of the police in the Reich, a chief of the German police will be appointed at the Ministry of the Interior of the Reich. He will at the same time be entrusted with the study of all questions concerning the police which are the province of the Minister of the Interior of the Reich and of Prussia.

Art. 2. Herr Himmler, assistant chief of the secret police of Prussia, will be appointed chief of police at the Ministry of the Interior of the Reich. He will be placed directly under the orders of the Minister of the Interior of the Reich and of Prussia. In all matters concerning his office he will represent the Minister of the Interior of the Reich and of Prussia in the absence of the latter. He will have the administrative title of chief of the German police at the Ministry of the Interior of the Reich.

Art. 3. The chief of the German police at the Ministry of the Interior of the Reich will attend all meetings of the cabinet when questions within his province are under discussion.

Art. 4. The Minister of the Interior of the Reich and of Prussia is charged with the carrying out of the present decree.

V

While we are dealing with the legislation of authoritarian regimes it is worth noting the new law on associations in Lithuania which has just been made public. The political

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régime in Lithuania is an authoritarian one¹ and so its latest law is a document which belongs to the new despotic epoch in Europe. By this law the statutes of all associations must be approved by the Minister of the Interior and even amendment of these statutes requires the consent of the Minister (Arts. III and V). The law regulates every detail of the life of an association from its formation to its dissolution. The watch kept on it is strict and rigorous. The public authorities even see that its members attend to their duties. Art. X says :

The association having been formed, its committee must be formed within six months of its inclusion in the register of associations. If no committee has been constituted by that time the local authority will dissolve the association. Until the committee is duly constituted the association will be governed by the founder-members represented by one of them to whom full powers has been delegated.

Surveillance is carried to such a pitch that Art. XV lays down :

Members of the committee of the association must be Lithuanian citizens able to speak and write Lithuanian. Test may be made of their knowledge of the language.

As may be guessed the public authorities have the right to dissolve the association and the law lays down in detail the ways and means whereby the authorities can intervene in the activities of the association. Art. XIX says :

If the committee of the association is removed from office, the Minister of the Interior will grant the association time to form a new committee, and until it is constituted he will entrust either the old committee or a person designated by it with the transaction of the current business of the association. If certain members of the committee are removed from office and the aforesaid committee cannot perform its functions without these, the Minister of the Interior will grant the association time to find members to replace these, and pending that event will entrust either to the old committee or to a person designated by it the transaction of the current business of the association. If a sectional committee is dissolved, or certain of its members are removed from office, the Minister of

¹ The provisional constitution of May 15, 1928 is still in force; none of its articles have been amended. It is still a provisional constitution for it provides for a plebiscite or referendum which would give it ratification by the people. This must take place according to Art. 106 within ten years from 1928, that is, May 15, 1938 at the latest. If the result was favourable to the constitution, it would cease to be provisional and become definitive. If the result was unfavourable the whole constitution would have to be redrafted. That is the legal position. Up to the present time this appeal to the people has not been made and no law providing for such a popular vote has been brought forward. Actually the Chamber (Seimas) which was constituted in 1936 has proceeded (in accordance with Arts. 103 and 104 of the provisional constitution) to discuss the amendment of that document without any popular referendum having been taken.

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the Interior will grant time for the constitution of a new committee or the election of new members to the vacancies created. Until the new committee is constituted or the vacancies are filled the business of the section will be carried on by the committee of the association.

An association must have at least twelve members. If its numbers fall below that figure, says Art. XXXII, the local authority will declare the association dissolved. Even while they are in session the members of the association may indulge only in such activity as is agreed to by the public authorities, and Art. XXXIX contains this rather odd provision :

The association cannot discuss the actions of a member in so far as these concern his activities as a public official and can neither blame nor pass judgment on such actions.

Even the name of the association is made the special concern of the Minister of the Interior :

The name of the association must be absolutely different from the name of any existing association. The name must be composed of full words. If the association abbreviates its name in one word or in several, these words must not be discordant with the rules of the Lithuanian language (Art. 44).

Other articles deal with the different methods of dissolving an association or surveying its activities, etc.

Thus the severe regimentation which Europe knew at the beginning of the nineteenth century is once again in force, and individual liberty is limited and controlled as it was in the epoch of absolutism.

VI

The drama in Spain is at the moment being played out in a field with which these surveys do not pretend to deal. The struggle between the Government and the rebels which has been going on since July last, and which is actually the most atrocious civil war in the history of Europe, has not yet produced any "juridical" acts in the true sense of that term. A legislative act, a law, a decree must always be interpreted by its political and social significance. In the murky atmosphere of civil war a legislative document has not the same force as a law promulgated in normal times. The efficacy of a juridical act which is accomplished in the throes of a fratricidal struggle cannot be compared with that of the normal legislative act. But all due reserve having been made with regard to revolutionary legislation in general,

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we do possess some documents which at least are indicative of certain tendencies.

The daily press has supplied us with much information concerning the social and political activity of the Madrid Government. The republican Cabinet is faced with a military rebellion and it has appealed to the forces of syndicalism and of the extreme Left whose influence has considerably changed the political aspect of the republican *régime*. The various decrees issued by the Madrid Government have been published and fully commented upon by the press.

We have also less well-known documents which come from the other side of the bloodstained barricades of the civil war. By the time this survey is published the situation in Spain will probably have become clearer. At the moment of writing, the civil war is still raging. But I think it is worth while giving here the "constitutional statute" of the rebels, for this provisional statute indicates the sort of state which will be established in Spain if the military win. On October 2 last General Franco signed the "constitutional" law on the technical government of the state. This law lays down:

Art. 1. There will be set up a Technical Junta of State which will be composed of the following sections:

- (a) the Finance Commission which will study and prepare all measures concerning taxes, customs, the stamp office, the budget, clearing-houses, etc.;
- (b) the Commission of Justice;
- (c) the Commission of Industry, Trade and Food Supplies which is charged with compiling statistics of the various commodities, food for the people, means of subsistence in the occupied areas, imports, exports and raw materials;
- (d) the Commission of Agriculture;
- (e) the Commission of Labour;
- (f) the Education Commission;
- (g) the Commission of Public Works and Communications which will be chiefly concerned with the execution of public works already in progress, with transport of all kinds and with posts and telegraphs.

Art. 2. The president of the National Junta will decide all questions that arise, will take the advice of the technical experts and submit his decisions to the Head of the State.

Art. 3. The post will be created of Governor General of the Occupied Areas.

Art. 4. A Secretariat of Foreign Affairs will be set up which will be concerned with diplomatic relations with other countries. It will include a press and propaganda section.

Art. 5. A special Secretariat of the Head of the State will also be set up.

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Art. 6. The directions necessary for the functioning of the public services will be given by the President of the National Junta, the Governor-General and the Secretary-General of the Occupied Areas.

Some interesting details can be added regarding the way in which this government will function:

- (1) It is a totalitarian government with one responsible head, a leader who rules the state.
- (2) It is composed of technical experts.

The Defence Junta of Burgos is replaced by the Government. Here is the composition of the latter:

At the head there is a chief of state—General Franco. Five organs of government derive directly from him. They are:

- (1) A Secretariat-General of the Head of the State at the head of which is the general's brother, Senor Nicolas Franco;
- (2) A Secretariat of War at the head of which is General Gil Yuste.
- (3) A Secretariat of Foreign Affairs at the head of which is Senor Francisco Serrat, the former minister to Vienna.
- (4) A Technical Junta with General Davila as president.
- (5) A Governor-General—General Francisco Fermoso.

There is also a Secretariat of Press and Propaganda which is placed under the Secretariat of the Head of the State and the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.

The Secretariat of the Head of the State is an organ which occupies a position somewhat between the Head of the State and the four other Secretariats. Its function is to put forward suggestions which can be placed before the Technical Junta and to receive from that body suggestions to be put before the Head of the State.

The Technical Junta is composed of seven commissions—finance, justice, trade and industry, agriculture, labour, education and public works, posts and telegraphs. The Junta has to some extent a legislative function and in its sessions, plenary or otherwise, can take decisions of secondary importance without reference to the Head of the State.

The Governor-General is concerned on the one hand with the administration of the provinces in close liaison with the civil governors of the fifty provinces and on the other hand with receiving deputations from the provinces. Later an effort will be made to give these last a representative system which will be fundamentally corporative in character.¹

¹ In order to give the reader an accurate comprehension of the way these technical measures will be applied, it is necessary to quote some sentences from the speech made by General Franco when the law on the Junta of State was promulgated: "When we consider that the time has come, the nation will have the opportunity to express its will but only through those technical and corporative organs which alone are capable of really expressing the wishes of the people of understanding and what the nation needs.....Every Spaniard must work, each according to his ability. The new government will not permit parasitic citizens to exist.....Spain desires to live in harmony with all nations but she refuses to have anything to do with any country under Communist rule."

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The chief point of interest in the "provisional constitution" is the conception of the state which underlies it, and which is formulated in these documents, a conception which will certainly be the basis of the new constitution of Spain if the rebels win. We are confronted with a military dictatorship, without any shadow of popular government, without popular suffrage, without representative institutions, without any parliamentary system, and with some vague allusions to a corporative regime and to improvement in the lot of the workers. From the technical point of view we find in it reminiscences of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, certain ideological elements which are relics of the ancient Carlism, and signs of German and Italian influence. In short, we have an authoritarian state which gives the people no possibility of controlling the rulers imposed upon it by violence.

In the Spanish civil war the moderate elements, as might be expected, have disappeared and extremists oppose extremists. The Republican Government has been outstripped by its own defenders who hold extremist views, and who intend, if they win, to make Spain an anarcho-syndicalist state, while on the other hand the rebels want to return to the Spain of the Inquisition, the Spain of the *ancien régime*. But while, if the Government wins, there is still hope that in the end democracy will triumph, the constitutional programme of the rebels as revealed by the "provisional constitution" leaves no hope at all of any return to normal constitutional life. That constitution is a step backward, a return to past centuries, and it takes an important place beside the other constitutions of the authoritarian countries of today which bear witness to the extent to which the twentieth century can return to an out-of-date absolutism.

The crisis of democracy is a very serious one. After the long democratic evolution of the nineteenth century, Europe today is reverting to absolutism in its most primitive forms.

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THE incident of King Edward and Mrs. Simpson was an immense shock to self-complacency. For the monarchy had been built up during the reign of George V to Olympian heights. During the period of his illness down to his Jubilee and death, the British monarchy was beyond criticism. A journalist who ventured a word to suggest that anything could be wrong with Olympus, and that such a prostrated and religious loyalty was dangerous to our democratic institutions, did so with the knowledge that he was almost certainly damaging the circulation of his paper. The monarchy was the symbol of our stability; it was also, in each of its members from the divine father down to the latest born baby, perfect and untouched by human frailty. One of the remarkable features of the nine days in which the royal taboo has been broken down by Edward VIII has been the way in which newspapers have been forced to reiterate that the King is "after all a human being." This phrase has been constantly repeated in leading articles and letters to the press. The people had to be told that the King was not a God because otherwise the situation was inexplicable. The first effect of the discovery was stunning; for a few days of confusion the public was like a man who has received a violent blow on the head and who feared, in his pain and bewilderment, that the injury might be permanent. A few days later it woke up, as it were, in hospital to find Mr. Baldwin sitting by the bedside explaining that nothing very serious had really occurred, that the monarchy was safer than ever and that it was a proof of the soundness of our constitution that we were able to return to normal with another King, a family man like his father, able to carry on the great traditions of British monarchy and to assure our stability for the future.

The shock was all the greater because until December 3rd very few people in England had even heard of Mrs. Simpson. It will be worth while to explain the reasons for the silence of the press about this subject of supreme news value which had been for months the main topic of publicity throughout the American press. Until the Simpson divorce suit at

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Ipswich no publicity of any kind had appeared in the London daily press unless we consider photographs of Mrs. Simpson with the King during their Adriatic holiday as publicity. The first reason for this silence was the law of libel which would have prevented any English newspaper from saying much that was true, as well as much that was false, that appeared in the American press. The second reason was the "informal understanding" among newspaper proprietors—there was at no time any action by the Newspaper Proprietors' Association—not to give publicity to a matter which so clearly threatened the prestige and indeed the existence of the British monarchy. Until the Simpson divorce case there had not been much danger of publicity. No reputable paper would have thought it good circulation policy to print news of a scandalous nature about the royal family. It would no doubt have sold for the moment, but it would have led to a storm of protest from readers and might even have been punished by the serious disapproval and withdrawal of information from Whitehall. The Simpson divorce case, however, was news which it could not be blamed for printing, and much persuasion, many telephone calls following upon discussions between newspaper authorities and persons in Whitehall and Buckingham Palace, were necessary to induce the whole press to give only the minimum of detail and "play down" the Ipswich divorce. No comment of any sort appeared, even though the case was featured with immense headlines all over the United States and its full implications stressed (a specimen headline was "King's Moll Renoed at Ipswich"). It may be asked why even at this stage the independent weekly reviews and some provincial papers upon which no pressure of any sort was brought and which were not members of the N.P.A. remained silent. I can only imagine that their editors and proprietors were influenced by the same motives that decided me to say nothing in the *New Statesman and Nation*. It was not until I heard privately that the King had made up his mind to marry Mrs. Simpson that I felt inclined to say anything. This made all the difference. Talk about the King and Mrs. Simpson seemed to me unwarrantable scandal anyway about a private matter, but the King's marriage was

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obviously a question of the greatest public interest. During the week before the news actually broke in England it became obvious that it could not much longer be concealed. On December 2nd Bishop Blunt's reference to the King's failure to appreciate the need of God's grace was merely the signal for which all the papers had been waiting. All their material was ready. But the London press proprietors thought it wisest to prepare the public mind gently and reported the Bishop's statement in full, but without editorial comment. A number of Provincial papers, however, headed by the *Yorkshire Post*, seized upon the occasion to comment at length on the scandal surrounding the throne. After that the lid blew off.

Bishop Blunt followed up his statement by an explanation that he knew nothing of the suspicion and merely meant that the King seldom went to Church. However that may be, it is clear that someone in authority thought his speech a good method of opening the full discussion that had become inevitable, and it is to be noticed that the *Yorkshire Post* is closely in touch with some of His Majesty's Ministers.

The leading article in *The Times* of December 3rd explained that neither Bishop Blunt's remarks nor the American publicity could any longer be disregarded. The American newspapers had even gone to the length in the last fortnight of saying that the King contemplated a marriage that was "incompatible with the throne and of announcing Queen Mary's approval of it." The two paragraphs that followed had obviously been prepared in advance. They quoted Halifax the Trimmer and *The Times* of 45 years ago to sustain an argument that kingship must be kept above public criticism, and that though "a King is entitled to his relaxation and the companionship of his chosen friends," the nation and empire could not afford that the influence of the monarchy should be weakened by a conflict "between private inclination and public duty." It demanded an act or statement which would put an end to the damaging campaign of scandal against the monarch, referred to their serious effects in Canada and other Dominions, and reminded us that

events in the world outside have imposed, as never before, upon

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the British monarchy the duty to stand as a rock to the world outside amid the seething tides of communism and dictatorship. So it stood a year ago. So, let us hope, it will stand a year hence when a new reign has been hallowed by the coronation. But the public need some definite reassurance if the rock is not to be shaken.

The *Morning Post* in a short leader broke the news to its loyal conservative readers by saying that it shrank from believing that the gossip could be true. The *Daily Telegraph* was sure that the King would choose aright (apparently implying that he would renounce his affections for his public duty). The *Daily Herald* reflected the bewilderment in the Labour Party by having no leading article at all, but filled its main feature article with an exposition by Professor Laski of the constitutional questions that would arise in the event of any conflict between the King and his Ministers. The *Daily Express* was equally cautious; it avoided editorial comment but covered half its front page with the news of an acute constitutional crisis between the King and his Ministers. Lord Rothermere's *Daily Mirror* carried the news that the King wanted to marry Mrs. Simpson. (At this stage her name was only mentioned by the *Daily Mirror* and the *News Chronicle*.) It printed her portrait, but also avoided comment. The *News Chronicle* took a much franker line and one which suggests, in the light of later developments, that it was unusually well informed about the actual situation. It urged that the King should not be prevented from marrying as he wished because the woman of his choice had been twice in the Divorce Courts and was not considered suitable as Queen. The solution was special legislation by which she might take titled rank and be the King's wife without being Queen of England. The same argument was elaborated in the *New Statesman and Nation* next day. The *New Statesman* pointed out that the situation had arisen because of the most attractive characteristic of Edward VIII: his dislike of humbug prevented him making a formal marriage to a royal personage whom he did not love, though a farce of this character would have been welcomed by the Cabinet and solemnised by the Church.

On Friday, December 4th, *The Times*, through the mouth of its Parliamentary Correspondent, showed its close contact with the Government by revealing that the King had himself

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expressed his desire to contract such a marriage as would require special legislation. The Ministers had done nothing to interfere with the King's private business. The suggestion had come before them at the Cabinet meeting on November 27th; the interval had been occupied in sounding the opinion of Mr. Baldwin's colleagues and supporters, of the Opposition leaders and of the Dominion governments; there had been no substantial differences of opinion shown in any of these quarters; Wednesday's Cabinet meeting had therefore been quickly over and the Cabinet's answer to His Majesty conveyed immediately afterwards. The anxiety of *The Times* that no constitutional issue should arise and that the King should be met by a united House of Commons was shown by its high praise of the *Daily Herald's* attitude (this must have referred to Professor Laski's article). It pointed out, however, that though Mr. Attlee and Sir Archibald Sinclair had been consulted by the Prime Minister, neither section of the Opposition were "as yet definitely committed to any policy which the Government may find it necessary to adopt." What was clear, however, was that Col. Wedgwood's motion declaring that the Oath of Allegiance to the King is "unaffected by any form of coronation ceremony or by the presence thereat or absence therefrom of any dignitary or personage whatsoever" was an independent view not generally shared by the Labour Party. In its leading article *The Times* urged that no one had any objection to any marriage with a commoner or an American, and it then went on to attack the suggestion of special legislation which would prevent the King's wife from becoming Queen. It argued, in effect, that if Mrs. Simpson was not suitable as Queen then she was equally unsuitable as the wife of the King. Its final paragraph was devoted to urging the dangers of delay.

The *Morning Post* demanded in decorous terms that the King should renounce his love for the sake of his duty. It also carried a special article suggesting that Mrs. Simpson might have descended from a Knight who came into England with the Conqueror. The *Daily Telegraph* let its readers know that there was a danger of the King's abdication, examined the legal position and said that the Dominions were shocked by the association of the Crown with a woman who was

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still married. The *Daily Herald* urged the Prime Minister to make a full statement of the facts, said that Labour would like a commoner as Queen but that the real issue was the over-riding necessity for the King to accept the advice of his Ministers. On the other side a number of influential papers began to stand in favour of the King having his own way. The *Daily Express*, whose proprietor is a personal friend of the King, contented itself editorially with saying "Let the King give his decision to the people." The *Daily Mail* said that abdication was out of the question, that the King would come out of the struggle stronger than ever, and praised the attitude of Col. Wedgwood. The *Daily Mirror* took the same line, urging that Mr. Churchill's demand that no "irrevocable step" should be taken without the House of Commons and Col. Wedgwood's Motion were indications that the issue might be decided by the representatives of the people. It added us that the King was a man and thought the public would support the King. The Minister reminded us that no advice has been given which would leave the King the blunt choice between renunciation and abdication. Why not a morganatic marriage? The *Daily Worker* carried a full report of a speech by Mr. Harry Pollitt, which spoke of the "flummery and flapdoddle" behind the constitutional crisis and urged that the real issue was the desire of Mr. Baldwin and the capitalist machine to coerce the King into doing his job of perpetuating the existing economic order.

On Saturday, December 5th, *The Times* reported the Cabinet's refusal of a morganatic marriage, again praised the *Daily Herald* for agreeing that the Cabinet could have taken no other course than to tender the advice it did, and urged that this was "no crisis precipitated by a Government of Mrs. Grundys or snobs," but that its attitude was supported by the Dominions, Parliament and the public; it said that great damage has already been done to the throne and that an early decision was essential. The *Morning Post* thought it "deeply repugnant" that an attempt should be made to arrange a marriage between the King and a woman who had not yet obtained her freedom. The King's choice lay between "self-will and self-sacrifice." The *Daily Telegraph*

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noted the constitutional dangers that would arise if the King persisted in his desire for a morganatic marriage and feared the possibility of a King's Party such as had not appeared for 150 years. The *Manchester Guardian* showed a Puritan background from which it has never departed and a caution which it has occasionally abandoned and has made itself famous in the past by abandoning at the right minute. On this occasion it took the same line as *The Times* but was less outspoken. Its London letter of December 5th, however, added a new point which was to become extremely important in the following week. It pointed out in guarded language that the King had got rid of the older and responsible advisers of the Crown, and was now surrounded by people of his own age who were not necessarily his truest friends. The *Daily Express* came out more openly on what was becoming known as the King's side. Mr. Baldwin's refusal to agree to a morganatic solution was a "direct challenge to the King" which had made the crisis worse. The Government did not represent the country; the crisis could be averted by the Cabinet giving way. The inclusion of a special article about the Archbishop of Canterbury suggested that those who sided with the King realised the part played by the Church in the dispute and might be prepared to fight the issue on theory of "puritanism versus freedom." The *Daily Mail* was also hostile to Mr. Baldwin, urged that the country was not yet informed precisely of what the King had in mind and that an intermediate decision was still possible. The *Daily Mirror* took the same line more strongly. Huge headlines demanded full knowledge of the King's proposition; Mr. Baldwin was hiding behind the Dominions; abdication must be avoided. It threatened that a General Election would follow abdication. The country would support the King, who would make his own choice. The *News Chronicle* still wanted to know why the morganatic marriage was impossible and printed a pointed letter from Dr. Maude Royden urging that none of the immoral Kings of the past had been asked to abdicate, and that it was odd that when a King did challenge bad moral standards and wanted honourably to marry the woman he loved he should not be allowed to do so.

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By the weekend it was clear that the growth of a "King's Party" was a real danger. The elements which supported the King's marriage were the Rothermere and Beaverbrook press; a group of Conservative M.P.s whose attitude was expressed by Mr. Churchill in a statement urging that the King must not be hurried and implicitly attacking the Government for forcing him into a position which might lead to abdication; by some socialists like Sir Stafford Cripps; by intellectuals and others who saw the issue primarily as a fight against puritanism and clericalism; and by Sir Oswald Mosley, who set out to show that only fascism was truly loyal and bitterly attacked the Government for trying to get rid of the King. His youthful supporters demonstrated in Whitehall on the King's behalf.

All possible points of view were expressed in the Sunday press on December 6th. Mr. Garvin opposed the morganatic solution and ended a lengthy sermon to the King with the hope that God would be his guide and that the King must choose which was his duty in his inmost conscience. The *Sunday Times* urged that Mrs. Simpson could be neither Queen nor King's wife, that he must decide between marriage and the crown, that delay was dangerous. It summarised the dangers in a remarkable sentence.

This great cynosure institution, round which as their sole remaining formal centre, the shining constellations of the British Commonwealth revolve cannot itself be grounded on a per-adventure.

"Scrutator" ended a more temperately expressed article with the hope that the King would "realise himself, but in the ways of constitutional kingship, in which conflict between personal feeling and royal duty can only be resolved in one way." On the other side, the *Sunday Dispatch* thought a morganatic solution better than abdication while the attitude of the *Sunday Express* was summarised by its headline "Hurrying the King." The *Sunday Pictorial* said that King Edward might broadcast within the next forty-eight hours, that he must not abdicate and that there ought to be a solution for a simple problem set by the facts that "the King wanted Mrs. Simpson and we wanted the King." *Reynolds* carried an unusual article by Mr. Brailsford, who pointed out that "while England chatters about a lady from Balti-

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more, Germany marches forward to the conquest of Spain." In his prelude to the article he pointed out the interesting fact that the attitude taken up by Bishop Blunt and others to the coronation, insisting that it would in some way be inefficacious unless carried out by an Archbishop or with the aid of nonconformists, was that of South Sea Islanders "who regard a coronation as a magical rite conferring on the King the power to control the winds and the rain."

The press on Monday and Tuesday, the 7th and 8th, betrayed the extreme anxiety in official quarters that the King might delay his decision while, with or without his consent, a Royalist party might gather round his supporters. On Monday *The Times* devoted its editorial to an account of the attitude of the Dominions, and to defending both their Governments and the British Government against the charge of trying to hurry the King. It urged that no constitutional issue had arisen or could arise. The *Morning Post* continued to urge that the King's decision might be hard, but that it was nevertheless simple, and it printed a remarkable selection from its correspondence during the next few days showing how strongly opinion was divided among avowed Conservatives, some of whom greeted its attitude with the warmest applause, while others described its request for the King to sacrifice himself as all "lies and cant." Another reader said that the Editor deserved "kicking from Tudor Street to Buckingham Palace." This violent division of opinion amongst people who wear the old school tie was one of the most interesting features of this whole dispute. One correspondent said that "words failed him" to characterise the Bishop of Bradford, and that it was an issue between old and young. Others supported the Church and the *Morning Post* in wishing at all costs to keep the Throne free from any immoral taint. The *Daily Telegraph* replied to Mr. Churchill urging the grave dangers to the Monarchy and Empire if decision was postponed and expressing its confidence in the King's sense of duty. The *Daily Herald* completely supported Mr. Baldwin. There had been no compulsion and no hurry. It laughed at the novel alliance between Sir Oswald Mosley and Mr. Harry Pollitt. Professor Laski explained the whole constitutional position, again

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urging that the issue was the supremacy of Parliament. On the other side the *Daily Express* featured pictures of a crowd cheering for the King in Whitehall, supported Mr. Churchill's plea for time, said that no one knew what Empire opinion was, that in any case the King could not marry immediately and that the people were behind him. The *Daily Mail* was remarkable for a letter from Lord Rothermere, its owner, urging that we could not afford to lose the King, replying to the Bishop of Bradford by recalling that the King had been a good friend of religion in supporting Toc. H. Lord Rothermere managed, as usual, to introduce Russia into the argument, and said that the King was the only agency powerful enough to obviate the necessity of introducing conscription. These remarkable arguments were repeated in two divergent letters that appeared in successive editions in Lord Rothermere's own evening paper. Lord Rothermere's acrobatics had the unusual result of eliciting a special editorial in *The Times* which castigated him in terms of bitter satire for wishing to drag the monarchy into politics and confusing every issue. *The Times* also attacked the *Evening Standard* and the *News Chronicle* whose issue of Monday the 7th had supported Mr. Churchill, who had been to Fort Belvedere on Friday and who might be entrusted, the *News Chronicle* suggested, to state a case for the King which he was constitutionally unable to state for himself. *The Times* somewhat overstrained itself in urging that no compulsion of any sort had been put on the King.

I have now reached the turning point in the history of these nine days. When Mr. Churchill rose on Monday to repeat his request that no "irrevocable decision" (which apparently meant abdication) should be made without Parliament, he was received with a chorus of disapprobation which obviously startled him, while Mr. Baldwin was received with loud cheers. The full summary of the reasons for this change was given by "Critic" in the *New Statesman and Nation* on Friday, December 12th. He wrote:

At the beginning Members were stunned. The pretended secret was public property, but the Government said nothing. An experienced lobby correspondent, whose business it is to ascertain the views of Members, estimates that about two-thirds of the House were behind the Government from the outset, while the remaining third was made up in almost equal proportions of the

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undecided and the very decided, that is to say, of the Members who thought that there was no difficulty about the marriage and those who didn't like it, but were not prepared to risk either abdication or a conflict with the King over it. The minority, scattered over all parts of the House, seemed likely to rally behind Colonel Wedgwood's pro-marriage resolution. This motion appealed to those Members, mostly of the Left, who hated the idea of an ecclesiastical veto on the marriage, and it appealed also to those members, chiefly Conservatives, who were for the King anyway, if necessary with Mrs. Simpson, and who may, some of them, have entertained the idea that this might be a good chance of getting Churchill in and Baldwin out. My lobby friend's view is that for about forty-eight hours there was a real danger of a deadly division of Parliament and the growth of a King's party; this danger reached its height on Friday when Mr. Baldwin somewhat brusquely announced that the Cabinet would have nothing to do with a morganatic marriage. The minority then surged out of the Chamber threatening war, real war, on Baldwin. By Monday all this had changed. Practically the whole House was behind Mr. Baldwin, and when Mr. Churchill again asked his delaying question, he was practically shouted down.

I think there were two reasons for this change. The reports from the constituencies showed that support for the King's marriage was practically only vocal in London. Scotland was solidly against, South Wales Members reported that the King's popularity was almost gone and that audiences in the cinemas saw in cold silence the films of his recent visit to the valleys where they had all cheered themselves hoarse. Lancashire and Yorkshire Members said the counties were solid against the marriage and even indifferent whether the King abdicated or not. Similar reports came from all parts of the country. The second and perhaps more important reason for the change was the realisation over the week-end of the danger of the formation of a King's party. Mr. Churchill had visited the King on Friday when it was believed that he was about to abdicate and rumours said that his visit was responsible for the prolongation of the crisis. Everyone was against delay, some people fearing that Hitler, who for the first time for many months, had stayed in Berlin over the week-end to watch events would think the moment good for adventure as the Germans did in 1914 when England was involved in the Ulster crisis. Then there were strong trade reasons against delay and the impossible thought of a general election fought on so confused and damaging an issue. Moreover, Mr. Churchill was unlucky enough to receive the support over the week-end of Lord Rothermere and Sir Oswald Mosley, not to mention the fact that the Communists were also keen to cash in on the King. Mr. Churchill himself was obviously quite ignorant of the change that had taken place between Monday and Friday and was startled by the almost ferocious resentment when he rose to put his question.

From Tuesday onwards the morganatic solution was

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clearly dead though *The Times* devoted its Tuesday's leader to a further violent attack on it. The old taboos were broken down. *The Times*, for instance, said that the idea of the morganatic marriage had been "raised by the King himself" and then called it "this foolish and deplorable product of misguided ingenuity." Its support of Mr. Baldwin was fully echoed in the *Daily Telegraph*, *Manchester Guardian* and *Daily Herald* which said on the 8th that the country was moving towards complete unity against the marriage and that it was sheer lunacy to suggest that Labour should try to seize the opportunity for party purposes. This attitude was violently criticised in the *Daily Worker*, which said that the Labour Party had lined up behind Mr. Baldwin, and that the House of Commons, and more especially the Communist M.P., Mr. Gallacher, had been completely muzzled. The *Daily Mail* was content to reiterate that every possibility must be exhausted before there could be any thought of allowing the King to abdicate, while papers which had hitherto supported or not repudiated the morganatic solution eagerly jumped at a new way of escape which seemed to present itself. A message was reported to have come from Mrs. Simpson saying that her position was "unhappy and untenable" and that she wished to do nothing to damage the King or to make his position more difficult. The *News Chronicle* hoped that this would make the path of renunciation easy for the King while the *Daily Express* and the *Evening Standard* of December 8th went so far as to say that the crisis was now completely over. The *Daily Mirror* also thought that Mrs. Simpson's statement cleared the air and began to edge in Mr. Baldwin's direction. It dealt with the strain on the Prime Minister and accepted his statement that no pressure had been put on the King. At the same time, it continued to feature Mrs. Simpson in a favourable light (reminding that Mark Anthony gave up a throne for Cleopatra) and concealed its change of position by quoting a number of extracts from the daily press which were critical of the King's proposal to marry Mrs. Simpson under a large heading, "Is this loyalty?" A selection from its correspondence suggested the existence of a large number of readers whose loyalty was vehement rather than forceful. The following is perhaps worth quotation:

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The Germans think God sent them Hitler. Let every English man and woman think God sent us Mrs. Simpson. What qualifications has the Bishop of Bradford, Mr. Baldwin and Sir John Simon to choose a partner for the King's bedchamber? I say Heil, Simpson of U.S.A., Empress of Britain, and Good Luck, your Majesty.

It is unnecessary to follow the papers in detail after this point because the 9th of December was a "day of suspense" in which there was little definite comment, some papers believing the King would renounce his marriage, others merely reiterating the need for haste. On the 10th abdication was generally expected. But it is interesting at this point to notice the attitude of certain Catholic papers. *Catholic Times* declared (December 11th) that the whole crisis was a ramp against the King and that financiers were using a moral issue to force an artificial crisis. As a Catholic paper it was not able to condone or recognise re-marriage, and it therefore insisted that no such person as Mrs. Simpson could exist. It insisted on giving her the name that she had taken in her first marriage—Mrs. Spencer—and gave the impression of looking, like Henry the Eighth, for a way of proving that this first marriage had not in fact ever been, in the sight of God, a marriage at all. The paper declared that "We are for the King. We are against the financial and political powers which are forcing King Edward from the throne." It demanded the re-establishment of the monarchy as an active force in the government of the country. Much more significant was the *Catholic Tablet*, which, referring to the possibility of the King renouncing Mrs. Simpson, said that "if the King makes the sacrifice now asked of him, he is entitled to expect in return more recognition than is now extended to his right to an initiative in the government of the country." Referring to this suggestion the *Church Times* (December 11th) rightly called it fantastic, and added that "here is one more striking example of the growing Roman Catholic opposition to democracy." By the 9th, however, most of the papers that had been most vehemently on the King's side prepared the way for a calm acceptance of the inevitable. The announcement came on Thursday afternoon accompanied by Mr. Baldwin's amazingly adroit speech. Those who listened attentively might have noticed certain

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ambiguities and omissions. Whereas the implications of Mr. Baldwin's earlier pronouncement had been that the King had not himself been in favour of Mrs. Simpson as Queen, it now became clear that his suggestion of a morganatic marriage was a second best, advanced because he was aware that Mr. Baldwin and others were altogether opposed to it. Moreover, *The Times* leader the next day with its strong remark about the pleasure-seeking and exotic people who had surrounded the King was another indication that there were important persons who preferred King Edward's abdication, possibly with good reason, because he had taken as his friends and advisers those who were regarded as politically and morally dangerous. This point was rubbed in with great emphasis by Mr. Gallacher in the short Debate that followed the abdication announcement. Mr. Gallacher went indeed further and suggested that the friends of the King included people who were in effect agents of a foreign power.

It did not need any unusual information or more than average amount of critical intelligence to realise that Mr. Baldwin had used the morganatic project as a means of getting out of a very difficult situation. In effect the King had been compelled to abdicate or completely to renounce association with Mrs. Simpson. If this had been clearly realised at the week-end it might have been fully and dangerously exploited by anti-democratic forces in this country.

Mr. Baldwin's speech of Friday perfectly set the note of the next day's press. The papers which had been prepared during the past few days for a possible decision in favour of renunciation by the King and which on Wednesday night had rushed through arrangements in case of decision to set up a Council of Regency and make the Duke of York's daughter, Elizabeth, Queen were also ready for the Duke of York's accession. There he was with his wife and daughters, the perfect family man ready to be built up as the son of his impeccable father, George V. There was not very much that could be said about the new King; his difficulty of utterance was indeed mentioned in one paper which told of his great efforts to overcome the defect, but stress was

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naturally laid on his work for boys' camps, on his remarks about the need of social betterment and about his happy and blameless family life. The only discordant note came from the small left socialist group in the House who polled 5 votes for a Republican amendment. Mr. Maxton urged eloquently but unoffensively that monarchy was an out-of-date institution which naturally led to such crises in these days and he was supported by Mr. Buchanan, Dr. Salter, Mr. Campbell Stephen and Mr. Gallacher. But perhaps the remark that will rankle most was made by Mr. Buchanan on the previous day when amid the eulogies of the departing King, he said he had never heard so much humbug in his life and that if the speakers really believed all the things they were saying about him "why did they unload him." The Labour Party attitude, however, was expressed by Mr. Attlee who said that socialists could not waste their time on an abstract discussion about republicanism, although they did hold that monarchy had been absurdly played up in the past, and had been invested "with an unreal halo" which had "tended to obscure the realities of the position."

If matters could have remained there, Mr. Baldwin would have pulled off a perfect job—a job as difficult and as successfully handled from his point of view as the General Strike. For complete success, however, he should have had the last word. His speech was a masterpiece of phraseology; the tone was perfect; trivial details about the exact times, even of phone calls to the King's secretary, were exactly designed to convey the atmosphere of complete frankness which was desirable, while successfully covering the omission of essentials. But the last word was not with Mr. Baldwin. On Friday evening some hours after his abdication had taken effect, Mr. Edward Windsor broadcast from Windsor Castle. The contrast to the sensitive listener was a fitting close to a drama whose conclusion is not yet certain. For Prince Edward spoke with a different kind of emotion from Mr. Baldwin's and with a simplicity and directness which were absolutely genuine. It may be that we shall never know what the conflict was that confronted the King during the week of suspense. It is generally understood that he was trying to make up his mind whether he would renounce the woman

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he wished to marry or abdicate from the throne. My belief is that the conflict was a different one. As I understand the story the King had absolutely decided to marry Mrs. Simpson and never wavered from that decision between the time he first informed Mr. Baldwin of his intention and his abdication. The question was not between renunciation and abdication but between abdication and fighting in any way constitutionally open to him against the Ministers who were determined to prevent his marriage. It is noticeable that he began his broadcast speech by saying that "at long last" he was able to speak for himself and it is no very well-guarded secret that he would have liked to have spoken for himself on the wireless at an earlier stage. If he had not put up the morganatic project to the Cabinet he might simply have announced his decision to make Mrs. Simpson Queen by marrying her without obtaining the permission of the Cabinet, thus appealing for public support not against the Government but simply on his own behalf. After the question had become a matter of public controversy and the Cabinet had announced their refusal to legislate for a morganatic marriage a public statement of any sort by the King himself would have brought him into party politics and involved a constitutional crisis. How much the constitution owes to King Edward's behaviour has not yet, I think, been fully realised nor have the mass of the public understood that the King could quite easily, as Mr. Baldwin himself explained, have said nothing about his intention to marry Mrs. Simpson until after her decree had become absolute and he himself had become crowned. Knowing, however, that this marriage would in any case be unpopular with powerful elements in the country, it appears to have thought it more honourable to rush the issue set out and publicly discussed before his coronation. The simplicity of his words in his final broadcast were again as marked as they had been in the document of abdication that was read by Mr. Speaker in the House of Commons. An objection to forms which have no meaning for him led him to leave out "by the grace of God, Defender of the Faith." In the same way, while Mr. Baldwin made much of his friendship with King Edward and of how it had grown in intimacy during their long discussions, King

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Edward said exactly what he meant and no more—that "His Ministers, especially Mr. Baldwin, had shown him full consideration." It may well be that if the King had earlier simply informed the public that he could not carry out his duties happily or successfully without the woman he loved and asked for public approval as the alternative to abdication, the opposition to his marriage with Mrs. Simpson could have been overcome both in England and in the Dominions. But no such direct question was ever put to the public nor indeed is it easy to see how it could have been without raising the whole constitutional issue. Puritanism was therefore once again almost accidentally associated with Parliamentaryism.

At the week-end people were more or less consciously preparing to be Cavaliers or Roundheads and if the battle had ever been joined it would have been complicated by the fact that in these days many of the political loyalists who might have been Cavaliers were puritans, while many of the strongest constitutional Roundheads detested what they regarded as an immoral and out-of-date puritanism and objected strongly to the part played in the background by organised religion. As it proved, the King went across the water without leaving a Cavalier party behind him and the victory went by default to the Parliamentarians and the Puritans.

KINGSLEY MARTIN

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SOME FOREIGN BOOKS

DR. FRIEDRICH STAMPFER'S *Die 14 Jahre der ersten deutschen Republik* ("Graphia," Karlsbad: pp. 640) should have been the most important book of the quarter, but it just falls short of being that. As one of the foremost collaborators of the socialist leadership, Dr. Stampfer was in a position to have knowledge intimate and detailed of all the transactions of the Republican years. Yet one would hardly gather that from this book. It is a straightforward narrative, very detailed and assembled with a curious lack of a sense of proportion, which chronicles events but leaves the reader very much in the air as to their why and how. The action of the Socialist Party is very open to criticism on many scores, and conscious of this Dr. Stampfer is throughout on the defensive. Not that there is no criticism but there is no fundamental criticism, and the defence throughout is a party and not a historical one. He supports the entire policy of the Ebert régime on socialist as well as national grounds in words that are curiously reminiscent of the utterances of some Labour leaders here, and on little more ground than that it is always wise to choose the lesser of two evils without troubling very much to investigate whether actually the choice was invariably so circumscribed. Very similar is his defence of the leadership in the last agony. It will be admitted that the leaders did what they thought best. That has never been contested; what has been contended is that what they thought best was not the best, and that charge Dr. Stampfer never sets himself seriously to answer. But his book will be a valuable addition to the student's library, for it contains a vast amount of facts and observations which merit careful consideration.

M. Benoist-Méchin's *Histoire de l'Armée allemande depuis l'Armistice* (Michel: pp. 416) is a compilation of which the student stood in some need. It is based on careful study of the best German sources, especially Maercker and Volkmann, and in this first instalment gives what is easily the most coherent and intelligible account of the part played by the army leaders in the revolution of 1918-19. The negotiations of Ebert with the High Command for troops to maintain

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order, the bargains then struck and the subsequent action of the troops regular and irregular to suppress "Bolshevism," are given in detail until the final break over the peace treaty and the establishment of the Reichswehr under the unemotional Seeckt. The formation of the first Freikorps, the designs of the General Staff in the East, the evacuation of the Eastern provinces—the author was not able to use the latest Reichsarchiv monograph *Die Rueckfuehrung des Ostheeres. In Auftrage des Reichskriegsministerium bearb. und herausgeg. von der Forschungsanstalt fuer Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte* (Mittler: pp. 208), which tells the reader all he wants to know on that subject—and the action of the High Command's formations in Central Germany and in Bavaria are ably summarised, and if the author can maintain the standard set until the end of the story he will have performed a meritorious task. There is nothing definitely new in his pages, but there is for the first time an ordered narrative which can be easily followed.

Herr von Ribbentrop contributes a foreword to a collection of documents entitled simply *Locarno*, edited by Fritz Berber (Junker und Duennhaupt: pp. xii, 408). The foreword is the only interesting part of it because none of the documents are new and are handy really only for the period 1935-36. In contrast to the regrettable tendentiousness—a hit apparently at the British blue book—of foreign publications, says the ambassador, this collection "without a gap" lets anyone who seeks to know the truth get an objective picture from documents which show clearly that France has steadily sapped and ruined the great security achievement of Locarno. It would be difficult to get a finer example of tendentious eclecticism than the collection thus sponsored.

Eugen Hadamowsky's *Hitler kaempft um den Frieden Europas* (Eher, Munich: pp. 270) is a lively account of the Fuehrer's tour through Germany in March of this year after the denunciation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. The purpose is, of course, to show Herr Hitler in the guise of national deity and it has therefore its social importance in its revelation of a certain type of National Socialist mind. The effect on the reader is purely emotional, whatever his emotions, but this is none the less a psychological document of real interest. As a counterpoise to this eulogy

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of the unity of a peace-loving Germany the reader may turn to *Das deutsche Volk klagt an* (Carrefour: pp. 318) which is a sustained documentation of the "bloody oppression" of the German workers, and evidence that the terror is still going on. There is a good deal of what may now be termed routine stuff on concentration camps, delation and police brutalities, but the most impressive thing in the book is the roll of the murdered which takes up seven pages for 1935-36. It is a curious commentary on Hitler's claim that the Nazi revolution was "bloodless." Mme. Irene Harand has made a critical examination of *Mein Kampf* in her "*Son Combat*": *Réponse à Hitler* (Imp. Bolyn, Brussels: pp. 236) and particularly of the anti-Semitism which is its inspiration. She examines the origin of Hitler's racialism and then proceeds to refute paragraph by paragraph his accusations against the Jews. The refutation is admirably phrased and made with full knowledge. It can hardly be described as objective but it is the work of a skilful and learned advocate whose historical instances are always apt, whose argument is never forced and whose spirit is admirable.

Among German books there is a curious work by—I reproduce the text—Dr. Dr. Dr. Hans K. E. L. Keller *Das rechtliche Weltbild* (Batschari Vlg.: pp. 186). So far only the first volume has appeared under the title *Gegenreich Frankreich: Geschichte des westlichen Internationalismus*. France here is credited with being the anti-Christ of the German (political) church, the seditionist and rebel who denies the unity of Europe and persists in creating and maintaining a counter-Empire. After an introduction on these lines the rest of the book is a long series of quotations from French writers from earliest times to the present day with the object of proving that, one and all, the French "oppose the Imperial order of the First Europe," are anti-Christian and anti-German. The purpose of the quotations often torn arbitrarily from their context is not always clear or would not be were it not for the introduction and so far the book is entirely worthless. Perhaps the second volume may make amends.

The problem of Fascism is dealt with in two works. The first, *Fascisme et grand Capital* (*Nouvelle Revue française*: pp. 270), is a long investigation of the connection of

"Fascism" with big business in all countries. It ascribes as the mission of "Fascism" the effort to recover from the "proletariat" the concessions made at the end of the war, its method as one of encouraging "plebeian" elements to seize power and then to replace the original "plebeians" with a police-cum-military dictatorship which to some extent gives satisfaction to the "plebeians" who have been encouraged to rebel. The "Fascist" state is therefore fundamentally an anti-working class state and strongly centralist, which, at home, claims the unlimited obedience of every citizen and abroad seeks to aggravate imperialist antagonisms. Its outward appearance changes locally but fundamentally it is a single phenomenon universal in its manifestations to which the only alternative is socialism. Much of the book is argument but it is based on sound study and much of the documentation is new or set in a new light, and however one may quarrel with this or that conclusion it cannot be lightly dismissed. The other concerns Italy alone—*L'Empire fasciste*, by Maurice Prélot (Sirey: pp. xii, 258). This is a detailed examination of the present regime in Italy, part of which is historical, describing the rise of Mussolini's party to its triumph and its constitutional and legislative activity. Then comes a description of the state as it now is, the principles on which it rests with its anti-liberalism and absorption rather than suppression of the individual and its evolution actually and theoretically to totalitarianism. It is statocratic, monocratic and autocratic and finds its constitutional form in corporativism of which there is an excellent analysis. The problem confronting any totalitarian state is the existence of the people and in corporativism that problem is solved by presenting to the people a sham self-government which has no reality because it is controlled by a party which has in essence become a public service. This is in no way a sensational book. It is soberly, even objectively, argued, and the exposition of Italian Fascism which it contains is a valuable contribution to our knowledge.

Books of purely theoretical interest may just be briefly mentioned. The most important is a large work by Prof. W. E. Rappard entitled *L'Individu et l'Etat dans l'Évolution constitutionnelle suisse* (Ed. Polygraphiques, Zurich: pp. 566).

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It is virtually an explanation of modern Switzerland by a clear-sighted patriot, of the transformations it has undergone and the reasons for them. Prof. Rappard traces the evolution of the old confederation of the eighteenth century through all the vicissitudes of the momentous years since then, and at times the book really becomes a history of constitutional evolution and legislation, a legislation which is voluminous and difficult and an evolution sometimes so slow that it is difficult to explain its course. Behind that legislative effort he sees the attempt perpetually to regulate the respective duties of the citizen and the state and a proof of the care with which the legislator must steer a course that will never risk the danger of inclining too much to one or other side and yet be skilful enough to make such inclination as the state of evolution demands. To any student of Swiss institutions it is invaluable, but it is no less valuable to anyone who seeks to understand the basic problem of our times.

In *L'Evolution du Régime parlementaire* Dr. E. Mélot (Bruylant, Brussels: pp. viii, 262) collected a series of opinions from well-known politicians including MM. Millerand and Blum and writers like Mr. Laski and Sir Maurice Amos on the present crisis of the parliamentary system. He then seeks to reduce their views to a whole and discusses first the alleged failure of parliamentary institutions to function, the causes of such bad functioning and the reforms suggested, dividing these into reforms which he rejects like dictatorship and reforms which are worth trying like reinforcement of the executive and reorganisation of the right of dissolution. The book concerns mainly the parliaments of France and Belgium, but it is suggestive reading for any liberal and has much in it that was worth saying.

In *Théorie juridique de la Revision des Traités* Prof. Scelle (Sirey: pp. 95) has written an interesting legal essay round Art. 19 of the League Covenant. There are the two basic facts—treaties have to be kept and treaties have to be altered. Of this thesis and antithesis the synthesis is the much controverted *clausula rebus sic stantibus*. Prof. Scelle analyses the effect of this conception in private and public law and finds a definite formulation of it in Art. 19. But there is only formulation in the sense that the article is based on the

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theory that circumstances alter cases. It does not provide a method beyond a vague recommendation of possibilities. There must therefore be method; once there is method, machinery is easy to find. Under the article the Assembly of the League has complete competence but it can only recommend, and Prof. Scelle sees no way out but an advance towards what he calls international super-legislation. The argument is intricate and often controversial and in places seems to have somehow got divorced from the unpleasant realities of a political situation, but it is always a reasoned argument which it is imperative to weigh.

Finally, there is the second number of the *Annales de l'Institut de Droit comparé de l'Université de Paris* (Sirey: pp. 274) which contains twelve articles—among which one may signal for special mention, Prof. Kelsen's "Droit et état du point de vue d'une théorie pure," Prof. Mirkine-Guetzévitch's on comparative constitutional history, Dr. Toledano on the constitutional evolution of Hungary and M. Ancel's on the rule *nulla poena sine lege* in modern legislation with special reference to Italy and Germany and the now indispensable *Annuaire interparlementaire* in its 1936 edition (Sirey: pp. 284).

R. T. CLARK

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CABINET GOVERNMENT. By W. IVOR JENNINGS. (*Cambridge: The University Press.* 21s.)

DR. JENNINGS'S volume has instantly taken its place as the outstanding discussion of its theme; and, indeed, it is fair to say that there are not more than two or three books in the whole range of our constitutional literature that are more indispensable to its understanding. If it lacks that touch of psychological genius which has made Bagehot's famous essay a classic, or that profound expression of a special *zeitgeist* which has made Dicey's work something more than a treatise on law, it is unlikely to be replaced for many years to come. And whoever may write upon the Cabinet in future years will find it essential to build upon the solid foundation Dr. Jennings has laid.

Only the specialist can adequately realise how truly solid that foundation is. He has combed the letters of Queen Victoria for every hint they reveal. Hansard, the Press, the innumerable biographies of the last hundred years, official papers, all these have been made to reveal their secrets. And I miss my guess if these pages do not reveal traces of conversations with highly-placed persons who were in a special position to paint an outline not usually visible to the ordinary man. The result is not only scholarship at its best; the result is also a living picture of the seminal institution of our governmental structure as it functions in its daily operation. It is not a picture painted with a flat brush. Because it is seen in all its complicated perspective, the proportions, not less than the principles, of the edifice stand out in striking realism. The reader who wants to see how admirable Dr. Jennings's treatment is has only to compare it with the previous discussions of the subject. Whether it is Anson or Lowell, the half-obscurities of Mr. Gladstone, the inspired hints of Morley, the incomplete researches of Miss Blauvelt, all of them are made antiquarianism by Dr. Jennings's research. He has inherited all their results and

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gone beyond them to a degree that only the expert can fully appreciate. It is not, I think, too much to say that no other country possesses a discussion of its main governing instrument that even begins to compare with this, either in amplitude or in illumination.

Dr. Jennings's treatment is not historical, nor is it an attempt at philosophic evaluation. He has sought simply to describe the factors that go to the making of the Cabinet as it is in their full and complicated relationships. The Crown, Parliament, the civil service, public opinion, all these enter into his survey. All that he has to say is amply fortified by a massive body of evidence, and if, sometimes, the reader is inclined to take a somewhat different view of its meaning from Dr. Jennings, he will invariably find that the discussion gives him at least the means of testing the evidence in the text. Let me hasten to add that this does not mean that *Cabinet Government* is a book mainly for experts. Not the least of its outstanding qualities is its straightforwardness. Dr. Jennings has discovered the secret that a great theme can be so treated as to be as fascinating for the general reader as it must be for a special public. The veil he has drawn away from what, before, was so largely mysterious, reveals a spectacle as dramatic and arresting as anything I know. Here, in a word, is real government—the things that actually do happen behind the façade. No more important contribution to the study of public administration is likely to be made for many a long year.

It has, as I say, been no part of Dr. Jennings's plan to evaluate the system he has set out to explain. But it will perhaps be useful to the reader if I set out some of the more vital problems to which his account gives rise. Outstanding, I think, is the problem of the Crown and the Cabinet. Here, inevitably, most of Dr. Jennings's material relates to the Victorian period; we shall have to wait for at least some years before the correspondence of Edward VII and George V enables us to answer the critical questions to which their reigns give rise. But there is enough here, as it is, to suggest some important conclusions. It is clear that Bagehot's picture of the monarchy is wholly inaccurate. The royal influence is profound; it is, for the most part, inherently

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conservative in complexion ; and it is, for the most part also, shaped by an environment that is only partially subject to ministerial control. One cannot help feeling from the evidence in these pages at least two things : first that *eminences grises*, like the late Viscount Esher, are wholly undesirable, if not dangerous, in a constitutional system, and second (as notably in the constitutional crisis of 1909-11), that the very indefiniteness of certain royal prerogatives make them a lever of possible reaction which might, in a crisis, produce momentous results. For their invocation, and it is clear that the Crown would be urged to invoke them, would end the theory of its political neutrality ; and no one could predict the outcome of such a situation. It is not at all impossible that the coming years will see, with all its dangers, the revival of the idea of a patriot king as a weapon of vital significance in the struggle against drastic or rapid social change. It is not unimportant that the one field in which the House of Lords has been anxious to limit the prerogative of the Crown is that in which it might be willing to create peers to relieve a progressive government in conflict with their Lordships.

The second point that emerges from Dr. Jennings's book is the outstanding importance of the little group of pivotal civil servants. This is important for two reasons ; in the first place, it was unobserved by Bagehot ; in his famous book there is not, I think, a single reference to the officials. In the second place, it has not only been gravely underestimated by Lord Balfour, in his well-known preface to Bagehot, but is usually obscured by civil servants themselves who delight to emphasise that not they, but ministers, are the effective masters of policy. In fact, the situation is much more complex for three or four reasons. The long tenure of great officials gives them views of their own which become departmental policy to the shape of which, in the long run, all but the most audacious of ministers are moulded. In the second place, few ministers, in our system, are likely to have a definite policy of their own, or, if they have, energy enough, or tenure long enough, to push it through. In the third place, far more than the minister, the official is the master of the materials from and through which decisions have to

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be made. And, finally, since one of the vital objects of the minister is to avoid making mistakes, any difference between his view and that of the department will, as a rule, tend to be settled in the direction the latter desires. The Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Home Office, the Board of Education under a great official like Morant, these have known well how to mould ministers to the destinies of which they approved. No doubt a good deal of our stability derives from this position ; no doubt, also, the great ministerial administrator, Haldane, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Herbert Morrison, will always be able to break through the leading strings of his officials. But no account of our system can pretend to accuracy that does not make the administrative class of the civil service a pivotal agent in policy. That, let me add, makes the question of the sources from which this class is recruited more important than it has been at any other period of our history.

Dr. Jennings has devoted a goodly portion of his book to a discussion of Treasury control, upon which he has given us, I think, the most informative account we possess. There are some additional questions it is worth while to ask upon which I should like to see him dilate in a later edition of his book. Treasury control, from the accounting end, is superbly conceived for its objectives. Is it so certain that the "Treasury mind" is the best kind of mind to have in its hands the fundamental controls that it exercises ? In the main, it is, as a mind, critical and negative ; in the main, also, it takes the near view of policy rather than the long view, owing to its preoccupation with cost. Is it wise for that type of mind to move, in the proportions in which it does move, to the control of departments ? Do men who pass long years in trying to prevent the growth of expenditure become, in the last ten or twelve years of their official lives, the best judges of that type of expenditure (the replacement of black-listed schools, for example), which is definitely creative ? And why is it that the Treasury, which can be so adamant in the field of the social services, is, relatively, so feeble, in detail as well as in principle, when it comes to grappling with the defence services ? It has always been able to mould successive Chancellors of the Exchequer in its own

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image? Why is its strength so much less virile when it comes to fighting the Army Council and the Board of Admiralty? I wish Dr. Jennings would throw some light for us upon these mysteries.

Dr. Jennings has some interesting pages upon the "inner cabinet" though he makes less of its significance, I think, than other students would do. Its importance does not lie so much, as his quotation from Mr. Lloyd George would suggest, in the way in which it becomes vital in an emergency, as in the shape it gives, in informal consultation, to the mind of the Prime Minister. And this shape is, I suggest, of quite special importance when the Prime Minister is a man who, like Mr. Asquith or Mr. Baldwin, has the balancing type of mind, the type that leads, rather than drives, his colleagues. Lord Morley used to compare the cabinets of Mr. Gladstone, in which the latter always had a lead to give his colleagues, with that of Mr. Asquith of which he remarked that he could always tell from what was said whether the Prime Minister had been in consultation with his "inner cabinet" or no. I suspect that not a little of the inadequacy of the two Labour cabinets derived from the fact that neither had an effective inner ring of ministers to whom the Prime Minister gave his whole mind and confidence and by whom his own purposes were formed and strengthened. From this angle, anyone who reads the correspondence between Sir Robert Peel and Sir James Graham can gain insights of high value. Dr. Jennings, I believe, sees that the inner Cabinet is important; I doubt whether he fully sees how pivotal it is to the success of an administration.

No chapter in Dr. Jennings' book is more new or more interesting than the ninth, in which he deals with the procedure of the Cabinet. Of the secretariat (the most enduring of Mr. Lloyd George's constitutional innovations) it is only necessary to say that, like Voltaire's God, if it did not exist it would be necessary to invent it; and it is difficult to conceive a technique more calculated to lead to creative discussion than that which the secretariat has devised. I add that my impression of Dr. Jennings's pages is that the burden of cabinet work is in fact less than ministers themselves and the pundits tell us. The burden, I suspect, comes from the immersion of ministers

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in departmental business, and the difficulty felt by minds fatigued by that pressure in turning to other subjects with the detail of which they are only partially familiar. A minister who knows all about the sugar-beet situation is not so easily at home amid the complexities of the Palestine problem; and it is not necessarily the better part of his brain that he gives to its consideration. After all, not he, but the Colonial Secretary, will have to answer for it in the House of Commons.

I have said enough, I hope, to make it plain that Dr. Jennings's book is one that no student of institutions, or, indeed, of human affairs in general, can afford to leave unread. Properly to discuss the issues it raises would require less a review than a book. I can hope only to have made plain my own sense of admiration for its knowledge and gratitude for its achievement. There are instances where colleagueship perhaps demands the tribute of silence. But the publication of this book is an occasion where a colleague may be permitted to salute with pride a master in that field in which he also seeks insight and illumination.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

THE RATEPAYER'S MONEY. By ARTHUR COLLINS. (George Allen & Unwin. 199 pp. 5s.)

STRANGE as it may seem, having regard to the fact that the local authorities are spending more than £500 millions a year, there is no simple handbook, for the student or the citizen, dealing in a general way with the whole field of municipal finance. Mr. Collins' little book is therefore welcome as a first attempt to fill the gap. It is also the first of a new enterprise which Messrs. Allen & Unwin are publishing entitled *The Town Hall Series*, which will aim at doing for local government what the well-known Whitehall series has done for the central government departments. It is thus doubly welcome.

The title is misleading, for the ratepayers' money—that is, the actual rates—only amounts to 45 per cent. of the total sum spent on revenue account by local authorities; and if one includes the municipal trading services, the rates account for only one-third of the total disbursements. Yet despite

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this fractional interest in the total volume of municipal finance, it is usual for people to talk as though the ratepayer bore the entire burden and who alone were responsible for finding the whole sum expended annually by local authorities. Mr. Collins falls into this error in the title, but not in the book itself. He deals at some length with central government grants and other sources of income, although self-supporting public utilities are given inadequate attention.

The immense growth of local government is illustrated by the fact that whereas the population of the country has increased by 50 per cent. since 1884, the total expenditure of local authorities in the same period has multiplied tenfold—from £54 millions (including £10 millions loans) to £543 millions (including £110 millions on capital account). The benefits resulting from this expansion can scarcely be over-estimated. It has taken place in consequence of a persistent emphasis on social needs and the claims or demands of the masses of poorer citizens. Yet Mr. Collins so far misreads the history of the past century as to say, first, that the "public opinion of this country is represented by the view of the ordinary ratepayer"; and, moreover, that "it can reasonably be suggested that a system of rationing expenditure which has proved successful in many large industrial undertakings, railways and other enterprises, could be extended to our local authorities generally." It is clearly the Conservative Party—under whatever name—which represents the ratepayers' point of view on the local council; but fortunately the ratepayers' point of view does not always prevail. For a ratepayer, as such, is desirous above all else of keeping the rates as low as possible. It is only as a citizen that he ceases to be exclusively preoccupied with this ignoble aim.

The proposal to ration expenditure is, of course, highly detrimental to the growth of the social services. But no thought of this appears to have crossed Mr. Collins' mind. His book, indeed, combines a masterly grasp of the technical aspects of local finance with a conspicuous absence of any understanding of the social issues underlying public expenditure. He recognises, however, the disadvantages of the rating system and includes interesting chapters on the

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rating of land values and the possibility of a local income tax. Curiously enough, there is no mention of the derating of industrial premises introduced by the Local Government Act 1929, which was one of the most defective pieces of legislation ever passed to amend the system of local rates.

W. A. ROBSON

THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS; RECOLLECTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS. By HENRY L. STIMSON. (*Harpers*. 1936. 15s.)

THIS is a deeply interesting book. It contains Mr. Stimson's version of the course of events in the Far-Eastern crisis, as seen from the State Department in Washington, from September 18, 1931, when the Japanese aggression in Manchuria began, until March, 1933, when, as a consequence of the defeat of Mr. Hoover by Mr. Roosevelt in the Presidential election, the author ceased to be Secretary of State.

It is a great advantage that we should have Mr. Stimson's story so soon after the events which he describes.

Some readers of this book have asserted that Mr. Stimson states that he proposed economic sanctions against Japan to the British Government, and that the latter refused to co-operate. This assertion is not borne out by the text and it is a pity that it should have been made, for it enables the British Government to put out a denial, which sidetracks the real case against them. The first point in this case is that they did not, at the outset of the aggression, propose economic sanctions against Japan at Geneva and communicate this proposal to the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, then, of course, outside the League. No such proposal was made. "On the contrary," says Mr. Stimson, "as early as September 26th it had been reported to us informally that Geneva was opposed to using sanctions." Nor did Mr. Stimson himself ever propose sanctions *in the sense in which this term is commonly used*. The second point in the case against the British Government is that at every stage they favoured Japan as much as they dared. The third point is that they failed to take even such opportunities as were presented to them of Anglo-American co-operation in the

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Far East and that they thereby alienated much American opinion which was disposed to be friendly. These three points are, of course, closely connected and Mr. Stimson's narrative throws light on all of them.

Until the end of September, 1931, Mr. Stimson's policy was based on the hope that Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Foreign Minister, whom he knew personally, would succeed in reasserting his authority over the military chiefs. Mr. Stimson, therefore, refused on September 23rd a request from the League to allow an American representative to serve on a Commission of Investigation which it was proposed to send to Manchuria forthwith, or even to allow an American representative to join in the discussion of this proposal at the League Council. He was afraid of "playing into the hands of Nationalist agitators" in Japan, and I have heard it said that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was very successful in those first days in fostering this fear in Mr. Stimson's mind and in suggesting to him that the League was trying to dictate a policy to the United States. Later, of course, an American citizen served on the Lytton Commission and an American representative sat, on several occasions, at the Council table of the League. But this first chance was missed at the American end. Later chances, however, were missed at the British end. As the American Government warmed up, the British cooled off, even from the tepid standards habitual to Sir John Simon. Early in January, 1932, when a large part of Manchuria had been overrun, Mr. Stimson sent a note to Japan intimating "non-recognition" of "any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to" the Briand-Kellogg Pact. He keenly desired that other Governments, and especially the British, should do likewise. Sir John Simon publicly refused, on the ground that Japan had promised to adhere to the open door policy in Manchuria and had stated that she "would welcome participation and co-operation in Manchurian enterprise." This stupid snub was administered on the eve of the assembly of the Disarmament Conference, at which close Anglo-American co-operation was evidently most desirable. It may be argued that Mr. Stimson attached an exaggerated importance to the

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practical effect of "non-recognition," which he described as "a sanction behind the expression of the moral disapproval of the world." But that is no excuse for Sir John Simon's *gaucherie*, which encouraged Japan to believe, not without reason, that official British sympathies were with her rather than with the United States.

In February, when the Japanese attacked Shanghai, Mr. Stimson made another proposal to the British Government. He suggested that under Article VII of the Nine Power Treaty a conference of the signatories, including Japan and China, should be summoned. He had several telephone conversations with Sir John Simon and sent him a proposed draft of a joint statement by the two governments. But "while no explicit refusal to my suggestion was ever made, I finally became convinced from his attitude in these conversations" that "the British Government felt reluctant to join in such a *démarche*."

In a very interesting passage, explaining the reasons for his suggestion, Mr. Stimson says:

"The possible use of economic sanctions against Japan was being more discussed in America since the Shanghai attack than it had been during the preceding autumn. It had become more of a practical possibility. Petitions looking to such use were now being circulated . . . Bills to give the President power to impose such action had been introduced in the Congress . . . If a situation should ultimately arise when the American Government felt it necessary to recommend the imposition, in co-operation with the rest of the world, of an embargo upon Japanese goods, I believed that such a measure would have more chance of being adopted by Congress if it were recommended following the invocation of the Nine Power Treaty than if it had been recommended solely by the League of Nations." But Mr. Stimson does not state that he put these considerations either to the British Ambassador or to Sir John Simon and, even had he done so, it would be incorrect to say that he had proposed the application of economic sanctions. He was still very far from that. None the less, it was a deplorable error on the part of Sir John Simon not to co-operate.

Thereafter there were no more brave initiatives. And by

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December, 1932, when the Assembly of the League was debating the Lytton Report, Mr. Stimson observes that "the speech of the British Foreign Minister in particular emphasised the arguments in favour of Japan to such an extent" that, according to the *Survey* of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, "after listening to Sir John Simon's speech, Mr. Matsuoka was reported to have remarked that 'Sir John Simon had said in half an hour, in a few well-chosen phrases, what he—Mr. Matsuoka—had been trying to say in his bad English for the last ten days'." I had forgotten that this famous story was so respectably authenticated.

HUGH DALTON

SPAIN IN REVOLT. By HARRY GANNES and THEODORE REPARD.
(Gollancz. 5s.)

AT a time when Communist spokesmen are acquiring merit everywhere by jettisoning their jargon—and revealing unsuspected resources of realism—this book is a disaster. It purports to be "a history of the civil war in Spain in 1936 and a study of its social, political and economic causes." (In the publisher's blurb this is transcribed as "a distillation of the best and most recent records.") But what Messrs. Gannes and Repard, both of the New York *Daily Worker*, have done, is to collate a mass of more or less accurate facts, and then string them together with the kind of machine-turned phrases which ruined one's enjoyment of the early Soviet films. Spain is, as it happens, the one country which cannot be explained by ready-made Marxian formulæ. Because it has never passed through the phase known to our history books as the industrial revolution—and at the moment the cause of the constitutional Government derives a considerable amount of its strength from the capitalists of the Basque Provinces and Catalonia—the present clash of ideals was bound to be expressed in a different class-form. To represent the civil war as the outcome of a conflict between "the toiling masses" and "the fascists" is to ignore entirely the Spanish spiritual climate. (Contrast the book by Mr. Langdon-Davies, who is just as much in sympathy with the Spanish Left.) Alas! the English publisher is loudly proclaiming this

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elucubration as "the" book about Spain. I defy anyone but a left-wing moron to find "Spain in Revolt" even readable.

We begin with a pithy chapter, oddly entitled "Upheaval," which reproduces the stock information about Spain's unsolved problems, at the root of which is the land question. Then Chapter II promises us "a rapid glance over the salient features of Spain's revolutionary history," in the course of which our simple-minded Marxists smugly assure us that "anarchist trends within the labour movement are a reflection of middle-class ideology in the ranks of the working-class." Anything less bourgeois than Spanish anarcho-syndicalism would be hard to imagine! If they were not so hag-ridden by doctrine, the authors might have spared a little attention for the constructive achievement of Lluís Companys and his friends of the *Esquerra* in Catalonia who have contrived to make an essentially bourgeois community appreciate that their political and economic interests are on the side of the workers.

In October, 1934, we are told, "faced by a point-blank threat of a fascist dictatorship on the Italian and German model, the Spanish workers..... tried to counter the danger by the establishment of a workers' and peasants' republic." The reality was very different. First of all, Señor Gil Robles was working for a Catholic, Jesuit-controlled and nominally Christian-Social state on the *Austrian* model. Then, it is simply not true that the powerful trade-union organisations—in October, 1934—were thinking in social-revolutionary terms. The Asturias rising, like most things in Spain, was primarily a local affair due to the predominance in the regional Workers' Alliance of the Nin-Maurin influence, i.e., the opposition Communist groups championing a "workers' and peasants'" régime, which later merged into P.O.U.M. It had some support from the bunch of left-wing Socialist intellectuals round Largo Caballero, but was opposed by the Communist Party and the bulk of the Socialist U.G.T. What organised labour was interested in was the general strike in order to register their protest against the inclusion in the Lerroux Cabinet of representatives of the C.E.D.A., whose loyalty to the Republic was suspect and whose leader, Gil Robles, had put himself out of court by occasional indiscreet outbursts against Parliament and democracy.

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Book II is rather more tolerable because it is mainly a study of facts—the economic structure, agrarian phenomena, the hold of the Church, the nature of the officer caste and, finally, a sketch of the labour movement. The latter, I notice, omits the significant fact that in Catalonia the Unitary General Confederation of Labour (corresponding to the French C.G.T.U.) has joined forces with the anarcho-syndicalist C.N.T., not, as elsewhere, with the Marxist labour unions. But the whole book is *simpliste* and superficial. And, to the present reviewer, at any rate, the style is exasperating. Here are one or two sample sentences:

P. 21. "Christianisation was not only a spiritual process of religious indoctrinisation; it was the ideological extirpation of Arab culture and influence to ensure the political domination of the European feudal rulers..."

P. 22. "Searching exclusively for gold and silver, the parasitic nature of the colonial conquest was obvious."

P. 89. "The Catalan National Government was forced to capitulate. The Madrid fascists breathed easier. They could now settle with brave little Asturias."

P. 98. "Velasco resigned for Rightist causes."

Among inaccuracies I have noted the attribution of a Treaty of Madrid in 1923 (favouring Signor Mussolini and Italy) to "Primo de Rivera's Foreign Minister, Santiago Alba," when in point of fact Señor Alba held that post in the Parliamentary Government which the Military Directory came to sweep away, and the bitter feud between Primo and Santiago Alba, who had fled to Paris, was one of the main political topics of the day! The authors say that in the Constitution "a full programme of socialist legislation was promised," when they mean, as the context indicates, social reform measures. The whole point was that the Constitution remained non-socialist, though it introduced the principle that property might be taken over by the state when the general interest required. Finally, there are one or two careless spellings, e.g., Herrara instead of *Herrera* for the able and powerful director of *El Debate*, and *rabacca morta* instead of *rabassa morta*, the peculiar land-holding system in Catalonia.

W. HORSFALL CARTER

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THE KING AND THE IMPERIAL CROWN. By A. BERRIEDALE KEITH. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. xiv and 491 pp. 21s. net).

IN this book Professor Keith has set out the law and practice of constitutional monarchy. The first five chapters are a statement of law and practice. In the rest, history predominates. The first five chapters are not in the author's usual style. They are written in the deferential manner which is considered suitable for gods and kings. It is not stated that some kings have been insane, but that "insanity has seldom been the fate of the kings of England." It is not asserted that Edward VII and George V were not as interested in public business as Queen Victoria, but that they "resisted the temptation.....to make the performance of official business in the sense of reading papers and writing minutes the chief concern of their lives." Occasionally the result is unintentionally to exalt the royal function. It is stated that "the most important acts of government are regularly performed with his assistance"; then follows a list of prerogative powers, and the uninstructed reader would think that the king had something to do with all of them. With Chapter VI, however, Professor Keith gets into his stride. Politicians of all colours get that passing slap in the face that so annoys some readers and delights others. Professor Keith at his best reminds one of a three-quarter back striding majestically through a crowd of clumsy forwards and "handing them off" contemptuously as he passes. We are told of "the rather mediocre men composing the Liberal Cabinet (of 1915)." Lord French was "unhappily" in supreme command. Mr. Lloyd George had convinced himself "in all probability quite wrongly" that the war could not be won on the western front. Mr. Wheatley failed to justify the high hopes placed in him. These examples are taken from a few pages, and hundreds more could be quoted. I disagree with nearly all the author's adjectives and adverbs; but I am entirely in favour of the principle that University professors should make no bones about their superiority to vulgar politicians.

This is, however, a peculiarity of style which we have learned to expect from Professor Keith and even to look

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for joyfully. In substance the book is an able exposition of so much of the practice of constitutional monarchy as is known. The material for an up-to-date exposition is never available, for the documents are never published until all concerned with them are dead. The author tries to make his exposition complete by setting out more recent political events and asserting that the king must have welcomed them or disliked them and by assuming that when politicians praise the monarch for something or other they mean what they say. In fact, however, there is very little material available for the present century. Professor Keith rightly expresses doubts about Lee's *King Edward VII*, except the footnotes. In fact, however, he makes use of both text and footnotes. I suspect even the footnotes. On Queen Victoria the material is ample, and no reader can be in any doubt of the obstinacy and treachery with which she treated all Liberal Governments after 1868.

The difficulty of the lack of documents is illustrated by the author's treatment of the power of dissolution. He criticises Mr. Baldwin for assuming in 1935 that it was he, and not the king on the advice of the Cabinet, who dissolved Parliament. As to the king, I am ignorant, because there is no recent material. As to the assumption that the Cabinet advises dissolution, Professor Keith is right on the documents but wrong according to modern practice. The documents show that up to 1910 the Cabinet always advised. In fact, however, the practice has changed, and now the question is not discussed in Cabinet. Again, Professor Keith seems to assume that the king still exercises the control of foreign policy which Queen Victoria insisted on so pertinaciously. Here the documents go up to 1900 only. In fact, however, the old practice of sending draft despatches to the monarch is no longer followed. The king sees only the daily print and so, like the Cabinet, cannot get in on the ground floor.

There are matters of opinion about which differences of view are possible. Professor Keith repeats from Anson the old statement that a ministry accepts responsibility for the king's acts in relation to its predecessor. What responsibility means in this connection is not explained either by Professor Keith or by anyone else. The statement

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of Peel on which it is founded was denied by some of the most important of his contemporaries and it was in fact quite empty of meaning. Peel was turned out in 1834 not because of the dismissal of Melbourne but because he had no majority. The most dangerous of Professor Keith's assumptions is, however, that the effect of the Parliament Act is to place the king in the position of what Conservatives used to call the 'watch dog of the Constitution': that is, it is the king's duty to stop the Labour Party from carrying out its policy. If constitutional lawyers are able to persuade the king that this is so, the king must necessarily become a partisan in public; and the public will be compelled to treat him as they treated "Mr. Balfour's poodle." Such a doctrine is dangerous to the stability of the monarchy.

Questions such as these are inevitable in our amorphous Constitution. This is much the best of Professor Keith's recent books, and perhaps the best since *Responsible Government in the Dominions*. The reader can discount the author's very obvious bias and be sure that it is on the whole, a fair and accurate portrayal of one of the most important institutions of the British Constitution.

W. I. JENNINGS.

UNDER THE AXE OF FASCISM. By GAETANO SALVEMINI.
(Gollancz. 7s. 6d. net.)

THIS book repays close and repeated study. The wealth of information it contains, and the implied denigration of the Italian Fascist State, give it high rank in the works that have been written about the experiment of original Fascism. No one ought to be misled into believing that Professor Salvemini's investigation is at all vitiated by bias because he occasionally makes bitter flings at Mussolini and the League of Nations. He does this because Mussolini has broken thousands upon thousands of lives like his own without returning even the mess of pottage promised for the destruction of political and civil liberty. "A poor nation cannot afford liberty," said Mussolini. "A poor nation cannot afford to be made poorer," answers Salvemini. That the nation has been made poorer is proved up to the

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hilt in this exhaustive, merciless, and remarkably well documented exploration. As one re-reads the analysis of and commentary on the figures, one is lost in admiration at Professor Salvemini's skill in marshalling the scattered information of the Italian Government's official reports, and the semi-official reports of the daily and periodical press, in such wise that it becomes an indictment of the Government's mismanagement, as terrific as it is valid. Not the least instructive and amusing aspect of it all is the fact that the indictment is not seldom skilfully composed from the unco-ordinated, and therefore betraying, boastings of the apologists of the Party.

The work falls into two main Parts : the first is an account of the "corporative" arrangements, their history, the law, and the working of the law. The second continues the discussion of the employers' and workers' associations, but is principally concerned with the intentions and achievements of the complex of social services. A brilliantly written conclusion asks, Is Fascism a Capitalist Dictatorship?

Salvemini shows conclusively that Bolshevism was not the cause of Fascism's rise, but that the causes must be looked for elsewhere, and not unimportantly in the personal will to power of one man who partly strayed towards and partly made for himself a strategic opportunity at a moment of domestic dissensions. It is important to remember, as the author points out, that "A police strike, such as occurred in Boston, never took place in Italy." The conquest of power by such brutal violence that the non-political onlookers were prepared to acquiesce in any regime which offered quiet was naturally followed by the extinction of the free trade unions, and, indeed, free associations of any kind, except, till 1927, the employers' associations. From that time forwards, Fascist mouths have been even more than before filled with the word, "Corporative." What does it mean, in fact? No one in Italy exactly knows. The Left Fascists expect "social justice" through the Corporative System. Just before, and during, the Abyssinian War they had many promises made to them (p. 141). The Right Fascists expect to be able to use the Corporations as marketing boards, price-fixing agencies, and permanent research institutions—and no more,

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certainly not instruments for the owning of property and its socialised management or the control of individual firms (p. 134). The *Fascist Fascist*, that is to say, Mussolini, expects this: "To-day, November 10th of the Year XIII (1934), the great machine begins to move. We must not expect immediate miracles of it..... We must prepare an experimental phase more or less long, and we shall need, regarding its yield, to count not only on the efficiency of things, but on the indispensable rectification of mentalities and on their selection by proven value, which is happening through the operation of Fascism." What a confession, after the world-wide propaganda since and before the publication of the Charter of Labour in 1927! Salvemini shows, with chapter and verse, how the world and the Italians have been deceived into believing that miracles were indeed in the process of accomplishment, and how such people as Barnes, Goad, Curry, Villari, Einzig, and quite a host of American students, were misled into declaring that Corporations existed and were functioning effectively years before they were even constructed on paper.

If the Corporations were nothing until the beginning of 1935, Salvemini shows how certain were the destructive attentions of Fascism to the trade unions. Their freedom of constitution, and their right to strike, their power of freely choosing their own executives—these have been destroyed. But the employers' counterpart in economic power, that is, control over their property, remains intact. Indeed, it is enhanced, for taxation (p. 260 n), principally levied through indirect means, has been converted in enormous amounts into subsidies for the relief of banks and industries which could otherwise not have lived through (a) the first crisis, engendered by Mussolini's vanity in setting the value of the lira too high in 1927, and (b) the era of the world depression which supervened in 1930. A bureaucracy of some 30,000 officials has been added to the bureaucracy of the state to manage the associations which were formerly free of state control. It is a bureaucracy which is the special "spoils" for the smart young University Fascists, youngsters who are entirely distrusted, though perforce sometimes utilised, by the workers, alien to them, and so little experienced in the

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ways of practical industry that even the employers to whom they are tender look askance at them. And the Labour Courts are either congested, or not used, or merely registrars of compromises. Unemployment, which the Duce promised to extirpate, has been far worse than anything in England. Beggars, swept away from public places, have never ceased to increase in number and need, as is proven by the figures of the generosity of Fascist charity organisation agencies! The social services, which are admittedly a gain, do not compare with those established by democracies such as England, the Weimar Constitution, or Czechoslovakia.

Yet it is not only the working classes who suffer. The middle and the upper classes now complain, discreetly of course, for the Corporate State could not exist without the Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State (see the account of its activities, p. 401) and its ancillary institutions. They would happily be rid of the controls which produce the restrictions and bureaucracy of Communism without its guarantees of security and justice. In his concluding chapter Salvemini shows how Italian industry and commerce have come under the almost policyless domination of the ordinary civil service, the biggest business men in the confederations, and the Fascist Party bureaucracy. As ancient *laissez faire* is not feasible in our age, and economic equality is decidedly not the goal of Fascism, nobody in Italy up to the time of the Abyssinian War knew quite what they were about. Since that war, policy has become much more definite. It is nothing more nor less than a War Economy. Whether the controls and privations are worth the candle will depend on two things: whether it is profitable to put a whole nation in chains so that one man may strut about with jack-boots on gun carriages and keep Europe in a turmoil, and secondly whether the war which is being prepared and provoked will bring adequate gains in territory.

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CHANGING MAN: THE SOVIET EDUCATION SYSTEM. By BEATRICE KING. (Gollancz 10s. 6d.)

MRS. KING is admirably fitted to write a book on Soviet education. She speaks Russian fluently, and has visited the country at intervals, so that she has been able to keep track of the many and various developments since the revolution. She has personal friends amongst the teachers, and she knows enough of educational methods in England and America to provide a background from which to survey this new and exciting experiment.

The book deals with education before the revolution to the summer of this year, and describes all phases from the *crèche* to the university. The principles underlying Communist education and its administration are explained, as well as the present position of curricula, discipline, the place of the arts, adult education, training of teachers, research and examinations.

Changing Man, as the title implies, is an account of the process by which the whole people, adults as well as children, are being fitted for the new society to which the revolution gave birth. It is written by one who is so sympathetic an observer that she gets over to the reader the passionate enthusiasm behind the drive for education. It hardly pretends to be a critical survey. Before we criticise, we must understand, and this book will help all who are interested in education and in Russia to understand something of the nature of the Soviet experiment, which is as much an experiment in human psychology as in economics.

It must, however, often have been difficult even for an enthusiast to refrain from criticism, especially when the author recounts on page 118 that "the onus of a child's progress rests on the teacher. If a child does not come up to the required standard, it is the teacher who is blamed. It cuts no ice for the teacher to say that so and so is lacking in intellectual ability and therefore is no good at mathematics. The teacher must find out exactly the cause of the backwardness, and then must find a way of removing the cause."

That teachers are not allowed to experiment, and that curriculum, syllabus and method are prescribed for the whole republic by the Peoples' Commissariat for Public Education,

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is perhaps understandable when so few of the teachers are experienced, but to force all children through the same groove regardless of individual capacity or interest, is to make impossible demands upon both teacher and child. To those of us who see, in the many experiments that are being made in our reorganised senior schools to develop the different capacities of the individual child, the greatest educational advance of the last ten years, this insistence on a rigid uniformity seems a serious defect in the Soviet system. It is mitigated, as Mrs. King points out, by, the out-of-school activities in art, drama, music, etc., where free choice and ample opportunity are offered to the individual child, but the time spent in these activities is very short compared with that spent in the classroom.

Mrs. King sometimes fails to distinguish between what actually happens and what Soviet educationists intend to happen. Polytechnisation, for instance, is described as a fundamental principle of Communist education. To appreciate the part that productive labour plays in the life of the community, school children are to be given an early introduction to manual labour, as well as a theoretical knowledge of its processes. On page 66 she says that not less than four hours a week are spent by children of thirteen and fourteen, and five hours by children of fifteen and sixteen, in the school workshops. As a matter of fact, the sudden and intense drive to abolish the shift system in the schools has resulted in a standardised school for 880 pupils from eight to eighteen years of age with only two workshops being built all over the R.S.F.S.R. A hundred and fifty-two of these were built last year in Moscow, and three hundred are to be built in the next two years, so that by 1938 over 70 per cent. of the school children of that city will be taught in these workshops. It is only possible for these children to have one hour a week in the workshops. The need to provide school places for all children between eight and fifteen, and for a large number between fifteen and eighteen, has evidently been considered more important than workshop practice. This is just one illustration of the gulf between theory and practice so well shown in the U.S.S.R., but it shows that the reader of even an informed book as this must be on his guard against

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assuming that what is intended to happen has actually happened.

The original idea of a free and classless education, with equal opportunity for everyone, has however remained unimpaired, and is realised, now that discrimination against the children of the former deprived classes has disappeared. This is surely one of the greatest contributions of the first Socialist Commonwealth—this, and a society where, not only in the schools and technical institutions, but in the factories, engineering works and professions, women are treated on complete equality with men. They are taught the same subjects; boys learn to sew, girls to use tools, and neither sex learns cooking or washing. Whether, given equal opportunity, there are or are not innate differences between the sexes, will at last be capable of proof, unless the demand for more and more babies pushes women back into the home before the experiment has had a fair trial.

In the attempt to be fair to the propagandist nature of Soviet education, Mrs. King suggests that the difference between it and the English system is merely that in our own schools propaganda is more subtle. 'Every Government tries so to arrange the environment for its children that they shall grow up loyal supporters of its system. It cannot be otherwise.' This is true of the U.S.S.R., where no criticism of fundamental principles is allowed to any of its citizens, but the English ideal, however far short of it we fall in practice, is to teach children to think for themselves, even if the result is opposition to the Government.

SHENA D. SIMON.

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. VOLUME VIII: SOUTH AFRICA. Edited by A. P. NEWTON and E. A. BENIANS. (Cambridge University Press. 42s.)

THE limelight of publicity still plays on the Union of South Africa. Although there are several British dependencies in Africa about which no one has written a book worth reading, more books continue to be produced about the Union than about all the rest of

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British Africa. This massive volume is a long-awaited composite history and the scale of its production alone makes it a most valuable source of reference. No one in search of historical facts could begin better than by consulting its thousand pages or its elaborate bibliography.

But if one's curiosity is directed to something that has happened within the last fifteen years, there is little to satisfy it here. Although the fact is nowhere prominently stated, the later narratives stop in 1921. Some of the contributors do mention subsequent legislation, sometimes as recent as 1934, but these references are seldom set in proportion to the rest and one gathers the impression that they were added after the contributions had been completed. This confusion about the period actually covered is doubly unfortunate because in 1922 and the following years tendencies hitherto latent in South African politics emerged with unashamed vigour.

Early in 1922 civil war was waged on the Witwatersrand between white people in order to ensure the continued subjection of black people; and it was soon followed by the advent to power of men determined to entrench that policy. It was the grave significance of these events that led Professor E. A. Walker to bring his own admirable *History of South Africa* as far as 1924. If a book first published at the beginning of 1928 could do that, it is hard to understand why one published in 1936 goes no further than 1921.

Southern Africa is historically and economically one. The book therefore deals not only with the Union but also with the three native Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland, the mandated territory of South-West Africa, and the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia. The real value of a history of South Africa in relation to her neighbours at this date is that, if written with candour rather than caution, it could assist in answering the questions now being asked about the future of these British dependencies. South Africans are demanding that the Protectorates be transferred to their government and Rhodesians that their native policy be entirely free from British control. After suitable hesitation Britain will in all probability accede to both these demands in the coming years. Time and again in the history of British policy in Africa public opinion at

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home has been no match for the full-blooded convictions of the white man on the spot who wants to run his own show. All that it can do is to insist on certain legal and constitutional safeguards designed to protect the natives. But those who retain their faith in the efficacy of such safeguards might profitably study the history of South Africa, especially since Union, and of Rhodesia since 1923. They will find that one by one the safeguards inserted in the Act of Union have been steadily and sometimes ingeniously whittled away until scarcely one is left today. The chapter on the working of the Union's Constitution hardly makes this clear nor does the whole section on the period after 1910 describe fully how the Cape's liberal tradition has been overthrown by the fierce hostility of the Northern provinces to any laws that even envisage political equality between white and black. Yet the first lesson of white settlement in Africa is that it creates a problem of political representation that is both intolerable and insoluble. Britain avoided the issue at the time of Union when, perhaps unwittingly, she purchased the goodwill of white South Africa by sacrificing the interests of the black majority. To repeat that act a generation later, while professing the newer doctrine of trusteeship for native races and in face of the stubborn facts of South African history, would be to commit something worse than an error of judgment.

By way of light relief, the book closes with a chapter on "cultural development." The writer assures English critics that Olive Schreiner's first novel—he mentions no other books of hers—was praised too highly and that Roy Campbell's poetry is inferior to that of certain local bards.

JULIUS LEWIN.

ENCYCLOPÉDIE FRANÇAISE: Issued under the general direction of LUCIEN FEBVRE. Vol. X: L'ÉTAT MODERNE. Edited by A. DE MONZIE. (125 fcs.)

THIS volume is the first instalment of an important new enterprise entitled *L'Encyclopédie Française*. The whole work will consist of twenty-one volumes, covering most of the principal human interests from physics to literature, from mathematics to religion. The

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method adopted is to allocate one or more groups of subjects to each volume; and the importance attributed by the editors to political matters is shown by the fact that two whole volumes will be devoted to *L'Etat Moderne*. The justification for this particular phrase as the dominating concept is put forward in the concluding section by the editor, M. de Monzie, who observes that "une seule idée sort victorieuse de la guerre mondiale prolongée en débâcle intellectuelle: c'est l'idée de l'Etat. Le grand fait contemporain, c'est l'hégémonie de l'Etat, se superposant ou se substituant à la toute-puissante de la Nation."

The work is typically and essentially French in its approach. In place of the heterogeneous collection of articles in alphabetical order to be found in most English Encyclopædias, such as, for example, the Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences, we are given an elaborately planned treatise by a number of different authors whose contributions fit into a general scheme.

The work opens with a discussion of the characteristics of the modern state, followed by a statement of what the state does and how it does it; then comes a section on the instruments of the state (men, material and money); Part III deals with the control of the state and by whom it is exercised, whether in the Parliamentary democracies or under the Soviet régime or in the Fascist countries; the conclusion consists of a short essay on the destiny of the state. The object which the editors have sought to attain is fundamentally different from that which underlies most English or American efforts at encyclopædia-making. In the latter case, the aim is to provide as much information in a succinct and selective form as possible. Here, however, the desire is to interpret, to illuminate. "L'Encyclopédie," writes Professor Febvre, the Editor-in-chief, "c'est Faire Comprendre. En renouant au second plan."

The work manifests in high degree both the qualities and defects of French thought in the social sciences. Its strength lies in the formulation in lucid terms of clear-cut ideas, the creation and systematic use of luminous doctrines and juristic principles. Its weakness lies in the absence of factual

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material, the inability to apply adequate descriptive methods to social phenomena. In consequence, the present work is more educative than any similar English or American work; but it is also less informative and less useful from a practical point of view as a work of reference. Nevertheless, it possesses one feature of great practical merit: it is produced on the loose-leaf principle, and new sections will be issued every three months to replace existing folios, in this way keeping the work up to date.

The contributors include many of the most distinguished writers, politicians and professors in contemporary France.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN GERMANY, 1789-1815. By REINHOLD ARIS. *With a foreword by DR. G. P. GOOCH.* 414 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 15s.)

Deals inter alia with the theories of Kant, Fichte, and Humboldt, and the relation between the Romantic Movement and nationalism. COLLECTIVE SECURITY. Edited by MAURICE BOURQUIN. 514 pp. (International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. 16s.)

A record of the seventh and eighth International Studies Conferences. THE LIFE OF LORD CARSON. Vol. III. By IAN COLVIN. 463 pp. (Gollancz. 16s.)

Covers the period from the outbreak of war to Carson's death. FIRST PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE. By A. DE VITI DE MARCO. Translated from the Italian by EDITH PABLO MARGET. 435 pp. (Cape. 16s.)

The definitive Italian edition on which this translation is based was published in 1934.

ZERO HOUR. By RICHARD FREUND. 257 pp. (Methuen. 10s. 6d.)

A discussion of the international problems which seem to make war so probable.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. By J. W. GOUGH. 234 pp. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d.)

An analysis of the ideas underlying the theory of the social contract and an account of its development.

THE FAITH OF AN ENGLISHMAN. By SIR EDWARD GRIGG. 405 pp. (Macmillan. 10s. 6d.)

A plea for the Empire and imperialism.

AFTER REPEAL. By LEONARD HARRISON and ELIZABETH LAINE. 296 pp. (Harper. \$2.50)

A report based on a two years' study of liquor administration since Repeal in the U.S.A.

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VEBLEN. By J. A. HOBSON. 227 pp. (*Chapman & Hall*. 6s.)

A volume in the Modern Sociologists series.

THE SEVEN SOVEREIGN HILLS OF ROME. By MARGARET JACKSON and ELIZABETH HODDER. 528 pp. (*Longmans*)

An attempt to trace the continuity in civic life of ancient Rome, Renaissance Rome, and Rome the capital of modern Italy.

POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW? By HAROLD D. LASSWELL. 264 pp. (*McGraw Hill*. 10s. 6d.)

Discusses the question what personalities succeed in politics and how they do it.

THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY. By SIR HARRY LUKE. 246 pp. (*Macmillan*. 10s. 6d.)

Describes the nature of the Turkish state from its beginning to the present day.

THE POLAND OF PILSUDSKI. By ROBERT MACHRAY. 508 pp. (*Allen & Unwin*. 15s.)

Incorporates much of the author's previous book *Poland, 1914-1931*, but carries the narrative down to 1936.

IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA. By KARL MANNHEIM. 318 pp. (*Kegan Paul*. 15s.)

An analysis of the effect of mental fiction and wish dreams upon our social thought.

THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND. By NICHOLAS MANSERGH. 335 pp. (*Allen & Unwin*. 12s. 6d.)

A critical analysis of self-government in Northern Ireland.

LOCAL AUTHORITIES: INTERNAL FINANCIAL CONTROL. By A. H. MARSHALL. 218 pp. (*Institute of Public Administration*. 7s. 6d.)

An examination of the methods adopted by local Authorities for securing sound finance and for measuring and controlling costs.

JUVENILE UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH WALES. By GWYNNE MEARA. 141 pp. (*Cardiff University*. 6s.)

Originally written as a dissertation for a Doctorate of Philosophy.

THE ROLL OF POLITICS IN SOCIAL CHANGE. By CHARLES E. MERRIAM. 149 pp. (*New York University Press & Milford*)

A series of lectures given at New York University.

OUT OF THE NIGHT. By PROFESSOR H. J. MULLER. 160 pp. (*Gollancz*. 4s. 6d.)

