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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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WHITHER EUROPE?

By WICKHAM STEED

In the December number of the *Nineteenth Century and After* Mr. Douglas Jerrold concluded his article upon 'The League and the Future' with these words:

Until the League acquires a conscience, it has no future as an agent of peaceful progress. . . . That people still continue to stay in it is a sign that the world is ready for a real experiment in world government. To see that that experiment does not perish amid a welter of political rhetoric is the first duty of all decent people. But the experiment in world government is not yet begun. The rule of law has not yet been admitted, nor have we even begun to see the first beginnings of an attempt to apply moral principles to political problems. Given good will, all these things can be attempted and some of them can be achieved. But first of all we must clear our minds of humbug and conceit.

I agree—with a reservation upon what humbug and conceit, especially humbug, may be. And I shall essay to answer the question 'Whither Europe?' without humbug or any kind of conceit. Plain speaking and frank writing have too long

gone out of fashion in this country. It is time they should come into honour again.

As I write, in mid-December 1935, after the association of Sir Samuel Hoare and, substantially, of the British National Government with M. Laval's 'peace proposals,' the preliminary answer to 'Whither Europe?' seems to be: Towards war! Up to the end of last June, when Great Britain had suddenly condoned German rearmament single-handed by concluding the egregious Naval Agreement with Hitler's emissaries, the same answer would have been warranted. The greater part of Europe was shocked and dismayed. By mid-September prospects had improved. At long last a clear and trustworthy British policy was believed to have been laid down. A British Foreign Secretary, with the approval of the whole country, had given the League of Nations, and the world, a lead towards peace by making a sane and courageous stand against aggressive and predatory war. Though suspicion may now be felt whether his insistence that collective action must be collective did not mask an unexpressed hope that it might not be collective enough to oblige Great Britain to make good her professions, Sir Samuel Hoare's lead revived drooping spirits in so many lands, and appeared to bring so unwonted a note of sincerity and straightforwardness into British protestations of fidelity to the League and its Covenant, that collective action was resolved upon and taken.

A competent witness, Señor Don Salvador de Madariaga, described in the *Daily Telegraph* of December 10 the effect of this new departure in British policy. By a singular irony of circumstance his article was published on the very day when the 'leakage' of the Franco-British 'peace proposals' showed how premature had been his rejoicing over the discomfiture of sceptics who 'would not believe that Article 16 of the League Covenant would be applied, and especially against a great nation.' These sceptics, he continued, had rubbed their eyes, and, without understanding what was happening, had obstinately believed that there was a snag in it somewhere, that someone was deceiving someone. And, he added, 'What has happened is that a great country has been converted to the system of collective security which was already the conscious policy of many countries of lesser importance.'

Señor de Madariaga is one of the few foreigners who are reputed to understand the English character. He explained that it was 'a formidable leap' for the English to pass from national insularity to international collectivity. The English nation, he claimed, is actually the most insular in the world, the most refractory to co-operation with the foreigner, the nation whose very term 'the foreigner' carries a sort of disagreeable flavour. Yet he thought that the English who invented self-government, the very soul of liberal democracy, and instinctively realise that the best interests of an individual nation coincide with those of grouped nations, had given a decisive lead towards international solidarity against aggressive war, 'a task for which England's national genius seems to have predestined her.' This Spanish reading of the English genius may be right or wrong. If it is right, the English may yet prove that their National Government traduced them and blackened their faces undeservedly before an expectant and semi-trustful world when it permitted its Foreign Secretary to associate it with the 'Anglo-French peace proposals.' Those proposals have been aptly compared to a judicial recommendation for the acquittal and rewarding of a housebreaker who, having been caught with the 'swag' in his pockets, should plead that the house he had broken into was inhabited by an uncouth fellow whose manners were deplorable.

Let us by all means 'clear our minds of humbug and conceit,' as Mr. Douglas Jerrold demands. Having done this, what are we to make, not only of Sir Samuel Hoare's Geneva speech on September 11, but of his Guildhall speech on November 9, and of Mr. Stanley Baldwin's final manifesto to the electorate on November 13? Sir Samuel Hoare said at Guildhall:

In a great crisis such as this no British statesman can play the part of Gallio, no British Government can wash its hands of a great responsibility. We had given our word in the Covenant and were bound to keep it. We had raised our voice against the doctrine of force and we could not abandon the friends of peace. We had great influence in the world, and it would be a miserable abdication not to assert it.

It was in these circumstances that I tried [at Geneva] to give the League and to give the world as simply and as plainly as I could the British point of view. . . . The opinion I was expressing was, and is, the opinion of the great majority of my fellow-countrymen. They are

determined to keep their word to Europe and to the world. They are determined to join in any honourable attempts that will bring the Abyssinian war to an end. They are determined to throw the whole weight of their country into the scales of world peace. . . . This is our policy. It is simple and clear. It has not changed since my speech at Geneva, nor will it change after the election.

Sir Samuel Hoare spoke thus for the whole Government on the evening of Lord Mayor's Day, November 9, in the presence of the principal diplomatists accredited to the Court of St. James's. Exactly one month later, on the evening of December 9, came the news that Sir Samuel Hoare had joined in an 'honourable' attempt to give, in one form or another, to the Italian aggressor, unanimously condemned by the League, a good half of Abyssinia, who, with the approval of the League, was defending herself against the 'doctrine of force.' Some members of the National Government are understood to have boggled at the Foreign Secretary's right-about-turn. Whether the Prime Minister was among them is not positively known. He may have been, for he cannot wholly have forgotten the final paragraph of his last electoral manifesto. It ran:

In this, my last appeal to the country before polling day, I pledge the National Government to work faithfully for security at home and peace throughout the world, spending not a penny more on our Defence Forces than is necessary for the safety of our people, and striving always to bring the nations into agreement for all-round reduction of armaments in a world where collective security has been made the sure protection against aggression.

Was this humbug? If not, what can have happened between November 13 and the early days of December to render nugatory the Prime Minister's pledge always to strive for the reduction of armaments 'in a world where collective security has been made the sure protection against aggression'? We have a right to know.

If Mussolini's threats to obliterate Malta, attack Gibraltar, and sink the British Fleet by submarines from below and aircraft from above caused the Government to waver, it must be said that those threats were not new. They had been uttered from the beginning. If the Government quailed before them, it ought long since to have told the country that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's National Administration, in which Mr. Baldwin was deputy-Prime Minister, had allowed the Navy to sink to

so low a level that it could not afford to run any risks whatever. True, experienced naval officers might then have given Ministers the lie. But, in any event, why was the Fleet concentrated in the Mediterranean? If the Italian anti-British propaganda, sent out daily from Bari in Arabic to Egypt, Arabia and the Middle East, or the concentration of Italian troops in Libya were too dangerous a menace to our Egyptian interests, or if the unhappy effects of Sir Samuel Hoare's references to Egypt had created a new situation, a Government that professes to be truly national should have given the nation some inkling of the position. If, on the other hand, the financial and economic plight of Italy aroused fears of a collapse of the Fascist system and of ensuing chaos which might threaten the Italian royal family, or lessen Italy's value as the military ally of France against Nazi Germany, Mr. Baldwin, who dislikes dictatorships, might surely have explained what interest this country can have in helping to uphold a megalomaniac and spendthrift tyranny that has brought Italy, our old friend and former ally, to the verge of ruin.

The blackest 'nigger' in this wood pile has obviously been M. Laval. There were other 'niggers,' notably sundry representatives of international oil interests; and when the question arose of making 'sanctions' effective by cutting off oil supplies to Italy, some people in this country may have wondered whether we ought to join in creating a precedent for an oil embargo, seeing that we ourselves are dependent upon oil from overseas. If our real, as distinguished from our ostensible, policy was to compass the ruin of the League so that we might one day engage without let or hindrance in aggressive or predatory war, these misgivings might be justified. But since the League Covenant has been officially defined as the 'sheet-anchor' of our foreign policy, and we are signatories of the Kellogg Pact in renunciation of war, it would seem to follow that, should Great Britain ever emulate the conduct of Italy towards Abyssinia, the people of this country would deserve to see their oil supplies cut off. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot profess our devotion to peace and aid or abet the making of war as an instrument of national policy or in order to get a share of whatever loot may be going.

Exactly what passed between M. Laval and Signor Mussolini at Rome last January nobody seems to know. Some arrangement was certainly made for the removal of Italian troops from the Italo-French frontier so that France could strengthen her forces on the German frontier. It appears also to have been understood that Italy would continue to mount guard on the Italo-Austrian frontier by way of keeping Nazi Germany out of Austria. It is the 'consideration' which M. Laval promised for these advantages that is not exactly known. Did Signor Mussolini ask for some big concession in French Northern Africa, and, when M. Laval objected, did Signor Mussolini then say that he must get something for Italy in Abyssinia? If so, did M. Laval assure him that he need fear no interference from France in that quarter? M. Herriot, who may be supposed to know as much of the Laval-Mussolini bargain as any Frenchman except M. Laval himself, is alleged to have said at Geneva: 'There must have been some misunderstanding at Rome about the meaning of the word "si"'. In French it means "if", and in Italian it means "yes".' In any case, both the French Prime Minister and the Italian dictator have behaved as though France had entered into a binding agreement to give and to get for Italy a free hand against Abyssinia; and only what seemed, until recently, to be the awkward dilemma of having to choose between Italy and Great Britain accounts for M. Laval's constant efforts to run with the Italian hare and to hunt with the League hounds.

The French Prime Minister is reputed not to be a simple soul. His dexterity is remarkable. But the question arises whether he was really so ill-informed as to imagine that British feeling would approve of the subjugation of Abyssinia by Italy under League auspices, and whether he thought that even the completest and swiftest conquest of the Ethiopian Empire could bring Italy, within a calculable future, any economic or financial return commensurate with the outlay it must entail. There are in France enough people who know something of Abyssinia to have told him that he was encouraging Italy in an adventure which, on the most favourable hypothesis, could not fail to strain her resources and seriously to diminish her value as a partner of France in Europe. Though he may have offered Signor Mussolini

financial assistance in the form of facilities for the discounting of Italian bills, by the Bank of France or otherwise, he can hardly have been so sanguine as to think that France would be ready to pay for Italy's 'little war.' Nor can he have expected that international 'oil interests' would foot the bill with such generosity as to afford real relief to the depleted Italian treasury.

Thus the background of M. Laval's policy remains mysterious—the more mysterious in that it brought the greater part of the French Press, and no small section of French opinion, into sharp conflict with British feeling. One would have to go back to the early days of the South African war in 1899 to find a parallel to the rich vituperation with which England was assailed in a number of French journals, not all of which are wholly refractory to official influence. The vilification of this country in Signor Mussolini's organs left us comparatively cold. *Bon chien chasse de race*. But the anti-British campaign in the greater part of the Parisian Press, even though it were not altogether spontaneous or of native prompting, left a very unpleasant taste in British mouths. There were honourable exceptions. Our 'candid friend' M. André Géraud, better known as 'Pertinax,' fought a very gallant fight in the *Echo de Paris* against the wave of Anglophobia; and Mme. Tabouis, M. Julien Benda and M. Jules Romains, to mention only these, wrote with pluck and good feeling. Sad to say, they wrote on the assumption that British official professions of fidelity to the League and to the principle of collective security against aggressive war were sincere and could be counted upon. They may be less confiding in future.

More serious than Press attacks or the policy of M. Laval was the disconcerting revelation that even French quarters favourable to the League and its Covenant held a view of collective security very unlike the view currently taken in Great Britain. However confused British notions of the League may be, the idea that its potential utility in preventing war or restraining aggression must be judged solely in the light of British security has not been familiar to British minds. German and other critics of France have, it is true, claimed that the French looked upon the League mainly if not entirely as an instrument for the safeguarding

of France and her friends from attack, as a means of stabilising the Peace Treaties, and, generally, as a rallying ground for the upholders of French safety. Against these strictures French writers and politicians have often protested. In theory, they have put a universal interpretation on 'collective security' even when they have advocated regional security pacts to cover local contingencies. But manifestations of French opinion, on the Left as well as on the Right, in relation to Italian aggression, tended to show that the British conversion to the principle of collective security was instinctively judged by its possible bearing upon French security alone. Instead of welcoming our adoption of what had for years been regarded as a French standpoint, France strove to drive a bargain with us upon the applicability of collective security to other emergencies than the Italo-Abyssinian conflict; and her Government needed 2000 words in which to say a doubtful 'yes' when it was asked whether France would stand with Great Britain in the event of Italian attack upon British Possessions or warships in the Mediterranean.

As one candid French Radical confessed, 'France looks upon the League as a one-way street.' He meant a street through which League traffic could pass if it were going to the help of France, not a street equally available should France or the friends of France have to be restrained from Covenant-breaking. This revelation of the French view of the League, coupled with the sinuosities of M. Laval's behaviour, have unfortunately brought about a wide divergence between French and British feeling. Such a divergence may become an event of European, if not of world-wide, importance unless means be found to correct it betimes and to bring the two chief democratic nations of Western Europe closer together. In conjunction with it, M. Laval's reading of French interests has done more to estrange Great Britain from France than the Kaiser, Prince Bülow, Herr von Kühlmann, Dr. Stresemann or Dr. Brüning was ever able to do. Herr Hitler must feel jealous of this achievement even as he rubs his hands. M. Laval has weakened the forces in this country which were firmest in their resistance to German propaganda and blandishments. And, in his lip-service to the League and heart-service to Italian Fascist aggression, he has shown

complete ignorance of an essential point in English psychology.

This essential point is that the English people rarely unite in demanding firm and swift decisions on foreign policy unless an issue presents itself to them as involving some supreme moral principle. For practical purposes it matters little whether they are conscious that the application of this principle is calculated to uphold a specific British national interest. At the end of July 1914 it was plainly a national interest that Great Britain should stand at once with France against German attack. Yet neither the Government nor Parliament nor the country was unanimous upon it; and, had Germany refrained from violating Belgian neutrality, the chances are that British action would have come too late. Even when Belgian neutrality had been violated, it was not the threat to the safety of the Narrow Seas that appealed most swiftly to British feeling. It was the moral issue raised by the invasion of Belgium that created, overnight, effective and dynamic unanimity in Great Britain and throughout the Empire.

No precisely similar issue is likely again to arise in the eventuality of another European conflict. But a clear case of Covenant-breaking aggression on the part of a League member, or of violation of the Kellogg Pact by one of its signatories, would assuredly have brought British feeling and policy into active harmony with League principles if, in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, France had backed wholeheartedly the efforts of the League to restrain or to penalise aggression. M. Laval covertly threw away this potential guarantee of French security. He gave, indeed, verbal adherence to the doctrine laid down by Sir Samuel Hoare at Geneva on September 11: 'The League stands, and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression.' But in practice he laboured to destroy what might have remained the admitted basis of British foreign policy, and of Franco-British concord in co-operation for peace. Finally, he cajoled or frightened Sir Samuel Hoare into going back upon the Covenant and into promising to join France in promoting the partition of Abyssinia for the profit of the Italian aggressor.

As for Great Britain, the harm done to her good name

throughout the world, and not least within the Empire, cannot yet be estimated. The swift revolt of national feeling against the Laval-Hoare 'peace basis' did something to repair the damage. Mr. Baldwin and his colleagues may repent them of their error. More may be done if the British Government should henceforth prove that it 'in earnest grieves by doing so no more.' But good will in the United States has been thwarted, and all the anti-British and anti-European influences there have been strengthened. In India and British Africa the moral advantages which this country gained by seeming to stand against the unscrupulous onslaught of Italian 'whites' upon Ethiopian 'blacks' have been largely lost—and lost for what? It is an open secret that fear lest the successful application of restraints to Fascist Italy bring about the downfall of Mussolini and his system played a considerable part in French and British hesitations. Papal influences, rarely wise, have been sedulously exerted to persuade 'sanctionist' States that, by depriving the Fascist dictator of the glory he so sorely needs to cover up the disastrous effects of his system, a Communist and anti-clerical movement in Italy might sweep all before it. The assumption seems to have been that, if Mussolini were helped by France and Great Britain to gain some mitigated glory, this danger could be averted.

On one condition it might perhaps be postponed for a time. The condition is that, when the League and Abyssinia shall have been successfully betrayed, France and Great Britain will lend Italy enough money to fend off the bankruptcy which is the Nemesis of uncontrolled 'totalitarian' methods of government. But the sums to be thrown into the Fascist abyss would need to be huge, and the security for them would be flimsy or non-existent. 'Sanctions' are said to be ineffectual. This is not altogether true. Both directly and indirectly their efficacy is greater than is yet generally understood. Indirectly, at any rate, they have tended so to increase the cost to Italy of 'sanctioned' supplies smuggled in from abroad that they have hastened the depletion of Italy's fast dwindling resources; and the longer they last, the deeper will be the pit which Fascism has dug for the Italian nation.

But what of the Communist danger? Is it real? Not unless French and British policy help to make it real. No greater humbug has been talked and believed in Europe during

the past thirteen years than the interested pretence that Mussolini saved Italy from Bolshevism. He himself denounced as visionary, in his own journal, the belief in the peril of a Communist revolution as long ago as July 1921, and declared it had disappeared in 1920. When questioned upon this statement by a British well-wisher a few years since he insisted that it was true, though he added, cynically: 'It is also true that I climbed into power on the shoulders of those who believed that there was a Communist peril.' To-day there need be no Communist peril in Italy if other countries do not allow themselves to be scared by fear of it into putting their money on the Fascist horse until that horse breaks down so lamentably that the disillusioned Italian masses give vent to their rage and despair in the extremest forms of revolt. There are other and more constructive alternatives to Fascism in Italy than the Communist movement. It is they which deserve encouragement and help, for they alone could bring Italy through the severe crisis which must in any event await her, and they might at last, with judicious foreign support, restore her to her former status as an asset to a peaceful and freedom-loving Europe. Nothing short of an improbable miracle can now save Italy from a painful ordeal. Dictatorships are a luxury which have to be paid for—as Germany, too, will find unless the Nazi system wrecks Europe before it likewise breaks down.

If the true financial and economic plight of Italy beggars description, that of Germany is hardly better. There, doubtless, a majority of the people believe in Hitler as a Heaven-sent saviour, more fervently and sincerely than the Italians are still supposed to believe in Mussolini. But the Nazi system is loathed by fully 80 per cent. of the German people, including—at last—the women whose votes and influence gave Hitlerism its strongest backing. Upon the real position in Germany I have information, from two moderate conservative informants who are by no means ill-disposed towards Hitler personally, that shows the position to be well-nigh desperate. Whether the Nazi system can withstand the strain indefinitely, if no shock comes from without, is a question which these discerning and apprehensive Germans do not profess to answer. Given a good harvest next year, they think, the system might pull through for a while; though,

before very long, the necessity of funding the immense, unconfessed floating debt, in the form of Government bills of exchange and promissory notes, will compel Dr. Schacht to authorise measures of State Bolshevism that will amount to the effective confiscation of most of the private property which its owners are still able to control, and will inevitably entail devaluation of the currency. At present the Nazi system tends to cut down the margin of profit in private industry to so low a point that manufacturers and business men are at their wits' end; and the growing shrinkage of German foreign trade, which no amount of disguised dumping has availed to check, is making it harder than ever to procure foreign means of exchange for the purchase of even limited quantities of essential raw materials. Japanese competition is swamping many a market which Germany formerly supplied; and to the undeniable, albeit incalculable, influence of the Jewish boycott is now added that of the silent boycott which Catholics, Protestants and Socialists abroad are maintaining against Nazi goods.

Within Germany the bulk of the Protestant and Catholic population are in dumb revolt against the Nazi system; nor are the Jews reconciled to the pitiless grinding of their faces. The underground propaganda of Communist and Socialist organisations goes on undiminished, despite the beatings and the 'suicidings' which continue to befall suspected prisoners. The Reichswehr holds aloof and is rigorously excluding 'politics,' not excepting Nazi politics, from the new army. Its chiefs believe they will want at least five, and some think ten, years to recreate the army of their dreams. Meanwhile they are working hard and are taking from the Nazi State all it can give them. It has given to them—and to the air force—the better part of £1,000,000,000 during the past three years. But they have found that conscripts from the Nazi Party have been physically damaged by the intense military exercises to which Hitler's 'Storm Troopers' were subjected. Many of these conscripts have had to be declared unfit for regular military training. The Nazi officers who were taken over by the Reichswehr have turned out to be inefficient, and not a few of them have been degraded to the rank of sergeant. Still, it is important that at least a million men, in the new army and in the Labour service, are now being better fed

than they would have been as wage-earners in industry or had they been drawing unemployment relief. This improves them physically, though it increases the demand for foodstuffs from abroad, and thus aggravates the German economic and financial problem.

The whole Nazi system is so artificial that doubt is widely felt whether it can last. In the opinion of my moderate conservative German informants, the failure of Italy's Abyssinian adventure, especially if it were hastened by the action of the League, would hit Nazism a hard blow. On the other hand, Italian success might, in an emergency, move Hitler to make a Mussolinian choice between collapse with glory by foreign adventure, or collapse without it by internal breakdown. If Italian Fascism were discomfited he would hardly know what to do. My informants insist that, while there is no real danger of Communism in Germany if the Nazi system fails, Hitler derives much passive support from people who think they would be totally ruined should the system collapse. Banking, industry, and every other major field of economic and financial activity have been so largely brought under State control that the fall of the Nazi State, and the revelation of national bankruptcy which must accompany it, would be likely to cause a stoppage of payments from insurance companies, of interest on State loans, and of drafts on bank deposits. Better Nazism than this, the middle classes and the upper classes are disposed to think; and the lower middle class 'chortles' over the straits of the wealthier. Nevertheless, the haunting doubt remains whether Nazism, as a system, can long endure; and the shortage and rising prices of some essential foodstuffs lend point to the doubt. Not for nothing did the 10,000 Nazi football 'fans,' who were sent to support the German team on December 4, take back with them to Germany an aggregate of more than three tons of butter from England.

Worst of all in Germany—as well as in Italy—is the progressive deterioration of intellectual life and of informed interest in public affairs. People dare not speak; they dare hardly think; and they know only what they hear through official channels. Spies are everywhere, and the well-organised police are omnipotent. What this lowering of intellectual and moral standards may mean, even should the Nazi and the Fascist blight presently be removed, it is impossible to foresee.

Half a generation of re-education might be needed to bring Germany, and Italy, back to what was once a normal level of general enlightenment. Should Nazism and Fascism break down, either by reason of their own inherent defects or in consequence of some shock from outside, Germany and Italy might be European liabilities for many a year to come. But should Nazism and Fascism retain their supremacy, they will infallibly drive Europe towards war, either in concert or severally, on account of their urgent demands for nationalist 'expansion' and 'glorious' adventure.

In answering the question 'Whither Europe?' these prospects need carefully to be weighed. They it is that lend poignant significance to the Italo-Abyssinian conflict and to the anxious uncertainty whether the principles of the League of Nations can now be successfully upheld. There was a chance, more than a chance, of winning for the League and for collective security so resounding a victory over predatory war that all peace-loving nations would have looked to Geneva with hope and faith, and to Great Britain with grateful trust. This is no humbug, nor is it conceit. It is a sober estimate of what might have been. Civilised mankind might have been shepherded into a fold of assured and lasting non-war which, if not a place of true peace, might have become the antechamber of peace.

But now? None can say. In *The Times* of December 12 Sir Abe Bailey—no visionary and no Communist—closed a letter of pregnant warning with the words: 'There is one ray of hope. The old British spirit has arisen, and the people of England will take the matter in hand.' May he be a true prophet! Otherwise, and in the absence of Fascist and Nazi collapse, the answer to the question 'Whither Europe?' will be likely to remain: Towards war!

WICKHAM STEED.

P.S. December 19.—The resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare is a first concession to 'the old British spirit.' It ought not to be the last.

W.S.

THE REAL WEAKNESS OF THE LEAGUE

By PROFESSOR H. A. SMITH, D.C.L.

THE controversy between the supporters and the opponents of the League of Nations is likely to remain barren so long as the method of argument consists chiefly in enumerating lists of failures or successes. Each side can quote selected instances in favour of its thesis, and even the present crisis furnishes munitions to both sides. On the one side it is fair to point out that the League has failed to prevent the outbreak of war between two of its members. Against this the partisans of the League may bring forward the application of sanctions, though it yet remains to be seen whether these will affect the issue of the war.

In the eyes of those who realise the continuity of history the record of the League closely resembles that of its nineteenth-century predecessor, the Concert of Europe. In each case it has proved possible to settle by international authority those problems upon which there has been a sufficient measure of agreement between the Great Powers. If the Great Powers have been at variance, neither the Concert nor the League have been able to prevent the outbreak of war. Both the Concert and the League have sometimes found it necessary to condone, and even to legalise *ex post facto*, certain acts of flagrant illegality which they have been powerless to prevent.

The common apology for the shortcomings of the League is to say that the League depends upon its members and can do no more than what its members are agreed that it shall do. But this superficial explanation merely states the difficulty in another form. If we wish to go deeper into the problem, we must ask ourselves why it is that the member States find it so difficult to agree upon common action, why it is that they fail to put the cause of world law and world order above their own particular interests. We see the League as an

admirable piece of machinery, which is only waiting for the appropriate motive power to be set in motion. In order to answer our question we must study the nature of the motive power, and this inquiry will compel us to consider the spiritual forces upon which all human action ultimately rests.

It seems necessary to emphasise this last point, for it is often overlooked. There are many writers and public men who believe that the failures of the League are due to what they call 'gaps in the Covenant,' and much labour has been wasted in the attempt to produce revised texts which purport to fill up these gaps. No legal language, however skilfully drafted, can ensure obedience to law if the will to observe and enforce the law is not present in those who have the power. The Covenant as it stands is an admirable instrument for achieving a common purpose, but it cannot create a common purpose which is not there, and this difficulty equally applies to any proposed revision of the text. The roots of world troubles are not to be found in defective draftsmanship, but in the souls of men.

This fundamental fact is equally missed by the school of publicists whose panacea consists in equipping the League with armed forces under its own direct control. Proposals for international fighting forces raise technical problems of the greatest difficulty, but even the technical difficulties are as nothing compared with the problem of ensuring unity of control in the supreme command, which can only be the League itself. If we find it impossible to obtain agreement upon the end to be achieved, it is not likely that we shall find it easy to obtain unanimity as to the means.

The motive power which can impel men to take common action in a common cause is usually called 'loyalty.' If the cause of universal peace and world order is to prevail over the interests of particular States, this cause must be able to command a loyalty which is stronger than the loyalty which men naturally render to their own countries. What, then, is the nature of loyalty? Is it possible that a Frenchman or a German can ever be brought to regard the human race as a whole with the affection which he feels for his own country, and to sacrifice himself for humanity as he would for his fatherland? Upon the answer to this question depends all possibility of effective international action in those supreme

crises which affect the vital interests of the great States of the world.

If we turn for a moment from the study of international politics, and examine this sentiment in the light of common experience, we shall find that this idea of loyalty always contains some element of exclusiveness, the drawing of comparisons between the group or society to which we owe allegiance and those to which we do not. Consciously or unconsciously, we regard our membership of this particular group as being in some way a privilege which others do not share. Membership engenders a feeling of pride, and we can only be proud of something which is not shared by all mankind. A man may be proud of a Roman nose, but he cannot be proud of having a nose. So it is that his pride in his family or his firm, his college or his regiment, is only made possible because each of these groups forms a limited society to which the whole world cannot belong.

This feeling of loyalty also requires the stimulus of constant comparison and rivalry with other groups. The rivalry may be friendly or hostile, but experience teaches us that some element of competition is essential. Even if direct conflict be avoided, each group is continually comparing its achievements with those of its rivals. If the society is to achieve success in the world, every member must be made to take a personal pride in its victories and feel every failure as a personal defeat.

The State is only one form of human organisation, and its corporate life, its common vitality, must be nourished in the same way as that of lesser societies. This is true both of those small nations which fiercely cherish their independence and of the great empires which have ruled vast areas of the globe. Empires are only possible because they are not universal. When St. Paul asserted his Roman citizenship he claimed by right of birth a privilege which the centurion had thought it well worth while to purchase for a large sum. Citizenship continued to be a privilege even after Caracalla had extended it to all inhabitants of the empire, for the greater part of the world still lay beyond the frontiers. To the Roman the world beyond the borders of the empire was something which did not share in the benefits of Roman civilisation, and a better rendering of St. Luke's well-known

text would be: 'There went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus, that all the *civilised world* [πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην] should be enrolled.' It was only within the frontiers of a limited society, continually compelled to defend itself against the barbarian world outside, that the Roman citizen could feel the privilege of belonging to a great empire.

In our own day we have seen great empires disintegrate completely because this bond of a common loyalty was not strong enough to stand the strain of defeat in war. All the lessons of history point the same moral. The American Civil War was only made possible because the people of the South felt that loyalty to their own States was a higher obligation than loyalty to the Union, and the military victory of the North would not have proved permanent if it had not been consolidated by a gradual change in Southern sentiment. On the other hand, there have been great movements of unification, but these tell the same tale. The unification of Germany and Italy was only made possible because the peoples of those countries were inspired by the vision of a greater nation which would be capable of drawing to itself the allegiance which had formerly been rendered to lesser entities.

To sum up, the feeling of loyalty demands three conditions: a definite limitation of the society which claims allegiance, a pride in membership of the society, and the stimulus of that feeling by comparison and competition with other groups. If this analysis be correct, we are now in a position to appreciate a necessary weakness in the nature of the League or of any other universal authority. The League aims at being a world society, and it is impossible for us, constituted as we now are, to have a feeling of loyalty for the world or for the whole human race. We cannot compare the life and achievements of our race with the life, if there be any, which exists in other planets. We cannot feel that we are exposed to the dangers of territorial conquest or cultural domination from another world. The idea of a world loyalty lacks those necessary elements of exclusiveness, of comparison, and of danger, upon which experience teaches us that all human loyalty depends.

It may be said that leagues and alliances have inspired loyalty before now, and may do so again. Closer analysis will show that such groupings have never been regarded as

ends in themselves, but as means for protecting the interests of the member States. Furthermore, it will be found that in all cases the motive power of the alliance has been derived from the sense of some common external danger, and that such groupings do not survive the particular peril which has called them into being. But the League is not even an alliance, and it has now become fashionable to praise the League for the very reason that it supersedes what is called 'the old system of alliances.' If the League were an alliance, if it were organised for the purpose of protecting its members against the non-members, it would probably show more vitality than it does now. But in fact the world is not divided along these lines. The non-members as such threaten no danger to the members, and it is quite impossible for the policy of the League to be inspired by the common purpose of protection against external perils.

At this point perhaps a few words of philosophy may not be out of place. Human action can only be inspired by emotion in so far as it rests upon the power of choice, the freedom of the will. We can only give a willing allegiance to any given cause or society by renouncing allegiance to others, and this is true of the highest allegiance that is possible to man. As the baptismal service reminds us, we cannot serve God unless we renounce the devil. Every conscious act of man involves the choice, trivial or serious, between at least two courses of action, and apart from this power of choice an act can have no moral value. Loyalty to our country is meaningless unless it is at the same time possible to be disloyal, either by transferring our allegiance somewhere else or merely by preferring our own selfish interests. In normal times the ordinary man is not faced with this duty of making his choice, but in times of crisis the problem becomes urgent for each individual. Within the limits of a single State the solution of such problems may well lead to a civil war or to a conflict between Church and State. What is the bearing of this upon the question of allegiance to the League of Nations? Can we, as individuals, be disloyal to the League in the sense that we can defy its authority?

The answer is at once apparent if we consider the fundamental difference between the League and a federal union, such as the United States. Loyalty cannot be demanded

unless it is also claimed. The Central Government of the United States makes a direct claim upon the allegiance of every citizen, and since the Civil War it has been settled that this federal allegiance, within the limits of the Constitution, overrides any allegiance to the several States. Congress makes laws binding upon the whole nation and taxes every individual. But the League of Nations, like the American Confederation of 1781, is only a union of Governments, and has no direct relations with their individual subjects. If the Government of Texas were to rebel against the Government of Washington, it would be the clear legal duty of every man in Texas to support the federal power, and this duty arises from the direct bonds which bind him to the Federal Government. No such bond connects the League with the individual citizen, and the decisions of the League can only affect the individual through the action of his own Government. In other words, the League claims no authority over the individual, and political allegiance must always be correlative to authority. Where there is no right to command there can be no duty to obey. From this it follows that in a conflict between the League and one of its member States the individual cannot be faced, as he is faced in a civil war, with the duty of choosing between allegiance to his own country and allegiance to the League. He cannot defy an authority which he is unable to obey.

So far I have written of the nature of loyalty as we know it in the light of our own experience. Is it possible that our race will ever be able to grasp the conception of a world society united by spiritual bonds which are not dependent upon the stimulus of privilege, comparison, and external danger? Christian thought envisages such a world under the name of the Kingdom of Heaven, made visible upon earth as it is in heaven. But it is necessary to remember that in Christian teaching, as in that of the Old Testament, the reign of universal peace is a consequence, not the cause, of the perfection of man. In Isaiah's vision the reign of peace is conditional upon the universal acceptance of 'the law of the Lord.' The loyalty thus demanded is loyalty to God. The error of the modern internationalist lies in the fact that he reverses the true order. He expects peace to follow from the establishment of a world organisation without waiting to

secure spiritual unity. He sees no need for a common faith, and very often he denies even the existence of God. He asks us to accept such devices as compulsory arbitration, or an international air force, but he does not demand that the Governments which operate the machinery shall be united by any common ideals, standards, or beliefs. Without such a community of ideals and purpose the international council chamber itself becomes a battle-ground, not of physical conflict, but of manœuvring, bargaining, and intrigue. That is what we can see at Geneva to-day.

We must further bear in mind that the Christian conception of a perfected world is not a scheme of government, but the vision of a new spiritual order. The world is too vast to be directly governed by any man or by any group of men, and no League of Nations can ever be more than a meeting-place of Governments. The conception of the *Civitas Dei* (the 'Commonwealth of God') does not demand the subordination of all Governments to a super-State, but the conduct of all human life, both public and private, in accordance with the principles of the Christian faith. From this point of view the dilemma, as St. Augustine puts it, is clear. If all intercourse between men is governed by the Divine law, then wars become impossible, and a super-Government is not needed. If the Divine law is not the rule of life, then no amount of organisation can prevent conflict, since the rulers who control the organisation, and the nations who support them, will themselves be actuated by the motives and the passions which give rise to war. The second branch of this dilemma is illustrated by what we can see to-day. Of the first we have as yet no experience.

The purpose of this article is to examine those weaknesses in all international government, whatever its form, which are permanent and not accidental, those which are derived from the nature of man rather than from defects of draftsmanship or of mechanism. Let us now consider another necessary weakness, which may be described as the absence of any true authority or control in an international council.

There is only one form of international government which has really worked, and that is the imperial form. Great empires such as the Roman Empire or our own have been truly international in the sense that they have established

peace, order, and security among a number of different nations without suppressing the national individuality of their component parts. But in each case we have the essential factor of unity of direction. The method by which this is achieved is immaterial. The Roman method, which we have followed in our Colonial empire, is to vest paramount control in a single central authority. Our modern Dominions, although not subject to direct orders from London, preserve our essential unity by being in practice willing to follow the lead of the mother country in all major questions of common interest, and they are willing to do this because they share our loyalty to the common Sovereign. No empire can hold together if this unity of direction be not preserved.

What is true of empires is equally true of every national Government. The party system of Great Britain, the presidential Government of the United States, the numerous dictatorships of to-day, all agree in this, that the executive power must be directed either by a single mind or by a group of minds which are in agreement upon all major issues of policy. In each case the men at the top are chosen for office by a single authority in obedience to a rule which compels them to be of one mind upon all matters of political principle.

To this we must add that the men who are thus chosen for high office have much more in common than membership of the same party or agreement upon political issues. They share in common all those ideas, interests, and prejudices which naturally arise in the course of a lifetime spent in the same society. They speak the same language, they have been educated in the same traditions, and they are subject to the same influences in their social and private lives. Whenever a question comes up for decision, there is a great convergence of forces which prompts them to decide it in the same way. Every member of a national Government has a strong personal interest in preserving its integrity, and minor differences of opinion are readily sacrificed for this end. None of these things can be embodied in the words of a written constitution, but in practice they are even more important than those requirements which can be stated in terms of law. The text of a constitution can do no more than define the formal structure, the legal machinery of government. The elements which make a constitution a living thing are to be found in

the minds and souls of men. Two constitutions which are substantially the same in their formal and legal structure are often found to differ widely in their actual working. The reason for such divergences can always be traced to the differences in ideas and traditions, the differences in upbringing and social environment, between the two groups of men who do the actual work of government.

How far may we reasonably expect to find this essential unity of direction present in international government? In practice all international authorities, including the League, are constituted in substantially the same way. Some kind of council or committee is formed by bringing together a body of delegates appointed by a number of different Governments. If there is general agreement upon the ends to be attained, as in the case of the Postal Union and other technical conferences, useful results may follow. But if there are grave differences upon fundamental issues of policy, it is obvious that the international conference contains none of those elements which are necessary to secure unity of direction in a national Government.

The individuals present are not chosen by a single authority, but by a number of authorities between whom there is no necessary bond of agreement. Each is closely bound by his instructions, and can agree to nothing except by permission of his superiors at home. They do not collectively belong to any party or to any body of opinion, nor are they united by any previous agreement upon the policy to be pursued, unless such an agreement has already been reached by the participating Governments. At the council table they are subject to no common direction, for no delegate has any authority, legal or moral, to guide the debate to an agreed conclusion, and decisions cannot be taken by the vote of a majority. The public debate tends to be unreal, for each member is speaking to a carefully prepared brief, and his duty is rather to explain the attitude of his Government than to convince his fellow-delegates.

It is equally clear that an international conference is lacking in those less formal elements out of which unity of direction must be built up. The personnel of the delegations changes frequently, and the delegates have little or no knowledge of one another apart from what they gain at the conference.

They lack a common language, a common education, and a common social life. For each man his family and his friends, his interests and his ambitions, are to be found in the country from which he comes. In his own country lie the roots of everything which goes to make up the complete man. No delegate comes to the council table with any real intention of being influenced by the arguments. His own judgment is already more than half formed, not only by the instructions of his Government, but by the books, the newspapers, the conversation, and by the whole life of his own country. The praise for which he hopes and the censure which he fears are dispensed by his own Government and his own people. Such unity as there may be in an international conference is like the unity of cut flowers in a vase rather than the unity of a plant rooted in the soil. To complete the simile, perhaps we should add that all the flowers in the vase should be placed there by different women.

Good and useful work can be done by international bodies in dealing with technical and non-political problems, or with political problems upon which substantial agreement has already been reached between the Governments. The purpose of this article has been to show that we cannot reasonably expect the League, or any similar body, to settle by its own authority the graver differences which divide the great States of the world. The weaknesses which we have examined are not due to any defect of form or of mechanism, and cannot be overcome by any amendment of the Covenant. They are weaknesses which must be inherent in any international organisation until mankind is inspired by a common purpose based upon a common faith.

H. A. SMITH.

THE ETHICS OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

By the late CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, United States Navy

As an exponent of sea-power Rear-Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan had no peer in the annals of literature. He consistently advocated a solid understanding between the English-speaking peoples. Seeing in Anglo-American naval supremacy the strongest hope of peace, he never ceased to oppose the doctrine of 'the freedom of the seas.' Before his death in December 1914 he foretold the defeat of the Central Powers and of Germany.

It was in England that his genius first found recognition, sealed by the grant of honorary degrees at Oxford and Cambridge in 1894. Deeply religious, chivalrous and unassuming, he applied historic insight to modern problems with calm impartiality. In The Problem of Asia,¹ published in 1900, he dealt in general terms with the impulse, then at its greatest strength, towards territorial expansion of the Great Powers. His views are of special interest to-day in relation to the dispute between Italy and the League. They are here set forth, in abbreviated form, in his own words.

THE progress of the world illustrates, beyond all corporate or even national experience, the uncertainties with which thought has to contend as it develops into policy and asserts itself in conduct. Every nation or race deals with its own problems—those of its internal and of its external life. Enmities succeed to friendships; weakness to strength; accidents cause revolutions. Nations and their rulers must take account of existing tendencies; they must take long views, and act upon them; yet so great are the uncertainties, so obvious the difficulties of prediction and of speculation, that they are compelled to treat the situation of the moment in the light of immediate necessities and to take short views.

The recent impulse towards expansion of the American

¹ Sampson, Low, Marston & Co. Ltd.: London, 1900; Messrs. Little, Brown & Co.: Boston, U.S.A.

people is but one phase of a sentiment that has swept over the whole of the civilised European world. Within the last few decades we have witnessed the advance of Russia in Asia, the division of Africa, the development of the colonial ambitions of France and Germany, the naval growth of the latter, the emergence of Japan, and the birth of the British idea of Imperial Federation, now fast assuming concrete shape. Every great State has borne its part in this common movement. We may not know whence it comes nor whither it trends, but it has already radically changed our relations towards foreign States and races. The intrinsic importance of Cuba, of the West Indies in general, and of the Isthmus of Panama, to the political, commercial, and military interests of the United States was long ago perceived: witness the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, the attempt to annex Santo Domingo, to purchase the Danish islands, and our action in Panama. The expansion of our country emphasised the consciousness of a probable destiny, which, deadened temporarily by the outbreak of the Civil War, revived immediately upon its conclusion, the insistence upon the French withdrawal from Mexico being the first-fruits of quickened life. For the moment the long view had yielded to the imperious demands of the short.

With the possible exception of the Monroe Doctrine, the people of the United States have been by long habit and deliberate intention indifferent to the subject of external politics. As a just counterweight to the Monroe Doctrine, which rests in nowise upon international law, but upon our own interests, as we understand them, we have adopted, as a rule of action, abstention from interference in purely European questions. Neither position possesses any legal standing or binding force; we are at complete liberty to abandon either at once. We are confronted at this moment in Asia by questions in which our interests are involved. There is no more inconsistency in taking suitable action there than in any international difference with a European Power. If such action should involve control by us of territory, it will only be because conditions make it impossible either to perpetuate the present system or to resist encroachments entailed under the impulse of more virile States by the progress of the world.

The declension of a European State might immediately and directly endanger our own interests and involve us in action, either to avert the catastrophe itself or to remedy its consequences. In any future federation of the world healthy politics will need an opposition of parties, drawn, doubtless, along national or racial lines. The first law of States, as of men, is self-preservation—a term which cannot be narrowed to a stationary round of existence. Growth is a property of healthful life; it does not necessarily imply increase of size for nations, any more than it does for individuals, with whom bodily, and still more mental, development progresses long after stature has reached its limit; but it does involve the right to ensure, by just means, whatsoever contributes to national progress, and oppose whatever may injure it. When a difference between two States can be brought to the test of ascertained and defined right, this carries with it a strong presumption in favour of submission; but when a matter touches only advantage, not qualified by law or by prescription, and is therefore one of expediency, it is justly and profitably considered in the light of self-preservation. The right of growth, which is common to both, is not legal but natural, and consequently less capable of precise definition. It is a great gain, not only to the parties concerned, but to mankind at large, when each candidly regards in this light the claims of an opponent as well as his own, and by mutual concession or impartial arbitration seeks to strike a fair balance; but in such a transaction Governments—and even nations—are not principals, but trustees for generations to follow. Recourse to arbitration is conditioned by the element of trusteeship, and cannot be embraced in that spirit of individual self-sacrifice.

It is therefore not enough to direct attention to the territorial rights of the two parties² who at the present moment are the principal exponents of contending impulses. There must be considered also the need and the right to grow. Nor can the question be confined to the two most prominent disputants. The right to grow, of the world in general and of other States in particular, is involved.

Growth depends upon vigour of internal organisation—which gives power to assimilate—and upon freedom of inter-

² Great Britain and the Boer Republics.

change with external sources of support. In the family of civilised States the former is solely the concern of the nation itself; external intervention is permissible only when its stage of political development corresponds to that of childhood or of senility. The methods of British internal administration are therefore outside such a discussion as this, except in so far as they indicate the probable effect upon other countries of the extension of these methods to the territory desired but not yet obtained. This is, indeed, a most serious consideration, and one that cannot fail to weigh heavily in the determination of policies. The ubiquitous tendency to territorial expansion results in a corresponding contraction of the ground free equally to all; and, as this narrows, there cannot but be increasing jealousy of every movement which carries a threat of exclusive control, whether by acquisition or by predominant influence, especially if the latter depends, not upon fair commercial struggle in open markets, but upon military or political force.

It is a mistake, when considering conflicting interests, to see in them only grounds for opposition and hostility. States that are more fortunate in the physical conditions which facilitate the circulation of the life-blood of trade throughout their organisation owe, at the least, candour, if not sympathy, to the fetters under which other Powers labour. Nevertheless, there remains the duty to their own people; and associated with these, but dominating both, the moral obligations to the populations and to the Governments of the debatable zone. We are not in the presence of a simple problem, easily decided by reference merely to existing rights—natural, prescriptive, or legal. We are confronted with the imminent dissolution of one or more organisms, or with a readjustment of their parts, the results of which will be solid and durable in proportion as the existence and force of natural factors either are recognised or allowed to reach an equilibrium by free self-assertion. Such a struggle, however, involves conflict and suffering that might be avoided, in part at least, by the rational process of counsel and agreement.

Equilibrium is one of the two factors that will tend to promote peace. Unhappily, the other factor, freedom from friction, is absent. Uneasiness, which is the mental equivalent of friction, now prevails. In order that the worst

results of such uneasiness (war) may be averted, a general appreciation of actual conditions is indispensable. Failing that, through ignorance of the strength of those opposed to them, and of the elements in which strength, or weakness consists, States and Governments hesitate to act when action is opportune, and are hasty when time is not ripe. In either case they act amiss, and incur danger. To recognise facts is the surest way to peace.

The question of dealing with countries in which Governments and peoples alike are content to be stationary, neither knowing nor desiring progress, is so troublesome that it will be postponed until the day when more advanced civilisations need them, or until the future need is emphasised by a consciousness of its imminence, and by a movement to obtain positions that can be utilised for control or influence. In order to be effective such influences need the possession of visible power and position, which alone the occupants understand as a motive for concession. There can be, of course, no question of dispossessing the present inhabitants, but only to induce them to accept such conditions as shall contribute to their regeneration, to their own benefit and that of the world at large, whether by a gradual assumption of rule, as in India, or by influencing the Government in nominal possession, as in Egypt.

In the past the history of such changes has commonly been that private commercial enterprise leads the way, and that the incapacity of the local Government permits the occurrence of abuses, which necessitate the interference of a foreign State to protect the rights of its citizens. Interference cannot be confined to mere remedy of the past and the engagements for the future, but seeks prevention by guarantees, usually of such a description as to confer a certain degree of local rule. This, in turn, partaking of the vitality of its mother country, tends to grow, as all life does. The seed, having been sown, germinates and thrives after its manner, which is not the manner of the soil, but, once planted, it is ineradicable. In Egypt as in India, quite contrary to what may have at first been expected, it has resulted in the dominance of a single State. In China the process has begun, and is still in progress. That other backward countries should remain indefinitely strangers to experience of a like nature is

not to be imagined. There is no reason why they should, and there are very evident conditions which indicate that, although postponed, the first step is sure to be taken and the consequences sure to follow.

It is clear, indeed, wherever a numerous population already exists, that regeneration must proceed through, and by, the inhabitants already in possession of the soil, yet these now have not, either in themselves or in existing Governments, the power to begin and to continue the process of reform. Under what impulse, then, and under the genius of what race, is the movement to arise and to progress? The determination of the answer depends upon a struggle, peaceful or otherwise, between the external Powers—a conflict inevitable because of their opposing political institutions, themselves the expression of the yet more vital force of contrasted national characters.

So far as we have gone it may have seemed that the people of the countries under discussion were being regarded only as the stake to go to the stranger. Such, however, has not been the case. The condition of these peoples is not that of sheep to be owned, although in some respects it much resembles that of sheep without a shepherd, for, strong and virile as may be their native characters in individual manifestation, much of their force is expended in maintaining unchanged their social institutions or government. If so, these races must either remain as they are or be reformed from without. In the latter case the source and character of these impulses is evidently of first importance. Whatever the character of the process, the result cannot be to obliterate the qualities of these races, but to introduce them into our existing civilisation, from which they have for ages stood apart. It was thus that the Teutonic genius entered into the civilisation of Rome, through a protracted process of development, under the reciprocal influence of diverse racial characteristics. That the result was thus happily protracted, to our own great gain, was due, as Mommsen has indicated, to the foresight of Cæsar.

The incorporation of this vast mass of beings, the fringe of which alone we have as yet touched, into our civilisation, to the spirit of which they have hitherto been utter strangers, is one of the greatest problems before humanity, but we

may face it with confidence and without fear. The success with which, in our society, the Latin and Teuton types mingle without losing their individuality has been due mainly, if not exclusively, to the spirit of Christianity, which reconciled the antagonism of ages without impairing the permanence of type. We must take the long view: We have much to hope from the fact that our present world of civilisation consists of strong opposing nationalities, and is not one huge, consolidated *imperium*, such as that of which Cæsar laid the foundation, driven thereto because the individual declension of the Roman citizen had destroyed the material from which the more healthful organism of earlier days could have been reconstituted. It is a weighty tribute to his genius, and to that of the best of his successors, that an organisation should have perpetuated its energy so long after vitality had departed from its frame. Fixed in this mould of arrested, or fulfilled, development, knowing only internal turmoil, without a recognised rival to stimulate it in the struggle for existence, and so to preserve it from stagnation and decay, the great centralised, unified world of that epoch was unstable because it lacked elasticity.

The example may be commended to the study of those who would push to a similar fatal unification, under a centralised authority, our own civilisation, already sufficiently hidebound by accumulated traditions. Contrast with this the energy of the broken warring communities that rolled back the Saracenic invasion and evolved the subsequent social order of Europe. Their strength lay in the strenuous vitality fostered by constant competition among themselves. Nothing more fatal can be devised for our civilisation than the habit, happily not yet acquired, of looking for the solution of doubts and the adjustment of interests to the universal paternalism of a central external authority. The health of the community of States, as of the community of citizens, depends upon the national self-sufficiency and vigour of the individual members. The competitive rivalries of national interests serve to perpetuate the strong contrasts of race temperament and political methods which now exist among us, and will retard the day of external conformity, the premature arrival of which, complete in form but imperfect in spirit, is to be dreaded.

Consideration for the populations involved should have the precedence of the interests of external nations—even of those taking action. This is not said as an apology for measures based on national self-interest. Self-interest is a legitimate and fundamental cause for national policy, which needs no cloak of hypocrisy and requires no justification, although the propriety of its application to a particular instance may call for demonstration. The first element of a just decision must be the determination to give due precedence to the natural rights and the future development of the peoples most directly affected. The phrase 'natural rights' is chosen expressly to indicate those that result from the simple fact of being born as distinct from political or legal rights. Thus the claim of an indigenous population to retain indefinitely control of territory depends, not upon a natural right, but upon political fitness, shown in the political work of governing, administering and developing, in such manner as to insure the natural right of the world at large that resources should not be left idle but be utilised for the general good. Failure to do this justifies, in principle, compulsion from outside; the position to be demonstrated, in the particular instance, is that the necessary time and the fitting opportunity have arrived.

The interests of the populations in these countries is by no means necessarily identical with those of the present Governments, nor with their continuance. These are not representative, in the sense that they embody the wishes or promote the best welfare of the subject. They represent at most the incapacity of the people to govern themselves, and in their defects are the results of generations of evolution from a false system, unmodified by healthy opposition. Being what they are, should necessity demand their discontinuance, there need be no tenderness in dealing with them as institutions. It is, in fact, the inefficiency of Governments that chiefly gives rise to the present uneasiness.

Accepting the existence of the problem in the terms so far stated, a solution may be attempted. Granting outside interference at all, the successful issue would be found in a condition of political equilibrium between the external Powers, whereby the equality of opposing forces should prevent the undue preponderance of any one State, or com-

bination of States, and which at the same time should promote the material and spiritual development of the populations affected. Thus would be hastened the day when the latter, while still retaining their special traits and aptitudes, shall have been successfully grafted on to the civilisation of Europe, which, whatever its shortcomings, certainly has produced the best fruits in the individual, social, and political well-being of its members. This vital change effected, these new branches will then be able to discharge all functions of self-governing peoples, such as now constitute the international commonwealth. Our own day has witnessed just such a day in Japan, which has not experienced the governmental paralysis of China, but has, since she felt the impulse of the foreigner, passed through a revolution of institutions, to the general admiration, into the full enjoyment of all international dignity and privilege.

We must seek the speedy establishment of conditions under which there shall be a balance of influence between land-power and sea-power, and at the same time a minimum of friction. The problem, from its nature, especially demands study by the Teutonic nations—Germany, Great Britain, and the United States; for to them, representing as they do one party to the case, co-operation is necessary, and co-operation must depend upon identity of conviction, resting upon community of interest. A single State like Russia, equipped with a Government embodying the simplest conception of political unity, escapes the embarrassment inevitable to several nations, of more complex organisation, in which the wills of the citizens have to be brought, not merely to submission, but to accord, upon a matter of international understanding.

Of other countries, France is, by her artificial connexion, engaged to some extent to the policy of Russia; whether for better or for worse will depend upon the coincidence of this with her natural interests there. At present, the principal result of the alliance is to emphasise the divergence of interests internal to the group of Latin nations. This is probably inevitable, both as a historical consequence of their too great proximity and from their conflicting ambitions in the Mediterranean. Nor can there be left out of account here the sincerely cordial interest, both past and present, of the

English-speaking nations in the progress and confirmation of Italian unity. This can scarcely fail to strengthen the bond of common interest in the Mediterranean, which is created and unified by the historic efforts of France to secure a preponderance there. In face of an immediate urgency like this, especially when supported by the might of Russia, it is unreal to appeal to an argument so phantasmal as a common Latinity; for France, after all, is Latin, in organisation rather than in temperament. The Gallic admixture, whatever its advantages, entails a lack of the steadfastness essential to the endurance of political combination.

The distant solution, which all three races should desire, is not the subversion of native genius or institutions, but the quiet introduction of the European leaven—under conditions of justice and good will. This is possible, in practice, only in the presence of force; by just self-assertion, taking the shape of insistence upon equality of opportunity, and supporting its demand by such evident preparation of means as will compel due attention. Preparation insures consideration; and consideration necessarily takes the form of courtesy. Both tend to peace, by recognising and giving free play to the many factors—position, numbers, race, temperament, political institutions, national aptitudes of every kind—which make evolution possible. In this spirit, when considering the demands of to-day, let us take the long view. In the present backward condition of certain States, which accurately reflects the want of political aptitude in their peoples, the lack of effective organisation deprives the great mass of population of the power of effective initiative, limiting its present function to passive resistance to change.

These, and other factors named, constitute the strategic features of the general world situation. With them nations have to deal in the light of their individual interests, checked by due respect to the right of others, measuring the latter, not exclusively by the rule of conventional ideas, essentially transitory, but by the standards of eternal justice, which human law can express only imperfectly. Nor does the mighty power of sentiment fail to find due place in such a scheme; on the contrary, it receives therefrom the intelligent direction which alone makes it operative for good. A large part of a nation's wisdom consists in reinforcing its

own strength, by co-operation with others, based upon a substantial identity of interests. If such identity is combined with community of character and tradition, the prospect of harmonious co-operation is greatly increased. From the sense of such kinship springs a sound affection, which redeems interest from much of the selfishness associated with the word. Such is the triple bond which may unite Germany, Great Britain, and the United States—not in alliance, but in solidarity of action, founded upon common interest, and cemented by the ties of blood.

The outcome of the Civil War in the United States, the unification of Italy, the new German Empire, the growing strength of the idea of Imperial Federation in Great Britain, all illustrate the tendency of humanity to aggregate into greater groups, which in the instances cited have resulted in formal political combinations. To the impulse and establishment of each of these steps in advance war has played a principal part. War it was which preserved our Union. War it was which completed the political unity of Italy, and brought the Germans into that accord of sentiment and of recognised interest upon which rest the foundations and the continuance of their empire. War quickened the spirit of sympathy between Great Britain and her Colonies, and gave life to the British Empire; and it needed the stress of war, the threat of outside interference with a sister nation in its mission of benevolence, to quicken into positive action the sympathy between Great Britain and the United States.

War is assuredly a very great evil; not the greatest, but among the greatest evils which afflict humanity. Yet let it be recognised at this moment, when the word Arbitration has hold of popular imagination, that within two years two wars have arisen, the righteous object of either of which has been unattainable by milder methods. When the United States went to war with Spain, 400,000 of the latter's colonial subjects had lost their lives, by the slow misery of starvation, inflicted by a measure—Reconcentration—which was intended, but had proved inadequate, to suppress an insurrection incited by centuries of oppression and by repeated broken pledges. The justification of that war rests upon our right to interfere on grounds of humanity. It was impossible to accept renewed promises, not necessarily through distrust of

their honesty; but because political incapacity to give just and good administration had been proved by repeated failures.

Great Britain and the United States have begun to know each other, in community of interest and of traditions, in ideals of equality and of law. The two States, in their various communities, will more and more clearly draw together in the unity of the spirit, and all the surer if they eschew the bondage of the letter of alliance. To complete the group, ethnically and spiritually, there is needed the accession of the other branches of the Teutonic family, of which the German Empire is the great exponent. The race can afford to wait for this, and it would certainly be injudicious to precipitate its coming by a forcing process.

Various causes have conspired during the passing century to depress the visible power and influence of the Latin, as compared with the Teutonic, communities in Europe. The unification of Italy is the one conspicuous exception. To this let there be added the strategic central position of the new State in the Mediterranean, which is to Europe far more even than the Caribbean can be to America, and also the political considerations which have forced her and France into the opposite scales of the political balance.

This attitude of Italy cannot but be fully confirmed by the clear necessity, to Latin and to Teuton, to insure that predominance in the Levant which is essential to both, because, as sea Powers, secure use of the Suez Canal is to them vital. The significance of this is that, by the force of circumstances, Italy, the modern representative of that which is most solid, politically, in the original Latin strain, remains in the intimacy of political attachment with the Teutonic Powers. This assures us the continued association of that Latin element which has contributed so much to the composite result of our Christian civilisation; and it still more points on to the time when that element, the lineal inheritor of Roman greatness, seeing more clearly where its interests lie, shall find in Italy the centre and the pattern which shall restore it, in renewed glory, to the commonwealth of States that already owes to it so much.

It would not be presuming an unfair burden to Great Britain to reckon in part upon her supreme navy as a factor

in some form of co-operation, and division of labour. It would be so only if we grudged our due proportion of a naval effort tending to the common advantage. Community of interests in objects implies mutual interest in each other's strength. To Great Britain the navy is indispensable to national safety and to the integrity of the British Empire. Whatsoever her relations to other States, this she must always have, while, on the other hand, she has no such need of internal development as still weighs heavily upon our national resources. Unlike her, we need not fear vital injury by an external blow to our communications with the world. For internal safety and maintenance we can depend upon ourselves; we have no distant possessions vital to our mere existence; each is interested to see the other grow in strength. There need, therefore, be no captiousness on the part of Great Britain, nor any mortification on our part, if the proportions of military navy which we could contribute to the common end be modest, compared to hers, and that we devote resources to a development of national internal vigour which will inure to the common strength. The two efforts will be not contradictory, but complementary.

Our fleet must, however, be adequate, keeping in view the amount of support to which Great Britain would be limited by her extensive responsibilities; we must be able to exert naval power in both the Pacific and the Atlantic. As regards other nations, the principle before alluded to is not affected; it is merely modified by the differing positions now occupied by Great Britain and by ourselves.

A. T. MAHAN.

NAVAL REARMAMENT?

By ADMIRAL SIR HERBERT RICHMOND, K.C.B.

UNLESS some change in outlook takes place, and the great maritime Powers of the world are prepared to reconsider and revise some parts of the policies which they have defined, a great increase in the cost of their navies is in store for all of them. Is it not possible, even at this eleventh hour, for the nations now assembled in conference to approach the problems which they are called upon to solve, with a determination to reduce the burden of naval armaments, even though this should need a departure from what has been proclaimed as a national policy?

No one could pretend to deny that it is very far from easy for a nation to abandon a policy which it has announced and to which it has already committed itself. National *amour propre* instinctively repels the making of a public admission that a policy to which it has set its seal is capable of revision. Yet it has been done on many an occasion. British Governments have not refused to amend their Irish policy, their Egyptian policy, or their attitude towards collective security; nor American Governments theirs of Slavery or Prohibition, and, perhaps more striking still, towards neutrality in war. French opposition to Italian 'parity' in battle forces has ceased. On the other hand, what a difference to the world would have resulted if Great Britain could have brought herself to change her outlook before 1775 and to admit that a mistake had been made in insisting upon taxation of her colonists in America! But dignity, or what was supposed to be dignity, forbade it.

Great nations should be capable of this greatness of admitting the possibility of error. Human nature being what it is, the possibility of error is always present. Is it then not worth while to examine, in a true sense of inquiry, the origins

of any declared policy? For a policy may have been initiated under conditions unfavourable to balanced judgment—the heat of party or national feeling, the chill of fear, the spirit of prejudice, or the sting of financial loss. Many things may be done under the influences of a sudden sense of wrong which, in calmer circumstances, would have been rejected.

Conditions, too, change. A policy enunciated for the purpose of fulfilling a certain object may be unsuitable under changed conditions. An example of this is to be seen in those years of the feverish growth of the German fleet. The conception which underlay that growth was the so-called 'risk-theory.' Great Britain, when this theory was first put forward, was threatened by a hostile France and a hostile Russia. A strong German fleet, it was supposed, would deter her from attacking Germany when the results of so doing would be that her fleet would be weakened unduly, and so leave her exposed to attack by the Dual Alliance. Although that danger disappeared with the changed conditions when Great Britain, France and Russia drew together and settled their differences, Germany still adhered to the risk-theory, continued her building, and so contributed towards the eventual disaster.

Is it not still possible to conduct what is called a 'fact-finding' inquiry into all those matters which constitute the naval problems of 'size and numbers'—an inquiry which does not treat those proportions and those sizes arranged in 1921 as axiomatic or irrevocable. To examine seriously, without bias or prejudice, the circumstances in which they came to be adopted—to recognise them for what they were, stop-gaps, temporary dams to check a spate of competition and expenditure; to survey the reasoning then put forward for their adoption, and to ascertain whether the conditions and opinions remain as they then were or have changed in the interval. In fine, to make sure that the motives of policy to-day are based upon reason and not upon purely psychological influences, such as dignity, fear, or even a misinterpretation of facts.

Of the six great naval nations some have increased and some desire to increase their navies. Some are satisfied and wish to preserve the *status quo*, some are dissatisfied and are determined to amend it. In what circumstances, then, to

answer what national needs, did those proportions and these sizes come into existence?

In the years before 1914 a great competition was in progress between Great Britain and Germany. That competition is now at an end, but the reasons why it took place, the spirit in which the questions were treated, deserve close study to-day. Such a study gives point to the need for a dispassionate examination of our present problems, for the obstacles which the German Kaiser and his Ministers put in the way of all attempts to stem the tide of shipbuilding are not without their analogies to-day.

The outstanding feature in the naval situation in recent years is the growth of the navies of the United States and Japan. To what were these growths due, to what national needs did they respond? Let me put the matter rather in the nature of a question than an assertion. What was the point of departure of American policy? Up to 1904 her building policy was based upon matching the German fleet by 1915, for the reason that Germany was considered the most likely opponent and equality a sufficient provision against injury. In the spring of 1916 a change was made when the United States were concerned at the interruption of their commerce by the Entente Powers. President Wilson then proclaimed the need for a fleet equal to that of the strongest Power in order that the neutral rights of the United States should be respected. That pronouncement was followed, in the autumn of the same year, by a shipbuilding programme of sixteen 'capital' ships; and though this programme was not at once proceeded with, since the United States entered the war in the following spring, it was revived in 1920, when a navy equal to the most powerful in the world was announced as a necessity for the United States. The reason was the need to protect her neutral rights.

Is it not possible, in the calmer atmosphere of to-day, when the tension and irritation which then so much affected men's judgments have passed away, to re-examine that theory?—to see whether, in actual truth, logic or experience confirm the doctrine that no neutral can make its voice heard, or compel attention to claims in war, unless its naval forces are equal to those of the strongest of the belligerents? Mahan did not think such strength necessary. Tirpitz did not. In

his memoirs he wrote 'one single ally at sea would have sufficed in the Great War to enable us to fight with the most favourable prospects . . .'; and we who have a vivid recollection of those critical years can fully confirm that opinion, not only by that experience, but also by our knowledge of how often in the past, from Queen Elizabeth's day to the nineteenth century, Great Britain had to pay attention to the demands of neutral Powers both in the Baltic and the Mediterranean. In the war a noble squadron of American battle-ships joined the Grand Fleet, and a flotilla whose efficiency was proved under the most exacting conditions joined in the defence of shipping against submarines. Can anyone say that if those forces alone had been thrown into the German scales the beam would not certainly have been tipped against the Entente? Unless the answer to that be a negative one, wherein does the case lie for that need for equality for the purpose of which this great expansion was initially made? And is not control of one of the most important sources of oil a weapon of singular power?

At a later date the total value of foreign trade was cited as the criterion of naval strength. Equality of seaborne supplies, outward and inward, was assumed to connote a need for equality in naval strength. Yet, is this so? Are not the degrees to which a country is dependent on its foreign trade—its geographical situation, its possession of positions in the many seas in which its traders ply and without which defence is impossible, the distribution of its territories about the world, its exposure to invasion over sea—factors of greater account? In the words of Professor Shotwell:

The figures at which a nation's naval strength is set must have regard to the location of its naval bases, the extent of its mercantile marine to be protected, the proximity of its trade to the coasts of a potential enemy, and its dependence upon oversea supplies. To set a figure for parity without regard to these factors in the strategy of defence is by no means high statesmanship or profound common sense. The whole teaching of naval science is to the contrary.¹

The professor was perfectly right.

Even the dependence upon foreign supplies is not measurable by the total volume. More correctly it is expressed in terms of the trade per head of the population. The figures

¹ *New York Times*, March 12, 1919.

(for 1929) give an indication of the respective importance of the foreign trade to the peoples of the great nations: Great Britain, 196; France, 101; Germany, 97; United States, 77; Italy, 46; Japan, 31; U.S.S.R., 6.

But another factor has come into play since the protection of neutral rights fanned the fire in 1916. Neutrality legislation has been recently passed of which the very essence is a departure from the previous doctrines. This may or may not be permanent: we cannot tell. But does not this seem to bear in some degree upon this question? For if the preservation of neutral rights formed the necessity for a certain strength, that necessity would seem to disappear or diminish when the neutral trader no longer may find the support of the Government.

The growth of the navy of Japan, accompanied by an expansionist policy in Northern Asia, furnished, however, another stimulus. To what dangers might that growth expose the United States and affect her security?

A navy so strong that it should be capable of obtaining what is called 'command' of the waters on the Pacific coast of the United States, to stop the highly important coasting trade, to block the harbours, or to transport an army and maintain it across the breadth of the Pacific Ocean would plainly be a great danger. But no blockade could be conducted, nor could such an army as an invasion would require be carried and supplied, unless the attacking fleet were so superior that it completely dominated the defending forces. That is a lesson with the whole experience of history behind it. Mere numerical equality would be insufficient unless there were personal superiority in skill or command. The forces needed for defence of a trade route are calculable only by those who have the responsibility for its defence, who know what trade must ply, how it can be organised, in what form the protection shall be given. But this is a problem of *cruiser* strength, and the number of cruisers a country needs is, as every competent person knows, not a relative matter. Proportions do not enter into the question.

Interests at sea, however, are not confined to home waters, nor is war merely a process of warding off blows. Nations who have trade or possessions in the outer seas need to defend them; and the magnitude of those interests is a

measure of the expenditure it is worth incurring for their security. The trade of the United States with Asia is about 10 per cent. of its foreign trade, and of that proportion 8 per cent. is with Japan, which would cease automatically in war—leaving 2 per cent. to be defended. To protect even that 2 per cent. is a very formidable task in distant waters and without, possibly, a base. May it not be that the expense considerably exceeds the value of the trade, and that sentiment rather than economics or strategy is governing the situation? No thinking person will leave out of account the possibilities of a great expansion of the trade in the future. But the heart should surely not govern the head—as we saw it doing in the recent election when sentiment on the part of the Opposition would have plunged the country into war by closing the Suez Canal.

A disturbing element, the Japanese demand for equality with the United States, then arises. Here, again, the problem is psychological rather than strategical, for no one can suppose that either Great Britain or the United States, with the proportional strength agreed upon at Washington, could singly threaten Japanese security. Distance is a powerful factor of defence. When the nearest bases of the enemy lie some 2000 miles from the area in which the fleets would have to operate in order to make their action effective, it is no exaggeration to say that the most the fleets can do is to make occasional appearances whose effects last precisely so long as, and no longer than, the time which they can remain on the spot. The experiences of the Anglo-Dutch wars, when the British fleet had on every occasion to return after a short stay off the Dutch ports, thereby leaving the Dutch fleets free to escort their trade, and of the wars in the Mediterranean before Great Britain possessed a base within that sea, and could only affect the course of operations during the short period of the summer months, are familiar to every student of sea war.

These facts are assuredly well known to those who conduct the naval policy of Japan; and, indeed, the truth of them was tacitly admitted by her acceptance of a 60 per cent. 'ratio' of battleships. Is it, then, correct to say that strategical necessity compels the demand for equality with the United States? Is it not rather, as a Japanese Minister has said, the national pride which has been taught to reject the implied

stigma of inferiority? Psychology again, not strategy, seems to govern this demand.

Although, as remarked earlier, great nations have not on many occasions found it inconsistent with their dignity or their interests to rescind a policy to which they have given expression, the difficulty, particularly when public feeling has been stimulated by the methods available in modern times, is undeniable. Difficult, however, though it may be for Japan to abandon the claim for equality, it seems not unworthy of consideration whether this might not be made easier if on the other sides some concession were made to some of her views. She has proposed a drastic reduction in the size of ships. Among the reasons for which the United States has upheld the need for very great tonnage is the expressed necessity for great size in order to be able to cross those broad stretches of ocean which separate her from her possible antagonists—in other words, that such size is essential for the conduct of an offensive. Whether this reasoning is sound is open to dispute, for a fleet which has to cross the ocean must be composed not only of great ships but also of the cruisers and flotilla; but the implication which Japan may draw is obvious. Might it not remove the apprehension of an offensive intention if, in consideration of her relinquishing her demand for equality, her proposal for a reduction of size were favourably considered? 'Capital' ships, of course, there always will be, however small the size. In a fleet of destroyers the flotilla leaders would be the 'capital' ships. But without descending to that size, a considerable reduction could undoubtedly be made.

There would appear to be four possible courses of action open: to maintain the present ratios and the present sizes; to concede equality to Japan on the present sizes; to concede equality at reduced sizes; and to maintain the present ratios, if not by definite treaty, by mutual consent, at reduced sizes.

Of these, the first would appear to expose the world to the possibility, and in the future to the probability, of a building competition on the most expensive scale possible. Costly as the great ship is to-day, it may with safety be predicted that she will become more costly. Greater speed is already being demanded, and speed is one of the most costly elements of construction. Some years ago 17 or 18 knots was deemed

sufficient—as, indeed, it was. To-day we see prospects of demands for ships of well over 30 knots. Competition could not be confined to the two Powers on the east and west of the Pacific. It must infallibly extend to Great Britain, then automatically to Germany by the action of the recent treaty, then to France, and through her to Italy. To what figure may the naval budgets of the world then expand, and what prospects, except financial exhaustion with continued insecurity, does this offer?

The second and third courses would seem to lie outside the range of practical politics, for neither satisfy either Power. The last—is it impracticable? Might it not be acceptable? It would remove the danger of a building competition; and instead of increasing the cost of their navies to all, would decrease it.

I am only too well aware, after fourteen years of controversy on the subject, how strongly the doctrine that great size is intrinsically necessary is upheld both in London and Washington. I am ready to believe that impregnability to the attacks of the modern types of flotilla craft—on, below, and above the surface of the water—cannot be obtained at a lesser size: I see, indeed, many who believe that even the ships of the present accepted sizes are too small. Yet I remain unconvinced that increasing size is the true military method of meeting the new forms of attack; and equally unconvinced that, however great the ship may be, such a degree of impregnability can be conferred upon her as shall render her capable of performing those very functions which it has ever been the duty of the 'mass' to perform. That duty has been to encounter the mass of the enemy before it can execute whatever operation it proposes. To do that it must be able to occupy a position from which it can ensure the interception of the enemy before he has done what he desires to do. If, notwithstanding their great defensive qualities, ships can neither cruise at sea nor lie in a base near enough to interpose themselves between the enemy and his target, the power of the fleet disappears; and we might expect to see situations, which it is not difficult to visualise, in which two fleets, upon which many millions have been expended, are so far withdrawn, owing to the danger of being bombarded in their ports, from the critical parts of the theatre of operations that

neither can exercise any influence upon the course of affairs. The struggle for command would then be conducted by those lesser craft which, from their small size, their speed, their numbers, and their powers of manœuvre, are exposed to no undue risks either from below or above the surface of the water.

The battleship of to-day may be the 'veritable fortress of defence' she has been asserted to be. But when all that can be done in size, armour and artillery to render her unsinkable has been done, it may be questioned whether there will be any greater inclination to station her in ports where she is exposed to constant attack from the air than there was to keep the Grand Fleet in Scapa until the defences of the port had been made effective against submarines. Whether it is expected that aerial obstructions can be made as effective as obstructions on the surface or under the surface have been made may well be a matter of opinion. But if there is doubt on this matter, the alternative is withdrawal, and the result of withdrawal must be the same as it has been before—inability to perform the very duties for which the mass exists.

Finally, is it not reasonable to suppose that neither France nor Italy nor Germany desires to be plunged into a vast expenditure at this moment, such as would be caused by rebuilding their fleets on the present-day scales of size? France, we know, would wish to possess a larger proportion of battleships than she was forced to accept at Washington; and she begins to see that, now that Germany has submarines, the advantages of retaining the submarine largely disappear. Might not she be willing to examine a suggestion for a higher proportion of battleships, of a smaller size, accompanied by abolition of the submarine?

Surely, therefore, there are reasons for earnest consideration of the problem on such lines as these. Both statesmanship and common sense (to borrow the words of Mr. Shotwell) appear to demand it.

H. W. RICHMOND.

THE REVIVAL OF MONARCHY

By SIR CHARLES PETRIE, Bt.

THE failure of wars to achieve their purpose in the field of ideas is one of the more curious facts of recent history. For over two decades the leading Powers of Europe, collectively and individually, exerted every effort to suppress the democratic doctrines born of the French Revolution, yet the century which followed the Battle of Waterloo witnessed the almost universal triumph of those same doctrines. The late war was widely advertised as one to make the world safe for democracy, but the seventeen years which have elapsed since its conclusion have seen the supersession of the democratic system to such an extent that Great Britain is to-day the only considerable State in Europe, if not in the world, where parliamentary government is being worked in a normal manner.

The reasons for the failure of democracy to maintain the position which it held on the morrow of the Armistice are many, but two are of more importance than the others. M. Charles Benoist has not hesitated to ascribe the victory of the Allies to the fact that they were more faithful to the principle of monarchy, in the etymological sense of the term, than were their opponents; and it is impossible to resist this conclusion. Such being the case, it is not surprising that when the difficulties of peace became pressing, the world should have had recourse to those same authoritarian principles which had proved so successful on a previous occasion. Had the example of war-time not been so fresh in the public memory, it is probable that greater efforts would have been made to work along democratic lines. The second important reason for the failure of political democracy was its proved inability to co-ordinate the various sectional interests in the superior interest of the community as a whole. This was probably inevitable in view of the prevalent doctrine

that the interest of the community was the sum of the interests of the citizens who composed it, but its effect was to convert the State into the battlefield of a civil war. Whoever might win, the ordinary citizen lost, and in his despair he turned to monarchy as the only effective solution.

Thus in nearly every country a reaction has set in against the ideals of the nineteenth century, or rather against what the men of the nineteenth century have persuaded posterity were their ideals. The fact, it may be remarked parenthetically, was often very different, and neither Italy nor Germany was made wholly by methods that would commend themselves to the League of Nations Union: even Mr. Gladstone once went so far as to express the opinion that 'if no instructions had ever been addressed in political crises to the people of this country except to remember to hate violence and love order and exercise patience, the liberties of this country would never have been attained.'¹ However this may be, it will hardly be disputed that what mankind all over the world is demanding in this fourth decade of the twentieth century is authority, continuity, and, although some austere critics may question the fact, pageantry. The problem is to find the form of government that shall both supply this want and at the same time have its 'foundations deep in public opinion'—to quote Burke's famous advice to Fox.

Dictatorship, to give monarchy its modern designation, can provide authority and pageantry, but it is by no means certain whether the blessing of continuity is also within its power to bestow. The leading dictators are all in the prime of life, but the question what will happen when they die is already being asked. In his *Diario*, 1922, General Balbo very pertinently observes, '*l'idea senza la forza è un non senso . . . ma anche la forza senza una idea è una mostruosità.*' The hereditary king represents in his own person the authority and majesty of the State, even if he exercises little direct political power; but he also embodies his country's tradition, which the dictator as such cannot embody. This has always been the weakness of that particular type of government. Almost without exception the Greek tyrannies were swept away during the lifetime of their founder or of his immediate successor; the despots of mediæval Italy encountered the

¹ Vide Lord Randolph Churchill, by Winston S. Churchill, vol. ii., p. 68.

same fate where they did not, like the Medici, contrive to attach to themselves the sanctity which surrounds a throne; and, more recently, the two Napoleons endeavoured to perpetuate their rule by the foundation of a dynasty. Tyranny in ancient, and dictatorship in more modern times, have always been essentially temporary forms of government, which have only been tolerated because they provided security during periods of rapid social and economic change, and enabled the transition from one condition of society to another to take place without the whole fabric of the State being brought down in the process. As a distinguished historian has written of the Greek tyrant, 'he rested on the will of the immature Demos, not on established law. . . . When circumstance, or the will, changed, his commission was ended, and he never had the bedrock of a loyal nobility, nor the social and religious sanction which that can give.' To-day the same difficulty confronts no inconsiderable proportion of the human race, and it is one that calls for a speedy solution, or the deaths of half a dozen individuals may well throw the world back into chaos.

It is no exaggeration to say that in this connexion the Silver Jubilee of His Majesty King George V. has had a most profound effect. Governmental authority in Great Britain is weak in comparison with that existing in many countries at the present time, but the searchlight which has been, during the past few months, turned upon British institutions has proved to the foreigner that what holds the King's dominions together is not force but tradition. The last war dealt a very severe blow at tradition abroad, but in this island the latter soon recovered much of the ground it had lost, as was clearly proved during the course of the Jubilee celebrations. On the Continent the case was very different, and even in countries like Austria it was impossible for many years after the conclusion of hostilities not to be struck by the complete absence, more especially among the younger people, of all interest in the past or its lessons. It is true that the inevitable reaction had already begun, but the Silver Jubilee has given the movement a decided fillip, and during the last few months events have moved very rapidly indeed. The King of the Hellenes, after twelve years of exile, has been recalled to the throne by the almost unanimous vote of his subjects, and has thus confounded those who so confidently declared that the

world would never witness another Restoration. The anti-Habsburg laws have been repealed in Austria, and if the Archduke Otto is not yet in Vienna it is owing to the opposition of foreign Powers. Even in France itself men are talking of a king who would have laughed at the very idea until a recent date. Elsewhere the dictators are beginning to adorn themselves with the halo of royalty. What is to be the outcome? Before expressing an opinion it will be well to look a little closer at some of the more important States.

Signor Mussolini well defined his attitude when he described the Italian Crown as '*simbolo della Patria, simbolo della perpetuità della Patria*,' and from the moment that he assumed office he has neglected no opportunity of enlisting tradition in the service of the Fascist State. Like Augustus, he has deliberately worked for a revival of the older loyalties and virtues, while giving them a fresh significance. Years before the war one of the leading authorities on international affairs, happily still alive, described King Victor Emmanuel III. as 'probably the most capable occupant of a throne in Europe,' and the House of Savoy affords an admirable example of the advantages of hereditary kingship. It has worked as harmoniously with Signor Mussolini as with Count Cavour, yet when it was necessary to take a definite line, as on the question of intervention in the war, and at the time of the March on Rome, the King has not failed to act. He had always been careful to behave in a perfectly constitutional manner, and it is an open secret that it was at the royal request that Signor Mussolini regularised his position in October 1922 by obtaining a vote of confidence from the Chamber. It is impossible to deny that the death of the Duce will be a moment of crisis for Italy, but the latter is in an excellent position to weather the storm owing to the existence of a dynasty which is more popular to-day than it has been for many years.

Nazi Germany is a pure monarchy under Herr Hitler, who exercises supreme power in a manner reminiscent of the Roman emperors. It is also an elective monarchy, for the *Führer* is head of the State for life, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that in the long run this will prove a serious source of weakness to the Third Reich. The most unpolitically minded people in Europe have adopted the most difficult

form of constitution to work successfully. On the other hand, it is true that for a thousand years elective monarchy has been a German tradition, though that was before the days of the totalitarian State. Germany is thus in a worse position than Italy, for when her dictator goes there is no king to see that the crisis does not take a violent form. The danger is that the event will be followed by an interval of strife during which various aspirants to Herr Hitler's power will struggle to obtain it, and another Thirty Years' War be the outcome of their rivalry. In these circumstances, it would seem that the *Führer* must before long address himself to the problem of the succession. There are two alternatives: either he must adopt a successor, as the best of the Roman emperors were wont to do, or he must revive a hereditary kingship in the Hohenzollerns or some other family. The latter would probably prove the more satisfactory, but it remains to be seen whether Herr Hitler is the man to place another over his head. In many ways he has tried to rally tradition to his side, and there can be no doubt that this step would conciliate those elements of the Right which the Nazis are too inclined to depreciate.

An excellent example of the tendency at work to-day is to be seen in the case of Greece. A republic came into existence in that country eleven years ago, and now the King has been restored to the throne as the only means of providing stability and continuity. This is due in no small measure to the example of the immediate neighbours of Greece, not least Yugoslavia and Rumania, whose very existence has been preserved by the fact of their monarchical form of government. Nor is it surprising that the Greeks should have come to mistrust the opponents of the monarchy, notably M. Venizelos. The latter and his friends never ceased to proclaim their devotion to the parliamentary system as the basis of a republican *régime*; but as soon as the vote of the majority went to their opponents they did not, in the spring of the present year, hesitate to plunge the country into civil war in what was, happily, a vain endeavour to reverse the verdict of the ballot-box. A gospel of which the appeal has to be reinforced by the revolver does not commend itself to the Greek, and he has not unnaturally returned to the *régime* which for fifty years was marked by steady progress in all

spheres of the national life. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the man as well as the monarch has appealed to the people of Greece, for the dignified attitude of King George II. during a period of great difficulty has only been equalled by the breadth of his opinions. The desire, too, for a leader who shall be, by nature of his office, above the strife of parties is widely felt in Greece. The same sentiment is at the root of the movement in favour of a Habsburg restoration in Vienna. The Archduke Otto, alone among Austrian leaders, has not used the machine-gun.

In these days when the voice of the 'planner' is so loud in the land we are inclined to believe that all mankind asks from its rulers is efficiency. Mr. Christopher Dawson has very well put the other side of the case :

. . . the fact remains that the typical leaders of *bourgeois* society do not arouse the same respect as that which is felt for the corresponding figures in the old régime. We instinctively feel that there is something honourable about a King, a noble, or a knight which the banker, the stock-broker, or the democratic politician does not possess. A King may be a bad King, but our very condemnation of him is a tribute to the prestige of his office. . . . The *bourgeoisie* upset the throne and altar, but they put in their places nothing but themselves. Hence their régime cannot appeal to any higher sanction than that of self-interest.

This observation is profoundly true, and it is particularly applicable to dictatorship. Man cannot be permanently governed by an appeal to reason alone, as the more far-sighted of the dictators realise. Both in Italy and in Germany no effort has been spared to capture the imagination, but something more is needed than the successful stage management of monster demonstrations. A few years ago it was generally believed that nothing but strong government was necessary, yet dictatorship alone is clearly not enough : there must be some other sanction than efficiency backed by force.

Curiously enough, this has been realised more quickly in the East than in the West. Both in Albania and Iran the dictators have become kings, and if little of the dignity that is said to hedge a king is so far evident at Tirana, that is largely due to the recent creation of the Albanian State ; but at Teheran the present Shah enjoys a prestige which was not his when he was merely dictator. The Oriental has in some ways a truer sense of political values than the European, and

for him the office is more than the man. It is thus easier to found a new dynasty in the East than in the West, and so Riza Khan Pahlevi was able to take the step which has daunted many another dictator. Further east still the establishment of the Empire of Manchukuo was largely due to the appreciation by the Japanese of the fact that continuity would make a strong appeal to harassed China, and their calculation appears likely to be justified by results. An assured succession, whether by heredity or by adoption, has the advantage of securing stability, not least because it encourages the ruler to take the longer view. The history of the last twenty-five centuries has shown that the great weakness of dictatorship is the tendency of dictators to be in too much of a hurry : they are subject to the not unnatural desire to effect the maximum during their own lives. Given an assured succession, this temptation is greatly weakened. To-day, when mankind is devoting far too much attention to the present, and far too little to the future and the past, some powerful corrective is essential.

Nor is this all, for the dictator, being unable to look far ahead, has to make up in activity for what he lacks in time : that is to say, he must keep the enthusiasm of his subjects at white heat, and after a certain period that becomes impossible. Not the least weakness of political democracy was its fallacious assumption that all the people are interested in politics all the time. The *ancien régime* had many faults, but it took human nature into account a great deal more than the democrats and the dictators have done. It was based upon a system which did not take too much for granted, did not ask too much from the ordinary citizen, and appealed to his heart as well as to his head. In this way it lasted for centuries ; whereas its democratic successor barely endured for fifty years, and he would be a bold man who would predict a life of one generation for most of the modern dictatorships ; yet the world cannot afford to be thrown into repeated convulsions for the sake of experimenting with different types of government. It must find some system sufficiently elastic to allow of change without unnecessary violence. Dictatorship by itself cannot supply this want ; it can only do so if it can ensure continuity.

There is also another argument in favour of a permanent

head of State. For a variety of reasons the machinery of government has of late years become extremely complicated, and it requires an expert to control it, especially in moments of crisis. A President, who holds office for a limited period, can never acquire the necessary knowledge or impartiality; in nine cases out of ten he is either a party politician, or a nonentity, or both, when he is elected, and he will revert to his previous condition when his term of office expires. He has no incentive to take the long view, and his advice is of no particular value to his Ministers, for they know as much, or as little, of the problem at issue as he does. A permanent head of State, on the other hand, can cite precedents which may be of the utmost importance, and the mere fact that he has for years held the same position renders it possible for him to be of incalculable service to the country over whose destinies he presides. It is probably hopeless to expect to prevent one generation from repeating the blunders of its predecessor, but it should be within the scope of practical politics to prevent it from itself making the same mistake twice, and that can best be done by avoiding such a system as implies a transient phantom as head of the State. As M. Manoïlesco has so well put it in his recent work, *Le Siècle du Corporatisme*: 'Elles [les républiques] ne conviennent pas aux classes laborieuses—physiquement et spirituellement—qui trouvent dans la monarchie un toit solide correspondant à leur besoin intime d'abri et de tranquillité.'

Not the least cogent reason for the return to monarchy has been the rapid growth of centrifugal forces in the modern State owing to the increasing importance of economic and social factors which the nineteenth century only too often refused to take into consideration. The old order, in particular the feudal system, was economic in its origin; but the effect of the French Revolution was to make political considerations supreme, and on that assumption the Liberals of the last hundred years proceeded. It came to be felt that there was no longer any need for a strong hand at the helm, as the forces which had previously challenged the State were all crushed. The period which has elapsed since the war has shown the fundamental fallacy of such a belief. In the strife between Capital and Labour, and between one vested interest and another, the ordinary citizen has in many countries found

life intolerable, and, as has been shown, has turned to an individual to regulate the various forces of the nation in the superior interests of the community as a whole. The position is the same as it was at the end of the fifteenth century when western Europe, weary of the brawlings of a selfish nobility, entrusted its destinies to such rulers as Ferdinand and Isabella, Henry VII., and Louis XI. All human history goes to show that the national interest and the national tradition are best represented by an individual, preferably with hereditary claims to leadership; that was certainly the dominant, if unexpressed, sentiment of the British people when they acclaimed His Majesty the King during the Silver Jubilee celebrations. More recently there has been an example of the same feeling in Denmark, where thousands of farmers went to King Christian to protest against the number of politicians who were given agricultural appointments. They felt that he was the embodiment of the Danish nation, and as such was superior to considerations of party.

In a book that deserves to be far more widely read—namely, *The Revolutions of Civilisation*—Sir Flinders Petrie some years ago advanced certain theories that find greater acceptance now than they did then. Having shown how civilisation is both intermittent and recurrent, he goes on to point out that each period goes through the same phases. The first stage is marked by strong personal rule. The next

is an oligarchy, when leadership is still essential, but the unity of the country can be maintained by law instead of by autocracy. . . . Then gradually the transformation to a democracy takes place. . . . During this time wealth . . . that is, the accumulated capital of facilities, continues to increase. When democracy has attained full power, the majority without capital necessarily eat up the capital of the minority, and the civilisation steadily decays, until the inferior population is swept away to make room for a fitter people.

In the present century this process has been accelerated by the war to such an extent that it has become obvious, and this explains the desire to reverse it. Unfortunately dictatorship, the form which the reaction has taken, has in many cases proved very expensive (one of the unfortunate consequences of being in too great a hurry), so that on financial grounds also there is a strong argument in favour of tempering it with continuity.

Since the French Revolution there has been such a number of violent changes that it is doubtful whether civilisation can survive the shock of many more, and it would seem that stability is essential if disaster is to be avoided. Yet there can be no stability worth the name where continuity is not safeguarded, and where provision is not made for gradual change. Kingship alone complies with these requirements. It is a system, not, like dictatorship, a form of government. A king can form the apex of any *régime* that looks to the national interest, but a dictator must dictate or go. Changing circumstances require different attitudes on the part of the Executive. In periods of crisis a strong Executive is essential, but at other times it may be advisable to give considerable freedom to the Legislative. Kingship can play its part on either occasion, but dictatorship cannot. In the unsettled world of to-day a permanent head of State, with an assured succession, is a necessity.