A biologist's view of the future.

FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES. By E. A. RADICE. 74 pp. (*Oxford Press & Milford*. 3s. 6d.)

An account of present-day problems of the constitution and administration in the United States.

THE DRAMA OF UPPER SILESIA. By WILLIAM J. ROSE. 349 pp. (*Williams & Norgate*. 15s.)

An American Study of Upper Silesia from 1742 to the present day.

POWER, ANCIENT AND MODERN

By BERTRAND RUSSELL

OF the three kinds of external pressure to which a human being is subject, namely, that from inanimate nature, that from the lower animals, and that from other human beings, science has enormously diminished the first two, while at the same time it has, especially in very recent times, produced changes which have increased the third in at least equal measure. So long as science affected only men's thoughts, and not their economic technique, it did not have this effect; in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it produced social emancipation even more than liberation from inanimate nature. In a general movement against traditional forms of authority, kings, churches, husbands, and fathers, all lost power together. This movement continued after the industrial revolution, and achieved its greatest successes during the nineteenth century, but it derived its guiding ideas from a pre-industrial period. Revolt against all human forms of authority passed from the German Anabaptists to the English sectaries of the time of Cromwell, and is embodied, in a very decorous form, in the doctrines of the Society of Friends. Robbed of fanaticism and hedged round with common sense, it was the basis of Locke's political philosophy. Rousseau, writing before, not after, a successful revolution, restored to it the fire and enthusiasm that it had had at the time of the Anabaptists. And later Liberalism added nothing fundamental to the doctrines of Locke and Rousseau.

But from the very beginning of modern industrialism, the necessary increase of organisation was bringing about an opposite set of changes, not provided for in the Liberal philosophy. To a continually increasing extent, our decisions

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are not individual, but collective; we do not have the entire control over what we do ourselves, but a millionth part of the control over what a million people do, which is a very different thing, and produces a very different effect on character. To many people, such fractional power is unattractive; they therefore willingly surrender their share of it to men who are more energetic or more despotic. And these men, by the very structure of modern society, acquire a degree of power to which there has been nothing comparable in former times.

The main political problem of our time is thus not, as formerly, that of freedom, but that of power: how can the power which modern organisation inevitably gives to certain individuals be prevented from becoming a tyranny in which the general good is sacrificed to the pleasures of the despot? Before this problem can be successfully tackled, it is necessary to consider the forms of power, and the ways by which, in our day, men actually acquire power. It is a surprising fact that, in spite of all changes in economic technique, there has been, in these respects, little change since ancient times; indeed the most modern developments are the most reminiscent of Herodotus or Tacitus.

Power may be defined as ability to cause others to behave as we wish, or to prevent them from behaving as we do not wish. It has various forms, according to the kind of influence that is brought to bear. These are most nakedly and simply displayed in our dealings with animals, where disguises and pretences are not thought necessary. When a pig with a rope round its middle is hoisted squealing into a ship, it is subject to direct physical power over its body. On the other hand, when the proverbial donkey follows the proverbial carrot, we induce him to act as we wish by persuading him that it is to his interest to do so. Intermediate between these two cases is that of performing animals, in

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whom habits have been formed by rewards and punishments; also, in a different way, that of sheep being induced to embark on a ship, when the leader has to be dragged across the gangway by force, and the rest then follow willingly.

All these forms of power are exemplified among human beings.

The case of the pig illustrates military and police power.

The donkey with the carrot typifies the power of propaganda.

Performing animals show the power of education.

The sheep following their unwilling leader are illustrative of party politics, whenever, as is usual, a revered leader is in bondage to a clique or to party bosses.

Let us apply these Aesopian analogies to the rise of Hitler. The carrot was the Nazi programme (involving, e.g. the abolition of interest); the donkey was the lower middle class. The sheep and their leader were the Social Democrats and Hindenburg. The pigs (only so far as their misfortunes are concerned) were the victims in concentration camps, and the performing animals are the millions who make the Nazi salute. But how about the supermen who are able to treat mere human beings as brute material for their schemes? What are the superior gifts by which they achieve their eminent position? By what combination of excellent qualities do they induce men to obey them?

The methods of acquiring political power in the modern world, in spite of all the novelties in industrial technique, have changed not towards something new but towards something very old; they have become almost exactly the same as they were in ancient Greece and Rome. Consider the three most powerful individuals in Europe: Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin. No one of them had any initial advantages of birth or fortune or education; all three owe their success to a combination of the qualities of the

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demagogue, the wire-puller and the gangster; their careers can be closely paralleled by those of many tyrants in Greece, and of Sulla, Cæsar and Augustus in Rome (except that the Roman Dictators were aristocratic). The requisites of success are: an important discontented class; a persuasive tongue, by which to make the discontented believe that you will right their wrongs; skill in organizing a party and a private army; ruthlessness in seizing and holding power by bloodshed and treachery. Having achieved control of the machinery of the state, you need only regulate propaganda and the press, teach children to regard you as more or less divine, feed the army well, and keep an immense secret service to nose out every whisper of disaffection. You will then be secure against everything except defeat in war.

The great dictators have arisen out of a system of free competition—not the orderly and limited kind that was praised by Liberals and is now praised by old-fashioned Conservatives, but the all-in kind in which no methods are barred, not even wholesale murder. They have, however, established systems in which competition is no longer free, but is confined to one particular form: the endeavour to secure the favour of the tyrant, or of his lieutenant, or his lieutenant's lieutenant, according to the hierarchical status of the aspirant. In antiquity, this situation produced government by eunuchs; in the modern world, it produces government by spies. And the most successful spy is the one who inspires most terror in the dictator.

The reversion to antiquity in recent years is remarkable, but is, I think, a natural result of certain modern inventions. Modern democracy has hitherto differed from that of Greece and Rome in the employment of the representative system, as opposed to personal voting on each issue by the citizens assembled in the market place. In ancient times, owing to the absence of an elected legislature, democracy could not

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extend beyond the walls of a single city. When Roman citizenship was granted to the inhabitants of other parts of Italy, the new citizens could not, in practice, acquire any share of political power, since this could only be exercised by those who were actually in Rome. The geographical difficulty was overcome, in the modern world, by the practice of choosing representatives. Until very recently, the representative, once chosen, had considerable independent power, since men living at a distance from the capital could not know what was happening soon enough, or in sufficient detail, to be able to express their opinion effectively. Now, however, owing to broadcasting, rapid mobility, newspapers, etc., large countries have become more and more like the City States of antiquity; there is more personal contact (of a sort) between men at the centre and voters at a distance; followers can bring pressure on leaders, and leaders, reciprocally, can exert influence on followers, to an extent which was impossible in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The result has been to diminish the importance of the representative and increase that of the leader. Parliaments are no longer effective intermediaries between voters and governments. All the dubious propagandist devices formerly confined to election times can now be employed continuously. The Greek City State, with its demagogues, tyrants, bodyguards, and exiles, has revived because its methods of propaganda have again become available.

Economics—the science of wealth—arose in the eighteenth century, at a time when power seemed stable, but new classes were rapidly rising to opulence. There has been no corresponding science of power, and yet that would be of even greater importance than economics. Men desire power quite as much as they desire wealth; indeed power is the source of wealth even more than wealth is the source of power. Wealth, in fact, is one department of power.

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Economics, from Adam Smith downwards, concentrates on the kind of wealth which depends upon law; the vocation of highwaymen is not included among industries, and is not treated as a legitimate source of the "wealth of nations." Yet it was the national exercise of this vocation which caused the wealth of Rome in antiquity, of Bagdad in the eighth century, of Spain in the sixteenth, and (to a considerable extent) of London in the eighteenth and nineteenth. It would be interesting to investigate in detail the connection between the conquest of India and the industrial revolution. Japan is, at the present time, seeking wealth by the time-honoured method of military force, while Germany and Italy are preparing to do likewise. It is part of the general movement of integration which is characteristic of our time that the distinction between economics and politics has become more obviously artificial than it used to be, owing to the increasing importance of states in commerce and industry. Is Dr. Schacht an economic or a political force? The question is obviously absurd.

In the science of power, there are two different techniques to be considered: (1) the kind that generates organizations, (2) the kind that gives control of organizations. In the former, economics has led the way, whereas in the latter it has always lagged behind politics. It was economic needs—railways, power stations, large-scale irrigation, etc.—that did most to promote the organizing of human activities. But the methods of obtaining economic power are much more old-fashioned than the methods of politics. Although until the Great War political power, over the greater part of the earth's surface, was handed down from father to son, the hereditary principle in politics, first effectively challenged by the French Revolution, has almost disappeared since 1918. In economics, on the contrary, it is still taken for granted; the overwhelming majority of those who have

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money leave it to their wives and children. Economic dynasties, such as the Astors, Rockefellers and Morgans, are not felt to be inconsistent with Jeffersonian democracy, which has a horror of dynasties on political thrones. The rise of new men in economics at the present day is still effected by means of such qualities as led to political advancement in the time of the Tudors. Some time ago, I had occasion to read about the first steps to fortune of a number of men who afterwards reached the front rank in the plutocracy, and found that they mostly had the capacity, when still young and unknown, to induce banks to lend them money without security. This is the same kind of ability by which Henry VIII's new aristocracy acquired the lands of the Church. In politics, the methods of acquiring power have changed very greatly; in economics, they remain what they were in politics before the French Revolution.

The distinction between economics and politics, which now begins to appear artificial, had its origin in certain historical accidents. Economics, both in England and France, was in the service of the insurgent middle class, against the monarchy and aristocracy. The new economic power belonged to one set of men, the old political power to another. *Laissez faire* was the demand of energetic men to be let alone by governments which seemed to them to be making a mess of things; when its champions acquired political power, their views changed. In America, where the battle against monarchy and aristocracy was completed in 1783, there was nothing corresponding to the Liberalism of British manufacturers up to 1846, when they finally defeated the aristocracy: on the contrary, Alexander Hamilton, from the first, taught the leaders of finance and industry to think as masters, not as rebels against external authority. The victory of the middle class, however, was not complete either in England or in America, for in both

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countries it was necessary to enlist the support of wage-earners, who, in return, demanded and obtained a share of political power. Thus the separation of politics and economics re-emerged in a new form: political power, formerly regal or aristocratic, became popular. Since wage-earners still failed to secure what they considered justice, their champions invented the theory that ultimate power is economic rather than political. Hence Marxism, which is based upon the circumstances of England, not of Marx's native country.

German development, in fact, has been always very different from that of England, America, or France. Hamilton's doctrines, preached by List, were taken up by an autocratic and pre-industrial state, and after a very few years of half-hearted *laissez faire* Bismarck's state socialism became the established system. The state thus retained economic power, and economics, as a science separate from politics, never had much reality. The only period during which, in Germany, economic and political power were divorced, was that of post-war Socialist government; although, in theory, Socialism stood for the unifying of the two kinds of power, in practice it alone parted them, since its victory was too partial to extend to the sphere of economics. And as soon as German Socialism failed, the Bismarckian combination of economics and politics was revived.

The separation of economics and politics, like Montesquieu's separation of legislature, executive, and judiciary, is merely the pleasant fancy of amiable people who value a quiet life more than power. Given a sufficiently strong desire for power, it is inevitable that all the forms of power should come to be concentrated in one organization, although the process may involve a longer or shorter period of Civil War. The whole tendency of the modern world towards larger and more efficient organizations is against

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the separation of economic and political activities. This is more especially the case where war, or the fear of it, plays a large part in the national life; for war is a political act, but is fought, nowadays, mainly with economic weapons.

Socialism, as a doctrine, may be considered to consist in three propositions: (1) wage-earners ought to have a larger share of the total produce; (2) for this purpose they must control the state; (3) and, further, the state must control economic activities. At present, the second object has been more or less achieved in democratic countries, and the third in Germany, Italy, and Russia; but there is no country where the second and third have both been achieved. Owing to the nineteenth-century separation of politics and economics, some Socialists and all Communists have regarded the third object as more important than the second. Yet a glaring proof of the contrary existed: the Congo "Free" State in the days of King Leopold. All wealth, all land, all natural resources, belonged to the state, and the state was the King. The resulting tyranny was such that the population was halved in a few years.

In place of the "economic man" of the old-fashioned text-books, we must substitute the "political man." The economic man was supposed to desire only wealth; the political man shall be supposed to desire only power. Both are abstractions, but all sciences work with abstractions, and the political man will give us a better approximation to the existing world than can be obtained from the economic man. Not that everybody is a "political man" in the sense of only desiring power, but that, owing to the breakdown of traditional sources of authority, the man who achieves power nowadays is, broadly speaking, the man who most passionately desires it. Hitler could not have risen to power in the Prussia of Frederick the Great, nor Mussolini in any past time later than that of Machiavelli; and Lenin could not

have been successful except under the Liberal régime of Kerensky. It was the doctrines of Liberalism that facilitated the free fight for power out of which modern tyrannies have developed.

Our troubles have arisen from the fact that those most desirous of power are not, as a rule, those most likely to exercise it for the public good. When a man seeks wealth, he is apt to be laughed at if he says that he only wants it in order to use it philanthropically; but when a man seeks power, his lofty professions are accepted by vast numbers at their face value. Democracy, the only device so far known for controlling the holders of power, breaks down when the electorate is unable to resist rhetoric; if it is to succeed, it requires a kind of popular education which has hitherto been wholly lacking, an education in critical judgment, in scepticism, even in something like cynicism.

THE ABDICATION AND THE CONSTITUTION

By W. IVOR JENNINGS

I

THE abdication of King Edward VIII is now sufficiently far off for its constitutional implications to stand clear of the personal considerations involved. Full information is not yet available. History may tell a story different from that which Mr. Baldwin told to the House of Commons. Regarding events from the constitutional angle and assuming that there was indeed no conflict between the King and his ministers, the most astonishing feature of the whole episode was the attitude of a section of the Labour Party. The views of this section received little or no publicity. They were contrary to the majority opinion in the Party; and the *Daily Herald* not only did not support them but even refrained from giving them serious consideration. They were, nevertheless, the views of an important section. They were, too, essentially intelligible even if the result of myopia.

They were based on the consideration that whether there is a king or not, or whether he has a wife or not, or whether his wife has two or twenty former husbands, are questions of no importance. What was important, it was urged, was that in defence of democracy and the peace of the world, the National Government should be turned out. It was added by some that the real motive behind the (apparent) conflict between King and Cabinet was the desire to hound out a King who was thought to be exercising his influence on behalf of the unemployed and the depressed areas. It was urged, therefore, that the Labour Opposition should support the King and oppose the Government; and it was

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apparently believed that public opinion would rally round the Labour Party, would force a dissolution, and so would bring a Labour Government into power. At any rate, it was thought that, whatever the consequences, the Labour Party should use Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's words and say: "Stop this fooling."

It is unnecessary either to affirm or to deny the assumption upon which these views were based. In so far as they assumed a conflict between King and Cabinet, they are not in accord with Mr. Baldwin's subsequent explanation. However, this is beside the point: there is one fundamental objection to the whole thesis—an objection which Professor Laski stressed in the *Daily Herald*. Nothing would have been more dangerous than for the Labour Party to suggest to the King that he could adopt the tactics of George III.

It has been a fundamental assumption of radical policy since long before the first Reform Act, that all power should be exercised under the strict control of a representative House of Commons. The principle has never definitely been established: it is inconsistent with the powers of the House of Lords. In respect of the monarchy, however, it has become the rule in spite of Queen Victoria's rearguard action. Power of initiation does not rest with the King. Apart from exceptional circumstances such as a request for a wholesale creation of peers, or a request for a dissolution in very unusual conditions, his sole discretionary function is the appointment of a Prime Minister where Parliamentary conditions do not clearly indicate upon whom the choice should fall.

To have broken this rule because it appeared to some—on very slender evidence, be it said—that Edward VIII had wider social sympathies than his ministers, would have been the height of folly. Such a step would have recognised the right of the King to have a policy of his own; and there was no evidence that Edward VIII was a socialist, or that his

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successors for all time would be socialists. During the last hundred years the monarch's influence has been exercised against the progressive party rather than in its favour. The manner in which monarchs are brought up, the environment in which they live, the people with whom they are brought into contact, the friends they choose for themselves, all suggest that normally the King will be a Conservative. It would be suicidal for a radical party to recognise the right of a monarch to a policy merely because there was a suspicion that Edward VIII believed that something ought to be done in South Wales.

Nor is this all. Those who wanted the Labour Party to support the King were inviting the King not only to form a policy but also to ally himself with the Opposition to carry it out. History and commonsense should have warned them that they were arming their political enemies. Disraeli used Queen Victoria to make Gladstone's path more difficult. Lord Salisbury intrigued with the Queen to prevent Home Rule. Edward VII was used more than once to hinder Liberal policies, especially in military matters. Lord Melbourne once said that it was a serious matter for a man to contend with the Crown, the House of Lords, and three parts of the gentlemen of the country. During the last century one of these has become almost neutral. The Crown occupies a key position that might become one of great power. Its prestige is immense. If the Labour Party once recognised that an Opposition could appeal to the country, whenever it could obtain the support of the Crown, it would be to give a most potent weapon to the Conservative Party.

The path of the Labour Party was, in fact, clear. It will be clear whenever there is a dispute between King and Government. It can attack the Government but not ally itself with the King; and if criticism of the Government implies support of the King it must support the Govern-

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ment. The fundamental principle of constitutional monarchy is that the monarch must be a figurehead, a symbol of national unity on those matters of sentiment on which the nation can unite. The other road leads to fascism.

II.

According to the Prime Minister's account all this is irrelevant because there never was any dispute between King and Government. In any case, while no formal expression of approval was registered by the Labour Party, in fact, there was no opposition to the Government. There are, however, some significant facts in the Prime Minister's statement. The most important concerns the Prime Minister.

Mr. Baldwin first discussed with the King on October 20, 1936, the rumours which were connecting his name with Mrs. Simpson. The Prime Minister says that he consulted none of his colleagues; and it appears that he did not consult the Dominion Prime Ministers. The conversation was by way of warning and was reported by the Prime Minister to about four of his "senior colleagues," but it was not brought before the Cabinet, at least formally. The next interview was on November 16, after the decree *nisi*. The Prime Minister then said that he did not think that "a particular marriage was one that would receive the approbation of the country" and pointed out that the lady would be Queen and that "the voice of the people must be heard." He felt certain, and said so, that the marriage was "impracticable." In reply, the King said: "I am going to marry Mrs. Simpson, and I am prepared to go."

Thus, the Prime Minister on his own responsibility and without consulting the Dominions had in fact, put before the King two alternatives: giving up the project of marriage or abdication. At no time, according to the Prime Minister's statement, was the question of an ordinary marriage brought

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before the Cabinet or submitted to the Dominions. The only question formally submitted was that of a morganatic marriage. The King asked for this to be submitted on November 25, and it appears (though the Prime Minister has not said so) that it was discussed by the Cabinet on November 27. The Dominions were consulted at the same time. The enquiries were not completed when the Prime Minister saw the King on December 2; but they had proceeded far enough for him to state that a morganatic marriage was "impracticable." The Cabinet met again on December 4, 5 and 6. No other question was submitted "formally" until December 9, when the King's decision to abdicate was communicated.

Thus, the main question was never submitted to the Cabinet, at least "formally." The only question submitted formally was the suggested compromise of a morganatic marriage. The more obvious alternatives, an ordinary marriage and an abdication, were never formally considered. Marriage had been ruled out by the Prime Minister. Abdication, failing a compromise, was the only solution.

The first question, naturally, is whether the matter was one for the Cabinet. Certain matters are commonly regarded as being outside the Cabinet's jurisdiction.¹ Queen Victoria on several occasions protested against consideration by the Cabinet of what she regarded as family affairs—for instance, the proposal that someone should be appointed to look after the finances of the Prince of Wales. Both Lord Melbourne and Lord Beaconsfield advised the Queen on family matters, but purely in a private capacity; indeed, Lord Beaconsfield continued to be family adviser while Mr. Gladstone was Prime Minister. The question of marriage is not one on which many precedents can be created. Edward VII and George V married before they came to the throne. Queen Victoria, on the other hand, married while she was Queen. It appears that Lord Melbourne was fully cognisant of her

¹ See Jennings, *Cabinet Government*, pp. 179-183.

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intention to marry Prince Albert, but there is no evidence that the question was considered by the Cabinet. Apparently ministers first heard of the matter when the Queen announced her betrothal in Council.

The fact that a matter has not been discussed in Cabinet in the past does not imply that it may not be so discussed in the future. As Mr. Gladstone said in 1894, "in the public mind, and in ordinary practice, the Cabinet is viewed as the seat of ultimate responsibility." If a matter is of public importance, the Cabinet has jurisdiction to consider it because it is responsible to the House of Commons for the public welfare. It does not follow that every question must be submitted to the Cabinet. Matters within the jurisdiction of a Government Department, if of sufficient importance, must be so submitted unless there is some special reason to the contrary—as there is in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy, the prosecution of offences, and so on. Matters outside the normal process of government may be taken into consideration if the Cabinet thinks fit. In other words, there is no matter which the Cabinet may not discuss, but there are certain matters which normally it ought to leave alone.

The marriage of the reigning monarch is a matter of the latter kind. The choice of a consort is, generally speaking, a private matter. It is not of serious importance whether the King marries Princess X or Princess Y, or Miss P or Miss Q. If his choice fell upon a Catholic, however, the question would immediately become of public importance, since legislation would be required to amend the Act of Settlement. Moreover, a Queen Consort is a public figure—a public servant would perhaps be a more exact expression. She is expected to undertake public functions. She assists, too, in maintaining that material and Commonwealth loyalty to the Throne which is the only real justification for monarchy.

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If there is anything in her character which precludes her from exercising these functions, the Cabinet must necessarily be concerned. If, to take an extreme example, a queen consort was flagrantly adulterous, there can be no doubt that the Cabinet would have to consider what steps should be taken.

It follows that if there is something in the character of the lady which prevents a substantial section of the population from accepting her as Queen Consort, the Cabinet has a complete right to consider the King's proposal to marry and advise him accordingly. In the case of Edward VIII this was not done. The Cabinet was not called upon, formally, to give any advice as to whether the King should or should not marry Mrs. Simpson. They were never asked because the King accepted the Prime Minister's informal advice that such a marriage was "impracticable."

There are, of course, many cases in which a Prime Minister has taken decisions even of major importance without prior Cabinet sanction. In every case, it appears, the decision was subsequently ratified by the Cabinet. Mr. Baldwin's advice that a marriage between the King and Mrs. Simpson was "impracticable" was, it appears, never brought formally before the Cabinet. Before we hasten to criticise the Prime Minister, it is essential to understand the situation. There was in October 1936, no proposal that the King should marry Mrs. Simpson. The lady was still married, though it was known that she had instituted proceedings for a divorce. In October, therefore, the Prime Minister merely warned the King that he was being "talked about," and that gossip was bad for the monarchy. In November, however, the decree *nisi* had been made, and Mr. Baldwin must have had good reason for supposing that the King proposed to marry Mrs. Simpson; for without being asked he expressed the

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opinion that such a marriage was "impracticable." The King replied that he was going to marry Mrs. Simpson and that he was prepared to abdicate. This statement was not brought formally before the Cabinet: but when at a later stage, a proposal for a morganatic marriage was made, this proposal was, at the King's request, formally submitted to the Cabinet.

It is clear that throughout Mr. Baldwin was acting not as friend but as Prime Minister. It must not be forgotten, however, that the process of government involves tact and discretion, and that many things can be done informally which cannot be done formally. The King's statement, "You and I must settle this matter together; I will not have anyone interfering," shows that he was prepared to accept friendly advice from a Prime Minister but not to permit a formal recommendation by the Cabinet. Clearly, the Cabinet could not in October have considered formally a matter which rested on three hypotheses: that the King wanted to marry Mrs. Simpson, that Mrs. Simpson wanted to marry the King, and that Mrs. Simpson could obtain a divorce. They might, perhaps, have considered the gossip. It was, however, much more convenient, and it was likely to be more successful, for the Prime Minister first to find out what friendly advice could do. The situation changed somewhat after the discussion on November 16. When the King asserted that he was going to marry Mrs. Simpson and that he was prepared to go, the line between the formal and the informal was wearing thin. No doubt this statement, too, was "informal." Nevertheless, it required full, if still technically "informal," discussion. Whether there was informal discussion in Cabinet we do not know. Probably there was; but the Prime Minister has not said so. Until full information is available it is unwise to draw conclusions. If, however, it be the case that the Prime Minister

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can take decisions "informally" that only the Cabinet could take "formally," there is evident need for caution. The importance of the Prime Minister's office has increased in recent years not so much because of any increase of powers—though there has been some increase, notably in respect of dissolutions of Parliament—but because there has been a tendency to exalt his functions above those of his colleagues. For this state of affairs the Labour Party is largely responsible. They keep insisting that the Prime Minister, and not the appropriate departmental minister, shall receive deputations. They keep emphasising—Mr. Atlee does it regularly—the personal responsibility of the Prime Minister as something different from the collective responsibility of the Cabinet. It may be doubted whether such tactics pay in the House of Commons; it is certain that they are pernicious in tendency. A Prime Minister is not a dictator; he should be only a little more than the chairman of the Cabinet. Nearly all changes in the British Constitution arise informally—and it would be wise to watch carefully the development of the "informal" functions of the Prime Minister, lest the "leadership" principle be introduced.

III.

If the Cabinet had been asked for formal advice on a proposal for a marriage, it would have been necessary also to submit the proposal to the Cabinets of the Dominions. It is not clear whether there was any informal consultation with the Dominions about the proposal for a marriage. The proposal for a morganatic marriage, which was formally submitted to the Cabinet on November 27, was also submitted to the Dominions. The enquiries had not been completed by December 2, but "had gone far enough to show that neither in the Dominions nor here would there be any prospect of such legislation being accepted."

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It is possible that, before his second meeting with the King on November 16, 1936, Mr. Baldwin had informally consulted the Dominions. It is more probable that he had not. At that meeting he in fact, though not in form, ruled out as "impracticable" a marriage between the King and Mrs. Simpson. If, therefore, there was no informal consultation, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in fact determined the King's course of action and in substance compelled abdication, without the concurrence of the Dominions. If this apparent breach of the Balfour Declaration implies that only formal advice matters, it seems that the whole problem of Commonwealth relationship can be solved—so long as the Dominions consent—by keeping everything informal.

When the question of a morganatic marriage was formally submitted, it appears that the method of communication operated reasonably well. The difficulty was not that the consent of the Dominions Governments could not be obtained but that immediate legislation to provide for the abdication was not everywhere possible. This situation is inevitable, since the legislatures of the British Commonwealth are in different hemispheres, and it can rarely happen that they are all in session at the same time. This difficulty explains in part the different attitudes adopted in the Dominions, in part, however, that difference was due to the Statute of Westminster. The provision of legislation throughout the Commonwealth shows that "Dominion status" is now a concept which varies from Dominion to Dominion.

The important provisions of the Statute of Westminster do not apply to Australia and New Zealand until they are adopted respectively by those Dominions. The preamble, which states among other things, that it is in accord with constitutional practice that legislation, touching the succession to the Throne should receive the assent of the Dominions

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as well as of the United Kingdom, does. Accordingly, special legislation for Australia and New Zealand was not necessary; and the Abdication Act merely recites that the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand have assented thereto.

The Statute of Westminster does apply to Canada, South Africa, and the Irish Free State. Section 4 of the Statute provides that no law of the United Kingdom shall extend or be deemed to extend to a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion unless it is declared that it is enacted at the request and with the consent of the Dominion concerned. The Dominion Government of Canada decided to make use of the excepting clause; and accordingly the Abdication Act recites that "the Dominion of Canada, pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, has requested and consented to the enactment of this Act." Thus, the Act took effect in Canada by virtue of Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster.

The Union of South Africa adopted a different procedure. Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster has been re-enacted by the Union Parliament in the Status of the Union Act, 1931, with the substantial modification that no Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to the Union as part of the law of the Union, unless extended by an Act of the Parliament of the Union. This provision is in substance an amendment of Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster, though by another provision of the same Act Section 4 is re-enacted in that modification. Assuming this ambiguity resolved in favour of the section as modified, there is the question whether a Dominion has power to amend the Statute of Westminster. Assuming that such amendment is possible, there is the further question whether Section 4 is effective in limiting the powers of the Imperial Parliament. There are expressions in *British Coal*

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Corporation v. The King [1935] A.C. 500, which appears to support Dicey's view that a sovereign Parliament cannot limit its own power—an expression very doubtful in its logic and not entirely supported by authority. In short, the legal position in South Africa is obscure. The simplest method, which would have raised no legal difficulties, was for the Union Parliament to pass the necessary legislation. That Parliament was, however, not sitting and it was not desired to summon it. At the same time, it was not possible for the Union Government to "request and consent" in view of the provisions of the Union Act of 1934. Accordingly the Abdication Act merely satisfies the preamble of the Statute of Westminster by declaring that South Africa assents to it.

The legal position was thus doubtful. If Section 2 of the Status of the Union Act, 1934, was valid and fully effective, the Abdication Act did not apply to South Africa. If that section was not valid, but Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster was valid and effective, the Act did not apply to South Africa because "request and consent" had not been recited. If, however, neither the Status of the Union Act, 1934, nor Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster limited the power of the Imperial Parliament to legislate as it pleased; and if the Abdication Act can be construed as applying to South Africa; then it did so apply, and Edward VIII abdicated in South Africa as in Great Britain. This interesting legal problem was, however, solved *ex post facto* by the subsequent enactment of legislation taking effect retrospectively to the date on which the King communicated his intention to Parliament.

Finally, there is the Irish Free State. The Abdication Act does not mention the youngest and most frisky of the Dominions. The Irish Free State did not even "assent" to it; and the constitutional convention set out in the preamble to the Statute of Westminster was therefore

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broken. It can nevertheless be interpreted as applying to the Irish Free State—though on one interpretation of Section 2 of the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922, the contrary might be argued—if Section 4 of the Statute does not bind the British Parliament. In fact, however, the Dail passed its own legislation, deleting the King's name and the name of the King's representative from the Constitution of the Irish Free State, and providing for a demise of the Crown for the purposes of external relationships. The result is to make the Irish Free State a republic "freely associated" with the other members of the British Commonwealth, but no longer "united by a common allegiance" to the Crown. The Crown is, as the preamble to the Statute of Westminster says, the symbol of free association and nothing more.

IV.

The final question must be whether the events leading up to the abdication need have taken place. It is clear that a substantial section of opinion could never have regarded Mrs. Simpson as Queen. It is probable, however, that if the situation had been properly handled a substantial majority would have regarded a marriage as the obvious solution. Many of the rest would have become resigned to the *fait accompli*. Care would have been needed in the preliminary publicity; but it might have been done. As events happened, it is probable that a majority of people first heard of Mrs. Simpson from their newspapers on December 2 and 3, while the crisis was working itself out. The rest had heard rumours or had read American newspapers. There was no possibility of preparing public opinion.

The King appears to have been quite careless of the effect of his actions on public opinion. It was, obviously, somebody's business to tell the King the direction in which his

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actions were leading him and the alternatives—not as yet restricted to marriage and renunciation—that faced him. It was not yet a political question in the usual sense. The Prime Minister would have had no right to intervene much earlier than he did. Clearly the function should have been exercised by someone of standing in the entourage of the King—one of the “irresponsible advisers” of whom Palmerston spoke so contemptuously, but who have on occasions not hesitated to tell unpalatable truths. Whether such advice was given and rejected we do not know. What we do know is that Edward VIII had by making changes in his staff deprived himself of some of the best available experience.

The office of king is already dull enough and onerous enough to appal any ordinary human being; and it would be unwise to suggest that the king's friends should be chosen for him. At the same time, there are positions at court whose public importance is so great that they should be exercised by public servants. It is only by accident that they are not. The office of Private Secretary was of some importance in the hands of Sir Henry Taylor; and had the normal development been followed it would probably have become a public office during the course of the nineteenth century. The accession of Queen Victoria and her subsequent marriage altered the course of evolution. Viscount Melbourne was almost private secretary to the young Queen; and the Prince Consort, with his own private secretary, later relieved her of most of the detailed work. After the death of the Prince Consort assistance became necessary; but the Government, instead of realising that the office was essential and that there were no dangers provided that the right kind of person were appointed, allowed the appointment to be private and almost secret. Only later was the title “Private Secretary” permitted.

The Private Secretary is not merely a private secretary.

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He is also a constitutional adviser. He must be concerned more with the communications that pass between the King and his ministers and between the King and the various public and charitable authorities with which he is in contact, than with the strictly private matters of the Royal Family. Obviously he must not be a politician. But equally obviously it is necessary in the public interest that he should be competent and experienced. All the Private Secretaries since 1861 have been men of intelligence and discretion. Only the most captious critic can find in the available documents evidence of bias, of error of judgment, or even of unnecessary servility. It is not suggested that there is any evidence that King Edward VIII was not properly advised. The probabilities are all the other way—that advice was tendered and rejected. The lesson of the abdication is, however, that the office of Private Secretary really is of public importance. If this is so there are dangers inherent in the present haphazard system of appointment. It is particularly dangerous that a young and inexperienced monarch could, if he so pleased, jettison all the accumulated experience of the Household and start again with the native wisdom of his bosom friends.

If the important Household appointments became civil service posts, it is possible that better officers than those appointed in recent years would not be obtained. Such a system might, however, avoid some difficulties. A king must be allowed to choose his own friends and to appoint those servants who exercise purely private functions. But those who advise on the exercise of public functions and those who look after the expenditure charged to the Civil List, are really public servants. The King would have much influence in their selection, but the nomination would come, as in senior civil service posts, from the Prime Minister.

THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

By D. W. BROGAN

THE recent American election has made of great interest and topicality a question that, eight years ago, would have seemed fantastically unreal, the question "Can the Republican Party survive?" In 1928, the Republican Party was, as a national party, seventy-two years old. Its presidential nominees had ruled the executive side of the American government for fifty-two of those years and, though its control of Congress had not been as continuous, the Union had been dominated from 1860, with three brief intervals, by the political combination calling itself the Republican Party. Only the domination of French politics by the Left since 1877 could be compared with this achievement in duration—and the French Left's political domination was in contrast to its isolation from the ruling powers in French economic and social life. The Republican Party, on the other hand, was close to, was indeed often identified with the most powerful social and economic forces in American life. Not merely the ruling politicians but the ruling businessmen of the United States were Republican. There was a symbiotic relation set up that was seldom disturbed by internal or external difficulties of a serious type. And, to this practical power, was added the power of sentiment; the Republicans were the "Grand Old Party"; they had saved the Union; they had made modern America. To be a Republican, over a great part of the United States, was to be not only on the side of the rich and the politically prominent, it was to be on the side of the good. "Not all Democrats are rascals but all rascals were

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Democrats." The Republicans had stopped saying this but had not stopped thinking it.

The election of 1928 seemed to have ensured that this state of affairs would continue. It marked the first inroads of the party into the "Solid South," that is, into those states whose political life was deeply coloured by their former status as slave states and by their experience as the defeated side in the Civil War. The slave states that had not seceded had been lost to the Democrats in the revolt against Bryan and Free Silver in 1896; five of the remaining eleven were lost in the revolt against Al Smith, the Catholic opponent of Prohibition in 1928. The description of the Democrats as the party of "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion" was now, it seemed at first sight, no longer true; for Rebellion had, in great part, cast off Rome and Rum. When Mr. Hoover was inaugurated in March 1929, the problem of party survival in America might have seemed to be exclusively something for the Democrats to worry over. The Republican Party had won an unprecedented electoral victory; it had repulsed the attack of a very formidable Democratic candidate; it had more than held its own. The politicians in the South who had, openly or covertly, bolted the Democratic Party when it was led by Governor Smith, might well have congratulated themselves on their prudence in leaving a sinking ship while there was yet time to board the superb vessel whose seaworthiness had been tested by the storms of two generations. Within two years the great vessel was straining all the resources of her pumps and, within another two years, she was barely keeping afloat; today, it seems to many that she may soon sink.

What has caused this change? The history of so sudden a reversal of fortune has its own interests and lessons; it is part of the data of the pathology of parties. One explanation of the evil fortunes of the Republican Party is, of course,

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highly relevant—as far as it goes. The depression that began with the bursting of the “Hoover boom” in 1929 angered the American people as corresponding smashes have angered other peoples. Mr. Hoover and his party suffered for the same reasons as Dr. Brüning or the Labour Party in 1931. That this was the occasion of the defeat of the party at the Congressional elections of 1930 cannot be doubted. That the continuance of the depression accounted in large part for the failure of the party, in 1932, to make a respectable fight is also obviously true, but the successive defeats of 1934, which was worse than 1932, and of 1936 which was worse than 1934, suggest more fundamental reasons for party despondency. In Britain, the opposition party, driven out of office by the same economic blizzard that overwhelmed Mr. Hoover, has greatly increased its parliamentary representation; it has not recovered all its lost ground, but it has recovered much of it and, in any case, the British Labour Party, even at the most prosperous moment of its career in 1929, was still a minority party; it was far from having conquered the allegiance of even half the electorate. The Republican Party was a dominant party, with resources far more varied and powerful than those of the British Labour Party and yet it has not merely failed to recover any part of its lost ground, it has kept on losing more. The Labour Party was as startled by its failure to hold all the mining constituencies in 1931 as the Republican Party was to see all the big states but Pennsylvania desert in 1932. But the Labour Party did recover Seaham Harbour in 1935. The Republicans lost Pennsylvania in 1936. In America, as in other countries, more than in other countries indeed, the first business of a party is to produce prosperity; to fail to do that is punished severely, but to continue the punishment, to make it more and more severe as the memory of the disillusionment grows more remote, suggests

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that the American people has more against the once dominant party than the collapse of the bull market and the depression. It suggests a temper that leads to political revolutions, not to sporadic and economically motivated revolts. The present sad state of the organization that for two generations considered, and rightly considered, itself the normal government of the Union, is due in great part to its former adequacy to its role. The experience of the sixty years of power had a highly selective effect on the personnel, on the doctrines, on the political practice of the party. To its complete adequacy for the role of dominant party in a given political and economic set-up the Republicans owe their past triumphs and their present low estate.

What was that economic and political set-up? Economic should come first in this analysis, for an American party to succeed has to perform a task which is primarily economic, though performed with formally political instruments. It has to unite sections of a vast country in a common programme of exploitation of the economic resources of the nation. All American parties have been, from the beginning, coalitions of sections, united if need be by some ideological bond, but united it must be by a tacit treaty on economic questions. As geography dictated a high degree of sectional differentiation in economic life, the interests of different types of production could be easily identified with geographical regions and, as the government was federal, the sections could be defined in terms of groups of states. The groups that, in combination, controlled the federal government were in favour of strengthening it; the group or groups shut out from this control tried to limit its efficacy by the doctrine of states rights. The failure of the legal doctrine to serve the ends of the slave states resulted in the Civil War; the result of that war determined, for good, that secession from the Union was a remedy barred to a section that

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thought itself victimized. The victor in this struggle in politics and on the battlefield was the Republican Party, that is, the political alliance of the middle west grain states with the industrial east. That party remained in power as long and only as long as the alliance of the manufacturer and western farmer held together; grave discontent in one adherent to the pact let the Democrats, reduced by the fortune of war to being the organ of the South and of minor economic interests (shipping and importing for instance), into power. When the west and the east made terms, the Democrats were again excluded from national office. In fact they attained it only about once in a generation.

But the Republican Party had not only practical economic assets to depend on; it had not only the natural advantage of being able to foster the interests of its allies (or owners) and thus increase their and its power. It had emotional assets. It had "saved the Union"; preoccupation with the causes and results of the Civil War was less intense on the victorious side than on the defeated, but it was great, and, as the victorious sections were relatively and absolutely much more populous, rich, and powerful than the defeated, the lesser intensity of emotional fixation was more than compensated for by its much greater extension. The north and west might only think of the War at election time, while the south thought of it all the time; but at election time was often enough. Over the greater part of the United States, then, the normal majority was Republican; the emotional issues were provided by a fixed historical tradition that wore very well and the practical issues of politics were settled within this frame. The size of the nation made it necessary to ascribe national character to what were fundamentally local issues or to keep alive a dead national issue, the Union, but the result was pragmatically adequate to justify the contempt for elegance. All over the United

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States, outside the south, politics were fought over local issues, and indeed, if there were any over national issues, within the dominant party, which included in its ranks all sections of opinion compatible with acceptance of the general constitutional structure and the capitalist structure of economic life.

In such circumstances, it was natural that the Republican Party should avoid as dangerous any innovations in practice or doctrine that could be avoided, since they could not better a situation which already made America, for that party, the best of all possible worlds. The Republican Pangloss had reasons for his optimism. It followed that the man who sought a career in politics naturally sought it in the ranks of the dominant party since that involved no sacrifice of opinion. Provided one did not believe in absolute free trade or in the right of secession, one could be received as a loyal member of the national Republican Party. What was asked of the aspirant, in addition, depended on the local, not on the national state, of the party. Thus within the party all ranges of opinion were permitted or only occasionally and intermittently reprovved. Senator Norris could sit on the same side of the upper house with Senator Reed. Nebraska could remain in formal communion with Pennsylvania. But even within these limits there tended to be selection. It was possible to be a Republican "in good standing" and be fairly far to the left, but it was difficult, if not impossible, for such a Republican to be in authority; to be a presidential possibility, to be a cabinet officer, to be potent in control of legislative business. The party rightly refused to choose when it could avoid it, but it had no doubt what it must choose when it had to.

The type of man who came to the top in Republican politics, local and national, but more especially in national politics, was then a man trained to play one type of political

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game with great skill, a game putting a high premium on conformity to certain rules and principles, a conformity adequate to the normal situation, but hopelessly inadequate, indeed crippling, in a new situation. The normal good Republican believed that there was one fundamental practical rule in politics, that the businessman was always right in his fundamental demands, that the American people deeply appreciated this truth and that with a top dressing of sentimental appeals to the sacred memories of Lincoln (and to such local party saints as there were) and a practical affirmation of the dogma enunciated by President Coolidge, "the business of the United States is business," neither the party nor the politician could go wrong. Nor could they, as long as these data were true. They are not true at the moment, nor have they been true since 1930. The problem of Republican survival hangs on the ability of the party (i.e., the leaders of the party) to realize that the old dog needs new tricks and on the ability of the old dog to perform new tricks. The Republican Party must adjust itself, that is to say, to a political world in which, for the moment, the psychological weight of the support of "business" is much less than it was—some would say that it is a handicap—and to an age which has at last forgotten Lincoln. It must find a new practical basis or wait until the old order has returned under its own steam; it must, in any case, find a new sentimental basis. An election in which only two states stick to the Grand Old Party, in which the Democrats in the north were able, *without producing any serious hostile reaction in the south*, to win over an overwhelming majority of the Negro vote, has revealed the passing of the fixed emotional pattern to which two generations had accustomed the Republican leaders. Inside the frame of business rule and patriotic prestige as the party of the Union the party had successfully manœuvred; two sides of that frame have gone

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for good and must be replaced. The survival of the party depends on its ability to retain control of the allegiance of the sections of the American people hostile by temperament and interest to the left-wing tendencies of the Roosevelt administration and also on its ability to acquire a new set of emotional assets to replace those that, after seventy years, of use, have now definitely proved inadequate. What chances has the party of doing this?

At first sight they are not great. The interests which hitherto have given prestige, loyalty, and cash to the Republican Party will not, it is true, cease to exist, but they may decide that the party no longer can give any real return for business patronage. The practical business man will tend to look on the situation with the eye of a practical politician. He will note that, to begin with, the Republican Party, if it is to be rehabilitated, will require a great deal of money indeed, for it is almost wholly without the auxiliary aid of state or municipal office. At the lowest ebb of its fortunes, the Democratic Party had in the states of the Solid South and, in great city machines like those of New York, Boston, Kansas City, bases from which the sinews of war and disciplined troops could be drawn. At the lowest ebb of Democratic congressional fortunes in 1920, these regions were loyal to the party. And these assets seemed indestructible; even in 1928, with an electoral triumph comparable to that of the Democrats in 1932 (though much less impressive than that of 1936), the Republicans made few inroads into their opponent's Congressional strength. At the worst, the Democrats controlled at least ten states and each house of Congress and Republican numbers have fallen, several great cities. Today they control the state government in four successive congresses, 19 senators out of 96; 89 than a fifth of each house (they control the state government out of 435). They

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ment of only one great state (California) and the city government of only one great city (Philadelphia); and, in both cases, a candid politician would allow that these local triumphs are accidental and the control limited and of uncertain duration. The greater part of the professional Republican politicians, all over the Union, have been out of office for from four to six years; even if this exclusion has not been financially ruinous for them, it has been bad for party discipline and, as the Republican Party has always depended (with reasonable confidence) on national predominance, lean years in nation, state and city are far more demoralizing to them than to Democrats who in the south, in New York (both state and city), and in other regions have always had the spiritual and fleshly nourishment of successful retention of office somewhere. The Republican Party machine over a great part of the United States was dead in the spring of 1936; it was only galvanized into a semblance of life for the campaign of that year and, since the shattering defeat of November, the machine must again have stopped dead over most of the Union. The sections of American economic life that have used the Republican Party in the past have not given up hope of finding a political party to suit them, but they may well decide that it would be cheaper, easier and more efficient to start a new one, that is, to wait for a split in the Democratic Party, a split that, they calculate, cannot indefinitely be postponed and is only delayed by the unprecedented prestige of President Roosevelt and by his immense political skill.

That such a split must occur, that a large section of the left or right wings of the dominant party must hive off seems obvious. If Mr. Roosevelt or his immediate successor does not move to the left, there will be a recrudescence of western agrarian revolt, probably accompanied by a corresponding movement among the eastern industrialists. If the present

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or future leader of the Democrats does move decisively to the left (the proposed changes in the Supreme Court may be the occasion), a considerable section of his party will be forced to leave it openly or surreptitiously. This split in the Democratic Party will provide the opportunity for a new conservative party should the split be a breaking away of the right elements; and, if it is the right wing that remains in command of the party machinery, the Democrats will be that conservative party.

What have the Republicans to set against such arguments, what assets can they produce that will be worth buying? First of all, they can point out that the fantastic Democratic majorities in the Electoral College and in Congress grossly exaggerate the disparity in strength between the two parties. That is obvious in the case of the distribution of presidential electors; Mr. Landon did badly, but not as badly as eight electoral votes out of five hundred and thirty-one would suggest. Nor is Congress a much better index. The Republican Party polled about three-fifths as many votes as the Democrats and a party that actually has sixteen million votes at its disposal is not negligible. More than that, the Republican politician still has the advantage of a name that, in some regions, has real prestige value. In the year of his greatest triumph, Mr. Roosevelt could not carry his own congressional district in New York, nor is this solely a case of a prophet having no honour in his own country, for there can be little doubt that had Mr. Roosevelt been a Republican he would have carried the counties that voted against him. What is true of rural New York is true of rural New England. All over the eastern and central states there are large areas where the Republicans are still the Grand Old Party and, should that party disappear or merge in another, it is by no means certain that these regions would be safely conservative. It is conceivable that a brand-new

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conservative party in America would not carry Maine and Vermont and, though such a failure would be more than compensated for if Texas or Virginia were won, it is by no means certain that they would be won. Of the sixteen million persons who voted the Republican ticket there are some who voted for it because it was the Republican ticket. Until we can be quite certain that this section is really negligible, we may expect to see the prudent politician avoiding any desperate measures.

On the other hand it must be admitted that the very loyalty of such regions has its handicaps. Secure in their bailiwicks, the Republican leaders of such regions may be unable to see the problems of their colleagues in less friendly areas with either sympathy or understanding. A miner's member for a safe labour seat, a conservative member for a south-coast seaside resort have often difficulty in making allowances for their less lucky brethren who have to preach to the unconverted. A programme that may look both "liberal" and attractive to the electors of Representative Hamilton Fish's district in New York may have no selling value in those great regions where the most distinguished resident of that district¹ is not rejected but adored.

¹ The Federalists, it should be noted, the only openly conservative party in American history, suffered badly from the domination of their councils by New Englanders whose personal political safety made them intransigent beyond the possibilities of the political situation.

On the other hand, the very completeness of the Republican defeat has at any rate cleared the decks of a good deal of overseasoned timber. The politicians who were most adequately adapted to the old order, typified in such competent practitioners of an obsolete technique as Senator

¹Mr. Roosevelt.

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Watson of Indiana, have almost all been swept away. The Republican Party has now very few vested interests in the form of old leaders whose claims and whims must be honoured and tolerated. The last chance of the old school was taken in 1936 and, after the failure of all the old charms, the charmers have in all probability been consigned to permanent political darkness. If the party is to be revived at all, it must be by new men and new methods, and this is so obvious that the way is open to those new men and new methods. Thus there is a real opportunity to free the party from some of the stiffness that grew on it as a result of such long success. While remaining fundamentally conservative, it need not make such gross blunders in tactics as that fantastic clinging to the corpse of Prohibition which marked its course in 1932. Nor will a blind belief in the economic and electoral virtue of higher and higher tariffs at all costs, exemplified by the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, be incumbent on a party no longer necessarily ruled by persons like Mr. Smoot and Mr. Hawley. A Republican Party, led more realistically, freed from the illusion that the electors shared the very natural belief of the politicians that there was something intolerable in the mere thought of the Democrats staying in power, might be a powerful weapon of American conservatism. To the conservative elements of American life, such a party, in addition to its still considerable local assets, would be able to lend one useful weapon, the name and prestige of a conservative party that can pretend (or claim, if you like) not to be merely a conservative party. In few countries outside Britain has it been found possible, in modern times, to create or maintain, by democratic means, an openly conservative party. Nor would it be an easy task in America, though if the Republicans fail finally, it will have to be undertaken. In America a brand new conservative party, whatever it called itself,

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would, if it were based on a Democratic schism, have as its nucleus the most reactionary elements in the Solid South, an electoral region less adaptable to the needs of the age than even a Republican party reflecting the views of rural New England. If the Republicans can show signs of coming back (e.g., at the Congressional elections of 1938) it seems probable that the business elements in American life will be justified in giving them another chance.

But, it may be asked, what of the sections of the American people which have no obvious interest in a revival either of the Republican Party or of any substitute for it? The reply is that there are no such sections. The powerful minority which voted for Mr. Landon is not going to disappear overnight; it may even make a fairly rapid recovery in numbers. Its actual political strength grotesquely misrepresents even its numerical strength, much less its economic importance. If fascism comes when powerful interests feel that democratic politics have nothing further to offer them, it is desirable that, until it is obvious that the American people has definitely condemned capitalism, capitalism should not be denied its due political weight. It is denied that weight at the moment and, should it prove necessary to start a new conservative party, there will be delay and confusion during which the tempers of the possessing classes may be dangerously frayed. The past of the Republican Party and its immediate future force it to pay at any rate lip service to democracy. That is all to the good.

Moreover, a new party would mean a considerable loss of useful political personnel. When a party begins to decay it involves in its decay the personal fortunes of its leaders who may not be responsible for that decay and who may, by training, temperament and ability, be useful public servants, useful exponents of their point of view. That

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point of view, those interests, will not necessarily cease to have powerful representatives, but they will be covert representatives. It was no real advantage to the French Republic that the decay of the openly conservative parties in France forced the important elements of French life which these parties had represented to turn to a Meline (or a Boulanger) to take the place of a Broglie. In the United States, the Republican Party still has some leaders whose fortunes might be ruined by a change in the party structure without any public advantage to offset this private loss.

It has been impossible to do more than sketch in outline the nature of the problem and it has been impossible to do more than deny, by implication, the common belief that American politics must be formally recast on British lines with an openly class left-wing party attacking a fairly openly class right-wing party. Something like that situation may soon develop, but it may well develop as a natural extension of the existing party alignment and nomenclature. If this be so, it seems desirable and not impossible that the right-wing party should bear the old name and take over the old assets of the Republicans. How far this is likely we shall soon know, by the degree of willingness of the American possessing classes to save the Republican national machine from its present dire financial straits and, if such rescue work takes place, by the comparative success attained in 1938. If the party cannot raise money now or win seats in Congress two years hence, it is indeed doomed. Its place will not long remain vacant, but its name will join those of the Federalists and Whigs in the shadow and the dust thrown by history over parties that have outlived the environment that bred and fostered them.

LONDON AND THE L.C.C. ELECTION

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

I

THE London County Council election which took place on March 4th was regarded by both parties to the contest as one of exceptional importance. The Labour Party had completed its first term of office at County Hall. It had substantial achievements to its credit in a number of services, but in certain spheres—notably rehousing—the inevitable time-lag between effort and result had concealed the full extent of its activity. Hence the Labour Party was anxious to secure a further term of office during which plans in process of execution might come to fruition. The Municipal Reformers, on the other hand, were uncomfortably aware that Mr. Morrison and his followers had made a respectable showing during the past three years, had committed no important blunder and had observed a cautious financial policy. Hence they were anxious that Labour should be turned out before Londoners became accustomed to a Labour majority in the same way that they became habituated to a Municipal Reform majority between 1907 and 1934, when a conservative administration was in continuous control at County Hall. Above all, this is Coronation year; and to some people there seems to be something almost improper, if not blasphemous, in the capital city of the British Empire being in the hands of “the reds” as they were called, at a time when patriotism, imperialism, rearmament, the throne, and conservatism are likely to be inextricably confused.

Accordingly, every nerve was strained, not only by the Municipal Reform Party and its henchman the London

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Municipal Society, but also by the National Government and the Central Conservative Office, to reverse the verdict of 1934. The campaign was at once unscrupulous and silly. Day by day such papers as the *Evening Standard* attempted to confuse the issue by identifying the London Labour candidates with the Communist Party and red ruin. The impossibility of making the Metropolis secure against the devastating attack from the air which was apparently due to start as soon as the election was over, unless Municipal Reformers were in command at County Hall, was made painfully clear. The fearful record of Mr. Morrison's party in breaking its promises was proclaimed from many hoardings. Above all, it was explained over and over again that Labour had usurped power for one reason only: namely, because of the slothful abstention from voting of the London ratepayer. Only one elector out of three voted in 1934. It was implied that every unused vote would have been cast in favour of Municipal Reform, or at any rate against Labour, if it had been used.

A successful issue to the campaign was thus assumed, on the conservative side, to depend on what is called in America “getting out the vote.” This simple view turned out to be quite mistaken. The poll was the largest recorded in an L.C.C. Election for many years. Approximately 42.6 of the electorate voted, which compares with 36.8 in 1922, 30.6 in 1925, 35.6 in 1928, 27.8 in 1931 and 33.5 in 1934.

The increase of voting strength was accompanied by an increase in the Labour representation from 69 elected Councillors to 75, with a corresponding reduction in the Municipal Reformers from 55 to 49.¹ When the aldermanic seats are included the Labour Party may expect a working majority of 30.

¹ A table showing the strength of the various parties from 1904 to 1934 was given in my article “Thoughts on the L.C.C. Election” in the *Political Quarterly*, April-June, 1934.

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II

It was no small thing for the London Labour Party to have gained control of the principal governing body in the metropolis in 1934. It is still more striking for it to have retained control in 1937, and to have increased its strength at a time when schemes of social welfare are becoming subordinated to considerations of military policy. The Labour appeal was based mainly on the party's existing achievements in the spheres of housing, education, the hospital service, public assistance, highways and bridges, parks and open spaces (including the green belt) and staff matters. Its future programme was declared to be a continuation of the principles of policy already initiated in these and cognate fields.¹

The magnitude of the task which is performed by the councillors and officials at County Hall is realised by few of the denizens of London. The L.C.C. is responsible for the welfare of 4,397,003 inhabitants (1931 census), and more than a million other persons who come into the area for work and pleasure each day. It is engaged in educating nearly 825,000 pupils and students in 1,500 schools of various types; wherein it employs 26,500 teachers. Over 486,000 of the children are in elementary schools, of which there are nearly 1,000 (including 357 non-provided). The London fire brigade has a staff of 2,131 and its equipment includes 60 fire stations, 52 miles of hose, and 1,742 street fire alarms. During 1935 it dealt with more than 6,000 fires. The London ambulance service consists of 173 vehicles operated by a staff of 425 officers. During 1935 it conveyed 282,000 persons over a distance exceeding 1,500,000 miles. The L.C.C. hospitals comprise 43 general hospitals, providing 25,664 beds and a further 31 special hospitals providing 14,386 beds

¹ cf. "What Labour has done for London," a pamphlet published by the London Labour Party.

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a total of 40,000 which compares with 15,000 beds in the voluntary hospitals. The London drainage system deals (each year) with 92,505,000 gallons of sewage. The mental institutions run by the L.C.C. accommodate 30,000 persons of unsound mind. The L.C.C. has provided more than 14,000 dwellings of various kinds inside the county, 14,000 re-housing dwellings and a further 44,000 dwellings outside the county boundaries. These few figures give some idea of the dimensions of the services.¹ The total annual expenditure is about £40 millions, of which about half falls on the rates.

The London County Council discharges most of its functions with efficiency and economy. One could, of course, find ground for criticism and need for improvement in a study of the various services, but broadly speaking the L.C.C. compares favourably with the city councils of most capital cities so far as its actual work is concerned. The real weakness of the Council is that the range of its duties is far too restricted. This is due partly to the apathy of past generations of Londoners, who permitted the public utilities of gas, electricity and transport to pass into private ownership; partly to the fact that some of the powers which the L.C.C. ought properly to possess were conferred on minor authorities such as the metropolitan borough councils, or on *ad hoc* authorities such as the Metropolitan Water Board; and partly because the City Corporation has been permitted to remain an autonomous unit outside the County Council's jurisdiction.

But leaving aside for the moment the question of the narrow range of duties and restricted area of the London County Council, it may be said that the inhabitant of London has much to be thankful for and little cause for grumbling, so far as the administration at County Hall is concerned.

¹ These figures are all taken from *London Statistics*, Vol. 39 (1934-6), an invaluable mine of information on the metropolis. P. S. King & Son, 158.

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The internal organisation is exceedingly effective. The majority party appoints the chairmen and vice-chairmen of all committees, thus securing control over the key positions. The office of leader of the council and leader of the opposition is a unique device in English local government for providing the leadership, responsibility and coherence which are essential requisites for successful administration in a democracy. The party organisation is closely knit and thoroughly integrated in all its ramifications, with the result that a consistent policy is maintained over the entire front, and the work of the Council can be considered as a whole. The personnel policy is free from jobbery and patronage, and the official staff has been strengthened in recent years by the appointment of the present clerk to the Council (Sir George Gater), by the regular recruitment of University men who have passed the Civil Service Administrative Class Examination, and by the importation of some able men from other local authorities and Whitehall. Above all, Mr. Herbert Morrison is a great personal asset to the government of London whose value it is not easy to overestimate.

III

Let us now turn to what is, unfortunately, the most significant fact about the recent election: namely, that none of the parties nor any of the candidates even mentioned the fundamental questions which ought to be agitating not only the London County Council but also Parliament, the central Government, and the entire nation. It is not too much to say that the future of the metropolitan region is a problem of national importance.

The metropolitan region consists of an area of nearly 2,000 square miles containing about 9,000,000 persons—roughly, the area of the London Passenger Transport Board. Within this area is concentrated about two-fifths of the

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assessable value of the country and an immense accumulation of controlling organisations (political, commercial, financial, judicial, administrative, scientific and cultural) operating directly or indirectly the principal institutions of England and the British Empire.

The municipal government of the region is divided between the L.C.C. (which deals with 117 square miles containing slightly less than half the population), 28 metropolitan borough councils, the city corporation, 5 county councils, 3 county borough councils, 26 municipal boroughs, 42 urban district councils, 4 rural district councils, 6 parish councils, the Port of London Authority, the Lee Conservancy Board, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and half-a-dozen other *ad hoc* bodies.

With such a dispersion of responsibility and power among more than 120 separate authorities, it is scarcely surprising that the vital problems concerning the government of the region escape both interest and attention, despite the fact that they are becoming more urgent every day. Broadly speaking, there are three outstanding problems. First, the question of limiting the further growth of London. Second, the question of planning the whole metropolitan region as a unity. Third, the question of reforming, enlarging and simplifying the local government of the region.

There is nothing new in the idea of restricting the expansion of the capital. The case for restriction has, however, become unanswerable today. In the first place, whatever the economic advantages of such a vast agglomeration may be—or may seem to be—to the industrial and commercial men who flock to it from all quarters, the social evils of such an excessive degree of urbanization are obvious. There are millions of men, women and children living in London who for the greater part of their lives are entirely cut off from any contact with the countryside. In the second

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place, it is now clear that the overgrowth of London has taken place in some degree at the expense of the distressed areas. If we wish to rehabilitate those derelict homes of misery, one obvious step to take would be to impose restraints on further industrial development in the London area. This problem of restricting London is essentially a question of the location of industry, which we have not even started to deal with on a national scale. The Government has decided to appoint a Royal Commission to enquire into the matter; so it may be hoped that eventually something will at last be done to relieve the congestion at the centre and anaemia at the extremities from which we are at present suffering.

The third factor which has transformed the situation is the sudden realization of the extraordinary vulnerability of London in case of war.¹ We do not know for certain the effectiveness of modern methods of attack from the air, although everything we do know is of a profoundly disturbing character. But clearly Great Britain is running enormous risks in having so great a proportion of her wealth, manufacturing resources and population concentrated in one centre situated within a few minutes' flying distance of the coast.

One of the least creditable aspects of human nature is the fact that people are often unwilling to accept desirable reforms unless they are thoroughly frightened. Many social services and permanent improvements have been instituted in this and other countries only as a result of flood, famine, disease, war, pestilence, fire and economic distress. One may hope that this new and terrible threat to London may at last stir Parliament, the Cabinet, and Londoners themselves, to deal with the urgent needs of the metropolis.

¹ See Sir William Beveridge's articles on "The Home Front" in *The Times*, February 2nd, 21st and 23rd, 1942.

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IV

The limitation on the further growth of London, and the relief of its congested industrialism, can be achieved only by national control over the location of industry. But while this will deal with the first of the three problems confronting London, it will not touch the other two.

The planning and the government of the metropolitan region are essentially inter-related. We shall not be able to plan the region unless it is envisaged as a whole; and it is unlikely to be envisaged as a whole unless organs of administration are set up for the entire region, at any rate for certain services. Just as the London County Council has produced a certain civic consciousness concerning the administrative county, so a Greater London Council would produce a consciousness concerning the unity and problems of the region. There is at present no body of any kind which is considering the planning of the London region. The Greater London Regional Planning Committee, which was an advisory body representing all the various local authorities, was dissolved last year, after having accomplished nothing.

A Greater London Council could not, of course, administer all municipal services within its area. Smaller local authorities would have to co-exist, although those which now exist would have to be drastically reformed. The reform of the existing structure is a subject bristling with difficulties, mainly political and psychological, due to the narrow outlook and stubborn resistance to change displayed by the vested municipal interests concerned. It would occupy too much space to discuss here in detail the best method of reforming the local government structure of the region. Moreover, I do not wish to confuse the main issue, which is whether we are going to give London the municipal government it requires or leave it to struggle along with the absurd jumble of obsolete bodies which now litters the

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ground. To administer a giant city with the present arrangements is like attempting to run the *Queen Mary* with the Victorian marine engines exhibited at the Science Museum in South Kensington.

V

The obsolete areas and inadequate authorities in the metropolis have operated powerfully in a negative sense in the physical development of the city. No one possessing normal eyesight and any power of discrimination could claim that London is a fine or noble city so far as its physical aspect is concerned. It contains a few excellent thoroughfares such as Whitehall, Exhibition Road, and the Embankment (North side only!), a number of beautiful squares that have come down to us from the eighteenth century, and an unrivalled series of parks. But most of the huge sprawling capital consists of an endless series of narrow streets, monotonous rows of houses exactly like one another, and mean blocks of warehouses—not to mention the hideous slum quarters.¹

It is obvious that we could make London an incomparably finer city than it now is. One has only to visit Stockholm or Moscow, Chicago or Paris, to realise the possibilities of planning a great metropolitan city. The trouble is that we have allowed the haphazard development of London to proceed on *laissez faire* lines for so long a time that the task of introducing coherence, order and beauty is infinitely more difficult than it would have been if we had started even ten or twenty years ago. Huge tracts of the central

¹ We have recently been given an account of the capital city which deals with London in the way that Miss Katherine Mayo dealt with India in *Mother India*: that is, we are told all the unpleasant facts and none of the favourable ones. Mr. Sinclair's book *Metropolitan Man* (Allen & Unwin, 10s. 6d.) may be accurate in the narrow sense but it lacks the broader aspects of truth. The lines may be significant but the drawing lacks perspective. Few people who live in London are likely to agree with the book: but it may serve a useful purpose in reminding people of the special difficulties and defects which exist in the metropolis.

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area, such as Shoreditch and the south side of the river, require to be reconstructed from the ground upwards; great new highways need to be driven through built-up areas; the slum clearance idea ought to be applied to factories, workshops and warehouses; and satellite towns established at distances up to 20 miles from Charing Cross.

Creative work of this order of magnitude is beyond the resources of the London County Council and probably beyond those even of a Greater London Authority. The assistance of the central government would certainly be required. But since this is a national problem it could properly be given.

In this connection one may refer to Mr. Keynes recent plea¹ for a considered policy of large capital expenditure on public improvements to be prepared in advance of an economic recession as a method of avoiding another slump. It would be difficult to find a more socially profitable object for large-scale expenditure than the planned reconstruction of London.

The drive for such a beneficial programme must come in the first instance from the London County Council. The recent election is a hopeful indication that the citizens of London are more intelligent than they are commonly assumed to be; that they are potentially interested in the good government of their city; and that they are not to be distracted and misled by nonsensical fables about red ruin and communism. The conservative press and the Municipal Reformers have failed to make their flesh creep. Can Mr. Morrison make their spirits rise? Can he make their spirits rise to the vision of a noble and inspiring city, not less splendid than that of which Wren dreamed when the Great Fire had made the realization of such a dream possible? One hopes that he will at any rate make the attempt.

¹ *The Times*, January 12, 13 & 14 1937.

THE FAMILY IN SOVIET RUSSIA

By N. V. KRILENKO

[This article by the Commissar for Justice R.S.F.S.R. appeared in the Soviet journal *Bolshevik*, in September, 1936.—Editors, POLITICAL QUARTERLY.]

OUR Socialist fatherland is about to ratify the great Stalin Constitution in which are embodied the greatest achievements of Socialism in every sphere of life: political, economic, cultural and social.

The law which came into force on June 28, 1936, prohibiting abortion and increasing the financial assistance given to women in childbirth, has aroused the widest discussion amongst all those concerned with the problems of our Soviet social life and with the principles of social rights and morality on which it is based.

Although we have in the socialist epoch achieved such notable victories as the establishment of complete judicial equality of the sexes, the protection by law of the rights of mothers and wives, and have put an end to the breaking up of marriages in a manner which is a disgrace to human beings, we are still far from having freed women economically from the cares of hearth and home, and it was these domestic cares which Lenin regarded as the chief obstacle to the complete emancipation of women. We have not yet completely overcome the traditional alien conceptions which are appropriate to capitalist relationships, and to the petty bourgeois outlook on marriage and the family. All this has to some extent crippled our social life.

A whole series of problems were raised during the discussion on the law prohibiting abortions, increasing the financial assistance given to women in childbirth and providing for State aid to large families, problems concerning the

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family, the duty of husbands, sex relationships, and the principles which should be laid down as the basis for such reciprocal relationships. A series of juridical problems also arose, i.e., the forms of marriage and the rules which should govern the contracting of marriages and their dissolution, registered marriages and common law marriages, legal punishment for abuse of the Soviet marriage laws in order to deceive, etc. In the course of the discussions, questions were raised as to the number of divorces permissible and concerning the advisability of penalising people who seek divorce for the third time and so on.

We do not by any means pretend to have solved all these problems; we only want to mention some of the main principles derived from the Marxist and Leninist classics and from the circumstances of the present epoch. We shall pose the following questions in order to find out the correct answers according to the fundamental tenets of Marxist and Leninist theory.

(1) What is a family, what was it in the past and what ought it to be in the present era of Socialism?

(2) What principles of social morality should regulate the behaviour of the toilers in their family life, with regard to marriage and personal life, in the present epoch?

(3) What are the main principles of socialist law which should regulate marriage and family relations in our epoch?

* * * *

What was the function of the family in class society beginning with ancient times and ending with capitalism? An exhaustive answer was given to this question by Engels in his famous work, "The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State." As Engels remarks, the monogamous family, from its first historical origins in society based on private ownership of the means of production, was founded not on any ideals concerning sex relationships

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(not on religious or any other ethical considerations) but on the economic necessity of providing for the care of the individual household and of children and of ensuring the legitimacy of children as inheritors of property.

Engels wrote :—

“ Among all historically active, i.e., ruling, classes, matrimony remained what it had been since the days of the pairing family—a conventional matter arranged by the parents. And the first historical form of sex love as a passion, as an attribute of every human being (at least among the ruling classes), the specific character of the highest form of the sexual impulse, this first form, the love of the Knights in the Middle Ages, was by no means matrimonial love, but quite the contrary.”¹

This essence of the family and marriage which already existed in ancient society, comes down to us through the ages and survives up to modern times. The essence of marriage as a juridical and economic contract was especially clearly revealed in the capitalist era. In spite of the differences between the Protestant and Catholic forms of marriage and the differences concerning divorce, in spite of the differences in the rights of the contracting parties according to the laws of the Protestant and Catholic Churches, there was no essential difference in the married state and in its reverse side—the prevalence of polygamy for men and prostitution for women.

Engels writes :

“ Marriages of convention often result in the most pronounced prostitution—sometimes of both parties, more commonly of the women. She is distinguished from the courtesan only in that she does not offer her body for money by the hour like a commodity, but sells it into slavery once and for all.”²

¹ *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. English translation published by Charles H. Kerr & Co. Chicago, 1902

² *ibid*, p. 86.

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The result is that in the old bourgeois family we get Hetaerism for the husband and adultery on the part of the wife. This old type of family with its bourgeois rights and morality was inherited by the proletariat when it came to power. It is, therefore, natural that the proletariat should immediately have raised the question : “ How to create its own proletarian family, its own matrimonial laws and social morality.”

The germ of a new family, new conceptions of right and a new morality were already in existence in capitalist society. Engels wrote :

“ Since the great industries have removed women from the home to the labour market and to the factory, the last remnant of man rule in the proletarian home has lost its ground.....”¹

Marx, Engels, and Lenin all stress the revolutionary social effects of large scale industry and the change it wrought in bourgeois and petty bourgeois family relationships. Marx wrote :

“ Modern industry, by assigning as it does an important part in the process of production outside the domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economical foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes.”²

The conditions of capitalist society and of the capitalist method of production converted woman into an object of exploitation with the same right to rightlessness as man, and equally with man freed her of all ownership of property. The basis of marriage amongst the toilers became sexual love in place of material calculation. Both parties being property-

¹ *ibid*., p. 87.

² *Capital*, Vol. I, chap. XV, section 9, p. 496. Edition Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1908.

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less it was no longer necessary to preserve the juridical fiction of man's monogamy for the purpose of ensuring the transmission of property to his heirs. Engels, describing the newly created conditions of proletarian social life writes :

"The woman has practically regained the right of separation, and if a couple cannot agree, they prefer to separate."¹

This preparation of a new basis for the family did not come all at once nor did it come painlessly. For decades the proletariat suffered whilst the old moral precepts of capitalism decayed.

The most impressive picture of those sufferings and of that decay was given by Marx in the First Volume of "Capital," and by Engels in his famous work, "The Condition of the Working Class in England."

* * * *

On what principles then has the proletariat founded its new system of rights and its new ethical concepts? Engels wrote :

"Sexual love in man's relation to woman becomes and can become the rule among the oppressed classes alone, among the proletarians of our day—no matter whether this relation is officially sanctioned or not."²

And further on :

"Here a new element becomes active, an element which at best existed only in the germ at the time when monogamy developed: individual sex love."³ Capitalist social relationships prevented this love instinct from becoming the only stimulus to marriage. It was only by the destruction of capitalist relationships that a new moral standard for judging sexual intercourse could be introduced

¹ *ibid.* p. 87.

² *ibid.* p. 86.

³ *ibid.* p. 92.

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according to which we ask not "Was it legal or illegal?" but "Was it caused by mutual love or not?"

But in order that this new standard should become the only stimulus to the contraction of a marriage the proletariat had not only got to destroy the capitalist order of society but also to accomplish the following great tasks :

(a) To cast off all the old judicial and moral shackles which are derived from the old concept of the family.

(b) To create a new material basis of existence which shall free the human race completely from the oppression of the old economic conditions, from the necessity of personal material calculations (being afraid of the consequences of marriage on account of being too poor to provide for children, being afraid of economic inequality and of the dependence of either husband on wife or of wife on husband).

(c) To create new Socialist relationships for the toilers on this basis.

These were the historic tasks to be solved in the sphere of the family and marriage by the proletariat and its vanguard the Communist Party, in the transition period from Capitalism to Communist Society.

What have we accomplished up to now?

Lenin wrote :

"No democratic party in the world has done it, none of the most advanced bourgeois republics; they could not achieve in the course of decades even a hundredth part of what we did during the first year after coming to power. We did not leave in existence any remnants of the terrible laws concerning the inferior status of woman, or the hindrances to divorce, nor the hideous formalities connected with it, or the non-recognition of children born out of wedlock, or the search for their fathers. All these laws are still in force in many civilised countries—a standing shame to the

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middle classes and to capitalist society. We have the right to glory in our achievements in this sphere."

"The Soviet Republic was the first and only one to destroy all the old, hideous bourgeois laws which put woman on an unequal footing with men and gave special privileges to men, e.g., in marriage rights and with regard to children. The Soviet Republic was the first and only one in the world to do this—as a republic of workers it destroys everything connected with private property, all the privileges which the man enjoyed even in the most democratic bourgeois republics."

This, however, was only half of our task and it was much more difficult to perform our second task: to create the material basis for the development of the new family. Lenin wrote:

"The more thoroughly we swept the ground clear of all the old rubbish of bourgeois laws and institutions the more obvious it became that this only meant making room for the building, not the actual construction of the building..... Woman still remains the slave of the house in spite of all the laws emancipating her, because she is still suppressed, stifled and deadened by the household tasks which confine her to the kitchen and the nursery. Her energies are wasted on absolutely unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, stupifying tasks. The real emancipation of woman, real communism, will only begin where and when the mass struggle against this petty household economy is begun by the proletariat led by the government of the proletarian state. In other words, the general reconstruction of household economy into a large scale socialist economy is a vital necessity."

Lenin poses the question most radically and profoundly:

"The position of woman whilst performing household tasks is still one of inferiority. In order to achieve

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the complete emancipation of woman and her full equality of rights there must be a collective household and the woman must perform her share of productive labour. Women would then occupy the same position as men; we don't want woman to be suppressed on account of her position in the household being different from that of a man."

How can the emancipation of women be made a reality?

"The substitution of social ownership of the means of production for private ownership is only the first step; it opens a way towards the complete emancipation of woman from domestic slavery through the transition from the small individual household to the large scale collective household."

The proletarian republic also began this work. Lenin wrote:

"We are creating exemplary institutions, such as communal dining rooms and creches, which will set women free from their household tasks. And it is for women themselves to do the work of organising these institutions."

Lenin also clearly formulated the third problem: The inculcation of the new socialist concepts of human relationships and the new socialist ethics. Here there are not only material obstacles to hinder us, but even more serious obstacles in the shape of the customs and outlook of the past. Lenin wrote:

"This transition is a very difficult one, because here we are dealing with the remodelling of an old-established, customary, narrow, petrified outlook and a past social order—not really order but disorder. But this transition is already begun, the impetus has been given. We have started on our new path."

The inculcation of the new concepts of human relationships and the spread of new customs which follow from the

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legal and economic emancipation of women, can only be successful if we really create the conditions for the new socialist relationships which already existed in embryo amongst the oppressed classes in the capitalist era.

* * * *

What then have we actually done to solve the second and third problems?

According to Comrade Stalin's proposals, the law prohibiting abortions, increasing the assistance given to women in childbirth and giving State aid to large families, also includes provisions for the enlargement of the network of creches and kindergartens.

The law concerning the 7 years compulsory education for children and concerning the right of every Soviet citizen to free elementary, intermediate and high school education is embodied in the Stalin Constitution. This all shows that our country progresses along the line of emancipating women economically and of inculcating a new socialist ethic and morality.

The collectivisation of the villages contributed greatly to the emancipation of the peasant woman. This collective farm gave her real economic independence and an opportunity to display real labour heroism. The importance of the collective farms in the emancipation of the women peasants was clearly explained by Comrade Stalin in his speech at the reception given on November 10, 1935, to the Women Shock Workers of the beet fields:

"What we have witnessed here today is a slice of new life which we call the social life of the collective farm. We have listened to speeches by women who are heroines of labour because only heroines could have achieved the successes they have achieved. We never knew women like this in the past. They are absolutely new people. Only free labour, only the collective farms

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could have produced heroines of this kind in the villages."

Comrade Stalin pointed out how collectivisation has made a revolutionary change in the life of women:

"Only life in a collective farm could have made labour an honourable thing and created real heroines of the countryside. Only life in the collective farms could abolish sex inequality and give women their independence. You know it yourselves. The collective farm has introduced the working day. What is a working day? Men and women are equal in calculating the number of working days; whoever has done the largest number of working days earns the most money. Hence neither the father nor the husband can claim to be the breadwinner. The woman who works herself and does her number of working days is her own master. The institution of the system of working days on the collective farms has freed the peasant woman and made her independent. If she is single she no longer works for her father, if married she no longer works for her husband; she works for herself. This is what is meant by the emancipation of the peasant woman. This is what the collective farm has done to make working women the equals of working men. It is only because of this that such marvellous women could exist."

The 14th article of the regulations for collective farms made by Stalin provides two months' holiday for pregnant women and nursing mothers, during which they get paid half the amount earned in the working day. Thus the principle of protection for women and mothers which was established in the Labour Code for working-class women is now also applied to the collective farms. Judicial sex equality, which was proclaimed after the great Socialist October Revolution, is still being systematically increased by concrete

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measures which secure to Soviet women in town and village the possibility of complete equality with man in every sphere of political and economic activity. In order to establish the new social relationships between the sexes, the Party and the Government continue systematically to enhance the dignity of woman as a citizen of the U.S.S.R., and as mother and wife, to a degree never attained in capitalist society. But this is not to say that all problems in this sphere have already been solved. The economic dependence of women on the individual domestic household, and the individual household itself, are far from having been completely liquidated. In spite of the tremendous increase in the economic strength of the U.S.S.R., we have not yet established the conditions for the complete abolition of this economic dependence.

In the era of socialism the separate individual household preserves its importance not only as a form of love relationships and social existence, but also as an economic necessity; as one of the pre-requisites for the bringing up of children. The problem of preserving and strengthening the family is a most important one in the era of classless society. This principle must become the basis of socialistic juridical rights. In our time the family preserves its importance for other reasons too. The economic necessity for the family as the social-economic cell, although only of a transitory nature, must endure so long as the small domestic household exists, and till the State is able to take over the duty of bringing up and maintaining the children. The problem of human reproduction, of giving birth to and of bringing up children will always remain a problem in every society including the socialist and the communist one.

For this purpose the family will have to be preserved. How would the problem be solved if the economic considerations of the family, which we spoke above, which demand the preservation of the family, should disappear? What is the future of the family?

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This question is solved according to the basic ethical principles which we consider essential for socialist society, and which in their turn are determined by the productive relationships.

In socialist society man and woman work in the same way on the collectivised means of production in one unitary system of socialistic economy. Hence comes the basic ethical demand to build up social relations between man and woman which shall exclude all forms of inequality, either legal or moral, and abolish all that which leads to the humiliation of one sex by the other. Such human relationships must be established as exclude the possibility of inequality, humiliation or exploitation. As far as personal relations are concerned, lying and deceit, which are derogatory to human dignity, must be done away with. When the material bonds which forcibly bind men and women together in capitalist society—bonds which convert their subjective inclination into an objective duty—shall have gradually fallen into decay, the natural attraction of one individual to another, which is the basis of love and which develops into a serious, not a transitory union, will be able to develop to the full.

This is how the problem is solved by Marx and Engels. Engels writes:

“Our sexual love is essentially different from the simple sexual craving, the Eros of the ancients. In the first place it presupposes mutual love. In this respect woman is the equal of man, whilst in the antique Eros her permission is by no means always asked. In the second place our sex love has such a degree of intensity and duration that in the eyes of both parties lack of possession and separation appear as a great, if not the greatest, calamity.”

* * * *

“Remove the economic considerations that now force women to submit to the customary disloyalty of

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men—the continuous fear for her own existence and for the future of her children—and you will place women on an equal footing with men. All present experience shows that this will tend much more strongly to make men monogamous than to make women polyandrous.”

The free, legally and economically independent woman, taught by past experience, will never show an inclination to adopt the light male approach to love. Engels assures us of this. The motive for such light love amongst women will gradually die out as also the conception of woman as merely an object for the satisfaction of sexual appetite.

All the old conceptions are irreconcilable with our fundamental demand for personal dignity in woman and cannot therefore be accepted as the future ethical foundation for our laws. Marx and Engels protested further in their polemic against Hugo in the “Philosophical Manifesto of the historical school of dogma.” Against Hugo’s assertion that man has a natural tendency towards promiscuous sexual intercourse they place “Moral beauty and the spiritual essence of marriage.” Hugo considered woman as an object for the satisfaction of one of the most powerful urges in nature. According to Marx and Engels “only the moral beauty and spiritual essence of marriage can convert the urge of nature into a spiritual union.”

Lenin’s views on “light” sexual intercourse are mentioned in the Memoirs of Clara Zetkin. Lenin strongly condemned those who consider sexual intercourse on a par with “drinking a glass of water.” Lenin did not by any means consider promiscuous sexual intercourse as desirable for the society of the future but, on the contrary, viewed it as a typical survival from the old society. Clara Zetkin writes that Lenin used to regard the disorderly sexual life of young men (and sometimes old men too) as nothing but a variety of the good old bourgeois brothel. He thought that it had nothing in common with free love as the Communist understands this term. The well-known theory that in communist society one can

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satisfy one’s sexual appetites as easily as slaking one’s thirst was designated by Lenin as not only anti-Marxist but also completely anti-social. Sexual life, said Lenin, is an expression not only of what nature has implanted in us but also of what culture has taught us, whether it be culture of a high or a low order. Communism should bring with it not asceticism but joy of living and happiness which spring amongst other things from a full love life. An excess of sexual indulgence does not increase our joy of living and our happiness but diminishes them. Further on Lenin introduces a series of political considerations which demand a regulated sexual life and which exclude the belief that sexual liberty and sexual licence are the same thing. In the case of a certain intelligent young man who had many love affairs and transferred his affections from one woman to another, Lenin said: I am afraid he will never accomplish anything, as this kind of thing makes a man useless in our political struggles and for the Revolution. “Revolution requires personal concentration from the masses and from individuals.” (Lenin’s words quoted by Clara Zetkin.) The orgies of the decadent heroes and heroines of d’Annunzio are intolerable in revolutionaries.

Sexual licence is for the bourgeoisie, it is a sign of decadence. Self-control, self-discipline, is not slavery and is, moreover, essential to love. Lenin’s precepts are of special importance in creating the third condition for Socialist social relationships, and for uprooting the old alien ones which are opposed to the new conceptions of sexual intercourse and of the family. Hence we come to the following obvious conclusion: the need to strengthen family ties in the Socialist era since the family is the normal means of human reproduction and is necessary for the bringing up of the new kind of man. Experience has already justified the strengthening of the family tie brought about by Socialist laws and by the force of Socialist morality. Experience has shown that, although the family still preserves its economic importance, our social progress, which is based on the increase in the material wel-

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fare of the people and on the gradual elimination of the material motive in personal relations, is not proceeding according to the principles of "free" love, i.e., licence, in sexual intercourse, with the State being made responsible for the children, but is transforming the family into an economic and social unit which men and women have created in order to live together and educate their children with the help of the State.

The desire for children was always, and will continue to be, a powerful motive determining the behaviour of women. Love of children was always, and will continue to be, a powerful motive which makes a man join forces with a woman in order to bring up children fit to be workers in Socialist society.

In a developed Communist society these stimuli should have much greater force. It is the old state, not the new, which has a disintegrating effect on the family. This is why our Soviet laws have to wage war on the old ways of life, uprooting all the perversions which adversely affect family life. There are still plenty of such perversions.

We shall give below several examples showing the influence of the old social order on Soviet family relationships, and the revolutionary effect of Soviet law as it protects the family and teaches those who still follow the old customs.

Here is the case of Citizen and Citizeness Gentschke who dismissed their servant Lebedeva and ordered her to leave their flat. Lebedeva had worked for Gentschke as a servant from 1927 to 1929. In 1929 Lebedeva ceased to be a servant and became a housewife—in other words she ceased to receive payment for her work, for Citizen Gentschke started to have sexual intercourse with her. In the year 1935 the Gentschkes terminated the labour contract with Lebedeva and told her to clear out. Lebedeva appealed to the court and said she was not a servant but in fact the wife of Gentschke. In her passport, which had been obtained for her by Gentschke, she was shown as his dependent, and this is why she had a right to live in his flat. Lebedeva, an illiterate young

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woman, proved that she had been violated by Gentschke and had lived with him from 1929 to 1935. The higher court to which the case was eventually transferred recognised Lebedeva as being Gentschke's dependent and refused to allow him to turn her out of his flat. The court did not recognise her as Gentschke's wife because Soviet law only recognises a marriage if a common life together has been declared, differing only from a registered marriage by the fact that no registration has been made. If the Court had recognised Lebedeva as a legal wife it would have meant recognising a double marriage which is not permissible in our law. Gentschke's behaviour from the point of view of civil rights deserved criminal punishment for deceit and exploitation.

Let us recall the famous case of George Dimitrievitch Suropa which was reported in the newspapers. This qualified engineer, who had just married for the third time, accused his second wife of not having returned to him the things which he had left behind in their flat. The list of his possessions, which covered about 6 pages, included 4 chairs of Karelian birch, a night table pedestal, a basin for washing the hair, 3 small cushions, 4 old pillow slips, etc., etc. In addition, Citizen Suropa asked his own daughter, a student Consomol, to leave the flat; since she was the daughter of his first wife but lived with the second one he wanted her to make room for the third wife. Koltzov writing about this shameful case said: "Around us are human beings, citizens, comrades, everybody sees it and feels ashamed of it."

This is the old way of life which we have to struggle against. Here is the rottenness of the old world which still continues to poison our Soviet atmosphere.

Another instance. The case of the former servant Rakitnikova who claimed from Dr. Levenson a third part of the flat which he had built. Rakitnikova entered the house of Levenson as a servant in the year 1929 and was his wife until 1932, having two children by him. Rakitnikova is illiterate; she came from the country and was persuaded to

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live with Levinson by his promise to provide for her in his will. Now she was to be turned into the street with her little baby. Of course, in this case also the Court decided in favour of the woman and allocated a part of the flat to her.

Many other cases could be cited which illustrate the attempt to exploit woman in contravention of the Soviet law.

There is the case of Citizeness Sokolova who claimed the right to inherit a property left on the death of Professor Skrilnikoff. There was plenty of evidence to show that Professor Skrilnikoff was never legally divorced from Citizeness Sokolskaya, nor divorced in fact, since he ate and slept at Sokolskaya's place and stayed at a health resort with her as his wife. At the same time he had sexual intercourse with Sokolova. Sokolova knew perfectly well that he was married to Sokolskaya, but nevertheless, she claimed a part of his property at his death as being his wife and legatee. The Court rejected her plea. Soviet law does not allow bigamy, but Sokolova had had the right to demand that Skrilnikoff should divorce Sokolskaya. The Court also on its own initiative decided to protect the rights of Skrilnikoff's daughter born of his first marriage, although this daughter had not put in any claim. The Soviet Court was here defending normal Soviet marriage from bigamy. Bigamous marriages are uncalled for in Soviet life and such marriages, even if registered, cannot be defended in the Courts.

Let us cite another example. The case of Citizen Rashtanov who was first a student at the Lomonosovsky Institute and later an engineer. In 1929 he registered his marriage with Citizeness Vasileva with whom he was living. A daughter named Geta was born of the marriage. Rashtanov at first refused to admit his paternity, then later he admitted it but refused to pay alimony. At the end of December, 1929, although not divorced from Vasileva, he married Kudryashova and later had a son by her. All this time Geta was living with her grandmother. Then Rashtanov agreed to take Geta to live with him in order, as he said to avoid a scandal.

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But later he went away to the Far East and refused to support Geta any longer. This is how he treated his own daughter. The mother was not much better than the father. When Geta in 1934 was brought to her mother at Kaluga, the latter wanted to get rid of her although her financial position was not at all bad and she had quite decent living accommodation. She told her servant Ustinova to take Geta back to Moscow and leave her with Rashtanov. The latter, declaring that he did not remember his daughter and did not know Ustinova, sent Geta back. Then Vasileva again sent Ustinova to Moscow telling her to leave Geta on the streets. She put Rashtanov's address in the child's glove. Ustinova did as she was told. A dvornik¹ found the five-year old girl in the street and brought her to the police. There they found Rashtanov's address in the child's glove. Rashtanov refused to take his daughter back, but being afraid of a "scandal" he sent the child to a Children's Home. The Court sentenced Rashtanov, Vasileva and Ustinova to a term of imprisonment.

Then there was the case of Kaunov who was sentenced to be shot because in his anxiety to get rid of his children he went so far as to decide to murder one of them.

The Soviet Government tries hard to eliminate all this rottenness which shows the influence of the old social customs on our family life.

To illustrate the influence of old traditions, even amongst working class people, we will cite the case of Alexander Maloletkin, a worker in a machine tool factory in Moscow. The ideas of the past were firmly implanted in his mind. He looked on woman as a chattel. He showed an unbounded cynicism in his sexual intercourse. Maloletkin met a woman working in the same factory. He swore that he loved her and promised to marry her. Two days later he told her that he did not intend to marry her and did not want to see her again. He did the same thing to another woman in the same factory, and to another woman in a different factory. He had sexual

¹ A caretaker or concierge who looks after a block of flats.

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intercourse with all these women and then mocked them and abandoned them. These women took the matter to court because they knew that the Soviet law protects women in such cases. Unfortunately the judge then officiating had the same conceptions as Maloletkin. Maloletkin explained that he could not have married any of these women because in the first place they were "light" women, and in the second place he had no room of his own. In the third place he said he was married already and had a wife in the village. All these excuses were due to the strong influence on his mind of capitalistic conceptions of woman and the family.

In the sentence of the Court it was written :

"O. knew perfectly well that Maloletkin had no room and could not get married. Therefore, if he made a promise of marriage, the woman should have understood that a man may promise a lot of things at a moment of sexual excitement and should not have taken the promise seriously."

This Court decision, which is impregnated with conceptions and a morality alien to us, was quashed in the Higher Court and the judge was dismissed.

What do all these cases prove ?

These cases prove that a terrific struggle to establish the Socialist family as a normal form of relationship between the sexes in Socialist society, is still proceeding. This family should be a union of two workers of the classless society ; they should help one another to bear children and to bring them up.

Engels wrote :

"That will be decided after a new generation has come to maturity : a race of men who never in their lives have had any occasion for buying with money of other economic means of power the surrender of a woman ; a race of women who have never had any occasion for surrendering to any man for any other

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reason but love, or for refusing to surrender to their lovers for fear of economic consequences. Once such people are in the world, they will not give a moment's thought to what we today believe should be their course. They will follow their own practices and fashion their own public opinion about the individual practice of every person—only this and nothing more."

How should we construct our legislation dealing with the family, what legal principles should we establish for the purpose of influencing human relationships in socialist society ? What are the legal principles which can liberate humanity not only from the old economic shackles but also from the moral—or, more truly, immoral—survivals of the capitalist past ?

Three main groups of such principles follow from what we said above.

First, there are the principles which define and safeguard the equality of the sexes—economic as well as legal equality ; principles which must form the basis of normal relations between men and women during the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The object of this first set of principles is to complete the work which we have already almost carried out, the work of destruction concerning which Lenin wrote. The work of destroying not only the abominable old written laws but also the whole bourgeois outlook on marriage and the family. The force of bourgeois conceptions of marriage and the family is not yet spent and hinders woman from becoming economically completely independent.

Relapses into bourgeois ways of thinking on this subject were apparent in the discussion on the law concerning the prevention of abortion, additional assistance to mothers in childbirth and state aid to large families. Such relapses assumed the form of a demand for the struggle against the light view of sexual intercourse to take the form of preventive laws : making it more difficult to obtain divorce and fixing

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criminal penalties for exceeding a certain permissible number of divorces, re-introduction of disqualifications for children born out of wedlock, non-recognition of common law marriages, etc., etc. There is no need to prove the reactionary character of all these proposals. It is enough to quote Lenin:

"It is impossible to be a democrat and a Socialist without demanding the full right to divorce because the absence of this freedom is a super-suppression of the oppressed sex; although it is clear that the recognition of the right of women to leave their husbands is not an invitation for them to do so."

The logical continuation of the line laid down in our legislation in this sphere should be our aim for so long as there is need of laws and of the State.

The second set of principles is derived from our recognition of the economic importance of the family as a social-economic unit in the era of Socialism.

The protection and strengthening of the family must be the aim of the State so long as the latter cannot assume the complete charge of children and give them full maintenance. Accordingly, Soviet law must do everything possible to ensure the performance by both parents of their duties with regard to the maintenance and education of their children.

The law for the prevention of abortions, increased assistance to women in childbirth and State aid to large families, is a great step forward in this direction since it fixes a compulsory scale of alimony and increases the penalty for its non-payment (up to two years imprisonment for wilful non-payment of alimony).

The application of the principles which we ought to adopt for the protection and strengthening of the family does not, however, end here. It also covers the regulations which should protect the legally registered family and enable parents to defend their rights before the Courts more easily when their marriage is registered than when it is unregistered.

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Whilst all attempts to return to the principles of bourgeois legislation and to the recognition only of registered marriages, should be strenuously opposed, legislation in the socialist era should, as far as possible, encourage the registration of marriages as giving a legal status to both parties; by giving them a number of advantages in the protection of their personal and property rights. This is the second set of principles of which we are in need.

The third set of principles is of quite a different kind. There are legal principles whose function it is to combat those actions which lead to the disintegration of the family. In this connection, however, the force of moral condemnation of an irresponsible attitude towards children and the family will be more efficacious than any law. Legal compulsion will only have to be applied in such cases where the freedom of sexual relations and the facility of obtaining a legal divorce are utilised by one party to the detriment of the other in a manner involving the humiliation of one party by the other. The new criminal code of the U.S.S.R. includes an article providing penalties for a deceitful use of the law of marriage and divorce for the purpose of seduction. It also increases the penalties for the neglect of children and for the non-payment of alimony.