CHARLES PETRIE.

BETWEEN BERLIN AND LONDON

By T. P. CONWELL-EVANS

ABOUT four hours separate Berlin from London by air. One leaves Croydon at 7 a.m., one breakfasts an hour and a half later at Amsterdam, and lunch is served in Berlin. Looking down from a great height on the English coast, we see the chalk cliffs looking like a neat white fence encircling the beautiful homestead that is England. On a dark day the aeroplane climbs through mist and cloud, ever higher, until suddenly it is bathed in glorious sunshine. A new world is revealed beneath one, like some remote region of the Arctic. We seem to be flying over great ice heaps that dazzle white in the sun; as we gaze entranced from the aeroplane window, the only thing that remains visible of our former world is the wing of the plane that stretches out with a proud confidence and moves forward relentlessly above the silent world of cloud towards the journey's end.

Thus is physical distance removed in our day. But this quick and breathless transition brings out with unexpected force how much greater are the time and energy needed to overcome the distance which separates the mind of one nation from that of another. You are suddenly planted down in Berlin, and are full of the preoccupations that dominate England—the war in Abyssinia, the ability of the League to end it, and all the hopes or fears concerning world developments which Englishmen associate with its success or failure. In Berlin your extreme preoccupation finds little echo. The world does not appear to stand at the cross-roads, because the League has never been to the Germans the symbol of a new era in inter-State relations. To German eyes power diplomacy has gone its way unhindered since 1919, and the League has hitherto served as its handmaiden. Four hours between Berlin and London, but between the English and the German

mind a distance of fifteen years of experience of unparalleled contrasts: for the one people, utter defeat, humiliation, impoverishment, the violent moral disturbance of two revolutions, a decade of occupation by foreign troops, a painful struggle to win back honour, independence and equality; for the other people, victory, prosperity, a quickening of national institutions, Imperial greatness unexampled in history, world leadership.

In England we hear on all sides of the rearmament of Germany, and Mr. Churchill heightens the impression with exaggerated detail. We see the first batch of recruits reporting for service at the present time under the new universal service law, and very many young Germans (as I am personally aware), in addition to those called up, have asked to be allowed to serve. What does it all mean? one asks here. The memory of the achievement of the German army, which from 1914 to 1918 kept the whole world at bay, lights up the walls of the mind with a lurid glow.

But see the German side of the picture: a Germany disarmed, supervised, controlled and partly occupied by the Allies until 1930, waiting in vain for the promised levelling down of the armaments of the signatories of Versailles; Stresemann, to his chagrin, told by Poincaré that Locarno carried with it neither disarmament nor evacuation; Müller, the Socialist Chancellor, pleading at the Geneva Assembly in 1928—I listened from the galleries—for some sort of equality between the nations; the rich baritone voice of Briand filling the hall in reply with oratorical fireworks ending in a fruitless negation; before a rising tide of national resentment in Germany, Brüning prays for some concessions, some 'samples' of armaments; the unfortunate word is thrown back at him in derision. In 1932 the Disarmament Conference, having deliberated for a year without so much as mentioning Germany's claim to equality, causes Germany's first withdrawal from the Conference. I witnessed the wave of indignation that swept through Germany as Sir John Simon, in a note showing more the skill of the jurist than of the statesman, declared that Germany had no right to legal equality. The way was paved for the Chancellor, who had put the policy of non-fulfilment on his banner. But Hitler's accession, instead of acting as a warning to the chief Powers

of the Disarmament Conference, spurred them on to acts of further discrimination; Germany must wait another eight years before equality can be considered. Such was the decree authorised in Paris in the summer of 1933 between the Powers, and pronounced by Sir John Simon at Geneva: that pronouncement brought about the end of the policy of fulfilment; Germany finally turned her back on the Conference and upon Geneva. But all was not yet lost. Prime Minister MacDonald presented a revised convention of limitation or reduction; Hitler replied by a conciliatory counter-offer: there was a basis of discussion, but Barthou gave his vehement 'No'; he must first strengthen his alliances—security before disarmament.

I am informed on high authority that from that moment, and not before—namely, April 1934—Hitler gave orders that rearmament should begin, and should be proceeded with rapidly and efficiently. And again, when the French Government in the spring of 1935 extended universal military service from one to two years, Hitler reflected alone, and decided that he must act quickly. The introduction of universal military service was received with enthusiasm and was regarded by the German people as a liberation from the foreign yoke. 'The essential conditions of independence were being restored to them.' My young German friends wrote to me about it as follows (from the Rhineland): 'I do not know how far you have identified yourself recently with the work of disarmament, but no doubt the measure must have been for you personally a hard blow. But the world must understand that Hitler could not otherwise act than he did after the failure of the Disarmament Conference and the increasing armaments of France and Russia which threaten our security. It is certainly a unilateral act, but unavoidable in view of the fact that equality remained a "platonic wish" of the Powers. The new law does not imply we wish to cultivate militarism, or prepare a war.' Another (from Königsberg): 'You cannot imagine how everyone rejoiced; yesterday the soldiers marched through the streets. The whole of Königsberg walked along with them. You can understand the feeling, as you know the Germans. We do not want war, but we all wish to become soldiers again, so that, in case of need, we can defend the

Fatherland.' A student from Hanover: 'We all rejoiced. Idlers and wastrels will now disappear from the streets and from the public-houses, and German youth will receive training and education that will restore discipline.' 'Why have you such a large army?' asked a distinguished Frenchman of a German in Berlin the other day. 'Do you think that Metriell would have been ripped away from East Prussia in 1923 if we were strong?' was the answer.

However much we dislike conscription in this country, it is necessary to understand the spirit in which it is accepted in Germany. Most Englishmen believe with the late Lord Grey of Fallodon that competing armaments are a prime cause of war; but Germany, in rejecting unilateral disarmament as a solution, is entitled to a belief in her *bona fides* when she is now in process of recovering her equality.

Those readers who are not willing to look at the question from this point of view, but who believe that Germany has aggressive designs, should examine her foreign policy in order to justify or dispel this belief. Her foreign aims are not so difficult to set down. The strength of German foreign policy lies precisely in the fact of its inevitable continuity since Versailles. As we know from his memoirs, Stresemann followed the customs of his great predecessor, Prince Bismarck, in publishing in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* anonymous explanations of his own foreign policy. On September 14, 1925, he wrote:

The aims of German foreign policy . . . are to struggle against the aggressive French in order to secure the real independence and equality of Germany

Germany must again be the shield of the German minorities in Europe, and to see that the rights of the German minorities are preserved in accordance with the international treaties in those lands which have accepted them—the revision of the Eastern frontier, the impossibility of which is to-day everywhere recognised. It must also consist in obtaining recognition of Germany's claim to colonial activity and to enjoy once again the possession of colonies (*und wieder Kolonial Besitz zu erhalten*). It must further champion the right of self-determination of peoples that in the question of the *Anschluss* of German-Austria to Germany has been treated by the Allied Powers with an unparalleled cynicism. . . . Progress along these lines requires no warlike instruments, which Germany lacks. But it requires co-operation and understanding with those Powers whose attitude to these questions determine

their solution. It requires, above all, the recognition of the inviolability of the Western frontier, and an acceptance of the ideas that are contained in the Security Pact [*i.e.*, Locarno Treaty].

In short, it was Stresemann's view that Germany, by means of a policy of reconciliation with France and England, would be able by peaceful means to obtain satisfaction of her claims for territorial revision, and equality in armament, in addition to securing the integrity of Germany (reference is to the Rhineland, which was then in danger of being internationalised).

Locarno achieved the last-mentioned aim alone; the security it gave France did not, unfortunately, lessen her chronic fears; it did not lead to negotiated equality in armaments, nor to territorial and colonial revision, though Germany became a member of the League; and Brüning's attempt at a Customs Union with Austria was rejected with such harshness that the Foreign Minister Curtius was sacrificed to appease the wrath of the German people. Locarno became merely an interlude of the post-war years during which the League has been an instrument chiefly of France and her military allies.

What is the position to-day? We have seen that Hitler has achieved equality on land by taking the law into his own hands. Of the other aims mentioned by Stresemann, the problem of the German Eastern frontier—that is, the frontier with Poland—bears a different face. There has been a distinct change of emphasis. Stresemann never made a secret in public or in private, either in conversation with Polish representatives or with Lord d'Abernon, of the fact that he would never recognise the Eastern frontier. It was precisely for this reason that protests arose in Poland and in France against the conclusion of a West Locarno Treaty—this was construed as an attempt to keep the Western Powers quiet; while Germany, having gained a free hand in the east, could override Poland and crush the Little Entente, Russia looking on at least with benevolence at the efforts of Germany. To meet these objections Stresemann concluded non-aggressive pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia at Locarno—negotiations that were conducted between Poland and Germany, with a very bad grace and in a heated atmosphere. These 'Eastern Locarno Pacts' ruled out force in

the relations of the three countries, but were drawn up in such a way as not to recognise the *status quo*. The danger of the situation was, however, made evident in Stresemann's comment¹:

Poland finds herself in the same position in regard to Germany as in regard to Russia, for the Russians equally, in effect, withhold recognition of their frontier with Poland. And when Russia moves, the whole question will be opened, though not necessarily through war.

The ingredients for an explosive outcome were thus fairly disquieting. For years afterwards the campaign for revision of the Eastern frontier and the counter-campaign against were conducted on either side of the frontier with increasing vehemence and tension, until, to the astonishment of everyone (except the Poles, who seemed to have understood Hitler's aims from the beginning), a cessation came with Hitler's advent. The German-Polish Pact of non-aggression arranged by Hitler may be regarded as a reaffirmation of the East Locarno Pact concluded by Stresemann, but with a difference. It was strengthened by subsidiary agreements which put an end to all revisionist and anti-revisionist propaganda, and which led to fraternisation between Germany and Poland in many spheres, such as cordial collaboration in wireless programmes and other cultural activities. The writer noticed its effects in a university town, where the Polish consulate no longer needed to be guarded by police, and the Polish consul was invited to lecture to the students and exchange visits took place. The Nazi doctrine of 'blood' or race—which gives an objective criterion, however untenable in fact, to the conception of a nation—probably helped this development.

Russia has replaced Poland as the country upon which Germany looks with unfriendly eyes, a feeling which is warmly reciprocated by Russia. It was an extraordinary experience for the writer to note, in conversations with the Russian consuls at Danzig and Königsberg, the violent change in the attitude to Germany brought about by the Hitler régime. From Rapallo to Hitler's advent in 1933 the relations of Russia and Germany had been almost those of allies; and now the menace of an industrialised Russia,

¹ *Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 93.

which ten years hence may overwhelm the west, is dinned into one's ears in Berlin, and no doubt if one went to Russia the converse picture would be held before one's eyes.

It is not a tangible and concrete claim to territory that can drive Germany and Russia to war. What stretch of Russian territory can usefully be coveted by Germany? People seem to forget that Poland, now a Great Power, lies between the two countries—a large State very nearly as great in size as the German Reich. Poland's avowed policy is, and must essentially be, that of peace with each of her great neighbours. With memories of her past, Poland would not welcome either German or Russian troops into her territory: the non-aggression Pact which she has concluded with each of the two countries derives body and substance from these memories. I know something of the deep passion with which the Poles cling to their territorial outlet to the Baltic, and how they speak of it in their universities and schools. There is little room for a deal here; it is probable that nothing but force would make them relinquish it. A German-Polish advance against Russia would, in the Polish view, endanger their Baltic outlet: equally would Poland be giving hostages to fortune if she combined with Russia in an advance against a powerful Germany.

Looking at the situation to-day, may we not reasonably say that the position as between Russia, Poland and Germany is more likely to make each of the parties think twice before resorting to violence than would have been the case if Stresemann's Polish policy were still uppermost? To reopen the Polish question would be an irresistible temptation for a strong Russo-German combination. Europe may, then, congratulate itself that a grave conflict over the attribution of territory—admittedly the most difficult question to solve peacefully—has been removed from its immediate concern. But there are other factors which, unless they are dealt with now, may in their cumulative effects be disastrous over a period of years. We are faced with the struggle of the Great Powers for spheres of political and commercial influence in Eastern Europe; the converging thrusts of Germany and Russia may be said to meet in Czechoslovakia, and of Italy and Germany in Austria. The Russian stresses are reinforced by the pact of mutual assistance which Russia recently con-

cluded with France, by means of which pact the latter country wishes to restore her failing predominance in Eastern Europe.

Czechoslovakia thus becomes a pivotal point in the European peace system. Fearing, rightly or wrongly, German expansion eastwards, it leans more and more on Russia, and M. Benesh's official visit to Moscow early in 1934 has served to increase Germany's anxiety to such a degree that now fears are openly expressed that Czechoslovakia may become a strategic outpost of Russia, and that Russian bombing planes may thus be brought within half an hour's striking distance of Berlin. All the conditions making inevitable an armament race are present, together with the alliances which may in later years set the whole machinery in motion on the Western and Eastern frontiers of Germany. The problem is made infinitely more difficult by the fact that the hostility between Russia and Germany is deepened by their passionate *Weltanschauung*, according to which each appears to the other as an enemy of society. Much emphasis is placed in high quarters in Germany upon Dimitroff's address at Moscow outlining the policy of the Third International (in other words, that of the Soviet Government itself), in the course of which he declared that its chief aim was the destruction of the Hitler Government—a declaration which does not square with Mr. Anthony Eden's optimistic view as to the pacific tendency of modern Russia.

If, then, German rearmament is to be regarded as an insurance in a perilous situation, and not as a preparation for future conquests in Eastern Europe, the position, as I firmly believe, can in time be made to look much more hopeful. If one objects to Pan-Germanism, one should not go to the extreme of denying to Germany that influence which is due to her as a great Power bordering on Eastern Europe. It would, indeed, be vain to attempt to destroy that influence. In the past the Germans have vitally contributed to the cultural and economic development of Eastern Europe. In mediæval days German settlers linked that region with the western world, and the existence of these settlements in the Succession States to-day—the 'Saxons' in Roumania, for instance—are evidence of these early achievements. The greatest German minority are the three and a quarter million Germans in Czechoslovakia inhabiting the fringe bordering

on Prussian Silesia and Bavaria. A Pan-Germanistic solution would consist in their incorporation in the German Reich. Both on historical and economic grounds they do not desire this; they do not ask for any territorial revision, but they demand the application of their full rights as citizens accorded to them by treaty. Their wishes have recently been made clear again and again by their able and sincere leader, Herr Henlein, who created a most favourable impression on those who met, and heard, him recently in London. It is Herr Henlein's earnest wish that the Germans of Czechoslovakia should act as 'a bridge of reconciliation' between Germany and Czechoslovakia. When M. Benesh takes the proffered hand of friendship he will destroy the magnetic point which would draw to his country the competing forces of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism. Reconciliation with the German minority is a far more effective means of protecting the integrity of Czechoslovakia than reliance on Moscow. Such a solution, moreover, would tend to lead to a slackening in the tension between Russia and Germany. Confidence has to be gained slowly and painfully in this distracted world. It can be grafted upon the tree of nationalism, but it does not bear fruit immediately.

The question of Austria is more difficult, because its solution demands a change of status hitherto rigorously opposed by France and Italy. A few people in Germany would like to see Austria completely incorporated in the German Reich, but the majority would be content to see Austria as a self-governing country federated to Germany in some way, but preserving full control in regard to internal affairs. Most people in Austria would support federated association with Germany and intensely dislike the enforced tutelage of Italy. To oppose such a degree of self-determination would be 'an unfriendly act'; no Government in Great Britain or in any of His Majesty's Dominions could justify to its peoples a war designed to prevent the fulfilment of this democratic aim. Italy, with its new commitments in the regions of Abyssinia, will probably be less hostile in the future to a fair and just solution.

France must eventually realise that co-operation with England, who is vitally interested in world peace, is far more productive than allying herself with Soviet Russia and

opposing the claims of German minorities for real cultural autonomy and the Austrian desire for independence. If France is sincere in her avowal that she desires nothing more than security, the moment may soon be ripe for a renewal in some form of the Locarno Pact. Some reaffirmation of the principle is necessary in view of the doubt which has been expressed 'in many quarters as to its applicability to-day. Hitler, who in his May speech expressed the view that the Locarno Pact 'is the most definite and most really valuable treaty of mutual assistance in Europe,' regretted the blow given to it by the Franco-Russian alliance. And here in England the view has often been held that Locarno is no longer in practice workable. I have already described the far-reaching effect of the reaffirmation of the Eastern Locarno Treaty with Poland. A similar renewal by the Western Powers of the Western Locarno system would go far to remove French fears of the new Germany.

The remaining question is that of Colonies. This would be far more susceptible of solution if Germany returned to the League, for then she could assume the position of a mandatory Power. Her treatment of the Jews does not make the problem simpler. But one thing is certain—Germany is not going to war with Great Britain for a place in Africa; the Naval Agreement is a proof of that. Clearly, her aspirations are not for a great empire overseas, and it is all the more incumbent on Great Britain to meet the German claims in this regard.

Germany's concrete aspirations may therefore be said to be fairly reasonable. She desires, above all, not to be treated as passive material which other countries can mould at their own sweet will in the building up of inter-State relations. Just like France and other countries, Germany wishes to assist at the birth of important political events and contribute her quota to initiative forces. In one of the conversations which the writer has been privileged to have with the Chancellor, insistence on this moral equality was forcibly expressed. In his May speech Hitler stated clearly:

We shall take part in no further conference if we have not had a share in the drawing up of the programme from the outset. Because two or three States concoct a draft treaty, we have no wish to be the first to sample it.

Much of the dislike felt by Germans for the League of Nations is to be explained by this feeling. Germans feel that it is so easy to build up a new world order at the expense of one country: tomes have been written by well-wishers of the League of Nations on the virtues of the mandate system, a form of trusteeship exercised on behalf of backward peoples under international authority; but the principle was applied to those colonies alone which were taken away from the Germans as spoils of war and on the wholly insincere ground that the Germans had failed at the job, and that, like Spain, they would really be happier without them. To the most disastrous example of the kind allusion has already been made; when the Powers of the Disarmament Conference met at Paris in June 1933, they deliberately left Germany out and drew up a plan in her absence which demanded from Germany further one-sided sacrifices. The result was Germany's abandonment of the League. The meeting at Stresa in 1935 was another example of the kind which deeply offended the Germans. The importance of a common approach to questions is paramount, and cannot be over-emphasised as a solvent of misunderstanding in Europe. Germany, France, and Great Britain should make a habit of consulting one another simultaneously on all questions that are common to them.

The development of policy along the lines indicated here would probably lead to the return of Germany to the League of Nations, provided that Germany is invited to take her place with the other Powers in proposing and working out certain reforms of the Covenant, such as its separation from the Treaty of Versailles. It may be a long road which leads to this desired goal, but it is the only hopeful approach to the problems mentioned—namely, the relations between Germany and Russia. It is the Covenant of the League that can alone bind these two countries to pursue a policy of mutual tolerance; no direct treaty or regional pact of mutual assistance can possibly be concluded between them.

Such general appeasement would enable the Powers to take up once again the thorny question of limitation of armaments. It is doubtful whether a single step forward can be made unless it has been preceded by some such political development as has here been sketched. Ten months

ago Russian intervention in Paris negated the proposal of an air pact, welcomed by Hitler, between the Western Powers; and now fear of a Franco-Russian military convention makes Germany, in its turn, hesitate. But conditions must again be created in which account can be taken of Hitler's wish, expressed in his May speech, for the abolition of the heaviest artillery and tanks, and of the bombing of civilian populations, as a first step towards general reduction. It is fortunate that the British Government did not miss the offer of naval limitation made by Hitler in that same speech, as it is unfortunate that other Powers fail to grasp his offer regarding land armaments. The Anglo-German Naval Treaty removes the one cause which might have existed of direct conflict between the two countries. Had such an agreement been possible between Haldane and Tirpitz in 1912, it is highly probable that the Great War would have been averted. The French Government, although informed of the progress of negotiations, was at first annoyed, and, after seventeen days' reflection, disapproved of the plan, but for reasons which did not seem to His Majesty's Government of sufficient weight to justify its abandonment. The French are now clearly beginning to appreciate its value. The Treaty greatly facilitates general limitation of the naval forces of the world. Sir Samuel Hoare and Herr von Ribbentrop have, in fact, laid one of the foundation-stones in the general peace structure; let us hope that the British Government will succeed in promoting the other necessary changes already mentioned which will finally contribute to the pacification of Europe.

T. P. CONWELL-EVANS.

THE FUTURE AND PROSPECTS OF THE LABOUR PARTY

By A. L. ROWSE

'THE situation is fundamentally not unhealthy,' said Mr. Herbert Morrison at the Parliamentary Labour Party's reception on the assembling of the new Parliament. It could hardly be described as a 'victory' reception, and Mr. Morrison's summing-up of the position of the Labour Party after the election expresses the minds of most Labour people in its tone of a modified and conditional optimism after the disappointment of more sanguine expectations. For there is no denying the fact that the party in general did expect a much better result—a considerably larger recovery of seats, at any rate—from the election. And in the first reaction of disappointment with the results there was some heart-searching in the Labour Movement. Mr. G. D. H. Cole, always the first with his reactions, wrote a depressing article in the *New Statesman* (November 23):

This is a time for facing hard facts. [Mr. Cole is always bravely facing hard facts: sometimes the facts are not as hard as he makes them.] At the close of the General Election of 1935 a Labour majority in Parliament looks further off than at any time since 1918. The Labour landslide of 1931 could be plausibly explained away: the disappointing recovery of 1935 imperatively demands straight thinking. Labour, to be sure, has gained about a hundred seats; but it is no stronger now than after the 'Red Letter' election of 1924, and not much more than half as strong as it was in 1929. The Liberals, who helped in 1923 and 1929 to provide a 'progressive' majority, have been almost wiped out as an independent force. A new minority Labour Government, even if anyone wanted it, seems nearly as improbable as a Labour Government with a clear majority behind it. . . .

All the intellectuals followed in full cry with their various (and mutually contradictory) explanations why it had happened: the party had not gone out sufficiently to capture the

Liberals, it had gone too far in the direction of conciliating the Liberals; the programme was not definite enough for the electorate, it was only too definite for the electorate and there was too much of it; the party should concentrate on social reform—it would never capture the imagination of the people until it went out whole-heartedly for Socialism. This last, needless to say, was the point of view of Sir Stafford Cripps, making his *post-mortem* speech at that revolutionary centre, Oxford. It was time that Mr. Morrison weighed in, to call one and the other of them to their senses, with that salutary gift of his—a little cool common-sense.

For, indeed, the situation is fundamentally not unhealthy; it is, on the contrary, quite healthy. Mr. Cole's depressing view bears within itself its own contradiction. The party is incomparably stronger now than it was after the 'Red Letter' election of 1924. In that year it polled 5,500,000 votes; this year it polled 8,300,000. Nor is the increase in the Conservative vote upon that year anything like proportionate, for whereas then the Conservatives polled 8,000,000 votes, in this last election they only polled, with the aid of the National Liberal and National Labour contingents, some 10,500,000 votes. Or again, take Mr. Cole's gloomy assertion that the party is not much more than half as strong as it was in 1929: actually its vote this year is exactly the same as it was in that, the high-water mark so far of Labour's electoral advance—in each case, some 8,300,000. That is to say, it looks as if the amount of support there is in the country for Conservatism and Labour is about equal, as it has been since 1929; and that the Conservative Party's preponderance is purely due to its appealing in a national guise, rallying the considerable National Liberal vote to it, while Labour and the Opposition Liberals, being able to come to no arrangement, keep themselves in a minority. Nevertheless, the total Government vote at this election was only 54 per cent. of the votes cast (excluding unopposed seats from calculation), while that of the Opposition was 46 per cent. It is true that the number of seats obtained was disappointing and nowhere near in proportion to our vote: every Labour M.P. represents some 55,000 votes; a Conservative member only 23,000. But there were special reasons for the unrepresentative character of the result. In the whole of the North—the northern

Midlands, the North Country proper, and Scotland—where three-cornered contests have previously greatly benefited Labour, as in 1929, there were very few this time. In those areas the Simonite Liberals are at least as strong as the Samuelite Liberals; the Government reaped the advantage of their support and mostly got their candidates in on straight fights. Conversely, in the South, where it is more advantageous to Labour to have straight fights, the blinkered obstinacy of the rump of Opposition Liberals in insisting on running candidates against both Government and Labour meant that Tories got in here in doubtful areas on minority votes—as in my own constituency of Penryn-Falmouth, a typical county constituency, where the Conservative candidate got in with 16,000 votes, against 13,000 Labour and 11,000 Liberal votes.

So that the Government gained on both swings and roundabouts this time. But that is no more than the luck of the electoral system. In 1929 it operated to our advantage, and from 1929 to 1931 our position in Parliament was stronger than our support in the country warranted; and that is not without its moral for that year of disaster, 1931. But quite a small swing, a very small percentage of votes, would change all this and give us a majority. So that, however great may be the longing of what Liberals remain for Proportional Representation, it is not likely to appear as an item on the Labour programme; it is much more likely to appear as another of Mr. Baldwin's astute moves to keep himself (in the centre) in a perpetual majority before the next election is taken.

From every other point of view, as against Mr. Cole and the gloomier prophets, the Labour Party has emerged from its years in the wilderness, tried and tested. Even its political opponents will admit it to be a tribute to the soundness and sanity of the movement that, so far from reacting into extremism after the bitter betrayals and disillusionments of 1931, it has emerged rather more moderate than before, less 'Marxist' than ever,¹ more responsible in its whole attitude

¹ *Pace* Lord Eustace Percy (*vide* Commons debate, *The Times*, December 7). He advised the Labour Party to give up its 'parrot-like semi-Marxism' and return to its old ideal of a co-operative commonwealth. It is becoming fashionable to accuse the Labour Party of Marxism. Needless to say, there is hardly a member of the Labour Party who understands what Marxism means—any more than Lord Eustace Percy does.

to government, more constructive in the proposals it has worked out for the amending of our economic and social system. Up to 1929 the record of the Labour Party was largely (save for a brief episode in government in 1924, when its conduct of foreign affairs was, as again in 1929, its real field of success) that of a snowball growth of membership, a propagandist party with mainly a propagandist attitude to the responsibilities and problems of government. There has been a profound change in that respect running from the top right down through the Labour Movement in these last four or five years. Anyone who has attended, and watched carefully as a political observer should, the annual Conferences which are the ultimate and deciding authority in the formulation of policy, and the forum of discussion for all the trends and currents of opinion in the movement, will have been struck by the changed atmosphere.² It is more than a change of emphasis away from the propagandist appeal, though that has its place; it is that the whole keynote of the discussions, with the new leadership of the Conference, has become the thrashing out of concrete and constructive policy. In place of the *démodé* theatricalism of a MacDonald or a Maxton—each calculated to bring the House down, and did, with like null effect—or the vulgar playing of a Jimmy Thomas to a popular gallery, there has been the progressive unfolding and debating of a whole series of Policy Reports (mainly presented in concise speeches by Mr. Morrison and Dr. Dalton), designed to make clear what the party means by Socialism and what its political and economic objectives are. In this transformation of the Conference much is due to the late Mr. Arthur Henderson, who was a dominating figure at every one of them, right up to this year, when he lay dying while the issue of the adherence or not of the Labour Movement to League Sanctions was being thrashed out; and still more is it due to the attitude of the great trade unions, the sheet-anchor of the Labour Movement. The difference between the old and new was dramatically expressed at the climax of the Conference by Mr. Morrison's speech on Sanctions; it was a magnificent effort, profoundly moving, not as an emotional appeal, but by its intellectual integrity; it was a piece of such statesmanship that, though the Con-

² Cf. my surveys of these Conferences in *The Nineteenth Century*, 1932, 1933, 1934.

ference had been rent by dissensions during the two days' debate, there seemed to be nothing to be said after it, nor has there been any sign of recrimination in the movement since. Anyone who heard that speech—it has now been published³—will recognise that the Labour Movement has found its natural leader, whoever may occupy the chair of the Parliamentary Party.

One of the most unfortunate results of the electoral *débâcle* of 1931 was that hardly a single one of Labour's tried parliamentary spokesmen was returned. So that in the past four years the party has been at a great disadvantage in the House, and this has had an adverse effect upon its standing in the country. Now all that has been changed by the election: the men who really are representative of Labour and express its mind are back. Mr. Morrison is back, in himself worth fifty seats; so is Dr. Dalton, a future Foreign Secretary, and Mr. A. V. Alexander, a future Chancellor of the Exchequer; in addition, there are Mr. Greenwood, Mr. Attlee, Mr. Lees-Smith, all skilled debaters and with experience of administration and political responsibility. There is one conspicuous figure among these younger leaders, Mr. Noel Baker, whose absence at the present juncture is most keenly felt, for his expert knowledge would be invaluable when the centre of interest is in the field of foreign policy and likely to remain so. Nevertheless, there is now a very effective Labour front bench, and already in the month that has elapsed between the election and Christmas it has made a great difference: in the debates in the House Labour has taken the initiative and already captured the intellectual leadership. That, in time, will have its effect in the country; already it is stimulating the Labour Movement out of its mood of despondency and defeatism since 1931. So that it seems that Mr. Morrison is justified in his view that the situation is 'fundamentally healthy'—he has since repeated it in that form in the House; and I have said that the early disappointment has given way to a modified and *conditional* optimism.

What then, we may most fruitfully inquire, are the conditions? In general terms, they are that the party should make the best of its opportunity; that it should recover confidence in itself, and build up the confidence of others in

³ *Labour and Sanctions*, by Herbert Morrison (Labour Party: Transport House). Vol. CXIX—No. 707

it, over the next four years; that it should make a good showing in Parliament and in the country; that it should clarify its programme and so present it that it cannot be so easily misrepresented as it is at present; that it should bring its new leadership into the foreground, and get it across to the nation, so that people should not be allowed to entertain the doubt whether, after all, Sir Stafford Cripps does not speak for the Labour Party (when nobody inside the party has any doubt on that point); that it should put its house internally in order—waking up the ponderous and unimaginative machine of Transport House, shaking up its personnel right through the movement, developing a proper sense of publicity which is abreast with the times, and not several years behind it, working out a policy as regards its candidates so that the abler young men are not for ever fighting hopeless seats while the worthless old guard from safe mining constituencies recline in the Library of the House of Commons; making a success of its local administration in the various areas like London and many large industrial towns which are under Labour control and where the party is being proved as to its ability to govern or not. It is a tall order: it will certainly take the party the next four years; and no doubt some of the conditions will not, or only imperfectly, be fulfilled. Nevertheless, some of them will have to be fulfilled, and all of them in part, if the party is to be returned at the end of four years to take over the government of the country.

To take the question of the programme first, since that is regarded as the chief stumbling-block, at least by a sufficient number of the middle classes, to prevent us from gaining a majority. *What does the Labour Party mean by Socialism?* Does it mean what Sir Stafford Cripps says, financial crisis and all? If it does, it so completely puts the Labour Party out of court, so far as the average mentality of the British electorate in normal circumstances is concerned, that it hardly enters into practical politics any more. Or does it mean what Mr. Herbert Morrison says? There really is not any doubt. You have only to look at the official and declared policy of the party; or, even better, at who it is that is in control of the Labour Movement, in order to see. Sir Stafford Cripps speaks for himself, and perhaps for the Socialist League, a

dwindling body of some 2000. Those who have the power in the Labour Movement, who overwhelmingly speak for it, whose policy is endorsed by majorities of 20 to 1 at Conference after Conference, who have practically all the trade unions and all the constituency Labour parties with them, are the present leaders—Mr. Morrison, Mr. Greenwood, Mr. Atlee, Mr. Alexander, Dr. Dalton. Sir Stafford Cripps has had all the *réclame* in the past four years, partly because the absence of altogether more representative figures put him into a position of undue prominence, and still more because for the other side and for the Press he is a very convenient stick to beat the Labour Party with. Tories are accustomed to regard him as electorally worth thirty seats to them. I notice that even Mr. Baldwin is not above making use of him. Speaking at Dundee after the election, he said:

Now I notice that Mr. Morrison, of the Labour Party, a very able man, has been complaining that some of the left-wingers had been unwise in some of the statements they had made, because they had frightened the electorate. That is all wrong. Statements that have been made by Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. Atlee are the statements of honest men who know what they are talking about.

Of course, it suits Mr. Baldwin's game to pay more serious attention to the statements of these and other individuals (like Mr. Cole and Mr. Laski, who are also generously referred to in the speech, but who have no official standing in the party and are not even candidates) than to the official statements of party policy. But there is no doubt about the latter; for since 1931 the party executive has presented its policy for the public control of industry, finance and the land, piece by piece in a series of policy reports which may be bought and read. The whole thing, together with its policy in international affairs, was brought together in the document *For Socialism and Peace*, which was presented to this year's Conference at Brighton, was the policy on which the party fought the election, and will continue to be the official programme.⁴

The trouble is that people do not read programmes, much less a whole series of policy reports. It will be the business

⁴ Cf. also *Labour's Foreign Policy*, by Arthur Henderson; *Currency, Banking and Finance*; *The Land and the National Organisation of Agriculture*; *The National Planning of Transport*, etc. (Labour Party: Transport House).

of the executive before the next election takes place to make a short list of points—some ten, or eight or six—which can then be effectively presented to the confused mind of the electorate.

But there is no doubt that the Labour Party means by 'socialisation' public control. It is Mr. Morrison's model of the London Passenger Transport Board, as he introduced it in the original Bill, which holds the field. There is no other. It is proposed to apply this same model of public control, at least the central principle of it, the appointment under public authority of an independent and expert board to co-ordinate, control and operate given industries which are thought ripe for public control, with variations according to the nature and structure of the industry. The Labour Party proposes to apply this principle first to the Bank of England—not that it would involve much, or perhaps any, change in the technical operation of the Bank's business, but it should have the effect of making that institution more amenable to the general needs of British industry than it was from the ending of the war to 1932. In the past four years, since our departure from the gold standard, there has been less to complain of as regards its credit policy. It would appear as if the Treasury had at last won its place as an equal partner with the Bank; but it is as well that that new-found relation should receive its expression in the constitution of the Bank, lest at any time there should be any backsliding. Perhaps at a later date this same model might be applied to the joint-stock banks, forming them into one banking corporation and thereby cutting out much overlapping, besides making them more susceptible to the credit needs of a centrally directed industry. Some such scheme for the general co-ordination and direction of the coal industry seems, to the ordinary citizen, long overdue; it is fantastic that the obstinacy of either the coal-owners or the coal-miners should be allowed to hold the community up in successive great industrial convulsions. The strike and the lock-out, under a properly directed industry under public control, should be as extinct as the dodo. But only the intervention of the State can bring it out of its present *impasse*. The principle of public control is not worked out for the whole of industry, nor is it intended to apply to every industry—in fact, only

to those where it is appropriate; but there are policy reports covering Transport, Electricity Supply and Distribution, and the National Organisation of Agriculture.

It may be said that in putting forward these proposals the Labour Party is only in line with the general trend in industry anyhow; but that is its case. It certainly seems difficult to realise what any Liberal of even average progressive sympathies can object to in the declared and officially adopted policy of the Labour Party, whatever he may think of Mr. Cole or Sir Stafford Cripps. But this policy of socialisation, or of public control as it would be better to call it, must go along with a general pressure towards greater economic equality, of which extended social services and further social reforms would be the main instruments. No one in the Labour Movement is in favour of sacrificing this side of Socialist policy; on this point Mr. Cole is quite right. The agreement that exists on this point was further emphasised by Mr. Morrison in his first speech in the new House of Commons:

If the House asks me whether I am prepared to tolerate in a State of substantially socialised industry—a Socialist Commonwealth—that for all time we should maintain in idleness a section of the community that lives without useful labour on rent, interest and profit, I tell you that I am not; and that as soon as I and my friends can do it we will lift not only from the backs of the working class, but the middle and professional classes as well, every one of these idle parasitic elements of society who are now living on the productive labour of the workers whether by hand or brain.⁵

A notable declaration, to which some attention has been called; and rightly, for it is to Mr. Morrison, in all probability, that it will fall to put it into operation. Nor is it less important for its obvious appeal to the middle and professional classes. For Mr. Morrison believes—and in this nothing is more symptomatic of the new leadership—that large elements in these classes will in time be more and more drawn into association with the Labour Movement. Already there are signs of it; everywhere the younger generation of school-teachers is turning to Labour (there was little enough support among the older generation of them); the medical profession does not present the unbroken front of social

⁵ Reported in *News-Chronicle*, December 10.

reaction that it did, nor the scientists: "is there not a vigorous and growing association of doctors that is affiliated to the Trades Union Congress? While the new spirit of unrest as regards social questions displayed in the scientific world is notorious. There is a growing Bank Clerks' Trade Union, the Bank Officers' Guild, whose avowed aims as regards public control of the banks are the same as those of the Labour Party. Indeed, one of the significant things to be remarked in the late election is the extent to which the Labour Party received support from the middle and professional classes. Throughout the whole of the South Country, where Labour support was previously negligible, the Labour vote very noticeably increased, though not enough in these constituencies as yet to win them. Where the party did much less well than expected was in its old industrial strongholds, in the North Country and the Midlands; while the Birmingham area has remained as yet impervious. Here there has been a considerable falling away of its working-class vote. The Labour Party has to find ways and means of rallying its working-class supporters, in the trade unions and outside, and then, with its new elements of support among the middle and professional classes, it will have achieved the majority necessary to support it in the government of the country.

A remarkable passage in Mr. Baldwin's Dundee speech deserves attention:

Has it ever struck you what a remarkable fact it is that since universal suffrage came in this country, our great party, or our great party with its allies, has been in power nearly all the time? Now, that is very significant. That shows that we have really faced up to these stupendous problems of the post-war years, that we have adapted our great party to meet them and to try to solve them, that we are ready to work with men who are like-minded with us, and we find to-day throughout the country that there are millions of voters, many of them not of our party nominally, who would gladly fall in alongside of us, with like minds, with like hopes, with like sympathies, and with like enthusiasm, to do what we can all together to better the conditions of our people.*

What this means concretely is that the Conservative Party has maintained itself in a majority all this time by a policy of social concessions, buying the support of the people by adopting and carrying on the social measures of the Liberal

* *The Times*, November 30.

and Labour Parties. To a Conservative of Lord Salisbury's or even Mr. Bonar Law's time, Conservatism to-day is hardly recognisable. The process has indeed gone far; elder Conservatives are in the habit of regarding Mr. Baldwin as at least half a Socialist. For the rest, is it surprising that, so far, universal suffrage has produced almost continuous Conservative government? Mr. Baldwin knew quite well what he was doing when he gave all the young women down to twenty-one the vote.

For the Labour Party to capture and hold its attention, a consideration much more important than the party programme—for the electorate does not read programmes, perhaps is incapable of understanding them—is the question of leadership. Everything in the contemporary world goes to show that the factor of leadership is of more importance in these large, ill-informed, mobocracies than any other. They do not, in general, understand what is said to them, still less are they capable of weighing its merits; they look only to the men who say it. Here it must be agreed that the assumptions of conservative thought, which never made the mistake of supposing the masses to be rational, are much more in keeping with the facts of present-day politics than Liberalism, with its outmoded rationalist assumptions, or Labour, which lies somewhat betwixt and between; and Conservatism is correspondingly more effective. Moreover, the Labour Movement has nothing like that instinctive sense of power which the Conservatives have so superbly. Indeed, it can hardly be expected: the Labour Party is very young; it is a party only of the past thirty years, and it has grown out of classes which are accustomed to be governed and have the mentality of the governed and not of the governing. Nevertheless, if the Labour Party is to win its majority, and to equip itself to govern, it will have to develop the will to power, and the sense of it, much more effectively than it has. The new leadership, particularly certain of the outstanding figures within it, certainly possesses it; but it will have to indoctrinate the whole party from the top downwards with that sense, if it is going to make the best of the opportunities that will present themselves in the next four years.

A. L. ROWSE.

COAL: THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

I. A POLITICAL VIEW

By GODFREY NICHOLSON

My only qualification as a writer on mining subjects is four years in the House of Commons during the last Parliament as member for a mining constituency in Northumberland; so this article can only give a purely personal impression of certain elementary aspects of what is known as 'the mining problem.'

It should be made clear at the outset that although a short article upon any subject in the world must mainly consist of generalisations, yet in dealing with mining matters generalisations are even more hazardous than usual. Every coalfield in this country differs from every other in geological structure, in the nature of the coal that is mined, and in the markets in which the coal is ultimately disposed of. In the same coalfield many different varieties of coal are produced, and almost every pit has its own unique difficulties both in production and in selling. Even in the same pit, and in the same seam, no two 'districts' are exactly alike, and we shall not be greatly exaggerating if we say that every 'working place' in the country has its own peculiar problems. Such a vast subject, then, can only be profitably considered if the existence of innumerable exceptions to every general statement is borne in mind.

Before coming to the present crisis and the possible consequences, we must try to understand something of the points of view and the natures of the three parties involved—the miners, the owners, and the Government. Of course there is a fourth party—the Great British Public; but as its function is limited to paying for the blunders committed by the other three—a privilege which it exercises quite admirably—the G.B.P. can be left out of it.

Let us take the miners first of all. I feel bound to say that my four years' contact with the Northumberland miners has left me convinced that there cannot exist a finer type of Englishman; and I see no reason to think that the miners in the other districts fall more than a very little below the Northumbrian standard. I do not want to be accused of gush, so I will leave it at that. I found that, contrary to what most people would expect, not the least striking of the miner's virtues are fairness and reasonableness. The average miner is not a wild hothead: it is important to remember this, for many people tend to attribute the chronic state of unrest that exists in the coalfields to something peculiar in the miner's mentality. On the contrary, the unrest and the feeling of grievance exist for very good reasons indeed. Some of these reasons are obvious, such as the sorry traditions of bitter conflict in the past, or the homogeneous and isolated nature of most mining communities, which means that industrial depression has particularly tragic consequences; but others, though equally obvious in theory, are less generally understood in actual practice.

For instance, everybody knows that mining as an occupation is not always pleasant or comfortable, but it takes first-hand knowledge to convince one of the degree of discomfort frequently entailed in the miner's daily work. It is said that there is nothing that one cannot get used to, and up to a point that is true; but I defy anyone to get used to working all day long up to one's knees in water, or in a thin seam (22 inches or less) with a bad roof and floor, or in a tropical temperature. Miners take no delight in complaining, but there are, in almost every pit, a very large number of 'places' where work is exceedingly arduous and unpleasant. The miner's work is real work—it needs a real man to stick it; and it is not surprising that the miner feels some resentment when he compares the respective discomforts of his own occupation and that of the directors of the company.

When we come to the question of the risk that the miners run every day, my own personal feeling is one of amazement that any body of men can be found to undergo such constant peril. It is not so much a question of fatalities; excluding catastrophes such as Gresford (happily rare), slightly over one miner in every thousand is killed each year. This is bad

enough; but is it generally realised that the number of miners disabled for more than three days during 1934 reached the appalling figure of 132,440? This is over 17 per cent. of the men employed, including surface workers. Only about 17,678 of these accidents disabled their victims for less than eight days. In addition there were 7,578 new cases of industrial disease for which compensation was paid. Put in another way, the number of cases for which compensation was paid in 1934 amounted to 22.4 per cent. of the number of men employed in the industry. These figures speak for themselves.

Wages are a more difficult subject, for it is impossible to give an answer to the question 'what are a miner's weekly wages?' The most one can do is to give average earnings per shift and per year for each district, and even these are apt to mislead, as there are so many more or less intangible factors to be taken into account. Once again one must have recourse to generalisations. A good man, in a good 'place,' can make good money; given a reasonable amount of luck, skill and strength, and regular employment, the miner, though not paid on a lavish scale, does not do too badly. The real point is this—many miners earn barely enough to live on. It is the knowledge that many miners are drawing 'starvation' wages that embitters the whole industry; the fact that many others, perhaps even the majority, are reasonably well paid has nothing to do with it. Besides this there is, for all concerned, the constant fear that lack of orders may cause the pit to work irregularly.

So far I have touched on tradition, discomfort, danger, and low wages as explanations of the sense of grievance felt by the whole mining community. These factors are, however, of minor importance compared with the feeling that the miner is treated, not as a human being, but as a piece of machinery. In saying this I do not mean to cast aspersions upon the good will of the majority of coal-owners; but it is an admitted fact that the economic state of the industry forces all of them to keep down their wage costs to the lowest possible level, to treat every compensation case as a liability to be reduced to the very minimum, and, generally speaking, to give sole consideration to questions of pounds, shillings, and pence. As for a pension for a man who may have spent forty-five

or more years in the service of the company (and don't forget the risks), why, the idea is ridiculous! In short, unless and until the everlasting 'pull devil, pull baker' tension can be relaxed, we can never lessen the bitterness that exists in the mining industry. This applies to wages, to compensation, and to the question of pensions. The plain fact is that unless we can so ease the financial situation of the industry that the miner can be sure of a decent minimum wage (and not be afraid to claim it); can count on adequate compensation if injured, and on light work if partially disabled; can be sure that his employers are not forced by circumstances beyond their control to cut corners, either in wage rates or in safety questions; and, finally, can count on some pension after a lifetime spent in the service of the shareholders—unless we can do all this, we had better resign ourselves to the prospect of an endless series of national coal strikes, and endless and increasing bitterness and grievance in the most important industry in the country. No solution of the present crisis can have any degree of permanence unless it is remembered that a low wage is only one of the miner's grievances; and I, for one, am not quite sure that it is the most embittering.

Undoubtedly the blame for this state of affairs must be shared mainly between the owners and successive Governments, but it is impossible not to feel that many, if not most, of these and similar abuses would have been remedied before now had the miners' leaders paid them the same attention as they have always paid to questions of a more political nature. I am increasingly convinced that nothing has injured the cause of the miners more than the alliance of their industrial organisation with one particular political party. Had one half of the energies devoted to campaigns in favour of such vague political questions as nationalisation been put into persistent and detailed demands for the reform of the compensation laws, or for a pension scheme, or, even more important, for the reform of the selling side of the industry, the plight of the miners to-day would have been far different. But, instead, the miners' leaders have always appeared to be reluctant to do anything which might imply recognition of the existing system of private ownership, or even so to improve conditions under private ownership that the indignation of the miners against the existing system might be diminished. How-

ever sincere their preoccupation with politics may have been, the result is that in his day-to-day life the miner has scarcely derived any benefit from his amazing loyalty to his union leaders. The present plight of the miners, taken in conjunction with their constant and unswerving loyalty to their leaders, is a striking condemnation of the policy pursued by the Miners' Federation.

But almost any error in leadership may be forgiven men who have to negotiate with employers of the type that, up to now, have directed the policy of the coal-owners. Here, again, generalisations are dangerous, for there are very many coal-owners whose attitude towards their workmen or towards the problems that confront the industry it would be impertinence to criticise. But, unfortunately for the industry and for the nation, in far too many parts of the country the ruling majority of owners have failed in most of the essential qualities of constructive leadership. It is impossible for an outsider to understand fully the difficulties which they have had to contend with, but the present state of the industry is sufficient proof of the fact that they have shown themselves unable to cope with the admittedly difficult situation that has arisen since the war. To lament this, or to try and find an explanation, is like crying over spilt milk; the fact remains that all those who have had to negotiate with them return with the impression that the owners as a body are lacking in vision and imagination. Unfortunately for them, they seem to have the gift of always putting themselves in the wrong in the eyes of the general public. This may be because of their innate resentment that the nation as a whole should consider itself in any way affected by the fate of the mining industry, or because of their constitutional inability ever to concede small points in order to gain big ones (for the coal-owner, every ditch is a last one). Whatever the causes, the coal-owner has few friends.

The third party concerned in the industry is the Government. Here it is not a question of opinion, but one of fact; and the main fact is that, with the exception of the Act of 1930, no Government has really attempted on a large scale to cope with the problems of the industry. The explanation is quite simple: during the last few years Governments have shown increasing readiness to assist in the reorganisation of

particular industries when the demand for such assistance comes from the industry in question. But they have never forced reorganisation upon any major industry against its will. I feel that some blame attaches to the Conservative Party in this respect. After the disastrous stoppage of 1926 it should have been plain that fundamental reorganisation of the industry was essential, but the Government accepted the oft-repeated contention of the owners that, given a return to normal prosperity, everything would be all right. When the Labour Party came into office, instead of having the courage to grasp the nettle boldly, and to sink or swim upon a drastic scheme of reorganisation, they succumbed to the temptation to compromise, and produced the Act of 1930, which satisfied nobody. The National Government, during the past four years, whether because its hands were too full with other and more pressing matters, or because it could not make up its own mind on the subject, likewise failed to do what was required. Now, at the eleventh hour, when we are faced with the possibility of what would certainly be one of the most unnecessary strikes in history, the Government is at last proceeding upon the right lines.

Let us now turn to the actual problems with which the industry is faced, and to the methods that are suggested for their solution. The general public seems to be under the impression that the main problem confronting the industry is the heavy fall in the consumption of coal during the last few years, and that the remedy can only be found by cheapening the cost by means of wholesale amalgamations and more scientific methods of production, as well as by finding new uses for coal by hydrogenation, etc. I believe that this line of reasoning is false. The maximum production of coal was in 1913, when the figure was 287 million tons. That year was a very exceptional year; but even if we take 1913 as the standard, the comparative figures are surprising. In 1933 the output of coal reached its lowest point—namely, 207 million tons. This was only 28 per cent. below 1913. In 1934 the output was 24 per cent. below 1913. Ignoring for the moment the export market, which is obviously affected by different factors, the 'quantity of coal available for home consumption for all purposes' was in 1933 only 20 per cent., and in 1934 only 12.2 per cent. below 1913, the maximum

year. This shows that, compared with other major industries, the fall in output of the mining industry cannot fairly be called catastrophic; nor can we attribute to that factor alone the present series of difficulties with which the industry is confronted.

What the industry is suffering from is the fact that there is little, if any, margin of profit on the sale of coal at the pithead. As this is merely another way of saying that the selling price has been forced down too far owing to an excess of supply over demand, surely the real cause of the malady is to be sought, not in the fluctuation of supply and demand, a common occurrence in every industry, but in the absence of any machinery or system which can maintain price levels in spite of such fluctuation? The coal-owners are divided into two schools of thought. The majority deny the need for any fundamental reorganisation of marketing, and profess to believe that the solution is to be found in lowering the pithead price, saying, 'We must wait until there is such a general revival of prosperity that the demand for coal will increase, and in the meantime concentrate our efforts upon lowering the costs of production,' the theory, apparently, being that this will ultimately lead to increased consumption, and so to a reduction of overhead costs.

There is a subdivision of this school of thought which consists of people who have got it into their heads that wholesale amalgamations will result in much increased efficiency and, presumably, in lower costs. In many cases the need for amalgamations is easily demonstrable, but such are the varied conditions that every case needs individual consideration. Anyhow, the resultant economies would have an infinitesimal effect upon the price of coal as a whole. In general the case for amalgamations as a means of reducing costs is a weak one, as production costs are often the lowest in the smaller concerns; incidentally, some of the pits which are most old-fashioned in technical methods and in equipment often show the lowest costs of all. Another section of the public seems to think that 'oil from coal' is the solution. A study of the figures would show them that even if we produced from coal all the oil we need, it would only increase the consumption of coal by about 5 or 6 per cent. In any case, it should not be forgotten that home-produced oil can only

compete with the natural product because of the high degree of protection which it receives. As a practical contribution to the actual and urgent problems which we are facing to-day, 'oil from coal' is illusory.

But let us get back to the main question, which is this: are there any grounds for thinking that the solution of our problems is to be found in reducing the costs of production? Let us look at the facts. Ever since the war the costs of production have steadily declined. The reduction has consistently been passed on to the wholesale purchaser. It is common knowledge that, in every pit, every economy made in the costs of production is immediately thrown away by the selling side. This is inevitable in the present disorganised state of the industry, and, failing reorganisation, there seems no reason to expect that future economies would not suffer the same fate. Nor is there any reason to think that a reduction in the pithead price of coal, even to the tune of 1s. a ton, would create an appreciably increased demand for coal; and a reduction of costs of 1s. a ton could only be obtained by reductions of wage rates which are unthinkable. The majority of coal-owners are undoubtedly aware of the fact that there is very little to be hoped for from reducing the costs of production; but they are either too elderly, or too lazy, or too busy, to face the facts, or, having faced them, to undertake the necessary thought and work, and to incur the inevitable odium, entailed by the production of a reorganisation scheme of the magnitude and complexity inseparable from anything of this nature in the mining industry. Very human, no doubt, and quite understandable, but a little hard on the man in the street who has to pay the price for this lack of initiative.

The other school of thought believes that neither improvement in trade nor reductions in costs can, by themselves, effectively deal with the fundamental changes that have taken place since the war—changes not only in potential production or actual consumption, and consequently in the intensity of competition, but also in the type and size of coal for which there is a demand: in short, they believe that the new conditions are such that a complete revolution in selling methods is essential. Happily for the mining industry, one district, Lancashire, has produced a real leader, a man who has had

the foresight, energy, and intelligence; not only to prepare a selling scheme for his district, but to induce all those who are engaged in producing or in selling coal in that area to adopt it. This man is Mr. R. A. Barrows; and he will go down in history as the creator of what is known as 'Central Selling,' and, incidentally, as the saviour of the mining industry. At the end of June 1935 the Lancashire scheme received statutory authority as a scheme under the Act of 1930. Put briefly, central selling for Lancashire means that all Lancashire coal is sold through one selling agency. This sounds too simple; but something of the complexity of any such scheme will be realised when it is pointed out that this has meant that Mr. Barrows has had to negotiate with, and persuade, not only sixty odd colliery undertakings in Lancashire, but all those who deal in coal as merchants or middlemen in that area, and even collieries and sales organisations outside the county which have been selling 'foreign' coal in Lancashire.

It is impossible even to summarise the main points of a central selling scheme, as they are numerous, technical, and complex; but what it amounts to is that central selling does away with internal competition within a district; the object, of course, being to get a better price for coal. It will readily be understood that the full benefits of central selling cannot be obtained until all districts have adopted schemes, with, of course, a national body or council to regulate inter-district competition; but, even in isolation, the Lancashire coal-owners take an optimistic view of the future. The same optimism is felt by the Lothians, a sub-district of Scotland, which has put an end to internal competition by a simpler form of selling agency which has not required statutory authority. The adoption of central selling is not an easy matter; it would be folly to attempt to minimise the difficulties. Not only does it entail on the part of all participants the surrender of a large measure of their independence—namely, of their sales organisations—but it implies what is known as 'stabilisation.' Agreement must be come to between the various producers as to the precise share of the market to which each is entitled. A standard year has to be taken, and each producer is allotted a fixed percentage upon that basis. On a large scale this will of course be necessary as between district and district. Lancashire presented a

simple problem compared with that which must be faced by most other districts; for Lancashire has no export trade, her markets being at her very door.

How different is the situation of, say, Northumberland. In Northumberland the coalfield is an expanding one; new pits are being sunk and new 'districts' being developed in existing pits, so that it will be much more difficult to 'stabilise' either individual collieries or the district as a whole. Then again, Northumberland is an exporting district, a good third of its coal being sent abroad, and more than half of the rest being shipped to London or other south-country ports. So how the general wage level of the county is to be raised by an increase in price which must be borne almost entirely by the home market, will be a tough nut to crack. Let us be quite frank about it: central selling in the exporting districts presents enormous difficulties, the solution of which may involve fundamental changes in the whole structure of the industry. The price paid for central selling may be, indeed is bound to be, heavy, but the desirability of controlling the selling price of coal cannot be questioned. Even the most convinced individualist must find it hard to contradict the statement that if the mining industry is to be saved from its present plight the pithead price of coal must be increased; and up to now no alternative to some form of co-operative marketing has been produced. Anyhow, the owners in every district have, in some cases very reluctantly, promised the Government to produce central selling schemes as soon as possible. The significance of this decision does not require emphasis, for we are familiar enough nowadays with the spectacle of an industry taking powers to control the marketing of its products. Even the industrial consumer, provided he does not feel that he is the victim of unfair exploitation, no longer believes that, in the long run, it is to his benefit that an essential primary product should be sold at, or somewhere near, a loss.

The advantages of central selling will be manifold, for not only should it enable the industry to run at a profit, but if the average pithead price of coal can be raised by a sum approaching 2s. a ton, the main problems facing the industry will be on the way to being solved. Given new district wage agreements so as to ensure that the miner gets his fair share of the

increased prosperity, substantial wage advances are a certainty; and, once the industry is free from the intolerable financial strain from which it has suffered for so long, it should be easy to improve the present compensation laws, and possible to inaugurate a pension scheme. Not the least of the advantages to be derived from controlled marketing will be that, once for all, the whole question of whether or not collieries are making enormous profits out of bye-product plants, etc., will be settled; for all sales, even to subsidiaries, will have to be done through the central sales organisation. The great question is, of course, whether it will be possible to raise the pithead price without doing more harm than good. All that can be said is that the general opinion, amongst people who are qualified to have one, is that it can be done. It must be remembered that one of the main features of a central selling scheme is that powers are taken to regulate and control the activities of the merchant and the middleman, with the result that in the case of household coal the ultimate purchaser, the householder, will probably pay, not more, but less, than he does at present. However, all this is mere guesswork; all that it is safe to say is that the outlook is most hopeful. One certain gain there will be: the miner will know that the highest possible price is being got for the product of his labour. If adequate steps are taken to come to satisfactory wages agreements, much cause for bitterness will have been removed. I cannot feel that any of the three parties comes out of the affair with much credit. Both the owners and the Government are open to the reproach that only now, under the threat of a national coal strike, have they done what should have been done some years ago—what, if done at any time up to last July, would have prevented the occurrence of the present crisis.

As for the Miners' Federation, whether there is a strike or not, sooner or later their tactics are bound to lead them into difficulties. If there is a strike, it will become abundantly clear that the real interests of the miners are being sacrificed for political ends; for a strike would, for many reasons, be bound to fail. Once central selling, together with guarantees that the miner will get his fair share of any increased prosperity that may accrue, have been obtained, there is very little in the industrial field left to strike for, and it will appear that

the objectives of the Miners' Federation are more and more of a political nature. In my opinion, which I have expressed above, they have already shown this by their concentration upon nationalisation rather than upon remedying the day-to-day evils from which the miner suffers; and they have shown it again by their stated willingness to submit their present demands to arbitration. On the other hand, the great principle of national wage negotiations and settlements would have been established. This would be the first step for the Federation towards a return to their pre-1926 political dominance, but it would be of very little practical benefit to the individual miner.

If a strike is avoided, as seems probable at the moment of writing, the Miners' Federation will naturally claim the credit for the results secured. Up to a point they will be justified, for without their intervention nothing would have been done for a long time. Nevertheless, I believe that in the end the miners, and perhaps the country as a whole, will realise that the methods and the mentality of the leaders of the Miners' Federation bode ill for the future. It cannot be for the good of those concerned that the spirit of party politics should dominate the industry, or that the Federation leaders should once again consider that their main duty lies in the political field.

To sum up. Low wages are only one of the miners' grievances: such matters as the inadequacy of the present compensation laws and the absence of any pension scheme must be dealt with if the state of feeling in the coalfields is to be improved. If a co-ordinated scheme of central selling is adopted as soon as possible, the economic outlook for the industry is bright, but it must be accompanied by satisfactory revision of wage agreements. It is not only morally right but also politically essential that the miners' legitimate aspirations should be satisfied. By itself, a small increase in wages can only be a temporary palliative.

GODFREY NICHOLSON.

NOTE.—In this article the word 'miners' also includes surface workers. All figures are taken from the last *Annual Report of the Secretary for Mines*, price 3s. 6d.

COAL: THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

II. AN ACADEMIC VIEW

By PROFESSOR K. NEVILLE MOSS

THAT industrial development and national wealth in Great Britain are alike basically dependent on our coal-mining industry is as true at the present time as it has ever been; and grave anxiety must inevitably result when one considers the depth of the depression in which it now is involved. In common with other industries, it has been subject to many vicissitudes, but it has suffered to a much greater extent than they from unrest among its employees. The constant, though sporadic, warfare, waged over the greater part of a century, between the miners' trades unions and the coal-owners has resulted in a latent mutual distrust which seriously affects the efficiency of the industry. For the sake of smooth working and real progress this bad feeling must be removed as quickly as possible by a policy of understanding and co-operation.

The efficiency of coal production can on the whole be criticised mainly for its lack of organisation. Many collieries are old and have to draw coal from the working face along tortuous roadways, and up shafts which are too small for cheap and efficient production. Thus, though valiant efforts have been made to bring these pits up to date, it is often impossible for them to compete with modern well-equipped collieries under the management of an able mining engineer equipped with foresight and adequate technical knowledge. One might now ask if the solution of these labour problems and technical difficulties would alone suffice to restore prosperity to the industry. Emphatically it would not; wider issues are involved.

Coal-mining has always suffered by its intense individualism, though the drawbacks of this policy were not

apparent until intensified by the economic situation which resulted from the European War. The immediate post-war period witnessed trouble in the industry, and the Government of the day appointed a Royal Commission in 1919, popularly known as the Sankey Commission, to advise it upon the action necessary to bring prosperity and peace to the industry. No constructive steps of any moment resulted, and in consequence the industry sank still deeper into the trough of depression.

The decline in export trade and home consumption of coal brought about by a reduction in world trade and foreign competition led to a steady fall in wages, and uncertainty of employment. The owners' policy of reduction of wages and increase in hours of work to meet the economic depression caused much unrest and a demand for nationalisation of the mines. Bitter strife thus seemed inevitable, and in order that the Government should be better informed a Royal Commission was appointed in 1925 to 'enquire into and report upon the economic position of the Coal Industry, and the conditions affecting it, and to make any recommendations for the improvement thereof.' Its chief recommendations (published in 1926) were the national ownership of all coal seams, and amalgamation of existing mines.

The Government could no longer evade action, and it proceeded to map out a policy with eyes turned towards the Miners' Federation. The Coal Mines Act of 1930 was its contribution to the solution of the problem. It shunned its first essential duty, which was to acquire the unmined coal for the nation. Part I. of the Act provided for regulating production, supply, and sale of coal through district and central boards of control. Under this scheme each colliery company was given its quota of production and the minimum selling price of its coals was fixed. Provision was also made for the imposition of penalties by the district boards for exceeding the quota, or selling below the fixed minimum price. This involved long and difficult negotiations in each coalfield, created jealousies, and invited means of evasion.

It must be realised how very difficult has been the task of the mining engineer thus called upon to make the collieries pay, when quota allocations imposed the necessity of working

short time and curtailing output in some instances to about half of the maximum production. This section of the Act was, in a sound economic sense, ill-conceived, for it was designed to keep open uneconomic pits, for the purpose of avoiding further unemployment, at the expense of others better and more profitably organised.

Part II. of the Act provided for the constitution of the Coal Mines Reorganisation Commission 'to further the reorganisation of the coal-mining industry with a view to facilitating the production, supply, and sale of coal by owners of coal mines, and for that purpose to promote and assist, by the preparation of schemes and otherwise, the amalgamation of undertakings consisting of or comprising coal mines where such amalgamations appear to the Commission to be in the national interest.' The Act gave power to the Commission to devise schemes for the amalgamation of mines if the industry did not provide its own when called upon to do so. Such schemes were to be approved by the Railway and Canal Commission, which should *not* confirm a scheme unless satisfied :

- (1) That it would be in the national interest to do so, and
- (2) That the amalgamation scheme
 - (a) would result in lowering the cost of production or disposal of coal ; and
 - (b) would not be financially injurious to any of the undertakings proposed to be amalgamated, unless the scheme contained provisions for the purchase, at a price to be fixed in default of agreement by arbitration, of any such undertakings ; and
 - (c) that the terms of the scheme were fair and equitable to all persons affected thereby.

The Government was fortunate in securing the services of Sir Ernest Gowers to be chairman of the Commission, but he and his co-Commissioners have so far had to administer an Act which gave them power by one clause and took it away by another. Moreover, it is practically impossible to obtain adequate power while the minerals remain under private ownership. A proposed scheme of amalgamation can so astutely be shown by the counsel for the coal-owners to be against the national interest, especially as increased unemployment is usually involved, that its acceptance by any court will be improbable in the extreme. Its acceptance, then,

is governed by vested interest rather than by national necessity. The Act also provided for a Coal Mines National Industrial Board to inquire into disputes affecting wages and conditions of labour throughout the coal mines of the country, but this section was virtually a dead letter from its inception. Thanks to these factors, to which also must be added the alterations in working hours which it imposed, the Act has proved to be, in the main, a clumsy piece of legislation, which has done little to improve conditions in the industry. It has, however, paved the way for co-ordinated central selling, which, when in operation, will prove the most effective piece of organisation yet undertaken by the industry.

What of amalgamations ? An industry like coal-mining, with roots so deep in the customs and traditions of the past, must be forgiven for its slowness in realising the advantages of unified organisation which newer industries have been able to devise. Although traditional ideas act as a strong brake on the wheels of progress, they prevent the immediate launching of schemes which would be doomed to failure because sufficient time had not been given for them to be absorbed and fully understood by the personnel of the industry. This essential factor has, very wisely, been fully realised by Sir Ernest Gowers and his co-Commissioners. Much has been done already by way of voluntary amalgamation of colliery undertakings, and this has resulted in a slow but sure weakening of the resistance of the old order of *laissez-faire*. The industry as a whole is much more inclined to look, though perhaps still shyly, at various schemes of organisation than it was five years ago. The fact remains, however, that isolated amalgamations, voluntary or forced, will not of themselves set the industry on its feet.

Effect of International Factors on Production in Great Britain.

—Since the war coal production has increased in France, Holland, Belgium, and particularly in Russia. It is difficult to predict the future world demand ; but, even though it may continue to rise, it is certain that Great Britain will still continue to experience great difficulty in increasing her coal exports.

The position of the coal export trade and home consumption in Great Britain is shown in the following table (millions of tons) :

	1913.	1933.	1934.
Total quantity shipped abroad	98.4	56.68	57.09
Total quantity available for home consumption	183.85	148.37	161.48

The extent of European competition in the coal industry can be gathered from the following comparative data for the June quarter of 1935, which were obtained from the Mining Association of Great Britain :

	Output per shift per person employed underground and on the surface.	Earnings† (including family allowances) per shift of underground workers.
	cwts.	s. d.
Great Britain	23.10	9 10
Germany (Ruhr).	33.05	12 3
France	17.13	9 11½
Belgium	15.20	5 8½
Holland	31.55*	14 2½
Poland	33.97	5 11½
Czechoslovakia	23.35	7 5

* For the year 1934.

† Converted at the average rate of exchange.

‡ Partly estimated in order to make the figures comparable.

Every effort has been made to regain our foreign markets, and to do so the industry has subsidised its coal export trade at the expense of the home market. The only way to prevent this drain of money is either to limit the quantity of coal exported, or to seek international co-operation of mine-owners with a view to standardising wages and hours of work abroad, so as to reduce the margin between cost of production and selling price. International co-operation in these matters, and an agreement upon export quotas, would quickly raise the level of the standard of life of the miners throughout Europe. At the same time it would go far towards salving the coal export trade of this country ; but the extreme difficulty of achieving international agreement upon questions so intricate and so fraught with economic repercussions would seem to render any such scheme very doubtful as a means of raising the coal-mining industry from its state of depression.

It may be that, in the wider national interest, coal exports must be maintained, at whatever cost, for the sake of cheaper food imports ; if this be so, we must next examine the effect of a subsidised coal export trade upon the industry as a whole.

Great Britain's Demand for Coal.—Let us now turn to the position of affairs within our own country.

The consumption of coal in Great Britain in millions of tons in 1913 and 1934, taken from the Annual Reports of the Secretary for Mines—is shown below :

	1913.	1934.
1. Gas works	16.7	16.66
2. Electricity generating stations, belonging to authorised undertakings and to railway and tramway authorities	4.9	11.17
3. Railway companies for locomotive use	13.2	12.17
4. Vessels for coastwise trade	1.9	1.26
5. Pig-iron manufacture	21.2	10.40
6. Other iron works and steel works	10.2	6.81
7. Collieries (engine fuel)	18.0	11.68
8. General manufacture and all other purposes	58.4	87.21 *
9. Domestic consumption	33.5	—
10. Miners' coal	5.8	4.12
	183.8	161.48

* This figure includes Classes 8 and 9.

It was estimated after the war that 40 million tons of coal a year were consumed in private houses, public buildings and institutions, including coal for domestic industries and miners' coal. The domestic use of gas and electricity in preference to coal for heating and cooking, despite their greater cost, is growing rapidly. This is mainly due to their convenience and to the ever-increasing difficulty of obtaining domestic help. The point thus emerges that present-day householders consider convenience before cost, and it is no longer necessary to keep down the price of electricity and gas by selling coal to the power companies at a figure below the actual mining cost.

Much has been done since 1913 to reduce coal consumption per therm of gas, per unit of electricity, and per ton of iron and steel produced. The following table summarises the available data :

	1913.	1934.
1000 cub. ft. of gas produced	210,149,894	313,546,000
Therms of gas produced per ton of coal on the basis of 500 B.Th.U. per cubic foot	58.7	75
Units of electricity generated by steam plants (millions)	4154*	16,138
Coal per B.T.U. (lbs.)	3.4*	1.59†
Pig-iron produced (tons)	10,260,315	5,969,100
Coal per ton of pig-iron (cwts.)	41.3	35.1
Steel produced (tons)	7,663,876	8,849,700

* For 1920-21.

† The lowest average fuel consumption per unit generated in 1934 was 1.06 lbs. at Battersea Power Station.

Much has been said lately about the value of the hydrogenation process in providing a new and expanding market for coal. There are few business men who will be prepared to spend millions of pounds upon an industry whose future is only tentatively assured by the imposition of a duty of 8d. per gallon on all imported petrol. The mining industry must, however, keep itself well informed as to the possibility which any new coal treatment process may have of proving a commercial success, so that it can take over its control at the right moment.

Before passing to the consideration of a future policy, it is important that the achievements of the industry should be fully realised. For brevity the facts are displayed in the following table:

DETAILS OF MODERNISATION OF MINES UNDER THE COAL MINES ACT

Year.	No. of mines at work.	Percentage of machine-mined coal to total production.	Percentage of mechanically-conveyed coal.	Percentage of coal cleaned before sale.	Horse-power of electric motors in use.	Output per man shift worked (cwts.).
1913	3267	8	Not known	Not known	628,069	19.9
1928	2539	26	11	25	1,722,332	21.29
1934	2123	47	37	40	1,949,186	22.94

Although these data show progress, they also indicate ample room for greater improvement, though the achievements in mechanisation in our newer and bigger collieries are most satisfactory.

Future Policy.—Within the industry to-day one finds a

large measure of technical efficiency almost completely frustrated in the broader national sense by obsolete methods of administration and organisation. Let there be no mistake, however, about the competency of the mining engineers in charge of our up-to-date collieries: they are achieving remarkable results in the face of great difficulties. But the industry lacks its fair share of enlightened administrators. Will it allow its false conception of economics to work itself out blindly till the community, through the State, intervenes for the sake of the welfare of the miners? If it does so, it will get nationalisation, and sooner than it imagines.

The public conscience is becoming very tender in its concern for the welfare of the miner, and it is useless for the owners to dismiss these tendencies irritably as gross interference: the demand must be met, in the interests of humanity and of that co-operation which alone can assist the industry to be profitably organised. The psychological factor underlying the spirit of antagonism is one which must be studied. It will be found to have all sorts of astounding repercussions which seriously affect industrial efficiency. The men do not want either kindness or brutality—merely fair treatment. The Miners' Federation must be prepared to do everything humanly possible to work with the owners for the common good, as soon as the owners show evidence of a change of heart. Very nearly 70 per cent. of the cost of production of coal is due to wages—wages paid to dissatisfied workers whose efficiency must be low in proportion to the degree of unrest amongst them. A policy of reconstruction must envisage what will be expected of the industrialist in his relation to the worker, say, thirty years hence. We must plan ahead. Every stage must be carefully thought out. Taking a long view, it will soon be realised that a well-cared-for, properly-paid, and suitably-housed personnel having proper amenities of life will help the industry to pay its way. No sentimental idealism is required; merely sound far-sighted business acumen.

The Policy.—The first essential duty for the present Government is to purchase the mineral rights in coal from the present royalty owners, under the terms suggested by the 1925 Royal Commission on the Coal Industry, taking due care to avoid undue waste of public money in the purchase.

When the country has acquired the mineral and mining rights it can, through its Commissioners, grant new leases upon terms which will envisage most up-to-date mining methods, and can call in leases when it is necessary in the interests of the industry to do so. The second task should be the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into :

(1) The maximum production of every colliery in the country on the basis of a five-day week, drawing coal, where possible, on two shifts of seven and a half hours each per day.

(2) The average total production cost per ton of output, over the past three years, of every colliery employing more than 300 men ; and the estimated costs under (1), above.

(3) The maximum number of employees required under (1), estimated on the present basis of efficiency.

(4) Instances of under- and over-capitalisation of some of the collieries.

(5) The possible demand for coal during the next twenty years.

When this essential information is available, a list should be made of the most efficient collieries in the order of their costs of production, giving also their present and estimated maximum output. The present yearly output of about 220 million tons should then be allocated to the most efficient collieries, allowing for working at maximum production consistent with gas liberation and other underground conditions—the remainder closed one at a time so as to allow each colliery to reach maximum production. The question of compensation requires thought. If the mines were allowed to remain open they would struggle along for a few years and finally close ; but in the meantime more money would be lost, and they would be responsible for lowering the standard of life of the employees therein. Such mines should be closed by a court order. In many cases a claim for compensation could not be substantiated, but, where it could, it should be based on the average dividend for the preceding five years.

The country should provide the money to cover compensation from funds obtained by the purchase of the mineral rights. A sinking fund would have to be provided by a royalty on the coal mined, to wipe out the debt in, say, fifty years. The effect of locking up mineral for all time by closing the inefficient collieries must not be over-estimated, but the effect of accumulation of water must be considered and provided against. If there should be an increased demand for

coal, it could be met by an improvement in the output per man by the introduction of labour-saving machinery. As collieries became inefficient by virtue of underground conditions or by obsolescence, new collieries should be sunk, on capital provided in the ordinary way. The collieries allowed to continue working should then, for technical and administrative control, be amalgamated in groups, depending upon geographical position and natural difficulties of production. In grouping them it would no doubt be wise to limit their size, according to circumstances, to a production of 5 to 10 million tons per annum.

Details of Organisation.—Having secured the amalgamation of the most efficient collieries, steps should be taken to secure district and national co-ordination. I suggest an organisation on the following lines :

The controlling influence in individual collieries would be the mining engineer or agent in charge of one or more collieries. Under him should be the managers, the electricians and mechanical engineers. A manager should be in charge of each colliery. All underground officials should be responsible to the manager. Each colliery should also have a costing clerk, working directly under the guidance of the group costing clerk, who, in turn, should work under the direction of the district and National Costing and Statistics Department.

By this means a uniform system of costing and statistics will be in operation for the *whole* industry—a most vital requirement for efficient control.

An amalgamated group should be under the control of a general manager, who should be responsible for the technical and commercial administration of his group. In the larger groups the general manager should be assisted by a number of mining engineers or agents, each taking charge of one or of several collieries, according to output and circumstances. The general manager and his agents should have control of a planning and efficiency department, which should be run by a well-trained and highly-qualified young engineer. It should be the duty of this man to devise schemes for increasing the efficiency of production and to carry out investigations to that end. The general manager should also have directly under his sole control a labour officer, with a nominee of the workers themselves to act as his second

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in command, whose duties might briefly be summarised as follows :

- (1) To investigate housing conditions and general amenities of all mine workers in the group and devise schemes for improvement.
- (2) To investigate the cause of disputes or complaints arising amongst the employees of the group and assist in an equitable settlement.
- (3) To investigate the cause of every accident, fatal or otherwise, devise means for the prevention of similar occurrences, and to see that the injured men receive every possible attention and suitable treatment.
- (4) To organise and supervise free medical, optical, and dental treatment for all workers.
- (5) To give advice (through the services of the woman welfare worker) to the wives and families of the miners, particularly in matters of diet and in bringing up young children.
- (6) To be responsible for the general working of the group's superannuation scheme, which should, as soon as possible, be applicable to every worker.

There should also be formed for each group a technical co-operation committee, consisting of the manager and a representative of the men of each colliery, under the chairmanship of one of the mining agents. The object of this committee should be to promote efficiency in production, and general co-operation for the common good. This committee should offer substantial monetary awards or preferment in position to any worker who devised a scheme which upon adoption proved of real value to the technical efficiency of the group. Each group should have a purchasing department, which should work through the district purchasing department.

A number of groups not exceeding five should constitute a district, which should be in charge of a vice-president. Each district should correspond with the district selling organisation, which should be under the charge of a general sales manager, who should be responsible to the district vice-president. District control should be organised from a central office, and, in addition to the two main members of its staff referred to above, it should include a district consulting mining engineer, a district coal-utilisation advisory officer, a district consulting, planning and efficiency engineer, a district labour officer, a district purchasing officer, and a costing and statistical department, together with the staff necessary for each. An appointments board, consisting of

the vice-president and others, should be responsible only for the appointment of agents, managers, electrical and mechanical engineers. The appointments of lesser officials should be delegated to the groups concerned.

A National Board, under the chairmanship of a national president, should be formed, consisting of the vice-president of each district. The collieries of Great Britain should be divided into seven districts. This Board would, of course, be responsible for appointing all vice-presidents of districts and general managers of groups.

The national organisation should include :

Five consulting mining engineers—one for Wales, one for Scotland and three for England.

A marketing organisation, including distribution and transport.

A National Accountancy Department for the purpose of co-ordinating costing and statistical information.

A labour advisory officer.

A national coal-utilisation officer.

A national purchasing advisory officer.

A national director of mining research with a co-ordinating committee.

This outline of the system of organisation suffices to indicate the type of policy I consider to be necessary. Its essential new characteristics—at least, new from the present standpoint of the industry—should be the effective co-operation between the workers and the management. In such an organised industry, as I envisage it, every man, from the national president downwards to the humblest worker, will be a full-time employee working for the national good. We must realise that the present-day worker hates to see, or to believe that he sees, an individual making a fortune out of the products of his labour. The only way to avoid this is to institute effective national control by the industry itself.

The National British Mining Company should control the shareholdings of every company, and new share certificates should in time be issued. Dividends should be based on the results of the national working of the mines of the country.

The organisation of the industry on the basis here proposed would take about eight years to effect. It would be wise, no doubt, to start with two small districts consisting of two or three amalgamated groups which should serve as a training-ground for the controlling personnel of two other

district organisations to follow, and so on till the whole organisation for Great Britain is complete. In such an industry there should be no room for those whose conception of industry is behind the times. A nucleus of national control would be essential from the start, but it cannot become wholly effective until the network of organisation for the whole of the mining industry of Great Britain is complete.

There will be a lack of men fitted for the responsible positions indicated in this scheme of organisation. The lack of fitness is more in attitude of mind than in technical efficiency, though there is room for improvement in this, and still greater scope for improvement in commercial salesmanship. It is essential, therefore, that the industry should devise a scheme—as, in fact, it now is attempting to do—to attract first-rate brains from the schools of the country by offering scholarships to enable them to obtain a sound scientific and technical training in our (far too numerous) University Mining Schools. Having acquired a sound knowledge of the technical or commercial side of the industry, they should be given the widest possible practical training, and a salary generous enough to attract the most intelligent and adaptable young men whose school records show evidence of fitness for a profession which makes heavy demands upon brain, body, and character.

An organised industry on the scale outlined will offer great scope for organising, technical, and commercial ability. Leadership, technical efficiency, and co-operation—these are the three ends of importance towards which staff education should be directed. Moreover, salaries must be commensurate with the responsibility and importance of the work I have outlined, which should whet the appetite of every ambitious young man with brains, character, and capacity for leadership.

Every new prospective controller of men must be given practical experience of scientific management as practised by the best-administered firms in this country and others. All mining engineers, mine managers, and under-managers of the future must have a higher standard of technical attainment than is at present deemed necessary. Underground officials, such as district deputies, must be required to hold a first-class certificate, and all lesser officials the second-class certificate, of competency of the Board of Trade. It must be recognised that mining under such an organisation will involve

a far higher production efficiency than exists to-day, and officials must be adequately trained to run a mine upon modern mass production lines. Electrical and mechanical engineers at collieries must also be required to show evidence of wider technical and practical knowledge than is customary to-day.

The training of the commercial personnel engaged on the selling side of the industry has in the past been completely ignored. It is useless to plan production unless distribution and sales are planned with an equal degree of efficiency. Steps must be taken at once, in the way outlined above, to remedy this state of affairs. To-day coal salesmanship pays lip service to the needs of the consumer, but in reality does no more than find the ways and means of forcing on to the consumer that which the collieries have for disposal.

Labour and Welfare.—One cannot stress too much the unfortunate lack of co-operation between the workers and the management. The men, however, will in time realise that in the new order of things they will be in the same category as the national president in that everyone engaged in the industry will be a full-time employee working for the common good. Common good should be understood to mean, first, a decent living wage and standard of life for all workers, and, secondly, organisation of the industry such as will inculcate a national pride in its efficiency and capacity to pay its way. Representatives of the workmen must be asked to give their assistance in achieving such results, and one can have little or no doubt as to the efficacy of such co-operation. The general outline of welfare and co-operation can be gathered from the duties of the district labour officer. Money should be allocated to each district for welfare work on the basis of a levy on output. The forced provision, by an Act of Parliament, of money for welfare work ought in the new order of things to be regarded as an insult to the industry. Common justice, and appreciation of the brotherhood of mine workers, should be so alive as to make the proper provision of welfare services, within the financial capacity of the industry, a voluntary charge upon profits. Every worker should, according to his years of service, be given a holiday on pay which should be based upon his average weekly earnings over a period of two months.

Research.—Vast sums of money have been taken from the
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industry for research. The most effective means of getting value for money would be for the industry to appoint a National Research Director and a co-ordinating committee. Funds should be provided to cover all kinds of researches concerned with: (1) Health and safety of workers employed in and about coal mines. (2) Efficiency of production. (3) Efficiency of marketing, distribution and transport. (4) The utilisation of coal. (5) General well-being of the workers. A sub-committee should be set up to co-ordinate each branch of research. The policy should be to offer grants to workers engaged in practical mining, or in the universities, to enable them to carry out investigations upon problems in which they have a lively interest. If their work is well done, it should be recognised by a suitable monetary award in addition to that of the grant in aid.

Selling.—The provision of a central selling organisation for the industry is now under consideration, and it will no doubt be dealt with effectively.

Wages.—The principle of wage payment in the industry is now fair and equitable; but only when the industry is organised on a national basis can wages be controlled by a national board, as they should be.

Conclusion.—The concentration of output in the most efficient collieries will inevitably cause an increase in unemployment amongst the mining population, and a certain amount of geographical reshuffling of the personnel now working at collieries which ought to close. The elimination of men from the newly constituted amalgamated groups will, of course, be gradual in that it will keep pace with the increase in mechanisation. The resultant difficulties will have to be faced by the Government, with the knowledge that miners are, in fact, as a class, well able to adapt themselves to new industrial processes.

The alternative to voluntary changes of the kind herein indicated is the imposition of a nationalised control under a bureaucracy which would lack the necessary intimate knowledge of the industry and business ability. That is desired by none: it is feared by all. The business of owners and miners, of the Executive Government and of Parliament alike is to avoid it, by the exercise of foresight. In the words of Talleyrand, '*Gouverner c'est prévoir.*'

K. NEVILLE MOSS.

COAL: THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

III. A PSYCHOLOGIST'S VIEW

By CHARLES S. MYERS

THERE are generally two ways of looking at any problem—from the narrow and from the broad point of view. When the supply of any commodity exceeds the demand for it, the obvious remedy from the narrow standpoint is to cut down production at all costs. From the same standpoint, when the supply of coal exceeds the demand, the obvious remedy is to work mines part-time or to close some of them down, thus throwing many miners out of work. This seems the cogent, logical and inevitable procedure, from the narrow point of view. But with the adoption of a broader standpoint, stress is laid on under-consumption rather than on over-production. And the question arises whether every inhabitant of the world has already enough coal, and whether costs of production and distribution can be so reduced that more would be purchased.

In the case of coal, it is possible to introduce machinery at the coal face, so that coal is won in greater quantity and with greater economy by mechanical rather than by manual means; in 1928 only 26 per cent. of the coal in this country was obtained by coal-cutting machines, whereas in 1934 this percentage had risen to 47. So, too, mechanical conveyers may be introduced to carry coal more efficiently and more economically from the coal face to the pit bottom: in 1928 only 12 per cent. of the coal in this country was being thus mechanically transported, whereas in 1934 this percentage had risen to 37. In 1928 the saleable coal in this country was being produced at a loss of 11*d.* per ton; in 1934 this loss had been converted through these mechanical and various other changes into a profit of 5*d.* But by 1934 the total production of coal had dropped to 220·7 million tons from

257.9 million tons in 1929 and from 287.4 million tons in 1913 ; while the number of employees in coal mines had fallen from 952,000 in 1928 to 798,000 in 1934. (These figures are derived from the recent P.E.P. Broadsheet No. 60.)

We may bewail, from the narrow point of view, this reduction in the number of miners employed. But when we remember that nearly 70 per cent. of the cost of coal production is due to the wages of personnel, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, if that cost is to be diminished in order to induce a greater demand, the high percentage payable to human labour must be reduced ; and in practice it can only be reduced by lessening the number of workers, not by lessening their present low wages. Yet if the demand for coal can be increased by reducing its cost, the question arises whether more workers will not ultimately be needed so as to cope with that increased demand. When the linotype was invented, its use threw thousands of hand-compositors out of work ; but the resulting reduction in the price of newspapers has since created such a vast demand for them that there are now far more employees engaged in the production of penny newspapers than there were when newspapers were sold at many times their present price. The same has happened in the case of bicycles, clothing, wireless apparatus, etc. But in the case of coal, the chief immediate remedy has been supposed to lie in raising its selling price to the general public.

Unfortunately, about 80 per cent. of the reduced output of coal in this country has been due to its lessened demand for export or for steamships plying for foreign trade. Yet, for home consumption, coal has been latterly used in increasing quantities by electrical undertakings, by blast furnaces and by iron and steel works, despite modern improvements in its more economical utilisation. Just over 75 per cent. of our saleable coal is destined for home consumption.

Even, however, if the employees working underground at the coal face can never be restored to their former number, the wider point of view raises a doubt as to whether this is to be nationally deplored, provided, of course, that the unemployed and their offspring can be transferred to other developing occupations. We may feel disposed to wonder whether, at least in its present form, coal-mining is a desirable employment for civilised man. We may recall the days when, before

the use of oil fuel and other improvements, the coaling of ships was carried out abroad almost wholly by half-nude, coal-begrimed coolies, or when, before the use of modern cranes and other mechanical appliances in our home docks, human labour was required to lift and to transport bales and cases of enormous weight and size. Coal-mining is not a physically unhealthy occupation. The miner's work demands intelligent foresight rather than mere bodily strength. But it is carried out under conditions of feeble illumination and at considerable depths underground, in relative isolation and not infrequently in adverse conditions of high temperature and of insufficient or too violent ventilation. Still more important, it is a dangerous occupation, involving the risks of falling roofs and explosions, and hence considerable mental anxiety, which, though habitually suppressed, finds its outlet in other forms of emotional instability and is revealed in the liability to miner's nystagmus, now generally recognised as of psycho-neurotic origin.

Even though the continuance of human labour in underground mines is inevitable, has everything been done to make the human factor in this industry as satisfactory as possible ? Should boys under 14 and old men still be employed in underground work ? And is it to be believed that in reality the too frequent disputes between mining employers and employed rest solely on the wages paid by the former to the latter, or on the hours of work ? It is well known that a worker in any occupation does not necessarily seek the most remunerative work, if thereby working conditions become more unsatisfactory than those which he can obtain at a lower rate of payment. Moreover, the publicly announced causes of an industrial dispute are seldom the fundamental ones : often they are merely the most tangible reasons, or the last straws that have broken the camel's back ! Does anyone suppose that the unsatisfactory relations so long existing between the miners' trade union and the employers' association rest really and solely on the wages or hours problem ? It has been well said that each industry gets the trade union that it deserves, and there can be no doubt that even within any one industry a trade union behaves very differently to good and to bad employers, when precisely the same difficulties arise and require friendly readjustment. It is not less true that every trade union gets the employers'

federation it deserves, and that by the very nature of his occupation and conditions of work the coal-miner is psychologically a 'difficult' employee.

Improved methods of industrial production and distribution may do wonders. But how much more can also be done by improved industrial relations, and hence by improvements in the will to work! Given good personal relations, miners are only too ready to suggest not only better working conditions that will improve the human factor, but also those that will more directly avoid waste and promote more efficient work. This is certainly the experience of the staff of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology gained during their past investigations, extending over several years, in several coal mines. They introduced a better miner's lamp, which increased illumination and reduced the casting of shadows. Quite wrongly, the management predicted that the miners would refuse to adopt it, because of its heavier weight: on the contrary, they were unanimous in their demand for it, saying that it facilitated, and that they felt surer in, their work. The Institute's staff was able to report similar successes in the improved illumination which they introduced at the pit bottom and in the screen-room, and in the investigations which they conducted into the more effective shape, size and weight of the miner's pick and into the best movements in wielding it. They also found opportunities for research into certain needless and irritating delays due to congestion and defective flow of material underground and above ground, and into methods of payment and the problem of 'dirt' sent up from the face with the coal. And they devised schemes for the better selection and training of the miner and for improvements in the easy and speedy transmission, and in the ready and correct interpretation, of signals, etc.; the aim of these and other investigations being directed not only to increases in efficiency and to reductions in waste of effort, but also to the diminution of accidents.

Since the time when these inquiries were conducted, experience has proved the value of investigating also the problems of distribution from the human aspect. Much work in the coal industry now awaits the attention of the industrial psychologist in regard to ascertaining and meeting the demands and desires, actual and potential, of purchasers,

remedying the wastage of time and expense in transport and elsewhere before the coal reaches its consumer, and other similar problems in which the human factor plays an important part, requiring an expert in this special aspect for their solution. It is only by their solution that the financial position of the coal industry can be completely re-established.