Another article provides penalties for blackmail even when connected with the law of alimony.

How should we combat promiscuous sexual intercourse, which still exists, although it does not always involve any hurt to another individual and is a mere survival of the past?

Compulsory measures must of necessity be unavailing in such cases. The way in which we shall eliminate such survivals is by raising the general cultural level, and enhancing our respect for the social code which is mentioned in Article 130 of the Stalin Constitution.¹ It is education and our new

¹ Article 130 states: It is the duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. to observe the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., to fulfil the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist human intercourse. —Editors, "Political Quarterly."

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socialistic morality, rather than preventive legislation, which are of importance here.

Personal relationships in Socialist society, free as they should be, must leave no room for lies and deceit. The freedom of human relationships under all conditions must exclude the dishonesty which shames and degrades human personality. "Down with lies and deceit in our social intercourse." This must be the categorical demand of the new morality of socialist and communist society.

Is it possible that we shall be able in the near future completely to overcome these survivals of the past? It will be very difficult. Nevertheless, this is the only path which Socialist morality can follow. There is no other way if human relationships are to be based on mutual respect.

This demand should be obligatory even when the parties regard each other's unfaithfulness with tolerance. It must remain the compulsory basis for normal relations between human beings, even when intimate relations with a third person are acknowledged by both parties as their free right. However, such tolerance, and the acknowledgment of such a right, already shows the existence of a relationship in which there is actually nothing to preserve and nothing to value.

Flighty Don Juans and priestesses of free love will not be encouraged in the new society. The law can help in overcoming these difficulties by acknowledging and protecting actual marriages, only when they involve open cohabitation exactly as in the case of registered marriages. Serious sexual intercourse is no longer concealed amongst us. The law prohibiting abortions, by making people adopt a more serious attitude towards "casual affairs," will also help in the struggle against them.

In the near future we shall find a more exact and definite solution of these problems.

NUTRITION AND SOCIAL POLICY

By A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS

NUTRITION has recently established itself firmly on the front page. It is the theme of innumerable articles, addresses and discourses; special numbers, as for instance of *Highway*, have been devoted to it. There is no doubt that it deserves this prominence and is a proper subject for general discussion. For it does constitute a real and serious social problem, and though the scientific questions involved are in many respects obscure and often only in the early stages of investigation, the main issues are nevertheless clear and comprehensible without expert knowledge.

It is proper to emphasise at the outset that nutrition is not merely a matter of giving a child enough of the right food; for a well nourished child is one who, not only receives an adequate diet, but also assimilates it and therefore profits from it. Many circumstances may prevent a child from assimilating food properly, such as anxiety and insufficient sleep or exercise, as well as many of the conditions commonly found in a poor home, to say nothing of pathological states and inherent weaknesses of constitution. In one inquiry into the diets of a group of badly nourished children the diet was found to be adequate in over a fifth of the cases. But it must not be assumed that, when diet is inadequate, poverty is always the reason. Income may be sufficient, but preference may be given to expenditure on objects other than food. Again knowledge of selecting food for the kitchen is at a low level in this country, and the atrocities practised upon foods in the course of preparation for the table not only fail to make meals attractive but deprive those who eat them of some of their food value. In short, malnutrition is a com-

plex problem; for it is in part bound up with getting rid of slums and with the provision of playing fields and so on, and in part related to lack of knowledge of and interest in domestic economy. One line of advance is to be sought in the education of the housewives of the future, and it is discouraging to learn from teachers in this special field that it is very difficult to interest girls in these things nowadays.

Nevertheless poverty is no doubt an important cause of malnutrition. It is, however, necessary to point out that certain investigations, purporting to show a relation between malnutrition and poverty, are not as well founded as is widely supposed to be the case. For example, of Sir John Orr's estimates Professor Bowley, whose authority in this matter cannot be doubted and who measures his words with much care, has written as follows: "They appear to have been accepted as established on scientific lines and as possessing at least reasonable precision. It has been said that 'the facts are not in dispute.' Actually they depend on rough approximations based on meagre and uncertain data, and the process of generalisation breaks logical and statistical canons."¹ One wonders what Professor Bowley would have said if he had felt called upon to examine the equally famous findings of Dr. M'Gonigle. They are widely quoted as established beyond question. Thus in a recent publication of the New Fabian Research Bureau we find the following: "Recent investigations made by Dr. M'Gonigle and others show that, where poor families have been removed from slum areas to new housing estates, but an increase in rents has resulted in less money being available for food, there has been a marked rise in the death-rate and the health of the family has deteriorated."² Incidentally, what Dr. M'Gonigle said, and what, no doubt, the author of the pamphlet means, is that "increased

¹ A. L. Bowley, *Poverty and Nutrition*. *The Nineteenth Century*, December 1936, p. 724.
² Barbara Drake, *Nutrition*. New Fabian Research Bureau, 1936, p. 8.

mortality was associated with dietary deficiencies." These findings were originally published by Dr. M'Gonigle in the *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine* in 1933, and are also to be found in his book *Poverty and Public Health* which ranks as a best-seller. But if these sources are examined, no age distribution of the persons transferred to the new housing estate will be found either before or after they moved, and no information is given about the migration of persons to and from the new housing area. Even about such a fundamental matter as the number of persons in question Dr. M'Gonigle is very vague. Obviously he has not proved that mortality increased under the changed conditions; the increase in the death-rate may have been due, and probably was due, to an alteration in age distribution caused by migration, births and deaths between the two dates. It is interesting in this connection to notice that one of the conclusions drawn from the recently published study made in Newcastle is that "rent was 21 per cent. higher in the new housing estates than in the old houses, but rent did not appear to be closely related to intake of food."¹

The fact is that some of the most recent contributors to the discussion of the relation between poverty and nutrition have not only based their findings on inadequate evidence and faulty methods, but have also abandoned the more promising procedure of the poverty surveys. This procedure was (a) to ascertain what means are sufficient for needs, and (b) to find out what proportion of households do not possess these means. The advantage of this way of going about things is that we can discover the proportion of households in which, owing directly to poverty, nutrition cannot be satisfactory. Other cases of malnutrition, not so accounted for, must be due to other causes such as unwise use of means.

¹ *A Study of the Diets of Sixty-nine Working Class Families in Newcastle-upon-Tyne*. City Health Department, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1937, p. 26.

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It should be emphasised that there is nothing in the recent scientific advances in knowledge relating to nutrition which invalidates this procedure. When attempting to ascertain what means are sufficient for needs, account is taken of the total energy and body building requirements of persons of different age and sex. Recent advances in knowledge have shown that bodily needs are not adequately met unless there is also included in the diet a sufficiency of vitamins and of mineral substances. The physiological basis for laying down the minimum requirements of these additional substances is not yet properly established, and therefore the positive statements, which are not infrequently met with, should be received with caution. Nevertheless it has clearly emerged that, if diet is to be adequate, it must contain elements which are found in the relatively expensive foods such as milk. Hence the necessity of revising needs, especially of children. But this demands only a modification of the details and not of the methods of well established poverty line investigations. If wages or prices change or if benefits or allowances for unemployed are altered, it is possible to measure the position of families under the new situation if we set the family income against the cost of foods found to be essential by the most recent investigations.

The results of these surveys are so well known, or in any case so easily ascertained, that no description of them is wanted here. But that is not all which the surveys have given us. The London Survey and others of recent date have analysed in the most exhaustive manner the reasons why those families, discovered to be below the poverty line, are in that position. We know for certain areas in the country exactly what part low wages, size of family, loss of the bread winner, short time, unemployment, and other factors, play in the causation of poverty. This means that we know what the relative importance is of the various conditions which

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produce poverty of a kind making inadequate diet inevitable. This implies in turn that we know on what lines to base a policy designed to eliminate extreme poverty. Many of those who have entered the field of discussion lately seem to have lost sight of, or perhaps they have never studied, this mass of valuable material.

While the obvious policy is to make use of these findings, and to plan to eliminate one by one the causes of poverty as shown by these inquiries, it may be said that we cannot afford to wait while the battle against poverty is slowly brought to a successful conclusion. The social conscience is more sensitive than it used to be, and the needs, especially of young children, are greater than we realised; also, quite apart from our feelings, it might save money in the long run if, by preventing malnutrition among the young, we reduced the cost of ill-health later in life. This is a powerful line of argument. The latest official figures show that an assessment of the nutrition of children in England and Wales in 1935 gives the following results. Out of 1,687,331 children examined in the course of routine inspections in schools the nutrition of 178,615, or 10.6 per cent., was "slightly subnormal," and of 12,683, or 0.7 per cent., was "bad." When figures for large areas or big cities are studied, it is found that they correspond on the whole with the prevalence of unemployment and therefore of poverty. The percentages of children examined who show "slightly subnormal" and "bad" nutrition are 5.67 and 0.08 in London, 8.63 and 1.24 in Birmingham, 10.1 and 1.4 in Liverpool, 6.53 and 0.18 in Manchester, and 19.80 and 2.7 in the county of Durham.¹ These figures call for some comment. The classification employed makes no use of objective standards since there are none available for the purpose. Therefore it is based on the judgment of the medical officers concerned. Consequently

¹ *The Health of the School Child*, 1936, pp. 13 and 18.

anomalies appear, and there are cases where in two contiguous districts, both subject to similar economic conditions, the percentages are notably different. This can only be due to the different views of the officers as to where the line between the classes should be drawn. The general result, however, is probably to be accepted as a fair picture of the position. Sir Frederick Menzies makes the point that, since the Board now requires evidence of some malnutrition as a qualification for free meals (a matter referred to later in this paper), the officers are likely to stretch the concept of "slightly sub-normal" rather than the reverse.¹ This is a fair point and will appeal to those who have some knowledge of the working of the system. For a medical officer will hesitate to class a borderline case as normal where he knows that by so doing the child will not be eligible for free meals.

The suggestions sometimes made that the Board attempt to minimise the gravity of the situation may be dismissed as unfounded. Their instructions to the medical officers can be studied, and it is possible in any locality to discover how they are followed. If in some places a medical officer takes a narrow view of what constitutes subnormal nutrition that is not the fault of the Board. The Board indeed are at pains to point out such mistakes. The position disclosed is serious, and in the light of the poverty line surveys it cannot be doubted that inadequate family means are an important factor. It can therefore be argued on the lines sketched above that a special policy is required which is designed to bring about immediate improvement. In a search for this policy a guiding light shines though all the darkness which enshrouds the physiological problem of nutrition. That is the value of milk for children. Therefore the policy must be to increase the consumption of milk which in 1930/34 was 23 gallons per head in Great Britain (including condensed

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

and dried milk), 36 in Denmark, 39 in the United States, and 58 in Switzerland.¹ Something is already being done with this end in view and we may next review the extent of these efforts.

Under the Public Health Act of 1936, which was a consolidating Act incorporating the provisions of the Maternity and Child Welfare Act of 1918, public authorities can grant extra nourishment to pregnant women, nursing mothers and children under five years of age in necessitous cases. By virtue of these powers in 1935 364 local authorities out of 377 supplied milk, free or at reduced price, to children under five years of age. It appears that about seven million gallons of milk in all are now supplied a year, but in some places in any case, and perhaps in many, it is dried milk which is provided. Further, this total is for nursing mothers, expectant mothers and young children, and we are not told what the share of the latter amounts to. Indeed, the published information is so scanty, and the practices of local authorities so various, that it is not possible to obtain any clear view of what is accomplished under this Act. In particular it is not known how far the provision is limited to children under one year of age; while it is possible to provide milk for children under five years of age, it seems often to be the case that it is only available for very young children, if available at all.

The next scheme is that under the Education Act, 1921, originally brought into being by the Education (Provision of Meals) Act 1906. In 1935/36 235 out of 316 local education authorities exercised their powers and provided meals free or children of necessitous parents. 485,000 children (8.5 per cent. of children attending school) received meals during the year, but as they only got 87 million meals in all, each child on an average had about 180 meals during the 52 weeks, to one meal for each day for a half year. Of the 87 million meals 64 million were of milk, and 406,000 children received

¹ *Statistics of Food Production, Consumption and Prices*. League of Nations, 1936, p. 20.

some free milk during the year. There are many anomalies and defects in this scheme. While authorities have power to continue feeding during school holidays, it seems that few exercise them. Then there is the extraordinary and deplorable fact that "the proportion of children receiving free meals in any area, such for example as the special areas, seems to bear little relation to the probable need of the area suggested by the 'index of unemployment' or by the returns of subnormal nutrition."¹ More serious is the method of selecting children for free meals. Hitherto it has varied from authority to authority, but the usual practice has been to draw up an income scale and provide meals for those below it. In December 1935 the Board of Education issued circular 1443 which stated that the Board "cannot regard the fact the parent's income falls within an Authority's scale as by itself justifying the provision of free meals. Regard needs also to be had.....to the actual condition and special circumstances of the child." This circular is open to the most serious criticism. It appears in any case to say that, although the family income is admittedly inadequate, the child must wait for milk until it exhibits evidence of the harm done by an insufficient diet. That this criticism is just seems to follow from the remark in the same circular that "the Board see no reason generally to question the reasonableness of the income scales adopted by Authorities."

Scrappy, inadequate, varying from one place to another without rhyme or reason, failing to aid where need is admittedly greatest—all this may fairly be said of these two schemes. The third scheme is more recent. Arrangements were made by the National Milk Publicity Council in 1927 to distribute milk to children in schools at 1d. per third of a pint. This service is now conducted under the Milk Act 1934. Clause II of that Act provided for contributions by the Treasury

¹ *The Health of the School Child*, 1936, p. 30.

of not more than one million pounds (increased in 1936 to 1½ millions) toward the expenses of the Milk Board incurred in efforts to increase the demand for milk. Most of the money is spent on the Milk-in-Schools scheme under which milk is available at ½d. per one third of a pint. In origin, in any case, this was an advertising scheme and not part of a campaign against malnutrition. At ½d. per one third of a pint the milk brings in a shilling per gallon. Of this the retailers get 6d. and the Board the same amount. The Board also gets from the Treasury part of the "loss" which it is assumed to suffer, calculated on the difference between 6d. and the wholesale price for liquid milk. Since very little milk sold in schools can be regarded as taking the place of milk that would have been sold at full liquid price, and since the school milk would otherwise have been sold for manufacture at less than 6d. a gallon, it may be that the Board suffers no real loss at all.

Milk at ½d. per third of a pint is available in 80 per cent. of public elementary school departments, and for some 90 per cent. of the elementary school population. Where milk is not available the reason is either that "the county medical officer does not feel able to approve the only available supply of milk,"¹ or that there are local difficulties about distribution. But, though fairly widely available, only 45.8 per cent. of the children were taking milk on March 31, 1936. In only a very few places has milk been made available during holidays under this scheme. The response to this scheme is therefore poor. If 90 per cent. of the children can get cheap milk and 46 per cent. of all children take it, then only 51 per cent. of all who have the chance in fact exercise it. The reason for the poor response is stated by the Board of Education to be mainly indifference on the part of the parents and the children. On the other hand an inquiry in London disclosed

¹ *The Health of the School Child*, 1935, p. 35.

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In 1934/35 about 67 per cent. of the milk produced was sold for liquid consumption and 33 per cent. for manufacturing. In England and Wales the average price payable to the Board for liquid consumption was $15\frac{1}{2}$ d. per gallon and for manufacture 4.81d. Let us remember that, as stated above, sale in schools at $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per third of a pint is equivalent to 1s. per gallon, of which the Board gets 6d. (and a government subsidy in addition). Without going further into a complicated position, there are evidently large possibilities of achieving the object desired without great expenditure of money. If more of the milk now sold at the low price went to the children and less to manufacture, the children would be better off, leaving the producers in the same position as now, while, if the consumers of manufactured milk products were allowed to avail themselves freely of foreign supplies, they would not suffer.

It is in any case clear that the matter should be fully explored. But there is very little hope that anything will result so long as the present position in the world of milk prevails. This fact has not received enough attention in the discussion of the nutrition problem. Milk holds a position of predominating importance among foods when nutrition is in question, and the marketing of milk is strictly controlled by statute. It is not generally recognised that the government has established a privileged organisation of producers of milk with powers to control prices. The English Board has used these powers to increase, each year since it came into existence, the price of liquid milk payable to itself. It is relevant at this point to remember that, to put it mildly, the quality of the milk supplied is far from satisfactory. It will be recollected in this connection, that, according to the Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education, the main reasons for the failure to operate the milk-in-schools scheme in certain areas is the inability of the local medical officers to approve any of the available supplies of milk. One wonders

how many of the other local medical officers would also be unable to approve the milk in their areas which comes forward through the Milk Board if it was not for the possibility of sterilising it locally. It is not unfair to say that the policy of the Board leads to a high price to itself for liquid milk of doubtful quality.

This is not the whole story. The Board can and does control retail prices in addition. For the Board is able, by inserting a clause in the wholesale contract, to fix the minimum margin, in excess of the wholesale contract price, at which milk can be sold retail. In the recent contract the Board has made provision for a reduction of retail prices with its consent in any area where the majority of distributors, selling the greater part of the milk in the area, request the Board to reduce the minimum price. "In consequence," we are told, "retail prices have been reduced in a number of towns and villages";¹ but anyone who searches for these happy places will have some difficulty in finding them, for they are few and far between.

This aspect of the position is so important that it deserves some further examination. Before the Milk Board will give its consent to a reduction in the retail price, it requires, not only that the retailers in any area who sell the major part of the milk sold in the area must agree, but also that the majority of retailers must agree. Thus it may come about that those selling nearly all the milk in an area want to reduce the price, but are not allowed to do so because the majority of the retailers, who sell between them a mere fraction, do not agree. Thus in one area retailers selling over 5,000 gallons wanted to reduce the price, but the Board would not allow it because a larger number, selling under 350 gallons, did not wish it. In a number of cases a co-operative society has taken the lead locally in an attempt to get permission to reduce the

¹ *Report of the Reorganisation Commission for Great Britain*, p. 27.

price, but has been unsuccessful because of the opposition of a number of retailers each in a very small way of business. Thus the policy of the Board prevents the efficient retailer, who would be content with a smaller margin, from reducing his price. The co-operative movement retails a very substantial proportion of the milk consumed in the country, and it is probable that many societies would be glad to reduce prices. But experience shows that there is little to be hoped from making a move in most localities.

Therefore it comes to this. A board of producers has statutory power to fix the price of milk payable to producers, and to insist upon a minimum margin between wholesale and retail prices. We have seen how it uses these powers. It might be that in the course of a century or two a board of farmer producers would come to realise that the way to prosperity lies through reduction of costs, lower prices, increase of sales and the creation of confidence among the public in the purity of the product. But it might not. Anyway we cannot afford to wait and see. The Report of the Reorganisation Commission, recently issued, recommends important changes. It proposes the establishment of a permanent Milk Commission, which among other things would fix producers' prices, and the abandonment of the fixing of retail prices and of distributive margins. They propose that efforts to lower costs of production should be encouraged by price differentials, and that a similar method should be used to improve the quality and cleanliness of milk. It is much to be hoped that these proposals will soon be adopted. Since any social policy designed to deal with the nutrition problem must be largely concerned with milk, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that progress will be seriously impeded until the present statutory position in regard to the marketing of milk is fundamentally changed.

THE FACTORIES BILL

By "LABOURER"

THE *TIMES* has issued a solemn warning (backed, there is some reason to think, by official encouragement) that if those who do not welcome the Factory Bill with unrestrained satisfaction, express their criticisms too loudly or vehemently, the Government may not proceed with the Bill at all. It is, however, to be hoped that the Government is anxious to put our factories as well as our homes in order, and will welcome criticism meant to serve that purpose.

The Bill is obviously the production of an admirably intentioned Department very little aware of how the outside world has altered in the past thirty years. It is indeed an illustration of failure to move with the times: for it is an antiquated view that to regulate the conditions of work in the factory is to regulate the conditions of industrial workers in general. Perhaps this was true at the dawn of the industrial era, when moreover the factory was an inferno and the general public had no understanding of the meaning of industrialisation—and when public opinion could only be aroused to action by an appeal to sentiment, by pictures of the pitiful plight of women and children.

The Bill falls into two main parts—that which is concerned with the fabric of the factory and the fatigues and dangers to which workers are exposed while in it, and that which is concerned with the length of time which women and children may spend at work in the factory. It is this second portion which by its nature seems antiquated.

For the Bill has no interest in the length of time for which males above the age of 18 may be kept at work. The reply would be, no doubt, that there are relatively few

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factories which can in practice be kept in operation without women and young persons. It is noteworthy, however, that the Bill provides for exceptions to its own rules in the case of youths of 16 or upwards who are employed in rolling mills and other continuous processes where men are the bulk of the workers. In any case it seems an unworthy makeshift to use petticoats and pinafores to limit the hours of work of certain adult males. Is it not, however, more credible that the employers of labour continue vehemently and successfully to oppose any statutory regulation of men's working hours (coal-miners being an exception which they can but deplore)?

In fact there is hardly a country today in which there is not some general legislation regulating hours of industrial employment. In a majority of countries there are laws establishing the 48-hour week; in some, such as France and New Zealand, the 40-hour week is established or in course of establishment as the general rule for men as well as women. Only the United States, as a result of the decisions of the Supreme Court—decisions now menaced by the Executive—and Japan are in much the same position as Great Britain.

This anomaly is perhaps the natural result of leaving it to the Home Office to prepare a Bill of this kind. No department of Government performs its difficult duties more admirably than the Factory Inspectorate, and no one would wish to see the Inspectorate administered otherwise; indeed, it is surprising that the arguments used to justify its retention under the Home Office when the Ministry of Labour was created, have not been used to secure the transfer to it of other Inspectorates (e.g. Mines) which have been less successful in winning general confidence. But the fact that its Inspectors, in spite of many difficulties, have on the whole managed to secure a smooth and general enforcement

of the Factory Acts, is no particular reason why the Home Secretary's should be the Department best qualified to lay down the general standard of hours of work. In fact, the Home Office, as its name implies, has its eyes almost perpetually turned to the interior of this country; the Bill suggests that it is oblivious of what is happening elsewhere.

The department of Government responsible for general policy on conditions of labour is the Ministry of Labour. Just as the Foreign Office is generally responsible for all British transactions with the secretariat of the League of Nations, so the Ministry of Labour handles all the work connected with the I.L.O. It is a representative of the Ministry of Labour who represents Great Britain on the Governing Body; whatever departments are concerned by the Agenda of the Conference—the Home Office, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Health, the Mines Department—one of the delegates represents the Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry supplies the secretariat of the delegation. Thus the Ministry is, nationally, the appropriate department to advise the Government upon industrial policy as it affects conditions of labour; and internationally the Ministry is equipped with knowledge of events and policies in other countries. The Home Office knows that in this country the hours of work of women and children but not of men have in the past been regulated within the factories; the Ministry of Labour knows that the general practice in other countries is to legislate for the hours of work of all workers in industry. And the Ministry knows that various as have been the reasons given for British failure to ratify even the Washington Hours Convention, it has never declared that the matter lay outside its competence; nor has it ever suggested that nothing was practicable beyond legislation, within the factory and without reference to wages, for women and children and not for men.

Apart from their discrimination between men and women,

the "employment" provisions of the Bill (as they are called) are very disappointing. At first sight they provide a 48-hour working week (or 9-hour day) for women and young persons; but as the Home Secretary puts it, "provision is also made" for overtime up to a maximum of 100 hours a year. True, there are conditions (working hours may in no case exceed 10½ a day, nor the "period of employment" 12 hours; and overtime is only permitted to be 6 hours in a week, in 30 weeks in the year); but the employer is not required to apply for permission or to justify his application. There is, in fact, a general permit to work 100 hours overtime a year. Furthermore in the case of women (though not of young persons) the Home Secretary may, in a factory subject to seasonal pressure of work, permit the overtime to be increased to 150 hours in the year. Thus for 25 weeks in the year women may be employed for 54 hours a week.

It is difficult to regard such a limitation of hours as an important improvement in the general level in this country; elsewhere, the 40-hour week is regarded as a more progressive and suitable standard for new legislation.

Equally remarkable is the absence of any provision as to the rate of remuneration of overtime. There is scarcely a country in the world possessing legislation on hours of work in which there is no statutory requirement for the remuneration of overtime at a special rate. As far back as 1919 the Hours of Work Convention adopted by the first International Labour Conference not only stipulated that 48 hours should be the normal maximum but also required payment of overtime to be at the rate of time-and-a-quarter; and that is now less than the generally accepted standard.

Why is the Home Secretary permitted to increase the hours of work of women in a factory by 50 in the year, and to attach conditions to his permit, but not to make extra payment one of the conditions? Is he unaware that spokesmen of the Ministry of Labour have repeatedly, here and in

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Geneva, declared that wages and hours of work are indissolubly connected? The Minister of Labour finds it impossible to ratify Hours of Work Conventions which do not deal with wages; the Home Secretary is unable, it seems, to deal with wages in a bill which ~~deals with~~ hours of work.

Doubtless, the same obscure reasons have prevented any provision for paid holidays—or indeed for any holidays save Bank Holidays, Christmas Day and Good Friday. Here again, the Home Office shows itself blind to the tendencies in other parts of the world and to the movement of opinion at home. And what, after all, are paid-holidays but a reduction of working hours, reckoned over the year (just like the overtime) but without reduction of earnings? Even as regards the weekly rest-day, the Bill is out of date, since it makes no provision for adult male workers. It lags sadly behind, for example, the Irish Free State Act of 1936; it brings Great Britain no nearer to ratification of the 1921 Convention.

In connection with International Labour Conventions (of the existence of which the Bill seems unaware except as regards night work of women and young persons), it may be mentioned that Night Baking is left on one side, pending further inquiry; and it is evidently assumed that the existing White Lead Paint regulations afford sufficient protection—a view which the statistics seem to support. The existing situation as regards childbirth is maintained, save that the administration of the law is wholly relegated to District Councils; here again, there is no progress towards the international standard which prohibits the employment of a mother for 6 weeks after childbirth and gives her a right to be absent for 6 weeks before childbirth¹—the British prohibition runs only for 4 weeks and only after childbirth.

¹ The Minister of Health showed in the House of Commons of February 15 that he had not studied the Convention with much care. It does not compel a woman's absence before childbirth; it gives her the right to leave work upon production of a medical certificate stating that her confinement will probably take place within 6 weeks.

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The Bill allows numerous exceptions to its own provisions—such as that mentioned above, which permits youths of 16 and upwards employed in shifts in such processes as smelting, steel and tinplate, and manufacture of paper and glass, to be employed for 56 hours in a week or 144 hours in three continuous weeks. Although the Home Secretary is empowered on occasions to act in restriction of the employer (e.g. where he considers the overtime employment of women injurious, he may prohibit it), his latitude mainly extends in the opposite direction; and he is given a remarkable power of action.

The Bill makes some innovations on the medical side—the examining surgeon may give a certificate of fitness for employment on condition that the applicant submits to a subsequent re-examination, and he may in effect prohibit the employment of a young person upon a process which he deems injurious. Here again, however, much is left to the Home Secretary: he prescribes the form of certificate. On the other hand he has power to provide medical supervision for particular factories or types of factory.

As might be expected, it is not, generally speaking, the nature of the “safety” provisions of the Bill that is open to criticism; here the expert knowledge of the Inspectorate is of undoubted value, and the Bill makes a considerable advance on existing 30-year old legislation. Even so, it is not difficult to suggest additional precautions against the risks held by the Chief Inspector himself to be the chief causes of accidents. Thus, employers might be required to take all reasonable precautions in the handling of goods or articles; hand-guards might be required where sharp objects are regularly handled; since in 1935 some 17,000 accidents were of persons struck by falling bodies, some general precautions might be required; provision might be made to deal with ladders as well as steps and stairs; precautions might be required against falls not of 12 but of 6 feet and since many, if not the majority of, falls are on the level

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ground, suitable precautions against slippery floors and faulty footwear might be inserted. Accidents, again, are more frequent amongst juveniles than adults; there might well be provision concerning juvenile employment on dangerous work, including such precautions as training and supervision. In general, indeed, the larger factories at any rate might be required to possess some form of safety organization.

The provisions against risks from particular parts of machinery seem to have gaps in them—for example, the drafting of the paragraph about lift-doors might easily be strengthened, and lifts and hoists might be brought unmistakably within the provisions of Section 23. Again, similar requirements to those related to fencing, hoists, floors, etc., might be applied to boilers and steam receivers; they should be required to be of sound material, good construction, etc., and the Act should specify to what standard the maker should conform for the “maximum permissible working pressure.”

It would be easy to extend the list of detailed improvements which are desirable (e.g. dry gas holders, which are more dangerous than wet ones, are not mentioned in Section 32), but it is of greater interest, perhaps, to observe how the general characteristics of the Bill show themselves even in what may be called its “technical” clauses.

Thus, prime movers and transmission machinery in motion may not be cleaned by women and young persons: is this not equally dangerous for men? If there are special difficulties in special cases where men alone are employed, should not this be covered by a special, and not a general, exception? Secondly, the direction in which latitude is given by the Bill: it is apparently left to the employer to judge whether it is impracticable to fence machinery “without serious interference with the work”; and though the

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Home Secretary can require special provisions in dangerous cases (Section 37) he can only do so “in view of the number and nature of accidents occurring”—which seems a “stable-door” arrangement.

The Bill marks an advance in its requirements of cubic space per worker (operative in 5 years’ time in the case of existing factories) but it leaves the standards of ventilation and lighting to the discretion of regulations; worse still, perhaps, it leaves it to the Home Secretary to determine the maximum weights that may be lifted. It is also left to him to say whether washing facilities and accommodation for clothing must be provided.

Finally, it is noteworthy that in general the Bill does away with the distinctions between textile and other factories except, perhaps, in one curious instance. Plans for the erection of cotton cloth factories have still to be certified in accordance with the Act of 1929; why should not the plans for the erection of any factory in which dangerous or unhealthy processes are to be carried on require similar approval?

In general, then, it is clear that whilst the Bill represents an advance upon existing legislation and perhaps reproduces the “highest common factor” or even the average of current practice, it is in no sense the kind of legislation to be expected from a country which seeks or even claims to lead the world in its treatment of its workpeople: it is far from providing a “lowest common multiple.” If in the past legislators had been content to stabilise industrial conditions at their general level there would presumably have been no need for factory legislation at all, though there would probably have been a revolution. Assuredly the Bill is not one which enables us to look forward with equanimity to a halt of another 30 years before fresh legislation is put upon the Statute Book.

SURVEYS

BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON SPAIN

IS British opinion indifferent to the outcome of the war in Spain? According to *The Times*, "the savagery which has marked the conflict has put an end to partisanship outside very restricted circles." Again, "the conflict is regarded with the greatest detachment, except by a small group of enthusiasts on either side and is commonly recognised to be an internal affair among the Spaniards themselves, with which foreigners should have as little to do as possible."

An examination of the British Press produces little evidence of such detachment. Without committing ourselves to any estimate of the extent to which the Press retains any power, we may assume that the influence of one newspaper upon its readers roughly corresponds to that of another. If we examine the circulation of the national morning newspapers we find that approximately:

Over 3 million units (*Daily Herald* and *News-Chronicle*) represent sympathy with the Spanish Government.
2 million units (*Daily Mail* and *Morning Post*) represent sympathy with the rebels.
2 million units (*Daily Express*) represent complete isolation (against the British Government's policy).

Three-quarters of a million units support the British Government's policy. In this last group are included the units represented by *The Times* and by the *Daily Telegraph*, although, as will be seen later, the two are in different categories.

It seems then, that a preponderance of propaganda in the Press has been against the rebels. Moreover, newspapers of the Left have been reinforced by an occasional outburst of spirit in an unexpected quarter. Here is a leading article of February 11:—

Italy and Germany—temporary allies—are proceeding with their conquest of Spain, while, with a canting hypocrisy quite nauseating to watch, members of the London committee of

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"non-intervention" go to Levees at Court or write letters asking interventionists to be good.

In the midst of it all, our home-bred, boot-licking Fascists tell us that we ought to get ready to lick the boots of the preposterous nincompoop Franco, who would have been defeated long ago without his master, Mussolini.

We ask then: Why lick Franco's boots? Why not Mussolini's—as many of you licked them when the bragging Duce went into Abyssinia to murder "savages" with poison gas?

The quotation is from the *Daily Mirror*. Although the attitude of this semi-picture paper is not entirely unexpected to readers who noticed its attitude to the Abyssinian war, its opinions remain the greatest mystery in the Press world, in view of the fact that it is owned by Lord Rothermere. When newspaper houses are so divided against themselves, it is scarcely reasonable to speak of a lack of partisanship.

To lump together all the readers of one newspaper as if they were unanimously in support of that newspaper's policy is, however, misleading. All we can do is to examine each type of propaganda and judge its probable effect. We then find that what the extreme Right lacks in numbers, it counter-balances by violence.

It was the editor of the *Sunday Dispatch* who summed up the outlook of the whole of the Rothermere Press (with the exception of the *Daily Mirror*) when he wrote:—

"The Totalitarian States are fighting for a particular form of social order and against a particular form of social disruption. No more profound cleavage has been known since the great religious wars, for this is a religious cleavage. It is between men who believe in a Deity, in a moral code, in race purity, in the sanctity of women, in the whole heritage of Christendom and men who do not."

Let us consider the *Daily Mail* as the prime advocate of this moral code, of race purity and the sanctity of women, or, as the *Daily Mirror* would put it, as the champion boot-licker. It may be objected that the *Daily Mail* is not a journal of opinion but merely one long violent assertion. Occasionally, the *Daily Mail* takes notice of something of which it disapproves, but it does not argue against the hated thing;

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it denounces a "lie," and advances a completely opposite statement of the "truth," usually about some completely different subject. The report of members of the Churches that Spain was anti-clerical rather than anti-Christian called forth a leading article in which the *Daily Mail* asserted that the whole report was invalid, because the "outrages upon nuns" were "completely ignored." But the propaganda of which this newspaper consists is of supreme importance as a weapon for deadening all opinion on the central issue.

Nothing illustrated its propaganda method better than its treatment of the fall of Malaga. The number slaughtered by the Government in that City, it said, was 13,000, while 8,000 members of the "intelligentsia" had been killed at Alicante. "These places have seen repeated those frenzied orgies of murder and pillage and horrible revenge with which Spain has become so familiar in the last few months. Once again Red ruffians recruited from the gutters have been turned loose in the hour of defeat to vent their unbridled fury upon an innocent population."

Remarking that "the ultimate success of the Patriots in Spain" had never been in doubt, the *Daily Mail* pointed out that it was alone among British newspapers in having "consistently predicted their triumph." The fly in the ointment, the failure of the Patriots to take Madrid, was there for "strategic reasons."

The news of the capture of Malaga appeared under the following streamer and headlines: "Reds massacre thousands in panic fight: Plot to burn hostages foiled: City's wild welcome to anti-Reds." According to the newspaper's correspondent, Col. Borbon had decided to enter the City because the Valencia Government had instructed the rulers of Malaga to intensify the terror and increase the number of victims. "The Red troops fled in all directions, throwing away their arms as they ran." Nevertheless, the same correspondent reported two days later that Franco had taken 2,000 Militiamen prisoners, "with the same number of rifles," presumably the weapons with which the Reds had massacred thousands while throwing away their arms.

Another correspondent, Mr. W. F. Hartin visited the scene to paint it in even more lurid colours. According to him,

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the "Reds" had executed 30,000 people in a City with a total population of 200,000. These victims were lined up against a wall six yards long, facing the sea. The rock had been worn quite smooth by the feet of the firing party; the wall was so pitted by bullets that it crumbled at a touch. The bodies fell into a pit only four yards long by two yards wide, which the Reds refused to empty until it was full of corpses. The hostages in the prison ship were frequently flogged with whips and shot if they protested. Some victims of the "prototypes of Red criminality" were flung out of high windows. Others had vitriol poured over them.

So we glimpse the technique. The Government forces are defeated by the rebels; it is more than ever necessary to blacken the character of the Government so as to justify the victory. Defame the man who is down! It is a technique used wherever power has gone to the Fascist, who, after knocking down his enemy, says: "The fellow is always knocking people down."

Perhaps its most heavily scented flower appeared in *The Times*, which, on December 1, gave the most prominent place at the head of its chief correspondence column to a letter from Sir Charles Oman, who argued that the responsibility for the sufferings of Madrid lay on the Government which chose to defend it! This argument recalls the kind of justice meted out to Whigs in Sir Charles Oman's own University at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when a satirist on Oxford ideas remarked: "A man was riding over Hounslow Heath and was robb'd: from whence I will argue that the man was guilty of the robbery himself, for if he had not been there the robbery would not have been committed." The Government of Spain is responsible for the horrors of the civil war because, if it had not been there, the rebel generals would not have attacked it; such is the outlook of the Rothermere Press (with the exception of the *Daily Mirror*) and Oxford's distinguished historian.

On controversial matters, this section of the Press is silent. The deduction to be drawn from the "news" here printed was that Britain ought to intervene in Spain on the side of General Franco, and the reader might well ask if such was the *Daily Mail's* policy. The newspaper itself has never gone

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so far as to advance this conclusion, being content to leave race purity to Franco's Moors, the moral code to Hitler and the sanctity of women to Mussolini. On any point which requires a statement of policy, it is silent. The news of the ban on volunteers was published without comment.

There is an obvious danger, however, that members of the audience who take the proceedings seriously may wish to join in the stage struggle against the arch-villain. This risk is avoided in the Isolation Press of Lord Beaverbrook. The *Daily Express* has consistently shown itself capable of publishing news as damaging to the rebels as to the Government, thus making the susceptible reader shrink from interference on either side. "Non-intervention," as advocated by the British Government was attacked on the ground that British participation in the control scheme might lead us into a dispute with somebody. "Britain has no interest in the war," said the *Evening Standard* of February 23.

It must be recognised that the boasted impartiality of the Isolationist is reflected to a surprising extent in the news columns of the *Daily Express*. At the same time, the question for British opinion was not whether we should help either party in the dispute, but solely whether we should allow the Spanish Government to get the help to which it was entitled. The powerful Isolationist section of opinion answered "No" as surely as the more raucous barkers of the extreme Right.

* * *

The consideration left out of account in the formative influences so far mentioned is the British Imperial interest. As surprising as the attitude to the Spanish war of the *Daily Mirror* is the fact that the Imperialist motive has been advanced only in the Left Wing *News-Chronicle*. The outstanding paradox of modern opinion on foreign affairs, in fact, is that Left Wing thought coincides with the interest of the British Empire (on Manchuria, Abyssinia, the Rhineland, Spain), while the Right Wing Press cheers on the powers most likely to menace the Empire. In the central Conservative Press, which wavers eternally between Class and Empire, the *Daily Telegraph*, with its vast network of associated newspapers, provides the best indication of where Conservative opinion is sitting at the moment.

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The *Daily Telegraph*, which naturally supported the British Government's policy, was capable of standing up for the Imperialist interest when it wrote: "It is only too clear that the Mediterranean agreement will be regarded in our country as an empty fraud if the other party to it insists on using it as an instrument for promoting a foreign policy which our country has opposed from the beginning." But, on January 26, it consoled itself with the reflection that no party alone could establish dominion over Spain, and found that: "On the surface, the German and Italian replies (to the proposed ban on volunteers) remove every major danger that the Spanish situation might become a threat to general peace in Europe."

In a leader called "A dramatic change in Spain," on February 9, it found that: "The Nationalists have established a definite superiority in generalship, in munitions and in the forces upon which they can call. Much more than half the country is under their control, while there are obvious signs of demoralisation in the Government armies..... It would seem that nothing can now deprive the Nationalists of final victory."

In the leading article of February 20, however, it was stated that General Franco had no hope of "a speedy and easy conquest of that half of the country that resists him." The issue was still in doubt, according to the statement: "However the conflict may be decided, outsiders will play no part in the future Government of Spain."

Non-intervention to *The Times* has been dictated by considerations not only of humanity, but also of policy. Again and again, it has pointed out that the dispute could be settled only by the Spaniards themselves. Hence, the importation of foreign troops became the chief target of its shafts. Commenting on the mutual proposals made by the British and French Governments on Christmas Eve, *The Times* remarked that the importation of men was following the importation of arms to an alarming extent: "Indeed, there is abundant point in the gibe that the fighting around Madrid has been held up by the scarcity of interpreters." To the interveners, it appealed not on grounds of humanity or abstract justice, but on those of practical policy, asking what the interventionist Governments hoped to gain: "Ideological triumphs?"

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Hardly. And no conceivable commercial concession or political advantage that they may hope to win will compensate them for commitments which, whether in Spain or outside, cannot be measured either in time or extent."

Such an emphasis on the bad policy, rather than the injustice, of interfering with Spanish affairs, marked all the advice given by *The Times* to Herr Hitler. The New Year's Day leader, "On the threshold," had the following paragraph:

"When Spain is again left to Spaniards, Europe will be freed not only from the fear of an explosion, designed or undesigned, but for the task, difficult enough, of mediation. Here, too it is difficult to believe that any of the seconds who are now in the ring will face the dubious commitments involved in procuring an alien victory in a neighbour's territory and of maintaining it indefinitely under a semi-independent Government."

On December 28, *The Times* had pointed to the number of Germans on the insurgent side as the "greatest danger"; it had argued that totalitarian governments were in a better position to prevent "volunteering" than were democratic governments, but suggested at this early date that the Foreign Enlistment Act might be invoked in Britain. A more cheerful note, however, was struck on January 4, by Count Ciano's written assurance that Italy intended to respect the territories of Spain in all circumstances: "This plain declaration, which is given express reference to the Balearic Islands, should do much to help a cooler view of the Spanish conflict than obtains everywhere at the moment. It deserves a special welcome, because it definitely broadens the base on which the Non-intervention Committee can work constructively."

But the hope of a happier New Year was to be rudely dashed by the sending of 10,000 Italian troops to Spain. "Far from advancing the revival of confidence of which the Anglo-Italian Declaration was to be the diplomatic instrument," wrote the diplomatic correspondent, "the Rome Government's failure to withhold extra reinforcements from General Franco has made a discouraging and damaging impression." "Disagreeable" was the epithet applied to this Italian waywardness in a leading article on the following day, when the sins of the various intervening countries were catalogued.

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The reader then advanced a step further in grasping the fundamental reasons for non-interventionist opinion in Great Britain: "Foreign intervention, so far from defeating Fascism or Communism in Spain, has merely increased their importance. It has converted a typical rebellion against the Government, in which some Communists took one side, and some Fascists the other, into a war between these rival doctrines..... The movement against foreign influences and the violent individualism of the Spanish character make it seem doubtful whether the sowers of Fascist or Communist propaganda, who are so active in Spain today, are likely to win any enduring success in that acrid half-African soil."

Hope of reaching the non-intervention goal revived a little with the receipt of the Italian and German replies on January 8, although the recent despatch of strong Italian reinforcements to Spain and provocative German activities in Spanish Morocco kept scepticism alive. On January 11, *The Times* recognised that "in itself, no doubt, the banning of volunteers from this country, without waiting for similar action elsewhere could have little practical effect. It dams at the source the merest trickle of recruits, which moreover is flowing to both sides, in so far as it can be said to flow at all..... But the psychological effect of this unilateral action may well be considered."

One eye remained on British interests. "In the end the proud Spanish people are likely to feel the least ill-will towards the foreign nation which has interfered the least in their internal quarrels." The only British interests were defined as "first, that the war shall not spread; and second, that the political independence and the territorial integrity of Spain should be preserved."

Thus we saw the various reasons for non-intervention. We were not interested in an ideological war, and Spain preferred us not to interfere.

But when the ban on volunteers was made general, *The Times* was not inclined to optimism: "It is unfortunate that it has been so long delayed and that so many volunteers have poured, or rather have been poured, into the country during the past few weeks." The baseness of Italian conduct had been proved again at the fall of Malaga. On more than one occasion the newspaper gave prominence to stories describ-

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ing the way in which Nationalist aviators had shot down fleeing civilians. When the newspaper's correspondent with the rebels urged British firms to trade with "Nationalist" ports and referred to "so-called Government" territory, his despatch was printed not in the news columns but as a letter!

Since the Right Wing Press has been to this extent divided, since it has never gone so far as to advocate open aid for Franco, and since its most powerful advocate has been shocked by the behaviour of Franco's friends, are we justified in assuming that the greater part of positive British opinion has favoured helping the Spanish Government? In trying to answer this question, it is of the greatest importance to notice the policy of the *Daily Herald*.

Members of the Trade Union Congress, said Sir Walter Citrine at Plymouth, must try to stifle their instinct on this question and use their brains. At Edinburgh, the Labour Party decided to favour the lifting of the arms embargo if non-intervention remained ineffective and Mr. Bevan promised to seat himself on Lord Plymouth's doorstep.

The *Daily Herald's* policy, as late as February 13, was still, apparently, that of Edinburgh: "The right course for Britain and France is clear. It is to announce that unless the Fascist Powers at once agree to cut off all supplies of men and materials to Franco, the Western democracies will sell to the Spanish Government such war materials as it requires until a general non-intervention agreement is reached and observed." This implied that Labour supported the embargo on arms if there was general non-intervention.

It has been the Press with Liberal connections which has unreservedly advocated help for the Spanish Government, in the name of law and justice. To the *Manchester Guardian*, the indifference of the British Government to the result of the war was a "scandalous" thing.

Meanwhile, the readers of the *News-Chronicle* have had a brilliant presentation of the anti-Fascist case throughout the whole struggle. Advocating from the first the cause of the Spanish Government, this newspaper has had in Spain an impressive array of correspondents, including John Langdon-Davies, Geoffrey Cox, Denis Weaver, Jay Allen

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and Philip Jordan. Vernon Bartlett, in following the proceedings of the Non-intervention Committee, hinted more than once that the British Government secretly desired a victory for Franco.

In its leading articles, the newspaper was "disgusted" last autumn to see how the "pretence of neutrality" was growing steadily thinner and thinner as Franco neared Madrid; it attacked the British Government for prohibiting British shipping from carrying goods to the Spanish Government, while tolerating any help given to the rebels through Portugal; the British ban on volunteers, it thought, would be of assistance to Franco and added "the last touch of irony" to the "cowardly vacillation" of the British Government. In a leading article on "The Tragedy of Spain" (February 18), it said:

Non-intervention has proved a capital screen behind which, since the hands of other countries were conveniently tied, they could make certain of the destruction of democracy in Spain. Exactly the same bluff has been tried as was tried in the case of Abyssinia and in the case of Manchuria; and with exactly the same success.

But whose fault, in the last resort, is that? The bluff was successful, in this case as in the others, because it was never called. And the chief reason it was never called was that the British Government was too cowardly, too divided, and too indifferent in its heart to the fate of democracy to challenge the bluffers.

Again, commenting on the "Volunteers Ban," it said: "The whole squalid, blood-stained history of foreign intervention in Spain might never have been recorded and the rebellion itself would long ago have been crushed, if Britain and France had had the courage to call the bluff of the Fascist Powers at once. Now it has been called with immediate success, but now it may be too late."

Against the power of this advocacy, however, must be set certain considerations. First, the reporting of atrocities committed by the rebels makes a number of people shrink from the subject as certainly as does frightfulness in the Right Wing Press. The *News-Chronicle* announced that photographs received from Barcelona were "too ghastly" to publish; it thus showed its wisdom, for photographs of children murdered by the rebels have the effect of making

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the spectator want to keep out of the whole horrible business himself and to end it at whatever cost to law and justice. The Left Wing, in this respect, is at a grave disadvantage when compared with the most ruthless organs of the Right Wing.

Secondly, Left Wing appeals to imperial interests (on January 19, the *News-Chronicle* carried a full-page leading-article, appealing to the British Government not to fritter away its vital interests) may be too realistic to appeal to a public for which the real nature of Britain's interests are always carefully disguised. Moreover, we have noted *The Times'* view of British interests, which were clarified by the argument in the "Round Table" of March, 1937, that Russia was possibly the real enemy of the future.

Thirdly, the Left Wing has inherited ideas of fair play which perhaps handicap its propaganda. The *Manchester Guardian* published an article by Anthony Crossley, M.P., supporting the Rebels; the *New-Statesman* of February 20 published an article by Cyril Connolly, describing the chaos and disunity on the Left in Spain.

Most important of all, the Left is disunited. The Right Wing division is between "class" and Empire. Sir Walter Citrine has said that the Left Wing division is between instinct and brains; others might say that the division is between anti-Fascism and pacifism. At all events, the desire to combat Fascism is nullified by a horror of war in some quarters, while, in others, an abstract sympathy with the Spanish Government is nullified by a fear of Communism.

Where, then, have we arrived? At the conclusion that, while it is impossible for opinion worthy of the name to be non-partisan, nevertheless the mass of British opinion is negative on this subject.

CHARLES FENBY.

CURRENT SOCIAL STATISTICS :

ESTIMATES AND FOREIGN POLICY.

An Analysis of the Estimates of the fighting services for 1911-1914 and from 1931 onwards and the political situation which they reflect.

EXPENDITURE on arms, both in its range and in tempo of production, is perhaps the most reliable barometer on which to read the disintegration of international relations.

Today there is a growing certainty, not only among Cabinet Ministers who are consciously preparing the stage for the next war, but among men and women of all European countries, that war is only a matter of time. Apart from the two important factors—and it is dangerously easy to over estimate them—of the revulsion from the experiences of the last war, and the widespread peace propaganda since 1918, the situation is ominously like that of 1911. With one important exception—that Germany was admitted to be the enemy.

By the end of 1910, the detailed plans of this war, as revealed in innumerable documents and biographies, had been worked out. Lord Haldane tells us in "Before the War" how he had solved his problem of mobilising and concentrating "at a place of assembly to be opposite the Belgian frontier, which had been settled between the Staffs of France and Britain" a force of 160,000 men to operate with the French armies, "with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East." Meantime, Mr. Winston Churchill was sent to the Admiralty in the autumn of 1911 with the duty laid upon him by Mr. Asquith "to put the fleet in a state of instant and constant readiness of war."¹

The Estimates of that year reflected these war plans and Members of Parliament began to show their anxiety. Thus, Mr. Murray Macdonald, in a motion which "viewed with alarm the enormous increase during recent years on the expenditure of the Army and the Navy," stated :

"There has been, in the course of sixteen years, an added annual expenditure on our defensive forces of not less a sum than thirty-one

¹ See *The Secret History of a Great Betrayal* by E. D. Morel. Published by the Union of Democratic Control, 34 Victoria Street, 1923, price 1/-.

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millions I ask what is the character of the foreign danger that has warranted such an increase and that justifies its continuance I sum it up by saying that there is no evidence that in determining the strength of the Army the Government has been guided by any standard of our requirements. Everything in this regard is left vague and indefinite, and the Secretary of War seems to have thought that his task was adequately discharged by putting the troops he finds to his hands in a more effective state of organisation than that which he inherited from his predecessors."—(*Hansard*, March 13, 1911.)

Another member, Mr. Hunt, was more specific. He suggested:

"The increase of the German naval construction has been such that between the years 1904-5 and 1910-11 British naval expenditure has only increased 16 per cent., while German naval expenditure has increased by 166 per cent. We are in far greater danger than we were in Napoleon's time; it is because necessity compels Germany to expand If Germany had a great territory like Canada where her surplus population could go and remain under the German flag, we might remain at peace perhaps for very many years, but the Foreign Secretary knows that that is not the case German publicists with one accord declare that Great Britain must be conquered to make way for Germany Bismarck's famous declaration still stands that the destinies of Germany must be worked out not by votes and speeches but by blood and iron."—(March 13, 1911.)

Mr. Reginald McKenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty, gave the reasons of his Cabinet for their expenditure:

" How can I explain the increases we have made unless I refer definitely to the preparations which are made by other Powers, and naturally the Power that I select is the Power which has got the second strongest navy in the world. Therefore, I have to compare our strength and our growth with the strength and growth of the German Navy."

Three days later when he presented the Navy Estimates, referring again and again to the strength of the German navy he stated:

"According to our forecast of the development of other Navies, we require a Navy of a certain strength in the spring of 1914. The spring of 1914 is, therefore, the date on which we want to have our ships ready for commission."

The Debates on the Estimates that year, helped by the unscrupulous propaganda based on the famous slogan "We want eight and won't wait", pointed clearly to a war with Germany within the next few years.

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That history repeats itself was shown by Mr. Churchill in presenting his first Navy Estimates on March 18, 1912. By substituting "air" for "navy" with the necessary statistical changes he might make the same speech today.

Keir Hardie in challenging the increase—considerable at that time—of nearly £5,000,000 on the Navy, stated frankly:

"We are not now building against Europe. We are building against Germany, and all through that part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech there appeared to be a girding at Germany, which can only emphasise the difficulty between the two countries."

By 1914 the atmosphere in official circles was heavily charged with the expectation of war. On March 17, 1914, Mr. Churchill tabled "the largest Estimates for Naval expenses ever presented." He was unusually frank as to their eventual use in the interests of British Imperialism. "We have got all we want in territory," he said:

"but our claim to be left in undisputed enjoyment of vast and splendid possessions, largely acquired by war and largely maintained by force, is one which often seems less reasonable to others than to us We have responsibilities in many quarters today. We are far from being detached from the problems of Europe The world is armed as it was never armed before."—(*Hansard*, March 17, 1914.)

The following table shows the expenditure on arms of the leading powers during the period under discussion:

EXPENDITURE ON THE ARMY AND NAVY BY
GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA, GERMANY, ITALY
U.S.A., 1909-1914

		1909 £	1910 £	1911 £
GREAT BRITAIN	{ Army	26,840,000	27,236,000	27,449,000
	{ Navy	32,188,000	35,807,000	40,386,000
FRANCE	{ Min. of War . .	34,845,200	36,584,160	40,617,280
	{ Min. of Marine . .	13,907,600	14,545,000	16,755,440
RUSSIA	{ Min. of War . .	50,286,094	51,522,005	52,431,718
	{ Min. of Marine . .	9,798,800	10,187,781	12,841,587
GERMAN EMPIRE	{ Army	42,335,865	40,582,143	40,204,320
	{ Navy	20,471,685	21,233,831	22,028,078
ITALY	{ Min. of War . .	14,535,240	16,058,560	17,399,360
	{ Min. of Marine . .	7,236,200	6,844,480	8,870,800
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	{ Military	34,030,005	32,952,709	33,824,375
	{ Naval	24,232,500	25,827,017	25,150,209

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		1912	1913	1914
		£	£	£
GREAT BRITAIN	{ Army	27,649,000 ¹	28,071,000 ¹	28,346,000 ¹
	{ Navy	42,858,000 ¹	44,365,000 ¹	48,833,000 ¹
FRANCE	{ Min. of War ..	39,733,320 ¹	50,489,000 ²	235,240,000 ³
	{ Min. of Marine	18,675,200 ¹	18,452,000 ²	22,480,000 ³
RUSSIA	{ Min. of War ..	55,916,400 ¹	68,143,500 ²	76,967,310 ³
	{ Min. of Marine	18,793,818 ¹	24,245,400 ²	26,604,790 ³
GERMAN EMPIRE	{ Army	46,093,759 ¹	58,020,900 ⁴	318,191,300 ⁴
	{ Navy	22,956,714 ¹	23,054,500 ⁴	58,329,600 ⁴
ITALY	{ Min. of War ..	22,571,600	29,121,280 ¹	25,836,640 ¹
	{ Min. of Marine	12,393,560	15,146,440 ¹	12,475,040 ¹
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	{ Military	31,468,333 ¹	33,876,875 ¹	36,616,667 ¹
	{ Naval	28,414,583 ¹	27,936,042 ¹	29,279,796 ¹

N.B.—The above statistics are taken from *The Problem of Armaments* by A. G. Enock, 1923. Published by Macmillan, price 6/-.

The figures were almost entirely compiled from H.M.S. abstracts. No reference numbers are placed against the figures from that source.

¹ Extracted from information on files at the Board of Trade Office, London, for several countries.

² France. Expenditure 1913-1914. Debts, 1915, 1916, and 1917. Figures supplied by "Agence Financière du Gouvernement Française."

³ Russia. 1913-1914. Royal Statistical Society, London. (From Russian Budgets.)

⁴ Supplied in full by German Embassy in London. The extraordinary depreciation of the mark seriously inflates the totals of 1919-1920.

Statistics for the four years of the war are too abnormal and the methods of calculation too confusing to be of any value. This applies also to the five years immediately following the war, when Germany was compulsorily disarmed, and war weariness induced the other nations to try, with varying degrees of sincerity, to achieve some measure of disarmament. It is true, for instance, that from 1925 to 1933 the expenditure on arms by Great Britain was £66,000,000 less than would have been the case had the estimates remained at the 1925 figure.

By February 1932 when, after years of preparatory work, the Disarmament Conference opened, there was very little chance that it would achieve any results. Imperialist rivalry was already proving stronger than the League of Nations. Japan was fighting for the control of Manchuria, and its subsequent occupation proved to be the first milestone on the world's greatest armaments race. The arrival to power of Hitler was a second milestone; the occupation of Abyssinia

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by Mussolini a third, and a fourth is now being built by the combined activities of Hitler and Mussolini in Spain.

A survey of political speeches during this period shows the continuous drift towards the present situation. Mr. Baldwin's speech of November 28, 1934, may reasonably be considered the first chapter in the story of the arms expansion programme. He was openly apprehensive about Germany and mainly referred to that country's air forces. "All that I would say is this," Mr. Baldwin suggested,

"that His Majesty's Government are determined in no conditions to accept any position of inferiority with regard to what air forces may be raised in Germany in the future."

The following year, the Government adopted what has since been made the practice, of publishing a White Paper on Defence preparatory to the publication of the Estimates. Cmd. 4827 of March 1, 1935, signed J.R.M. and subsequently underlined by Mr. Baldwin in the Defence Debate of March 11, 1935 again specially referred to Germany's rearmament which:

"if continued at its present rate, unabated and uncontrolled, will aggravate the existing anxieties of Germany, and may consequently produce a situation where peace will be in peril."

Two months later, when Mr. Baldwin no longer concealed the knowledge of Germany's rapidly increasing rearmament, he made it clear that it was this factor which was determining the rate of British armament expansion in the air. By March 3, 1936, the White Paper on Defence Cmd. 5107 set out the Defence Policy which paved the way for the leadership which Great Britain has now assumed in the world's arms race. A picture of an arming world was painted and the reasons for the plan which was outlined were stated:

"To serve two purposes, namely, to provide an improved and strengthened apparatus for the consideration of Defence problems as a whole and to ensure the fullest and most effective use of the industrial capacity and the man power available for production of material in the country."

Throughout 1936 the danger of war grew rapidly and by February 1937, the Government "threw in its hand" and plunged into a five-year programme of war preparations which will cost the country at least £1,500,000,000. The

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following table shows in statistics the worsening international situation :

NET CASH EXPENDITURE OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT 1931-1937

	Army £	Navy £	Air Force £
1931	38,455,496	51,014,752	17,868,948
1932	35,978,239	50,164,453	17,057,371
1933	44,900,000 ¹	53,443,545	16,700,794
1934	44,900,000 ¹	54,561,010	17,670,893
1935	55,881,000 ²	81,289,000 ³	27,515,185 ⁴
1936	82,174,000 ⁵	105,065,000 ⁶	50,700,000 ⁷
1937			82,500,000 ⁸

¹ The estimates for 1935 were £44,900,000 including supplementary estimate of £1,350,000.

² The estimates for 1936 were £49,281,000 not including July Supplementary Estimates which amounted to £6,600,000 and a large proportion of some £10,000,000 for Supplementary Defence referred to in Mr. Chamberlain's Budget speech, April 22 (the rest went to Air Force).

³ Estimates for 1935 were £64,900,000 including Supplementary Estimate of £4,850,000.

⁴ Estimates for 1936 were £81,289,000 including Supplementary Estimates of £10,300,000 and £1,959,000.

⁵ Estimates for 1935 were £27,515,185 including Supplementary Estimates of £5,335,000 and £4,850,000.

⁶ Estimates for 1936 were £50,700,000 including Supplementary Estimates of £11,700,000 but including a certain proportion of £10,000,000 for Supplementary Defence alluded to by Mr. Chamberlain in his Budget speech, April 22 (the larger part went to the Army).

⁷ Includes sum of £19,054,000 provided by Consolidated Fund in accordance with the terms of the Defence Loans Bill. Not including £8,528,000 for Army Ordnance Factories.

⁸ Includes sum of £27,000,000 provided by Consolidated Fund.

⁹ Includes sum of £26,000,000 provided by Consolidated Fund.

This shows an increase between 1931 and 1936, on the three services combined from £106,863,429 to £187,870,000, i.e., £81,006,571, or approximately 75 per cent. on the 1936 estimates.

Thus, the total for the three Defence Services to be provided by the taxpayer and by loan is now shown as £278,267,000 :

	Gross Total £	By Loan £	Increase on 1936 £
Navy	105,065,000	27,000,000	23,776,000
Army	82,174,000	19,054,000	26,293,000
Air	82,500,000	26,000,000	31,800,000
Army Ordnance Factories ..	8,528,000	7,946,000	8,528,000
Total	278,267,000	80,000,000	90,397,000

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The following analysis of the three estimates for 1937 shows the main items on which these enormous sums of money are being spent.

ARMY ESTIMATES

The increased expenditure of £26,293,000 is due primarily to the expansion and acceleration of the programme for bringing military preparations up to date. "The past year," as Mr. Duff Cooper points out in his Memorandum relating to the Army Estimates 1937 (Cmd. 5381), "has been one of ceaseless activity in every sphere of military policy."

The main items of increase are :

(1) £7,867,000 is to be expended on Vote 2, Territorial Army and Reserve Forces. This represents an increase over the 1936 figure of £1,824,000 mainly made up of increased grants to County Associations; payments to county associations for buildings and ranges, and training.

(2) £6,005,000 is to be spent on supplies, road transport, and remounts. This represents an increase over the 1936 figure of £1,273,000 mainly made up of an increase in provisions and allowances in lieu.

(3) The chief increase in the Army Estimates is on Vote 10, Works, Buildings and Lands. The gross expenditure on this item is £30,326,000 of which £14,446,000 is being found from Appropriations in Aid. The gross increase is £18,605,800; the net increase is £4,406,000. Item C, Vote 9 Warlike stores, shows an increase of £15,958,500. This includes guns and carriages, gun ammunition, small arms and small arms ammunition, armoured cars, tanks and other tracked vehicles, anti-gas equipment, searchlights, signal and bridging equipment. In all, no less than £25,032,000 is being spent on warlike stores—a figure which indicates the acceleration in the mechanism of the army and the accumulation of enormous stores of munitions.

NAVY

The Navy Estimates represent the largest amount ever asked for in peace-time in a single year. The largest increases are :

(a) In new construction where an increase of £14,033,215, is due not only to the commencement of a building programme considerably larger than that provided for in 1936 but to a

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full annual provision for the 1936 programme, which was itself more than double the programme of immediately preceding years.

(b) The maintenance of the fleet, where an increase of £9,081,985 includes the modernisation of capital ships and large repairs, increase in personnel and the making good of deficiencies in stores and material reserves.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Naval Estimates is the large amount which is being paid to contractors to extend their works so that they can cope with the orders of the Admiralty.

On Vote 8, £1,915,000 will go to the extension of plant and works for the manufacture of armour plate; on Vote 9 £871,600 will go to the extension of plant for the making of guns and on Vote 10, £976,000 will be spent on the building of new factories. Thus a total of £3,762,000 is being paid over to private firms for the equipment of their factories.

The Naval armament firms, of which by far the most important is Vickers-Armstrongs, have every reason to thank the present government which is giving out to private firms no less than 56 out of a programme of 80 vessels. Meanwhile, Government dockyards will become busy reconstructing older ships.

AIR

The Air Estimates indicate the greatest acceleration of the three Services. Since the new expansion scheme of 1934 was announced, when a five year programme was drawn up, a new scheme of expansion for a two year programme was brought out on May 22, 1935. By March 1936, a third programme of an even more comprehensive nature was drawn up involving a very large works programme both in enlarging existing service stations and in creating and equipping new stations of various kinds. Further, as Lord Swinton points out in Cmd. 5388.

"On the industrial side, additions have been made at existing aircraft manufacturing firms, and in order to broaden the basis of production, certain firms have, with Air Ministry approval, entered into agreements with firms outside the industry, which will enable the resources of these latter to be used for the production of aircraft. In addition, a number of firms have agreed to erect and manage 'shadow' factories for the Government. Six factories for

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the manufacture of engines are in course of erection, and most of these will be completed within a few months. One air-frame factory is nearing completion, and work on the second has commenced. New factories are also being established for the manufacture of air-screws and certain types of bombs."

The main increases in the Estimates are:

(a) On Vote 3, where an increase of £17,798,500 (£16,590,000 of which is raised from Appropriations-in-Aid) is made up largely of 4 items. In 1937, aeroplanes and spares will cost £29,000,000, i.e., an increase of £9,400,000; armament and ammunition will cost £7,475,000, i.e., an increase of £3,828,000; balloons and hangars for the balloon barrage scheme for London will cost £690,000, i.e., an increase of £572,000; and petrol and oil will cost £2,760,000, i.e., an increase of £1,180,000.

(b) On Vote 2, an increase of £1,140,000 is largely due to the expansion of the Royal Air Force in 1937, when entries of 1,500 pilots and 15,000 airmen are required.

Faced with this enormous expenditure on war, it is not surprising to find Mr. Neville Chamberlain saying:

"I cannot dismiss the hope that we and the nations of Europe will presently find some less suicidal way of ending our fears and suspicions of one another before we are all ruined by our efforts to defend ourselves."

Meanwhile the industry of the country becomes increasingly dependent on the production of arms and before long, the country will be on a war basis. The arms race has now begun in earnest. Already since the publication of the Estimates, it has gathered a new momentum. At the present time the seven great military powers—Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., Germany, Japan, Italy and the United States—are alone spending money at the rate of £2,632,000,000 a year. In November 1936, the rate was £2,285,000,000 a year, i.e., an increase of 15 per cent. in three months.

The question "Against what enemy are we arming?" is assuming a new significance. In Parliamentary, including Cabinet, circles, there is a growing suspicion that Germany is the most probable enemy in another war. Recent speeches in Parliament and in the country begin to sound ominously

¹ At the Usher Hall, Edinburgh, on March 5, 1937.

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like those of 1911 onwards. Mr. D. R. Grenfell in the Debate on the Foreign Office Vote voiced the opinions of many people on both sides of the House when he said:

".....it is true today that all Germany's neighbours are apprehensive and nervous about her alone. There is no other element of danger. There is no one else causing anxiety or giving a hint of aggression."¹

Mr. Winston Churchill, speaking on the Defence Loans Bill showed as much concern for Germany's air fleet today as he did for her navy in 1911. "Can Ministers assure us," he asked, "that this time next year the British Air Force will be more nearly a match for the German Air Force than it is today?"¹ Meanwhile a three-day Debate on foreign affairs in the House of Lords showed how large Germany looms in all political calculations at the moment.

The National Government meets the situation by a vast arms programme, apparently unrelated to any definite programme of foreign policy. But arms alone will not prevent fascist aggression. There may be no hope of preventing another war. But an unequivocal statement by Great Britain that she will work closely with France, the U.S.S.R., with Czechoslovakia and a number of small states might postpone another crisis immeasurably more disastrous and far-reaching than 1914.

¹ *Hansard*, March 4, 1937.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAWS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATION:

RUSSIA—GERMANY—ITALY—AUSTRIA—COLOMBIA—PORTUGAL.

IN a former survey I analysed the draft of the new Soviet constitution published at the end of 1936. The Eighth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, of the U.S.S.R. which met on December 5, 1936, passed several amendments, and then accepted the draft as amended. The new constitution thereupon came into force.

The constitution has four essential elements; (1) the mechanism of the relations between the various organs of authority; (2) the concessions made to certain privileged classes; (3) the position of Soviet citizens, the limits and content of their liberty; (4) the part played by the Communist party in the Soviet state.

We may leave the first of these aside, for to study it will throw no light on the realities of the political situation. The key to the political mechanism will not be found in this complicated system, but in the unified, concentrated will of the Communist party.

As to the concessions, the most important is the re-establishment of private property (Art. X of the amended Bill):

The right of private personal property of the citizens in the income and savings resulting from their work, in their houses and their domestic economy, in articles of use and personal property as well as the right of inheritance of personal property, is protected by law.

By Arts. IV to X three types of property exist in Russia. There is the property of the State, the "perpetual enjoyment" of the co-operatives and the *kolkhozs*, and finally individual property. There is already a certain recognition of private property in the second case. The peasants have the right of property in their little patches of land and their stock. The law deliberately uses the vaguest terms like "small holding" and "small equipment." As to the third class, that is to say, private property in the true sense, the concession concerns above all the most privileged citizens, officials, party members, citizens who have received honours from the state, etc.

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The constitution creates nothing; it merely recognises a state of things already existing.

The historian of the future will have, when he comes to discuss the problems raised by the Russian revolution, to study particularly this peculiar phenomenon of the survival of institutions in contradiction of codified law. Soviet law abolished the family and property in the bourgeois sense. But opinion proved recalcitrant. It remained devoted to the family and property as every primitive eastern society does. Despite the constitutions promulgated and the decree-laws passed, the old social structure, although disfigured and distorted, still existed in Russia. None the less the official recognition of the principle of private property, even if limited and reserved to certain classes, is of great importance.

As far as the individual liberties are concerned, the new constitution changes nothing. Despite all the amendments the list of the individual liberties remains unaltered and includes the same restrictions. The liberty of the press, of assembly, of speech is not conceived as a right of the individual but as a task of the State. The Soviet State is bound to supply the people with books, newspapers and orators.

The new constitution establishes universal suffrage. By Art. CXXXIV it is also equal suffrage. Previous to December 5, 1936, the electoral suffrage was a "property qualification" one. The qualification has a social and also a political significance. Relatives of *émigrés*, former land-owners, children of former bourgeois—all these classes, often hereditary in character, were deprived of the right to vote. On the other hand in the elections to the soviets, the workers had one deputy for 25,000 voters while the peasants had only one for 125,000 voters. The new constitution puts an end to these inequalities and establishes universal suffrage.

With great frankness the new constitution lays down in Art. CXXVI:

Conformably to the interests of the workers and in order to develop initiative among the masses of the people in the matter of organisation as well as to develop their political activity, the right is assured to citizens of the U.S.S.R., to group themselves in social organisations—professional unions, co-operative unions, Youth organisations, sports and defence organisations, cultural, technical and scientific societies, while the most active citizens and

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the most class-conscious workers and other classes of workers are united in the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. which is the advance guard of the workers in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist régime, and which represents the governing nucleus of all the workers' organisations whether they be social or State organisations.

The constitution deliberately excludes the possibility of there being other political parties. Power is the monopoly of the Communist Party. This article, which did not appear in the earlier constitutions, definitely puts out of court any discussion on the "democratisation" of the régime.

From the political point of view the new constitution changes nothing in Russia. Power as before belongs to the Communist Party and the dictatorship of that party is now formally expressed in a constitutional text. Power belongs to a group which intends to keep it. Now that the international situation has become threatening, that group more than ever needs to have loyal servants; that is why the new constitution concedes to certain privileged classes the right to hold property, that excellent stimulus to loyalty and energy.

2

This identity of the state and the party is characteristic also of the Fascist régime. On January 11, 1937 a decree law was published in Italy conferring on the secretary of the Fascist Party the title and functions of a minister secretary of state.

The purpose of this law is to establish the complete identity of the Italian state and the Fascist Party. Sociologically and historically this identity has no need of proof; it is an historical fact, for the Fascist state is completely identified with the governing group composed of the Fascist Party. It is not without interest, however, to follow through the Fascist legislation the tendency to give this identity legal form. As I have already said, the new Russian constitution likewise expressly indicates the rôle of the party in the mechanism of the Soviet state. The new Italian law belongs to the same category of laws passed by a dictatorial régime. It makes legal a situation already existing.

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3

I have often had occasion in these surveys to deal with the illusory corporatism of the dictatorial countries. On December 21, 1936, the constitution of Portugal was revised by means of the "law No. 1945 of December 21, 1936, modifying certain articles of the Constitution relative to the corporative and administrative organisation." This is a single-articled law as follows :

Arts. 20, 21, 126 and 127 of the Constitution are thus amended.

Art. 20. In the corporative organisations all the activities of the nation will be organically represented, and they are empowered to participate in elections to municipal chambers, and provincial councils and also to the corporative chamber.

Art. 21. In the political organisation of the State the parish councils will participate in the elections to the municipal chambers and the latter in the elections to provincial councils. In the corporative chamber local authorities will be represented.

Art. 126. The administrative bodies are the municipal chambers, the parish councils and the provincial councils.

Art. 127. The administrative activities of the local authorities are subject to inspection by agents of the government; the deliberations of the administrative bodies are submissible to authorisation, and need approval by other organs or authorities and may be submitted also to referendum.

There is no need to analyse these provisions. I need only say what I have already said in these surveys on the character of Portuguese corporatism, that it is purely illusory and its aim is to conceal the fact of dictatorship. But this constitutional revision is none the less characteristic in its attempt to adorn the material fact of dictatorial power with an ideology called corporative.

4

Among laws recently passed in authoritarian states I may mention, first, the German law of December 1, 1936, on economic sabotage. This law, which provides for the death penalty for those who keep moneys or property abroad is very characteristic of the juridical spirit of the Third Reich and of public feeling in Hitlerite Germany. It is as follows :

Art. 1. Every German citizen who knowingly and intentionally urged by the spirit of gain or by some other motive of base egoism, exports abroad or maintains there in violation of the legal pro-

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visions in force, part of his fortune in a manner capable of gravely injuring the national economy is liable to the penalty of death. The goods of the guilty person will be confiscated. He will be liable to the same penalty if the punishable offence is committed by him in the territory of any other state. The People's Court (*Volksgerichtshof*) will take cognizance of the offence and pronounce the sentence as laid down.

Art. 2. The present law will enter into force as from the date of its promulgation.

There is no need for any commentary. The law corresponds to the whole conception of the state in Hitlerite Germany.

Another law of December 1, 1936, is devoted to the charter of the City of Berlin. By this law an administrative unity is instituted by making the chief burgomaster also the head of the administration of the country (Prussia), hitherto the Commissar of State. The head of these two administrations will be the chief burgomaster and president of the city. The first burgomaster is directly under the central administration. The delegate of the National Socialist Party for the capital is the head of the Berlin district.

I may also mention the six decrees issued by General Goering, dated November 9, 1936, and regulating the recruitment of labour. The first deals with the training of qualified workers. Industries are under compulsion to make known before January 1, 1937, how many apprentices they employ. Those which do not employ apprentices, or which do not employ a sufficient number in proportion to the number of workers will have to pay a tax. The second forbids the management of factories belonging to the heavy industries to hire directly extra metalurgical workers. All requests for extra hands have to go for authorisation to the Labour Exchange. According to the fifth a census must be taken of all aged unemployed and all businesses employing more than ten people have to provide work for a certain number of persons over forty years of age.

5

The political and legislative life of Austria too is lived under a dictatorship which is seeking to maintain itself against German efforts to absorb it. From that point of view the

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latest law on the dissolution of the volunteer defence organisations is interesting. It lays down :

Art. 1. The defence organisations declared to be protective forces (*Schutzcorps*) by Art. 1 of the government decree concerning the statute of the protective force formations (*Bundesgesetzblatt* No. 261/1935) to wit, the Austrian Heimatschutz, the Ostmaerckische Sturmsharen, the Freiheitsbund, the Burgenlaendische Landes-schuetzen are dissolved, with immediate effect, including all their affiliated or companion groups and associations of like nature.

Art. 2. The dissolved defence organisations are liquidated. The Patriotic Front is the liquidator. The Federal Chancellor will establish at the general secretariat of the Front a liquidation office for each of the dissolved organisations. The competent tribunals in Vienna will be solely qualified to deal with complaints against the dissolved organisations.

6

Among the new legislative texts in the New World, mention must be made of the revision of the constitution of Colombia which took place at the end of 1936. This revision is interesting as a manifestation of the *social* tendencies which are penetrating the constitutional law of Latin America, or at least the legal tests. It is clearly very difficult to judge how far these advanced tendencies are given effect to in every day life, but the fact that these social tendencies do appear in the revised constitutions of the Latin American Republics is very significant.

Art. IX lays down the general principle governing the social duties of the state :

The authorities of the Republic of Colombia are in office to protect and maintain the honour and property of all persons residing in Colombia, to see that the State and individuals fulfil the social tasks incumbent on them.

Arts. X and XI deal with the intervention of the State in economic relations and with certain limitations of the rights of property :

Art. 10. Private property and all the rights justly acquired by it in conformity with the laws by individuals or legal persons are guaranteed and no later law may assail them. None the less when the application of a law passed from motives of public utility or social interest gives rise to a conflict between the necessities recognised by this law and the rights of individuals, private interest must always give way to the public or social interest.

Property is a social function entailing obligations.

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Expropriation by sentence of law and after receipt of an agreed-on indemnity can always be carried through for motives of public utility or social interest as defined by the legislator.

The legislator can always for reasons of equity determine those cases, after the Chamber has agreed by an absolute majority, where indemnification is profitless.

Art. 11. The State by the intermediary of the legislator can intervene in the exploitation of industries and public enterprises with a view to rationalising production, and the distribution or production of goods, or to see that the workers receive that just protection to which they have a right.

A certain limitation of economic liberty is indicated in Art. XV:

Any individual is free to choose his profession or trade. All that the legislator can enforce is professional ability regulations for the practice of a profession.

The State authorities control the conditions of morality, security and public health under which the professions and trades are practiced.

The legislator is empowered to restrict production and consumption of liquor and fermented beverages.

He can also order the revision of or control tariffs and the regulations of the transport and other public services.

Art. XVI lays down the social obligations of the State :

Public assistance is a function of the State. It ought to supply the needs of poor persons physically incapable of working and who cannot demand aid from individuals.

The legislator will lay down the conditions under which such assistance is given and the cases in which the State will directly supply it.

Art. XXI defines the right to strike :

..... the right to strike is guaranteed except in the case of public services. The legislator lays down the manner in which the strike may take place.

7

Among the new French laws, mention must be made of the law on the procedure for conciliation and arbitration in collective labour disputes. The French and foreign press has sufficiently commented upon this new measure of the Blum government and all I need do is to give the text of the important laws of December 31, 1936 :

Art. 1. All collective labour disputes in industry and commerce must be submitted to conciliation or arbitral procedure before any strike or lockout can be declared.

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Art. 2. The regulation of conflicts already in progress is equally to be submitted to such procedure.

As regards conflicts already in progress the commencement of such procedure entails the obligation for all parties to resume work.

For the meantime any dispute of a nature to delay the immediate resumption of work will be brought directly and without any conciliation procedure before the arbiters.

The arbiters will pronounce without delay on the case brought forward either definitively or provisionally; all the rights of the parties will remain in this case reserved until the solution of the other difficulties existing between them.

The decisions of arbiters, definitive or provisional, cannot be appealed against.

Art. 3. If there exists no collective agreement fixing the rules for such procedure of conciliation and arbitration the government is authorised, until the close of the session of 1937, and in the case of any conflict covered by Art. 1, to fix the methods of such procedure by decrees passed in the Council of State in conformity to the dispositions of Art. 15, para 2, of the monetary law of October 1, 1936.

The decree envisaged in Art. 15 of the monetary law will take the form of a public administration regulation.

The decrees promulgated in virtue of the present law and of the aforesaid article, Art. 15 of the monetary law of October 1, 1936, will be rescinded legally on the date indicated. None the less procedure begun at that date will take its course.

Art. 4. If there is occasion to appoint a referee, and if the parties or the arbiters originally chosen fail to agree on the choice of one, such a referee will be chosen from members active or retired of the great public authorities.

Art. 5. This procedure of conciliation and arbitration will be drawn up in conformity with the existing legislation.

The two arbiters and the referee will have the powers of arbitrators.

The arbitration will have as aim the establishment of an equitable settlement of conditions of labour with the object of creating in the places where labour is employed an atmosphere of collaboration with respect to the mutual rights of the parties concerned—rights of property, trade union rights, individual liberties, freedom of labour, and trade union liberties.

Art. 6. Reasons will be given for the arbitral judgment; against it there will be no appeal. It will be obligatory and made public.

The present law, debated and passed by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, will be executed as a law of state.

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BOOK REVIEWS

MOSCOW IN THE MAKING. By SIR E. D. SIMON, LADY SIMON, W. A. ROBSON, AND J. JEWKES. (*Longmans, Green & Co.*, 1937. pp. xii. and 253 with 2 plans. 7s. 6d.)

THIS is exactly the sort of book that is now wanted about the Soviet Union. It makes no attempt to cover the whole social organisation, or even to describe the U.S.S.R. in its entirety. On the other hand it spares the reader all the commonplace incidents of travel, as well as the raptures and hasty animadversions of the tourist. Its ten chapters (of which Sir Ernest Simon contributes seven) amount to a singularly interesting combined report by expert specialists on three important aspects of the government of the second largest city in Europe, namely, housing and town planning, elementary and secondary schooling, and the relation of a metropolitan municipality to the national government on the one hand, and to the subordinate ward or district administration on the other. These three subjects, with the necessary explanatory account of their relation to the remainder of the administration, give the reader a substantial view of the civic organisation of Moscow, in terms which enable valuable comparisons to be made with London and Glasgow, as well as with the Manchester to which three-fourths of the contributors do not conceal their patriotic devotion. What we now badly need, to get the vision stereoscopic and in focus, but are not likely to get, is a similarly faithful examination of the government of Manchester by an equally patriotic group of citizens of Moscow!

Sir Ernest Simon, who contributes a full half of the volume, goes straight for the worst blot on the social picture of the Soviet Union, the terribly low standard of housing. His acute cross-examination of the Moscow officials, from whom he wrested the actual statistics of which he was in search, probably shattered a little of the complacency with which they are apt to regard their achievements. It is wholesome to bring them and their enthusiastic admirers up against the fact that the majority of Moscow's four millions occupy, for each family, for living purposes, day and night, only one

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small room (with only a share of a kitchen, etc.). What is worse in British eyes is that they will have to continue in this overcrowded condition for some years to come. Strive as it may, the Moscow municipality has been, even during the past decade, barely keeping pace in the provision of new buildings, with the unparalleled increase of its population, which, between 1918 and 1932 more than doubled. The highest peak in building construction was reached in 1932, in which year somewhere in the neighbourhood of one hundred thousand people were rehoused. Since then, although even larger programmes have each year been attempted, they have been only half fulfilled, owing principally to the diversion of men and material to the measures of national defence by means of which, as it is believed, the apprehended attack of Japan was successfully averted. If war is still further deferred, the Moscow administrators are counting on rehousing the city's population at the rate of 200,000 a year. It is not that overcrowding and insanitation is, even in Moscow, worse than it was. On the contrary, it is today considerably better, so far as concerns nine-tenths of the population (and that the poorest section) than it was under the Tsar. The steady reduction in the general death-rate by at least one-third since 1913, and particularly the reduction in the infantile death-rate by one-half in the same period, may be cited in confirmation of the housing statistics and the popular impression. Nor is the overcrowding peculiar to Moscow. There is reported to be a similarly low standard of housing in most of the three thousand cities of the U.S.S.R., small or large, whilst in the villages it is lower still.

But though the gregarious Russian seems to have no feeling for privacy, and in winter no yearning for ventilation, it is useful to measure the result of his standard of housing. Here it is now, thanks to Sir Ernest Simon, in black and white for all to read. How many of Moscow's citizens live and sleep in how many square metres of floor space; why they prefer blocks of tenements to cottages in the suburbs; by whom the blocks are built, and how they are managed; what determines the rent, and how the tenants are chosen; even how the Stakhanovite bricklayer, in Sir Ernest's presence, with the

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cordial approval of the trade union secretary who was looking on, laid 570 bricks in 10 minutes, regularly doing 20,000 bricks in his seven-hour day, with the assistance of two girls whom he had trained to perform the subsidiary operations. It was this perfect passion for productivity among the wage-earners themselves, supported by the full-force of the trade unions, that seems most full of significance to the observant economist.

The only exception that can fairly be taken to Sir Ernest's severe strictures on Moscow's insufficiency of housing is that of an unduly limited range of comparison. It may well be that Moscow compares very unfavourably with the recent history of Manchester or London, in the magnitude or the rate of its improvement of its people's housing. But how about the populous cities of Scotland and Ireland, and even many of the smaller boroughs of England and Wales? Is not the fundamental fact about the situation that the English standard of housing for the wage-earner's family, as it has lately been imposed on public opinion (say, that of three bedrooms and a kitchen living room), is far above what is, even today, popularly expected throughout the whole of Eastern and South Eastern Europe? We may more justly rejoice that the Soviet authorities are striving so earnestly to raise the standard of living of the Russian people, than look down on them from the height that we have in England (and that only in the most energetic cities) quite recently attained. What is supremely valuable to us in England is when travellers describe what they have seen superior to our own doings, rather than dwell on the manifold imperfections from which the poor foreigners suffer to a greater extent than ourselves.

It would have been useful to the London County Council and the Ministry of Health, if not to Manchester, if more particulars had been given of the points of detail in which the newest and best of the Moscow blocks of tenements seem to excel our English practice—say, with regard to the provision of lifts to enable the young children and the infirm more easily to get into the open air; or the way in which such amenities as electricity, gas, hot water, as well as cold, telephone and radio, or one or more of them, are provided for each tenement; or of the warm showerbath as a less

costly substitute for the fitted immersion bath; or the joint arrangements for washing and drying clothes of several families; or of the methods by which the drawbacks are mitigated; of the sharing of the entrance lobby and kitchen among two or three tenements. There seems still something to be learned as to economical ways of providing much which the poorest families ought, in the public interest, to possess, but which, in our common niggardliness, we continue to let them do without.

A more fundamental question may be asked. The housing authorities of England have been pressed by the experts in health and sanitation into aiming at rehousing the poorer sections of our population as quickly as possible on the basis of three bedrooms and a kitchen living room, for the normal family. This is involving the exaction of a weekly rent frequently exceeding a fourth of the labourer's wage, with (as now appears) the result of lowering his wife's expenditure on food to such an extent as often to cause positive malnutrition of the family. In the Russian cities the rent is fixed independently of the cost of building and maintenance (and without any ground rent), at a maximum for the wage-earner of one-tenth of his wage. Moreover, the disadvantages of the scanty floor-space of the Russian dwelling are mitigated by the provision, much more amply than in England, of hospital accommodation, crèches and nursery schools, holiday camps, communal meals for adults as well as children, clubs for both sexes, and what not. The choice between these alternative ways of dealing with the circumstances of Moscow and Manchester respectively, is not so easy as the partisans of either imagine. In another chapter of this volume, it is suggested that Soviet Communism involves the "liquidation of the discriminating consumer." Are we in England consulting in this matter the labouring consumers, who might prefer (as perhaps the Russians do) to discriminate against four rooms at one-fourth of their wage, with the consequent squeeze in the family's food on the one hand, and, on the other, to prefer one or two rooms at only one-tenth of their wage with school dinners and club life, and more ample food for the family? And which discrimination should we urge them, in the public interest to exercise?

When the investigators turned to town planning, they

alternated between amazement at the achievement and admiration of the programme. Here what was apparent was the almost boundless opportunity for creating an ideal city; and the courage and ability with which the opportunity was being used. The reporter cannot hide the thrill of excited amazement with which he contrasts the position of Mr. Herbert Morrison, as Leader of the London County Council, with that of Mr. Bulganin who stands at Moscow in a similar relation to town planning. The latter, it is pointed out, has one of the most "exhilarating and even exciting jobs in the world." By a decree already passed, on plans already prepared, and in full progress, he has "to rebuild Moscow during the next ten years with no interest opposing him, with the full force of the government of the U.S.S.R. and of popular opinion behind him" (p. 233). Looking back at the whole length and breadth of his survey, Sir Ernest Simon lets himself go, in words which may astonish British City and County Councillors. "What," he asks, "will the Mossoviet achieve? I believe that they have the best constitution yet devised for effective city government; that their leaders are men of integrity, enthusiasm and ability; that the advantages of socialism and of the one-party system for town planning purposes are of overwhelming importance. If there should be no great war, if the population of Moscow does not exceed five million, if the government maintains its present integrity and strength of purpose, I believe that at the end of the ten year plan, Moscow will be well on the way to being, as regards health, convenience and amenities of life for the whole body of citizens, the best planned great city the world has ever known" (pp. 233/4).

The second subject, for which we are indebted to Lady Simon, is a painstaking survey of the elementary and secondary schools of Moscow. This will be intensely interesting as well as instructive to all concerned with educational administration and school life. The Moscow schools are found to be in many ways different from those of Manchester; and here, as with housing, it is the shortcomings that are uncovered and dwelt on, with greater emphasis than is given to the achievements. This enhances the value of the survey

to the Moscow educationists, and may be suggestive also to the terribly backward Local Education Authorities in our rural areas. But the Manchester Town Council and the London County Council might have found more instructive some account of the far-reaching influence on the schools, the scholars and the teachers of the fact that seems to the English so amazing, of there being absolutely no class distinctions in the educational provision. At all stages from crèche to university, children and adolescents of both sexes sit side by side, speaking with every accent, coming from homes maintained on incomes of widely different amounts, of parents of every grade of intellectual attainments and every kind of occupation, including the highest placed officials and the humblest labourer. What is even more important, there are no other schools or colleges for any rich parent to patronise. Many people would like to know what are the effects or results of this startling innovation of the common school, which seems to be pushed much further in the U.S.S.R. than ever it was in Scotland, or New England, or than it today is in Switzerland or Sweden. This universalism is, of course, merely one manifestation of the persistent purpose of the Soviet authorities to produce, even within the present generation, not merely an educated class, or a cultured élite, or even a trained intelligentsia for the service of the state; but, genuinely and literally, an educated people—a result which no other government in the world has ever intended.

This fundamental purpose of transforming, within a single generation, not some sections only, but all the vast population of the U.S.S.R., explains a feature of the Moscow educational administration which Lady Simon finds as strange as objectionable. In the Soviet Union, Lady Simon complains, nearly everything in the school system is directed and governed by the People's Commissariat of each constituent republic (or we should say, by its Cabinet of Ministers); in the case of Moscow by that of the R.S.F.S.R., which governs over 100 millions of people from the Baltic to the Pacific. Lady Simon contrasts this centralisation very unfavourably with the British freedom of each Local Education Authority to have what schools it chooses, and to spend

on them as much (and as little!) as it pleases. It may be questioned whether either the formal centralisation in the U.S.S.R. or the apparent local autonomy of Britain is in effect, as great as Lady Simon suggests. But admitting the contrast, is it quite clear, in the different circumstances of the two countries, which plan is the better? 'We, in England, have never tried to produce an educated people. Our schools started as a branch of "rescue work." We have consequently been content to prescribe the barest minimum (and not even to enforce that); and to leave it to the local authorities of exceptionally enlightened cities and counties to provide a little more from time to time (but not too much!). Hence the difference between Manchester and London on the one hand, and most of the small towns and rural counties on the other, is simply prodigious, and the width of the spread is scarcely, if at all, diminishing. Thus we pay for our local autonomy by the exclusion from any effective education of at least half our children. Such a policy in the U.S.S.R. would have left the hundred millions of illiterate peasantry and backward races hopelessly behind for many generations. In order to save the children of the present generation, the whole nation had to be lifted up. Nothing short of the centralised strength of the people as a whole could have brought, within a single decade, some 25 million children to school, and to school up to at least 15 plus, whilst in the technical college, university and scientific institute students over 18 are reaching up to a million. Given the purpose of educating the whole nation—which has not yet dawned on the British governing class—was there any alternative to a centralised direction of the schools?

In the chapter entitled "Industry and Finance" Professor Jewkes was set an impossible task. To describe even the structural framework of the financial and industrial institutions of the U.S.S.R. within the limits of 23 pages, is beyond human capacity. Very usefully he has contented himself with providing an intelligible background to the special studies of the local government of Moscow to which the rest of the volume is devoted. Very characteristically, too, he emphasises, in his description of the federal government of the U.S.S.R., under which not only such municipalities as Mos-

cow, and such giant republics as the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine, believe that they enjoy considerable autonomy, what seems to him the all penetrating interference of a dictatorship, which appears sometimes as that of Stalin, and sometimes as that of Gosplan (the State Planning Commission). What puzzles Professor Jewkes is on what considerations, in the absence of "a capital market" and of a "pricing system," operating with the free competition of profit seekers, Gosplan makes its decisions to extend this industry rather than that, to erect new factories in one place rather than in another, and to put one price rather than another on the commodities of which it directs the production. Professor Jewkes seems unaware of any ground for taking one course rather than another, except that of "price in the market." Let him imagine himself to be the sole proprietor, and therefore complete governor, of England. He would want roads and bridges, playing fields and hospitals, drains and universities. Which would he choose and where would he place them? He (or his Ministers) would have first to decide whether he would govern for the benefit of all his people, or for that of some sections of them. Either way, it would be necessary to calculate or estimate, with regard to all these enterprises, not their respective profitableness in the capitalist sense, but the respective social utilities of themselves and their locations. He would be realistically guided by the volume and quality of their several social advantages, to which the possible price in a market of competitive profit seekers would be the poorest of indications. Just in this way is the decision made in the Soviet Union, not only for hospitals and drainage but also for factories and retail shops, works of defence and oilfields, and all the thousand and one enterprises of a nation rapidly approaching 200 millions of a hundred different races. What the consumer freely exercises in his choice of how he will expend his wages if he is a wage-earner, or the sum in currency for which he finds he can sell the product of his own and his partners' labours in the bazaar, or free market. That he can quite effectively "decide how he will spread his expenditure through time" (which Professor Jewkes denies at p. 90) is shown by the large temporary deposits in the State Savings Bank, which the depositor

periodically withdraws at will. That "the discriminating consumer in the U.S.S.R. has been liquidated" (p. 91) is shown not to be true, by the perpetual waxing and waning of the consumers' purchases of this or that commodity, and by the frequent "selling off" at reduced prices (exactly as in capitalist countries) of remnants left on the hands of the shops and producing trusts, when the consumers' demand has changed, or has been erroneously forecast.