It should be realised that the miner is now a very different type of man from what he was in the days long past. In those days the most useful managerial assistant was he who could swear the hardest and could most easily knock a man down. To-day the miner reads more serious books and drinks far less alcohol than he ever did before. More than ever, he demands decent housing, and he appreciates the provision of pithead baths and other amenities which make for modern civilised life. Like employees in other industries, he is eager to welcome other than monetary incentives in his life's work, provided, of course, that his earnings are sufficient for a decent life.

There is, indeed, abundant evidence that purely economic factors are by no means the only ones which are required for the resuscitation of the coal-mining industry. Without closer and wider attention to the human factor, without better relations between employers and employed, that resuscitation, if it is to be real and lasting, can never take place.

C. S. MYERS.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND SUGAR CONTROL

By RICHARD COMYNS CARR

SUGAR was hit by a slump in the world price before the general depression in commodity prices set in, and, at a time when the general commodity indices register a gradual but persistent rise, it continues to fluctuate about a price level which is the lowest hitherto known. The slump in sugar has lasted longer than that of other raw materials, and it cannot be regarded as in any way an ordinary market phenomenon. Though in pre-war days the sugar market appeared to be subject to fairly regular cyclical movements, the cycle of boom and slump then occupied a period of something between seven to eleven years, whereas the present depression has lasted continuously, except for a temporary rise in prices during 1927, since the year 1924.

Several attempts to restore the price level by an adjustment of supply to demand have collapsed. The most ambitious, known as the Chadbourne Scheme, in which the chief sugar-exporting countries of Europe combined with Cuba, Peru, and Java to restrict exports under a five-year quota plan, has ended in failure. The world sugar price has, in fact, fallen almost continuously during the period of the agreement, and the International Sugar Council, on which the signatories to the Chadbourne Scheme were represented, decided at a meeting held in August not to continue the scheme. Instead, it was decided to invite Great Britain to call an international sugar conference, and there can be no doubt that the great sugar-producing areas all over the world are now waiting on us for a lead.

How is it that a country which produces only 600,000 tons of sugar out of a total world production of 27,000,000 tons, and ten years ago produced practically no sugar at all, thus dominates the future of the sugar-growing populations?

The answer is that the problem of restoring equilibrium in the sugar trade and assuring a fair price to sugar growers has become insoluble for the sugar-producing countries themselves. The maladjustment of world supply and demand was the outcome of unhealthy post-war speculation and expensive Government subsidies. Sugar growing practically all over the world depends on fiscal aid; the whole condition of the industry is utterly artificial. Even if the exporting countries could agree on respective quotas, the statistical position of the commodity would be liable to deteriorate again owing to the development of a new national sugar industry in some country outside the agreement. Every improvement of the sugar price would encourage the factories which supply a protected home market to dump their excess output on the international market.

This country holds the key to the situation because it is the greatest free market of the world for sugar. The prolific cane-growing lands which depend on their export trade, and the State-assisted European beet-growing areas which are stimulated to produce a surplus for export, alike seek a market which is not filled by a domestic sugar industry or preferential imports. Owing to the growth of protection, the market remaining thus available in various countries of the world for competing supplies is now less than 3,000,000 tons out of the world consumption of 26,000,000 tons; but this free market determines the world price for sugar and is of crucial importance to the big sugar producers. The United Kingdom takes nearly a third of the 3,000,000 tons of free sugars. Despite the rapid development of our home industry, we still import three-quarters of our requirements, and although half of this is filled by preferential supplies from the Empire we require between 800,000 and 900,000 tons annually from foreign sources. Sugars from all over the world are coming on the London market at various seasons of the year—from Cuba and Peru, Mauritius, Fiji, the West Indies, South Africa and Australia, from Java, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It is clear, therefore, that this country is in a strong position to impose agreement among sugar producers, since pressure by this country, if it could be exercised without injury to national interests, might provide that sanction which is required to force countries to carry

out their national obligations under an international agreement, such as could not be provided within the limits of the Chadbourne Scheme. We used this power with decisive effect before the war. In 1903 the Brussels Convention, which put a stop to the export bounties on Continental beet-sugar which were ruining sugar planters in the West Indies, was concluded on the initiative of the British Government, and Great Britain, which at that time imported 1,700,000 tons of foreign sugars, enforced the Convention for the next ten years and compelled outside countries, such as Russia, to conform.

Countries which largely depend on their exports of sugar hope that the British Government will once again undertake decisive action in restoring reasonable economic conditions in the sugar trade. Java, which was principally instrumental at the recent meeting in Brussels in preventing any continuance of the Chadbourne Scheme, owing to a conviction that no general improvement could result from the quota agreement as it stands, is anxious to obtain British co-operation. Her delegates declared that they would welcome a world-wide sugar agreement if the British Empire was prepared to participate. Other signatories to the Chadbourne pact, in forming an International Sugar Committee to replace the old International Sugar Council in its function as a central office for the sugar countries, showed that they have hopes of achieving a new restriction scheme and wish to facilitate approaches to Great Britain.

Mr. Elliot's statement in the House of Commons last July, when announcing the Government's policy for the British beet-sugar industry, has aroused fresh hopes. This policy, he said, was framed in accordance with the belief that sugar supplies should be adjusted by agreement to the requirements of the world market; he added that the British Government proposed to 'invite the Governments of the sugar-exporting Dominions and Colonies to examine with them the possibility of a joint endeavour to re-open international negotiations if it should appear that there is a reasonable prospect of a successful issue thereto.' This was more than the promise of a move from Great Britain to promote agreement among sugar producers. It aroused hopes that the British Empire might itself be able to make some positive

contribution to crop regulation, for a substantial part of the increase in production, which was the primary cause of the breakdown of the Chadbourne Scheme, occurred within the British Empire.

The causes which have mainly operated to force down sugar prices in the last few years are not the same as those which brought about the slump prior to 1929. The original fall in sugar prices was caused by post-war expansion both of the cane-growing and European beet areas. Scarcity prices and abnormal demand for sugar from Europe during the war years and immediately after led to intensive production and extended plantings in the cane areas outside the zone of hostilities, and capital was poured into the Cuban industry. In 1919, however, European countries, with the experience of sugar shortage fresh in their minds, hastened to rebuild their national industries and make themselves self-sufficient. The Brussels Convention lapsed on the outbreak of war and was apparently terminated, as a result of denunciation by various countries, between 1917 and 1920. Although in the years immediately following the war no general recourse was had to the principle of export bounties, Governments imposed high protective tariffs in their effort to accelerate the revival of home production. The effect of this policy was seen in a rise of the world's beet-sugar production from 3,254,000 tons, to which it had fallen in the year 1919-20, to 11,261,000 tons, the record output achieved in the year 1930-31.

For these developments the countries which signed the Chadbourne pact were primarily responsible. If we compare production by the chief Chadbourne countries in the year 1919-20 and ten years later we find that Cuba, which produced 3,730,000 tons in the first year, was producing 4,671,000 tons in 1929-30, while Germany increased her output from 730,000 tons to 1,938,000 tons, Czechoslovakia from 483,000 tons to 1,007,000 tons, and Poland from 139,000 tons to 916,000 tons. On the other hand, it is equally clear that since the signing of the Chadbourne Convention these countries have maintained a policy calculated drastically to reduce exports and production, and if the statistical position of sugar has not greatly improved it cannot justly be ascribed to them.

In 1931, when excess stocks of sugar in the world amounted to somewhere around 7,000,000 tons, the chief exporting countries (Cuba, Java, Peru and Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Belgium) signed a five-year export quota agreement, the Chadbourne plan, aiming at an eventual reduction of stocks to normal proportions. By the end of 1934 the European countries in the group had reduced their stocks to normal. Cuban reserves, which at the end of 1931 stood at the immense figure of 1,771,869 tons, amounted on December 31, 1934, to 706,621 tons. Accumulations in Java, which in 1931 almost equalled those of Cuba, continued to overhang the 'free' market, but these have been heavily reduced in the past year and will be entirely worked off by 1937, under the drastic system of control initiated by the Netherlands East Indies Government. All countries except Cuba have tended to export well below the quotas which were fixed for them when the scheme started. Java has been unable to dispose of excess sugars, and the protected sugar industries of Europe have not found it profitable, at prevailing world prices, to sell outside their own countries. As the reduction in their exports and stocks should have benefited the world market, the reduction in output achieved by the Chadbourne countries should, other things being equal, have brought about a greater improvement in the statistical position of sugar than has actually occurred.

In Europe, Germany reduced her annual output from 2,529,000 tons in the campaign year 1930-31 to 1,675,000 tons in 1934-35, Czechoslovakia from 1,126,000 tons to 630,000 tons, and Poland from 792,000 tons to 430,000 tons. Cuba, whose 1930-31 figure of production stood at 3,122,000 tons, turned out rather over 2,500,000 tons in the present year, while Java has produced about 460,000 tons of sugar this season in comparison with a total of nearly 2,800,000 tons produced in 1931. Despite these impressive figures, however, the market position of sugar has only weakened, and the hope of prosperous times in the sugar trade has only receded further. During successive years of the Chadbourne Agreement the average annual price of 96° raw sugar c.i.f. the United Kingdom has shown a continuous fall—6s. 4d. per cwt. in 1931, 5s. 10d. in 1932, 5s. 3d. in 1933, and 4s. 9d. in 1934; while the price in the middle of September last was standing around 4s. 3d. (The recent rise above this figure is due to war scares and will not endure.)

The report of the Greene Committee on the United

Kingdom sugar industry contains a table of comparative production by the Chadbourne countries and outside areas. This table reveals at a glance the unforeseen factors which rendered nugatory the efforts of the Chadbourne Scheme.

The figures refer to the years 1929-30 and 1933-34. In this period the Chadbourne group reduced their output by more than a half—from a combined 12,500,000 tons to 6,100,000 tons, equivalent to a cut of more than 6,000,000 tons in annual output of sugar. World production, however, only decreased at the same time from 27,300,000 tons a year to 25,100,000 tons, a fall of little over 2,000,000 tons. On the other hand, under the section 'U.S.A. and Dependencies' we find that sugar production rose from 3,500,000 tons to 5,000,000 tons, while under 'British Empire' we see an increase from 4,600,000 tons to 7,400,000 tons. This figure is to be treated with caution. It includes a large tonnage of Indian gur with a low sucrose content; it is used for other purposes than ordinary sugar. The actual increase is much less than the 60 per cent. implied by these figures. Production in countries outside the Chadbourne group, however, and not belonging to the British Empire or the United States and her dependencies, remained practically stationary.

The crucial importance to the world's sugar trade of the British Empire and the United States is due, of course, not only to their resources and consequent potential capacity for sugar manufacture, but also to their position as consuming areas. The United States consumes about 6,500,000 tons of sugar annually and, situated conveniently for the world's biggest producer (Cuba), provides the natural market for two-thirds of her sugars. Since the beginning of this century Cuba has enjoyed a tariff preference against other foreign suppliers in the United States, and her trade primarily depends on the sales of sugar she is able to make there and the prices obtained. The United States, however, draws supplies also from sources within her own territory and dependencies, and these sugars enter the market free of duty. There is a home-grown beet-sugar industry and a home-grown cane-sugar industry, and, in addition to these sources, Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippines send large consignments of sugar to the United States market. All these sources of free sugar have been increasing their output in recent years.

Expansion has been particularly striking in the Philippine cane industry. Figures for 1931 (the year when the Chadbourne Agreement was signed) and 1933 show an increase in Philippine production from

782,000 tons to 1,145,000 tons. This glut of free sugars weakened the price in the American market, and seriously diminished the imports required from Cuba. After the conclusion of the Chadbourne Agreement Cuban sales in the United States continued to fall, and in 1933 amounted to 1,336,000 tons—in itself a decline of 135,000 tons on the previous year.

The United States, however, was not prepared to tolerate such deterioration indefinitely. In the first place, the Cuban sugar industry is a direct commercial interest of the United States, which provides most of the capital and exercises most of the control. In the second place, Cuba is an important market for United States exports. During the boom years, when about 50 per cent. of United States sugar supplies came from Cuba, American firms did a highly profitable trade with the island. In the year 1924 they sold Cuba \$300,000,000 worth of goods, and this included \$37,000,000 relating to iron and steel and machinery, a large part of which was machinery for sugar factories. One of the first things which President Roosevelt did, therefore, to revive American export industries was to tackle the problem of sugar supplies and the sugar price. In May last year he signed the Jones-Costigan Bill, which regulates sugar supplies in the United States for three years under a system of quotas. Total supplies are fixed at about 5,700,000 tons per annum, and the allotment of quotas, while stabilising United States domestic production at slightly above the level of 1933, demands drastic cuts in consignments coming from the Philippines, Hawaii, and Porto Rico. Cuba has also gained a higher rate of preference by the Reciprocity Treaty concluded in the year 1934. Thus the American market can be said to be insulated against the fluctuations of world prices, and to guarantee Cuba an output for the greater part of her sugars at prices well above those which she can hope to obtain by selling in the open market. It is true that the whole structure of sugar control, along with other sides of President Roosevelt's New Deal, has now been threatened by legal decisions in the American courts, but there is strong support in public opinion, as well as Government quarters, for this measure of the A.A.A., and it is thought likely to survive.

The difficulty of Java, the chief exporting country in the Eastern hemisphere, is of a different kind. In the past her

largest individual customer has been India, which at the peak of the boom years was taking over 1,000,000 tons a year from her. Until lately these supplies from Java provided almost all India's needs of pure sugar, but native industry provided in addition a very large quantity of the impure (but succulent) sugar called gur, to which reference has been made above.

It so happened that at the very time when the Chadbourne countries agreed to limit their exports in an effort to adjust the world sugar supply position the Indian Government started to build up an Indian national sugar industry behind a protective tariff. The tariff caused a rush to set up sugar factories, more particularly in the United Provinces. Indian production of sugar, excluding gur, rose from 352,000 tons in 1930-31 to 478,000 tons in the following year and 645,000 tons in 1932-33. Production for the past season is estimated around 880,000 tons; the potential capacity of the existing sugar factories in India is put at 1,080,000 tons, to which must be added the output of sugar made by the 'open pan' process and known as 'khandsari,' so that the total capacity for sugar, apart from gur, is now about 1,400,000 tons.

From the point of view of the sugar planters in Java the sudden growth of an Indian national industry has been ruinous. It has coincided with disorganisation of the market in China and a fall in exports to Japan. The effects on Java's trade can be seen from a comparison of the boom year 1928 with 1933. Between these years Java's exports of sugar to India fell from 1,090,000 tons to 352,000 tons, her exports to China and Hongkong from 589,000 tons to 292,000 tons, and her exports to Japan and Formosa from 265,000 tons to 185,000 tons. Java has been forced to cut down her production, as was shown above, to no more than a sixth of what it was in her best years. Manufacturers have been selling their sugar mills to Japan for scrap metal; a few have dismantled their mills and re-erected them in India behind the shelter of the tariff. From the point of view of the 'free' market in sugar the expansion of the industry in India has done as much as anything to undermine prices by causing the enormous accumulation of stocks in Java ports which threatened at any time to invade the market west of Suez.

Apart from the special encouragement given to Indian production, there have been two distinct developments in

the British Empire which have contributed to disturb the world's sugar trade: one is the increase of preferential supplies from the Dominions and Colonies coming to the United Kingdom, and the other the rapid expansion of British home-grown beet-sugar. In any examination of the sugar statistics of the Empire it must be remembered that, besides the United Kingdom, Canada is an important market. Supplies from the various sources go sometimes to one market and sometimes to the other under the influence of various factors, of which price is the most important. The United Kingdom is a consumer, but also a processor—importing raw and exporting refined sugar. The quantity so imported varies from year to year, but, owing to the higher price obtainable by Empire sugars, foreign sugar only is used in this trade. Subject to these qualifications, the following figures are of interest.

In the calendar year 1930 exports from Empire countries to the United Kingdom amounted to 543,000 tons and those from other countries to 1,373,000 tons. In 1934 Empire countries sent 950,000 tons, and there was only room for purchases from other sources of about 1,000,000 tons. Empire sugars arrive here from Australia, Mauritius, Fiji, South Africa, and the West Indies. Of these countries, Australia and South Africa have followed the bad example set by a number of the Continental beet-sugar producers, and have forced the growth of their sugar industries by high protective tariffs and artificial prices in the domestic market. The result is to encourage the production of excess sugars which have to be disposed of on the world market at a loss. Australia, which has enjoyed bumper crops of about 640,000 tons in the last two years, had to sell nearly half the crop at a loss overseas. Producers in South Africa, where consumption of sugar is below 200,000 tons per annum, talk of increasing their output to over 500,000 tons. It is clear that the only outlet for these sugars is in London, where at least the difference between the artificial domestic price and world market prices is tempered by the tariff. There are heavy offerings of Natal and Australia sugars in the summer and autumn.

Taking the figures which show the advance made by the British sugar-beet industry during the duration of the Chad-

bourne Agreement, we find that domestic production rose from 251,000 tons in the year 1931-32 to 615,000 tons in 1934-35. This production is hardly exorbitant for a country which consumes about 2,000,000 tons of sugar per annum, and it bears an insignificant relation to the annual world production of 26,000,000 tons; but in view of the importance of London in a 'free' market, which has shrunk to 3,000,000 tons, the addition of such a supply of protected and subsidised sugar was bound to depress prices, and the effect was enhanced by uncertainty as to how large an acreage the British Government was prepared to subsidise in the effort to attain self-sufficiency. Hence the satisfaction which sugar-growing countries of the world derive from the decision to stabilise British beet-sugar production at an output of 560,000 tons per annum and from the announcement that the Government intends to discuss sugar restriction with the Dominions and Colonies. Will the Government insist on limiting Dominion and Colonial exports of sugar to this country to definite quotas? The possibility of quotas for Colonial sugars has been much canvassed lately among dealers, but there are difficulties. This country could hardly with justice impose quotas on the Colonies, which primarily depend on the sugar trade, while putting no limit on the excess sugars coming from the Dominions; and the Dominions are another problem. Indeed, even if the Mother Country restricted imports from the Dominions, that would not of itself enable her to control the expansion of sugar manufacture in India, where the industry produces at present for the internal market.

Nevertheless, the British Government has all along declared itself favourable to sugar control. At the Economic Conference we made it known that we were prepared, if the principal producing countries should reach a satisfactory agreement, to stabilise Colonial exports for two years, allowing for a reasonable expansion for the three subsequent years. That offer was repeated at the London Sugar Conference in March 1934. Mr. Elliot's statement in Parliament went further, however, for it did not make British intervention contingent on previous agreement by the Chadbourne countries on export quotas. The sugar countries are not likely to embark on another restriction scheme without

reference to the British Empire. Moreover, Cuba, Java, and certain European countries, such as Poland, have conflicting claims to a share in the export market which make any new agreement difficult. These obstacles, however, could probably be surmounted by a world plan headed by the British Empire, and there is a hope among sugar producers that this country will now take the initiative and carry through a plan based on the co-operation of the sugar-growing Dominions and Colonies.

RICHARD COMYNS CARR.

'LA CRESCENTA': IN MÉMORIAM

By CAPTAIN W. H. COOMBS

ON November 30, 1933, a little ship steamed up the Thames to deliver, for the first time in history, a petition from the sea, signed by over 12,000 merchant officers, and by many thousands of landsmen, praying for an inquiry into the conditions of service in the Merchant Navy, and as to the need for amendments to the Merchant Shipping Acts.

On December 11, 1935, Lord Merrivale, as Wreck Commissioner, gave his decision in the last of four Courts of Inquiry recently held to investigate the loss of British ships. The facts brought to light in these inquiries have awakened the public conscience. The case of *La Crescenta* was particularly striking; but facts revealed in each of the others have shown that the petition of the Merchant Navy Officers Federation was more than justified. It was formally presented and duly printed, but no action has yet been taken. A similar petition was debated in the House of Lords on December 20, 1933, when Earl Howe, supported by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Beatty and others, strongly urged a public inquiry into conditions at sea. Among those who supported the Government view that no inquiry was necessary was Lord Essendon, the chairman of Messrs. Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd., a great shipping firm.

Had action been taken on the lines desired by the petitioners, many of the ninety-six British officers and men who perished in *La Crescenta*, *Usworth*, *Millpool*, and *Blairgowrie* might be alive to-day. Almost all the important points which emerge from these inquiries turn upon 'manning' in the widest sense of the term, although in no case was it found that undermanning was the cause of the loss. Let us examine some of these points.

In the *Usworth* inquiry it was admitted by the owner,

Mr. R. S. Dalgleish, a former president of the Chamber of Shipping and a member of the Shipping Federation (late Lord Mayor of Newcastle-upon-Tyne), that the *Usworth* had never carried more than two officers, although under a collective agreement, to which his firm, through the National Maritime Board, was committed, the vessel should have carried at least three officers. Under the Merchant Shipping Act she need only have carried one in addition to the master, and the Board of Trade has no direct authority to stipulate that more shall be carried. The Board of Trade, under its general powers, can detain a ship attempting to proceed from this country in an unseaworthy condition; the Board has instructed its surveyors that, failing compliance with a certain manning scale, a ship may be regarded as unseaworthy and detained. But the Board of Trade detains a ship at its peril, and if the courts decide that it is, in fact, seaworthy, then the owner must be indemnified. Moreover, the 'Instructions to Surveyors' are designed solely to ensure safety, to which end the Board of Trade requires two officers. The Board of Trade *minimum* requirement for officers and sailors (there is none for engine-room crew and stewards) has come to be regarded by many shipowners as the *maximum* they need to carry to meet the requirements of routine, unusual emergency, and maintenance work on board.

Lord Merrivale has clearly indicated that doubt exists as to whether these official requirements are, in fact, adequate. The majority of officers at sea to-day will say that the regulations do not really ensure safety, and are certainly insufficient for the reasonable comfort and well-being of the officers. Men serving in a ship where only two watches are possible must obviously serve at least 84 hours per week, and it is no uncommon thing for the two officers in such a ship to work for 90 or 100 hours per week. In the *Blairgowrie*, and also in the *Millpool*, there were clear indications that the master was expected, by employing his crew at sea, so to maintain his ship that little expenditure need be incurred on shore. Thus witnesses in the case of the *Blairgowrie*, spoke of a practice, all too common at sea to-day, of the captain and officers working on deck at manual labour while one seaman steered the ship with no look-out.

In the case of *La Crescenta* the master was judged to have

overloaded his ship, though reluctantly, so slender is the thread by which employment is held to-day. In the *Blairgowrie* a former chief officer confessed that he had made false entries in log-books, in the potential interest of the owners, on the advice of the captain. In the *Usworth* the evidence showed that by the time rescue was possible the crew were so exhausted that they could not have launched a boat, even if weather conditions had permitted. In the case of the *Blairgowrie* it was stated that she, too, had at one time offended against the agreement to carry a third officer; when one man was appointed he was at first paid able-seaman's wages—again in contravention of agreement. In the *Usworth* the owner admitted that in some of his ships he had paid officers less than he was pledged to do under the collective agreement of the National Maritime Board.

In delivering the finding in the case of *La Crescenta* Lord Merrivale emphasised that overloading, in contravention of the Statute, was even the more reprehensible because the law, as it at present stands, is in ratification of an International Load Line Convention to which the signatory nations have set their hands. None know better than shipmasters and ships' officers the peril of overloading, for they are taught and examined in, and they understand the mathematics and practice of, ship stability. A few years ago the *Eastway* foundered in the North Atlantic, as is alleged in the case of *La Crescenta* and as was found in the case of the *Vestris*, in an overloaded condition, and, unless the terms of service for officers in the merchant navy are so reformed as to make them safe in resistance to this and other illegal practices, overloading will continue and such cases will again occur. The peril which is present in the minds of a vast number of officers to-day is unemployment in a market deliberately overcrowded by an industry given to exploiting the inherent call of the sea which runs in the blood of young Britons. Overloaded ships generally reach their port; but few masters and officers who disobey, or even draw attention to, unlawful orders can feel safe in their employment!

Lord Merrivale's findings support the view that considerable improvements can be made in the existing system of periodic survey of steamers, made by classification societies,

on behalf of shipowners, in order that underwriters may have systematic information as to the type and class and condition of ships. In a natural desire to ease the burdens of shipowners in the recent difficult times, surveyors have perhaps, in some cases, been unduly tolerant. As Lord Merrivale observed, these things 'provoke inquiry as to whether the rules and procedure now in force provide for sufficient standard surveys, and whether the age of ships should not be taken particularly into account so that risks of loss by perils of the sea may be more fully guarded against.' The question of accommodation arose in the *Millpool* and *La Crescenta* inquiries. Evidence was given as to leaky ports, fore-castles in bad condition, with (in the *Millpool*) only paraffin lamps burning night and day. In the *Millpool* inquiry the owners admitted that one of their ships at least (the *Pikepool*) had sailed with no third officer, in contravention of agreement. An illuminating piece of evidence was adduced in which the captain of vessels of the same line admitted that, in a recent voyage, when a few passengers were carried, the third officer vacated his cabin for those passengers, the apprentices vacated their cabin for the displaced third officer, and themselves slept in the captain's bathroom. The captain of the *Usworth* stated that manning conditions aboard that ship were such that there was no provision for 'specific instruction of the apprentices.' (The question of the training of future officers was one of the several matters which Parliament was petitioned to inquire into in 1933.)

The technical questions dealt with in these inquiries comprise stability and overloading in the case of *La Crescenta* and steering gear in the case of the *Usworth* and *Blairgowrie*, and it is to be hoped that the outcome of the Special Committee which has been set up to inquire into the question of rod-and-chain steering gear will allay the apprehension of practical seamen as to the efficacy and safety of this type of gear in certain classes of ships. The question of hatches needs careful investigation, for there can be little doubt that, at some stage in each of these disasters, the importance of the security of hatches was of the utmost concern to the gallant officers and men who were reaching their end.

The piecemeal inquiry now proceeding into such matters as manning, steering gear, hatches, surveys, Board of Trade

regulations will not rectify the serious deficiencies which exist in places in the fabric of our mercantile marine. This requires an inquiry of wider scope, which could examine the operation of managing companies, who are frequently more prosperous than the operating companies with which they are associated. The competence of managers also deserves attention: the managers of *La Crescenta* and the owner of the *Eastway* sought to establish their ignorance of the technical matters with which every ship manager should be conversant.

As indicated by Lord Merrivale, the practice in the underwriting world of readily insuring vessels for sums in excess of their known value needs study. But a full inquiry into the whole question of manning is all-important; and possibly the question of officers' employment is the most important aspect of manning, as an officer's duty is to lead his men fearlessly, with only one motive—the true welfare of the ship. At present the position of captains and officers is frequently akin to that of casual labourers; they are obsessed with the fear of starvation for themselves, their wives and families. They are ill-paid, and, not unnaturally, discontent is rife. Leadership and discontent do not go well together. Officers cannot to-day legally claim leave, and many have not been with their families—except for a few days or weeks—for any length of time within the last five years unless unemployed. Few can look forward to pensions when they are too old to follow the sea, that has made their lives so full but has provided little material reward. Lower-deck manning calls for immediate reform, and I believe that the British shipowner and Government, having failed to keep pace with maritime nations more progressive in this matter than we are, will find that an International Maritime Convention on hours of duty and manning will soon emerge from Geneva. The state of our merchant shipping law is undoubtedly backward in so far as it affects human values. It permits vessels of any tonnage, so long as they are not carrying passengers, to sail in the most crowded waters of the world—i.e., round the English coast and between Brest and Elbe—without a single certificated or qualified officer on board. It permits British ships to sail between foreign ports without a British subject on board, except for the wireless operator. But above all, it

permits economic pressure to be so ruthlessly exerted that the officers and men of the British merchant navy are, in many cases, living under conditions of service which are unjust and unreconcilable with the degree of civilisation which we claim as a nation to have reached.

Lord Essendon, a shareholder who was personally financially interested, as was one of his companies (Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd.), in the group operating *La Crescenta*, must, I am convinced, have found it impossible in his busy life as a respected shipping leader to study the detailed work from which abuses arise. He fought strongly, and with conviction, against the submissions of the officers when they presented their petition to Parliament in 1933. It is to be hoped that, in the light of recent disasters, he and another large shareholder, Lord Wimborne, will use their deserved influence and great powers in aligning themselves on the side of those who are determined that, for the good name and ultimate prosperity of British shipping, a very full and exhaustive public inquiry shall be held into the things of which the officers and seamen complain, and of which the British public are at last aware. If so, these men will not have died in vain.

W. H. COOMBS,
Master Mariner.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

AFTER attending a lecture of quite exceptional interest and importance by Mr. F. A. Secrett, of Walton-on-Thames, on the way to grow the best early and late vegetables upon the greatest scale,¹ I chanced to meet a young journalist who had also heard the lecture and the vivid, eloquent comments of that ever-youthful veteran of science, Professor Henry Armstrong, F.R.S.—the inveterate foe of ‘the oppositions of science falsely so called,’ a prophet far more advanced and far-seeing than most of his juniors. The man from Fleet Street was full of enthusiasm; the hall was crowded, mostly by experts: the lecture should have been broadcast, so full was it of promise and new ideas.

We went to a corner-house for food, for we had both missed our dinner. The talk turned to hire-purchase sales. Almost any commodity, observed the young man, could be obtained in these days by instalments—except an advance from a bank. The banks financed the hire-purchase business, which tempted people to get things they could not afford; but none other than the moneylending tribe would advance good men in steady employment from £10 to £50 wherewith to pay an unexpected hospital bill or funeral charges, or enable a young couple to set up house in the most economical way by paying cash for the bare necessities of life, bought, new or second-hand, wherever good value could be obtained. This was the ‘Social Credit’ which the world needed. The business would be too much trouble for a bank. Hire-purchase

¹ A copy can be obtained from the Royal Society of Arts, John Street, W.C.2 (price 7d., post free).

firms had a lien on saleable assets, which a bank might not have, but both could rely upon the law to assist them in the last resort.

He wished someone to start—in large factories, to begin with—a loan society run by a small committee, which would sift applications and grant them to approved borrowers at 6 per cent., paying to depositors 4 per cent., the balance to be charged to overhead expenses. The idea is, of course, not new, but deserves to-day to be explored afresh. The trouble is that there is little money in it, whereas there is much profit in the sale of goods.

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On my way North I found myself sitting next to a grimy youth whose job was the almost unique one of aquarium engineer and outfitter. Seldom have I met a more engaging enthusiast. In the van, visited from time to time, were tropical fish in a great insulated churn, which he was taking back to his headquarters. His firm imported them from Bermuda, Florida, Singapore, and Frankfurt. He had just finished a little aquarium in a private house, the water kept at the right heat under thermostatic control: he hoped to be putting a bigger one into the *Queen Mary* before long. He spoke learnedly of fish-food and shelter, exotic weeds and many hued sands, of difficulties with the Ministry of Agriculture, and of the thrills of fish-breeding—the summit of his ambition. He talked of the way to make water fit for fish to live in, of the right kind and weight of plate-glass, of fish that ate their fellows, and fungi to be watched. His life was bifocal—fish and his *fiancée*. He foresaw a great future for both. People loved to see beauty on the move, and his fish were beauties—modern electric light made it so easy to see them at their best: with thermostatic control it was so easy to keep them warm. The fashion was returning: aviaries were all very well, but could not compare with aquaria.

He was proud of the fact that he had 'pushed his boat off for himself and paddled it too,' though, he added generously, 'it was my parents who built it for me.' At fourteen he left

the elementary school at St. Martin-in-the-Fields—and a good school it is—and had found a job for himself successively as an errand boy to a firm of electrical engineers, a garage, and a hardware merchant. He had gone to evening schools to put together what he had picked up. He had changed his job several times before he was eighteen, all according to plan so as to get experience; he was fond of reading. Seven months' unemployment in 1931 had been a boon: he had read a lot, he had been to a handicraft centre, and he had studied at the Regent Street Polytechnic. He was still attending courses in engineering, and spoke with awe and admiration of the great men who taught there and at another place he frequented. Now his course was set, and, with the election over and no harm done, all he desired was peace abroad and a chance to show his mettle at home—and marry—at Christmas.

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Returning to town a few nights later, I shared a carriage with a young man on his way back to the Riviera, where he had worked for two years as a valet. He was one of six children: his parents had lived all their lives in a small mining village in Durham. His brothers were all as big as he, and he had done four years in the Guards. All but one had 'bettered themselves.' His memories of the Army were not happy: the shouting, barking, bullying sergeants belonged to a time when recruits were different. To be in the Guards was good for the body, but not for the mind. He earned good money in France, but was happier in Germany: it seemed natural for an Englishman to get on better with Germans, though he did not hold with what they were doing to the Jews. He hoped to save a bit and return to England to look after his parents and perhaps help a young brother, just married, who was earning good money in a brickworks when he could get it, but he was generally stood off on alternate months. That kept him from leaving the county, and from living a reasonable life: he got the worst of both worlds.

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After listening to Sir Samuel Hoare during the debate on the Address, and before returning to hear the Minister without portfolio for League Affairs, I took a No. 12 omnibus from Westminster Bridge to Camberwell Road to pay a visit to 'Clubland'—one of the most remarkable institutions of its kind in this country. It consists of two clubs, one for boys and one for girls, each with a self-governing membership of 100. The head is a parson whose stature is less than his genius. The centre of the communal life of the members is, in fact as well as in theory, the club chapel. Originally one of the ugliest buildings erected by the evil genius of our grandfathers, it has been converted, by the loving art of a great architect, into as beautiful a place of worship as I know, in which all members of both clubs meet on Sunday evenings. Below, leading directly from the common rooms, are two small chapels-of-ease—that for boys severe in its simplicity, that for girls furnished with grace, as is proper. There is a workshop for the boys; for the girls a workroom provided with sewing-machines and the like. The fittings are of the best and are, therefore, kept perfectly clean and neat. The spirit of the place is gay, its keynote self-discipline and self-government. Upstairs a young dentist devotes one night a week to the needs of members, who, practically without exception, are not entitled to free dental treatment under the Health Insurance Acts, though they are at the time of life when it is most needed. Unless cared for now the gaps in their jaws in ten years' time will be proof of the gaps in the scheme.

I spent an inspiring hour in these surroundings. Writing on Christmas Eve, I do not hesitate to break an editorial rule and remind my readers that what this and many other such clubs want is good modern books for boys and girls. If those whose children have just received their annual instalments of such books will lighten their shelves by sending a corresponding quantity to 'Clubland,' and go there some months later to see them better housed and better cared for than they are in the back passage outside the old nursery, they will be amply rewarded.

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Just before Christmas I visited one evening a home for epileptics, managed by a Roman Catholic sisterhood. It was the great day of the year. The inmates had staged a musical comedy; the dresses were brilliant and pleasing to the eye—they were largely made of paper; the big cast of players were word-perfect and sang their parts as well as they spoke them. All, from children of twelve and fourteen to middle-aged folk, thoroughly enjoyed themselves, and very pretty they looked, well 'made-up,' in front of the footlights. The one essential for them was a full and enthusiastic house; and that was not denied them, for the hall was packed. Of the 250 or so patients in the home, only about one in five had a record of epilepsy in the family; the others were casual cases, such as may occur in any walk of life and to persons of any ancestry. The malady is not curable, but, in the peaceful surroundings and steady routine of the institution, attacks are reduced to the minimum. It kills about 2000 persons every year, and the mortality shows no signs of dropping. Here was courage and endurance—shown both amongst the patients and, above all, in the work of the staff, most of whom are literally devoted to this service. We need a new Order of Merit—not for their satisfaction, but for our own. No man who is entitled to wear several medals on his breast can watch their work without feeling that they deserve His Majesty's favour in no less measure than the great ones of the earth. Would it spoil the value of their work? The Order of the Red Cross has not done so, and all classes welcome the award of the Kaiser-i-Hind Medal to men and women who pass their lives in many spheres as servants of India.

* * * * *

The House of Commons was never more crowded than on December 19 when Sir Samuel Hoare rose from a back bench to explain why he had resigned. He faced a House which was critical in nearly all and hostile in some parts. He spoke for nearly three-quarters of an hour and achieved, beyond all question, a personal triumph. Cheers came with

increasing frequency as he explained the position which he had faced. Trouble in the East, and in Egypt, coincided with a growing dislike in France of the policy of sanctions against an aggressor, of which we were the leading exponents, and with a deepening emphasis on the need for peace by conciliation, even if it involved compromise.

Early in December it became clear that oil sanctions, if effective, would mean war between Great Britain and Italy—for no other Power had moved a man or a machine. He did not fear the ultimate outcome, but it might well be fatal to the League. He went abroad on medical advice: it was with Cabinet approval that he met M. Laval: no time was to be lost. Oil sanctions were to be discussed five days hence. Some basis for discussions which might bring about a settlement must be sought. After two days' discussion with M. Laval he had worked out terms which were far less than Signor Mussolini had demanded and no more than the Negus, before hostilities, was willing to give. He was always afraid lest the League, and we ourselves, might induce Ethiopia to take up an attitude which might be fatal to her interests—as we had done to others (he doubtless had the Armenians and Assyrians in mind). Peace must come by negotiation or surrender: he believed it could only come by the former. He felt that he had for the moment lost public support, and he had therefore resigned. But he remained confident that he was right, and unrepentant. He was greeted when he sat down with a warmth accorded to few statesmen at the height of their careers, and, soon after, left the House.

It remained for Mr. Baldwin to explain, in effect, that he had regretfully parted company with his second Foreign Secretary in six months in deference to public clamour both in the House and in the country. He told the House nothing of the abyss into which he had peered before turning back, like M. Laval. Nor did he say whether he would advance again or by what route. His speech did little to hearten the Opposition, nor to encourage his supporters, most of whom would have happily flocked into the lobbies behind Sir Samuel Hoare and gone then to their constituencies to explain to them the reality of the menace to peace and to defend the

policy which Mr. Baldwin and the Cabinet had accepted a week earlier.

Things seemed black that night; but I see light ahead, nevertheless: we are at last facing realities. Once we can make up our minds to do that, I have no fear of the ultimate issue.

ARNOLD WILSON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

OUR MILITARY JUNGLE

This Our Army. A Critical Examination, by Captain J. R. Kennedy, M.C. (Hutchinson & Co., 9s. 6d. net).

This book has appeared at the most opportune moment ; for if the recent election cries are to be upheld, then the first problem which faces the Government is to set our Defence Forces in order. How should they proceed? This book answers this question, clearly pointing out that the fundamental problem is not rearmament, but a reorientation of our military mind, without which rearmament will contrive to be carried out on its hitherto haphazard lines. To be brief, the architect must precede the design, and the design the building.

The importance of this book is consequently psychological. 'I propose to lift the veil on our Army,' writes the author, 'which belongs to the people, for which they pay, and from which they have the right to demand the fulfilment of its duty, not only with courage, but also with competence.' Further, he writes: 'The ordinary slaughter-house for animals is surrounded by a set of rules which ensures efficiency and humanity. Is not the slaughter of human beings worthy of a similar extension of the attention and care of authority?' His answer is a no uncertain 'Yes'; and the veil is lifted in no uncertain way, for no criticism is levelled which is not supported by a host of facts.

And what do we see behind it? A jungle of obsolescence governed by a conspiracy of mediocrity which reduces army life to a sport for intellectually indolent men. In its shadows are to be found many strange creatures, not contending together, but co-operating in inefficiency.

First, there is the secret ritual by which not only the soldier but the people who pay for him are maintained in a

blind ignorance. Freedom of speech, of opinion, and of criticism are rigorously denied.' Secondly, there is the dictatorship of the permanent official, its power-house being the War Office, in which the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, and not the Secretary of State, rules supreme, opening and closing the throttle of the financial engine which maintains in bread and butter a host of subordinates to whom military efficiency are meaningless words. Thirdly, there is the hopelessness which this system creates, and the inevitable sliding back upon the past, in place of a stepping out towards the future. For this reason, as the author points out, though outward appearances may have changed, in design, in idea, the Army has slipped past 1914 and is virtually back to pre-Haldane days.

It is not possible in a review to examine the many defects touched upon, such as our individual system of promotion, of study and training, the age of our generals, the predominance of the horsey-minded, etc. Or upon the clear lessons of the World War, such as the obsolescence of infantry and cavalry, the importance of artillery, and the rising supremacy of tank and aeroplane. Yet it must be remembered that until these defects are eliminated, and until these lessons are learned, it is next to useless even considering rearmament. Should a cook have proved herself incapable of making an omelet with two eggs, why ask her to make one with half a dozen? To me it seems that the best solution lies in the following direction: Establish forthwith the embryo of a future Ministry of Defence to inquire into the whole question of rearmament from a combined strategical point of view—that is, one embracing the use in peace and war of all three Services as one Fighting Force. Next, instead of increasing the Service Estimates, drastically reduce them, so as to compel the War Ministries to disgorge what is obsolete. Personally, I believe that £20,000,000 could be saved. Lastly, draw up a combined plan of reorganisation and rearmament and capitalise it by a loan of, say, £100,000,000, which will be paid off with interest in about six years by the reductions made. At the end of this period the reductions should be cancelled, which will mean that in 1942 we shall have a new Navy, Army, and Air Force for the same price we are paying to-day.

This is not Captain Kennedy's scheme, but it is a possible scheme which this highly critical and close-reasoned book of his has suggested to me. That it will suggest many others to other readers is likely. Hence its value as a stimulant to thought; and thought must precede action, and new thoughts in this new age are impossible without a new thinking machine: an instrument which will produce a new discipline of mind before it attempts to create a new military anatomy. To go on reduplicating the old is the surest road to ruin. We trod it in 1914-1918. Are we going to tread it again?

J. F. C. FULLER.

The Scandal of Imprisonment for Debt, by J. D. Unwin (Simpkin, Marshall, 7s. 6d. net). The importance of this book is not diminished by the fact that, concurrently with its appearance, Parliament has carried out most but, unfortunately, not all of the recommendations made by the Departmental Committee for ending this particular scandal. The Money Payments (Justices' Procedure) Act, 1935, will prevent thousands of committals to prison every year. But Mr. Unwin's book remains of the greatest importance, and for a reason that the author is too polite to mention. The book is a severe indictment of our magistrates, especially of our stipendiary magistrates, who are paid to know better. They should long ago have realised this scandal and taken the lead in stopping it. Yet, generation after generation, they have been content to speak unctuously at city dinners of our glorious legal traditions, without thinking how often they are a direct cause of injustice.

Reform came at last as the direct result of the energy—some would say the indiscretion—of one stipendiary magistrate. The campaign for reform began on December 6, 1932, when Lord Snell opened a debate on this scandal in the House of Lords. From that debate emerged the Departmental Committee, and thence, after unpardonable delay, the new Act. But the debate in the Lords would never have taken place but for the action of Mr. Claud Mullins. That fearless magistrate was so shocked at what he found to be the general practice that he finally begged Lord Snell to take it up. It is common knowledge in parliamentary circles

that Lord Snell's motion was actually drafted by Mr. Claud Mullins, from whom also came most of Lord Snell's material.

Those who still boast of our legal system would do well to ponder over this story. If one unconventional magistrate can get this particular scandal put right, what could not magistrates collectively, or, even more, High Court judges, do? There are many dark corners in the law that need light, and the reformer's broom. Will the present Lord Chancellor be as active as was Lord Sankey? Will the new Government seriously tackle the whole question of law reform in this country? Our Statute-book is a disgrace to a civilised country. It is unfair to complain of unpaid or stipendiary magistrates until Parliament has placed in their hands an effective and modern instrument for justice in place of the monstrous jungle of contradictory Acts covering three centuries which to-day constitutes their only guide. It is with this underlying thought that Mr. Unwin's book should be read and studied.

The Burushaski Language, by Lieut.-Colonel D. L. R. Lorimer, C.I.E. (Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 2 vols., 25s. net each), has been published at the expense of the Norwegian Instituttet For Sammenlignende Kulturforskning at the inspiration of the director, Professor Georg Morgenstierne. It is the work of an Indian Army officer who, having retired some ten years ago from the Indian Political Department, returned to his old haunts in the Gilgit Agency, where the Himalayas join the High Pamirs. The size of the two volumes, totalling nearly 900 quarto pages, may seem disproportionate to the subject—one of the most obscure tongues in the world. It is spoken in some inaccessible mountain valleys where three great linguistic families meet—the Indo-European, the Tibeto-Burman, and the Turkish—but is unconnected with any of them. Those who speak it have made no contribution to written history: they are not known to have assisted the march of progress; it is improbable that they were present at the building of the Tower of Babel. The Flood did not trouble them: they are surrounded by the highest mountains in the world; they have never been conquered; no one has coveted their country. From time immemorial generations have lived their lives where they

were born, and the old man, in the words of Horace, 'leans with his staff upon the very floor where as a baby he had crawled before.' Much inbreeding is inevitable, for the community is small: yet men and women live long and are at least as intelligent, by any objective standard, as the urban masses of Europe. Their traditional fairy stories, as here recorded, are as good to read as anything that Jakob Grimm collected. We are apt to forget that he and his brothers were first and foremost philologists, and that only a century has elapsed since he collected much of his material, as did Lieut.-Colonel and Mrs. Lorimer, from the mouths of men, and not from books.

Hans Andersen's fairy tales did not quickly achieve fame: Jakob Grimm did not regard his collections of German folklore as comparable in value to his philological discoveries. Yet both have increased their hold upon later generations,¹ which, as T. E. Brown wrote of Manxmen,

Lost in the Empire's mass
Yet haply longing for their fathers, here
May see, as in a glass
What they held dear—
May say, 'Twas thus and this
They lived'; and, as the time flood onward rolls,
Secure an anchor for their Keltic souls.

There is material in these volumes, in *Persian Fairy Tales* by the same authors, and in *Folk Tales of Iraq* by E. S. Stevens² for a new series of nursery tales, as fresh and as vivid as anything that has yet been set down in print.

We know, said Max Muller, Taylorian Professor at Oxford, that all the most vital elements of our knowledge and civilization—our languages, our alphabets, our figures, our weights and measures, our art, our religion, our traditions, our very nursery stories—come to us from the East . . . but for the rays of Eastern light . . . Europe might have remained forever a barren and forgotten promontory of the primæval Asiatic continent.

We may rejoice that the Burushaski grammar did not extend beyond the primæval Asiatic mountains; but we may be proud that it has fallen to a retired servant of India to do justice, thoroughly, scientifically, and lovingly, at once to a

¹ See, especially, *Four Tales from Hans Andersen*, new translation by R. P. Keigwin
Cambridge University Press, 3s. 6d.

² Oxford University Press: London, Milford, 15s. net.

linguistic problem, and an ethnographical puzzle, as fascinating as the people who for 4000 years or over have watched from their fastnesses the ebb and flow of waning civilisations around them and have lost neither independence, courage, nor the ability to live happily in society.

'Would that we still had the old ballads of which Cato speaks,' exclaims Cicero (*Tusc.*, *Quaest.* iv. 2, and *Brutus*, xix.). He would have rejoiced at the work just reviewed and at the further, though much less ambitious, publication, *The Daina. An Anthology of Lithuanian and Latvian Folk-Songs*,³ collected on the spot, clearly printed and well annotated. These songs spring naturally from the soil, with a passionate appreciation, lyrically expressed, of the drama of love and death, of the joys of family life, work and dancing, marriage and childhood. The translations are as simple as the tongue in which the ballads were first sung. To read them is the best possible antidote to the bitterness aroused by contemporary politics.

To the select row of books upon my writing-table at home I have added *Three hundred and sixty-five Short Quotations from Horace, with Modern Titles and varied Versions in English*, by Professor H. Darnley Naylor.⁴ The price is high; only 210 copies are for sale; the type is hand set and the book is a beautiful specimen of the printer's art. The book itself is of interest for another reason. It is the work of Mr. Masters and his wife, without any outside assistance, using a small hand press; yet the result challenges comparison with the finest work done by the most elaborate machinery. Seldom have I found such good value for money. Here is wisdom, here is wit, 2000 years old, and, thanks to Mr. Naylor's titles, both find application to the emotions aroused by a General Election, and by reading a daily paper.

We seek freedom, but who is really free. Horace replies:

Quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincula terrent.
(Who fears not penury, nor chains, nor death.)

³ With a critical study and preface by Uriah Katzenelenbogen and an introduction by Clarence A. Manning, Assistant Professor of Slavonic Languages at Columbia University. (Chicago: Lithuanian News Publishing Company Incorporated, 1935. \$2.00 net.)

⁴ James E. Masters: The High House Press, Shaftesbury, 1935, 15s. net.

We seek to extend the old age pensions, and to give them sooner :

*Solve senescentem mature sanus equum, ne
Peccet ad extremum ridendus et illa ducat.*

(Yes, free the aging horse betimes with thanks ;
If not, mid jeers, he'll fail and strain his flanks.)

Will you, asked the electors of many a candidate, use your judgment and not merely follow your leaders into the lobby? The Independent candidate replies, like Horace, that he is

Nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri.
(Not sworn to answer cracks of any whip.)

We seek to extend the national system of education in the belief that

*Nemo adeo ferus est ut non mitescere possit,
Si modo culturae patientem commodat aurem.*
(No man's so savage that he can't progress,
If culture's voice his patient ear possess.)

Monetary reform is on all men's lips : the banks are full of deposits, but, as says Horace,

Quo mihi fortunam, si non conceditur uti ?
(But what's the use of money, pray,
If I can't use it any day ?)

To quote further would be an injustice to the author of the best Horatian anthology that I have yet read : and it is dedicated to Professor Gilbert Murray. Is it, I wonder, because he is steeped in classical lore and the love of what is good in the past that he feels constrained to-day to stand preaching to his countrymen in the market-place at an age when most men '*lecto gaudent et umbra*' ?

A Schoolboy caught in the Russian Revolution, by André Mikhelson (Putnam, 10s. 6d. net).

'*Porque, como, las paga el vulgo es justo hablarle en necio para darle gusto.*' Thus wrote Lope de Vega 300 years ago : thus think most men of newspapers to-day, and some writers and publishers, including those responsible for this book. 'Write what will please the crowd, which foots the bill.' This poor boy was the son of a rich man. The revolution in Moscow struck his home when he was but a child ; his childish eyes saw its horrors ; he suffered the miseries that followed : hunger, dirt and vermin, distrust, fear and hatred ; imprisonment, torture and massacre.

Yet he accepted the Communist creed at its face value : he was infected with the lust for licence, for power unbridled by the traditional inhibitions of religion, of society, and of self-respect. He tells, with little restraint, how he was tempted and gave way to sordid passions.

Unlike most books on the Soviets, it has a happy ending, for he contrived to leave Russia, with his body unscarred but with a soul seared by his experiences.

SOME ANNUAL REPORTS

Criminal Statistics—England and Wales, 1933 (Stationery Office, September 1935. 3s. 6d.) Suicides and attempted suicides, which have nearly doubled in the last twenty years, showed in 1933 for the first time since the war a very small but welcome decrease.

The proportion of persons guilty of indictable offences in every age group, male and female, continues slowly to rise : it is highest between fourteen and sixteen ; it is very high between sixteen and twenty-one ; it is scarcely less high between ten and fourteen : from thirty upwards the number of male offenders per 100,000 of the population is 171, against 807 between fourteen and sixteen. The criminality of females, at 33 and 81 respectively, though increasing, is negligible in comparison.

Before courts of assize and quarter session cases of murder are steady, of abortion are increasing ; other 'offences against the person' show little change, but bigamy has doubled in the last twenty years. Offences against property with violence are twice as numerous—those without violence have dropped by 50 per cent. : cases of forgery and coining are as common as in 1900, of rioting twice as frequent (there were in 1931 no cases at all !)

Before courts of summary jurisdiction the figures are worse. Cases of malicious wounding have leapt from a pre-war average of 20 to an annual average of nearly 1000 ; of indecent assaults, from 50 or 60 in 1900-1909 to over 800. Offences against property with violence have risen in the same period from 500 to 2500 ; without violence, from 45,000 to 55,000. Malicious injuries to property are three times as numerous ; forgery and uttering are increasing.

The steady increase in juvenile delinquency, which accounts for more than half the indictable cases that come before the courts, is ominous, but it is partly due to a greater readiness to use the juvenile courts. The figures of offences under the Gaming and Sunday Trading Acts are very high, but reflect more upon the folly of keeping obsolete laws on the Statute-book than upon the morality of the offenders.

In 1933 there were known to the police 89 cases of murder of 110 persons aged one year or over. In 42 cases the murderer killed himself ; 22 others were found insane. Nineteen death sentences were passed, of which eight were commuted.

There is no ground in this Report for complacency or for Couéism : the figures are a reflection on our educational system, official and unofficial, and on the Churches as well as on our civilisation.

The Annual Report of the Board of Education for 1934 makes, on the whole, more satisfactory reading. The child population of the elementary schools of every age group is falling: the average number in each class is smaller; as also the number of unsatisfactory school premises. The number of Roman Catholic schools is increasing; those under Church of England management have dropped by over 100. An expenditure of £4,500,000 on new school buildings has been approved. Eight local authorities have raised the school-leaving age to fifteen, but find it necessary to grant exemption in many cases.

The number of pupils in secondary schools, on the other hand, is still increasing: four-fifths come from the elementary schools; more than half pay nothing.

Of the open scholarships at Oxford and Cambridge 60 per cent. were awarded to pupils of grant-earning secondary schools; of these 60 per cent. went to ex-elementary school boys.

The social and other implications of these figures have been recently discussed in this Review. It is clear that, in this country at all events, brains are very widely distributed.

The Annual Report of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children for 1934 is a disturbing document. Never before in the history of the Society have cases of cruelty, prosecutions, or convictions been so numerous. Cases of violence rose for the seventh year in succession, and at 4814 were by far the highest total yet recorded: the same is true of cases of corruption of morals. Five-sixths of the cases of violence were of continuous ill-treatment and terrorisation, mostly by fathers. In more than half the cases home conditions were satisfactory; only one-seventh came from slums: unemployment was not a factor in 75 per cent. of all cases. The number of cases in which the family lived in one or two rooms was never smaller.

So much for the effect of sixty years or so of compulsory education, Children's Acts, etc. The child population of England has never been smaller in proportion to the total: the proportion of children living in homes and orphanages has never been so large. Public grants and private benevolence in relation to children have never been so liberal, yet, for seven years in succession, cases of cruelty have increased. The Society is admirably administered, and deserves even more generous support than it is now receiving: it has a deficit this year on its general fund. It would do well next year to publish a classification of cases by countries—separating England, Wales and Ireland, and distinguishing between London, county boroughs, urban and rural districts, showing the percentage of cases to the child population as shown in the Census Report of 1931.

ARNOLD WILSON.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCCVIII—FEBRUARY 1936

'The King is Dead'

'THE days of our age are three score years and ten.' Our Most Gracious King died on January 20 before he had completed his seventy-first year, bequeathing to a grateful and affectionate nation the unclouded memory of a long life, and of a reign of twenty-six eventful years passed in the service of his peoples at home and abroad. No monarch had travelled so widely: none had used more wisely 'the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn.' He had been only four years on the throne when the war broke out in Europe, at a moment when he was successfully devoting all his powers to allay dangerous internal strife. Then it was that he was seen at his best, inspiring men and women in every walk of life to serve the nation in the measure of their capacity. It was not to Downing Street or to the Palace of Westminster that the people turned on November 11, 1918. They flocked to Buckingham Palace to pay their homage to

the man who embodied in his person the greatness and the endurance of a nation, and to receive, as their reward, his response to their acclamations. Such a thing had never happened before.

It happened again in November 1928 when he was taken dangerously ill. The anxious crowds were moved by no idle curiosity, but solely by the desire to show their solicitude and sympathy. On July 7, 1929, there was held in Westminster Abbey a service of 'Thanksgiving to Almighty God for His good Providence whereby our Most Gracious Sovereign has been delivered from severe illness to the comfort of the whole Realm and for the signal love and loyalty of his people made manifest in the time of trouble.' Happy was the King and happy his Realm on that day. It was in the spirit of these words that services were held in every church and chapel in the kingdom and in thousands of places far away over the seas.

The Jubilee celebrations were a memorable manifestation of loyalty and personal affection displayed by his people in giving thanks 'for the protection afforded to the King's Majesty during the twenty-five years of his auspicious reign.' Long in the harness of office, inured to the daily tasks of a hard day's work, he had not realised the growth of personal bonds so strong as were then displayed. The intense enthusiasm that marked the celebrations took him by surprise. 'It astonishes me,' he said to one who had known him at Court for forty years; 'I am only an ordinary man, yet'—and he turned to the dense crowd surging below the Palace windows: the sentence was unfinished. Words failed him.

His drives through the poorest parts of London, through streets unlined with troops or police, were the envy of the world. The loving care lavished on the decorations he saw in the meanest side-streets moved him profoundly. What he did not see, the Queen noticed.

King George lived to see some monarchies fall, and others restored: he had seen the British Empire take shape under his grandmother, and reach its highest development under his father. During his reign every constitutional bond was snapped, every legal cord loosed, sometimes hastily and not always by wise hands. The King's Majesty alone

remained, as the embodiment of the spell of sentiment and of interest, of tradition and of history, to hold the Commonwealth together, which, like Rome of old,

received the conquered into her bosom and, like a mother, not an empress, protected the human race with a common name, summoning those whom she had defeated to share her citizenship, and drawing together distant races with bonds of affection.

King George inherited in a singular degree his father's memory for men and affairs, and possessed, as perhaps no sovereign has possessed, the ability to detach himself from the transient policies and views of political parties. He knew, what some of his advisers have not always understood, how deep and strong was, and is, the instinct of national unity. His relations with his confidential advisers, from whatever party, delighted those who, until the experience was theirs, could scarcely credit the value and importance to national stability of the long experience of a constitutional monarch. His simplicity of character, of outlook and of speech, endeared him to his people. They took a pride in his accomplishments; they were proud that he shared their pleasures, freely and unaffectedly. He was the first reigning sovereign to use the microphone in order to address the people of this kingdom, and, in later years, those of the Dominions and India, the Colonies and Protectorates. On three occasions he sent a greeting to his people on Christmas Day, in words of his own choosing, so appropriate, and in a voice so perfectly attuned, as to bring to every fireside, camp, and homestead a vivid glimpse of his own personality, and of the nature of the bond of sovereignty which, because it is impalpable, will not soon be severed.

Queen Mary during a married life of forty-two years has shared all his activities and, in her own spheres, developed them on lines which have brought her into closer touch with the public than the consort of any of King George's predecessors. The nation, knowing her deep practical interest in affairs of many kinds, shares her sorrow, and her pride.

A rubric to the Marriage Service dating from Queen Elizabeth's reign enjoins that 'the persons to be married shall come into the body of the Church with their friends and neighbours.' It was as friends and neighbours that the public shared King George and Queen Mary's happiness in the

marriage of their sons and daughter. It is in that relationship that she and the Royal Family are to-day assured of the nation's sympathy.

This hasty tribute is edged in black, as is the custom; but never was there better reason for the nation, on the demise of the Sovereign, to look back to the past with gratitude. Mr. Lloyd George, for twelve years one of the King's servants, and for six years his principal adviser, speaking in the House of Commons in May last, concluded with these words:

During His Majesty's reign the liberties of the people have been preserved, but there is no country where good order is more sacredly assured. The power of the people has been enhanced, but there is no land where justice and authority are more respected. The conditions of the nation have been improved during the reign: its wealth is still the envy of the world. There are few States and no Empires of which this can be said. No wonder that this week there has come from the hearts of the people one universal prayer that such a beneficent reign should continue for many a year to come, to bring plenty and contentment to every home and peace to all the world.

The nation never had better reason to look to the future without fear as they listened to the voices of heralds proclaiming a new Sovereign, and demanding the fealty of all lieges, as they have done at intervals in almost unbroken succession for a thousand years. King Edward the Eighth is even more widely travelled and even better known to his people than was his father at his accession. No Prince of Wales in the past has more completely captured the public imagination: none has studied so deeply the conditions of life, the needs and aspirations of the masses. He is in his forty-second year: he is ripe in experience of men and affairs, of the Empire and of foreign countries. He will not fail us: we shall not fail him.

'Long Live the King!'



R

Whitehall, January 21, 1936

ON Monday night the twentieth of January instant, at five minutes to twelve o'clock, our late Most Gracious Sovereign King George the Fifth expired at Sandringham in the seventy-first year of His age, and the twenty-sixth of His Reign. This event has caused one universal feeling of regret and sorrow to His late Majesty's faithful and attached Subjects, to whom He was endeared by the deep interest in their welfare which He invariably manifested, as well as by the eminent and impressive virtues which illustrated and adorned His character.

Upon the intimation of this distressing event the Lords of the Privy Council assembled this day at St. James's Palace, and gave orders for proclaiming His present Majesty, Who made a most Gracious Declaration to them.

Whereas it hath pleased Almighty God to call to His Mercy our late Sovereign Lord King George the Fifth, of Blessed and Glorious Memory, by whose Decease the Imperial Crown of Great Britain, Ireland and all other His late Majesty's Dominions is solely and rightfully come to the High and Mighty Prince Edward Albert Christian George Andrew Patrick David; We, therefore, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of this Realm, being here assisted with these of His late Majesty's Privy Council, with Numbers of other Principal Gentlemen of Quality, with the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of London, do now hereby with one Voice and Consent of Tongue and Heart, publish and proclaim, That the High and Mighty Prince Edward Albert Christian George Andrew Patrick David, is now, by the Death of our late Sovereign of happy Memory, become our only lawful and rightful Liege Lord Edward the Eighth, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India: To whom we do acknowledge all Faith and constant Obedience, with all hearty and humble Affection; beseeching God, by whom Kings and Queens do reign, to bless the Royal Prince Edward the Eighth with long and happy Years to reign over us.

Given at St. James's Palace this twenty-first day of January, in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred and thirty-six.

Albert.

Henry.

Arthur.

Cosmo Cantuar.

Hailsbam C.

Stanley Baldwin.

J. Ramsay MacDonald.

E. A. FitzRoy.

John Simon.

Norfolk, E.M.

(Here follow 186 other signatures.)

God Save the King!

Proclaimed on Thursday, January 23, before noon at the Palace of Saint James's by Garter Principal King of Arms, by Lancaster Herald at Charing Cross, by Norroy King of Arms at Temple Bar, and by Clarenceux King of Arms at the Royal Exchange.

At the Court at *Saint James's*, the 21st day of
January, 1936.

PRESENT,

The KING's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

HIS Majesty being this day present in Council was pleased to make the following Declaration:—

Your Royal Highnesses, My Lords, and Gentlemen.

The irreparable loss which the British Commonwealth of Nations has sustained by the death of His Majesty My beloved Father, has devolved upon Me the duty of Sovereignty. I know how much you and all My Subjects, with I hope I may say the whole world, feel for Me in My sorrow and I am confident in the affectionate sympathy which will be extended to My dear Mother in Her overpowering grief.

When My Father stood here twenty-six years ago He declared that one of the objects of His life would be to uphold constitutional government. In this I am determined to follow in My Father's footsteps and to work as He did throughout His life for the happiness and welfare of all classes of My Subjects.

I place My reliance upon the loyalty and affection of My peoples throughout the Empire, and upon the wisdom of their Parliaments, to support Me in this heavy task, and I pray that God will guide Me to perform it.

Whereupon the Lords of the Council made it their humble request to His Majesty that His Majesty's Most Gracious Declaration to Their Lordships might be made public; which His Majesty was pleased to order accordingly.

M. P. A. Hankey.

At the Court at *Saint James's*, the 21st day
of *January*, 1936.

PRESENT,

The KING's Most Excellent Majesty.
His Royal Highness The Duke of York.
His Royal Highness The Duke of Gloucester.
His Royal Highness Prince Arthur of Connaught.
Archbishop of Canterbury.
Lord Chancellor.
Prime Minister.
Lord President.
Mr. Speaker of the House of Commons.
Viscount Halifax.

(And 141 other Privy Counsellors.)

HIS Majesty at His first coming into the Council, was this day pleased to declare that, understanding that the Law required He should at His Accession to the Crown take and subscribe the Oath relating to the security of the Church of Scotland, He was now ready to do so at this first opportunity, which His Majesty was graciously pleased to do according to the Forms used by the Law of Scotland, and subscribed two Instruments thereof in the presence of the Lords of the Council, who witnessed the same. And His Majesty was pleased to order that one of the said Instruments be transmitted to the Court of Session, to be recorded in the Books of Sederunt, and afterwards be forthwith lodged in the Public Register of Scotland, and that the other of them remain among the Records of the Council and be entered in the Council Book.

M. P. A. Hankey.

LONDON

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GENTLEMEN OF THE *SLUMS*

By A. TRYSTAN EDWARDS

THE survey of overcrowding which is being undertaken in accordance with the provisions of the Government Housing Act of 1925 is due to be completed next April, and, as the information thereby obtained will take several months to analyse and record, housing proposals based on the result of this survey cannot assume final shape until the autumn. Thus there is a period of at least six months' grace, in which we may reconsider housing policy in general. It might perhaps be imagined that during the last two years the whole problem has been thrashed out so often that no new solution is now likely to be discovered. The 'experts' have been called into consultation and they have persuaded the Government to adopt two principal methods of dealing with the housing shortage. The first is to erect blocks of tenements in the central areas of existing towns, and the second is to plan dormitory suburbs with cottages in 'open development' at a density of not more than twelve to the acre. A third method—namely, that of urban decentralisation—was advocated in the Marley Report, but these proposals proved abortive. There was no popular movement in favour of building a large number of Letchworths or Welwyn Garden Cities, and, as nothing else but this type of development was advocated in the Marley Report, the Government were able to advance plausible reasons for rejecting it.

Yet the municipalities are finding great difficulties in making good the housing shortage within the areas under their jurisdiction. As evidence in support of this statement it may be mentioned that the London County Council has already been obliged to build upon some of the few remaining open spaces in the metropolitan area, although it has only just begun to carry out its programme of slum-clearance, and has

still in front of it an even heavier programme of supplying the additional new dwellings which will be proved necessary as a result of the overcrowding survey. As a corrective to the evil of slums, 'dormitory' suburbs are by no means a complete success, for the vast majority of existing slum-dwellers could not afford the cost of travel from the suburbs to their places of employment. When they are forcibly turned out of their homes and made to inhabit dwellings provided for them under these conditions, after payment of the necessary travelling expenses they find that they have not enough money left to feed themselves and their families adequately. A similar privation is imposed on the wage-earners when they are re-housed in tall blocks of tenements, for, owing to the inflated land values in the built-up areas of industrial towns and the greater cost of construction of flats as compared with that of buildings in cottage formation, the rents of such dwellings are usually excessive. Moreover, it has been established that tenements are unsuitable for family life because the children are apt to be imprisoned in the upper floors, and through lack of exercise and fresh air contract rickets and tuberculosis.

The recognised town-planning and housing experts have as yet suggested nothing except the two methods of rehousing just mentioned, to both of which there are grave objections, and a type of urban decentralisation which does not meet with popular favour. It is here suggested that no radical and satisfactory solution of the problem can be arrived at until the slum-dwellers themselves have been called into consultation, and are allowed to exercise a formative influence upon housing policy. When the inhabitants of the houses which are being demolished under slum-clearance schemes display a savage indisposition to move into the alternative quarters which are being offered by the local authorities, it is by no means sufficient to say that these people have had their taste and judgment warped by bad housing conditions and that for this reason they cannot appreciate the new hygienic heaven which a benevolent bureaucracy has created for their benefit. Admittedly some of the slum-dwellers have been so degraded by extreme poverty and by the lack of opportunity to acquire habits of self-respect that they are not able to contribute any useful ideas on the housing problem.

But this statement is true only of a quite minute fraction of those for whom the 2,400,000 new dwellings are intended. The vast majority of these folk are sturdy English types who, in spite of living conditions which, it must be acknowledged, are highly unsatisfactory in many ways, yet succeed in maintaining a high standard of cleanliness and in upholding the sanctities of family life. Such people may very properly be described as 'Gentlemen of the Slums,' and if they have certain objections to the new dwellings now being provided for them, their point of view should receive careful consideration by the Government and the local authorities.

Housing experts are slow to recognise that the old-fashioned little streets afford certain comforts and social amenities which are unobtainable even in the best designed block of tenements or in the dormitory suburbs in 'open development.' There comes to my mind one of the most charming scenes it has been my lot to witness. It was a little street in Holborn, and the mayor of this metropolitan borough was giving a grand party on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of King George V. and Queen Mary. Lines of bunting hung across the thoroughfare, and the numerous flags at the windows reflected the gaiety of the assembled company. In one part of the street tables were brought out for refreshments, and in another part there was dancing to the accompaniment of music. The people seemed as happy as they could be, and the children especially were in high spirits. As a place of public entertainment the street seemed immeasurably more attractive than the grandest hall that the mayor could have hired for the purpose, because this festival was taking place in the people's own home. A narrow street with hardly any through traffic is the common and almost exclusive possession of its inhabitants. It provides a setting for a type of sociability which is thoroughly human and desirable and greatly appreciated by those who are *allowed* to indulge in it. The word 'allowed' is used advisedly, because it now appears that the rights of social communion in the manner in which the bulk of the English people has been accustomed to exercise them are about to be taken away at the bidding of housing reformers of various persuasions. As the 'slum-dwellers' are now being compelled to migrate either to tenement blocks or to cottages in 'open development,' it may be of

advantage if we attempt to describe in detail their objections to both these types of housing accommodation.

Let us first consider the tenement problem. Nobody would dispute that there exists in this country and elsewhere a large number of very comfortable and even luxurious flats, so at first sight it might seem that when a man is informed that on being turned out of his present home he is going to live in a flat he should be highly pleased at the prospect. It may be admitted at once that in a well-appointed flat where there is a lift and where the family is fairly well-to-do the situation, although for various reasons not ideal, is at least tolerable, especially if there is some public recreational space within reasonable distance of the flats, as, for instance, in the case of blocks of flats in Mayfair, Kensington and Bayswater, from which the children are taken by their nursemaids every day to Hyde Park. Moreover, the children of the richer flat-dwellers at a very early age are sent away to boarding-schools where they have abundant opportunity for physical exercise, while on their holidays they are taken to the seaside or the country. In no instance, however, even in the most expensive flats in the built-up area of London, is there an adjacent garden of sufficient size to provide a playground for all the children who might be resident in it. It must also be borne in mind that a very considerable proportion, estimated at much more than half of the middle-class inhabitants of flats in London, have no young children, so they do not represent the normal family unit the satisfaction of whose housing needs is one of the main problems of statesmanship.

Unfortunately, the 'flats' which members of the wage-earning class are given an opportunity of renting are by no means as attractive as those in Mayfair. In support of this statement it may be of interest to quote the evidence of a British working man who now lives in a new block of tenements erected by a housing society in London. It may be mentioned that this particular block is considered to be an exceptionally good example of what enlightened housing reformers can do in the London area, and distinguished visitors of both sexes are shown over it and are called upon to admire the type of accommodation provided. Yet this is what one of the tenants says:

For eight years I lived with my wife and children in a dark and damp basement. I live now in the fourth floor of this new block of tenements. I am, of course, grateful for the better conditions, but I have not been given what I can regard as a proper home for a family man. It is asking too much of my wife to make her go up and down so many stairs for every little thing that she needs. When she wants to take the baby out, she has first to carry the pillows down to the pram shed, so it means a second journey upstairs to fetch the baby. Often she does not feel up to it, so both mother and baby go without their outing. There is a small yard in which my older children can play, but if they make the least noise the caretaker chucks them out. No ball games are allowed.

Contrast with this the old-fashioned little street where, out of school hours, one may see the children running up and down and shouting at the tops of their voices, skipping or playing hopscotch on the pavement and indulging in all manner of games of their own invention. And all this healthy animal spirit is let off within easy range of the children's appointed guardians. When it is time for little Tommy to come in to his dinner his mother pokes her head out of the door and calls for him, and little Tommy comes in with rosy cheeks and a good appetite. Provided that the residential areas are planned away from the main traffic routes, the arrangement seems to be the best that can be devised for people of very small means. If it be objected that the living-room is exposed to too much noise from the street, very convenient small house plans can be devised in which the sitting-room faces the back garden, leaving nothing but the little entrance-hall and the kitchen-scully in front. Not even the most modern blocks of tenements in this country or abroad provide nearly as good facilities for the children to play as are to be found in hundreds of little streets now doomed to demolition under the slum-clearance schemes. Much is said about *crèches* for children, and very admirable institutions these are; but *crèches* do not belong exclusively to blocks of flats, for they can be just as well provided in areas where the people live in streets.

Reference has hitherto been made only to the practical objections to the tenement block, but there are certain other factors which influence the popular judgment concerning this type of building. An expression commonly used about a block of tenements is that it 'looks like a barracks.' Let us attempt to estimate the value of the criticism herein implied.

A barracks, as everybody knows, is an institution where soldiers live; and these same soldiers have voluntarily surrendered part of their individuality and are subject to discipline which associates them in groups under a single authority. Moreover—and this also is very important—in a barracks the soldiers, whether married or unmarried, live apart from their families. Thus it is quite natural and proper that family life does not find architectural expression in the design of a barracks. We may therefore construct the syllogism: 'All barrack-like buildings fail to give expression to family life. This particular block of tenements, according to the considered judgment of those who live in it, looks like a barracks. Therefore it fails to give expression to family life.' Now, what are the minimum conditions for such expression? The first and most obvious mark of a separate family abode is a separate front door, preferably having immediate access to the public thoroughfare. In even the meanest slum street, provided there is not more than one family living in each house, one can say 'So many front doors, so many families.' We are not here dealing with a matter of architectural style, nor is there any suggestion that every street which shows this particular feature is a good street of its kind. It may be a very bad street—insanitary, gloomy, or monotonous. Nevertheless, it has this essential social characteristic, that each family owns or occupies one visibly separate fragment of the building formation as a whole. This is the Englishman's castle to which he will cling. It is not a grand castle, yet it is a spiritual possession of immense value to him. But it must be observed that it is not by any means necessary for the establishment of this castle that the building should be detached. In fact, we shall see in a later stage of this argument that in the case of very small dwellings the true 'castelline' quality—if one may so describe it—finds its most attractive expression when it is not detached or semi-detached, but a subordinate unit in a street, square, or other large architectural whole.

A tall block of tenements nearly always has an institutional air. The wage-earners of this country find that there is something about it which reminds them of the workhouse, an impression which the existence of a caretaker armed with disciplinary powers 'to check the erring and reprove' does

nothing to diminish; and the functionaries recently appointed to give instruction in household management, however well meaning and skilled at their task they may be, represent a far from popular innovation in the lives of the wage-earners. Moreover, some of the architectural features to be found in the most recent blocks of flats erected by the London County Council and other local authorities appear to be gratuitously offensive. It is, for instance, singularly unfortunate that the brown glazed bricks which line the common staircases to the tenements are so often of a sort which the wage-earners have learnt to associate with public lavatories.

The only alternative to the tenement block, which now finds favour with the dominant schools of housing reformers, is the lay-out of cottages in what is called 'open development.' In 1919 a regulation was passed fixing the maximum density of twelve cottages to the acre in all State-aided housing schemes. As far as domestic architecture was concerned, the built-up, continuous street was to exist no more, and there was to be established, in the name of hygiene, a new kind of lay-out, the quintessence of suburbia as expressed in a revel of architectural detachment and semi-detachment. In such style were most of the 'homes for heroes' after the war, and the convention still lingers, because, although it is severely criticised in many quarters, it has the authority of law. It is of interest to note that when houses in State-aided schemes were first designed in this convention they were popularly described as 'dolls' houses.'

The expression seems to savour of ingratitude, because the dwellings in question exemplified a higher standard of accommodation than the wage-earners of this country had ever enjoyed before. No better plans for the small house have been devised than those which emanated from the special technical staff of the Ministry of Health in the years immediately after the war. These cottages had a living-room of good size, a well-appointed kitchen, a bathroom and three or four bedrooms, while special attention was paid to aspect and incidence of sunshine. Why, then, did they acquire the contemptuous designation of 'dolls' houses'? The matter deserves investigation. We are here dealing with some of the 'imponderables' of architectural design which are apt to be neglected by the bureaucratic mind. But the 'Gentle-

men of the Slums,' although they claim no special knowledge of building technicalities, have certain instincts which enable them to appraise the *social* qualities of architecture. Just as in the case of the blocks of tenements the condemnatory phrase 'like a barracks' was found to possess a certain philosophic justification, the description 'dolls' houses' as applied to the cottages in 'open development' may also be proved by no means so capricious or illogical as it might at first sight seem to be. Some of the housing reformers forget that human beings require more than physical health for their spiritual content. They are not just like cows or pigs, for whom one has perhaps performed an adequate duty if one puts them into a hygienic byre or sty. The advocates of the standard of twelve cottages to the acre have never grasped the fact that the 'Gentlemen of the Slums' have a grand tradition of sociability. They do not wish to live on top of one another, as in the tenements, but neither do they wish to be planted like cabbages on the countryside.

The 'dolls' houses' represent a kind of architectural baby-talk. The characteristic of baby-talk is that it consists of short, disjointed phrases, and it cannot at this stage of development rise to the continuous and sometimes lengthy sentences which are characteristic of adult speech. The architectural equivalent of the continuous sentence is *the street*, and that is why adults, even if they do not claim to any special knowledge of architecture, can always find satisfaction in a street of coherent design. This is not to say that detached buildings cannot have their appropriate dignity; but in general it may be suggested that a building does not deserve to be detached unless it is of a certain size or importance, because otherwise its claim upon the separate attention of the spectator is a presumptuous one. But when these small units are grouped in long streets, as in so many of our old English villages, the collective effect may be of extraordinary significance and charm. The detached building blocks, however, in the dormitory suburbs in 'open development' are too small to excite such interest; and therefore for the most part they suffer from a lack of dignity. This is perhaps why the 'Gentlemen of the Slums' have described them as 'dolls' houses.'

It may be of interest if we quote the opinion of one of

the inhabitants of a dormitory suburb in 'open development.' The witness in this case says:

I was turned out of my house at Wapping because the street in which I lived was pulled down. I was allowed to rent a house in A [one of the post-war dormitory suburbs several miles away]. I stuck it for seven months although the rent was excessive, and, what with fares, it practically ruined me. Shopping facilities were very bad, and everything at tiptop prices. There was no sociability in the place. Every night when I came back from work my wife implored me to find another home. So we then moved to B [another of the post-war dormitory suburbs], and there the conditions were even worse. I cleared out after five months, and have now got a house at Bow. Although the house is not really big enough for us and I pay 17s. a week rent, we are much happier and better off.

The question of shopping facilities, mentioned in the foregoing statement, is a very important one. It is not sufficiently realised that in migrating to a dormitory suburb the slum-dwellers not only pay a higher rent than previously and must meet the expense of fares to and from their work, but, in addition to shouldering these burdens, must pay more for their food. Near their old homes they can nearly always find a little shopping thoroughfare exactly suited to their needs and tastes, with hawkers' barrows on either side, from which they could obtain at very low prices vegetables, fruit, butcher's meat, fish, winkles and cockles when in season (very wholesome food, yet extraordinarily cheap), and many nourishing titbits of a kind which do not usually find their way to the dinner tables of middle-class households. The vendors of such articles of food are accustomed to do business in the friendly proletarian atmosphere of an old-fashioned narrow street which, on a Saturday night especially, has the characteristics of an open-air market. But they could scarcely find a suitable pitch for their beneficent activities in the more frigid social atmosphere of a dormitory suburb in 'open development,' where all the roads were 70 feet wide, with grass verges which must not be trodden on. It is also worth mentioning that if, as is apparently intended, large areas of little streets in our industrial towns are to be replaced by blocks of tenements, the shopping facilities will be injuriously affected there also. With the incursion of the taller buildings the land values will mount even higher than they were before, and the small shopkeepers will be squeezed out, and there

will be no place for the street hawkers with their barrows who now cater for the needs of the poorest section of the population. It is scarcely surprising that for many of the slum-dwellers what is now called 'housing reform' is not a relief, but an infliction.

Let us assume that wage-earners were organised in such a way that they could formulate their own conception of what constitutes reasonably pleasant living conditions. The arguments and evidence of the foregoing pages enable us to venture upon an anticipation of the two essentials which would in all probability be insisted upon by the 'Gentlemen of the Slums.' In the first instance, they would declare emphatically against all blocks of tenements, whether with or without lifts, and they would also reject the dormitory suburb of the kind which is now being planned. What then would become of the official housing scheme now in process of being carried out? It would need to undergo drastic revision. There can be very little doubt that what the vast bulk of the wage-earners want is a separate family house in a street, square, or other continuous formation which gives architectural expression to human sociability. In order to attain this end, the first step must be to rescind the regulation which insists upon a maximum of twelve houses to the acre. This regulation was originally proposed by idealists who had a special liking for cottage architecture in a rural style and the strongest possible objection to housing the people of England in tall blocks of flats. But one of the actual effects of this restriction has been to compel many thousands of people to accept this latter method of habitation who would not otherwise have been obliged to do so.

The limitation of twelve houses to the acre has been a perfect godsend to the advocates of blocks of flats, for obviously on expensive urban sites it is quite out of the question to erect cottages in 'open development.' Yet in many such sites cottages at a higher density could quite easily have been built. It can be proved that commodious cottages of 1000 feet super-floor area (*i.e.*, representing a standard of accommodation considerably higher than the minimum now permitted by the Ministry of Health), with ample fresh air and sunlight and a reasonable amount of recreational space, can be planned at thirty to the acre; and that if an exactly

similar hygienic standard were insisted upon in the case of a tenement building five floors high, not more than thirty-eight dwellings per acre would be permitted, and for blocks ten floors high forty-eight to the acre.¹ Where land is not quite so costly, a density of twenty to the acre might be permissible; and this would allow a quadrangular development expressing a standard of amenity in respect of open space and sunlight comparable to that exemplified in the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, which have not yet been designated as slums.

If the wage-earners insisted upon the adoption of a reasonable and happy mean between the two extreme and mutually inconsistent policies now advocated by housing 'experts' and enforced by governmental authority—namely, the building of cottages in a style of semi-rural suburbia on the one hand and tenements at anything up to 150 to the acre on the other—they would earn the gratitude of large sections of the middle classes as well, who now look on helplessly while the countryside is being devastated by ill-considered 'open development' and the existing towns are being rendered ever more congested, noisy and uncomfortable because of the senseless urge of 'building upwards.' There is no more powerful agency for remedying this situation than that which would come into being if the 'Gentlemen of the Slums' would organise themselves and insist upon the adoption of some of their own human and sensible standards of value.

It would probably be found that not more than half of the wage-earners who need to be rehoused could obtain in the existing towns, at a reasonable distance from their work, accommodation of the kind they approve. Consequently the other half, perhaps amounting to several million people, would have no other alternative than to go to new towns. When once this argument is made clear and is advanced by representatives of a large part of the electorate, the conditions for a successful movement of urban decentralisation will for the first time be established. If the slum-dwellers, the unemployed and others suffering from bad housing conditions

¹ The diagrams and calculations by which this conclusion is arrived at are given in detail in a pamphlet entitled *A Hundred New Towns for Britain: A Scheme of National Reconstruction*. (Simpkin, Marshall, 3s. 6d.)

could assume a proprietary interest in housing and town planning and, in the exercise of their full rights of citizenship, become agents in a creative design shaping itself in accordance with their wishes, they would become an irresistible driving force for the rebuilding of Britain.

The phrase 'rebuilding Britain' is not rightly interpreted if it is held to mean nothing more than housing reform. If several million new houses are to be built within the next few years, there should be new churches, new theatres, new schools, new factories and buildings serving numerous other functions, so that the contemplated development may be an organic one, harmoniously balanced, and not just a renewal and a swelling of one part of the body politic without reference to the remainder. The main reason why so little progress has been made in town planning and civic design during recent years is that the middle-class enthusiasts interested in these matters have tried to obtain their ends without eliciting the interest and support of the wage-earners. But it is surely time that there should be an extension of the democratic principle so that the people at large, and not just a few bureaucrats, technicians or speculators, determine the outward forms of our civilisation and what is now commonly described as 'The Face of England.' What seems to be needed is a more distinctively *aesthetic* approach to politics. The concepts of justice and liberty, to which the upholders of democracy rightly attach so much importance, should be supplemented by a creative principle which is concerned with the establishment of the healthiest and most convenient conditions of living for all, and *beauty* in our environment both urban and rural. The 'Gentlemen of the Slums' are fully alive to the importance of these issues and await a sympathetic leadership which will show them the way to a new and more gracious environment not determined for them by others but of their own choosing.

A. TRYSTAN EDWARDS.

THE LANCASHIRE COTTON-INDUSTRY

A CRITICISM OF THE COTTON SPINNING INDUSTRY BILL

By W. S. ASCOLI

FULLY to grasp the importance, present position, and difficulties of the Lancashire cotton industry, it is essential to recall in brief outline its rise and fall. From the middle of last century down to the outbreak of war the native genius of Lancashire developed, out of a rudimentary hand industry, the greatest manufacturing industry the world has known; it created the industrial age and gave to the outside world a technique of production which brought good clothing within the means of the poorest—an achievement probably unequalled in the world's history. This industrial revolution, unchallenged for half a century, was no less due to those fearless inventors who by their devices courted death or starvation, in multiplying tenfold the workers' output, than to the ingrained skill and natural adaptability of Lancashire workpeople. The main effect of this masterpiece of industrial achievement was to create an insatiable demand throughout the world for ever-new products which kept demand ahead of supply and forced the pace—perhaps beyond the industry's capacity. Herein lies the seed of any defects inherent in the industry of to-day. The insistent world demand which Lancashire's own achievements had created persisted right until she reached the zenith of her prosperity in the years just before the war. Prosperity throughout two generations, bereft of the purging influence of competition, had profigately scattered plant and personnel over an area of some 2000 square miles, without thought for economy of production, and concealed the advent of a newer and more effective technique in other countries which was destined to supplant the coarse bread-and-butter trade of Lancashire.

The post-war history of the industry has been a succession

of blows such as no industry, however proficient, could withstand. The war paralysed Lancashire's export activities and gave a great fillip to competing industries in India and Japan. Peace induced an orgy of buying, which culminated in a frenzy of recapitalisation of mills at exorbitant figures under the auspices of the great banks. This not only denuded reserves, but originated the heavy overdrafts which hang like a pall over Lancashire. By the time recapitalisation became effective the post-war slump had set in.

In 1925 the return to gold dealt a fresh and more serious blow to Lancashire. The resultant deflation reduced the industry's liquid assets; stocks depreciated in value and good debts became bad ones. Liabilities to creditors and running costs remained at the old levels. Meanwhile, Lancashire lost some 1000 million yards of trade in neutral markets—partly due to new cotton industries and partly to economic disequilibrium, tariffs and exchange difficulties.

During the war India revised her tariff policy, which had previously dealt equitably between the Lancashire and Indian mill industries; duties on British imports were raised to 25 per cent. *ad valorem* (in some important branches to as much as 60 per cent.), with the result that Lancashire has lost 2000 million yards of trade there—about 30 per cent. of her total pre-war exports. The belief was general that in abandoning gold in 1931, and with the signing of the Ottawa Agreements, the end of Lancashire's troubles was in sight. These hopes were soon shattered, for Japan so depreciated her currency as not only to defeat the objects of Ottawa, but vastly to increase her cotton exports. Thus a further 2000 million yards of Lancashire's former export trade were wrested from her.

Therefore, of her immense pre-war exports of 7000 million yards, Lancashire has lost 5000 million yards, or over 70 per cent., and that of the five main reasons given above only one—the post-war recapitalisation folly of 1919-20—can be attributed even partially to her. The other four lay beyond her control.

The Cotton Spinning Industry Bill

The industry is now crippled financially, and, through loss of outlets, has much redundant plant. Being insolvent,

it is unable to take the steps essential for recovery: For many years unsuccessful attempts have been made to establish selling-price agreements in the hope of stopping sales under cost. In 1932 the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' Associations sponsored a scheme for eliminating redundant spindles, but it was inadequately supported. In 1934 the Federation appointed a Committee under Lord Colwyn to go into the question of reorganisation. Two schemes were evolved—one to cartellise the entire industry for the purpose of fixing prices, pooling, allocating quotas, etc., and the other to remove redundant spindles. The first was turned down by the industry and ultimately abandoned. After inducements were given to vote, on the 'general principles' only, on the Redundancy Scheme, the Colwyn Committee announced that it had a sufficient majority to warrant statutory measures being taken. So much secrecy has surrounded this ballot on 'general principles' that it is impossible to verify whether a majority existed or not, as many spinners voted on conditions which do not obtain in the Bill; and in any case, the alleged majority of 65 per cent. is considerably less than the 80 per cent. required, in all previous votes in the Federation, for effective action.

It should be pointed out here that the Lancashire spinning industry consists of three sections—coarse, medium and fine. The last is not yet, generally speaking, subject to much foreign competition; the first two have for over a generation met with fierce foreign competition. In the fine section, which in pre-war days embraced about 12 million spindles, demand is strictly limited, as its products enter chiefly into the more expensive types of cotton goods. To-day the fine section numbers close on 18 million spindles, due largely to incursions from the coarse and medium sections, deprived of their normal outlets, and, as demand for fine goods has not increased and competition is chiefly internal, price-cutting exists on a scale which fully justifies a redundancy or regulating scheme confined to the fine-spinning section only. Hence all subsequent comments exclude this section, which could and should be treated separately.

The coarse and medium sections are governed by fundamentally different factors. The Lancashire cotton industry was built up very largely on its export trade, which in the

pre-war period accounted for seven-eighths of its output. This export trade has fallen from 7000 million yards in 1913 to 2000 million yards in 1934, and still shows a tendency to fall. Contrary to the general view, this immense loss of trade is by no means principally due to the decline in international trade in cotton textiles, which in 1934 still amounted to £152 million against £180 million in 1913—a decrease of about 15 per cent. compared with one of over 70 per cent. in the volume of Lancashire exports. Hence the possibility of expanding exports of cotton textiles, a consideration entirely ruled out by the Bill, is self-evident. The prices of cotton goods and the consequent demand, when freed from other restrictions, are ruled by world prices, and not by any artificially created figure. That is a fact which must ultimately govern the value of the Bill to the industry.

Briefly summarised, the main features of the Bill now before Parliament to deal with these matters are as follows :

(a) By removing surplus capacity or creating a shortage of supply, to stop internal price-cutting. Redundancy of plant is presumed and no ultimate objective is predicated.

(b) Provision is made for the removal and destruction of an undefined quantity of spinning plant (according to the Colwyn Scheme, 10 million spindles).

(c) All spinners electing to remain in business must pay for the plant to be destroyed by means of a levy of one and one-sixth of a penny per spindle owned, per annum, for a period of fifteen years.

(d) Absolute power is given, in all matters connected with

- (1) The purchase of plant,
- (2) The enforcement of the levies,
- (3) Prevention of extensions to existing plant,
- (4) Entry of new enterprise into the industry,
- (5) Entry and inspection of mills and acquisition of statistical and all other information regarding output,

to a Spindles Board of three members to be appointed by the Board of Trade.

The Spindles Board may consult an Advisory Committee of four members whom the Board of Trade may consider representative of the industry. No provision is made for referring decisions of the Spindles Board to any other independent authority.

The Bill assumes that internal price-cutting is the cause of the financial chaos existing in the industry. It is nothing

of the sort : it is entirely the effect of external competition, or of the closing of outlets, or both, which cause a potentially large volume of supply to compete for an insufficient volume of business regardless of cost. It is only Alice who can cure a cause by removing the effect—and then only in Wonderland.

The Bill accepts redundancy as chronic, whereas, viewing the volume of world trade available, it is the passing effect of closed outlets or high costs. Ignoring the basic fact that world prices govern those obtainable by Lancashire, it assumes that a saving in cost of production will be secured by concentrating output in fewer mills. Such concentration has, in fact, already been largely achieved : witness the spectacle of idle mills containing $7\frac{1}{2}$ million spindles. The advocates of the Bill claim that it will prevent any such idle plant restarting when prompted to do so by increased margins. This is precisely what a rationalised industry would do—under control—in similar circumstances.

The Bill aims at creating a shortage of supply to raise prices. The experience of the coarse-spinning section during the past four months may be cited as an illustration of the probable outcome of such a policy. A vigorous demand for yarn sprang up in the early autumn, filling the capacity of all running mills and inducing the raising of prices beyond the needs of any sound concern ; new business has, in consequence, been paralysed since the middle of November. If the Bill becomes law, the probability is that a rise in prices will be followed by a fall, resulting in further redundancy and fresh cries for palliative schemes. The solvent section of the industry will have been relieved of £2 million of much-needed capital, with the certainty of further heavy contributions and of a fast-vanishing export trade.

By the destruction of spinning plant the Bill not only precludes future expansion of the industry, but condemns to *permanent* unemployment all labour dependent on it. Not only is this policy a purely defeatist one unworthy of a virile nation, but it suggests a lack of clear thinking on the part of the Government which requires explanation. On the one hand it provides a means of destroying plant to reduce capacity to the level of actual output, and on the other professes to support the Commission held recently in India to

press for a reduction of import duties for the recovery of part of the 2000 million yards of trade lost to that country.

If it could be shown that payment of the levy by those electing to remain in business would bring them any lasting benefit, there might be some justification for compelling those who for years have survived the ruinous price-cutting of units and combines to pay for their removal. As matters stand, the payment of £2 million provided by the Bill is a legalised penalisation of proficiency. It makes a closed market for textile plant in order to assure creditors a five-fold increase in the value of their security. The whole of the proceeds of the levy will go to the creditors without benefiting the industry, for it is unlikely that solvent concerns would accept the price available for their plant, while creditors would not voluntarily forego satisfaction of their claims on such favourable conditions. The indefensibility of the forced levy is self-evident when it is realised that the usual practice of creditors in insolvency would rid the industry of any possible redundancy without any cost to it.

The Bill confers absolute and autocratic power on the Spindles Board. Henceforth no spinner shall act on his own initiative, or make dispositions, without consent of the Board. For the next three years no successful spinner shall add to his plant in order to increase the stability, or improve the prospects, of the factory for which he is responsible to those whom he employs. No new blood shall enter or bring new enterprise into Lancashire without consent of the Board. They must go to Shanghai or Hong Kong or Bombay to do this. The Board may or may not be well-disposed, either in itself or through its Advisory Committee of men selected by the Board of Trade, to the industry as a whole or to any particular group in it. The triumvirate may dispossess those who disagree with them and equip their adherents with the spoils. The scheme envisages a form of socialisation for private gain with the support of the State and the backing of the Treasury under the control of interested parties and by back-door methods. Through the absolute power of the Spindles Board, unchecked by higher authority, it opens the door to jobbery, or suspicion of jobbery, which is almost as fatal. It could, for example, acquire first-rate, efficient plant at any price and dispose of it cheaply to a favoured party

without in any way disturbing the susceptibilities of the respective creditors, who might conceivably be one and the same party.

The Government and the Industry

What is the Government's attitude in these matters? By its frequent changes of ground, by misleading public statements, not less than by evading all attempts of the very large opposition to elicit information and to state their case, it is obviously neither sure of its ground nor anxious to court free expression of public opinion. In presenting the Bill to Parliament it claims that the Colwyn Scheme, on which the Bill is ostensibly founded, is the only one to hold the field, and that the Bill itself represents the wishes of the majority in the industry. That the Colwyn Scheme is the only one in the field is only true to the extent that the Government has refused to consider others.¹ As to whether or not the Colwyn Scheme represents the wishes of a majority, it is necessary to bear in mind that a large proportion of the spinning industry is virtually insolvent and consequently in the hands of banks and cotton brokers, who have naturally required their debtors to accept and to press for a measure likely to bring them substantial benefits. The Lancashire Cotton Corporation (a purely banking enterprise), with its vast voting power, has been foremost in pressing for a redundancy scheme, and stands in urgent need of the assistance fore-shadowed by the Bill.

Why, then, this disdain for constructive action and this partiality for a scheme destructive to the industry itself but quite patently of value to financial interests? The reason does not seem far to seek. In 1929 the Bank of England, in co-operation with the Government, brought into being the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, formed out of some 100 odd mills heavily indebted to the joint-stock banks. In concentrating their attention on refinancing this octopus the authorities entirely neglected its industrial basis. They believed that by heavily writing down capital values and by

¹ There are at least three of these in their archives; one, for restoring the coarse trade, endorsed by all the 'intelligentsia' of the industry, on whom the Government generally relies, has been on the Treasury shelves since 1930, since when two others on similar lines—all emanating from entirely independent sources—have shared the same fate.

strictly controlling the large sum of new money made available through the bank they could restore the coarse-cotton trade of Lancashire—the original *raison d'être* of the Corporation—without taking effective steps to improve technique or formulate a modern basis of production. The outcome of this neglect of the industrial basis was inevitable; the Corporation soon found itself in difficulties, and led the field in a ruthless campaign of price-cutting for the purpose of getting its local competitors' business, not, as was its original objective, with a planned basis of recapturing lost export trade. Through this policy it alienated the sympathies of the whole of Lancashire, and a reversal of this policy recently to that of equally archaic price-fixing has done nothing to rehabilitate it. Neglect of a modern industrial basis has brought this Corporation industry, in the space of six years, into as parlous a financial state as any unassisted concern which has faced the full blast of post-war difficulties. Those anxious to see Lancashire restored to her rightful place in international trade apprehend in the promotion of the Cotton Spinning Industry Bill the same handiwork which brought into being the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, and which, by similarly neglecting a true economic and industrial basis, is likely to condemn the whole industry to paralysis and ruin.

The responsibility of the Central Government for the state of affairs existing in Lancashire is by no means confined to its attitude as shown in the Bill. Successive Governments have treated the industry with contempt and have refused it sympathy or constructive assistance, except on condition of unattainable unanimity on the part of the industry. The Government, while paying little heed to the recognised representatives of one portion of the industry, refuses to consider the advice and efforts of those representing other portions. Modern Government can no more forego the principles of progress than can industry itself. If its time-honoured contacts become unyielding, it must encourage new and unaccustomed ones. Similarly, if the main arteries of the industry—its export outlets—become clogged or difficult of access through circumstances outside the industry's control, it is the duty of Government to take all steps in its power to restore them. This it has signally failed to do.

Taking first the question of Indian markets, where

Lancashire has lost 2000 million yards, it may be argued that, having conceded fiscal autonomy to India at the end of the war, the British Government had no means of influencing the situation. Whatever the political significance of such autonomy may be, it cannot be argued that a free licence to a tiny minority in India, as represented by local mill interests, to exploit the masses by means of prohibitive duties is in the interests of the Indian people, the Indian Exchequer, or Lancashire. If the 300 odd million inarticulate and under-clothed people of India understood its effects, it is conceivable that they might interpret fiscal autonomy in a manner not unwelcome to Lancashire. In any case, whatever the Imperial Government's obligations to India, it has no right to abandon one-quarter of a great industry, which by its own endeavour virtually created the Indian market, and then attempt to legalise its destruction. The workpeople and employers of Oldham, Darwen and Blackburn have at least as much right to the preservation of their livelihood as a handful of powerful Bombay millowners to preserve their vast wealth. Perhaps, now that India is a party to the Ottawa Agreements, providing a basis of 'fair competition' throughout the Empire, Lancashire may look to Whitehall to ensure her rights. If so, we might conceivably require a large number of the spindles which the Bill sets out to destroy.

If we turn to the question of Japanese competition, which has robbed Lancashire of another 2000 million yards of foreign trade, the attitude and inaction of Whitehall is even more blameworthy. Japan's inroads into world trade before Ottawa were already a serious menace, but were a perfectly legitimate development of a superior industrial enterprise. The crux of the actual catastrophic phase of Japanese competition is centred in Ottawa. Not only could Ottawa have definitely stemmed the flood of Japanese goods into Empire markets, but, had steps been taken to prevent her levelling out customs barriers and entering our markets on a more favourable footing than ourselves, Japanese intransigence in other spheres would have been less marked, for all her recent activities have depended on a great increase of her exports. As these consist mainly of textiles, Lancashire was the principal sufferer, the depreciation of the yen giving Japan initial advantages of from 30 to 60 per cent.—impossible

margins for any industry to bridge. Although the threat to Japanese industry itself has probably passed, opportunities still exist for reducing the enormous advantage which Japan has in the depreciated yen if Whitehall will press on the Dominions the necessity of preserving the fundamental basis of the Ottawa Agreements. Lancashire herself is helpless in the matter; Whitehall is not. And Lancashire's rights in the matter are by no means unilateral, for abnormally cheap clothing is valueless to producers unable to sell their goods. Not more than 10 per cent. of Japan's frugal daily requirements is imported, and her encroachment on the trade of large consuming countries tends to depress the prices of commodities, and would stop the sale of many altogether to the extent that such consuming countries were deprived of purchasing power. Several foreign countries are giving Lancashire greater assistance than Whitehall by prohibiting imports of Japanese goods on a greater scale than Japanese purchases from them. Scope still exists for Whitehall to lend a very effective hand in most parts of the world to assist an expansion of Lancashire's principal trade, and thus help constructive measures to remove the redundancy which the Bill seeks to achieve by a process of destruction.

Conclusions

It would be ungracious to leave the impression that the Japanese cotton industry is a thing to be despised. On the contrary, apart from the currency manipulation of the Japanese Government and a certain proneness of the industry to copy our products and even our trade marks, it is an outstanding example of modern proficiency which can serve well to illustrate the possibilities open to Lancashire. The Japanese have two permanent advantages over Western industries: labour costs are much lower, and the cotton industry followed in the steps of a great predecessor from which the highly-developed imitative faculties and discriminating powers of the Japanese allowed them to adopt all that was best in the Lancashire system. It is not generally known to-day that already twenty years before the war Japan challenged the whole world in the spinning of coarse yarns and was already a very sturdy competitor in the simpler types of cloths before the outbreak of war. But it was the war which gave her her

real opportunity. Space forbids any detailed description of the amazing developments which followed and continue to this day; but it should be pointed out that the basis of her meteoric advance to the position of the world's largest exporter of cotton goods was not her cheap labour or her depreciated currency—advantageous as these undoubtedly have been—but the extraordinarily effective system of direct control from the raw material to the customer's counter she has developed from small beginnings to a virtual all-embracing monopoly. The Japan Cotton Spinners' Association controls the entire spindleage and 60 per cent. of Japanese export looms, and by dominating the yarn output has an effective control of the whole industry. The industry derives its great driving force, not from its monopolistic nature, which in itself was a process of evolution, but from the fact that its vertical organisation and direction embrace a complete knowledge of all requirements from raw cotton to overseas markets, with instant contact throughout the whole chain.

When business is offered here negotiations have to be conducted through as many as six or eight divergent interests—each trying to obtain its margin out of the next, none cognisant of all the particular requirements, all divergent in interests. The watertight compartments and horizontal layers which have crystallised in the Lancashire industry have destroyed all elasticity in production and have prevented all possibility of that comprehensive knowledge of the essential requirements without which effective competition is impossible. While the up-to-date plant used by Japan is an absolute necessity for economic production, it is of secondary importance to that unhindered through-drive which has enabled Japan to oust any competition in markets to which she has access. Japanese industry has never misused its monopolistic character, as is so often the case in British industry, to raise prices; on the contrary, it has used its great economies to cheapen its sale prices to such levels as to prevent any competitors encroaching on its preserves, and it has not done so at the expense of its profits and reserves. But, whatever the individual merits of the Japanese cotton industry, the master-key to its success is the comprehensive knowledge and frictionless complementing of all stages throughout the industry. Can such a master-key be held in Lancashire?

To answer the question we must marshal the governing factors and requirements of the industry.

With international trade only 15 per cent. less than in 1913, Lancashire's share in proportion to her pre-war figure should be close on 6000 million yards instead of the present 2000 million yards. With determined and sympathetic governmental assistance to reopen choked outlets, and by reorganisation of the industry's internal structure, a figure of between 4000 and 5000 million yards of export trade should be possible—a volume sufficient to fully occupy all existing plant and employ every operative at present unemployed and create a non-existent demand for new hands. The economic urgency to the nation of such an increase in exports is obvious: if we value them at not more than £40 million (a very conservative figure), we get the following net gain in national income:

In direct wages in the cotton industry	£20,000,000
Saving in unemployment pay and administration	£7,500,000
In industrial profits.	£2,500,000
Total	£30,000,000

in addition to large additional gains in dependent industries, services, etc. Can we afford to neglect any reasonable attempt to attain such results?

If we are to achieve our purpose with any chance of success, we must:

Abandon the attempt to run counter to economic laws or endeavours to frustrate those of supply and demand or attempt the creation of artificial prices.

Abandon all attempts at fixing margins, the only result of which is to destroy the initiative essential to reduce costs.

While giving full consideration to the interests of finance and labour, to place in the forefront a sound rational industrial policy.

Encourage all channels of constructive effort irrespective of whether they have been previously used in the industry.

If these considerations are adopted as the basis of a new policy, the prime requirements of the industry are:

An actively sympathetic attitude on the part of the Government, and means by which capital may be made available to those in the industry able to make out a case for its fruitfulness and of not becoming a charge on the public. If we take the Japanese model as a pattern, it will be appreciated that modern plant by itself is not the key to success: it is the modern mind directing the use of modern plant through the best channels, and Lancashire to-day has few modern minds. Yet it may be said with equal truth that, unless capital is made available, regeneration of the industry is out of the question.

Those anxious to assist in making Lancashire once again a pillar of strength and wealth in the national edifice must neither exaggerate nor minimise the task, nor construe into the new gospel the creed of monopoly and trustification. The Japanese evolved their homogeneous industrial machine out of small beginnings, gradually linked together and expanded by common interest and good will. Lancashire will never accept an imposed constitution, but she can effectively cut its pattern, and, by its success, induce others to join forces. The road may be a long one, but short in comparison with those which have brought her to her present pass. There still remain in Lancashire men throughout the industrial strata imbued with sufficient of the old spirit and inspired with enough of the new to carry the industry on a new road to its old successes, if they have the unstinted, loyal support of their fellows elsewhere.

W. S. ASCOLI.

CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

II

By CLOUGH WILLIAMS-ELLIS

IN the November issue of this Review, written while local government was still celebrating its centenary and congratulations upon its achievements were echoing from every cathedral pulpit, I suggested that all was far from well with local government. I cited evidence not only in support of the allegation that corruption is rife in municipal administration, but to prove that the whole system of local government as at present established in this country is inefficient and effete, and that changes as drastic as those introduced by Lord John Russell in 1835 are imperative if local government is to take its proper place in the national economy.

That municipal administration is honeycombed with corruption can no longer be seriously denied. That—despite the cases and the evidence cited—public prosecutions of major municipal malefactors are comparatively rare is equally undeniable. How, I have been asked (not without reason), are these two facts to be reconciled? The answer to this question is not to be found by attributing to corrupters and corrupted any very remarkable skill in invention or technique: the clumsiness of the methods employed in the cases I have already reviewed suggests, indeed, a significant contempt for even a little camouflage. Nor is it to be found by attributing to the fellow-councillors, fellow-officers, or local electorate of the practitioners of corruption any abnormal ingenuousness, gullibility, or belief in the incorruptibility of man. It is to be found in the surprise and bewilderment of most of the convicted municipal paid officers or unpaid officials at finding themselves in the dock; in the extent to which their feelings are invariably shared by witnesses for and against them and by those who have sat and worked with

them on public bodies; and not least by the difficulty of securing conviction though the guilt of the offender be widely known.

Seldom—and this is possibly the most disturbing fact about local government administration—does knowledge of corruption in its midst come with the shock of surprise to the body in which it is unmasked. Indictable or non-indictable—and I have already drawn attention to the thinness of the line that divides the two—corruption seems to leave behind it an odour that betrays its bed. Though its commerce be secret, on the morrow it is known. News of it is whispered in the clubs and shouted in the taprooms. Yet either the forms of its commerce are non-indictable or ties of friendship, ties of relationship, ties of employer and employed, fear of the law of libel, fear of the ‘unseen hand’ that may make protracted unemployment the price of disclosure, combine to prevent proofs that would ensure conviction in the criminal court being secured. And lest this last fear be thought to be exaggerated, it should be noted that in the second case recorded in my previous article the auditor stated unequivocally that he was satisfied that several members of the staff of the undertaking concerned suspected, even if they had not complete proof, that the two principal officers were engaged in questionable transactions; and that one cause of their failure to disclose their knowledge, suspicion or belief was ‘fear that the informer would be penalised.’ On the protective value of ties of friendship and relationship, did not no less careful a person than Mr. W. A. Robson state, in his evidence before the Royal Commission on Local Government, that ‘within his knowledge there were five or six local authorities where a large proportion of the staff were relatives or friends of the local councillors’?

In one form or another there seems always to be a ready protection for the practitioner of corruption in local government. A word spoken by even a junior member of the staff in the case mentioned above might have saved the ratepayers more than the £50,000 that corruption in one instance alone cost them; but it is not easy to be satisfied that it would have done so. One remembers a good deal of publicity being given in certain sections of the Press to a very emphatic, startling and deliberate charge of attempted corruption by

seeking bribes in connexion with municipal contracts for omnibuses, made by Mr. John McGovern, M.P. for Shettleston, during the municipal elections in November 1934. What followed? Unbroken silence. One remembers—and how brief is memory!—charges of corruption brought against the councils of Sunderland, Hereford and Brighton, to mention only three. It may be—despite Mr. Justice du Parc's view to the contrary—that local government in Sunderland is, and has always been, as chaste as Cæsar's wife. So, also, may be, and have always been, local government in Hereford and Brighton. But are the special committees of accused councils which have so curiously unanimous a habit of finding allegations of corruption in their councils unproved quite convincing referees? Is not asking the prisoner to be his own judge and jury loading the dice a little unfairly against the upholders of decency and good morals?

To the thinness of the line dividing indictable from non-indictable corruption may be attributed much moral obliquity. Where of two equally discreditable forms of corruption one may be practised with legal and social impunity, shall they who practise it turn informer against him who, no more culpable in intent, has yet transgressed the letter of the law? Even, however, granted both knowledge of transgressions of the law and willingness to turn informer, of what use is knowledge unless the parties to corruption have been taken *in flagrante delicto*? Breaches of the Prevention of Corruption Acts have this in common with breaches of the Seventh Commandment—that they are rarely committed in the marketplace, and actual proof can therefore be expected of less than 1 per cent. of such breaches. But there the parallel ceases. Whereas the President of Probate, Divorce and Admiralty is permitted and encouraged to infer an act of adultery where evidence of opportunity and inclination is conclusive, nothing short of irrefragable evidence of the commission of the act itself is adequate to ensure conviction in cases of bribery and/or corruption. Small wonder that the fiat of the Attorney-General—which is essential for the successful prosecution of charges under the Prevention of Corruption Acts—is so seldom invoked! It is almost as true of a prosecution under these Acts by a local authority as it is of a field general court-martial in the Army, that acquittal is unthinkable

since the prosecution would never be opened except upon clear and incontrovertible proof of guilt.

At Glasgow, where a Tribunal of Inquiry was appointed to investigate very widespread allegations of bribery and corruption in the civic and municipal administration of the city, forty-one witnesses were interrogated. Says the report:

The evidence was in the main negative in character. . . . *This tendency of the evidence was anticipated.* Bribery is an offence most difficult to detect. Despite the offer of immunity which was made it was thought most unlikely that individuals who had given or accepted bribes would come forward and admit that they had broken the law. No such volunteered evidence was presented to the Tribunal and, in its absence, it is impossible to affirm that the general allegation of bribery has been substantiated.

Not being a whitewashing committee, the tribunal was careful to add: 'On the other hand, on consideration of the evidence as a whole, *we are not prepared to hold that the general allegation has been disproved.*'

Here, then, is the explanation of the amazing disparity between the incidence of corruption in local administration and the number of criminal prosecutions of guilty parties launched by local authorities. It is a profoundly disturbing explanation. If it be true—as local authorities will be the last to doubt that it is—that proof of corruption can be expected in less than 1 per cent. of cases in which corruption is actually practised, there can be little doubt that the number of cases of indictable corruption in local government must amount—as many of us know that it does—to several thousand per annum. This in a business in which in 1931-32 the Revenue Account showed an income and expenditure of roughly £450,000,000; in which, in the same year, expenditure on roads and bridges was, apart from loan charges, £61,519,000; in which, in 1934-35, expenditure from loans only was £51,280,381 (housing alone £25,253,984); and in which outstanding loan debts have risen from £544,185,000 in 1918-19 to £1,356,813,000 in 1931-32. What, one wonders—quite idly—is the sum that corruption steals from the ratepayers' purse in an average year? Ten per cent.—£45,000,000? Or only 1 per cent.—a mere £4,500,000?

The gravest reflection has yet to be made. The baker's

dozen of representative cases cited in my previous article did not deal—though they were not chosen to exclude them—with the offences of men for whom the excuse of feeble-mindedness and inability to grasp the meaning of ethics could be urged. They dealt with corruption of which were convicted: (1) An ex-lord mayor, chairman of an important committee, and also an alderman; (2) an engineer, earning a Cabinet Minister's salary; (3) an alderman; (4) a magistrate; (5) an alderman (chairman of an important committee) and also a deputy-engineer; (7) two county councillors; (8) a group of senior corporation officials; (10) a county councillor who was also a magistrate; (11) a town councillor who was a member of the General Purposes Committee; (12) a council architect; (13) a city councillor. All these men were members of important corporations. To have attained their positions in the corporation they must—unless we are to believe that the whole system of local administration is rotten to the core—have been shrewd men, acutely conscious of the responsibility involved in their office, acutely sensible of the difference between right and wrong (more than the two specifically enumerated were magistrates). They did not yield to sudden temptation. Though single acts were charged against some of them in the indictments, in hardly any instance could it be suggested that a single act of corruption was the sum of their guilt. They embarked, most of them, upon a system of corruption deliberately, knowing that they were committing criminal offences, knowing that they were risking not only their liberties but also their careers and the municipal honours (ironic word!) they had attained.

It is impossible to resist the conclusion that they did so believing (as they were entitled to believe) that there is honour among municipal thieves; knowing that they were only doing what their fellow-councillors and local government officers did; knowing that the giving and taking of bribes and secret commissions was an accepted practice (was 'all in the game'); certain that the Ministry of Health was a policeman whose manifold responsibilities kept him almost always off his beat; completely satisfied not only that there was no danger in what they did, but also that there was little danger in others knowing that they did it.

Hear the Glasgow Tribunal of Inquiry on case 3, cited in my previous article:

Of the guilt of Baillie X there is no doubt; he was trapped and taken red-handed. Baillie Y was completely cognisant of Baillie X's crime; and his conduct in witnessing without protest the commission of the statutory offence by Baillie X makes him quite unfit to be a magistrate and a town councillor.

There is an aspect of this proved instance of bribery which throws some light on the question whether the cases of bribery of which there is proof are exceptional or are examples of more general practice. Baillie X, at what was practically a first meeting with a man who prior thereto had been a complete stranger, invited a bribe. Would he have taken such a risk if he had not good reason to believe, either from his own experience or the experience of others of which he had the benefit, that persons wanting favours from the corporation could be asked to give bribes without much risk of exposure? . . . If this were an isolated instance one would hardly expect the recipient of the bribe to be willing to trust the knowledge of what was being done to so many people. . . . Taken together, as they must be, these features suggest that this was an example of a practice familiar to the parties concerned.

A verdict such as this, from a completely impartial tribunal, prompts the question whether local government administration is to-day as a whole morally so very much better than the administration it replaced a century ago? So completely without illusions were the judicial minds which comprised the tribunal, that of licensing administration they could write: 'It would not have been surprising had there been much evidence of venality in the granting of licences.' Little was laid before them, and even less evidence of corruption in that most fruitful field for the corrupt—rating and valuation. Not without reason did the *Glasgow Herald* draw attention to what has been a noteworthy feature of all such tribunals: 'the cynicism with which the inquiry was popularly regarded.' There are more than nine and ninety opportunities for perverting the course of justice in licensing administration; and I am not alone in believing that an exhaustive comparative survey of the treatment under Mr. Neville Chamberlain's Rating and Valuation Acts of the properties of aldermen and councillors and their relations could be highly instructive—and startling. Adequately to deal with corruption in either field would take a full-length article.

From the conclusion that local government administration

is honeycombed with corruption, and that that corruption is common knowledge and is regarded with the utmost cynicism by a considerable proportion of elected representatives and paid officers, there is, I am afraid, no escape. My first article in this Review evoked little interest or comment even in quarters which might have been expected to protest most vehemently. More often than not it has been passed over in discreet silence. The conclusion that local government administration is, from its nature, not only inefficient, but grotesquely inefficient, is equally inescapable. Mr. N. T. J. Moses, borough treasurer of Newport, said in a paper read before the Institute of Municipal Treasurers: 'For every £1 a local authority loses through corruption, it loses £20 through avoidable waste and out-of-date methods.' Local government officers—and particularly municipal treasurers—do not, in a matter of this kind, tend to err on the side of exaggeration. If (as we suspect) Mr. Moses' figure is an understatement—if, indeed, it is merely an accurate statement—then it follows that if through corruption only 1 per cent. of the ratepayers' money is being misappropriated, through inefficiency and out-of-date methods something over £90,000,000 a year is being frittered away. Local government has a turnover of well over £400,000,000. The business with a turnover of £100,000 which allowed its branches to make their purchases independently, and with no regard for the effects of their competition upon the market, would soon be bankrupt.

The proofs of inefficiency in practically every department of local government administration are plain for all to see. Among its monuments are those architectural tragedies called 'council houses' that deface the countryside; the reckless way in which the amenities of the country are being destroyed through the ignorance, incompetence, cupidity and roguery of the elected representatives and paid servants of our municipal authorities; the lay-outs of our towns and cities, which in themselves—all question of æsthetics apart—cause the nation a loss of millions sterling a year in waste of time and late delivery of goods; the pitiable mess made, not merely of the lay-out of our roads, or by the ribbon development that has been encouraged along them, but by the construction of new roads immediately after the war by municipal engineers

and surveyors who knew nothing of road construction, nothing of the loads the highways they built would be asked to carry, little if anything of the results of the impact and weight of vehicles on irregular surfaces or on any surface. Is it an exaggeration to say that not one road in ten built or rebuilt during the decade after the war was fit to carry the traffic load it had to carry? Or that it is mainly because of the incompetence of the road-builders of that decade that our bill for the maintenance and repairs and minor improvements of our roads and bridges was in 1931-32 no less than £31,220,000, and in 1932-33 was £28,393,000? How much of the additional £19,675,000 spent in, for example, 1931-32 on 'major improvements and new construction' was due to the same cause there are no figures to show. But this much is certain—maintenance of first-class roads cost us, in 1931, exactly £497 *per mile* for a total of 20,164 miles!

What are we to say of authorities who persisted in using—and some of whom still persist in using—road surfaces of which the best that can be said is that without them not half the motor repairers could live, fewer motor insurance companies would have gone bankrupt, and perhaps only 25 per cent. of the hideous structures called repairing garages would have sprung up to add to our roadside disfigurements?

What are we to say of authorities who build—and allow to be built—houses that will be in ruins before the next generation is dead, and that in the meantime debauch the minds of their tenants and everyone who has to look at them by their sheer ugliness and squalor? That it is incompetence (or roguery) that produces these lamentable results, and not economy, is proved by the few admirable exceptions where cheapness and seemliness have both been achieved together.

What, again, are we to say of a system of administration that allows a municipal authority to conduct business as the business of one particular—and not very singular—local authority is conducted? That city has a governing body (paid officials apart) consisting of over 150 councillors, of whom over 20 per cent. are aldermen. The council's duties are delegated to thirty committees, nearly forty sub-committees, and an even greater number of sub-sub-committees—a total rather larger than the total number of city councillors! (The Education Committee, with fifty members, has ten sub-

and nearly forty sub-sub-committees; the Public Assistance Committee, with some ninety members, has between twenty and thirty sub-committees.)

How does a machine of such unwieldy dimensions work? The committees consider the business and make recommendations, but have no executive power; the council, as the executive authority, approves or criticises. The reports of the committees are epitomised by the town clerk in a document which has to cover the proceedings of all the multifarious committees, embodied in hundreds of resolutions. Thus, inevitably, the record of a long and important committee meeting may occupy no more than a few pages or even a few lines. At the council meeting—which occupies five hours per month only—this epitome is before the members, and is the material on which executive action is taken. The chairman of each committee formally moves the adoption of the more important resolutions of his own committee, and then the adoption of the committee's 'general proceedings.' How much effective control is it possible for the council to exercise over its committees? How much understanding of the problems before those committees is it possible for the council to have?

Thus is a local business, with a loan debt of £45,000,000, a revenue from rates of £4,500,000 and a working expenditure of £7,000,000 per annum, conducted by elected unpaid representatives, many with no business experience whatever. And be it remembered that in local government even chairmanships seldom go by merit. Quite apart from those which inevitably 'go by favour'—relationship, friendship, political pull, expectation of reward, indebtedness, 'moral suasion,' business interests and back-scratching, chairs have to be distributed to prevent awkward opposition at the polls in certain wards, and thus preserve the balance of party power in the council.

Controlling—nominally, at all events—the discretions and indiscretions of the corporations is the Ministry of Health: of whose staff it would probably be no exaggeration to say that, however excellent their morals, however great their efficiency in office routine, however deep their knowledge of the theory of local government administration, they number in their ranks few individuals of outstanding general business

or administrative experience and ability. Providing a large percentage of local government revenue (Government grants amounted to £126,550,000 out of the local government income of £446,760,000 in 1931-32), this Ministry 'calls the tune' for local authorities, spending with little regard for the national economic situation, and often with none for the local. Its position is rather like that of a single policeman asked to organise and control the whole of London's traffic on, say, Lord Mayor's Show Day, and accepting the duty without qualms.

So much for the disease. If we are to find a cure—a task for which I claim no special qualifications—we must seek first the causes. Corruption and inefficiency on the scale they have reached in local government (be it said, in passing, that the influx of Labour and Socialist councillors has neither increased nor sensibly diminished either) would appear to be due to four main causes:

(1) The general incompetence and unsuitability for their work of the unpaid elected representatives of the ratepayers who are responsible for local government administration. Of these representatives neither business knowledge and experience nor knowledge of local government administration is demanded. Comparatively few possess either to more than a superficial degree; and a growing proportion seek election solely for the advantages councillorship is expected to bring them in improved credit, more business, and the satisfaction of 'seeing their names in the papers.' Many of them are not capable of making a success of a tobacco kiosk; yet they are permitted to control the spending of anything up to £10,000,000 a year by a single authority.

(2) The incompetence for their responsibilities of a considerable proportion of paid municipal officers. These officers—generally, if not always, hard-working, well-meaning, ambitious and (within well-defined limits) capable servants—are, in all but a few instances, helpless in the hands of the unpaid elected representatives. They have, in any case, seldom any equipment of education or experience to fit them to make the local government of their county, borough, district, or even their department, the business concern it ought to be made. The principal officers (town clerks and clerks to councils) are almost invariably solicitors; and

solicitors are excellent business men as between solicitor and client, but have, as a rule, about as much practical business knowledge (other than legal) as the average nun. Municipal engineers, surveyors and architects are not—as they ought to be—the best men who can be had for the money, drawn from the ranks of the best-qualified engineers and surveyors and architects in the country, but are for the most part men with no wide general experience, who have been ‘trained’ in the stultifying atmosphere of local government under men who had no real technical training or experience at all. Municipal engineers are generally the council architects, though they have had no architectural training whatsoever, and never had, and never will have, any sense of beauty or design. So the tale goes on.

(3) The inability of the Ministry of Health to fulfil the multifarious duties it has usurped or had thrust upon it. For this inability the Ministry has every excuse. It has grown too fast—and it has grown too big. It has grown so fast and so big that it has become a body whose members lack co-ordination, and would, even if they could achieve co-ordination, lack the strength for sustained co-ordinated effort.

(4) The unsuitability of the existing partition of the country for local government purposes, and the unsuitability of existing local government machinery for the ever-increasing productive effort and constructive work that are demanded of it. The anomalies and absurdities of this partition are too familiar to need much more than a passing reference; but a few examples may be cited. The Borough of Cowbridge has a population of 1027; the County Borough of Birmingham has a population of 1,025,000. Cowbridge has a revenue of £5250; Birmingham a revenue of £6,719,270 and a debt of £52,765,741! Of the metropolitan boroughs, Wandsworth has a population of 353,110, Stoke Newington a population of 51,208. Merseyside is an industrial entity with a population of 1,500,000; it is governed by a multiplicity of local authorities with antagonistic and (frequently) bellicose attitudes to each other. The same thing is true of most large industrial areas where there should be a common government pursuing a common purpose.

How is a cure to be found? I am not a second Lord John Russell, ready to celebrate the centenary of his great achieve-

ment by producing out of my hat a new form of government guaranteed to substitute for all the anomalies, muddles, confusion, inefficiency, corruption, graft, spite, jealousy, trickery, treachery, that have arisen out of the Act of 1835 a Utopia whose epitaph men shall write a century hence. Yet there are certain revolutionary changes which must be made before any satisfactory new form of local government administration can be evolved: and to those who answer that no revolutionary changes are possible in this conservative England of ours except by the ‘little by little and bit by bit process’ I would answer that precisely the same thing was said—and immediately disproved by Lord John Russell—a century ago, when England was an even more conservative country. I shall content myself by suggesting a few of these changes:

(a) A complete regrouping of local government areas, designed to ensure that (to take but one typical example) large industrial districts shall be administered as a whole, with due regard for their needs as a whole, their future as a whole, and their place in national development and in national economy as a whole. Such a regrouping would provide both inspiration and opportunity for large and important areas to look beyond the day, to set before themselves social and æsthetic ideals that would prevent the despoiling of their heritage by their own or any future generation, to work out constructive and regenerative policies and to put them into effect. It would, moreover, go far—since the new administrators of local government would inevitably be men of a very different calibre from the old—to ensure active co-operation between industrial and other districts, and as a result the solution of problems of production and of employment by national and effective, in the place of local and ineffective, policies.

(b) A complete change in the character and standing of local government representatives—which the first reform would do much to facilitate. Superficially it would seem that the results of local government by unpaid elected local representatives have been so appalling that the only way to mend the system is to end it. If, however, by regrouping areas into much larger and economically sensible units the status of councillors could be raised appreciably; if the achievement of a definite standard of education and knowledge

and success in specialised businesses and professions that would be of value to local government administration could be made a condition of nomination; if councillorship could be made both difficult to attain and a mark of distinction when attained, nothing could well be better than local government by locally elected representatives.

(c) The throwing open to the best men in the country (whether previously employed in municipal service or not) of all important paid posts in local government. I am in entire agreement with Sir E. D. Simon, Mr. Graham Wallas, and Mr. W. A. Robson in their evidence before the Royal Commission on Local Government that the whole system of recruitment stands sadly in need of overhaul; but reform must go further than that. The regrouping of areas would provide the opportunity for increases in salaries for chief officers (some of whom are highly paid at present) sufficient to attract the best and most experienced men. At the head of each local authority there ought to be an official of outstanding ability and skill in administration, with wide general knowledge of economic problems.

(d) The reform of the Ministry of Health; a considerable curtailment of both its powers and its responsibilities, many of which should revert to the newly-constituted local authorities; and the setting up of something in the nature of a co-ordinating body for local authorities, among whose duties would be the co-ordination of work planned by local authorities, the arrangement of purchases of materials in advance of requirements so as to ensure economical production. No one is better able, or more likely, to achieve this than Sir Kingsley Wood.

These are mere suggestions, covering what I feel to be vitally necessary reforms. All of them would be stoutly opposed—not least by the National Association of Local Government Officers—and I have no hope that any of them will be adopted in the form in which I have presented it. I throw them on the table, however, in the hope that they may provoke discussion out of which some real reform will come that will make of local government administration the service of dignity, importance and probity that it is not and that it ought to be.

Clough Williams-Ellis.

THE ANGLO-IRISH ECONOMIC CONFLICT

AN IRISH VIEW

By JOSEPH JOHNSTON, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin; University Lecturer in Applied Economics.

THE way of the popular lecturer in Economics is not easy. Almost a hundred years ago the Barrington Trust was established with a view to the dissemination of elementary economic knowledge in the 'towns and villages of Ireland,' and since 1920 I have held the position of 'Barrington Lecturer in Economics.' In the first year or two I had to compete with the rival entertainments provided by bank robbers and civil warriors. Then matters settled down, and it was difficult to arouse public interest in the economic questions of the day, because everybody was too busy 'getting on with the work,' and if we had any real economic problems, either people were not acutely conscious of them, or, if they were, they were not particularly interested in the solutions that I might propound. I was vaguely conscious that the academic outlook was somehow divorced from the point of view of the man who was in daily contact with economic realities. I sat on more than one Government Commission, and had numerous opportunities of hearing practical men give their views, and yet we seemed to speak a different language. In 1928 I took up residence in a purely rural environment, and kept a couple of cows and a few hens as a hobby. There I sought to acquire the art of expressing elementary economic truths in language which our agricultural population can understand and appreciate. Then came the change of Government in the spring of 1932. At first it was by no means certain whether I would be able to continue my work of peaceful education, for, both by training and instinct, I found myself diametrically opposed to the policies which are now the official policies of

our Government. I am glad to be able to state that I have enjoyed complete freedom of speech in both town and country; on two occasions Ministers have occupied the same platform with me, argued their views in opposition to mine, and thus helped very materially in giving wider publicity to the policies I recommended. I would like to lay special emphasis on the fact that my personal relations with President De Valera and his colleagues have always been most friendly, and my experience is by no means unique in this respect.

In the early summer of 1933 I had to take part with the Minister of Agriculture in a debate, under the auspices of a college society, on the subject of 'ranching.' The latter had no difficulty in showing that the small farmer, with family labour, produces far more *per acre* from his 30-acre farm than the rancher does from his ranch. He omitted to mention the important fact that output per *worker* is much higher on the large farm than on the small one, and he failed to explain how we would dispose of the increased product that would result from 'breaking up the ranches,' in view of the fact that we already produce from our farms twice as much as our 3,000,000 people can consume.

Personally I am all in favour of a more intensive use (not necessarily tillage) of our famous Midland pastures, provided that our export market remains freely available; but in my reply I took the line that grass farming had expanded at the expense of arable husbandry for reasons that were not confined to Ireland, that the Irish farmer had found salvation from the acute depression of the 'nineties by this transfer to animal husbandry, and that there was plenty of room for the further growth of population and employment by a continued development of poultry and live-stock husbandry in conjunction with free export markets. Dr. Ryan suffers from the wheat and beet complex, which is also not unknown in Great Britain, and does not realise the supreme importance of grass in our agricultural economy. Accordingly it was not altogether unfair when I rewrote the 'Wearing of the Green' for the edification of the audience, though, like Queen Victoria, many of them were 'not amused':

Oh Paddy dear and did you hear
The news that's going round
That the green grass is by law forbid

To grow on Irish ground?
John Bull's bullocks no more we'll keep
They make us all see red,
We'll exterminate these ranchers,
And plough up the land instead.
To 'speed the plough' 's our motto,
But it must not go too fast,
For motor ploughs and such like
Disemploy men at the last.
We'll 'spade' the plough if need be,
That is turn it to a spade,
And thus the firm foundations of
New Ireland will be laid.

Early in 1933 I set myself the problem: assuming that I shared the socio-political ideals of our rulers and governors, how would I, as an economist, set about transforming the economy of the country so as to induce our neighbours to abandon their differential tariff legislation as soon as possible, and in the meanwhile minimise the economic losses that we must suffer? I assumed that our Government *was* really anxious to 'win' the Economic War as soon as possible, and thus restore freedom of export to our major industry. I assumed that it wished to withhold the disputed payments in fact as well as in form, but I confined myself exclusively to the economic aspects of this policy. Subsequent events have shown that these assumptions were quite without justification. My answer to the problem I set myself was contained in three Barrington Lectures, since published under the title *The Nemesis of Economic Nationalism and other Lectures in Applied Economics*. The curious reader can pursue the matter further in the pages of that publication if he feels so disposed. I pointed out that, unlike other agricultural-surplus exporting countries, we were a creditor country and disposed of realisable foreign assets to an extent which is really enormous in proportion to our small population. We could therefore afford to 'live on our capital' and employ our dislocated workers in tidying up the national household without any immediate danger to currency stability. I tried to make it clear that the success of such a policy required that imports of all kinds should be allowed freely to expand under a low-tariff policy (or no-tariff policy), but that there was no objection in principle, and as a 'war' measure, to encouraging an expansion of imports from non-British rather than British

sources, and paying for foreign imports by the sale of sterling assets. If this had the effect of inconveniently depressing the foreign exchange value of sterling, that could surely be no objection in the eyes of our, supposedly, anti-British rulers. I had in mind, too, the desirability of absorbing in the home market as much as possible of our normal export surplus of agricultural goods, so as to diminish the target at which the arrows of the British taxes were aimed. The important thing seemed to be to restore, as far as possible, the equilibrium of our internal price structure by securing greater conformity between the price levels of agricultural and non-agricultural goods.

If our Government had adopted a policy of this type my responsibility would have been a very serious one; but, fortunately for me, they have now gone so far in an opposite direction that it would be impossible at this stage for any Government to apply a policy like this without serious modification of detail, if not of principle.

My assumption that our Government really wanted to win the 'Economic War' was falsified by the event, otherwise it would not have continued to use 'pop-gun' measures when other measures were available for which our opponents would have had greater respect. The other assumption that our Government was determined at all costs to keep the annuities was falsified within the first six months. We could, of course, only keep them, in reality, by allowing our agricultural export surplus to disappear; but as soon as the effect of the British taxes on the prices of our agricultural products became manifest, a system of export bounties and subsidies was inaugurated which has since been maintained and developed. Now the payment of these bounties, which amount to more than £2,000,000 sterling annually, is simply the payment of the annuities in all but name. They have, in addition, the effect of keeping up exports which would otherwise disappear. The bounty on eggs, pig products, and butter is a substantial proportion of the corresponding British taxes, and the prices of these commodities are in consequence just as high to the farmer and consumer in our home market as they are in the British market—higher in the case of butter. On the other hand, the bounties on the export of cattle leave nearly two-thirds of the tax uncovered, and cause the tax to

fall more heavily on fat cattle than on calves or stores. In this way our Government is enabled to effect a revolution in our agricultural economy, with the help of the British taxes, which it could not effect without them.

The economic value of the large and even of the 50-acre farm has been destroyed, and even the large or medium-sized tillage farm has suffered seriously in value, for large cattle are an integral part of our husbandry on tillage as well as on grass farms. Land is now being acquired by the State at a price of about £8 an acre, for division among landless men, which fifteen years ago was letting for more than £10 per acre *per annum*.

In consequence of the Cromwellian and Williamite confiscations of Irish land, and the 'clearances' that were effected in the latter half of the nineteenth century, population has been very unequally distributed over agricultural land as a whole. Farms of less than 20 acres are the rule, not only in the 'Congested Districts,' but all round the coast from Cork to Sligo, and along the Border from Donegal to Monaghan and North Louth. There are important regions, like Limerick and Wexford, where 'strong' 50-acre farms are the rule, but in the fattening counties of the East Midlands farms or ranches of 100 acres and more are extremely prevalent, and tillage is conspicuous by its absence. It was this very land which suffered most from the Cromwellian confiscations. It is certain that our Government is taking advantage of the present unique *conjuncture* of circumstances in order to reverse, in the present generation, the misfortunes of those who backed the wrong king in the seventeenth century. The victims of this virtual confiscation are probably in a minority of cases the descendants of those who profited by the spoliations of Cromwell and the Williamite *régime*, but the present policy of land transfer is not animated by any sectarian bias. It is part of a general social and economic policy which is regarded by some as a tardy act of justice, and not actively resisted by others because, after all, they are getting the full market value of their land, and that has become in recent years a liability to them rather than an asset. If we ask what has destroyed the market value of this land, much of it the best of its kind in Europe, the answer is, of course, the British taxes, and most of all the British quota on the export of fat cattle. If we ask why our Government has exerted itself to

maintain prices for the produce of the small farmer while allowing the large farmer to bear the full consequences of the British taxes and quota, the answer is that Mr. De Valera is a politician, and a very astute one, and Mr. Thomas is—Mr. Thomas.

There is a story told of an absentee Irish landlord who, from his home in Mayfair, wrote to his agent in Connemara as follows: 'Please make my tenants clearly understand that no threats to shoot you will influence me in the slightest.' The circumstances are not quite parallel, but if Mr. De Valera were quite frank about it he would write to Mr. Thomas somewhat as follows: 'Please understand that the success of your efforts in destroying the last remnant of the British agrarian interest in Ireland is not causing me to lose any sleep. Let the galled *shoneen* wince, the Gael's withers are unwrung.'

'It stands not with the policy of the State that the wealth of the Kingdom should be engrossed into a few graziers' hands.' Thus Bacon expressed himself in the last of Queen Elizabeth's Parliaments, while Chief Justice Coke denounced the depopulator 'who drives away everybody and keeps only a shepherd and his dog.' Similar language might be heard from Mr. De Valera or any of his lieutenants at any cross-roads or chapel-gate meeting, and one must recognise, I think, that there is something Elizabethan in the quality of Mr. De Valera's mind and statesmanship.

The policy of undoing the wrong done by Cromwell when so many of the native Irish were sent 'to hell or Connaught' has been accepted by every Government responsible for administration in Ireland ever since Mr. Balfour established the Congested Districts Board. The present situation has in it the possibility that every farm of 50 acres or more will be cut up into 30-acre holdings on which tens of thousands of landless men will be established and financed by the State; and this gives rise to all kinds of difficult questions—questions of agricultural technique, of incidental economic reactions on our national economy as a whole, of financial ways and means, and, last but not least, of social justice and elementary right and wrong. It is no remedy for an injustice inflicted on one section of the population some generations or some centuries ago to inflict a similar injustice on a section

of the agricultural community to-day. The fact that British policy has been made in an important respect *particeps criminis* does not affect the ethical issues that are involved. Any adequate discussion of all the questions that arise would fill the pages of a fair-sized book. The point is that under cover of the alleged Economic War, a social and agrarian revolution, as well as an industrial revolution which will be glanced at presently, are being pushed forward with precipitate speed, that no adequate examination of the relations between these several revolutions, from the point of view of the national economy as a whole, is being attempted or even thought necessary, and that no dispassionate examination of the important issues involved *can* be attempted while our national vision is clouded by the existence of our absurd Economic War. It is only possible, in the limits of this article, to express one's intuitive feelings on the matter.

There is no guarantee that the applicants for land are in every case qualified to make good in the present difficult conditions of Irish agriculture, and it is possible that some of them owe their present economic difficulties, not to the fact that their ancestors backed the wrong king in the seventeenth century, but that they themselves backed the wrong horse in more recent years. It is by no means certain that the rich grazing land, on which these new settlers are being established, is suitable for small-scale cultivation with the plough. Farms under 20 acres in Meath, Westmeath, and Kildare have felt the draught that blew over the fat-cattle trade since 1932 just as much as farms over 40 acres. From some inquiries I have been able to make, it appears that since 1932 small farms in this area have diminished in value by nearly £5 an acre, and large farms by not much more than £3. If the existing small farmers, of whom there are tens of thousands even in this ranching region, are scarcely able to maintain themselves, the outlook for the new settlers is not attractive.

On general agricultural grounds it would appear that the farm of 50 to 100 acres is the most economic unit for the type of agriculture that must prevail in this area, on any long-term view, provided sane commercial relations with our neighbours are restored. The increase in the rural population of this region that is desirable should take the form of an increase in the numbers of a well-paid class of agricultural labourers,

as part of a general intensification of the business of live-stock production on a foundation of scientific grass farming. Even under present conditions the agricultural labourer of the East Midland counties is economically better off in all essential respects than the small-holder of the West. It is reported that some of them, seeing their employment disappearing in any case, are not particularly enthusiastic at the prospect of becoming small-holders on their own account, and that, apart from economic stress, their chief motive for doing so is the desire to 'keep out the foreigner from Connaught.' The latter, for their part, have to be almost compelled to leave their barren mountains.

If small-holders in Meath fail with the plough, they may perhaps succeed with the spade, for much of this land, impossible to cultivate with any ordinary plough, will yield enormous crops of horticultural produce if suitably cultivated with the spade. The home market for such products is very limited, and no sound economic development along these lines is possible without freedom of export. It is to be hoped that the Minister of Agriculture will in due course pass on the advice to 'spade the plough.'

Even with freedom of export, a very small proportion of the total agricultural land in this fertile region could be devoted to market-garden produce, and thousands of acres must remain for grass-fed bullocks.

The great tragedy of modern Irish history is, of course, the fact that the population of the present Free State area was 6,000,000 about the middle of the last century and is now only 3,000,000. The popular view is that the rapid increase in the number of bullocks, which coincided with the fall in human population during the last century, was the cause of the latter phenomenon. Even if we admit this, it does not follow that the physical destruction of 'surplus' male calves, which is now the policy of our Government, or the destruction of the fat-cattle trade, which is now the policy of *both* the British and the Free State Governments, will immediately restore our vanished millions. It is quite possible that our present agricultural policy, and our conglomerate of economic policies generally, would be appropriate to a national community of 6,000,000. But a policy appropriate to the circumstances of 6,000,000 people may cause national economic

disaster when applied to the circumstances of a population of 3,000,000. One of the defects of our national character is a tendency to try and blink unpleasant facts out of existence.

A word must be said about the ethical aspects of the present agrarian revolution. The outstanding characteristic of nineteenth-century landlordism in Ireland was that a few thousand owners of land, alien for the most part in race and religion from the bulk of their tenants, let land on yearly or short-term leases to tenants who competed eagerly for it because they had no other way of living. The British landlord has provided at his own expense the buildings, fences and permanent equipment of the farms which he lets, and the rent which he receives amounts to a very moderate rate of interest on the £800,000,000 which British landlords are said to have invested in this form in the agricultural industry. The Irish landlord did nothing of the kind. All buildings, permanent equipment and improvements were provided by the tenants, and as the latter had no security of tenure the landlord was able automatically to confiscate the capital value, created by an improving tenant, by successive increases of rent. The essential object of the land legislation that began in the seventies of the nineteenth century and was completed by the Land Purchase Acts of more recent years was to prevent this legalised robbery, and give legal sanction to the 'equity' which generations of Irish tenants had created for themselves by their work. What the Irish tenant purchaser now enjoys is an equity which he has either inherited or purchased. The equity is, of course, subject to an annuity charge, of a fixed or diminishing amount, which will eventually disappear. The equity in question represents a capitalisation of the earning capacity of the farm as a going concern subject to the well-known annuity and other legal charges. Naturally the valuation which the market places on this equity varies widely from time to time, but at all times when land changes hands the prospective earning capacity of the farm in question is a main factor in determining its value. We are not concerned with the fabulous prices for land which in Ireland, as elsewhere, were paid in 1921; but from such information as it has been possible to acquire, one may say that £20 an acre was no unusual price to pay for land in 1929. By 1932 variations in opposite directions had taken place in

the sample areas which were investigated, but on the whole the fall was very slight. At the present moment a flat average of £10 an acre would be an optimistic estimate of the value of the equity of 400,000 tenant purchasers in over 12,000,000 acres of agricultural land. It is impossible to say by how much the value of land would have fallen if there had been no Economic War; but it stood up wonderfully well between 1929 and 1932, in spite of the intensity of the world agricultural depression.

The Economic War, and nothing but the Economic War, is responsible for a confiscation of capital values which, if we include farming stock, must approximate to £100,000,000. Thus Messrs. Thomas and De Valera take their places in the procession of Irish agrarian history, as confiscators of the equity created by the toil of Irish farmers, in succession to the alien oppressors of bygone years. From the ethical point of view their proceedings do not differ in essence from those of rack-renting landlords in the past. From the practical point of view the proceedings of the latter were at least more sensible. For what the tenant lost the landlord got, and the robbery involved was to some purpose. But the losses of the Irish farmers on capital and income account are not pound for pound the profits of anyone, either here or in Great Britain. Most of it represents sheer economic destruction. In comparison with the national leader who robs, or sends men to their death, in the name of a half-baked social or national or imperial philosophy there is much to be said for the point of view of the *honest* robber or murderer.

In some respects the British quota limiting the export of our fat cattle to 50 per cent. of the normal number is a more disastrous infliction on our agriculture than the tariffs to which the annuities dispute has given rise. It should be noted that the quota is quite different from, and even contrary in principle to, the tariffs, for the object of the one is financial or political, while the quota brings in no money to the British Treasury, and diminishes the sources from which the tariff money itself can be obtained. The quota is an episode in recent British commercial policy, the object of which is to improve the prices which British farmers may command for their fat stock. As quotas are threatened or imposed in the case of imports of agricultural products from the Dominions

and foreign countries, the possible reactions of this instrument on commercial and political relations with the Dominions and foreign countries should be examined, lest something resembling the 'Old Colonial System' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries be inadvertently revived as an incident in the promotion of Mr. Walter Elliot's agricultural revival.

The quota limitation in the case of our fat cattle has been imposed since the beginning of 1934. In accordance with the usual procedure, licences for the export of about 150,000 fat cattle per annum (the normal number exported is about 300,000) are transmitted from time to time by the British Board of Trade to our Ministry of Agriculture. Officials in the latter have, up till recently, had the invidious task of distributing them to clamorous applicants. The work is now done by the County Committees of Agriculture, but the principles and problems involved are the same. The normal consumption of beef, fresh, chilled and frozen, in Great Britain is about 4,000,000 carcasses per annum. Accordingly the British stock fattener might hope, as a result of keeping out 150,000 Irish fat cattle, to benefit by whatever effect on price a reduction in supply of less than 4 per cent. might produce. The consumption of fat cattle in our home market, even in recent years, probably does not exceed 150,000 per annum. The fat cattle excluded from the British market were of course thrown on the home market. The effect on price of a 100 per cent. increase of supply has, of course, been calamitous. From the point of view of the fortunate holders of fat-cattle export licences, most of which, for administrative reasons, found their way into the hands of dealers rather than farmers, any beast offered for sale is part of the redundant domestic supply and can command no higher price. Consequently the licences themselves, giving access to the more remunerative market, represent the difference between artificially separated market price levels, and are freely bought and sold for as much as £3 or £4 each. As the cattle trade itself languishes a lively trade in these valuable pieces of paper has sprung up. The irony is that they are put in circulation in the first instance, gratis, by comparatively poorly paid Government officials. If the latter were allowed to charge an 'economic price' for this valuable service, there would be at least one section of the Civil Service which would

have no reason to complain of its scanty emoluments. It is freely rumoured that many individuals have been able to develop a valuable connexion in the cattle (licence) trade who could never have played any part at all in the cattle trade itself.

As it is inevitable that the bulk of export licences will find their way into the hands of the trader rather than the farmer, the chief effect of the quota system is to depress prices to the original producer in the exporting country, and this is true of the Argentine as well as of the Irish Free State. Is it in the larger interests of British world commerce that agricultural producers in overseas countries should be bled white in the supposed interests of British farmers?

The reaction of our Government to the British quota infliction was typical. They had a first-class case which they could have argued on general economic, Commonwealth, or other well-chosen grounds. But, so far as the Irish public is aware, no serious effort was made to secure its removal; and, in fact, the present writer listened in the gallery of the Dail to the Minister of Agriculture defending recent British agricultural policy on the ground that it was in accordance with the principles of Sinn Fein. The fact that the quota policy in particular is completing the ruin of our agriculture seemed to me to be the only point that mattered in an Irish assembly. Dr. Ryan doubtless admires the career of George Washington, but he will search history in vain to find a record of the latter defending the British Navigation Acts before the representatives of the insurgent Colonies.

It would take too long to explain how essential the production of fat cattle is to the maintenance of the fertility of our soil, and even to the continued existence of a national agricultural economy that will be either national or an economy. 'Fat cattle' connotes in certain minds large grass farms or 'ranches,' and the new Utopia has no place for the latter, or for a specialised production of the farmer.

President De Valera, when he assumed office, might have addressed the fat-cattle industry in the words of Shakespeare: 'Though I wish thy death, I will not be thy executioner.' Then Mr. Thomas came along with his tariffs, which began the good work, and later came Mr. Elliot with his quota. King David was able in a similar manner to dispose of the inconvenient life of Uriah the Hittite.

The point of view of President De Valera and his colleagues is at least intelligible, for they possess a townsman's knowledge of agriculture, which is worse than ignorance. But is the British quota policy defensible from any British or Imperial point of view, and is it not calculated to drive a wedge of economic cleavage between Britain and her overseas Dominions?

The question of the rights and wrongs of the annuities dispute from the legal point of view is now of no practical consequence whatever. If and when a tribunal is set up which will give judgment in accordance with international or inter-Commonwealth law, and if the verdict goes against us, which is by no means certain, the equivalent of the sheriff in international law will have to make the return '*nulla bona*.' The longer the economic dispute continues, the more certain it is that all the claims in question will go the way of the German indemnity and the American war debt. The only question of interest is whether that inevitable decision will be arrived at while there is still some framework of civilisation, some remnant of social order, and some hope for the future in this political community. It is true that we appear at the moment to enjoy a high degree of prosperity. The Dublin Horse Show was never more successful. There has been a real industrial development, and many of the new industries appear to be well planned and deserve to succeed. But the situation of our agriculture is so desperate, and our agricultural industry is so important, that I can only regard even our recent industrial achievements with grave misgiving. We appear to be putting a Rolls-Royce engine in an old stage-coach.

A few weeks ago I read a paper before the Statistical Society on 'Aspects of the Agricultural Crisis at Home and Abroad.' Three farmers, who between them farm 700 acres and employ about fifty workers, were present. About 250 human beings owe their continued economic welfare to these three *entrepreneurs* being able to carry on. Up till 1932 they carried on very comfortably and made an annual profit. Since 1932 they have been carrying on at a loss, hoping that the economic blizzard would come to an end. The position of these three farmers is typical of about 100,000 other owners of large and medium-sized farms who employ about the same

number of agricultural workers. Some of them may find refuge in wheat or beet or the fresh-milk trade, but for the generality of that class freedom of export is a matter of life and death. Sooner or later, if the present situation continues, they must withdraw from the stricken field and give up all serious effort to produce for exchange. And then what will become of their employees in the country, and of tens of thousands of other workers in cities, towns and villages, who will find their economic foundations non-existent when our national agricultural economy dissolves into its component atoms? This will be the ultimate result of the revolution which His Majesty's Government of the Irish Free State is now promoting in active partnership with His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom.

JOSEPH JOHNSTON.

THE EFFICIENCY OF THE DEFENCE FORCES

By LORD STRABOLGI

ALL the signs point to a demand on the taxpayers for large additional sums of money for the Defence Forces in the near future. An informed and widespread opinion is held that the moneys voted in the past have not been spent to the best advantage, and that there is no guarantee, under existing conditions, that the additional money will be spent in the best way in the future. A demand will be made in both Houses of Parliament for reassurances on this point, and, failing such reassurances, then there will be a demand for the strongest impartial Committee of Inquiry to examine the whole organisation of defence. Is this demand justified? The reasons for the extra moneys for defence are clear enough; but how is it that there are so many authoritative statements made by persons of the highest authority, including the Prime Minister and, wonder of wonders, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, describing the weakness of our Defence Forces? Large sums, never less than £115,000,000 a year, have been voted since the Armistice. It appears obvious that there are defects in our system of administration. Even this year the Service Estimates are expected to show a considerable increase. More money will be required for the Air Force, under the agreed programme of expansion. The goal here, which we have been gradually trying to reach, is that there should be a striking force, or defence force, however we like to describe it, stationed in Britain and equal in strength to the available forces of the strongest air Power within attacking distance of our shores. A year ago this was France. A year hence, from all accounts, it will be Germany. The mechanisation of the Army is to make further progress. It may well be found that recent events, especially in the Mediterranean, and the need of strengthening the overseas garrisons disclosed

by these events, make up a sufficiently strong case for the Army Council to demand an actual numerical strengthening of the land forces.

As regards the Navy, even within the present Treaty limits, there appears to be a general consensus of opinion that we are weak in destroyers; the Admiralty makes a strong case for an increase in cruisers; and the problem of the great battleships, the super-Dreadnoughts, is understood to be acute. There is a breathing-space imposed upon us in the construction of the heavier naval units by the existing Naval Limitation Treaties of Washington and London, which do not expire until the end of the year. As from the beginning of this year the Admiralty case will be that eleven of our existing fifteen super-Dreadnoughts will have either reached the age limit or be approaching it, and a heavy programme of battleship building will be called for.

In naval circles the generally accepted view appears to be that a programme of new battleship construction consisting of three next year, two the following year, three new keels in 1939, and so on, will be adopted. Failing an agreement at the London Naval Conference of the five signatory Powers of the Washington Naval Treaty to reduce by mutual agreement the size and armament of these ships of the line, the cost may be taken at £7,000,000 or £8,000,000 apiece. If, however, the Japanese, for example, begin to lay down very large capital ships—and a tonnage of 50,000 is freely discussed amongst naval architects—then the cost will be even higher. Hence the suggestions from influential quarters that there should be a special loan of £150,000,000 or £200,000,000 for shipbuilding purposes. If, therefore, everything proceeds according to present plans, the taxpayers may expect a considerable addition to the Budget this year, and even more next year; at best no reduction in taxation, and at worst a considerable addition. Even if there is no increase in the size of warships, and therefore their cost, occasioned by increases abroad, and failing an increase in numbers caused by a new shipbuilding race led by Japan, the Admiralty will demand, as a minimum, the authority to replace the older warships by modern vessels. This will cost £150,000,000 alone, spread over six or seven years. The corresponding demands of the Air Ministry and Army Council are not so

easily foretold; but each is believed to have plans ready for spending an additional £20,000,000 a year, or £280,000,000 in the next seven years.

With all the three Services apparently able to make out a strong case for an increase in their Votes, a number of other controversial questions present themselves. I do not propose to give an opinion on the merits of these controversies, beyond stating their existence and describing their nature; but before the Treasury consents to the heavy additional outlay demanded the public as a whole have, I suggest, the right to be assured, not only that the demand for additional money is justified, but that the existing heavy Votes for the Defence Forces are expended in the most economical and effective way. I hope to show that there is sufficient difference both of professional and political opinion to make it desirable that the strongest available independent Committee of Inquiry should be appointed, with full powers, to investigate the whole problem of defence under modern conditions, and to report to the Cabinet.

There is much to be said for an open inquiry or, at least, for a non-confidential report to be presented to Parliament. We shall lose more than we shall gain by secrecy; and this opinion is reinforced by some of the extraordinary rumours that circulated in Fleet Street, in Parliament and elsewhere, during the controversy aroused by the Hoare-Laval peace terms for ending the Italo-Abyssinian War. Nevertheless, if 'open diplomacy' of this kind is an unattainable ideal, then at least we might expect that the Cabinet should be fully informed. Thirteen years' membership of the House of Commons convinced me and, as I know well, many others that parliamentary control or supervision of national defence is non-existent. Vital information is invariably refused as 'not being in the public interest'; yet it is often of supreme public importance. There is much to be said for the French and American permanent committee system under which the 'professionals' can be examined *in camera*; but the matter has become too urgent to wait on such a reform. What I have in mind is an inquiry on the lines of the Esher Commission which examined the problem of Army organisation after the South African War, but in this case investigating the whole problem of defence and reviewing the situation and needs

of the three Services together. Its terms of reference might also include an inquiry and report on the methods of control of the three Services.

There have been a number of committees which have specifically examined this question, and particularly as to the need or otherwise of a single Ministry of Defence. They have all rejected the proposal; but, since then, evidence has accumulated of the need of at least a permanent combined General Staff, under a whole-time political chief of high standing and position, for the purpose of studying combined strategy and the material needs of a combined strategy. The whole of this particular question has been complicated by the first attempt made in history to establish a system of collective security through the League of Nations arising out of the supposed threat by Italy brought about by the Sanctions policy at Geneva.

Put briefly, the nature of this particular problem is that the co-ordination of the three Services to-day depends on:

- (a) The deliberations of the Cabinet, of which the three Defence Ministers are members;
- (b) The work of the Committee of Imperial Defence and its constellation of sub-committees; and
- (c) The work of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which is supposed to meet under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.

With regard to (a), the pressure of work on the Cabinet and the length of its weekly agenda is notorious. As a co-ordinating body for defence the Cabinet is unwieldy and unsuitable. What happens in practice is that the three heads of the Defence Services engage in an annual pull-devil, pull-baker contest with each other and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and the result depends largely on the individual personalities of these political chiefs.

The Committee of Imperial Defence is an even more unwieldy body than the Cabinet, meets irregularly, and, in any case, is only advisory and not executive in its functions. Its hundred or so sub-committees do good work, no doubt; but there exists no suitable body for sifting and analysing the results of their deliberations.

With regard to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, it is known that the overworked Prime Minister (and every Prime Minister

is overworked) is unable to give sufficient time to its work. In any case, each of these three eminent warriors fights for his own Service, which is inevitable under present conditions.

The result is a notorious lack of real co-ordination between the three Services. Examples of the mischievous lack of liaison are shown by the fact that in the post-war years the main preoccupation of the Navy was to build up a strong base at Singapore and a strong strategical position in the Pacific; the main preoccupation of the Army was the defence of India; and the main preoccupation of the Air Force the defence of our own shores against a possible attack from Europe. Then, when there was a threat in the Mediterranean, it was found that Malta was too close to the Italian aerodromes to be healthy as a naval base, the harbour at Alexandria needed dredging, and the land defence of Egypt against a military threat from Libya was rudimentary. It is absurd, even in the light of recent events, that we should be feverishly dredging Alexandria harbour and extending the railway along the coast of Egypt to the west, while, to all intents and purposes, from the naval point of view, Malta has been evacuated. I am betraying no secrets in pointing out that if Malta stands a siege, a vital part of its defence will be the submarines and destroyers stationed there. Yet, as every foreign General Staff knows, we have not even provided concrete bombproof shelters for these vitally necessary mosquito craft.

The next subject of controversy and doubt to which I would draw attention is the relative value of large warships and aircraft. Many laymen have heard the extraordinary stories about the alleged danger to our powerful and modern ships-of-the-line from Italian aircraft in case of a reprisal against Sanctions aimed at us by the Fascist Government of Rome. There is one school of professional thought, not confined to any one Service, which maintains that the growth in power and efficiency of flying-machines constitutes a real threat to even the largest and most powerful surface warships. On paper, it is possible to show that for the cost of one super-Dreadnought air squadrons so powerful and numerous can be built as to make the destruction of that mighty vessel inevitable. Over against this school is another section of professional opinion, again not confined to any one of the

three Services, stoutly maintaining that the air menace is exaggerated and that the powers of defence, passive and active, are greater than is generally supposed. This latter school quotes the existence of powerful squadrons of fighter aeroplanes borne in the aircraft-carriers of the Fleet, or stationed on land near the fleets themselves, or carried in the warships, which can act as interceptors and prevent the bombing or torpedo-carrying aeroplanes from reaching their objectives. The Committee of Inquiry into the Arms Traffic was told that the modern anti-aircraft gun is likely to prove unexpectedly effective; again, that the hull and deck protection of a modern battleship enables her to defy a very powerful attack from the air. Thus, on April 11, 1934, the First Lord himself, Lord Monsell, speaking in a sympathetic atmosphere after the annual dinner of the Institution of Naval Architects, made out an elaborate technical defence of the warship against air attack, and quoted in support of his arguments the famous experiments carried out in 1921 by the United States navy.

These same experiments have been quoted by the other school in their favour; and certainly the findings of the United States Government inquiry seemed to support the argument that it would not be possible to design a warship with sufficient defensive power to resist the surface air attack that can be brought against her. Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, as he then was, cited the recent case of the revolt of the Greek navy and its supposed suppression by air attack alone. His words are worth quoting:

Some very up-to-date evidence on the subject has been obtained from the recent revolt in the Greek navy. An old cruiser, the *Averoff*, with no deck protection and two antiquated 3-inch A.A. guns, steamed slowly out of harbour on Friday afternoon, March 1, with what appears to have been a somewhat scratch crew. A modern trained air force went in pursuit from the same base on the following morning. The next day (Sunday, March 3) there appeared in one of our enterprising newspapers a photograph of the *Averoff* with aircraft just over her funnels and explosions taking place on her deck. This was a veritable triumph of film over fact. On the Monday morning we were being told that the rebel warships had been reduced to impotence. I have no doubt that the staff of these papers hailed the Greek revolt as a gift for the propaganda they were indulging in, but it is proverbially very necessary to be cautious in regard to gifts from the Greeks. The *Averoff* continued to go about unhampered and undamaged exactly where she wished.

Yet this same action by loyal Greek airmen against rebel sailors has been used as evidence by the anti-battleship school in support of their arguments. The First Lord concluded with the following statement:

I am sure that the battleship—not necessarily big ones—will remain the pivot upon which all our ships will perform their historic function of supplying the factories of these islands with raw material, of feeding our inhabitants, of keeping open the communications and intercommunications of the Empire, and of making a tremendous contribution towards the general tranquillity of the world—by making a quarter of the globe safe and secure.

This was in April of last year; yet last December rumours were flying thick and fast round the capitals of Europe to the effect that the British Fleet in the Mediterranean was in deadly danger from Italian air attack. The Italian air force is, moreover, only fifth or sixth in strength, and many of the best squadrons are involved in the East African campaign. At the beginning of the last General Election the Prime Minister declared that only three of our capital ships were efficiently protected against air attack. Yet large sums ranging from £1,000,000 to £2,000,000 each have been spent on modernising and reconstructing our older battleships. No wonder the ordinary citizen is troubled and doubtful about the way the money voted by Parliament is spent. Before we embark on a heavy and costly programme of battleship building the Government, Parliament, and the public generally have, I suggest, the right to know the truth. It is a fact that large-scale experiments to test the efficacy of aeroplane bombing against warships have not been carried out on the instructions of the British Government. The only large-scale experiments were those carried out fourteen years ago, on the instructions of the American Government. Since then great technical advances have been made both by the naval architects and by the aeronautical engineers. I believe it would be true economy to use up two or three of our obsolescent super-Dreadnoughts for experimental purposes. They can be distantly controlled by wireless, and, when used as targets, they reproduce, in part at any rate, the conditions of active service. Theoretical allowance will have to be made for the absence of the counter-attack and other factors. The only disclosure of actual results so far

on a wireless-controlled ship, steaming at 17 knots on a zigzag course, were the experiments in the English Channel in 1923, when, from a height of 8000 feet, 2 per cent. of direct hits were scored, and 17 per cent. of the projectiles fell within damaging distance of the under-water hull. This was with dummy bombs. But I submit that something far more reaching and thorough in the way of experiments with real bombs and torpedoes is required. This problem of the relative values of aircraft and surface warships is admittedly difficult, and yet of the very greatest importance from the national point of view.

With regard to the Army, there is acute professional controversy also; though, as Captain J. R. Kennedy, in his brilliant study *This Our Army* explains, controversy in military service is discouraged, and any independent expression of opinion by serving soldiers is frowned on by the authorities. Captain Kennedy makes some startling statements, which will come as a revelation to non-military readers. Is it a fact that, owing to the block in promotion and other reasons, the average age of the generals is higher than in 1914, and if this is true, what is the reason, and what is going to be done about it? Is it true that we are proceeding on our Army reorganisation and mechanisation in preparation for a possible war to be fought under the conditions of the last great war? It is a historical fact that in the Crimean War the tactics first employed were those of the Napoleonic Wars. In the South African War the Crimean tactics were attempted; while in the Great War of 1914-18 it is only too well known that we started with the equipment and ideas of the South African War.

What is likely to be the nature of the next war, should this catastrophe come upon us? What part will air fighting play in it? The late Marshal Foch has left on record his opinion that the air arm will be decisive in land fighting. Is this true, and, if so, is the fact recognised by the Army Council? Is mechanisation proceeding on the right lines? If we are likely to wage campaigns in comparatively roadless countries, the mistakes of the Italian command in Abyssinia should be noted. The Italians appear to have over-mechanised and to have attempted to wage a war of movement in difficult country with over-large and clumsy forces. Is it wise to cut down

the cavalry, or is the 'modern' school right in declaring that the cavalry arm is obsolete?

It is a curious fact that senior officers in the Royal Navy in retirement or on the half-pay list are far more ready to engage in healthy professional controversy than their 'opposite numbers' of His Majesty's Army. With the notable exceptions of Earl Roberts and Colonel Repington before the last great war, and Major Liddell Hart and Captain Kennedy to-day, the retired or half-pay generals and other senior officers are almost silent. Yet for years a not unhealthy controversy has been carried on by naval officers. The cases of Fisher, Beresford, Custance, Scott, Richmond, and, quite recently, Keyes and Bacon are leading examples. There must be discipline, and public criticism by serving officers is, of course, quite out of the question; but it is known that there is much uneasiness in all ranks about the state of the Army, and it is also known that the safety-valve of criticism is kept screwed hard down by the Army Council. This may be a comfortable state of affairs for elderly generals just approaching the retiring age after an honourable career in the service of their country; but it is not so comfortable for the taxpayers, nor even for the politicians who will be held responsible for the defence of the country. Thus, it is generally known that the wonderful organisation for an expeditionary force created by Lord Haldane has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. How many divisions, for example, properly equipped for modern needs, could we send at short notice to-day to any unexpected theatre of war? I believe it would be true that we could just about maintain our overseas garrisons and the army of India, and a small army at home organised rather for reliefs and reinforcements for these garrisons than for independent action. The Territorial Army is known to be 30 per cent. under strength and short of officers; and its establishment is only half that of 1914. Many hundreds of Territorials are pinned down to home defence anti-aircraft duties.

Field-Marshal Lord Allenby wrote in the public Press on November 9, 1935, that 'the majority of our tank units are still equipped with vehicles which cannot be regarded as fit for a modern European war . . . the Army is at present lacking in anti-tank weapons. The same is true of other

items of equipment. . . . If the Regular Army is lacking in equipment, the state of the Territorials is immeasurably worse. The Territorial Army to-day possesses no tanks at all.'¹ This is a terrible indictment of the whole system of providing for the defence of the nation ; and, under the Locarno Treaty, we are bound to intervene in another war between Germany and France !

We are told, again, that the Home Defence Air Force is too weak and its rate of expansion too slow. We know that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this or any other Government has a difficult task to balance the Budget. No man can prophesy with confidence that the present minor boom in trade will continue. Money is scarce, and is likely to be scarcer in the future. The Geneva Disarmament Conference has failed ; the London Naval Conference has been abortive. The international situation is overcast, and even a workable system of collective security through the League of Nations necessitates a suitable and efficient contribution from all three British Services. Before vast commitments of new expenditure on the various forms of armaments are entered upon it would appear to be only common-sense that some independent body with the necessary time and the necessary prestige should examine the whole problem as rapidly as possible and present its series of reports.

¹ *Evening Standard*, November 9, 1935.

STRABOLGI.

'THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION' IS DEVELOPING.'

By WALTON NEWBOLD.

NEITHER the volume nor the frequency with which appear successive contributions to the literature descriptive or analytical of the régime now established so firmly in Russia is so extraordinary as the continuing neglect in this country of the declarations of its leading organs and personalities as to what they themselves regard as its eventual, and, indeed, not long now to be deferred, rôle of guide, philosopher and friend of 'the international social revolution.' An excuse for this does not lie in the fact that they are not available in English, for there has been issued in the last few years, in cheap and handy form, a stream of books, pamphlets and periodical publications the machinery for whose popular circulation has been erected through a chain of selling agencies all over the country. A plea that their style of presentation renders them unreadable falls to the ground once it is remarked that they are edited and explained by writers so lucid and so informed as Emile Burns, Maurice Dobb, and Palme Dutt. A reason for this phenomenon must rather be found in the fact that persistent currency has long been given to the falsehood that a mere superficial difference exists between the theories of Lenin and Trotsky, whereby the book-buying and library subscription public has been diverted to the bowdlerised versions of Leninism put out by such *petit-bourgeois* popularisers as Brailsford, Cole, and Laski.

The holding of the seventh Congress of the Communist International in August of last year, after an interval of seven years between it and its predecessor, was an unpleasant shock to the complacent admirers and would-be copyists of the achievements of Stalin. The intellectuals of Liberalism and the Labour Party were at pains to represent it as a very tame

affair. They misunderstood, as an admission of past error, the tactical manœuvre in belated defence of what Moscow regards as an already moribund democracy. They went on to interpret the shifting of the responsibility from Russians to non-Russians for the initiation and implementing of the resolutions adopted as evidence of the retreat of the former from their rôle of promoters of 'the international social revolution.' Rejecting with the same emphasis as they bring to record their ecstasy in contemplating the results in that Fabian-like manipulation of 'the toiling masses' the means whereby Lenin and Stalin have done those things which the Webbs have left undone, they could not be expected to recognise any special significance in the appointment last August as secretary of the Communist International (hereafter we shall allude to this as 'the Comintern'), in place of a Northern Slav, of one who is a Southern Slav.

Already clamouring for such measures to be taken in restraint of imperialist war in Ethiopia by the League of Nations, latterly reinforced by the Red army and the Red air fleet of the Soviet Union, as were calculated to induce in Italy the same state of civil war as still smoulders in Spain, these curious pacifists, devotees of 'Collective Security,' either could not or would not appreciate the fact that, besides being the hero of the Leipzig Trial, Dimitrov was a Bulgar. This first crisis in Europe, so grave as to call for the imposition of collective sanctions partaking of the nature of war, makes it ominous that the Comintern should have claimed in March of 1935, through the editor of the *Labour Monthly* in his second preface to *Fascism and Social Revolution*, that 'the Spanish revolutionary struggle at the end of 1934, following on Vienna at the beginning, is the signal of the future in Europe' (p. xii).

The Comintern entrusted the report on 'The Tasks of the Communist International in connexion with the Preparations of the Imperialists for a New World War' to the Italian Communist Ercoli, and then proceeded, amid wild applause, to hail a Balkan Slav as 'the helmsman of the Communist International, Comrade Dimitrov'! In 1931 we had another crisis in Europe which shattered 'the temporary stabilisation of capitalism' to which Comrade Stalin had alluded, and which he had made the basis for his tactical

demands of the 'fourteenth' Conference of the Russian Communist Party in 1925. That crisis brought down the financial fabrics of Austria and Germany, pulled London off the gold standard, and rent asunder the polite fiction of any unity of purpose between the T.U.C. and Philip Snowden, between Lord Allen and Fenner Brockway, between Lord Passfield and Ramsay MacDonald. Of it an informed correspondent of the *Economist* (December 3, 1932) said: 'Not chance made Austria the train that set fire in Europe to the financial crisis of last year. . . . [It was] not chance that Hungary was the first of the States of Europe to declare a moratorium on its external debt.' In the light of that indubitable fact it is desirable to draw attention, not only to the events in Brazil in the closing weeks of 1935 and to the action of the Republic of Uruguay in expelling the diplomatic representative of the Soviet Government for alleged complicity in the efforts to extend the trouble all over Spanish America, but also to the resolution of the Comintern of August 20 last, ensuing on the report of the Italian Ercoli, and to a statement made by Palme Dutt in the previous spring. 'The main contradiction,' we are told, 'in the camp of the imperialists is the Anglo-American antagonism which exerts its influence on all the contradictions in world politics.' In South America 'the hostile interests of Great Britain and the United States clash most sharply.' Hence, no doubt, the choice of the city of Monte Video, where met the last Conference of the Pan-American Union, with Mr. Cordell Hull attending, as the headquarters of the Comintern in Spanish America.

'The formation of the Soviet régime in Asturias,' says Palme Dutt, 'at the outset of the struggle and the prolonged and tenacious resistance against the forces of the Spanish Government, reaches a point of revolutionary struggle unequalled in Western Europe since the days of the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet Republics in 1919' (*Fascism and Social Revolution*, p. xii). That reminder emphasises the coincidence of the troubles in South Wales, which Jacob Borodin came over to instruct the editor of the *Labour Monthly* in the means to foment before 1926, with those which he himself went out to direct from Canton in the form of what another Communist writer frankly called the 'War on Hong Kong'

and the preparation for trouble-making in our coalfields once more by an agitation to close the market for coal exports simultaneously in Italy and in Latin America.

But Palme Dutt has done more. He has revived our memories of the circumstances attendant on the formation of 'the Hungarian and Bavarian Soviet Republics in 1919.' The former of these was promoted in Budapest in March and the latter in Munich in April. Eighteen months had elapsed since the November revolution. The attempts to overthrow the Weimar Republic in Germany from the Ruhr and from Berlin had been abortive, but there was impending a crisis in the coalfields of Great Britain. March 1919 saw the formation and the first Congress of the Communist International. There is apparent a rhythm about these recurrent up-surges of international revolution. Through them all, however, there rises exultant the *leit-motif*, insistent as in the doom music of *The Flying Dutchman*, at the existence of forces 'threatening to break the domination of the world citadel of imperialism, Great Britain.'

But not only did the Communist International come into being one month before the *putsch* in Munich and coincident in time with that in Budapest. After the latter was 'liquidated,' and whilst the eyes of everyone were fixed upon the third-rate figure of Bela Kun, there went into the service of the Comintern, and available to inform the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the former Professor of Political Economy at the University of Budapest. For all the fun that was made of 'old Uncle Varga and all' by Postgate and his like, there has been no more constant factor, and no more potent influence on the economic and diplomatic policies of the Soviet Government and the theses and tactics of the Comintern in the days since 1922, than Professor Varga. Elevated to the well-earned dignity of Director of the Institute of World Economy and Politics in Moscow, it is his brilliant studies of that year, and of 1924, 1928 and 1934 of the movements affecting the rate in 'the decline of Capitalism,' that, more than anything else, have determined 'the continuation, intensification and expansion of the international social revolution.' Behind Stalin, and influencing him in the application of Marxism as modernised by Lenin, it is high time that everyone saw the erudite Professor Varga.

The economic debility induced by the political disintegration of what was formerly the single Customs Union of the Dual Monarchy, and the draining away of bank credits formerly available from Vienna and from Berlin, rendered and have kept the financial and the commercial classes in Hungary and in Austria in a psychological condition eminently distressing to the Governor of the Bank of England, but equally advantageous to the political clients of Professor Varga. The embarrassed and ever more hopeless debtors to Milan, to Paris, to London, and to New York must have turned away many a time from the mortgage-holders in the west to contemplate the mirage of their own renewed ascendancy in the east. The Slav world of the Succession States was so inhospitable a clime that every free trader who could do so made his way to London. Whether in exile overseas or eking out an ever more attenuated existence in the Danube Valley, he tended to think, and not infrequently to think aloud, in certain sections of the Liberal and Labour Press that there was quite a lot to be said for a Customs Union of all the Slav lands, even if instead of a return to free trade it involved the Planned Economy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Patently, therefore, if 'the imperialist front was broken at its weakest link, in Tsarist Russia,' when 'the February revolution overthrew the domination of the autocracy of the big landowning class,' and 'the October revolution overthrew the rule of the *bourgeoisie* (*vide* Programme of the Communist International, 1928), the dialectic of concrete experiences in the Danube Valley might cause it to break a second time at its next weakest link and, thereafter, to repeat the process at a third point and at a fourth.

Those who do not understand how close is the relationship between the developing theory now come to be known as Marx-Lenin-Stalinism and the practice of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union can have no appreciation of the purposes which go to determine both the devious courses of Soviet diplomacy and the mystifying contradictions which appear to prevail between these and the direction given to the political initiative of its constituent parties beyond the borders of the Soviet Union by the Comintern. It is a feature of the political method of the country which they

who profess to have come so sympathetically to interpret it seem as completely unable to grasp as those who retain for it both dislike and distrust. It is a feature ensuing from a method of approach so different from all others known to and practised by the observers that they may be excused their inability to follow the gyrations of a Government that not only affirms on every possible occasion its belief in Marxism, but whose members can only be reconciled to the slightest deviation from the paths of a strict orthodoxy by a conviction that their 'master' Lenin and 'the great Stalin' have come upon phenomena that could not have been seen or foreseen by Marx and Engels. It is a further complication of the problem for the commentator that, should he have familiarised himself with the doctrines of the two fathers of the faith as they have been accepted and interpreted by their adherents in the west and centre of Europe so far as to be able himself to think within their limits, he will find that he must next seek the shifting point somewhere beyond these at the new interpretations put upon them in the recent past by Lenin and in the present accepted from Varga by Stalin. He will do well, having so far corrected his compass, to recollect that Lenin and, still more, Stalin have been men of action from the east of Europe, and that the second has never left it for the west.

After that, let him read the two final sentences with which Stalin concludes his forthright work, *The Theory and Practice of Leninism*: 'The union of Russian revolutionary inspiration with the American practical spirit—that is the essence of practical Leninism. Only this union will give us the perfect type of Leninist worker.' This clearly recognisable successor of Lenin, as Lenin was of Marx, can only be understood by those who allow for the differences both in time and space between the three great masters of the evolving theory and practice of Scientific Socialism. It has been said of Marx that he thought as a Frenchman but wrote as a German. It may be said with equal truth of his successors that they thought as Germans or as German-Americans, but, whilst learning to think in that school, they have been able to make the workers and peasants feel that they felt as Russians. That has accounted in no small degree for the great positive achievements to their credit. Flatly rejecting

the distortion which Trotsky gave to the theory of 'permanent revolution,' they decided to concern themselves with 'the stabilisation of the Soviet system' and the making of 'Socialism victorious' in their own homeland of Russia. The very excess of this quality which has stood them in such good stead in their dealings with their own compatriots has hampered them when they have sought to influence the thought and guide the actions of those who were by origin and upbringing unable to divest themselves of their objective limitations as nationals. But the disintegrating effect that these Russians had upon the organised workers during 'the first round of revolutions' which, says Varga, 'developed out of the World War' may not be repeated in 'the second round of revolutions' which the Hungarian economist forecast in that year and which the Comintern hastened to prepare to make certain when it met in the sixth World Congress in 1928.

Four years before he had warned, and Stalin had concurred, that (*The Decline of Capitalism*, p. 56) 'Capitalism has entrenched itself during the last years. The power of capitalism has grown.' Trotsky and his following were 'liquidated,' and Stalin and his colleagues 'for a number of years worked to get the first Five-Year Plan ready while at the same time the so-called "general plan" of reconstruction of the national economy, envisaging a period of ten or fifteen years, was being prepared.' So said Molotov when presenting the second Five-Year Plan to the seventeenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But 'this last undertaking was not completed,' for, in the interval, both Varga and Stalin became convinced, as the former wrote, that

The possibility of overcoming crises by an extension of the capitalist market is limited by the bounds of the Soviet Union, embracing as it does one-sixth of the earth. This means an intensification of economic crisis; increased difficulty in overcoming them temporarily. It means a new impetus towards a redivision of the world. [*The Decline of Capitalism*, 1928, p. 10.]

All the Powers, without exception, are arming themselves for a new war against each other . . . imperialist antagonisms become more bitter, the anti-capitalist and the anti-imperialist forces within the *bourgeois* world increase among themselves . . . the contradictions are becoming sharper and making straight for imperialist war, either of the

imperialists against the Soviet Union or of the imperialists among themselves, to determine the redivision of the world (a combination of both is possible). [*Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.]

The last statement foreshadowed the course that has since been adopted in opposition to both Japan and Germany, whilst it found expression in the theses drawn up by the sixth Congress of the Comintern in the same year :

The growth of monopolist capitalism in Germany leads on one hand to an increasing disintegration of the Versailles system, and on the other to Germany adopting a more definitely 'Western' [imperialist and anti-Soviet] orientation. While in the days of her economic decline and her political and national humiliation Germany sought an agreement with the proletarian State, the only State that opposed her imperialist enslavement, the matured tendencies of German neo-imperialism are forcing the German *bourgeoisie* more and more towards an anti-Soviet position.

Varga had told his clients, however, that

export to independent countries comes up against tariff barriers ; to the colonies against their monopolist rule by individual imperialist Powers ; to the Soviet Union against the barriers of the foreign trade monopoly. The contradiction between production and the possibility of realising goods on the market is growing greater. It will come to a head in a grave crisis, which will necessarily be but the prelude to a new war for the redivision of the world. [*The Decline of Capitalism*, p. 51.]

Convinced that such was the case, not only did they jettison the third of the Five-Year Plans intended to take effect from 1938, but they took advantage of the great crisis of 1929 to accelerate the first Five-Year Plan so as to complete it 'in four years.'