The longest chapter in the volume (67 pp.) and that to which pride of place is given is a masterly description of "The City Government of Moscow" by Dr. W. A. Robson. The extraordinary complication of this municipal machinery almost baffles description with the plenum, ispolkom and presidium of its elected council (Mossoviet), and the sections and departments through which it works; and the elected soviets and sections and bureaus of sections of the 23 *reions* into which the city is divided, with their departments and district trusts, together with the multitudinous co-opted "activists" among the citizens who busy themselves in supervision and inspection of all the municipal work in their localities. The functions are as numerous and as diverse as the structures. It is, indeed, part of the conception of local government in the U.S.S.R., that each local body may and should carry out, within its own area, many of the functions and powers of the bodies in the official hierarchy superior to itself. Hence the Moscow municipality, besides doing its specifically municipal business, acts as the executive for many of the functions and departments both of the R.S.F.S.R. (the constituent republic within which it is situated) and of the U.S.S.R. (the federal government) itself. At the same time it has to control and direct the bodies beneath it (those of the 23 *reions*, or municipal wards). It has its own water and gas supply (but that of electricity is directly administered by the federal government) and tramways, housing and townplanning, paving, lighting and cleansing. It has also many minor manufactures, and a large part of the retailing. It administers its force of "militiamen" (the word police is avoided in the U.S.S.R., as evoking disagreeable memories).

Amid all these complications and peculiarities, Dr. Robson

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Leagues, here and in Mr. Werth's previous volume, is well told, the problem raised by the growth and evolution of French Communism has been partly overlooked. The views expressed by Frenchmen on the subject are extraordinarily confusing; but they exercise nevertheless an enormous influence on their mind.

The grievances of all social classes, the spontaneous movement of discontent and hope which has swept the country are indeed well understood. The successful appeal made to the democratic spirit of France to fight a new aristocracy of wealth could have been placed more to the front. Mr. Werth does not seem to have fully realised its importance because of his severe appreciation of the part played by Radicalism in French politics. The present divisions of the Radical Party make it hard to remember that Radicalism remains the political and social party which suits best the French democrats.

Mr. Werth is fully aware of the influence which conditions in Europe have on "the destiny of France" and many Frenchmen will support his view as to the reaction of public opinion on March 7, 1936. However, the reader must not fail to see the dangerous responsibilities which the French Cabinet at that time had to shoulder and the influence which Britain's attitude had on its fateful decision. On the whole Mr. Werth has succeeded in presenting a large amount of accurate information in the form of a narrative which often makes fascinating reading.

A Frenchman will welcome Mr. Davis's interest in "the study of potential allies" and his attempt "to give a picture of what security seemed like to the various governments of France." He describes the efforts made to solve France's manpower problem by increasing the birth-rate, by altering the length of service, and by calling upon the resources of the colonies. On staff plans, the influence of new weapons, air and naval development the reader is given precise and reliable information. The author does justice to French efforts towards disarmament but fears that France will soon reluctantly be compelled to accept a disastrous rearmament by restoring the old law of a three years' service.

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moves freely, and is accordingly able to describe clearly. No such lucid, interesting and complete account of the organisation of Moscow has before appeared.

Let us note a few of the interesting details on which Dr. Robson throws light. He devotes five whole pages to a unique experiment in democratic control, namely the extraordinary volume and particularly of the "Instructions" which the electors at large impose on their representatives at each election, on which the representatives are required to report periodically to their electorates. It appears that more than half of these instructions actually get carried out, whilst as to most of the remainder it can be said that something has been done towards the object aimed at.

A second feature, in which the Moscow City Council is unique among the municipalities of the world, is the extent to which it has developed something corresponding to the British Cabinet of Ministers, corporately deciding policy and individually controlling the several departments which have to carry it out. "The presidium," he says (p. 14), "resembles a cabinet of ministers on the English model more closely than it does any feature of British municipal institutions..... There is the same kind of responsibility to the elected assembly, a similar concentration of power, the same opportunity for energetic leadership and closely co-ordinated action, which is found in the British Cabinet system."

Dr. Robson does not fail to notice the shortcomings and weaknesses of Moscow government. He denounces the fanaticism, by which its members are afflicted; the intolerance towards anyone guilty of deviation from the "General Line"; their almost complete ignorance of the experience and the condition of other great cities of the world, and, with all their worship of physical and biological science, their complete ignoring of the social sciences outside the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. But Dr. Robson can sum up as follows (p. 66): "The Soviet Union has evolved a system of local government.....which embodies all the requirements necessary for a high degree of efficiency. There is a well-articulated and closely knit organisation which combines in a remarkable degree the advantages of concentrated power and leadership in a small group of executive chiefs with the benefits of

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widespread popular participation in the subordinate parts of the administration. The methods by which responsibility, decentralisation, and multiformity have been obtained are at once novel and successful. The relations between the city soviet of Moscow and the minor authorities in charge of the districts seem to me almost ideal, and incomparably superior to those existing in London, Paris or New York. The relations between the Mossoviet and the higher authorities are theoretically attractive in a society where great government activity is called for. The practical working of these relationships varies between the different services and makes a common judgment difficult. It appears most satisfactory in regard to public health, and least satisfactory in regard to education, which is excessively centralised."

Altogether a singularly penetrating and discriminatively critical account of Moscow in the making, which becomes at once indispensable to every serious student either of municipal institutions or of the Soviet Union.

SIDNEY WEBB.

THE DESTINY OF FRANCE. By ALEXANDER WERTH. (*Hamish Hamilton*. 414 pp. 10s. 6d. 1937)

THE FRENCH WAR MACHINE. By SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS. (*George Allen & Unwin*. 221 pp. 8s. 6d. 1937)

MR. WERTH has written a brilliant, witty and instructive survey of the political struggle now taking place in France. While his sympathies are with the Popular Front, he retains a complete freedom of criticism. His book contains many striking details on recent events such as the last electoral campaign and the strikes of May-June, 1936. But it also provides a clear and fair discussion of the reforms undertaken by the Blum Cabinet.

Although his main object is to describe the tendencies of the present government, he rightly devotes half the volume to the preceding period. Successive chapters deal with the abortive attempt to form a Cartel government in 1932, with the causes and results of February 6, 1934, M. Doumergue's interlude and above all with the Laval era. The strength

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of the popular movement which now carries with it "the destiny of France" cannot be properly estimated without keeping in mind both the failure of a Left coalition to pull the country through the opening stages of the world crisis and that of the Right parties to find a way out of its increasing difficulties. But I doubt whether he was right to add an introducing chapter which summarises the whole post-war period in the form of a "non-stop" review. It leads to the conclusion that France was all the time following a blind alley and the reader should at least be warned that Frenchmen are at present by no means prepared to share such a view.

The constitutional reforms advocated by M. Doumergue in 1934 are bitterly criticised. Mr Werth well shows that they were not accurately described as being borrowed from England and regards them as calculated to favour the ambitions of the Fascist Leagues. This may be true of M. Doumergue's policy in the later part of 1934. But during the previous months there existed in the country a general desire for some changes at least in the working of the French constitution. M. Doumergue's worst mistake was to miss such a god-sent opportunity.

Again I do not object to the author's appreciation of M. Laval's career. The way he played with the renewed activities of the Croix de Feu and with the issues raised at Geneva produced in France a widespread feeling of insecurity and discontent which is here well analysed. However the reader is not led to understand the importance of the financial effort made by the Laval Cabinet. The process of deflation undertaken without facing the problem of a possible devaluation was not followed by any reduction in the cost of living. But many Frenchmen do believe that it did nevertheless prepare the way for a subsequent recovery of trade.

The volume provides much information on the activities of the Communists during and after February 6, 1934. But I doubt whether the reader will grasp the many reasons that led to the formation of a "rassemblement populaire." The instructive discussions followed for two years between Socialists and Communists, the circumstances under which the two Trade Union Councils joined hands are not on the whole properly explained. While the story of the Fascist

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Leagues, here and in Mr. Werth's previous volume, is well told, the problem raised by the growth and evolution of French Communism has been partly overlooked. The views expressed by Frenchmen on the subject are extraordinarily confusing; but they exercise nevertheless an enormous influence on their mind.

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JAPAN'S FEET OF CLAY. By FRED A. UTLEY. (Faber. 15s.)

MILITARISM AND FOREIGN POLICY IN JAPAN. By E. E. N. CAUSTON. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

THE Nazi-Japanese Alliance against Communism and the U.S.S.R., Japan's feverish war-preparations, the steady pursuit of her policy of aggression in China, and the periodical assassinations of Cabinet Ministers by Army Officers, force even our distracted Western world to pay attention to the Far East. These two books set out to make Western public opinion understand why it is that Japan has embarked on a policy of militarism and aggression.

Mr. Causton explains that his book was an essay to fulfil a requirement for the degree of Master of Arts at Yale University, U.S.A. His work displays the virtues and defects of American scholarship of this order. On the side of virtue it is a conscientious and thorough compilation of facts, with much quoting of sources. The defect is naiveté and superficiality when it comes to analysing, i.e., using thought to extract a meaning from, the facts.

Mr. Causton's object, he says, is to analyse the causes and effects of the influence which the Army and Navy in Japan exert upon the country's government and foreign policy. He sets about this task in a series of chapters. The first explains the survival of feudal and militarist traditions as largely due to the teaching of "Bushido," Zen Buddhism, and Shinto. In Chapter II, the absence of democracy in Japan is explained as a result of the defects of the Japanese Constitution. "There can, in fact, be no denial that the Constitution was framed without any idea of instituting democratic control, which was the antithesis of the Emperor's power. The Constitution, therefore, stipulated none of those democratic powers which have played so important a part in democratic control in Great Britain. The checks and balances of the American Constitution were absent."

Every chapter is packed with sensational discoveries of this sort. There is a great deal of information about the Constitution, the peculiar position and practices of the Army and Navy, the events of 1931 and since. But Mr. Causton's attempts to explain the causes of the phenomena he describes

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are little more than an essay in tautology, as in the examples given of his "explanations" of why feudal and militarist traditions have survived and why there is no democracy in Japan. That is because he is apparently innocent of any understanding of any connection between social and economic conditions and political events. He even manages to describe the events of 1931 without any reference to the social and economic strains set up by the world depression, although they were the *fons et origo* of the Manchurian outbreak and its aftermath. Even when he does stumble on social and economic facts he does not realise their significance. Thus, in several passages he mentions the rise in the Army of a lower middle class and small landowner group of officers, with General Araki at their head, and the passionate hatred of this group for the big industrialists and bankers. And yet, on p. 174, he observes that it is difficult to understand why the Army in appealing for public support not only laid stress on the national emergency but also upon "the responsibility of the capitalists for the existing economic and financial troubles." He cannot understand the contradiction between the Army's professions of anti-capitalist and peasant feeling and its demands for vast military appropriations, which inevitably and automatically cut down the funds available for farm relief.

If Mr. Causton had been familiar with the economic origins, class-composition, and social demagoguery of Fascism, he surely would have recognised and understood its Japanese variant. The curious thing is that he appends references *passim* to O. Tanin's and E. Yohan's "Militarism and Fascism in Japan," which contains a masterly analysis, supported by a wealth of evidence, of precisely the social and economic facts which Mr. Causton either finds unintelligible or ignores, although they supply the key to the aspects of Japanese policy which he purports, but fails, to explain.

Miss Freda Utley's "Japan's Feet of Clay" is a work of a wholly different order. Anyone who wants to understand what is happening in Japan today and what that distressful country is likely to do next, ought to buy this book and read it from cover to cover. It is indeed of first-class importance

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for all who wish to understand some of the major forces that are shaping the future of civilisation before our eyes.

In chapter after chapter of brilliantly marshalled and overwhelmingly detailed facts, Miss Utley lays bare Japan's poverty in raw materials and dependence on foreign trade; the primitive organisation and under-capitalisation of most of her industry and nearly all her agriculture; the extraordinary way in which the remains of a feudal economic and social structure have been blended with an ultra-modern concentration of financial and industrial power, and how the result has been to exaggerate and intensify all the evils and contradictions of capitalism. A beautifully clear analysis shows how the whole of Japan's economic life is based on agriculture, and how the Japanese peasantry live in a state of chronic land-hunger, debt, and semi-starvation, rising at times to stark famine. A striking historical survey shows the "fundamental causes of the diseased structure of Japan's national economy" and the social and economic foundations of Japan's "despotism and the absence of civil rights and liberties."

A chapter on "the imminence of social revolution" makes out a strong case for its opening statement (p. 288) that: "The extreme misery and discontent of the peasantry, the obstacles which the feudal survivals place in the way of the accumulation of capital and of a healthy development of a middle class, the restricted home market, the savage repression of the working class and of all socialist and even liberal opinion, the revolutionary spirit and activities of the "intelligentsia," the revolutionary ferment amongst the enormous class of artisans, small industrialists and traders, the lack of all political and social liberties, the autocratic powers of the monarchy and its bureaucracy, the petty and all-pervading tyranny of the police, the widespread corruption amongst the ruling class and throughout the whole administrative apparatus—all these and many other features of present-day Japan recall those of Tsarist Russia. Large as Japan's army may be, and loyal as the Japanese proclaim it, successful as Japan's expansion in Asia has been until now, zealously as the devotion of the mass of the people to the Mikado may be proclaimed, Japan is actually as politically

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and socially unstable and as near to revolution as was the old Russia.'

A final chapter on "Food, Armaments, Morale and Finance" gives ample support for the view, held by most of those who really know the situation in the Far East, that Japan could not and would not have defied League economic sanctions applied with the help of the U.S.A. in 1932. Former Secretary of State Stimson's recent book supports the view that this co-operation could have been secured if the British Government had wanted it. But our "National" Government were more afraid of the consequences to capitalism of a revolution in Japan than they were of the consequences to the League and to world peace of giving Japanese Imperialism its head in China. We could have had a successful Disarmament Conference and a secure world peace, guaranteed by a strong collective system enjoying American support, if our Tory rulers in 1931-1932 had not chosen to default on their treaty obligations and to connive at aggression. But they did, and as a result, as the Chinese Ambassador in London, Mr. Quo Tai Chi, observed to the League Assembly, the Far Eastern skies are now dark with chickens coming home to roost. The Abyssinian and Spanish betrayals and the sabotage of the Disarmament Conference, have since filled the Western skies with even grislier birds of a feather. But the dirtier their record, the more shining is the self-righteousness of our rulers, and the more disastrous the consequences of their policy, the more unshakable their conviction that they alone can save the country. When they break treaties and outrage mercy, justice, and the honour of the British people, they plead "realism." When their crimes turn out to be blunders, they do not perceive that honesty would have been the best policy, nor do they realistically abide by the test of the results of what they have done. On the contrary, they fall back on a kind of *post-mortem* idealism, and plead their good intentions as the excuse for their failure to arrest the drift to war which their cynical travesty of realism did so much to start.

"EURASIAN"

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A HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. By K. B. SMELLIE. (*Duckworth*. 15s.)

THE purpose of this book is to show how, since 1832, intellectual and religious movements, and economic developments have influenced the organisation of politics; and how the changes in the organisation of politics have transformed the machinery of administration. Mr. Smellie divides the hundred years under review into three periods, 1832-1870, 1870-1914, 1918 onwards, and an interregnum, 1914-1918. Each of the three periods is discussed in three chapters, dealing respectively with the State and Society, Government and Parties, and the Machinery of Administration. One chapter deals with the war, outlining the governmental problems which it raised, the efforts which were made to surmount them, and innovations made while it lasted, some of which, like the Cabinet Secretariat and the consequent change in the Cabinet's method of business, have become permanent. But Mr. Smellie is concerned to emphasise the difference between the problems of war, when all efforts are concentrated on a single well-defined object, and those of peace, when a democratic government has to decide what aims it is to pursue before it can decide how to attain them.

The demarcations which Mr. Smellie adopts are significant: the first two periods end with a continental war. With commendable courage he has taken all public affairs as his province and each of the chapters dealing with the State and Society, except, curiously, the last, includes a very able summary of foreign policy. 1870 was the year not only of Sedan but also of Forster's Education Act and Mr. Smellie shows a relation between them. 1832-1870 was a period of government by the aristocracy for the upper middle classes; after the repeal of the Corn Laws the latter were politically a spent force, and the creative work which was done thereafter was only the adaptation of the machinery of government to upper middle-class requirements. A career open to their sons' talents was one of these: hence the substitution of competition by examination for patronage in the Civil Service. The upper middle-classes lived in towns, and were liable to

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infection with the diseases of the poor: hence the germs of a policy of public health. But they did not believe in spending their money on educating their inferiors: hence it required the pressure of the new classes of voters to be aggravated by the jolt of Prussian hegemony before real progress in public education could be made.

The Reform Act of 1867 dealt *laissez faire*, as a rule of universal application, its death blow. From 1870 to 1914 the State had two main tasks: to "hold the ring" where there was reason to believe that the free play of individual choice and judgment would be of benefit to society; "to discover administrative methods for the production and control of necessary and possible things not produced by the free play of individual choice and judgment in the market." After the war the main problem was to reconcile the need for expert government with the inevitability of mass propaganda, and to adjust the relations not only of the politician with the expert administrator, but also of each with the technician. 1832 destroyed Clarendon's "balance of the Constitution"; today we are ruled by a Cabinet dictatorship.

Such, in the broadest outline, is the background against which Mr. Smellie sets the most interesting, because the most concrete, part of the book. The background, particularly in so far as it covers the post-war years, some will find not wholly satisfactory. But the study of the machinery of administration is a masterpiece of selection, condensation and clarification. Mr. Smellie has a fine historical sense: he is anxious that we should understand even where we cannot presently venerate, and he explains, as well as exposes, the defects and inconsistencies in our administrative system. It would be invidious to select any part of this study for especial praise, but the excellent account of the strange, eventful history of the War Office is of particular topical interest.

The book will be of interest to the specialist for its method. The general reader will find it a most stimulating introduction to the study of administration. But it is marred by a number of mistakes, small in themselves, extremely irritating in the aggregate. The punctuation of sentences is often bad, their structure sometimes clumsy. Verbal errors abound,

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and there are also a number of errors in dates and figures. Campbell-Bannerman is said to have been marked out for the leadership of the Liberal Party from 1908: the year of his death. After the statement that the standard rate of income tax in 1932-33 was 5s., and the maximum figure of surtax 8s. 3d. we are informed that the taxpayer in 1933 "might pay as much as 2s. 3d." It is also most aggravating to have to go to the end of the chapter in order to look at a reference, instead of seeing it at the foot of the page. The book should never have been allowed, either by the author or the publishers, to go to press in its present form. We can only hope that the public will not be deterred. "Easy writing makes damned hard reading," but Mr. Smellie, if sometimes careless, is generally clear and frequently entertaining.

W. T. WELLS.

THE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE GERMAN-POLISH BORDERLANDS; A STUDY OF CONDITIONS TODAY IN THE PRE-WAR PRUSSIAN PROVINCES OF EAST AND WEST PRUSSIA. By IAN F. D. MORROW, assisted by L. M. SIEVEKING. (Oxford University Press and Milford. 1936. Pp. xiv + 558. 25s.)

THIS is a heavy but good book, published under the auspices of Chatham House. British eyes have been curiously slow to focus Poland. The country itself and its history, literature and language are discredibly little known among us. The more familiar Germans, therefore, have always had a great advantage in the contest for the support of British opinion in German-Polish controversies. And, on the whole, British sympathies have certainly lain, even among relatively well-informed persons, on the German rather than the Polish side. Probably since 1933 there has been some change in this emotional attitude. But not because of a better knowledge of Poland or a better understanding of the Polish case. Too many Englishmen are still Westerners in Europe. Like Mr. Eden in his surveys of our foreign relations, they do not travel beyond Germany in their eastward journey. Yet Poland, both actually and potentially, holds a key position in Europe.

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Mr. Morrow's book is objective and, within its limits, very complete. Unfortunately, however, he omits Upper Silesia and Poznań, which fall within his main title, though he includes Memel, which does not. But on "the Corridor," Danzig and East Prussia he is exhaustive.

The present German-Polish frontiers are practically the same as they were from 1651 to the Partitions, and not very different from those which were established in the middle of the fifteenth century. And the present status of Danzig closely resembles that which prevailed from 1454 for nearly three hundred and fifty years, and again for a short period at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The "Corridor" is a tendentious title for the northern part of the province of Pomorze or North-West Poland. Its common use represents a victory for German over Polish propagandists. It carries a suggestion of something artificial, inherently unnatural and unjust. "No one," as Mr. Morrow observes, "refers to the American Panama Canal Zone as 'the American Corridor,' or to British Columbia as a 'Canadian Corridor' separating the American State of Alaska from the United States." Yet the population of Pomorze is 90 per cent. Polish and only 10 per cent. German, and before 1914 it habitually elected Polish Nationalist deputies to the German Reichstag. The present population is about 1½ millions with a high rate of natural increase, while the growth of Gdynia causes a steady immigration of Poles into the area.

Mr. Morrow shows that there are now no tangible German grievances regarding transit of persons and goods between East Prussia and the rest of Germany, and adds that "the fact that the Reichswehr has been able to hold its annual manoeuvres in East Prussia without any difficulty shows that military traffic across 'the Corridor' works smoothly and without incident."

If North Pomorze is a "Corridor," East Prussia is an island, or enclave, surrounded on all sides by Polish and Lithuanian populations. Those who dislike untidy looking frontiers should consider the alternatives. And here the two alternatives, either of which would make a tidier map, the cession of Pomorze to Germany, or of East Prussia to Poland, would both be equally unjust to the population to be ceded.

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The population of East Prussia is $2\frac{1}{4}$ millions, and is increasing very slowly, the highest rate of natural increase being among the Polish minority which is larger proportionately than the German minority in Pomorze. The present frontiers of East Prussia were determined after plebiscites in 1920 in the districts of Marienwerder and Allenstein, both of which contain a Polish element in the population. Both these plebiscites resulted in an overwhelming majority for Germany, but Mr. Morrow does not mention the fact that they were taken at the moment when the Soviet Armies were rapidly advancing on Warsaw. This was not a moment when prudent peasants would vote Polish!

East Prussia has for many years been a source of emigration to the rest of Germany. Mr. Morrow gives a very good account of agricultural and economic conditions in this province, and of the growth of agrarian indebtedness. He concludes that "the German contention that the creation of 'the Corridor' has been responsible for agrarian distress and indebtedness in Eastern Germany is unsupported by the facts," and that "the importance of the 'Corridor' problem in German political life has been mainly due to the fact that the chief sufferers in an economic sense as a result of the 'Corridor's' existence, have been the East Elbian Junkers." This also furnishes the clue to the fall of Brüning and Schleicher, the first arrival of Hitler in power and the subsequent conduct of Hindenburg.

Danzig has always depended, and must depend, on its trade with the Polish hinterland. But "a natural consequence," says Mr. Morrow, "of the paramount German influence, coupled with the lack of local patriotism, has been that the Free City has often pursued a policy towards Poland that was incompatible with its true economic interest."

Most notably in the case of the munitions strike in 1920, which the Poles, at war with Soviet Russia, regarded as a stab in the back. In that hour the project of Gdynia was born. "There can indeed be few ports in the world," says Mr. Morrow, "of which it can be said that they have developed in a single decade from a fishing village of a few hundred inhabitants into a harbour that cleared more than five million net registered tons of shipping in 1932. The energy and enthusiasm displayed by the Polish nation in this

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great undertaking compel admiration." Poland could now, perhaps, afford to let Danzig go back to the Reich—and starve. But for those who know and love that beautiful old city, this is a hateful solution. Sir Richard Haking, one of the most successful of the League's High Commissioners in Danzig, a few years after the war expressed the opinion that, "if Danzig had been given out and out to Poland before Germany had recovered from the first shock of her defeat and of her political upheaval, the situation would not have been so bad and in time would have been accepted."

This was the original proposal made by the Polish Commission of the Peace Conference. It was modified through the influence of Mr. Lloyd George. Had it been accepted, there would today be no Gdynia, and Danzig would be much larger and more prosperous, but substantially Polish.

From Danzig Mr. Morrow passes to Memel, and relates in detail its unhappy history since the war. If only German good faith could be trusted, the obvious solution here, as part of a general European appeasement, would be that the town and port of Memel with its immediate surroundings should revert to the Reich, with free zones in the port for Lithuanian, Polish and probably also for Soviet trade, and that the rest of the present "Memel Territory" should be part of Lithuania. But even such a small item of peaceful treaty revision is difficult to contemplate in the present atmosphere of Europe.

In a final chapter Mr. Morrow refers to the German-Polish ten-year pact of non-aggression concluded in January, 1934. "A veil has for two years been drawn over the so-called 'Corridor.' Its existence is never referred to in the German—and therefore in the world—press. Passengers and goods traffic cross and recross the 'Corridor' without let or hindrance. Indeed its presence seems to have been so completely forgotten in the midst of other more immediate concerns that a reader might justifiably ask the question, 'Why were there so many complaints of its existence before 1933 and none afterwards?' A further legitimate question would be, 'Were these complaints warranted in view of their total cessation?'" This book should be read by every serious student of the complexities of modern Europe.

HUGH DALTON.

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SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1935. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, assisted by V. M. BOULTER. Two volumes. (Oxford Press & Milford. Vol. I 18s., Vol. II 21s.)

PROFESSOR TOYNBEE'S annual survey of international affairs which he writes for the Royal Institute of International Affairs is even more remarkable than usual. In the first place it is two volumes instead of one. In the second, it is, if possible, even more interesting and readable than usual. It is an extraordinary feat to make an account of the foreign affairs of a single year at once so detailed and so readable. There are over 1,000 pages in these two volumes, and they contain a minute record of events, many of which are not in themselves of much interest, yet it is literally true that the present reviewer several times "could not put the book down." Perhaps the main reason for this is that the writer contrives to make the reader see the world events of 1935 stage themselves as a kind of cosmic tragedy in which nemesis and sin and the Eumenides drive the nations of Europe to destruction, while in the background absurd manikins like Mussolini and Hitler gesticulate grotesquely.

The second and larger of the two volumes deals exclusively with the Italian attack upon and conquest of Abyssinia, so that it covers not only 1935, but the first nine months of 1936. The first volume covers in two parts the affairs of Europe and the Far East, and in a third part deals with two phases of the world's economic problem. The close interconnection of foreign affairs in every part of the world is shown by the fact that the first volume again and again throws light upon the second. Thus the negotiations for an East European Pact, the Franco-Italian agreement of January 1935, the German law introducing conscription in March, the signing of the Franco-Soviet agreement in May, the Anglo-German naval agreement of June are all seen to lead, inextricably and almost inevitably, to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October and the attitude of Great Britain and France, which in its turn led to the destruction of the League. Again, one of the sections in the third part of the first volume, devoted to world economic affairs and contributed by Mr. H. V. Hodson, is directly connected with the Abyssinian

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question, for it deals with the problem of raw materials, and therefore with one of the reasons given by Italy for her conquest of Abyssinia.

As Professor Toynbee himself points out, the events with which he deals, particularly in the second volume, are more "controversial" than those which he usually has to recount and explain in these surveys. To write about them impartially and intelligently is impossible, for no intelligent man can afford not to decide on which side of the line he stands in this international controversy. Professor Toynbee has made his decision and never attempts to conceal it.

LEONARD WOOLF.

UNDER MOSCOW SKIES. By MAURICE HINDUS. (736 pp. Gollancz. 10s. 6d.)

IT is unusual to review works of fiction in *The Political Quarterly*. An exception is made in the present instance because of the interest of comparing Mr. Hindus's remarkable novel with the article by Mr. Krilenko appearing elsewhere in this issue. Both deal with sexual relations and the family under Soviet communism. Both contain a mixture of fact and fiction, though doubtless in different proportions. Both are concerned with the problem of adjusting the personal relations of men and women to the economic and social environment created by the Russian revolution. There the likeness ends and the differences begin. First comes the difference between the general and the particular. Mr. Krilenko states his dogmatic thesis in general Marxian terms and illustrates it by individual cases. Mr. Hindus concentrates primarily on particular persons and refers to general considerations only in order to show how those lives, which are presumably typical, are affected by social and economic forces operating throughout the whole Soviet Union.

There is also a second and much more profound divergence between the point of view of the Commissar and that of the novelist. Mr. Krilenko declares that "capitalist social relationships prevented the love instinct from becoming the

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only stimulus to marriage." Mr. Hindus shows that the new social relationships in the Soviet Union can in their own way no less effectively prevent the love instinct from becoming the only stimulus to marriage. Of this possibility, Mr. Krilenko appears to have no inkling.

The scene of Mr. Hindus's book is an apartment block in Moscow known as the House of Destiny. In it are living a varied collection of persons ranging from *koolaks* engaged in illegal trading operations to Andrey Belov, an energetic and able Bolshevik industrial leader, and his wife Anna, who is engaged in social welfare work at a factory. Into the House of Destiny there drifts a visitor from America, Bernard Blackman, the grandson of a former revolutionary Russian exile who went to the U.S.A. and became a prosperous man of business in the Middle West. Anna and Andrey are living happily together with their child until Bernard and Anna fall passionately in love with one another. Anna divorces Andrey and Bernard endeavours to persuade her to marry him. But this means leaving Russia and relinquishing her share in the task of building up the new society; and faced with this choice Anna discovers that love is not enough.

Andrey has suffered unspeakable misery through the break-up of his marriage and the loss of his child; and at the moment of his deepest anguish and mortification the dogmas of the revolution concerning women's freedom become utterly remote from his feelings and behaviour. Ultimately he marries Yelena, the daughter of a *koolak* who for that reason alone had become a virtual outcast from society and unable to marry the man she loves, who himself had sunk to the lowest dregs for a similar reason. Yelena is loved by Petya, a young komsomol who, in turn, had found that his deepest emotions were in conflict with the iron discipline imposed by the komsomols and the inflexible assumptions of Bolshevik theory.

Under Moscow Skies is both a work of art of high merit and a sociological document of great significance. Mr. Hindus is neither "for" nor "against" Soviet communism. His book is primarily a work of comprehension; and it is almost incidentally that it reveals the accomplishments and destructiveness of the revolution. Only a writer of Russian

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extraction could have penetrated so deeply into the Russian character. Mr. Hindus's moving and vivid pages bear the authentic stamp of truth. He stands in the tradition of the great Russian novelists.

MR. KEYNES AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT. By A. L. ROWSE.
(Macmillan & Co. 68 pp. 2s. 6d.)

MR. J. M. KEYNES (born 1883) and Mr. A. L. Rowse (born 1902) can each be described as being among the foremost intellectuals of their respective generations. So when one of them writes a book on the subject of the other, it is bound to make interesting reading. As *The Times* said of Mr. Keynes' *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, the reader confining himself to passages of general interest alone, will obtain more for his five shillings than by reading the whole of a good many more expensive books. In Mr. Rowse's book there are no passages which are not of general interest, and the book provides the most readable half-crown's worth that we have seen for some time.

The two dullest products of the nineteenth century were the doctrine of *Laissez-faire* and orthodox Marxism. Nominally speaking, Mr. Keynes has in the past adhered to the former, Mr. Rowse to the latter. But, in the course of the last ten years, Mr. Keynes' mind has been gradually rejecting the tenets of *Laissez-faire*, while Mr. Rowse's Marxism has always been of the eclectic kind, allowing him to believe also in the maintenance of the colonial Empire, the gold standard, bilateral trade agreements and a number of other political proposals more usually associated with conservatism than with Marxism. Now, in the present situation of the world, and having carefully studied the proposals of Mr. Keynes' *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, Mr. Rowse moves forward to a subtle, brilliant and unexpected synthesis. The economic views embodied in policies which the Labour Party, without formal guidance, has put forward during the last twenty years, are, Mr. Rowse

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claims, in agreement with those now proposed by Mr. Keynes and justified by up-to-date economic theory. And Mr. Rowse is right.

He opens with a brilliantly malicious yet constructive account of the state of economic thought at the present time, and the trend among economists "away from the real world of economic affairs, led by what might be described as the London School" (since the retirement of Professor Cannan; but the real villains of the piece are the Viennese School). Mr. Rowse trounces the excessive deductivism and theorisation of present-day economists and their inability to reach conclusions applicable, or even of interest, to the real world, and is struck as the reader cannot fail to be struck by the contrast, of the more scientific and factual, less pretentious basis of Mr. Keynes's work.

Mr. Rowse deals in turn with five fundamental issues of policy on which the Labour Party and the Trade Unions have taken their stand during the past fifteen years, and shows how their attitude was abundantly justified in the light of the economic facts which Mr. Keynes puts forward. The first is resistance to wage reductions, in which field the Trade Unions have put up a stubborn and on the whole successful resistance since 1925. The second was the opposition to the restoration of the gold standard in 1925, and the demand for its abandonment in 1931. On this point, the Labour Party and Trade Unions were certainly not unanimous, but most of those who are now influential leaders of opinion in the Labour Movement had formed a correct judgment on this subject in 1931. This cannot be said of anyone in the other political parties.

The third point of policy is described by Mr. Rowse as an understanding of the necessity "to look to effective demand to keep up employment." This comprehends not only wage policy, but also the payment of a generous scale of unemployment benefit, and the provision of public works, rather than relying on any self-regulatory action of the economic system to provide employment. The two remaining matters of policy are the necessity of lowering interest rates and of diminishing the claim of the rentier upon the community's resources, and the need for the extension

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of public control over banking and investment on economic as well as social grounds. In Mr. Rowse's last page he sums it up as "a complete justification, on the best theoretical grounds, for a practical and moderate English Socialism."

COLIN CLARK

THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVANT. By ELEVEN AUTHORS. Edited by WILLIAM A. ROBSON. 254 pp. (Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

IT may be remembered that the issue of the *Political Quarterly* for April-June, 1936, contained a series of articles devoted to various aspects of the personnel side of the public service. This civil service number attracted widespread attention and the desire was expressed in several quarters that the essays would be reprinted in book form.

The wish has now been more than fulfilled. Messrs. Allen and Unwin present, under the editorship of Mr. Robson, a volume which makes a succinct but comprehensive conspectus of the entire service. The five original essays consisted of: The Public Service, by Mr. Robson; The Home Civil Service, (The Administrative Class), by Professor Ernest Barker; The Foreign Service, by the Hon. Harold Nicolson, M.P.; The Local Government Service (The Chief Officers), by Sir Ernest Simon; and the Semi-Public Services (such as the London Passenger Transport Board, the B.B.C., and the Central Electricity Board), by Dr. H. Finer. These are reprinted (with considerable enlargement and revision in the case of the last-mentioned essay). In addition, there are six entirely new chapters which have not previously been published, dealing with other aspects of the subject. Mr. A. J. Waldegrave writes on the Middle and Lower Grades of the Civil Service; Mr. L. Hill on the Middle and Lower Grades of the Local Government Service; Mr. F. A. A. Menzler on the Scientific, Technical and Professional Expert in the Civil Service; Mrs. Ray Strachey on Women in the Civil Service; Professor John Coatman on the Indian Civil Service; and Mr. Leonard Barnes on the Colonial Service.

The contributors have all had exceptional opportunities for gaining knowledge and insight into the subjects with

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which they deal, either from actual experience in some branch of the service, from service in a local authority, association with one of the vocational organisations of public servants, responsibility for examining candidates for the service, or prolonged study and research. The purpose of the essays is to discuss the main problems which confront the public service today in all its branches, to analyse present tendencies, to criticise defects and to offer constructive suggestions for their removal. There has been no book of importance on the public official for many years, and *The British Civil Servant* makes a notable contribution to the intelligent appreciation of this important element in our political system.

YES AND ALBERT THOMAS. By E. J. PHELAN. (Cresset Press, 1936. 10s. 6d.)

MR. PHELAN'S tribute to his chief is at once a biography and a study in public administration and social philosophy. As to its merits in the former respect there is nothing to be added to the laudatory comments that it has already evoked both from those who knew his work and to those for whom he was but a name. Albert Thomas, the most dynamic figure on the international stage during the post-war period, lives again in his pages. But just because these are so entrancing there is a risk that the other side of this noteworthy book may be overlooked. The following paragraphs are an invitation to the reader to study the development of the International Labour Organisation in the light of Mr. Phelan's concluding chapter.

Albert Thomas was a democrat who desired to see the existing economic interdependence of the modern world transformed into a social interdependence. He visualised the world of the future as a single society governed in conformity with an accepted standard of social justice. Called to direct the International Labour Office in December 1919, he realised the possibilities opened out to him, and to the organisation of which he was the servant, for aiding in this process of transformation.

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Mr. Phelan's pages explain in detail how Albert Thomas applied this guiding conception in his interpretation of his duties. He acted throughout *as if a world society were already in existence* and the Governing Body and the Conference of the I.L.O. were emanations of it. The organisation was an organisation of peoples. So is the Assembly of the League of Nations: it is just as representative as the I.L.O. Conference, though the principle on which representation is based is somewhat different in the two cases. But the Secretary-Generals of the League of Nations have never for one instant aspired to the role which Albert Thomas assumed for himself and handed down, confirmed by successful usage, to his successor. Somewhere within the world society there must be a person or persons armed with the power of making decisions. But the Conference and the Governing Body, meeting at rare intervals and not naturally animated by an *esprit de corps*, do not meet this need, any more than the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations. In the League proper, the power of decision has gone by default and the world has reverted to the system, such as it was, of the nineteenth century, or even of the eighteenth. But in the International Labour Organisation the power of decision has become vested, in fact if not in name, in the Director, whose role in Mr. Phelan's carefully chosen words, is "similar in some respects to that of the Government" behind a Civil Service of the ordinary type. That this audacious and far-seeing policy has been carried out with so little friction is due partly to the administrative skill and other personal qualities of the two successive Directors, but also to the fact that, from the point of view of high politics, the I.L.O. is a backwater. But that does not detract from the interest of the experiment. What can be achieved with Employers' Delegates today may be achieved with Foreign Offices tomorrow—but only when the Kellogg Pact has become a reality.

But Albert Thomas was also a democrat. By that is meant firstly that, as Mr. Phelan says, he was "interested in men as men," and secondly, as a corollary to this, that he was not at heart (whatever his head may have suggested to him at times) a centraliser. Hence his inveterate passion for

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travelling, for seeing local conditions, for getting to know the "men on the spot."

Albert Thomas did not visualise the world society as an enlarged national society. He saw it as an ever-increasing group of local societies held together, not only by a common ideal of social justice but by close personal contact and constant professional co-operation between an elite of key-men. He wore himself out in establishing these necessary links—in Europe, in North and South America, in the Far East, as his devoted disciple, H. A. Grimshaw, wore himself out in Africa. He was ever ready to adjust himself to a new milieu, to new minds grappling with conditions unfamiliar to him. He was the least doctrinaire of Socialists. "I must renew my ideas" was his phrase when he set himself to frame a new speech for a new audience. Very characteristic is Mr. Phelan's account of his criticism on the draft Chinese labour code, in which (very unlike a Frenchman, some people will say) he laid all the stress on first building up, step by step, a corps of factory inspectors, to ensure that the code should not be a dead letter. These would be one of China's chief links with Geneva.

But Albert Thomas did not look upon the world society as consisting of a herd of common people managed by an élite of super-bureaucrats. He was as eager to create and to maintain links between the professional and the common man and woman as he was to relate the professional to Geneva. Hence his unflagging interest in Trade Unionism and in the co-operative movement, particularly in the former. "Trade Unionism," says Mr. Phelan, "was to Albert Thomas not so much an end in itself or a factor in the improvement of labour conditions as a means of securing for the masses of the people a real political apprenticeship, an experience of government of the People, by the People, for the People." In the reformulation of democratic doctrine and the working out of a new democratic practise which lie before the twentieth century when its immediate defensive tasks have been accomplished Albert Thomas' theory and methods will occupy a peculiar place. For he was that rare combination, at once a prophet and a practical builder.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

ADULT EDUCATION. AN IMMEDIATE PROGRAMME. *Report by a SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE N.F.R.B. with an introduction by A. CREECH JONES, M.P.* 30 pp. (New Fabian Research Bureau. 6d.)

Suggests lines of policy and financial provision for adult education for a socialist government.

AFGHANISTAN. By JAMAL-UD-DIN AHMAD and MUHAMMAD ABDUL AZIZ. 160 pp. (Longmans. 15s.)

The authors are an educationist and an archæologist. The book was originally published in Afghanistan and gives a very full account of the country.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC. By GREGORY BIENSTOCK. 299 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.)

Deals fully with the rival policies of Powers in the Pacific and with strategical problems.

PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC FROM AERIAL ATTACK. By the CAMBRIDGE SCIENTISTS' ANTI-WAR GROUP. 127 pp. (Gollancz. 2s. 6d.)

An examination of the recommendations of the Home Office with regard to air raid precautions.

NATIONAL INCOME AND OUTLAY. By COLIN CLARK. 303 pp. (Macmillan. 12s. 6d.)

Mr. Clark has enlarged and completely rewritten his *The National Income, 1924-1931*.

A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF BRITISH GUIANA. By SIR CECIL CLEMENTI. 546 pp. (Macmillan. 20s.)

A very full and interesting account of the vicissitudes of the British Guiana Constitution.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL YEAR BOOK, 1937. 473 pp. (Harrison. 5s.)

The fifty-first edition of a very useful political book of reference.

THE CROWN OF ENGLAND. By RUARAIKH ERSKINE OF MARR. 183 pp. (Dent. 6s.)

A lively study of the place of the Crown from the earliest times to George VI.

ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY. 371 pp. (Harvard University Press and Milford. 15s.)

The volume is in honour of Professor McIlwain and the essays are by his former students.

HITLER'S DRIVE TO THE EAST. By F. ELWYN JONES. 126 pp. (Gollancz. 2s. 6d.)

An account of the new Drang nach Osten.

CAPITAL AND EMPLOYMENT. By R. G. HAWTREY. 348 pp. (Longmans. 15s.)

A study of current economic doctrines, particularly those of Mr. Keynes, Professor Hayek, Professor Pigou, Mr. Harrod, and Major Douglas.

AN ATLAS OF EMPIRE. By J. F. HERRABIN. 160 pp. (Gollancz. 3s. 6d.)

The story of imperialism told in Mr. Herrabin's admirable maps.

HISTORY OF MODERN MORALS. By MAX HODANN. 338 pp. (Heinemann. 12s. 6d.)

An important study of the modern social and legal attitude towards homosexuality, venereal diseases, birth control, abortion, sex education, etc.

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THE FAR EAST IN POLITICS. By G. F. HUDSON. 276 pp. (Oxford Press and Milford. 7s. 6d.)

A short historical introduction to the present international situation in the Far East.

THE INDIAN FEDERATION. By SIR SHAFAT AHMAD KHAN. 450 pp. (Macmillan. 15s.)

An exhaustive study of the constitutional changes in the Government of India Act by the ex-Chairman of the All-India Muslim Conference.

THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF SUN YAT-SEN. By P. M. A. LINEBARGER. 278 pp. (Oxford Press and Milford. 12s. 6d.)

An exposition of Sun Yat-Sen's chief work, the *San Min Chu I* by an American.

ALLAH DETHRONED. By LILO LINKE. 341 pp. (Constable. 15s.)

Describes a journey through modern Turkey. There are 81 illustrations.

INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONTROL OF COMPETITION. By ARTHUR F. LUCAS. 384 pp. (Longmans. 15s.)

The study of industrial reorganization under Government control in England by an American professor.

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE. By DAVID MITRANY. 280 pp. (Yale, Oxford Press and Milford. 13s. 6d.)

Published for the Carnegie Endowment, a study of the effects of war upon political and economic conditions.

THE NAZI CONSPIRACY IN SPAIN. By the EDITOR of the *Brown Book of Hitler Terror*. 256 pp. (Gollancz. 5s.)

A documented account of Nazi intervention and conspiracy in Spain.

THE ROAD TO WIGAN PIER. By GEORGE ORWELL. 264 pp. (Gollancz. 10s. 6d.)

The author describes himself as lower upper-middle class. The book is partly autobiographical and partly a study of working-class life in Wigan.

FREUD AND MARX. By R. OSBORN. 285 pp. (Gollancz. 8s. 6d.)

A comparative study.

RAW MATERIALS OR WAR MATERIALS. By ALFRED PLUMMER. 144 pp. (Gollancz. 3s. 6d.)

A study of the claims of dis-satisfied Powers by the Vice-Principal of Ruskin College.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1937. Edited by W. H. MALLORY. 207 pp. (New York Council of Foreign Relations. \$2.50.)

The new edition of a useful annual giving information about the government, political parties, etc., of the various countries.

THE MAKER OF MODERN JAPAN. By A. L. SANDLER. 429 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 16s.)

The life of Tokugawa Ieyasu.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

By JOHN COATMAN

THE Imperial Conference of this Coronation year of 1937 has been carried through with a singular paucity of publicity, both before it began and whilst its work was in progress. But this lack of limelight does not mean that the Conference is of minor importance. On the contrary, it ranks with any of the great conferences of a generation ago in which the battle for imperial federation was fought and finally lost, and the Colonies attained the stature of Dominions during the literally vital discussions on imperial defence between 1907 and 1911. And the secret of its importance is this. It is the first conference since 1926 at which the fundamental problems of our imperial association have come up for discussion. The conferences of 1930 and 1932 were chiefly concerned with economic policy, which, though obviously of great material importance, does not touch the real springs of the Empire's life and unity. Its importance, in philosophic parlance, is accidental only.

For the 1926 Conference, with the Balfour Declaration and its outcome in the Statute of Westminster, may be likened to a watershed. On one side the streams of feeling, opinion and action run back to the days of the old *imperium* and colonial status. On the other side they run through the new expanding Commonwealth of Nations to countries still unexplored and unknown. Before 1926 the old Colonies, now the Dominions, were growing up to full national stature. Every change in their relations with the mother country was consequently a change in the direction of greater autonomy for themselves, and of apparent weakening of the ties which held them in communion with the mother country and with each other. The Statute of Westminster completed the

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process of emancipating the Dominions from all traces of the old *imperium* and gave statutory expression to the reality of their sovereign national status. And now it appears that this centrifugal process must be arrested, and indeed reversed. A number of fully independent nations, which in due time will be joined by others, have agreed to form a Commonwealth of Nations. And so the whole vast process of working out the conditions on which they can remain in association in war and in peace has got to be undertaken.

Undoubtedly the most difficult of the problems which this task brings in its train is the problem of co-operation in foreign policy, and in the dread event of war. The finding of a solution to this problem has been made very urgent by the present condition of the world, and the Imperial Conference of 1937 has at any rate begun its examination of this most formidable of the problems of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Here then is its importance, and here is the reason for the secrecy in which its proceedings have been veiled. The Economic Conference at Ottawa was carried on in a blaze of publicity and amid the din of violent partisan warfare in every country of the Commonwealth, and indeed in many foreign countries. This time the principal delegates have been occupied, as we have seen, with matters far more vital even than economic co-operation—far more explosive, far more unsuitable for public information and discussion.

But before we turn to the work of this Imperial Conference, it will be of benefit to consider the conference itself in its character of the central political institution of the British Commonwealth of Nations. For some years past there has been increasing realisation on the part of the different peoples of the Commonwealth, of its unity and individuality as a whole—an individuality to be distinguished from that of any of its separate component units. This unity and individuality exist, but a long series of developments leading up to the Statute of

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Westminster, and the Statute itself, have left the Commonwealth almost completely bare of machinery for concerted action in such vitally important matters as foreign policy, defence, the settlement of disputes between two or more countries of the Commonwealth, and for other purposes second in importance only to these. Yet if the British Commonwealth of Nations is to continue to exist, it must fit itself to undertake concerted action by all its members in pursuance of objectives and interests which all the peoples of the Commonwealth believe to be of paramount concern to themselves. How is the Commonwealth to be fitted with such machinery, and how are the very numerous and profoundly difficult problems, which will constantly arise in the course of the creation of such machinery, to be solved? The answer is that the machinery will be created and the problems will be solved by the Imperial Conference. Already the post-War conferences have begun to tackle some of the more pressing of these needs, and a brief glance at the work of the conference as a whole or of its committees and sub-committees will throw light on this process.

The true character of the Imperial Conference cannot be fully understood without some study of the work of its subsidiary bodies. These deal with the most important problems of inter-Commonwealth co-operation in constitutional, defence, and economic matters, and deal with them moreover in a highly practical fashion. Such subjects of first-rate importance as the creation of an inter-Commonwealth tribunal to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—a body which shall be more in accordance than the Judicial Committee with the new constitution and spirit of the British Commonwealth—the vastly important subject, from a trade point of view, of the co-ordination of an all-commonwealth basis of engineering and electrical standards, and the whole range of methods of economic co-operation

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have at different times provided work for committees or sub-committees of the Conference. Usually the reports of the sub-committees are unanimous, and are accepted as a matter of course by the Conference as a whole, but there have been exceptions to this general rule. Thus, the question of the creation of what is generally known as an "Imperial Secretariat," to keep the Commonwealth countries in touch with each other during the intervals between Conferences, and to prepare the agenda for the latter, has come up for discussion from time to time, but on each occasion there has been a split in opinion. The United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have generally favoured the proposal, whilst the other Dominions have opposed it.

One or two of these examples are worth a little further consideration because they reveal a vastly important side of the Imperial Conference, and show it in fact as the creative force on the institutional side of inter-Commonwealth relations. Let us dwell for a moment on the discussions which have taken place over the question of substituting some new tribunal for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It is well known that, for some Dominions at any rate, the Judicial Committee has little if any practical significance, whilst for others it is one of the cornerstones of the constitution. In the Irish Free State the appeal to the Judicial Committee has been formally abolished by an Act of 1933. South Africa has sent very few cases to the Committee, and in Australia, only constitutional cases—that is, cases arising out of a dispute between the Commonwealth and the constituent states, or between two or more states—may be referred to the Committee, and even then a special certificate from the Australian High Court is necessary. From New Zealand and India cases go to the Committee whenever they are thought necessary, whilst for Canada the Judicial Committee is by statute the final court of appeal, and many cases of the greatest con-

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stitutional importance have come from that Dominion.

This question of an Imperial Court of Appeal was fully discussed by the Conference as early as 1907, when the Conference agreed to a resolution moved by the Australian delegation "that it is desirable to establish an Imperial Court of Appeal." It is highly desirable that the position should be improved, as soon as possible, because it is quite likely that in the future there may be disagreements, even quarrels, between two or more of the members of the Commonwealth, or between the United Kingdom and one or more of the Dominions, for whose peaceful solution some acknowledged and authoritative tribunal is necessary. Agreement between the members of the British Commonwealth, or disputes between them, can be no concern of the League of Nations, and this fact reinforces the desirability of their setting up some machinery of their own. There have, in fact, within recent years been more or less serious disputes between different members of the Commonwealth, and one possible cause of serious dispute was pointed out by Professor Berriedale Keith some time ago. He was referring to an agreement, made in 1924, between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, regarding safeguards for holders of Union Trustee stocks. Before the agreement, the Government of the United Kingdom had discretionary right to disallow any South African legislation which was considered to be injurious to stockholders or to violate the original contract. Now, however, the Government of this country may merely request the South African Government to take the necessary steps to ensure such amendment as may be desired. To quote Professor Berriedale Keith's own words:

"Imagine the position of the Union Government when it brings down to Parliament a Bill to carry out a request by the British Government of which it does not approve. Parliament can hardly be expected to approve

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such a proposal on British authority. The obvious course is to provide for reference to an inter-Imperial Tribunal of such a dispute, both sides agreeing to accept its decision; for the Union Parliament would doubtless honour an obligation thus affirmed where it might decline the mere request of the British Government. As it stands, the new agreement replaces disallowance by a procedure which if brought into practice would probably involve a bitter inter-Imperial conflict . . .”

At the Conferences of both 1926 and 1930 this matter was discussed and was left admittedly in an unsatisfactory position. It was decided not to recommend the creation of a permanent court, but to set up some *ad hoc* tribunal, whenever a specific case came up for settlement. The creation of a special tribunal will, of course, be a slow and delicate business, but there is little doubt that it will be achieved sooner or later. There is not the slightest doubt that its creation will have to be the work of the Imperial Conference, because it could hardly be done by any other agency, or by any other form of co-operation between the governments; certainly it could not be done by discussions and debates in parliaments. This example, in fact, well illustrates the creative functions of the Conference.

Again, let us consider the important report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, which was set up by the Imperial Conference of 1926. In both 1921 and 1923 the crucial problem of how to arrive at a definite and agreed body of principles in regard to both treaty-making in particular, and foreign relations in general, had occupied the attention of the Conference. The Committee of 1926 carried the discussion farther than it had been carried by either of the two previous conferences, and from their work the following general principles emerged:

- (1) That any of His Majesty's governments should inform the rest when engaged in any negotiations that might

interest them so as to give them an opportunity of stating their views.

- (2) That the governments consulted should state their views promptly, and
- (3) That no government should take steps involving the others in any active obligations without their definite assent.
- (4) All parts of the Empire affected by treaties must be represented, either directly or indirectly, at the proceedings leading up to them and must ratify them before they can become effective.

These principles were reaffirmed by the Imperial Conference of 1930, which further emphasised the special need of informing the other British Governments of treaty negotiations, and of promptness in forwarding news on the latter. This year's Conference started out from the base thus secured and consolidated and as we shall see progress has been made, among other reasons because discussion, particularly during the past eighteen months, has been very active in all the Commonwealth Parliaments, and there has been clearly discernible an approximation between the views of the different governments concerned, both in regard to fundamental matters of principle in foreign policy and also in the matter of defence policies.

These two specific examples are in themselves sufficient to show the Imperial Conference in its essential character as the central political institution of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A glance at its past history will be equally instructive, as showing how it has acquired this character by the stress of circumstances, the inner growth of the Commonwealth, and the nature of the principles on which it is based. This historical retrospect will also show that both the Imperial Conference and the Commonwealth are still in process of evolution, and that it is hard to say whether the progress of

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the Commonwealth is moulding the Imperial Conference, or whether the Imperial Conference is now guiding and controlling the future development of the Commonwealth.

The series of Imperial Conferences began with a somewhat fortuitous assembly of official and non-official, representative and non-representative, persons from all over the Empire, who were in London for the Jubilee of 1887. But we quickly find the Conference putting itself on a more formal basis, and perpetuating its existence. Again, the first Conferences were regarded as meetings between the Colonies, now the Dominions, on the one hand, and the mother country on the other. There was no question, fifty years ago, of equality of status between Great Britain and her offspring. But, by the beginning of this century, the delegates to the Conferences already found themselves faced with problems of prime importance, not only to themselves but to the whole world. These were, first, the problem of the future political relations between Great Britain and the British countries overseas. In accordance with ideas which had become fairly popular in this country since the publication of Seeley's *Expansion of England*, and had prevailed in greater or lesser strength from the days of Sir William Molesworth, a federation of the mother country and Colonies was believed to be the only alternative to ultimate dissolution of the Empire. Joseph Chamberlain fought the battle for federation with courage and determination, but he lost it at the Conference of 1902 when the British countries turned their backs for ever on this solution.

After this began the fateful series of Conferences held under the increasing threat of German naval competition. In the Conferences between 1902 and 1911, Dominion status, as we know it to-day, came to birth. Faced with the request from Great Britain to join in one common scheme of Imperial defence, Canada asserted her separate nationhood, and in effect

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did the same for the other Dominions. By 1914, they were all, in theory at any rate, sufficiently masters of their own destinies to come into the war with Great Britain or to remain neutral, and in fact the kind and extent of the Dominions' participation was entirely in their own hands.

It is impossible to see how the decision on federation could have been taken so quickly, efficiently and harmoniously, had the question had to be threshed out in the press, on public platforms and in the legislatures of the countries concerned. Most certainly the vital decisions in regard to Dominion status could not have been made so safely and smoothly as they were, by any other means than those actually employed, namely, intimate, confidential discussion between the heads of the governments of Great Britain and the Dominions, all gathered round one table.

For already by 1907 the constitution and character of the Imperial Conference had changed profoundly from the first more or less casual assembly. The reality and the vital importance of the discussions on federation and defence were reflected in the composition of the body by which the discussions were carried on, and in corresponding changes in the relations between the representatives of Great Britain and the other countries taking part in the Conferences. The story is told in a series of resolutions passed by successive conferences. The first of these dates from the first Ottawa Conference of 1894, when it was resolved that: "it would be desirable to hold periodical conferences of representatives of the Colonies and Great Britain for the discussion of matters of common interest."

The next resolution was passed in 1902, and not only defines the status of the representatives of the Colonies and Great Britain who are to attend the Conferences, but fixes a definite interval between successive meetings. The resolution runs: ". . . it would be to the advantage of the Empire if

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Conferences were held as far as practicable at intervals not exceeding four years, at which questions of common interest affecting the relations of the mother country and His Majesty's Dominions over the seas could be discussed and considered as between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Colonies . . ."

The third resolution in this series was passed at the Conference of 1907 (for it was not found convenient to hold one in 1906 as suggested in the 1902 resolution) and ran as follows: "that it will be to the advantage of the Empire if a Conference, to be called the Imperial Conference, is held every four years, at which questions of common interest may be discussed and considered as between His Majesty's Government and his Governments of the self-governing Dominions beyond the seas. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom will be ex-officio President, and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions ex-officio members of the Conference . . ."

Even a cursory examination of this resolution will reveal some very significant changes, both in the wording of the resolution as compared with that of the two preceding ones, and in the status of the Conference and the delegates who comprise it. Thus, the Conference has definitely become the Imperial Conference. The word "Colonial" goes once and for all. Next, the discussions are to take place between His Majesty's *Governments* in the United Kingdom and overseas. Therefore, the principal representatives of all the countries concerned will be the Prime Ministers. No longer will the Secretary of State for the Colonies preside over the deliberation of Premiers. Finally, the former Colonies have grown up into Dominions, this word registering a change, subtle but real and important, which has taken place in their own political stature and in their relations with the mother country.

The crucial turning point in the history of the Imperial

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Conference, and indeed of the British Commonwealth itself, was the development of the Conference into a meeting of Governments. From that moment onwards, the advance of the overseas members of the Commonwealth to Dominion status, with all that that phrase implies now, was inevitable. The fact that the Governments were meeting in person through their Prime Ministers meant that the Conference was competent to deal with the most important matters of inter-Commonwealth relations, and also that it was the one body which *could* be competent to deal with these matters and to guide the further development of the Commonwealth itself. The War history of the Conference shows that it can turn itself into an executive body with authority surpassing that of any individual government, and it may be that occasions will arise when this transformation will be effected for purposes of peace as well as for war. The British Commonwealth of Nations to-day is a political association of a kind completely new to political science. It is a new discovery in political association, with nothing more tangible to hold its members together than the determination of them all that they shall hold together. We have seen that this association must embody itself in political institutions and administrative machinery of different sorts. Happily in the Imperial Conference it already possesses its *primum mobile*, and we have seen some of the ways in which it works.

Such are the character and history of the body which was in conference for about a month after the Coronation. Its agenda was comprised in the three chief categories of foreign affairs and defence, constitutional questions, and trade, shipping and air communications, and various other related topics. With one exception, to be noted shortly, trade questions did not come prominently before the Conference for discussion. The broad features and basic conditions of the trade of the United Kingdom and the Empire were

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brought before the delegates by Mr. Runciman while he was still at the Board of Trade, and by Mr. Ormsby-Gore speaking about the dependent Empire. Further, at the first plenary session of the Conference on May 14, Mr. Mackenzie King dwelt on the duty of all British countries to do whatever lay in their power to abate the fury of economic warfare and lower the barriers to international trade. But the practical work in this regard had been mostly done in advance by means of separate negotiations between the countries concerned, a method which will continue to be followed in future in any questions arising out of the Ottawa Agreements.

One very striking exception, however, to this comparative indifference to trade affairs was provided by the discussion by the Conference of the Anglo-American trade talks. The Dominion representatives were given full information of the American proposals for a trade treaty, and were asked to state what modifications of the Ottawa Agreements they would accept in order to make such a treaty possible. It is clear that some adjustments in the present system of imperial preferences will be necessary before an Anglo-American trade treaty can be concluded, and the Government of the United Kingdom, quite rightly, brought the matter before the Imperial Conference. The action of the British Government carries inter-imperial economic co-operation a long step further, and in a direction which nobody can deny is the right one, both for the Empire and the world. The following passage from the published summary of proceedings aptly sums up the attitude of the Conference towards international trade.

"It was recognised that in the last resort the prosperity of the Commonwealth depends on that of the world as a whole, and that a healthy growth of international trade, accompanied by an improvement in the general standard of living, is an essential step to political appeasement."

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The general arrangement of the work was laid down at the opening plenary meeting on May 14, when it was agreed that foreign affairs, defence, the general review of Empire trade, and Colonial affairs, should be handled by the principal delegates. The other subjects of discussion, namely, shipping, civil air communications, a proposal to establish an Empire Agricultural Council, nationality inside the Commonwealth, and the supply and production of munitions and food supplies, were handed over to specific Committees. But the most important objective of the Conference was defined by the Chairman at the opening meeting, when he said, with general assent: "We are agreed that questions of foreign affairs and defence shall be our main subjects."

But first let us deal with the Committee reports. The Shipping Committee emphasise how important co-operative action is inside the British Commonwealth, when British shipping is endangered by undue assistance being given to foreign shipping. Also, the special case of British shipping in the Pacific is examined, and the four countries concerned—namely, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and this country—are charged to consult further in this matter. The Civil Aviation Committee, too, arranged for joint action in promoting air communications inside the Empire, and approved the existing practice whereby any nation of the Commonwealth, giving a foreign air-line rights to operate, grants the same rights to Commonwealth interests as and when these are desired. The Constitutional Committee showed how to avoid dual nationality inside the Commonwealth, and arranged for the question of the nationality of married women to be further examined by the various British Governments concerned. The Economic Committee decided not to create an Empire Agricultural Council.

On the all-important questions of Defence and Foreign Policy, the summary has much of great value and

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importance. In discussing the question of munitions and other war supplies, as well as the supply of food and feeding stuffs, the Conference was impressed with the value of the free exchange of detailed technical information between the officers of the various Governments. Further, it "found general agreement among its members that the security of each of their countries can be increased by co-operation in such matters as the free interchange of information concerning the state of their naval, military and air forces, and the continuance of the arrangements already initiated by some of them for concerting the scale of the defences of ports, and measures for co-operation in the defence of communications and other common interests." Also the Conference recognised the vital importance of safeguarding sea communications, and providing naval bases. But it should be noted that although co-operation is the theme of this discussion of defence, it is repeatedly emphasised that every member of the Commonwealth reserves to itself complete freedom of decision and action.

The keynote of the whole discussion of foreign policy is the prime necessity to preserve the peace, and to establish the principle that international differences should be settled, not by force, but by conciliation. The Conference, therefore, were at one in declaring that the armaments of British countries should never be used for aggression or any purpose not consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Pact of Paris. Concerning the League, however, the Conference, whilst recognising how desirable it is to strengthen it by enlarging its membership agreed that this object would be made easier by separating the Covenant of the League from the Peace Treaties.

The Conference recognises very clearly that the influence of each British country in the cause of peace will be greatly increased by agreeing to use that influence in the same

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direction. Therefore, all the countries of the Commonwealth will continue to consult and co-operate with each other in this vital interest, and all matters of common concern.

Lastly, the Conference Report strikes a hopeful note in foreign affairs, when it declares that all the British nations will co-operate with foreign nations in examining current difficulties, including obstacles in the way of international trade. It also says that while themselves attached to democratic principles British countries believe that differences of political creed should be no obstacle to friendly relations.

Such are the chief points of the Report of the Imperial Conference of 1937. Clearly a notable step has been taken towards unifying policy and practice throughout the Commonwealth in the vital matters of foreign policy, defence, air communications and shipping. The work thrust upon the British Nations by the Statute of Westminster and the developments which led up to it has been begun.

A SOVIET VIEW OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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THE transformation of the British Dominions, till then autonomous colonies of Great Britain, into participants of the British Empire, had already begun at the beginning of the present century. The World War accelerated this process. The Dominions rendered valuable assistance to Great Britain when they sent their soldiers to fight on the battlefields of the Old World; the Dominions kept Great Britain supplied with foodstuffs and raw material. The British government undoubtedly did a very wise thing when it invited representatives of the Dominion governments to participate in the Imperial War Cabinet and in the conference of Versailles. But both at Versailles and at the League of Nations the Dominions no longer appeared merely as parts of the British Empire, but as autonomous state organisations, with their own interests and their own independent views of the events taking place in the post-war world.

This process of development of the Dominions into independent political entities, about which specialists in political law have written countless volumes, symbolised the victory of centrifugal tendencies in the British Empire over centripetal tendencies. However the innumerable patriotic and conservative-minded British journalists tried to slur over the nature of this process, to all unbiased observers of British political life it was obvious that the development of the British Empire had entered a new phase. The Dominions had emerged from their state of political dependence on the metropolis: the latter had to reconcile herself to the fact

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that they had attained their political majority. The Statute of Westminster of 1931 merely stated in legal terms what already existed *de facto*.

In whatever light one regards the new Indian Constitution: whether one looks upon it as a step towards the transformation of India into a seventh, and the most important, British Dominion, or as an attempt on the part of British imperialism to hide the real state of affairs from the toiling masses, i.e., the unceasing dependence of India on England, one thing is clear: the very necessity of passing and promulgating a new constitution also testifies to the growth of centrifugal forces in the British Empire. The new treaty of alliance between England and Egypt speaks of the same thing. Egypt has been tied to the chariot of the British Empire for more than half a century. And if now it has been found necessary to tie her with a new silk ribbon, we must seek the explanation in the fact that the former ties have become rusty and threaten to break asunder.

And thus the attention of the men of science who were studying the state organisation and internal political life of the British Empire was directed towards the growth of centrifugal forces of the Empire. These men of science patiently reckoned up the losses of Great Britain in the imperial markets, studied the growth of the local industries of Canada, India and Australia, examined the problem of the contradictions between the interests of the bourgeoisie of the Dominions, whose concern is to protect the home market from foreign, which includes British, competition, and the interests of British industry, which is accustomed to make itself perfectly at home in the imperial markets.

The Ottawa conference was something of a surprise to these men of science. The Ottawa conference once more demonstrated the strength of the bonds between the metropolis and the Dominions. Although only trade agreements

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between the metropolis and the Dominions were signed at the Ottawa conference, the conference revealed the presence of a certain identity of interests which the men of science knew about, but to which they paid insufficient attention.

In our opinion, the five years separating one Imperial conference from the other (1932-1937) have proved the presence in the British Empire of considerable centripetal tendencies as well. These centripetal tendencies stand in opposition to those centrifugal forces of which we have already spoken. The common culture and language of the metropolis and the Dominions, the British capital invested in the industries of the Dominions and India, the predominance of British banks, of the British mercantile marine and of British trading interests and trading methods over the whole vast territory of the imperial possessions, and finally, the Navy and the military strength of Great Britain, which is potentially far greater than one might gather from the available information on the military strength of the metropolis—all this has its effect as well. Great Britain is the principal market for all the Dominions without exception: not one Dominion can do without it. Only Canada is more closely connected with the U.S.A. than with Great Britain, but even for Canada the metropolis is the next most important market and source of import, which Canada can by no means afford to disdain. The deliberate policy of London to utilise all these factors also has its effect.

Thus if it is true to say that after the war the development of the British Empire entered a new phase, it would be wrong to consider that the British Empire, as a result of *internal* centrifugal tendencies, was on the point of falling to pieces. Those men of science who were of this opinion were confusing trends of development with the present stage in the history of the British Empire. The Indian constitution, her treaty of alliance with Egypt, the Westminster Statute—all

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these state enactments, though they differ in form and in substance, point to the elasticity of the methods with which the metropolis checks the centrifugal forces of the British Empire, and checks them not unsuccessfully.

Nevertheless, the peculiar feature of the modern stage in the development of the British Empire lies in the fact that a certain mitigation of the centrifugal tendencies in the development of the British Empire is accompanied by increased danger to the integrity of the Empire from *without*.

England was, and still is, first among the powers which possess colonial raw material. It is natural, therefore, that the appetites of the aggressor powers, which strive to seize colonial raw material, to secure colonial markets for themselves, and to make high profits on capital which could be invested in the colonies, should be directed towards the greatest colonial empire in the world. The aggressors from the German, Italian and Japanese camp put the British Empire first amongst the "possessor" nations and look with unconcealed longing at the vast possessions, the vast "expanses" of the empire.

Herr Schacht, the economic dictator of Germany, in an article on German colonial aspirations in the January number of the American Journal *Foreign Affairs*, points out that the British Empire is eminently well supplied with colonial raw material, and expresses his indignation at England's "incomprehension" of the "peaceful spirit" in which German fascism demands other people's property. Not long ago Herr Goering, from his ministerial tribune, accused England of having "stolen" German colonies. During the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, a picturesque caricature of John Bull denying Italy the right of colonial conquest appeared in a fascist journal. Before the stout well-fed figure of John Bull, who sits at table with a table napkin round his neck, stands a huge joint of smoking hot roast-beef bearing the legend "Colonies." At some distance away stands the mendicant

"proletarian" Italy with a beseeching expression on her face. Under the caricature is written "This is he who preaches morality for us." The Italian, German and Japanese aggressors try with their usual cynicism to appeal to world public opinion: they defend their right against England and in the eyes of England to act now as England acted in the past.

We shall not go into the moral rights and wrongs of that claim to justice which for the fascist dictators consists in the right to rob other nations.

But as recently as two or three years ago one might have thought that Germany would agree to content herself with "equality" in Europe and, in the last resort, would make war on her eastern neighbours, without causing thereby a world conflagration. Of course, the menace of an attack by Germany on Czechoslovakia, on the U.S.S.R., and on the Baltic States, not only still holds good, but has grown immeasurably as a result of Germany's armaments. Germany now speaks to Europe in the language that pre-war European democracy used to associate with the "mailed fist" of the empire of Kaiser Wilhelm II. But even the most shortsighted European politicians cannot fail to see that the Germany of Hitler, like the Germany of Wilhelm II, aspires to nothing less than world power. Hitler and his followers declare that Germany needs colonies from the economic point of view; with true German precision they are already working out the conditions on which Germany is ready to take colonies, whether they are those that belonged to Germany before the war, or territories which belong to other powers.

There is, it is true, a difference between the Germany of Hitler and the Germany of Wilhelm II in their colonial policy. The policy of German imperialism before the war in the matter of colonies differs very little from the policy of other powers which were striving to seize colonies: it was founded on the identical imperialist aim of the subjugation of other

peoples. And the colonial acquisitions of German imperialism before the war did not justify the expense incurred by Germany for their sake. With the possible exception of Tanganyika, the German colonies were sparsely populated and comparatively poor. In Germany's foreign trade and in her export of capital, her colonies play a very insignificant role. On the eve of the World War Germany was trying to seize new rich colonies in North Africa, and only the Anglo-French alliance prevented her from doing so. But for Hitler the seizure of colonies has not only the same objects as it had for Wilhelm II. Hitler endeavours, by the seizure of colonies, to strengthen his prestige in Europe and above all in Germany itself. The struggle for colonies is, to a considerable extent, of a symbolic character, and the leaders of the Third Empire not only do not deny this, but, on the contrary, continually stress the symbolic nature of their colonial pretensions. The seizure of colonies must add lustre to the tarnished countenance of fascism. From this point of view it demands the "return" of its colonies with particular insistence. Hitler wants to be able to say to the German people: "We have returned to our German Fatherland what the cursed Marxists lost." That it was the Germany of Wilhelm II which lost its colonies after having challenged the whole world is of no consequence.

The Spanish adventure of German fascism exposes the danger of German policy before the eyes of the whole world; for by its intervention in Spain Germany lays claim to world supremacy. Germany has no interests in Spain which she is obliged to defend with her army and fleet. There are three possible explanations of Germany's participation in this joint German and Italian intervention in Spain. First of all, Germany aims at deriving immediate economic and political benefits for herself in Spain, i.e., to lay her hands on the Spanish colonies, on concessions of minerals in Spain itself,

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and on Spanish military bases or islands. At present we only have Hitler's word "guaranteeing" his renunciation of all conquests in Spain. Secondly, Germany aims at creating an ally for herself on the south-western frontier of France, an ally who would greatly embarrass France's position, and consequently that of England, if and when France and England were forced to fight Germany. Thirdly, in Spain German fascism asserts its world mission of combating "bolshivism," though a legal democratic government is in power in Spain. But there's nothing accidental about this: in the eyes of fascism, democracy is not only an object of hatred, but of contempt. All three aims of German policy in Spain threaten the British Empire. If Germany succeeds in securing a firm foothold for herself in Spain, Gibraltar will lose its present importance for England. If a fascist Spain arises as a result of German and Italian intervention, England and France will have to maintain considerable forces on the south-western Pyrenean front, in order to keep in check the loyal sentiments of Franco and his adherents towards their German patrons. Finally, German fascism in Spain challenges the principle of popular government, which is the basis of the whole state system of the metropolis and her Dominions.

The appearance of Germany in Africa in the rôle of a colonial power, whether in Portuguese Angola, or in Tanganyika, or in the Cameroons, will be another menace to the British Empire. Germany will use its colonies in Africa for the construction of military bases, which will be used against England in the event of a new war. The granting to Germany of colonies in Western Africa will endanger British communications with Cape Town, i.e., the safety of the alternative route to India and Australia (that avoiding the Suez Canal). In addition, there can be no doubt that the appearance of Germany in Africa might be the signal for all the anti-British forces in the British colonies to rally round the German

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agents in Africa. The World War showed that German intrigues and subsidies in the South African Union led to a rising right at the beginning of the world war. We are far from considering the South African Union with its specific racial and national problem as a country which is immune from the contagion of the fascist doctrine. Doctor Malan and his party, for example, have ideologically much in common with German fascism.

But Germany is not alone. The occupation of Abyssinia, which fascist Italy succeeded in carrying through, has made a substantial difference to the correlation of forces in the Far East and in North-East Africa. Abyssinia does not actually lie on any of the trading and strategic routes of England. But if one were to draw three lines on the map marking the three most important British lines of communication—one to Suez, Aden and Bombay, the second from Cape Town to Cairo, and the third from Cape Town to Zanzibar and Socotra, it will be seen that Abyssinia, together with Eritrea and Somaliland, lie just in the centre of the triangle formed by these three lines. This means that Abyssinia can become a splendid base in the hands of Italy for an attack on British communications. Control over the sources of the Blue Nile enables Italy to bring pressure to bear on Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and on Egypt itself. True, we read a document which had been stolen from the archives of the British government and published in the Italian press, in which British experts endeavoured to prove that the fate of Abyssinia in no way concerned British interests. But the rearmament of British bases in the Mediterranean, the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, and the concern shown for Palestine, make it perfectly plain that the leading British politicians do not in practice take this extremely optimistic estimate as their point of departure.

In the nineteenth century we learnt in our geography text-books that the length of Italy's coastline did not permit

her to fight against an enemy who possessed a very strong fleet. We knew, therefore, that in spite of all the opportunism of Italian foreign policy, Italy would never dare to attack England. But the development of technique has changed this correlation of forces. Since the appearance of bombing aeroplanes in the world, the length of Italy's coastline (6,660 kilometres as compared with its 2,078 kilometres of inland frontier line), will no longer be such a danger to Italy in the event of a war between her and England. Aviation can keep Italy informed of the movements of the British naval forces, and these very forces can be attacked from the air.

We are by no means of the opinion, of course, that the British position will be hopeless in the event of a war between her and Italy. We are much farther from this thought than are Mr. Garvin and certain other British "patriots." But we are bound to record the danger which issues from Italy and threatens England in the Mediterranean. Italy aspires after the Nile, the Jordan, and Suez—that is to say, the decisive regions of British influence. Italy has already secured a footing on the threshold of these regions. And if Italy herself is not very dangerous, Italy in alliance with Germany can become a sufficiently serious menace to the integrity of the British Empire.

Finally, for over six years already Japan has been carrying on a policy of conquest in the Far East. In 1931 Japan seized Manchuria without having met even with that minimum of resistance, which had endeavoured to block the path of Italian aggression in Abyssinia. Since that time Japan has continued her advance into China without interruption, seizing one Chinese province after another. At the same time Japan is gradually laying hands on the whole trade of the provinces she has seized, thereby depriving England and America of their age-old positions in Northern China.

China and Manchuria are not, of course, parts of the

British Empire. But to speak of direct British interest in China, it should be noted that the strengthening of Japan in China has already weakened the English positions in some of the regions adjacent to British India, and has forced England to spend enormous sums on the fortification of other second-line approaches. Many British authorities consider Hongkong and the Philippines as no more than "a pledge in the hands of Japan." Such, for instance, is the opinion of the Canadian group of members of the Pacific Institute, declared in a memorandum at the last session of this Institute.

On the other hand, the attention which Japanese military circles have begun to pay to Australia has also aroused no little anxiety. In his brilliant speech in Moscow in 1936, Mr. Carter, the secretary of the Pacific Institute, said that North Australia is known better in Tokyo than in Sydney or Melbourne. Once upon a time German geographers, economists and military specialists boasted that they knew the geography of Tsarist Russia better than the Russians themselves. At the Berlin Congress on the Eastern question the Russian diplomats used Austrian maps. We know what this portended: an attempt to seize foreign territory in connection with the peace of Brest-Litovsk, and a return to the same frenzy of conquest in "Mein Kampf." If matters really are as Carter described them, then Japanese aggression in North Australia is also not only possible, but even highly probable. The successes achieved by Japanese trade in the Dutch East Indies proved that there is some foundation in the rumours that the German-Japanese agreement, veiled by its avowed aim of combating the Comintern, includes, amongst other secret objects, the sharing out between them of the Dutch East Indies. It must not be forgotten that this agreement enables Germany and Japan simultaneously to bring pressure to bear on Holland both in Europe and in Asia. But it must be borne in mind that the Dutch East

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Indies are one of the direct stepping-stones to the British Empire, and one in which England is most profoundly interested. The Dutch producers of rubber, tin and petroleum oil are closely bound up with British investors.

And in our view, therefore, those organs of the English press like the London *Economist* were right when they pointed out the danger threatening the British Empire in the present combination of powers, i.e., in the trinity of aggressors—Germany, Japan and Italy. This bloc has already to a certain extent taken on the form of a united political force. In the centre stands Germany, the principal member of the bloc. Offshoots from Germany branch off in two directions: one towards Japan, the other towards Italy.

We have seen that in the post-war period Great Britain was able to find some means of bringing about more unity in the British Empire, of overcoming, to a certain extent, temporarily though it may be, the centrifugal tendencies which were, and still are, tearing the Empire asunder. But Great Britain has still to find means of overcoming the danger which threatens the British Empire—and world peace—and which comes from the aggressor powers.

The British Empire is vast and rich, but it is these very qualities which make it vulnerable. The British Empire can be compared to the Greek hero Achilles, but whereas only Achilles's heel was vulnerable, the British Empire, that most mighty Empire of all times, has heels everywhere; that is, it is vulnerable at every point and is obliged to scatter its forces. There is no doubt that it is this which must be considered as its chief problem today. Far more than by its own centrifugal forces, it is threatened today by the rise in the world of aggressive forces which are seeking for territories which should be most convenient to seize and are naturally devoting their attention to British possessions.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE LEAGUE

By LEONARD WOOLF

INTERNATIONAL affairs have drifted these last months into a situation where there is a faint and momentary hope of stopping Europe's suicidal plunge into an "inevitable" war. An opportunity has arisen, a lull, a breathing space, a comparatively lucid interval, in which statesmanship of intelligent boldness and cautious sagacity might begin the resurrection of peace. In order to understand and grasp this opportunity of peace, it is necessary first to understand the danger of war.

The immediate danger of war, which has been growing with terrifying rapidity since 1931, is due primarily to two factors. If both or either of these factors were removed or substantially modified, the chances of preventing a European war in the next 15 or 20 years would be immeasurably increased. The first is the policy and international manners and methods of the three fascist Great Powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan. If an earthquake or miracle painlessly removed these three countries from our midst without disturbing the rest of the earth, or even if a still greater miracle converted their governments over-night to the political views of Mr. Lansbury, it is practically certain that Europe would enjoy peace for the next 25 years. The peace treaties of 1919 were bad treaties, just as the Treaty of Vienna after the previous great war was a bad treaty, but to-day there is no major international question which is in itself or contains within itself a threat to peace. There is no major question between the Great Powers now which even in the international system of the last part of the nineteenth century would have been felt to endanger peace. The danger to peace is not in the "questions" themselves, but in the methods and policies of the three fascist Powers. Their governments are com-

mitted to an extreme form of militarist nationalism. Like many other governments and states, they are "dissatisfied," and all three have shown that at any moment, if their rulers consider the moment favourable, they will resort to war or take armed action which makes war inevitable in order to obtain "satisfaction." The immediate danger of war in Europe comes therefore solely from the danger of an act of aggression on the part of Germany or Italy or of some aggressive or spectacular action by one of the dictators which would involve him in a dispute in which the alternatives for him were to make war or lose face.

The second threat to peace comes from the breakdown of the League and of its system of collective security. It is intimately connected with the threat which comes from Germany and Italy. The policy of the mailed fist, shining armour, and an armaments race—which is the policy of the fascist Powers—involves an international system which is the antithesis of the League system. Up to 1931 the initiative in international affairs, despite the crudities and follies of allied statesmanship, remained with the League. A major war was then improbable, because in any major question or crisis it was probable that the League system would work at least to the extent of preventing war; it would impose some sort of pacific settlement upon a would-be aggressor because he had to face the probability of collective defence of his victim. Since 1931 the initiative has passed from the hands of the League and the pacific League Powers into those of the bellicose Powers, Germany and Italy. France, Britain, and the League Powers no longer attempt to control or even influence the course of international affairs; like birds in the vicinity of a large snake, they watch in paralytic expectation Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini for the next flamboyant action and the next victim. Their only statesmanship consists in armaments and more armaments, in the hope that, when war

comes, they may be formidable enough to defend themselves or deflect it upon a weaker victim. In other words the fascist system of settling international disputes and regulating interstate affairs in Europe by military action, force, threats, and war—the old international system in its crudest and most barbarous form—has established or re-established itself. The corollary of this is that the League system of settling disputes by pacific methods and of collectively defending a victim of aggression no longer exists. The League, of course, still exists at Geneva; the corpse of the collective system, reduced to a skeleton of dry bones, persists in the Covenant; but both, as instruments for preventing war or as effective factors in the international situation, are dead. How dead they are is shown by the dominance of the fascist Powers in international affairs, the abandonment of any attempt on the part of Britain and France to control events, and the hopeless fatalism of rearmament undirected by any policy but that of panic.

Who killed the League is not merely a question of historical interest, for those who killed it are still in power, at any rate in this country, and to-day they are drifting to the appalling catastrophe of a European war directed by the same ideas as those which led them to destroy in Manchuria and Abyssinia the first foundations of permanent peace which had been laid in the collective security system of the League. The responsibility of the National Government for destroying the League has been admirably analysed and expounded in a book just published, *The Road to War*,¹ and I would refer those who want a detailed analysis of the policy which has brought us to our present pass and must, if continued, land us in an inevitable war to that book. Ultimately there are only two ways in which the relations of European states can be regulated: one is force and the threat of force, a system—adopted and proclaimed in its extreme form by Germany and Italy—

¹*The Road to War*, prepared by a Small Group of Experts. (*New Fabian Research Bureau and Gollancz*. 3s. 6d.)

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in which each state, armed, drilled, and militarized to the maximum extent, is judge in its own cause, is not bound by any of the rules of international law or by any obligation to submit disputes to pacific settlement, and is prepared at any moment, in large or small questions, to take armed action against another state;¹ the other is a system which insists upon the regulation of international affairs and inter-state disputes by an ordered and prescribed method of pacific settlement instead of by force and threats and upon limitation of armaments, and which provides some assurance of collective defence against aggression.

The League established a system of the second kind. It has been destroyed, because, as I showed in a previous article,² it depends upon a psychological factor, a belief in peoples and governments that its obligations will be carried out, and the French and British Governments by their action in the Manchurian and Abyssinian affairs destroyed that belief. No one in Europe now believes that, if, in the next year or two, there is a threat of war or an act of aggression, France and Britain will comply with their obligations under the Covenant. No one believes that there is now any kind of assurance that disputes will be settled pacifically. No one regards the League as an effective instrument for preventing war and safeguarding their security against attack. The concrete expression of this disbelief in the existence of the League and of any system of collective security can be observed in the rearming of the Great Powers and in the *saute qui peut* among all the smaller states to detach themselves from any commitments in the

¹The extent to which this system of savage anarchy has been imposed upon Europe in the last five years is not yet realised by very many people. The Italian Government showed, indeed openly declared, that nothing but war and conquest would satisfy it in Abyssinia. The armed intervention of Germany and Italy against the Spanish Government is destructive of any kind of international law or of an ordered society of states such as had begun to grow up in the last century. The immediate bombardment of Almeria by German warships as a "reprisal," without any communication with the Spanish Government, carries this process of barbarism and anarchy a stage further.

²*The Political Quarterly*, July-September, 1936.

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Covenant or other agreements and understandings which might involve them in the coming war.

That any sane and civilised person can believe that the complicated relations of European states can be carried on for long without the catastrophe of a great war under the anarchic system of force and threats imposed upon us by Germany and Italy makes one despair of the political intelligence of the human race. It is impossible to make permanent peace a certainty, but without the League system or something like the League system in Europe war is a certainty. It follows that the only hope of peace is to take the initiative in international affairs out of the hands of Germany and Italy and to re-establish a system of pacific settlement and collective security. The two things, as I said above, are intimately connected; they are two facets of the same problem, the problem of re-establishing order, civilisation, and peace in Europe.

Let us turn back now to the immediate situation to which I referred in the first paragraph. The temporary breathing space and opportunity which have appeared are not due to any resurrection or signs of life in the League or in French and British policy, but to an ebb in the bellicose policy of the fascist Powers. Six months ago there was considerable danger that Germany or Italy or both would take some deliberate step in the near future which would precipitate war. All over Europe statesmen and ordinary people were feeling and saying this. The danger still exists, but it is less immediate and, what is even more important perhaps, people feel it to be less immediate. There are three things which have contributed to this temporary anticyclonic change in the international weather: the comparative failure of German armaments and of the Italian forces in Spain, the effectiveness of the Russian air-force in Spain, and the rearmament of Great Britain. The psychological effect of these three facts has been

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considerable. Everything which is known points to the conclusion that they have strengthened the forces in Germany which are opposed to a violent and forward policy which would precipitate war. Events in Spain itself confirm this view, for they indicate that Germany and Italy are prepared to continue their policy of violence and intervention in Spain, but not beyond the point at which it might involve them in war. These conclusions are, of course, highly problematical ; but even if they be not true, there is no doubt that a large number of people believe them to be true. And that is a fact of the greatest importance. For it means that there has been a change in political international psychology. A calmer, more optimistic feeling has spread over Europe in the last few months. Six months ago thousands of persons in every country were feeling that war was inevitable, that it would come upon us from some violent act of Germany or Italy to-morrow or, if not to-morrow, the day after. Now many of those people are feeling that the fascist Powers have had a bit of a shock and that the rearmament of Britain has given them something to think about. There is, they feel, a breathing space, a lucid interval in the madness. This psychological change, one must repeat again and again, may be very fleeting ; some incident in Spain or some violent action may destroy the new confidence before what is written here is in print ; but while it lasts, it is of great importance, for nothing increases the danger of war more than a general feeling that it is imminent and inevitable.

If the policy of the pacific Great Powers were directed by intelligent and determined statesmanship, this breathing space and psychological moment might be used to stop temporarily, or even perhaps permanently, the drift to war. To do this a twofold policy is required. First, the initiative in international affairs must be taken out of the hands of Germany and Italy. That means that in every major question, involving the risk

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of war and, therefore, as the Covenant says, " of concern " to all other states, for instance, the Spanish civil war, Britain, France, and Russia must have a clear, defined policy based upon the rules of international law and the keeping of treaties and directed to preserve peace and prevent violent or aggressive action or intervention by any other state in Europe. From the first moment of doubt or crisis, it must be made clear to Germany and Italy that this policy of peace, order, and law will be firmly and unprovocatively pursued, and that attempts to override it by sudden violent and aggressive actions will be resisted. The lesson of the last few months is that the fascist Powers are prepared to go to the extreme limit with threats, bullying, and violent dramatic actions against smaller Powers, but they are not prepared at present to risk war with the pacific Great Powers. If their policy of bullying and violence is resisted and the rights of other states to order and peace are asserted, they give way. By asserting their right to peace and to a say in the ordering of Europe, the pacific Powers, particularly France and Britain, would regain the initiative in European policy and might prevent the German and Italian Governments from involving Europe in war during the next two years. Such a prolongation of the temporary breathing space and lucid interval would give time for the second part of a programme of peace, namely the first steps towards a reconstitution of the peace or collective security system, the beginning of a resurrection of the League.

The reconstitution of what is called a " peace front " in Europe and the resurrection of the League will be a much more difficult task than many people, particularly in the Labour movement, realise. These people imagine that, if only the governments of Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. went to Geneva prepared to " make the League a reality," the resurrection of the League would be immediately accomplished and a collective security system re-established in Europe.

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This is a delusion. It ignores the deep disintegration which the Manchurian and Abyssinian affairs have produced in Europe. They destroyed completely the bonds of belief upon which an international peace or collective security system must depend. None of the smaller Powers of Europe now believe that the obligations of the collective security system will be complied with by the Great Powers in the interests of or to protect the integrity and independence of small states. In so far as they regard the League seriously, they regard it as a danger and snare for themselves. They regard their obligations under the Covenant as a net which may entangle them in the inevitable war between the Great Powers. That is why the motive power of international organisation at the moment is not co-operation or collective security, but a *saue qui peut* from all the obligations of collective security. You can observe Belgium leading the way in this process by demanding formally to be relieved of such obligations. The Prime Minister of Holland has publicly stated that, if a neighbouring Great Power were the aggressor, it is out of the question that Holland would apply sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant. In July, 1936, the Prime Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, after consultation, issued a statement beginning with the significant words :

"The aggravation of the international situation and the cases of resort to force that have occurred during the last few years in violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations have given rise in our countries to some doubts whether the conditions in which they undertook the obligations contained in the Covenant still exist to any satisfactory extent."

These are all examples, among the most pacific states of Europe, of the general *saue qui peut* from the League and collective security. The same process can be observed, under

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slightly different forms, in the equivocal policy of Poland towards the League and France ; in the agreement between Italy and Jugoslavia with its menace to the Little Entente, which has been hitherto one of the chief pillars of the League system among the smaller states ; and in the failure of the whole French system of agreements within the framework of the League, based upon the Soviet pact and the Little Entente.

To state these facts is only to draw in detail the picture of the League's disintegration. In doing so we have necessarily had to describe the disintegration in psychological terms. These statesmen of the smaller Powers no longer believe that the Great Powers will comply with their obligations under a collective security system to defend a small Power against aggression ; hence their determination to release themselves from any commitments under a Covenant which will not secure them against attack and yet may involve them in war. This shows the difficulty of any immediate resurrection of the League and the danger of attempting any immediate reconstitution of the peace system on a grandiose scale. There can be no doubt that the Franco-Soviet Pact had a profoundly disintegrating effect upon the "peace front" in eastern Europe, and those who really want to reconstitute that "front" should learn the lesson of that fact. After Manchuria and Abyssinia any policy of the Great Powers involving reciprocal guarantees of security is deeply suspect to smaller Powers ; they regard it as a manœuvre of the Great Powers to obtain allies for the strengthening of their own position and they do not believe that the Great Powers will honour their obligations if it is merely a question of protecting a smaller state. The Franco-Soviet Pact, therefore, increased the pace of the *saue qui peut* among the small states of Europe, for they saw in it no assurance of security for themselves, but a danger of being entangled in a war between Germany on one side and France and Russia on the other. The small states

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will see exactly the same danger in any attempt to resurrect the League immediately on a large scale and will regard with well justified suspicion any proposal that they should enter a collective security system in which they would be bound to apply sanctions against the aggressor in any war between Great Powers.

These are unpleasant facts, but they are realities which must be faced by pacifists and those on the Left who believe, as I do, that there can be no hope of prolonged peace without a resurrection of the League and of collective security. The facts merely show that the damage done to the League and to the European peace system by the French and British Governments was so profound, that, if we are to rebuild them, we must start slowly and from the foundations.

Our problem is to find the nucleus of a resurrected League and of resistance to the anarchical system of violence which is being imposed upon Europe by Germany and Italy. The nucleus of a new League will be the nucleus of the "peace front" in Europe. It can be found in France and Britain, and our whole policy should start from that. It should begin with close co-operation between the French and British Governments in working out the basis for a common front of all pacific European Powers to resist aggression. The basis should be an open agreement between France and Britain mutually to guarantee their security. The two countries must have a common armaments policy determined by their common needs of defence. They should have the closest possible co-operation in economic policy, directed to freeing international trade. They must explore together the possibility of creating a common peace front in Europe. In practice, that means that they must consider and decide in concert to what extent they are prepared to guarantee individual states or groups of states against aggression. Are they prepared to guarantee the security of Czechoslovakia, for instance? And of

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Austria? And of Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and so on? Each case must be considered realistically and on its merits. That means that no obligation must be assumed which will not be met and which cannot be openly proclaimed. The objects in view must be to set up barriers to aggression in those parts of Europe in which any act of aggression would most endanger peace and at the same time to bring back the smaller Powers into a collective security system. In order to achieve the second object the fact will have to be faced that, in the present state of Europe and after their experience of the League, the smaller Powers will not enter a common front, unless the Great Powers guarantee their security without asking from the small Powers a reciprocal guarantee of the security of the Great Powers. This is a very important fact both with regard to the immediate situation and the eventual reconstitution of the League. The resurrection of the League will be impossible if small Powers are expected to guarantee the security and integrity of Great Powers or once more to accept to the full the obligations of articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant. It is probably true that a fully effective collective security system cannot be established, and therefore that the maximum insurance against war in Europe cannot be given, without a universal obligation upon all states within the system to defend the victim of aggression. But we have to learn from the experience of the last few years and build upon the actual situation. The actual situation is that the policy of France and Britain towards the League since 1931, the dominance of Germany and Italy, and the rearming of the Great Powers for war have had such a disintegrating effect upon Europe that the small Powers cannot afford to come into any system in which such obligations are asked of them. The time may come again in which the wider security system of the League can be re-established. But for the moment, if we wish to prolong the breathing space and lay the foundations

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of peace, we must begin by basing peace and security upon guarantees of those Powers which alone can be expected to make them effective.¹

A close alliance between the democracies of France and Britain, such as is here advocated, and an open exploration by their Governments of the possibilities of guaranteeing the security of the smaller Powers and so of resurrecting the League would have an immediate and profound effect upon Europe. It would take the initiative out of the hands of the fascist Powers and so help to re-establish confidence. But to be effective, it would have to be accompanied by a definite policy, wherever and whenever possible, towards Germany and Italy, based upon the following principles :

(1) France and Britain must oppose a common front to any attempt at aggressive action on the part of the fascist Powers wherever such action endangers peace. This must and can be done firmly, but yet unprovocatively, and it is the only way of preventing the present drift towards anarchy and violence in international affairs which is the direct result of our Government always leaving the initiative in the hands of Germany and Italy. To give an example : having adopted the policy of non-intervention in Spain and having obtained the agreement of Germany and Italy to it, the French and British Governments should firmly and actively insist upon it being carried out by those Powers, and should not, as they have done hitherto, passively acquiesce in continual intervention by the fascist Powers. That does not mean, of course, as conservatives and extreme pacifists pretend, that those who favour this kind of policy propose that France and Britain should conduct their policy on fascist or militarist lines and put a pistol at the heads of Germany

¹ Space makes it impossible for me to deal with other obligations, short of the reciprocal guarantees of the Covenant, e.g. the obligation of benevolent neutrality towards the victim of aggression, which the smaller states might or might not be reasonably asked to give in the early stages of the League's resurrection.

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and Italy and threaten war on every possible occasion. What it means is that the Governments of the great democratic Powers must have and pursue firmly and actively their own policy of ensuring peace, maintaining the rules of international law, and protecting the primary rights of democratic states to existence, and they must show that they are not prepared to abandon that policy at the first sign of resistance or threat. Everything which has happened in the last two years proves that to yield to the international bully and blackmailer only increases the danger of war, and that firm but unprovocative resistance to the bullying, threatening, and blackmailing promotes the chances of peace.

(2) An active policy of resisting violence and threats of violence from the fascist Powers should be accompanied by an active policy of attempting to redress any of their legitimate grievances. It is essential that the French and British Governments should make it clear to Germany and Italy and to the rest of the world that, while they are determined to assert the right of themselves and the smaller Powers of Europe to enjoy peace and democratic liberties, they are prepared to redress any legitimate grievances, territorial or economic, which the "unsatisfied Powers" may have. The French and British Governments should also, wherever possible, try to get Germany and Italy to share in the guarantees of security to smaller Powers and in this way to enter themselves into the collective security system.

(3) The French and British Governments should make the greatest possible effort to obtain agreements for the limitation of armaments and to induce the fascist Powers to agree to limitation.

It will be observed that in this outline of policy little or nothing has been said about the U.S.S.R. The proposals

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will be condemned out of hand on that account by many people on the Left as anti-Russian or anti-Communist. That is not the case. In the long run, peace is not possible in Europe unless the U.S.S.R. can be brought as an active member into the "common peace front" and a collective security system. But that does not alter the fact that the disintegration of the League and of the peace front is so great at the moment that any attempt to reconstitute them with France, Britain and the U.S.S.R. as nucleus would be doomed to failure. Instead of stopping the disintegration, it would increase it. It must be remembered that the Franco-Soviet Pact and the attempt of France to build upon it and agreements with the smaller states of south-eastern Europe a system of security definitely accelerated the disintegration. The attempt broke down owing to the ambiguous position of Poland and the fears of the smaller states that they would gain no security themselves, but would run the gravest risk of becoming involved in the quarrels of the Great Powers. If an attempt to reconstitute the League through what would amount to an alliance between France, Russia and Britain were made, it would have the same effect. That is why, if we are to recreate a collective security system, we must start again from the beginning, and the only safe beginning is France and Britain as a nucleus. That nucleus is clearly a defensive and pacific nucleus, and it has the great advantage from the point of view of working for peace at the present moment that it is not tied up to either of the two "ideologies" which seem to be going to do for Europe in the twentieth century what religion did for it in the seventeenth. But though at the moment peace can best be assured by not attempting to bring the Soviet Union into some large collective security system, the French and British Governments should work in close accord with the Soviet Government in all international questions. In all cases where it is necessary

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to oppose aggression or violent policy on the part of the fascist Powers, they should co-operate with the U.S.S.R., and in working out the basis for a common peace front they should consult the Soviet Government. Finally, wherever feasible and desirable they should try to get the Soviet Government to share in guaranteeing the security of smaller states.

There are two points or objections to these proposals which will occur to some readers and with which I can only deal very shortly in the space available. What, it will be asked, would be the position of the Franco-Soviet Pact if the policy urged in this article were adopted by France and Britain? In my opinion, for the reasons given above, the system of the Franco-Soviet Pact has in fact broken down. The sooner the Governments of France, the U.S.S.R. and Britain tacitly admit this fact, the better for the peace of Europe. The right way "tacitly to admit the fact" is to substitute for the now emasculated system of the Franco-Soviet Pact a system under which France and Britain, united in a "common front" and in co-operation with the U.S.S.R., would pursue the policy of resisting aggression, defending democracy, and resuscitating the League put forward in the preceding pages. The second objection which may be taken is that a limited collective security front, based on Britain and France, might be confused with or easily transformed into the "western security pact" advocated by Herr Hitler. The answer is that the western security pact of Herr Hitler is the exact opposite of the pact between Britain and France upon which I propose a rebuilding of the collective security system in Europe. Herr Hitler's Pact is designed to secure peace in the west by a multilateral treaty of western Powers in order to leave his hands free elsewhere. The Pact proposed here is a pact between the two great democratic Powers openly made, in the first place to defend themselves against

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aggression and in the second place to work out a system of barriers against aggression and violent action both in the east and west of Europe. I have no doubt that the National Government might adopt the system proposed here and turn it in practice into its opposite, namely Herr Hitler's western security pact, just as they adopted the League system and turned it into its opposite, the existing anarchy. But I am not proposing that this system can be worked by the National Government. No international system designed to prevent war and to defend the rights of democratic states to peace and liberty can be worked by our present government. It can only be worked by a government which has a policy which it understands and believes in, which is determined to make the sacrifices necessary in defence of peace and liberty, and which has the courage to control events rather than drift before them helplessly into disaster.

THE PRESENT POSITION IN THE DISTRESSED AREAS

By HENRY A. MESS

THE drab tragedy of the distressed areas plays on, as it sometimes seems interminably. It is now sixteen years since the brief post-War boom collapsed. In all that time there has been a great deal of unemployment at the coal mines, at the shipyards, in the heavy engineering trades. Children have grown to manhood or womanhood in communities blighted by an all-pervasive atmosphere; young men have grown to middle age, never knowing the opportunities which the young should know; men in the prime of life have grown old, and have known that trade revival would come too late for them at least.

Of course, the phenomenon of decaying areas is not a new one. It has happened time after time in history. The hammer ponds of Sussex remind us of an iron industry which has passed away. Wareham and Bosham, which are artists' paradises to-day, were once busy English ports. The Mendips and the Peak district are full of long-disused mines. The exodus from Durham and from South Wales, which is going on now, had its counterparts in earlier times. But of these economic cataclysms of the past we know comparatively little, and we have scanty record of the misery and bitterness which accompanied them. To-day we know more, perhaps feel more about what is happening; we measure and we document. The plight of the distressed areas has been written up by countless journalists; it has produced a considerable serious literature, of which a few recent examples

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are the basis of this article.¹ The report on South Wales is the most comprehensive and detailed study yet produced of any distressed area.

These areas were before the War highly specialised industrial regions, dependent in large measure on foreign trade. They have been ruined by post-War conditions, by new competitors abroad and by the high protection and other features of economic nationalism which have characterized the post-War period. In South Wales, in Durham and on Tyneside, in West Cumberland, on Clydeside, and latterly in parts of Lancashire, we have had large populations with their former means of livelihood cut from beneath their feet.

Professor Marquand argues cogently that the present plight of South Wales is in large measure due to, or has been aggravated by, actions of the Government of this country, upon which there rests therefore a heavy obligation to contribute to the revival of the area. All the writers whose books are cited in the footnote to this article are agreed that measures restoring international trade would do more to help the distressed areas than anything else could do. But it requires a sanguine man to believe that the nations will speedily return to economic sanity. As it is, we are distracted to some extent in our judgments and in our policies by our ignorance of the future trend of international trade.

During the sixteen years since 1921 there has been a certain amount of adaptation to the new conditions.

¹ THE INDUSTRIAL POSITION OF THE NORTH-EAST COAST OF ENGLAND. By E. D. MCCALLUM and others. (P. S. King. 1935. 2s. 6d.)

TRADE REVIVAL IN A DEPRESSED AREA. By D. CARADOG JONES. (University Press of Liverpool. 1937. 2s. 6d.)

THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL SURVEY OF SOUTH WALES. By H. A. MARQUAND and others. (University Press Board, Cardiff. 1937. 3 volumes. 30s.)

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Roughly speaking, this has been of four kinds: (1) scaling down the old staple industries and adding to their efficiency; (2) migration of persons from the depressed areas to other parts of the country; (3) attempts to make the lot of the unemployed more tolerable; (4) attempts to start new industries within the areas, and diversion to other occupations. As examples of the first of these may be quoted the operations of National Shipbuilding Securities, Limited, and of the Cotton Spinning Industry Act, and a good deal of introduction of new processes. It is clear from the South Wales report that rationalisation might be applied with advantage to the tinplate industry. These pruning operations do not immediately increase employment, may even decrease it; but they do prepare the way for healthy industries, capable of paying good wages and capable of expansion.

Migration, the second form of adaptation, has been on a very big scale. The industrial region of South Wales surveyed by Professor Marquand and his colleagues (a wider area than the statutory Special Area) lost on balance of migration over 70,000 persons between 1931 and 1935, about four per cent. of its population. Departures on this scale much more than offset the still high natural increase of the district. Professor Marquand estimates that if present trends continue, the surplus of employable labour may be expected to have disappeared from South Wales by 1943, even if no new large industries have been started.

And migration is reducing similarly the surplus population in other distressed areas. Of course, it is attended by many difficulties. And it leaves behind many difficulties. The migrants include a high proportion of the young and enterprising; the residual population contains an unduly large proportion of the old and of the less adaptable. To that extent it renders the future recovery of the districts more difficult to achieve. For that and for other reasons,

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some good and some bad, there is considerable feeling in the depressed areas against this migration. None the less it continues, and it is the biggest factor in the process of restoring equilibrium between population and available employment.

I shall not write at length here about the many methods by which it has been sought to make life a little better for unemployed men: occupation clubs, allotments, subsistence production schemes and the like, though I believe them to have played a great part in maintaining or restoring morale. Many men could not have returned to industry, when opportunity occurred, if it had not been for them. And they will be needed for a good while to come, to cater for those, especially the ageing men who are scarcely likely to be reabsorbed into industry, of whom there are many thousands. Many of these have settled down bravely and cheerfully to make the best of a very bad job, just as a blinded man or a man who has lost a limb adjusts himself as well as may be to a maimed life. And economically a good many families are as well off, or very nearly so, in unemployment as they would be receiving the low wages paid in many local industries and with the extra costs attaching to employment.

Since the distressed areas were highly specialised areas, and since that specialisation is no longer economically justified, it is natural to look for adaptation by way of de-specialisation: diversion of labour into other industries of the area or into new industries. With regard to new industries, the record of the past ten years has been very disappointing. The main facts are well known: that new light industries, catering mainly for the home market, have proliferated in the Midlands and even more in the Home Counties, but that few factories of the kind have been established in the depressed areas. Mr. Malcolm Stewart, in his last report as Commissioner for Special Areas, expressed

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his disappointment at the response of manufacturers to his appeals to consider placing works in those areas; and he and others have suggested compulsory location of new enterprises in distressed areas, or at least a ban on their location in Greater London. The Government has not accepted any of these suggestions, but it has given the new Commissioner power to offer inducements to manufacturers in the form of contributions to income tax and local rates. The Government is further helping in some cases to finance new enterprises; and the Nuffield Trust is working unobtrusively, and, so far as one can gather, with good judgment, in the same direction.

A very large part of the three volumes of the Second Industrial Survey of South Wales is devoted to the discussion of this matter of new industries. Why has it proved so difficult to attract new industries? How can the difficulties be overcome? What industries offer prospect of development? Where should they be located? The whole of the second volume is devoted to a study of the facilities of South Wales. A first chapter by Professor A. N. Cox gives an account of its mineral wealth. A second chapter discusses the transport facilities of the area; a third chapter describes the supplies of electricity, of gas, of water. In a fourth chapter it is argued that South Wales labour, contrary to an opinion sometimes held, is adaptable and reasonable. A fifth chapter describes the new trading estates, and the financial assistance available from the Treasury. A sixth chapter (of 164 pages!) describes in great detail the resources of different parts of the region, and is in the nature of an economic gazetteer. The third volume discusses very closely questions of location; it points out, for instance, the inaccessibility of the mining valleys and their unsuitability in general for new industries. There are areas on the northern edge of the coalfield which have certain advantages, such as a plentiful

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supply of clean water, which are hampered at present by inadequate communications. Equally carefully and in similar detail, the prospects of industries are examined, both existing industries which might be expanded and new industries which might be introduced.

The number of unemployed in the distressed areas, which was at its highest in 1931 and has fallen considerably of late, can be considered as made up of three parts. Part of it may be considered as the unemployment which was everywhere to be found in this country in a comparatively prosperous post-War year such as 1929; Mr. Caradog Jones calls this "normal unemployment." Part of it is the additional unemployment which fell upon the distressed areas, in common with the rest of the world, as a result of the "economic blizzard" which originated in America; this Mr. Caradog Jones calls "abnormal time unemployment." And finally he gives the name of "abnormal place unemployment" to the excess of unemployment in a distressed area (in his case Merseyside) over the England and Wales level. On that basis Mr. Jones gives the following figures for Merseyside in 1936:

	Persons	Percentage of insured population
Normal unemployment	33,800	8.5
Abnormal time unemployment.. ..	17,800	4.5
Abnormal place unemployment ..	40,000	10.2
Total	92,000	23.2

Abnormal time unemployment is fast diminishing; in 1934 it accounted for nearly 25,000 persons on Merseyside, in 1936 for less than 18,000. Abnormal place unemployment, on the other hand, bulks larger than before; in other words, Merseyside has not shared proportionately in the trade recovery which has been going on all over the country.

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"The conclusion is that special measures are necessary to remove this peculiar sluggishness and restore the pace of improvement on Merseyside." Mr. McCallum had written much the same about his part of Great Britain a couple of years earlier: "Without vigorous action on the part of the central government, large-scale unemployment on the North-East coast is likely to persist."

The new factor which has come into play during the last year has been the entering by this country upon a heavy programme of re-armament. Re-armament involves a large consumption of iron and steel, and their production requires a large consumption of coal; re-armament further involves much building of ships and much heavy engineering. The distressed areas have been areas where these industries flourished, and the Tyne in particular has a long tradition of armament industries. It is therefore a natural assumption that, however regrettable re-armament may appear from many standpoints, from the standpoint of employment it is a boon to the distressed areas. And there can be no doubt that a number of men have found work because of it. And, moreover, it is likely to have the effect which a large-scale public works policy (to which the Treasury has always refused assent) would have had in buoying up the purchasing power of the areas, and thereby making less unfavourable the situation for new light industries looking to the local market.

There are, however, good economic reasons (as well as other reasons) for discounting the beneficence of re-armament. It is not so easy to-day as it would have been ten or twelve years ago to resume the interrupted pattern of those areas. Plant and personnel have been scaled down as part of the accommodation to a changed situation. It will not, therefore, be merely a matter of utilizing resources which are available and idle. Mr. Caradog Jones thinks it likely that skilled

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labour will have to be imported into certain of the depressed areas where munition factories have been or are to be set up. There is also the danger that there will be competition for plant, raw materials, and capital with peacetime industries and especially with the new industries which seem at last to be getting under way. Whether this is so or not will depend partly upon the pace of re-armament, the competition being more serious if it is very rapid, and partly upon the presence or absence of any kind of co-operation and agreement between the promoters of the two kinds of industries. It is to be hoped that the Minister of Defence and the Commissioner for Special Areas will continually take counsel together on this matter.

In any case re-armament on a big scale cannot last indefinitely. Either it will issue in war, in which case we must anticipate a repetition of the post-War slump, or something worse; or there will be a scaling down by agreement of the armed forces of the leading nations, in which case there would be an economic dislocation though in more generally favourable circumstances. And a *détente* of one kind or the other cannot, one supposes, lie in the very distant future. Re-armament is therefore no permanent addition to the industries of the areas in which it is taking place; and, economically, it is a repetition of the grand blunder of the past, an encouragement to specialisation for a precarious market. It is indeed a reversal of the process which was going on with increasing rapidity, the assimilation of the economic structure of the distressed areas to that of the country as a whole.

Let us now recapitulate the stages through which the depressed areas have passed, and in doing so see which of the old factors still operate and what new factors have come into play, and try to form an estimate of the probable future. We can do that with more confidence because of the amount

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of analytical work which has now been done upon the problem.

First of all, there was the period which preceded the War: England specialising as a manufacturing and exporting country; and with certain parts of it more specialised than the rest, and specialised increasingly (Lancashire is a partial exception) for heavy industries largely dependent on foreign trade. That was the period of pre-War prosperity, a prosperity not unchequered and by no means unaccompanied by evils, but still a period in which that particular structure and distribution of economic forces seemed justified by results. The second period was that of the War, when the specialised areas were over-stimulated, their industries were hypertrophied, whilst under stress of circumstances foreign countries developed their own similar or substitute industries. This period lasted, with the short post-War boom, till the precipitous break of 1921. It was then that the new situation developed: impoverished foreign buyers, disturbed currencies and other confusions, new competition, together with a good deal of displacement of labour by very rapid rationalisation and mechanisation. From 1921 to 1926 may be called the period of incredulity; England, and the most affected districts in particular, were unable to believe in a permanently changed set of conditions, and were fortified in their attitude by some recovery of trade. In 1926 there took place the coal stoppage and the general strike, and all hopes of early recovery were nipped; and from that year may be dated a growing recognition that an era had ended, and that the prosperity of the future must be built upon a different basis from that of pre-War years. Again there came a period of partial recovery, and, particularly relevant to our subject, a considerable easing of the position in the distressed areas by extensive migration. It was during these years that a new feature became apparent, that in the new protectionist England

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a number of light industries were springing up to replace the old exporting industries, but that the distressed areas were not getting their share of them. This new trade revival was frost-bitten in 1929, and from that blight British trade is now recovering. During this latter period of intense depression the terrible condition of the distressed areas excited a great deal of public sympathy; and, tardily enough, a number of steps have been taken both by the State and by private bodies and individuals which do at last give hope of new industries being started in those areas. Lastly, there has come this new phase of re-armament.

To summarize: it is indubitable that some of the elements in pre-War prosperity are gone beyond recall; this is especially true of shipbuilding, including naval shipbuilding, where other nations have challenged successfully the virtual monopoly of forty or fifty years ago. More open to question is whether the present high protectionism and policy of self-sufficiency of the nations are likely to last long or not; our economists regard it as folly, but it is a folly which the nations may hug for a very long time, and it is probably wise to leave a return to easy international intercourse out of our present reckoning. The third element in the situation is adjustment by migration, and that is still proceeding rapidly. A fourth element has been the world economic blizzard of American origin, which has now blown itself out. A fifth element is the attempt to restore the depressed areas by introduction of new industries, and concurrently with that the re-distribution of workers between existing occupations in the areas; the former has not yet operated to any great extent, but there are indications that it may do so in the near future; the latter has already taken place on a considerable scale.

Last but not one, sheer lapse of time is affecting the situation. Sixteen years have turned many of the displaced men into

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old men no longer of employable age, often deplorably into prematurely aged men. A generation will soon have passed; we have failed to solve their problem. Professor Marquand, as we have seen, looks to the disappearance of an employable surplus in South Wales by 1943 at latest. The situation is not dissimilar in other areas. We are in the fourth act of this dismal drama. It might have been shortened and eased. There is still much which may be done or left undone, and the character of the next ten years will depend upon our choice. The studies referred to in this article, and others like them, have helped to clarify our thinking and to supply charts for action.

Last of all, re-armament introduces new complexities and perplexities. It will probably reduce unemployment and speed up recovery in the distressed areas, but at the expense of preparing for the future a repetition of the problems and distresses of the past sixteen years.

THE INTERNAL CONSEQUENCES OF REARMAMENT

By R. W. B. CLARKE

ALTHOUGH for a period of over two years rearmament has been the dominant fact of our political life, there has been little serious discussion of its economic consequences. Its political implications have been discussed and re-discussed in scores of Parliamentary debates, hundreds of conferences and innumerable articles. Its military implications have been carefully analysed by professional and amateur strategists alike. But there has been singularly little discussion of the short-term and long-term effects of the Government's programme upon Britain's economic life. Indeed, those who argue politically in favour of rearmament tend also to provide economic arguments in its favour—there has been an astonishing number of converts to the doctrine of public works as a means of reducing unemployment and increasing social welfare. And those who argue politically against rearmament equally astonishingly emerge as extreme advocates of Budgetary rectitude and supplement their political arguments with grim prognostications of the economic future. In neither case are the arguments relevant. If rearmament is necessary for the nation's security, then the nation must be willing to accept the internal consequences. But it is the duty of the Government which embarks upon a rearmament programme to consider the manifestly dangerous internal effects, and to take all the necessary measures, at no matter what cost to vested interests, to reduce those ill-effects to a minimum. It is by that criterion that public economic policy must now be judged.

When, some time in 1934, the Government decided to

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rearm, the major problem which it had to face was the industrial one. The political problem, as Mr. Baldwin has admitted, was a grave one, but he has demonstrated that it was soluble. The financial problem could always, at worst, be shelved by borrowing. But the problem of armament-producing capacity could not be shelved. It was a two-fold problem. First of all, it was necessary substantially to expand the existing aircraft factories and to re-equip the specialised arms factories—particularly those which were producing armour-plate, heavy ordnance and the like—which had been more or less depressed since the war. The magnitude of the necessary expansion was about five times the 1934 output. Secondly, it was necessary to prepare reserve capacity for possible war conditions. The Government had to provide plans for a switch-over of peace factories to war production, for an industrial mobilisation the speedy achievement of which is all-important in modern strategic conditions. If plough-share factories could suddenly be converted to the manufacture of swords, of course the problem would have been simple.

But the main feature of armament manufacture is its extreme specialisation and high level of industrial concentration. Even in 1934, about 70 per cent. of the national aircraft output was consumed by the Royal Air Force. The production of armour is a highly specialised process, undertaken in Britain by only three firms—English Steel Corporation (Vickers group), Thomas Firth & John Brown, and William Beardmore. Only one firm—Vickers-Armstrongs—produces gun-mountings, the most delicate of all armament work. Naval shipbuilding is to some extent interchangeable with commercial shipbuilding, but experience of and familiarity with naval work is an obvious essential for the recipient of Admiralty contracts. Moreover, the shipbuilding industry had been depressed for so long that considerable re-equipment

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was necessary and extensive re-recruitment of labour. Some military products—for example, shells—can easily be produced by non-specialised firms, but in the main heavy products there is no possibility of transfer. The Government's industrial problem, in short, was even more difficult than a post-war "demobilisation" of war factories. Commercial products can be made in an arms factory, but the reverse process is highly difficult, and in heavy armament manufacture impossible.

During the last three years, the Government's policy has been gradually developing. It appears to be a four-legged policy. First, the existing producers (and, of course, the Government factories) were induced to modernise and extend their plants. If this did not suffice, other and hitherto wholly commercial undertakings were induced to accept arms contracts of the simpler kind, and to establish plants accordingly. The number of firms receiving Service orders has doubled in the last two years. Thirdly, the Government embarked upon a plan to prevent the scramble for component parts which must inevitably follow a rapid increase in Government orders. The Government decided in many cases (e.g., magnetos) to purchase the supplies of components from the sub-contractors and then distribute them to the contractors. Finally, the Government introduced the notorious "shadow" scheme in order to provide a reserve capacity for mass-production of aircraft in war-time. The Government, by this scheme, actually builds, owns and controls the factories. But the actual management of the factories is done (at a management fee) by leading motor companies. For the making of air-frames there are two "shadow" factories, managed by Austins and Rootes; for the making of aero-engines there are six, and for air-screws one. Each engine factory makes a range of parts, and the parts are assembled at the "shadow" works managed by the Bristol Aeroplane Co.

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The Government is building alternative "chains" of this kind, in order to diminish the risk of dislocation by bombing. Theoretically, the "shadow" scheme is wholly separate from the ordinary peace-time expansion of aircraft output. The Government has in fact neglected existing aero-engine capacity. Nearly all the engines are made by three firms—an arrangement which smacks ominously of the pre-war heavy armament rings. The dispute between Lord Nuffield and the Air Ministry last winter revealed the somewhat Gilbertian situation in which Lord Nuffield was being asked to build, at the Government's expense, a "shadow" factory to produce parts of engines while he had a complete aero-engine plant of his own (although not of the type required by the Government) standing idle. This muddle—which ended in the allotment of a War Office contract to Lord Nuffield's engine company—illustrates admirably the rigidity and lack of flexibility of the system.

From the beginning the public interest has been handicapped by a fundamental contradiction in this four-legged policy. The Government's policy, simply, is to press ahead with the expansion. "It will be important," as the March, 1936, White Paper said, "to see that the work is not delayed by the over-elaboration of financial safeguards." Indeed, it is inevitable that the companies, asked to double or treble their plant capacity and to embark upon extensions which involve massive increases in their capital, should demand assurances that their investment would be a profitable one. From their shareholders' point of view, they could not legitimately embark upon such schemes, knowing that the rearmament programme was due to be completed in five years' time, without some guarantee either of compensation then or large enough profits now to enable them to amortize their plant.

But at the same time, electoral considerations compel

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the Government to limit profits. "His Majesty's Government are determined that the needs of the nation shall not serve to pile up extravagant profits," said the same White Paper. This is the essential contradiction of private arms manufacture. It is interesting to see the steps which the Government has taken to minimise it. With the aircraft industry (about which most is known) the Air Ministry manœuvred in a somewhat complex manner. It placed its contracts but did not fix the prices. The companies were forced, rather unwillingly, to go ahead, for the Ministry held the threat of nationalisation over their heads. For nearly eighteen months, indeed, the industry carried on under I.T.P. (Instructions to Proceed). The Government paid the prime costs, and, as we have seen, supplied some of the component parts itself.

Not until the Ministry's accountants had found a satisfactory working basis and the industry's extensions had been pushed so far that they could not be retracted was the margin of profit—some 10 per cent.—fixed. The real meaning of these final contracts will not appear until the next company accounts are published. But it is believed that they include compensation for future losses on plant put up at the Government's request. We should note, moreover, that the delay in price-fixing both increased the difficulty of raising further capital and delayed the delivery of aeroplanes. In the late autumn of 1936, the supply position was admitted to be a long way behind time-table. The inexperience of the manufacturers in mass-production methods was inevitably delaying delivery, and this price uncertainty made conditions even more difficult. Outside the aircraft industry, the Government was in a much weaker bargaining position. The latest accounts of the constituents of the Vickers group—which invariably seriously under-estimate the true earning power of the group—suggest that the terms of

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the contracts have not been unfavourable to the companies. The Select Committee on Estimates, it is true, has found no evidence of profiteering in the ordinary sense of the word. But none the less, in the absolute sense, the profit level is considerable.

Moreover, the Government has been unable in many cases to induce companies to undertake the desired expansion. Many concerns already doing a profitable business and mindful of the speculative nature of arms contracts have flatly refused to take the risk. The Government has therefore been forced to step in and "assist" them on the same general lines as the "shadow" schemes. The Government, in fact, provides the factory and the company operates it. The principle which underlies this policy is highly significant.

One of the main arguments which is adduced against arms nationalisation is the supposedly greater flexibility of private enterprise. The State, it is argued, cannot face the losses and dislocation which would occur if there were a sudden decline in the demand for armaments. But now it appears that the State is the only body that *can* take these risks. The marginal plant and the sub-marginal plants, the plants which cannot be financed by private capital and which would be the first to be dismantled if peace became assured, are being financed by the State. Thus, either the State has to finance the most risky enterprises itself or it has to pay high enough prices to provide, say, 10 per cent. on the new real money subscribed by private investors. This 10 per cent., moreover, is payment for risk-taking, and yet the contracts may include compensation clauses which involve the Government in further expense if the need for armament production passes. The public, in effect, suffers the ultimate financial disadvantages of nationalisation without securing the corresponding financial benefits of nationalisation during the rearmament period.

This public semi-control—very typical of the Government's general economic policy—is the logical outcome of the attempt to compromise between the extravagant payment which private enterprise requires as an inducement to take the very substantial risks inherent in armament expansion and the economy and prevention of profiteering which public opinion demands so urgently. Thus, prices are fixed and the firms' premises overrun by Government accountants and costing experts: the problem of labour supply is left for the companies to handle, although the supply of machine tools is controlled: some raw materials are bought by the Government in bulk and then distributed while others are allowed to provide large profits for sub-contractors who may be financially associated with the "controlled" contractors: much of the essential research is done and paid for by the State: the State is left to take the risks which private capital refuses to take—and the supply of aeroplanes falls behind schedule. We seem to have arrived at a position in which the public no longer reaps the advantages of capitalism and is denied the advantages of socialism.

This tendency to make the worst of both possible economic worlds, of course, is not a new one and it is not confined to Britain alone. The principal feature of the long-term developments of the last decade, indeed, has been the growth of the State's interference with private enterprise. Sometimes the interference has been deliberately designed to correct some abuse which has troubled the public conscience: more frequently it has been designed to maintain declining industries, to stabilise the profit margins of existing monopolies and near-monopolies or even to create new monopolies. The emergence of the State as a monopoly consumer of the products of a large section of industry, the need that those sections of industry should be efficient, and the public demand that they should not be allowed to extract excessive profits

have immensely stimulated this process of public semi-control. In the Fascist countries, indeed, the process is reaching its logical extreme of wholesale regimentation and bureaucracy—in Germany, it is estimated that there are some 500,000 officials engaged in the administration of the State supervision and control of privately-owned industry. Thus the enterprise and the free market which are the only theoretical justification for private capitalism are enclosed in a bureaucratic strait-waistcoat, without the positive vigour and initiative in the public interest which is possible in socialised industry and has been achieved by the Central Electricity Board, the L.P.T.B. and the Post Office since it was removed from Treasury control. The needs of rearmament have accentuated this development, and the ideas which now underlie it are seen throughout the Government's economic policy. They are particularly evident in the Government's plans for electricity supply reorganisation, for example. Privately-owned supply companies will be retained, but only on terms of bureaucratic control by the Electricity Commissioners which leave no essential decisions in the hands of the private managers. This type of economic system which is being developed—suspended mid-way between free capitalism enterprising in search of private profit and publicly-owned monopoly enterprising in the public interest—has an ominous Fascist tinge, and is assuredly unhealthy in a progressive nation.

The fundamental criticism of the Government's plans for rearmament is precisely its refusal to face this dilemma. From the beginning, it decided against nationalisation. It immediately took steps to forestall the public demand for nationalisation by the time-honoured device of Royal Commission. A fortnight before the famous Defence White Paper signed "J.R.M."—in February, 1935—the Commission was appointed. Its personnel, under the venerable chair-

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manship of Sir John Eldon Bankes, was of a type which, though worthy enough, had no special competence to deal with the problems involved. Moreover, it was given far less extensive powers than those which enabled the Nye Senatorial Committee to unearth its sensational discoveries. It slowly and steadily heard evidence, the most significant part of which was a swingeing condemnation of nationalisation by Sir Maurice Hankey, who somewhat surprisingly had been allowed by the Government to give evidence. Eventually, in October, 1936, when the Government's rearmament machine had been built, the Commission reported.

Its report, as most people expected, was a whitewashing report. It gave the British arms-makers a clean bill of health. It rejected nationalisation. But it did make a number of recommendations which conceded much of the case, moral, financial and technical, for public control. It recommended that retired public officials should not accept appointments with armament firms: it recommended a more rigorous and positive control of arms exports: it recommended that the Government should support the United States proposals for international arms trade control. It recommended the establishment in effect of a Ministry of Munitions: it recommended that some of all types of armament should be made in Government factories in order to check private manufacturers' costings: it recommended a restriction of profits in peace-time and industrial conscription in war-time.

The enactment of these recommendations would not have solved the essential dilemma of private manufacture. But it would have met some of the public objections to the present arrangement. The Government, however, in a White Paper issued on the day on which Parliament rose for the Coronation vacation, tacitly admitted that the sole object of the enquiry had been to delay public outcry until the rearmament

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organisation had become so developed that fundamental alteration was impracticable. Some of the recommendations (e.g., profit control) had been carried out. Others (e.g., the Ministry of Munitions) were unnecessary, for the present organisation was adequate. Others (e.g., arms export control) were undesirable. One, the control of activities of retired officials, was under consideration. In short, for all the notice the Government intended to take, the Commission might never have sat. It is not easy to find an explanation, other than the obvious and discreditable one, for the Government's procedure.

The French experience, indeed, shows very clearly the financial savings which would have accrued to the State if even partial nationalisation had been carried through, say, in 1934. And it provides no justification for the fears that nationalisation would limit the State's arms supply or reduce its efficiency. Indeed, what evidence there is points to the opposite view. Financially, at any rate, the French taxpayer will derive considerable benefit, although the terms of compensation were fixed so favourably for the manufacturers that their publication caused an immediate rise of over 10 per cent. in the prices of the chief armament shares. M. Pierre Cot, the Air Minister, in an interview with the representative of the *Manchester Guardian* (November 9, 1936), illustrated the immense savings which the Government, by nationalising before rearming, would achieve. "We shall spend (in compensation for aircraft plant) say 400,000,000 francs," he said, "but our orders in a year will amount to 800,000,000." If we assume a 10 per cent. profit on turnover under private manufacture, therefore, the whole cost of the plant will be written off in five years. Similarly in Britain, compensation terms which would have looked very attractive to Vickers shareholders in March, 1935, would have been very profitable for the taxpayer. Since that date, in anti-

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pation of rearmament profits, the shares have risen from 9s. 3d. to 30s.

The effect of rearmament upon the public finances is likely to be so serious, indeed, that any proposal to reduce its cost must be considered very carefully. The Government may be eager "that the work be not delayed by the over-elaboration of financial safeguards," but the taxpayer and the recipient of social services cannot afford to be so generous. The plain facts of the position are that ordinary expenditure has increased from £709 millions in 1934-5 to £943 millions in 1937-8—armament expenditure from £114 millions to £278 millions—while ordinary revenue has increased from £716 millions to £863 millions. During the next five years, the expenditure upon armaments may be expected to increase. The average for the five years 1937-42 is estimated at a minimum of £300 millions—£22 millions greater than the figure for the current year. Of this total, the Government intends to finance £80 millions a year by borrowing.

The implications of this, for those who believe in sound finance, are staggering. First of all, in the "rearmament period," the Budget will be unbalanced to a minimum of £80 millions a year, a deficit which, in the face of a national debt of £7,800 millions, is serious enough. But it seems unlikely that the deficit will be limited to £80 millions. When in a year or two's time rearmament expenditure reaches its peak, the total Budget ordinary expenditure may not be far short of the £1,000 millions mark. While prosperity lasts, and the yield of taxation continues to expand, the revenue may be sufficiently buoyant to cover most of this additional cost. But it is hardly credible that prosperity can last for the whole five years of the arms expansion. When a decline does come, the Chancellor will face a problem of falling revenue and stable or rising expenditure in its acutest form. Moreover, even when the rearmament expenditure is

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complete, the problem will not be solved, for the cost of maintaining the newly-built defence forces, together with the extra debt service, will probably not be far below the average £220 millions a year which the Chancellor is now charging to revenue during the five-year period. Thus, if prosperity is maintained indefinitely, the most favourable prospect is one of five £80 million deficits in succession followed by a precarious balance—all achieved with a 5s. income tax and the highest level of indirect taxation in our history, and with no allowance for redemption of debt.

In the long run—if we assume that Budget balance over, say, a ten-year period is a necessity for a financially solvent nation—the effect of rearmament will necessitate one of three courses. It will be necessary either to adopt drastic measures to reduce the burden of Government debt by capital levy or inflation or to make sweeping cuts in the social services or to find a new long-run source of revenue. The second of these alternatives, besides being the least palatable to any citizen with the slightest sense of social responsibility, is also the least effective. A 10 per cent. cut in the whole Civil Service Vote would bring in only £40,000,000 a year, and a cut of that order would arouse such social discontent that even from the military point of view it would be more safely made in the Defence Votes. It is certain, however, that there will be strong demands for economies in the social services when the depression comes—the first shots are already being fired in the City columns of the *Evening Standard*. The first alternative, the reduction in Government debt, is probably inevitable but is not yet within visible range of possibility.

It is therefore incumbent upon the Government to adopt the last alternative—to discover a new source of revenue, not only for the period of armament expansion but afterwards to cover the increased needs of armament maintenance. This Mr. Chamberlain attempted to do when he introduced

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N.D.C.—the tax on the growth of profits. But his method was peculiarly inept. Not only was the tax uneven in its incidence and costly and inequitable in its administration, but also its value as a revenue-producer was limited to times of expanding profits: when profits fell below "standard," the State would have been liable for heavy refunds to industry. At the moment of writing, it seems likely that the Government will introduce some form of corporation profits tax. This would be a great improvement, although in principle it is difficult to make a case for singling out Ordinary shareholders for extra taxation, while leaving immune the rentier, the farmer and the landowner. There is more to be said for a return to differential taxation of unearned incomes—a sad use for this powerful engine of redistribution of incomes and expansion of social welfare, but one that is necessary to protect the social services.

The short-term economic consequences of rearmament are equally dangerous, and once again the Government does not appear to be aware of them. That the effect must be inflationary is apparent from the briefest study of the industrial incidence of rearmament expenditure. When to the normally high activity of the capital goods industries in the later stages of the trade cycle is added the stimulus of Government borrowing for rearmament, the normal tendencies to boom inflation must necessarily be strengthened. The high degree of industrial concentration of armament demand must cause an acute shortage of materials and skilled labour. The demands of the Services require that this year the 1936 output of the engineering and shipbuilding industries—already working nearly to effective capacity—should be increased by some 10-15 per cent. This necessarily implies an increase in costs, and a choking-off of the commercial demand for capital goods. Already we are seeing signs of this. The railway development plans which were announced

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before the General Election and were financed by Government-guaranteed loan are being seriously delayed: the rise in the price of electrical equipment is delaying rural electrification: local authorities are being forced to delay plans of development.

If it were possible to reduce commercial demand *pari passu* with the increase in armament demand, then business activity could be maintained for a long time ahead. It is unfortunately true, however, that the rise in costs, coupled with the gradual increase of interest rates (stimulated by the unbalanced Budget) will at some not far distant date cause a reduction in the total demand for capital goods, and a consequent decline in trade activity. Armament demand is still only a relatively small proportion of the demand for capital goods as a whole, and its high degree of industrial concentration means that it cannot compensate for a decline in the most important capital-goods industry—the building trade. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that much of the present "commercial" constructional activity represents extensions of factories and re-equipment of works for rearmament purposes, and this re-equipment work is now nearly done. Consequently, rearmament in this country is not on a large enough scale to offset the normal cyclical economic forces. It accelerates boom inflation, because of its high industrial concentration, but it cannot counteract the forces which are making for depression. Wise public policy, of course, would provide against these dangers in advance, above all by doing everything possible to increase international trade and by preparing emergency schemes of public works. But that involves planning ahead, and the Government in all its policy shows a deplorable tendency to live for the moment.

Finally, the impact of rearmament upon the social structure is seen in the awakening of trade union activity. This revival is partly the simple result of the rise in prices—a rise which has been intensified rather than caused by rearmament, but

which incidentally was dangerously stimulated by the Government's indiscreet statement that it proposed to purchase huge stocks of essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and by its repeated denials of the existence of speculation. But the movement has been most significant in the unions which have been connected with the rearmament programme. The increase in industrial capacity has inevitably induced a demand for dilution of skilled labour and a dangerous tendency to regiment labour. The refusal of the Government to take any of the responsibility for recruitment of labour and for the negotiation of wage agreements, together with the careful moderations of the official union leaderships has prevented these difficulties from coming to the surface. But by no means the least significant effects of rearmament have been the resuscitation of the shop stewards' movement and the obvious dissatisfaction of large numbers of trade unionists. In all the armament centres—and especially on the Clyde—there have been strikes of varying degrees of "officialness": local union executives have been constantly at odds with the central controlling bodies. And now that the rise in wholesale prices is beginning to make itself felt in the cost of living, there are evidently the makings of social conflict of similar order to those conflicts which have convulsed France and the United States. Taken in their context of the political set-up of rearmament—intensified military propaganda, supersession of democratically-elected local authorities by military and semi-military commissioners for air-raid precautions and the like, espionage and counter-espionage in the arms factories, and interference with civil liberties—they may shake this country from the placid social path which it has followed during the last decade. It is early yet to embark upon prophecy, for there are still very many imponderables, but there is no doubt that the danger of a clash of social forces is greater than it has been at any time since 1926.

THE LONDON BUS STRIKE AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION

By ERNEST DAVIES

THE London bus strike raises questions as to the efficacy of the public corporation, the model for public ownership accepted by the Labour and Trade Union movements for the future organisation of industry. The London Passenger Transport Act, which created a public monopoly for London passenger transport, was changed for the worse by the National Government particularly as regards the appointment of the Board; but it must not be too readily accepted that those changes are responsible for the failure of the Board to maintain good relations with a section of its employees or for its failure to live up to its financial obligations. The chief change was the removal of the appointment of the Board from the Minister of Transport to a body of Appointing Trustees consisting of an ill-assorted group of public and professional men possibly completely disinterested in or ignorant of London transport problems.

Had the Board been appointed by the Minister of Transport as was proposed in Mr. Herbert Morrison's original bill it is conceivable Parliament would have influenced the Minister to take earlier action in regard to the strike and perhaps the incompetent handling of the situation by the Government would have been avoided. It is certainly unlikely matters would have been allowed to drift until at the last minute the Minister of Labour intervened, only to appoint a court of inquiry mediocre in personnel and severely limited in time. On the other hand, in view of the Government's past record in the matter of hours of labour, notably at Geneva during meetings of the International Labour Office, and

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recently in its refusal to meet the demands of the Post Office employees for a 40-hour week, it cannot be assumed that even had Parliament greater responsibility any encouragement would have been given to the Board to reduce the number of hours worked per day by the busmen. In fact the experience of the Post Office indicates that a government can be an extremely bad employer. Previous to the creation of the L.P.T.B. the combine under the chairmanship of Lord Ashfield had been a particularly good employer: at the inquiry Lord Ashfield in evidence said:

"This Board has publicly and openly been described as a good employer. We are very jealous of that reputation."

In view of this, how is it that the Board so definitely and uncompromisingly refused to discuss the question of a 7½-hour day for busmen, already the principle which governs the working conditions of the railwaymen employed by the Board?

In the statement of the Board's case published on the eve of the strike the reason was given in the first paragraph:

"The Board cannot help but feel that the trade union so far have failed to appreciate the effect which an acceptance of their proposals must have upon the position of the Board. Nor do they seem willing to recognise the fact that the Board have not at this time any margin of receipts available out of which to pay the cost. If therefore they were conceded, the Board would be unable to discharge the responsibilities placed upon them by Parliament and their position would thus become of extreme gravity."

The Board could not concede the busmen's demands and at the same time meet the financial obligations imposed upon it by Act of Parliament. In his evidence Lord Ashfield made this clear.

"Under the Act, the 'C' stock carried interest of the standard rate of 5 per cent. for the first year and 5½ per cent. thereafter with a maximum of 6 per cent.

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in all. The revenue must be sufficient to satisfy this, and if the Board could not fulfil its obligations it must face up to possible legal action and the appointment of a receiver. . .

"If the Board failed to pay a standard rate of interest of 5½ per cent. in respect of one particular class of stock for the year ending not later than June, 1938, then the Board would be in the position of having failed to discharge its obligations in respect of that class of stock and it would be free to the shareholders to move for the appointment of a receiver and manager. . .

"If the Board had to face another increase in costs it would be impossible for it to proceed with the extensions and improvements which the public were demanding. It was not only a question of meeting the interest on the stock. It was a question, unless the Board could discharge its obligations, of not being able to get the necessary credit to raise more capital."

The financial obligation to pay a standard rate coupled with a sanction enforceable every third year of default arose from the compensation given on the transfer of the acquired undertakings to the Board. Because the burden of compensation interposes itself in this case it can do so with equal force on every occasion that demands are made by labour on the one hand or by the consumer on the other. What applies in particular in the case of the L.P.T.B. applies to the public corporation in general.

The principle of the public corporation is that it be financially self-supporting, i.e., it must balance its budget. The success or failure of the public corporation will be judged, among other things, by its ability (a) to provide the consumer with services or goods at satisfactory and normally stable prices. (b) To maintain peaceful relations with its employees who should enjoy at least as good conditions of employment and security as those granted by the best employer under similar conditions. If public ownership is to be justified, efficient and co-ordinated operation plus

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independence nor is a return to direct Ministerial responsibility and Parliamentary control advocated. Appointment of the Board by a Minister and retention of Parliament's right to question and discuss general matters of principle and policy plus the right to remove members of the Board by resolution of the House of Commons¹ is the maximum control desirable. This would not solve the problem, but would enable a certain measure of control and pressure to be exercised which to a small extent might help to maintain the correct balance between the respective claimants to a Board's revenue, which must arise however clearly its allocation is laid down by Act of Parliament. At least it would be known where responsibility lay, and matters of policy and principle could be discussed outside of the Board's offices.

Further, decisions on certain matters should be delegated to bodies independent of the Board. On labour matters—demands for improved conditions on the part of the workers, or on the part of the Board for worse conditions—consideration by a third party is called for. If these be left to the Board and the union to settle then the fulfilment of financial obligations may well be the deciding factor. There could be disputes similar to the London bus strike. To prevent financial considerations being the main test of labour's demands, disputes other than those easily adjustable between the union and the Board could be submitted to the Industrial Court. The findings of the Court could be compulsorily binding on both parties, and while finance would inevitably play its part, as in the case of all labour disputes, it would not be given main or undue consideration. At least the men's claims would be heard and the findings would be impartial. There would be no denying consideration on financial grounds, as was the demand of London busmen for a 7½-hour day.

¹As suggested by Dr. W. A. Robson in *Public Enterprise*. Ed. Dr. Robson. (*Allen and Unwin*.)

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Similarly, requests on the part of the consumer for reduced charges or increased facilities should be heard by other bodies than the Board. Ample provision for this is made in the case of the L.P.T.B. through the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, the Local Authorities and the Railway Rates Tribunal. Here consumer protection is spoilt, however, by the proviso of the Act that no order shall be made which precludes the Board from fulfilling its financial obligations. This includes of course, the payment of interest, including the standard rate on the "C" stock. Where such a proviso is included unprejudiced consideration is ruled out. The interests of the consumer need to be examined in as unprejudiced a way as the Industrial Court would examine labour matters.

Only through the compulsory removal of major decisions on labour matters and consumer problems to statutory bodies unrelated to the public corporation concerned can the overweighting of the stockholders' right as compared with those of the consumer and the employee be prevented. This could be provided for in the Act creating the corporation.

Although in some such way as this the rights of the consumers and workers can be safeguarded, their position can only be absolutely secure if the interest charges for which the corporation is responsible are such as in all normal circumstances the industry can afford. While the amount of compensation must not be overburdensome to the corporation it must also be fair to the stockholder. In the case of past transfers from private to public enterprise compensation has been on far too generous a scale. Had it been on a fair basis it might not have proved a handicap. The experience of the Metropolitan Water Board and the London Passenger Transport Board have much to teach. In the case of the former the compensation increased the capitalisation from £22 13s. 6d. per company service to £46 9s. 9d. per service

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under the Board. Whereas from year to year the water companies were able to vary the rate of dividend paid, the Board was burdened with a fixed interest charge, approximately equal to that paid out by the companies in the last year of their existence. The Board, despite reduced expenditure, experienced a deficit in five out of eight of its first years, a deficit unquestionably due to a too burdensome inheritance, mainly in the form of capital charges. The ratepayers of the areas served by the Board carry this burden inasmuch as the Board's deficit is chargeable upon the rates. Compensation has been unnecessarily high in the case of transfers of electricity undertakings to local authorities while the generosity with which shareholders in the concerns acquired by the L.P.T.B. were treated is largely responsible for the Board's difficulties. I have given detailed calculations elsewhere of this.¹

Equally generous treatment was meted out to the shareholders in the beet sugar companies on the formation of the British Sugar Corporation in 1936. Their income is assured by fixing the sugar beet subsidy at the level necessary to maintain earnings of at least $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Too generous treatment has been due to the basis of acquisition. Maintenance of shareholders' income at the level experienced in the past has in the main been the principle followed: this net maintainable reasonable revenue is the formula adopted by the Labour Party. Such a formula might be satisfactory if the revenue could be a correct assessment of future probabilities instead of a computation of past realities. A fundamental weakness of the London Passenger Transport Act was that compensation was based solely on the past and took no account of possible future developments. That part of the income which had been variable in the past became fixed and stabilised at the level of peak earnings. The result:

¹See *Public Enterprise*. My chapter on the L.P.T.B.

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fear on the part of the Board of its inability to live up to the financial obligations imposed by Parliament.

By accident and not design the Board can stave off the shareholders' sanction. On the lowest ranking stock, the "C" stock, a standard rate, after the first two years, of $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. was fixed. The intention was that this $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. should be regularly paid. To protect the holders of this stock the Act provided that if this standard rate was not paid at all for three consecutive years the stockholders would have the right to apply to the High Court for the appointment of a receiver. Owing to a number of circumstances, including the onset of the depression and changes in the habits of London's travelling public, regular payment of this standard rate appears improbable. It has been realised that the provision protecting the stockholders can so be interpreted as to enable a varying rate on the "C" stock to be paid. As long as $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. is paid once in three years the stockholders cannot exercise their sanction. It is thus within the power of the Board to use the "C" stock as a varying dividend stock providing the standard rate is paid every third year. In addition the Act provided that a further $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. could be paid on this stock making a maximum of 6 per cent. although earnings over the $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. would be divided equally with the reserve and with the stockholders. Unintentional as was the ability to vary the dividend to this extent, it does offer a way out of the difficulty that arises if fixed interest stocks are created in place of equity stocks. A variable interest stock can intentionally be created. If no standard rate be fixed but only a maximum rate, a compulsion on the corporation to sacrifice everything to the payment of the standard rate is removed and there is no stabilisation of interest charges at any given level. If it be argued that the control the equity holder exercises in the public company is removed on his becoming a stockholder in a public

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corporation and he should be assured of some payment, then the fixed rate must be far lower than that received by him during periods of prosperity. Such a minimum rate must be one which in all circumstances it is expected the corporation will earn. Justification for this is that he must sacrifice both income and capital for the greater security he receives.

This is where the mistake was made in the past that has resulted in the over-capitalisation of public concerns. A variable dividend stock provides a cushion to cope with changes in earnings. The equity holder normally suffers variations in his income and it is reasonable that when compensation is given he should never receive more than under conditions currently prevailing he would have received in the past. That is to say his income must decline at the same time as the income of equity holders in private industry is declining. Looked at from the point of view of the public corporation it means that at the same time as private enterprise is paying out less in dividends to its shareholders owing to depression, the public corporation would be under no obligation to maintain its interest distribution at the same level. It, too, would reduce its distribution. Should a low minimum rate be deemed advisable and the industry unable to afford even this low rate, a case could be made out for a Government guarantee. It is in this direction of retaining a variable dividend stock that the means can be found of ending the privileged position of the stockholder. In other directions the faults of over-generosity in the past can be overcome. Allowance must be made for the greater security of the public corporation which means that the rate of interest paid on the fixed interest stocks should always be less than that previously paid. In the same way stocks should be redeemable at an early date at the option of the corporation to enable conversion to lower rates of interest to be made when the opportunity occurs.

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The breakdown in the capital structure of the L.P.T.B. raises the wider question as to whether the substitution of stocks on the basis of stock held in the past is the best way of approach. If there were a method of determining compensation which valued the industry to be taken over, assessed its earning capacity and determined interest rates these difficulties might be overcome. In the case of coal royalties a tribunal was appointed to determine the total value on the basis of a hypothetical sale in the open market between a willing seller and a willing buyer. To arrive at this sum the average annual amount of coal royalties was taken over seven years and a global sum was arrived at on the basis of so many years' purchase. How many years' purchase to apply to these earnings was the task of the tribunal. In making their award they had to take into consideration such variations, if any, "in the amount of the net income as may reasonably be expected in the light of this source or otherwise." The tribunal was to make no allowance on account of the acquisition being compulsory nor to take into account any increased value because the property would be in the hands of the State. Where the structure of an industry is simple enough to enable such a basis to be used it is likely to prove the best way. Public corporation stock in such proportions as the tribunal thinks best can be created and distributed to the companies for distribution among stockholders irrespective of the previous capital structure of the concerns acquired. Where this method is inapplicable and the direct substitution of stocks is followed, to guard against over-compensation the rate payable on fixed interest stock must be no more than that at which a public corporation could borrow in the market at the time of acquisition. As far as the equity stock is concerned no more stock must be created than there are net assets available after deduction of debentures. The income on the stock on its

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maximum payment must be no greater than past earnings adjusted downwards by having regard to any conditions that may be imposed by Parliament, such as the increased cost of the raising of the conditions of industry to the standard rate of the best employer, and allowance would need to be made if profits were swelled by excessive charges or because of tariffs or subsidies.¹

The London bus strike leads to the conclusion that the following general principles should in future be applied to all public concerns. (1) The extent of the public corporation's responsibility to the central Government must be defined. While there should be no possibility of interference in normal operation the board must always be responsible to a higher body so that it can be answerable for decisions taken on matters of principle and policy. (2) Final decisions on important matters relating to relations between the board and its employees must be decided by a third party. This is necessary to prevent undue weight being given to financial considerations. Such a body could well be the Industrial Court. (3) In the same way the final decision on consumer demands should be taken by other parties than the Board itself. In making such decisions no specific instructions should be given that the Board's financial obligations come first. (4) The previous methods of determining compensation have resulted in over generous treatment of stockholders which severely handicaps the public corporation. To avoid a repetition of this, compensation needs to be determined differently than on maintenance of past income; possibly on some such basis as follows: (a) Where it is possible to fix a total value for an industry this should be done in preference to substituting stocks company by company. In determining the value, specific instructions to the tribunal would be given and particularly to have regard to any conditions which may be

¹For detailed discussion on the problem of compensation, see my pamphlet, "How Much Compensation?" (*Gollancz and N.F.R.B.*)

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imposed by Parliament in the Bill. Valuation on this basis could be followed by distribution of stocks of a public corporation to the industry for distribution among the respective companies and their stockholders. (b) Where the above is not possible and acquisition takes place by substituting public corporation stocks for those of the acquired concerns, the fixed interest stocks and ordinary shareholders call for different treatment. The rate of interest payable on fixed interest stock should be no greater than that at which the public corporation could borrow in the market at the time. As regards equity holders, a variable dividend stock should be substituted to enable the corporation to negotiate the full course of the trade cycle. On this stock there would be a maximum rate, but preferably no minimum rate. Where the latter is necessary it should be fixed in accordance with an estimate of what the industry can bear throughout the trade cycle. If necessary it could carry a Government guarantee.

Had the London Passenger Transport Board been appointed by the Minister of Transport, and less remote from Parliament; had at the outset the rate of interest payable on the fixed interest stocks been adjusted downwards to allow for the greater security of the public corporation; had the stock been redeemable at an early date at the option of the Board; had there been no fixed standard rate on the "C" stock accompanied with the sanction of applying for a receiver, the urgency to fulfil the financial obligations imposed by Parliament would have been an unnecessary and ineffective plea in resisting the demands of the London busmen for a shorter working day.

PRESENT TENDENCIES OF TRADE UNIONISM IN FRANCE

By PAUL VAUCHER

TRADE Unionism has suddenly acquired in France a supreme and unprecedented importance. It has played a leading part in the movement towards social reform which inspired the parties forming the Popular Front and it has at the same time enormously increased its own membership. The Trades Union General Council, which is known in France as the C.G.T. (*Confédération Générale du Travail*), had less than one million members a year ago and now claims a membership of five millions. In attempting to foresee how far the trade unions will succeed in preserving control over their many new members and what permanent results they are likely to achieve it may be useful to survey the transformation that French trade unionism has undergone in recent years.

The unionist leaders were persuaded to follow a new course both as a result of the War and of the World crisis. In pre-War days they adhered to the principle of "direct action." They refused to join any political party or support any political programme, but endeavoured by agitation and strikes to improve the conditions of the workers. They hoped that a general strike would enable them ultimately to seize control over French society.

The ordeal of the War, the failure of several important strikes that broke out after the armistice, above all the appearance of a rival council created by the Communists in order to outbid the old leaders, all led the C.G.T. to make a new departure. Although it did not join any of the existing political parties, it made its own contribution to the work of national reconstruction that all of them were undertaking.

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It drafted a plan, a "minimum programme," defining both the demands which the workers were entitled to put forward and the steps necessary for an economic recovery. It advocated the foundation of a National Economic Council on which it was given a large representation. The economic policy supported by the C.G.T. soon appeared out of date as it was chiefly calculated to obtain a general increase in production, but the trade unionists succeeded in obtaining the statutory enforcement of a 48 hours week and in launching a wide scheme of social insurance that Parliament in 1928 was finally persuaded to accept.

The economic depression from which France suffered after 1931 again imposed new responsibilities on the C.G.T. The workers were now inclined to expect a lasting decline, if not an ultimate breakdown, of the capitalist system, but they were also aware of the dangerous prospects which the progress of fascism opened up for a democratic country. The C.G.T. found it quite impossible to profess any longer indifference towards political problems. In 1934 its new attitude was clearly defined. An offer made by the Communists to restore the unity of syndicalism was met with much diffidence and finally rejected because it appeared that the real aim of the Communist Council was to drag the old leaders to its side. But the C.G.T. drafted a new plan which is well worth studying because it formed the foundation on which the programme of the Popular Front was subsequently erected.

The plan aimed at combining an attack against capitalism with a defence of democracy. It first expresses the view that an economic recovery, which deflation failed to produce, depends on an increase in the purchasing power of the masses. The workers are therefore entitled to claim new advantages, an increase in wages, shorter working days (the demand for a 40 hours week is now put forward), paid

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holidays, unemployment benefits paid out of a National Insurance Fund. Such advantages should be obtained by the method of collective bargaining and the institution of workshop committees.

Faced by the objection that its policy might easily produce a financial deadlock, the C.G.T. does not care to consider at any length how the necessary income could be raised. But it makes a very elaborate criticism of the new forms of capitalism which have appeared in recent years, showing the dominating influence that a few magnates have acquired in the banks and the main industries. The nationalisation of the Bank of France and of the key industries is therefore advocated and the C.G.T. calls attention to the wide financial powers that the development of saving banks, of post office deposits, above all of the *Caisse des Dépôts* where the reserve funds of all saving banks and societies for mutual help are centralised, has placed within reach of the State. Thus the government now stands in a strong position to overcome the resistance of the capitalist interest.

While professing eagerness to start a fight, the C.G.T. does not pretend to destroy the capitalist system by the revolutionary methods of "direct action." Neither does it believe that a general strike could help. What is called a "private sector" in industry and trade should be maintained. The reform of a few big concerns would free the small employers from the oppressive rule of an aristocracy of wealth. The C.G.T. openly calls on the middle class and the farmers to support the labour movement and to fight on the side of the workers.

The battle is bound to take the form of a political conflict and it is no longer advisable for the C.G.T. to keep aloof from the political world. Not only does it want to carry with it the National Economic Council but it even seeks to conquer power in Parliament. The plan for social reform

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must be enforced by the parliamentary institutions of a democratic state.

The trade unionists were therefore willing to support a coalition of the Left parties. In 1936 they hailed with delight the conclusion of an electoral alliance between the Radical, the Socialist and the Communist parties. At the same time they also found it possible to restore the unity of the trade unionist movement. As the Communist party joined hands with the Socialists, the Communist trade unions also expressed willingness to submit to the rules of the C.G.T. Their offer, accompanied by an undertaking not to remain dependent on the Communist party or on the Communist Internationale, could no longer be rejected. The C.G.T. admitted two Communist leaders to serve with five of its own leaders on the directing committee of the Trades Union Council.

Our brief survey tends to show that the C.G.T. was entitled to regard the success of the Popular Front at the general election of May, 1936, as its own victory. M. Blum immediately offered the C.G.T. seats in his Cabinet. But the offer was declined, and M. Jouhaux, for many years the general secretary of the C.G.T., proceeded to define the position of trade unionism towards the new government. He kept to the old rule according to which the C.G.T., not being a political body, should not take a direct part in politics. But he expressed a keen desire to support the Blum Cabinet. The way in which assistance could be rendered remained however obscure. The C.G.T. would act as a consultative body, but also as a driving force. It intended to tender advice, but also to dictate its views. M. Jouhaux's words revealed a definite ambition not to allow the ministerial departments to delay the accomplishment of social reform. He apparently expected the Socialist ministers to turn from their own experts to those of the C.G.T. and use the latter in order to enforce their policy on the former. It was the more

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disquieting because at the same time the Communist party also refused seats in the Cabinet and came forward with a proposal to form in the constituencies joint committees of workers with a view to support constantly, but also to direct the activities of, the new government.

M. Blum was of course reluctant to accept such assistance but the matter was not pressed further because, at that very moment, in May and June, 1936, there occurred a wide, unexpected outbreak of strikes. Frenchmen felt that they were suddenly in the midst of a social revolution. These strikes seem to have been largely the result of a spontaneous movement spreading among workers who, after suffering from years of severe depression, were suddenly carried away by the feeling of their own victory. But the movement was imbued with a revolutionary spirit although it was not directly produced by any revolutionary group. The trade unionist leaders, who seem to have been taken by surprise, were nevertheless suddenly called to a position of great eminence. The outside pressure which they sought to exercise on the government was provided by the strikes and the C.G.T. was able to obtain at a single stroke the fulfilment of the greater part of its programme. Moreover, it had to act as the representative of the whole working class when the treaty which was to restore peace was signed.

The famous agreements, known as "*accords Matignon*" from the name of the house where the Prime Minister has his office, were concluded on June 7th by the leaders of the C.G.T. and representatives of the principal employers' association. They acknowledged, while accepting an all-round increase in wages, the principles of collective bargaining, of paid holidays, of workshop delegates, of a 40-hour week. Bills to effect these objects were quickly passed in Parliament, while another Act providing for a reform of the Bank of France was also voted.

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Although it was not exactly responsible for it, the C.G.T. had now won an extraordinary victory. A stream of workers invaded the unions and their membership rose from 1 million to 5 millions during the summer. But the C.G.T. was faced by two fateful problems. It had first to secure the rapid and stringent enforcement of the new laws. It had also to organise and educate the masses of new members.

I do not propose to follow in detail the process by which the social reforms came into force. It is enough to say that the Acts of Parliament were applied by issuing numerous ministerial decrees, drafted after consultation with the interested parties and approval by the National Economic Council. The trade unionist leaders were thus kept busy sitting on joint committees, and, owing to the constant support of the Socialist ministers, they were on the whole successful.

The majority of the workers already obtained paid holidays during the summer. Collective bargaining led to the conclusion of collective agreements in the main branches of industry towards the autumn. More time of course was needed to put into practice the 40-hour system; but from September 1936, ministerial decrees began to apply the new rule to the various industries and, while one may well question the possibility of having it completely enforced, the movement for the shortening of the working day is now in full swing.

Meanwhile these far-reaching changes had given rise to bitter discussions that often led to open struggles. The employers, having recovered from the first shock they had experienced in the spring, were eager to limit and reduce as far as possible the concessions they had first felt compelled to make. The conditions prevailing in many industries often made the enforcement of the new laws a risky if not an impossible adventure. Small employers complained much of

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being the victims of their more powerful leaders and the dangerous Treasury crisis which compelled the government in September to accept a new devaluation tended to strengthen the stubbornness of the capitalist magnates. The workers on their side were quick to resent and resist any attempt to deprive them of their new conquests, making extensive use of the dangerous weapon of the stay-in strike.

The Government has endeavoured to restore order by launching a proposal for a system of compulsory arbitration. It prevailed on the C.G.T. to support it but could not obtain the agreement of the employers, who feared that the C.G.T. would then claim the privilege of acting alone on behalf of the workers in the choice of arbitrators. Parliament did not accept M. Blum's scheme and was content to grant him full powers to test an arbitration procedure acting on his own responsibility. The experiment has so far not been altogether successful and the employers have had several occasions to complain that no liberty to work or to join separate unions is allowed to workers who do not belong to the C.G.T.

It is, however, impossible to know how far the trade unionist leaders are able to maintain control over the rank and file or to define with any precision the policy which they intend to follow in the near future. One can only record the conflicting views held in France at the present time. Many Frenchmen believe that the persistent social disturbances are the work of certain revolutionary leaders who keep in touch with the Communist party. Others are convinced that no political party or responsible body of trade unionists is really working for industrial war. The recent activities of several small groups of extremists who borrow their views from Lenin and Trotsky, bitterly criticising the present attitude of the Communists, do not on the whole seem important as these groups are still absorbed by their own domestic quarrels. These Frenchmen therefore approve

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the attitude of the government in refraining from using force to restore order and acting in the belief that time must be given for the social agitation to lose its strength. It is hard to estimate the proportion of truth in these contradictory opinions. But it is possible to describe the various bodies which are at work in the trade unionist world.

In addition to the five millions of "*Cégétistes*" the Church unions (*Syndicats chrétiens*) which first appeared in the nineties and formed in 1919 a *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*, also made headway after the 1936 elections. They had a membership of 150,000 in 1934. They have now been able to group 800 unions comprising more than half a million members. The many clerks who first filled their ranks were now joined by workers from the Parisian and Northern districts and from the conservative provinces of the West. The views held by the *Confédération* have been defined in a plan which was issued in 1936. They differ from those of the C.G.T. in so far as they reject the Marxian doctrine of class war. But their immediate aims are much the same. They include collective bargaining, minimum wages, a national insurance fund for unemployment and even schemes of nationalisation. While the *Confédération* resents any pretence on the part of the C.G.T. to speak alone in the name of the working class, the two categories of trade unionists are sometimes inclined to act in common.

The same cannot be said of the professional unions which have recently made their appearance and of the *Confédération des syndicats professionnels français* formed among them immediately after the great outbreak of strikes in June, 1936. The movement obviously started as a protest against the dictatorship of the C.G.T. It stands for the "liberty of syndicalism," and the social reforms advocated by such unions are intended to arise out of a co-operation of capital and labour. The *Confédération* professes to be entirely unpolitical

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and strongly denies having anything to do with the attempt recently made by the *Croix de Feu* to win over the working class. It also maintains that the proposal for organising the workers on a professional basis should not be confused with the fascist doctrine of corporatism. One finds it hard nevertheless to draw between them a clear line of distinction and it is difficult not to connect this new branch of trade unionism with the effort now made by the employers' unions to resist the ambitions of the C.G.T. The future activities of such bodies as the new *Comité de prévoyance et d'action sociale* formed under the auspices of the *Confédération nationale du patronat* will perhaps enable us to understand the real meaning of the movement for professional unions.

Technicians of all grades, from the engineers to the foremen, are busy forming several associations and endeavouring to raise an independent voice. The C.G.T. is working hard to bring them over to its side but makes no secret that the attempt has so far not been successful. Only a small minority of the engineers have joined its ranks. The driving force behind the whole movement was provided by the state of insecurity and the lack of discipline prevailing in many factories, which makes the position of technicians a very awkward one. They feel strongly the difficulties which they often encounter in their relations with the trade unionists who work under them. But they also much resented the way in which employers, during the stay-in strikes, left them without guidance of any kind.

Within the boundaries of the C.G.T. attention should be called to the influential body formed by the civil servants. This is not the place to explain how the State's servants after ten years of struggle gained the privilege of having their unions admitted to the C.G.T. The Government, having failed to prevent the formation of trade unions in the Civil Service, was compelled to seek their co-operation and a Bill

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which is now before Parliament will probably acknowledge their victory. Meanwhile they had succeeded in 1929 in entering the C.G.T. organised in three groups: the postmen, the teachers and a general union. When the total membership of the C.G.T. stood at one million, the *fonctionnaires* accounted for nearly one-third of that number. Their influence should by now be reduced as a result of the enormous increase of trade unionists. But the special position in which they stand is bound to make their voice more powerful. They have so far shown a genuine desire to co-operate with the Blum Cabinet. Very typical has been the attitude of the teachers, often denounced as extremists, who nevertheless have fully appreciated the financial difficulties encountered by the Ministry and refrained from taking advantage of the rise in the cost of living to press for an increase in salaries. One should not however nourish the illusion that such moderation will last for long.

The rise in prices and the persistence of unemployment are obviously the two factors that chiefly affect the present attitude of trade unionists. The C.G.T. after having opposed a devaluation was finally compelled to give way. It obtained substantial increases in wages only to find that they are losing the greater part of their real value. It must obviously reconsider its position. While still pressing for the enforcement of the 40 hours week and the various reforms voted by Parliament the leaders are bound to feel other problems bearing more heavily upon their mind. When told by M. Blum that the financial position did not allow him to proceed immediately with the remaining items included in the programme of the Popular Front, they were bitterly disappointed.

Not only is it unlikely that the rank and file will remain patient for long, but even the leaders have always been very reluctant to admit that financial difficulties could hamper

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progress. They have always been inclined to assume that after all rich men can pay and that means exist to raise the money needed for reforms.

The tendency was indeed strengthened by the new policy which trade unionism has followed in recent years. The rules of the C.G.T. were amended after the War in order to enlist members who did not belong to the industrial proletariat, but were agricultural workers, small farmers, technicians or representatives of the lower middle class. The political coalition known as the Popular Front well fitted the new associates of the trade unionists. They were prepared to join a movement which intended to link together all popular classes for a fight against the aristocracy of wealth. The old methods of direct action with the uncertain prospect of a general strike bringing a decisive victory in the distant future no longer commended itself to the aspirations of trade unionists who looked upon themselves as entitled to obtain immediately a decent standard of life. The C.G.T. professed to lead a political campaign in democratic France for the sake of the workers. But the assumption was that in a democratic country the popular classes alone are entitled to rule, and there may be a short cut from such a principle to that of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is at present impossible to know how far the Communists will be able to prevail on the older leaders in the trade unions. But the difficulties that both have to face may lead them to make the same bid for power. However it is hard to believe that the effects of the economic depression have turned into lasting supporters of revolutionary methods the new elements which the Socialists and the Communists are now eager to rally around them: the lower middle class, the farmers. Their moderating influence may soon again affect the destinies of trade unionism.

LIGHT ON THE TROTSKYIST TRIALS¹

By SIR JOHN MAYNARD

“ELEMENTS of the Left? Psychologically they were the last revolutionaries. Authentic, blazing... Admirable men. Idiotic ideas. The burning up of the Universe and such-like visions.”

The words quoted at the head of this article were written by one Petrov, a member of the Communist Party since 1918, who fought in the Civil War, and got into trouble with the revolutionary authorities for his support of the Right Opposition. He escaped from exile in 1936, and this is his judgment on the Left Opposition, the so-called Trotskyists. *Admirable men. Idiotic ideas.* Trotsky quotes Petrov and tells the joke against himself.

But, he asks, are these the sort of people to enter into conspiracies with imperialist powers to invade and annex the territories of the Socialist Fatherland?

Still more pertinent is the question, are these the people to fly in the face of Marx by plotting individual acts of terrorism, to attempt the restoration of capitalism, to outrage all adjustment of means to ends by devising accidents in mines in order to make the regime unpopular?

All the probabilities are against anything of the sort.

On the other hand Trotsky has for a whole decade been making himself intolerable to the present government of the U.S.S.R. by a stream of penetrating invective. The mere titles of his works are enough to show that Stalin must have been stung beyond endurance: *The Stalinist School of Falsification, the Revolution Betrayed*, and (in course of preparation) *the Crimes of Stalin*. Latterly his offences have culminated in the declaration that his Fourth International will prepare and make, on a suitable opportunity, a new Revolution.

¹ This article was written prior to the trial of the Army officers.

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Forewarned is forearmed, and it was inevitable that Stalin should decide to crush the serpent in the egg, and include as many as possible of the eggs in the operation.

In July, 1936, a Dutch newspaper published a report that Bukharin had visited Holland along with other representatives of the Third International and met some of Trotsky's followers. It added that co-operation between the two sections had been arranged. It seems however that, though negotiations probably took place, they were abortive. In the middle of August we learned that sixteen members of a Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre were to be brought to trial. The trial of eight Russians and one German engineer, the so-called "counter-Revolutionary Trotskyite Wrecking Group at the Kemerovo mine," followed in November, and that of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre" in January, 1937. These trials were accompanied by widespread proceedings of a less sensational character against a large number of other persons, some belonging to the Right deviation rather than to the Left, but all described in language which suggested their association in treasonable and other criminal activities with Leon Trotsky.

The past history of some of the more prominent figures who have been in trouble in the last few months may give us a clue to the probabilities. The first point to notice is that the net has been spread wide. One of the offenders, Rykov, who succeeded Lenin as Chairman of the Council of Commissars, has been known as a man of the Right rather than of the Left, and has had the reputation of a practical man, untroubled by inconvenient ideologies. He was frightened by Stalin's veer to the Left in 1928, when the policy of the exiled Opposition seemed to have been adopted by those who had crushed it; and he was for a time associated with Bukharin and Tomskey in an abortive tentative of resistance. Otherwise his one fault seems to have been

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that which is conveyed by one of Trotsky's mordant witticisms. Asked, when in exile, by an interviewer whether he, Trotsky, expected to be embalmed in spirit and buried in the wall of the Kremlin, he said that he proposed to leave the spirit intended for his preservation to Rykov (who would enjoy it), and his brains to Stalin (who needed them badly). But this capable administrator of the Right, with an innocent foible, has been swept into the net with the rest, and deprived of his offices, though not actually prosecuted.

Bukharin, who has been similarly treated, is a brilliant intellectual, all brains and nerves. Throughout the history of the Revolutionary parties, there has always been a close correlation between philosophy and politics, and the dialecticians charged Bukharin with the mechanistic heresy, which takes the life out of dialectics. In 1918, he was among the ultra-Leftists, and along with Karl Radek, V. M. Smirnov and others, he edited the *Communist* journal which daily printed attacks on Lenin's German policy. He held out to the last against the Brest-Litovsk peace with Germany, and urged the prosecution of a revolutionary war in spite of the collapse of Russia's military power. Equally in an ultra-Leftist spirit, he advocated in the Third International in 1921 the seizure of power in Germany by the German Communist Party, but was outvoted by the majority, which included Lenin. Later, he became the leading ideologist of Stalin's ruling group, and was one of the Septemvirate of 1924, which included also Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, and set on foot the attack against the Trotsky Opposition. He believed it to be possible to absorb, instead of destroying, the anti-Bolshevik forces of the village, and the slogan of "*Grow rich*," addressed to the peasantry, was his. When Zinoviev and Kamenev broke away from Stalin on the question of the peasant policy, Bukharin succeeded Zinoviev as Chairman of the Third International. At the so-called

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bloodless insurrection of the Kulaks in 1928, when the peasants created something like a famine in the towns by withholding grain, the ruling group split into a right wing which included Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy, while Stalin took the leftward turn which resulted in the first Five-Year Plan and the collectivization of agriculture. His present disgrace must be attributed to right, rather than to left, tendencies. His record is that of an opponent, rather than of a supporter of Trotsky.

G. E. Zinoviev, an eloquent Jew who was reputed to lack physical courage, became a sort of political "boss" of the Petrograd region, with a powerful influence among the most revolutionary of the city-workers, and was the Chairman of the Third International for the first seven years of its existence. He and Kamenev opposed Lenin's policy of insurrection in 1917, and published in the non-party press the statement of their reasons. As Chairman of the Third International he was responsible for the policies in Bulgaria, Esthonia and Germany, upon which Trotsky directed his most persistent attacks; policies which are accused of fluctuation between the neglect of revolutionary opportunities and ill-judged adventurism. His close connection with the urban workers set him against Stalin's policy of favouring the prosperous peasant, and brought him into close association with Trotsky in 1926. He made his peace with the majority in 1928, but fell again under suspicion in 1932 when the U.S.S.R. was in ferment over the collectivization of the farms and the scarcity of food. He has been declared responsible for the assassination of Kirov, and is one of those reported to have been shot after the trial of August, 1936. A pitiable picture has been given to us of his anguish when summoned by the executioners.

L. B. Kamenev was a Jew of Tiflis, the son of a well-to-do bourgeois family. He was closely associated with Lenin in

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Geneva, married Trotsky's sister, and taught for a time in Lenin's propagandist school near Paris. He had great influence in Moscow, and his close association with Zinoviev in many questions is a reflection of the influence upon both of the working proletariats of the great cities. He had a pleasant way with him which earned him the reputation of being genial, and he had a gift for negotiation and compromise. It is doubtful whether he or Zinoviev ever really warmed to the peasantry. Both were pre-eminently men of the cities. After the Revolution, he shared the political vacillations of Zinoviev, and finally his fate.

Tomsy, well known in English Trade-Union circles, and a determined champion of Trade-Union independence, was always accused of Right Wing tendencies, and was the last man in the world to take part in a conspiracy for terrorism, economic sabotage, and treasonable correspondence with a foreign enemy. His heart was with the working class of which he was himself a member, and his most congenial work was done as President of the all-Russian Trade-Union Council. He was single-hearted in his resistance to the encroachments of the State upon the Trade-Unions, an attitude which led to his removal from the Presidential Chair. He committed suicide on July 23rd, 1936, when the agents of the department of Internal affairs arrived to arrest him; an honest man, able and sincere, if ever there was one.

I. P. Bakayev, one of the prisoners sentenced to be shot after the trial of August, 1936, was an old head of the Cheka, who took a very prominent part in the demonstrations which preceded the final proceedings against the Opposition in 1927. He is described as having fought with the Militia in front of the gates of the Hermitage at Leningrad. He was also one of those who mimeographed the statement of the Opposition platform in 1927 after its publication had been refused.

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J. N. Smirnov, who suffered the death-penalty on the same occasion, was among the officers who accompanied Trotsky when he recovered Kazan from the Whites. He afterwards commanded the force which drove the Whites over the Urals, and in 1920 was presiding over a Revolutionary Committee engaged in reorganizing the administration of Siberia.

G. E. Evdokimov, another of those sentenced to be shot in August, 1936, also took part in the publication of the prohibited statement of the Opposition in 1927.

Karl Radek, a Polish Jew, is a brilliant journalist, and was at one time the close political friend of Trotsky; but Trotsky says he was always nearer to the Right than to the Left Opposition. A recently-published description characterizes him as "talking in a rough Yiddish dialect, rough, ungraceful, undignified, but having inexhaustible vitality and a rollicking humour; the *gamin*, the *enfant terrible* of the Revolution." He made a special study of Chinese affairs, and was for some time the head of the Sun Yat Sen academy in Moscow for Chinese propagandists. He was removed from this post in 1927 because he advocated more drastic revolutionary action in China than was at that time approved by the authorities of the Third International; but he afterwards made his peace with Stalin, and attacked the policy advocated by Trotsky. In his "*Stalinite School of Falsification*," Trotsky publishes in facsimile a letter of Radek, dated December, 1927, describing a conversation which betrayed the intrigue of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to keep Trotsky out of the leadership when Lenin died. Radek was one of Stalin's deportees in 1928, but he placed his pen again at the disposal of the ruling group. We may be sure that Stalin did not forgive the letter which Trotsky had reproduced in facsimile. Radek played at the trial of January, 1937, a part which can only be understood in the light of his

reputation as a jester and an *enfant terrible*. He gave away completely the methods of the investigating agency. "For two-and-a-half months, I compelled the examining official, by interrogating me and by confronting me with the testimony of the other accused, to open up all the cards to me so that I could see who had confessed, who had not confessed, and what each had confessed." So this was how the examining agency got the confessions, and they were patient over the process, for they went on at it for two-and-a-half months! What finally convinced Radek that it was better to confess was "when Nikolai Ivanovich Muralov, Trotsky's closest follower, of whom I was convinced that he would rather perish in prison than say a single word, gave testimony, and explained that he did not want to die in the consciousness that his name would be a banner for every counter-revolutionary scoundrel."

And what did Radek mean when he said that "there are in this country semi-Trotskyists, quarter-Trotskyists, one-eighth-Trotskyists . . . to these people we say . . . whoever has the slightest rift with the Party, let him realize that to-morrow he may be a diversionist, to-morrow he may be a traitor, if he does not thoroughly heal that rift by complete and utter frankness to the Party." We think that he unconsciously furnished a clue to the riddle of the confessions. Not only in these Trotskyist cases, but in many others, we have seen accused persons apparently eager to confess, and to insist upon the completeness of their guilt. And the confessions have not been of the defiant kind. Rather have they been of the penitent kind, of the sinner making a clean breast of his sins, and extenuating nothing. Those who confessed to the sin of witchcraft, when witchcraft-trials were common, may have felt a certain pride in the awfulness of their commune with the Evil One and in the powers which it gave. But these persons, self-confessed traitors,

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Party, and again held responsible posts. At the January trial he was sentenced to be shot. L. P. Serebriakov, another of those who took part in the publication of the prohibited Opposition-programme, and was exiled in 1928, was also sentenced to death in 1937. So were Boguslavsky, another of the exiles of 1928; and N. I. Muralov, the Bolshevik giant, known for his exploits in the Civil War, and a sturdy henchman of Trotsky, who, Radek says, seemed likely to hold out against all inducements to confess, but did in fact humble his soul with the rest. According to his statement on page 231 of the report of the proceedings, Muralov held out for *no less than eight months*, and ultimately gave way because he feared that otherwise he "might become the standard-bearer of counter-revolution." This idea frightened him terribly. He dreaded isolation from his brethren, as we should be disposed to put it.

It would seem that Christian Rakovsky, whom the Commissariat of Health, in which he recently held an important post, is attacking as a wrecker and an enemy of the people, is to be the next sufferer. He is described as the perfect diplomat and cultivated gentleman, former Ambassador in London and Paris, but a member of the Opposition in the hectic days of 1927 and the writer of one of the letters revealing the plot against Trotsky's leadership which is quoted in the *Stalinist School of Falsification*. He was also the author of a study of the bureaucracy which gave very great offence, and his withdrawal of this pamphlet did not suffice for his forgiveness.

In addition to Bukharin and Radek, a number of literary men are in trouble for their "Trotskyist" sympathies. Among these are Boris Pilnyak, whose novel, *Mahogany*, was banned in Russia because it shows sympathy with a sort of romantic Trotskyism. One of the characters enumerates the Emperors whom he has survived, and adds that he will

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probably also survive Alexei Ivanovich—an obvious reference to Rykov who was then Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars—and announces a theory that the proletariat will become extinct because all its members will become engineers. He tried to rehabilitate himself with the authorities by incorporating *Mahogany*, with variations, in *The Volga flows to the Caspian Sea*. There is a good deal in the last-named work which is obscure in meaning, and some of it is almost certainly veiled satire on the Soviet system and Soviet society. So we need not feel surprise that he has been picked out for exclusion from the Writers' Association, at a time when all Trotskyists are particularly under the ban. Since *Volga* was published in 1931, the ban might have been pronounced earlier.

Valentin Kataev's case is harder to understand. He has been excluded from the Party. He wrote a satire on the Soviet bureaucracy in 1926 (*The Embezzlers*), but a later work (*Forward, O Time!*) takes for its subject the beating of the world's record in concrete-mixing, and shows the proper enthusiasm for socialist construction. Professor Gleb Struve thinks he has deliberately blunted the edge of his satire; and his play, *Squaring the Circle*, is a hearty farce of the Box & Cox type. A not unnatural inference from the two cases of Pilnyak and Kataev is that the anti-Trotskyists have felt bound to show their zeal by looking up old offences.

Another writer who has been excluded from the Writers' Association, and therefore presumably from the prospect of earning his livelihood, is Boris Pasternak, a lyrical poet of very high quality. He has always stood aloof, and has looked within the heart of man for his subjects and his inspiration. The critics have called him anti-social and even anti-revolutionary. But it is obvious that he has never had his mind upon politics at all. A work of his dealing with the suicide of the poet, Mayakovsky, and dealing with it in

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saboteurs, assassins, are not proud of their plots. We suggest that they are under the influence of certain ideas which the Orthodox Faith has implanted in the Russian soul, implanted so strongly and deeply that the rejection of religion has not uprooted them. One of these, inherited from an earlier past, very marked in the Old Believers of the Schism, and expressed in literary form by the Slavophiles, is that Truth resides in the congregation where Love is. To be outside of the congregation of the Faithful is to be outcast indeed, excluded alike from Truth and Love. "Our people go to Heaven by communes," said a famous Slavophile. "All are responsible for all," says the monk in Dostoevsky's *Brothers Karamazov*. We hardly exaggerate if we say that there is no individual salvation. He who is outside the congregation where Truth and Love reside must find his way out of the misery of isolation by confession and penance, so that he may be at peace with his Orthodox Russian brothers.

We suggest that these religious conceptions have established themselves in the political and social relations of to-day. The revolutionaries of the nineteenth century proudly and defiantly proclaimed their deeds. They were conscious that their Russian brethren were with them, and they felt no sin. These offenders against the new Russian State have no such sustaining conviction. Their Russian brethren are against them. Therefore they seek by confession and penance to find their way back to the congregation of the faithful which now takes the form of the political majority. And, in confessing, they must be sure they confess not less than the sum total of their sin. Do they confess more than the truth? We think they do. Not reason but feeling governs this, as it governs most other human affairs.

What Radek says—says in complete unconsciousness of the source of his own thought—is that to be outside the congregation where Truth and Love are, to be outside it

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by a hair's breadth, is to be outside it altogether, and he says it although he is a Polish Jew and doubtless an agnostic, because the idea is present in the very air that he breathes.

Another explanation of the confessions has been put forward and justified in some detail by the exiled Bolshevik, Victor Serge, in *Crapouillot* for January, 1937. It is that the Soviet authorities send for trial only those of the Opposition who have been brought to the point of confession. According to this theory, the investigating officers work upon the prisoners' devotion to the Party and to the cause of the Revolution. The accused persons are in mortal dread of doing anything that would encourage counter-revolution, and sacrifice themselves and their consciences for the sake of the revolutionary front. It seems doubtful whether this explanation will fit all the cases, but it may be that it is applicable to some of them.

For reasons which are a matter of speculation, Radek was sentenced, not to death, but to ten years' imprisonment.

Gregory Sokolnikov, who built up the Soviet currency, was Vice President of the State-Planning Committee, Chairman of the Oil-Syndicate, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain, and Assistant-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and became a member of the new Leningrad Opposition when Zinoviev, Kamenev and others joined Trotsky. He is reputed to have made a statement which gave great offence to Stalin, but he was sentenced, not to death, but to imprisonment for ten years.

G. L. Piatakov, whom Lenin called a good administrator but not a good politician, did valuable service in economic affairs, and was at one time Chairman of the State Bank. Trotsky published a letter of his, describing conversations which revealed a plot to oust Trotsky from the leadership, and it is likely that he was not forgiven for this. He made his peace in September, 1928, and was reinstated in the

a spirit of sympathy, was suppressed by the Censor. But that is an old story.

Prince Mirsky, very well known in London for his writings on Literature and Social History, and for a pungent account of the British intellectuals of to-day, has also been excluded from the Writers' Association for supposed Trotskyist affinities. Here again it seems likely that the ministers of punishment have turned back to the past for their material; for the Prince is a *ci-devant*, who was not at once reconciled to the Revolution.

Another group of victims has been E. B. Pashukanis, head of the Institute of Soviet Law, along with his associated jurists. He wove a system of jurisprudence about the Soviet conception of property or its negation. But the Soviet conception of property, like all else in the U.S.S.R., is in flux. There are "millionaire" collective farms, and there are Stakhanovite workers who earn ten and twenty fold. The theories of the jurists must be amended to fit the new ideas. So the Institute of which Pashukanis was head has become "a harbour for enemies of the people, including prominent Trotskyist double-dealers": and the once orthodox professors have been displaced. It is not the first time that the political plan has affected the professional fortunes of jurists, philosophers, historians, even artists. Something similar happened in 1924, and the inception of the first Five Year Plan was accompanied by a "new turn on the Philosophical Front."

Hundreds of minor personages have suffered penalties of one kind and another; and the name of Trotsky has been associated with the charges made against them. The Soviet Press has released an avalanche of vilification. Trotsky is Cain, who slew his brother; Ham, who made a scoff of his father's nakedness; Judas Iscariot, who betrayed his Lord with a kiss; Skuratov, the executioner, who killed the

victims of Ivan the Terrible; Nero, Caligula, and—by an anti-climax—also Narcissus, who fell in love with his own image.

Whatever the intentions of this campaign, certain results of it seem certain. No one in the U.S.S.R. will dare to be, or even to seem to be a partisan of the theories of Trotsky; and a large number of persons of very varying opinions, who might have made use of the new Constitution to present heretical opinions, have been silenced or discredited. Trotsky's declared intention of preparing, and executing in due season, a new Revolution in the U.S.S.R. has been made more difficult of fulfilment, at all events in present conditions. If foreign opinion has been shocked by what has seemed to many to be a fabricated case, it is nevertheless probable that the masses of the U.S.S.R. have been convinced.

Does the present writer intend to suggest that there was no basis for the charges? Beyond all question, Trotsky and his supporters intended to make a fresh Revolution, and to oust Stalin and his "apparatus" by force, as soon as the time was ripe. They intended to make what Trotsky calls a social, not an economic, revolution, and they contemplated with satisfaction the prospect of general revolution in Europe and elsewhere as the occasion for it. They did not, in the present writer's opinion, plan the restoration of capitalism, the invitation to Germany and Japan to annex portions of the territory of the U.S.S.R., the assassination of individuals, the causing of discontent and economic loss by accidents in mines and on railways; because these things do not harmonize with their known strategical and tactical principles. But it was most desirable to bring upon them a maximum of odium, and the agents of the department of Internal Affairs—Okhrana, Cheka, O.G.P.U., for it is always the same thing under changing names—*improved the case*. There is a Persian proverb—it would be surprising if it had not its parallel in Georgia—which bids the wise man crush the

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serpent in the egg. Such trifles as a lie do not stand in the way of policy. It is shocking, no doubt, but this is what the police of the more barbarous countries of this still somewhat barbarous world systematically do.

It is not quite so barefaced as it looks upon a crude examination. The police are not *judges*, that they should determine whether the facts put before them in their investigations are true or not. They use their traditional methods, of which we have had a glimpse in Radek's revelation, to bring pressure to bear; and they utilize the talent for confession and the talent for romancing. If it all fits in with the aims of their superiors, all the better. What follows is for the Courts, not for them.

In most of the *causes célèbres* of the U.S.S.R. which have attracted attention in Western Europe, there is probably a nucleus of truth—even though it be *improved* out of all recognition. Close examination certainly reveals such a nucleus in the Vickers-Maxim trial at Moscow in 1933. Sabotage and espionage were the embroidery then; as treason, murder, and economic mischief were the embroidery in the Trotskyist trials.

In a book on **Soviet Justice and the trial of Radek and others*, an English barrister, who was himself present at the trial, has expressed the opinion that it was conducted fairly and regularly according to the rules of procedure, and that the defendants were fully guilty of the crimes charged against them. The present writer does not doubt that the trial was conducted fairly and regularly according to the rules of procedure, but the most important, and immensely the most prolonged, portion of the proceedings was completed outside of the Court. The darkness of those proceedings is illuminated only by an occasional flash from statements such as those of Radek and Muralov which have been quoted above.

**Soviet Justice and the Trial of Radek and Others*, by Dudley Collard, Barrister-at-Law, with an Introduction by D. N. Pritt, K.C., M.P. (London, Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 3s. 6d.).

THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION

By J. HENRY RICHARDSON

WHEN the International Labour Organisation was set up in 1919 in accordance with provisions of the Peace Treaties as an autonomous part of the League of Nations, it was widely believed that its membership would be similar to that of the League and that the two institutions would evolve along parallel lines. In recent years, however, the League has been weakened by difficulties not encountered by the International Labour Organisation. While the League's prestige was declining as a result of the ineffectiveness of its policies in the Sino-Japanese dispute and the Abyssinian crisis, and of the failure of the Disarmament Conference and the World Economic Conference 1933, the International Labour Organisation, partly sheltered by the nature of its work from political storms, weathered the economic depression with surprisingly little difficulty. Indeed the progress of social legislation and the ratification of international labour conventions suffered little interruption from the depression, which even "had the effect of stimulating fresh measures of social amelioration."¹ At the same time the I.L.O. made an important advance towards universality when the United States of America and the Soviet Union became members, the former because of close similarity between President Roosevelt's labour policy and the aims and objects of the Organisation, while the latter accepted membership when, for political reasons, she joined the League of Nations. Japan retained her membership of the I.L.O. when she left the

¹ *Report of the Director*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1937, page 53.

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League. Brazil also has remained in the I.L.O. Both organisations suffered from the withdrawal of Germany.¹

The changes resulting from the decline of the League and the progress of the I.L.O. raise a number of important questions. It may be asked whether the future of the I.L.O. is inseparably linked with that of the League, whether the I.L.O. might benefit if its connection with the League were to be severed, and what would be the position of the I.L.O. if the League were to be disbanded.

Under present conditions, despite the weakness of the League, there seem to be no adequate grounds for a separation of the two institutions. The I.L.O. has its own Conference and Governing Body, it is independent in policy, while no serious difficulties arise because the annual budget of the I.L.O. is reviewed by the Assembly of the League, or because certain formal communications, particularly the ratification of conventions, are made through the Secretary-General of the League. The progress of the I.L.O. which has coincided with the League's decline has not, therefore, been hampered by the rather slender constitutional links which hold the two institutions together, and it is difficult to see that the advance of the I.L.O. would have been much more or less rapid had it been entirely independent of the League. An outstanding illustration of this is the fact that notwithstanding the general attitude of the United States towards membership of the League that country was not prevented from joining the I.L.O. On the other hand it is highly probable that the Soviet Union would not have joined the I.L.O. if the two institutions had been independent. The case for separation would, however, become strong if any attempt were made to insist that membership of the I.L.O. must be identical

¹ From some points of view the adoption by Germany of a policy of economic self-sufficiency has diminished the effect of her withdrawal upon the work of the I.L.O. It is of interest to note that the German Government sent an Observer to the recent I.L.O. Preparatory Textile Conference at Washington.

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with that of the League, and that a State could not become or remain a member of the I.L.O. without also being a member of the League.