The Comintern had been getting along with no more than a plenum or enlarged executive, and the simpletons of Liberalism everywhere trumpeted the folly that 'the realist' Stalin was no longer interested in 'the World Revolution.' Now, it was called together in the first World Congress since 1925, the sixth of the series. The statutes were revised and a new programme was produced. Under the section headed 'The Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the U.S.S.R. and the International Social Revolution' there was another subsection entitled, ominously enough, 'The Significance of the U.S.S.R. and its World Revolutionary Duties.' Herein it was laid down :

In the U.S.S.R. the world proletariat for the first time acquires a country that is really its own, and for the colonial movements the

U.S.S.R. becomes a powerful centre of attraction . . . the simultaneous existence of two economic systems—the socialist system in the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist system in other countries—imposes on the proletarian State the task of warding off blows showered on it by the capitalist world [boycott, blockade, etc.] and also compels it to resort to economic manœuvring and the utilisation of economic contacts with capitalist countries.

Encouragement must have been derived from Varga's statement (*The Decline of Capitalism*, p. 13) that 'Britain's attempt to unite the European States against the U.S.S.R. brings to light all the hidden antagonisms in the Balkans, in Eastern and in Central Europe.' Which may well have prompted the approach made to myself through the intermediary of a Labour Party candidate, regarded as unimpeachable in his loyalty to Labour Party headquarters, immediately following my appointment to the Macmillan Committee, to make available to Moscow the relations existing between the Bank of England and the British Treasury. The rôle of the Bank of England was most obviously of interest ; but, to my amusement, the inquiry did not come through the same secret agent of the Comintern as had in 1922, following upon a spontaneous speech of mine in criticism of the extension of a British Treasury guarantee to the League of Nations Stabilisation Loan to Austria, instructed me to vote for it !

Formulated a year before the revision of the Dawes Plan, nearly as long after Stalin, speaking through the lips of Litvinov, had proposed to the Preparatory Conference on Disarmament at Geneva first 'total' and then drastic disarmament, and at the moment when the Soviet Government was endorsing the Kellogg Pact, the programme was followed up by lengthy theses on *The Struggle against Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists*. The Labour Party was expected to return to office, and under a sub-heading, 'The Proletariat's Fight against Pacifism,' it was asserted that

The workers of the Soviet Union . . . may adopt a new method in their fight against pacifism—that venomous tool of imperialism—viz., to propose general disarmament to the imperialists. But the proletariat which is still fighting for power in capitalist States cannot employ such a method. It would not be a revolutionary act for the proletariat in these countries to propose or to demand disarmament from their

bourgeoisie and their flunkies [*i.e.*, the Social Democrats]; it would merely mean the replacement of the slogan ARM THE PROLETARIAT by the slogan DISARM THE PROLETARIAT; it would mean the rejection of civil war and Socialism.

There, for all the members of the League of Nations Union to read, is the elucidation of the rôle of Messrs. Litvinov and Maisky. Through them Stalin makes speeches that appear with the endorsement of the late chairman of the Disarmament Conference, that are given on platforms graced by Mr. Clynes or that distinguished Quaker theologian Mr. H. G. Wood. Of course, the Comintern laid it down in a resolution of August 20, 1935, that

Flexible use must be made, in every country and on an international scale, of the most varied organisational forms to establish contacts between and bring about joint action of the revolutionary, Social Democratic and progressive women's organisations, while ensuring freedom of opinion and criticism, without hesitating to form also separate women's organisations wherever these become necessary.

Now we know why the Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties made a statement against the Prevention of Disaffection Bill in the pages of Palme Dutt's *Labour Monthly*. He and his associates demand freedom 'of opinion and criticism'!

The establishment of a united front with Social Democratic and reformist organisations and with the bulk of their members as well as with mass national-liberation, religious, democratic and pacifist organisations and their adherents is of decisive importance for the struggle against war and its Fascist instigators in all countries.

A glance any Sunday at *Reynolds's Newspaper*, with its recurrent allusions to the Duke of Kent, the Prince of Wales and the King of the Belgians, shows that, since 1928, the Comintern's instructions have been carried out and relations have been 'established' with 'co-operative organisations.'

The 1928 programme of the Comintern, and, after that, in 1931 the speech of Molotov in presenting to the seventeenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the second Five-Year Plan, should leave no one under the Philistine illusion that there was other than the closest connexion between 'the victory of Socialism in the Workers' Fatherland' and the object of the Comintern, which is

'the establishment of a World Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.' The former stated that

the internal consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., the success achieved in the work of Socialist construction, the growth of the influence and authority of the U.S.S.R. among the masses of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the colonies, signify the continuation, the intensification and the expansion of the international social revolution.

And went on to assert (as in 1925, see p. 218 above) that

the U.S.S.R. inevitably becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the centre of international revolution. In the U.S.S.R. the world proletariat for the first time acquires a country that is really its own, and for the colonial movements the U.S.S.R. becomes a powerful centre of attraction.

Thus, the U.S.S.R. is an extremely important factor in the general crisis of capitalism . . . because it plays an exceptionally great revolutionary rôle generally: it is the international driving force of proletarian revolution that impels the proletariat of all countries to seize power . . . The principal and fundamental line to be followed must be the line of establishing the widest possible contact with foreign countries—within limits determined by their usefulness to the U.S.S.R.—for laying the base for its own heavy industry and electrification, and, finally, for the development of its Socialist engineering industry.

The last-named phrase is the euphemism for what a wider reading of the literature of the Five-Year Plans for industry, agriculture, and the army reveals to be the mass production of war material.

Molotov in the first minute of his speech was saying:

Let us first consider the international importance of this event [the drafting of a second Five-Year Plan for the Soviet Union]. Its international importance lies in the fact that the workers in every country throughout the world are now able to compare the results of *bourgeois* domination in the capitalist countries with the results—the first results as yet—of the rule of the working class in the land of the proletarian dictatorship.

Stalin was even more explicit in his statement on 'the International Significance of the Five-Year Plan.' He said right out that

the main link of the Five-Year Plan was heavy industry, and its core, machine construction . . . the restoration of heavy industry had to be put, at the base of the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan . . . heavy industry calls for enormous financial expenditure . . . finally, all this

resulted in the fact that from a weak country, unprepared for defence, the Soviet Union has been transformed into a country mighty in defence, a country prepared for every contingency, a country capable of producing on a mass scale all modern weapons of defence and of equipping its own army with them in the case of an attack from without.

Voroshilov, Commissar for War, completed the picture by declaring:

During the first Five-Year Plan we have created a powerful base for the manufacture of big guns, founded a strong bureau of designers, trained skilled technicians and engineers; in the factories we have established such a technique that it is possible for us to solve all problems in the sphere of artillery equipment of our Red army. . . . We can already say that during these four years we have fully mastered tanks, both as regards their manufacture and their use in the army. . . . we are absolutely confident that in the coming Five-Year Plan we shall reach the level of world aviation and shall create all the conditions necessary to surpass all others in this sphere.

Yet, if we are to believe the spokesmen of the organisations, the pace for which and the arguments for which are furnished by these people, aviation can *never* be effective as a weapon of defence but only of offence.

The Theses of the sixth and the resolution on 'The Struggle for Peace' of the seventh Congress of the Comintern were specific about 'a special rôle' of 'the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom in London.' Now, at the time those words were written, the secretary of the latter body was Miss Dorothy Woodman, afterwards to be the authoress of the pamphlet assailing the arms trade—*i.e.*, *The Secret International*. The secretary in New York was the person pre-eminently responsible for the initiative of Senator Borah in having set up in Washington in 1934 the Senator Nye Committee of Inquiry into the Trade in Arms, which was made the occasion of a world onslaught on Vickers and the British Admiralty. Again, it is worth noting that in 1932, the year of the appearance, under the auspices of the Union of Democratic Control and with the widest advertisement in the Liberal Press of this country, of *The Secret International*, there appeared also in Moscow, in a pamphlet entitled *How Workers become Engineers in the Soviet Union*, this illuminating outburst (p. 12):

The Stalin [turbine] works is competing not only with its neighbours; its main rival is over the seas, sending its smoke into English skies.

For the Stalin plant is really competing with the world-famous Vickers works, which it proposes to overtake and surpass. It is easy to foretell who will be victorious. The old Vickers plant is weakening at every stage in the struggle, at every stage of the Five-Year Plan.

In the following year, it may be remembered, 'at another stage in the struggle,' the engineers who had been sent out to teach the Stalinists how 'to overtake and surpass English plants' were suddenly arrested and put on their trial as, presumably, another 'stage in the Five-Year Plan.'

Finally, let us point out the fact that the attack on Vickers, 'ideologically' and through the G.P.U., arises out of the theory underlying the whole policy and programme of the Comintern, the basic beliefs of Stalin and of Varga. This is the theory advanced in that work, *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, which is defined in the explanatory notes at the end of the English edition (Martin Lawrence) as 'being the basis of the Leninist teaching of proletarian revolution.' Its plainly evident deviation from the teaching of Marx is recognised by Varga. The formula he uses to reconcile the two is not only ingenious, but interesting, in that it bears within itself the possibility of justifying in the future some deviation by Stalin from Lenin. In the course of the second chapter of his latest survey of 'the objective situation'—namely, 'The Great Crisis of 1929-33'—he says:

In making a concrete analysis, it is necessary to omit some of the methodological simplifications which Marx made in order to make the general causes of the crisis more understandable, and on the other hand to introduce the new circumstances created by the development of capitalism. . . .

The economic theory of Marx in general, and his theory of crises in particular, are based upon industrial capitalism, upon the capitalism of free competition. Present-day capitalism is monopoly capitalism—imperialism.

This is the definition occurring in chapter vii. of Lenin's work, *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. There he asserts (p. 80): 'If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism, we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism.' Lenin wrote his book in 1916, less as a piece of objective analysis than as a polemic aimed at the accepted theorist of the orthodox Marxian wing of the Second International. It was calculated to discredit Kautsky. Ever a political tactician rather than a profoundly informed economist, and writing

in the midst of the war and with his eyes on the disagreements within the International between the Marxists and the MacDonaldists, Lenin was at pains to enlist on his side the Liberal economist on whom relied both the Union of Democratic Control and the I.L.P.—to wit, J. A. Hobson. That was a conditioning factor for the part of his mind that was already working upon the problem of a new International. There was another for that part which was planning the use it could make in the stern task of building up on the economically almost virgin *terrain* of All the Russias a new State, of the inherent contradictions in capitalism which were intensifying the ancient antagonisms of the Great Powers. He fixed his eyes, therefore, on the German banks, heavy (*i.e.*, armament) industry, and electrical combines. He saw humiliation ahead for the Germans. He looked down the long vista of historical dialectic. He saw that 'the partition of the world between two powerful trusts does not preclude a *repartition* if the balance of forces changes as a result of uneven development, war, bankruptcies, etc.' When he realised his plans and came to power in Moscow, in 1920 he sent to negotiate the Trade Agreement in England an engineer who had been with the Siemens electrical 'trust.' He associated with him another who had been with Vickers. Two years later he negotiated, through Tchicherin, the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany, represented by the head of the other electrical 'trust,' Rathenau. He defined Socialism as 'Soviet Power *plus* Electrification.' H. G. Wells found him dreaming of electrifying All the Russias.

Such are the circumstances, and such the reasons, underlying the Lenin-Stalin deviation from Marx, as it is being applied in the practice of Soviet economic planning, of Soviet foreign trade, of Soviet official diplomacy, and of Comintern manipulation of 'the Struggle for Peace.' Are we wise in closing our eyes to it, and in concentrating our attention upon what is, at best, a purely secondary issue—namely, the attitude of Italy towards the Covenant, a document which Stalin and his associates and predecessors have never tired of ridiculing? Geneva serves their purpose to-day, but for how long?

WALTON NEWBOLD.

GERMAN EXPANSION AND 'AUSLANDS-DEUTSCHTUM'

By DAVID STEPHENS

THE problem of Expansion—of how to satisfy the demands of the 'Have-not' nations—is one likely to become more, rather than less, pressing in the course of the next five years. The demand for more elbow-room is heard in Asia from Japan; in Europe, principally from Italy and Germany. The first two have already resorted to war to gain their ends. But in either case it is doubtful whether substantial outlet for the surplus population exists or could be created in Manchuria or North China, or in Ethiopia.

Germany's problem differs in several essentials from that of Japan or Italy. There the complaint '*Volk ohne Raum*' ('a people without space') is beginning to reappear on the programme; and as armaments increase, the demand for colonies will no doubt be more insistent. But their return would be welcomed more for reasons of prestige than as providing any solution of the problem of surplus population. Germany arrived late on the field of colonial competition; according to statistics published in 1913, there were but 23,468 Germans in the whole German colonial empire. The colonies may have been important as military bases, or as markets, or as potential sources of raw materials; they certainly were no advantage as fields of emigration.

But if Germans only bethought themselves of overseas colonies in the days of Bismarck, the reason is, perhaps, that they had till then plenty of scope for expansion inside Europe. The German colonisation of Central and Eastern Europe began some five centuries before Great Britain ever had a colonial possession overseas. This process was 'perhaps the principal achievement of the German people during the Middle Ages.'¹ The cultural battle between Teuton and

¹ H. A. L. Fisher, *History of Europe*, vol. i., p. 203.

Slav begins with Charlemagne, in whose age all the great plain west of the Elbe, which is now the heart of Prussia, was predominantly Slav, an inconvenient fact, incidentally, for the advocates of any theory of racial purity. Colonisation proper, as distinct from the gradual absorption of Slav elements that were always pushing the indefinite frontier between Slav and Teuton further east, began in the twelfth century. By 1300 groups of German settlers had found their way to the Lower Vistula, and further south as far afield as Reussen (the Ukraine), the Zips (under the High Tatra), and Siebenbürgen (Transylvania). In the thirteenth century the Teutonic knights established themselves on the Vistula and brought civilisation and Christianity by force of arms to the Baltic States. In this and the following century the intellectual and commercial development of Poland would have been far poorer but for the presence of German merchants and German craftsmen, who were everywhere the mainstay of growing towns and did much to repair the devastation of the Tartar invasions of 1241 and 1259. Germans claim to have taught the Poles the use of stone for building, of the iron plough for tilling and, later, of the musket in war. Similar services were later rendered by the colonies of Swabian peasants, who settled in the Danube plain after the Turks had been driven out of Hungary at the end of the seventeenth century. With their help a wide area of desolation and swamp was converted into the district that soon earned the name of the Granary of Europe.

The presence of German minorities to-day in every country in Eastern Europe is evidence that this colonising process has been consistent and lasting in its effects. It is no accident that German is the *lingua franca* of Eastern Europe, that all the way to the Black Sea the traveller will find scattered clusters of German villages. It is even claimed that one could drive a horse and cart from the Rhine to the Black Sea and sleep in a German village every night—an exaggeration no doubt, but not far from the truth. The pre-war kingdom of Hungary contained more than 2 million Germans, of which the great majority were originally Swabian or Saxon colonists from South and West Germany. A language-map of Europe with the islands of German-speaking people, picked out in some distinctive colour, such as Germans love to make,

reveals a surprising range of penetration—a rash of spots covering the Danube plain, an irregular chain stretching down through Czechoslovakia to Rumania, running on through Transylvania, until it comes up against the Carpathians, a sprinkling still in Poland—not by any means confined to the former German territory in the west—and a whole republic on the Volga. It is claimed that there are over 80 million Germans (*i.e.*, people who speak German as their mother-tongue) in Europe to-day; which means that one in every six Europeans is a German by race if not by citizenship.

If such are the fruits of some eight centuries of German colonisation, it is worth while to inquire what is happening among Germans who live to-day outside the boundaries of the Reich and for whom the Germans have the omnibus expression '*Auslandsdeutsche*.' What are their aspirations and hopes, and what are their reactions to the new Germany? What form will German expansion take in a world of hardening frontiers and economic nationalism, where even the exchange of goods has been rendered difficult enough, to say nothing of movements of population?

It was such questionings as these which prompted me to embark on a study of German minorities and of '*Auslandsdeutsche*' in general. In the course of the last eighteen months I have visited every German settlement of importance between the Baltic, the Adriatic, and the Black Sea. It is not easy to sum up the results of such an inquiry in a series of tidy generalisations, for conditions are everywhere different. A small minority of peasants with no political influence, like the Germans in Hungary, will clearly have little except their culture in common with the 3½ million Germans in Czechoslovakia, who are culturally, economically and politically organised and form a substantial part of the Czechoslovak State. Again, Memel and Danzig, which must also be reckoned as aspects of the whole '*Auslandsdeutsche*' problem, can hardly be compared with countries where Germans are in a minority. But one general observation can be made with fair certainty: the appeal of National-Socialism has everywhere evoked a positive though by no means unanimous response. Nobody is now indifferent to Hitler as they might have been in pre-war days to Bismarck or

Wilhelm II. To-day every German is either for him or against him, and that passionately.

Of the many doctrines of National-Socialism, none has been more enthusiastically received by '*Auslandsdeutsche*' than that of the essential unity of the German race. The avowed aim of National-Socialism is to weld all Germans together into one great spiritual community or '*Volks-gemeinschaft*,' which shall hold together in a spiritual, not a political, sense by natural virtue of the fact that its members are German. There must be a spiritual bond transcending political frontiers. Many of Germany's neighbours are, however, asking themselves, at what point will this spiritual bond become a political instrument? What guarantee is there that the conception of '*Volks-gemeinschaft*' will not soon develop into a new Pan-Germanism? At present there is no modern equivalent to the Baghdad Railway; on the contrary, in order to justify their anti-Semitic excesses, National-Socialists have adopted a doctrine of racial purity which precludes any wish or attempt to assimilate other races. The immediate need, it is assumed, is a purge of their own. But even though Germany may have formally renounced the pre-war ambitions, her neighbours, especially those who, like Czechoslovakia, shelter large German minorities, are uneasily suspicious of a new Pan-Germanism that may do them more harm in the long run than the old. In this anxiety lies, no doubt, the explanation for the lack of generosity with which German minorities are everywhere treated. The feeling of mistrust among their sovereign overlords is almost universal.

It will be convenient in the remarks that follow to start with the Baltic coast and to work round towards Central Europe, which has come to occupy so high a place in the hierarchy of German aims. A notable feature of National-Socialist foreign policy is the shifting of the axis from east to south—or at any rate, south-east. The German gaze is no longer directed fixedly eastward towards Poland, but rather southwards towards Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Danube valley (where the German element is by no means negligible). The '*Drang nach Osten*' has become a '*Drang nach Süden*.' There are, however, several places further north which harbour '*Auslandsdeutsche*,' and towards which German attention has been sometimes nervously, sometimes indig-

nantly, directed—notably the ports of Memel and Danzig on the Baltic. These two, though essentially different in constitution, have several points in common. Both belonged to Germany before the war and were detached by the Treaty of Versailles. Both are served by a hinterland which is not German, the severance of which would mean for either a relapse into commercial insignificance. Reincorporation, therefore, in the German Reich, which, with Stettin, Elbing, Pillau and the rest, has already as many harbours on the Baltic as she can usefully employ, would certainly be economically unprofitable. But both have German populations which are restive under their present state, and while in the Memel territory itself there is no expressed irredentism, in Danzig the principal Government paper bears on its title-page the challenging motto '*Zurück zum Reich*' ('Back to Germany'). But, as a wise Danziger has remarked, 'We can only return to Germany as a corpse.'

But there the points of comparison end, for, while Danzig as a Free State is to a great extent its own master, the Memel territory, after a considerable period of hesitation that was clinched by the Lithuanian invasion of January 1923, was given over to the sovereignty of Lithuania. The Memel statute of May 1924 provided that 'the Memel territory shall constitute, under the sovereignty of Lithuania, a unit organised on democratic principles, enjoying legislative, judicial, administrative and financial autonomy . . .' and proceeded to lay down an elaborate constitution to ensure the realisation of this autonomy. The general purpose of the statute was to secure for Lithuania her natural outlet to the sea (Memel is the only harbour on the coast between Germany and Latvia, and the Memelland occupies two-thirds of the Lithuanian coast-line); and to secure for the Memelland as much autonomy as was compatible with this end.

The Memellanders are a typical mixed frontier population. The town is predominantly German; the country people mostly speak a dialect of Lithuanian, just as the country folk in Upper Silesia speak a dialect of Polish. But, as election results from 1924 onwards show, the Memellanders are solidly German in sympathy; the German parties in the Landtag (Representative Assembly) have never been returned with less than 24 seats out of 29.

Ever since the statute came into operation the greatest difficulties have been experienced in its execution. The Executive Directory appointed from the Lithuanian side has on only two brief occasions enjoyed the confidence of the Landtag, which, according to the statute, it must always do. The Memellanders complain that they have been ruled as a Lithuanian colony; the Lithuanians reply that they have violated the letter of the statute in no single particular, and that all would have been well but for National-Socialist interference and propaganda. A bone of contention is that the whole of Lithuania has been under martial law since 1926; and martial law and 'democratic principles' go ill together. Perhaps the most regrettable feature of the whole dispute, which assumed dangerous proportions with the Kovno treason trial of April 1935, is that both sides have now worked themselves into positions from which retreat is difficult. Such differences as do exist would certainly be easier to compose, were it not for the disparity in economic and cultural values between the Memel territory and Lithuania. A consciousness of superiority gives rise to a feeling among Memellanders that their standards are being dragged down to the lower levels of Lithuania, whereas theirs are properly the higher culture and standard of living of East Prussia. Nor are the views propagated from the Königsberg wireless station likely to dispel this conviction.

The Constitution provided by the Memel statute is workable in theory, but presupposes a more generous measure of co-operation than has previously characterised Lithuanian relations with the Memelland. The demand of the Memelland parties at the recent election was for nothing more than a fair operation of the statute and a genuine realisation of the autonomy that is therein provided. This granted, there would be little irredentism, for the commercial disadvantages of separation from Lithuania are recognised. But if it came to a choice between Germany and Lithuania, over three-quarters of the population—notwithstanding its mixed character—would be for Germany. At the last election, it may be noted, German propaganda did its utmost to represent the issue as a choice between Germany and Lithuania and to lend to the election the character of a Saar Plebiscite.

Lithuania has been imprudent in neglecting the deep

impression which five centuries of German rule has left on this mixed population, whose most marked characteristic is a solid adherence to the culture, habits and ideals of Germany. In this, economic considerations have doubtless played a part, as is usual with frontier populations, which are not normally ultra-nationalist but rather incline to that side which has most to offer. Lithuania has been urged to avoid provoking her larger or stronger neighbours. She has quarrelled with both Poland and Germany. Whatever course events take, a drastic revision of frontiers would bring little profit to anybody and great loss to Lithuania, which has spent over £1,000,000 sterling on improving the harbour of Memel. It is, therefore, to be hoped that, with the assistance of Great Britain as honest broker, a *détente* may be achieved.

Memel can prosper only as the port of Lithuania; Danzig only as the front door of Poland. Unfortunately for Danzig, there has grown up beside her during the last ten years another front door, Gdynia, which, since 1933, has actually taken more of Poland's trade than Danzig itself. Where in 1924 was a fishing village of a few hundred inhabitants is now a flourishing modern port of 50,000, with an artificially created harbour and every conceivable lading and storing amenity. This mushroom achievement has acquired in the Polish mind an almost sacred significance, as a symbol of the resurrection of Poland among the sea-faring nations of the world. If there is anybody who still supposes, as has occasionally been suggested in the past, that Poland might one day be prepared to surrender the Corridor to Germany in return for some nebulous *quid pro quo* that Germany might obtain for her on the east (it is not clear how, or where), he has but to spend an afternoon in Gdynia and make some calculations of the capital sunk in it, or even talk about Gdynia to any Pole that he might meet in any railway carriage, to convince himself of the absurdity of that supposition. Besides, apart from any consideration of Gdynia, the Corridor is now one of the most Polish parts of Poland.

Danzig has naturally suffered from the growth of Gdynia, and she has for some time had difficulty in making both ends meet. But it could not truthfully be said that her financial troubles are entirely of other peoples' making. Since 1933 Danzig has been ruled by a National-Socialist Government,

which had no difficulty in balancing its budget so long as Berlin was prepared to foot the bill. In 1934 the widow's cruse began to fail, and in 1935 almost dried up. Danzig had depended hitherto for almost half the credit side of its balance of payments on Germany, and when the lack of foreign exchange at the Reichsbank made the transfer of funds hazardous, Danzig was at once in financial difficulties, which were not lessened by the extravagances of its National-Socialist Government. In May 1935 the Danziger gulden was devalued down to the level of the Polish zloty (42 per cent.), but the effects of this operation, carried through as it was in the desperation of a last-minute remedy instead of earlier, when there was still a basis of confidence, was largely discounted by an immediate rise in prices. The subsequent dispute with Poland in August, which seems to have been liquidated through Berlin, only gave one more proof that economically Danzig is entirely at the mercy of Poland.

The object of the creation of the Free State of Danzig was to secure for Poland her natural outlet to the sea at the mouth of the Vistula. Nazis now urge that, since Poland has since constructed for herself another outlet, there is no longer any good reason for the continued preservation of the Free State. But there are still respects in which Gdynia is not yet the equal of Danzig, notably in the whole complicated machinery of commerce, and above all in experience; and Gdynia, for example, can never deal with the stream of Vistula barges which can only cross the Bay of Danzig in calm weather. The two ports are thus complementary rather than exclusive; and a commercially young and expanding country like Poland may well need both. The main argument, however, must always be that the port at the mouth of the Vistula must remain available for the country of the Vistula, or face ruin. The half-and-half arrangement concluded in August 1933, whereby it was agreed that Danzig and Gdynia should share the Polish traffic, seems an equitable arrangement, if it be observed. But the political and financial uncertainties of last summer have certainly helped to divert a further proportion of Danzig's trade to Gdynia.

The importation of National-Socialism to Danzig has done little enough for the trade of that city. A port which has to serve as the outlet of another country cannot afford an

exaggerated nationalism. A certain tolerant, international character, such as the Hansa towns have traditionally possessed, is a condition of successful trading. Jewish merchants in Warsaw or Cracow, for example, will hardly be encouraged to send their goods through a port in which anti-Semitism is rampant. As it is, the Nazi Government in Danzig is faced with considerable opposition. In the April elections they could not poll 60 per cent. of the votes cast, in spite of election methods which, in a recent inquiry, have not stood too close examination. To-day, in a free election, they would certainly poll much fewer. Danzig seems, therefore, notwithstanding its solidly German character, only to confirm Dr. Goebbels' principle that National-Socialism is not for export. Its history as a Free State is a tale of the disastrous interference of politics with commerce.

So much for Baltic anxieties. Of the two ports, Danzig is by far the larger, more important, and more exclusively German. Neither would be of much commercial value for Germany. The question which the next few years must decide is whether nationalist or commercial considerations are to be paramount. But it should be possible to allow either port to serve the purpose required by its geographical position and yet retain its German character.

Several other matters besides Danzig were at issue between Poland and Germany until Marshal Pilsudski and Herr Hitler agreed in January 1934 to make up their quarrel and sign a pact of non-aggression. Germany seems well content for the present to let her Eastern frontier rest. She has other more important aims in Central Europe, and both sides have realised how little is to be gained by campaigns of mutual recrimination. The only losers seem to have been the German minority in Poland, now shrunk to something under a million, who feel that they have been sacrificed to larger political ends. Their grievances are no longer aired in the German Press as they were two years ago. It is worth while, in passing, to notice the spirit which Nazism has produced in this scattered community. There are now two factions, besides in Upper Silesia a party of brave opposition Catholics with money from nowhere—the '90 per centers' and the '110 per centers,' as they are irreverently called by their opponents—each claiming to be the true

prophets of Berlin, composed on the one hand of the steadier, elder men of experience, who hold remunerative positions, and on the other of the more radical younger men who want them. The same phenomenon is not unknown in present-day Germany, and recurs in several other '*Auslandsdeutsche*' communities.

In Central Europe there is one country whose position is different from all others that shelter German minorities. Of the principal nationalities of Czechoslovakia, 50 per cent. are Czechs, 16 per cent Slovaks, and 23 per cent. Germans. The Germans there number nearly 3½ millions; the majority live in a solid band on the periphery of Bohemia—that is, adjacent to the German frontier. A comparison of the linguistic with the political map of Europe reveals at once the insecurity of the Czech position—a long ill-balanced cutlet-shaped country, completely surrounded at its western and broader end by German-speaking peoples. Were Austria one day to come under German influence, the strategic position of Bohemia would become precarious. And if one thing is certain in Europe to-day, it is that Germany has not given up interest in Austria, nor has any intention of doing so.

It was noticeable that during the past autumn both Germany and Poland have been prosecuting campaigns, both by Press and wireless, against the treatment of their respective minorities in Czechoslovakia—the Poles on account of their minority (about 100,000) in Teschen, the Germans on account of the '*Sudetendeutsche*,' as the Germans of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia are called. In this apparently fortuitous conjunction some have professed to see a kind of burglar's agreement. But if that goes too far, it does at least appear to suit the policy of both countries that the quarrel with their southern neighbour should be kept alive.

In the Czechoslovak elections held in May 1935 a new German party, led by Konrad Henlein, scored a triumphant success. The '*Sudetendeutsche Partei*' had never previously fought an election, but in May captured more votes than any other party and only one seat less, owing to the unequal method of distributing mandates, than the Czech Agrarians. A new factor was thereby introduced into Czech politics, for whereas formerly one German party could, if need be, always be played off against another, Herr Henlein had now suc-

ceeded in rallying a good two-thirds of the German electorate to his banner. The conditions and background of his success were much the same as those of Hitler's—successful appeal to nationalist sentiment, general dissatisfaction with the multiplicity of political parties, which had produced only squabbling and few practical results, and, finally, great distress in the industrial areas, which are so disastrous a feature of the German part of Bohemia. A chief and pressing grievance of the '*Sudetendeutschen*' is that the State does nothing to relieve the unemployment in the German areas, which are probably harder hit by trade depression than any other part of Europe. The incidence of unemployment is there twice as frequent as in other parts of Czechoslovakia. For in North Bohemia was once concentrated the entire industry of the Habsburg Empire; with the spread of economic nationalism and the shrinkage of the home market from 50 odd to 13 millions, the whole has become one vast depressed area, in which misery and starvation have produced a dangerous degree of sullen despair. Henlein's demands are for an equitable share in the administration of the State. At present he claims the Germans have in proportion to their numbers 50,000 too few '*Beamte*' (employees in the State services). His party, although the strongest, has not yet been invited to share in the government; he also claims cultural autonomy.

It is clear that Henlein owed much of his success to the influence of National-Socialism. Apart from the fact that his party must have absorbed the majority of the two Nazi parties, which were dissolved by the Czech Government in the same month as that in which his party was founded, it would be strange if some ideas did not filter through from Germany. Henlein himself has tried to select the good points of National-Socialism while avoiding its extravagances. He has adopted in his propaganda much of the Nazi ideology. There is much talk of '*Volksgemeinschaft*,' of putting '*Volk*' before party or individuals, and of preferring public to private interest. He professes to be neither anti-Jew nor anti-Catholic, nor, of course, totalitarian—no minority can afford to be that. His avowed aim is to find a *modus vivendi* with the Czechs, with whom the '*Sudetendeutschen*' have shared the Bohemian basin—albeit not always peaceably—for a thousand years. But the Czechs remain profoundly sceptical. The

anxiety in the Czech mind finds a close parallel in that of the French. Any attempt to urge an understanding with Germans meets in Czechoslovakia, as in France, with the same apparently insurmountable barrier of suspicion and mistrust. For the Czechs, whether it is '*Sudetendeutsch*' or '*Reichsdeutsch*' makes no essential difference. They believe the '*Sudetendeutsche Partei*' to be Nazi-inspired and Nazi-aided, and will, therefore, have nothing whatever to do with it.

It is impossible not to feel a certain anxiety at the course events may take in Czechoslovakia. The danger is that the sympathy for National-Socialism that obviously exists among the '*Sudetendeutschen*' will not be diminished, but rather inflamed, by the Czech policy of non-recognition; that repression will only tend to render it more radical. Now, as the Czechs realise well enough themselves, their country occupies a key position. Where would lie the sympathies of the 3½ million Czechoslovak Germans, it is asked, if one day Austria lost her independence (of which, after all, a weakened Italy is not the best guarantee)? Herr Henlein has times without number categorically denied all connexion with Germany; but in different circumstances, who can say whither the natural sympathies of his supporters might not lead them? It is doubtless some such misgivings as these that prevents the Czech Government from taking up a positive attitude to the German problem within their own frontiers. But it is difficult to see what they would stand to lose from at least parleying with a party that has never ceased to proclaim its loyalty to the Czechoslovak State and an anxious wish for constructive co-operation with its other nationalities. At present there is no basis for co-operation, and that is the worst possible augury for the future.

The German minorities of the Danubian countries form in no case a large proportion of the population: in Hungary 7 per cent., in Yugoslavia 4½ per cent., in Rumania also 4½ per cent. Except for the Siebenbürger Saxons in Transylvania, who form a developed and highly educated island of German culture by themselves, the majority are peasants bound to the soil, and in general prepared to be good citizens of any State that will give them a measure of cultural freedom. There is never much irredentism among agricultural populations. But they are sufficiently numerous to be the means

of cultural penetration, and their rôle will doubtless become a more important one as German relations with those countries become closer. Germany's trade with the Danubian countries, which are the producers of those essential raw materials and foodstuffs which Germany requires, is year by year increasing. Hence the importance of the Danube valley in German policy. The road thither leads through Austria and Czechoslovakia.

The central fact towards which I have attempted to draw attention is that of the cultural development which Germany has for some time been encouraging among people of German race outside her own frontiers. It is both natural and legitimate that Germans, wherever they may live and whatever their technical citizenship may be, should wish to draw their inspiration and direction from the fountain-head. The idea is to be found in many of Kipling's poems and prose writings in relation to English-speaking peoples. It is immanent in the Zionist movement. Its roots are deep in human hearts. The presence of Germans in every country in Central and Eastern Europe provides for that fountain-head an exceptional opportunity of making its influence felt in almost any corner of the Continent and beyond. They have been the means of German expansion in the past, and in most countries their industry and thoroughness made them welcome guests. Only the future can show whether they are to serve as the basis of another and a different form of expansion in the future.

DAVID STEPHENS.

CHILDREN OF THE SOIL

COUNTRY MARRIAGE IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND

By J. S. COLTART

WE arrived at Langres from Dijon one October evening and found a state of some expectancy in the Hôtel du Cheval Blanc, a small and comfortable little provincial inn. M. le patron met us and answered our inquiries and showed us a room, but while he was assisting me to garage the car it appeared that matters had been removed from the male hands and that our respective madames had met and were getting down to the essential facts of food and lodging. Thereafter monsieur was relegated to his masculine insignificance: he was, in fact, left to cool his heels in the outer parts, and madame supervised a respectable dinner with marked ability.

We soon saw that something was afoot. There was a partition across the dining-room, and there were mysterious comings and goings, gigglings among the serving maids, and an air of anticipation from which even madame was not immune. After dinner our curiosity was gratified: a bridal party came down the street in procession and filed into the inn; they were met and ushered in by a smiling madame. Monsieur continued to sulk unregarded in the outer world; we surmised that he had been too officious earlier in the day and was now being shown how well things could be run without him. And thus monsieur—poor chap!—fades from the story: I found him quite good at guiding a car to the garage.

The bride and bridegroom had led the procession in full bridal array: they were pale little things, dwarfed by the monstrous regiment of kinsfolk, and rather pathetic. This could not be said of the relatives: they had obviously come to do themselves well this evening. There were two mothers

in almost regal splendour, and two fathers, trying to create the illusion that their share in the matter was not to be overlooked: the others were assorted, quite simple folk, one would say, and brought up in rear by an enormous gendarme in all the glory of his full-dress uniform, arms, and war medals—a notable relation indeed.

As we drank our coffee on the terrace we could see into the kitchen, where an extraordinarily young chef was dealing with the banquet with the hand and assurance of a master of his craft; and, from what we could see, the marriage feast was no light affair: sounds of revelry issued from the dining-room, and they were still going strong when we retired to bed. Then the proceedings began to warm up; judging by the applause, there were after-dinner speakers, weighty but light of heart. Some time later on I was awakened by music, which, by its volume of sound, we surmised came from the town band: it was probably some hours later that we realised that it was from a gramophone of super-volume. We discovered this from the uproarious hilarity when the needle stuck at one spot on a record: this record became a favourite, and it was put on again and again throughout the night, scoring an unqualified triumph each time. Sleep was by now out of the question, so we settled ourselves down to get what entertainment was going; that, as I have indicated, was considerable.

Sometime after midnight the bride and bridegroom were escorted to their home by their younger supporters. They had a hilarious send off, and we could hear the shouts of their attendants as they wended their way through the streets. Poor little bride and bridegroom! But one day they will get their own back. Their departure tuned up the party to concert pitch: the mirth became fast and furious, and the favourite record was played almost continuously to deafening applause. I think it was about 4 o'clock when this happy gathering dispersed.

In noting how well such frugal people as the French rise to occasions even though their circumstances be humble, how they have the means to do it, and how they regard the early and successful marriage of their children as one of the first duties of parents, one wonders how their customs compare with corresponding English people. One can remember,

when one lived among the common people in the war, that however hard they worked on their holdings or about their business in towns, however simple their dwellings, they always seemed to be equipped for greater things; how well dressed they were when they turned out to Mass; how smart the girls and women were whenever one passed through a French town on a Sunday; how marriages, funerals, or other of the great things of life were undertaken on a comprehensive scale, or, in lesser things, how one was always sure of a clean bed in a French billet. And there were not wanting those who said that comparison would go ill with a corresponding home in England or Scotland.

I have just been to a wedding here—that is, in a remote Norfolk village—and if there is anything more remote in a country that professes and calls itself civilised, I have yet to know it. And whereas I can only speak of the wedding at Langres as a spectator, however friendly and interested, I can vouch for my English facts in every particular. The wedding reception was held at the bride's home, a small farm a little above the small-holding type. The bride herself, with the bridegroom near by, met the guests as they arrived in dribblets from the church: she was radiant in her bridal dress and veil, tall and vivacious, very happy and charming. The bridegroom was more subdued and self-conscious, but he was a good-looking young man, well set up and dressed, and more slim than one would expect in a farm worker. Hired cars conveyed the bride and bridegroom, the two bridesmaids, and the parents; the rest walked. When the guests had assembled they were seated in two rooms: the bride directed the arranging and served out the food; her mother poured out tea for everybody; her stepfather was busy for the time being attending to his stock. The tables were adequately set out with flowers, plates, knives and forks: there was a two-tier bridecake, which might have graced any wedding feast, made by a baker in an adjoining village. The tables were plentifully set with loaded plates of home-made bread rolls, sausage rolls, mince pies, and all varieties of cakes—all made by the bride on the previous day. The company ate cold salt beef and pickles, also cooked at home; it was good.

Then the bride proceeded to cut the cake; she was

generous with it, though perhaps more generous to special friends. The 'best man' had retired behind the scenes and proceeded to hand round glasses of port to everybody: he was no orator in proposing their health; this, however, did not restrain the company from doing honour to the bride and bridegroom. The port, also, was good.

It was now dark, but lamps had been lighted before the proceedings began; indeed, it was one of the features of the evening that things went without hitch of any kind. The best man had disappeared again (at this stage he was much too busy a man to pay much attention to the bridesmaids—he dealt with that matter adequately at his leisure), and his presence was next felt by the explosion of sundry fireworks outside the house: his married sisters looked at each other pityingly. Meanwhile, the bride was busy cutting up her cake and wrapping up portions in clean tissue paper (ready to her hand in the necessary quantity) and handing it out to relatives who were present to give to those who were not. The bridegroom remarked that that was saving postage, but she was prepared even for that: she produced a box containing little bridecake boxes, each with its card printed in silver (printed in the local town), with all particulars given in proper form. Throughout the meal, as well as being vivacious, she was a most charming hostess, being exceedingly considerate and nice to everybody.

The best man next appeared (after the tables had been cleared by the bride's mother and helpers in the company) laden with trays of ale, stout, port, and lemonade; though by rank and profession a gardener, he had a way of dealing with drinks which drew admiring comment. Meanwhile, the bridesmaids had changed their dresses (probably in order to help to wash up); but the bride was loth to doff hers, as well she might, for she was a beautiful bride and was not unconscious of the fact. She went at last, assisted by her maids; but only to reappear in another frock, for the night was yet young.

The company sat round in gratified content; and presently a man with an accordion arrived, and there was dancing among the younger ones in a back kitchen (the bridegroom did not dance—he preferred sawing, the bride explained); but the bride kept things going, and the best man

was having a wonderful time as butler in the dairy. The dancing was mingled with a few songs. I drove the bride and a few of her husband's relations over to see her new home. With such entertainment the evening passed, stimulated by friendly chat, food and drink. We left at about 9 o'clock, but the proceedings continued in great harmony till midnight.

Now for figures and facts. The bridegroom is twenty-three years old. His father was a farm labourer, but he had a bad illness at about the time he was due for the old-age pension, and his family persuaded him to stop work. The father and mother have a family of ten—six daughters and four sons: all the girls are well married to suitable husbands; but this is the first son to leave home. The eldest son is a farm labourer—he was wounded in the war, being the only one old enough to go; the next, the best man, is our gardener and attends to the fruit orchards. My wife has a poultry farm; the bridegroom is the poultryman. The youngest son drives a grocer's cart (horse—there still are such things here) on a house-to-house round: he started that when he left school, age fourteen, and, being now about eighteen, he is an established and rising man about the countryside. The wage of the agricultural labourer is 31s. 6d. per week, or 35s. for teamsmen and yardmen: before and during the first part of the war, when the parents were bringing up this family, the wage was about 14s. Yet they were all decently brought up with good health, and as a family are justly regarded as good workers.

The bride has just had her twenty-first birthday. She left school when fourteen years old and became our maid, and continued to be for four years, when both parties thought a change would do good: she then went as cook to a house in one of the coast towns. She is a clever and intelligent girl, as may have been surmised, and an excellent cook: I bore her loss with deep sorrow. Her father was killed in the war and she was his only child: her mother remarried a small farmer and has three more children. The bride is on excellent terms with her stepfather.

Now this young couple, starting with only their own courage and hard work, have been able to marry and set themselves up in very good comfort at the ages of twenty-

three and twenty-one. The bridegroom is a young man of intelligence and character, which should act as an excellent complement to the ability and vitality of his bride. He, however, owing to no fault of his own, has not been in continuous work since leaving school, but he never 'went on the roads': his savings are, then, the more noteworthy. A couple of years' work among poultry has led to his being put in charge of the concern and given a bungalow consisting of sitting-room, kitchen, and two bedrooms: hence the wedding. He gets 40s. per week, less 3s. 6d. rent, which is the local rent for a labourer's cottage with garden; the council houses are 4s. 6d. or 5s. per week, but they are larger. We calculate that they have spent quite £50 on furnishing; and we also surmise that the bride provided much of the wedding feast.

Their house is very well furnished, and anyone might live in it who did not mind economy of space. An enterprising firm of house furnishers in Norwich, 20 miles away, supplies a private car to take would-be purchasers to and from their shop. In writing this one can almost hear the chorus of critics: 'Hire-purchase; buying beyond their means; bribed by the car to buy what they don't want; slick salesmen taking advantage of rustics!' The facts are that they paid cash down for everything they bought, and that, including every item of outlay they have had, they have by no means exhausted their bank balances: they both have had savings bank accounts since commencing work. And as for the furniture, they had a day's shopping together, which the bridegroom found exhausting—so, I gather, did the salesmen. The bride knew exactly what she wanted and what she was going to pay for it: to cite one instance, she made them turn out every carpet in the shop (the bridegroom reckoned it at seventy), as the flashy 'modern' designs were not what she wanted at all, and finally an Axminster had to be made specially for the size of the room. And, even at that, the wretched shop did not get the whole order; they could produce nothing up to standard for the small bedroom, and its furniture was bought elsewhere.

The account of the wedding day may have given the impression, possibly, of a charming but also of rather an extravagant girl. The later narrative may have corrected this

impression, but have given birth to a doubt as to whether such a paragon would not be more at home furnishing the mansions of the blessed than a house on this green earth. That doubt also may be removed: when she is not being a perfect angel, she is quite capable of acting as a complete little devil! For example, she was seriously late in arriving at church—it was something about not being able to get her veil right; but she explained that she knew they could not get on till she got there, though this entailed keeping the rector waiting, not to speak of a church full of villagers, who would talk; and she has never been without her critics, whom she can repay in their own coin. In fact, she has the imperfections which go towards making a daughter of Eve—a creature more dear to mortal man while on earth than are the holy angels who neither marry nor are given in marriage.

I do not contend that this is typical of a country wedding—many, indeed, fall short of it abysmally; but it has been achieved, and, as I stated earlier, I can vouch for every fact I have adduced. Contrasted with the wedding at Langres, it evokes several comparisons—most of all, perhaps, in the relative positions of the parents and the young couple. In France the parents were supreme; in England they were in the background. I cannot say whether the match originated with the French parents or their children: here it was arranged from first to last by the bride and bridegroom themselves; and they had been 'walking out' for years before the wedding. One's knowledge of provincial France leads one to suppose that the establishment of the bride and bridegroom was carried out and paid for by the parents, in such proportions as were negotiated by the respective mothers: in England it was jointly found by the hard work and savings of the young people themselves, for, despite her lively and happy disposition, the bride was willing to forego picture-houses, village dances and the like, for the purpose she has now achieved. Their house was further embellished by presents from relatives and friends, and the wedding party was a generous and wholly delightful acknowledgment from the bride. The dinner at Langres was a more elaborate and costly meal—that, at least, we could see. But there the difference in the customs of the countries comes in: it is not the practice in England to dine out at the inn of the small

town or village (and this is the reason why English hotels cannot, and never will till things change, approach anywhere near the Continental standard); but in this remote and tiny village, of about 120 people, we were well and hospitably entertained and passed a happy evening in great concord and good fellowship.

Nor do the conclusions stop here. These two young people left school when they were fourteen; they are both intelligent. Since being put in charge of the poultry farm the bridegroom has shown marked ability in controlling the two boys under him and arranging the work of the place. Previous staffs of trained poultrywomen (girls from agricultural colleges) have been tried and found wanting, either in economy, ability, the desire to work, or the amount of supervision and work required of the mistress: this young man has taken the entire affair on his shoulders and gets it done efficiently and without friction. He is a handyman with tools and repairs; he has quickly picked up the more technical work, and is reliable in that as well as in getting through with the routine tasks.

The bride was a clever girl at school, and always a leader in her class: had she wanted to, she would have had little difficulty in winning a secondary school scholarship. This, in the present system of education—which, in so far as it affects the ordinary council schools, seems only designed to supply recruits for itself—would probably mean that she would become a certificated or an uncertificated teacher. This would imply that for three years she would be earning nothing; her pay as a pupil teacher, if she chose that course, would be swallowed up in travelling, lodging, or clothes. Even supposing she had secured a grant as a war pensioner, her earning capacity would not commence till this time was over. As it was, at the age of seventeen she was earning £30 a year, over and above her board and lodging, and she had been earning and saving for three years. Had she pursued a school career she would eventually have greater earning power, and possibly larger prospects: in doing so she would join that indeterminate and not altogether established class who do not fit in too well with the life of the countryside, having more or less left their own people without being identified with any others.

Scholastic preferment might have taken her to the towns,

though this is extremely doubtful, for the call of the country is strong, and she would not lightly break family ties ; but the possibility of it raises the whole question of the black-coated worker as against the farm labourer. Under the Agricultural Wages Act a boy of fourteen receives 10s. 6d. per week, which rises rapidly by annual increments till at the age of twenty-one he is in receipt of a man's full wage : that wage may be adequate or inadequate (according to the size of his family), but it sets the standard of life of the country. A young man in regular work therefore has the recognised full income by the time he reaches man's estate ; 15s. per week is the commonly recognised scale of payment for board and lodging for a man. The young labourer is thus very much better situated than his opposite number among the black-coated workers : he has a very good surplus of income over necessary expenditure if he is living at home, and he can marry whenever he has saved enough for furniture and can get a house. Few clerks are in a corresponding position for another ten years : they have expenses in clothes, travelling, and the continuous calls of living in a town, which do not hit the countryman. The townsman's salary may become higher, but his expenses also soar, and there is disparity, instead of uniformity, in the circumstances of the people with whom he comes in contact. These conditions seem to point to the sound good sense with which our bride and bridegroom have ordered their life.

Is more education, therefore, going to do any real good to the rural districts ? Is it really going to get down to ' some heart pregnant with celestial fire ' and ' unroll the ample page of knowledge to their eyes,' or is it going to turn out hordes of half-baked black-coatees going about canvassing things people do not want to buy, or spending their lives adding up other people's money ? In the country, with the exception of the small percentage of scholarship winners, the wish of the children, and of their parents, is to get out and start earning money as soon as possible. Where there are brilliant children who would benefit by higher education the present system of scholarships might well be extended, so that parents who cannot afford to board their children in a town where there is a secondary school, or send them to a university, might have these expenses met : that is a development which has the

support of all who have the cause of education at heart, as opposed to those who would mix it up with politics and use it for a possible palliative for unemployment. But where the children lack either the wish or the brains to profit by it, what will they gain by spending two more years in school ? Is the usefulness of the low-grade clerk or other such type, which this extension might encourage, to be compared to the value to the country of the sturdy farm labourer ?

I can imagine no sounder stock for the good of the country than that of our bridegroom's parents. They have spent a life in honourable toil ; they have raised ten children who are carrying on their tradition, without cost to the rates or the health services. Our bride and bridegroom have not only established themselves in early life in comfort, but they have been able to do so with all the *élan* and ceremony of an ' occasion ' : their party was the bounty and hospitality of a gracious hostess, for which the bride and her mother had set to and worked for her guests. Even her wedding dress, which to my inexperienced eyes would have done for any but the most fashionable bride, had been bought judiciously some months before, with an eye to dyeing it for future use after the ceremony ; the other dress she changed into she had worn two years before as a bridesmaid to one of her sisters-in-law. One learns all these pleasant details when one has secured the gift of the heritage of friends among one's neighbours.

But enough of figures and conclusions. The pleasure of it all remains—the beauty and radiance of the bride, the quiet happiness of her husband and his pride in his new-made wife, the dignified content of the parents, and the complete harmony and accord of all the guests.

The French wedding guests escorted the bridal pair to their home with much hilarity ; the English party broke up at the parent's house. Then, the wedding ended, the guests gone, husband and wife walked quietly down the winding lanes to their new home. There had been cars to collect and transport the guests and for themselves to go to the ceremony : it is touching to think that, having given so generously of their best, there was now no more need of fuss for their own departure—to face together the battles of life with the courage and gallantry with which they had begun.

CONCERNING BOOKS

NEVER were there so many people in the world who can read English: never were more books worth reading published every month of the year. Publishers may reasonably complain that they are liable to prosecution at the discretion of any chief constable, and, on grounds of obscenity, to conviction at the whim of any magistrate in England or Wales, for sponsoring a book dealing with subjects which convention regards as legitimate on the stage, or in the cinema, but improper in book form. It is common ground in legal circles that the law of libel as it affects the publishers of books and newspapers affords them insufficient protection. Yet the fact remains that English is pre-eminently a free tongue, Great Britain a free country, and publishing a free trade which, though it has its own problems, has not yet been subjected to those processes of rationalisation and amalgamation of which Mr. Harold Macmillan is, in the House of Commons, the leading exponent. The output of books from our publishing houses is not the least of national assets. Are we making the most of it? The library committees of clubs and institutions, schools and colleges, steamships and commercial houses can do much to give sinews to the bones of freedom, which never more greatly needed strengthening, by purchasing and encouraging the reading at home and abroad of books which show those forces at work. As neither the season nor the weather were such as to encourage 'Walks and Talks' (which I hope to resume in February), I have spent my leisure time at home with books. The first few which have newly found their way to places of honour on my shelves are:

This Torch of Freedom: Speeches and Addresses by the Right Hon. Stanley Baldwin, M.P. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1935, 12s. 6d.). Ten years ago Mr. Baldwin published his first collection of speeches *On England*: two years later

followed *Our Inheritance*. This volume, published in a form and at a price which must preclude a large circulation, follows precedent in containing, with two exceptions, which will be referred to later, no political speeches. Each item in the collection is self-contained, was addressed to audiences as various as they were doubtless appreciative, and contains material for half a dozen good sermons. Students of Mr. Baldwin's speeches will find here little repetition of the thoughts, still less of phrases, which are embedded in his earlier collected addresses; there is nothing inconsistent with what has gone before, and little that is new. That is not a criticism of the book. No one is better able than Mr. Baldwin to delight an audience, in Dr. Johnson's phrase, 'by only diversifying the surface of knowledge, and luring the mind by a new appearance to a second view of those beauties which it had passed over inattentively before.' He is speaking of ideals, never realised but always being realised, and of men and things of permanent value. Steeped in the spirit of which he is the leading exponent, he discusses one aspect after another of our daily life in phrases—often witty, sometimes profound, never unworthy—which can be remembered with pleasure and quoted with effect.

But there is little indication that Mr. Baldwin desires action on the lines of his own thoughts. Six years ago, in a speech here reprinted in order to remind the public of his outlook, he observed that certain constructive proposals for the improvement of parliamentary procedure were 'important, and of some urgency.' But nothing has been done. 'It is not the function of any Department or Minister,' he adds, complacently, 'to examine how far the laws have fulfilled the promises of their sponsors.' 'I am assured,' he continues, 'that there is need to examine the effects of the provision of social services. I am told that there is at least reason to question

(a) Whether the expansion of protective services . . . is encouraging inertia.

(b) Whether the constructive services are being developed along lines which encourage to the full variety, initiative, and self-exertion.

(a) Whether the sense of corporate responsibility . . . is being fostered by the expansion of social services.'

But there has been no such inquiry.

This is one 'political' speech; there is yet another, and it is not that addressed to the Junior Imperial League, but to the Peace Society. It was perfectly attuned to the mind of the daily Press and of a majority of its readers at the moment when, on October 31 last, it was uttered. It was not a party speech, but it was political rather than philosophic. 'Shall we,' he asks, 'attempt to solve differences between nations by the way of law that we all adopt as a matter of course for our private differences?' But he does not ask the next question that arises, 'if so, by what law?' Can a majority verdict of national delegates be regarded as having the force of law? Sir Samuel Hoare in December last was acting not only as Foreign Secretary, but as the authorised agent of the Committee of Eighteen, on behalf of the Council of Fifty, duly empowered, with M. Laval, to seek the road to peace. He was compelled to resign, as was the Canadian delegate a few weeks earlier, by public outcry in his own country before he had reported to the Committee for whom he was acting. What is the future of a jury whose members may be thus removed, or 'instructed'? To ask this question is not to answer it, but it should be asked. Was the 8-7 verdict of the Permanent Court of International Justice against the *Anschluss* a wholly judicial or a partly political decision?

Mr. Baldwin deals with Collective Security, observing that 'upon another occasion I have expressed my thoughts upon this policy in fiery language *not my own*. And I do not withdraw.' That is, indeed, a cryptic utterance. 'It is the history of mankind that if our aspirations are to be made effective they must be embodied in a Church, in an Order, in a Parliamentary Assembly.' Surely Mr. Baldwin here assumes what he seeks to prove. Is the League of Nations any of these things?

He speaks with approval of the frequent meetings of representatives of the Powers to discuss business of all kinds and to reach agreements. Yet in the House of Commons on December 19 he appeared to deprecate the growing practice of personal discussion, culminating in 'conclusions' between Foreign Ministers.

He protests that 'the League is living: it also gains adherents: that is a sign of growth. Not long ago it was strengthened by the advent of the U.S.S.R.' Here again the

Prime Minister is assuming the truth of a proposition that many people would like to see argued. If real agreement is to be reached by men or by nations upon a matter of importance, surely there must be some ground common to all. What common ground can there be between the bitterly opposed philosophies of the Comintern and Christianity, between the outlook of the Germany of Hitler and of modern Japan or China, the passionate desire for isolation of the American people and the pathetic desire for security of the smaller Powers, grouped like frightened sheep at the sight of a wild beast? Is not the foothold of the League, in his own phrase, too slippery?

It was a great speech, noble in language, worthy of the moment, in its frank admission that 'we have gone too far alone, and must try to bring others along with us.' But it avoided more issues than it faced.

Immanuel Kant in his essay of 1795 on *Perpetual Peace* suggests the insertion of a secret stipulation in all treaties that 'The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the possibility of a Public Peace, shall be taken into consideration by States armed for War.' This, he said, must be a secret clause, for to ask advice from philosophers might endanger the reputation of statesmen, to whom must be attributed all wisdom. In Britain to-day this clause is unnecessary, for, as this book shows, we have as our leader a statesman who is also a philosopher.

The Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs (Smith and Heseltine, the Clarendon Press, 21s.). Here, at last, is a fitting companion to the *Oxford English Dictionary*—a Dictionary of National Biography, of figures of native speech, many of which have an ancestry as well-attested as that of any family in the land.

It is the pious work over a period of twenty-five years of Mr. W. G. Smith; and it is assured of a life as long as that of its companions of honour, those great Clarendon classics, the *O.E.D.* and *D.N.B.*, which the piety and scholarship of many generations have with much painful labour bequeathed to us. Here are the title-deeds of our common fields of thought, and the quintessence of wisdom of common men throughout the ages. It is not a Dictionary of Quotations, though the earliest

written or printed record of each saying is recorded: it does not record the vast number of sayings from Holy Writ which have become so embedded in our thought and speech that their origin is often forgotten, nor does it include quotations from Shakespeare, often used to-day with meanings other than those first intended. Mr. Smith has successfully resisted the temptations to include such in his collection, and it is well that he has done so, for we all have our pet quotations, and it would have become too bulky for use.

To Mrs. J. E. Heseltine has fallen the task of revision; she has prepared an index which, so far as I have tested it, is impeccable and a work of art in itself. Her Introduction is worthy of the book. It cannot wholly replace the specialised works upon which it has been founded, such as Apperson's *English Proverbs*, Skeat's *Early English Proverbs*, Tilley's *Elizabethan Proverb Lore*, and *Proverb Literature* by Bonser and Stephens. But it will henceforth be as indispensable as the *Oxford English Dictionary* itself, and, like that glorious achievement of English scholarship, may some day require a supplement.

All good men who love to browse in their scanty leisure in the 'rich battlegrounds' (Henry VIII.'s paraphrase of 'green pastures' in Ps. xxiii.) of early literature should be ready to send to Mrs. Heseltine genuine and authenticated addenda to her collection. The editor of this Review will be prepared for the next six months to print a selection of such as are sent to him, preferably on postcards, fully attested with the title of the work in which they appear. He will pay a fee of 5s. for each item printed. For example:

(Smith.) *Use makes (maketh) mastery.*

1519. *Horman's Vulgaria*, p. 343. Use maketh mastery.

Truth will out.

1519. *Horman's Vulgaria*, p. 307. The truth will appere in processe of tyme.

(Smith.) *God sends meat and the devil sends cooks.*

Hollyband. *The French Schoolemaister* (1569 (?)).

(Reprinted as *The Elizabethan Home*, 1925, p. 40.)

God sendeth us meate, and the Devill cookes.

Such works of reference are becoming daily more popular as their value is recognised: they will help us not only to

solve *The Times* cross-word puzzle, but to face the puzzles of the times in the knowledge that our ancestors faced theirs in their day, wittily and boldly.

Cheerful Giver. *The Life of Harold Williams*, by his wife, with a preface by Sir Samuel Hoare (Peter Davies, 1936, 10s. 6d.). Harold Williams was a journalist whose interest lay in foreign affairs, who added genius to linguistic gifts. His home was in New Zealand; his father a Wesleyan Minister and later editor of the *Methodist Times*; his mother was of West Country yeoman stock. His Russian-born wife, who has written this book in a style worthy of her husband, was herself a brilliant figure in intellectual post-war Russia.

The *Manchester Guardian*, the *Morning Post*, the *Daily Chronicle*, and *The Times* each in turn had the honour of numbering him among their foreign correspondents; the greatest diplomatists and Foreign Ministers communicated with mutual confidence to him far more than he ever published. At the end of the last century, as to-day, the fight against social injustice inspired many of the best younger men in Russia, Spain, England, Germany and Italy. Harold Williams entered the Methodist ministry in New Zealand on probation at the age of twenty, depriving himself of food to buy books—Tolstoy, Wallace, Ruskin, and Henry George. He was in advance of his day, and with his probation his ministry came to an end.

He migrated to Europe to study in Germany in great poverty, feeling 'very fortunate in being able to exist here at all. If life is a battle, every stage of a battle may be a victory.' Twenty years later he was at the height of his great influence as Foreign Editor of *The Times*; twenty-five years later he wrote to his wife:

Christ is Risen, my dear. I feel it, though I cannot explain it, trampling down death by death—so all becomes less terrible, less hard to bear.

He died in November 1928, fortified by the sacraments of the Russian Church, leaving the world richer for his short life. In the words of Sir Samuel Hoare's discerning introductory note, 'He was among the first of our intellectuals to penetrate the falsities of a new creed, and to see that oppression, even though it be painted by propaganda and strengthened by overpowering force, . . . is nothing more than the old despotism mechanized for modern use.'

This is a book to be given as a prize to young men and women: here they will find inspiration, and wisdom; history in the making and the world at work. Harold Williams never lived in a cloister. His wife, who was also his colleague, has done justice to him and

to a great figure in English journalism, and a tragic phase in the declension of Europe. The moral of the book is to be found in her husband's own words :

One has to struggle continually. The most painful thing of all is when it comes our way into our own lives ; but then, too, we must struggle with the same faith. There are forces around us. Our life, our hope and our light are in them. Man is not powerless in this mysterious universe.

Albert of Belgium : Defender of Right, by Emile Cammaerts, C.B.E., LL.D. (Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 21s. net). This is much more than the biography of one of several sovereigns who, in the twentieth century, proved to the world that, whether in peace or in war, a monarch can lead and inspire a democratic people far more effectively than a president, giving continuity to national ideals, and shape and expression to aspirations common to all political parties. It is much more than the affectionate tribute to his sovereign of a great literary figure, a brilliant writer in two languages. Much is passed over that the late King Albert's subjects would have lovingly dwelt on : much is omitted of which we in this country, to whom he was the glorified personification of his countrymen, would have gladly heard more—for he was a great figure among the troops in Flanders. M. Cammaerts has written an important historical work round a great historical figure—historical because, again and again during his reign, his attitude was not less decisive in shaping his country's fortunes because it was exercised constitutionally.

This book should be in every school library, for it shows, as no work that I have read has shown, not 'the realities' of war, but the indirect consequences upon a helpless nation. M. Cammaerts cites the aged Burgomaster's reply to the threats of a German officer : 'You have the power, sir. You can imprison me, condemn me, rob me, shoot me, but I have the right to demand that you should do it politely.' The words will be remembered longer and convey more than the most eloquent phrases. M. Cammaerts emphasises in almost every chapter the moral aspects of the problems with which the King dealt, and shows, by many quotations, that he never allowed himself to fall below the level of events. His Cabinet was bound to take short views, to reach day-to-day decisions ; but he never forgot the concomitant need for long views. The time has not yet come when King Albert's share in promoting long-term policies of appeasement with her neighbours can be assessed. That it was important has been shown by Mr. Christopher Dawson.

King Albert was a very practical man—serious in his studies, thorough in his reading, happy in domestic life. With the bearing and figure of a soldier he combined a deep religious temperament ; his life-long friend, Cardinal Mercier, did not exaggerate when he said in 1919 that 'After God, Albert, King of the Belgians, is the author of the great moral victory which is being proclaimed throughout the world.' This aspect of his life is handled with sincerity and feeling by M. Cammaerts, and the tragedy of his death, even at this distance of time, cannot be read without emotion. One criticism alone may perhaps be made : it was not necessary for the author of this book to emphasise, on p. 494, that his hero's death was accidental, nor to reproduce the official denial by Sir John Simon regretting 'the pain and indignation that was caused throughout Belgium by the unfounded and irresponsible statement made by Colonel G. S. Hutchinson [in certain newspapers] to the effect that the late King of the Belgians was murdered.' But the fact that he does so is a warning to us. Wild words in Fleet Street may do lasting harm to our good name abroad. A free Press has responsibilities.

(1) *Gustav Stresemann : His Diaries, Letters and Papers*, edited and translated by Eric Sutton (Macmillan, vol. i., 1935, 25s.).

(2) *Frustration ; or Stresemann's Race with Death*, by Antonina Vallentin (Constable & Co., 5s.).

These books should be read, and kept on the shelf together. Frau Vallentin was an intimate friend of the Stresemann family : she has written a vivid, incisive account of a gifted personality, seen at close quarters, sometimes *en pantoufles*, sometimes with the mantle of authority, not hanging heavily on his shoulders, but bearing him up, and giving him moral strength to bear the heaviest burdens that a statesman may be called upon to shoulder—obloquy, suspicion and failure. Her portrait is of Gustav the man : Mr. Sutton's book is the record of Herr Stresemann the Chancellor, and of Herr Stresemann the Foreign Minister as revealed by his diaries, letters and papers. The documentation is not, of course, complete, but it is essential to a right understanding of Europe in 1936. The folly of the occupation of the Ruhr, and the supine part played by Great Britain, is made clear by a reference to Reuter's inspired despatch of August 7, 1923 :

London Government circles were glad to observe the Chancellor's statement that Germany expected nothing from England. It was quite erroneous to assume that England was anxious to help Germany out of troubles she had brought upon herself. The new English note was a

last attempt to co-operate in the reconstruction of Europe. If it met with no success, the entire Cabinet had decided to withdraw from the affairs of Europe.

Let us hope that in 1936 this attitude of mind will find no echo in Whitehall, though the temptation must always be strong.

Mr. Sutton's translation is excellent: his own brief notes are always to the point and always illustrative as well as illuminating. He has divided the first volume into five parts: (1) 'The Invasion of the Ruhr'; (2) 'The Hundred Days as Chancellor'; (3) 'The Way to a World Policy'; (4) 'Ideals'; and (5) 'New Aims.' The first part speaks for itself and tells us little that is new, except, perhaps, as to Herr Stresemann's share in combating the disastrous consequence—the destruction of the middle class. The second section will be of great personal interest to those who study the influence of individuals upon policy—and it was never greater—and who wonder why Germany has no use for a League of Nations, or anything like it. The third section includes much new material on the question of Reparations, and the Conferences in London in 1924 in which Mr. MacDonald, as Prime Minister, and Mr. (now Lord) Snowden, as Chancellor, with M. Herriot, representing France, took leading parts, the last named being always under political pressure from 'the menacing figure' of M. Loucheur. The Press were another menace; 'if,' remarks Mr. MacDonald, 'they get to know of the state of affairs, they will endanger the whole issue of the Conference.'

Sanctions in the Ruhr had been tried, and had given results, but not those expected or desired. Herriot, the peace-maker, had no more support from his countrymen than had Sir Samuel Hoare a few months ago.

Space forbids a reference to the other sections, which are of great interest. No student of current events should fail to study the whole work, for it suggests, on almost every page, parallels to current, and not less catastrophic, events.

A History of Clifton College, 1860-1934, by O. F. Christie (Arrowsmith, 10s. 6d.). The actual history of this comparatively modern school began in 1862. Dr. Temple had been five years at Rugby when he was asked to recommend a suitable man to take charge of sixty or seventy boys at Clifton, where a group of leading citizens of Bristol had formed a company to finance the new venture. There were then at Rugby three remarkable young assistant-masters—Mr. J. Percival, the Rev. Charles Evans, and my father, James M. Wilson. Mr. Evans was appointed, but withdrew a few weeks later when offered his old school at Birmingham. The governors applied

again to Dr. Temple, who recommended Percival, who thus became the first headmaster. Seventeen years later James Wilson succeeded him, and remained till 1890. Clifton College was thus for twenty-eight years watered and tended by the spirit of Rugby.

In 1842, when Dr. Thomas Arnold died, at forty-eight, Rugby, with over 400 boys, was at the zenith of its fame. Eton was under 500, Harrow had fallen to 69, Winchester had 200, and had a reputation for roughness¹; Shrewsbury was well spoken of. Two hundred boys 'met in the old hall of the Seymours on the banks of the Kennet,' but the Rev. Charles Plater's plan for a new school at Marlborough for the sons of clergymen was based on too economical a system, and a financial crisis nearly closed its doors in 1854. Having weathered the storm, it did valuable pioneer work in forming a Modern side which was imitated at Clifton. Cheltenham was founded also in the Arnold tradition in 1841. The school then had twenty-seven masters, under the Rev. H. A. James, and was the friendly rival of Clifton, Wellington, and Shrewsbury.

Dr. Arnold—a Winchester scholar, a scholar of Corpus, Oxford, and Fellow of Oriel—was appointed to Rugby, at the age of thirty-two, from the country vicarage at Laleham, where in 1827 he was writing his *History of Rome*. He was aware of modern requirements, encouraged games, and inculcated sixth-form responsibility. His public utterances were not popular, especially those on Church reform, but his fame spread until it became almost legendary. His memory has been kept green by *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, published anonymously in 1857. The author was Thomas Hughes, Oxford stroke and cricket Blue, afterwards a county court judge, dying in 1896: his daughter is still living amongst us, with memory and spirits unimpaired.

In seventeen years Dr. Percival made Clifton one of the great public schools. His Life has been written by Archbishop Temple, and an excellent account of his astonishing progress is contained in *A History of Clifton College* now before us. It fills seventy-six of its pages. The succeeding headmasters are treated in due course: Mr. Wilson, 1879-90; Canon Glazebrook, 1890-1905; Bishop David, 1905-9; Dr. King, an Old Cliftonian of Percival's time, 1910-23; and Mr. Norman Whatley, who has done much during the last twelve years to adapt old traditions and institutions to new needs.

In 1879 Dr. Percival, who had offered to succeed Hayman when he left Rugby, and never gave up the hope of going there, accepted the offer of the headship of Trinity College, Oxford. He strongly recommended as his successor my father, the strange

¹ A. G. Bradley, *History of Marlborough College*.

circumstances of whose double election were made public only in 1927, when *Clifton College Forty Years Ago* was published.²

The *History* will be of great interest to Old Cliftonians. The writer, a pupil of my father, has spent immense labour upon it, and has had access to many archives and records which have not been available before. In style or plan the book does not resemble the histories of other schools. It is more personal and more detailed, and probably more acceptable to ordinary readers, but a more rigorous revision by some qualified person or committee would have removed some slight defects.

It is difficult in such a work to hold the balance between school heroes and boys, undistinguished at school, who afterwards became heroes. As to the former an editor or compiler has all the material at hand, but not as to the latter, and in either case he wields immense power. Someone might have told him that the fastest Clifton bowler was not anyone mentioned in the book, but T. W. Stubbs, the fifth Cliftonian in the Oxford Eleven of 1877, who broke a wooden paling on the extreme boundary of the ground when bowling in the middle of the Close. Colonel J. K. Watson, who fought in eight campaigns, should not be dismissed with a word, any more than Sir Thomas Heath, F.R.S. He is one of the most learned men in England, was the first secretary to the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and could be adequately described as Assistant-Secretary to the Treasury. The historian mentions Sir H. Warren and Mr. Allen, Clifton's two Oxford heads, but not Professor A. Hutchinson, F.R.S., master of Pembroke (Cambridge) since 1928; and also overlooks R. S. Hichens, musician, novelist and dramatist, who has published more than fifty works. It is true that he was only two terms in the school; but so was Colonel Machell, D.S.O., C.M.G., whose name is in the Memorial Gateway. Admiral Luce was never in the Upper, but only in the Junior School. The awkwardness and embarrassment of having to decide unaided among such a host of competing candidates must have been great. The difficulty and the power and the limitations of the historian are illustrated in another way by an actual case. A, B, and C were boys together. A won a scholarship and B a race; C was unknown in the rank and file. A and B are

² Major Christie acknowledges his indebtedness to this book, but does not mention that it contains original letters of great interest written by Canon Wilson, the Rev. T. E. Brown, Sidney Irwin, and H. G. Kyns; and historical notes of value about F. M. Bartholomew, E. N. P. Moor, and J. C. K. Fox and the famous Sandford family. He mentions Fox, a very remarkable character, but the name of Sandford does not appear in the Index. Have we already forgotten Zeebrugge? Captain F. H. Sandford rescued the crew on C 3, commanded by his youngest brother, not a Cliftonian, who won the Victoria Cross.

immortalised, though their subsequent lives were ordinary; but C, who is not mentioned, was given the Military Cross for leading fourteen bombing expeditions into Germany with success, and this was known at Clifton.

But these are details, and a more important matter in the history of the school claims attention. Its foundation was part of a widespread feeling that the old schools were not only insufficient in number, but too rough for modern ideas. The inclusion of home-boarders offered some amelioration, and, though the choice of Mr. John Percival was hurried, everyone trusted Dr. Temple, and admired Rugby, for various reasons. Percival's success silenced criticism, and he kept the parents at a distance: the sixth-form discipline had full play, and football and long paper-chases were a trial to many, but the success of the school was astonishing. A gradual change, however, was coming over the country; and when my father came with his very different temperament and training he, unconsciously perhaps, helped on a great humanising movement which is still progressing and, amongst other things, has led to Women's Suffrage and a Parliamentary Labour Party. In contrasting him with his great predecessor the gossips of Clifton assigned to him certain characteristics and qualities, which he undoubtedly possessed, as faults; but the wheel has turned full circle, and they are to-day widely regarded as having been virtues. The Rugby code was softened, and science, in the widest sense, became an increasing influence. For generations, back to Keate, cruelty and brutality had been associated with all schools. In the *History of Rugby School* (1898) it is stated that Arnold 'set his face against too much drinking of strong liquors,' and that the sixth form were allowed, in beating boys, to give 'sixty cuts,' which Goulburn, in 1854, reduced to twelve! Old men may recall a small book, or pamphlet, styled *The Ash Stick*, which described frightful doings at a famous school and was suppressed; and Bradley's *Marlborough* also gives horrible pictures of punishments.

My father's successor and my own headmaster, Mr. Glazebrook, was of a different character. He came from Harrow, where he spent ten years under Montagu Butler. 'In manner he was austere, neglected nothing, and was scrupulously just'—his three years at Manchester Grammar School were not happy; and, though he stayed at Clifton fifteen years, he was not less successful than was hoped by those who appointed him, though, besides taking a most brilliant degree, he jumped and ran for Oxford, and was a friend of Asquith, Milner, Toynbee, and Warren. He and Warren married sisters. The *History* does him full justice, but he did not evoke affection. Yet many of his pupils remember with reverence and

gratitude his indifference to popularity and his stern sense of justice. He did not always get the best out of 'good' boys, but he was successful in exorcising evil spirits from the bodies of many 'bad' boys—who owe much to him.

Major Christie has nobly accomplished a very difficult task. Such books are not less a part of national history than the Journals of Parliament or of the League. For such schools are the crucibles where the metal is mixed and blended; to be annealed later in the universities before it is planed and shaped, sheared and punched, in the mills of life.

ARNOLD WILSON.

The Forward View, by the Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P.; *Conférence Economique de la France Métropolitaine et d'Outre-Mer, 1935*; *Annual Report of the Imperial Economic Committee*, covering the period from October 1, 1933, to March 31, 1935 (H. M. Stationery Office, 6d.). These publications should give students of Imperial and international affairs seriously to think. We may quarrel with Mr. Amery on one or two of the few points at which he touches on pure economic theory, but disagreement with him here and there is a more forceful argument than mere acquiescence for the strength of his main theme. That theme is, that political and economic nationalism continue to be the most serious menace to the peace of the world, and therefore to our own security and independence; that the gathering thunderclouds are not likely to be dispersed by the soulful idealism of the sentimental internationalist, with little understanding of 'realpolitik' or of any viewpoint save his own; that the integrity of the British Empire is the best guarantee of world security, and the pursuit of the ideals for which it stands the best means of achieving world peace; and that by policies of imbecile inactivity we are doing our best to destroy both ourselves and our civilisation. Mad nationalism, he argues, can only be met by sane nationalism. Applied to the British, the word embraces not one country, or one race, or one economy, but many, and group nationalism is the inevitable next step in evolution from the narrower sort, leading in the still very remote future to a world-state. Nation-groups, whether on a mingled racial, historical, and constitutional basis like the British Empire, or on a functional and territorial basis like the federation of American states, are a step ahead of individual national entities such as Germany, Italy, or Japan. Because they are in an economic sense potentially self-contained, a determined leadership is in their power; and, indeed, they must not avoid the responsibilities which it gives them, chief among which is the building up of the strength of the League of Nations from within.

Yet we have done little. Only in the present crisis have we begun to assert ourselves, and the repercussions both of our leading and of our drawing back are the strongest possible arguments for something closer and more concerted by way of co-operation as between our several parts.

As Mr. Amery points out, the core of the world problem is to be found in the distribution of world resources; hence the approach to its solution must be primarily an economic one. It is here that the Report of the French Imperial Economic Conference is of interest. The object of the Conference was to formulate a programme of industrial, commercial, mercantile, and financial policy on an imperial basis, providing a planned imperial economy of a complementary kind. Specific recommendations were made for the creation of new bodies, or the amplification of the functions of existing organisations, with a view to this, and one cannot escape the impression that the Conference handled their inquiry with extraordinary speed and efficiency. Whether the recommendations of the Conference will ever pass into execution is another matter. The interesting thing is that a nation whose colonial empire is of considerably less world importance than ours, and whose methods of colonial administration we have mostly affected to regard as inferior to our own, has done something which we have not yet attempted—it has examined with real energy the possibilities of imperial development.

The Imperial Economic Committee's Report contains an explanation of why we have done nothing. Setting aside for the moment the consideration that the French Empire is entirely colonial, and that this description applies to part only of the British Empire, we may note certain facts. First, the Imperial Economic Committee is composed of representatives of ten entities, of which seven (eight if India be included) are equal in status. Secondly, the fund put annually at the disposal of the Committee is the incredibly small sum of £20,200, of which the United Kingdom contributes 35 per cent. on behalf of itself and of the Colonial Empire. Thirdly, with the exception of the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux (a series of purely scientific and technical bodies) and the Imperial War Graves Commission, the Committee is the only truly representative and autonomous Imperial body in existence. Fourthly, it is specifically debarred by its terms of reference, not only from working out schemes for Empire co-operation and development, but even from 'initiating proposals regarding consultation in respect of economic policy.' Canada thinks Imperial Economic Co-operation worth £3232 per annum; Australia puts its value at £2828; India puts it at £2424; South Africa and New Zealand at £1616; and the Irish

Free State, partly perhaps because of the present troubles, at a mere £808. Yet the future peace of the world, it is no exaggeration to say, depends on what the British race does with the immense resources contained in the quarter of the earth over which it exercises political control. If the position were not so serious it would be laughable. But even this parsimony is hardly so great a reproach to us as the fact that, in the three General Election campaigns recently fought in this country, in Canada, and in New Zealand, no party included as a plank in its platform that which would be the greatest single measure possible making for the alleviation of social distress and for permanent economic recovery—the promulgation of a scheme for Empire development. No party even hinted that it would negotiate for a general Empire-wide inquiry into the position, and if any individual candidate mentioned the subject he did so in a whisper and it passed unnoticed. To the sceptic's question 'Is the electorate really interested in this thing?' the answer is to be found in the popular appeal of the late Empire Marketing Board's 'Buy British' campaign. Moreover, those that have preached the gospel of the New Imperialism of Partnership from the public platform, clearly distinguishing it from pre-war Jingoism, have found in their audiences a new and responsive enthusiasm. It appeals alike to Conservative, Socialist, and Liberal, for it represents a new British opportunity of a quite remarkable kind, and a practical expression of the goal of all moderate thinkers. Its creed, nowhere clearly expressed, is implicit in every page of that excellent political quarterly, *The Round Table*.

The British position is admittedly more difficult than the French, for we have always the Seven Sisters—sometimes wilful, seldom enthusiastic—at any conference table. But our Colonial Empire is entirely within the United Kingdom's control, save for the few Dominion dependencies, and the task in this quarter is easier. Yet the Secretaryships of State for the Colonies and the Dominions have always been regarded as lesser Cabinet posts, convenient in Coalition dilemmas. The Colonial Office has carried out recently a valuable survey of the economic resources of our Colonial Empire; but whether or not the Government of the United Kingdom intends to base any active policy upon it we are not informed. The Dominions as well as the United Kingdom public are surely entitled to be informed and to have views on this point. They are vitally interested in British Colonial policy, since we stand or fall together, and Africa has been dragged once again into European politics. Unless the development by European Powers of their colonial estates is pursued energetically for the benefit of the human

race as a whole, what moral claim have we to continue to occupy our Colonial territories, which we avowedly administer as trustees?

Our former lack of an Imperial policy was due in the main to two causes—the Free Trade tradition of the United Kingdom, and the distrust of the then subordinate partners in the Commonwealth. The Statute of Westminster removed the ground of the latter cause, and the Import Duties Act of 1932 that of the former, yet still we hesitate. Our prosperity and our security alike demand a certain minimum of active co-operation, and our responsibilities as a chain of world Powers encircling the earth call for the greatest measure of co-operation that we can achieve. The Report of the Imperial Economic Committee shows the gross inadequacy of our attempts to co-operate hitherto, and provides an apt instrument for future use; the French Report shows what is in fact being done by a rival colonial Power and supplies us with a compelling example. Mr. Amery's book indicates the danger of continued inaction and points the way to the impregnable and great position that might be ours. Our first step should surely be to set up, as an Empire, a representative Commission to examine and report on our economic resources, actual and potential, and on the political, social, economic, and financial conditions affecting their production, distribution, and consumption. It would be for that supreme quasi-legislative, quasi-executive organism, the Imperial Conference, to act boldly on its recommendations. The urgency of the present position and our relative prosperity warrant considerable expenditure on this service, for economic co-operation is our best, and in the limit our only, means of mutual defence.

J. H. LASCELLES.

CORRESPONDENCE

'WHITHER EUROPE?'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—I gladly accept your invitation to comment on Mr. Wickham Steed's article in your January number. The opportunity to reply to attacks upon Italian policy and upon the Italian nation is to-day all too rarely afforded in the British Press.

Those of us who have had the privilege of reading Mr. Wickham Steed's Memoirs (together with the priceless parody of them in *Punch*, 'Through Dirty Days, by Stickham Weed') will always look forward to his writings, which are certain to provide us with thrills of the Edgar Wallacian variety, together with plenty of healthful mirth. He is at his best when dealing with Italy and Italian affairs, for it is then that his vitriolic wrath attains its fullest development, combined with an ignorance of the facts which is surprising in one who has actually been to Italy, although many years ago, and is reported even to know something of the language.

Mr. Steed lectures Kings, Premiers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and nations, as one conferring a privilege on his hearers. But woe betide those statesmen or peoples who elect to disregard his advice! Indeed, his hatred of Italy dates from the time when an Italian Minister dared to follow a line of policy not in harmony with Mr. Steed's *Diktat* and on one occasion actually (*horresco referens*) refused to receive him!

In the January issue of the *Nineteenth Century and After* we have Mr. Steed in full cry. In his article 'Whither Europe?' he excels even himself. With many of his pontifical utterances concerning other countries I do not propose to deal, as I lay no claim to omniscience, so I shall limit myself to his remarks on Italy, a country with which I am familiar. Mr.

Steed is apt to expect his readers to take for granted a number of assertions which have never been proved. Thus he speaks of 'the Italian aggressor unanimously condemned by the League.' Now, throughout the proceedings at Geneva in connexion with the Italo-Abyssinian dispute there has been no unanimous decision, nor indeed any League decision at all. In fact, well knowing that he could not secure a unanimous decision, and that, as M. Avenol, the Secretary-General of the League, definitely stated,¹ 'without unanimity there could be no decision,' the British delegate took good care not to put any question up for decision; the various delegates were merely asked to express their opinions and, by a wholly new procedure, those who remained silent and refused to answer were regarded as having acquiesced in the point of view submitted to them. Even so, Mr. Eden did not secure favourable answers from all the other delegates, and with any normal procedure the whole of the indictment against Italy would have collapsed. But these are trifles too *terre à terre* for Mr. Steed's notice.

Then again, he takes it for granted that Signor Mussolini threatened 'to obliterate Malta, attack Gibraltar, and sink the British Fleet by submarines from below and aircraft from above.' It would be interesting to see a speech, article, or statement by the Italian Prime Minister bearing out this amazing statement. Mr. Steed will tell us, no doubt, that that was what Mussolini meant, even if he did not say it; but here, then, we have a *procès aux intentions*, which we have always been taught to regard as inadmissible. In any case, with reference to Malta, if Italy has any interest in the island it is on account of its Italian civilisation and culture, so that it is difficult to imagine that any Italian should wish to 'obliterate' it.

But it is surely obvious that Italy never contemplated anything of the kind. Of course, if her possessions or warships were attacked in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, as Mr. Steed would evidently wish to do, or, rather, to see someone else doing it, she would defend herself to the end, which would be bitter, and not only to herself. But who in Italy has thought of taking the offensive in this way? It was

¹ Lecture delivered at Chatham House in 1933, and published in the *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, January 1934.

not Italy who took the initiative in the matter of Mediterranean fleet activity.

The economic and financial situation of Italy Mr. Steed asserts to be desperate, but offers no figures in support of this popular belief. He maintains that Great Britain can have no interest 'in helping to uphold a megalomaniac and spendthrift tyranny that has brought Italy, our old friend and ally, to the verge of ruin.' His allusion to 'Italy, our old friend and ally,' is touching indeed, for no man has done so much as he to create ill-feeling between Great Britain and Italy, both during the World War, when he was both foreign editor of *The Times* and joint editor of the notorious *New Europe*, and ever since. Who in Italy expects Great Britain to help in supporting what he is pleased to call a 'megalomaniac and spendthrift tyranny,' but which the immense majority of Italians regard as something quite different. Italy has long been accustomed to '*fare da sè*,' and does not intend to apply for help now from Mr. Steed or anyone else, not even from the mysterious 'oil interests.' We may note, in passing, that Italy has been asserted to be heading towards bankruptcy since 1861—the date of the foundation of the Italian kingdom—and to be on the very edge of it (coming next week) since October 1923—the date of the advent of Fascism.

'Papal influences, rarely wise,' we are told, are alleged to have been exerted to persuade sanctionist States that, 'by depriving the Fascist dictator of the glory he so sorely needs to cover up the disastrous effects of his system, a Communist and anti-clerical movement in Italy will sweep all before it.' Here, again, Mr. Steed takes it for granted that Signor Mussolini needs help from outside. If the effects of his system had been so disastrous, would he have undertaken a difficult and expensive enterprise?

Mr. Steed speaks again of the financial and economic plight of Italy as beggaring description. If this threadbare *cliché* had any real meaning we might have witnessed some of the following phenomena:

- (1) A great increase in the cost of living;
- (2) A great increase in the numbers of the unemployed;
- (3) Non-payment or delayed payment by the Government on the interest of its securities and of the salaries of civil servants and members of the fighting forces;

- (4) A scarcity of food and other necessary commodities;
- (5) Widespread poverty.

But, as it happens, none of these things has occurred, as anyone who is in Italy or has been there recently can attest. Of course, Mr. Steed may answer that all these dreadful things, even if they have not happened yet, will happen in the future. But here we cannot follow him, as we do not profess to be prophets. Incidentally, it will be noted that none of Mr. Steed's past essays in the field of prophecy with regard to Italy have ever come true.

Or again, he may claim that Italy to-day would not be able to raise a loan abroad. This may be true (or it may not); but for many years she has raised no loans abroad, and since the World War the only Italian foreign loan is the comparatively small Morgan loan floated in New York. But even of this the greater part of the bonds has been redeemed by Italian investors several years ago and are now held in Italy. The policy of the Fascist Government has always been definitely suspicious of foreign loans, even when they were pressed on it.

Mr. Steed scouts the Communist danger to Italy, both now or in the past. He asserts that, were Fascism to be eliminated, 'there are other and more moderate constructive alternatives to Fascism in Italy than the Communist movement,' and that 'it is these which deserve encouragement and help.' Here we see the cloven hoof emerging. It is Mr. Steed's personal friends, such as Signor Nitti, Professor Salvemini, Don Luigi Sturzo, etc., whom he wants to see installed in power in Italy—brought back, no doubt, under an escort of foreign bayonets, just as the Neapolitan Bourbons, the Temporal Power of the Papacy, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the Dukes of Modena and Parma were brought back after the revolution of 1848-49. Then Mr. Steed could resume his rôle of Adviser-General and Lord High Controller. But nearly a century has passed since those events, and such interventions are to-day no longer fashionable.

British readers should not forget that it was when Mr. Steed's friends were in power that the conditions of Italy were really disastrous and that the Communist danger was at its worst; it was they who were opening the door to social disaster, just as the fatuous Kerensky had done in Russia a

few years previously. Moreover, the Italian people, who have had experience of their incompetence, pusillanimity, dishonesty, and lack of backbone, is hardly likely to call them back, especially after the very different experience it has had during the last fourteen years under an infinitely more popular, capable and efficient *régime*. This is not the place to set forth the achievements of Fascism, but all those who knew Italy before 1922 and know her to-day can have no doubts on the subject.

We are also told that, 'worst of all in Germany—as well as in Italy—is the progressive deterioration of intellectual life and of informed interest in public affairs.' About Germany I am not prepared to express an opinion. But with regard to Italy the statement is utterly fantastic. In no country does one hear more outspoken expressions of opinion on public affairs.² As for 'the lowering of the intellectual and moral standards,' one has but to compare the standards of to-day with those of the last generation to realise the immense progress achieved. I am old enough to remember the conditions of the Italian student world as it was over thirty years ago, when all was apathy, scepticism, and cynical indifference. To-day the whole of the younger generation is full of vitality and keenness—keenness in public affairs, social service, sport, etc.—and, above all, full of enthusiasm. As Rostand wrote in *La Princesse lointaine*,

Le seul vice c'est l'inertie,
La seule vertu c'est l'enthousiasme.

Finally, we are told that 'should Nazism and Fascism retain their supremacy they will infallibly drive Europe towards war.' If we look around us to-day we cannot fail to see that it is not Fascism but its enemies who are doing their level best to convert a colonial expedition, similar to innumerable others conducted by Great Britain, France and other countries in the past, into a world war, the outcome of which will be wholly to the advantage of the forces of anarchy—never far off in 'Europe or Asia.' No one wants war to-day. But it is still safe and remunerative to preach war and revolution in the pages of newspapers and reviews or in a lecture-room.