The question whether the I.L.O. could have a successful existence if the League were disbanded would depend upon the causes of the League's collapse and the views held about the objects and purposes of the I.L.O. A great war which destroyed the League would also destroy the I.L.O., or leave it merely as a nucleus undertaking minor tasks without the support necessary for effective international action. Similarly, even without the collapse of the League in the chaos of a great conflict, it is scarcely possible, in a world that feels itself upon the brink of war, for States to co-operate on a large scale in applying principles of social justice and in improving labour conditions as means of strengthening the foundations of peace. This idea is well expressed by Mr. Harold Butler, Director of the I.L.O., in his Report to the 1937 International Labour Conference when he says: "There is no ultimate conciliation possible between social justice and preparation for war. Economically as well as ethically they are at opposite poles. War preparedness can only be bought by the sacrifice of civilised living to a greater or lesser extent. Social justice is only attainable if the forces of production are harnessed to the causes of peace, without which the general progress of mankind is impossible."¹

It cannot be denied, therefore, that a continued deterioration of international political relations must sooner or later affect the I.L.O., and that its long-range progress will inevitably be impeded if political relations between States remain unfavourable. It is true, for example, that the Universal Postal Union existed long before the League was established, that it was little affected by the strain upon international relations which preceded the war, and that it

¹ *Report of the Director, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1937, page 81.*

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was able to continue its functions, though with various difficulties, during the war. If the I.L.O. were to limit its activities to the collection and publication of information and to research it could do useful work in a world in which political relations were seriously strained. The larger aims and objects of the I.L.O. are, however, intimately related to economic and social conditions throughout the world, and these in turn are related to political conditions. The two movements are not so closely harnessed that the rates of progress must be identical, but great permanent advances cannot be made by either in isolation from the other. On the other hand, the reaction of the work of the I.L.O. upon political relations must be continually emphasised. Not only is the I.L.O. steadily developing the technique of international co-operation, but its successes in achieving social security and social progress must tend to reduce political tensions. The political importance of the I.L.O. is fairly well recognised by many countries, although the British authorities seem to regard it as something quite apart from "foreign affairs."

The task of the I.L.O., as laid down in its Constitution, is to secure an improvement of labour conditions by international action. In particular it must work to remove social injustice, hardship, and privation, since, so long as such conditions remain, they will cause unrest and thereby endanger the peace of the world. Labour conditions, however, are intimately related to production, trade, monetary policy and other economic problems. It would be impossible for example to deal with the problem of unemployment without considering monetary and commercial policy, yet the I.L.O. has no authority to secure international agreement in these fields. Such tasks belong to the League. A system of joint committees, in which the I.L.O. and the League are each represented in dealing with questions of common interest,

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has been devised to meet this difficulty, but it does not always work effectively. It is sometimes argued, therefore, that in consequence of this limitation the I.L.O. cannot deal satisfactorily with international labour problems, and that its scope should be enlarged to include economic as well as labour questions. It is a weakness of the League that a political crisis almost immediately affects adversely the work of its economic, financial and other technical organisations, whereas the I.L.O. is, for a time at least, much less affected owing to its large measure of autonomy. The separation of the League's technical work from its political activities raises difficult constitutional issues, and there is little prospect of a transfer of the League's economic functions to the I.L.O. If the League were to collapse owing to political difficulties it would be a sound move to combine in one organisation both economic and labour questions, although, as already indicated, political, economic and labour questions are so closely related that, in a world in which States were unable to co-operate in political matters, the extent of their co-operation in economic and labour policy would inevitably be limited.

Representation at the Conference and Governing Body of the I.L.O. is based upon the assumption that in each country workers and employers form distinct groups, each with special interests. It also assumes that employers and workers are well organised, forming voluntary independent bodies within each State. Along with one employers' delegate and one workers' delegate there are two government delegates, and, although this double weight for governments is sometimes criticised, the proportion is reasonable so long as the application of I.L.O. conventions is based upon national legislation and governmental obligations and not upon a development internationally of the method of collective agreements. This normal representation of two government delegates together with an employers' delegate

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and a workers' delegate is, however, less appropriate for totalitarian than for democratic States. In a world of totalitarian States the most suitable representation would be that of governments only, accompanied no doubt by advisors familiar with management problems in industry and with workers' attitudes. In such States governments do not permit employers or workers to pursue policies independent of that of their governments. The workers' group and employers' group which form so active, though unofficial, a part of the I.L.O. system would not have developed if the structure had been based upon totalitarianism.

Difficulties due to the membership of several totalitarian States in the I.L.O. have already arisen. For a number of years the workers' group, which, in effect, represents the trade union movements of many countries, has objected to the Italian workers' delegate on the ground that he is not free to pursue a policy independent of that of the government, and it has refused to appoint him to represent the workers in committees. Since the Soviet Union joined the I.L.O. the employers' group has complained that the Russian workers' delegate is not independent. From this point of view Italy and the Soviet Union can be offset the one against the other, and there is no case at present for altering the type of representation. Important changes would, however, be necessary if totalitarianism developed. Difficulties have also arisen in selecting workers' and employers' delegates in countries in which workers' and employers' organisations are weak and unrepresentative, whether owing to apathy or to restrictions upon freedom of association.

All States Members are entitled to send delegates to the Conference, but the Governing Body is a much smaller body, with only sixteen States represented, together with eight persons representing the employers and eight representing the workers. Eight States of chief industrial

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importance have permanent seats, while other States are represented by electing eight of their number in accordance with principles which ensure the representation of countries in different parts of the world. There is no strong demand for any fundamental change in this system of representation.

It is sometimes thought that the purpose of the I.L.O. is to *equalise* wages, hours, and other working conditions throughout the world, by levelling conditions up to a common standard. The attainment of all-round equality of labour conditions is so remote that it may be dismissed as the practical purpose of present policy. It is prevented by wide differences in natural resources, in capital equipment, and in labour efficiency as well as by maldistribution of labour in different parts of the world. For example, an eight-hour day may be too long in advanced industrial countries where workers are using powerful machines and working at high speeds involving great nervous strain, whereas a nine-hour day may be appropriate in a country with more leisurely methods. The essential task of the I.L.O. is not to secure equality of conditions, but to apply the principles of social justice. It directs attention to unduly low standards and stimulates measures for ensuring their steady improvement, very much as the trade boards system has succeeded in greatly reducing sweating in this country. The I.L.O. also contributes to the restraint of unfair competition by securing the adoption of agreed international labour standards. But the emphasis is upon social justice and the prevention of exploitation, and not upon equalising competitive conditions between different countries.¹

The reaction of international competition upon labour standards is, however, a serious consideration. "The failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve

¹ See E. J. Phelan, *Yes, and Albert Thomas*, pages 247-8.

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the conditions in their own countries.”¹ Hence the need for international action in order that social progress may be a co-ordinated movement. Equality of conditions is not required, but appropriate rates of advance must be made on a world scale, with pressure upon laggards. Such action would go a long way towards preventing unfair competition. Competitive relations may be fair between two countries one of which has much higher wages than the other provided its labour productivity is correspondingly higher, but competition may become unfair if one of them increases its productive efficiency without making appropriate advances in its labour standards.

Since the setting up of the Organisation in 1919 the Conference has passed some fifty draft conventions which together form the basis of an international code or standard of fair labour conditions. Most of these conventions are suitable for wide practical application. In order to be adopted by the Conference a two-thirds majority is necessary, this implying extensive support for the principles upon which conventions are based, and the support must include that of a large number of government delegates, who form fifty per cent. of the representation in the Conference.

In the preparation of a draft convention and in its discussion in the Conference account is taken of the present state and possibilities of labour legislation and practice in the various countries. Difficulties arise because of the wide range which often exists in labour standards from backward to advanced countries, and the Conference can adopt various solutions. It may set a relatively low standard easy of attainment by the great majority of countries. Such a convention would be adopted in the hope that the least advanced countries would be able to apply the convention and thereby make some progress. Other conventions may set standards

¹ Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation.

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closely related to existing legislation and practice in the main body of industrial countries, and this is the course usually followed. Some of these countries may need to make a few changes in their legislation in order to be able to ratify the conventions, and by making these changes a movement is made towards greater international uniformity. Backward countries may often be unable to ratify the conventions, which, however, set standards towards which these countries may appropriately direct their evolution. Some conventions may set a high standard even for advanced industrial countries. Proposals on the forty-hour week are of this type.

Reference has already been made to the relation between conventions and restriction of unfair international competition in labour standards. Now labour competition is based upon labour costs, and these costs are made up of various labour conditions including wages, hours and social insurance. A country might ratify a convention setting a high standard of social insurance benefits, and yet maintain its former competitive power against other countries by offsetting the burden of social insurance charges by reductions in wages or lengthening of hours. Unless, therefore, international labour agreements effectively cover all the chief items of labour cost, the application of conventions will not necessarily reduce the severity of international competition in labour standards.

This raises a real difficulty, for up to the present the I.L.O. has been able to deal only tentatively with wages, and its success in the application of conventions dealing with hours of work has been limited. The wage problem is complicated by differences in productive efficiency, cost of living and habits of consumption in various parts of the world, and also in recent years by currency instability. On hours of work several conventions have been adopted by

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the Conference, but a number of chief industrial countries have neglected to apply them. It cannot, however, be assumed that inability hitherto to deal with the whole field of labour conditions results merely in a transfer of burdens from one part of the field to another. The conventions already adopted have usually been applied without a lowering of other standards.

Where a convention sets a standard which, if applied by some countries only, would be likely to place them at a competitive disadvantage with other countries, the method of simultaneous ratification by all the competing countries is usually considered. This method was proposed for the eight-hour day convention and also for the convention fixing the hours of labour of underground workers in coal mines. Up to the present the hopes of progress by simultaneous ratification have been disappointed, but the method is one which should yet prove of great value under favourable conditions.

A further problem in the application of conventions arises from the varying practices of different countries in methods of regulating labour conditions. In some countries working conditions are mainly regulated by legislation, whereas in others voluntary collective agreements are negotiated whenever possible. The I.L.O. has relied up to the present mainly upon legislation, desiring governments to assume international treaty obligations towards one another by undertaking to apply through national legislation standards which conform with those laid down in conventions. This is appropriate in countries where labour conditions are largely regulated by legislation. In Great Britain, however, wages, hours and certain other conditions of work are mainly regulated by voluntary collective agreements. These represent "gentlemen's agreements" between the parties, and the government has no responsibility for their enforcement. It

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could not use such agreements as a basis for State obligations towards other countries without altering the character of the agreements. There is some tendency in this country for statutory authority to be given to representative collective agreements, this system being introduced in the cotton industry by temporary legislation in 1934. It is too early yet to say whether this method is likely to be extended to other industries or whether it is mainly a device to deal with the special circumstances of an industry suffering from severe depression or from lack of organisation adequate to enforce collective agreements by voluntary action. An extension of this method would facilitate the ratification of certain conventions by Great Britain and other countries, and it might also provide a means for the development of international labour legislation.

A government's decision upon the ratification or non-ratification of a draft convention depends largely on the national legislation already setting a standard at least equal to that of the convention, or alternatively on the government's willingness to pass new legislation bringing the national standard up to that set by the convention. Great Britain, with thirty ratifications to its credit, has a higher record of ratification at the present time than any other important industrial country. Great Britain also sets a high standard of enforcement, owing to the activities of an efficiency inspectorate and to the vigilance of the trade unions and employers' organisations. About one-half the British ratifications involved no legislative change, as existing law and practice was at least equal to the standards set by the conventions, while some of the other ratifications involved only minor legislative changes. New or appreciably improved standards were introduced into British legislation and practice when the conventions were ratified requiring the payment of wages for a period up to two months to indemnify shipwrecked

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seamen for loss of employment, requiring a medical examination of children and young persons entering upon employment at sea, prohibiting the night work of young persons, and fixing fourteen as the minimum age for admission to industrial employment.

The British Government has been criticised for its failure to ratify certain conventions, particularly those dealing with hours of work. It has also been charged with showing undue caution and lack of leadership. It must be remembered that the prosperity of Great Britain is dependent to a greater extent than that of any other country upon international trade. Britain cannot, therefore, undertake obligations which would seriously weaken her competitive power in international markets. She has not, however, shown any enthusiasm for the method of simultaneous ratification which would have largely removed this difficulty. In the regulation of hours of work the Government has been reluctant to introduce extensive statutory authority into a field largely controlled up to the present by voluntary collective agreements.

The British Government's arguments to explain non-ratification of the Washington Hours Convention varied from year to year and were sometimes self-contradictory, while its attitude towards the forty-hour week has not always been constructive. In the discussions on the forty-hour week, however, there was considerable justification for the British Government's refusal to support the original proposals, there being confusion due to misunderstanding and differences of opinion on the purpose in view. To some the proposal represented a method of sharing the work available during the industrial depression, and this would have involved sharing the wages. The employed would have received a lower income for a shorter week in order that numbers of the unemployed would be brought back into

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work. Others, including British workers' representatives, desired the forty-hour week as a change affording a permanent increase in leisure time, and they considered that this change should be effected without reductions in weekly earnings. They believed that the growing productivity of industry could ensure maintenance of standards of living with a reduced week. In later discussions this confusion of purpose was largely removed, but disagreement remained between those who favoured the general application of the forty-hour week and those who advocated that the question should be considered separately for each industry. The British Government supported the latter more practical method.

In dealing with hours of work in separate industries the I.L.O. has marked out one line for its future development, that is, to supplement its general conventions with special ones for particular industries. A second development would be to prepare regional conventions covering groups of countries in which conditions are fairly similar, or alternatively to include in one convention several standards suitable for application in different regions. The Conference held last year at Santiago and the suggested Conference in Asia may prepare the way for this development.

The I.L.O. provides a means of pooling experience in the field of labour legislation and practice, and of establishing principles and standards suitable as guides to progress. It is strengthening the forces in various countries which are working for the prevention of exploitation in labour standards and are insisting upon social responsibility for humanising industrial progress. It offers opportunities for international consultation and co-operation on questions not directly involved in the manoeuvres of high diplomacy and the struggles of power politics. Such machinery is of special value at the present stage in the evolution of international relations.

SURVEYS

CURRENT SOCIAL STATISTICS:

THE INSURANCE OF BLACK COATED WORKERS

THE term "Black Coated workers" is generally taken to cover, roughly, all those wage or salary earners who are not engaged in manual work. These are at present about two million men and one million women, and include people in managerial positions in business, those engaged in public administration, clerical workers of all kinds, professional workers, and those working in businesses owned by themselves.

Of these three million, only those employed under contract of service at salaries below £250 per annum are compulsorily insured for health, unemployment, old age and widows' and orphans' pensions under the State schemes, but the new Act just passing through Parliament extends to independent workers (up to salary limits of £400 for men, but only £250 for women) the option of entering the State scheme as a voluntary contributor. It is estimated that about two million people will be affected by this option, and the Government Actuary anticipates that some 700,000 will take advantage of it.

The existing possibilities of insurance for workers of this class are bewilderingly varied and numerous, and the facts as to the extent of insurance affected by them are correspondingly difficult to ascertain with any exactness. The risks which black coated workers consider insuring for are many. The first in order of popularity appears to be property (including motor-car insurance, which is compulsory). Hardly any one who owns a small house fails to insure it against fire, and most small householders carry policies for their goods, whatever else they omit to insure. This type of insurance is effected through the private insurance companies, and amounts to many millions of pounds premium each year.

The next most common form of insurance is life insurance, now very commonly taken out by married men who wish to make some provision for their wives and children in case of their own sudden death. The amount of this type of business

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done annually by the insurance companies reaches staggering proportions, being carried on by some 120 insurance companies, of which some of the larger receive as much as £12,000,000 in annual premiums on this account. So great is the popularity of this type of insurance that it is estimated that the new business last year represented a capital of £200,000,000.

Parallel to this type of voluntary private insurance runs the State scheme for widows' and orphans' pensions, first introduced in 1925 and amended in 1929 and now further extended. This scheme caters for the same risk as life insurance. Manual and other workers who are compulsorily insured for this risk (and now the new black coated workers who may come in as voluntary contributors) know that on their death they will leave a pension of 10s. a week for life (or until re-marriage) to their widows, and additional pensions to their children until they leave school.

The third risk against which insurance is effected is illness and accident. Accidents arising out of and in the course of the employment were first provided for under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 (amended in 1906 and 1918 and 1923) and these liabilities are usually covered by insurances taken out by employers with private companies. Other accidents are often insured against by individuals under separate policies, and of recent years newspapers have made a great feature of the offer of such insurances to their registered readers.

The cost of illness, as apart from accidents, is insured against under the vast scheme of National Health Insurance, first established on a small scale in 1911 and frequently extended, amended and improved since then. This scheme does not at present cover any black coated workers who are earning over £250 a year, except those who, having been in the scheme while their salaries were low enough to make them eligible, elect to remain in as voluntary contributors afterwards. For many years the number who did so elect was small, and was only 28,000 in 1928, but it increased rapidly in the following years, and was 285,000 by 1931, and is 650,000 to-day.

There was for a long time a great deal of prejudice against

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Insurance for funeral expenses, which is one of the oldest of insurances, is not very common among black coated workers. It is extremely prevalent among manual workers, and the 170 competing industrial companies are said to employ some 70,000 agents and to collect over a million pounds a week in tiny sums.

Taking all the risks together, however, it appears that there are a very large number of ways of insuring against each of them, and it also appears that a very high proportion of the black coated workers do in fact take advantage of these possibilities. It should however be noted that all the schemes, whether of private companies or of State insurance, tend to base themselves upon the needs of the average family—the male bread-winner with dependent wife and children. In reality the insurance needs of the population nowadays cover a much more variegated range, and although by diligent search almost every type of contingency can be found to be covered by some available policy, there is room for much more elasticity than is yet common practice, especially in regard to the insurance needs of single women and women workers.

RAY STRACHEY.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE CORONATION

IN a recent article in this journal I discussed the growth of a semi-religious attitude towards the monarchy during the reign of George V, and showed that he became in the minds of a very large number of people a "father figure," infinitely benevolent and magically powerful. But I pointed out that this exalted and sacred position for the monarch was a new development and only came into existence when the public were sure both that the King was no longer really capable of interfering actively in political affairs and also that his personal life was beyond reproach. Now Edward VIII was unable to fit into this picture. He was too individual, too unconventional and too unstable. A popular and smiling bachelor prince, refreshingly unorthodox as he was in some of his public appearances, his role was rather that of an elder brother than that of a father. His popularity was of a different type; he proved too awk-

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ward a figure to act as the centre of that immense radio and press propaganda which builds up the king as the magical symbol of our national unity and the bulwark against class division and socialism. His determination to marry a woman who had been in the divorce courts made the rulers of England despair of finding in him a suitable successor to his father, a family man of blameless private life, who would create an atmosphere of security and embody in himself English prosperity and English respectability. Edward's abdication was, therefore, a very serious blow to the monarchical idea as it has developed in the last generation. Immediately after his departure from England, all the organs of propaganda were set to work to build up his brother George into the image of his father, into the model of the perfect British monarch. No one who carefully observed the Coronation could doubt that these months of propaganda were extremely successfully employed. A few left-wing critics raised a little cheer for republicanism when Edward abdicated, but they carried with them only a very small following.

Foreign and British observers agreed that the Coronation itself was an immense "success," that the mass of the public celebrated the occasion happily and enthusiastically. It was a demonstration of unity. An American journalist with a wide reputation in his own country was so impressed by the spontaneity of the cheering, by the absence of any "sour note," that he concluded that England is alone impervious to the struggle between left and right, that it has already achieved a "united front." He expected to find the Crown one of those "pleasant anachronisms with which man solaces himself for the pains of progress. I had thought it a quaintly charming bit of medievalism preserved in lavender as a memento of days presumably more glamorous. I was not prepared for its vital reality. I looked for the theatrical and found a sacrament." He noticed that whilst there was no "wild applause" there was apparently universal and willing acceptance of something which seemed to him as an American to have "nothing to do with government of, by, and for the people. It was something quite different—a theocracy in partnership with a military oligarchy. George

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was cast for the leading role, but His Grace of Canterbury had all the lines. In the Abbey the priest was top man. On the street the men-at-arms took over. The people sat or stood by the wayside and approved"¹.

There is no doubt that many foreign observers were similarly impressed, though not all of them had the same capacity for ironical appreciation. General von Blomberg expressed, I understand, a profound admiration for a display which, in spite of its comparative spontaneity, rivalled the most ambitious spectacles arranged by Dr. Goebbels.

I wish to add the following comments. (1) It is true that the number of republicans, or rather of those who think it worth while to try to make a republic an immediate object of propaganda, is very small. It is true, too, that the effect of the intensive monarchical propaganda which preceded the Coronation has been to create an appearance of unity and to disguise real social division. This is indeed part of the intention; the Coronation procession and festivities are subsidiary to the rearmament programme. They are intended to show that the British Empire is still as strong and united as it was in 1914, that Manchukuo, Abyssinia and Non-Intervention in Spain are merely signs that the British lion is not in a mood for roaring, not that he has lost his teeth. About this there is no doubt that the propagandist effect of the Coronation is also substantially truthful. English people are still, above all, nationalist and, less than any other people, conscious of a social struggle on class lines. The public attitude to the Coronation is very much what it would be towards a serious threat to the British Empire. The Labour Party, and indeed the left as a whole with numerically unimportant exceptions, says about the monarchy, just as it says about the Empire: "Of course, there's a lot of ballyhoo about all this and we protest against the use of a national symbol for the purposes of conservative propaganda. But to go with the comparatively few extremists and attack the monarchy, the Empire and the Coronation, is simply to play into the hands of our opponents, who will have the vast majority of the people with them anyway. Far better pro-

¹Mr. Vincent O'Brien, of the *Chicago Daily News*, in a letter in *New Statesman and Nation*, May 22, 1937.

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claim our loyalty with the rest and so be in a position to catch the public ear when we point out that there are still slums in England, still unemployment, and that glass coaches and golden crowns don't fill hungry bellies." It is to be noticed that even the Communists, who produced a penny pamphlet called "Parade of War" criticising the Coronation, were careful in their criticism not to offend the mass of working-class people, who whatever their politics, were spending surprising sums of hardly-saved money on tea-parties in the streets and other demonstrations of their determination both to be loyal and to have a good time.

As for the less extreme organs of the left, they were probably far less guided by considerations of public policy. A journal with a million or two millions circulation is not likely to be openly critical of so immensely popular an event. The *Daily Herald*, which was as full of Coronation news and pictures and as empty of all other news as the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express*, attempted no criticism of the monarchical propaganda. It spoke of the Coronation as an overwhelming demonstration of national unity and contrasted our constitutional and Commonwealth freedom with the forced and false government of a totalitarian state. In criticism it went no further than Hannen Swaffer's remark that the King was surrounded by members of one class. This was in line with Mr. Attlee's criticism in the House of Commons of the excessive adulation shown towards royalty, and Labour's plea a little later in the debate on the Civil List for a "simpler" throne. This debate was remarkable for Sir William Davison's superb statement that "there is no family in the country which lives more simply than the Royal Family." The *News-Chronicle* took a similar line, recalling that there are two nations in England, but it deduced from this not a class-war argument but the conclusion that since the King was popular with the down-and-out England as well as with the well-to-do England, monarchy is no longer a class affair. The *News-Chronicle* did, however, put in a word of warning against complacency by recalling that our prosperity was mainly on the surface and that there could be no security while everyone was making arms for mutual suicide.

(2) The effort to build up George VI into the image of his father has been extremely successful. The newspapers have not found it altogether easy, for the public knows very little personally of the present King and Queen and was for a long time still haunted by the memory of Edward VIII. One north-countryman put it in this way: "If it had been Edward, the nation would have gone mad. As it is, we would still like to cheer Edward, but we know that we've got to cheer George. After all, it's Edward's fault that he's not on the throne, and George didn't ask to get there. He's only doing his duty, and it's up to us to show that we appreciate it." I have met this sporting attitude on several occasions during the Coronation period and I think that it has offset the natural appeal of one of the great love romances of modern history. It has been amusing throughout to notice how the very mention of Edward, who so short a time ago had all the limelight, was avoided in the souvenir Coronation programme and in the various newspaper supplements which have told and re-told both in picture and in text the somewhat uneventful story of the upbringing and careers of the sons of George V. This policy of forgetting the Duke of Windsor could not be wholly successful and Mrs. Simpson's doings continued, of course, to possess good news value. But I think there has been a change and that to-day Edward is positively unpopular with a large section of the community. The editor of one of our great national daily papers tells me that the letters he receives suggest to him that the Duke of Windsor is now repudiated and even hated by many people who think of him, to follow Dr. Ernest Jones's analysis, as the head of the family who has "let them down" and disgraced them. Nevertheless the attitude of the Church towards the ceremony—strictly correct from the point of view of Anglican doctrine—and the decision that no member of the Royal Family should go to the Duke's wedding and that no film of the marriage should be shown in England, have aroused much resentment against the Archbishop and the Government. This resentment is vocal, however, mainly among the intelligentsia, and it is difficult to tell how widely it is felt throughout society.

(3) Granted that enthusiasm has been general during the

Coronation period, it remains important to know what prompts this enthusiasm. How far do men and women in the street realise the symbolic significance of the occasion, how far is their loyalty personal and how far are they victims of that hysterical retrogression into magical theory which I have already attempted to analyse? There is no evidence to warrant a confident answer. But careful observation of the crowd and comparison of notes with other observers suggest that to the overwhelming majority the Coronation is primarily a vast circus or pantomime, centering round celebrities who have been made popular in the press and even on the wireless; that it is a unique opportunity of waving a Union Jack and taking part in an historic event. Probably very few of the millions who have cheered the Royal Family during the past month are conscious of any significance beyond this. A tramwayman, held up with me by a crowd waiting the arrival of the King, remarked: "It would be just the same to them if I were in the King's place, as long as I had the same clothes on." An independent radicalism of this kind is still common, and the feeling for the monarchy would be quickly revealed as a superficial sentiment if another effort were made to exploit the King's popularity for political purposes. The two conditions for the popularity of the English throne are still applicable. There would be a quick reaction if the private life of the King was not exemplary, or if he were persuaded to take a partisan share in politics. For this reason one of the oddest statements made during the whole Coronation period was surely that of the Lord Chief Justice, who wrote, in an article in the *Daily Mail* on May 12, that the citizens of this country "know that the King can appoint and dismiss Ministers, that he can dissolve Parliament, and that he can refuse assent to any Bill which Parliament has passed." Legally, of course, the King does possess these powers, but it is an astonishing thing to find the Lord Chief Justice of England lending the great weight of his authority to so misleading a statement of the actual functions of the King. It is also a reminder of how our least wise and most reactionary politicians might again be tempted, as they were in the Ulster crisis of 1914, to try to exploit the Crown for political purposes. One thing is certain. There would have

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been no unanimity and much less enthusiasm if the public had believed in Lord Hewart's theory; if the Crown still claimed to possess the veto which it has not in fact used since the reign of Queen Anne, we should have a strong republican party in England in a week.

How far the attempt to revive the primitive magic of the Coronation, in a Christianised form, was successful, I am not sure. The effect the ceremony had on some observers was interestingly illustrated in the article by Sir Hugh Walpole in the *Daily Mail*. He was clearly affected by a symbolism of sacrificial and resurrected monarchy. When the King was stripped for anointment, Sir Hugh interpreted this ceremony as a surrender of power preliminary to the assumption of full glory. At that moment, he wrote, the King seemed to say: "I surrender everything except service." "He is at this moment the one great self-abnegating figure in this present world." It was interesting to compare this solemn statement with the jovial account of the ceremony given by Lord Castleross. The *Daily Express* is written for a more sophisticated and more modern public than the *Daily Mail*; it expects more humour and less superstition. But the most impressive example of such an attempt appeared in *The Times'* leading article on the day after the Coronation ceremony. The leader, entitled "The Lord's Anointed," noted the origins of the Coronation in dim antiquity and the continuity throughout of the conception of a mysterious priest-king who dies and is reborn, is "a sacramental, even a sacrificial man" who lives for his people and for his people sometimes "must sacramentally die." It was clear that the well-informed leader-writer in *The Times* fully understood that the Coronation ritual with its gorgeous regalia, its stripping and anointing, robing and lifting upon the throne is the same ritual that is used when kings are crowned in Fiji, and when royal chiefs ascend the throne in darkest Africa—the ritual which reached its greatest elaboration in the anointing of the early Brahmanic priest-kings. Anthropologically considered, the Coronation is a piece of magic, a magic ceremony carried out by the medicine-man, with the king as hero and victim, designed to bring fertility and prosperity. This ritual is commemorated in the folk songs and dances of every country; if *The Times*

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leader-writer had been dealing with his subject in an anti-quarian instead of a reverential spirit the natural title for his article would have been "George Barleycorn."

Strangely enough, however, the object of *The Times* in reminding us of the anthropological basis of the Coronation was not to smile at the common conservatism of men who like to maintain forms when reality has changed, nor was it to warn us against the deadly danger of superstition. On the contrary, its aim was apparently to increase superstition, to persuade men, who might otherwise take a common-sense view of their institutions, that something magical had really taken place and that what we have all been brought up to dismiss as mumbo-jumbo in Central Africa had somehow become something very serious and efficacious when imported into Westminster Abbey. *The Times* leader-writer was no doubt sincere when he suggested that some mystical virtues did in fact proceed from the sprinkling of oil on the chest and hands and head of the King, when he said that once "the King had sat in that chair and passed through that experience" he "must rise up something other than he had been," and that when the Archbishop went in under the canopy over the King's chair "bearing the consecrated oil as in the tabernacle, it seemed that those two men were alone with God, performing an act greater than they knew, more solemn than any person present could hope to understand." But such language, appropriate enough in the time of the Stuarts, is surely out of place in the traditionally Protestant columns of *The Times*. Those who have abandoned the belief in the Real Presence in the Sacrament might be expected to distinguish in the Coronation between the symbolic use of ceremony and the primitive conception of the magical efficacy of ritualistic and cabalistic words.

It is true that men in all ages have associated the idea of kingship with the idea of the patronage of a tribe, and it is true that the rationalistic republican has too often failed to realise the instinctive enjoyment which people find in ceremony and pageantry. It is true, too, that men do not necessarily become more rational because they have become republican. It is a delusion, which is dispelled by a glance at any modern dictatorship, that a republic is necessarily

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more rational than a country which maintains a ceremonial and symbolical king. But it is just this natural tendency of man to relapse into superstition which it is the business of responsible newspapers to counteract. Through a long evolutionary process men have learnt to see through the magic rituals which were once the centre of tribal life; they know now that to put on masks and join in a sacred dance will not change the weather or make the crops grow. They know, if they think about it, that if we are to solve the problems of war and poverty and misery, we need to be just as practical and as scientific in our understanding of the conditions of society as an agriculturist is to-day when he ploughs and irrigates the land. Yet there are those among our rulers who know all this, but who, for all their talk about democracy, do not intend a rational understanding of such matters to be spread among common people; they will prevent, if they can, the mass of mankind from understanding the causes of class division and the reasons why men are hungry in the midst of potential plenty. If we can be made sufficiently conscious of national unity, our leaders, magicians and wise men will be blessed, as the prayer in the Abbey put it, with "a quiet Empire." Therefore the more we are deluded into magic and the less we understand our symbols the better for the powers that be. This is an easy but dangerous state of mind for our rulers to drift into. It is unwise to encourage hysteria and superstition. The reaction against reason and common sense has already, as *The Times* constantly remarks, gone to extravagant lengths in Europe, and the stability of society will not in the long run be increased if the politicians and newspapers in this country also turn their backs on reason, abandon the progress of centuries and deface our "pleasant anachronisms" with the revival of magic and the cultivation of Abracadabra.

KINGSLEY MARTIN.

SOME FOREIGN BOOKS

OF historical books the most important is M. Momtchilo Nintchitch's two-volumed *La Crise bosniaque 1908-1909 et les Puissances européennes* (Costes: pp. 418, 412), not merely because it is founded on a close study of public documents, but because as a former Minister of

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Foreign Affairs he has intimate knowledge of Serb policy and of local conditions. He traces in great detail the history of the preliminary steps with special reference to the famous Buchlau conversations at which he has no doubt that the more cunning, but less clever, Aehrenthal tricked Isvolsky into an attitude of immediate acquiescence in something definite for the sake of remote and undefined compensations. Both statesmen were badly in need, personally and politically, of a startling success; both had its winning in their minds and both would have won it if the conversations of Buchlau had not been between two men who knew that any really great success must be won at the expense of the other. The foundations of Aehrenthal's policy are well described both in their personal and public aspects, and the annexation was, as a result of Aehrenthal's foresight in getting a blank cheque from Buelow, a first-class diplomatic victory of the moment. Isvolsky, who did not despair of getting the compensations vaguely promised by a revision of the Berlin Treaty, found himself opposed, not only by the policies of other countries, but by an overwhelming outburst of public opinion at home, which, ignorant of the possible developments, saw only the immediate and apparently irrefutable humiliation. Of the sequel, which was so nearly a European war, M. Nintchitch gives an excellent account particularly valuable for its ample information on Balkan opinion and policies, and in his conclusion explains what in his view made the Austrian victory really a defeat. That last chapter is very valuable; it is at once a criticism of the performance of statesmen and a treatise on statesmanship in general. Particularly interesting is the analysis of the currents and personalities which prevented the Austrian jingoes from making war on Serbia and his defence of the decision not to break the peace. The serious student of the sources will find here only little definitely new information, but he will indeed be a serious student if he does not find something which he ought to have known and had overlooked or of which he had missed the significance. He will also find ripe judgment of men and things such as is all too rare in work of this kind.

Beside M. Nintchitch's monumental work some recent studies of pre-war history which have appeared in Germany

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seem slight but should not be passed over. There is first Walter Schinner's *Der oesterreichisch-italienische Gegensatz an der Balkan und an der Adria bis zur Dreihundkrisse 1875-1896* (Kohlhammer: pp. viii. 204) which brings together in narrative form an immense mass of material. The actual "Gegensatz" did not lead to any great events, but it was determinative of policy to an extent often stated but less often so well appreciated. Herr Schinner has studied his documents carefully and has political sense.

The second is Cemal Tugin's *Die politische Beziehungen zwischen Oesterreich-Ungarn und Bulgarien von 1908 bis zum Bukarester Frieden* (Christian: pp. 234). This is much more wordy and less reliable, but deserves mention as another study in isolation of a particular set of political events. Its main merit is its inclusion of Bulgarian material. The third deals directly with M. Nintchitch's period, Heinz Sasse's *War das deutsche Eingreifen in die bosnische Krise im Maerz 1909 ein Ultimatum?* (Kohlhammer: pp. x 113). There is here much on the nature of an ultimatum on more or less familiar lines, but there is also a good deal about the actual diplomatic negotiations. Herr Sasse concludes that there was no ultimatum, though the precise difference in effect between this particular *démarche* and an ultimatum is difficult to see. M. Nintchitch satisfied the legal purists and the historians by talking of *pression*.

Of recent books on German policies the enlarged edition of Franz Reuter's biography of Schacht (*Schacht: Deutsche Verlag, Stuttgart: pp. 234*) deserves attention. The earlier sketch was just a eulogy; the revised edition is a much more serious piece of work, for it deals in considerable detail with the financial history of Germany. It is throughout a defence of Schacht's policy and is apt to mistake financial for political judgments, while discreet silence is maintained on vital aspects of the self-sufficiency and raw materials policy, but it does give clearly and intelligibly an outline of a situation which Schacht is doing his best to dominate. Herr Reuter's task was not easy, because he could not but remember the bitter criticism of the radical Nazi wing, and there is a good deal missing, but there is for the first time a connected account of the technical reasons for Schacht's strange conduct

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over the Young plan and his conversion for politico-financial and sentimental reasons to National Socialism; it does not appear that he ever regarded National Socialism precisely in the light that its leader does. The book ends with a very full account, bristling with figures, of the four years' plan. There are perhaps over-many figures and over-few judgments for the political student, but there is much here for the student of economics in this defence, although he may find as much to disagree with as to support.

Otto Strasser returns to the charge of accusing Hitler of betraying National Socialism in another small book, *Wobin treibt Hitler?* (Grunov, Prague: pp. 82). The argument is the familiar one that in the June purge Hitler broke with revolutionism and came down on the side of old-fashioned reaction, that the policy of aggressive imperialism succeeded in isolating Germany with the result that Germany, just because of her efforts at self-sufficiency in a suspicious world, faces an internal revolutionary situation although there is as yet no revolutionary movement. The signs of its creation are collected and analysed and the conclusion drawn is that, while anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism are mere camouflage for the aggressive war-victory which will save the regime, the situation itself may develop swiftly enough to anticipate the aggression. There are one or two new details and pieces of information, but on the whole the evidence like the argument is familiar.

The famous purge saw the final liquidation of the Freikorps as an influence in Germany. Four years have passed, and it has seemed good to the Government to permit rehabilitation. Nothing else can explain the simultaneous appearance of what all students have wanted for years, histories of the Freikorps movement. These are F. W. v. Oertzen's *Die deutschen Freikorps 1918-1923* (Brueckmann, Munich; pp. 510) and E. von Schmidt-Pauli's *Geschichte der Freikorps 1918-1924* (Schramm, Stuttgart: pp. 372). The subject was a delicate one. The facts remain, alluded to very courageously if complimentarily by Oertzen, that the present saviour of the German people never thought of joining any of the unofficial organisations whose members, whatever their faults, at least fought, bled and died against the Communist and the

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foreigner, that he spent years eradicating one by one the best of the Freikorps leaders from the party, and that he finally crushed what was left of them in one grand holocaust. There is something delightfully naïve in the endeavours of both authors to make out the Freikorps men as magnificent, unselfish heroes which they weren't, but completely ignorant of politics which again they weren't, and to create a contemporary Valhalla of heroes who are out-of-date. To say that either book is adequate is untrue, although Oertzen's is a valuable contribution to post-war history, for it is less rhetorical and much better documented than Schmidt-Pauli's. Between them it is possible to trace the events in a tormented history and to gather something of the real, as opposed to the sentimental, significance of what was a movement of great importance to Europe.

There are several legal books which can only be briefly mentioned; their titles indeed will tell the legal student all he wants to know. Prof. J. Escarra's *Le Droit chinois* (Sirey: pp. x ii 562) is a detailed account preceded by a valuable historical introduction of Chinese law, analysing at once the law as at present in force, its effects and its teaching. Prof. Mirkiné Guetziévitch's *La Technique parlementaire des Relations internationales* (Sirey: pp. 86) is another of that author's illuminating expositions of the part played by parliament in international relations and its control of foreign policy. The same author with three other professors is responsible for a new review, the *Revue d'Histoire politique et constitutionnelle* (Sirey), which promises to be most useful to the student. In the first number Senor Zamora analyses the Spanish constitution of 1931, M. Siegfried the constitution of Canada, Sir Maurice Amos the new Indian constitution, and M. Millerand writes an interesting article on the first days of the Third French Republic.

Finally one may just mention that the *Annuaire inter-parlementaire* (Sirey: pp. 244) with its mass of political information has just appeared in its 1937 dress. In its own sphere there is no better book of reference.

R. T. CLARK.

BOOK REVIEWS

GREY OF FALLODON. By G. M. TREVELYAN, O.M. (*Longmans*. 16s.)

ONE of the reasons why Professor Trevelyan excels in the art of biography is that he possesses in a very high degree the capacity of concentrating upon one aspect of his subject. Like a great portrait painter, he makes the characteristics which he considers significant so alive and interesting with deft touches and subtle shading that the rest of the man is only a background. In this book the portrait of Grey the man seems to have been a labour of love—the rest merely a labour.

As is explained in the preface, Grey of Fallodon had two entirely distinct careers. He was a great lover of nature and devoted a large portion of his life to observing birds, fishes, flowers, and streams. He published three books on these themes which Professor Trevelyan perhaps places a little too high when he ranks them with those of Izaak Walton and Hudson. Still they are delightful pieces of literature and together with the extracts from the diaries printed in this book will continue to give to many the great pleasure which they have obviously produced in Grey's biographer. The birds of Fallodon and the cottage in the Hampshire woods, the perfect harmony of the marriage with Dorothy Grey, the tragedy of her death and that of her successor as well as of two dearly loved brothers, the loss of sight when leisure came at last, all these are depicted with the art of which the author is a master. For these beautiful pictures the book will always be read and remembered. Only one disconcerting note occurs. For the devoted lover of birds was also a first-class shot and in early life at least enjoyed to the full a "hot corner" with the pheasants. Neither Grey nor his biographer seem to think this combination at all surprising and the book is thus all the more a perfect interpretation of the English attitude towards nature and sport.

There was however another Grey who was foreign minister of Britain during eleven fateful years. This was no bad position for any man to hold and there is perhaps in the

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book too much insistence on the sacrifices it entailed. Both Castlereagh and Palmerston also loved country life and fondly longed for it in the midst of their labours to which they gave up not eleven years but a whole life's span without more than an occasional grumble. Grey of course enjoyed his work as all British foreign ministers have done except Derby. The negotiations in which he took part have already been analyzed in greater detail than those of any other of our foreign ministers. Numbers of his own private letters have been printed in the *Twenty-five Years* and the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*. Professor Trevelyan does not seem to be quite at his ease in this environment and such new material as he uses adds but little of importance to what we already know. He accepts Grey's point of view throughout. Occasionally he criticises mildly his methods as in the famous instance of the military conversations with Russia about which Grey attempted to deceive Parliament. But of most of his diplomacy he gives merely a lucid summary without attempting to go very deep beneath the surface. There is an enormous literature on this period of history. But the only criticisms which Professor Trevelyan answers in any detail are those of Mr. Lloyd George. Foreign historians he almost entirely ignores in the true spirit of Grey himself. He even claims that Grey's ignorance of Europe was an advantage to him. Grey was in truth the most insular of our foreign ministers and he made no attempt to correct his defects. It is a singular irony that no other minister since Castlereagh involved us so deeply in Continental entanglements. Perhaps the two facts are not unconnected.

Grey's patience and steadiness will always be admired. There will be for long debate as to his insight into foreign problems and the minds of foreign statesmen, his ability to control his own office especially men like Nicolson and Crowe, his power or even desire to make his Cabinet, Parliament and people realise the issues at stake. Like Castlereagh, whom Professor Trevelyan describes as the greatest of his predecessors, he relied on patient work through diplomatic channels to keep the European peace. But Castlereagh had a conception of the unity of Europe which Grey lacked and he knew himself all the men who determined its fate. Grey

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had to rely on subordinates for the interpretation of telegrams and despatches. One has the feeling that Europe was never real to him.

One of the most curious things in British Foreign Policy is the military conversations. Grey was unhappy later at his concealment of them from the Cabinet. But the whole situation was dominated by the fact that it was certain that if Germany attacked France she would violate the neutrality of Belgium. Grey cannot have been ignorant of this fact which was a commonplace to the General Staff. Even if he could not take notice of it publicly, as Mr. Trevelyan suggests was the case, why were the Cabinet not made aware of it and prepared to face it? The soldiers knew that this fact would make Britain's entry into the war a certainty, and their military plans were based on the supposition. Grey seems to have shrunk from the contemplation of the brutal reality.

Grey's entente with Russia before the war at the expense of Persia and his treaty with Italy during the war at the expense of the Serbs were distasteful to him and are only defended on grounds of the extreme necessity of winning allies against Germany. There is much to be said for the view that both were mistakes and cost us dear. Italy, however, had always been the friend of England and Professor Trevelyan misleads his readers when he says that she had not positively stipulated in any treaty that she should not be called upon to fight against her. She secured Ministerial declarations to that effect from her partners in the Triple Alliance which amounted to the same thing. The instinct of most of her statesmen and people was to come in on the same side as Britain or at least preserve a benevolent neutrality. This last attitude might have suited us better than her armed assistance. But in all his war agreements Grey was the puppet of circumstances. He had no plan or consistent policy for the reconstruction of Europe.

His instinct was however profoundly right in his dealings with the United States. Here he was much helped by Cecil and the two statesmen were also amongst the foremost in accepting the idea of a League of Nations. Grey's authority did much for that cause in his later years though he seems to have been very sceptical of its chances of success. It was

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indeed only by a great effort that he could bring himself to play any part in politics in the post-war years. His dislike of the principles or lack of principles of Mr. Lloyd George was the sole stimulus to action. He always believed in immortality and was longing for a release from this world and a reunion with Dorothy Grey. His increasing blindness and other misfortunes make such an attitude a natural one. But one of the keys to an understanding of Grey's career is that his personal life prevented him from using to the full the possibilities of greatness that were his. Similarly in this book the very excellence of the description of Grey the man makes the rest of it curiously unsatisfying.

C. K. WEBSTER.

WORLD TRADE AND ITS FUTURE. By SIR ARTHUR SALTER.
(Humphrey Milford. 7s. 6d.)

SUCCINCT without dryness, brilliant without superficiality, realistic without losing hold on underlying economic principles, Sir Arthur Salter must surely be one of the most convincing propagandists of economic sanity in an economically insane world. *World Trade* places before a wider public five lectures delivered, under the terms of the William J. Cooper Foundation, at Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, and its aim, to quote the author's prefatory note, has been "rather to suggest a certain general orientation of policy than to present an actual programme." This orientation of policy consists, briefly, in the acceptance of the regrettable fact of economic nationalism and endeavour, instead of vainly striving for a return to cosmopolitan individualism, to frame a workable system on the basis of that fact. The rise of economic nationalism is explained and described, analytically and historically, in the first three chapters; essentially it is the outcome of capitalism's inadequate flexibility in practice, when confronted with changes in demand or with the results of error. *Laissez faire* individualism, in these circumstances, jettisons its surplus factors of production; and the process of reabsorption, theoretically automatic, even in a closed community, has in the past only been made tolerably swift and certain by the existence of the

ever-expanding markets provided by unexploited territories abroad and an increasing population at home. These outlets no longer exist on anything like the same scale; consequently the inevitable temporary disequilibria of economic change impose, when they occur, intolerable hardships which have to be relieved by State intervention. Such intervention in turn increases rigidity, makes the process of adaptation slower, and leads to demands for more intervention; the State finds itself more and more concerned with industry and commerce. A nationalist trade policy results, partly from the pressure of vested interests created at one stage or another of intervention, and partly from the genuine desirability, to the legislating authority, of substituting transactions within its control for transactions over which it has no jurisdiction. This is the underlying development; superimposed upon and reinforcing it are, of course, the more acute maladjustments and the intense national feeling, among victors and vanquished alike, arising out of the Great War.

Such is the situation from which Sir Arthur Salter's policy has to start. We are unlikely to revert to *laissez faire*; collective action has come to stay. No nation may be—no nation probably is—an ideal unit for this collective action; but no alternative authority stands a chance of gaining political acceptance at present. The way out lies through deliberate and clearly thought out collaboration between the national units. Co-operation should begin on the monetary front, with exchange stabilisation, not at rigidly unalterable parities but with provision for change after consultation. The agreed ratios should be maintained by joint action, either by a joint equalisation fund or by the concerted use of national funds. At the same time the Central Banks should co-operate in maintaining relative price stability; and the issue houses in financial centres should guide long-term international movements of capital on responsible lines. The nations should consider their balance of trade as a whole and in relation to their whole economic policy, aiming not—as under the new-bullionism of today—at a positive balance but at an equilibrium. Once definite policy has supplanted the chaos of special measures improvised under the pressure of emergency or of vested interests, the

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way will be open for more low-tariff clubs and for a widening and liberalisation of clearing agreements. This process should be supplemented by a return, in colonial territories, to an open door policy.

If only some such plan had been put into operation in 1932! Perhaps it is not too late even now. But in 1937 the consideration of national economic policy as a whole has, where it is heard, an ominous ring. The nations are indeed overhauling their policies; with the single aim of efficiency in war.

HONOR CROOME.

HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: BIOGRAPHIES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMONS HOUSE, 1439-1509. By COLONEL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOSIAH C. WEDGWOOD, D.S.O., M.P., in collaboration with ANNE D. HOLT, M.A. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936.)

THIS volume is the first to appear in the *History of Parliament* launched by Colonel Wedgwood. It forms part of a series of three, which will cover the period 1439-1509. It contains biographies of members of the House of Commons for the whole seventy years in question. In the second volume members of both Houses will be classified by the Parliament in which they sat. The third volume will use the material assembled in the first two to draw conclusions as to the political characteristics and development of the period.

Of the necessity for a work such as Colonel Wedgwood has planned, there can be no question. "Knowledge of the personnel," as he rightly remarks in his introduction, "is essential to the knowledge of the working of the Institution." Nor is it only to those interested primarily in Parliament as an institution that information as to its *personnel* is indispensable. Some justly esteemed accounts of the working of Parliament occasionally appear to the layman in constitutional history to be slightly unrealistic. If man is a political animal, he is also a landowner, farmer, merchant, banker and industrialist. Members did not in the past shed, on riding to Westminster, the interests in which they were involved in the life of their

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counties and boroughs, any more than they do at the present day. No theory as to the relation between the economic and political aspects of life is implied in saying that not much will be made of either if each is studied in isolation. If, however, they are to be used to throw light on each other, we must know far more than at present we do of the economic affiliations of members. It is equally true, and equally important—since man is not merely an economic animal—that we must know more about their family connections, the offices, if any, which they held, and the part which they played in the life of their localities. What that means is that we must use much more evidence of a biographical kind than has hitherto been available. The prospect is an appalling one; except as regards the celebrities, the labour involved is enough to break one's heart. The present volume contains biographical notes, on the average 150 words each, relating to 2,500 members out of the 3,800 or so who, it is thought, may have sat in the twenty-nine Parliaments summoned to meet between 1439 and 1509. For later periods, the task is likely to be even heavier. Only a co-operative undertaking can enable it to be carried through. That is the justification of Colonel Wedgwood's project.

Only a specialist in the history of the fifteenth century could say how far the present volume satisfies the demands of the historian. The layman, except in so far as he is interested in particular persons and localities, will not get far beyond the racy introduction of Colonel Wedgwood. He will note the large number of officials of one kind or another returned as members, the importance of family connections, the dependence of many members of the House of Commons on the nobility, the considerable contribution to it made to it by a long list of trades and industries, the presence in Parliament of members of some families then obscure, but later to be famous, the surprising youth of many members, and the violence which is the background of the politics of the time. But beyond these commonplaces he can hardly go. It would help him, and, indeed, all readers, if in later volumes more use could be made of tabulation, for example—to give only one illustration—of the number of members connected with different occupations, which is in place in a work of

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reference of the kind. For the rest, the reader can only express gratitude for what is here provided, and look forward with pleasurable anticipation to subsequent volumes.

R. H. TAWNEY.

PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN. *Edited for the New Fabian Research Bureau by WILLIAM A. ROBSON.* (Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.)

THE most important feature of post-war constitutional history is the rapid development of the public commission as an instrument of government. It is worthy of study for its own sake. It is even more suitable for examination because it is a device which can be used for the administration of some of the services which a Labour Government might decide to nationalise. It is, of course, only one such device. Roughly speaking, there are four different ideas in the Labour Movement as to the government of national services. The first is that any such service should be administered under the direction of a minister responsible to Parliament. The practical working of that system, its advantages and defects, are studied by Mr. John Dugdale in his essay on the "Post Office." The second is that of worker's control or guild socialism. That is not studied in the present volume because there are no examples; nor, in spite of the miners, are there likely to be any unless a Labour Government completely loses its head. The third is the co-operative idea examined, not very thoroughly, by Mr. O. Walworth. The fourth is that of the public board, of which seven examples are chosen for examination in this volume.

The book is concerned with public enterprise. It is, therefore, concerned with the public board only so far as it is an instrument for the government of socialised industries. This limitation unfortunately cuts out one of the most instructive, the Unemployment Assistance Board. It is instructive because the Unemployment Act, 1934, was one more attempt to take a social service out of politics. The attempt failed when Chadwick's Royal Commission recommended it in 1834. It failed again in the example of the

Insurance Commissioners (which, with the Scottish boards, called forth by the general objection to administrative boards set out in the Report of the Machinery of Government Committee). It failed again in the early months of 1935. An examination of this example on the one hand, and of other examples of successful boards (such as the Civil Service Commission) on the other, is really part of an effective examination of the commission system, even in relation to enterprise.

The essays themselves vary in quality from the excellent example set by Dr. Lincoln Gordon in his explanation of the Port of London Authority down to the least effective, which need not be specified because it is in fact quite good on some aspects of the problem. Two fundamental facts emerge. The first is that there is no common mould from which a new commission can be cast. The method of government and the constitutional relation must be examined in each case to determine the scheme which best befits the particular industry. The second is that on the whole the system is approved. It is not always approved for the same reasons, and in some cases (notably those of the marketing boards) considerable modifications are considered desirable. On the whole, however, it may be said that the device has come to stay. This conclusion would probably be reinforced if some of the less well-known bodies had been considered. These include, for instance, the harbour authorities, Trinity House and (a significant example for those who ask for an Investment Board) the Public Works Loan Board.

On one fundamental question some of the essays are strangely reticent. There is no real explanation of the methods and efficiency of Parliamentary control. Mr. Dugdale explains the difficulties arising from Parliamentary control of the Post Office; but not all the essays state whether the Speaker allows questions or the Minister answers them, whether the Estimates are presented to the House of Commons, whether the authorities appear in the Estimates of the relevant Departments, whether debates have been raised on adjournment motions or otherwise. Dr. Robson's excellent concluding survey mentions this question casually. It is there pointed out that a debate may take place on a new

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Bill; and it is also suggested that a debate may occur on the presentation of the report of a Departmental Committee. Dr. Robson was thinking, no doubt, of the recent Broadcasting debate, which took place only because the Government moved a motion. The real question is the opportunities which the ordinary procedure at present allows. In this connection there might be considered more fully the examples of the Forestry Commission, the Charity Commission and the Church Estates Commission. In this connection, too, the example of the Unemployment Assistance Board is again important because Estimates are presented and can be put down for discussion in Supply. These matters ought to be fully considered because the real question at issue is that of the relation between the technical service and the elected representatives. The information can be obtained only by grubbing through Hansard and by careful study of the Standing Orders; but this is the kind of work which the New Fabian Research Bureau ought to do.

In spite of this omission and the sketchy character of one or two of the essays, the book is a notable contribution. It does not wholly fill the gap because the control of trading services is one aspect only of public control; and if there is a difference between those services and such services as unemployment assistance, mental deficiency, the registration of births and deaths, and other quasi-independent services, it ought to be brought out strongly by examination of those other services. Nevertheless, it fills a large part of the gap. Particularly important are the discussions, especially in the concluding chapter, of the problems of personnel and staff. The essay on the London Passenger Transport Board and the final essay also deal with the difficult subject of compensation. The volume is essential to every student of the modern Constitution and to all who want something more precise than a vague aspiration for "nationalisation."

W. IVOR JENNINGS.

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PROPERTY AND IMPROPERTY. By J. A. HOBSON. (*Gollancz*. 4s. 6d.)

IN his latest book Mr. Hobson returns once again to the attack on capitalist inequality, supporting the familiar underconsumptionist thesis with the attractively named new concept of "improperty." Socialists have made the mistake of lumping together for condemnation all property from wherever it may be derived; a mistake not only in social wisdom but in political tactics, and one for which their opponents have been quick to make them pay. There should, says Mr. Hobson, be a clear distinction drawn between legitimate property, such as a man's possession of his own clothes and tools, and illegitimate property, or "improperty," based on the unscrupulous use of superior bargaining power—which merges, if one goes far enough back into history, into actual robbery and forcible expropriation. Improperly perpetuates and enlarges itself by reason of the fact that saving is costless and automatic to the rich, who can thus enlarge their wealth indefinitely, fortifying their enhanced bargaining power at every stage. This same phenomenon of costless saving, unrelated to any personal sacrifice, brings about recurring maladjustments between productive capacity and market capacity; maladjustments met up to roughly the time of the Great War by a forward foreign trade policy, but now, in the absence of fresh markets, taking their full effect in devastating depressions. Thus improperty underlies what Mr. Hobson maintains to be the fundamental unsoundness—the self-destructiveness—of modern capitalism. Make improperty impossible, and the major cause of economic maladjustment, as of international disagreements, disappears. There remain the administrative problems of socialist control, its extent and nature; the former depending on the degree of standardisation of the product, the latter left virtually undiscussed.

As always, Mr. Hobson writes moderately, persuasively and well. But quite apart from the shortcomings of his analysis of the trade cycle, stated here with a downright dogmatism which takes no account of recent theoretical advances, the all-important distinction between justifiable property and unjustifiable improperty is never really made

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clear. Improperly arises from inequality of bargaining power. "Everywhere the so-called 'cost' measures, not the skill or effort given out, but the strong or weak 'pull' of the owner of some factor of production." This is of course perfectly true. It would remain true of any conceivable society, however equalitarian, in which any freedom of choice remained either to consumer or to producer. Costs, to quote Professor Knight, register competing attractions. They do not register horse-power, or pints of sweat, or degrees of dexterity as measured by industrial psychologists. It is no less true that the inequality of incomes distorts the action of the pricing process as a guide to production; but it is not the inequality of incomes which is responsible for the relativity of costs. It is surprising to find an economist of Mr. Hobson's standing suggesting, in effect, that there is something immoral about a low-cost producer making a better profit than a high-cost producer, such differences in cost constituting a constantly accruing source of "impropriety." The idea wants further definition. Most people agree, whether they use technical language or not, that there is something wrong with the cumulative effects of monopoly and monopsony. Jacob did treat Esau shabbily. But where the barter is not a mess of pottage against a birthright, under the stimulus of starvation, but a perch at a window on the Coronation route against a sum sufficient to rent the whole house for a month, under the stimulus of Press-fed loyalty, does the transaction wear the same ethical appearance? The economic facts are exactly the same: monopoly confronted with exceptionally inelastic demand and therefore well placed for exacting special profits. Go a step further; is the rise in price of fruit in hot weather, weather which makes no difference to the cost of production, a source of impropriety because, the buyers' wish for fruit having been stimulated, the bargaining position of the sellers has been improved? There is no logical line to be drawn, no practical criterion to be applied; and until one is found, there is really no room for "impropriety" as an economic concept.

HONOR CROOME.

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THE MAGIC OF MONARCHY. By KINGSLEY MARTIN. (Nelson. 2s. 6d.). THE TWILIGHT OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY. By AN AMERICAN RESIDENT. (Secker & Warburg. 1s.).

IN a leader on the occasion of the death of George IV *The Times* wrote: "If the late King ever had a friend—a devoted friend in any rank of life—we protest that the name of him or her has not yet reached us." Some ten years later Queen Victoria was hissed in the streets as Mrs. Melbourne. At the time of the Crimean War large crowds gathered on Tower Hill in the confident expectation that the Queen and the Prince Consort were to be imprisoned for high treason, an example of a real popular movement. In 1872 Bagehot described the Queen and the Prince of Wales as "a retired widow and an unemployed youth." As late as 1894 Keir Hardie said, words which were constantly in my mind during the Abdication crisis: "The life of one Welsh miner is of greater commercial and moral value to the British nation than the whole Royal crowd put together . . ."

What has caused the startling subsequent change in tone about the Monarchy? It is this question which Mr. Martin's book answers. As readers of *The Political Quarterly* already know Mr. Martin is a remarkably skilled and objective observer of public opinion, and like everything else that he writes this book is brilliantly written. One may cite in particular the passage on pp. 99-100 explaining, with reference to the recent crisis, the traditional process of re-assurance which takes place in this country after the indubitable occurrence of one of those events which we have been brought up to believe impossible. The first student of the psychological aspects of the British Monarchy was Bagehot; Mr. Martin is his worthy successor, and his book undoubtedly the best that the Coronation has produced.

Three factors account for the new-found popularity of the British Monarchy: first, a reasonable and proper respect for the characters of our recent Kings and Queens; second, the development, particularly among the middle classes, of an unreasonable and superstitious worship of the King as an, almost semi-divine, "Father of the Family"; third, deliberate exploitation of these two currents of feeling by "sinister interests." The line between the second and third factors is

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not, of course, easy to draw. A broad criticism of Mr. Martin's book is that he concentrates his attention on the second, "magic," and insufficiently stresses the connection since the seventies of the last century between the growth of the royal prestige and the growth of imperialism.

The anonymous author of "The Twilight of the British Monarchy" covers much the same ground and expresses much the same opinions as Mr. Martin, and is similarly a brilliant writer. Few American residents can be as well-informed about British social and political institutions. He knows (p. 23) that "Royalty is the special toy of the upper middle class," that (p. 24) "the greatest contradiction in English social life" is that "of a society based at one and the same time on an advanced political democracy and on a retrogressive social aristocracy," and shrewdly points out (p. 21) that: "Long before Hollywood was discovered, Buckingham Palace had been the Hollywood of the British middle class, the projection screen for its ideal." This is a very interesting pamphlet; it is only unfortunate that the general difficulty of selling pamphlets will almost certainly mean that it will not command the attention it deserves.

Towards the end of his book Mr. Martin asks himself whether the effect of the discovery last December that after all the King was only human has been to break the Monarchy's magical spell. That question has already answered itself. A propaganda campaign of tremendous intensity, waged by press, pulpit, radio and cinema, has succeeded in "building up" George VI into the exact replica of his father. This, with the Coronation, has ensured that the magic of Monarchy is as real to-day as it was at the time of the late King's Jubilee. Mr. Martin and his brother-author make their plea, dignified, reasonable, restrained, for a British Monarchy of the Scandinavian type. They might as well try to fight poison-gas with a sword. Criticism of the Monarchy can only be part of the general struggle for reason against unreason, for equality against privilege. The Monarchy in its present form will last as long as inequality and superstition last, and not very much longer.

Meanwhile there seems no reason, in that struggle, for singling out the Monarchy for special attack. It serves a

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useful negative purpose in drawing-off from our heads the lightning of a Fascist dictatorship. Up-to-date as ever Mr. Shaw pointed this out in the Preface to his last play. Mere iconoclasm, he said, was a mistake, and the Roundhead folly of destroying the power of the pageant by forbidding all theatrical displays and dressings-up really a Thickhead one.

FRANK HARDIE.

SOVIET DEMOCRACY. By PAT SLOAN. (Gollancz. 288pp. 6s.)
THE END OF SOCIALISM IN RUSSIA. By MAX EASTMAN.
(Secker & Warburg. 46pp. 1s.)

THESE two publications are significant illustrations of the present state of discussion concerning the Soviet regime. They are both written by Socialists. Mr. Sloan's book is full of enthusiasm and support for the U.S.S.R. as it exists to-day. Mr. Eastman's pamphlet is full of bitterness and criticism. There is relatively little serious disagreement over the facts. It is their interpretation which causes such violent divergence of views.

Mr. Sloan is an educated Englishman who has recently lived and worked in Russia for six years. It is seldom that one comes across a book containing so much truth and falsehood, so large a measure of wisdom and foolishness, as are to be found between the covers of *Soviet Democracy*. It starts by giving an interesting and readable account of the new rights and opportunities which are available to every citizen in the Soviet Union. Equality of opportunity in regard to education and the choosing of a vocation; the rights of the wage-earner in a society where private employment for gain has been abolished; the unique status and power of the trade unions; the opportunities for effective criticism offered by the periodic meetings of the whole staff of each enterprise with the director; the protection against arbitrary action afforded by participation of the local trade union official and the party cell in the management of each industrial undertaking; the methods for ensuring that the People's Courts reflect the opinions and feelings of the workers: all these aspects of the Soviet regime enable the author to contend with irresistible force that in many ways

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the U.S.S.R. is far more democratic than any of the capitalist countries. Occasionally one comes across absurd statements, as, for example, that whereas in 1933 London appeared to be a land of plenty in comparison with Moscow, in 1936 no such contrast was visible. But lapses of this kind do not affect the general argument and Mr. Sloan is on very strong ground when he is discussing the new rights, opportunities and liberties which are available to everyone in the Soviet Union.

It is when Mr. Sloan comes to discuss the older rights, opportunities and liberties which have been for long established in the Western democracies that his book deteriorates rapidly into a feeble panegyric of everything Russian. This failure to distinguish between the old and new elements vitiates much contemporary work on the Soviet system.

Mr. Sloan seriously asserts that not only is the press of the Soviet Union entirely free, but that it is the only free press in the world. "The Soviet press," he tells us, "gives voice to two kinds of criticism which are more or less non-existent in the press of Britain: criticism of the working of all kinds of public institutions; and criticism of the working of responsible persons. Both these kinds of criticism, in a country of private enterprise, would be damaging to the firms concerned, also to the authority of employers over workers, and are therefore taboo" (p. 103). He pursues this argument at great length, insisting that the working citizen of U.S.S.R. enjoys an effective freedom of expression denied elsewhere, and that "the Soviet Press can truly claim to be democratic." The prohibition of any fundamental criticism of the regime, and the suppression of dissentient opinion, resulting in the crimes alleged in the treason trials, he explains by saying that these people were suppressed because no one wanted to hear them any longer. "This fact illustrates, not the undemocratic, but the democratic character of such a prohibition" (p. 116).

There is much else of an equally specious kind. Stalin's position is said to be constitutionally similar to that of Baldwin when prime minister. The absence of any opposition party is justified on the ground that where a common purpose exists a party system is unnecessary. Mr. Sloan considers

that it is completely misleading to regard a party system as in any way typical of democratic institutions. In his view parties are simply the organs of conflicting classes. Hence he justifies the absence of any opposition party or group by assuming the complete identification of the Communist Party with the interests of the only class now supposed to exist in U.S.S.R.

In the chapter on "Democratic Discipline and Freedom of Opposition" the author relapses into almost inconceivably weak arguments. Democracy, he says, means that the people shall have the opportunity to refuse to hear those whose views are antagonistic to them. In capitalist democracies this is achieved by expelling them from their organisations—e.g., trade union or political party. This cannot be done in U.S.S.R. because the entire State is a worker's organization, and expulsion beyond the borders is not feasible because the neighbouring countries would object. Hence, exile in Siberia or imprisonment for political dissentients is just and democratic. The question of freedom of speech is dealt with by equally simple and misleading methods. "Do Soviet workers want to get up and attack their Government in public meetings?" asks Mr. Sloan. And if certain individuals do want to do this, do the majority of workers want to listen to such speakers? (p. 233) The answer given is that while a small minority may not enjoy complete freedom the vast majority of the people are free to express themselves as they choose (p. 235). Yet a little later Mr. Sloan declares that "the freedom of workers to criticise their superiors and Government institutions does not extend to freedom to attack the Government as such, because the people as a whole support this Government and do not oppose it." How could opposition ever be formulated in such conditions? Only by active violence, it would appear. But Mr. Sloan makes no mention of the 3,500 train wrecks said to be the work of Trotskyist conspirators.

From beginning to end of this book there is not one word of criticism of the U.S.S.R. or its Government. Nor does the author so much as even mention the censorship of foreign newspapers and books in the Soviet Union, the prohibition on foreign travel and similar methods of con-

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trolling opinion. The explicit and implied perfection of the Soviet regime is more fatiguing and less persuasive than a discriminating analysis would be, at any rate to English readers. Mr. Sloan has much of value to say; but he has stultified himself by wildly overstating his case and obscuring its weaknesses.

Mr. Eastman (who has been associated with Trotsky as his English translator) declares, for his part, that there is nothing good in Russia to-day; that the work of the revolution has been undone; and socialism abandoned. He attacks everything, especially the cultivation of national feeling and patriotism, the introduction of new economic inequalities among the workers, the emergence of a class structure based on these inequalities, the anti-feminist consequences predicted of the law prohibiting abortion, the issue of State loans at high rates of interest, the making over of the land for all eternity on an hereditary basis to the agricultural collectives, the introduction of strict discipline and uniformity into the educational system, the development of a bureaucracy of great strength, and the governing of Russia "by speeches from the throne." Mr. Eastman seems to have a temperamental dislike for organisation, bureaucracy and leadership; and he does not attempt to explain how they can be dispensed with in a complex technological civilisation. Above all, he deplores the passing of Lenin's former associates as a result of the trials; and he ascribes the conversion of Liberal intellectuals (including the Webbs, Professor Laski and Maxim Gorky) to the support of the Soviet regime as a consequence of its having abandoned all attempts at establishing true socialism. His pamphlet is a much more powerful document than the *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.* by Andre Gide (now published in English by Martin Secker & Warburg under the title, *Back from the U.S.S.R.*) which attracted an undue amount of attention both in France and in England.

The intolerance of the Soviet Government is partly responsible for the production of such excessively uncritical and excessively critical writings as these by Messrs. Sloan and Eastman.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

THE TWILIGHT OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY. By an American Resident. 44 pp. (Secker & Warburg. 1s.)

Reflections of an American resident in London occasioned by the abdication and coronation.

WE OR THEY: TWO WORLDS IN CONFLICT. By HAMILTON F. ARMSTRONG. 114 pp. (Macmillan. 3s. 6d.)

An extremely interesting discussion, by the editor of the American *Foreign Affairs*, of dictatorship and democracy, the two worlds which he sees in conflict.

OLIVER CROMWELL AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE. By ERNEST BARKER. 106 pp. (Cambridge Press. 3s. 6d.)

This little book originated in a lecture given in Berlin.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE THE PEACE TREATIES. By E. H. CARR. 285 pp. (Macmillan. 6s.)

A chronological account of international relations since 1920 by the Professor of International Politics in the University of Wales.

DEFENCE OF MADRID. By GEOFFREY COX. 221 pp. (Gollancz. 2s. 6d.)

An eye-witness account by the *News Chronicle* correspondent.

THE SPANISH PLOT. By E. N. DZELEPY. With a preface by PERTINAX. 157 pp. (King. 6s.)

The book which is translated from the French is by a well-known writer on international affairs; in it he discusses the strands of high international policy behind the Spanish civil war.

HITLER'S CONSPIRACY AGAINST PEACE. By S. ERCKNER. 288 pp. (Gollancz. 6s.)

The author, said to be a former Staff Officer in the German army writing under a pseudonym, exposes Hitler's aims to be world conquest.

CHRISTIANITY, COMMUNISM AND THE IDEAL SOCIETY. By JAMES FEIBLEMAN. 419 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.)

A philosophical argument directed to proving that the ideal society must contain something which can be contributed both by communism and Christianity.

THE POST-WAR HISTORY OF THE BRITISH WORKING CLASS, 1918-1937. By ALLEN HUTT. 320 pp. (Gollancz. 6s.)

A chronological narrative of events.

CWMARDY. By LEWIS JONES. 310 pp. (Lawrence & Wishart. 7s. 6d.)

A novel dealing with a Welsh mining village.

INDIAN ADMINISTRATION. By G. N. JOSHI. 316 pp. (Macmillan. 6s.)

A text-book for students by the Professor of Law in the Government Law College, Bombay.

SELECTED WORKS OF V. I. LENIN. Vol. VIII. 460 pp. (Lawrence and Wishart. 5s.)

This volume covers the period of war communism, 1918 to 1920.

THE CURSE OF CREDIT. By BARON R. A. DE LYNDEN. 254 pp. (Longmans. 10s. 6d.)

An attack upon the credit system and the creation of "credit-money."

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THE WHITE SAHIBS IN INDIA. By REGINALD REYNOLDS. 410 pp. (*Secker & Warburg*. 12s. 6d.)

The book covers the history of the last 300 years. Jawaharlal Nehru contributes a preface.

AFRICA AND WORLD PEACE. By GEORGE PADMORE. 285 pp. (*Secker and Warburg*. 7s. 6d.)

An analysis of imperialism in Africa both before and since the war. Sir Stafford Cripps contributes a foreword.

INDIA'S BALANCE OF INDEBTEDNESS. By Y. S. PANDIT. 210 pp. (*Allen and Unwin*. 10s. 6d.)

An inductive study of India's balance of indebtedness between 1898 and 1913.

HINDU CUSTOMS AND THEIR ORIGINS. By STANLEY RICE. 219 pp. (*Allen & Unwin*. 7s. 6d.)

The author is a retired Civil Servant who was subsequently a member of the Government in Baroda. The Gaekwar contributes a foreword.

VOLUNTEER IN SPAIN. By JOHN SOMMERFIELD. 159 pp. (*Lawrence and Wishart*. 2s. 6d.)

The author is a novelist and fought in the International Brigade.

THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN. 671 pp. (*Lawrence & Wishart*. 8s. 6d.)

The volume has been prepared by the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. and contains a chapter on the fulfilment of the plan by V. I. Mezhlauk, Chairman of the State Planning Commission.

STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By JACOB VINER. 650 pp. (*Allen & Unwin*. 18s.)

The author is Professor of Economics in the University of Chicago.

WAR IN SPAIN. By F. WHITE. 88 pp. (*Longmans*. 1s. 6d.)

A narrative of events down to the early months of 1937.

EUROPE LOOKS TOWARDS AMERICA

By SIR ARTHUR SALTER

IT WAS once present during a debate on questions of economic policy in the House of Representatives in Washington. I had recently taken part in a long series of negotiations at Geneva on similar questions, mainly between delegates of European countries, though American representatives, or at least representative Americans, had taken part in some of them; and I was puzzled by a strange difference of atmosphere which I could not at first define. Gradually I realised that it was due to something that everyone took so much for granted as to be quite unconscious of it. At Geneva the speakers had defended policies of economic nationalism and trade impediments of every kind imposed by their respective countries, had maintained their right to continue or increase them, had been very unaccommodating as to any suggestions for a give and take policy or the subordination of national policy to a wider world interest; amid many good intentions and some international good will, there was much also of the opposite. But of one fact no delegate at Geneva was for a moment unconscious. He was perpetually aware of the profound repercussions of what his own country was doing on the economic fortunes of others, as he was of the effect of their policy on the national interests he was himself defending. In Washington it was just this which—to a European observer—was so strikingly absent. The range of the economy directly affected by Washington action was so great, most of the countries that would be indirectly affected seemed so remote, that the debate proceeded almost as if in a world apart. There was at once less conscious national selfishness and at the same time less consciousness—indeed hardly any—of

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the interests of other countries. Realising, as no one who had come from Geneva could fail to realise, the profound impact of American policies upon every quarter of the globe, I found an image coming to my mind of a great animal of the forest crashing his way through, crushing or pushing aside a host of forest life of whose very existence it was unaware, not ill-intentioned but only unconscious.

This is so often the dominant note of a European's impression of American policy that I will give two specific illustrations. In October, 1933, President Roosevelt wished to stimulate American recovery by raising prices. He chose to do so by deliberately raising the dollar price of gold. Other countries had previously depreciated their currencies in terms of gold, sometimes because they could not help it, sometimes with the hope of snatching a competitive trade advantage for their exports. President Roosevelt's action was completely different in its origin and its motives. A favourable balance of payments and great gold reserves made the dollar impregnable; the action was therefore deliberate, not due to *force majeure*. But it was certainly not inspired by a desire to obtain an unfair advantage in the foreign markets. It was designed for an internal purpose; its external effects were, in the mind of the initiator, secondary and incidental. Gold, however, as the basis of most countries' currencies, was the most international thing in the world. In changing its price the President was using an essentially international instrument for a domestic purpose. More than that, since the internal economy of the U.S.A. is so much greater than its external economy, he was using an instrument geared the wrong way; a great (and unintended) external effect was required to secure a lesser effect of the kind intended. The increase of American prices, which could have been secured by other means, though perhaps more

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slowly, was obtained at the cost of inflicting a new deflation on all the countries (such as France, Belgium, Holland, or Switzerland) whose currencies were linked at fixed ratios to gold. All these countries had, in the preceding six months, shown an increased economic activity; all of them, in the succeeding six months, showed a decline.

It would be outside the scope of this article to discuss the technical questions involved. I only mention this action as an instance of the profound, and unintended, repercussions upon other countries of American policy designed for domestic purposes. My second illustration enforces the point even more strikingly. While gold was the currency of most countries, silver fulfilled this function for China. For that great country of 400 million people, the price of silver was therefore of fundamental importance. For other countries it was merely a commodity of very little economic significance; it was, for example, for the U.S.A. a negligible item in the general economy of the country—perhaps less important, economically, than the production of peanuts. But its production happened to be associated with certain interests of some political importance. The price of silver was therefore raised. There was certainly no intention or desire to injure the interests of China. These interests were not attacked, they were simply ignored. China was thrust into a new depression, profoundly affecting the lives of hundreds of millions, as the incidental and unintended consequence of a policy of altogether minor importance in the general economy of the U.S.A.

These two examples happen to concern action which involved disaster to other countries; but repercussions of the opposite kind are equally important. When increased prosperity comes to America, however originated, it radiates beneficially throughout the world, and the unintended benefits are then as great as in other cases are the unintended losses.

II

These illustrations will perhaps serve as well as any others to indicate the fundamental factor in the relations between the U.S.A. and the rest of the world; a combination of isolationism in outlook with a profound, unavoidable, unintended influence in fact upon the fortunes, the policies and ideas of other countries.

It will be well, before we consider some of the problems of current policy, to note briefly the principal causes of this paradoxical combination.

In the first place, the U.S.A. comprise a greater total of developed national resources, accumulated wealth and industrial capacity than is, or ever has been, within a single and continuous section of the globe and a single government. This gives at least a potential influence over world affairs that is, beyond question, greater than that of any other country.

This strength is, moreover, combined with a degree of potential self-sufficiency which is without equal and indeed, with perhaps two exceptions, without comparison. This does not indeed mean that America's economic system is exempt from external influences; the world depression was a sufficient disproof of that. But it does mean that, at a considerable cost and with great loss in the transition, America could in time conceivably make herself an almost self-contained economy, with no more than a fringe of imports which could be secured without great risk of complication or involvement in the troubles of others.

Even more important is the fact that America is, beyond all comparison, militarily the least vulnerable of all countries. She has neither the danger which small but enviable resources bring to the smaller countries of Europe; or the weakness that makes China a continual temptation to Japan; or the dependence upon imports and the responsibilities of a

dispersed and coveted Empire that constitutes the perpetual menace of Great Britain; or the proximity of great armed Powers which threatens France and even Russia; or the pressure of a growing population with inadequate domestic resources which gives a sense of suffocation to Italy, Japan and Germany, and tempts them to hazardous ventures. No country has, or ever has had, anything approaching the immunity from external aggression that America now enjoys.

To these physical conditions must be added all that comes from America's racial and historical origins. She inherits the blood and traditions of European civilisation, and has founded her own political system partly upon the experience, partly upon reaction from the experience, of European states. The result has been an experiment in federalism, which is one of the greatest contributions in history to the art or science of government, based upon a profound belief in the rule of law and a profound distrust of systems of autocracy.

III

The principal political ideas of America are not mainly the result of either race or individual qualities, but of these physical conditions and historical origins and experience.

The American is pacific, non-imperialistic, internationally benevolent and philanthropic, and isolationist, as perhaps most men would be if they were equally rich in natural resources, equally secure from external danger, and fortunate enough to have started their national history with a stable and, in its main framework, an appropriate, political constitution.

Conscious, moreover, of his happier fortune, he is naturally inclined to pursue a policy of isolation in proportion as the misfortunes and dangers of other countries increase. Other countries which would benefit from American partici-

pation in world affairs, and Americans who would like their country to exercise an influence proportionate to its strength may regret this. But it is useless either to cavil or to exaggerate the legitimate arguments that may be urged against isolationism.

An Englishman, who considers the interacting forces, and changing policy, of his own country, even though it is separated from the Continent by twenty miles and not three thousand, and is dependent upon external resources and responsible for the maintenance of a dispersed Empire as America is not, has no excuse for not understanding why America stands aloof from a world system, and draws further away when her participation is most needed. It is true that America would benefit by the maintenance of peace and cannot secure exemption from the economic consequences of another great war. But it does not follow necessarily that it would be worth her while, in order to diminish the danger of war, to accept responsibilities which would involve her participation if war comes. It is true that America was drawn into the last war. But it does not follow that she could not, by deliberate policy, enable herself to stand out of the next one. The case against isolationism, which is nevertheless a strong one, is based upon other grounds. In particular, it is not because her involvement in a war is in any case inevitable that America can be expected to take risks to prevent it. Rather, it is because she is at once so strong and so invulnerable that she could take action which might be decisive in averting war, while still remaining free, if war came, to decide either to participate or to stay out.

IV

The general considerations just set out indicate at once the decisive potential influence of America in world affairs and the limiting conditions of any practicable policy designed

to arrest at an early stage any movement towards a dangerous crisis in the international situation.

On any near and narrow view of her interests America may well be inclined, and probably a majority of her people are now inclined, to subordinate almost every other consideration to a desire to avoid entanglement.

On a wider view, however, there are powerful reasons which may, in time—if time is allowed—modify this position. Even though America can “contract out” in the sense that she can keep out of actual participation in another great war, she certainly cannot isolate herself from the consequences. She suffered with the rest of the world (and even more than most countries) from the effects of the world depression, of which the principal causes are certainly to be ascribed to the last great war. A particularly foolish legend has in recent years been circulated to the effect that her economic troubles during the depression were due to the fact that she participated in the war. This is a complete illusion. Her troubles were due not to the fact that she participated but to the fact that there was a war. The war created forces which strained, and overstrained, the economic and financial system on which the fortunes of every country depend. Those who fought, and those who did not, have equally suffered from these recent consequences—a Switzerland, for example, as much as a Belgium. Even countries, therefore, which contemplate standing out of another war, if it should come, have a strong inducement (though, of course, it is not so strong as that of countries which would necessarily be combatants) to exert their influence in favour of the forces that make for peace. And, as already suggested, America’s strength and natural invulnerability are so exceptional that she could exercise a great, and perhaps decisive, influence without substantially increasing her risks of being involved against her wish in war, if it comes.

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The prospect of a recurrence of economic dislocation is not, however, the only, and perhaps not the principal reason for modifying a purely isolationist policy.

The profound underlying force which determined America's policy before was her sympathy with the side which on the whole seemed to represent the cause of freedom against militant autocracy. As events are now developing, a similar issue becomes even clearer; and if America realises, as she may, that she can exercise a decisive influence in such a way as to turn the scales in favour both of freedom and of peace, she may decide that it is worth taking the not very great risk involved in doing so, and indeed that, on a balance of risks, this is to her national advantage.

This consideration is likely to be reinforced in time by another, as she becomes more conscious of the responsibility that properly attaches to her great position in the world. Perhaps the most distinctive and constructive idea of our age is that all wealth, and all power, whether in private or public hands, involves a corresponding responsibility for its use in the public interest. America's power is such that it must determine the fate of the world; and every opportunity is in some measure an obligation.

V

Let us then enquire along what lines, under these conditions, it is reasonable to hope that America's influence may develop.

It will be convenient in doing so to take first a broad view of the international situation, extending, say, a decade back and forward, and then to look more closely at the problem of the moment.

Since the war a large part of the world has been engaged in trying to construct an elementary form of world government, designed to control the issues directly related to the

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problem of maintaining peace. Till a few years ago this attempt was apparently proceeding gradually towards a successful result. More recently, the ground gained has been lost. It may be regained, whether or not with some help from America. Let us first, therefore, consider in what form it might be reasonable to expect America's co-operation in a period in which Europe was itself making progress in building up some form of collective system.

In the early years after the war, when this progress was being made, many illusions were entertained. It was natural to hope that America's decision not to join the League of Nations, determined by so narrow a margin and partly as a result of a series of accidents, might be reversed. It is, however, very doubtful, in the light of the subsequent development of American public opinion, whether full membership, even if accepted, could have been maintained. In any view of the future—even if European conditions for American participation become again as favourable as they were before 1931—it will be prudent to make the following assumptions as to the limits that will be set by American traditions and public opinion: that America will not accept the political conditions of the League of Nations; will not bind herself beforehand to accept the opinion of other nations, however unanimous, as to the merits of any future dispute; will not undertake to participate in any action to restrain or penalise an aggressor, even if she should decide when the time comes who is the aggressor, and in doing so, is in agreement with the rest of the world. I believe that most of those who have studied American opinion closely will realise that these are necessary assumptions, but that within the limits so set a determined President could, at an appropriate time and under favourable conditions, secure freedom to act with an assurance of public support. The most promising line of action under these conditions is not

difficult to discern. It would consist in resuming, and somewhat developing, the policy pursued before the set-back of the last few years. The Kellogg Pact, to which not only America but the countries which have recently left the League remain signatories, proscribes the use of war as an instrument of national policy. America could interpret this, as she has done on more than one occasion in the past, as giving not only a principle by which she will guide her own policy, but a criterion by which she will form her opinion as to the policy of others; and make it clear that she intends to pursue this course steadily and consistently in future. She could next make a regular practice of consulting other signatories of the Kellogg Pact when an actual threat of war, or war itself, occurs before forming her own opinion. This would leave her absolutely free to form her own judgment, even if it differed from that of other countries, but would give the world the assurance that her opinion was at least formed after a full knowledge of the facts. It would not involve her in an obligation to take any positive action whatever judgment she formed; and the consultation could take place in such a way as not to involve membership of the League, or even formal relationship with it, while still leaving League members free to utilize their own organisation. In addition, she could announce beforehand that, if and when she herself came to the conclusion that a given country had resorted to war in plain and flagrant breach of its engagements under the Kellogg Pact, America, even though unwilling to participate in any action to restrain the aggressor, would at least refrain from impeding by diplomatic protests the collective effort of other countries. It is indeed probable that no such impediment would be imposed, but probability is not enough. The uncertainty might at any time be a decisive factor (as it has been) in preventing countries desiring to take collective action from being able to combine

in the difficult and hazardous economic measures necessary for the purpose. Lastly—and this is perhaps the point upon which the issue will turn—it would be highly desirable to secure some modification of the “neutrality” legislation which would give the Executive greater discretion, subject to agreement by Congress at the earliest opportunity, as to the application of the measures for prohibiting supplies to combatants. There has been much recent evidence of a widespread conviction in America that such a modification is required.

VI

In any period in which the countries which still desire a collective peace system are actively directing their policy to this end, with some apparent prospect of success, action by America along the lines indicated in the preceding paragraph might again become practicable and would probably in that case be of decisive effect in helping their efforts. It will be said, however, that that paragraph has been written as if we were now in the situation of six years ago, and that the situation being now in fact incomparably worse, America cannot be expected to pursue this policy.

This is true. The first fundamental truth to realize is that the more successful European countries are in solving their own problems the more co-operation they may get from America in the task, and that the further they are from this, the stronger will be the forces making for American isolation.

If Europe solves four-fifths of its problems, American participation is likely to be forthcoming to crown its efforts. If Europe is divided into two or more groups of not very unequal strength, with a grave danger of war between them, America will draw back and the extent of any practicable co-operation will be much more limited.

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This is the situation now. I thought it well to enquire first what kind of co-operation might be hoped for in conjunction with the rebuilding of a collective system because I remain convinced that some system embodying this principle is indispensable for the establishment of peace on a stable and permanent basis. But co-operation must now start much further back than the period reached six years ago, and must for the time take a different form. What should this be?

In political action the opportunities for co-operation are likely for the present to be rare and limited in scope. In dealing with the problems of the Far Eastern crisis, parallel action on some points may be arranged, and the development of that crisis may open out further possibilities. This, however, is doubtful, and in European affairs political action of any kind by America is not in present circumstances to be expected.

There is one line, and one line only, upon which co-operation is likely to be practicable on a considerable scale, and that is in economic and financial policy. It is evident that both the President and Mr. Cordell Hull would like to do something to ease the world tension. It is equally evident, that whatever they might personally wish, their power to exercise an influence by direct political action is restricted, indeed, practically annihilated, by the strong isolationist and neutralist opinion in Congress and the country. This in part accounts for the importance which both President and Secretary of State attach to the extension of the trade agreements for the reduction of tariffs to other countries, in particular Great Britain. But, in addition, Mr. Cordell Hull has throughout his term of office been patiently and with great skill directing his main efforts to removing the impediments to international trade, partly because this represents his life-long economic convictions,

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and partly because he regards (perhaps even to a point of exaggeration) economic frictions as the root cause of all political tensions.

It is this situation which gives their importance and urgency to the Anglo-American trade negotiations, which are likely to be renewed during this autumn and winter. The direct and immediate economic consequences of an agreement might be—probably would be—comparatively modest. But the importance of the political consequences can scarcely be exaggerated. This does not mean that America would be drawn from economic negotiations into political entanglements. She will certainly keep herself completely free to resume, or not to resume, the line of policy which she was pursuing during Mr. Stimson's tenure of office. But even without any such sequence, the effect on the general international situation of an extended economic co-operation with America would be very great. An agreement between America and Great Britain would be likely to be followed, or accompanied, by further co-operation with France.

The tripartite declaration in relation to the franc would form the basis of increasing collaboration in both financial and economic policy, which would naturally extend to the countries most nearly associated with them, the "Sterling" area on the one hand and such countries as Switzerland and Czecho-Slovakia on the other.

A successful development of this kind might transform the whole political situation. For in the present balance of forces and tendencies in Europe, the visible and successful collaboration of the free countries of the Continent with each other, the U.S.A. and Great Britain in increasing their reciprocal trade, and in consequence their economic strength, would be a factor of incalculable value which would facilitate the task of their diplomacy in every sphere.

VII

The international situation, with the danger to peace which it involves, of course dominates every issue at this moment, and it has determined the perspective of this article. Limits of space forbid more than a brief reminder that, even if the danger to peace were removed, the collaboration of America in concerted action to reduce the risks of a recurrence of a world depression would be essential. But that is a theme which requires treatment on a more extended scale than is now possible.

It will be well to conclude with an observation as to the special position of Great Britain in relation to America. Her geographical position, her historic and racial relationship, her common language and analogous traditions make her obviously the principal medium of communication between Europe and the Western Republic. Her close and inescapable connection with Europe constitutes half the problem of her policy; her position as the centre of a world sea Empire, facing across the Atlantic, constitutes the other half. It follows from the first that she shares with France the principal role in building up a European system; and from the second that the establishment of cordial collaboration with America (linked perhaps with the European effort through a development of the principles of the Kellogg Pact) is the other, and not less important, necessity of her policy. This collaboration needs infinite skill and patience upon both sides; but the reward of success is greater than any other conceivable policy could offer. For the two great English-speaking political entities, the British Commonwealth of Nations, comprising with its self-governing and dependent communities, a greater number of human beings that are, or ever have been, brought within a single sovereignty, and the Federal Republic, comprising an unequalled and unprecedented total of economic resources, between them possess

a power and influence of incomparable strength. If the appropriate form and method of collaboration between them, and with other countries, could be found, the problem of reducing the economic and political tensions that now endanger peace, and re-establishing the defences against war, would at once become soluble.

The resources of both America and Great Britain are still growing, and both countries have been impelled by the danger of the international situation to devote a larger proportion of these resources to military preparations. Neither has, however, yet found for itself a clear answer to the question; for what purpose, and in support of what policy, should this national strength be used? It is not impossible that a common answer can be found by both countries which is compatible with their respective interests and traditions, and with collaboration between them. The crucial point is this: Both countries have, with others, subscribed to the principle that war should not be used as an instrument of national policy. Is this principle to be reduced to a nullity by a policy of complete neutrality, unconditional and indiscriminating? Or will that policy be so qualified as to enable the influence of the two countries, within the limits set by their respective traditions and public opinion, to be effectively used to discourage and prevent aggressive policy and action when they threaten the peace of the world?

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By RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL

AS this article is being written, the Japanese army has swept the Chinese forces out of the Peiping Tientsin area, while the navy has carried hostilities into Shanghai. Confronted by a violation of treaties and a threat to American interests even more serious than in 1931, the Roosevelt administration has followed a policy which, superficially at least, stands in marked contrast to that followed by the United States six years ago. During the Manchurian crisis Secretary Stimson addressed nine communications urging the parties not to violate their obligations under the Anti-War Pact—five of which were addressed to the Japanese government alone. On several occasions Secretary Stimson co-operated openly with the efforts of the League of Nations in composing the dispute. On January 7, 1932, he laid down the non-recognition doctrine in a note to China and Japan declaring that the United States did not intend to recognize any situation or agreement brought about by means contrary to the Pact of Paris. After vainly endeavouring to induce the British government to join the United States in invoking the Nine-Power Treaty, Secretary Stimson sent his letter of February 23, 1932, to Senator Borah which, after referring to the Washington Conference, said: "The willingness of the American government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam and the Philippines without further fortification, was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine-Power Treaty"—which Japan had repudiated. Alone among the Great Powers, the United States concentrated its entire fleet in the Pacific. In his recent book, *The Far Eastern Crisis*, Mr. Stimson

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implies that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii removed the danger of a Japanese attack against the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. Generally during this period the United States took a strong stand on behalf of the Washington treaties and against Japanese expansion. Owing to the reluctance of Britain and France to co-operate fully with the United States, and to the unwillingness of the Hoover administration to support its protests with economic or military sanctions, Japan succeeded in its immediate objective, namely, the establishment of the puppet state of Manchoukuo.

In contrast, the Roosevelt administration to-day has not invoked any treaty nor made any public protests to Japan against its operations in North China. It has not, openly at least, consulted with Britain or co-operated with any group of Powers in attempting to protect its own nationals or mediate between the two parties. In fact, however, America and Britain have worked together more closely in the present Far Eastern crisis than at any other time in recent years. They have followed "parallel" policies of urging the parties to compose their differences peacefully. For reasons of domestic politics, the Roosevelt administration has not been willing openly to associate itself with Britain in a co-operative policy. But neither government has wished to go further than the other in outright intervention, and a basis for stronger co-operation in the future seems to have been laid.

Through the American Ambassadors in Tokyo and Peiping, and through almost daily conferences with the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors in Washington, Secretary Hull has continued to lend his influence on behalf of peace. On July 12 a State Department communiqué declared that both the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors had been informed that "armed conflict between Japan and China would be a great blow to the cause of peace and world progress." Four days later Secretary Hull issued a statement

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laying down 14 "pillars of peace," reiterating, among other things, the principles of sanctity of treaties, economic recovery and reduction of armaments, but omitting the use of the word "neutrality." This statement was circulated to every capital in the world, and on August 14 the replies of 62 nations were published. Although the pronouncement did not mention the Orient, Secretary Hull apparently desired to mobilize world opinion in this indirect way against Japan. But the reception in the press to this rather oblique approach was disappointing. Meanwhile, during the present crisis, the Asiatic fleet has indefinitely postponed its projected trip to Japan; the administration has announced its intention of laying down two new battleships; it has also concluded a new trade agreement with Soviet Russia, while not opposing Soviet negotiations for the construction of several battleships by American shipbuilding companies.