² The recent refusal of the B.B.C. to allow Senator Marconi to speak on the wireless shows that there are countries where freedom of speech is limited.

The writer adds a postscript to his article to the effect that the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare is a first concession to 'the old British spirit,' and hopes that it will not be the last. According to our reading of British history, the 'old British spirit' implied something very different—something that has not yet appeared. We await its resurgence.

LUIGI VILLARI.

'FRANCE AND THE PRESENT CONFLICT OF IDEALS'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—In the December number of your Review you published an article by Mr. Randolph Hughes entitled 'France and the Present Conflict of Ideals,' which has not failed to impress intellectual circles in France.

Mr. Hughes, in this article, undertakes to give English readers an account of the various currents of opinion set up in France by the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. His qualifications for treating this complex and delicate question are altogether exceptional. His affection for France, his long periods of residence there, and his unusual mastery of the French language enable him to understand, both with the heart and the head, the psychology of the French people. What he has written gains an added importance from the fact that the authority of his opinion is enhanced by that of *The Nineteenth Century* itself. May one of your French readers venture to lay before you a few reflections suggested by the article in question?

I would not try your patience by going over Mr. Hughes's analysis point by point in order to justify or explain the attitude or the language of the French Press on this or that issue. The object of this letter is of a more general character. My aim is to dwell on the Italo-Abyssinian question only in so far as it has to do with Anglo-French relations, with certain misunderstandings on both sides, and with the wounding of certain susceptibilities; it is worth while dwelling on these occasions of dissension and attempting to get at their ultimate causes, with a view to preventing their recurrence, if such a thing be possible.

Mr. Hughes's article is a test that in a conflict upon which the tribunal of the League of Nations is invited to pronounce, public opinion in each country concerned plays a capital part, and that the manner in which this opinion is expressed cannot be a matter of no importance to other nations, whatever be the degree of its offensiveness.

This is so; and here we come up against a serious problem.

Even if he is not prepared to attack the fundamental conception of the League of Nations, the most detached observer cannot help noticing that it adds to the difficulties with which it has to deal, by the very fact that it makes them the object of so much attention. I do not wish to condemn the League of Nations out of hand. I am prepared to grant the

argument of those who see in it a chance of ensuring peace *in the future*. But beyond all doubt it involves risks *in the present*. To deny this would be to shut one's eyes to facts. Now, a very large number of Frenchmen are conscious of these risks. Many of them believe that Ministers of State and professional diplomatists alone are in a position to have exact knowledge of *the international situation as a whole*, and successfully to conduct, in any given set of circumstances, the negotiations essential to safeguard world peace, by taking due account of the honour and the interests of the parties concerned.

That there have been collisions between French susceptibilities on the one hand and English on the other is a thing beyond dispute. Of course, we must deplore them, but at the same time we must seek to get at their causes. Is not the source of them to be found in this new diplomatic procedure, according to which the issues of peace and war are dealt with by an international parliament in the same way as questions of taxation are dealt with by national parliaments? But in this latter case all that is at stake is the continuance in power of this or that political party, whilst in the former case it is a matter of the life or death of thousands and even millions of men.

I do not propose in this letter to touch upon the technical side of the question under consideration. Foreign politics are the business, not of the intellectuals, but of the professional politicians. Such is my conviction, and I will remain true to it. As to the sound reasons which lead so many Frenchmen to demand the utmost prudence on the part of their Government in the matter of sanctions, your readers will find them adequately set forth in Mr. Hughes's article. My own observations supplement—if there is room for any supplementary comment—the explanation given by him of a state of mind shared by many Frenchmen. I refrain from emphasising anything. Anything likely to revive misunderstandings would be out of place. Discussions of mere detail lead to the defining of an endless series of questions of minor interest. I take it that between gentlemen it is easy to size up intentions and ideas and not necessary to be constantly giving the exact import of, or correcting, language which is not all it might be.

In other days—I mean before the Great War—an affair such as the present one would have come within the competence of the chancelleries. Already grave enough, it would not have been aggravated by the play of popular emotion of the several nations concerned. Interests often lead to war. But principles, too, lead to war, and more frequently than interests. It is advisedly, I imagine, that Mr. Hughes entitled his article 'The Conflict of *Ideals*.' It is, indeed, one of the major issues of his subject.

I would insist on the extent to which the main drift of Mr. Hughes's conclusions is in harmony with the desire of the great mass of the French people, not so much with regard to France itself as to the indefinable totality of the values which go to make civilisation. We, like him, believe that England, 'whether she likes it or not, belongs to Europe.' We are fully in accord with him when he says 'that she should take her

place—and it will necessarily be a high place—among the family of European nations.' ■

As soon as the powerful ties—ties of friendship, of memories, of common interests and common ideals—uniting England and France are made fast and secure by a pact that leaves no room for uncertainty, the league of nations of the West would be made much easier of realisation. Europe, which is an extension of Asia, would be able to withstand all attacks. These latter words, I think, are not without significance when the peace of the world is under consideration.

As Mr. Hughes justly observes in the final sentence of his article, Europe and true civilisation are inseparably one. *The maintenance of this fundamental reality is an ideal against which it appears that no other ideal can easily prevail, particularly if it is simply a matter of ways and means.*

And since Mr. Hughes has quoted Royalist pronouncements in his article, I should like to be allowed to recall the following passage from a letter of His Royal Highness the Comte de Paris published in the *Courrier Royal* of October 5 last:

'Sharing the good sense of those families sprung from the soil of France who hate waste and unnecessary risks, jealously sparing of the population of France, already decimated by a war in which 1,500,000 of our sons perished in the defence of their fatherland, the Royal House of France enjoins prudence and calm. Between the fair-seeming but ruinous ideology which to-day appeals to many good Frenchmen, and all too often makes dupes of them—between this ideology and that Reason which is our national heritage, all of us have already made our choice. If our friends quarrel among themselves, our rôle should be to reconcile them and bring their conflicting views into harmony. If our friends face each other in a fratricidal dispute, let us rather play the part of a sentinel so that no one seeking to profit from the ensuing disorder may make inroads upon our common heritage.'

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

LOUIS SALLERON.

December 18, 1935.

'THE FUTURE AND PROSPECTS OF THE LABOUR PARTY'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—In the January issue of your Review appears an article entitled 'The Future and Prospects of the Labour Party,' by A. L. Rowse. On p. 78 a statement is made: 'the Bank Officers' Guild, whose avowed aims as regards public control of the banks are the same as those of the Labour Party.' In view of the fact that this is incorrect, I should be very much obliged if you would correct the statement in your February issue.

This Guild is a non-party-political trade union. As such its function is to secure just and reasonable terms of service and conditions of

employment from the present directorates or any body which in future might be set up to control the banks in this country.

Included in the membership of the Guild are all shades of political opinion, and as a non-political organisation the Guild does not declare itself 'in favour of,' nor 'against,' nationalisation or any other form of control of banking. It leaves the matter to be decided by its members individually in their capacity as citizens with a political vote.

Bank staffs who are members of this Guild are prepared to work the banking system for whomsoever may be in control of the banks, provided they receive a square deal in return for efficient service together with full and official recognition of this national association.

In an effort to enlist further the interest of members of Parliament in the Guild's struggle for recognition by the banks and for adequate service conditions, it questioned the candidates of various parties at the last General Election. Included in the questionnaire were nine questions, one of which sought the candidates' views on nationalisation in this form: 'Are you for, or against, nationalising the joint-stock banks?'

Lest this question may have led your author to assume wrongly that the Guild was 'taking sides,' I must point out that to ask an opinion on any subject in such a straightforward manner does not imply support or opposition.

I wish it to be clearly understood that the Bank Officers' Guild is neutral on the subject of control of banking, and, moreover, has no desire to influence its members one way or the other.

Yours faithfully,

T. G. EDWARDS,
General Secretary (Policy),
Bank Officers' Guild.

*Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the
NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street,
Leicester Square W.C. 2.*

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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THE UNITED STATES

A BALANCED VIEW

By WALTER LIPPMANN

Mr. Lippmann is one of the leading writers in the United States of America upon international affairs. He was closely connected with Colonel House in the preparation of data for the Peace Conference in 1917 and has written a number of important works upon the American outlook on world affairs. The following article is an abbreviated summary, in exactly his own words, of a series of papers entitled The New Imperative¹:

It has, I think, been clearly established that government must henceforth hold itself consciously responsible for the maintenance of the standard of life prevailing among the people. This is, I believe, a new imperative which takes its place alongside the older imperatives to defend the nation against

¹ Published by the Macmillan Company of New York, price 5s. (Printed here by courtesy of Messrs. Macmillan & Co. Ltd.)

attack and to preserve domestic peace. But in this new and unexplored realm the basic idea has not yet been accepted into the tradition of government. It is entangled with superficial differences about highly debatable particular measures. Yet experience in the post-war era has shown, I am convinced, that the ability to protect the popular standard of life is an indispensable condition of the survival of political institutions.

No one as yet can hope to have understood all the implications of this duty or to have come to clear conclusions as to how it can best be discharged. There was no conscious decision to accept the duty. It was forced upon President Hoover and upon President Roosevelt under the compulsion of the crisis. In this great change, as in so many other historic changes in the character of government, practice preceded the theory and measures were taken which have no warrant whatever in the philosophy of those who took them. It has been said that to place upon government responsibility for the defence of the popular standard of life is to ask of it more than it can do: the rulers of men are not wise enough or brave enough or disinterested enough to fulfil this new imperative. That may be. My thesis is that they have to attempt it whether or not they succeed. When an intricate capitalism is combined with popular sovereignty the people will turn to the State for help whenever capitalism is unable to satisfy their habitual expectations.

A clear and unprejudiced view of this new imperative is rendered difficult because it is, for the moment, fashionable to think of all political change in terms of ideas borrowed from the revolutions of Central and Eastern Europe. There will always be many whose minds come to rest in a slogan, and if they did not have the phrases about Bolshevism and Fascism to draw upon, they would find others, no less irrational, in which to vent their prejudices. But the spell cast by the European revolutions is wider than that. To a very high degree the whole discussion of current American events is imprisoned within these same stereotypes. It is assumed, as if it were axiomatic and self-evident, that social change in all countries, the United States among them, is in the direction of Communism or of Fascism, and that there is no other direction in which it is possible to go. The underlying assumption is that there is one highway for mankind

and that on that highway the United States can stand still, it can move forward to Moscow, or it can move backward to Berlin.

This assumption is false and misleading. It does not make for understanding to study the habits of a dog under the impression that it is a cat, or of a cat in the anxious fear that it is tending to become a tiger. Theoretically, of course, it is conceivable that in Russia, Germany, and Italy we can see the prototypes of our struggles and the anticipation of our destiny. But there is no reason why we should accept the notion as self-evident. It takes for granted something which is extremely improbable—namely, that nations which have had different histories will henceforth have the same future, that dissimilar causes will produce similar results. The development of parliamentary government in England has impressed mankind. But though attempts have been made to imitate it, in fact that development has been repeated only in a few parts of the British Commonwealth. The Renaissance, the Reformation, the Revolution, were great movements in the European world, but they never pervaded even the whole of Europe. What reason, then, is there to assume that the development of Russia furnishes a pattern for the development of countries which, in all their social arrangements, have been for centuries so unlike Russia? There would be much better reason for thinking that precisely because Communism took root in Russia it will not take root in a wholly different environment. I have convinced myself at least that we are on a road which is not the Berlin-Moscow road, that we are evolving a method of social control which is not that of *laissez faire* and is not that of a planned and directed economy.

The principles involved are, I believe, the actual principles which are producing a substantial measure of recovery, and with that recovery a strengthening of the foundations of the Republic. But the application is confused and the discussion is distorted by the prevailing notion that all public control to protect the standard of life is an approximation to one of the European revolutionary *régimes*. The conservatives fear it. The advanced New Dealers are half-seduced by it. It is a dangerous misconception. If the conservatives, thinking that all public control leads to Communism, refuse responsibility

for safeguarding the standard of life by deliberate measures, they will renounce their title to govern a modern democratic State. If the progressives attempt to discharge that responsibility by measures that are imitated from Europe, they will come to grief upon the rocks of the American political tradition.

Burke has said that 'one of the finest problems in legislation' is 'to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion.' Our inquiry is to find out, if we can, whether it has already been determined by historical circumstance that the State must henceforth direct certain affairs which hitherto have been left to private exertion. It may be that we no longer have that perfect freedom of choice which Burke's remark implies, that a fundamental decision has already been made, and that our freedom to choose what ought to be the province of government is limited by that decision. Must it be said that we have recently passed decisively into a new relation between the government and the national economy? Obviously, a contemporary opinion of this sort will be highly vulnerable. Not all the seedlings will become trees; to attempt to say which ones will flourish, which ones will wither away, is to enter a realm where certainty is impossible. Yet the living generation can hardly defer the attempt to understand its own actions because posterity will understand them better. Somehow or other we have to find a method of analysis that will discount our bias and provide a reasonably objective criterion with which to distinguish the transitory from the permanent.

The Great Depression has run nearly six years. During the first half of this period Mr. Hoover and the Republicans were in power; during the second half, Mr. Roosevelt and the Democrats. They profess to be deeply opposed. Would it not be reasonable to assume that where we find a new principle and a new function of government common to both Mr. Hoover and Mr. Roosevelt, there is a strong presumption that we are in the presence of a change due to historical forces that transcend individuals and parties and their articulate programmes? When men who think differently behave alike, is it not probable that they are both responding to forces that are stronger than their conscious beliefs?

I contend that if there has been anything in the nature of a sharp break with the past, the break occurred, not in March 1933, when Mr. Roosevelt was inaugurated, but in the autumn of 1929, when, with the collapse of the post-war prosperity, President Hoover assumed the responsibility for recovery. No doubt it was inevitable that he should have done this, since he had been elected on the promise of four more years of prosperity. But that does not alter the fact that the policy initiated by President Hoover in the autumn of 1929 was something utterly unprecedented in American history. The national Government undertook to make the whole economic order operate prosperously. President Hoover, let us remember, did not merely seek to create an atmosphere of confidence in which private initiative could act; he intervened at every point in the national economy where he felt that something needed to be done. His historic position as a radical innovator has been greatly underestimated and Mr. Roosevelt's pioneering has been greatly exaggerated. It was Mr. Hoover who abandoned the principles of *laissez faire* in relation to the business cycle, established the conviction that prosperity and depression can be publicly controlled by political action, and drove out of the public consciousness the old idea that depressions must be overcome by private adjustment. A radically new conception of the functions of government was established in the autumn of 1929. The subsequent course of events becomes utterly unintelligible if we accept naïvely what the partisans of Mr. Hoover and of Mr. Roosevelt say to-day. Only those who have forgotten the inclusive and persistent experimentation before March 1933 can, I think, fail to see that most of President Roosevelt's recovery programme is an evolution from President Hoover's programme, and that there is a continuity of principle; and that both programmes are derived from the unprecedented doctrine that the government is charged with responsibility for the successful operation of the economic order and the maintenance of a satisfactory standard of life for all classes in the nation. After October 1929 that doctrine was the major premise of the Hoover Administration. It is the major premise of the Roosevelt Administration. Never, except in time of war, has it been the major premise in the policies of any other President.

Yet that is precisely what President Hoover, beginning in the autumn of 1929, took to be his duty and his right. Not until his time had any American President assumed this specific responsibility with all the expansion of the functions of government which it necessarily implies. Yet when the change occurred, there was almost no comment. So we have a strong presumption that the great change was generated by historic circumstances that are stronger than the ordinary opinions of men.

On August 11, 1932, in accepting his renomination, President Hoover declared that when 'the forces of destruction' invaded the American economy and brought about 'bank and business failures, demoralisation of security and real property values, commodity prices and employment, . . . two courses were open. We might have done nothing. That would have been utter ruin. Instead, we met the situation with proposals to private business and the Congress of the most gigantic programme of economic defence and counter-attack ever evolved in the history of the republic.' Mr. Hoover made it perfectly plain that he had departed from the individualistic doctrine that depression must be liquidated by individual adjustment. 'The function of the Federal Government in these times,' he said, 'is to *use its reserve powers and its strength for the protection of citizens and local governments by support to our institutions against forces beyond their control.*' He had no doubts, theoretical or practical; indeed, he proudly declared that 'we have not feared boldly to adopt unprecedented measures to meet the unprecedented violence of the storm.'

He then went on to describe his unprecedented measures:

- (1) To uphold wages until the cost of living was adjusted.
- (2) To spread existing employment through shortened hours.
- (3) To advance construction work, public and private, against future need.

He then described how he had mobilised the relief agencies, and 'when it became advisable to strengthen the States who could not longer carry the full burden of relief to distress, I held that the Federal Government should do so through loans to the States.'

He went on to tell how he had used government credit

- (1) to strengthen the capital of Federal Land Banks, (2) to lend money to farmers' co-operatives to protect farm prices

and to home-owners in danger of foreclosure, (3) to set up the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 'with a capital of two billions to uphold the credit structure of the nation.'

He stated that 'we expanded the functions and powers of the Federal Reserve Banks that they might counteract the stupendous shrinkage of credit due to fear, to hoarding and to foreign withdrawals.'

Finally, he announced that 'I am to-day organising the private and financial resources of the country to co-operate effectively with the vast governmental instrumentalities which we have set in motion.' His programme was unparalleled. But what interests us about it is that it lays down the fundamentally new principle that it is 'the function of the Federal Government in these times to use its reserve powers and its strength' to regulate the business cycle, and that in applying this general principle Mr. Hoover formulated a programme which contains all the more specific principles of Mr. Roosevelt's recovery programme.

Apart from the Roosevelt measures of reform, which we shall have to examine later, all the main features of the Roosevelt programme were anticipated by Mr. Hoover. The only important difference between the monetary policies of the two Administrations is that Mr. Hoover attempted to regulate the internal value of the dollar, whereas Mr. Roosevelt is attempting to regulate its external value as well. Mr. Hoover was just as eager as Mr. Roosevelt has been to bring about a rise in the wholesale prices of staple commodities, particularly the politically sensitive farm products and raw materials whose prices are fixed by international competition. He was just as eager to stop the general deflation and to bring about a reflation. Nor did he hesitate to use monetary measures, sometimes called 'currency tinkering.'

Mr. Roosevelt has continued this policy. He has supplemented it by measures designed to regulate the international value of the dollar in terms of gold, silver, and the foreign exchanges. But the major premise, which was that the regulation of the purchasing power of money is a function of government and is not automatic, was accepted and acted upon by the Hoover Administration. However great may be the differences of opinion as to how the purchasing power of money should be regulated, however much men may

disagree as to who shall exercise the power to regulate, it would therefore seem reasonable to assume that the effort to manage the purchasing power of money will continue to be a function of government. Legally it has, of course, always been a function of government, and ever since the war we have had a managed monetary system. When the value of gold changed violently between 1929 and 1933, Mr. Hoover was caught on the horns of a dilemma. If he regulated the currency to maintain a stable gold content he had a currency which was catastrophically unstable in its purchasing power. Mr. Roosevelt resolved the difficulty in 1933 by abandoning stability in terms of gold in order to achieve control in terms of purchasing power. But in 1934 he returned to stability in terms of gold, and ever since the American price level has once more been under the disturbing influence of the instability of gold itself. The effort to manage the value of gold by manipulating the value of silver followed. It is too early to judge the experiment when this is written. The idea that it is a function of public authority to regulate the purchasing power of money is not likely to be abandoned, whatever may be the fate of the particular measures now used to regulate it.

The use of the national credit to support and to supplement local and private credit is not, strictly speaking, a radically new innovation. It was practised during the World War and in the first post-war depression. President Hoover adopted the policy on a grand scale when he created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and various farm credit agencies. Mr. Roosevelt has continued the policy and has extended it. Both have acted on the principle that this banking operation should be supported by deficit financing. It is reasonable to suppose that this principle will become orthodox and that in future emergencies government borrowing will be resorted to when private credit is deficient.

The questionable element of the Roosevelt budgetary programme is in that part of the deficit which is being deliberately incurred in irrecoverable expenditures—for relief and for public works that are not 'self-liquidating.' Mr. Hoover had deficits of this sort. But he had a bad conscience about them, whereas Mr. Roosevelt has seemed to look upon them as preferable in principle to the deflationary effect of greatly

increased taxes or of drastic retrenchment. In their relations to agriculture and to industry there is no sharp break between the two Administrations. Both have recognised that the agricultural staples have unsheltered prices, whereas most manufactured goods have sheltered prices, and that this produces a disparity which it is a function of government to correct.

As regards their relations to industry, if we strip the N.R.A. of its ballyhoo, of the more or less unenforceable and unenforced labour provisions, we find the trade associations (which Mr. Hoover did so much to promote as Secretary of Commerce) freed of the menace of the anti-trust laws (which Mr. Hoover as President did so little to enforce). The N.R.A. extended the principle of organisation to industries and trades that had not been organised previously. It tightened up the organisation all along the line. It made price-fixing and production control and marketing quotas more general, more effective, more respectable. But in embryo, in all its essential features, the substance of N.R.A. existed before the Blue Eagle was hatched. The National Industry Recovery Act was little more than the substitution of legal for companionate marriages in the realm of private monopoly. Even the wage policy of N.R.A. was a continuation of a policy inaugurated by Mr. Hoover in the autumn of 1929 and maintained by him throughout his term.

In rough fashion, this covers the ground usually marked out as the recovery programme. I do not see how one can fail to conclude that in all essential matters of policy—dealing with monetary management, the budget, the agricultural disparity, and industrial 'stabilisation'—there has been no break in principle, and that the Roosevelt measures are a continuous evolution of the Hoover measures.

The measures which are specifically called the 'reforms' are distinguished from the others by the fact that, except as a response to the challenge of popular discontent, they were not dictated by the emergency and might have been imposed later and in more leisurely fashion. But it is clear, I think, that though the reforms might have been delayed, and though they might have been different in detail, their essential principles are derived directly and inevitably from the fundamental assumption of the whole period since 1929, that we have a

national economy and not a mere aggregation of individual enterprises. The reforms extend into new fields the regulation of private enterprises on the one hand, and the expansion of government enterprises on the other. Some of the new regulation is merely the logical development of well-established principles.

In the present Administration we come soon, however, to regulations which are novel and radical. In the Securities Act and in the Stock Exchange Act, and in certain parts of the Banking Act of 1933, the orbit of public authority is enlarged. In substance, these reforms lay down the principle that corporations financed by public subscription are publicly accountable. The underlying theory of the legislation is that when the ownership of corporations is widely diffused, when corporations are financed out of the savings of large masses of people, it is an anomaly that those who control and manage them but do not own them should have the kind of privacy in their corporate conduct which men have in their genuinely personal affairs and in the handling of truly personal property. The legislation in these three Acts is not Socialism. It does not substitute government ownership or government management for private ownership and management. It lays down the rule that private management shall operate in the public view in order to make it accountable to the great mass of its owners, its creditors, its customers, and its employees.

That this development of public policy is the logical consequence of the corporate form of industry seems plain. It might have come more slowly had the public not suffered such losses after 1929, and if there had not been so many flagrant examples of the abuse of positions of trust. But once so important a part of the property of the nation became organised in large corporations, it was only a question of when and of how they would be recognised as being public institutions in all their essential relations. The transition to this new conception of policy might possibly have been delayed a few years had the accidents of politics brought a conservative rather than a progressive Administration into power in 1933. The impulses of reform generated in the upheaval of the 'nineties were held back for a few years by the reaction against Bryanism and the distraction of the Spanish War. They became effective about 1902 and were not

exhausted until the World War introduced a new diversion of the national energy.

In addition to this extension of the regulatory functions of government, there has been an extension of government enterprise. A part of it is simply a development of the conservation movement. Reafforestation, measures against soil erosion, the protection of watercourses are not new in principle: it has long been recognised that there were certain kinds of capital investment which, because they could not be profitable to private enterprise, had to be undertaken collectively. Mr. Roosevelt has, however, made a departure in at least two important directions. The first is represented by the Tennessee Valley Authority: here collective enterprise has been deliberately undertaken for the purpose of making a competitive demonstration against the electric utility companies. The second is the social insurance programme: here the Federal Government enters a field heretofore left to individual or local action.

It would be an exaggeration to say that either of these Roosevelt reforms represents a clean break with the past. No other President, it is true, ever sought to regulate electric utilities by forcing them to face the competition of government-owned utilities. But other Presidents have sought to regulate railroad rates by building canals, and President Hoover himself promoted the St. Lawrence Seaway as a competitor with the railroads. As for social insurance, while it represents a new function of the Federal Government, it is not a new function in State government, and Republican leaders, including Mr. Hoover, have endorsed it in principle.

We must conclude, I think, that however startling they may have seemed, however inadvisable or inexpedient it may have been to impose them at this time, the Roosevelt reforms are far less novel or radical in their implications than is the recovery programme which Mr. Hoover and Mr. Roosevelt have both followed. They are all the continuation of a movement in American politics which goes back at least fifty years, and there is little if anything in the New Deal reforms which was not implicit in the New Nationalism of Theodore Roosevelt or the New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson. The recovery programme, on the other hand, is new and is radical. For here we have an assumption of responsibility

for the operation of the whole national economy and the conviction that all the reserve power of government and all the resources it can command may and must be used to defend the standard of life of the people 'against forces beyond their control.' This represents a far more radical change in the conception of government in America than is to be found in any of the reforms. For if it is now the responsibility of the government to protect the people against the consequences of depression, then inevitably the government must regulate the prosperity which precedes depression and produces it. If government is responsible for the downward phase of the business cycle, it has a responsibility in the whole business cycle. If it is fitting and necessary to manage the currency, the national credit, budgetary expenditures, and the like to counteract deflation, then it is fitting and necessary that they be managed to counteract inflation.

It would seem that the decision which Mr. Hoover took in the autumn of 1929 is irreversible: he committed the government to the new function of using all its powers to regulate the business cycle. Because Mr. Hoover and Mr. Roosevelt have regulated a slump, their successors will also have to regulate a boom. The business cycle has been placed within the orbit of government, and for *laissez faire* and individual adjustment and liquidation there has been substituted conscious management by the political State.

It is perhaps possible to go further and indicate why it is that this very great new duty has been imposed upon the State. The recovery programme since 1929 has rested on the basic assumption that the 'fixed costs' in a modern economy are rigid: that debts, contracts, wage rates, taxes cannot be reduced quickly or easily or sufficiently to liquidate the depression. Part of the recovery programme under both Mr. Hoover and Mr. Roosevelt has, in fact, been a defence of rigid wage rates and debts. The classic remedy, the only remedy known to *laissez faire*, is therefore impracticable. But if 'fixed costs' are rigid, then flexibility must develop somewhere else in the economy if there is not to be complete paralysis followed by a social collapse. The flexibility to compensate for the rigidity of 'fixed costs' has been found in the currency, in the national budget, and in public expenditure. Unless one is to suppose that the proportion of fixed debt

in the modern economy will be drastically reduced, that long-term contracts and rentals will become easily amended, that salaries, wages, and pensions will become easily adjustable, we may take it as certain that we shall not return to *laissez faire* in the business cycle. If we do not return to it, then the management of money and the use of the national credit to expand and to contract government expenditures must be regarded as permanent functions of the American Government. We have come on to a new plateau from which it is not likely that we shall easily descend. On this plateau the issues of the near future will be fought out, and there it will be determined whether a system of private enterprise, which has lost much of its power to adjust itself, can be preserved in working equilibrium by the compensatory action of the State.

We live in an age when men are dismayed because they feel that they have lost the tradition of the good life. They are acutely aware of the unrealised possibilities of human societies. The intellectual life of the Western world is distracted, its spirit is impaired, by the paradoxes of poverty when there is plenty, of science triumphant in political disorder, of conscience become sensitive to human dignity in the midst of a reversion to the primitive. To these paradoxes men cannot become resigned. They will not resign themselves to a failure which originates—so they must believe—in their own behaviour and could be remedied by intelligence and courage and good will. A civilisation tormented by these paradoxes is sick, like the Roman world of which Lucretius said that it had a malady of which its masters did not know the cause.

We are unable to transmit from our generation to the next a credible and coherent tradition. This is our danger. The nation is secure against conquest. Its resources are ample. Its people are energetic and cheerful and brave. But those who determine what schools and colleges and the Press shall transmit as the American tradition do not know what to tell the young men. There is a breach, which is threatening and sinister, between the energy of youth and the experience of age. This new generation, to whom we can offer skill rather than wisdom and specialised knowledge without philosophy, is cheated, and feels it is cheated if we do not know how to

offer it a part in some great enterprise. They must enter into an idea that will inform and transfigure their private worlds. But they cannot find this idea in the teachings and the warnings of those who sit in the seats of authority. Some, therefore, have sought it, and believe they have found it, in the revolutionary fervours and alien faiths of Central and Eastern Europe. Others (and they are the great majority) go out into the world without political convictions. The consequences are ominous. For they mean that those who will rule the American commonwealth to-morrow are spiritually isolated from those who rule it to-day. The fathers do not know what their sons will do with the estate, and so they cannot act in the present with the conviction of permanence. The sons cannot prepare for the future with the enthusiasm of loyalty.

This is the condition, which has preceded so many of the tragedies of history, when the successful and the dominant live for the moment, defensively, dreading the future and not daring to engage it, irresolute because they have lost purpose and intention and the conviction of a great destiny. When this happens, wisdom acquired through many ages is blown about by all the winds of doctrine; then the government of the commonwealth is not in the hands of confident men.

The articulate belief of the industrial and financial leaders of America is the doctrine of *laissez faire*. On the major issues of the modern world they believe in an ideal of masterly inactivity. This is the ideal they would have the schools and colleges profess. To the young men asking how they can serve their country—how they can mitigate booms and depressions, maintain a healthy relation between agriculture and industry, conserve and develop the natural resources, prevent the congestion of population and the concentration of wealth and power—the orthodox answer must be that these matters are not the concern of the State and that the only sound policy is to have no policy. It is perfectly true that this tradition has an honourable history. It has served the country well for more than a hundred years. How is it, then, that this conception of the commonwealth has lost its authority? It has lost it, I believe, because those who preach this gospel do not practise it. It is no longer the rule of their own conduct. But those who are most insistent upon the ideal

of *laissez faire* are the very men who by means of tariffs and combinations have organised the industrial life of the country into corporate systems subject to highly centralised control. In their articulate thinking they are free traders. In their actual practice they suspend the free play of supply and demand and substitute for it, whenever it is practicable to do so, the conscious management of production and the administrative determination of prices and wages. Is it astonishing that a doctrine which is not practised should lack vitality and authority? Sermons on the danger of interfering with economic laws are somehow unimpressive when they are preached by men who in their own markets have suspended those laws.

A social order flexibly competitive in all its parts, as the free traders of the nineteenth century imagined it, is theoretically conceivable and might be very attractive. It is an ideal which a modern State might consciously pursue, using all its powers against monopoly of any kind. But an economy which is automatic and flexible in some of its parts, managed and inflexible in others, can be self-regulating only by subjecting its unorganised parts to an intolerable strain. The doctrine of *laissez faire* is open to the devastating criticism that it is preached by men who wish other men to practise it. From such logical, moral, and practical confusion it is impossible to derive a noble tradition which will engage the enthusiasm of young men. They have perceived the humiliating paradoxes of our time. They have seen the glut of food while there is hunger in the land, homeless men and untenanted houses, idle men and unused machinery, stagnant money and desperate debtors, and when they ask those who speak with authority, What shall we do? they are told in substance that there is nothing to do. These things are beyond human control, and the only wisdom is resignation. They are not even told to go West and start a new life. They are told to sit and wait, like Chinese coolies in a famine, until, for some mysterious reason, the warm blood of confidence rises once more in the veins of bank directors and corporation executives.

If you wish to know why the young men are tempted by Communism, by Fascism, by almost anything which is emphatic and bold and positive, the reason is that those

who sit in the seats of authority are preaching a gospel of frustration. If you wish to know why, in spite of all our schools and colleges, the level of competence in public life is low, the reason is that we are not training men to govern; we are teaching them to believe that in great matters it is unnecessary to govern. If you wish to know why the political sciences are not a true discipline for the future guardians of our civilisation, but are a haphazard collection of disconnected specialties, the reason is that it is disreputable to hold and to declare a positive and coherent conception of the function of the State in a modern economy. The basic question is not whether we ought to have State Socialism, regimentation, inflation or a flexible and competitive economy. It is whether we can have any coherent and working economy by having no conscious policy, allowing those who are strong to escape automatism in their own efforts and to subject others to its intensified consequences. The truth is that in the modern State even a policy of *laissez faire* would have to be deliberately administered—the free play of supply and demand would have to be deliberately maintained. This would be my own deepest preference. I should rather have economic liberty than centralised direction and command. But if we are to have economic liberty we must accept the ancient truth that liberty is not the natural state of man, but the achievement of an organised society. Liberty is a right which only vigilant and wise government can provide. It is the artificial product of civilised effort and is lost almost instantly when the primitive passions of men are unleashed. The association between liberty and the absence of purpose in government is merely a temporary coincidence due to the fact that in the nineteenth century the English-speaking peoples had an open frontier in America and a head start in the export of manufactures from England. The coincidence will not be repeated in this century. We have to govern the great interests of the commonwealth, or we perish. We have to govern them, or we lose our liberties. We have to teach young men to govern them, or we shall not teach the young men their inescapable duty. But we cannot begin until we have said farewell to the assumption that Utopia is in the old American frontier and in the Lancashire of Cobden.

The issue of automatism as against governing is obsolete.

The real issue is not whether the major interests of the commonwealth shall be matters of conscious policy. It is what the policy shall be and by what means it shall be applied. I am not pleading that we indoctrinate young men with a belief that all social arrangements should be planned and directed by highly centralised government. Far from it. On that question I shall be in the ranks with those who think no government is wise enough or good enough to be trusted with so much power, with those who will fight as best they can for the utmost that is possible in decentralisation and in voluntary agreement. But it is precisely because this great issue of the omnivorous State confronts us that it is so urgent to rid ourselves of the fictitious and distracting issues raised by the automatists with their programme of know-nothing and do-nothing. For I hold that the transition from automatism to the deliberate government of the main elements of the modern economy is already so far advanced that it is impossible to retrace our steps. If we are not to be swallowed by an imperious State Socialism in some one of its many possible forms, then we have to govern successfully this capitalist democracy. Ungoverned, it will not drift through stormy seas into safe harbours. Those who say that it cannot be governed without sacrificing personal liberties to the authority of the State are in effect saying that our civilisation is doomed. I do not believe them. They have never given the problem their undivided attention. They cannot see the way because they have not the will. They are like the men who once thought it sacrilegious to examine the constitution of the universe. Like those men, they are able to learn little about the constitution of the universe. For the progress of scientific knowledge is the work of men who have believed that it was noble to seek for truth and possible to find it.

We must answer the question that young men put to us. We must tell them that they will have to manage the social order. We must call them to the study, not warn them away from it, of how to achieve the healthy balance of a well-ordered commonwealth. We must call them to the task of preserving the integrity of our civilisation as against proletarianism and plutocracy and the fatal diseases of concentrated power and concentrated wealth. We must call them

to the defence of freedom, now imperilled throughout the world, by showing them not only its value but the method of its defence. We must dedicate them by re-dedicating ourselves to the promise of American life which is that men can govern a State in order to enlarge and to preserve the rights of men. Let us not rebuff them and thwart them and deny them by telling them please to be good enough to do nothing. Let us rather tell them the truth, that our civilisation is in peril and that they have a great duty—a duty comparable in its grandeur with that of any generation that ever entered the arena of events. For theirs is the duty in an age when darkness is again setting in elsewhere, and the barbarians are again at the gates, to make invincible on this continent a commonwealth that invites the souls of men.

RUDYARD KIPLING

By BASIL WILLIAMS

THE task of the future biographer of Kipling has been much lightened by Kipling himself. Few, if any, of our great authors have taken the public so fully into their confidence about the successive stages of their careers, or as to their own varying moods and the processes of their minds, as Kipling in the fifty odd volumes he has published.

Born in Bombay in 1865,

So thank I god my birth
Fell not in isles aside—

Of no mean city am I,

he had as an ayah one of the 'dear, dark foster-mothers' at whose knee he learned to love the land of India and its people and legends during the happy baby-life he speaks of so tenderly in *Wee Willie Winkie*. Sent home at about the age of six to a very different foster-mother, he gives a terrible picture in *Baa Baa, Black Sheep* of his misery, his partial blindness and his terrors in the chilly puritanical atmosphere of that dreadful home near Portsmouth; and in his later novel, *The Light that Failed*, he reverts once more to the agony his childish soul must have suffered when he was threatened with complete loss of sight. Of the glorious doings of himself as 'Beetle' and his two fellow-ruffians in study No. 5 at Westward Ho! he gives us a great account in *Stalky and Co.* At sixteen this 'square-built chap,' as his uncle Burne-Jones remembered him, already filled with strange lore and exotic learning culled in the headmaster's private library, goes back to India as a budding journalist on the *Civil and Military Gazette* at Lahore, and later to the *Pioneer*, of Allahabad. It was the time of the Russian scare, so Kipling, who had

learned Russian at school, made it his business to study the *Novoe Vremya* for hints of Russian designs on India. In a few paragraphs of *The Man Who Would be King* he brings before us what work in an Indian newspaper office was like when 'the thermometer walks inch by inch to the top of the glass . . . and the press machines are red-hot of touch . . . and the punkah-coolies had gone to sleep . . . and the perspiration poured down my face and splashed on the blotter.' But, from all accounts, his work as sub-editor was not his best line of business, whereas he proved a prince of journalists. He found at once, with, maybe, a dim remembrance of his happy infancy, ample material for his *Stories of Mine Own People*. Through his father Lockwood, curator of the Lahore Museum as he appears in *Kim*, his connexion with old pupils of Westward Ho! in the Army and the Civil Service, and above all his own insatiable curiosity, piercing vision and comprehensive sympathy, he was able to enter into every phase of life in India. He soon became equally familiar with the camping and campaigning life of British and Indian soldiers, the dangerous life of the frontier (where he made early acquaintance with 'Bobs'), the work and play of civil servants, forest officers, engineers and famine officials, the characteristics of all classes of Indians in the bazaar, the temple, the solitary shrine, the Grand Trunk Road, where the whole panorama of Indian life passed before his eager eyes; and he was even at home under the deodars, where the Mrs. Hawksbees and the *tertium quid* flourished in the irresponsible holiday atmosphere. In an impetuous spate the stories and verses suggested to him by this multifarious outlook on Indian life came pouring out from his fertile brain, first as 'turn-overs' in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, next in a small volume brought out by himself, and then in seven volumes, each costing a rupee, of Wheeler's Indian Railway Library.

Late in the 'eighties some of the volumes of this library, such as *Soldiers Three* and *Plain Tales*, trickled through to this country. The impression they created over here was instantaneous and tremendous. Within three years they had earned the tribute of J.K.S.'s satirical lines:

When the Rudyard's cease from kipling
And the Haggards Ride no more.

For here was a man who dealt with things in which the British public was deeply concerned, but of which it was supremely ignorant: life in India, both of natives and officials, the way in which India was governed; and the life at home and abroad of the officers and men of our Army—these matters and many more this unknown author began to bring home to us, forcing them on public attention by his vivid and startling narrative conveyed in so few, so aptly chosen words. Most of the stories were soon republished in England; and Henley, discovering his poetical genius, began to print his verses. A story is told of Professor Masson, of Edinburgh, that he came home one day in great excitement, exclaiming 'Here's literature, here's literature at last,' as he waved his copy of the *Scots Observer* containing Kipling's *Danny Deaver*, which he forthwith read out to his family.

After a short visit to England in 1888, in the following year he left India for good, travelling back by Burmah, Singapore, Hongkong, China, Japan and America, noting and storing up for future use all he saw in those countries—their great ports, the ways of sailors and engineers and of their engines, and the lighthouses that made the vast traffic possible. Burmah inspired one of his most famous ballads, *Mandalay*; his journey through America, during which he had a talk with Mark Twain, helped to cure him of the ferocious prejudice against Americans that characterised his *Pioneer* days. But, though he had now begun looking further afield, he was still held by the lure of India, which, as he said after near forty years' absence, 'is the mother that never forgets her children, however far they may travel.' *Life's Handicap*, *Barrack Room Ballads*, half the stories in *Many Inventions* and *The Day's Work*, the two *Jungle Books*, and above all *Kim*, came hot and fast between 1890 and 1901. After that he found an even wider world to survey, and was gradually becoming the laureate of the whole Empire.

Settling for a time in London near Charing Cross in full view of the Thames, he forthwith took London and her great river to his heart, entering into the lives, just as he had in India, not only of those of his own caste and education, but also of the poor, the rascally, the down-trodden and the ordinary hard-working toiler, and finding in them spots of beauty, heroism, uncanny vision and contagious humour,

unperceived by those of coarser grain. And he poured it all forth in his London tales such as *The Finest Story in the World*, *Badalia Herodsfoot*, and *Bruglesmith*. London River and all it suggested, with its ships bearing men and cargoes to and from every country in the world, urged him to see still more of that world, and especially those parts where the English had adventured. So in 1891 he completed his knowledge of the Empire by a tour to South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon. On his return to London he collaborated with the American Balestier in *The Naulakha*, and in the following year married Balestier's sister. With his American wife he settled for four years at Brattleboro', in Vermont, and, during this prolonged sojourn on American soil, finally cast off his old prejudice and came to see what is finest in *An American* (the American spirit speaking):

But through the shift of mood and mood
Mine ancient humour saves him whole.

. . . while Reproof around him rings
He turns a keen untroubled face
Home, to the instant need of things.

Lo, imperturbable he rules,
Unkempt, disreputable, vast—
And, in the teeth of all the schools,
I—I shall save him at the last.

But with all his sympathetic vision of other peoples, his love of the British Empire almost as a personality, fostered by voyages and discoveries in the Seven Seas, was becoming more and more his master passion. As early as 1895 in *The Flowers* he reminds the English at home that 'English posies' are to be found not only in Kent and Surrey but also among the bloodroots of Canada's maple groves, the heath and lilies of South Africa's Muisenberg and Constantia, in Australia, 'where the Erskine leaps down the road to Lorne,' and 'on Taupo's face,' where grow New Zealand's myrtle blooms; and two years later he is singing his hymn of triumph to *Our Lady of the Snows*. What, within the brief space of ten years, he had already come to mean to his homeland and the whole English-speaking world was revealed by that world's anxiety when, in the closing months of 1898, he was lying at death's door.

The South African War aroused all his strongest feelings. Already, in his *Recessional*, he had uttered a word of solemn warning against the signs of *ὕβρις* described in the Jubilee festivities; he had also foreseen the conflict from his talks with his friends Jameson and Rhodes. In an early stage of the war he had come out to stay at 'The Woolpack,' Rhodes's cottage in the grounds of Groote Schuur, in order to follow the fighting close at hand. His chief thoughts were with his beloved soldiers of the Queen, with their families, for whose benefit he wrote his once-famous ballad, *The Absent-Minded Beggar*; he pilloried with ferocious sarcasm in *Stellenbosch* the incompetent generals who shirked responsibility; he could even find a good word for our enemy the gallant but canny *Piet*. A characteristic little instance of his genial interest in those who had volunteered for service was told by Erskine Childers, then in the C.I.V. He had been asked by Mr. Amery to meet Kipling at dinner at the Mt. Nelson Hotel; arriving prodigiously hungry, as only raw soldiers can be, 'how I enjoyed that dinner!' he wrote in his book; 'had there been many drivers present, the management would have been seriously embarrassed that evening'; and as a testimonial to his prowess he proudly took back to camp a menu-card with the autograph inscription, 'I certify that driver Childers went steadily through every item of this dinner.—RUDYARD KIPLING.'

After the South African War he finally came to rest in what became to him the most beloved of all lands, Sussex-by-the-Sea. At first he dwelt with Burne-Jones at Rottingdean. 'Oh, my beloved Ruddy,' wrote the uncle once from London, 'I am so glad to be going back to you to-morrow. I am growing tame like a curate,—like an over-anxious curate. So to-morrow down to little Rottingdean, to laugh and roar and throw care to the dogs.' Later Kipling found his own home at Bateman's, Burwash. Here he soaked himself in the lore of England, and notably in that of Sussex, most lovable of all English counties, its history and traditions, from the days of Merlin, the Flint Man, the Roman, the Saxon, the Norman, not from any merely county feeling, but in the spirit of a child first learning its love of the land from its own village, thickets, fields, downs, and cross-country tracks with all the legends about them, and then gradually realising

that these were only part of a great national tradition common to the whole race. *Puck's Song*, *The Land*, telling of the Lower River Field owned in succession by the passing conqueror, Roman, Anglo-Saxon, Dane, Norman, and finally by Kipling himself, but always watched and worked over by one of the thirty generations of Sussex Hobdens; and other such lovely fantasies about Sussex or further afield, as in *The River's Tale* about the Thames, show this bent in Kipling's mind. And then he looks abroad, and his soul is troubled about the power of these English to preserve their great inheritance. In the glorious days of Queen Victoria he had been well content, save for an occasional hint of doubt, to let Englishmen pat themselves on the back; indeed, he was forward to show them the way. But now he began to fear our complacency and even our ability to retain what we had won. As he said to his French friend, M. Chevrillon, in 1909: 'The one thing you and we have to think of now is war.' He joined Lord Roberts in his campaign for conscription, and tried to awaken the country to its dangers before 'Armageddon break our sleep,' in some score of poems, such as *The Old Men*, *The City of Brass*, *The Dukes*, *The Islanders*. But when the war actually broke out he changed his tone of impassioned reproach to the stirring trumpet sound of *For All We Have and Are*. A year before he had in *France* proclaimed his love for all that is best and noblest in the country soon to be our great ally:

Broke to every known mischance, lifted over all
By the light sane joy of life, the buckler of the Gaul;
Furious in luxury, merciless in toil,
Terrible in strength renewed from a tireless soil;
Strictest judge of her own worth, gentlest of man's mind,
First to face the Truth and last to leave old Truths behind—
France, beloved of every soul that loves or serves its kind.

During the war he published little except collected writings and a few such things as were designed to enhearten the home-dwellers or pay homage to the combatants. 'I have no words for this time. I am not writing. I have no words,' he confessed to a friend when his only son John was being sent to the front. But the death of that son called forth three of his most touching poems, in which he made his own

and the mother's grief an expression of the grief and pride of all the bereaved of this land. The first is *My Boy Jack*:

'Have you news of my boy Jack?'
Not this tide.
'When d'you think that he'll come back?'
Not with this wind blowing and this tide.

The other two are *The Nativity* and, not the least touching, *A Recantation (To Lyde of the Music Halls)*, which begins:

Ere certain Fate had touched a heart
By fifty years made cold,
I judged thee, Lyde, and thy art
O'erblown and overbold.
But he—but he, of whom bereft
I suffer vacant days—
He on his shield not meanly left—
He cherished all thy lays.

One other poem on the same subject contains that supremely beautiful refrain:

These were our children who died for our lands: they were dear
to our sight.
We have only the memory left of their home-treasured sayings
and laughter. . . .

But who shall return us our children?

Even after the war he published little that was new, except such books as *Land and Sea Stories for Scouts and Guides*, a labour of love for a cause he had much at heart. The pursuit into which he threw himself with most eagerness was that of honouring the dead. He was one of the keenest members of the Imperial War Graves Commission, and it was only fitting that one of his pall-bearers last January should have been his old friend Sir Fabian Ware, the originator and deputy-chairman of that body. He took an immense interest and pride in the great cemeteries of France and throughout the world—'the greatest bit of construction,' he said, 'since the Pharaohs; and they only worked in their own country'; and in his last long talk with Sir Fabian he was a-wondering what the dead soldiers over there were thinking about the way we were honouring them. The children, too, were never far from his thoughts. At the last meeting of the Commission, a few days before his death,

a friend told him that a boy of ten, after reading the *Jungle Books*, had said: 'This Mr. Kipling knows how to make jungle noises.' 'That is a compliment,' said Kipling, beaming like a child, 'because a boy knows all about noises.' And the friend added: 'After the meeting, as I was hurrying away, Mr. Kipling ran—literally ran—after me and handed me a sealed envelope saying: "Give this important message to the boy." There was a twinkle in his eye as he gave me the manilla envelope marked *On His Majesty's Service*. When it was opened we found the following note: "From the man who, you said, knew how to make the jungle noises.—RUDYARD KIPLING."'

Kipling has already had his ups and downs in popular estimation. When he first loomed on the English horizon his chief rivals among the younger writers were those who sought their inspiration from such as Pater and Flaubert, preoccupied chiefly with the subtleties of feeling and style, and with a tired outlook on the world. Some wrote beautiful poetry and good stories and criticism that have survived, but as a school they appealed mainly to the restricted audience of the *Yellow Book* and other such precious publications of the 'nineties. Into this world of over-introspection suddenly leaped this vivacious personality from the East, with his new message—strange, creative, stimulating. No one could mistake Kipling's meaning, conveyed in his vivid staccato style, or those elementary sentiments whereby he appealed to the cultured no less than to the common man. This instant recognition was voiced by his uncle Burne-Jones in 1888 after reading *Plain Tales from the Hills*:

I want to send you a greeting and tell you with what delight and pride I have read your tale-book—read it this last week, being disabled from work, and it was a mighty comfort and beguilement to me—I don't know when I have so enjoyed a tale-book. . . . Sure nothing is so nice as a book of little tales, when if they are tragical they are not long enough to harrow the heart too much, and if they are merry, the gods are not likely to envy us ten minutes' fun. Dear Ruddy, this is the truth, your work will be a new pleasure to me in life.

What Burne-Jones said then seems equally true to one who has been re-reading them after a lapse of nearly fifty years. With the exception, perhaps, of *The Light That Failed*, for the first ten years or so there were few discordant voices in

the almost universal chorus of praise which greeted each volume as it appeared year by year. There were, indeed, already a few who complained that his sentiments were too crude and obvious, and that his philosophical aspect on the English race, its duties and its merits, were too complacent and jingoistic. As Kipling with the approach of and during the South African War further emphasised this view and seemed gradually to be identifying himself with one party in the State, this feeling became more widespread. It was strengthened by the shrill partisanship he displayed in the succeeding years, especially in such poems as *The City of Brass*, an obvious attack on the Radical Government and its social programme, and others that might be recalled. Of such no doubt Mr. Max Beerbohm was thinking when he portrayed Kipling 'taking his girl Britannia out on Hampstead Heath.'

But the bulk of Kipling's work, and the work by which he will live, is found in that other Kipling, ever more and more mellowed by his loving sympathy with the young, the simple, the beautiful.

It is enough that through Thy Grace
I saw naught common on Thy earth,

as he says of himself; and in truth he found beauty not only in all God's creatures, man and beast, but in all Nature and all the works of man. This contagious delight of his is nowhere better expressed than in such lovely prose and verse as he has given us in the *Jungle Books*, *Puck of Pook's Hill* and the *Just So Stories*, and above all in *Kim*, the one great long story that he wrote—prose and poetry which in 1907 earned him the Nobel Prize 'for the most distinguished work in the field of idealistic tendency.' Few, even of our greatest prose writers, have been able in so few words and with such penetrating understanding to bring before us the very look and essential nature of a countryside, of an animal or of a man, so that they actually become realities to us. Take, for instance, the scene as it unfolded itself to Purum Baghat as he looked forth from his little hillside shrine: 'Immediately below him the hillside fell away, clean and cleared for fifteen hundred feet, where a little village of stone-walled houses, with roofs of beaten earth, clung to the steep tilt. All round

it the tiny terraced fields lay out like aprons of patchwork on the knees of the mountain, and cows no bigger than beetles grazed between the smooth stone circles of the threshing floor.' Or this, from *Rewards and Fairies*, how 'Old Middenboro', the lawn-mower pony, stumped across the paddock and hung his sorrowful head,—with the face of a Spanish friar,—over the fence.' Or this, of a seashore in his beloved Sussex, 'The little wrinkled waves grieved along the shore to Newhaven and down the coast to the long grey Brighton whose smoke trailed out across the Channel.' Who but Kipling would have thought of 'grieved'? But once heard, no other word would do.

The last edition of Kipling's collected verse was published in 1933—verse collected not only from the three slender volumes published before 1896, but from contributions to the Press and from the poems scattered with generous profusion throughout almost all his prose works. Its mere bulk—over 800 pages—was a revelation to those who had thought of him chiefly as a story-writer: the matter, now one can take stock of his whole poetical production, reveals him as indeed a great poet. Most of it seems so simple, so direct, as nearly all great poetry is; but this simplicity is at times delusive. Mr. Desmond MacCarthy, in the most suggestive article that has appeared since Kipling's death, points out that his poetry shows evidence of enormous pains and craft for the achievement of this emphatic simplicity. Not content with his natural genius for finding the right effect, he studied the value of words and of their arrangement, especially as he advanced in life, with hardly less meticulous care than a Pater; and from school upwards throughout life he also studied the great masters with reverent enthusiasm. In *Jane's Marriage* we have a catalogue of some of his most loved authors:

Jane went to Paradise:
That was only fair.
Good Sir Walter met her first,
And led her up the stair.
Henry and Tobias,
And Miguel of Spain,
Stood with Shakespeare at the top
To welcome Jane.

To this list of Shakespeare, Cervantes, Fielding, Smollett, Scott and Jane Austen must be added the Bible, obviously, besides Dickens, whom he could quote by the page, and Browning, the one contemporary poet that he regretted never having met. Browning may seem surprising till we remember his

Here and here did England help me; how can I help England say
Whoso turns as I, this evening, turn to God to praise and pray,

or the same simplicity as Kipling aimed at, in such passages as:

Like an asp
The wind slips whispering from bough to bough,

or:

Stoop thou down, my child,
Give one good moment to the poor old Pope
Heartsick at having all his world to blame.

The most elaborate criticism of Kipling's work, and especially his poetry, is to be found in two long essays by the French Academician M. André Chevrillon, the second admirably translated into English. He brings out his 'art brutal et franc,' especially in the earlier works, and, throughout, his wonderful conciseness, his power of seizing the essential details in words 'that leap out at you'; and he hits off 'cette intense, cette tyrannique, cette inévitable personnalité de Kipling qui . . . nous impose dès le premier mot son obstinée présence.'

Of Kipling's poetry no doubt much, and some of that most popular at the time, will pass into oblivion, as oblivion covers the incidents that called it forth. But more that is really great will survive. Among those surviving, I venture to prophesy, will be the poems expressing his intense pride and love, not so much for the material greatness of England's Empire, as for the quiet service, sense of responsibility, kindness and essential unselfishness of the best men of Britain who have made that Empire possible. Many such, *The Burial* or the *Explorers*, for example, could be quoted. Here is another, *The Song of the Dead*, with these lines, typically beautiful for rhythm and choice of words:

We were dreamers, dreaming greatly, in the man-stifled town;
We yearned beyond the sky-line where the strange roads go down.

Came the Whisper, came the Vision, came the Power with the
Need,
Till the soul that is not man's soul was lent us to lead.
As the deer breaks—as the steer breaks—from the herd where they
graze,
In the faith of little children we went on our ways.
Then the wood failed—then the food failed—then the last water
dried—
In the faith of little children we lay down and died.

Again we have such poems as *The River's Tale* :

Twenty bridges from Tower to Kew
Wanted to know what the River knew,
For they were young and the Thames was old ;
And this is the tale that the River told—

quite in the great tradition of Spenser's :

Sweet Thames ! run softly till I end my song.

Such as these and the poems about the animals and the
children and the quiet English countryside that he loved :

I've given my soul to the Southdown grass
And sheep-bells tinkled where you pass.
Oh, Firle an' Ditchling an' sails at sea,
I reckon you keep my soul for me,

assuredly such as these are of the great heritage of English
poetry.

BASIL WILLIAMS.

THE HIGHER ORGANISATION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

By FIELD-MARSHAL LORD MILNE

THE general interest which is now being displayed by thinking people throughout the country in the matter of the organisation and direction of national defence has found expression in the numerous articles and letters which have been published in the Press during the past few months. While there has been a pretty general consensus of opinion that there is a strong case for the better co-ordination of the work of the three Defence Services, from the point of view of finance and of military direction there have been put forward many solutions for the attainment of this end which display considerable ignorance of the machinery which already exists for this purpose. That this machinery is susceptible of improvement no sane person who is conversant with its complicated mechanism will deny, and the first object of this article is to explain to those who have no first-hand experience of the workings of the Committee of Imperial Defence how this organ functions. My personal experience of some seven years as C.I.G.S., which brought me into the closest contact with the C.I.D. and its most important sub-committee—namely, that of the Chiefs of Staff—may perhaps be regarded as a sufficient justification for my making a critical analysis of the various proposals that have appeared in the Press for improvement in its operation and even for its supersession by that other and ill-defined body referred to as a Ministry of Defence.

It is as well to clear the air by a short explanation of how the Service departments are organised and work. As I am, by reason of my service, best acquainted with the War Office, I will describe its organisation and functions.

The Secretary of State for War, as head of the Army

Council, has entire charge of the Army and its affairs. He is responsible only to Cabinet and to Parliament, and on financial questions deals direct with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He is assisted by two parliamentary Ministers, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, whose chief responsibility is the Territorial Army, and the Finance Member of the Army Council, whose title explains his position. His five professional advisers on the Army Council are the four military members and the Permanent Under-Secretary. The last named is the head of the Civil Service in the War Office, is the official accounting officer, and is responsible for the constitutional and financial side of the Office.

Of the military members of the Army Council, the first, the C.I.G.S., deals with policy, plans, training, education, operations and intelligence. The second, the Adjutant-General, deals with all questions of personnel and discipline. The third, the Quartermaster-General, deals with movements, quartering and food supplies. The fourth, the Master-General of the Ordnance, deals with research connected with, and the provision of all war material and clothing, and the supervision of the ordnance factories. There are, therefore, eight members of the Army Council, each, with the exception of the Secretary of State, in charge of his own department. Though, naturally, it is in practice impossible to obtain the concurrence of all the members on every question that arises, all decisions carry the weight and authority of the Army Council, but the Secretary of State can, and sometimes does, override the opinions or decisions of his professional advisers.

With inevitable changes in matters of detail, both the Admiralty and the Air Ministry are organised on very similar lines, and it is as well to take this opportunity of saying at this point that, so far as the Naval, General and Air Staffs are concerned, the individual officers in each of the three Ministries understand each other's organisation and functions intimately. Consultation with each other is a matter of almost daily occurrence, so that any failures to co-operate or to co-ordinate their efforts are certainly not due to ignorance of each other's personalities or methods. The annual Estimates are drawn up by the three Service Ministries independently, and certainly, until very recent years, no attempt has been made to correlate the demands for money by the three Services

with the *roles* which they were expected to fill in Imperial defence.

THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

The co-ordination of the policies and plans of the three Service staffs is the responsibility of the Committee of Imperial Defence. This Committee was brought into being by Mr. (later Lord) Balfour. Its constitution and functions were laid down in a Treasury Minute dated May 4, 1904, which stated that it was 'to consist of the Prime Minister, as president, with such other members as, having regard to the nature of the subject to be discussed, he may from time to time summon to assist him.' So far as its functions were concerned, it was laid down that it was purely an advisory body, it had no executive powers and could, therefore, issue no instructions, and that no recommendation by it could be effective until endorsed by the Cabinet.

The composition of the C.I.D. is essentially elastic, but in practice it generally includes the three Service Secretaries of State and their professional advisers, as well as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, India, the Dominions and Colonies, and the Home Secretary. Representatives of the Dominions and other experts are called in as required. The secretariat consists of the secretary to the C.I.D. and four assistant-secretaries who are officers of the Navy, Army, Air Force and the Indian Army, and are generally selected from amongst the graduates of the Imperial Defence College.

In actual practice, practically all the preparatory work of the C.I.D. is done by sub-committees, of which there must be well over fifty, and on which several Government departments are represented. When the work of these committees reaches the point of requiring a decision or reaches a periodical report stage, it is generally placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the C.I.D., and a full dossier is prepared and circulated to its members. The range of subjects varies from a report by the Chiefs of Staff on some question of high policy to recommendations by the Principal Supply Officers on Industrial Mobilisation, questions of man-power, the defence of India, coast defence at home and abroad, censorship, protection of the civil population against air raids, League of

Nations problems, fuel research, and innumerable other subjects. Indeed, there is hardly any subject discussed by these sub-committees which has a purely military aspect, and the C.I.D. is obviously in no position to issue executive orders on subjects which vary so much in character and in import and on which the Cabinet alone can make the final decision after full consideration of all the implications involved.

THE CABINET AND THE C.I.D. SECRETARIAT

It is of interest to trace the growth of the present system under which the secretary of the C.I.D. has had superimposed on his original responsibilities other and onerous duties connected with the Cabinet and the Privy Council. Until 1914 no written record was maintained either of Cabinet proceedings or decisions, and each Minister was responsible for giving effect to these decisions in so far as they affected his particular department. In practice, it was not unnatural that sometimes Ministers should differ from each other in the exact interpretation which they placed on decisions which had never been reduced to precise written terms. When the war broke out the risk of misunderstandings became too serious, and it soon became apparent that it was impossible to rely solely on the memories of harassed and overworked Ministers. Old methods were abandoned and the present system of recording Cabinet minutes and communicating decisions in writing was introduced. The machinery was ready to hand in the shape of the C.I.D. secretariat; and what was easier than to appoint the secretary of the C.I.D. to be secretary to the War Cabinet and to establish a central Government bureau directly under the Prime Minister?

There was some criticism in the Press and in Parliament to the effect that this secretariat was unconstitutional; but it undoubtedly worked in practice, and the Prime Minister decided to continue the system after war-time conditions had ceased. In 1923 the secretary of the C.I.D. became in addition Clerk to the Privy Council, and on the formation of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee he was appointed its secretary. Thus we find combined in the person of one man the secretaryships of the highest executive authority in the land, the highest legal body in the land, and of two advisory bodies, one of

which, at least, is a whole-time task for the ordinary mortal. This system has grown up with the present incumbent, and it is extremely doubtful whether any man who had not grown up with it and who was not gifted with the exceptional mental equipment of Sir Maurice Hankey could possibly have shouldered these enormous responsibilities with the conspicuous success he has achieved. Nevertheless, it is wrong in principle; the burden is too heavy for one man to carry, and the secretary of the C.I.D. should be relieved of his responsibilities to the Privy Council and to the Cabinet, which, after all, is not part of, but superior to, the C.I.D. It may be urged that a common secretary to these two bodies has its advantages in that important recommendations of the C.I.D. are not lost sight of in the welter of Cabinet discussions of subjects unconnected with defence. The solution, however, lies elsewhere and will be dealt with later in this article.

SUB-COMMITTEES OF THE C.I.D.

It is impossible to deal with the details of all the fifty odd sub-committees of the C.I.D. It will suffice for the purposes of this article to explain the objects and working of three of the more important ones. Of these, the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee deals with subjects analogous to those dealt with in the Service Ministries by the Naval, General, and Air Staffs. The Man-Power Sub-Committee, as its name implies, interests the Naval, Military and Air Chiefs who deal with personnel, whilst the Principal Supply Officers Sub-Committee interests the third and fourth Service members of the Board of Admiralty, the Army and Air Councils. Thus the questions discussed by these three sub-committees are regulated to correspond with the organisation of the Service Ministries, and a considerable degree of co-ordination is ensured before the recommendations of these sub-committees reach the C.I.D.

The three Chiefs of Staff, in addition to being advisers to their own respective Councils on questions of sea, land and air warfare, are collectively responsible for advising the Prime Minister on all questions of defence policy. For this purpose they hold a warrant and thus constitute a super-Chief of Staff in Commission. Their chairman is the Prime Minister, who is also chairman of the C.I.D.; but, as his other duties seldom give him the leisure to enable him to take the chair in person, in practice one of the three Chiefs of Staff presides for

a period. In the preparation of their annual report they base their appreciation of the defence situation on an international survey prepared by the Foreign Office. Their recommendations must inevitably involve expenditure of money, but on this aspect the Treasury naturally have the last word before their reports are laid before the Cabinet. The preparatory work involved before any question can come before this sub-committee is done by a joint planning committee in which officers of the Naval, General and Air Staffs take part. We have thus a combined staff, in all but name, co-operating in recommending a line of action on which a decision is eventually come to by the chief advisers of the Government. This is a very different state of affairs from that which seems to be envisaged by some critics of the existing system, who would like to impose over the Service Ministries a kind of super-staff, which would be in a position to criticise and possibly override their recommendations.

The Man-Power Sub-Committee deals with questions involved in the production of the men necessary to carry out the military policy of the Government. This sub-committee takes cognisance, not only of the requirements of the three Fighting Services, but also of the requirements of industry and of the nation. As the Naval, Military, and Air Chiefs of the Service Ministries who deal with personnel serve on this sub-committee, it can safely be assumed that requirements in man-power of the three Services are fully considered before any allocation of resources is decided upon. Third in order, but by no means the least important, is the Principal Supply Officers Sub-Committee. This sub-committee is presided over by the President of the Board of Trade and includes in its membership, in addition to various high officials in the Civil Service, the Third and Fourth Sea Lords, the Quarter-master-General, the Master-General of the Ordnance, and the Third and Fourth Air Members of the Air Council. This sub-committee is charged with making recommendations regarding the provision of supplies and war material of all kinds in war-time. It practically constitutes the nucleus of a peace-time Ministry of Supply and Munitions, and is the only machinery in existence for planning industrial mobilisation and for allocating the resources of the nation to meet the war requirements of the three Fighting Services.

It is now universally recognised that the organisation of industry will be one of the decisive factors in any future war fought under modern conditions. Every important nation is engaged in an intensive study of this problem, and in drawing up plans to admit of the maximum possible effort of the whole country being put into effect in the shortest possible time, to meet the enormous expenditure of munitions which modern war entails. The progress made by the United States of America in this respect is no secret, and forms the subject-matter of a voluminous report published in 1933 by the War Department of the United States. The organisation of their respective industries by Italy and Germany has already been put to a practical test. The former nation is reaping the benefits of years of preparation in its present struggle against Abyssinia, whilst the success attending Germany's industrial organisation is only too evident in the rate at which the rearmament of that country is proceeding.

How far the plans for industrial mobilisation in this country have advanced can only be a matter of speculation, since all the proceedings of the Principal Supply Officers Sub-Committee are necessarily kept secret. But it is pretty safe to say that, with a committee composed of members who are all fully employed in their departmental appointments, progress is unlikely to have been very rapid. An immense amount of exploratory work has doubtless been done, but the gap between paper planning and the preparedness of industry to turn rapidly over from peace to war time production is a wide one, and there is little external evidence to show anything more than that the foundations of the bridge have been laid.

The above three sub-committees may be regarded as co-ordinating the three main factors in the preparedness of this country for war—namely, policy, man-power, and war supplies. In addition, there are several co-ordinating committees which deal more with the peace-time activities of the three Ministries and whose energies are directed more in the direction of securing economical administration. These committees deal with the co-ordination of contracts, and of questions relating to foodstuffs, textiles, mechanical transport, general, medical and veterinary stores, and certain aspects of research. The work of these committees hardly comes within

the scope of this article, but their existence is mentioned to show that machinery for the co-ordination of the various Services' requirements exists in a degree which is probably unknown to the general public.

A certain amount of criticism of the working of the C.I.D. has appeared from time to time in the Press, some of it useful and constructive, but for the most part levelled by those who know little or nothing of the organisation of the Service Ministries and also have no real knowledge of the methods by which the business of the C.I.D. is conducted. Even the work of, and the atmosphere obtaining at, the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff is criticised by people who, in view of the secrecy maintained as to their recommendations, can have no better foundation for their criticisms than conjecture or idle gossip. Amongst the alternatives which are suggested by various critics who would either destroy or improve the C.I.D. the more important are :

The constitution of a Ministry of Defence.

The appointment of a joint staff to work permanently on defence problems and including a joint intelligence department.

The appointment of one Chief of Staff over all three Services.

The appointment of a Minister of Defence.

The separation of the duties of the secretary to the Cabinet from those of the secretary to the C.I.D.

A MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

This proposal is no new one, and its advocates seem largely to be imbued with the hope of securing substantial economies and greater efficiency both in peace and in war by the amalgamation of duplicated services such as the intelligence, medical, supply, and other departments. It has other attractions in that the formulation of an agreed defence policy and the allocation of available funds to the three Services can be more readily and satisfactorily achieved when there is but one political head who has to make the decision. The attainment of this ideal is not so easy as its advocates seem to think; but nevertheless, the attractions of the proposal have moved more than one Government to investigate the possibility of its adoption. The question was considered in 1880 by a

Committee under Lord Hartington which reported two years later that 'there were grave objections to the proposal.' Since then the advent of the air arm and the development and increasing complexity of modern weapons have added to the difficulties already inherent in the proposal. To the divergent traditions, psychology, and customs of the two older Services must be added those of the latest joined partner in defence, and everything tends to make supervision by one head very much more difficult than it was even in 1900. Lord Weir in 1922 presided over a Committee which examined the possibility of amalgamating the common services of the three departments; this Committee reported most emphatically against the proposal and saw no financial advantage in such amalgamation.

In the subsequent debate in the House of Lords the late Lord Thomson stated that a Ministry of Defence would effect no economies and that the Minister would require the energies of three Cabinet Ministers in having to deal with three policies and to work in the three elements of Sea, Land, and Air. Lord Balfour, with his wide experience of all questions connected with defence and the working of the C.I.D., could see no advantage in a Minister of Defence. Lord Haldane agreed, and considered that the appointment of such a Minister would be a retrograde step and that his duties would be beyond human power to carry out.

The most recent Government inquiry into the question was conducted in 1923 by a Cabinet Committee under the presidency of Lord Salisbury. This Committee considered certain other questions at the same time, and their Report was published as Command Paper No. 2029 in 1924. The Committee, after hearing the evidence of several leading authorities of the day, considered their 'criticism to be overwhelming as against all proposals for setting up a Ministry of Defence or any Minister of Defence with authority overriding that of the Ministers at the head of the Service departments or a combined staff.' More recently Mr. Baldwin expressed himself, on March 28, 1928, as opposed to the institution of a Ministry of Defence in the following terms :

Even in peace the work of running three Service departments would be too much for one man; the Minister would have to be a super-man, the burden would be intolerable. . . . The Services are for war, not for

peace; in war a single department with single control must break down. . . . War cannot be run by centralisation, but by co-ordinated decentralisation.

It is amply clear from the above extracts from reports and public speeches that those who have been best qualified by reason of their knowledge and experience to study the question of the formation of a Ministry of Defence have come to one and the same conclusion—namely, that no good purpose would be served by the formation of such a Ministry. The media in which they fight, the divergent aspects of sea, land and air warfare, the methods of training their personnel, and the means by which they hope to attain their respective and varying objectives in war differ so much from each other that the amalgamation of the administration of the three Service departments into one Ministry must be a problem the solution of which is beyond the wit of man to devise. The co-ordination of their efforts so as to achieve a national objective in war is, however, a totally different question, the best answer to which has yet to be found, but the answer will not be found by the formation of a Ministry of Defence.

A JOINT STAFF

Another solution which is advanced by the advocates of better co-ordination is the formation of a joint staff, which would presumably find a place somewhere in the C.I.D. organisation between that Committee and its three leading sub-committees. The leader in *The Times* of February 4, 1936, seems to point in this direction, as the two following extracts will show: 'The guiding principle (to secure an organic defence plan) is "wholeness." To see the problem, and deal with it, as a whole there must be freedom from sectional cares and from sectional ties. . . . Hence the foundation of an effort to deal with defence as a whole must be the formation of a combined staff. That staff must have a whole time head, who will also be chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.' Again: 'But it is difficult to see how combined strategy can be produced by separate departments.' A body of this description, whilst appointed primarily with the object of securing co-ordination, finds it, historically, very difficult to avoid the pitfalls of criticism. Moreover, the temptation for the Cabinet to secure 'a second opinion' is seldom resisted.

One need only quote the system under which, prior to Lord Kitchener's tenure of the Chief Command in India, the Viceroy had two, and not infrequently antagonistic, military advisers on his Council.

Again, the military representatives who were appointed towards the end of 1917 to advise the Supreme War Council at Versailles were primarily charged with the duty of ensuring co-ordination of Allied military effort. It would, indeed, have been very singular had this body not sometimes gone beyond its charter and offered criticism of, and alternatives to, the plans of the constitutional military advisers of Government—namely, the C.I.G.S. and the British Commander-in-Chief in France. Furthermore, it does not generally seem to be recognised that this proposed joint staff would in effect be co-ordinating, and possibly modifying, plans submitted by the highest naval, military and air advisers of the Crown. Whatever rank the head of the joint staff held, it would make the positions of the Chiefs of Staff intolerable. Co-ordination must of course be achieved before, and not after, the Chiefs of Staff tender their advice; for this purpose there exists already a joint planning committee composed of responsible officers belonging to the Naval, General, and Air Staffs who investigate the various aspects of every question set to them in their own respective departments, and, after consultation with their administrative colleagues, bring their solutions together for consideration in committee and endeavour to arrive at a common conclusion. Differences of opinion undoubtedly do occur at times, but these same differences would have to be composed even in a super-joint staff. The differences may perhaps survive consideration by the Chiefs of Staff, and may not even be resolved by the C.I.D., in which event it is the duty of the Cabinet to make the decision. The crux of the matter is the point at which unanimity and co-ordination should in all reasonable circumstances be reached, and that point is undoubtedly where the Chiefs of Staff tender their advice.

Another point which seems to be lost sight of is that planning and execution cannot be divorced from each other. The successful planning of a modern campaign is as much dependent on the meticulous care with which the details are worked out by the administrative staff as it is on the genius

of the General Staff. Sea, rail and road movements, questions of supply, both of food and of war material, and the requirements of medical and other services, all must be carefully thought out before the General Staff can satisfy themselves that the plan is capable of execution. This elaborate jig-saw puzzle can be fitted together only within the Service department concerned; and if a super-staff is to be given latitude to alter the positions of the pieces because they do not happen to like the completed picture, the result can hardly be other than chaotic.

The criticism that combined strategy cannot be produced by separate departments in reality begs the question. The decision, for instance, in 1915 as to whether the Dardanelles expedition should be undertaken with a view to knocking the Turks out of the war was a question of major strategy. It could never have been decided by either the Admiralty or the War Office alone. The views of the naval and military advisers were doubtless taken on the feasibility of the operation, but it was for the War Cabinet to decide whether or not to adopt this course of action. Once the major question is settled, the Service staffs each work out, in their own spheres, how to give effect to the decision. Co-operation is, of course, essential, and it is just here that the Joint Planning Committee fulfil the function which their name implies. If they should disagree as to the relative spheres of importance of their respective Services, the solution will not be found in referring their difficulties to a higher body, a combined staff constituted on much the same lines as they are themselves, but deficient of all the administrative help obtainable only inside the Service Ministries. Moreover, *quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* The proposal to appoint a super-Chief of Staff who shall be superior to those of the three Services seems to be only a logical extension of the proposal for a joint staff. It is open to much the same objections and is really hardly worthy of serious consideration, as it builds up yet another sort of critical authority between the C.I.D. and their principal military advisers.

A MINISTER FOR DEFENCE

It will probably be admitted that the existing machinery of the C.I.D. gives ample opportunities for achieving co-ordination. This does not mean that co-ordination is always

achieved, and it has been continually pointed out in the Press and elsewhere that this is what is really lacking in our system. There is, not unnaturally, considerable truth in the assertion. Until quite recently the sums allotted annually to the three Service departments depended largely on what the Minister concerned was able to extract out of the Chancellor of the Exchequer: they certainly bore little relationship to the tasks which the Navy, Army, and Air Force were supposed to be capable of performing. The trouble was primarily due to the anxiety of the nation to cut down military expenditure and to give a lead to the rest of the world in the reduction and limitation of armaments. In consequence, successive Governments, though warned every year as to the risks which they ran by the Chiefs of Staff, burked the issue and laid down no definite policy (other than that of retrenchment) for the Service departments to pursue. The Chiefs of Staff were given, from time to time, various problems to solve connected with the defence of various parts of the Empire where trouble had arisen or was likely to arise. Their opinion and advice were not always unanimous, the Prime Minister seldom found time to preside over their meetings and to compose their differences, and, with one of the Chiefs in the chair, it is not surprising that the compromises reached were not entirely satisfactory either to themselves or to the C.I.D. whom they were advising.

It is impossible, and even inadvisable, that these three senior officers should always see eye to eye with each other. Wholesome difference of opinion is sometimes a good thing when dealing with a subject in committee, but there must always be an unbiassed chairman present who can make divergent views converge and, where complete identity of views is impracticable, give a deciding vote. It is clearly impossible for the Prime Minister to find time to preside every time that the Chiefs of Staff meet in committee, and one solution, to which there is probably pretty general agreement, is to appoint a Minister who will act as deputy-chairman to the C.I.D. The title of this Minister is immaterial, but there will be found some who will object to that of Minister for Defence, lest he should be tempted in time so to enlarge his duties as to become, in effect, the head of a Defence Ministry. This deputy-chairman of the C.I.D. will find ample scope for

his activities in filling the appointments of chairman of the sub-committees of the Chiefs of Staff, 'Man-Power, and Principal Supply Officers, to mention only three sub-committees where Ministerial guidance and authority would be of inestimable value.

So far, the discussions in the Press have chiefly centred round the necessity for providing some authority higher than the three Chiefs of Staff for ensuring the co-ordination of their proposals on strategical matters. This the proposed deputy-chairman of the C.I.D. should be able to ensure through his chairmanship of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee. But just as important is the necessity for ensuring that co-ordination is reached in, and effect given to, the recommendations of the Principal Supply Officers Sub-Committee. The prime importance of an efficient scheme for industrial mobilisation has been pointed out earlier in this article. The preparation of paper plans is merely a matter of time, but their translation into ensuring the preparedness of industry to turn over rapidly from peace to war production demands an amount of authority and driving power which does not at present exist. The P.S.O. Sub-Committee may make recommendations, but, when one envisages the extent of the expense and labour involved in estimating the capacity of hundreds, and possibly thousands, of industrial firms in this country, and in ascertaining, and in some cases supplying, the machines, jigs, tools, etc., necessary for their conversion or expansion to production on a war scale, one realises that such a herculean task is beyond the capacity of such hard-worked Ministers as the President of the Board of Trade and the three Service Secretaries of State. This task might well be entrusted to the deputy-chairman of the C.I.D., who, with Cabinet authority behind him, should be well equipped to ensure that the recommendations of the P.S.O. Sub-Committee are given effect to without being subjected to those irritating delays which seem to be inseparable from the departmental handling of questions of major importance.

THE SECRETARY TO THE C.I.D. AND OF THE CABINET

The separation of the duties of the secretary of the Cabinet from those of the secretary to the C.I.D. has been discussed earlier in this article. The advantages of combining these

two offices in one man have been very real during the years succeeding the Great War. The wave of pacifism which has swept over the country, the many ill-conceived proposals which have been put forward with the object of advancing the cause of disarmament, the reactions of various Governments to popular clamour favouring some measure or another which was tabled at Geneva, and the rapidly changing political situations in various portions of the globe, have all had their repercussions on the defence of the country. Had it not been for the steadying hand of the man who combined in himself the duties of Cabinet and C.I.D. secretary, his ready appreciation of the implications of the above factors on questions of defence, and his ability to put these in their proper light before the Cabinet, the preparedness of this country for defence might well have been in a worse plight than it is to-day. Nevertheless, I hold that the task involved in filling both these appointments is getting beyond the powers of one individual. With the appointment of a special Minister for the C.I.D. much of this load can be taken off the shoulders of the secretary, and, at the same time, the views of the C.I.D. can be constantly kept before the Cabinet which might otherwise be lost in the fog which to-day makes it so difficult to discern what is really going on in the world.

In the preparation of this article I have been assisted by Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Charles, who for four and a half years was Director of Military Operations and Intelligence under me at the War Office. He was subsequently Master-General of the Ordnance for three years. He has, therefore, an up-to-date experience of the possibilities of co-operation between the three Services, and of the working of the C.I.D., extending over a total period of seven and a half years. He has had the double advantage of having had to deal first with the strategical and planning side of the C.I.D. and subsequently with the equally important side which deals with the provision of war material in war-time. His views and mine coincide as to the impossibility of merging the three Service Ministries into one Ministry of Defence.

MILNE, F.M.

HOW PRESS AND PUBLIC RECEIVED 'THE PICKWICK PAPERS'

By WALTER DEXTER, Editor of *The Dickensian*

ONE hundred years ago—to be precise, on the 31st of March, 1836—appeared the first number of *The Pickwick Papers*, a thin pamphlet of twenty-six pages, and four illustrations, enclosed in a green wrapper, price one shilling. It was the work of a man practically unknown, and an account of its inception, by the author himself, forms part of the preface which is generally printed with every edition which has since been published. But no attempt has yet been made to ascertain from contemporary sources what were the causes which led to the great popularity the work achieved within a comparatively short time. It is well known that the first few numbers were a decided failure, but with the advent of No. 5, in which Sam Weller made his second appearance, the circulation took a turn for the better and thousands were called for where only hundreds had been sold before.

That admirable biographer of Dickens, John Forster, was not at all correct when he stated that the first five parts appeared 'without newspaper notice or puffing,' although, of course, he is right in saying that it later 'sprang into a popularity that each part carried higher and higher, until people at this time talked of nothing else.' The present article, while contradicting the first statement of Forster, will amply confirm the second. The publication of works in monthly parts does not appear to have been anything out of the ordinary in the days when *Pickwick* appeared; but these were not new works, but republication of already popular novels previously published in three-volume form, usually at the price of one and a half guineas. Thus in February 1836 we find *Brambletye House*, by Horace Smith, being advertised in six monthly numbers at one shilling each, and No. 1 of *The Pilgrims of The*

Rhine at half a crown per part. Neither was a new story. To publish in this manner a new work by an unestablished author was a bold experiment on the part of the publishers, and they took the wise course of giving it as extensive a publicity as they thought was warranted by all the circumstances.

Their earliest advertisement was in the *Athenaeum* for March 26, 1837, where it occupied the upper half of a full-page advertisement. It read, in part, as follows:

On the 31st March will be published, to be continued Monthly,
price One Shilling, the First Number of
The Posthumous Papers
of
The Pickwick Club
containing a faithful record of the
Perambulations, Perils, Travels, Adventures and sporting
transactions of the corresponding members
Edited by Boz
and each Monthly Part embellished with Four Illustrations
By Seymour.

A shorter advertisement appeared that week in seven other papers—*The Times*, *Bell's Life in London*, the *Observer*, *John Bull*, the *Weekly Dispatch*, the *Satirist*, and the *News and Sunday Herald*. On April 1 there was an advertisement in both *The Times* and the *Morning Post*. The next day we find a similar announcement in the *Court Journal* and the day following in the *Age*. But these advertisements did not in all cases bring further immediate publicity in the way of notices or reviews.

The first review we have been able to discover appeared in the *Atlas* three days after publication. The writer referred to it as 'a strange publication' for which he had 'in vain endeavoured to discover the purpose.' 'It ostensibly professes to be very funny,' the reviewer continued, but he found it 'excessively dull':

The wit of the writer has no wider range than through that melancholy region of exhausted comicality, which Hood and Poole and Smith and Cruikshank have reaped, until they have not left a single laugh behind.

That was the sum-total of the notice taken by the Press during the first week of issue. 'Strange publication,' 'exhausted comicality,' 'excessively dull.' Did Dickens see

this notice, we wonder? He most probably did, but was so immersed in the more important matters of a honeymoon to pay much attention to it. Besides, we have an idea, from his letters during the writing of the first two numbers, that he knew he was on sure ground.

It is evident that the reviewer in the *Atlas* lacked appreciation of the new humour; so did the *Bath Herald* the following week:

This appears to us to be a squib directed against the British Association for the encouragement of the arts, sciences, literature etc. which has had meetings in London, Edinburgh [*sic*], Dublin, and is about to sit next in Bristol. If this be really not its drift, we must leave the solution of the enigma to some other Œdipus.

Neither the *Observer* nor *The Times* made any comment on the publication, in spite of the advertisements they received. *The Times* very rarely indeed reviewed publications in those days, and when it did it was not a work of fiction that was noticed. Yet somebody on the staff read the first number of *Pickwick* and chuckled over it, then extracted the tall story about the cabman's horse, and printed it in the issue of April 7, giving the source whence it came. The result of this was to give a large public a taste of the new humour.

The first long extract to be lifted by another periodical and tacked on to a 'review' appeared on April 9, in the *Literary Gazette*, and must have done more than any large displayed advertisement to help on the sale of the publication. It is evident that advertisements did not in those days control the reviews. The *Literary Gazette*, like the *Atlas*, was one of the weeklies in which the new work was not advertised; perhaps the publishers thought that, as an advertisement had appeared in *The Times* and the *Athenaeum*, the class of public to which *Pickwick* would appeal would not be interested in seeing a further advertisement in this high-class and important weekly. But the *Literary Gazette* did not fail to notice this new publication in an article combining also the other new publication of Chapman & Hall, the *Library of Fiction*, to which Dickens contributed a story.

Both these commencing periodicals promise well [it said]. The first contains original, selected and translated stories; and *The Tuggs's at Ramsgate*—with which it sets out—possesses drollery and characteristic-ity. The *Pickwick Club Papers* bid fair, however, to surpass their con-

temporary. The design is playful, and the opportunities for good natured satire, if we may judge from a few pages, do not seem likely to be neglected.

That same week two newspapers in which the work had been advertised came out with fairly lengthy reviews. The *News and Sunday Herald* said 'This is a novelty in the monthly innumerable,' but found fault with the manner in which the book had been advertised:

These 'papers' come before us with the unexceptionable claims to our best consideration, save that they are heralded by an advertisement of pompous insipidity, in which modesty is sacrificed to a contemptible thirst for display, and a wretched attempt at tawdry smartness substituted for the commonsense and business air that should characterise tradesmen's bulletins.

An appreciative review appeared in *Bell's Life in London*, to which Dickens had contributed some of his 'Sketches':

A periodical under the title of *The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club* has just come forth. It is edited by 'Boz' whose humorous productions are already familiar to our readers, and whose power of describing the singular and the ridiculous, in the human character, is not excelled by any writer of modern times. The present work is full of quaint humour and close observation of the eccentricities of mankind, and will amply sustain the fame which 'Boz' has already acquired in the same amusing style.

On April 16 there was a good notice in *The Spectator*:

Boz has commenced a periodical under the title of the *Pickwick Club* which feigns to be a record of the sayings, doings and adventures of a knot of aspiring Cocknies whom he makes butts of for ridiculing the airs of superiority and importance commonplace people are apt to assume by way of propitiating their self-love. The 'Trip to Rochester' in the first number is cleverly done, though forced. The characters have too much of caricature, and the incidents belong to the stage rather than to real life. 'The Duel' when one of the *Pickwickians* goes out to give satisfaction for an insult he only supposes he might have offered because he cannot recollect what he did overnight, but which was really given by an adventurer who borrows his coat—is a scene for a farce. 'The Assembly' is capitally hit off.

The *Court Journal* reviewed the first number at the end of the month, when the tragic death of Seymour had drawn a little more attention to the work on which he was engaged:

We have glanced at the humorous designs with which this first number is illustrated in a less mirthful mood than this whim and spirit were intended to create. . . . In Boz, who is the editor of these *Pickwickian* pleasantries, Seymour found a writer of congenial spirit and humour.

The death of Seymour appears also to have been the keynote of the May number of the *Metropolitan Magazine*, of which Captain Marryat was the editor.

The hilarity with which we were about to hail the appearance of this new comic work [it said] is dreadfully overcast by the memory of the miserable death of poor Seymour. . . . However our regrets must not prevent us doing justice to the genuine humour of this the first number of these posthumous papers. 'Boz' is a rising writer; in his prosperous navigation he has but one shoal to beware of—extravagance. Yet even extravagance may be pardoned in him, when he makes it so laugh provoking. When we receive the next number, we will give a more detailed account of this paragon of clubs.

Although somewhat belated, the *Morning Post* gave prominence to the first number of *Pickwick* in its issue of May 11, when the second number was already published.

We have been highly amused by the perusal of this number, the first of a series [it said]. 'Boz' is a shrewd observer of all the phases of citizenship . . . and has the happiest knack in the world of combining the glowing outlines of personal sublimity with that recipient risibility of conception which makes them unconsciously waver into profiles of the ridiculous. His imitations of Parliamentary eloquence and etiquette in the proceedings of the Pickwick Club are particularly good.

The *Satirist*, which had already written in high praise of the *Sketches by Boz*, terming them 'in their way inimitable,' was not long in expressing its opinion of *Pickwick*. Although the publication had been advertised in its columns, there was no notice during April of the first number; but on the day of the appearance of No. 2 it made the following reference to it:

Boz is really an agreeable fellow, and whether he travels by himself or in association, enough is seen of him to give us a high relish for his company. He has an aptitude of delineation that must render him at all times amusing, and many of his scenes are sketched with a master hand. He is one of the few authors of whom we never tire.

The first number of *Pickwick* did not 'go' like the proverbial 'hot cakes.' According to a statement made at a later date by Mr. Aked, the binder, the first order for binding up No. 1 was for 400 copies, all of which included Seymour's original work. It is this which has made a really fine first edition of *Pickwick* command such a high price whenever it has come upon the market.

True to its promise, the next month (May) the *Metropolitan* again returned to *The Pickwick Papers*, and especially to the tragic death of Seymour, who was, of course, a more real figure to the literary world of the day than the fresh young 'Boz'; and there the reviewer gives an opinion which the present writer has for long held, but which has not since been stated in print, so far as he is aware: that the death of Seymour was hastened somewhat by the vivid story of 'The Stroller's Tale,' and the equally vivid drawing the artist made of it. Said the *Metropolitan*:

It is a heart-rending subject, that engraving, and too exciting for the sensitive and overwrought nerves of misery. Might it not have been the one drop of bitterness which made the cup of anguish overflow, and thus incite him to pour out his life hastily with it? . . . Mr. Pickwick himself is, as the nurse of Juliet says, 'A man of wax—a mould—a bright light among his brethren.' We hope, notwithstanding the ominous word Posthumous—that he is not quite dead—buried, at least, in oblivion, he never will be. We hope some day to view him in all the vigour of vitality and in his own improper person.