Nevertheless, in view of the breakdown of the Stimson policy, it is popular to say that the United States has decided to give a free hand to Japanese aggression by "withdrawal" from the Pacific. This statement may be true in the limited sense that the United States does not intend to use military force to uphold the Washington treaties or to defend the independence of China. In this respect, the policy of the United States remains substantially what it was at the time of the Boxer movement in 1901, when Secretary of State Hay wrote: "We are not at present prepared to attempt singly, or in concert with other Powers, to enforce" our views with respect to the Orient "by any demonstration which could present a character of hostility to any other Power." But in its wider implications the statement is by no means correct. For the Roosevelt administration is following three fundamental policies which eventually should work against Japanese domination of Asia in favour of the principles established at the Washington Conference.

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The first of these policies is the reiteration of the validity of the Washington treaties and the open refusal to acquiesce in Japanese pretensions. Following the famous statement of the Tokyo Foreign Office spokesman on April 17, 1934, claiming for Japan the right to act single-handedly in maintaining "peace and order in Eastern Asia," the United States in a diplomatic note declared: "In the opinion of the American people and the American government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavour to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, the obligations, and legitimate interests of other sovereign states"—an indirect reference to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Anti-War Pact.

A second pronouncement was made by Secretary Hull on December 5, 1935, at the time of the "autonomy" movement in North China. In referring to this movement, Secretary Hull again declared that the United States adhered to the provisions of the treaties to which it was a party and continued to "bespeak respect" for these treaties by other Powers. This statement followed conferences between Under-Secretary of State Phillips and Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador. On the same day Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Minister, made a similar declaration.

A third statement which, while not official, was of political importance, was made in the Senate on February 10, 1936, by Key Pittman, head of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee. In the course of this statement he quoted Vice-Admiral Takahashi, Commander of the Japanese fleet, to the effect that unless the United States renounced its naval policy aimed at the expansion and protection of its foreign trade, Japan would be forced to extend the cruising radius of its fleet to the Dutch East Indies and establish "footholds" in the mandated South Sea Islands. "Never in the history of modern times has such an undiplomatic, arrogant

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and impertinent statement been volunteered by one holding such a position," said Senator Pittman. "Of course, Congress will not be bulldozed into the abandonment of national defence, the protection of our legitimate foreign trade, or our commerce with China. . ."

While during the present crisis the United States has not invoked any specific treaty, the Roosevelt administration has pointedly refused to acknowledge Japan's claim that the Nine-Power Treaty is dead. It has kept the record clear as a basis for possible action in the future. Washington has declined to consider any agreement admitting Japan's claim to naval parity; it has rejected the British suggestion that the non-fortification provisions of the Washington Naval Treaty continue in force despite the termination of that treaty last December. It has declined to recognize Manchoukuo, while remaining cool to the proposal of Premier Lyons of Australia for a Pacific pact, and to former Foreign Minister Arita's suggestion for bilateral conversations relative to the issues raised by the lapse of the Washington Naval Treaty.

The second fundamental policy of the Roosevelt administration has been military and naval preparedness. At the time when Secretary Stimson made his protest against the Japanese invasion of Manchoukuo the American navy had dropped considerably below the 5:5:3 ratio established for battleships by the Washington Conference. The Roosevelt administration has taken steps to build up the navy and to maintain a decided superiority over Japan. The naval appropriations of the United States have increased from 297 million dollars in 1933-4 to 516 million appropriated for 1937-8, an increase of nearly 100 per cent. during five years. Also showing vast increases, Japan to-day is expending about half of its budget upon its army and navy. But Japanese military appropriations constitute only about one-

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fourth of those being made by the United States, and the latter country is devoting only about 13 per cent. of its budget for military purposes. Although it is probable that Japan gets more for its money than does the United States, these figures demonstrate the colossal financial superiority of the United States, actual and potential.

In terms of tonnage, the American navy to-day consists of 113 under-age vessels of a total of 869,230 tons, in comparison with Japan, which has a total of 171 vessels of a tonnage of 708,158. The United States, however, has a vast superiority in over-age vessels, and it plans to build 89 new vessels (including four modern battleships) of a tonnage of about 400,000, in comparison with Japan, whose known replacement programme consists only of 23 ships of a total of 79,000 tons. The American navy believes, however, that Japan has recently adopted a secret five-year replenishment programme. It cannot learn the details of this programme, although the press reports rumours of new battleships of 50,000 tons, which would make obsolete the types laid down in the Washington treaties. The secrecy of the Japanese admiralty, even more than its refusal to accept the 14-inch gun limitation proposed at London, has aroused a certain bitterness in Washington. These incidents give a foretaste of the type of unrestricted naval rivalry which may develop despite the limited resources of Japan.

In the field of aviation the United States is steadily strengthening its position in the Pacific. Under the Wilcox Act air bases may be erected at places designated by the War Department; the Panama and Hawaii naval bases are being strengthened and the desirability of building a similar base in the Aleutian Islands is being discussed. During the past three years the Pan American Airways has installed a trans-Pacific airline with the aid of facilities extended by the United States government. Thus the Navy Department

granted this company permission to construct landing-fields at Guam, Midway and Wake Island. Obviously this airline will be of military value in time of war. Moreover, shortly after the termination of the Washington Naval Treaty the American government began to establish a field base suitable for military aircraft and airboats, on tiny Howland Island, lying south-west of Hawaii. By means of these developments the United States will soon be able to maintain a great aerial defence wall stretching from Alaska down to Howland Island which will meet the wall being built up by the British Empire upon bases resting at Singapore, Hong Kong, Port Darwin and Auckland. Last February, 12 naval patrol airboats flew in formation from San Diego to Hawaii, a distance of 2,650 miles. Experiments are now being made in the United States with the so-called railway take-off which if successful will increase the range of planes at least 2,000 miles. When one adds to these aviation developments the military preparations being made independently in the Philippine Commonwealth by General MacArthur, but useful nonetheless to the United States in the event of war, one can see the outlines of a new military policy. After the Washington Conference it was popular to say that even with the 5 : 3 navy, the United States single-handed could not operate successfully against Japan in Asiatic waters. But as a result of freedom to build fortifications and of the new possibilities of airpower, the situation to-day may have changed. Military experts are pointing out that by means of a great circle route from the Aleutian Islands an American fleet and aircraft carriers could operate from a base at Unalaska which would be well within 2,000 miles of Japan. If the American fleet could establish itself in the Russian harbour of Petropavlovsk, Japan might have to submit. Certainly the American fleet operating in connection with the British fleet from Singapore could from the strategic

standpoint quickly bring Japan to terms. The United States does not intend to use its military force in war against Japan. But the administration hopes that by means of this relentless pressure Japan will feel obliged gradually to modify its policies.

In the third place, United States government agencies have extended financial aid to the Nanking government which may have political implications. In 1933 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation extended a three-year credit of 50 million dollars to the Nanking government, ostensibly for the purchase of American wheat and cotton. About the same time the Department of Commerce co-operated with American aircraft firms in selecting American aviators who went to China to assist in training Chinese pilots. It is perhaps significant that the sale of American aircraft and accessories to China increased from \$138,000 in 1932 to more than \$6,000,000 in 1936. The damage done to China by the silver purchase policy of the United States was removed in May, 1936, when the Treasury made an agreement promising to make substantial purchases of silver from China while China in return is building up a reserve for currency stabilization purposes. On the very day (July 12) when Secretary Hull admonished Japan and China not to go to war, Dr. H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance, made a new agreement with Secretary Morgenthau under which the Chinese government purchases American gold with silver from the reserves of the Central Bank of China. A few days previously Dr. Kung obtained a five-year credit from the Export-Import Bank of Washington to finance the sale in China of 20 locomotives and other equipment. Although the fate of these arrangements is not clear while war continues in the Orient, their existence indicates the deep sympathy of the United States government for the Chinese republic.

In contrast to these three fundamental policies, the American Congress and general public are opposed to any

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policy which involves the risk of clashing with Japan. This point of view is held by a number of high officers in the General Staff of the Army; thus several years ago the War Department proposed that the American troops stationed in North China under the terms of the Boxer Protocol be withdrawn. During the present crisis several congressmen have repeated this request, so as to avoid becoming involved in the Far Eastern danger zone. The withdrawal of such troops lies within the President's prerogative. But he has not chosen to exercise it, partly out of a desire to protect the several thousand Americans in North China; but largely because such withdrawal would be interpreted as a complete surrender to Japanese pretensions.

The American Congress, however, has taken two steps indicating a desire to escape from involvement in the Orient. The first of these steps is the Philippine Independence Act of 1934. Under this act the Philippine Islands is to receive its independence in 1946. Until then they are to constitute a self-governing commonwealth under the sovereignty of the United States. The place of the old governor-general is now occupied by a high commissioner with vaguely-defined powers. The American Congress wishes to get rid of the Philippines because of a desire to erect a tariff wall against Philippine products now entering this country, and to remove a possible cause of conflict with Japan. For many years Philippine leaders have demanded complete independence, but now that it has been definitely pledged they are exhibiting grave apprehensions, at least in private, as to the future. At present the Philippines ships 80 per cent. of its exports to the United States, and buys 60 per cent. of its imports in this market—all duty-free. In 1946 Philippine products entering this country will have to pay full American duty, for last March President Quezon and Assistant Secretary Sayre jointly stated that preferential trade relations are to be

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terminated as quickly as possible in favour of a reciprocal trade agreement on a non-preferential basis. This means that if the United States reduces any of its duties on Philippine products, it must extend the advantage of such reduction to third parties generally. Such a reciprocity agreement will be of value to the Philippines only if the Islands are able to produce materials for the American market more cheaply than competitors. Unfortunately this is not the case as far as sugar is concerned, which produces nearly 58 per cent. of the total exports of the Islands, sold entirely in the United States. Cuba can produce sugar much more cheaply than the Philippines, and under historic treaty arrangements will receive a 20 per cent. preferential advantage in any duty reduced by reciprocity treaty with the Philippines. Unless the United States can guarantee a definite sugar quota to the Philippines, the Philippine sugar industry will be largely wiped out by independence. A reciprocity agreement reducing duties might preserve a large part of the American market in hemp and cordage and make possible a further increase in the export of copra at the expense of oils. But these gains will by no means compensate for the destruction of the Philippine sugar industry. Moreover, in view of the Japanese policy of expansion it is assumed in many circles that Japan will seize the Islands after the American flag is hauled down. For these reasons, Philippine leaders secretly hope that the date of granting independence will be indefinitely postponed and that they will be allowed to have virtually complete freedom in internal affairs while continuing to enjoy the protection of the American market and navy. Undoubtedly the military policy introduced by General MacArthur constitutes a step in this programme. While Congress and the State Department are determined to cut the ties if it is possible to do so, President Quezon has it within his power to create a situation within the Philippine

Commonwealth such as to make American withdrawal virtually out of the question by 1946. To-day, however, the United States has given up direct control of the administration of the Islands while remaining responsible for their defence. So long as the Commonwealth continues to exist disputes are bound to arise between the High Commissioner and the President of the Commonwealth. It is ironical that the Independence Act of 1934 has created a more dangerous position for the United States in the Philippines than existed when we had complete control.

The intention of Congress to withdraw from the Orient has been further evidenced by the neutrality legislation of 1935, 1936 and 1937. Under the present law an arms and loans embargo upon all belligerents automatically enters into effect when the President proclaims the existence of a state of war. Thereafter Americans cannot travel on belligerent vessels and American ships cannot be converted into armed merchantmen. The President, moreover, has discretion to prohibit American vessels from carrying any articles to belligerents and to allow the export of articles generally from the United States only after American title has been divested at the port of departure in accordance with the cash-and-carry principle. In enacting this law, Congress had a future European War undoubtedly in mind. In such a war, the Neutrality Act would operate to the advantage of Britain and France. These powers have large gold reserves, merchant marines and navies so they could take advantage of the cash-and-carry principle in contrast to the fascist dictatorships. But as far as the Orient is concerned the principles of the Neutrality Act play into the hands of Japan. Japan is virtually self-sufficient in munitions and will not be hurt by the American embargo; but China, still dependent upon outside supplies, will be injured. On the other hand, Japan will be allowed by the Neutrality Law to continue to buy cotton and oil in

the United States for cash, for the Chinese navy is too small to interfere with this trade. Defenders of the Act assert that even in the absence of these provisions China could not import arms from the United States because of a Japanese blockade. While to a certain extent this statement is true, arms might be shipped into China through Mongolia and French Indo-China. Moreover, under the old rules of neutrality China was responsible for determining whether it could succeed in escaping the clutches of the Japanese navy. Under the new Neutrality Law, the United States does not give China this chance. It accepts responsibility for cutting China off from this market at the very time that it is the victim of aggression. Thus our Neutrality Law imposes a penalty upon China and probably violates the implied obligations arising out of the Nine-Power Pact. American "realists"—and this includes many pacifists—defend this discrimination against China on the ground that the policy will keep the United States out of war. But it is doubtful whether the American people, who have always had a sense of justice, will long tolerate a policy which interferes with the trade of a country which cannot retaliate, such as China, but which allows a valuable trade in cotton and oil to continue with a powerful aggressor. The encouragement of Japanese aggression will eventually react upon the interests as well as the emotions of the American public. The situation could be rectified if Congress would give the President power to extend embargoes to raw materials. Should the President, however, embargo all trade with the Orient it would mean the loss of about half a billion dollars a year and the trade would probably be diverted to other competitors. This kind of an embargo policy, applied unilaterally, is unlikely to have any effect in arresting the course of war; while, far from removing the dangers of involving America, the law imposes upon the President alone

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the onerous responsibility of determining whether given hostilities constitute a "state of war" justifying the imposition of an embargo. The President realizes that to proclaim the existence of a state of war at a time when diplomatic relations are still being maintained between Tokyo and Nanking would doubtless make worse the crisis in the Orient and arouse the ire of the belligerents.

From the technical standpoint, the Neutrality Act does not constitute a complete barrier to co-operative action against Japan. If the European signatories of the Nine-Power Pact, together with the Soviet Union, would agree to apply an arms and shipping embargo against Japan, leaving China free to import from European markets in accordance with League of Nations principles, the President could co-operate to the extent of imposing an arms and shipping embargo upon both parties.

In view of the European situation, it is doubtful whether any League member to-day would be willing to go even so far as a shipping embargo against Japan; and owing to the confused state of American opinion, the administration in Washington will find it difficult to co-operate positively with other like-minded powers in the Pacific, while it is unable or unwilling to withdraw its troops from China, or surrender its economic interests there, or evacuate the Philippines. Probably it will therefore continue to follow the remaining course—of keeping the record clear and of building up its armed forces for the future. If existing tension in Europe increases, the danger in the Pacific will grow. But if, by a miracle, Britain should succeed in consolidating the European situation, then the United States would undoubtedly join with Britain and other powers in working for a new Washington Conference. There are no signs as yet that Japan would consider any such conference, but no one may predict what the future may bring forth.

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

By CHARLES BEARD

PROPHECY in the domain of politics is an ambiguous and hazardous employment. It relates to the future. What future? Ten years? Fifty years? One hundred years? Decisions are arbitrary. Prophecy calls for definitions, and definitions are always somewhat arbitrary. It assumes that all relevancies and contingencies are known, but wisdom and knowledge suggest that many of them are not even suspected. Yet the statesman and the student must, in the very nature of things, proceed in the belief that the coming consequences of present actions are in some measure calculable and predictable. Otherwise why act or attempt to think?

In respect of the time element, let us make it ten years. We are considering the prospects of American democracy during the span of 1937-1947. What lies beyond that horizon or at the world-end, we may leave to Professors of Eschatology. If Marcus Aurelius could have caught an exact vision of Joseph Stalin or Franklin D. Roosevelt, he would not have believed his own eyes. The degree of profitableness in prophecy seems to vary with the square of the distance.

With reference to definition, we may be a little less arbitrary. We may take "democracy in the United States" to mean the forms and methods of government now obtaining under state constitutions and the federal constitution. It involves government by pluralities or majorities under duly constituted provisions of existing law. It is easy to point out that in many respects the practices of party leaders and machines do not conform to the theory. It is equally easy to show that some constitutional provisions are not democratic

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at all, in the numerical sense of that term. For example, the federal constitution assigns two Senators to Nevada with 91,000 inhabitants and two Senators to New York with 15,500,000 inhabitants. This disparity savours of the rotten borough system which political philosophers in Great Britain now deem entirely undemocratic. But allowing for departures in practice and contradictions in law, we may speak of democracy in the United States as the prevailing constitutional system in accordance with which elections and government are carried on.

Under this system, government has been conducted for one hundred and fifty years, while democracy has been widened by extensions of the suffrage. Under this system the several crises in American life have been "weathered," and adjustments have been made by political methods, save in the case of the irrepressible conflict between the Union and the Confederacy, 1861-1865. Only once has there been an appeal to large-scale violence, the arbitrament of the sword. By general consent the fruits of that arbitrament were not altogether happy. Entirely apart from the bloodshed and human suffering of the conflict, its economic costs would have compensated every slave-owner many times over for his "property." If "necessary" in the economy of history, the Second American Revolution confirmed, rather than weakened, the American conviction that the adjustment and conquest of crises by the methods of political democracy are preferable to adjustment and conquest by the sword.

Viewing American democracy against this background and taking account of visible tempers and practices, there seems to be little reason for supposing that the democratic method will be abandoned in the proximate future for some other method of government. Two other methods, applied in other countries amid different economic and cultural traditions, have recently been tendered to the American

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people by enthusiastic disciples absolutely sure of their science and rightness—Bolshevism and Fascism. In the name of these closed systems, widespread propagandas have been carried on. Industrial workers have been invited to adopt the one, and the middle classes the other. Professional conservatives and professional patriots have displayed great alarm, and there have been some local disturbances. But if "objective relations and events" are evidences of reality, neither Bolshevism nor Fascism has made any substantial headway against the American constitutional system.

The appeal of these totalitarian systems to the American people, such as it may have been, appears to be diminishing rather than increasing, thus making the immediate prospects of democracy more secure. As for the attraction of Bolshevism, events in Russia have been and are disconcerting to exponents of the creed in the United States. The expulsion of Trotsky and the bitter war between the two factions of simon-pure Marxism could not fail to raise doubts among the faithful. How could a political party have an exact science of government and yet split wide open over the interpretation of the perfect Word—the right party line? At all event, the unity of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviks has been shattered. The exponents of adjustment by violence, as distinguished from adjustment by political methods, are divided into two camps and their hatred for one another exceeds, if possible, their hatred for plutocracy. The spectacle has not been appealing, even to those Americans who deplore the apparent wastes and futilities of campaigns and elections.

In addition, the scene in communist or socialist Russia has not been exactly edifying or encouraging to American Bolsheviks. That Russia has made enormous strides in great industry and agriculture, as compared with things under the Tsarist regime, may be conceded. But "the spring into freedom" promised by Engels and Marx has not so materialized

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as to sweep American industrial workers off their feet. And the sight of old Bolsheviks "shooting it out" among themselves in the most approved military manner has bewildered the orthodox Marxians who imagined that this kind of business was foreign to the true faith. For Bolshevism there remains only the Trotsky "solution": Socialism has failed in one country; *therefore*, world revolution will spring the works and carry us into the promised land. Confronted by the war between Stalinists and Trotskyites, invited by the latter to crusade for world revolution, American industrial workers seem to show less interest in Bolshevism as the years pass. They are painfully aware of bad spots in American economy and of police brutality in many cities, but they see little prospect for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in the formulas of Bolshevism. To this extent loyalty to democratic processes is strengthened.

On the other hand, the Fascist rose is fading. There have been and are middle-class Americans who talk proudly in their drawing-rooms about the need "for the strong man." Huge masses have been enlisted for lynching, vigilante, and Ku Klux parades and enterprises. In many communities terror, either lawless or under forms of law, reigns periodically. But sporadic terror is quite different from systematic, prolonged, nation-wide Fascist government by arbitrary violence. It is true that many Americans were at first attracted by Mussolini's Fascism. Thomas Lamont visited the Duce, arranged a Morgan loan, and spoke approving words about the "good things" Fascism had done in Italy. Nicholas Murray Butler called upon Mussolini and reported, with some effusion, that the dictator had saved Italy from bankruptcy and anarchy. That was early in the dawn of Fascism. So, too, there were Americans ready to applaud Hitler for "putting down communism, socialism, and anarchy." Had Hitler let the Jews alone, the applause might have been

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terrific, but American business men know something about the power of Jews in American finance and in the field of oral, written, and visual expression—radio, press, and movie; and are careful about losing the home market by loud talk abroad.

Time added to circumspection. Those Americans ready to cheer Fascism at the outset and to sneer at "the failure of democracy" began to have grave doubts as the nature of Fascism unfolded. They are no pacifists, but they find war and sabre-rattling disturbing to business. Although Mussolini and Hitler smashed trade unions and liquidated labour, they did not give capitalism that "free hand" so popular in capitalist circles in the United States. Hitler has certainly favoured monopoly capitalism, but among his arbitrary decrees, thoroughly Bolshevik in their arbitrary character, are innumerable orders which make New Deal measures look like Sunday school pleas. With Fascist dictators lunging and plunging about on the world stage, thundering and threatening, their American sympathisers show a tendency to forget their "services" in putting down "democratic anarchy," and to grow alarmed at the internal decrees and external menaces of Fascism. If compelled to choose between Fascism and Communism, the great majority of middle-class Americans would doubtless take Fascism, but this is far from saying that in present conditions Fascism is growing in popularity in the United States at the expense of democracy.

Indeed there are good grounds for thinking that Fascism as such cannot get a dangerous foothold in the United States. Doubtless the German Nazis are doing a lot of talking and back-stage parading in American cities. It is claimed that they number at least a million. Doubtless also Italian Fascists are at work underground as well as in public places. Doubtless millions of native Americans have a blood lust for Black Legions and other vigilante organisations. All that is unquestioned. But it is another thing to imagine

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any one of the groups getting possession of Washington and the forty-eight state capitals and erecting violence into a system on the ruins of constitutional government.

In the first place, the United States is huge in extent and is not overcrowded like Europe. Sheriffs may terrorise fruit and vegetable workers in California, without disturbing cotton spinners in New England. Only one who has motored and walked across the continent can have any realistic idea of its vastness, variety and regionalisms. When all due allowance is made for airplanes and the radio, these geographical stretches and variations exist, are impressive, and work against steam-roller uniformity. Five million people congregated in Boston to cheer a Hitler or Rust would leave 125,000,000 people scattered from New York to San Francisco only mildly disturbed, perhaps amused. There is in America, no Rome, no Berlin to march on. When the British seized and burnt the Capitol in 1815, the rest of the country was enraged but not seriously affected. Nor are Americans much given to marching. They like parades, to be sure, but they have not yet taken to the endless goose-stepping, wheeling and saluting for which the Italians and Germans show a positive frenzy. The ten or fifteen million American farmers and industrial workers who own cheap automobiles, prefer riding to marching. They would rather "pile the family into the old bus, step on it, and go places," than get flat feet pounding metal roads behind a *Fuehrer*. That seems to be a condition, not a theory, bearing on the prospects of democracy in the United States.

Nor do American "intellectuals" take to the copper-riveted *Weltanschauungen* of the tireless Germans and the effusive Italians. It may be that the Americans are "shallow" for refusing to take Marx or Spengler or Pareto or Hitler or Mussolini as having said the last word on everything (*Weltanschauung*). They may be "stupid" for muddling

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along with pragmatism, instrumentalism, eclecticism, and all the other purely relative expedients, instead of grasping and swallowing whole the closed systems which Continentals are fond of turning out and accepting as the word of God, Nature, Materialism, or the Duce. Speaking for myself, as I look upon events and personalities in Russia, Italy, and Germany, I am inclined to the view that Americans who reject all absolutes are not shallow or stupid for performing this act of salvation. But, of course, I may be shallow and stupid in passing this judgment.

However that may be, the fact remains that the kind of universal intellectual prostration required by Bolshevism and Fascism is decidedly foreign to American "intelligence." It is significant that the United States has produced no Marx, no Pareto, no Spengler, and that all such compass-boxing theories awaken only a mild interest and an amused scepticism in the United States. Europeans have explained it to their satisfaction by reference to our superficiality, our incapacity for profound study and thought. So be it. Whatever the interpretation, our wisdom or ignorance stands in the way of our accepting the totalitarian assumption of Omniscience. And to this extent it contributes to the continuance of the arguing, debating, never-settling-anything-finally methods of political democracy.

If we assume the soundness of the old theory, expounded by Harrington, Jefferson, and Daniel Webster, that democratic institutions rest at bottom on a wide diffusion of property and are incompatible with a high concentration of ownership, what of the prospects for democracy in the United States? Indisputable statistical studies do reveal an enormous concentration of wealth, and a tendency in that direction over recent years. Two questions arise at once: Has the concentration reached such a point or will it reach such a point within the next ten years as to produce a social

explosion? And, if it does reach that point, will the result be an abandonment of democratic institutions or drastic measures for socialisation or diffusion?

To the first question the answer of cold facts seems to be that, despite the concentration of wealth, there is still a wide diffusion of farm property, homes, and petty business enterprises. Statistics do not permit us to say positively whether concentration has reached the danger point. Farm tenancy is undoubtedly increasing. The areas of urban poverty are immense. Yet taking the country as a whole—farming districts, villages, and small towns, as well as industrial cities—the majority of the American people are far from proletarianised in the European sense. There is still a wide base of small property ownership. And it is improbable that the base will be so narrowed in the next ten years as to produce a social upheaval from below.

Should concentration rapidly approach a danger point, American democracy, to use Daniel Webster's formula, would have to work a diffusion of property or property would wrest the suffrage from democracy by force. The outcome of that contingency neither rationality nor calculation can forecast. It is a matter of intuitive insight into probabilities, whatever may be the factual features now brought into consideration.

If I correctly read the speeches of American politicians, the measures of the New Deal, and the thought of the majority, the problem presented by this contingency is widely understood in the United States, and decided, though blundering, efforts are now being made to slow down the concentration of wealth and work a more equal diffusion of income, if not ownership. This seems to be the fundamental line on which the Roosevelt administration is proceeding. Among the instrumentalities of the "line" are collective bargaining for labour to foster stability and enlarge buying power, the organisation of agriculture with similar ends in

view, various forms of social and old-age insurance, public employment for unemployed, public ownership of power on a large scale, government-managed currency, drastic control over the exploitive activities of finance capitalism, and projects for releasing the technological potentialities of industry. None of these measures have been carried very far. Some of them are still in the nature of blue-prints and hopes. Too much money has been borrowed. The tendency to impose burdens of taxation on consumption has been too evident. There has been confusion beyond description, arising out of interested opposition, incompetence, and uncertainty as to objectives. Yet the New Deal marks a break in the optimism of Coolidge and Hoover, which saw no perils in the concentration of wealth, imagined that the raw capitalism of 1896 could endure for ever, and made democracy synonymous with capitalism. Even if the Republicans return to power in 1941, it is not likely that they can reverse history and restore the normalcy of 1921. Hands have been put to the plough, and it is highly probable that some furrows will be ploughed towards the far horizon of time.

But there are two contingencies not yet taken into the reckoning. The first of them is another economic crisis. How far what is called recovery is due to the "normal upswing of the business cycle," to government spending, and to the buying of munitions and materials by the rearming nations of the earth, it is impossible to discover. Undoubtedly there has been a certain recovery since 1933. But six or eight million are still unemployed, and there is no way of knowing whether or when recovery, such as it is, will explode again. Could the Government of the United States, under the constitutional system, withstand another economic crash? On June 30, 1937, the national debt stood at \$36,425,000,000—an all time high. The deficit for the fiscal year was reported as \$2,707,000,000.

On their face, these figures look ominous enough, and no one should minimise their significance. Yet, large as they are, the Government of the United States is still in a relatively strong position. The interest rate on the debt has been lowered by refunding operations. In relation to the increase in capital values and wealth production, the national debt is not substantially out of line with the figures for 1930 or 1932. The Government has possession of an enormous gold stock—too enormous—and timid, frightened, avaricious or reckless bankers cannot pull that underpinning away from the Government, no matter what happens. The control of the Federal Reserve system over banking and currency and open-market operations has been materially strengthened and could be easily drawn more tightly in another emergency. No banker could do to the Federal Treasury what Morgan did to it in the second Cleveland administration. Given the temper of President Roosevelt and Congress, it is likely that whole sectors of the capitalist system would be socialised if another business depression sank into a general industrial collapse; and democratic processes would be employed in the socialisation. The conclusion under this head seems to be that the Government of the United States is strong enough, despite its debt, to pull through another economic collapse.

The second contingency, likewise incalculable, is a European or Oriental war. War and militarism have been traditionally regarded as the worst foes of democratic institutions. After studying the sedition legislation and punitive judicial processes developed during American participation in the World War, Mr. Charles E. Hughes declared that it was doubtful whether our constitutional system could survive another world war, even if victoriously waged. That participation provided opportunities for every natural-born fascist and financial racketeer to fasten himself upon the government and the community, to persecute and

oppress, to exploit and rob. When the fulness of the truth is actually known, it will make one of the blackest pages in American history. Despite all the palaver about "conscripting wealth," another war would be the occasion for enslaving able-bodied men for the army and the rest of the population for industry. In this uncertain world, that much seems reasonably certain.

This great fear, this feeling that democratic institutions will perish in another war accounts for a large measure of the support given to the Neutrality legislation in Congress. The sponsors of that legislation may be disappointed in their hopes, they may have chosen the wrong method, but they are profoundly moved by a desire to preserve democracy through keeping the United States out of European and Oriental wars. The revelations of Entente and Central Powers diplomacy from 1892 to 1914, the inquiries into the "neutrality" of the Wilson administration, the publication of the secret treaties, the munitions investigation, the examination of banker manipulations—all these things combined to convince members of Congress that immense national sacrifice must be made to keep America out of the next World War. Will their efforts be successful? I have no way of knowing, but it is my firm conviction that the United States can not prevent war in Europe and that if it participates in another general European war, no matter what the alleged pretexts or the alignment of powers may be, that participation will mark the end of democratic institutions in the United States. Some forms may survive, as of the Roman Republic, but the spirit and substance will be destroyed.

This conception of American policy, domestic and foreign, it is appropriate to recall, conforms to old and powerful traditions. When the United States was established, the Continent of Europe and the Orient were controlled by despotic rulers who made wars with the frivolity that

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characterises Hitler and Mussolini; and Great Britain was a narrow class State. The founders of the American republic believed that the geographical location, the natural resources, and the social composition of the country gave it a peculiar function in the economy of history. As George Washington said, Europe has a set of primary interests that are foreign to us. The essential truth of that proposition still stands.

Under Admiral Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, and Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States was manoeuvred, it is true, into an uncontinental rôle as "a world power" and under Woodrow Wilson it was temporarily transformed into a universal philanthropist. But with much twisting and turning, the American people are renewing the Washington tradition and repudiating both the Kiplingesque imperialism of Theodore Roosevelt and the universal philanthropy of Woodrow Wilson. In domestic affairs they are renewing the progressive tradition that was rudely shaken by the World War—a tradition that runs as far back as Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man* and *Agrarian Justice*.

They fear and suspect the internationalism of finance-capitalism almost as much as they dislike and distrust its counterpart—the international Bolshevism of Leon Trotsky. If their convictions on this score be condemned as provincial or nationalistic, they reply: From the point of view of whose interests? They would not be oblivious to the emergence of Hitler as an Atlantic Sea Power, but they are inclined to await the event rather than to anticipate it, as they watch Great Britain labouring to preserve her Continental and Mediterranean interests. Such, it seems to me, is the slowly maturing judgment of the majority in the United States, for weal or woe, with malice towards none and with a firm resolve not to be duped by another deluge of propaganda—right, left, or centre.

THE CONSTITUTION UNDER STRAIN

By HAROLD J. LASKI

I

EVERY constitution works in terms of a parallelogram of forces which determine its meaning at any given time. The American Constitution is no exception to this rule. The principles it embodies derive their meaning not from the words which express them, but from the meaning which the pressure of social forces in each age gives to the interpretation of those words. It is not, therefore, surprising that a period of economic crisis in the United States should have meant, also, a period of constitutional crisis. The problems themselves are not new; what is new is their range and intensity. What is new, also, is the speed of intellectual adjustment called for from men whose thought, for the most part, is set by old ways and old standards. To adapt a constitution to purposes the end of which is still only half-consciously formulated is always a difficult task. To adapt it when what is in issue is the fundamental purpose itself of the society governed by the constitution is to set out on a political adventure than which only revolution itself is more profound. That is the essential situation in the United States to-day. The real struggle over constitutional principles does not wholly conceal a deeper struggle over the economic configuration of American society.

It must never be forgotten that the men who made the constitution of 1787 were in no sense democrats. They feared and distrusted the masses. They sought, not merely to unite a nation within a frame of government; they sought also so to unite it that the owners of property would be safeguarded in their "rights" from invasion by the ignorant

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will of a turbulent democracy. The constitution was nothing so much as an effort to protect a creditor-class from the reckless determination of debtors and working-men to use the legislative power of numbers to the detriment of property. The class-consciousness of the Fathers was profound. They fully accepted the comfortable theory that the possession of property is the safest index to the possession of wisdom. They believed that the more fully they guaranteed its rights from invasion, the more amply they would secure the future of their country.

The nineteenth century gave that ideology deep roots in the American consciousness. It saw the growth of a nation with a higher standard of living, fuller opportunity for individual expansion, less consciousness of class-limitations, than any other society of the age. The resources of the United States seemed endless. The growth of its power was legendary. If there were occasional crises, industrial violence, the grim tragedy of civil war, proof, in 1917, that the United States was inescapably involved in the structure of world-capitalism, yet from each misadventure, the nation seemed, to its own people, to move upwards to a higher level. And since that upward movement was achieved under the ægis of the constitution, the principles this was taken to embody were held to be interwoven with the causes of national success.

Those principles, in part by the division of powers consecrated by the constitution itself, in part by judicial interpretation, in part, also, and perhaps mainly, because a new civilization rarely requires the habits of the positive state, were predominantly individualistic in character. They therefore gave to the "rights" of property a freedom from interference by law which, as Mr. Justice Holmes once remarked, seemed to assume that Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics* was an unwritten part of the constitution itself.

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As late as our own day, social legislation which had become part of the established habits of Western Europe was frowned upon by the Supreme Court. As always in society, the ideological outlook of its governing class was a half-century behind the facts in which they were involved. In a period when the free lands of the West were exhausted, when giant trusts had overwhelmingly replaced small commodity-production, when corporate organization had proceeded so far that ownership and power were no longer, in any major industry, convertible terms, the governing class of the United States thought the thoughts, and spoke the language, appropriate to a civilization in which none of these habits had become fundamental. Not only so. Because the society was governed by a written constitution, the lawyer's outlook was pivotal in the determination of its legal habits; and, for the most part, the last fifty years of American history had made the lawyers, as a social group, overwhelmingly parasitic upon big business. They were, in mental outlook, an annexe of Wall Street; and when they were elevated to the Bench in recognition of their success—success being mainly measured by the scale upon which big business employed them—they took to the courts, as Mr. Justice Miller has remarked, the mental habits through which their success in private practice had been achieved.

To all this, two other factors must be added. Because, until quite recently in American history, industry had been, as it were, the nation's politics, political parties lived almost wholly within the framework of the ideology by which business men lived. Their conceptions of social action and its possible limits were largely determined by what business-men thought desirable. Labour, moreover, so far as it was organized, accepted in a considerable degree the outlook of business men. It was in that first phase of evolution under capitalism in which it had little or no consciousness of its

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existence as a separate class with a separate interest needing political expression ; it thought it sufficient, like British trade unions before 1900, to bring pressure to bear upon the existing parties to secure particular legislative objects in which it was interested. From time to time, no doubt, the separation between reality and the party ideologies might breed protest, even, as in 1912, the revolt of the progressives. But the ever-upward turn of American social evolution seemed always capable of restoring the traditional political equilibrium.

When, therefore, the crisis of 1929 and its aftermath revealed that the United States had an individualistic habit of mind and, as a result, a negative state at a period when the facts called for a collectivist outlook and a positive state, a demand for the revision of constitutional principles was inevitable. In the panic days of depression, it appeared as though President Roosevelt would be able to improvise the necessary principles and give them their institutional application ; in the first days of his administration, big business went cap-in-hand to the White House and seemed to salute his experiments as salvation. But, as panic passed, it began to be clear that what was in issue in the United States was what was being decided, also, in Western Europe—the principles upon which the relation between capitalism and democracy should be maintained. The President's purpose, courageously announced, and, at least in part, courageously attempted, was to socialize the habits of big business, to secure that the will of the political democracy should prevail over the little oligarchy of business men who had made the economic power of the United States their private empire.

To that end, he required the positive state. To that end, therefore, he required such a re-orientation of constitutional principles as would give the necessary implications of the positive state their full recognition in the operation of

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American institutions. That requirement encountered obvious difficulties. It meant the subordination of economic power to political authority. It meant that the old habit of liberty of contract as freedom for the business man to do what he would with his own should be read in the new context that a President with a majority could use the State-power to subordinate property-rights to social rights. It meant, therefore, government intervention on a large scale ; it meant a new place for trade-unionism in society ; it meant the end of business autocracy in the United States. The democracy, as Hamilton and his contemporaries feared, were seeking to transform political democracy into social democracy. But the founders of the constitution, and the main operators of that instrument since their day, had to prevent exactly this transformation. For them it was a major catastrophe exactly because all their traditions would be overthrown by its achievement. They did not doubt that their empire was the condition of national well-being : why should they who lived by its privileges ? They doubted it the less when they saw on one side the rich, and, as they assumed, the wise, on the other, the poor, and, as they assumed, the unintelligent. To keep the constitution on its historic lines was thus, for them, not merely to safeguard property, but, also, to save the nation from a mad economic escapade. They organized, therefore, all their forces to attack the President's re-orientation. Here, in the struggle for economic power, is the true source of the strain to which the constitution is subjected.

II

That strain is evident in a number of ways. It is seen in the bitter conflict between the President and the Supreme Court. It is seen in the grave need for a centralized Federal power over commerce and labour to offset the intense centralization of economic control under giant capitalism ;

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it is doubtful, at the least, whether this is obtainable in the existing distribution of functions between the Federal Government and the States. It is seen, again, in the wholly necessary attempt by the Federal Government to investigate and to control the great nerve centres of financial power like the banks and the stock-exchanges, and this despite the obstacles placed in its way by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. It is seen, also, in the vast growth, wholly unimaginable even so recently as the Coolidge epoch, of delegated legislation by which authority over commerce and industry is entrusted, through the President, to a great mass of administrative commissions. This has had, of course, the inevitable effect of increasing enormously—though, so far, beneficently—the power of the executive in the balance of the constitution. Finally, the strain is clearly seen in its effect on parties in the new atmosphere. Neither has been able to maintain its integrity before the challenge of massive events. The Republican Party is already split into conservative and radical factions; and the line of demarcation is broadly in terms of the attitude of its members to the empire of big business. In the Democratic Party, the President's leadership is, in a similar way, dividing it into a faction whose alignment with reactionary business interests in the South drives them, despite formal party loyalties, towards opposition to liberal constitutionalism, and a faction which is beginning to recognize the need of changes on a wider scale than it has been customary to recognize. And behind this renovation of the party alignment is the consciousness of a new attitude in Labour which is driving the masses to a more intimate realization of the need for political organization; in some degree, the same is true, also, of the heavily depressed farming industry of the Middle and North-West. The problem for existing American parties is whether they can reconstitute themselves in time so as to

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form a natural Right and Left through which the new attitudes can express themselves. If they can, skilful leadership may, for the next two decades, build a similar relationship for Labour to the party of the Left which the British Labour Party occupied to the Liberals from 1900 to 1918. If they cannot, the growth of a separate political Labour movement, perhaps in alliance with agrarian radicalism, is certain; and this will compel drastic constitutional reorganization if American democracy is to be preserved.

The most dramatic aspect of this crisis has, undoubtedly, been the conflict between the President and the Supreme Court. For three years, usually by a narrow majority, the Court declared unconstitutional the bulk of Mr. Roosevelt's major economic experiments. It did so by a technique of narrow, and often perverse, construction which usually showed a complete unwillingness to recognize the advent of a new time. Most of its decisions were inexplicable except upon the basis that the majority arrogated to itself the right to identify its private economic philosophy with the permanent principles of American constitutional law. During his first term, the President contented himself with satirical comment on the Court's attitude. After his re-election, he introduced a plan for reorganizing the Court the basis of which would have been the conference upon him of the right to add to its membership a number of new appointees, not exceeding six, for each of the existing judges who should not retire on reaching the age of seventy.

The effect of this proposal was remarkable. In the first place, the Supreme Court changed its habits and at once began to pronounce a series of new decisions, in principle hardly compatible with its earlier ones, upholding some of the more drastic legislation of the new deal. The change was wholly due to the defection of a single judge from the reactionary to the progressive side. For effective purposes,

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in fact, the sovereignty of the United States rested in the unexplained *volte-face* of Mr. Justice Roberts. In the second place, the President's plan aroused passionate controversy which transcended party lines. Some objected to the "packing" of the Court. Others demanded its reform by way of amendment. Others proclaimed that it was the ark of the constitutional covenant which it was sacrilege to violate. The President was at length defeated by a curious combination of Liberals who did not recognize that peers must always be created to override the veto of the House of Lords, and reactionaries to whom the House of Lords (in its American form) was sacred. But, in the long view, it is by no means certain that the President's defeat is final. For, in the first place, his pressure has secured for him a temporarily favourable Court; and, in the second, he has struck so resounding a blow at its prestige, as to make it certain that its next period of illiberal construction will evoke an immense movement for the drastic reorganization of its powers.

In a direct way, nothing has been done to redistribute functions between the Federal Government and the States since Mr. Roosevelt took office; what has been achieved by way of co-operation has been due to the persuasive instrument of Federal aid to sorely-pressed state finances. What, however, is emerging from the experience of the depression is the bankruptcy of the federal idea in the face of giant capitalism. The States are obsolete as economic and administrative units; and compacts between them are too slow in coming, and too small in subject-matter, to overcome the fact of their obsolescence. No Federal Government, moreover, can tackle the now nation-wide problems of labour and commerce unless it has direct authority over them; and the procedure of amendment by itemized detail is too cumbersome to be acceptable. What is called for is a power in

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Congress to regulate them for the general welfare; and this is incompatible with the document of 1787. The phenomenon is not, of course, restricted to the United States; it is not less true of Canadian and Australian federalism as well. The difficulty of constitutional reorganization in America lies in the fact that, historic sentiment apart, there is behind the present distribution of functions all the power of vested economic interest in America; that was shown in the inability to secure ratification of the amendment prohibiting child labour. So long as the control of industrial conditions is in the hands of 48 separate legislatures, reactionary business enterprise has hopes of defeating for a long period a democratic effort to secure the enactment, by legislative compulsion, of decent labour standards. They will therefore resist to the uttermost any constitutional revision in this regard. The ideas of 1787, of what the President has aptly termed the "horse-and-buggy age," are the best defence they possess against the requirements of democracy in the age of big business.

Much the same considerations apply to the problems connected with due process of law and the consequences of delegated legislation. The first has now become, through the accretion of fantastic decisions, one of the essential bulwarks of capitalism against legislative regulation; it has become, in fact, the right of property to such safeguards of its privileges as the private habits of five out of the nine judges happen at any time, despite countervailing currents of opinion, to think reasonable. The problem of delegated legislation has, since Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in the *Schechter* case, become so closely bound up with the fundamental principle of the separation of powers, as to raise the grave issue of whether, under the constitution, the American Executive can ever be endowed with the authority fully commensurate with its problems; the alternative being

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a Congress destined to remain a pale and ineffectual angel in a void which will never be luminous enough for the beating of its wings to be detected. When to this is added the fact that the Supreme Court continues to insist on its right to review, sometimes, as in the New York telephone case, after years of expensive conflict, the findings of expert commissions on technical matters, it is clear that the constitution, in its present form, is a positive stumbling-block in the way of democratic progress.

The President himself has said in effect that the constitution suffices for all the purposes of modern America if it is generously interpreted. The difficulty in the way of accepting that natural optimism is the profound one that all the interests of big business to-day are against the consequences of a generous interpretation. For, in periods of a liberal-minded Congress, that interpretation means an invasion of the economic privileges of big business by American democracy. The whole constitution is geared to the idea of preventing such an invasion. America has evolved the need for a positive state without evolving the institutions that positive state requires. To do so is, in the mental climate of the time, a Herculean labour. No doubt the remarkable efforts of the President have done something to make its accomplishment possible. Above all, he has gone a long distance to the preparation of its psychological basis by destroying the myth of the fitness of bankers, business men and lawyers, to dominate a civilization striving to make political democracy effective. It is because he has pursued this task with such energy and such courage that American democracy retains the right to hope. But it will take at least a generation of persistent and unyielding energy to push his effort to a successful conclusion.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM

By LINDSAY ROGERS

“GOVERNMENTS, like clocks, go from the motion men give them: and as governments are made by men, so by them are they ruined too. Wherefore governments depend rather upon men than men upon governments.” From what representative political institution does the truth of William Penn’s dictum receive a more convincing and more vivid demonstration than from the American presidential system? Its history is the history of the men who have been at its head. Some Presidents were vigorous. Others were inert. One avoided the ruin of threatened disunion. A century and a half after the adoption of the Constitution, the manner of the functioning of the presidential office cannot be adequately discussed save in terms of its occupants. The system now works differently from the way it did under Coolidge whom the country desired to be inactive, or under Hoover to whom the electorate administered a decisive rebuke for vacillation and timidity.

Not of his two immediate predecessors has Franklin Roosevelt thought when he considered his responsibilities and opportunities. He has looked to Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson and, in a lesser degree, to Jackson, Cleveland and Theodore Roosevelt. They have been the last century’s “strong” Presidents. So far as Franklin Roosevelt is concerned, differences of opinion exist only in respect of whether his manifestations of strength have been expert or inexpert, wise or unwise. All of the men in the galaxy of strong Presidents were by temperament averse to inaction, but in three cases at least they were aided by the fact that

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their times clamoured for leadership. Lincoln and Wilson led the country through two wars. Mr. Roosevelt had to battle with a depression. Warfare on the economic terrain has proved a more demanding, and will to historians seem a severer, test than warfare on the military terrain. When he holds an ordinary office a man is judged by what he does, but a man at the head of affairs which call for leadership must, as Bishop Creighton said, be judged also by what he chooses to do. That is pre-eminently the case with American Presidents. What they choose to do moulds the presidential system. Unlike Prime Ministers, they have the advantage of relative freedom from the restraints of colleagues or the command of party. They have the great disadvantage that certain choices which they prize highly may be disapproved by the Aristocracy of the Robe as not authorized by the Constitution.

To the draftsmen of that document there was vouchsafed no vision that they were creating the most powerful elective office that one hundred and fifty years later the world was to know. In method of recruitment and the tasks imposed on it, the Presidency is now precisely the opposite of that which the Framers contemplated and for which the written word still provides. Their scheme was for an exceptional man to be chosen by a group of outstanding men—the Electoral College. Universal suffrage and the growth of political parties have transformed the Electoral College into a device for recording the verdict of an electorate which is forced to choose between candidates put forward by irresponsible party nominating conventions. The race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong, but time and chance have happened favourably to the United States in turning up at crises men of exceptional stature.

Less spectacular but hardly less complete is the change in the part that, after his election, the President is called

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upon to play. The Constitution provides that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States" and imposes upon him the obligation of seeing that the laws are "faithfully executed." Its intention was that in law-making the President should be no more than a check or balance. Thus "all legislative powers" are vested in Congress, and the President's share in this process—according to the literary theory—is confined to summoning Congress into extraordinary session, delivering messages and vetoing proposals of law. If when this last happens, Congress is still in session, it may by a two-thirds vote of each House "override" the veto. In determining the relations between the White House and the Capitol in Washington, the laws now reach but a little way.

The President's minor rôle has become his major rôle. Nor was this development only at long last. The growth of political parties which from time to time differ on the programmes they wish to see driven to the statute book, and the clamour of interests and sections for Congressional legislation have been responsible for the change. Politics and economics have reversed the emphasis of the Constitution. The stone which the builders thought unimportant has become the cornerstone of the presidential system. The President is now chief legislator and the country judges him on the basis of his success as a legislator rather than his success as an executive.

How Franklin Roosevelt has played his more important rôle is notorious. No previous American President has been so much discussed in Europe. Great journals which have rarely paid attention to American affairs now send their most brilliant critics to see the great actor perform. It should not be thought, however, that the drama is of a new genre. Its tempo is faster, there is more action, and the climaxes are more smashing; but from Wilson to Roosevelt there have

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been changes of degree, not of kind, of personality but not of task. The depression called for more vigorous leadership than did the War—vigorous in that the subjects of legislation were more numerous and covered a far wider ambit. The task was greater also because in economic warfare there is no unanimity on objectives. During the World War, dissentient groups were unimportant. Under the Roosevelt Administration there have always been determined minorities who insisted that measures argued for must not be accepted because of the sacrifices they would require of individuals or groups. That, to be sure, is an obstacle that has to be surmounted in any representative government, but in the United States the separation of the President and Congress creates difficulties which can be avoided by parliamentary chief executives.

The presidential system is highly personal and Mr. Roosevelt has greatly intensified what legal structure has made inevitable. The American Cabinet is an inchoate body of clerks chosen on the basis of geography and of political followings. No more than half of the ten members of the present official family could in a Cabinet meeting furnish any ideas or criticisms worth listening to on subjects other than those immediately concerning their own departments. Moreover, great segments of public policy—interstate commerce, the control of monopolies, shipping, communications—are the province of the so-called independent boards and commissions. These are quasi-administrative, quasi-judicial bodies whose members are appointed for staggered terms and who are not easily removable by the President. As chief legislator, the President can support or oppose or supplant the proposals of these commissions but he has no power of control. Since the United States has no administrative class of civil servants, there is a lack of creativeness at this level, and the civil service is normally

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not the source of important new legislation. In his major rôle, therefore, the President must take much of the initiative himself and on each specific piece of legislation must determine the *ad hoc* assistance which he will require. That assistance is *ad hoc* not only on the content of the legislation but also in respect of its draftmanship. The Senate and the House maintain legislative drafting services which are inadequately staffed, but the President has no such agency.

The most spectacular legislation which Mr. Roosevelt has proposed was the Bill to add six additional Justices to the Supreme Court of the United States. That scheme was hatched by the President in consultation with two or three intimate advisors, put in the form of a Bill, shown to the Attorney-General so that he could prepare a supporting letter (which turned out to be quite weak on its facts) and then communicated to the Cabinet a few minutes before it exploded in Congress and stirred up a bitter discussion in the country. In the ensuing debate, the President discarded the grounds on which he had first urged the measure and took a more tenable position. Or, as chief legislator, the President can function in consultation with the officials immediately concerned. That has been the procedure for the preparation of much of the relief administration. Or he can appoint an interdepartmental committee to draft a Bill. That was the course followed when the reciprocity treaty policy was framed. Or the President may ask that a special group—half governmental, half extra-governmental—sponsor the studies that are necessary to serve as the base of legislation. That was the background of the Social Security laws. Finally, the President may emerge as an advocate of measures which have been hatched in Congress and for which there seems to be some support. That roughly was the situation with the recent minimum wage and maximum hour legislation to take the place of the National Industrial

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Recovery Act which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

Given such handicaps in preparing legislation, the President, manifestly, is not happily circumstanced in dealing with Congress. He gets highly uncertain assistance from the instrument of party. The machinery of presidential nominating conventions is geared to choose "available" candidates. It is rare that those nominated have been outstanding party leaders, and even rarer that they have been leaders for any length of time. In 1928, for example, Alfred E. Smith, then the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, persuaded Mr. Roosevelt to be the Democratic party's nominee for the governorship of New York State. Much against his will, Mr. Roosevelt consented. He was elected and, after two years, re-elected. Albany was an excellent vantage point from which to plan the capture of the presidential nomination. Had Governor Smith had other preferences in 1928, or had his importunities not been yielded to, Mr. Roosevelt could not have been the presidential candidate in 1932. After election, however, a President, no matter how minor a person he has been before, at once becomes the leader of his party. If he be a man of only ordinary force, no one can challenge his titular primacy because he has enormous powers of patronage. If he be a man of more than ordinary force, with a programme that has support in the country, he can translate titularity into reality.

Nevertheless, leadership is personal rather than party. The President heads, that is to say, a national organization which is made up of sectional organizations that have varying interests and loyalties. There is little agreement on doctrine. The paths down which the President may attempt to lead Congress are sometimes entirely different from those promised on the hustings. That was the case, for example, with much

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of the New Deal legislation. Between the election and the inauguration the situation had changed greatly and different panaceas seemed to be called for. Or, after searching his secret conscience, the President may blaze a trail through a new wilderness and ask the party to go hunting with him—e.g., the Supreme Court proposal. In such adventures the President cannot rely on party discipline, for there is little of that. For many years most major legislation has been pushed through Congress with the support of bi-partisan majorities, and has been opposed by bi-partisan minorities. Rarely does the President carry with him all of his party, and to carry as much as he does, he must be adept in handling patronage and artful in persuasion. Senators and Representatives follow because they wish to be known as supporters of the President. They think that such a label will advantage them when they stand for re-election. Or they oppose the President because this seems politically more expedient. Nor does a large party majority in Congress necessarily increase prospects of control. I doubt whether Mr. Roosevelt was greatly overjoyed when the last election gave him such an overwhelming number of Senators and Representatives who labelled themselves Democrats. As he looked at them when he read his message to the new Congress, he must have had something of the feeling credited to the Duke of Wellington when he was inspecting a group of new recruits for the British army. "I don't know whether they will scare the enemy, but, by God, they scare me." In the summer of 1937 Mr. Roosevelt's party majority began to scare him.

Presidential attention to drilling the recruits may be confined to Washington or it may extend throughout the country. When the latter is the case, the President concerns himself with "local situations"—with nominations and elections to state or even municipal offices. Woodrow Wilson, who attempted with considerable success to be the

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leader of the Democratic party in Congress and who through a party caucus (now unimportant) established more discipline than any of his successors have enjoyed, did not concern himself with local political organizations and their problems. It may be that President Roosevelt has an opposite view of his responsibilities. It may be also that by temperament he enjoys the game that the Tapers and Tadpoles play. Whatever the reason, President Roosevelt devotes a good deal of his time to the petty business of local politics, to the scufflings of the Tapers and Tadpoles. Whether from the standpoint of the presidential system the game is worth the candle is highly doubtful. It is rare that votes in Congress are thereby influenced. Moreover, in recent elections the swings of the popular vote have been so great as to suggest that an unpopular President does not measurably increase his chances of re-election by the attention which he pays to local political organisations. Indeed, he may give the country the impression that he is descending from his eminence. Perhaps his best strategy is to be as intelligent as he can be and pray that the country will be favourably impressed.

In his other rôle also, that of Chief Executive, the President must rely on personal rather than on party loyalty to fill the legal lacuna which the Constitution permits and even desires. Throughout much of the administrative field, the President is unable to initiate or to prevent. The heads of departments and independent establishments have authority which is theirs to use without the necessity of securing presidential approval. Because of the ineffectiveness of the Cabinet and because there is no centre of legal reference like the Privy Council through which administrative legislation must be filtered, the President lacks machinery to turn up the information which he should have in order to control administrative policy. When informed, he can do no more than attempt persuasion, and if this fails, removal from office

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is the weapon which he must use. In that is to be found the sanction of administrative management under the presidential system.

Hence, with the presidential system as it is now organized, the President cannot be a highly successful chief administrator. Indeed, it is amazing that breakdown is avoided. At the apex of the hierarchy, he is responsible for all policy. Each of the ten secretaries who head departments and each of the sixty or seventy heads of independent establishments have direct access to and take advice only from him. Even within the departments there are certain officials who on some matters deal with the President rather than with their nominal chiefs. Laboriously he must thread his way through a host of unrelated matters. Everything is tackled *à deux*: neutrality policy with Secretary Hull; Puerto Rico with Secretary Ickes or the Governor of the Island and the Chief of the Division of Territorial Possessions; labour policy with Secretary Perkins or the heads of the various boards or a specially constituted body, as in the case of the steel strike; relief with Mr. Hopkins or governors or mayors. The President must act on a series of *ex parte* cases presented to him. He hears only one side. Inadequately staffed so far as a personal secretariat is concerned, he lacks anything remotely resembling the organization which Sir Maurice Hankey heads. In short, the system imposes the maximum of physical burden and reduces to a minimum the opportunities for discussion and thought before action. The situation is far, far worse than that against which Mr. Lloyd George revolted in 1916 when he set up his War Cabinet and made Mr. Bonar Law the sentinel to drive away intruders so that the members of the War Cabinet would have time to think.

In his uncoördinated handling of large policy and petty detail, the American President lives under the shadow of Congressional refusal to permit any managerial freedom.

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With respect to personnel and the estimates, he has hardly an iota of the authority that the British Treasury possesses. On such matters, Congress is the dictator, and it has not yet learned that by imposing too severe limitations on the structure and methods of administrative management, it is really lessening its own authority. The Congressional prerogative of criticizing and calling to account a man who has full responsibility is far more valuable than insistence on a statutory straitjacket which may be used to furnish an alibi for delay and inefficiency. The weight of this consideration is not lessened by the President's political irresponsibility *vis-à-vis* Congress. His responsibility to the country would be less clouded if Congress could bring itself to give him a freer administrative hand. Congress delegates tremendous law-making authority and then makes it difficult for the President to see that the laws are faithfully executed.

Finally, as every schoolboy knows, the American Presidency combines the two functions of government which Walter Bagehot distinguished as ceremonial and efficient. The result is a heavy addition to the already tremendous physical burden of the office. But the combination has further unfortunate consequences. The fact that the President is the Head of the State draws from him some of the fire to which a political leader should be constantly subjected. Press and political opponents deal with ignorant or mistaken presidential utterances more hesitantly, more politely and therefore less cogently than they would if the utterances came from a Prime Minister facing the legislature.

These combined functions and the separation of the executive from the legislature mean that the President must devote some attention to public relations—to "building himself up," to persuading the country to accept the picture of himself which he thinks is desirable. In Great Britain, I take it, such publicizing has thus far been confined largely

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to the Monarchy. There, as Mr. Kingsley Martin's brilliant little book shows, the publicizing has had remarkable successes. In the United States, public relations are to those who work the governmental machines, more important than they are in a country with a Cabinet system. British Ministers can be judged on their performances in the House of Commons. Failure cannot be long concealed. Whatever may be thought of the representative character or the legislative efficiency of the House of Commons, or of its lack of control over the executive, that body still compels Ministers to show what kinds of persons they are. Hence there can be some measure of agreement on the characters and abilities of men in office. Myths cannot long endure. In the United States, those who attempt to work the presidential system do not have to prove themselves in day-to-day dealings with the legislature. They must therefore convince the public of their strength by resort to the press, the wireless and the cinema. Sometimes it is difficult to demonstrate the fake of touched-up portraits. Under the presidential system, office-holders need never appear in the mental undress of parliamentary squabbling.

Since Mr. Roosevelt put forward his court proposals, some quarters have voiced fears concerning the growth of personal government in the United States. These fears seem to me chimerical—with one possible reservation and even for that Congress is responsible. Of necessity Congress had delegated to the President far-reaching law-making authority. The mathematically-minded can calculate that President Roosevelt is empowered to "make legislation" on more than seventy subjects with which his predecessors did not have to deal. But what Congress has granted, Congress can take away. Hence I see scant reason for being alarmed by the argument that the presidential system is developing into a personal dictatorship.

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My reservation is in respect of the huge sums for relief and public works which have been authorized by Congress but which the President can allocate. The bulk of these moneys is distributed through state and municipal governments. Since those who head the state and municipal administrations are in part judged by their success in securing federal funds to supplement their own relief measures, the President of the United States in a sense holds the power of political life and death over a host of public officials throughout the country. That is a new and dangerous kind of political power. As a bribe or as a weapon, it can be far more important than patronage ever has been—that is, appointments to office. It can be far more insidious than Congressional “pork barrels”—that is, the appropriation acts which contain grants for post offices, river improvement, public buildings, and so on, in such profusion that representatives of the communities favoured are sufficiently numerous to make approval overwhelming. But even this spending power of the President is exercised only because Congress so wishes. Congress could set up a non-presidential—if it so desired, a non-partisan—machinery for allocating relief funds. Apparently Congress does not want to do this. The present system is wasteful and corrupting, but it is not a system which makes the head of the presidential system a dictator.

Viewing these constitutional and statutory handicaps, one naturally asks: why have they not had more serious consequences? Why does not the American presidential system work so badly as clearly to demonstrate these defects and to secure their correction? It is true that on critical occasions the United States has been fortunate in the men brought forward to work cumbersome machinery. But the success of the presidential system is not due to the factors that Bagehot had in mind when he said that the men of

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Massachusetts could work *any* constitution. American economics have made American politics tolerable and now—as in other countries—the great question is whether politics will be competent to provide a tolerable economic life. The size of the country, great natural resources, a small *per capita* public debt, relatively low taxation and a rising standard of living have combined to muffle the creaks and strains of the presidential system. Moreover, as in Great Britain down to the advent of the Labour party, the United States down to the advent of Mr. Roosevelt had escaped political cleavages on any matter (save slavery) that was fundamental. Even now in the United States the cleavage is not between parties. Indeed, it may conceivably force a re-alignment of parties. Publicists frequently point out that governmental institutions as we have them—parliaments and executives—were set up in an age when governments dealt with problems that were largely political. Now governments must deal with a host of economic problems. Will the old institutions prove efficient instruments? By such a test the future of the American presidency will be determined. That future, however, will be shaped more by men than by laws.

STATE GOVERNMENT TO-DAY

By ROBERT E. CUSHMAN

AN American scholar, wearied by the writing of a thorough treatise on American state government, remarked that the enterprise had made him a passionate admirer of the unitary state. If the forty-eight American commonwealths smother the student under a bewildering avalanche of data, it is because they constitute the most diversified political laboratory in the world. They are, as Mr. Justice Holmes once said, "insulated chambers" within which experiments in the organization and working of democratic government are constantly going on.

The importance of the states as political experiment stations is increased by the diversity in their size, population, economic life, and the character and traditions of their people. Texas, with about two-thirds of London's population, covers a slightly greater area than France and England combined. New York, with about 13 million people, is the size of England. Rhode Island, the smallest state, with a population of 681,000 covers but 1,248 square miles, about two-thirds of the London Passenger Transport Board area. The mountainous state of Nevada is nearly the size of Italy, but has a total population of but 98,000. New York's total wealth is estimated at 37 billion dollars, four times that of Texas which is five times as large, and seventy times that of Nevada which is more than twice as large. There is almost equal variety in the character, temperament, cultural background and economic interests of the people. The shrewd Yankee industrialist of the east has little in common with the easy-going southern planter, the western cattle-man or the farmer of the central plains. There are sections in the far south in which the negroes outnumber the whites; the statutes of

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New Mexico are required to be published both in English and Spanish to meet the needs of the two racial elements in the state; while the legal system of Louisiana is based on the French civil law instead of the English common law.

The states, however, do not enjoy unlimited freedom in the field of political experiment. The Federal Constitution requires them to have a "republican form of government" and forbids them to violate the sanctity of contracts or to take life, liberty or property without "due process of law."

This brief review will fall into three parts. First will be sketched some of the recent trends in the government and political practice of the states viewed as separate units. Second, the increasingly important relations between the states will be reviewed. Third, the relations between the states and the federal government, with the recent changes in the traditional equilibrium of that relationship will be examined.

I.—RECENT INTERNAL STATE GOVERNMENT.

Leaving out of account the relations which the states bear to the other states or to the federal government, we may note a number of interesting developments in the forty-eight "political laboratories."

1. The single-chambered legislature of forty-three members set up in Nebraska represents perhaps the sharpest break with established tradition. There have been no unicameral legislatures in America since the Revolutionary period until the veteran Senator George W. Norris persuaded Nebraska to establish one in 1935. While it is too early to appraise the results of the change, it promises to justify itself in such a homogeneous rural commonwealth as Nebraska. The two houses of the American state legislatures have long since ceased to represent anything but identical interests. The members of each are chosen by the same voters, grouped

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into districts of different sizes and boundaries. At the same time a two-chambered legislature provides a basis for compromise in dealing with the difficult political problem of the representation of those vast metropolitan areas, which, like New York City and Chicago, contain or will shortly contain more than half the total population of the state. These urban areas may be more fully represented in one house than in the other. Without bicameralism this deadlock of urban and rural interests may prove unbreakable.

2. By 1936 every state but one had set up a planning commission. These bodies deal with a considerable variety of problems but are chiefly aiming at a sound classification and use of land, and at the conservation of the physical resources of the state, to prevent shortsighted exploitation. The federal government has encouraged the state planning movement by money and counsel, and there is co-operation between the planning agencies of the various states.

3. There has been steady and needed improvement in the judicial systems of the states. An increasing number of state judicial councils have been set up, supervisory and investigatory bodies drawn from the bench, bar and the laity, which watch the actual working of the judicial system, report their findings and recommend desirable changes. In New York a Law Revision Commission is engaged in surveying the substantive law of the state, and in urging changes for its clarification and improvement. Many of its proposals have already been adopted. Valuable but not spectacular progress is being made towards the improvement in some states of the archaic systems of civil and criminal procedure which have made the administration of law costly, uncertain, and inefficient.

4. The reform and simplification of the administrative systems of the states still presents a pressing problem. In a number of states thoroughgoing reorganizations have been

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carried out, but there are still many states in which executive and administrative functions are scattered amongst fifty or more independent and unco-ordinated boards, commissions, or bureaus. The administrative changes which have been made all tend to place the governor of the state in an increasingly dominating position as the chief executive to whom the heads of a limited number of administrative departments are responsible.

5. The movement, so conspicuous twenty years ago, for the spread of the direct primary and the initiative and referendum has abated. The direct primary, a system whereby the candidates of a political party are chosen by the votes of the party members, has actually lost ground, especially in the east. The voters have remained largely indifferent to this new responsibility, with the result that the task of making the vital selections remains where it has always been, in the hands of unofficial party leaders.

The initiative and referendum has nowhere been abandoned but it has ceased to spread. Each year a substantial grist of laws, or constitutional amendments, whether initiated by popular petition or referred to popular vote by the same process, are voted on by the people. Those who vote on these measures are much fewer than those who vote for major candidates. The early conservative fear that direct legislation by the people would produce radical and ill-considered legislation has, in general, not been supported. The voters have in the main looked upon novel or freak legislative proposals with suspicion or disapproval and it is easier to secure the passage of this type of law by the average state legislature than by the people voting in a referendum.

6. Changes in state constitutions in recent years have been accomplished mainly by separate amendments, ratified by popular referendum, rather than by the process of constitutional revision by an elected convention. A constitutional

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convention will meet, however, in New York in the spring of 1938. Its work will be watched with interest, as well as the fate of its proposals when submitted to popular vote. The work of the last New York convention, which met in 1915, was not approved by the voters.

7. There is a marked increase in the volume and variety of social and economic legislation passed by state legislatures in the exercise of their police powers. Much of this has been due to the pressure of the problems created by the depression. Laws for old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, minimum wages, protection of collective bargaining, regulation of prices, rationing of oil and gas production and many other restrictions on business and industry have pushed forward the earlier frontiers of the police power. These new forms of social control must, of course, all be kept within the limits of both state and federal constitutions. Especially must they meet the test of "due process of law," which means concretely that the Supreme Court must be convinced that the social need for the new regulatory power is clear enough to justify the restriction on freedom of action or on the free use of private property, so that the act is not an "arbitrary" deprivation of liberty or property. This was the issue so spectacularly involved in the Court's recent decisions on state minimum wage laws.

This *résumé* gives some idea of the freedom within which the states manage their affairs, and the variety of the problems they are trying to meet. It must be remembered, however, that state activity must keep not only within the constitutional limits mentioned, but also within the limits imposed by the temperament and political mores of the people. There is, in actual practice, an essential conservatism in the operation of state government and a definite conformity to established American political traditions.

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II.—RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATES.

The American states are required by the federal constitution to conform to a certain minimum of interstate co-operation and good manners. By what is known as the "comity clause" (Art. IV, Sec. 2) the citizens of each state are entitled to "the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." Thus a citizen of New York is not an alien in California but enjoys there the same treatment which California extends to its own people. The states must accord "full faith and credit" to the public records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the other states, which means that a deed executed or a marriage lawfully performed in one state will be good throughout the union. The states must also render up to each other on demand fugitives from justice. There is no legal means of compelling a state to do this, but in the main the obligation is observed as a matter of course.

But interstate relations in the modern federal union have assumed an importance completely overshadowing these legal requirements and the states have recently been experimenting with active and constructive interstate co-operation along very broad lines. This is mainly due to the emergence of a large number of "twilight zone" problems with which no one state, because of its limited geographical jurisdiction, can effectively deal, and over which no adequate power has been delegated by the constitution to the federal government. If the problems are to be met, it must be through the voluntary co-operative efforts of several states. This newer interstate co-operation has taken several different forms which may be mentioned.

First, there has been an increase in the number and importance of interstate "compacts." The American states are forbidden by the federal constitution to enter into "treaties, alliances or confederations," but they are permitted,

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with the consent of Congress, to make compacts and agreements. From the earliest times such compacts have been used as the means of dealing with the mutual interests of two or more states in boundary waters, harbours, bridges and the like. The beautiful Palisades Park along the Hudson is governed under a compact between New York and New Jersey. A few years ago Congress sanctioned a compact between seven states in the south-west to deal with the distribution of power and water at Boulder Dam on the Colorado River. One of the states, Arizona, refused to enter into the compact and the remaining six have gone ahead without her consent. More recently there have been compacts on matters of greater and more general significance. Some of these deal with the conservation of oil, with the marketing of prison-made goods, and other matters affecting the economic interests of the states involved.

The interstate compact provides a working basis for the regional treatment of regional problems. The surveyor's lines which form many of the boundaries between states cut up into arbitrary jurisdictional areas regions closely knit together by common economic and social interests. By means of the compact those regions may provide for themselves a common policy which no one state or number of states can establish by independent action. The compact is, however, subject to certain limitations. It has not, thus far, been difficult to secure the required congressional approval of compacts. In fact, in recent years Congress has sought to induce the formation of certain interstate compacts by granting its approval in advance. But the compact is a purely voluntary device. No state can be compelled to become a party to a compact and with respect to some of the highly controversial problems on which co-operative action is most needed it may be impossible to get the states to agree and the whole enterprise may be blocked.

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Secondly, there has been steady but unspectacular progress in the movement for uniform state legislation. Model legislation on an increasing range of topics where uniformity is sorely needed has been drafted, and state legislatures are being steadily pressed to adopt these uniform laws. From the field of commercial law, where the most rapid progress has been made (as evidenced by the very widespread adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act) the movement is spreading and may in time reach the chaos of state laws dealing with such matters as extradition, or motor vehicle control. Here again uniformity can come only through the voluntary action of the states.

Finally, more than a third of the states have created permanent commissions on interstate co-operation. These bodies are active in the calling of conferences for the consideration of interstate problems, and in furthering co-operative action of various kinds.

III.—FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS.

Important changes are taking place in the equilibrium of state and federal power under the American constitution. To understand these one must recall how that constitution distributes powers between the two governments. The powers of the federal government are enumerated, delegated powers. They have been enlarged by liberal construction, it is true, but the federal Congress has a particular power only if that power has been given to it. The states, on the other hand, have all powers which have not been taken away from them either by the federal constitution or by the self-imposed restraints of their own constitutions. A new division of powers between states and nation can be effected at any time by means of constitutional amendments, but with the exception of the short-lived experiment with national pro-

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hibition no important shifts of authority between the two governments have been brought about in this way.

Without amending the written constitution, however, important changes in the balance of power between the states and the central government are taking place, and the methods by which these changes are coming about may be discussed here.

In the first place, Congress has extended its authority into the realm of state affairs by a sort of federal benevolence in the form of federal subsidies to the states. While Congress possesses only delegated powers, its delegated power to spend money is not hedged about by any sharp restrictions. Congress has always spent money for objects which it has no delegated power to regulate. The federal government can, therefore, provide funds to be spent in the various states, and in active co-operation with the states, for purposes falling within the range of state-reserved powers. Congress can also insist that certain conditions be met by the states before such federal money shall be available. Thus Congress has long subsidized public education in the states, and in so doing has insisted that the funds be spent on certain branches of education. Large sums of federal money have been spent in the states on road improvement, on the condition that the states make contributions for the same purpose and that federally approved standards of construction be observed. Recently in setting up its system of social security under the Act of 1935 Congress made available to the states huge sums of money on condition that the states enact and administer social security systems which meet specified requirements set forth in the act. The states are rapidly taking advantage of this federal bounty and are submitting their legislation to federal inspection and approval.

The significance of these conditional subsidies or grants-in-aid is far-reaching. Many worthy objects are thus attained

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which would be far beyond the financial capacities of the states, especially the poorer ones. Congress could not step in and exercise direct federal powers over education, roads, etc., for it has no delegated authority to do so. But it can virtually hire the states to carry on the work. Great advantages have resulted from most of these expenditures of federal money. At the same time there is no question that the range of federal power has been vastly extended by this method which some of its critics describe as federal "bribery." The federal government buys a certain amount of control over local affairs by setting up the conditions under which it will place at state disposal sums so tempting that few states resist the offer. The states are the recipients of an ever-increasing volume of federal money and are disposed to clamour for more. They are, however, by no means equal partners in the joint enterprise. There can be no escape from the conclusion that conditional federal subsidies tend to subordinate state authority to the control of Washington.

In the second place, a much more important change in the balance between state and federal power has resulted from the very liberal construction of delegated federal powers. Congress has the delegated power to tax, to spend money, to regulate commerce, to operate a postal system, and upon these constitutional "pegs" it has been able to hang a vast and ever-expanding control over the social and economic life of the states—a control penetrating into many fields supposed originally to lie securely within the reserved powers of the states. The economic and business life of the nation has become essentially nationalized. State lines in the field of commerce no longer exist. Accordingly a steadily mounting list of interests and transactions come to fall within the legitimate scope of federal power. Congress has heavy responsibilities with respect to the interests delegated to its

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care and it is merely assuming those responsibilities when it decrees that obscene literature, adulterated food and drugs, and the white slave traffic shall not pass through the channels of interstate commerce, or that the federal mails shall not be used as an aid to fraud. The development in this way of a vast federal police power has furthered the process of federal centralization. These accretions of federal power are, however, in the main not at the expense of the states. The new federal authority is not subtracted from existing state power, but arises because new interests and problems emerge which are national in scope and which can be drawn under the powers already delegated to Congress.

This is illustrated by the recent federal crime legislation. Congress has no delegated power to punish murder, robbery, kidnapping or similiar offences. But it has been made a federal crime under the so-called Lindbergh Act to use interstate commerce in carrying out the crime of kidnapping, and if a kidnapped person is not returned within seven days a legal presumption arises that he has been transported in interstate commerce and federal jurisdiction thereby exists. In the same way it is unlawful to use any facility of interstate commerce or the mails to extort money. It is a federal crime to spirit away witnesses needed in criminal cases by taking them across state lines. And it is a crime to ship stolen goods through the channels of interstate commerce. Thus an imposing federal criminal code has been built up on the basis of what are technically transactions in interstate commerce. Here again, however, state authority has been supplemented, not supplanted. The states have not lost what the federal government has gained.

Can one venture a prediction as to the probable future of the American states? Can they resist the onward march of federal centralization or will they tend to lose a portion of their autonomy and relative importance in the federal system?

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It seems probable that state lines will be increasingly dimmed by the growth of interstate co-operation and the rise of a sound regionalism. There will be a continuance of the movement which concentrates power in the federal government. This seems inevitable. More and more problems demanding national control will emerge, and to meet them ways will be found of extending federal power. Some of this expansion of federal authority will be into fields now free of all regulation and will not represent any diminution of present state authority. Some of it will tend to replace state power with federal or tend to subordinate the states in some degree to the federal government. But there will always remain a vast range of concerns which can be effectively and wisely handled only by the states, in which uniformity and centralized control would jeopardize the public interest and violate the American traditions of local self-government.

RECENT TRENDS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

By LEONARD D. WHITE

THE depression and its aftermath involved the public service of the United States in a series of significant developments.¹ The immediate effect of falling income was a demand for reduction in taxation and consequently for retrenchment in the administrative services. Another phase of the resulting attack upon the civil service was expressed by a prominent business man in these words: "The best public servant is the worst one. . . A thoroughly first-rate man in public service is corrosive. He eats holes in our liberties. The better he is and the longer he stays, the greater is the danger."

While these sentiments are still occasionally echoed by reactionary journals, this point of view has been submerged by the new concept of the service state for which the Roosevelt administration is responsible. In contrast to the cautious and reluctant policy of the Hoover administration, Roosevelt insisted upon the recognition of the duty of the national government to develop a positive programme to secure a broader distribution of national income, to conserve human as well as natural resources, and to achieve by governmental intervention in the economic order a degree of security for American citizens. Hence the "New Deal" legislation: relief and public works, regional rehabilitation

¹ For English readers, the American use of terms may be stated at the outset. The public service is a phrase denoting the sum total of officials and employees required at all levels of government, federal, state, county and municipal, including the publicly supported schools, numbering over 3,000,000 individuals in the United States. Civil service is used as synonymous with the merit system: that is, that portion of the public service selected through examination and possessing status, permanent tenure, and usually a retirement pension. The merit system, more specifically, is the body of law and regulations which confer such status in order to diminish the effect of politics and patronage, referred to generally as the spoils system. Americans use the term, civil service, to apply to employees selected by examination in state and municipal, as well as in the national government.

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as represented by the Tennessee Valley Authority, insurance of bank deposits, a national employment service, regulation of the sale of securities, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions, Federal assistance to states in matters of social welfare, and national planning through the National Resources Committee.

Such a programme cast into bold relief the necessity for a stronger public service, the instrument through which these new lines of action could be made effective. It called for men and women skilled in large-scale management, able to grasp the broad goals towards which many operations converged, impartial between the conflicting social groups which contended for or against particular aspects of the whole plan, and free to act without dependence upon political favour.

While acceptance of the need for renovating the public service was slowly gaining force, the managers of the Democratic party were consolidating the traditional right of patronage appointment in these very agencies of social reconstruction. In most of the agencies established during 1933 and 1934 Congress authorized or directed appointments to be made without reference to the Civil Service Act of 1883. While some progressive administrators, such as Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, used civil service employment lists in part, the general result at the end of three years was the creation of over 200,000 new posts, appointment to the great bulk of which was governed by the Democratic National Committee. The elaborate appointment machinery, efficient for its own purposes, which the Committee developed need not detain us; suffice it to say that for a brief time it rivalled the Civil Service Commission itself.

EXTENSION OF THE MERIT SYSTEM.

In perspective, this extraordinary expansion of patronage

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appointments will doubtless prove to be an episode rather than a reversal of the main current. Congress itself in 1935 and 1936 returned in large part to the merit system, although the present session hesitates between patronage and merit. The press of the country is almost united against patronage. Public opinion is being deeply affected by the League of Women Voters and by the National Civil Service Reform League. The report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, a statesmanlike document prepared by Louis Brownlow, Charles E. Merriam and Luther Gulick, insisted on the extension of the merit system "upward, outward, and downward."

Within the states, the trend towards the merit system is pronounced. During the legislative sessions of 1937, five states—Maine, Connecticut, Tennessee, Arkansas and Michigan—adopted formal civil service legislation. In other states, similar legislation is being actively pressed. In most states, the new offices established to co-operate with the Social Security Board are adequately protected against patronage. The national employment system, a co-operative federal-state plan, is built on a merit basis. The state dispensary systems (sale of intoxicants by the state) are removed from patronage.

While these encouraging trends are making their contribution to a stronger public service, notice must be taken of certain forces which delay and at times defeat the main trend. The unemployed press endlessly on the public service, insisting that Congressmen find them jobs. Their expectation is fed on the recollection of the mass patronage which was available in 1933 and 1934. The political organization is still reluctant to part with patronage, especially in view of its apparent value as demonstrated in the 1936 elections—national, state, and municipal. Then, too, in the United States there is no clear recognition of any alternative means of maintaining

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party strength apart from patronage—a consideration of considerable underlying significance.

NATIONAL INFLUENCE ON STATE EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS.

For a half-century the tide of power has been slowly flowing from the states to the national government. During the last eight years it has been running with accelerated force. It has now brought to the national government means of influencing, at certain points, the personnel procedures and standards of the state governments.

The Wagner-Peyser Act, providing for a joint federal-state employment service, required each state receiving grants-in-aid to submit plans "reasonably appropriate and adequate to carry out its purposes" for approval by Washington. The Director of the United States Employment Service may inquire whether the state employment offices are conducted in accordance with "the standards of efficiency" prescribed by him.¹ Standards of qualification and an examination system for the selection of personnel in such offices were required by the Director for each of the co-operating states, some of which yielded only with reluctance.

The issue of national supervision over state agencies arose again in the Social Security Act of 1935. Here the friends of state autonomy rallied and secured agreement upon a provision intended to curtail national control of local personnel standards. The relevant section reads: "A state plan for old-age assistance must . . . (5) provide such methods of administration (other than those relating to selection, tenure of office, and compensation of personnel) as are found by the Board to be necessary for the efficient performance of the plan. . . ."² Despite the reservations of this language, the influence of the Social Security Board upon state standards is considerable. On July 30, 1937, federal payments to the

¹ 48 Stat. 113, Act of June 6, 1933.

² 49 Stat. 620, Title I, Sec. 2 (a), (1935).

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state of Illinois for old-age assistance were suspended because the state failed to maintain administrative standards satisfactory to the Social Security Board.

CAREER SERVICE.

The protecting dykes of legislation and administrative standards are therefore being extended and strengthened. Within the areas thus reclaimed substantial progress has marked civil service trends of recent years. The impulse to the reconsideration of the American stock of ideas on the public service was provided by the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel. This unofficial body, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council, stressed the importance of envisaging the public service as a career, struck out against the fallacies in American thinking about governmental personnel, and urged the substantial reconstruction of the service along professional lines.

Quiet progress in the national government in the direction of a career service has already been recorded. Means have been invented to recruit and to place a new type of college and university graduate from the liberal arts institutions; a new examination for men and women with graduate training or special experience in the fields of economics, political science and sociology has been announced; new procedures to facilitate transfer from one agency to another have been proposed; more careful promotion procedures have been introduced in several organizations and are under consideration elsewhere; and in general a new appreciation of the importance of training and developing personnel for the higher professional and supervisory grades is evident on all sides. However, a proposal to increase the pay scale for the higher permanent personnel from \$9,000, the present maximum, to \$15,000, found no favour in Congress; and there is a disconcerting tendency on the part of some

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members of the present Congress to insist on senatorial confirmation of all appointments to positions paying over \$5,000 a year. This policy is, of course, fatal to a career service.

The national service has suffered by reason of the absence of any considered procedure for the development of supervisory, executive, and administrative talent. Under American conditions it is undesirable to follow the English practice of special recruitment by means of a difficult university examination for an administrative corps, nor has the United States an educational institution like the *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques*. Emphasis upon a legal training such as prevails for the German higher service has never been conceived as a suitable basis for the more responsible work in the American service. The United States has, in a word, neither a well-defined administrative corps nor a recognized system of preparation for higher administrative work.

Recognition of the need for special procedures to prepare men for responsible work is, however, gaining ground rapidly both in Washington and in municipal government. It seems unlikely, however, that a separate administrative corps will be formed.

In municipal affairs, the city manager is the principal illustration of the general administrator. The number of managers is steadily increasing, and their background and preparation is gradually receding from engineering and "business administration" to general administration.

PRE-ENTRY AND IN-SERVICE TRAINING.

The expansion of facilities for training young civil servants has been one of the notable trends of recent years. In the cities this movement commenced about 1928, the initiative proceeding from the various state leagues of municipalities. Short courses in such fields of municipal administration as police, fire, assessment or evaluation of

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property are widespread ; less frequent are courses in drafting by-laws, street cleaning, operation of municipal utilities, disposal of sewage, and the like. Such instruction contributes much to steady improvement in the tone of municipal affairs.

In Washington, the "in-service" training movement took on substantial form in 1922 with the foundation of the Graduate School of the Department of Agriculture, designed for further training along scientific lines of the research and technical personnel of this justly famed department. Within recent years, new training facilities have been developed by the Bureau of the Census, the Bureau of Prisons, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Income Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Bureau of Investigation in the Department of Justice, the Civil Service Commission, and other agencies. Co-operative courses have been worked out in several instances between government bureaus and American University, an institution of higher learning located in Washington. The demand for in-service training increases more rapidly than the facilities, a reflection in part of the new type of college graduate now entering the national service.

Another type of training facility is illustrated by the programme of the School of Government of the University of Southern California. An evening professional training programme is conducted in the city hall and adjacent buildings ; a short annual summer "Institute of Government" provides lectures on a wide variety of administrative problems ; and in addition the regular facilities of the university are open to municipal, county, state and federal officials located in Los Angeles.

In 1935, Harvard University announced the foundation of the Graduate School of Public Administration "to promote the science and art of government administration." The Graduate School, a separate organization giving instruc-

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tion through its own faculty, will also serve as a co-ordinating agency to make available the entire resources of Harvard University for public service men.

TECHNIQUE OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

Coincident with the recognition of the value of extensive training for public service employment has arisen a wider appreciation of the task and opportunities of the personnel director. In the development of the American service, the traditional civil service commission has been conceived principally as a protective agency designed to thwart the appointment of incompetent persons for irrelevant reasons. It has usually stood somewhat aloof from the departments, an enforcement rather than a service agency. Within the larger units of administration, the necessity of maintaining various types of records led at an early date to the development of an office known as the appointment clerk, or the chief clerk, whose responsibility was to see that records of appointments and changes of status were in due order.

The personnel officer performs neither of these functions, although he is concerned with both. It is the task of the personnel officer to secure by all means within his power a smooth working, harmonious organization producing at full capacity by virtue of the wisest utilization of its human resources. He has less responsibility than influence, for responsibility rests primarily with the operating heads of the organization and its subdivisions. Working with them, the personnel officer will aid in the selection, placement, reassignment, transfer, promotion and discipline of employees ; will assist in the improvement of techniques of supervision ; will encourage the discussion of work problems and aid in their solution ; will co-operate in training programmes and in opening opportunities to promising juniors ; and will seek in many ways to raise the morale of his group.

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Such personnel officers have been making their way into the public service, commencing over a decade ago in the Department of Agriculture and the Forest Service, and recently in the Department of Labour and in such newer agencies as Farm Credit Administration, Resettlement Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Home Owners' Loan Corporation, Rural Electrification Administration, Soil Conservation Service, and others. In 1936 an examination for personnel officers was held, the first in the history of the Civil Service Commission. In 1937 the personnel officers in Washington formed the Society for Personnel Administration. The Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada is now favouring the formal recognition of professional standards for personnel officials.

UNION ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE PUBLIC SERVICE.

The trend in recent years is towards a wider recognition of the competence of civil service employees to form either professional associations or unions. In the national service, statutory recognition of the right to organize unions and to affiliate with organized labour under conditions prohibiting strikes has existed since 1912; postal organizations were formed as early as 1890. In 1932 the National Federation of Federal Employees, the largest general union, suffered a secession of a minority group at the time it withdrew from the American Federation of Labour. This minority group, the American Federation of Government Employees, has had a stormy history, and in 1936 and 1937 several units were separated from it. These are now being absorbed by the United Federal Workers of America, a unit of the C.I.O. (Committee for Industrial Organization). The outcome of this realignment is not clear, but these events have caused renewed interest in the role of civil service unions.

Speaking at a press conference on July 8, 1937, President

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Roosevelt is reported to have stated that while government employees have no right to strike and no basis for collective bargaining "contracts" on wages and hours (which are fixed by statute), they should be permitted to join "one or ten unions" and to enjoy the free exercise of collective bargaining in matters where administrative officers have some discretion, whether as unions, minority groups, or individuals.

The union movement is relatively undeveloped in the state services, many of which are not yet on a stable foundation. Active state organizations exist, however, in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and California, together with a few less important groups in other states. Within the large cities, unions have been active for a generation. Only in 1936 were the first steps taken to bring them into a common organization. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees is a definitely union group, affiliated with the American Federation of Labour. It is now competing with the Committee on Industrial Organization.

The National Association of Civil Service Employee Organizations unites the New Jersey state employees, and municipal employees in Cleveland; Flint, Michigan; and Chicago. It is not affiliated with the labour movement although friendly to organized labour. These national organizations are still too young to permit a forecast of their future, but the potential field of nearly 2,000,000 state and municipal employees is not likely to be overlooked.

PERSONNEL POLICIES OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY.

On August 28, 1935, the Tennessee Valley Authority announced an Employee Relationship Policy, the terms of which represent an advanced position towards which general trends appear to be moving. This Authority, although an agency of the national government, was excluded from the

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provisions of the Civil Service Act ; in lieu of this safeguard, the Authority was directed to follow the principle of merit, and has in fact done so. Acting with complete freedom so far as federal statutes governing employment are concerned, the Authority has developed a programme of which the following are the principal features :

1. Every member of the staff of the Authority is obliged to render honest, efficient and economical service, in the public interest.
2. For the purposes of collective bargaining and employee-management co-operation, employees have the right to organize and to designate representatives of their own choosing, free from any restraint, interference or coercion.
3. No employee and no one seeking employment shall be required to join or to refrain from joining any association of employees.
4. The majority of the employees as a whole, or of any professional group, or craft, or other appropriate unit, shall have the right to determine the organization, person or persons who shall represent them.
5. Disputes between an employee and the management shall be handled through established supervisory channels, with an opportunity to appeal to the central office of the Personnel Division for adjustment.
6. Appointments, promotions, demotion and transfer will be made on the basis of merit and efficiency. No test of political belief or affiliation will be required. If an employee, who is doing the best work he can in good spirit, is found to be unsuited for the tasks to which he is assigned, an earnest effort is made to reassign him. Employment is not a vested right.
7. Supervisors may for just cause terminate the service of any employee, in writing, subject to an appeal to the Personnel Division.
8. "The Board of Directors looks forward to the establishment of joint conferences between the duly authorized representatives of the supervised employees and the supervisory and management staff for the

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purpose of systematic employee-management co-operation. The Board recognizes that responsible organizations and associations of employees are helpful to such co-operation."

These policies have been conscientiously pursued by the Authority, which has had the advantage of an unusually progressive and able personnel division. Their success has raised the question whether the more rigid system of the national government has not delayed similar progress in Washington ; the better view is that the national system is flexible enough to permit much progressive experimentation as the modern type of personnel officer makes his influence felt.

A CIVIL SERVICE ADMINISTRATOR.

The boldest challenge to the existing personnel system in Washington comes from the President's Committee on Administrative Management. In their report, which has been warmly endorsed by President Roosevelt, the Committee recommend the elimination of the Civil Service Commission in favour of a Civil Service Administrator, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for an indefinite term, from among three names certified to the President on the basis of an open competitive (but not written) examination.

Opposition to this proposal is due chiefly to fear lest a single administrator be unable to withstand pressure from Congress for political favours, and to reluctance to increase the influence of the Chief Executive. Advocates of the plan urge that it will lead to more positive and effective personnel management, and that it will raise personnel management to a more important level by recognizing it, together with fiscal management and national planning, as one of the three major administrative responsibilities of the President himself.

THE TRADE-UNION MOVEMENT

By GEORGE SOULE.

WHEN the historian comes to assess the New Deal in the United States, he may be led to the judgment that its most significant social change was a reinvigorated trade-union movement. New legislative ideas in profusion were tried, abandoned or modified; reforms were enacted by the score; but no abiding alteration was made in the basic structure of our economy; much that was done had, in principle, long been familiar to England and to continental democracies. Alone among western industrial nations, however, the United States had never before produced a labour movement having an influence in industry and politics commensurate with the development of a machine civilization. If now at last we are to have one, a powerful social force will have been created that will outlive the excitements of the day.

The last time a burst of activity occurred in the trade-unions was during the great war of 1914-18 and immediately afterwards. Growth was natural on account of full employment and a rising cost of living. When this country entered the war, a governmentally administered truce was informally accepted by industrial and trade-union leaders. Strikes were discouraged; disputes were settled by arbitration under the National War Labour Board and subordinate bodies; it was agreed that neither side would use the crisis to seek any fundamental alteration of status. Samuel Gompers, though forceful and shrewd, was both patriotic and a stout adherent of conservative trade-union policies. He was as fearful of radical ferment in the rank and file as he was hostile to anti-union employers. The result was a temporary enlargement of membership and improvement of standards, but no notable

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gains of organization in the great industries that had hitherto resisted unionization. There was no attempt to organize the iron and steel mills for instance until the autumn of 1919, and then it was a failure.

With the deflation of war industries and the general post-war depression, the unions were greatly weakened; the arbitration machinery and safeguards were scrapped; employers used the occasion to take the aggressive with a campaign to break up unions, which they attempted to make palatable with the name of "American plan." By 1923, the trade-union movement had lost its war-time gains in membership, and a defeatist attitude was fastened upon most of its leaders.

They were impressed by the ruthless power and obstinacy of the great corporations; they had found the newly organized members either embarrassing in their militancy or too dependent on governmental intervention. The units organized during the war and now destroyed were called, just like the industrial stocks which had profited by temporary inflation, "war babies." The leaders preferred to safeguard what they had left by being as inoffensive as possible. The final outbursts of militancy in the bitterly contested strikes of 1922 in railroads and mines, and the unsuccessful LaFollette Progressive campaign for the Presidency in 1924 (which was largely supported by the more aggressive unions) left the leaders with no more stomach for adventure.

We had, then, at the beginning of the Coolidge Era of prosperity, a trade-union membership of some 2,500,000 out of about 40,000,000 gainfully occupied persons, of whom perhaps 20,000,000 were, theoretically, prospective union members. The majority of these were in unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labour, a loose federation with no central power except to decide inter-union disputes about demarcation, and no function except to exert political pressure

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and to represent the movement to the public. The Federation, though it contained both craft and industrial unions, clung to a craft-union orientation and had no initiative in enlarging the scope of the movement. Its strongest sections were the building trades, the coal miners, the railway workers not employed on trains—who were organized on the craft basis and coöperated in collective bargaining through a loose alliance of their own—and the garment workers. Though the ranks were filled out with scores of miscellaneous unions, labour was not effectively organized in any of the great basic industries except coal and railroads, and unions scarcely had a foothold in the newer mass-production industries like automobiles.