The immortality of Mr. Pickwick predicted at so early a stage of his career was remarkably prophetic. And the desire to see that worthy in the flesh was but the forerunner of that claim to kinship which has persistently grown during the last hundred years, until the word Pickwickian has found a place in the *Oxford Dictionary*, and Mr. Pickwick has been once more immortalised in a book entitled *Personalities and Powers*, by Knut Hagberg, where a chapter is devoted to Mr. Pickwick cheek by jowl with such actual personalities as Kitchener, Gladstone, John Stuart Mill and Cecil Rhodes, and where he is described as 'a gentleman in that word's most aristocratic significance.'

The *Sun* appeared to have a strange opinion of the make-up of Pickwick, for in its issue of May 2 it said:

The second number of an entertaining, miscellaneous collection of tales, anecdotes, etc., collected and arranged by Boz and illustrated by Seymour. The best, at least the most vigorously written, tale is the one which described the death of a low Pantomime actor at one of the minor theatres.

Bell's Life in London wrote of the second number in its issue of May 1:

The second number of the highly humorous Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club by 'Boz' is out, and in all respects sustains the

reputation for characteristic originality which the author has so justly earned. It is illustrated by three admirable sketches, from the pencil of the unfortunate Seymour, which, from his melancholy fate, become doubly valuable.

Number 2 of *Pickwick* was not reviewed by the *Bath Herald* (which had noticed the first number), but we find this understanding notice of it in the *Bath Chronicle* :

The second number of this humorous publication is as full of sly and racy fun as the first. Intimate acquaintance with that strange piece of patchwork—human life—peeps forth in every page.

Although each number had been advertised in *John Bull*, it was not until after the third number had appeared that this paper gave it a notice. This was on June 12, when it said, after dealing with some of the monthly magazines :

Another periodical work, of a very different character, claims our particular attention—we mean 'The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club,' illustrated by plates from sketches by Mr. Buss, who has succeeded to that department of the work upon the death of the lamented Mr. Seymour. There is as much genuine humour, and as much real fun, in the *Pickwick Papers*, as in these days generally fall to the share of half a dozen books of the same size. We have not the least knowledge of the author, or even his name. His *nom de guerre* is Boz, under which he has written another extremely entertaining work. If the *Pickwick Papers* keep up to their present level, they will, in conclusion, assume a high place in the ranks of comic literature.

Here was praise indeed, and although three months elapsed before *John Bull* gave the publication a further notice, we can see from its implication that the writer had been joyfully devouring the intervening numbers.

The *Pickwick Papers* are this month irresistibly good [it said on September 11]. Smollett never did anything better than the sixteenth chapter of the present number. The loss of Mr. Seymour to the work, as far as illustrations go, is obvious ; but while the author continues to serve up such rare treats as those which he has already laid upon our table, he will find the public appetite so sharpened as to be ready to gobble it all up even without plates

—a little piece of humour which was surely inspired by *The Pickwick Papers* themselves.

When reviewing the third number the *Metropolitan Magazine*, which had been so interested in the fate of poor Seymour, seems to have got into a confusion over the name of the artist engaged in that unfortunate artist's place ; for in

announcing the title of the publication it says 'With Illustrations by R. W. Boz,' and the artist Buss was again referred to as 'Boz' at the end of the review. The same mistake appears in the August number of the magazine reviewing the fourth number, in which Phiz's first sketches appear.

This is what was said about the third number :

The third number of this amusing work is well sustained, with the same humour and drollery that have made the preceding parts so popular. The Fat Boy improves upon us, and we find that he turns out to be not quite so great a fool as the world had generally supposed. His betrayal of the loves of the elderly Mr. Tupman, and the not less elderly Miss Wardle, to his mistress is a very rich scene. The cricket match, also, is well described. We are glad again to meet Mr. Jingle on the scene, though he is but a sad rogue at best and comes but to create all manner of mischief. We predict that these papers will never be at a discount, though we prophesy that there will always be a great run upon the publishers for them. Mr. R. W. Boz has done his part well, and much lessens our regret at the want of Mr. Seymour's spirited hand.

Another notice of No. 3 appeared in the *Sunday Times* for June 12 :

This little work is brought out under the editorship of the gentleman who, under the whimsical nomenclature of Boz, has already afforded us no ordinary gratification by his laughable sketches of character. The style is that of Fielding and Smollett, and we can truly affirm that no modern writer has approached so nearly to those great originals. The graphic illustrations to the early numbers were by Seymour, whose melancholy suicide we mentioned some time since.

There is no comment here on the illustrations by Buss, but in the *Bath Herald* of June 11 we find this mention :

Library of Fiction No. 3. The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club No. 3.

These comic and diverting series are illustrated by a new hand. As far as regards the graphic designs 'Buss' now sketches the drolleries which 'Boz' relates, and the operation of the two will banish 'black melancholy' as effectually as a dose of laughing gas.

The *Brighton Guardian* did not devote much space to literature of any kind, but on June 15, 1836, it felt forced to note the publication which was beginning to be talked about among the visitors from London. This is what it said in presenting a long extract :

The current number of this work is now before us, and we can only remark that it is equal to its predecessors in sharp and pungent humour.

We have no room for extracts, or 'The Cricket Match at Muggleton' and the Dinner after it, and the flirtation of the spinster aunt should certainly adorn our columns.

Three months had gone, and still *The Pickwick Papers* were hanging fire. It is doubtful if more than 400 or 500 copies of each number had been sold. The publishers appealed to Charles Tilt, a large wholesale bookseller, to help them to push the sale; they had every confidence in the ultimate success of their project, if it could only be brought more directly to the notice of the reading public. Tilt's plan was to send out 'on sale or return' 1500 copies of each of the three issues: this was done, but it was disastrous. On an average 1450 copies came back; net result, 50 copies sold of each. The death of Seymour was said to be the reason. Buss's illustrations to the third number were not as good as they should have been, owing to the nature of the process of reproduction, at which Buss was not an adept.

Still the publishers persevered. Hablot K. Browne, quite a young man, even younger than the youthful author of the work itself, was engaged as artist in place of Buss: to save expense the number of the illustrations was reduced from four to two; the letterpress was increased to 32 pages per number, and Dickens agreed to accept the reduced payment of ten guineas per number for his work.

And so No. 4 came out in July. To Mr. Jingle, who had so far held the stage, was added a new character—a cockney type, Sam Weller: there was a graphic piece of writing describing the chase of Jingle and Rachael Wardle to London; Sam had made his bow with a few whimsicalities, and the number concluded with a powerful interpolated tale, 'A Madman's Manuscript.'

The Press notices as each month went by appear to have become alarmingly less. Only two London papers commented on No. 4; one was the constant *Bell's Life in London* (July 3), but it said never a word about Sam,

The fourth number of this periodical is before us, and we find in it all the well-known raciness of the talented Editor 'Boz,' who is ever at home in delineating the nice shades and eccentricities of human nature. It is illustrated by two humorous drawings, and also contains an affecting paper entitled 'A Madman's Manuscript.'

The *Bath Herald* of July 9 deals with No. 4 of each *Pickwick* and the *Library of Fiction* (to which Dickens did *not* contribute), and also with *Sunday under three heads*, in omnibus fashion.

Our readers are already acquainted, from previous notices, [it says] with the merits of the first two series of which the humour, sentiment, and oddity are so powerfully aided and illustrated by the graphic fancy of 'Buss,' the mighty co-operator of 'Boz.'

This is amusing, as R. W. Buss was no longer illustrating the publication at the time, and in any case 'Buss' was not a *nom-de-plume* like 'Boz' or 'Phiz'; but while R. W. Buss had been announced on the cover of No. 3 as providing the illustrations, the name of 'Phiz' did not appear on the cover of No. 4—only the remark 'With Illustrations.'

It was probably the *Literary Gazette* of W. Jerdan which saved *Pickwick*; at any rate, it was the first paper to recognise Sam Weller as a force to be reckoned with. It had given a fairly lengthy extract from the first number. The publication was not advertised in it until June 4 (in May there had been an advertisement of the *Library of Fiction*, but not of *Pickwick*), when No. 3 of *The Pickwick Papers* was announced as 'now ready.' But even then there was no further notice of the story in this discerning weekly. When Mr. Sam Weller appeared in the July part (No. 4) Jerdan could not resist the humour of Sam, and we find in the issue of July 9 the passage commencing 'A loud ringing' from chapter x., quoted in full, prefixed by the following:

The members of the Pickwick Club continue to display the humour and talent of this clever writer. The last number, for instance, gave us the following good description of Boots, at an ancient inn in the borough:

The *Literary Gazette* was evidently not going to let *Pickwick* alone for a while. Next month it did not hesitate once again to speak most highly of the work and to quote yet another typical extract from it. Giving the public a sample of the goods offered was an excellent idea, and the publishers and Dickens had much to thank Jerdan for. Of Nos. 4 and 5 there were still 1500 copies being sent out 'on sale or return,' and regularly the greater part came back. Jerdan's review of No. 5 undoubtedly paved the way for an increase in the sale of the next part, published at the end of the month. It will

be found in the issue of August 13. The title was somewhat incorrectly given; but what did that matter?

The *Pickwick Club Papers*, edited by Boz. London: Chapman & Hall.

We hope and believe that this clever and characteristic publication prospers, as it deserves to do. The present number has a very amusing tale of a bagman, told in Boz's best style, which we recommend to readers, and would indeed extract, were it not too gross an act of plunder from so small a tome. We will, however, copy (as a specimen of an election 'miraculous circumstance') as related by Sam the coachman, as happening in his father's time:

We have not found any more London reviews of No. 5; but the two Bath papers still continued to enjoy the perusal and to recommend it to their readers. The *Bath Chronicle* said on August 7:

The fifth number is out, and sustains the well-earned fame of Boz, whose descriptive faculty was never more humorously displayed. The characters are admirably drawn, and Hogarth in his last days could not have given us such faithful pictures on canvas as Boz has on paper.

The *Bath Herald* the same week had specially to excuse themselves from quoting a long extract, in the following words:

The best episode is a most whimsical and laughable dialogue between a travelling bagman and an old-fashioned arm-chair, which we could wish our space would allow us to transcribe entire, for it admits not of amputation or division.

The *Brighton Guardian*, after missing the fourth number, returned to the fold in August with a further favourable review, using the word 'inimitable' in connexion with it; but that by the way in reference to Phiz's drawing, and not to the text of 'Boz':

The present number contains, as usual, plenty of food for mirth. The scene between Mr. Pickwick and Mrs. Bardell is highly ludicrous. We advise our political friends to peruse the account of the election at Eatanswill. To the lovers of the marvellous, the Bagman's Story will prove highly amusing. The illustrations which accompany this number seem to us to be a shade superior to those which appeared in the two numbers for June and July. The scene in which Mr. Pickwick is taken by surprise with Mrs. Bardell in his arms, by his fellow Pickwickians, is inimitable; the likenesses are well preserved.

A magazine which had forgotten Dickens for a while now woke up. In the September *Metropolitan* we find a reference to 'the great Mr. Pickwick,' as well as the following eulogy:

'Boz' marches on triumphantly, and has completely taken possession of our ear, and of the hearts, too, of his countrymen.

The circulation of No. 6, published at the end of August, began to show signs of improvement; everybody wanted to read about this man Pickwick and his comical servant, Sam Weller, and orders poured in for the previous month's issue; and then more Sam was wanted. 'When did he first come into this remarkable story?' people asked; and placed an order for the back No. 4, and enjoyed it so much that Nos. 1 to 3 had to be purchased. From a modest circulation of from 400 to 1000 copies of each of these first five numbers, all at once the publishers found themselves inundated with orders. It is no exaggeration to say that the circulation leaped to 40,000 copies, and 'Phiz' was kept hard at it, etching and re-etching not only his own illustrations, but those of Buss and Seymour.

One hundred years ago not only was the population much smaller than to-day, but only a small proportion of it were potential book-buyers owing to the lack of education. *Sketches by Boz* had done well with a circulation of 1000; but here were forty times that number of 'Pickwick's' in demand. No wonder Dickens should write his first publisher, John Macrone, the joyous phrase, in a large hand, 'PICKWICK TRIUMPHANT!' The success of *Pickwick* was the talk of the literary world; and Macrone put a fresh edition of the 'Sketches' in hand at once!

Mr. Chapman and Mr. Hall were delighted; young Dickens had stood by them in taking a smaller payment a couple or so months ago; now it was time for them to show their appreciation—they increased his monthly 'emolument' to twenty-five pounds.

WALTER DEXTER.

A CAMBRIDGE UNDERGRADUATE TOURS AMERICA

By C. J. M. ALPORT

THE following pages are the outcome of a six weeks' tour of the Eastern States of the United States of America undertaken by another undergraduate and myself as representatives of the Cambridge Union. Our object was to debate. We visited, in all, some twenty-six different colleges and universities, and came into contact with students of many types and classes.

One of the first things that struck me was the wide diffusion of 'college education.' It is becoming more and more essential to a successful career, and it is open to anyone with brains and ambition. A student who does not have sufficient means to pay his fees may work his way through college. He may stoke the furnace in the boiler-room, or, as at Yale, act as secretary to one of the Faculty; he may mow the college lawns, officiate as an assistant librarian, or work behind the counter of a local store. More than once I debated against men who had served me at lunch as waiters. This entails no loss of social status whatever. Their position is precisely the same as that of the wealthiest undergraduate among them, and they sometimes form more than half of the student body. The only disadvantage is that, as they have to work three or four hours a day besides preparing for lectures, they have very little time for the important social side of college life.

In almost all colleges there are fraternities—semi-masonic bodies whose object is mainly social and which have a dual character. Thus the 'Alpha Beta Delta' may have chapter-houses in fifty different colleges, each self-supporting and practically independent; it also has a shadowy national organisation to which all 'brothers' belong after they have ceased to be students.

The individual fraternity-houses themselves are the property of the chapters and are run by officers elected by the students from among their own number. The president has almost dictatorial powers over the manners and morals of the 'brethren'; the treasurer has complete control of the finances of the fraternity; another officer is responsible for the catering and other domestic arrangements. About twenty or thirty students sleep in each house, and there are expensively furnished lounges, recreation and study rooms, a dining-hall, and several small bedrooms. These latter contain two or three students each, who often sleep in bunks one on top of the other, and which look, unlike the sitting-rooms, exceedingly uncomfortable.

Each fraternity has its own initiation ceremonies, which are usually preceded by a period of trial and tribulation, known as 'Hell Week,' during which the members seek to make life unbearable for the unfortunate candidates. One boy told me that he was made to walk 5 miles with a 10-lb. block of ice under one arm and a dozen eggs under the other. On reaching the appointed place he had to do obeisance to a fiery-cross which was the symbol of the fraternity. Finally, after being blindfolded, he was taken to an out-of-the-way place and bound to a tree. It took him two hours to get loose, after which he had a 19-mile walk back to the college.

On another occasion I was shown some light wooden bat-shaped instruments. These were used to test the staying powers of the candidate. Each 'brother,' armed with one of these weapons, administered a certain number of strokes which totalled twenty on the first day and rose to two hundred by the end of the seventh. I remarked that it sounded very painful, and they assured me that it was. However, after a week of this sort of thing the candidate is so exhausted that he does not really care what happens. My friends explained that the value of these ordeals lay in the sense of comradeship between the companions in misery and the proof thus afforded of real determination and courage. The authorities, however, are beginning to restrict 'Hell Weeks' because they interfere with the work of the whole school. These fraternities are the only sources of social distinction in the colleges. Before a man is admitted, careful inquiries are made through 'brothers' in his home town as to his social position and his

general character. If the report is unsatisfactory, he will not be allowed to become a member. The same is true of the more select schools for both boys and girls. Would-be pupils must have the necessary social qualifications before they are admitted, and careful inquiries are invariably made.

In spite of the fact that many pay their fraternity fees by working in the dining-hall or kitchen, the poor student often cannot afford to join, and suffers, in consequence, many social disadvantages. Jews, too, are not admitted to the majority of these fraternities. Indeed, I think, generally speaking, the position of the Jew in America is very much worse than is realised in England. I was told by a negro teacher at a coloured college, who had graduated from Wisconsin University, that in some States in the North a negro has more chance of getting an appointment than a Jew. He said: 'If a white man, a coloured man and a Jew were in for the same job in Wisconsin, the white man would get it anyhow; but if he couldn't take it, the negro would have a better chance than the Jew.' The editor of a leading Boston newspaper (himself a Catholic) told me that society in the United States was closed to Catholics and Jews. On the other hand, in commercial circles in America the Jew is as influential as anywhere else.

The majority of the colleges we visited were co-educational. If a college education is necessary for a man in order to get a good job, it is also essential for a woman from a social point of view. The great majority of girls at an American college have no intention of entering a profession after they have finished. They go, as I was told on many different occasions, to enjoy themselves—'to make contacts,' and, above all, to find husbands. The president of a well-known girls' school in the South said to me in answer to a question: 'The main interests of the average American girl are dancing, bridge, and men. I wish that they were more like English girls; but they are not fond of games of any sort—except, possibly, riding. You must understand, the American girl takes men very seriously.' This interest is reciprocated by the men; indeed, I should say that the interests of the average male student at a co-educational college are half work, half women—the latter probably constitute the better half. I watched the last Armistice Day

celebrations at Atlanta, in Georgia. First came a detachment of the National Guard, which corresponds to our own Territorials. After them marched various contingents of College Officers' Training Corps; each had its band and colours. The student officers carried drawn swords, and all wore officers' uniforms. In the centre of this long column I was startled to see a girl walking, clinging to the arm of a cadet-major. She wore a scarlet tunic, white trousers, high-heeled shoes, a Sam Brown belt and a little white side cap, and looked as though she was playing the lead in an amateur musical comedy. 'Who's that girl?' I asked. 'Their honorary colonel,' a man replied; 'most corps have them. They're elected by the students for their looks, and appear on all ceremonial parades. I guess it helps recruiting.'

The interest taken in the League of Nations by college girls since Mr. Eden took charge of that section of British foreign policy is another indication of college psychology. As one young woman put it, in an article headed 'Britain's Eden': 'I feel a bond across the waves with this son of our mother country. . . . As I see him walking towards me from a picture in the *New York Times*, the long slender human form, the thin hands, the grave eyes, and the perfection of clothing gain perspective'! The writer of the article wanted to know Mr. Eden because he was 'a leader among men and always a student.' This is not quite so fantastic as it may seem. The influence of women in public affairs in the United States is very considerable. In every town there are 'ladies' clubs,' which, on more occasions than one, have altered national policy.

If the average girl prefers dancing to outdoor exercises, the same is true of the average man. Except at places like Yale and Princetown, few undergraduates play organised games of any sort. Football is usually confined to the 'football squad,' which in a college of a couple of thousand may number about sixty. These men, in most cases, go to college to play football first; and after that, to do anything else for which they may have time.

There has been considerable controversy for a long time past regarding the so-called 'professionalism' in American college football. All colleges deny its existence in public; many have tried to prevent it. The task is hopeless. The

president and faculty know well that they depend upon the success of their football team to maintain their numbers. A college is judged by its last season's football triumphs rather than by its academic standard, for most students will choose the school with the best team. There are so many colleges, and consequently so much competition for students, that the publicity value of a first-class football team cannot be ignored. Moreover, the gate takings at matches during the season are often very large, and form a very considerable part of the annual income. It follows that the demand for good footballers is tremendous; a first-class football coach is paid a salary many times greater than that of any professor.

Different methods are used by the college authorities to obtain good material. In every large town a college of any size will have an Alumni Association, which, besides keeping 'old boys' together, keeps a look-out on the high-schools. If a promising footballer is discovered, who cannot afford to go to college, the association will offer to pay his fees if he will join the 'football squad.' This is true of most colleges I visited. Often, however, the authorities may themselves offer a promising high-school boy some light job at the college at a salary sufficient for him to enter into all departments of student life and to complete his education. Many such have had successful academic careers. Many men who could not otherwise have obtained the advantages of a higher education have had their chance by this means. But the system has disadvantages. Professor Owen, of Massachusetts Institute, recently referred to the team of a great university as 'a bunch of paid hirelings.' He suggested that it was high time that this was stopped; a running fight took place between the Professor and the Dean of the University. Many players are bought; more than once, enthusiastic alumni have sent real professionals to college under assumed names. At one university on the west coast each member of the team finds a tin opposite him at dinner after a game. He opens it, to find within a roll of notes! The college does not actually pay him money, but he gets it all the same. This was told me by a man who had been there and had received his salary in that way.

Last December a number of colleges in the South decided to recognise the payment of promising athletes. Dr. Tigert,

the president of the university of Florida supporting this action, said: 'Students will be eligible for legitimate financial aid for their athletic services as other students for scholarly and other desirable qualities. I realise that this provision may be subject to abuse, and that some students may receive compensation beyond their expenses, but, on the whole, it is a great improvement over conditions that have existed in the past.' I do not doubt that in a few years the payment of athletes will become general. Just as we tend to idealise self-interest, so Americans have the invaluable knack of extinguishing their vices by proclaiming them to be virtues, thus solving many complicated social problems. It seemed to me—and my opinion was endorsed by high authority—that the average standard of American education is about two years behind that of England. A student goes to college when he is about eighteen. He takes a four years' liberal arts course which entitles him to the degree of A.B., and which is of a general, and rather elementary, nature. He may work at and qualify in a number of different subjects; English literature, American history, public speaking, botany or zoology, and a modern language are the sort of courses which are taken together.

I attended a class in public speaking at a small college in Pennsylvania. When I say small, I mean that there were only about 700 students there. The class itself was twenty strong. To begin with, a girl made a three minutes' speech on 'The causes of road accidents in Ohio.' She was followed by a boy who had chosen to speak on 'Why I like to take an interest in public affairs,' and who strongly advised his listeners to read the *Literary Digest*. A number of others followed. Finally, the 'professor of speech' got up and said: 'I have here some words which are usually mispronounced. I will write them on the board. Status . . . data . . . gratis . . . been . . . incognito . . . vaudeville.' This was part of a course which at the end of four years was to entitle the students to a Bachelor of Arts degree, and it gives some idea of the standard of education in many American colleges. In the bigger universities the situation is different, but I have noticed that many American students coming over to Cambridge with considerable reputations have had difficulty in attaining the standard of an Honours Degree in the Tripos.

Indeed, the president of one of the universities told me that when he went to Oxford before the war as a Rhodes scholar he found that the grounding provided in America was not sufficient to enable him to take Greats, and he was compelled to read for another subject. The situation has not changed much since his day.

One of the first places we visited was Wayne University, in Detroit. We were met at the station by the 'Professor of Forensics' and a man whom we were informed was our 'publicity agent.' We were rushed off by taxi to have our photos taken for the local newspapers—in a tenth-floor room of what we were told was the largest newspaper plant in the world. We were escorted thence to our hotel, where large baskets of fruit awaited us in our rooms. Three newspaper reporters arrived in quick succession to learn our impressions of a country on the shores of which we had only landed two days previously. This sort of publicity drew an audience of over 2000 and a record 'gate' of nearly 500 dollars.

While we were at Detroit we saw barristers 'called to the Bar.' The ceremony was not unlike that of an English Inn of Court. The presiding judge made the usual remarks about the dignity of the profession and of the necessity for diligent toil. He spoke of the responsibilities of lawyers to their clients, and concluded: 'Gentlemen, remember that the profession which you have chosen is one open to many temptations. . . . I do not know whether I am justified in stressing this point, but it struck me forcibly. It would scarcely occur to a learned Master of the Bench to make such a remark. But in America, where the whole administration of justice is riddled with corruption, it appeared to be a necessary warning. Outside the hall where the ceremony took place we were introduced to one of the Judges of the local Court of Common Pleas. He was lolling against a wall, smoking a cigarette. 'Good day,' he said. 'From Cambridge, England? Going to the law? Pleased to meet you!' He spat upon the floor, and we passed on our way.

From the court we went to the gaol. It was a show-place—very up-to-date and comfortable. There was a wash-basin in each cell. A dinner which lay uneaten near a grill consisted

of stew, fried potatoes, and fruit jelly. As we left it a little gipsy woman was brought in by a large policeman. She was dressed in a tight-fitting bodice and a red skirt and looked inexpressibly guilty. 'What's the charge?' asked the wardress. 'Shoplifting,' replied the policeman. 'Put her in here,' said the other.

The officer led his prisoner to the cell indicated. She shook herself free from his grasp, went in without a word, and sat down on the bed. The door closed, and we heard the grating of the lock. Having shown us the gaol and how it worked, the detective who was acting as our guide was at a loss to know where to take us next. 'No good going to the morgue,' he muttered thoughtfully; 'no bodies there. Perhaps you'd like to have a look at our car squad. Let's take the elevator.'

We descended six floors to the basement where the police cars were garaged. A small blue saloon with bullet-proof glass and a plated machine-gun rest was getting ready to go on patrol. We jumped at the driver's offer to show us the sights and got in behind him. Soon we were running lazily through the side streets of Detroit's slums. The car was equipped with wireless, and messages were constantly reaching us of motor accidents and civil calamities of various kinds. We were instructed to look out for a man in a 'green hat . . . light overcoat . . . five foot eight inches tall . . . weighing a hundred and seventy pounds . . . made away up town after robbing a woman in Lee Street.'

Our guides showed us the place where all cars involved in accidents were dumped. The toll of the roads in America is enormous. In eighteen months 52,000 people were killed and 1,300,000 injured, which, as the advertisements say, is more than the total of America's dead in all foreign wars. At colleges we were constantly coming across students who had met with accidents within the last few months.

To this problem, as to so many others, the attitude of the ordinary citizen seems to be one of complete indifference. We have often wondered why in England and America public opinion is not aroused to put an end to bribery, corruption and terrorism, and why something is not done to prevent this wholesale slaughter. The answer, in America as in England, seems to be that public opinion does not really care. If

questioned, men will express horror and disapproval. If pressed, they will admit that some measures should be taken. But when asked what they propose to do they usually look slightly perplexed, say they do not know, and intimate that they do not really care. Public morality in the United States is certainly not high. The fact that a mayor of one of the towns near New York has managed to invest over a million dollars in English and French banks during his thirteen years' tenure of that office scandalises only those who, but for him, would themselves be doing likewise. The great mass of people seem to be so busy living their own lives that they have no time to be indignant at the existence of social and political evils among them.

The car dump which I left to make this digression contained about 400 or 500 cars in various stages of disintegration. Our driver was most informative. 'Three people were killed in that green Chrysler. You see that Dodge? I was at that wreck. Gee, I never saw such a mess. There is some on it still!' On the jagged glass of the wind-screen of the car to which he pointed was a broad splash of blood.

Our last evening in Detroit was spent in a restaurant called the 'Russian Bear.' It was in the basement of a small house. All the patrons, except ourselves, spoke Russian. On the walls some artist had painted legendary kings and wicked, dark-eyed queens and dwarfs and Cossack men. We supped off *brinskis* served with sour cream and drank sweet Russian tea. At the other end of the low room a sad-faced orchestra of five played listlessly on grotesquely shaped instruments called *balalaikas*. Perhaps they brooded over the Kremlin's distant domes or heard the tinkling of sleigh bells across the snow, or they may have been thinking that it was high time we all went to bed; anyhow, their music, and indeed the whole atmosphere of the place, was inexpressibly sad. We might have been anywhere in the world except an American city where Henry Ford turns out a million and more automobiles a year, and where the watchwords of life are 'efficiency, realism and strife.'

The greatest charm of America is the frequency with which the traveller encounters the most violent contrasts. Journeying from Cleveland to Atlanta, we passed from winter

into summer in a night. At the first named a bitter wind scattered leaves by the lake shore; in Georgia there was warm sunshine, with blue skies, and the trees were fresh and green.

Just as there are contrasts in climatic conditions, so the people differ. The United States is not one but many nations. In Pittsburg I counted newspapers in seventeen different languages on one stall alone. In New York, on one side of Canal Street below the Bowery one sees nothing but Chinese; on the other, only Italians. The great mistake we make in England is to look upon the United States as an Anglo-Saxon country. It is true that the English influence is predominant at the moment, but in time the Slavs and Latins may weave their racial characteristics into the fabric of American life, as the negro has done in some degree already. The English influence is strongest in the East, where it has been so long established. But the Middle West is becoming more and more important. The inhabitants of that part are drawn mainly from Continental immigrants who passed through the Eastern States towards the end of the last century to the new lands not then fully populated.

The bulwark of Anglo-Saxon influence in America, besides the language, is, however, the schools, where English tradition is deep-rooted. A rich alumnus, Mr. Harkness, offered Harvard and Yale large sums of money to build colleges similar to those at Oxford and Cambridge. The offer was accepted. To-day in Yale there is a copy of Cambridge so exact in every detail as to be highly flattering to the latter. There are 'junior parlours,' Gothic dining-halls, shady quadrangles, ancient traditions and oil paintings of famous Yale men, besides a Union Society which looks like a French revolutionary tribunal. The dons retire after 'hall' to converse over wine and walnuts in the 'senior combination room.' The tutorial system, too, is used. The only difference, as one undergraduate whom I met there put it, is that there is 'None of that slap-you-on-the-back, hearty college spirit which you boys have at Cambridge, I guess.' As it was only a guess, I did not pursue the matter further.

There are, of course, many other differences. The Fellows sit democratically at a table in the body of the 'hall,' and not on a dais. Men in their first year are segregated from the rest

of the University, and only join their colleges at the beginning of the second. Not more than one undergraduate in ten is able to choose the one to which he would like to belong. The rest are apportioned to the various colleges by the dean, for if undergraduates were allowed to choose for themselves the wealthier would be inclined to congregate and Jews be segregated. An investigation is therefore made into the social and financial status of every undergraduate before he comes into residence, and the authorities do their best to distribute various types and classes of student equally among the different colleges. No doubt this scheme has advantages, but the corporate feeling in, and the family association with, a college are necessarily lost.

Yet it would be a mistake to think that the Yale experiment is a failure. On the contrary, it has been so well done that I found it hard to believe that it had been in existence, not for four centuries, but for less than four years.

But, in conclusion, let me say that all the students I met were amazingly friendly. If they took comparatively little interest in affairs beyond the precincts of their own 'campus,' they were completely free from one vice—namely, the tendency to look upon themselves as a fifth estate of the realm. There is nothing quite so depressing as the vapid emanations of what is called 'student opinion.' The growing tendency among the undergraduates of English universities to follow the example of their contemporaries in Egypt, Portugal, and Cuba finds no favour in America. On only three occasions did I find men of my own age really interested in national or international political questions. They were much more prone to comment on my 'British brogue' or to analyse the beauty of American and English girls. All, without exception, expressed an earnest desire to visit England. I wonder if we can give to such as come a welcome comparable with that accorded to us?

C. J. ALPORT.

ON THE TIGRÉ FRONT

By MURIEL CURREY

I HAVE just returned to London after spending three months with the Italian army in the Tigré, and my first contacts with my fellow-country people have left me in a state of amazement and bewilderment. Leaving out of the question what may be described as the 'League' aspects of Italy's Abyssinian venture, the statements that are made to me and the questions I am asked betray a startling ignorance of the real conditions both of the army and the country in Northern Abyssinia. Before trying to dispel some of these misconceptions I may perhaps explain that I went to East Africa with the intention of writing a book on my experiences, and that consequently I was able to pass days, and even weeks, with the troops in the front line, whereas journalists were under the necessity of spending much of their time at Asmara, the only place in which telegrams could be censored and despatched. Secondly, my knowledge of Italian enabled me to talk, not merely to generals and staff officers, but to the soldiers, the Blackshirts, the workmen and the Askari (locally recruited soldiers).

'How did you stand the awful climate? Isn't there a great deal of sickness?' are generally the opening questions of any discussion, and therefore it would be perhaps as well to deal first of all with physical conditions. Eritrea boasts two distinct types of climate: the flat strip of coast and the plain in the north-west on the Soudanese frontier are tropical, the highlands of the colony and of the Tigré are 'alpine'; the heat of the sun is frequently tempered by cool breezes and the nights are cool; indeed, at this time of year they are bitterly cold—I have even seen frost at Adigrat. Massawa, the only serviceable port, is on the Equator and is one of the hottest places in the world; labour for the great reconstruc-

tion and development which have been carried out during the last year has been imported from southern Italy and the Soudan, and even during the summer months the proportion of sickness among the Italians was very low. When I arrived in September the troops were disembarked during the night; they were immediately packed into motor lorries and driven up to the central plateau. During the winter months Massawa enjoys a climate like that of a pleasant Italian summer, and one division which was landed in November marched the whole 400 miles to Makalé without any discomfort.

The malaria and the tropical diseases which it was prophesied would decimate the Italian army are non-existent. I have visited the empty hospitals and also the base hospital ship at Massawa, to which any serious cases are sent before being repatriated, and I satisfied myself of the truth of the statement that the percentage of sickness was lower than in Italy. There is no malaria in Eritrea except in certain parts of the Mareb valley, and, as one colonial official told me, 'there is no reason why you should get it if you take reasonable precautions.'

An 'expert' on Abyssinian affairs whose knowledge was based on a few weeks spent in Addis Ababa announced the other day that the Italian army would suffer from an epidemic of typhus. 'Typhus running through an army would be a terrible calamity.' I am not a medical authority, but I have always understood that typhus is what is known as a 'dirt disease'—i.e., that it is conveyed by lice; and the 'expert' rather grudgingly admitted that perhaps the epidemic would not be so serious if the Italian troops were 'kept well away from Abyssinian dwellings.' As a matter of fact, I never heard the disease mentioned by the doctors, and certainly there were no cases in the base hospital ship. The 'occupation' of the filthy villages such as Adowa, Axum, Makalé, etc., is only a military phrase: no troops are ever quartered in those so-called 'towns'; the camps are on the surrounding heights, for reasons both of strategy and health.

I spent most of my time in the front line with the troops, living in a tent and messing with the officers; and if the life was hard and comforts lacking, I have never seen men in better condition. The water problem was also a figment of the imagination of those who had never been nearer to Eritrea

than Fleet Street. Except for two tiny lakes near Asmara and for a few streams which gradually disappear during the dry season, there is no water to be seen; but wells were sunk all over the colony and in the occupied territory in the Tigré, and excellent and abundant supplies were found 6 feet below the ground.

But if the danger of disease and the lack of water have both been vastly exaggerated, it seemed to me that it was impossible to exaggerate the difficulties of transport and supply. Except for the beef ration, a large portion of which arrives at the front on its own feet, everything which the army requires—from a nail or a piece of wood to ammunition and food and clothing and the motor lorries on which its existence depends—has to be brought from Italy, unloaded at the one port, and transported over mountain passes 5000, 6000 or 7000 feet high. The roads climb in a series of zig-zags, or are blasted out of the sides of the mountains, with drops of hundreds of feet into the valleys on the one hand and the rock face on the other. It seemed to me that there was never more than a hundred yards of level or straight road, and every corner was 'blind'; at the best there was seldom more than a few inches to spare in passing or overtaking, at the worst it was impossible to pass at all, while the dust was so thick that it rose like a solid wall around a convoy. The difficulties of roadmakers and drivers were multiplied a thousand times by the fact that it was never possible to wait till a stretch of road was finished; whatever its condition, the traffic had to continue, with results that were disastrous both to the surface and the lorries. The courage and devotion of the drivers were beyond praise, but the loss of life and vehicles was heavy. At the end of November the casualties among the men of the motor envoys were heavier than those of the troops in the front line. The Italians are very fine drivers, but their one idea is speed; they have no idea of trying to 'save' their cars and lorries by proceeding cautiously over the appalling collection of boulders and holes which represented the first state of the roads after an advance, and the wastage of cars and lorries appeared to me a very serious matter.

Road and traffic problems were matters of immediate and personal concern, as I inevitably spent much of my time

motoring up and down to the front-line positions. Cars incessantly broke down or stuck on hills, or two motor convoys tied themselves in knots; but these incessant delays gave plenty of time for conversations with the officers and men of the regular army, with the Blackshirts, and with the workmen. The cheerfulness and good temper of officers, men, and workers seemed to me to be unfailing. I was amazed when I returned to London to be informed by the 'pundits' who knew all about it that there was very dangerous friction between the army and the Blackshirts; it was the first I knew of it. There is a little friendly rivalry and superiority on both sides; the regulars allow themselves the kindly smile of professionals and the Blackshirts say 'We are all volunteers.' As far as an outsider could judge, their attitude to each other was very like that of the Expeditionary Force and the Territorial battalions during the early months of the war in France. Certainly regulars and Blackshirts shared the same dangers and the same hardships. Officers and men alike have the bare necessities, and nothing more; this is partly due to the difficulties of transport, but also to the fact that Italians are accustomed to live very much more simply than the corresponding classes in England.

One thing that struck me was the total lack of any form of relaxation or amusement for officers or men. There is no organisation such as the Y.M.C.A. attached to the Italian army in East Africa; there are no 'sing-songs,' no games, nothing to break the intolerable monotony of the life. But I seemed to be the only person who noticed such a lack; the Italians are not in the habit of having their amusements or small comforts provided for them. The one relaxation was the making of gardens; the battalions or divisions which had been in Eritrea for some time before the first advance had planted vegetable gardens (there are no vegetables in the colony), while after the advance a halt of even twenty-four hours seemed sufficient for the men to make 'gardens' of patterns of stones and cactus plants. The stonemasons and sculptors would exercise their art on boulders by the roadside, and very often there would be a boldly executed bust of Signor Mussolini or the symbol of the Fasces, while the smoothed surface of other rocks would record the name of the battalion which had made the stretch of road.

Many of the misunderstandings about the Italian campaign in the Tigré have arisen from the use of language which is so familiar by experience or tradition as a legacy of the World War. 'The Italian lines' calls up a vision of hundreds of miles of trenches; 'the Italians occupied Adowa or Axum or Makalé' suggests the cautious seizure and fortification of a few battered ruins. Nothing could be further from the reality. There are no 'lines' in the old meaning of the word: the Italians hold strong defensive positions on the crests of the ridges; the advance guards march, or indeed, more correctly, scramble, down the mountain side up on to the next ridge and then wait while the goat tracks are cleared of sufficient stones to allow the '*auto-carretti*'—solid-tyred, four-wheel drive, light lorries—to struggle up after them. Adowa, Axum, Makalé, which look so imposing in a headline, are merely collections of filthy huts which have neither been shelled nor bombed, and, as has been said, they are not 'occupied' in the ordinary sense of the word.

The great military problem which the Italians have to face is not the holding of the positions in which they are, but first of supplying their front-line troops, and secondly of guarding their lines of communication and of trying to establish contact between the Second Army Corps at Adowa and the First, Third and Native Army Corps at Makalé. Between these two points lies the Tembien.

As the eagle flies it is 80 to 100 miles from Adowa to Makalé, but actual distance is of little importance in that country; to the question 'How far is such and such a place?' the answer is always 'so many hours' or 'so many days' march. The Tembien is a roadless tangle of wild country with mountains that run up to nearly 10,000 feet; there are small fertile plains, and at Abbi Addi there were actually bananas growing in the garden of one of the innumerable '*ghebi*' of Ras Seyum. (But it is no good his going back to look for them; we ate them all when I was there in December.) Undoubtedly the Abyssinian attacks in this area are dictated by the twofold motive of threatening the Italian communications and of finding food; the Abyssinian forces live on the country, passing over it like a horde of locusts, and are forced incessantly to change their quarters in order to find fresh supplies. The communiqués from Addis Ababa provided the standing

jokes of the Italian messes ; we lost count of the number of times they had retaken the places in which we were actually sitting, and of the great victories they had won at places 100 miles behind the lines. When I read a few days ago that they now occupied the 'road' from Adowa to Makalé I longed to be back with the headquarters staff of the Native Army Corps and to hear their laughter.

I happened to be at Makalé when the Native Army Corps was starting for the Tembien, and General Pirzio Biroli, the corps commander, was so kind as to take me with him and his own 'flying column.' We followed this 'road' as far as Abbi Addi ; it was a mule track which wound along mountain sides, up and down steep rocky gorges, and for the greater part of each day the path was so narrow that we were obliged to ride in single file. The track crosses the locally famous (or notorious) Passo Abarò, which is 9000 feet above the plain of the Eastern Tembien. The northern face is but little better than a precipice, and the boulder-strewn path drops down the side of the mountain in zig-zags which are about the length of a mule. The staff dismounted, but when I looked at the depths below me I felt that my little mule was much more likely to get down in safety than I was, so I stuck to his back. It took us two hours and a half to climb down, and this, as one officer remarked bitterly, is the 'main road' between the two most important towns in the Tigré.

One question that I have been incessantly asked since my return is whether the native troops are not bearing the brunt of the fighting, as they figure so frequently in the Italian communiqués. The answer is very simple ; much of the fighting up to the end of December was an affair of outposts and scattered detachments, and, owing to their extreme mobility, the Askari are much more suitable for this type of work. The Askari need virtually no transport ; they live on a handful of grain and a little dirty water, they sleep on the ground without tents, and their pace is so fast that no white troops can keep up with them. During the ten days that I was in the Tembien with General Pirzio Biroli we covered over 200 miles, although, in addition to the total lack of roads, we had no reliable maps and were forced to depend on the vague and inaccurate information of local

guides. We were able to water the animals once a day, but for our own drinking supplies we had to depend on what could be carried by the baggage mules. We could probably have found water had we had time to dig for it, but we were moving too fast. No white troops could have carried out such a march.

The devotion between the Italian officers and the Askari is touching and lasting. I have listened by the hour while the officers in the native regiments have sung the praises of their men, 'the finest native soldiers in the world' (I thought the officers in the Indian regiments would have had something to say to this claim, but there was never a pause in which to argue the point). Both in victory and defeat the Askari have shown unfailing loyalty, and the retired men regard their discharge papers as their most precious possession and carry them in little tin cylinders slung round their necks. They never forget the names or the smallest details connected with the Italian officers under whom they have served ; the delight of the veterans has been unbounded when they saw some of their previous leaders again ; General Santini, for example, was a junior lieutenant in the days of the first Adowa campaign and has now returned in command of the First Army Corps. Even in the wilds of the Tembien between Abbi Addi and Melfa we met a retired Askari who proved an invaluable guide, and marched along with the staff talking of old days.

There are, indeed, many of these men in the occupied territory in the Tigré, and they have spread knowledge and support of the Italians among the local inhabitants. During the ten days that I was at Adowa I spent much of my time sitting in the political bureau and listening to the interviews with the local chiefs and priests who had come to swear allegiance to the Italian Government. Some of these men came from places two or three days' journey beyond the lines, and had been sent as representatives of their villages and districts to beg that the Italian forces would advance as soon as possible. The majority of the population in the province have no love for the Negus and the chiefs whom he has appointed. This year, in addition to the usual heavy tribute in kind which is paid to the local governors, the unfortunate peasants have had Ras Seyum's levies quartered on them and have

been 'eaten out of house and home.' In some places Italian transport difficulties have been increased, by their free distribution of grain to prevent the native population from starving.

The temporary hospitals which have been set up by the military authorities are surrounded all day long by men, women, and children waiting to be treated; they have absolute confidence and belief in the Italian doctors. The local markets are crowded with natives, who, however ignorant they may be of the other arts of civilisation, thoroughly understand war profiteering. But apart from the larger centres, where whatever trade that exists has always been carried on across the frontier of Eritrea, with the result that the Italians and their methods of government are thoroughly well known and understood, I found exactly the same attitude in the Tembien. In many of the remoter parts which we visited the natives had never previously seen white people; but except for the local bandits who objected to the interference with their regular occupation, and for the actual followers of Ras Seyum, the local inhabitants were friendly and seemed quite contented to accept Italian rule.

In the amazing whirligig of international politics Great Britain is now regarded by most countries as the champion of the barbarous and cruel tyranny of the Negus and his local governors; our protestations of devotion to the League (while blandly ignoring Japanese action in China) are sneered at as camouflage for fears about the security of the Empire or jealousy of another Power acquiring colonial possessions. Apart from the Socialists, who seem to have discovered a heaven-sent opportunity for an attack on Fascism, I am convinced that the opposition in Great Britain to Italian action in East Africa is genuinely inspired by loyalty to the Covenant. But there is one aspect of the present conflict which is entirely ignored in this country—the lives and fates of the unfortunate peasants in Abyssinia. When members of the League of Nations Union tell me that sanctions must be enforced 'at all costs,' that Italy must be compelled to evacuate all the territory that she has occupied, I ask these enthusiasts what they are suffering for the cause. Ignoring for the moment the whole question as to whether

European civilisation would survive the war which they seem to desire, who are actually paying the price of the sanctions and the rejection of the Hoare-Laval peace plan? The hapless Abyssinians who have lost their lives in the recent battles. 'Occupied territory must be evacuated'; what, I ask, is to be done about the thousands of the defenceless inhabitants who have clearly shown that they prefer the peace and security of Italian rule? What about the liberated slaves? 'The Negus will give pledges that they shall not suffer.' The mingled ignorance and indifference of such an answer fills me with indignation and despair. When has Abyssinia ever kept her most solemn treaties or undertakings? How is it possible to contemplate handing over these people to the torture and massacre which would follow the withdrawal of the Italian forces? I have no sentimental affection for the inhabitants of the Tigré; I did not, indeed, particularly like them, and thought that the Italians were too generous and too indulgent in their treatment of the local population; but I have seen the misery and the poverty in which they live, and it is impossible not to feel the most profound pity for them. I know that their only chance of better conditions, of security and of happiness, is under the rule of a civilised Power; it is they who, without their knowledge or consent, would be sacrificed if the Italians were to be forced to evacuate the Tigré.

What then becomes of the sacred principle of 'self-determination'? I am told that we must support the League because it is the only hope of peace in Europe. The League could and should play a great part in maintaining peace, but could there be a more bitter and ironical comment on the way in which League affairs have been conducted than to be told that its future safety depends on compelling Italy to abandon the helpless people whom she has sworn to protect?

MURIEL CURREY.

DRAMA AND THE POET'S TONGUE

By JOHN GARRETT

THERE is always something wrong in the dramatic state of Denmark, and the disease is about as difficult of diagnosis as Disraeli found the Irish problem in the nineteenth century. 'It's potatoes one day, and the Pope the next,' he complained. For some years past now the trouble has seemed to lie in the obstinate persistence of dramatists in barking up wrong trees. England's creative achievement since the war has revealed little that is new and arresting and vital. Galsworthy has gone, and the present revival of his plays is unlikely to show them as anything but pioneering pieces important as steps in progress rather than as plays revealing or intensifying human existence. Mr. Shaw continues to pervert drama triumphantly to serve his own ends. For him art must be didactic, and therefore didacticism is made artistic. But in content or method he breaks no new ground. *Village Wooing* was a conversation on the theme of 'Man and Superman,' with a boa-constrictor woman pursuing her prey from pleasure cruise to village shop. *On the Rocks* stopped where it should have begun. This form of drama has been developed to its highest pitch of efficiency, and nothing there remains to be done. Too many dramatists stay content to serve up variations of yesterday's theme in yesterday's form. When the audience is travelling by air, drama will be housed in the 'Rocket.' Cold mutton is no fare with which to attract guests to a party.

Sometimes one is led to suspect the existence of a *Mrs. Beeton's Cookery Book* for dramatists, from which all the bolder and more enterprising dishes have been deleted. From this they learn in what proportions to mix their ingredients to command success, and what has paid in the past is guaranteed to pay still. There follows as a result a drama so sterile that

it affords escape for the moment but never beyond. Though the high standard of English acting ensures the attention of audiences during the performance itself, how often does one ever hear the play being talked about, or its merits canvassed, by minds stimulated to activity by what they have heard? In the bar as often as not alcohol is consumed to induce forgetfulness of what has gone before or to fortify for what lies ahead. The apotheosis of criticism is that this actor or that actress is good or bad. After the play, in omnibus or train going home, how many people reveal themselves as having been to the theatre, except by the programmes they bravely brandish? There can be no animated discussion of play or performance because no issues worthy of discussion have been raised. The play has concerned itself with people either trivial or tiresome, people we should in life either avoid as bores or run from as from the devil. Given a disciplined decency, they would never be in their dilemmas; given common sense, they would be easily extricated. They follow their lusts as decent folk their noses. The difference that makes the part of Sally Hardcastle in *Love on the Dole* the most moving in London is that she is driven to accept adultery as the only means of saving father and brother from the blight of long unemployment. She does not take to it as to cocktails, and neither does she wail for three acts that it has consequences that she did not foresee. Too many plays exhibit inmates of a psychological Whipsnade, whose fates induce more pity than profit. Distorting mirrors are amusing enough in their place, but not to reflect nature. No play can linger on in the memory unless it concerns people who matter, and it is a fair test of a play's merit how long a life it has in the imagination after the curtain's fall. Imitative playwrights continue to cater for snobbish audiences because 'what great ones do, the less will prattle of,' as Shakespeare's Captain tells Viola. The pity is that enough playgoers are found interested in the antics and tantrums of people they regard as 'great' because they are lazy and leisured. For such Debreth-addicts there is probably no hope. But those keen enough on the theatre to stand long hours in queues might stop going to bad plays if there were good ones available. Meanwhile intelligent people wanting from the theatre bread and nourishment are fobbed off with diluted pig-wash.

Neither has the theatre been served as it should be by its own dramatists. Too many have fallen prone before false gods. One of these is the potent deity of the biographical play. A half-educated democracy takes pleasure in learning in simple form of its great ones of the past, and so the theatre is inundated with plays of history made easy. Such plays cater for that impertinent curiosity against which Tennyson protested. 'What business has the public to know about Byron's wildness? He has given them fine work and they ought to be satisfied.' Which is exactly what they are not. Half the success of *The Brontës* was due to crafty references to Victorian authors, which the competition of the *Daily Herald* and the *Daily Express*, for the literary education of their readers, introduced to London's suburbs. Mr. Sangster, turning from literature to history, has now started a Napoleonic relay-race. The Rossettis have attracted attention and a boom in the 'nineties is imminent. The first of a Dickens series has seen the light of day. Every repertory theatre in England has a cupboard stacked with plays submitted to the management which deal with every figure in history from Alfred the Great to Oscar Wilde. All this effort should have been poured into original work, and not expended upon making dramatic what must generally remain diffuse. For there is little enough in the average life even of monarchs which is the real ore of drama. It was Mr. Lynd (I believe) who once said that the worst thing about life is that it has no plot. Now drama requires form and plot, so that historical plays are faced with the alternatives of authenticity and poor drama, or good drama and bold inventiveness. Herr Bruno Frank in his *Twelve Thousand* indicated a way out. He mastered his period and then invented fictitious personages for its illumination. Thus he was able to place them in dramatic relation one to another, and write a play that was alike good history and good drama. In *Strife* half the effectiveness of the shareholders' repudiation of Anthony comes from the fact that Edgar, his own son, is among those who reject his leadership. If Galsworthy had been writing a play which purported to be biography he would have been denied this fine touch of ironic relationship. Dramatic architecture is the true stuff of dramatic effect, but architecture and authenticity make poor bedfellows.

'Do I contradict myself?' asked Walt Whitman. 'Very well, I contradict myself. I contain multitudes.' Of himself he was speaking truth, and in so doing he was describing the bulk of human personality. Whether this paradox of character is the best raw material for dramatic art is another question. The easy transition of Lytton Strachey's Florence Nightingale to the Florence of Mr. Berkeley's *Lady with a Lamp* demonstrates, not the drama inherent in her story, but the dramatist inherent in Mr. Strachey. That artist of economy selected his materials, taking only the data consistent with the view of the subject, at which he had arrived after patient research, even as a good dramatist must select his. But the new biography insists on complexity. Plato's conception of the human soul dragged in opposite directions has returned with a vengeance. 'It is biography's job to show,' as M. Maurois has insisted, 'how a man with a difficult pair of horses to drive can succeed as well as fail.' Unfortunately, to show on the stage such a struggle involves use of material more often drab than dramatic. Shakespeare could overcome all difficulties with *Hamlet*, but writing to-day he might well have cast his theme in the form of a novel. As drama Harpagon must always remain more effective than Shylock, Bobadil than Iago, because an actor can only show a part of the magnificent enormities that these characters are. The place for psychological puzzlement is in the novel, for dramatic characterisation is more suited to singleness than to the 'multitudes' of the Whitmaniacs.

Time was when biographers composed their works that their readers might be edified by the virtues of their heroes. To-day a new order obtains. A world grown Lilliputian likes well to see its own face in the glass and to worship. This has had its effect on drama as well as on biography. Less character shall become more than life-size, it is shown conscientiously as less. Everyone has money, but no one earns it. Bills and increasing years are the sole cause for tragedy, and cocktails an easy escape from either. Great lust becomes petty lechery. Cleopatra, the 'triple turn'd whore' dominating African empires and Antony's heart, becomes Amanda of *Private Lives*. Lady Macbeth's tragedy was passion for her husband's advancement, Florence Lanchester's is the imminence of wrinkles. If whores have suffered sea-change,

so have soldiers. Tamburlaine, 'the man that in the forshed of his fortune, Beares figures of renowne and myracle,' becomes Trotter of *Journey's End*, who admires hollyhocks, scoffs at *Alice in Wonderland*, and hankers after safe living in suburbia. Post-war diffidence has brought distrust of greatness, and audiences accept drama's puppets because in their littleness they recognise their puny selves. But as long as dramatists continue to pick up pins and give them an attention proper to tigers, the theatre must be the poorer and the return of great acting the longer postponed.

Mr. Strachey once described a man of parts with little opportunity to show them as a thoroughbred harnessed to a dog-cart. To-day there are too many thoroughbreds harnessed to dramatic dog-carts. Talent has been expended on turning such a novel as *Jane Eyre* into a play. Naturally the attempt fails, for the huge dimensions of the novel defy dramatic concentration. In the attempt to achieve it the splendid scene of the forbidding of the bans was even transferred from the church itself to the third-floor landing at Thornfield, where the bedroom doors of Jane, Rochester and his lunatic wife were placed in capricious proximity. Such jerrymandering with the artistic creation of the dead is as questionable in its decency as it is sterile in its results. Some few novels there are which ask for dramatisation. Reading Mr. Maugham's *The Painted Veil*, so taut was it that one dramatised as one read. The recent version of Mr. Oke's novel *Frolic Wind* at the Royalty Theatre is another honourable exception. The work of adaptation has been so well done that not until the last act of crowded and perspiring sorting out was one conscious that a trunkful of clothes had to be rammed at break-neck speed into a suit-case. With *Love on the Dole* Mr. Ronald Gow has made a happy selection from the novel, though there is inevitable loss in the probability of Sally's actions. But then Mr. Gow is a very considerable dramatist, whose *Gallows Glorious* received but scurvy treatment at London's hands.

Some of the blunders of the post-war theatre have been due to economic panic. The cinema had arrived, and it seemed at least possible that the blow to the theatre would prove fatal. In their distress managers began to seek shows which would beat the cinema at its own game. It was said

that people flocked to cinemas to see stars, not films. Very well; they should flock to theatres to see stars, not plays. Films could thrill an audience to the marrow with cavalcades of galloping horses. The stage then must have its horses too—and elephants, camels, and what-not. To attempt to circumvent drama's unity of place one London theatre turned the very boxes into hotel bedroom windows. Many more followed with revolving stages. The pity of it all was that the theatre had elected to fight the cinema on the ground best suited to its enemy. The practical side of things, such as more comfortable seats, greater luxury and courtesy, the accessibility of the picture theatre at practically any hour, got ignored. Of course, in all questions of spectacle, particularly with the rapid mastery of colour photography, the film had the stage play beaten before the race began. What the ostriches did not understand was that they were throwing away one of the greatest advantages of the drama—the uninterrupted development of thought, feeling, and action, in a single setting which commands, without clamouring for attention, up to a curtain of the author's choosing. So a dramatist is able to play on his audience's emotions, and get from it that greater degree of response which should be the aim of dramatic writing. Herr Toller's play on the life of Mary Baker Eddy was often a fine and always an interesting piece of work, but interest in the unfolding of the story was discouraged by its tabloid scenes. Interest was dissipated by a frequently falling curtain, and the advantage for actors and audience alike of a snowball accumulation of feeling was forfeited. Galsworthy's *Escape* was an early example of the influence of the film on play-writing, but one had only to see the film version to realise how much more effective the theme was treated by the camera. Once film and play recognise that in the spheres of their proper activity there is no rivalry, then the film can help the drama. For, just as the advent of photography led painters away from the pursuit of likeness as an end of art, and therefore to a revival of painting, so cinema art may lead to a revival of acting, with feature, limb, and voice. Young actors have imitated Mr. Gielgud's technique without possessing his unrivalled clarity. Since the war there has been a reluctance to 'act up.' When the other day Sir John Martin Harvey played the Convict in a dramatised

version of *Great Expectations*, his performance seemed almost to embarrass the team of players who, though with him, were of another generation; but it is his performance, and not theirs, which sticks in the memory. They forget that no one can chat convincingly who cannot rant. The audience is an instrument upon which the actor can play. He must move it by his physical immediacy, in a sense denied to the film-actor. Appreciation of this advantage may well encourage a revival of acting. If people at the theatre are only to be treated to polite—or more probably impolite—conversation, seasoned with occasional wit, they might as well stay at home and organise charades with their friends and neighbours.

Mr. Noël Coward must be held largely responsible for this mania for catching the exact idiom of everyday conversation. By trying not to write language above the standard proper to nitwits and ninny-hammers he has written beneath. Indeed, talk overheard in train or tram has often more point and vividness, and beside it Ma Parker's speech is literature. A man breaking stones on a road near Malvern, complaining of the dynamiting of that incomparable line of hills, once said to me: 'They're cutting great scars into the hill face. They'll stay now for years a shame and disgrace to our generation.' When Milton told how the Fallen Angels 'opened into the hill a spacious wound,' he was hardly more expressive. Naturalistic dialogue would have prohibited this rhythm of speech. Yet, in its place, it cannot be denied that it is inevitable that what Archer called 'the true accent and delicate interplay of actual talk' should be captured, and no one can do this better than Mr. Coward.

It all centres on what we want from the theatre. If photography is the objective, then dialogue must remain realistic and non-literary. But the Dead Sea fruits of realism are surely by now apparent. They were pithily revealed when, standing outside the Gaiety Theatre at Manchester during Miss Horniman's régime, one girl said to another: 'Oh, come on, do! Don't let's go in there. It's just like home.' There is neither escape through spectacle, nor illumination by way of poetry, when art assumes success when the exact proportion of aspirates have been dropped, and the exact number of cobwebs blown between the leaves of the aspidistra. An audience is diverted from thought, feeling, and co-operation in an

imaginative act, to appraisal of accuracy, and that, like patriotism, is not enough. Much good work has been done in the clearing away of the impedimenta of scenery, and in the return of the soliloquy. But, taking poetry to mean memorable speech, speech which moves and excites, the theatre is seen to be still a barren place, shy of poetry. Great art, we take it, must produce a greater elasticity of emotion, as surely as athletic exercise gives elasticity to the limbs. Art is under no obligation to suggest solutions for the ills it ventilates, though it can produce a state of mind and feeling which demands action with greater urgency. It can stimulate pity and kindle resignation. It can bring about a catharsis of pettiness. No wife should be able to nag her husband after having seen the Banquet scene in *Macbeth*. Lady Macbeth knows that her husband's words have betrayed their guilt, but when they are left alone no word of rebuke passes, and all she can bring herself to say is: 'You lack the season of all natures, sleep.' This is memorable. Why is it that the contemporary parallel, 'Little man, you've had a busy day,' strikes nothing from us? Surely, because one is poetry and the other is not. Assume that Macbeth is a modern gentleman of means with an itch for self-advancement. His nefarious designs need the co-operation of two toughs of easy conscience. Two such he thinks he has found on the Embankment, and to his suggestions they reply:

'I am one, my liege,
Whom the vile blows and buffets of the world
Have so incens'd, that I am reckless what
I do, to spite the world.'

'And I another,
So weary with disasters, tugg'd with fortune,
That I would set my life on any chance,
To mend it, or be rid on't.'

The fact that these words of the two murderers in *Macbeth* could as well come from any two men to-day having no hope of employment is of interest enough. But what so-called naturalistic dialogue has the same power of appeal, or the same promise of eternal life and application?

Rhythm has an inexplicable effect upon us. 'The moment the drum stops beating the appeal of art weakens,' Mr. Wyndham Lewis has written. In scorning poetry drama

commits an act of self-amputation. If it is going to be a worthy social force and lead to a greater intensity of living, then it must take to its service again the poetry of the Elizabethans and the Chorus of the Greeks. The Chorus can serve a play as a conductor serves a symphony. Mr. T. S. Eliot has shown how it 'can lead up to and away from the moments of greatest dramatic intensity.' In *Murder in the Cathedral* he deliberately reduced the tension after the murder by giving to one of the knights a quasi-comic apologia. The relief, however, was momentary, and, as soon as he wanted, the audience at Canterbury was brought by an adroit use of the Chorus back to a plane where they could respond to the play's tremendous *finale*. The Chorus is the means whereby the dramatist can control his audience, and cause its members to rise to his emphasis. So they may come to feel the whole effect and unity of the feeling in which the work was conceived; so they may be induced to imaginative co-operation with what is being presented on the stage.

This question of dialogue goes deeper yet. By means of words a dramatist is able to rise superior to the limitations of time and space which the healthy discipline of his art imposes upon him. For the drama has to be selective, and economy is more than half its art. Where the novel can deal with potatoes *and* the Pope, drama makes Hobson's choice between them. Realms beyond the crisis and the years behind can only be suggested by single evocative phrases. Even Shakespeare, with a stage convention as elastic as he pleased, but writing for an audience which had not let its ears go out of commission, made himself a past master in this art of illumination. The picture of Shylock distraught over the loss of Leah's ring, which he would not have lost for a wilderness of monkeys, because he had it of her when they were young; the picture of Lady Macbeth as daughter of the father whose resemblance to the sleeping Duncan alone holds her back from murder; the picture of Sir Andrew Aguecheek beloved, conjured up in the phrase 'I was lov'd once'—these are the true language of drama. Such phrases become for drama the equivalent of the throw-back in film technique, only, unlike the film, they require for their appreciation a lively imagination which can respond immediately to the evocative compulsion of the spoken word. Mr. Coward knows the

high value of the device. When Keri says of the Grand Duchess, 'Aunt Emily has passed unscathed through four revolutions,' she corrects him with, 'Five, dear, counting the small one when your Uncle Paul took to flying his kite in the public cemetery. He loved his kite.' What a word picture!

If this sketch of tendencies in the post-war theatre has smacked more of criticism than of congratulation, it is well, in conclusion, to strike a note of hope and thanksgiving. Shelley called the poets the world's unacknowledged legislators, and now the poets are taking service in the theatre. The plays of Mr. W. B. Yeats have a beauty all their own and can boast a far finer craftsmanship than seems apparent to those for whom Celtic wind music is enough. From Ireland, too, there have come fine plays by Mr. Sean O'Casey and Mr. Denis Johnston, notably *Within the Gates* and *The Moon in the Yellow River*. Poetic drama proper, however, in its revived form seems likely to explore the worlds of economics and religion. The Marxist idea that literature to justify its existence must have a political-social significance has led to the play demonstrating the decay of capitalist society. In *The Dance of Death* and *The Dog beneath the Skin* Mr. W. H. Auden has effected a brilliant fusion of entertainment and intellectual excitement. Just as the Victorian poets rammed home the misery brought by the machine, so poets to-day try to stimulate sluggish imaginations, that society may be induced to confront its own horrors and to amend them. In contemporary idiom Mr. Auden pushes home his thesis, all the more effective for having a wealth of resource equal to Mr. Coward's:

If Chanel gowns have a train this year,
If Morris cars fit a self-changing gear,
If Lord Peter Whimsey
Misses an obvious clue,
If Wallace Beery
Should act a fairy
And Chaplin the Wandering Jew;
The reason is
Just simply this:
They're in the racket, too!

On the evidence of pantomime a British public will stand for any hotch-potch of dramatic forms, and *The Dog beneath the*

Skin employs mime and broadcasting, song, dance, and chorus. Francis, to escape a society he detests, disguises himself as a dog. At the play's end he reveals himself, asking: 'Wasn't it Life itself I was afraid of, hiding in my dog-skin?' Similarly Mr. Auden shows in this play that he has come out on the other side of his own exploration of sub-consciousness. This play is as crystal clear in meaning as it is rich in entertainment.

The recruitment of Mr. T. S. Eliot to the cause of drama is an event of first-class importance. *Murder in the Cathedral*, now to be seen at the Mercury Theatre, is a play of rich quality and genuine dramatic power. *The Rock*, produced last year at Sadler's Wells, proves to have been a faithful portent. Part-pageant, part-revue, the scenes were bound together by choruses containing poetry superb as anything in the English language. The play abounded in entertainment, yet it agitated great issues. Humour was there with philosophy, and Ariel and Prospero joined hands. When a poet and critic of the calibre of Mr. Eliot writes for the theatre, the reign of tawdry shallowness is threatened. He has as surely devised an original dramatic form to emphasise the claims of an ancient tradition as has Mr. Auden to beckon forward to a new. If poets can trumpet tunes which will exalt while they divert, the walls of Jericho must fall. The theatre may soon become again of real value to the community, when drama remembers to cope once more with issues as compelling as man's relation to man and man's relation to his Maker.

JOHN GARRETT.

THE REPORT OF THE ARCHBISHOPS' COMMISSION ON CHURCH AND STATE¹

By PROFESSOR THE REV. NORMAN SYKES

The ground for a legislative alteration of a legal Establishment is this: that you find the inclinations of a majority of the people, concurring with your own sense of the intolerable nature of the abuse, are in favour of a change. If this be the case in the present instance, certainly you ought to make the alteration that is proposed, to satisfy your own consciences and to give content to your people. But if you have no evidence of this nature, it ill becomes your gravity, on the petition of a few gentlemen, to listen to anything that tends to shake one of the capital pillars of the State, and alarm the body of your people upon that one ground, in which every hope and fear, every interest, passion, and prejudice, everything which can affect the human breast, are all involved together.

THE terms of Edmund Burke's speech in February 1772, upon a petition to relax the terms of subscription required of the Anglican clergy, strike the modern ear with a sense of strangeness and perhaps exaggeration; yet the principle laid down as the indispensable condition of legislative change remains valid despite the difference between the temper of his generation *quieta non movere* and the itch of the present age for rapid reform. Advocates of change must still establish the intolerable nature of the abuse which they seek to remedy, and (what may be even more difficult) the desire of a majority of the people for their particular measure of readjustment.

In order to understand the Report recently made public, it is necessary to recall the terms of reference of the Commission, set up in accordance with a resolution of the Church Assembly of February 5, 1930:

That whereas, in the words addressed to the Church Assembly on July 2, 1928, by Archbishop Davidson, with the concurrence of the whole

¹ *Church and State: Report of the Archbishops' Commission on the Relations between Church and State*, 1935. Vol. i., Report and Appendices, 2s. 6d.; vol. ii., Evidence of Witnesses, 7s. 6d. (Issued by the Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly.)

body of the Diocesan Bishops, 'it is a fundamental principle that the Church, that is, the Bishops, together with the Clergy and Laity, must in the last resort, when its mind has been fully ascertained, retain its inalienable right, in loyalty to our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, to formulate its faith in Him and to arrange the expression of that Holy Faith in its form of worship':

It is desirable that a Commission should be appointed to enquire into the present relations of Church and State, and particularly how far the principle, stated above, is able to receive effective application in present circumstances in the Church of England, and what legal and constitutional changes, if any, are needed in order to maintain or to secure its effective application; and that the Archbishops be requested to appoint a Commission for this purpose.

One reply to the resolution might of course be that no violation of the fundamental principle had been committed, and therefore no inquiry into possible legal and other changes was needful. It is possible to suspect that this would have been the reply of Davidson himself, if he had told the Church Assembly in July 1928 of the sentiments which he confided to his private diary shortly afterwards in respect of the very episode which had evoked his declaration.

Had I been ten or fifteen years younger, I should have treated the defeat of the Prayer Book as an episode in the life of the Church, and in my own life:—an important episode no doubt, but not one that called for heroic measures or a drastic resignation.²

It is extremely fortunate that the publication of the Bishop of Chichester's biography of Archbishop Davidson has preceded that of the Report of the Church and State Commission, for the opinions of the late Primate are of the utmost value in criticism of those of the Commission, and his evidence cannot be discounted as proceeding from ignorance either of the wider currents of Anglicanism or of the administrative difficulties of the episcopate.

It may be pertinent at the outset to refer to the protest made by the Bishop of Norwich before the Commission to the effect that 'no member appeared to belong to the number of those who objected to the new Prayer Book' despite the fact that the Commission owed its appointment to the rejection of the Prayer Book revision. There seems to be weight in this protest; because at least one member of the Commission, the Archbishop of York, had already stated in

² Bell, *Randall Davidson*, ii., pp. 1361-2.

print his persuasion that unless the Parliament were willing to grant to the Church of England 'such freedom in spiritual matters as is enjoyed by the established Presbyterian Church of Scotland,' then 'the sooner the Establishment is ended the better.'³ These words, written *before* the second rejection of the Prayer Book in 1928, make it clear that their author approached the tasks of the Commission with a fixed resolve as to the outcome of its deliberations; and in such circumstances the request that the Commission should have included some persons who had been opposed to those very parts of the Prayer Book revision which produced the crisis is reasonable. Throughout the proceedings of the Commission defenders of the *status quo* were placed in a position of disadvantage by having the *onus probandi* placed on their shoulders, whereas it should rest upon those of the advocates of change. It is much to be regretted, also, that Sir Lewis Dibdin was compelled by illness to withdraw from the Commission in 1934. His name does not appear amongst the signatories to the Report, and his presence might have helped to modify its recommendations.

The recommendations of the Commissioners are prefaced by an historical introduction, to which they draw particular attention, and which is written with a succinct economy of words combined with a felicitous lucidity of phrase. Notwithstanding, there are a few points upon which it may be wished that fuller details had been added. Thus, in discussing the relations between Convocation and Parliament in the sixteenth century, it would have been wise to mention that it is quite uncertain whether any of the English Prayer Books before that of 1662 were ever submitted to the Convocations. Further, if the non-jurors are to be hailed as pioneers of the spiritual independence of the Church (despite the difficulty of reconciling this with their conduct towards James II. both before and after 1688), it would have been less partial if the name of William Warburton had been also mentioned, since critics so widely different as Dr. Figgis and Professor Laski have seen in him a precursor of Gierke and Maitland in the exposition of the thesis of the essential rights of voluntary societies within the State. With its treatment of the Oxford Movement, the historical narrative assumes somewhat of a

³ W. Temple, *Christianity and the State*, appendix ii., pp. 196-7.

couleur de rose. Emphasis is rightly placed on the cardinal principle of ecclesiastical autonomy proclaimed by the Tractarians; but it is significant that no mention at all is made of the fact that this principle was associated with the most extreme assertions concerning episcopacy and apostolical succession, as in the description in Keble's Assize Sermon of Nonconformist churches as 'houses on which Apostolical authority would . . . set a mark as unfit to be entered by a faithful servant of Christ,' and in the insistence of Tract I. that episcopacy was so essential that 'we must necessarily consider none to be *really* ordained, who have not *thus* been ordained.' These assertions are not of mere academic importance; for they have introduced an element of bitterness into the relations between the Church of England and the non-episcopal reformed Churches of this country, which has reacted injuriously upon the good estate of the Establishment. This was brought out emphatically in the evidence of Mr. B. L. Manning:

To the legal, political, and social superiority which an Established Church must have, episcopalianism has added a claim to ecclesiastical and spiritual superiority. To those of us in a tradition where churchmanship is the essence of Christianity, this is, of course, intolerable. In Scotland, in Sweden, in some parts of Germany there need not be this bitterness added to the difficulty. It is sometimes hard for a Free Churchman to be sure whether what he dissents from in England is Establishment or Episcopacy.⁴

Likewise, in dealing with the ceremonial disputes of the nineteenth century, the Report observes that the Oxford Movement produced 'an interest in practices which signified the continuity of the Church of England in doctrine and ritual with the Church of primitive times, and, though in less degree, of the Middle Ages.'⁵ The biographer of the late Lord Halifax uses language more direct and accurate in stating that the ceremonial revival was led by

men with more zeal than scholarship. In the absence of authoritative guidance each clergyman was inclined to make his own law. He consulted contemporary continental use rather than the older traditions of the Church of England; and sometimes he fell into extravagances for which no warrant, either contemporary or historical, could be found.⁶

⁴ *Report*, vol. ii., p. 88.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 26.

⁶ J. G. Lockhart, *Charles Lindley, Viscount Halifax*, part I., p. 186.

These matters have a particular importance, because the association of the principle of spiritual independence with extreme theories of episcopacy and ceremonial eccentricities did much to discredit the doctrine of ecclesiastical autonomy and to throw suspicion upon the motives of its champions. Furthermore, it was precisely upon these two matters that the Oxford Movement disavowed the Caroline High Church divines, to whose authority the Tractarians were otherwise wont to appeal.

On the other side of the picture, however, stand the facts of secular history which represent the real strength of the argument of the Commissioners' Report. The abolition of all religious tests for membership of Parliament evidently complicated the difficulties of that body in dealing with ecclesiastical issues, and made it an unsuitable assembly for the sole deliberation and preparation of measures concerning the Church. Furthermore, the disestablishment of the Churches of Ireland and Wales suggested the possibility that the same treatment might be meted out to the Church of England, though it should be added that disestablishment seems to have disappeared from the number of contemporary political issues. For these and other reasons the passing of the Enabling Act of 1919 was altogether to be welcomed; for it conferred wide powers on the Church Assembly in the discussion and preparation of measures of an ecclesiastical character; and upon such measures the two Houses of Parliament have only a right of final rejection, not of amendment. The Report is concerned to emphasise the fact that this Act in no wise curtailed the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament in ecclesiastical matters.

It left the constitutional relations of Church and State substantially unaltered. The sole legislative authority after, as before, its passing is the King acting by the advice of the two Houses of Parliament. . . . Moreover the old power of legislating by parliamentary bill without any reference to the Church Assembly remains unimpaired.⁷

It should be observed at once that this right of legislation by parliamentary bill without any reference to the Church Assembly, though theoretically intact, has not been acted upon since 1919. If, for example, after the rejection of the Prayer Book in 1928, Parliament had passed a new Act of

⁷ *Report*, vol. i., pp. 34-5.

Uniformity with a project of Prayer Book revision attached, of its own compilation, then the Church of England would have complained with justice of a violation of its spiritual independence, and could have demanded repeal or disestablishment. Instead, the Parliament has raised no finger to prevent even the widespread use under episcopal sanction of many parts of the revised Prayer Book. It will be proper to complain of parliamentary oppression when these theoretical powers are exercised.

In considering the operation of the Enabling Act it is necessary to remember that of sixty-three measures presented by the Church Assembly to Parliament fifty-nine have been passed into law—a sufficient evidence of the goodwill of the temporal legislature towards the ecclesiastical assembly and of a genuine desire to help the work of the Church. Two of the measures rejected were the Prayer Book revision projects of 1927-8, to which it is necessary to give a detailed consideration. The Commission's Report allows that these failures were due chiefly to the provisions for an alternative Order of Holy Communion and for Reservation, 'which were mainly responsible for the rejection,' and to 'the record of some dioceses' which caused distrust of 'the will or at least the power' of their bishops to restrain the most extreme illegalities.⁸ Upon both these points the testimony of Archbishop Davidson is of great importance, and, as given in the Bishop of Chichester's biography, is almost disconcerting in its candour. Of the Order for Holy Communion Davidson wrote privately :

On the one hand my own instinct would have been for leaving that Office alone, and adhering to what has satisfied English people for more than three centuries. And I am certain that such is the view of the overwhelming majority of English churchmen throughout the country. The average M.P. or county councillor, or local squire, or man of business, says emphatically 'let it alone.' Ought it to be one's policy to fall in with that wish or give leadership in that direction, and practically refuse what the ecclesiastically-minded folk want in the way of change or reform or reversion to older usage? The answer is not easy. These people who have given their thoughts to the structure of a service, which to many of them means more than anything else on earth, have been working for years at trying to bring about the sort of changes which they think would make our Office more Catholic without impairing its really English character. The majority of churchmen want no change.⁹

⁸ *Report*, vol. i., pp. 37 and 38.

⁹ Bell, *op. cit.*, ii., p. 1332.

Concerning Reservation, he wrote :

I have to admit that with regard to Reservation, my line of action is based upon the conviction that in the present unsettled conditions in London and some other places, the only chance of peace is by allowing some degree of Reservation-liberty, guarding it scrupulously against abuses.¹⁰

Here, evidently, is no approval of Reservation in principle, but only a reluctant acceptance of it as a *pis aller*; whilst the testimony against the alternative Communion Office is emphatic. Even stronger terms were used by Canon Peter Green in a review of this biography in the *Manchester Guardian* :

To a man outside the official circle it must often have seemed both during the first and the second presentation of the book, that 'blindness in part had happened to Israel.' The bishops, the two Convocations, and the members of the Church Assembly, were so confident that they had the nation behind them. Now if the alternative service for Holy Communion and the proposals for Reservation had been dropped, the nation at large would have received the new forms for the other services with gratitude. Here and there a man with some slight tincture of literary taste would have noticed that some of the new prayers compared poorly with the old collects. But that would have been all. May not the Archbishop have realised, with his extraordinary flair for public sentiment, that 90 per cent. of the nation was against the book as it stood?¹¹

It may be supposed that Canon Peter Green is at least as familiar with lay opinion as any of the presbyteral members of the present Commission, and Archbishop Davidson as well-informed as any of its episcopal personnel. Two such emphatic expressions of opinion may not be swept aside, therefore, without note.

It is the chief and outstanding weakness of the Report of the Commission to omit all consideration of such evidence. It is not that arguments are advanced against the opinion of Davidson; the existence of such a standpoint is simply ignored. The Commission apparently closed its ears to voices speaking unwelcome things. Yet, according to the testimony of Davidson, it would appear that the votes of the House of Commons represented lay sentiment more truly than those of the House of Laity in the Church Assembly. Certainly, in view of his opinion and of the fact that during the parliamentary debates the opposition of Anglo-Catholic dissidents

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1335.

¹¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, November 11, 1935.

was voiced by the late Lord Halifax and Sir Henry Slesser (now Lord Justice Slesser) and of Evangelicals by the late Lord Brentford (then Sir W. Joynson-Hicks) and Sir Thomas Inskip, it is very difficult to maintain the contention that the House of Commons acted in defiance of the wishes of a great majority of the Anglican laity. The Commission, instead of facing squarely this standpoint, contents itself with urging the abolition of the parliamentary veto on spiritual measures upon the ground of the theoretic impropriety of a modern Parliament, bound by no religious tests, debating religious matters. It may be pertinent to recall to the historians of the Commission the persistent tendency of English institutions to ignore strict theoretical arguments; so that even Pope Gregory VII. allowed William I. and Lanfranc to govern the *Ecclesia Anglicana* in open disregard of papal pronouncements against lay control of episcopal appointments and lay investiture because in practical operation they fulfilled the demands of *justitia*. But the Commission, more Hildebrandine than Hildebrand, will have no compromise, and produces a novel scheme of its own.

The Report affirms that 'the Enabling Act must not be regarded as in any degree a final settlement of the relations of Church and State'; that the episode of 1927-8 'revealed in unmistakable fashion the subordination of the Church to a Parliament which might consist largely of non-Christians, and does consist largely of persons who are not members of the Church of England'; and that this same episode 'made it clear that, in the legislative sphere at any rate, the Church had not attained to spiritual freedom.'¹² Accordingly it recommends that all measures 'touching the doctrinal formulæ or the services or ceremonies of the Church of England, or the administration of the Sacraments or sacred rites thereof,' shall be exempt from parliamentary veto. Instead, after passing through the prescribed stages in the Church Assembly, after approval by resolutions of the two provincial Convocations, after dual approval by resolutions of the diocesan conferences of not less than three-quarters of the dioceses of the two English provinces, and after the two Archbishops, the Lord Chancellor and the Speaker of the House of Commons have certified unanimously that such

measures 'relate substantially to the spiritual concerns of the Church of England, and that any civil or secular interests affected thereby may be regarded as negligible,' they shall receive the Royal Assent and have the force of an Act of Parliament. A doctrinal safeguard is offered in the shape of a declaration of the two Primates that each measure is neither contrary to nor indicative of any departure from the fundamental doctrines and principles of the Church of England, as set forth in the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion and the Book of Common Prayer.¹³

The chief practical difficulty in this proposal is that the Prayer Book revision secured handsome majorities in Convocation, the Church Assembly, and the diocesan conferences, and yet, according to the judgment of Davidson, its crucial features were opposed to the desires of 'the overwhelming majority of English Churchmen throughout the country.' Presumably this circumstance might be repeated; and herein lies the grave mistake of the Commission in ignoring in their Report the standpoint so forcibly and authoritatively stated by the late Primate. The Report, however, does admit that twenty years is too brief a period for the general body of the laity to become 'accustomed to take its part in the councils of the Church'¹⁴; and it may be deduced that any constitutional changes should properly await the realisation of this consummation. On the other side, full weight must be given to the incongruity of a very mixed multitude, such as the modern House of Commons, from an ecclesiastical standpoint, certainly is, discussing such matters as eucharistic theology. But in point of fact the Bishop of Chichester observes that it was an Anglican, Sir W. Joynson-Hicks (himself a member of the House of Laity in the Church Assembly), who, in the Commons' debate of December 1927, 'did the very thing which the Archbishop had refused to do' in the Lords—that is, 'he turned the occasion into one of high doctrinal dispute.'¹⁵ Here, again, the moral is plain: that Churchmen should compose their own differences instead of throwing such matters open to controversial debate in Parliament. It must be reiterated emphatically that until an agreed liturgical measure, which is supported in the Houses of Parliament by the Anglican laity of all schools of thought,

¹² *Report*, vol. i., pp. 62-3.¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.¹⁵ Bell, *op. cit.*, ii., p. 1345.

has been there rejected by the voice and vote of other members, there is no substance in the allegation that the spiritual independence of the Church has been violated. The possibility of action on the part of Parliament which would constitute an unequivocal challenge to the Church may be granted. But proposals for constitutional reform should have relation to actual and proved abuse of power, not to hypothetical contingencies.

The affirmation of the ideal of spiritual independence would receive a sympathetic consideration from Churchmen, if advocated upon adequate grounds, designed to operate with justice and impartiality to all the schools of thought within the Church, and accompanied by a resolution to make the Church more truly national and comprehensive. It may be affirmed with confidence that the alternative Order of Holy Communion and Reservation are an insufficient ground, both because they were not wanted by an overwhelming majority of the laity and because they are secondary matters in themselves. Throughout the revision of the Prayer Book Archbishop Davidson lamented the concentration of attention on liturgical details, 'as though they were the things which absorbed the Church's interest, as indeed for the moment they do absorb clerical interest to the detriment of wider things.'¹⁶ His own position was that he did not 'very greatly long for any of the changes or feel that they were of supreme deep-down importance'; and he certainly thought the episode of their rejection not one calling 'for heroic measures.' The same warning of the unimportance of such matters is expressed by Dr. Oldham:

It may well be that the main conflict between Christian faith and the secular interpretation of life will have to be waged in the field of public education. The Church will have won little in obtaining liberty to preach and to conduct its own worship and services, if the whole weight of a public system of education is directed towards inculcating in the impressionable mind of youth beliefs about the world and man and conduct which are incompatible with the Christian understanding of life.¹⁷

The Report, indeed, gives one paragraph to education, but with no suggestion of its manifest priority in importance to the controverted parts of the 1927 Prayer Book. The

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1335.

¹⁷ J. H. Oldham, *Church, Community and State*, pp. 17-18.

fundamental spiritual malady of the Church, seen in its concentration of energy upon internal issues to the overshadowing of its duty towards the nation, is diagnosed with acumen in Ronald Knox's novel *Barchester Pilgrimage*:

In Barchester, as elsewhere, English people have not lost their religion; but they no longer feel that they have any right or need to go to church. When I asked Mr. Bunce how modern congregations at the cathedral compared with those of his youth, he said, 'There's fewer goes, and oftener.' And this then, it seems, is what has happened since the war; a rallying of forces within the Church, accompanied by, and producing, a kind of moral dis-establishment.¹⁸

Unfortunately, the Commission's Report acquiesces in this moral disestablishment, and even encourages the idea that actual disestablishment would be the better part:

We should misrepresent the impression made upon our minds if we did not make clear our conviction that the case for disestablishment is strong. Some of us deliberately consider that disestablishment should be preferred to an indefinite continuance of the present relationship between Church and State.¹⁹

Such a standpoint involves the abandonment of the national vocation of the Church, a vocation cherished by such erudite historian-bishops as Stubbs and Creighton and accepted as the basis of his policy by Davidson.

The Report, indeed, recognises that much of the suspicion aroused by the advocacy of constitutional change springs from uncertainty as to its intended uses. The cry for spiritual independence proceeds very largely from one school of thought in the Church, the Anglo-Catholic. The question, naturally, is asked, To what purpose would spiritual independence be turned? Would it be applied to the authorisation, for example, of a service for the unction of the sick, a matter which has been debated in the Convocations, but which was not provided in the 1928 Prayer Book? The 'suspicions and fears of what may underlie the proposals of those who are in favour of reform'²⁰ are justified; and the matter is crucial.

The real question now raised is the maintenance of the Church of England, as it has been accepted by the English people, in relation to their national life, during three centuries and a half. Nobody feels any interest in ceremonies as such or in doctrines as such; but they feel that a powerful and useful institution must not be turned into something which it

¹⁸ R. A. Knox, *Barchester Pilgrimage*, pp. 184-5.

¹⁹ *Report*, vol. i., pp. 48-9.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

never has been, and which they do not want. Roman ways are suspected because they lead up to the Roman conception of the Church as an organisation created and ruled by the clergy, existing independently of its members, conferring or withholding salvation according as its rules are observed. . . . Priesthood, Sacraments, Confession are all explicable by themselves. They can be placed in a system which finds room for individual liberty, or in a system which excludes it. But it makes a great difference how the system shapes itself. Do not let us make a mistake. The question to be decided is, How much of the results of the Oxford Movement are to be permanently incorporated into the Anglican system? The answer is, from my point of view: As much as is compatible with the maintenance of that system as founded on a view of the Church which safeguards liberty.²¹

Creighton's contention is pertinent and vital. The fundamental objection of the English laity is to the permeation of the Church by Roman principles. Archbishop Davidson insisted that no attempt to exclude from the Church its Anglo-Catholic school could be tolerated; and there can be no doubt that the verdict of history will uphold his judgment. 'But it is the province of the Church to assimilate those results of the Oxford Movement compatible with its traditions, not of the Anglo-Catholic school to incorporate the Church.'

Archdeacon Storr, a member of the Commission, stated on behalf of the Anglican Evangelical Group Movement that they 'supported the Book of 1928 solely and only because they trusted the bishops to restore order on the basis of it,' adding that 'there is growing anxiety lest we have been deceived and that is growing in the Church very largely.'²² It is a fortunate circumstance, therefore, that certain recommendations of the Commission's Report will afford an opportunity for testing the desire of the episcopate effectively to pursue the ends of discipline and impartiality. It is of the utmost importance that the personnel of the Conference to consider the Holy Communion Office and Reservation, which the Report desires to be summoned, should be really representative, that the several schools of thought within the Church should themselves select the personnel of their own delegation within the number allowed to them, and that laity as well as clergy should be included. Since the whole possibility of further action admittedly depends upon the issue of

²¹ *Life of Mandell Creighton*, ii., p. 378.

²² *Report*, vol. ii., p. 154.

such a conference, it is greatly to be hoped that the fundamental question posed by Creighton will be fairly faced. Other recommendations of the Report would help considerably to produce an atmosphere of confidence in the episcopate; and it is much to be wished that the proposals for a reconstitution of the Final Court of Appeal in Ecclesiastical Causes and for the constitution of new pastoral tribunals might be acted upon forthwith. Furthermore, a beginning might be made without delay in respect of two important proposals of the Commission—namely, the adoption by the Convocations of a synodical declaration interpretative of the present Declaration of Assent, and the conferment upon the episcopate of increased powers to refuse institution to a presentee to a benefice 'who has not previously satisfied the bishop of the diocese of his willingness to obey the law as to the conduct of Divine Service and as to the ornaments and fittings of churches, and to submit to directions given by the bishop.'²³ In the case of those dioceses the disorderly condition of which contributed, in the Commissioners' judgment, very considerably to the rejection of the Prayer Book revision of 1927-8, advantage should be taken of proximate appointments to these sees to ensure an episcopal administration which will remove the reproach. In this connexion a warm welcome should be accorded to the recommendation for the appointment of a Commission to investigate the complex and controverted problem of canon law in the Church of England.

There remains the final criterion of the advocacy of spiritual independence, its relation to the national character and vocation of the Church. The Commission professes its cordial admiration of the relationship between Church and State in Scotland, and its regret that the adoption of an identical scheme is not possible in England. Such a consummation might not be impossible if the Church of England were able to approximate to the conditions upon which the Church of Scotland based its claim. The maintenance of the Establishment in England depends in the last resort upon the confidence of the nation in the Church as representing a version of Christianity acceptable to the majority of the people. The approach towards spiritual independence there-

²³ *Report*, vol. i., p. 89.

fore must be attended by measures directed towards the affirmation and fuller realisation of the national character of the Church of England. The Commission is emphatic upon the need of wide agreement within the Church before any appeal for constitutional changes is made. Its commendation of its proposals depends upon the Church being 'substantially united in accepting them as a whole'; and it deprecates any attempts to carry them, in whole or in part, 'after hot controversy, in the face of a large minority,'²⁴ or to 'try to get an Act of this kind passed by Parliament, overriding the earnest protests of a sincere and substantial minority of the Church.'²⁵ The intention is laudable; and it is much to be desired that the concluding appeal for an ecumenical temper may be rewarded. But the spirit of conciliation must be shown on all sides. The recommendations of the Commission are almost wholly designed to meet the demands of the Anglo-Catholic school. If Evangelical and Modernist Churchmen are to be urged for the sake of peace and unity within the Church to accept both an alternative Order of Holy Communion and Reservation (to both of which many of their number have very strong objections), and also the abolition of the parliamentary veto (despite their persuasion that the rejection of the 1927-8 Prayer Books in no wise violated the spiritual independence of the Church), then they have the right to ask that assurances shall be given for the maintenance of the national and Reformed character of the Church of England. The most urgent necessity of the present moment is the reaffirmation by the episcopate of the ideal proclaimed by Archbishop Sancroft of 'an universal blessed union of all reformed Churches, both at home and abroad, against our common enemies,'²⁶ together with appropriate steps to place the Church of England at the head of such a movement.