Though it is usual for trade-unions to grow and become more active in periods of boom, no such development occurred between 1923 and 1929. The coal industry had a special depression of its own, and the United Mine Workers were seriously weakened. The building trades, which were benefited by a construction revival, did increase in numbers and power; they were the most conservative element in the Federation. In general, the movement did not advance. Some commentators attributed this fact to exhaustion after the recent defeats and the inertia of the leadership. The leaders themselves argued that they could not compete successfully with employers for the loyalty of the rank and file of unorganized workers, who were misled by expensive propaganda and elaborate spy-systems, cowed by the immense power of the great employers, and corrupted by the hope of higher wages and personal advancement. Whatever the facts, the unions had neither the proper form of organization to offer to the semi-skilled in the new industries nor the alert personnel necessary to enlist their confidence. It was furthermore observed that this boom was distinguished from previous ones by extremely rapid technical advance, which kept in existence

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a large reservoir of unemployed and prevented the cost of living from rising. Thus workers, contrary to their experience in former periods of industrial activity, were neither freed from the fear of losing their jobs if they should strike, nor spurred to make demands for higher wages by rising prices. The depression beginning in 1929 of course brought further weakness to the trade-unions.

The beginning of the present revival in the labour movement may be traced to the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (N.I.R.A.) in 1933. It was the announced purpose of President Roosevelt to increase wages and shorten hours, and legal powers to do so were embodied in this law. Still more important, however, was its famous section 7A, which guaranteed to workers the right of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, and outlawed certain familiar anti-union measures, such as "company unions," or those instigated or controlled by employers. This looked like a charter of freedom to industrial workers who formerly had been afraid to organize; now the prestige and power of the national government appeared to be on their side. In spite of the large volume of unemployment, new unions sprang into existence on every hand, clamouring for advice and leadership from the existing labour movement. But the American Federation of Labour was not prepared to meet this demand, and anti-union employers soon recovered from their shock and began to defy the law by challenging it in the courts or on the industrial battle-field. In numerous instances the administration failed to satisfy the workers' expectation that government would protect them in organizing. It was afraid of a constitutional test of the new legislation, and so failed to check important employers who disregarded the law. In other cases section 7A was interpreted so that union representation was divided and weakened. While substantial gains were made, the mass-production

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industries still remained outside the trade-union realm. Finally the Supreme Court declared the whole National Recovery Administration unconstitutional.

Important events, however, had occurred within the fold of organized labour during this period. Those unions that were strongly and aggressively led had succeeded, under the N.R.A., not only in reforming their ranks and maintaining good standards of wages and hours but also in exerting influence in reconstruction of their respective industries. The United Mine Workers of America was completely rehabilitated and its President, John L. Lewis, emerged as a highly successful national leader. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers, under the skilful guidance of President Sidney Hillman, achieved a like result, and Mr. Hillman as a member of the official Labour Advisory Board of the N.R.A. exerted a wide influence. It became obvious that the N.R.A. was strong and ably administered in those industries where labour could make it so; that it faltered and failed where dependence had to be placed solely on governmental enforcement and the activities of employers. Success in their own industries convinced the more aggressive and capable union officials that the same results could be achieved in others if only effective leadership were given to the workers in them. It was also clear that two things chiefly prevented the offering of necessary assistance—the timidity and incompetence of the old-line A.F. of L. officialism, and the refusal of the A.F. of L. to permit the building up of powerful industrial unions in the mass-production industries, because of the jurisdictional claims of craft unions.

In the meantime, reactionary opposition to the President and the forces behind him was gaining headway. It was feared that the New Deal might be succeeded by a new anti-union drive like that which had followed the war, if not indeed by a more openly fascist movement. This appre-

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hension was strengthened by the revelations of Senator La Follette's committee investigating violations of civil liberties, which showed the large extent of industrial espionage, the enormous amount of money spent upon it by great corporations, and the violence and corruption which it stimulated in the effort to disrupt and defeat labour organization. Plants were arming themselves with machine-guns and tear gas. In one case a close alliance was shown between a company engaged in selling arms and ammunition to employers, an anti-labour spy agency, and a firm of attorneys who specialized in representing employers against labour in the courts. The American Liberty League, financed largely by contributions from moneyed interests bitterly opposed to organized labour, formed a lawyer's committee, which declared, in advance of the Supreme Court decision, that the new laws protecting unions were unconstitutional, and announced that it would supply assistance to employers engaged in litigation against their enforcement. (Soon after the N.R.A. was invalidated by the high court, the Wagner Labour Relations Act, embodying and improving upon the provisions of its Section 7A, was passed by Congress.)

The more aggressive labour leaders saw on the one hand what might be done to strengthen the trade-union movement by prompt and effective action, and feared on the other that if the opportunity were lost, their own organizations would be in danger. Indeed, they believed that this was a critical period not only in the history of the labour movement, but in American history as a whole. If Mr. Roosevelt and what he had stood for should be defeated, reactionary forces might be in the saddle for another generation. The industrial workers should therefore be mobilized to exert political as well as economic power. In two conventions of the American Federation of Labour these leaders succeeded in obtaining the passage of resolutions in favour of the action they desired, but

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they saw that the Federation officials either would not or could not act on the basis of the resolutions. They therefore formed the Committee for Industrial Organization, for the purpose of assisting the organization of the unorganized. Associated in this Committee were the strong and successful United Mine Workers, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, International Ladies' Garment Workers, International Typographical Union and other unions of minor or more potential importance, such as the United Textile Workers, Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, United Automobile Workers, the Aluminium Workers, Glass Workers, Oil Workers, etc. The committee and its aims were at once challenged by the A. F. of L. officialdom, which called upon it to disband, as a dual or competing movement representing a minority of the Federation. The Committee declined to do so, and the unions composing it were, after much controversy and fruitless effort to compromise, suspended from the Federation. This left, as the backbone of the Federation, the conservative building trades, the railroad men, the teamsters and a large number of miscellaneous craft unions. Among these loyal unions there are a number of capable and progressive bodies. Throughout the Federation, both among the rank and file and the officialdom, there is much sympathy with the aims of the C.I.O., and regret that the Federation had to be split on this issue.

The C.I.O. at once proceeded to act by contributing large sums of money and experienced organizers to the industrial battleground. The prestige of the unions composing it and of their leaders called forth confidence in the unorganized rank and file; this seemed to be what they had been waiting for. New members flocked into its ranks in the great unorganized industries. Other unions came to it from the A. F. of L. or from the outside. It was not long before the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Labour Relations Act in

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a series of unexpectedly sweeping decisions. This increased the *élan* of the movement. Employers, welcoming rapidly expanding business, were reluctant to incur the loss of prolonged strikes. Victories were won in rubber manufacturing and elsewhere. The first spectacular success, however, occurred in the automobile industry, where a series of "sit-down" strikes won victories against General Motors and all the independents except Henry Ford. Even more startling was the signing of a union contract with United States Steel as a result of peaceful negotiations, since from the time of its formation some forty years ago this huge corporation had been the foremost enemy of organized labour in the United States. There followed the organization of all but three or four of the largest steel independents. For the moment it looked as if the C.I.O. were invincible. It swept impressively on, gaining members more rapidly than it could discipline them or train the subordinate leadership.

Such rapid progress was of course bound to produce a reaction. A spirited controversy arose over the sit-down strike—which was not an invention of the C.I.O. and has not been employed in many of its combats—and over the sporadic violence which was bound to occur under the circumstances. A premature and poorly mobilized strike against the recalcitrant steel independents failed in its major object. A large number of unauthorized local stoppages to protest grievances occurred, contrary to the terms of the contract, in General Motors plants. Employers and local public officials, echoed by the conservative press, began to embitter a section of public opinion against the new movement by raising the red bogey and talking of union irresponsibility, the supposedly dictatorial aims of John L. Lewis, and the "right to work" of the non-striking employee. There is no doubt that mistakes were made in the campaign of the C.I.O. and that there was a lack of experience and discipline among the new organizations.

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Nevertheless the set-back which it suffered has been much exaggerated, and has not stopped the advance.

In steel some 400,000 workers are now organized and under collective contracts, against perhaps 75,000 in the independent plants concerned in the abortive strike. In automobiles only Ford remains to be won; the aircraft workers are organized. Impressive progress has been made in rubber, oil, aluminum, transport, shoes and other industries. At this moment large gains are being made by a carefully conceived and well executed campaign in textiles—an industry never successfully organized in the United States. The new Maritime Federation is rapidly winning its field. In scarcely more than a year of intensive activity, the C.I.O. has acquired a membership of about 3,000,000, nearly trebling the number in its original units. In the same year the A. F. of L. unions, stimulated by the competition, have increased their membership by about 600,000. The total trade-union movement has nearly doubled as a result, and now has approximately 6,000,000 members. More significant than the numerical growth is the advance into strategic territory, hitherto believed impenetrable by organized labour. Among the campaigns contemplated for the future, one of the most interesting is that designed to enlist the "white-collar" or clerical and professional occupations. Most of the victories have been won without the strikes or the violence that have made such lively reading in newspaper despatches.

The political influence of the new movement is more intangible but is unmistakable. Because the national elections occurred in 1936, political activity had to be undertaken before the industrial campaign was well under way. It was headed by a new organization, inspired by C.I.O. leaders, called Labour's Non-Partisan League, which mobilized labour votes behind President Roosevelt and local candidates whom the unions could trust. Local labour parties were organized

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as permanent units, such as the American Labour Party in New York. In these efforts A. F. of L. unions coöperated with the C.I.O. The overwhelming victory of Mr. Roosevelt and of progressive local candidates in the great industrial states provided the surprise of the election, since many of these states had traditionally been under the dominance of Republicans, and it was not expected that the old political bosses would lose control of all of them, even when opposed by such a popular presidential candidate. It is not believed that the labour movement is ready yet for a national labour party nominating its own candidates; it first wants to protect its opportunity to organize on the industrial field, and it can do this better at the moment through such friendly candidates as are put forward by existing parties. Much depends upon what happens to Mr. Roosevelt and the Democratic party before 1940. If it splits, its progressive wing may become a sort of people's front, with labour support. If the conservatives gain control of the party machinery, a new national party may be the outcome.

What of the breach in the trade-union movement itself? It has been steadily widening ever since the formation of the C.I.O., and the chances are that this committee will soon be reorganized as a permanent and regular central Congress of unions. Paradoxically, however, this action may bring unity nearer. The more sober leaders of both C.I.O. and A. F. of L. have tried to avoid conflicts in the field of action; major attention has been devoted to the hitherto unorganized rather than to setting up competing unions. The common sense of the rank and file will exert a pressure for unity. The C.I.O. has impressively achieved a large part of what it set out to do, and thus has proved to many in the A. F. of L. that its original contentions were valid. The advantages of being allied with strong unions in other industries will not escape attention by either party. As the mass-production industries become

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firmly organized in the industrial form, the jurisdictional claims over them of craft-union officials will be seen to be impractical; history will have settled the dispute. In such a rapidly growing movement there is no problem of taking care of surplus officials; plenty of work can be found for all those competent to do it. Most of the irreconcilables in the A. F. of L. are rapidly approaching superannuation. In the meantime, the competition has been more healthy than destructive; both rivals have gained. Strong personal enmities remain and may prevent compromise, but the chances are that irreconcilables will in the end be deserted by their rank and file.

Two important dangers still threaten the movement. One is the very rapidity of its growth. There has not been time to train the necessary captains and non-commissioned officers, and new members cannot acquire experience and trade-union discipline overnight. Overconfidence, rash action and mistakes of judgment may imperil the raw troops that have pushed this great salient so far into the enemy's territory. Knowledge of these facts and preparation to guard against them are not lacking in the higher command. The other peril is that the present upswing of business activity will soon be succeeded by another recession, and that unemployment, which is still serious, will increase again. In this case the offensive must give way to rearguard action, in which losses are inevitable, and undisciplined troops may be routed. It is not likely, however, that either danger will cause more than minor and temporary checks. The chances are that the recent victories can be consolidated before the present favourable situation changes materially. If prosperity arrives and continues for several years, the unions are likely to become a major, perhaps a determining force in American society.

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By OSCAR B. RYDER

THE years which have elapsed since 1929 have brought significant developments in the foreign trade policies of the United States, till the end of 1933 principally in the direction of increases, but since then principally in the direction of decreases, in trade restrictions.

The first result of the depression was an extension of the protectionist system. Although in 1922, after a decade of lower tariff policy, the tariff had been restored to a high level, it was further increased in June, 1930. The 1930 increase, although initiated early in 1929, was nevertheless largely influenced by the depression and by conditions, particularly in certain branches of agriculture, which foreshadowed it. Since 1930 there has been no legislation imposing new or higher tariff duties as such—that is, as amendments to the Tariff Act. What, however, are in effect additional duties have been imposed in successive Internal Revenue Acts, under the guise of excise taxes on importation or on the first processing of materials which are entirely imported. By imposing import charges in these acts it was possible to avoid the almost insuperable difficulties in the way of separate tariff legislation on specific commodities or groups of commodities and to lessen the chances of a presidential veto.

The Internal Revenue Act of 1932 imposed excise taxes on imports of lumber, coal and coke, copper and copper products, and petroleum and petroleum products. These taxes, urged largely as emergency measures, were first imposed for two years, but were later extended to July 1, 1939.

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Agitation by certain farm groups came to fruition when the Internal Revenue Acts of 1934, 1935 and 1936 completed a thoroughgoing system of charges on imported animal and vegetable oils and oil seeds. The duties on such oils in the Tariff Act of 1930, applying chiefly to edible oils, were extended and supplemented by taxes on imports, or on the first processing in the United States, of soap and paint oils. Coconut oil is subjected to a processing tax of 3 cents per pound if made of Philippine copra, of 5 cents if made of copra of any other origin. This marks, in effect, a departure from the policy of admitting all commodities from the Philippines free of duty.

A second consequence of the depression was a tendency towards quantitative limitations on imports. Absolute import quotas have been imposed by direct governmental action on sugar from all sources, on tobacco from Cuba, on cordage from the Philippines, and on red cedar shingles, which come entirely from Canada. The import quota on sugar, imposed contemporaneously with a reduction in duty on Cuban sugar, is part of a general quota arrangement applying also to marketing sugar produced in the United States and its possessions, including the Philippines; that on Cuban tobacco followed restrictions on marketing of domestic cigar tobacco and lapsed with their abandonment.

In addition to these quotas imposed by the United States government, informal agreements were made with foreign countries whereby they restricted exports of certain commodities to the United States to a stated volume or percentage of United States consumption. The first agreements of this kind resulted from the regulation of industry under the National Industrial Recovery Act and were in lieu of action, under that law, directly restricting imports.

Recently the tendency has been for domestic and Japanese producing interests to make private agreements in which the

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Japanese obligate themselves to limit their shipments to the United States and the Americans bind themselves not to seek further governmental restrictions on imports. Early in 1937, private agreements were made regarding cotton cloth, on which duties had previously been increased under the flexible tariff provision, and regarding cotton hosiery, cotton velveteens and corduroys, on which investigations under that provision were in process. Moreover, the intergovernmental agreement for a limitation of Japanese exports of cotton rugs to the United States was transformed into a private agreement. Arrangements such as these result in a division of the market between Japanese and American producers.

Despite the developments outlined above, certain underlying factors were working towards more liberal foreign trade policies.

In the first place, since the World War, the United States has occupied a creditor position. However, the direct influence on tariff policies of this change from its traditional debtor position has been small. Certainly the change did not prevent an increase in the tariff in 1921-22 nor in 1930, although in the intervening years the United States strengthened its creditor position by making large private loans and investments abroad.

More important was the domestic agricultural situation. Before the depression, and more markedly during it, United States exports of agricultural products declined. Large surpluses of commodities accumulated, and prices fell to unprecedentedly low levels. In consequence, it became essential to general recovery that domestic agricultural production be drastically restricted or that lost export markets be regained.

Another significant factor was the foreign trade policies of certain countries, their effects on American trade, and the attitude in opposition to them adopted by the Department of State.

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The logic of the tariff policy and economic position of the United States led the Department of State, beginning in 1922, to support the unconditional form of the most-favoured-nation clause. This reversal of a traditional policy corrected an anomalous situation. Although prior to the passage of the Trade Agreements Act in 1934, the United States had a single-column tariff except for exclusive concessions to Cuba, nevertheless it formally adhered until 1922 to the principle of unequal tariff treatment as expressed in the conditional form of the most-favoured-nation clause. It, therefore, could not consistently demand most-favoured-nation treatment from countries having multiple-column tariffs. By adopting the unconditional clause the United States, as did the United Kingdom long before, put itself in a better tactical position to insist upon being given lowest tariff rates without any compensating concessions.

After 1930, many countries adopted quantitative limitations on imports and clearing agreements obviating the use of foreign exchange. Countries using these new methods of reducing trade developed also a tendency towards bilateral trade balancing. Because of this tendency, and of difficulties in meeting their obligations to the United States, with which most of them had adverse trade balances, European countries were prone to use quotas to reduce the proportions in which various articles were imported from the United States. The Department of State made frequent protest against quotas in general and specifically against their use to discriminate against American trade.

The contraction of markets for American exports, to which multiple-column tariffs, quotas and clearing agreements had materially contributed, naturally suggested that the United States should take the lead in a programme of mutual reduction of trade barriers, particularly since the tariff policies of the United States had helped create the situation.

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The factors discussed above had their influence, but together they would not have sufficed to bring about the turn in 1934 towards more moderate tariff policies had the Democratic Party not come into power in 1933. Despite protectionists in its ranks, that party stood committed by tradition and platform to tariff reduction. The tradition in this respect has been strongly reinforced by the leadership of Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

With the active support of the Roosevelt Administration a law was passed, against strong opposition, in June, 1934, authorizing the negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements. This authority, at first granted for three years, was in 1937 extended to June, 1940. Under it the President makes agreements with foreign countries for mutual reductions in trade barriers. These agreements become effective by proclamation of the President without submission to the Senate for ratification. His power, however, is limited by a provision forbidding any increase or decrease in duty of more than 50 per cent. or any transfer between the dutiable and the free lists.

An important provision of the Trade Agreements Act requires that concessions made to any one country shall be generalized on the principle of equal treatment of all countries. The Act itself, however, authorizes exclusive concessions to Cuba. It also specifically authorizes the President to suspend extension of concessions to any country found to be discriminating against the commerce of the United States. However, although many countries discriminate in one way or another against American trade, only two, Germany and Australia, which have done so openly and flagrantly, have so far been denied the benefits of concessions made to other countries.

The practice of extending to all "non-discriminating" countries the concessions made in any agreement has

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influenced the character of concessions made by the United States in much the same way as it has influenced those made by other countries pursuing the same policy. In order to reserve bargaining power for other countries, the United States has followed the general policy of confining concessions to any country to articles of which that country is the principal, or a high-ranking, supplier. On the whole the rule has worked out well, although occasional difficulties have arisen.

The effort to meet the demands of a particular country without serious impairment of bargaining power needed for other countries has given rise to further refinement in tariff classification. Although a country may not be the principal supplier under an existing classification, a sub-classification may sometimes be made to cover the particular variety of which it is the chief source.

As a precaution against the possible effects of extending concessions to third countries, most of the trade agreements provide that should third countries obtain the major benefits of any duty concession, and should an unduly large increase in total importations result, the concession may be withdrawn or a quantitative restriction imposed. This provision is a weapon to be used in extreme circumstances to protect a domestic industry from ruinous competition from third countries. In case either country acts under it, the other country has the right to terminate the agreement.

So far trade agreements have been made with sixteen countries (including Cuba) which together supplied in 1935 41 per cent. of United States imports and took 34 per cent. of United States exports. Concessions made in these agreements affect every schedule of the tariff act and, taken together, constitute a substantial tariff reduction. On about 440 dutiable items out of about 3,200, duties have been reduced to all non-discriminating countries, and on 25 additional

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items exclusive concessions have been made to Cuba. These items represented about 25 per cent. of the dutiable imports in 1935. In addition, duties have been bound against increase on 23 items accounting for more than 2 per cent. of dutiable imports in that year, and free entry has been bound on 77 items constituting more than 35 per cent. of the free imports. A simple average of the percentages of reductions on items on which duties have been lowered in agreements is about 35 per cent. These reductions, and the substantial concessions received in return for them, have contributed materially to the recovery of the foreign trade of the United States since 1933.

The countries other than Cuba with which trade agreements have been made are Canada, six European countries—Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, and Finland, and eight tropical American countries—Haiti, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. In the agreements with the tropical American countries the United States in return for duty reductions, chiefly on manufactures, binds the free entry of such tropical products as coffee and bananas—the principal exports of those countries—and grants duty reductions on the few dutiable articles coming chiefly or largely from those countries.

A survey of the principal problems arising in the negotiation of the trade agreements so far made may prove of interest.

One problem is connected with the programmes of the New Deal for governmental regulation of agriculture and industry. Provisions of law have been enacted authorizing additional import restrictions when necessary to safeguard against such increases in imports as may render these programmes ineffective. To meet this situation the provision in trade agreements prohibiting quotas on imports of concession articles makes exception of quotas imposed "in conjunction

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with governmental measures operating to regulate or control the production, market supply, or prices . . . or (in some agreements) tending to increase the labour costs of production." This exception was not invoked under the National Industrial Recovery Act or the Agricultural Adjustment Act, both no longer in force, nor has it been invoked so far under the still effective Soil Conservation Act. The Labour Standards Bill now pending before Congress, like the acts named, authorizes action to prevent measures taken under it from being rendered ineffective by excessive increases in imports.

Another difficulty is that in a number of countries quota limitations are for many commodities the effective form of import restriction. So far agreements have been made with three such countries, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and France, largely on the basis of duty concessions by the United States in return for quota concessions by these countries. In each case, however, the European country also made some duty reductions.

In dealing with the quota problem, the United States insists only that it be given a fair share of any quota established on any article in which it has an interest. The trade agreements provide that in the case of quotas established by either party the other party shall be given a share based upon its position as a supplier in a representative period prior to the imposition of quantitative restrictions. Both parties to the agreement are left free to discriminate among the other supplying countries. Thus, the United States, although itself maintaining a policy of equal treatment, has not attempted to effect the complete reform of a country's trade policies as the condition of making an agreement with it.

In order to prevent apprehension on the part of the interests involved and to avoid the possibility of serious injury to them, the United States, in reducing the tariff on

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certain agricultural and forest products in its agreement with Canada, resorted to the use of "tariff quotas" limiting the increase in imports at the reduced duties. Imports in excess of specified quantities of heavy cattle, calves, milk cows, cream, seed potatoes, and lumber of Douglas fir and western hemlock, remain dutiable at the full rates. Although these tariff quotas are global, they have not been allocated among supplying countries, since the commodities in question come either exclusively, or almost exclusively, from Canada. In 1936 the quotas for heavy cattle and calves were filled and, in addition, small quantities came in at the full duty. The effective limitations on imports of the other four commodities were the reduced duties, as in no case were the quotas filled.

An entirely different problem arises with countries which have multiple-column tariff systems and which refuse to extend most-favoured-nation treatment automatically in return for such treatment. Agreements have already been made with two such countries, Canada and France. Canada granted the United States the lowest non-Empire rates on all products; France, the lowest rates except on a limited list of articles with respect to which the United States has no important interest.

Uncertainty concerning the stability of currency values has created still another difficulty. This has been met by a provision in a number of agreements that should "a wide variation occur in the rate of exchange between the currencies of the two countries . . . the government of either country . . . shall be free to propose negotiations for the modification" of the agreement or for its termination. No use has been made of this provision, although it is in the agreements with Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and France, all of which have since devalued their currencies.

Of the countries with which agreements have not yet been made, some present in more acute form certain of the

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problems discussed above, or present other and more difficult problems.

A number of these countries are principal or important suppliers of few, if any, of the commodities imported into the United States. With them it will be difficult to go beyond limited agreements based largely on mutual most-favoured-nation treatment. The advantage accruing to any country from the extension to it of concessions made to other countries grows, however, with the number of such concessions.

A greater difficulty will arise in making trade agreements on the unconditional most-favoured-nation principle with countries which have rigid exchange controls, which subject imports to licensing without fixed global quotas, or which have entered into clearing agreements covering the bulk of their trade. Obviously these arrangements might nullify any duty or quota concession made in a trade agreement. So far, the United States has made no agreement with any country pursuing these policies in a pronounced form although negotiations with Czechoslovakia have been announced. Switzerland has a number of clearing agreements, but they do not affect, to any great extent, the commodities which Switzerland might be expected to import from the United States. Moreover, Switzerland has not exercised any rigid form of exchange control.

Even greater are the difficulties in the way of agreements with countries, such as Germany, which conduct their foreign trade and exchange transactions on bases diametrically opposed to those of the United States. Under present conditions it would be difficult to find even a *modus vivendi* which would partially bridge the gap separating the two foreign trade systems. In the case of the Soviet Union, however, a satisfactory method of accommodation has been found. Agreements have been made for a year at a time in

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accordance with which the United States undertakes to extend to the Soviet Union the tariff concessions made in trade agreements with other countries, in return for the promise of the Soviet Union to take a specified minimum total value of American goods, or, as in the agreement for 1937-38, to increase its takings of them.

But the most pressing problem, from the standpoint of further progress in the trade-agreements programme, relates to the agricultural situation both in the United States and in foreign countries. In this regard the principal countries with which the United States has yet to make agreements fall into two groups. In the one are the primarily agricultural countries of the temperate zone, such as Argentina and Australia, which import from the United States chiefly manufactures and which export principally agricultural products more or less similar to those produced in the United States. In the other are primarily industrial countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Czechoslovakia, which afford principal markets for agricultural products of the United States and which export principally manufactured products.

The concessions which the United States can make to the agricultural group of countries must consist principally of duty reductions on agricultural commodities more or less competitive with domestic production. Such reductions may be difficult, however, owing to the persistent tendency towards agricultural protection in the United States, a tendency which is the harder to combat because of the contraction of export markets for American farm commodities resulting from the extreme agricultural protectionism prevalent among European countries. In fact, it may prove impossible to lower duties on typical products of the agricultural countries unless further concessions can be obtained from the industrial countries of Europe affording increased export opportunities for American agricultural

products. In the agreements so far made, substantial concessions have been secured on certain classes of these products. In general, however, the largest agricultural import markets are in countries with which agreements are yet to be negotiated.

The negotiation of a trade agreement with the United Kingdom presents special problems. Inasmuch as the United Kingdom has been the principal market for American agricultural products, and inasmuch as the British tariff and imperial preferences tend progressively to reduce the share of the British market obtained by the United States, the procurement of more favourable treatment for these products in that market is a *sine qua non* of any agreement in which the United States may make substantial reductions in duties on imports of British manufactures. The principal obstacle is the Empire preferences under the Ottawa Agreements.

The origin of this situation is interesting and instructive. In 1922 and 1930, the United States raised its tariff. The consequent decline in American imports of the agricultural products of the Dominions, and of the manufactured products of the United Kingdom, was an important contributing factor to the negotiation of the Ottawa Agreements, which resulted in a further shifting and reduction of trade, to the detriment of the American export trade in both agricultural and manufactured products. The United States now seeks trade restoration through agreements with British countries. Already it has made an agreement with Canada resulting in a mutual increase in trade. Its ability to reach similar agreements with other self-governing Dominions, such as Australia and New Zealand, depends largely upon whether it can negotiate a satisfactory agreement with the United Kingdom for a reduction in the preferences accorded the Dominions on agricultural commodities with respect to which the United States is on an export basis.

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By HERBERT HEATON

THREE years ago¹ I described the American farmer in the dell of depression. When the article was written he had already climbed a long way out of the deeps of early 1933. The index number of farm prices had risen from 51 to 71 in a year, and to 81 by June, 1934. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration and nearly a dozen other New Deal agencies were at work on him, and attention was shifting from emergency relief schemes to talk about permanent plans for a remodelled rural economy. Yet gloom lay heavy over the talkers. Some of them were convinced that American agriculture should abandon all thought of regaining export markets, and deliberately fit itself into an "America Self-Contained." Mr. Wallace, the rural philosopher turned cabinet minister, was announcing, in his famous "pamphlet of the month," that "America Must Choose" between self-sufficiency, free trade, and a middle course; and while he advised us to pursue the middle course, making bilateral trade agreements wherever possible, he warned us that the imports of farm produce which we must be willing to accept from foreigners would result in the permanent withdrawal of 25,000,000 acres of good land from cultivation.

Three years of business recovery, of prices rising under the stimulus of drought, reduced surpluses, monetary policy, and war scares, of lavish public spending, and of Supreme Court decisions, have drastically changed our conditions, our minds and our emotions. After two years of fierce drought (1934 and 1936), separated by a year of partial drought, bumper crops are the order of the day in 1937. Last year's corn crop was 1,500,000,000 bushels, but this year's may be 2,700,000,000, which is much larger than the average for the years 1928-1932. Last year's wheat yield was about 600,000,000 bushels, but this year's may be 900,000,000, a crop exceeded in size only three times since the War ended. The crop of oats is 40 per cent. larger than that of last year,

¹ "The American Farmer" in *Political Quarterly*, 1934, pp. 530-548.

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of barley 55 per cent., of rye 40 per cent., and so on down the line. These yields will end the period of deficiency, for during the past year we have been importing corn from the Argentine and wheat from Canada, and for more than two years no American wheat has left the country. But in July last, wheat-laden boats sailed from Chicago bound for overseas, and the first sale ever recorded of Kansas wheat to Canada took place—a good American case of carrying coals to Newcastle. More important still, this expanded crop comes to a market ruled by good prices. Wheat and corn are selling at more than a dollar a bushel, against depression “lows” of about forty cents for wheat and twenty-five for corn; and in general the prices of farm produce are twice as high as they were in the darkest days. Hence one of our leading statistical organizations makes the following prediction in a weekly survey issued in late August: “There is ample support for the belief that the real purchasing power to accrue from this year’s harvests will closely approach that of 1929.”¹

These are glad tidings, especially because of the size of the sector occupied by agriculture in the American economic circle. On 6,300,000 farms about 10,000,000 of the 49,000,000 “gainfully employed” earn their livelihood; and on them dwell 33,000,000 people out of a total population of about 130,000,000. This rural quarter of the nation received in pre-depression days about one-eighth of the national income; the fraction fell to about a tenth in 1932, but may return to the old figure this year. In 1932 the “total cash income” of farmers was estimated at \$4,400,000,000, and in 1935 at \$7,200,000,000. If it should reach or even approach \$10,000,000,000 this year, the effect on the rest of the country will be deep and widespread, especially because of the great extent to which American agriculture is commercialized. An estimate made in the twenties said the farmer was four-fifths commercial, and while he retreated a little into the shell of subsistence farming when his markets and prices collapsed, he will emerge as soon as he can. He has been brought into much closer contact with retail stores during the last seven years, for the mail order houses which

¹ Standard Statistics Company; quoted in *Toronto Globe and Mail*, Aug. 21, 1937.

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used to send him goods he ordered from a catalogue have established branch stores in most of the county towns, and only the very remote farmer is out of reach of a branch of “Monkey Ward” (Montgomery, Ward) or Sears, Roebuck—the two giant mail order firms. In addition the red-fronted chain stores of Woolworth, Kresge, Atlantic and Pacific, and half a dozen other firms, now serve Main Street as well as Zenith. The farmer’s methods call for much mechanical equipment, and his depression re-discovery of the horse is likely soon to be forgotten when he can afford “gas” for the truck and tractor. In high school or university his children acquire urban middle-class tastes and standards.

The dependence of other branches of American economic enterprise on the farmer’s purse is not, of course, so vital as some of our physiocrats suggest, and it is not true that a poor countryside always means a poor town. While American agriculture was painfully adjusting itself to the gap between war and peace prices in the twenties, industry was flourishing, because of the great demand of the non-agricultural population for such consumers’ durable goods as houses, flats, electrical appliances, cars, and roads on which to run them, and because the vast capital exports were made largely in the form of American goods. The cessation of those exports shut a large overseas market to manufacturers, and the door has not yet been reopened. Consequently urban prosperity does at present depend more on the health and wealth of the rural population than it has done at any time since pre-war days. Realization of this fact made city-dwellers more willing to bear the levies imposed on their foodstuffs by the New Deal in order to increase farmers’ incomes; and it may have left them more appreciative of the need for sympathetic government action to strengthen the weak spots that were revealed when the rural fabric was strained on the rack.

What are the weak spots? Alongside the relief and recovery activities of the New Deal there has gone a vast amount of “research.” The result is a mass of findings, of plans and of critiques which reminds one of the mountain of blue books produced by the select committees and royal commissions in Britain during the eighteen-twenties and thirties. On top of the heap “we have a whole lexicon of

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new stereotypes, such as 'social planning,' 'adjustment,' 'world markets,' 'conservation,' 'natural resources,' 'problem areas,' 'recovery,' 'security,' 'authority,' 'administration,' 'resettlement,' 'rehabilitation,' 'human needs,' etc."¹ Some of the stereotypes may stick, and some of the reports may have repercussions. At the moment the upswing of business has brought an upswing of optimistic individualism, and plans which involve government action are at an increasing discount. But the essentials of the diagnoses and prescriptions remain, and cannot be ignored indefinitely; the pressure of facts, of events, and of farm groups, and the persistence with which biennial and quadrennial elections force parties to fashion farm planks for their platforms, all are guarantees that public opinion will be asked to give thought to the rural problems which are not automatically solved (or shelved) by a rising price index number. Let me examine three of these problems—those of parity, of land use, and of land tenure.

Parity was the aim of the New Deal's agricultural policy and in part of its monetary policy. It was defined in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as the re-establishment of "prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period"—which for most commodities was 1909-1914. The "severe and increasing disparity between the prices of agricultural and other commodities" had largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for industrial products, and was thus in part responsible for the "present acute economic emergency." Against this tragic contrast between cheap farm goods and dear factory products an ideal was found in the relative price levels of the five pre-war years. That relationship could be brought back by "adjusting" supply to demand. The adjustment involved some heroic reduction of stocks in commodities in hand or on their way; cotton and tobacco plants were ploughed under, six million hogs were slaughtered, part of the California peach crop was left to rot on the trees, and the wheatfields narrowly escaped sabotage. Then adjust-

¹ Lowry Nelson, "National Policies and Rural Social Organization," in *Rural Sociology*, March, 1936, p. 89.

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ment meant control of new production, which in 1933 could mean only planned reduction of acreage, either by voluntary agreement among farmers or by a measure of legal compulsion. But to induce co-operation or to make compulsion acceptable, benefits must be paid, and those who reduced their acreage or the number of their hogs were to receive payment "for not producing," as the popular interpretation put it. Thus a reduced supply would cause prices to rise; the farmer would get at least as much for a reduced crop as for a large one, and in addition would receive his cheque from the A.A.A. The money for that cheque would be obtained by levying a processing tax on farm products as they entered the flour mill, the slaughter yard, the cotton mill or the tobacco factory.

Production control was effective for wheat, cotton, corn, hogs, tobacco, sugar, rice, rye, and peanuts (*anglicé* monkey-nuts) till January, 1936, when the Supreme Court killed the processing tax and declared that control of agricultural production was not a federal function. The control had reduced substantially the output of cotton and tobacco, but had had very little effect on the yield of corn, hogs, or wheat. For these commodities Nature, in the form of the drought of 1934, was the Great Adjuster of Supply and the Great Ameliorator of Prices. "Compared with the effects of weather, the contribution of A.A.A. measures as they were applied was practically negligible."¹ In terms of price, the A.A.A. may have raised the price of wheat two or three cents a bushel, the new monetary policy and fear of inflation may have raised it fifteen to twenty cents, but the drought raised it forty to fifty cents. For the rest, the A.A.A. supplemented farm receipts by handing over about \$1,100,000,000 in benefits. It made loans to corn and cotton producers, who were thus able to hold back supplies till prices improved; it negotiated agreements which raised the price of milk in large cities, and did a few minor things. In a general way the benefits accrued most largely in the areas where depression had been most severe; and regions which received much A.A.A. money needed less for unemployment and other forms of relief.

¹ Nourse, Davis, and Black, *Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration* (1937), p. 127.

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The Supreme Court decision stopped the subsidizing of controlled production by processing taxes. It came at a time when prices had risen substantially, when disparity had been greatly diminished, and when pleas for price parity had lost much of their appeal. A frantic search began for a new basis for subsidized agricultural adjustment, and ended in the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. The theme of this law was state and federal co-operation in preserving and improving soil fertility, in promoting the economic use and conservation of land, and in checking the wasteful and unscientific use of the nation's land resources. But, as if by an afterthought, the Act provided for the re-establishment "of the ratio between the purchasing power of the net income per person on farms and that of the income per person not on farms that prevailed during the five years August, 1909, to July, 1914." Soil conservation, scientific land use, and parity of *income*, not of price, became the new trinity.

For soil conservation and the proper use of land there is everything to be said. The startling fact is that the farmer is to be paid for doing what self-interest should make him do on his own account, at least if he owns his farm. He gets "payments or grants of other aid" for diverting land from "soil depleting" to "soil conserving" crops and for following soil-improving practices as defined by the A.A.A. Over four million farmers agreed to do this in 1936; they changed the use to which many acres were put, reduced the area under crop, and the drought of 1936 reduced the crop still more. Thus soil conservation can be used as a subsidized form of production control, and Mr. Wallace has said that "if there is another emergency in which farm prices collapse" the stress on reduction of output "may overshadow for a time the work then being done in preservation of the soil." But critics of the scheme feel convinced that the whole plan "in practice . . . has taken on such a character . . . as places minor emphasis on true agricultural adjustment and major emphasis on disbursing a very large amount of money to the maximum number of farmers."¹ It is a way round the Supreme Court decision, a device for dispensing subsidies

¹ Nourse, Black, and Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 472.

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to agriculture, and with no effective machinery to make sure that the recipient of the money fulfils his part of the bargain.

The shift from price parity to income parity is a move from an economically unwise ideal to a statistically indefinable one. The choice of 1909-1914 pinned us to a period when farm prices were relatively high, so high that they stipulated a vast expansion of acreage. They reached nearly the same height in 1925 and again stimulated an extension of production which helped to create the vulnerable wheat situation of 1929. Farmers' actions since then have shown that even sub-parity prices will provoke the same optimism if they are rising. Professor Davis concludes that "if wheat-growers were assured parity prices they would produce, with average weather conditions, far more than could be sold commercially at that price," and that a parity price for cotton "would entail sacrificing still more of our export markets."¹ But the alternative, income parity, no man can define or estimate, and we have no statistics from which we can learn the income position in 1909-1914. At best it is a statement of the direction in which farm income should go, and a justification for "doing something" for the farmer.

Of the two other problems that have emerged from the depression, there is little room for more than an indication of their general character. Again, but not for the first time, we have realized the price that has to be paid for taking no thought for the morrow in our attacks on the virgin resources of soil and forest. The "exploitation economy" of the frontier took out all it could and put nothing back. But the frontier habits lingered long after the frontier had passed. It has been difficult to accept the obligation to plant trees, to renew the fertility of the soil, to check erosion, and adopt scientific rotations. It is difficult to persuade the tenants who occupy two-fifths of the country's farms to take care of land on which they may be spending only a year or two, and equally hard to get the owner of those farms to spend money on their maintenance. Some parts of the country ought never to have been settled. Land fit only for grazing has been occupied by cultivators. Settlers have gone into forest

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 484-485.

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regions on the trail of the lumberjacks, and have found themselves stranded on miserable soil when the axe-men and saw-mills departed. We have allowed the tractor, the giant plough and the combine harvester-thresher to turn semi-arid grazing-lands into precarious wheatfields; then when the rains did not come, but the high winds did, the soil has been gathered into the air in a swirling black dust-storm.

Depression, two years of western drought, and some winters of heavy rain or snow have dramatized the consequences of these follies. The waters of the eastern mountains have raced down deforested and eroded slopes to produce the tragic floods in the Ohio and other valleys winter after winter. And we have scarcely finished watching news-reel pictures of these raging waters before the cameraman sends us pictures of the dust-storms of the south-western dust-bowl. But the records of erosion by wind and water, and the human erosion which comes from fighting a hopeless battle, are little less serious in parts that the candid camera never finds. They have been found by the relief workers, and we now talk of the "Six Rural Problem Areas" just as in England you talk of your depressed areas. In these six areas 20 per cent., 30 per cent., or even more, of the families in some counties were receiving relief during the dreary years, and in all of them the population is too large for the resources and economic opportunities that are available.

These six problem areas do not exhaust the list of challenges to action. We have recently become alarmed once more over the general spread of farm tenancy, and over the gradual but sure disappearance of that old American institution and precious heritage, "the family-sized farm owned by the man who operates it." It is vanishing at a "menacingly regular rate" which, if continued long enough, will "transfer most of the land to *rentiers*." In 1935, 42 per cent. of the farms were held by tenants, and of the remainder many were so heavily loaded with mortgage debt that the owner's "equity" was little more than a fifth of the total value. The southern tenants make up a large slice of the 42 per cent., and sons who rent a farm from their father till he dies are numerous. But if we deduct these two classes, 25 per cent. of the farmers are still tenants, and this "central core of our

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institution of farm tenancy"¹ is not shrivelling. There is little to be said, either economically or socially, for tenancy in North America. Rootlessness, insecurity and indifference are its three curses; it is good neither for landlord nor tenant; and its spread is bad for the health of rural community life.

The curing of rural ailments will take all the medical and surgical skill the country can muster. The hopeless areas must be evacuated and the population resettled elsewhere. But where, how, and at what cost? The reclaimable areas must be studied in order to decide what effective use can be made of them. Most states now have advisory planning boards, and a few "land studies" have resulted in recommendations for drastic changes, e.g., ranching instead of cultivation, and the merging of small units into large ones. But what the devil was willing to do when he was sick he may not do when he is well; even in the darkest days many harassed farmers refused to be moved from the place where their lives had been spent. The tenancy problem can be tackled as it was in Ireland, by laws regulating relations between landlord and tenant, and by purchase plans which spread payments over twenty to forty years. But no mere change of tenure can help the South much. Co-operative farming, perhaps of the Russian collective pattern, a vigorous education campaign, and a far-reaching public health policy would be only the end of the beginning in the South. For some regions the Tennessee Valley experiment, with its promise of cheap electricity, cheap fertilizers, reforestation of submarginal lands, erosion control, and cheap river transportation, may offer an example for other areas to follow. But the experiment is only in its early stages as yet, and is facing many unsolved problems.

All these and a score of other plans demand government action and chiefly federal action. But the bounds of federal power under the constitution remain too narrow or undefined to permit the necessary freedom of action, and co-operation between state and federal authorities is not always easy. Equally serious is the lack of sure co-operation between the

¹ Black and Allen, "The Growth of Farm Tenancy in the United States" in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1937, pp. 393-425.

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legislative and executive arms of the federal government. At many points during the last four years pressure groups, operating through the legislature, have forced on the administration plans it did not like, and during the last session Congress overrode the President's veto of a bill to extend for two more years the "emergency" credit facilities set up in 1933 and renewed in 1935. He pleaded that farm income had doubled since then, that prices were up, that the continued offer of mortgage credit at less than the market rate would cost the Treasury \$50,000,000 a year and make the balancing of the budget still more difficult. His plea was overridden with scarcely a glance at its contents. "Many of you have lived on a farm, as I have," said a leading legislator, and that argument sufficed. The episode is illuminating and sinister. It gives force to the conclusion of Professors Nourse, Davis, and Black, that the A.A.A. programme "seems on the whole to take on more definitely the character of financial aid for everybody, and less that of specific implementation for a planned system of efficient planning." If that character prevails, there will be no effective adjustment in terms of land use, rural credits, marketing, or improved rural social services. There will simply be one more pork-barrel.

THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL STATE

By M. J. BONN

THE United States is such a big country and represents such an infinity of divergent social conditions that any observation concerning them may be true, however exceptional it may be. But there can be no doubt about one conspicuous fact: there is a growing class-feeling in the U.S.A. Its representatives are not the workers or the farmers, but the minor intelligentsia and certain groups of business men. The former have, somewhat late in the day, discovered Marx. They feed on the Communist Manifesto and on the apologists of the Russian Revolution rather than on a profound study of his great work. They are disgruntled for various reasons. The position of the intelligentsia in American life is not very impressive. President Wilson's ultimate failure had blocked the high road to power to the highbrows for a long time. They crept in in shoals through administrative petty lanes when the New Deal needed trained minds rather than faithful party henchmen. But though those of them who manned the departments and the newly-created boards did admirable work anonymously, the official brain-trusters have not greatly enhanced their own and their professions' reputation. It is very easy in the U.S.A. to become a minor intellectual; but it is very difficult to get a job which can keep one going and a position satisfactory to one's aspirations. Advanced American liberalism has always had a rather shrill, almost hysterical note; it could easily be tuned to a communist key. There is not yet any working-class sentiment behind it. American strikes may use the methods of Syndicalism; they do not adopt its aims. They are out for collective bargaining, short working hours, high wages and social security, but not for wrecking the capitalist system. They still hanker after bourgeois ways of living. Class-consciousness does exist amongst the foreign-born groups and the coloured people who suffer from discrimination; it does not animate the working-men.

Class-consciousness is far more virulent amongst certain frightened groups of business men, whom the Republican

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debacle, the growth of a rather unruly sort of Trade Unionism and the Marxist screams of a pale intelligentsia are terrifying. The end of some of their privileges heralds to them the doom of the orderly bourgeois world. Their temporary powerlessness fills them with despair and with a hatred of those responsible for it. Class-consciousness finds a much readier expression in the hatred of another class than in the pride of one's own class achievements.

I

These tendencies do not reveal the true nature of the present-day struggle in the United States. It centres in the making of a state, i.e., of a national government, which can conceive, formulate and carry out the social measures which the never-ceasing changes in conditions are demanding.

The original conception of the American Government was that of "*une république fainéante*." Since governments were sure to abuse the powers entrusted to them, either because they were born wicked or were made wicked by possessing them, they must be so checked that the individual and the particular member state of which he is a citizen can be made safe from the despotism of the central administration. The constitution has admirably succeeded in fulfilling this purpose; for a century and a half it has given to men and states such scope for individualism, not to say anarchist, action as no other civilized community ever enjoyed or suffered from.

The liberalistic anti-government attitude of the United States was originally derived from the same philosophical concepts which influenced their European fellow-nations. It changed colour very quickly when the fight against a well-organized absolutist State, in which they had to use discipline, was won. The opening of the West freed the pioneers from the State anyhow. They preceded the State and established a government when conditions seemed sufficiently settled to warrant it. And they went farther West, if they did not like the government they had set up. American individualism is far more akin to the craving for independence of mediæval robber barons than to the dreams of universal happiness which animated humanitarian eighteenth-century philosophers.

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Americans desired a weak government, because they had got on without a government. At the same time the conception of a government showering gifts on its citizens was by no means absent from the public mind. Uncle Sam does not look like Santa Claus, but he has always exercised some of his functions. He gave away the national domain, on more or less strict terms it is true, but almost as a free gift. He presented the rural democracy with homesteads and the grasping business men with lumber, water-power and mineral concessions. He could neither stop predatory economics when practised on the Indians nor when perpetrated against nature. The handling of the Indian may not have done much harm to anybody (apart from the Indians), but the spoliation of the soil has made a bad return for Uncle Sam's generosity. Though the nation has now to pay for its wastefulness, it is still relying on Uncle Sam's generosity. The monetary conceptions embodied in Father Coughlin's or Dr. Townsend's plans were but the corollary of the national land policy. As Uncle Sam owns the land, so he should own the money. And as he gave away the land to deserving homesteaders for practically nothing, he should offer them the cash for running their farms on similar terms, so that they need not pay interest to blood-sucking banks. The issue of unlimited fiduciary money was always the ideal of the frontier, which depended on an unlimited supply of free land. Since its exhaustion, the need for free money is even greater.

This attitude of Uncle Sam was by no means unsympathetic to the business men. It enabled them to get their lumber, their coal, their oil and their silver from him—just for the asking. And he has given generous protection to their industries by a tariff, the fiscal need for which had to be artificially created by setting up a scandalously wasteful pensions system. The American business man's rugged individualism did not prevent him from using Government intervention for profitable inroads on other people's income; but it must be kept from meddling with his own property.

The government was notoriously corrupt. Legislators went into politics for the spoils they personally could enjoy and for those they could give to their faithful henchmen. Offices meant jobs. The wider one stretched the functions

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of the State, the greater would be the number of offices and of jobs. Government intervention was expensive to business: the jobs created had to be paid for by taxes, and, what was worse, the army of place-hunters, whose personnel changed with every political swing of the pendulum, could not be expected to carry out their duties decently and effectively. Government by its very nature was wasteful and corrupt; the less one had of it the better. Not that business objected to corruption. The grant of valuable franchises depended on municipalities and states; their rulers had to be squared. It was in some ways much easier to do business with bosses, controlling a reliable machine, who stayed in office for a long time, who had no deep-seated political convictions, and who knew to a cent "how much the traffic could bear," than with political idealists or fanatics, who wanted to improve the world.

Improvement could not be brought about by government intervention; Prohibition had shown this clearly enough. If one could not make people good by forbidding them to quench their thirst when and where they liked, it was evidently much more difficult to make them happy by forcing upon them action they did not want to take. Governments did not even fulfil properly their most elementary functions. Justice, at least in some of the lower courts, was not only blind, but venal. Gangsters ruled big and small cities. Racketeering could not be suppressed—at least, not permanently. The well-to-do had to provide for their own safety and security; company police prevented and squashed strikes. The State was all politics, and politics were the playground of the great unwashed. One could not do anything with it, except keep it out of one's private affairs.

II

This partly complacent, partly deprecating conception of the State was attacked long ago. The "Wisconsin idea" which animated the Lafollette Movement and provided the theoretical background of the louder Roosevelt's campaigns implied a new conception of the State. It had drawn its inspiration from the German universities, where so-called "Katheder" Socialism—Socialism from the pulpit—was rife.

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Its practical success in Wisconsin was due to the political genius of the elder Lafollette, who knew how to build a political machine and to choose his experts (they were far better trained, more efficient and ever so much less self-advertising of their success than the brain-trust). Later on similar ideas found shape in that prophetic, though almost forgotten political novel, "Philip Dru, Administrator," in which the anonymous author—Colonel House—outlined the tasks of a temporary democratic dictator, who was to save the American people from the unclean alliance of big business with large-scale corruption. President Wilson drew some of his inspiration from it.

The Great War necessitated a widening of the functions of the administration. One cannot conscript the manhood of a nation and maintain a purely voluntary system in production and consumption. But what was called "War Socialism" elsewhere left no deep marks on American economic life. Since Socialism and Socialist conceptions were of alien origin, the background was wanting, against which the introduction of coercive economics under the roaring of the guns could be seen as the beginning of a collectivist age. Moreover, coercion was sufficiently irksome to irritate the people; it did not go far enough to change permanently their ways of living. As soon as the War was over, the return to "free economics" was effectuated.

The war had enriched the U.S.A. The capitalist system had shown marvellous capacity for expansion. It could apparently produce miracles. Technical progress was reducing costs and prices, whilst industrial efficiency had raised wages. The millenium seemed in sight, since permanent prosperity was assured. If only politicians could be made to keep their clumsy, grabbing, dirty hands off the tender mechanism of economics, the world was bound to boom for ever and for ever. A funny new Manchester creed arose—in the U.S.A. as elsewhere—which demanded complete liberty for business enterprise, even where its objective was monopoly. A government of business men, by business men, for business men seemed the appropriate system for running progressive communities. The business men posed as the people's born leaders at home and abroad. They sacrificed to their vanity

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the inestimable boon of anonymity, which their wiser fathers had cherished, when they had left the glory and the spoils to the political henchmen who did their bidding whilst they themselves were satisfied with business benefits. When the prosperity bubble burst they could not get quickly enough under cover. They claimed they had made prosperity. It had gone. They had not foreseen its eclipse; they were not prepared for an emergency. They went down with a crash. They not only showed the nation that they had no idea how to run its affairs; the crash seemed to prove clearly enough that they did not even know how to manage their own business, which had to be saved by the government. It had to ladle out billions and billions of the taxpayers' wealth, in order to keep going these mighty concerns, which otherwise might have crumbled to dust. The nation no longer looked for leadership to the captains of industry of Boston, Chicago and Detroit. The centre of its power shifted from Wall Street to the White House, where a new administration battled desperately to save it from the frailness of its self-appointed would-be rulers. They no longer wanted to lead; they went on their knees to Washington, clamouring for help and government intervention in their affairs. The real political revolution, the downfall of the captains of industry as trusted national leaders, was accomplished before Roosevelt took office. They fell, as every ruling class falls, by their own mistakes. His coming into power made, however, their come-back impossible—at least under the old conditions.

For these conditions have gone for good. The exhaustion of free land put an end to those limitless opportunities which dangled before the eyes of the American people, and which had made them callous to the wastage involved in the opening up of the West. They had gone before the War, but the great boom had prevented the nation from realizing the change. Though their disappearance was recognized in immigration restrictions, its importance was not fully understood until the prosperity had gone. Deep depressions, accompanied by indescribable suffering, had not been unknown to the American people. They had been the inevitable result of the breaking of a boom. But when the crisis was at its worst, some new Eldorado had always

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beckoned from some latest West, and those who had survived its ravages could start again and hope to win the coveted prize.

This time it was different. Opportunity, it seemed, had gone for good, and, what was worse, so had security. The American people had been willing to live dangerously. They had not cared much for "security and stability." They wanted progress and opportunity. But when opportunity for a quick and apparently certain rise had gone, the least one could ask for was security in one's job. With one fell swoop both had gone. The worker had no longer a chance to become a master, and before he had fully realized that his prospects had gone, he was losing his job. For the country's productive capacity had expanded to such a degree that a long period of contraction had to follow before the glut could be overcome and production could be resumed. In the meantime employment chances contracted, and each contraction brought additional shrinkage. The savings of the workers were eaten up long before the crisis was over. Private charity organizations were unable to take care of the needy. Municipalities were verging on bankruptcy, and States could neither balance their budgets nor find the necessary credits which were to care for their unemployed. For this was not only a production crisis, swelling the ranks of the unemployed. It was a debtors' crisis on an unheard of scale as well. Agriculture, trade, industry (to a much lesser degree) states and municipalities, had borrowed on the assumption of an ever-increasing income. And nearly everywhere these incomes had shrunk, if not completely dried up, whilst the debt charges remained. Banks crashed as they never had crashed before; it would have been quite impossible to collect from their debtors. For even if these debtors had not resisted execution and sometimes resorted to rioting, their assets would not have sufficed to cover the claims.

The end of the capitalist system as such was not in sight, but the "twilight of the gods" who had controlled the American capitalist heaven was setting in. The federal government had to step in to prevent mass starvation, wholesale execution, riots, and social dislocation. At this time the representatives of business demanded government

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intercession most insistently. The real Reds, who worked for the demise of American bourgeois society, would have been much better pleased with an inactive government. Social dislocation and politico-economic despair provide the atmosphere in which Bolshevik experiments flourish. When people have nothing much to lose and very little to gain by clinging to an existing order, they are willing to let the wizards have a try to produce the millenium.

The only figure which was not swept off the board was Uncle Sam. Since he was represented by a very courageous President, he took upon himself all burdens. He financed corporations and kept them out of the bankruptcy court; he reorganized agriculture; he saved banks and refloated municipalities and states by providing the cash they needed for carrying on. He saved owners of houses by taking over mortgages. He gave work to the unemployed by spending money on public works, and he fed the workless, who otherwise might have starved. He did a great many silly and wasteful things, but he kept the United States a going concern. *Laissez-faire* theories disappeared, not because a new social philosophy had arisen—the only new philosophy available was the practice of Soviet Russia, which greatly impressed American *litterateurs*, but had little influence on their leading men. Non-interventionist theories disappeared because interventionist action had to be taken. The Americans have always been a people of action. They have always believed in a man-made society, which can be perfected by social engineering and must not be held back by older prejudices and traditions.

III

The great crisis has shown the gaps in the social order as well as in the constitution. The U.S.A. does not possess the machinery to deal automatically with a huge crisis; neither private institutions nor municipal or state authorities are organized for this task. And the federal government can only act by straining the emergency clauses of the constitution. The machinery for dealing with the past crisis had to be improvised on a gigantic scale, and though the American people excel in emergencies, waste and some sort of chaos

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are inevitable in these circumstances. To avoid them in future, the machinery for coping with such problems has to be set up in normal times. This means the strengthening of the central government in its dealing with men and states by widening the sphere allotted to it by the constitution. It means, moreover, a vast expansion of the Civil Service, which will have to administer new tasks. The administrative dilettanti who were drawn into the government service in the last emergency excelled in energy and initiative. They probably needed more soft pedalling from above than any other group in other lands on account of their exuberance. A great many regular officials are still appointed under the spoils system, the technical difficulties of increasing government services are huge. One cannot very well entrust the spending of vast sums of money to people to whom public service is more or less a racket. The imposition of Civil Service rules (competitive conditions) on all appointees would paralyse the present political machinery. For the army of political "volunteers" who do the party work are attracted by the hope of spoils. The influence of Assembly men and Senators is partly based on their "right" to propose worthy adherents for spoils. And the President's hold on Congress depends to a considerable degree on his power to grant or to withhold spoils to or from applicants, though lately public works have taken the place of spoils as means of exercising pressure on recalcitrants in Congress and State governments. The application of Civil Service rules to all appointments would shift the centre of the stage to impersonal spoils, which consist of legislative benefits voted to well-organized groups. Lobbying and log-rolling will become even more important than at present. Personal corruption may disappear in favour of impersonal corruption; political parties may be converted into economic blocks. The moralist may triumph, but the economist may well weep. The growth and, with it, the reform of the Civil Service are, however, inevitable. One cannot pick cherries from tall trees without a ladder.

The constitution does not favour the growth of the executive of the federal government at the expense of state governments and the decrease of personal liberty. The

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Supreme Court as a judicial body is probably right in declaring many of the new laws unconstitutional. It blocks the way to reform when it is acting in a strict legalistic manner. The President's views on elastic law are probably not very sound. But the Supreme Court has justified him by suddenly showing political wisdom. As soon as its composition was seriously threatened, its attitude on legal issues changed, showing that its majority members, anyhow, believe in elastic law. What should have been done by amendment to the constitution is now being done by amended interpretation.

Whichever way is chosen, the powers of the central executive are growing. It is not only enabled to fight a crisis; it has been offered a chance of preventing it. It can prepare an organization which fits the changed social condition of the United States. The unemployment benefit, old-age pensions, factory legislation, all the functions which the social service state exercises elsewhere are being introduced in the United States. Since opportunity is disappearing and since the hope of individual advancement no longer holds the members of society together, security must take its place. This depends on a strong State. For American individualism is violent, not to say lawless. Since its energies can no longer be diverted to the winning of a vast continent, they must be controlled by some body stronger than sectional groups and their members. American labour and American capital cannot be allowed to fight out their battles amongst themselves. For they are quite willing to settle them by guns and dynamite rather than by argument and conference. A kind of anarchist feudalism prevailed in the United States so long as the frontier was moving. Now that expansion has come to a standstill a strong State is needed to fuse and mould the discordant groups, which compose this mighty commonwealth into a socially united nation.

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By CARLETON BEALS

THE map of South America," wrote the great Nicaraguan poet, Rubén Darío in his *The Caravan Passes By*, "forms a head, the sombrero of which is that of Uncle Sam." Pan Americanism is the shade cast on the lands of sun by Uncle Sam's sombrero. It is more than that; it is the instrumentation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is a negative statement of "won'ts" and "don'ts"; Pan Americanism is supposedly the smile and hand-shake of the United States' sphere-of-influence policy of Western Hemisphere isolation.

The Spanish statesman, Salvador Madariaga, once said at a luncheon of the Foreign Policy Association in New York that there were three things that Americans of good breeding would not permit to be criticized: God, the President, and the Monroe Doctrine. He was merely stating that for the United States, the Doctrine is as sacred a totem as the carved rain-making pole of the Sioux Indians.

But though President Woodrow Wilson succeeded in having the Monroe Doctrine written into the covenant of the League of Nations, only American nations not believing in the Monroe Doctrine and not accepting it became members of the League. Even during those days of the signing of the Peace of Versailles, the lightning of the Beelzebubs was striking close about the sacred pedestal of Monroe; to-day many Americans profess to be in doubt whether the Doctrine still exists or not. Others declare that it is no longer unilateral in its formulation and application, but is now the joint attitude of the twenty-one so-called republics of the Western Hemisphere.

But it is noticeable that the State Department has made no recent utterance on the matter; and President Roosevelt at the last dramatic special Pan American conference in Buenos Aires never once mentioned the doctrine he was supposed to be burying, a strange lack of respect for the illustrious dead. On the other hand, Pan Americanism is said to have really come to life for the first time. Uncle Sam

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and his harem of dusky sister republics are supposed at last to have banned all family discord and to be living in unparalleled felicity, in democratic bliss, surrounded by a world of predatory despotism and political Don Juanism. Never before have the diplomatic and business eunuchs of the menage been uttering nicer platitudes.

As a matter of fact, just the converse is true. The Monroe Doctrine was never more alive than at present; Pan Americanism was never deader than at present, if a thing unborn can be said to be dead. The Monroe Doctrine is not the joint utterance of the entire Western Hemisphere; it is still a sternly unilateral doctrine. It is still anathema to all of Latin America except those diplomats who praise it with their tongues in their cheeks.

The beauty of all sacred irrational belief is that you can constantly violate your belief and still keep on believing. Non-interference by the United States in the affairs of Europe, one of the cardinal provisos of the Doctrine, may now be defined as meddling whenever it is to American interest and shirking the responsibilities attendant upon that meddling. The World War, the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations, the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, American diplomacy looking towards the control of a share of European and Near Eastern oil-fields, even the present neutrality policy towards Spain, all are impressive monuments to American meddling in the affairs of Europe. But we Americans nevertheless inflexibly believe in the Monroe Doctrine, though that aspect of it has far less reality than Banquo's ghost.

When we went to war with Spain at the turn of the century, seized Puerto Rico and set up a protectorate over Cuba as the spoils of war, we definitely violated the Monroe Doctrine pledge that we would not interfere with existing European colonies in the New World. It had been our policy earlier to oppose the efforts of Mexico and Colombia and of the liberator Simón Bolívar to free Cuba; we had frowned on independence efforts by the Cubans themselves. But though the clause of the Monroe Doctrine regarding the inviolability of European colonies on this side of the water has been ground to powder under the heel, we still ardently believe in the Monroe Doctrine.

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The fact is we have never once invoked or applied the Monroe Doctrine, when it was not to our interest to do so. During our Civil War, Santo Domingo appealed to us for aid against Spain's efforts to reconquer the island. But when Spain recognized our blockade of the ports of the seceded Confederate States and refused to allow the ships of the rebellious South in her ports, we promptly forgot the Monroe Doctrine, and Santo Domingo was obliged to repel the invasion single-handed. The only protection Santo Domingo has ever had from the Monroe Doctrine was that of our attempting to force her to cede a naval base, an attempt under the Grant administration, through connivance with an unprincipled executive, to annex it, and, finally, marine intervention to collect the debt of the National City Bank.

We let England carve out Belize as a colony in return for canal rights, a clear violation of the Doctrine. When Philander P. Knox, of "dollar diplomacy" fame, was Secretary of State, he warned England not to persist in attempting to make a debt arrangement with Guatemala. But when Guatemala declined to accept the terms of the Seligman loan which so delimited her sovereignty, Knox then never blinked an eyelash when an English warship hove-to in Puerto Barrios to see that Guatemala behaved.

We intervened in Santo Domingo to prevent European governments from having a reason to intervene. But, thereafter, we interested ourselves practically none at all in the claims of offended European nations, but looked closely to our own demands and forced the Santo Dominicans to accept the customs collection arrangements of an American bank.

If so much of the actual Monroe Doctrine has been shattered, if it has never been applied when it was inconvenient for us to do so, why then do I say that it is still more alive than ever? It is alive more than ever because the United States is convinced of the desirability of isolation—though it be not an impartial isolation—and is more than ever determined not to permit European aggression in the Western Hemisphere; and, despite Roosevelt's good-will policy, the United States still seeks to exercise control over the Latin American countries and their foreign policies.

II

The Monroe Doctrine is a Janus-faced God. One face frowns with the policy of aggression and overlordship toward Latin America; the other face, so affable, is labelled "Pan Americanism." However, "Pan Americanism" is a word that carries a heavy handicap. It immediately evokes imperialism. It is reminiscent of those pre-1914 expressions, "Pan Slavism," "Pan Germanism." The Latin Americans have never liked the word, don't like it now. It symbolizes to them conquest, war, not mutually respectful relations. It represents a long series of farcical quinquennial conferences of the Western Hemisphere nations, conferences railroaded and dominated, until the last one, by the North American delegates, who steam-rollered every attempt to discuss the real problems of the continent and to face the issue of marine intervention. Pan Americanism, for the southern countries, symbolizes Big Business, loans, the Big Brother patronage idea.

Pan Americanism is an American trade-mark term. It is registered in the American patent office. It is a neat little apparatus, stamped "Made in the U.S.A." It is the little gas-pump of trade. It means buy from us. It also means, don't buy from Great Britain. It is a word used lavishly at banquets sponsored by the sales managers of large corporations for visiting Latin American buyers, when the flags of the twenty-one presumably sovereign nations are draped over the speakers' dais.

Inter-Americanism, promoted by Simón Bolívar, back in 1826 at the Amphyctionic Congress in Panamá, sought to create Western Hemisphere unity on the basis of freedom and good works. The Panamá Canal was to be built as a joint effort of the American nations. But inter-Americanism is deadlier than Pan Americanism.

Pan Americanism probably originated in the head of Henry Clay, who in 1821 declared: "It is in our power to create a system of which we shall be the centre and in which all South America will act with us." This imperialist concept was the same concept, quite unchanged, of Franklin D. Roosevelt, when 115 years later in December, 1936, he

journeyed to Buenos Aires to perpetrate one of the unluckiest diplomatic fiascos on record.

Pan Americanism as an organized policy was founded in the eighties by Secretary of State James Blaine, who was interested purely in trade opportunities. Out of the inter-American sessions of 1889, over which Blaine presided, grew the International Bureau of American Republics, which was renamed, later, the Pan American Union.

Not only in the manner in which it was founded, but also because of the false premises on which it rests, the Pan American Union represents a failure, despite numerous good deeds, both as a trade-promotion and imperialistic venture and also as an idealistic promotion of family concord. The organization has rested on the supposition that there is an inherent, strong and cohesive community of interest among all the American nations. Spiritually, culturally and economically we are supposed to have close bonds. Nothing could be more absurd. Nothing could be more false.

It is true that all the Latin American countries are liberated colonies; it is likewise true that, in name at any rate, they are republics, with written constitutions more or less modelled on the ideas of the French Encyclopædists and the American constitution. But there the institutional resemblance ends. Spiritually and culturally the ties of Latin America are and should be firmer with Spain, Portugal and France than with us. Furthermore, republicanism is merely a formal cloak for petty feudal military oligarchies. Democracy does not exist in any of the Latin American countries, except to a limited degree in Costa Rica, Mexico and a few others. Hitler, indeed, is a model of fine liberal statesmanship compared to President Vargas of Brazil or Benavides of Perú or Batista of Cuba or Trujillo of Santo Domingo.

On the eve of the 1934 Montevideo conference, President Roosevelt declared that never had the governments of Latin America so well represented the people. Then a swordfish has wings. Never have the governments there less represented the people. The idea that the Western Hemisphere is an area of the world where popular and free democracies exist as contrasted to the jarring despotisms on the continent

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of Europe is utterly false. It has, in fact, never been a supportable thesis.

The cultural and spiritual bonds between the United States and Latin America are flimsier than those between France and Germany, and no one dreams of arguing that because the latter are on the same continent they should have the same policies. The Argentine writer, Manuel Ugarte, has gone so far as to declare that the only ties that bind Latin America to the United States are "timidity and fear."

Economically the thesis falls down nearly as badly as the concept of cultural and institutional correlation. The idea is held that Latin America, a producer of raw materials, the United States a manufacturer of finished goods—the two areas should be not only closely linked, but so far as possible exclude the rest of the world. Various professors, such as Chester Lloyd Jones of the University of Wisconsin and Frank Tannenbaum of Colombia University, have hastened to write books to prove that Latin America can never become industrialized. Yet Brazil has a quarter of the world's iron supply and at least 5,000,000,000 tons of coal, and is to-day exporting textiles to five adjacent countries.

Brazil is friendly to the United States to the extent that we buy coffee from her and because she is suspicious of Argentina. But in the world cotton market she is now our strongest competitor, has wrested much of it away from us. Her product is sold in Europe and Japan, and she has no desire to enter a closed economic system which would break such intercourse. So with many of her products. Naturally, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, for instance, prefer to buy their cotton and other supplies from a raw-product country like Brazil, where they also have a type of market which they do not find in the United States. It is natural that Brazil should buy a corresponding amount of finished goods from those countries rather than from us. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Last year Brazil bought more goods from Germany than from any other country on earth.

Argentina is a competitor of ours in the world wheat market, and her best customer for wheat, beef, and corn,

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which we shut out with high tariffs, is Great Britain. Japan also takes her wheat and beef. So do Germany and Italy.

Pan Americanism also breaks down through the exclusion of Canada. With Canada we have far closer spiritual, cultural, institutional and economic bonds than with any other nation of the Western Hemisphere, as strong as with any nation on earth. We have constantly ignored Canada's interests and rights in Latin America, and they are considerable. Latin American writers and, occasionally, diplomats have repeatedly insisted that the proper system of Western Hemisphere concord must inevitably include Canada. But, of course, this opens up the dismal prospect of also having to include the French possessions and Dutch Guiana, and would that not mean inevitably admitting European powers to the council table?

But it is a sad sort of Pan Americanism that cannot stand the strain of such participation. Would not indeed a better New World understanding be built up if Canada, which has such vital interests in Mexico, Cuba, the Caribbean and elsewhere, and England, with such preponderant interests, particularly in Brazil, Chile and elsewhere, be included in any discussions and proposals. The present idea involved in Pan Americanism is that American marine intervention, as practised in the past, was a sacred obligation, but was heinous if committed by England, Italy and Japan in other parts of the world where they had interests comparable to ours; that American commerce is sacred, but that British and Japanese commerce represents unfair poaching; that American financial penetration is always righteous, but that of England and France dastardly; that American foreign policy is always wise and just, but that of all other nations Machiavellian, selfish and tricky.

Through the ignoring of these simple truths, Roosevelt never made a greater blunder than when he travelled to Buenos Aires to make a grandstand play for the neutrality of the American continents. Though the December, 1936, conference was played up in the press of the United States as a great success, it was a complete flop.

That grandstand play was the product of Roosevelt's good-will policy. That good-will policy was, in turn, an

inevitable product of depression, a necessity not a virtue. It was the result of the unfavourable reaction in Latin America to our marine interventions in the Caribbean and to our increasing political and financial pressure on all the countries of the two continents. It was a result of the collapse of our frenzied loaning of money: all the mistakes England had made in her investments of a hundred years earlier in Latin America were ingloriously repeated. The bubble collapsed. We could no longer coerce Latin America with bayonets. We could no longer coerce them with dollars. We were losing the commerce of Latin America, and to-day hold little more of the total than we did in 1913 before the World War threw the entire market into our laps without a struggle. A new policy had to be devised.

Coolidge began it when he sent Ambassador Dwight Morrow of the House of Morgan to Mexico to talk friendship and oil compromise instead of to threaten. Hoover continued it when he yanked the marines out of Nicaragua. Roosevelt thereupon seized upon a necessity—and a policy already started—to elevate it into a new continental doctrine of good-will.

Actually, in the case of Cuba, Haiti, El Salvador and Panamá, except for not actually landing marines, Roosevelt has not changed the traditional practices of coercion, but he has managed to build up an appreciable popularity in Latin America, more than any other American executive has enjoyed. That is undoubtedly a great asset in international relations.

But he made a colossal blunder when he went to Buenos Aires. For he went there with the same thesis as Clay had enunciated—to make the United States the head of a New World political and economic system, and there was far less opportunity, given the new policies of economic nationalism to the south and the vast trade relations with Europe, to bring what Roosevelt desired to pass than there had been in Clay's day.

The American proposals at Buenos Aires were for the creation of a permanent body, an "Inter-American Consultative Committee," composed of representatives of the twenty-one nations, in order to adopt an export and credit

embargo policy by international agreement and through legislation such as that already in vogue in the United States. Fortunately for us and for the world, Roosevelt suffered complete defeat in his proposals. In the signed conventions resulting from the conference, the countries agreed to consult with one another "in the event of international war outside America" in order "to determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory states, if they so desire, may eventually co-operate in some action tending to preserve peace in the American continent." This means—exactly nothing. No embargo provision whatsoever was made.

The only mention of it occurs in connection with the Convention Co-ordinating Existing Treaties, which deals exclusively with the danger of war between the American nations. Then the signatory states "may take into consideration" the adoption of embargo measures, "but only through the operation of domestic legislation." This means—exactly nothing. In fact, it removes it from the realm of international treaty.

The reasons for this failure I have already indicated. England, besides having over \$2,000,000,000 of invested capital in Argentina, takes over 30 per cent. of that country's exports. It would be suicidal for Argentina to enter into any such pact. Besides, Argentina has aspired to political leadership of South America and resents the efforts of the United States in that direction. She saw her chance to strike and strike hard at our pretensions in this conference. She did.

It is also necessary to repeat once more that Roosevelt's thesis of Western Hemisphere democracy is completely romantic nonsense. If Roosevelt's words about the ideals of democracy had been taken seriously by all the people of the Western Hemisphere, he would have raised a holocaust of revolution from Cuba to Tierra del Fuego. He scarcely wanted that.

The government of Brazil certainly feels much more spiritual kinship with Nazism than with the democratic nations. Possibly the Argentine government does also. Chile certainly does. Perú even more. All of the Latin American countries, except Mexico, are passively or fervently pro-Franco in the Spanish conflict.

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Another reason for the failure of the American proposals at the conference was the fact that, if anything, they would have brought the southern countries closer to war than otherwise. For to have thus allied themselves with the United States was to subordinate their policies to those of the very nation most likely to become involved in any European war.

Still another reason for failure was the hypocrisy of the American proposals. Obviously they were intended to be so operative that in the case the United States did get into war, even if the other New World countries failed to follow her example, the embargo provisions would not be invoked against her even if invoked against Europe. This certainly is trying to have your cake and eat it too. The fact is that the United States cannot very successfully engage in foreign war without certain of the key materials of Latin America. And everyone is pretty sure that if Latin America tried to invoke such an embargo against us in such an eventuality, our battleships would jolly quick be steaming south to rectify the matter.

And, finally, the whole proposal was farcical because it did not include Canada. Here we were asking the Latin American countries to create a credit and goods embargo policy that would severely undermine their respective national economies, while we were leaving our back door open to ship through Canada all the war supplies we might desire to export. We have already done that in connection with our supposed neutrality with reference to the Spanish conflict. We protested to the Mexican government when American war materials were transhipped to the Loyalist government; we have not once protested when American war materials were transhipped from Canada to Franco.

The real accomplishment of the conference—that which had value and importance—was almost completely ignored by the press, namely the outlawing of armed intervention. If Latin America ceded nothing to us, she pried out of us, because of our hope that she would play ball, treaties guaranteeing that hereafter unilateral intervention was outlawed. We pledged ourselves never again single-handed to invade militarily any Latin American country on any pretext

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whatever. This was a fine victory for Latin America, and since it was based on justice and accepted international law, it was at bottom a real victory for us also.

Similarly Roosevelt's failure also represented a fortunate thing for us and the world. The whole point of this article is that Pan Americanism, as a closed system, cultural, economic or otherwise, is founded on false premises, and besides being a delusion, would be essentially pernicious. The proposal, whatever the lofty reasons adduced, to array the Western Hemisphere against Europe and the rest of the world is to be deplored as a definite menace to the peace of the world. Whatever temporary gains it might provide, in the end it could only bring future disaster and war. Such a closed system has no moral place in modern life. Inter-Americanism is a fine thing, but official Pan Americanism, with its narrow geographical and selfish political concept, is a bad thing for us and everybody concerned. It is merely an unusually deleterious extension to continental proportions of the traditional American isolationist policy. No fairly enduring peace in the world can be achieved until the United States at last decides to go forth and boldly shoulder its world responsibilities, cost what that may. Pan Americanism has validity only as a part of a complete participation of all the western countries, including Canada, and then only as a system that furthers rather than delimits the proper relations of all the countries with the rest of the world.

BOOK REVIEWS

UNEMPLOYMENT AND ITS TREATMENT IN THE U.S.A. By
DOROTHY KAHN. (*American Association of Social Workers.*
\$1.00.)

TO-DAY in America social reform is the order of the day. *Laissez-faire* is in retreat. A vigorous majority of citizens have turned angrily against the "Rugged Individualism" which tolerated a do-nothing public policy towards poverty, unemployment and the needs of youth and age. They demand a full measure of social security for all, with a federal or state guarantee behind it. At the front of the whole movement march America's social workers, the men and women who staffed the great host of private agencies for poverty relief in all the years when public social services were non-existent or corrupt. Thousands of these people are now administering federal or state services under the New Deal and, at their head, is Mr. Harry Hopkins, himself a full-time social worker before Mr. Roosevelt invited him to direct the vast Emergency Relief programme, costing over £300,000,000 a year.

Miss Kahn belongs to this movement. She is herself a social worker turned public administrator. Her informative survey is a very useful compilation, with plenty of figures in it, and is apparently the only attempt to disentangle, in retrospect, the various Federal Emergency Relief schemes which have been in operation since the new era opened in 1933.

American unemployment policy may have been confused in detail, but it has evolved along fairly logical lines. First, the Federal Administration had to improvise some kind of cash relief for at least 20,000,000 people including dependants; the states and cities proved to be quite unready for the task. Then Mr. Hopkins began to build up a nation-wide organization of relief work, including in that term the Civilian Conservation Corps, genuine public works and a host of make-work projects of questionable merit. At the peak the astounding number of 3,000,000 people were given work and wages. Later, in 1936, the Federal Government began to hand back to the states and cities the duty of relieving local

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poverty in so far as it was missed by the national work-relief scheme. It is some measure of the magnitude of the Federal burden that in 1935 the total allocations for Emergency Relief were no less than £900,000,000, but not all of this went to the unemployed as such.

Meanwhile a far-reaching scheme of permanent reconstruction was prepared. The Social Security Act was passed in 1935. It was the most comprehensive measure of its kind in modern times, providing for contributory and non-contributory old-age pensions, public health services, aid for mothers and children and for a network of state unemployment compensation (i.e., insurance) schemes.

Miss Kahn outlines the Act, but at the time she wrote, few of its sections had been implemented. To-day every state and territory, including Hawaii and Alaska, has come into line with an approved unemployment compensation act. About 21,000,000 wage-earners are insured and, in most states, benefits will begin in 1938. As a rule, only the employers contribute; they are taxed on their pay roll up to 3 per cent. Benefits of short duration will be at the rate of 50 per cent. of wages subject to a minimum of £1 per week. Agriculture and domestic service are usually excluded. Every state scheme differs a little from its neighbours, though all follow the ground plan laid down by the Social Security Board in Washington. It is a courageous and complex experiment requiring elaborate records of work and wages. Being based strictly on the principle of limited liability, it will admittedly leave uncovered a large margin of American unemployment. That fact has not been overlooked. For instance, Mr. Altmeyer, the new chairman of the Social Security Board, said in a recent speech: "It is entirely feasible to relate a federal works programme to the state unemployment compensation systems, so as to provide extended benefits, in the form of work, to beneficiaries who exhaust their compensation rights."

Apparently, therefore, federal work relief is to continue in spite of all its crudities and expense. Can it succeed? This is a crucial question and Miss Kahn has a word to say about it: "If, in the provision of work relief, the projects are socially useful, if relief status is not required for employ-

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ment, *if the work conforms to the worker's own trade*, and if the wages are the "going rate," then work of this nature is likely to conserve his skill, occupy his time and maintain his status . . . , but if any of these criteria are absent, then we find a loss of morale more serious than that which accompanies unwise administration of relief." This is rather a large order for poor Mr. Hopkins, but, in fact, it approximately represents the ideal after which he and his colleagues have actually been striving for the last three years. Can they keep up the struggle? There have lately been heavy cuts in the federal work projects and other signs that the U.S. Treasury Department is putting on the screw. RONALD DAVISON.

IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA. By KARL MANNHEIM. (*Kegan Paul*, 155.)

THERE could not well be a more important subject than that which Professor Mannheim has treated in this book. And whatever the defects in style and treatment, this makes it perhaps the most significant piece of work for social theory since Graham Wallas' *Human Nature in Politics*. It is curious that there should be no mention of Wallas in the whole course of it, for in a sense this takes up where that book left off.

The subject which is of such critical importance for contemporary minds is that of the social conditioning of knowledge. How many even of the supposedly intelligent (and they are few enough in number) realise the extent to which what they think is determined by what they are? That social doctrines, the creeds of parties, the points of view of groups, classes, individuals, the theorising of intellectuals, the abstractions of the supposedly "pure" academic mind (the subject of such illusions at the London School of Economics and among the older generation at Oxford!) are for the most part in origin and existence but the expression of the interests of the social groupings behind them? The realisation of all this is compared by Professor Mannheim to a Copernican revolution in thought; and it is hardly too much to say so. I know from experience that it makes a complete chasm, hardly bridgeable in the ordinary universe of discourse, between this way of thinking, and

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those who have been brought up in academic orthodoxy to think that what they think is quite unaffected by the social circumstances which make them think what they think, or that at most such circumstances do not much matter. Whereas we know that they very largely determine the structure and character of their thought. They believe in "pure" thought, self-complacent, self-deluded fools that they are!

This whole point of view is of course a development of Marxism; though Mannheim is quite right in saying that Marxism has not yet fully drawn out the implications of its point of view, any more than Marx himself did. Nevertheless he was full of the most striking *aperçus* in this direction; witness not only his constant debunking of the philosophical and theoretical pretences of his opponents (mere intellectual devices to clothe the nakedness of what they wanted), but such good sense as "You do not judge a man by what he says of himself, but by what he is and does." Conservatism has always known this, and such persons as Machiavelli and Swift: it is mere good horse-sense: only the irremediable rationalists of the left are unable to see it. "Whenever an idea is labelled Utopian," says Mannheim, "it is usually by a representative of an epoch that has already passed. On the other hand, the exposure of ideologies as illusory ideas, adapted to the present order, is the work generally of representatives of an order of existence which is still in process of emergence." In plain English, this only means that all human fools are more or less good at finding out their opponents. Only the really rational are any good at finding themselves out. Behind such reflections, lies a technique, a method which Mannheim has worked out, which he calls the sociology of knowledge.

In this book he applies it fruitfully to the complementary concepts of "ideology" and "utopia." The former, he says, "reflects the discovery that ruling groups become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination . . . The concept of *utopian* thinking reflects the opposite discovery of the political struggle, that certain oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those

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elements in the situation which tend to negate it." The first is a type of mentality, a complex of thought, directed towards the maintenance of an existing order and is conservative in character; the second is directed towards changing the existing order, and is radical in character.

Working with these two concepts, Mannheim has penetrating things to say over the whole field of social thought. But he is at his best when he is applying his method to specific types of mentality, such as the four forms of utopian mentality he takes to illustrate his thesis: the chiliasm of the Anabaptists, liberal-humanitarianism, the conservative idea, and the socialist-communist utopia. On the second and fourth of these he is particularly good; less good on conservatism, perhaps because he is less sympathetic to the subject. He does not fully appreciate how much it is of the very essence of conservatism *not* to theorise; that is its cleverness: theorising would reveal the facts of politics (the facts of class-conflict, etc.), far too clearly for its purposes. Mannheim will need a long stay in England to appreciate what and how subtle conservatism really is.

The profound question which all this opens up, is whether it does not lead to complete scepticism with regard to human thought. One is so sickened by finding everybody thinking just what he wants, to observe again and again the most elaborate façades of "thought" erected to disguise what men desire; and their very unconsciousness about it is what I find most of all infuriating. Not so Mannheim. He says mildly: "We need not regard it as a source of error that all thought is so rooted." He has a remedy to propose, and he is quite right; it is that we should consistently and at every point lay bare the unconscious motivation that makes people think what they think. "Wishful thinking has always figured in human affairs," he says pleasantly. But does not the trouble lie deeper than this?—how far namely is thinking really *dependent* upon willing, indeed an aspect of the will? If not wholly dependent, it is hardly to be regarded apart from will. One knows how mistaken it is to hold reason and the emotions in direct antithesis.

That Mannheim is aware of where all this leads is witnessed by his curious peroration on pp. 235-6: "It is possible that

in the future in a world in which there is never anything new . . . there can exist a condition in which thought will be utterly devoid of all ideological and utopian elements. But the complete elimination of reality-transcending elements from our world would lead us to a 'matter of factness' which ultimately would mean the decay of the human will." One has often thought of this from another angle: suppose human beings were so rational as one would like them to be, they would cease to fight, to struggle, perhaps to make an effort; the end would be a sort of Buddhist quietism. Irrationality must therefore be of the essential nature of the human mind. If only one could cease to quarrel with it! Meanwhile, until the day of that logical nemesis comes upon us, with the tendency of rational thought to approximate ever more closely to the real world, there is Mannheim's method to apply, with which one is in entire agreement: in every case, collective and individual, to make allowance for the social and personal equation; to put what people think in relation to the environment of what makes them think it. The equation that one will get is the nearest that one can hope for objectivity and truth. And always and everywhere complete candour with regard to one's own as well as to other people's assumptions. It is a cold gospel; no wonder that truth is so unpopular in the world of public affairs, that nobody believes in truth, even among those incredibly few people capable of realising it.

A word, and more than a word, of protest is due at the jargon in which this book is written and into which it is translated. Here is a book of extreme importance, such a book as one has been waiting for for years. Yet it is almost impossible to read it; I have, with the greatest goodwill, been reading it off and on for six months in a kind of opaque vision. If Professor Mannheim ever wants to get across to the English public, which has always been very properly sceptical of pretentious terminologies—the more pretentious, the more sceptical it becomes—he will have to write more simply, sharply, concretely. When one reads a few pages of this work, one understands how it was that Hitler won in Germany; and one begins even to appreciate the beauty of his style by contrast.

A. L. ROWSE.

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ARMAMENTS. By FRANCIS W. HIRST. (*Cobden-Sanderson*. 5s.)
RAW MATERIALS OR WAR MATERIALS? By ALFRED PLUMMER.
(*Gollancz*. 3s. 6d.)

THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC FROM AERIAL ATTACK.
By a group of Cambridge Scientists. (*Gollancz*. 3s. 6d.)

THE automatic self-deception of even quite rational minds! With disarmament apparently off the map, how many even of us who understood the urgent case for it have hastened to forget that there ever was such a case. Presumably, if one did not slur over the nightmare cost and danger of this unprecedented arms race, day-to-day work and pleasures would be impossible. Still, it is bad to become unaware of what is going on, and Mr. Francis Hirst's array of appalling facts is an efficient reminder.

His book contains a short history of arms-building and arms-limitation from 1815 to 1914, an account of the cost of the Great War, a survey of armaments since the War, and finally a detailed analysis of the present arms race. The trouble is that he suggests no way of stopping it, a rather sketchy chapter on "Armaments and Unemployment" being the only constructive part of his book.

Readers should be on guard against his pro-German bias, which results once or twice in a misleading emphasis. For example, "the large military expenditure of France . . ." he writes, "at a time when there was no visible enemy except a disarmed and powerless Germany, is all the more difficult to understand when we remember that French diplomacy had also encircled Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria by the Little Entente, which remained heavily armed." The psychology of the French should not be "difficult to understand" when we remember that in the past 60 years France had been twice invaded, and that Germany's man-power exceeds that of France by about a half. To show how German nationalism is excusable, though regrettable, and not to do the same for the French, is highly misleading. Again, he exaggerates the "internal dissensions" of Czechoslovakia when he says that "over 23 per cent." of its inhabitants "are Germans, who demand federal home rule." Of the 3,000,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia about 1,000,000 belong to the activist German parties, which are loyal to the Government.

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But in general Mr. Hirst's book is fair, a mine of information, and a warning.

Mr. Plummer's is a sane and constructive book. He begins by examining the existing conditions of access to the chief raw materials, his conclusion being that "in time of peace there are no grounds for the general assertion that the Dissatisfied Powers are excluded from raw materials." He goes on to argue that Japan, Germany and Italy at present mean war. "This," he says, "accounts for their desire to have political control over territories containing raw materials"; and "No Redistribution without Disarmament" is the only safe and sound principle for the peaceful Powers," disarmament of course depending on real collective security. He then suggests the concessions which ought to be offered to the "Have-Nots" if they do join in collective security and general disarmament. And if they do not . . . ? But it is not Mr. Plummer's fault that there is probably no way to conciliate the "Have-Nots" without adding to their power of aggression. A firm anti-aggression front, combined with real attempts to expand world trade (even at the expense of Ottawa) seems the most hopeful line. Mr. Plummer might have said more about this.

The Protection of the Public from Aerial Attack is a totally unconstructive treatment of a newly and vitally important problem. As long as there are national forces of bombers, there will have to be air-raid precautions in all cities. The sooner all of us face this fact, the better. Apart from saving lives in the event of war, every measure or combination of measures that can really make cities less vulnerable to air attack will tend to discourage such attacks and so make war less likely. It was therefore important, in debunking particular devices and statements of the Home Office Air Raid Precautions Department, not to prejudice the ordinary reader against taking effective air-raid precautions seriously. The authors' experiments show that "gas-proof" rooms are less effective than one had expected, gas-masks rather more. Because these give only partial protection, ought they to be neglected? Clearly not: for in cases where the weather conditions do not favour poison gas, even partial and temporary protection may save many lives. Again, in cases

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where we cannot give much protection to people in places directly hit by bombs, we can and must prevent the disaster from spreading to involve places not directly hit. Food storage, the duplication of the essential services, organised evacuation of towns, new fire-fighting appliances—all these means must be explored. Passive defence is a new necessity, an unexplored and urgent field for research. Yet the authors of this book make no constructive proposal whatever. That this book should be the first on its subject to reach the intelligent Left-Wing public in this country is almost a disaster.

JONATHAN GRIFFIN.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE. *A report on its structure and problems by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.* (Oxford University Press. 15s.)

SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, 1918-1936. By W. K. HANCOCK. (Oxford University Press. 25s.)

THESE two books are simultaneously issued under the auspices of Chatham House, and they are intended to be complementary. In point of quality they make a queer pair—a hack compilation and a thoroughbred essay running in double harness. The contrast suggests powerful arguments against the Study Group method.

The very lay-out of *The British Empire* is eloquent of the bias of its authors. For the purpose of their exposition they group the Empire geographically and list the groups in the following order. First comes the United Kingdom, next the Dominions in single file and in their customary order of precedence, then Newfoundland, followed by Southern Rhodesia. Hand in hand, India and Burma bring up the rear, leading a nondescript little dog called the Colonial Empire. This ranking neatly expresses the colour bar of the Imperial Constitution.

The book concentrates its attention on the constitutional and governmental aspects of Empire affairs, and to a large extent disinterests itself in the basic economic problems. There is one chapter on economic policy, and as it happens it is the best in the book, but elsewhere economics receives perfunctory treatment. Even that chapter exhibits a tendency to shy at difficulties. For example, the Treasury's power of veto over Dominion legislation thought to prejudice the

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interests of investors in Dominion trustee securities has survived the Statute of Westminster. As Britain has in inter-Commonwealth relations abandoned every other prerogative of sovereignty as unessential, this single survival is a remarkable fact, calling for realistic discussion and explanation. Why has the bondholder been picked on as the object of such unique solicitude? The Study Group dismisses the whole matter as a faint anomaly, a mere business obligation on the part of the Dominions "that does not detract seriously from equality of status."

Again, there is a reference to the Indian taxpayer being saddled with the cost of a large part of the British Army. Some critics, we are told, think that this imposes an undue burden on India. But nothing is said about how an arrangement apparently so unjustifiable ever comes to be made at all. The book does not visualise such questions in terms of the correlation of social forces actively and vitally involved, but rather in terms of financial and legal convention. And when the reader turns to Africa, he finds that labour migration, white settlement, the conflict between South African and British native policy—in a word, the living issues of our time—are quietly ignored.

The book is offered as an objective survey. Actually it is written *de haut en bas* as a sketch of the Empire viewed from the pinnacles of Whitehall. It is a highly abstract Empire, and a very different one from the Empire seen from an Indian village or an African tribe. The sketch is, in fact, rigidly conventional, and therefore pervasively partisan—beautifully and completely the production of ruling-class minds who have never profited by intimate and equal conversation with the lower orders in any country, and least of all in countries where the lower orders have dark skins.

Professor Hancock's survey is, on the other hand, a real survey—that is to say, it honestly tries to give the facts. Often, indeed, the author seems to torture himself with his own honesty, forcing his mind to admit data and considerations which are distasteful to him, but less distasteful than not playing fair with himself and his audience. The result is an exhaustive, a brilliant, and, given its political assumptions, a masterly study.

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The author's method, when he has to test a hypothesis, is to confront it with the facts that seem to favour it least. He shares with imperialists of grosser texture an enthusiasm for "the unique experiment in human co-operation which is the British Empire." He finds in its structure and organisation a satisfying intellectual subtlety, and he believes that the "Commonwealth ideal" is not merely British, or merely European, but human. He comes down, we may say, on the side of Magna Britannia. But he does all this after having put his mind through a thorough investigation of, for example, the position of Indians in South Africa and in Kenya, where, as he himself insists in so many words, the Empire was nearly wrecked on the disputes between Indians and white settlers—two tiny communities both of which were alien to the country.

Thus in a couple of sentences we learn more of imperial realities than the 300 pages of *The British Empire* have told us. It may remain a mystery to some how Professor Hancock can conclude, in face of the evidence, that the Commonwealth ideal arises out of the Empire's history, and has not been imposed upon it by the historian. It may surprise others that he can reconcile this faith with the admission, which he also makes, that the same stuff of Empire history provides the materials for an opposite interpretation. He recognises not only a gap but a conflict between the Commonwealth ideal and the actuality of Empire. He sees that even the ideal has but lately emerged, and he likens it to a death-bed repentance. He goes further and grants that his whole view may be attributable to his "dangerous habit of lofty and optimistic speculation." But he gives us the evidence, and acknowledges and warns us of his own bias. Such scrupulousness is worth ten times its weight of "objectivity" and "impartiality."

The present volume, which deals with inter-Empire relations mainly from the standpoint of constitutional history, is to have a successor treating particularly of the economic aspects of Empire in the post-War period. It will be eagerly awaited. We may find in it, the author suggests, that the statesmen who attend Imperial Conferences belong to the exploiting side of the Empire.

LEONARD BARNES.

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