Towards this end the Commission leaves standing one landmark of the historic English tradition of the relationship of Church and State—namely, the method of episcopal appointment. In view of the evidence recently published in the Bishop of Chichester's biography of Randall Davidson on this matter, there is no difficulty in maintaining the wisdom

of this decision.²⁷ The Report proposes only the removal of the penalty of *præmunire* attaching at present to a cathedral chapter refusing to elect the Royal nominee and to the Archbishop refusing to consecrate the bishop-elect. The freedom of choice of the Prime Minister in recommending to the Crown is left unimpaired.

In conclusion, it may be contended that the Commission has failed to establish 'the intolerable nature of the abuse,' since it has not attempted an answer to the judgment of Archbishop Davidson that the alternative Order of Holy Communion and the provisions for Reservation in the 1927-8 Prayer Books were not desired by 'the overwhelming majority of English Churchmen throughout the country.' Accordingly, the rejection by the House of Commons of the revision projects did not constitute a violation of the spiritual independence of the Church, and does not call 'for heroic measures' such as the abolition of the parliamentary veto. Separated from this episode, the case for spiritual independence may be examined more impartially. Several of the recommendations of the Commission, such as that of a Round Table Conference of a really representative character between the several schools within the Church and the proposals for judicial reform, may be welcomed as contributing towards a restoration of confidence in the episcopate and the inferior clergy. But the grant of spiritual independence in England, as in Scotland, is dependent upon evidence of a real desire and intent on the part of the petitioning Church to reaffirm its character as the national and Reformed Church of the kingdom. It is upon this point that the Commission speaks with an uncertain and confused voice. The Report says little of the duty of the Church towards the nation, or of its responsibility to the nation for the fulfilment of its vocation as the national organ in religious matters. Churchmen may be justly grateful to the Commission for compelling the study of this fundamental question of the conflicting ideals before the Church, national or sectarian. Shall the Church of England become the *Ecclesia Anglorum*, or, as the city of Zoar, 'a very little city'?

N. SYKES.

²⁷ Bell, *Randall Davidson*, ii., chap. lxxviii.

²⁴ *Report*, vol. i., p. 96.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

²⁶ Cardwell, *Documentary Annals of the Reformed Church of England*, ii., p. 376.

THE DESERTED VILLAGE

By SIR FREDERICK KEEBLE, C.B.E., F.R.S.

Even now the devastation is begun
And half the business of destruction done.

KNAPSACK on back, Jenifer and I had been hiking over the Welsh hills for a week or more. Plynlymon to-day. It had to be, for Jenifer had set her mind on finding out what the emerald-green patches high up on the mountain side could be. We had seen them from afar. It was a long climb, and I was beginning to think that we never should get there, when Jenifer suddenly stopped and cried out :

'Look ! They're grass, lovely dark-green valley grass' ; and sure enough, that's what the patches were.

'However did grass like that get here ?' she asked. 'An oasis of green in a desert of grey !'

It was early autumn. Sheep were grazing on the green pasture. The old shepherd tending them, hearing her voice, looked round, smiled a welcome to Jenifer, and, touching his hat, made answer :

'It's our wizard who's done it, marm.'

'Who ?' demanded Jenifer.

'The Welsh wizard,' I said. 'Who else could it be ?'

'How silly of me not to have guessed !' Jenifer exclaimed. 'Of course, I knew he had gone in for agriculture and was selling up his poultry farm.'

'I'm not surprised at that,' I remarked. 'Not even a wizard could make poultry pay these days.'

'Excuse me,' said the shepherd, 'it's not that one. This 'ere grass is real grass. There's no conjuring about it.'

'But,' cried Jenifer, 'that's just what it is. Conjuring—to make the mountains clap their hands with the gladness of green pastures.'

'Tell me, shepherd, who is the wizard ?'

'One o' they college professors,' he replied. The sound of the shepherd's voice had the soft accent of the Berkshire Downs with the lilt of the Welsh hills in it.

Jenifer said 'Oh !', paused, threw a sidelong glance at me, and added : 'Like my husband.'

The shepherd gave a look in my direction—a doubtful look. It seemed very necessary to create a diversion. •

I went down on my knees to look more closely at the green pasture, and with, for me, well-feigned surprise called out :

'Look, Jenifer ! Look ! it's full of wild white clover. That's why it's such a dark green.'

'Ah !' said the shepherd, wagging his head. 'Professor, he would have it be so. Of the name o' Stapledon. I told 'em,' he continued, 'when they tanks came'—tractors with caterpillar wheels were crawling across the hillside—I told 'em "clover can't grow on they thick old mats o' molly grass." Professor, he did laugh. "'Twill, shepherd," he said, "if the mats be well shaken first." And that's what they brought these here war engines for.'

'Of course,' I intervened, 'he's quite right, when you come to think of it. . . .'

The shepherd went on unheeding as though talking to himself :

'Happen Professor was right. For why ? When they tanks got their claws into the old mat, clover just grew like magic. You must understand marm 'twas abiding there all the while : suffocated it was. We give 'un air to breathe and light to see 'un's way by, and of course t' clover grew. And now, darn me ! if I can keep they sheep of mine off it. If I didn't watch 'em they'd eat till they got all blowed up and busted.'

'I think it's a fairy tale,' said Jenifer : 'the tale of the Magic Carpet. Tell me more, shepherd.'

'Oh !' I said, a little impatiently, 'I can tell you, or if you like you can read about it for yourself. It's all in *The Land Now and To-morrow*, Stapledon's book. It's just out. Everybody ought to read it.'

'The land of to-morrow !' Jenifer repeated musingly, with her eyes fixed on the grass. 'It's to-morrow now. It must be, because miracles don't happen to-day.'

'Well, marm,' conceded the shepherd, 'tis rightly speaking a miracle: one o' they loaves and fishes sort.'

'Just so, shepherd,' I said, and, turning to Jenifer, remarked reprovingly: 'No, dear, not to-morrow! It isn't to-morrow yet, and most likely never will be.'

'The world lives only in to-day: the self-same day in which our fathers lived and in which our sons shall surely die. The world has grown practical. Therefore it must be so. Only the unpractical live in to-morrow: prophets and poets and pioneers. They have to. They'd die of neglect if they lived to-day. Who would be a prophet—if he could be a profiteer! And who has ever heard of a pioneer who wasn't premature?'

I stopped, looked up, and saw that neither Jenifer nor the shepherd was listening. He was helping her to find four-leaved clover. 'Just for luck,' she said.

'What is it, dear?' Jenifer asked soothingly. 'I'm listening,' and . . . resumed her search.

'Mark my words,' I said impressively, 'that professor of yours who's done this wonderful thing 'll never get the money to put his pioneering into practice. It can't be spared. The money is wanted for armaments. Why, I shouldn't wonder if the Air Force came and took these green swards for aerodromes! They're unsuitable enough.'

'What a shame!' exclaimed Jenifer as she pinned a bunch of four-leaved clover in my coat. 'There!' she exclaimed, putting the lapel straight. 'Go on.'

'Not a shame at all, my dear,' I continued. 'Safety first. You have been warned. Soothe me with slogans; I am sick of truth. Beside, in all earnestness, Jenifer, I ask you, what on earth is the good of making land more fertile when there's no money to be made out of it?'

This, however, was too much for Jenifer, who evidently had been listening more closely than I could have guessed.

'I've no patience with you,' she cried. 'Haven't I heard you say yourself the land is the life of the people?'

'Often, my dear,' I answered cheerfully. 'The last time was in a lecture.'

'Oh, lecturing!' she exclaimed.

'Yes, in a lecture,' I insisted. 'You remember! What fun it was! The man who proposed the vote of thanks made

the audience roar with laughter by declaring that he knew nothing about agriculture. Let me see. Didn't they elect him to the House of Commons in tribute of his truthfulness?'

'Do be serious,' Jenifer begged.

'Never more so,' I protested.

'You're not,' she answered. 'I know you better than you know yourself, my dear.'

The prerogative of wives, I reflected, though I kept the reflection to myself. 'How lucky it is,' I mused, 'that conscience *does* make cowards of us all!'

Jenifer had begun again. I heard her say:

'You were serious enough when you told me of the wonderful vision you had.'

'Vision?' I murmured, questioningly.

'Yes,' she replied. 'Jacob's ladder and the ascending and descending angels. "Behold," you cried, "the earthly and the heavenly hosts of life. They arise from the bosom of the earth. They move unseen through the green pastures, and through the yellow corn—giving them life and bringing that life to all animal and human kind. They ascend, gather strength from heaven and descend bearing the blessings of fertility to the earth."'

I was listening intently now. Jenifer went on speaking:

'"Life"! you said, "is not an infinitude of separate and successive little lonely living souls. It is one mighty stream proceeding from earth to heaven and from heaven again to earth: flowing through all things incessantly, and because incessant making all things live, and keeping all alive.'

'"Death is but a diversion: a diversion of the waters of life." You declared, "We drink no longer freely of its waters: the living waters that spring up fresh out of the earth. We try vainly to raise life from the dead: to make mind and body and spirit grow by feeding them on things with no life in them. That's why, instead of becoming ever more full of life, we can but just hang on, generation after generation, to the little life we have. Like petty *rentiers* living on their petty capital."'

I felt uneasy. My long sojourn in the University of Bletchworth had taught me well enough that enthusiasm is bad form. Yet in spite of that—to my shame I say it—I found myself carried away by her enthusiasm.

'It's true,' I exclaimed, 'every word of it. That's what life is. By life begot and by it alone sustained. "All are but parts of one stupendous whole"—poetry has always been, and always will be, centuries in advance of science. David will ever triumph over Goliath. Civilisations have perished because they knew not this secret, and our civilisation, ignoring it, will likewise perish. Already the fertility of the earth declines, and with it is declining the fertility of the people. It is the writing on the wall.'

'Well,' Jenifer cut in, 'what are you going to do about it?'

'Me?' I asked.

'Yes, you!' she cried. 'Why don't you tell people? Take the lead.'

'No, dear,' I replied. 'Science is too learned ever to lead. Yet,' I said sadly, 'it is true that we know enough to transform our land into an earthly paradise. See! Plynylmon throws off the blight of barrenness, responsive to the charm of the Stapledon chant: "Lift up your heads, oh! ye hills." But . . .'

'Oh, bother buts,' Jenifer ejaculated. 'Go! Tell this simple, saving secret—the oneness of life.'

I answered patiently: 'Don't you understand, my dear. Missionaries are only for export, like beads from Birmingham, and surely you know that an earthly paradise is uneconomic. Only poverty pays—other people's poverty. Thus only may a nation be prosperous: with saving and starving hand in hand.'

The shepherd had folded his sheep. The evening star was shining above Plynylmon.

'Good-night, Shepherd!' said Jenifer.

'Good-night, and God bless you!' the shepherd answered.

We turned and went pensively down from the mountain.

Several days later our tired feet were trailing a mournful way along some blackened valleys.

'Where are we?' asked Jenifer despondingly.

'In the Yonder Valley, I think'—I said so, though I wasn't sure: wasn't even sure that we were in Wales, and, in the light of what happened afterwards, am now quite sure that we were not; though in what country we were I cannot guess, nor imagine how we got there.

We came to a village.

Sad-eyed women with drawn faces were carrying water from the well. Gaunt men stood listless in the street. Their lips scarcely moved as they muttered 'Good evening' in answer to Jenifer's salutation. Hope was dead within them.

'Must it be like this?' she whispered with a catch of her breath. She must have been thinking with horror of the wreckage of a derelict industrialism which had strewn our path for many a weary mile.

'Like this! Good God! No!' I cried. 'Anyone with a ha'porth of sense would have set about clearing up all this ghastly mess long ago.'

'Could they do it?' Jenifer asked.

'They could,' I answered.

'Why don't they, then?' she asked.

'Because,' I replied, 'it would not be economic.'

'I don't understand,' said Jenifer plaintively.

'Nor does anyone else,' I told her.

'What does it mean, "economic"?' she questioned.

'I'm not quite sure, but I think it means that a smiling countryside, with happy housewives and sturdy men and laughing, bright-eyed children—important, of course, as they all are—are less important than balancing the Budget. Because if you do that, there can't be any want or misery at all.'

'It doesn't sound quite right,' said Jenifer, looking about her.

'Give it time,' I answered.

'Look!' exclaimed Jenifer. I looked. She was pointing to the notice-board on the Methodist church. It read:

NEXT SUNDAY.

SERMON

The Lord is my Shepherd. I shall not want.

'There, there, dear!' I said, to comfort her. 'It will be all right next Sunday. It says so.'

She put her hand on my arm, and whispered: 'Take me away. Take me away!'

'Can we find a room for the night?' I asked of one of the group of men gathered about an orator on an egg-box—foreign eggs they were, by the inscription.

He turned away from listening to the Communist curses the orator was uttering—low fellow.

'Over there,' the man said, nodding toward the village inn. We got rooms there.

Yes, we could have supper. We supped on a freshly-opened tin of lobster from Newfoundland, a couple of 'new-laid' eggs from China, a freshly-opened tin of apricots from California, with a loaf of bread deadly in its whiteness, finishing up with something which seemed like synthetic cheese. It felt like home.

'What is the name of this place?' asked Jenifer.

'We call it the Deserted Village,' the landlady answered, as she lit the candle to light us to bed. We said 'Good-night' and went upstairs.

'Call me if you want anything,' I said to Jenifer.

'I shall not want,' she answered.

I got into bed, but could not sleep. I took down a tattered volume from a bookshelf—*The Collected Poems of Oliver Goldsmith*. The book opened at 'The Deserted Village.' I read:

No busy steps the grass-grown footway tread
For all the bloomy flush of life is fled.

I read on:

Ye friends to truth, ye statesmen who survey
The rich man's joy increase, the poor's decay.

The book fell from my hand. I felt drowsy—anyone would after reading stuff like that: poor little Oliver Goldsmith! Irish, of course . . . always grouching.

My last waking thoughts were very incoherent. They ran:

'After all, there can't be much wrong with Merrie England now that exports balance imports. Poor Stapledon and your Land Now and To-morrow. That morrow shalt thou never see.'

'What's the fertility of the earth, and what's a smiling countryside, to dividends? These be your gods, Oh Israel! Fat ones. Better, far better for a nation to be solvent than to be sound. . . .'

Troubled dreams—no doubt it was the lobster stirring within me.

I saw the Pied Piper.

'Who are you?' I asked.

'Of the name of Stapledon!' the old shepherd with him said.

The Pied Piper began to pipe and climb the mountain. The music echoed through the valley. Wonderful it was to hear; and still more wonderful to see where he passed the little tufts of young green grass, rye grass and slender fescue, and creeping bent and golden buttercups as well, begin to follow him: a band of happy children.

When he paused they stopped, and where he stood the grass took on a brighter and more verdant hue.

Higher the piper climbed, and still the children followed, till there was a grassy path like a deep-green ribbon stretching from the valley to near the mountain top.

The piper ceased his piping. The children gathered round him, clamouring to enter the mountain side where he had told them 'Everything is strange and new.'

The Piper laid down his pipe to fumble in his pockets. He turned them inside out: they were quite empty. There wasn't a copper to pay the price of admission.

The door in the mountain side shut fast.

Yet, in after years, there was always to be seen the narrow, grass-green track that followed the Piper's feet up nearly to the mountain top: verdant, resurgent every spring; like a string of close-set emeralds on the withered breast of the old mountain.

We woke to find the village deserted. Our landlady told us that everyone had been carried away by the Communist's voice. Rain during the night had washed out part of the text on the notice-board.

Only 'The Lord is my Shepherd' remained.

We stood and stared at it. Jenifer put her hand gently in mine, whispered:

'We must always remember that, dear'; and sadly, with bowed heads, we went on our way.

FREDERICK KEEBLE.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

ON January 26 I left London once more for Rome. The ship was as empty of passengers as the boat train. The young steward on duty in the saloon told me something of his life-history. Champion boxer of a home county, he was nigh killed when matched at Liverpool against harder stuff from the North of England—young men who could be knocked out by nothing short of a pole-axe. He had been obliged to give up boxing. Passengers did not like to be served by a man with a black eye and a thick ear, however honourable such scars; but he stuck to his physical training, and it made a great difference to his life. A steward on a Channel steamer lived three lives, of about equal length—one on board, the second in the town where he made his home, and the third on the opposite side of the Channel, where he had to find his own amusements. He talked some French and had a friend in both the French ports he visited, but he preferred Germans to other foreigners. He admired their practical devotion to athletics—not mere lip-service or in the passive rôle of spectator; he was surprised that they so seldom sought to bet on races or sporting events. The younger generation he had seen and talked with on board were proud of their physical fitness. They walked better, particularly the girls, and carried themselves better. His father had served in the Navy and, like him, favoured compulsory military service for everyone for one year, with a year on public works for ‘conchies’ and unfits. He would have joined the Navy himself but for the very long period of service required. The Army in this respect was even worse. They would enlist a band-boy at fifteen and make him sign for twelve years starting from his eighteenth birthday, and it cost at least £30 or £40 to buy a boy out.

* * * * *

Between Dunkirk and Paris I shared a compartment with a young Englishman who represented a British firm in Paris. We soon fell to talking about his ‘shop.’ At fifteen and a half years of age he left a small ‘private’ school in the Midlands to work in an office in France for two years, for his father did not believe in too much book-learning. He got on so well that the firm took him on and managed to keep him for two years, till his presence was discovered by the French Ministry of Labour. ‘I expect our Ministry of Labour turned a French boy out of London the same month for the same reason,’ he added; ‘that’s how we encourage trade and good relations!’

He soon found himself in a new post which he secured without paternal aid, and in his twentieth year, with five years’ experience in France, was earning good money. He was only an agent now; but his firm would soon open a branch and he would be manager—perhaps next year—and then he would marry the girl he had left behind him. He got on with the French; he mixed as much as he could with them. Starting with an elementary knowledge of French grammar, he had learned the language thoroughly. After grammar, slang was most important—much more so than in England. There were scores of young Englishmen of his age in Paris houses: many had old school ties and some had degrees, but few had a kick in them. They expected to be kept by the firm that employed them. He didn’t. He was out to get business and to keep the firm. He knew and respected his boss. He travelled third class, lived in a cheap hotel, and saved a third of his pay. If the French went off gold it would be a struggle to keep an import business going. He was helping to pile up a reserve by keeping costs down.

As we reached Paris I observed that it was unlikely to be easier to get something to eat or drink than it would be at Victoria. He knew where to go: we waited for a minute outside a shop 100 yards distant from the station. Soon after six the lights went on, the door opened, and my companion was made welcome. Taking some ham and eggs and a pat of butter from the meat-safe, he slipped into the private kitchen of the household, lit the gas-range, and ten minutes later emerged with a dish that would do credit to a chef. ‘How long have you known this place?’ said I. ‘Only a month,

but it is easy to be friends with people here if you don't expect too much.' He talked to the genial proprietor so rapidly, and so allusively, that I could scarcely follow him. He was clearly at home in Paris. I wondered whether he would have been so adaptable in social life or so successful in business had he followed the orthodox routine of the schools and universities, interspersed by joy rides to the Continent, winter sports or canoeing on the Rhine. He was certainly living a full life, and he did not neglect books; he read much in French and English—fiction and 'classics' respectively. The meal ended, he put me into the omnibus for the Gare de Lyon, presenting me with a ticket from his book of vouchers as he had noticed that I had no small change. We exchanged cards and went our ways—he to sleep for a few hours, I to take the express to Rome.

* * * * *

Thanks to the good offices of the manager of the restaurant-car, I secured an introduction to an officer of the French General Staff who was travelling, in uniform, between Paris and Bourg. Our talk turned on the military value of Russia. The Soviet, of course, had universal compulsory military service. Half a million were under arms—for five years nominally, but actually for three or four years; another million were territorials, serving for three months in the first year and annually for a month thereafter. Liability to service continued to the age of forty, and a Red army of ten millions could be mobilised, complete with artillery, machine-guns, and all subsidiary service.

The Ossoaviakhim—a propaganda body which existed to foster public interest in aviation and chemical warfare—was doing good work. They had 3,500 aeroplanes—according to some authorities, 5,000 to 6,000; but most of them were out of date, and the ground staff were not competent. They might execute a few successful surprise raids, but they were no match for German chasers, and war could not be conducted by air only. He believed the military strength of the Soviet to be a dangerous myth, encouraged by the Germans, who did not believe it, and relied on too much by French politicians. No real help would be expected from that quarter in the event of war. France needed England, but also

Italy. The real problem of Europe was Germany: it was futile to rely on a network of pacts; our preoccupation with Ethiopia was disastrous. We had nagged at Germany long enough; it was time to negotiate, sword in hand.

* * * * *

At Bardonecchia, the first station on the Italian side of the Mont Cenis tunnel, in deep snow, a score of young Italian officers, in snow-boots and laden with skis, entered the train on their way to Turin. Of the three who shared the compartment two spoke French. I introduced myself, not without some hesitation, as a retired English army officer. They were most courteous, and very willing to talk. One of them was in the air service: he was well-informed, from an Italian official hand-book, of the rôle assumed by the British Air Force in Trans-Jordan, Iraq, and on the Indian frontier. To rely as we did on bombing tribes from the air, in order to keep order on behalf of Arab Governments in the first-named places, was dangerous; but how magnificently we had succeeded! We had wiped out herds of camels, destroyed flocks of sheep and cattle. It was a wonderful story—'*un récit lyrique*.' We had saved thousands of lives—the lives of our brave infantry and cavalry—by thus using the air arm: we had driven the tribes in winter from their villages and forced them to live in caves, destroying their homes and supplies, and thus their morale. We had brought them to subjection with such effect that Trans-Jordan and Iraq had enjoyed for six years freedom from Arab or Kurdish raids; and on the Indian frontier we had been almost equally successful. Did we use mostly large or small bombs? Did we use machine-guns in collaboration with the bombing 'planes or only the latter? We always warned people that we would bomb their villages; that was wise, for we wanted to break their spirit rather than their bodies. Did we use gas, and, if so, was it any good? They were not using it in Ethiopia. He doubted its value in hot countries. He was an enthusiastic and ingenuous youth—just like his British *vis-à-vis*.

The other officer, who had a brother in Eritrea, probably by now in Ethiopia, was rejoicing over Graziani's great victory, made the more welcome because it was announced

within a day or so of the solemn declaration in English newspapers that the Italians could do no more this season, and of the issue of a cartoon by *Punch* showing 'Il Duce' swathed in barbed wire. We in England had resented the Hoare-Laval proposals because on the map they anticipated the course of events by a few months. He did not regret sanctions. Their imposition in October had rallied the clericals and the intellectuals: it had at last united the nation as perhaps nothing else could have done. The masses were behind the Duce and were ready to make any sacrifice. They were not a politically minded people, and their distrust of politicians and parliaments was the fruit of experience. But they were being led—not dictated to—of their own free will. It was harder to suffer privations than to die gloriously, but Italians would do both, for their cause was just. The right to live came first: the right to expand was a necessary corollary. He was sure that there was room in Ethiopia for Italian colonists without displacing a single native. The Negus and the chiefs had no more title to rule the non-Amharic regions in dispute than they had. Fifty years or so ago these had been conquered by Menelik, and the population had been almost wiped out since then by slave-raiding and misrule.¹ Italy had a mission to fulfil in Ethiopia not less sacred than Britain in the Sudan, and she would not flinch, as Gladstone did, from the consequences. But for Italian action the League would have complacently dismissed Ethiopian miseries: had they ever intervened in the internal affairs of any member State? No. They had just proposed to abolish the Nansen Bureau, and to wash their hands of White Russian, Armenian, Jewish, and all other victims of human cruelty. As for the Negus, he had less power than a constitutional monarch in Europe; and what did that amount to? Nothing. A monarch, however well-meaning, had no more authority than his supporters cared to give him, and those, in Ethiopia, were slave-owners and traders to the last man.

We reached Turin before he came to the end of what he

¹ 'Reports of British officials long resident tell pitiful tales of the devastation caused by slave-raiding in Ethiopia and neighbouring countries. Mr. Hodson tells of the reduction in his own lifetime of a population of a district from 250,000 to 10,000 by slave-raiding and its consequences.' (*The Round Table*, January 1936, p. 16.) See also *Ethiopian Realities*, by Major Polson Newman. (Geo. Allen and Unwin, 1936, 3s. 6d.)

had to say, and he insisted on discovering, in the train, a friend to continue to indoctrinate me with the Italian view. The conversation ended in the small hours of the morning.

The Italian newspapers, of which I purchased a large selection at Turin, together with English, French, German, Swiss and Austrian journals, had much the same news as the English papers, though the emphasis was different. They left their readers in no doubt as to the attitude of the foreign Press.

Everyone in Italy who owns a wireless set can listen in to half a dozen capitals every evening. There is no censorship on book packets or on newspapers sent by post. Extracts from British newspapers filled much space in the Italian dailies, and if more attention was devoted to the views of Bernard Shaw than to the song of the Norman Angels, that is a weakness shared by the Press of every country when selecting passages from foreign newspapers for reproduction.

* * * * *

The *tempo* of life in Rome seemed to have changed little since my visit in September. The cost of the people's food has risen scarcely at all, though the cost of certain raw materials has risen and will continue to rise, and no permits are being given for new buildings. There are fewer cars to be seen. Train services, except on electrified lines, have been cut down to save coal, and every train I travelled in was overcrowded except in the *wagons-lit*. Yet both officers and men in uniform more than once refused to let me stand and offered me their seats. Great efforts are being made to develop indigenous sources of essential commodities. Coal, iron and nickel mines are being reopened and substitute materials being developed. Nowhere did I encounter black looks: everywhere I was received with a courteous reserve. 'Anger,' said one Italian to me, 'is a sign of weakness; we are strong. Our Press is less given to insults and gibes against England than is yours against Italy. Your editors do not understand that the new Italy is different from the old. The Duce has united us: he has ceased to be a dictator only; he is our leader, and we shall not fail him. Sanctions have enabled us to realise national unity, from our Royal Family—never nearer our hearts than to-day—down to the poorest. We

have poverty, but it does not degrade; we make sacrifices, but they are fairly distributed: not poverty, but a desire to serve, animates those who go to fight our battles.'

I met, during my stay in Rome and Florence, Ministers and soldiers, Foreign Office officials and Italian men of business, and several members of the British colony of either sex. I found almost everywhere, even in public conversation in the presence of strangers, a surprising freedom in the expression of opinions at variance with those officially accepted. I am assured by those who know Italy well that free discussion is a luxury still widely enjoyed.

There is a general feeling that Italy has not done herself justice in the diplomatic sphere. Had she formally indicted Ethiopia before the League for the successive acts of aggression repeatedly committed since 1930, had she exposed the misrule and misery inflicted upon the conquered provinces by the Government of the Negus, she might have secured many, if not all, of her objectives. Italy might have insisted upon these evils being remedied under penalty of expulsion from the League. The official reports of happenings on the frontiers between Ethiopia and British spheres in Kenya and the Sudan, as summarised for presentation to Parliament, make painful reading; and they are amply confirmed elsewhere: there is no reason whatever to believe that conditions have been or can be improved without European control. English men and women recently returned from Eritrea told me that the Italian troops are everywhere welcomed and nowhere opposed by the local inhabitants, to whom this is a 'war of liberation.' The troops of the Negus are Amharas, the local tribes their slaves.

The assumption of Great Britain that Signor Mussolini was bluffing is regarded as a tragedy. Stalin, President of the Communist International, Hitler, Führer of Germany (within and without the territorial confines of the Reich), and Mussolini, who brought new life to Italy in her darkest days, have this in common. They do not bluff: they mean what they say, though, like other men, they change their outlook with changing circumstances. They each embody national ideals; they are accepted in their respective countries by all but a negligible minority, and followed with blind and unswerving loyalty by a vast majority. The attempts made by British

Ministers in Parliament, and by our Press, to distinguish between the Italian people and their leader are bitterly resented. They feel that it is we, not they, who have betrayed Europe. Mussolini will remain at the helm until he is removed by the hand of death. The London clubs were in February full of stories of his approaching decay, dissolution or demise. Never was he in better health; never was there less reason for us to desire his elimination. Italy would, I am convinced, find other leaders were he to die this year; having savoured the feeling of strength from unity, they would crush mercilessly those who sought to destroy it.

It was everywhere agreed that the future depends largely upon the financial strength of Italy, and I met a number of Italians who did not conceal their anxiety in this regard, and said so publicly. Signor Guarnieri, the Under-Secretary of State who controls foreign exchange operations, was good enough to receive me. He was naturally reticent as to figures, but told me that plans for 1937 were already in preparation. They would impose fresh sacrifices on the Italian people: the war was not popular—no war ever was—but they could be relied upon, in face of foreign pressure, to stand firm. The imposition of sanctions had necessitated great changes; some of them would be permanent. New industries were being started; new channels were taking the place of old. The process was painful, but, when peace came, trade would not always revert to the old channels. Too much had been and was to be spent in devising new ways. Italy was bound to make fresh efforts to increase her self-sufficiency. Oil was coming from Albania—300,000 tons a year; more might be derived thence: it was being sought in the Apennines, just as we were searching for it in England. Much of the English coal trade had gone for ever; German coal was firmly established. The supply of British coal had repeatedly been stopped, at immense loss to Italy, by coal strikes, from the consequences of which Italian consumers could not protect themselves. Such things did not happen in Germany. Water-power would be further developed: they would learn to do without, or to make, many things hitherto imported. (I heard such views expressed in Ireland and Germany last year.) 'You have yet to learn,' he said, 'that man does not live by bread alone. People come to me with statistics to prove that we

must soon collapse. Have they so soon forgotten the lessons of the war? I shall not tell you how much gold and silver has been freely given by bishops and brides, priests and peasants. The figure would astonish you. I shall not tell you the strength of our reserves: it is far more than you imagine, and we shall lose less this year than last, as our plans develop.'

Of the strategic position in Ethiopia I heard comparatively little. There was a general belief that the territory now occupied could be held and far more besides. There was no doubt that the tribes now behind the Italian advanced lines welcomed the Italian occupation and would soon be able to sell them many local supplies in large quantities. Sickness was far less than was expected—far less than in previous campaigns—and there were no epidemics. Casualties were few. The loyalty of local troops was beyond praise. Italian, no less than British, officers knew how to evoke and to keep it. The state of the Ethiopian cultivator, the degradation that had resulted from the fifty years of rule from Addis Ababa, had filled Italian troops with horror and inspired them with a desire to fulfil a civilising mission,² such as we had undertaken in the Sudan, and they would not rest until they had done as much in Ethiopia as we had accomplished there.

The bombing of Red Cross stations was one of the stock complaints of every war: it was not wholly avoidable when attacking a crowded camp, and airmen often had ocular proof of the gross and continued abuse of the Convention by Ethiopian leaders. A Swedish Red Cross unit had been taken in the act of carrying military munitions and equipment—doubtless unknown to the Swedes.

When on January 30 I was again received by Signor Mussolini at the Palazzo Venezia, he stated with great emphasis, in response to a direct inquiry, that he had repeatedly assured the British Government that he had no manner of designs against any British interest in Africa or (I gathered) in Arabia.

² I was shown a letter written from Milan in 1886 to the British explorer H. M. Stanley, of which the following is a rough translation: 'Let us hope that, having taken the first step, united Italy, heir of Roman fame, genius and enterprise, will emulate in Africa the vigour which enabled ancient Rome to reach the height of her glory. Massawah is an important strategic point, but if you stop here it will only be "a colony of sentiment." Go ahead, gain influence in the interior, occupy strategic points and encourage trade. Ethiopia can become your granary: the Ual'a country may have great commercial importance. Do not wait upon events, but work.'

He had always believed that the growth of Italian commitments in Ethiopia would create a solidarity of interest between Italy and Great Britain. That, indeed, was the assumption made in every diplomatic discussion since 1884. What else was involved by the Treaty of 1906, creating spheres of influence, or of 1925 when we handed over Jubaland to Italy?

Signor Mussolini's assertion seems to me to be well-founded. If Italy assumes heavy liabilities in Ethiopia it becomes vital to her to ensure that the Suez Canal remains open at all times. Italy would be compelled to join forces with us to ensure this in time of war, and, when the Suez Canal Convention expires, we could rely upon her diplomatic assistance to ensure that the Egyptian Government do not use it, as it is now used, to levy exorbitant tolls upon every ship that uses it. (The dues of £2000 or more per ship could be reduced by half and still leave a handsome profit to the shareholders.) He assured me that Italy, having given hostages to fortune in East Africa, would be willing, and is indeed anxious, to collaborate with other Great Powers in devising and executing a wise policy in Africa. She is ready to undertake not to follow the example of France in the matter of raising a great black army. (Italian sentiment in this matter is very different from that of the French.)

The Italians believe, as did Stanley, that Ethiopia can become a prosperous country under European control. Industries, not agriculture only, are necessary if the standard of living is to be raised. The French have colonised Algeria and have thus raised the standard of life in that country, as also in Morocco and Tunis. 'Pietists and quietists and pacifists, and old women in trousers,' said Signor Mussolini, 'may cherish their deluded belief in and hope for a world in which there is no struggle, in which the least able and the least competent will be able to keep the progressive races within the limits set at a given moment, not by Providence, but by accidents of history. Much has happened since 1919. Fascism has arisen and also Communism: new nations are being born. Is it not time for the British people to realise that their present attitude implicitly condemns all that is greatest in their history? Are you really ashamed to have seized the great areas which you hold in trust? Do you really

believe that you should have left the savage world to its own devices—in the New World, in the Antipodes, in Africa, and in Asia? Are not we Italians, by imitating you, paying you the highest compliment? Is there anything immoral in enabling a great race to expand and at the same time to liberate millions of wretches from the foulest servitude ever imposed by man on man?

I asked him whether the Hoare-Laval proposals, had they been approved, would have been regarded by Italy as a suitable basis for negotiation.

'Yes,' he said. 'I had already drafted a cautious formula of acceptance as a basis of negotiation. The Council of Ministers, which would have been asked to approve a statement on these lines, was actually sitting when the news came that you gentlemen in London, who had praised Sir Samuel Hoare so highly on September 13, had rejected him with ignominy on December 19. We have gained much since then. As a direct result of your action, much Ethiopian and some Italian blood has been needlessly shed, much treasure vainly spent.'

He was perhaps a little thinner than when I saw him last, and he looked tired; but his health and his competence seemed wholly unimpaired, and, as he himself told me, the demonstration of national unity from all parts of the world had profoundly moved him. I heard later that letters had been received from many of his bitterest opponents, now residing abroad, such as Signor Orlando, assuring him of their wholehearted support in the present crisis; and amongst them several former Socialist and Syndicalist leaders. I heard elsewhere some talk of a loan to Italy. It is not at present a project which is viewed with favour in official circles. London, say some, is the last place they will go to for a loan for many a year.

Of oil sanctions and tanker embargoes much was being said. On one point opinion was unanimous. Oil sanctions would make an eventual settlement far more difficult, and would greatly exacerbate public opinion. In October last the reserve of petroleum was the weakest spot in Italy's armour; that is why Signor Mussolini made it clear that the application of oil sanctions would be regarded as an act of war. By the end of February reserves will have been accumu-

lated. Oil sanctions will cause much hardship to the public and will arouse intense feeling, but they will not seriously affect military operations. Tanks are being excavated or erected in a score of places, on a great scale. The principal sufferers from sanctions would be the oil companies, who might see their great equipment, costing many millions, taken over by the State—a counter-stroke of some importance.

Sanctions are hurting Italy; they are hurting us too, though, as the schoolboy said to the headmaster, 'not in the same place.' What hurts more are the phrases attributed to British statesmen in this connexion. 'Sanctions are an experiment,' said Sir S. Hoare. 'So we,' reply Italians, 'are to be vivisected on the table at Geneva as a demonstration of international goodwill.' Mr. Anthony Eden is credited with having said that the object of sanctions was to 'strangle' Italy and that the proceedings of the League, under the presidency of M. Litvinoff, are 'a full-dress rehearsal' of the great parade of force which must some day be brought to bear on Germany. Italians reply that such phrases come ill from such lips; that we are sacrificing the substance—the former solidarity of old Allies—and the reality of a common humanism and common interests for a shadow. They add that if the object was to teach Germany, it has been attained. Germany has learned not to allow herself to be thus caught, is quickly taking steps to accumulate vital supplies, and she is more experienced in manufacture and in administration on a great scale than is Italy, whose business is not conducted by vast combines, but by many small independent units. Germany can laugh at sanctions, from which, say Italians, Great Britain will suffer most, because she depends more than any nation on international trade, against which we have, by sponsoring sanctions, struck a deadly blow. Italian diplomacy has much to answer for; but is ours blameless? Private persons as well as experienced statesmen assured me that had we made our position clear, a year or eighteen months ago, a solution could have been reached, though perhaps not at Geneva, which is ill-adapted for peaceful negotiations.

We should never have allowed the British Academy in Rome to be closed for lack of £6000. To have kept it alive would have been a gesture worthy of us, as the principal upholders of what is best in classical learning. To the Latin

language we owe, in Professor Mackail's words, practically the whole vocabulary of our theology and moral philosophy. European prose, as an instrument of thought, is Cicero's creation. Satire on the Roman model had no antecedent model, and has had no subsequent rival. In letter-writing Rome led the way; but it is in the domain of law that we owe her most. In the words of the late Lord Oxford, 'She founded, developed, and systematised the jurisprudence of the world.' Yet the British Academy at Rome is the first victim of sanctions: it is unlikely to revive.

I personally consider the Italian case to have been far stronger than has generally been believed in this country, but it has been prejudiced almost beyond repair by Italian errors of political strategy and tactics. The application of Ethiopia for admission to the League should have been opposed by Italy as it was by us. They supported it to please France and in the hope of placating Ethiopia. As soon as it became clear that Ethiopia was not, and perhaps could not be, a good neighbour, Italy should have used the machinery of the League to arraign her for the maintenance of slavery (which will never be abolished unless under European control), for repeated acts of aggression, and breaches of existing treaties. She should have brought the Wal-Wal affair before the League instead of handling it herself under the Treaty of 1928. The Italian version should have been given to the world at once, and not, nine months too late, in an unreadable document without an English translation. To be too proud to explain is as bad as to be too proud to fight.

When the controversy became acute, the Italian case should have been more wisely handled. The almost unanimous voice of responsible British journals should not have been ignored. Some spiteful and much contemptuous writing in certain sections of the British Press should not have been countered by denunciations of England and threats of 'throwing her out of the Mediterranean.' A close study of Press cuttings is a dangerous diversion for statesmen unless they know what importance attaches to various papers. It is not realised abroad that weight is often in inverse proportion to circulation. The worst offenders were journals which are seldom to be seen in the hands of responsible Englishmen

even in their idlest moments, or which are frankly read for amusement rather than instruction, and the same was, I believe, true in Italy, though the relations of Government with the Italian Press make comparisons difficult.

The campaign once started, journalists were sent to the Eritrean front at great cost. Everyone, including the Italians, was full of admiration for their work, and long extracts from their articles were quoted in the Italian Press. Whatever might be the politics of their papers, the journalists reported fully and loyally what they had seen, and they had nothing but good to say of the Italian troops and their conduct. What happened? Every Pressman was suddenly ordered back to Asmara and supplied with the daily bulletin after it had appeared in Rome. What was the result? The special correspondents were withdrawn; there are no more interesting and friendly articles, the Abyssinian propaganda once again holds the field, and the curt Italian communiqués are read with scepticism or indifference.

I have here and elsewhere criticised what has been done by Great Britain in this affair, but I am bound to conclude by placing on record my conviction that the primary responsibility for the tragedy we are now witnessing lies in the failure and mistakes of Italian diplomacy. The League might have been made an instrument of progress and even of Italian expansion in Ethiopia: they antagonised friend and foe at Geneva by jeering at it. Their economic problems are acute. Though the birth-rate has dropped steadily every year since 1921, the net increase is still about 400,000, for the death-rate has, under Fascism, dropped to a figure which approaches ours. The need for an outlet for their population is thus urgent. Their case on these lines is very strong: it has never been comprehensively put forward.

The Fascists are rightly proud of the Corporate State as the only alternative on the mainland of Europe to Communism: they are proud of the spiritual changes that Fascism under Mussolini has wrought in the morale of the nation, and especially of its youth. They claim with truth that they have proved their ability to apply new methods to old problems. Yet in international affairs they have entirely failed to recognise the existence of new factors or to use the technique that the times require. In their own interests and

these of Europe they will do well to recognise these facts and to apply themselves to the remedy; for they cannot exist apart from the European family of which they are the progenitors, and Italian culture and Italian influence are an integral part of what is best worth preserving in Europe.

We have got to make the peace. To revert again to Burke's speech, on April 19, 1774, on American Taxation: 'For many months now we have been lashed round and round this miserable circle of argument; invention is exhausted, reason is fatigued, experience has given judgement, but obstinacy is not yet conquered. . . . Once more there are grounds of deliberation—one narrow and simple, the other more large and complicated, comprehending the whole series of their causes and their consequences,' and once more the official opinion 'states it as useless and thinks it may be even dangerous to enter into the more extensive field of enquiry,' and so once more we 'consult our invention and reject our experience.' 'This mode of deliberation,' pleads Burke, 'is diametrically opposite to every rule of reason and every principle of good sense established among mankind.'

These words seem to me fairly to apply to further action on our part in support of sanctions. We have failed, as I was convinced from the first that we must fail, to coerce a great nation by any measure short of open war. The Italians have admittedly mishandled their own case, but they have in equity a better claim than we have been prepared to concede to them in law. The precipitate disavowal of Sir Samuel Hoare has done great damage to the cause of European peace. We must look forward to the resumption of peace-making at the earliest possible moment.

ARNOLD WILSON.

CORRESPONDENCE

'WHITHER EUROPE?'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—Two considerations make it expedient to refer briefly to Signor Luigi Villari's 'comment' in your February issue upon my article 'Whither Europe?' Otherwise I should have preferred to ignore it, since there is no common ground, either in outlook or method, between me and Fascist propaganda.

The first consideration is that Signor Villari's 'comment' unwittingly bears witness to the 'lowering of intellectual and moral standards' in Fascist Italy which my article mentioned. I knew, and loved, an Italy in which men like Visconti Venosta, Gaetano Negri, and many others moved and worked upon a level as high as any in the world. Among such men Signor Villari's father, Pasquale Villari, held rightful place. The Italy of Benito Mussolini, with Virginio Gayda and Luigi Villari among her apologists, lies so much lower that, in regard to these apologists at any rate, one can only follow Virgil's counsel to Dante: '*Non ragioniam di lor, ma guarda e passa.*' ('Let us not speak of them; glance only and pass on.')

The second consideration concerns, not Signor Villari's contemptible untruthfulness about myself, but his studied insult to honourable men who have scorned the sweets of Fascist favour. When he ascribes to political exiles for freedom's sake, such as Don Luigi Sturzo, Professor Salvemini and others, a desire to go back to Italy 'under an escort of foreign bayonets' he writes what he knows is false. Future generations of re-redeemed Italians will hold the names of these men in high esteem for having, by their faithfulness to truly Italian ideals, deserved well of their country.

Yours obediently,

WICKHAM STREED.

London, February 11, 1936.

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—In my letter which you were good enough to print in your February issue, the passage to which Don Luigi Sturzo takes exception does not, as he seems to think, imply that he and the other persons mentioned wish to return to Italy 'under an escort of foreign bayonets,'

but that their too zealous non-Italian friends might desire such a consummation. I can assure Don Luigi Sturzo that I am certain that the aspiration of the former is to attain their ends by Italian means alone, and I never intended to suggest anything else. My remarks were addressed to Mr. Wickham Steed, and I regret that they should have lent themselves to such a misinterpretation.


I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

LUIGI VILLARI.

2 Via Antonio Eosio, Rome,
February 17, 1936.

[We desire to associate ourselves with this expression of regret.—ED.]

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCCX—APRIL 1936

HITLER'S CHALLENGE

By WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON, Hon. D.Phil.

THE German Chancellor's challenge to the statesmen of Europe, though brusque in the manner of its delivery, had at least the novelty and the recommendation that it was a challenge, not to war, but to peace. That important fact should be steadily kept in view. Of course, it administered to the Chancelleries, and to most people out of them, a severe shock, though whether, as has been suggested by Mr. Baldwin, 'the shock was one to their consciences'—at least, in the manner implied by him—may be doubted. There are occasions, however, when shocks, even violent ones, are necessary and salutary, and such an occasion existed. For while the statesmen who muddled the international situation in July 1914 are in the habit of cloaking their incapacity with the plea that Europe then stumbled and blundered into war, for some years their successors have trod the way to disaster with eyes open.

Hitler's action on March 6 in so abruptly violating the

*Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the
NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 & 12 Orange Street,
Leicester Square, W.C.2.*

German demilitarised zone and denouncing the Locarno Convention will have done good if it has awakened us out of lethargy and inaction, and determined us to lose no further time, even in the eleventh hour, in seriously grappling with the hitherto disregarded task of restoring and strengthening the shaken fabric of the European political system. Of course, he has sadly transgressed the proprieties; yet was it, on the whole, so egregious a sin to have marched German soldiers from one part of their own country to another, from which they had been excluded by foreign dictation for seventeen years, that we must belabour him with more stodgy sermons on the duty of being docile and good-mannered? Let Englishmen show a little more of the 'sporting spirit' which befits them so well. For how long should we have liked and borne similar dictation? Can there be many of us who, if in the German position, would not have gladly seen a hundred treaties broken rather than have suffered equal humiliation for, not seventeen years, but seventeen days?

Moreover, if Hitler has evaded a treaty obligation, have we never done the same thing when strong reasons have existed? Two instances jump at once to the mind. When in 1878 we seized Cyprus against French protests, Lord Salisbury, on behalf of the Government, gave to M. Waddington, the French Ambassador, a definite pledge—from the standpoint of honour as good as any convention—that as soon as Russia withdrew from Turkish territory in Asia Minor we would retrocede that island. The condition of its return occurred, but we continued to retain Cyprus, and we retain it still. Again, when we occupied Egypt in 1882 for the purpose of suppressing rebellion we gave the pledge that when order was re-established we would withdraw. This pledge was officially repeated on various occasions by Lord Salisbury and others. Circumstances changed, and we with them: we are still in Egypt.

And however Hitler's action may be judged from the standpoint of strict legality, is it not right that a thought should be given to the fifteen and a half millions of people in the Rhenish provinces who have so long borne the slur of a depressed status and an inferior citizenship? Perhaps less would be said about the alleged heinousness of overriding

the demilitarisation stipulations if his censors knew their history. How many people are aware that if France had had her way Germany would have been subjected to a far greater humiliation? When the British and American delegates would not agree to the demand that the German territory on the left bank of the Rhine should be put under an international commission, with France in military occupation, the alternative was made that the German inhabitants on the left bank of the Rhine should not be allowed to bear arms, or receive military training, or be incorporated in military organisations of any kind, or even be taxed for national defence. That discreditable proposal was rejected, though the restrictions eventually adopted were indefensible because entirely one-sided. Articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Treaty provided that on the left bank of the Rhine and on the right bank for roughly thirty-two miles eastward Germany should not maintain or construct fortifications, maintain or assemble armed forces, carry on military manœuvres, or have permanent works for mobilisation. The inequity of such a one-sided arrangement is obvious. As Major-General J. H. Marshall-Cornwall says in his book *Geographic Disarmament*, this military handicap was imposed solely in order that in another war France 'might be able to seize the initiative hitherto held by Germany and strike at once into the heart of her enemy's country. Such a weighting of the scales is not the proper function of a demilitarised zone.' The French Prime Minister said a few days ago that 'the existence of a demilitarised zone is not a disgrace.' But if that is so, it is a thousand pities that his Government did not prove it in 1919 by submitting France to the same control.

The importance of the fact that Germany now claims that she has at last won back her independence, self-respect and honour as a sovereign State is far too great to cause men of just mind and of good will to trouble overmuch about ways and means. With that status she may again become a stout pillar in a political structure which otherwise might at any time have given way. What Hitler has done is to make a first real attempt since 1919 to restore normal conditions to Europe, from a consciousness that only when a clear course and stable foundations have been prepared can the urgent work of reconstruction begin.

For our own country in particular the disappearance of the demilitarised zone of German territory marks a new and welcome stage in the emasculation of a treaty which, because entirely alien to the English spirit, it was a wrong to our nation to have concluded in the English name. The remarkable evidence of so ready a response, on the part of all parties and classes of our population, to Hitler's constructive proposals, and of their disposition to view indulgently the arbitrary action which accompanied them, proves the nation's impatience with the long-continued subordination of British policy to the wishes and whims and interests of a single Power, and its earnest desire that its foreign relations should be brought back into the forsaken more generous lines.

That Hitler should have denounced the Locarno Convention has created less surprise, for in diplomatic circles it was expected directly the Franco-Soviet Pact began to be seriously talked about. No one doubts that the Pact is aimed directly and exclusively at Germany, for Article 4 of the Explanatory Protocol attached to it leaves no uncertainty on the subject. But the Pact is otherwise inconsistent with the spirit, if not with the letter, of the Locarno agreement. So far as Germany is concerned, its sting lies in a provision which flatly overrides Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and practically supersedes the League Council. That Article stipulates that where a dispute likely to lead to a rupture arises between members of the League and is submitted to the Council, and the latter 'fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.'

But Article 1 of the Explanatory Protocol takes this reservation out of the hands of the League members and empowers the two allies to act according to their own judgment and interest. In other words, they claim the right to determine independently and arbitrarily who is the aggressor in a given dispute in which either of them is involved, to be judges of their own complaints or claims, and to resort together to such measures as they please, in accordance with

their obligation to 'render mutual assistance' whenever a dispute occurs. What Germany's position would be in such an eventuality may be easily imagined. Inasmuch as this perversion of League of Nations procedure must destroy confidence in France as a co-signatory of the Locarno Convention, her withdrawal from that agreement in its present form is comprehensible.

It is, however, the positive side of Hitler's overtures to the European Powers that really matters, and in comparison with it everything else is unimportant. Here he shows constructive ability of the highest order. The proposals by which he makes atonement for setting weak nerves on edge form the most hopeful contribution yet made by any Government, or all Governments together, to the solution of the problems created by the most exasperating of the Treaties of Peace. What he has done is to offer new and vital ideas for outworn formulas, practical measures for unworkable makeshifts, guarantees of peace and protection all round on conditions as free from privilege as from bias and humiliation.

Thus, instead of the one-sided German 'zone of security,' he is prepared to conclude arrangements with France and Belgium for creating on a reciprocal basis zones which he asks them to make as extensive as they like. In place of the Locarno Convention he will enter into pacts of non-aggression with the same countries, and with Holland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria—probably he would extend the offer to Denmark likewise—with a duration of either twenty-five or even fifty years, just as they please; and in order to make it as firm and secure as possible he asks Great Britain and Italy to guarantee it, an invitation not to be lightly declined provided some sort of reciprocity be introduced into the arrangement. On the question of armaments, while taking it for granted that Germany, forced thereto by her present defenceless condition, the fact that she is surrounded by strongly armed and hostile States, the refusal of the Allied Powers to fulfil their pledge of disarmament, and the example set by most European countries, will continue to rearm to the extent of her needs, he is nevertheless willing to enter into an air pact with Great Britain, supplementing the naval pact already concluded, as a step to restrictions all round. He also offers on Germany's behalf to conclude a compre-

hensive non-aggression pact with the States on her eastern borders; and with surprising magnanimity, in view of the discreditable way in which Lithuania has violated its obligations towards Memelland, he is even willing that that primitive little State shall be included, subject to guarantees that the stipulated autonomy of Memel shall be no longer challenged. Finally, he offers to re-enter the League of Nations, though he will probably make conditions designed to free the League from its present character as concerned more for the protection of the Treaties of Peace than of peace itself.

If this grandiose project is of Hitler's own conception, he is both a big and a bold man. Already he has saved Germany from confusion and collapse; what if he should be proved to have saved Europe from the same fate? It will be a calamity if the measures here proposed do not receive from the Powers chiefly concerned the fullest and fairest consideration, together with the determination to do everything possible to give effect to them. Nevertheless, it would be a fatal mistake to expect from them more than they are able to perform. In a sense they are rather a purpose than an end. To assume that once the projected pacts of non-aggression came into force Governments and nations would be able to bask in ease and tranquillity beneath their overspreading vines and fig trees, congratulating themselves that Europe's ugly problems had been satisfactorily disposed of, would be to misunderstand altogether the object of the truce which has been foreshadowed. That is where the Locarno Convention has specially failed, since it has proved merely a sedative, instead of a stimulus to action on positive and ameliorative lines. For the duty of treaty revision would remain all the same. What the pacts may and should do is to create a new and more genial atmosphere favourable to quiet and dispassionate reflection, and to afford the opportunity of approaching that task in a spirit of good will and with an earnest desire to reach the utmost degree of agreement possible. Not to improve that opportunity to the utmost might leave the state of Europe worse instead of better than now.

In suggesting the countries with which he is willing to enter into pacts of non-aggression Hitler has left no doubt as

to where he looks for accommodation by peaceful procedure—it is in the revision of the new German frontiers where they can be shown to be indefensibly wrong and to have inflicted great yet remediable injustice and injury, not only on the local populations immediately affected, but on the entire body politic. The fundamental grievance of Germany, from which all other injustices have issued, is the fact that although her Government surrendered on the condition, offered by her and formally accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers, that President Wilson's Fourteen Points, as contained in his Message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and his later peace pronouncements, including his supplementary Principles of February 11 and his speech of September 17 of the same year, should form the 'basis for peace negotiations,' that solemn agreement was repudiated. A treaty was arbitrarily drawn up which in almost every respect violated the pledges given, and it was thrown at the heads of the German delegates with the warning that unless they signed it within a specified time their country should be invaded and the hunger blockade be re-enforced. Is it surprising, therefore, that the Germans contend that they were cajoled and cheated?

Again, early in the war Mr. Asquith gave the nation the assurance that no annexations were to be made, and Wilson repeated the assurance more emphatically, yet before the fighting was half through most of the annexations embodied in the Treaty of Versailles were agreed upon. For Germany the effect of these provisions was the loss of nearly one-seventh of the entire area of the country, in extent almost equal to that of all Ireland, with a population of six and a half millions, or nearly that of Scotland and Wales. Moreover, although when the spokesmen of the Allied Powers foreshadowed frontier changes it was always with the promise that there should be full self-determination. Thus the official statement of British war aims, as revised as late as January 1918 to meet Wilson's pronouncement of that time, was particularly emphatic. 'The consent of the governed,' it said, 'must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war.' Notwithstanding this pledge, 80 per cent. of the Germans denaturalised were never consulted.

Hardly a single annexed territory can be named the

retention or loss of which Germany was not willing in 1919 to submit to an honest plebiscite, abiding by the result. Yet except in North Schleswig, a small district in the east, and later in the Saar region, plebiscites were either not held at all or they were gerrymandered, as in the Eupen and Malmedy district of Belgium (where a member of the national Parliament publicly condemned the Government for not allowing 'an honourable plebiscite') and in Upper Silesia. In the latter Prussian province the French Commissioner assisted the Poles in the organisation of two brutal and bloody insurrections—one before the voting, in order to terrorise the German inhabitants, the other after it, in order to terrorise the Allied Powers, insomuch that a correspondent of *The Times* on the spot wrote: 'The result of French partiality and co-operation with the Polish cause is such that any person with a sense of justice is driven to support and defend the Germans.' The second had the effect desired, since, though three-fifths of the electors declared for German sovereignty, the Powers in Paris gave to Poland the best part of the province, including five-sixths of the industrial area and three-quarters of the mines and metallurgical industries.

These unjust cessions of territory cannot be defended, and they will never survive as they stand. Where readjustment cannot be effected by amicable agreement the promised plebiscites should still be instituted on such principles as equity demands and under impartial control. As Germany has agreed to make no further claim to Alsace-Lorraine, the status there would not be disturbed. There should be no difficulty in meeting justifiable Polish claims in the Corridor, but the reunion of Prussia would be essential, and Danzig would have to go back to that country, if it so decided by vote, as it would do. The position in Upper Silesia is difficult, but the economic interests of the two nations call for a reasonable settlement there as well, and with moderation on both sides it could be reached. As for Memelland and the annexations in Belgium and Czechoslovakia, where at present intolerable conditions exist, all Germany claims is that the inhabitants shall be allowed to decide for themselves. Such adjustments as are here suggested would be greatly facilitated if arrangements were made for the exchange of populations, with State assistance where necessary.

As the question of the colonies is the only source of contention between Germany and this country, it is of paramount importance that an amicable settlement should be sought on generous lines without unavoidable delay. The future of the colonies was explicitly dealt with in the fifth of President Wilson's Points—again, let it be said, formally adopted by both sides as part of the basis of peace. It provided that there should be 'free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustments of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.'

This stipulation, which was a promise and a guarantee to Germany of fair play, was likewise entirely disregarded. Not once was she consulted or even considered when the colonies were discussed. The decision to appropriate them had been taken before the Peace Conference opened, and all that remained to be done was to divide the spoil. That the claimants did, scrambling for it like Westminster School boys for Shrove Tuesday pancakes. The big Powers, already superabundantly provided with oversea territories, got the lion's share, the smaller ones only scraps. Yet Germany did not gain one of these territories by conquest, while she held some of them in virtue of treaties bearing Great Britain's signature. Lack of space makes it impossible to refute again the baseless and unworthy slanders cast at Germany, in the hope of justifying the annexations—slanders which General Hertzog not long ago so strongly condemned. Nor can I do more than state how vital to Germany, still the third greatest industrial and commercial country in the world, is the possession of tropical and sub-tropical territories in order to control supplies of raw materials for many of her important industries and to provide outlets for emigration and settlement.

Not long ago the head of a North German university, a stranger to me, wrote me a letter deploring the lack of openings for the educated youth of his country, chiefly owing to the havoc made of its social and economic life by the Treaty of Versailles. The letter ended: 'For us university teachers it is heartbreaking to watch the growing up of an

academic youth for whom, in spite of their good capacities and achievements, there will be no living room in Germany, yet who would be ready to do self-sacrificing pioneer work in colonies.' Compare the positions in the two countries. Great Britain has eligible surplus lands which clamour for population, yet her people will not go to them. On the other hand, Germany needs openings for surplus population, yet she has no lands for them to go to.

There is also the claim based on sentiment and national honour. With a great price Germany bought her colonies—a price paid not only in treasure and hard work, but in the countless lives of the administrators, soldiers, settlers, doctors, scientists, schoolmasters, missionaries and traders, who have done heroic pioneer work in those lands and whose bodies remain where they laboured. There was lately a correspondence in *The Times* concerning the bartering of British Colonies, and it was condemned as an outrage on the souls of the Colonists. That is just the complaint of Germany, yet how many people refuse so to see it!

There is one other aspect of the present situation to which reference must be made, and is of profound moment. I would appeal for a new orientation of our foreign relations as wise for us and beneficial for Europe. During all the years following the war our foreign policy has been regulated and at times dictated by a single Power, whose political aims have seldom in history been identical with our own, and during those years have again and again been in conflict with what Mr. Gladstone once spoke of as 'English ideas.' We all know what those ideas are; we value and are justifiably proud of them: they can be fairly said to connote a deep-rooted, almost instinctive love of fair play, justice, and right. Because of their dependence on France—sometimes unavoidable, but far too often voluntary—our statesmen have handicapped and compromised themselves at every turn, with the result that this English tradition has seldom been allowed its due and just influence.

The French have attractive qualities, but ability to look at questions from other standpoints and with other preconceptions than their own is not one of them. They want peace—who can doubt it?—but it is to be a peace of which they shall lay down the conditions. They want security, but at the

expense of the security, dignity, and honour of their late enemy, for their idea of security is domination. Owing to their intransigence, from the effects of which all Europe is suffering to-day, few indeed have been the ameliorations of the Treaty of Versailles, a document for which they bear the chief responsibility, and even these they have first tried to thwart and later only resistingly accepted. I would call to mind particularly, and commend to Sir Austen Chamberlain's 'quivering memory,' the accelerated evacuation of the Rhineland, the repeated scaling down of the impossible reparations, and the ultimate writing off of a huge balance as a bad debt. On the other hand, regardless of the discredit reflected on her late allies, they have gone out of their way to irritate and injure a sufficiently penalised nation, as by the callous treatment of the population of the Saarland, the endeavours to foment sedition both in that region and in the Rhineland, and the illegal invasion of the Ruhr with coloured troops, with all its shootings, rapings, and other excesses.

Take, too, the wearisome sequence of rejections by France of friendly German overtures, leading to the abrupt repudiation of the demilitarised zone arrangement, from the well-founded belief that to ask for relief would mean another rebuff. And bound to France as we are, since she does not want an equitable understanding with Germany we are not allowed to have one. Just as in the pre-war days, the very slightest indication of an attempt to conciliate that country immediately provokes expostulations, while the Paris Press, true to its traditional character, launches into petulant attacks on 'perfidious Albion.' If anyone wishes to know what our constant running after France has meant for our prestige in that country, let him reflect on M. Tardieu's claim that 'l'Angleterre a besoin de la France pour sa sécurité.' One can imagine the scorn with which Palmerston or even Richard Cobden, a man of peace but one of the proudest of Englishmen, would have thrown back those words.

Mr. Baldwin talked the other day of the rough way in which Hitler has wounded 'the most delicate, the most raw susceptibilities of the French.' But has not France for seventeen years outraged the most delicate and raw susceptibilities of the Germans? Do not let us ignore facts and imitate a bad example by setting up different standards and

measures of national honour. From personal knowledge I can speak of the memories left in the Rhineland by the French and British troops of occupation respectively. The former went as arrogant victors, and from first to last flung insult and humiliation right and left. When I was there in 1919, and again in 1921, it was as distressing to hear of the hatred which the French had earned for themselves as it was gratifying to be told everywhere that the British soldiers, from highest to lowest, had in everything acted with consideration and courtesy. When later there were rumours of the British troops withdrawing alone, the inhabitants lived in dread until they were officially contradicted.

And having more than any other country brought Germany into her present defiant mood, what has France made of Europe? At the beginning of the war Mr. Asquith promised us 'the substitution of alliances and groupings and a precarious equipoise' by a 'real European partnership based on the recognition of equal rights'; and President Wilson said the same thing a dozen times. What we see to-day is a single Power supreme on the Continent and Germany encircled by that Power and its allies in a stranglehold of a kind never before known to history. It is also no injustice, since it is true, to say that France is primarily responsible for the present rearmament race, for she refused to listen to Germany's proposal for a reasonable armament convention. In face of such a fact, how is it possible that M. Herriot should have said lately, 'It is for the French Republic to call the nations back to reason, understanding, and disarmament'?

Our attachment to France has proved, both politically and morally, a great and harmful entanglement. What our Governments should do is to steer clear of alliances and hazardous engagements of every kind. It is the fashion to look back on our old policy of 'splendid isolation' as a sort of antediluvian anachronism, yet so long as it continued we were never in danger of war. No sooner had the Lansdowne Declaration of April 4, 1904, been concluded than that security disappeared. Although on the British side the honest intention of that Convention was to remove all grounds of friction with France, the statesmen of that country had far other ideas. Owing to their pertinacious efforts, its purpose was perverted so completely that at last we found

ourselves bound by moral if not contractual obligations which in 1914 landed us in the Great War. How, in the years immediately preceding, France and Russia bargained together behind the back of our Foreign Office, the one for Alsace-Lorraine and the other for Constantinople, which it was admitted would only be possible after a war, and how in pursuance of this conspiracy the French Press was bribed by Russian money, M. Poincaré undertaking its distribution, is a discreditable story told in the Siebert collection of diplomatic documents as exchanged between the Governments of those two countries and their representatives in European capitals. Yet at that time the retention of Constantinople in Turkish hands was still a cardinal point of British policy, and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine by France had never been even a subject of discussion.

To put ourselves in the power of statesmen who can resort to shifty transactions of that kind is unspeakably dangerous. No country in the world knows so clearly what it wants as France, or fails so seldom to get it, and that is why attachment to her involves so great a risk—there is no knowing to what it will lead. It has led Russia to ruin once, and it remains to be seen whether the new Franco-Soviet Pact will have a happier issue. Let us be as friendly to France as the claims of other nations to our consideration will possibly allow us, yet remembering always that there is only one European country on which Great Britain can at all times and in all circumstances rely—it is Great Britain. All our foreign relations should proceed from the recognition of that fact.

I would earnestly appeal to our Government to cut all our present foreign liabilities to the utmost, and not to give for the future, to France or Germany or any other Power, guarantees and insurances without ample reciprocal protection. We must close our ears to the perpetual cry for 'Security' by the spokesmen of a country which is panoplied by alliances as none ever was before. France should learn that peace must come before security and justice before peace. Let justice be done, and the international status which will ensue will need no Locarno conventions or pacts of non-aggression, but be its own guarantee.

What the world needs to-day is moral reinvigoration—

we should be all the better for it in our own land. For ever since the war politics with us have become more and more a hard and callous business. A discipline which should be the finest for the cultivation of a judicial temper and the highest type of citizenship has been discredited by cant, cynicism, and cowardice. We see, on the one hand, sympathies (not generally, by any means) simulated in the House of Commons for the purpose of prolonging the war spirit and giving vent to animosities which the speakers would otherwise be ashamed to own; and, on the other hand, vast sums of human misery in all parts of Central and Eastern Europe, due to the wanton violation by the States concerned of solemn treaties concluded with Great Britain and other Powers. I have in mind the great minority populations—prolonged from year to year without evoking so much as a protest. Yet that the heart of our people is sound at the core is unmistakable. When we put together the reflections and impressions to which Hitler's dramatic speech of March 6 has given rise there must be in most of us an uplifting feeling of gratitude that the nation in general has judged the situation so justly and so generously, helped, no doubt, by a Press which in this conjuncture has proved worthy of its best traditions. While the irregularity of what has happened is not ignored, it is not on it, but on the positive proposals which were no doubt intended to excuse it, that attention is universally concentrated in this country.

That is a fact of the utmost importance, and, happily, the Government and Parliament have not been slow to draw the moral and apply it. It is for them and for all of us to make the present crisis the occasion of a new start, a bold adventure, in the quest of the long-deferred peace. In that quest all the late belligerent States are bound by duty and obligation to each other to take part, since all alike are to blame, through action or inaction, for the deplorable condition into which Europe has fallen. In one of his novels of East German life Sudermann tells how a good village pastor on his knees implores the hero, a local squire of character who has done grievous wrong, to repent. 'Repent I will not,' the man replies, 'but I will do better.' After all, doing better is the main thing.

Here has come to Great Britain, as often before in

history, the precious opportunity of asserting a true moral leadership of Europe, by setting an example of unselfishness and, undeterred by the craven fear of doing right, making whatever reasonable renunciations are needed in order to complete reconciliation with the nation which was our enemy, yet now has so strong a wish to be our friend. An example so given could hardly fail to provoke imitation; and whether it had that result or not, it would prove to the world that Old England is not a victim to the common vices of age, avarice and cupidity, and that her aims in seeking peace are pure and sincere, while our conscience as a nation would be clean.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

POSTSCRIPT

The development of events which culminated in the meeting of the League of Nations Council, with a representative of Germany present, and the acceptance of the proposals of the four Locarno Powers, adds urgency to the argument advanced. Some of the proposals are reasonable, some are unwise and irritating because impossible; others which are objectionable have doubtless determined the German attitude to the document. It is true that it is not final. But why anger people unnecessarily? A man annoyed by indiscreet language is not mollified by the assurance that it was not seriously meant! The virtuous affirmation of the excellent principle of 'scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations' comes with bad grace from States all of which have in one way or another violated treaties or pledges since 1919, and in two cases—as in the treatment of minorities—are doing it to-day. Hitler does not repent his failure to ask permission to march German soldiers into the German Rhineland, only to receive from France a repetition of M. Briand's 'I will not allow it'; the indulgent judgment of the world at large will console him.

The proposal that an international force should again occupy German frontier territory is the one that rankles most; while the idea that Italy should be one of the police Powers can only be described as grossly immoral. If, further, France were also to furnish a contingent of troops—

and nothing is said to the contrary—the indignation of the population, whose bitter memories of her past doings in the province are still vivid, might lead to deplorable consequences. Again, if there are to be negotiations for a ‘new statute for the Rhineland area,’ Germany will insist on knowing beforehand what design is in the air. For if France is to be screened behind her impregnable Maginot fortresses, her neighbour will naturally claim the right to decide what defences are needed for the security of the other side of the frontier.

From the British standpoint the most dubious part of the document is that which suggests the existence of a new secret military engagement to France of the kind we have hitherto been led to believe would never be entered into again. It was to this that M. Flandin recently referred when he spoke exultantly of ‘the decisive phase in Franco-British relations since the war,’ and of ‘the successful end of a persevering effort, and the establishment of a conception of complete mutual support under the threat of war.’ The last secret commitments to France cost our Empire a million lives, and the results for Europe in return are wholesale discontent, disquiet, and economic distress, a wilder armament race than ever before, Germany encircled by a ring of hostile neighbours, and France the dictator of the Continent. Parliament should lose no time in insisting that the whole truth about this project shall be made known before a final decision has been taken.

What one specially misses in the proposals, however, is a generous admission of the courage and large-mindedness of Hitler’s less formal but more imaginative programme. The reference to it is scanty—a sort of I’sau’s blessing—and the restraint does not encourage the highest expectations.

W. H. D.

TITHE

By the EDITOR OF ‘CROCKFORD’

THE Report of the Royal Commission appointed on August 27, 1934, ‘to inquire into and report upon the whole question of tithe rentcharge in England and Wales’ was published on February 27, 1936. The members of the Commission cannot be charged with dilatoriness, especially as it appears, from a remark on pp. 65–66, that the text of the Report was so nearly complete by the end of September 1935 that since that date only one sentence in one footnote has been added. It may even be doubted whether a period of little more than a year could be sufficient for an adequate inquiry into a matter so complicated and extensive as ‘the whole question of tithe rentcharge in England and Wales.’

Of the five members of the Commission, one (Lord Cornwallis) died last year, having lived long enough to express ‘complete concurrence with the text of the Report.’ Another (Sir Edward Robert Peacock) differs from his colleagues ‘on one point of substance.’ He thinks that the liability of the tithepayer for the payment of redemption annuities should extend over fifty years, whereas the Report restricts it to forty. The shorter period means, of course, a heavier charge on public funds. A third (Sir Leonard James Coates) has produced a Minority Report which occupies thirty pages—that of the Majority occupying sixty-six.

The conclusions of the Majority Report, which recommends the complete abolition of tithe rentcharge, are summarised as follows on pp. 46–47 :

The tithepayer will pay in half-yearly instalments at the rate of £91 11s. 2d. per annum per £100 tithe rentcharge (par value) for a period of forty years. The titheowner will receive a security¹ which will give him a net income of the highest class equivalent in value to that which

¹ In the form of Government stock bearing interest at 3 per cent.

his property, if valued as we propose, would produce. The State will for forty years contribute an annual sum substantially less than the amount which under existing legislation it pays in respect of the rates on ecclesiastical tithe rentcharge—a payment which under the Tithe Act of 1925 was to continue for a period of eighty-five years, of which over seventy years still remain unexpired. The State will, however, support a certain new expense in the collection of the redemption annuities and in the cost of the Temporary Commission and may have to consider some concession to certain local authorities in respect of the loss of rates. [Section 120.]

Before going further, it may be worth while to explain to those readers who are not familiar with the technicalities of the subject that *tithe rentcharge* is the term commonly used in lieu of *tithe* since the Act of 1836 substituted a payment in money based on the average price of corn for the previous seven years for tithe in kind—*i.e.*, one-tenth of the actual produce of the land.

Also, that tithe rentcharge has always been regarded as a form of property (as, in fact, it is), and not as a tax. It has therefore inherited liability to local rates from the original tithes. This has really been an inequitable anomaly ever since the year 1836, as it has meant that the owner of ecclesiastical tithe rentcharge, alone of all men, has paid rates as well as income tax upon his earned income. For a time this burden could be borne, but as 'social services' of one kind and another caused rates to soar to undreamed-of heights it became intolerable.

An Act passed in 1899 gave him the same measure of relief as had been given three years before to the occupier of agricultural land. Further instalments of justice were meted out in 1920, 1923, and 1929 *pari passu* with the relief given to agricultural land, the net result being that, subject to certain payments by Queen Anne's Bounty, the rates upon ecclesiastical tithe rentcharge are paid by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, the amount paid being a charge upon the Consolidated Fund.

If tithe rentcharge ceases to exist, this payment must determine and local authorities may find themselves in serious financial straits. They may even—*horresco referens*—have to levy a higher rate to meet their obligations, which might mean that the tithepayer would find that he had lost on the swings more than he had made on the roundabouts.

The *Temporary Commission* is the body which will have to

be set up to give effect to the legislation which, it is expected, will be an outcome of the Report.

So far, what could be more promising? The tithepayer is to pay less (£91 11s. 2d. in lieu of the £199 10s. fixed by the Act of 1925), and his liability is to come to an end forty years hence instead of seventy. The State is to pay 'substantially less' and local authorities are not to lose. Now it is fairly obvious that, if in any financial arrangement all the contributors are to pay less, somebody somewhere will have to receive less, and if one of the beneficiaries is not to lose anything the other will have to lose a great deal. And so it is. The most important words in the summary are *valued as we propose*. A transaction in which A. is to be compelled to sell his property (which in many instances is virtually his sole means of livelihood) to B., at the price fixed by B., obviously demands the closest scrutiny to ensure that it stands in any intelligent relation to the idea of justice. The first question which arises, therefore, is: How much is the titheowner going to lose?

The total amount of tithe rentcharge in existence in December 1934 appears to have amounted to approximately £3,100,130 *per annum*, nearly £1,000,000 *per annum* having been redeemed by the payers since 1836. This sum of £3,000,000 odd, which is not in itself, we think, a very formidable charge upon agriculture, is held as follows:

By Queen Anne's Bounty £2,088,032, of which £1,992,288 is the property of parochial incumbents and £95,744 of ecclesiastical corporations, which means, almost entirely, certain cathedrals.

By the Ecclesiastical Commissioners £274,000, which probably represents for the most part property surrendered to them by certain cathedrals during the last century.

The £205,000 paid in Wales is held by the Commissioners who were created for the purpose when the Welsh Church was disestablished. It is worth noting that the anticipation—which was, we believe, general—amongst the Welsh farmers that if the Church were disestablished they would not have to pay any more tithe was incorrect.

The remainder, £532,598, is the property of colleges in Oxford and Cambridge, of hospitals of ancient foundation, of the colleges of Eton and Winchester, of some charities, and of some private persons.

We are not directly concerned here with this last class of tithe—not that we think it unimportant, but because we think that the owners can be trusted to vindicate their rights. It is enough to say that any considerable reduction in its value would affect adversely the most important educational institutions in the country. It would immediately diminish the number and value of the scholarships and fellowships which they can offer.

The Welsh tithe is, we understand, devoted to the provision and maintenance of public wash-houses and other much-needed institutions within the Principality. It can be ignored, as if the owners find their beneficent operations hampered for lack of funds they have, we imagine, the rates at their command.

What really matters most is the tithe—approximately two-thirds of the whole amount—held by Queen Anne's Bounty, most of which belongs to parochial incumbents. How much does this class of owner stand to lose?

The Bounty Office is under no illusion. In a brief memorandum which appeared in the issue of *The Times* for February 29 the Governors pointed out that every benefice would, so far as it depended upon tithe rentcharge, suffer a loss of nearly 18½ per cent. of its income, the net value of every nominal £100 being reduced from its present real value of £94 to £76 12s. 6d. They estimate that the total loss of income by the incumbents for whom they are trustees will amount to £346,000 per annum, representing, on a basis of 3 per cent., a capital expropriation of £11,500,000 in favour of the landowner. This will not be met by a grant of a capital sum of £2,000,000 which, it is suggested, might be made.

The total loss of the Church will not end there. The cathedrals affected will lose £15,287 out of £95,744 income, representing a little more than £500,000 of capital. Add to these that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners as titheowners will lose nearly £50,000 *per annum* of income.

We believe that it will be found impossible to dispute these figures seriously. In justice to the Report, it must be pointed out that titheowners are being offered a better security than they possess at present. This capital will be in the form of Government stock, so that the punctual

payment of their interest will be guaranteed by the State. Unquestionably this will be a gain, and much emphasis is laid upon this point by the Report. That this improved security justifies some reduction in capital and income cannot be denied. But there is room for difference of opinion as to the amount of reduction which can be regarded as equitable, and the conclusion reached will be affected by our estimate of the character of the present security. This is one of the points with regard to which we differ widely from the Report.

What, so far as can be foreseen, will be the effect of these enormous—the adjective is not unfair—losses?

The resources of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners are not unlimited. They are strained already by the demands upon them, and we venture to doubt whether they could be employed to better advantage. Any curtailment of the Commissioners' income will be felt throughout the whole Church, probably most directly where the augmentation of poor benefices is concerned.

Anyone who knows anything about cathedrals knows that, with possibly four or five exceptions, they are starving. Deans and chapters find very great difficulty in keeping the fabrics for which they are responsible in an even tolerable state of repair, and in maintaining the services with the dignity which is fitting, especially the great musical tradition which they have inherited. Yet there has never been a time when so much public interest was taken in these great churches and when their opportunities were so many. If they, or any of them, are crippled financially even for a term of years, that will mean a national loss, the extent of which cannot be measured.

And then, what of the parishes? They are, for the most part, rural ones, and anyone who has any first-hand knowledge of patronage knows that it is very difficult to find anyone to take a country parish if the income is less than £350 per annum and that it becomes more difficult every year.

If an income is stabilised at a figure which renders it permanently incapable of supporting the office to which it is assigned, its security ceases to be a matter of much moment. If the benefices which depend largely upon tithe rentcharge are to have their incomes drastically reduced, comparatively few country parishes will be able to have a resident incumbent

of their own. The Minority Report appears to regard this as *per se* a good thing and an ideal at which the Church ought to aim; and it is only fair to say that one distinguished bishop has expressed himself to the same effect. But we do not think that this opinion is generally entertained by the parishioners, whose views are entitled to some consideration. The Minority Report also envisages a thorough-going reconstruction of the financial system of the Church, by the creation of a pool into which all benefice incomes are paid so that the 'surplus' of the wealthier parishes can be used for the support of the poorer. Of course there is nothing new in this suggestion. The arguments against it are probably more numerous and weighty than its latest sponsor realises. Among them may be mentioned the cost of the central office which would have to be created to receive and pay out the income. This would certainly exceed by a very large figure the £10,000 *per annum* which the Church of England Pensions Board costs the Church. We suspect that behind the proposals of the Minority Report lurks the popular superstition that 'the Church' has plenty of money if its resources were administered more efficiently and distributed more equitably. In any case, the State has no right to force a reorganisation of this kind upon the Church. The argument that the Church will gain largely in prestige and moral influence by handing a considerable portion of its property over to someone else is specious, and much will probably be made of it in some circles—especially those in which the prospective recipients live, move, and have their being. But it really amounts to no more than a suggestion that the present generation of clergy would do well to buy popularity, for the most part with those whose opinion they have *ex hypothesi* least reason to value, by mortgaging the future. If anyone thinks that this course is likely to be permanently beneficial to religion we would respectfully commend to his attention the Gospel for the First Sunday in Lent²—which happened to be the Sunday next after the publication of the Report.

We agree that if a first-class Government security is to be substituted for tithe rentcharge, the titheowner may reasonably be expected to accept a little less than the sum to which he is at present entitled. The question which then

arises is: How much less? The Majority Report says '£91 11s. 2d. in lieu of every £100.' This figure, which is gross and is to be subject to considerable reduction before it reaches the owner's pocket, has been taken because it is the average which the titheowner received during the period 1836-1916. Therefore, in the eyes of the Commission, it represents the real value of his property. In fact it does nothing of the kind.

It shows that the framers of the Act of 1836 made an error in their calculations, or did not forecast the future with complete accuracy, with the result that for eighty years the titheowner received £8 8s. 10d. per cent. less than was intended. We must confess that we do not see why the injustice in which he has acquiesced without complaint should now be adopted as a standard for legislation, or on what principle the error of 1836 is supposed to have ceased to be an error in 1936.

The determining of the period at 1916 is arbitrary. The Report defends it on the ground that the conditions which prevailed after that date were abnormal. So they were; and that weighted the scale in favour of the owners. Ever since 1884 they had been weighted heavily in favour of the payer. If the titheowner is to be expropriated now, we think that the whole period (1836-1936) during which the present system has been in operation should be taken as the basis of calculation. After all, who can predict that abnormal circumstances will never recur?

The Report dwells much upon the difficulties experienced by landowners in consequence of the rise in wages and increase in the general cost of the maintenance of their property. No one can deny that the weight of the burdens which press upon them is heavy. But there is no reference to the fact that the country clergy are also landowners, if upon a smaller scale. They are responsible for all repairs to the houses in which they are compelled to live and for the outbuildings attached to them, and a higher standard of maintenance than what the private owner usually considers adequate is demanded of them. They also have gardens which generally require a gardener, whose wages are a formidable charge on their resources. Beside this, a large number of them own glebe, in respect of which their position

² St. Matt. iv. 1-11.

is identical with that of any other landlord, so that the rise in wages and cost of repairs has affected them *pro rata* as much as anybody else.

We cannot help thinking that the members of the Commission have exaggerated the unpopularity of tithe rentcharge and the difficulties attendant on its collection. It is not unlikely that they have heard more from malcontents than from those who have no axe to grind, and that this has given them a false perspective. It appears that there are special reasons of a legitimate character (as distinct from political or semi-political agitation) for reviewing the position in parts of East Anglia and Kent. But elsewhere we believe that there is very little trouble. We happen to have some personal knowledge of three widely separated dioceses, and in them the experience of the tithe-collectors does not differ from what is common to man when trying to get in money due to him. We suspect that most members of the medical profession have a larger number of bad debts on their books than most titheowners.

If a piece of land is subject to tithe rentcharge the purchaser pays less for it than he would have done otherwise. He is therefore in the same position as a man who has raised part of the purchase-price on mortgage. He has, however, two advantages: his rate of interest is unusually low, and neither the holder nor his executors can foreclose.

The principal source of grievance is, of course, the Act of 1925, by which the value of £100 of tithe rentcharge was stabilised at £109 10s., of which £105 goes to the owner and £4 10s. to a sinking fund for the redemption of the charge. If this Act had not been passed the owners would have received considerably more than £105 for some years and would be receiving considerably less now. The latter possibility was not foreseen at the time. Had it been, we doubt whether the Act would have been demanded. The Act was passed avowedly in the interests of the payer, and was accepted by the owner though he stood to lose considerably by it. The payer now finds that he has overreached himself and is in a very difficult, if not impossible, position. Of course, as we have pointed out elsewhere, to transfer summarily to a basis of gold a payment which has been based on cereals for more than a thousand years is to do what the

Americans call 'ask for trouble.' The Act of 1925 has turned out to be even more shortsighted and foolish than its critics anticipated. It is a good example of what an urban-minded Legislature is likely to make of rural questions. It must be repealed. But as it was not promoted by the owners, we fail to see why the whole of the hardship which it has created should be transferred to them.

Another source of difficulty, which is perfectly genuine, though, again, one for which the owner is in no way responsible, is that a very large amount of the soil of England (according to some estimates as much as 30 per cent.) has changed hands of late years. Many of the present owners bought at exorbitant prices round about the year 1920, and, as they have little capital, are now hard pressed to meet their obligations. Beside the economic aspect of these changes with which the Report deals there is the social one, which it ignores. Many of these *novi homines* bought because they knew that ownership of land enhances social status, but have not yet learned that an advance in social position always brings new moral and financial obligations.

Two paragraphs from the Report call for special comment :

(a) The titheowner is in a position similar to that of a creditor in relation to the owner of land, whether owner-occupier or landlord of an occupying tenant. But the claim of the titheowner is not based upon any direct service which he himself or his predecessor in title has rendered to the land, it is unlike a claim for rent by an agricultural landlord who not only puts the land and buildings at the disposal of the tenant but who also usually does repairs, or a claim of a mortgagee for the interest on principal money lent. [Section 59 (1).]

This is too obvious to be a very cogent argument. Against it must be set the fact that land is of no value without people to cultivate it, and that the services rendered by the titheowner to the men, women and children who live on, by and for the land are direct if invisible. Anyone who has ever had to listen to local objections to the uniting of two parishes has probably been surprised at the importance which a small rural community attaches to the presence of a resident parson. If this feeling is sometimes exaggerated and unreasonable, it deserves at least as much respect as the 'feeling' against the payment of tithe to which the Report refers more than once.

In our opinion it would be difficult to point to any work of any kind to be done in England to-day better worth doing than what can be done by a country clergyman. To cripple or hamper it seriously would, we think, be a piece of folly of such exceptional magnitude that the Government which had perpetrated it would win a secure if unenviable niche in history.

(b) It has thus been no surprise to us to find that a very large majority of our witnesses, both tithepayers and titheowners, were agreed that the existing system of tithe rentcharge is unsatisfactory and that its abolition on fair and equitable terms is highly desirable, though as to the terms of any such abolition very different views were put forward. We concur in this consensus of opinion. [Section 60.]

No fault can be found with this, provided that due regard is paid to the words *fair and equitable*, though a glance at the list of witnesses printed on pp. 68-70 shows that some of them were not impartial. But the words which follow immediately are noteworthy:

An universal feeling, whether well or ill founded, cannot safely be disregarded.³

Neither, we think, can the difference between *an universal feeling* and the opinion of *a very large majority of our witnesses*. At any rate, it is by no means negligible.

The Commissioners' task has been laborious—not least, on account of the difficulty to which they refer more than once in the way of obtaining complete and trustworthy statistical information. There are, for instance, more than 11,000 tithe maps in existence, and many of them are not up to date. The Majority Report has brought together a quantity of useful information and may fairly be regarded as a valuable document. But it has always been our opinion that the appointment of the Commission was due to an access on the part of the Government of the unreasoning and unfounded fear which the adjective *panic* was coined to describe, and we feel bound to say that we think that the Commissioners have shown undue deference *arbitrio popularis auræ* and have not really considered the fundamental principles involved in the question with which they had to deal. Perusal of the Report suggests that in the authors' subconscious, if not conscious, minds the words *and abolish* were included in the Royal

³ This appears to be a quotation, but we do not recognise the source.

Warrant which bade them inquire, as the words *and execute* were included in the Royal Warrant for the trial of the last Abbot of Glastonbury.

Beside the economic and social aspects of the question upon which the Report lays stress there is another which it ignores. The existence of tithe, whether in its original form or as rentcharge, has linked the Church with the land, and thereby rooted it in national life and history, in a way with which there is no parallel elsewhere. It has also emphasised the fact that the possession of land is not an absolute right, but a sacred trust. The owner of the soil on and by which men must needs live is under an obligation to provide for their highest interests as well as for their other needs. These *imponderabilia* are not negligible.

It is true that modern conditions have made tithe rentcharge, for the moment at any rate, a somewhat cumbrous and inconvenient form of property. The break-up of large estates has substituted a very large number of small payments for a small number of large ones. These small amounts should all be redeemed compulsorily without delay. Some other adjustments, of which the most important is the repeal of the Act of 1925, are also necessary. The Commissioners may even be right, though we doubt it, in their view that the existence of this particular form of property is universally and permanently undesirable. But we hope that any Government which attempts the complete extinction of all tithe rentcharge will remember that more than economic considerations are involved. Justice, which is Christian, as distinct from sentiment, which is upon a lower level, makes it impossible to regard the titheowner as a parasite, an abuse or an anachronism. He holds his property by the longest title in the kingdom, and the amount of it cannot be regarded as excessive. He holds it in trust to promote the highest interests of the community, and no one can pretend that he does not use it well. There is no case for expropriation. If he is to be compelled to surrender his trust property, he is entitled to receive the real value of it in exchange, that he may be enabled to continue to discharge his all-important functions. It is not suggested that anyone else will be able to take them up if he is obliged to lay them down.

THE EDITOR OF 'CROCKFORD.'

'BRITISH' WITH A SMALL 'b'

By F. CLARKE

THE purpose of this article is not to discuss British policy in the customary sense of the word, but rather to attempt some estimate of the significance and function of the *Res Britannica* in the world that is now taking shape. The term *Res Britannica* (formed on the analogy of *res publica*) is meant to indicate not so much a unitary political structure as that whole philosophy of life and culture and social order which, with its roots and historical origins in these islands, has now re-rooted itself and grown to maturity in distant lands. That, rather than any political structure of the moment, is the real deposit of four centuries of expansion, enterprise, and settlement; the solid fact of which the historian of modern ages must take account.

It is not suggested, of course, that questions of political structure and action are unimportant. What is suggested is that they derive their importance at any moment from the massive fact of an achieved history to which they are relative.

A glance at the map of the world may be enough to illustrate what is meant. Across the oceans, spread like a broken crescent around the central core of the Old World, are the new lands—the Americas, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand. South and Central America, Spanish or Portuguese in origin, contain the great bulk of these lands which fall within the tropics. The rest, almost entirely in the temperate zones, is in the hands of British subjects or of peoples of predominantly British origin.

For if one fixes attention on what has just been called the massive historical fact, setting aside for the moment questions of political structure and allegiance, then the United States will be seen both to fall within the history and to have their

increasing part to play in the future development of this world-wide drama.

Indeed, there is good reason for believing that any attempt to estimate the future rôle of the *Res Britannica* as above defined which omits them from its calculations is inviting the fate of all those—and they are many—who think to make history inoperative by ignoring it.

Our concern, then, is with the *Res Britannica* in this sense, its significance and value in the world, the justification for asserting and maintaining it, and the methods by which and the spirit in which it is to be thus maintained.

One who, like the writer, returns to live in England after many years of life and work in the Dominions is impressed by many things. He notes, for example, the marked difference of outlook as between the centre and points on the circumference. This is natural enough, and there is no reason, given good sense and good management, to fear that the difference will ever become dangerous.

What is of more immediate importance is another phenomenon, the very striking change of ideas now going on in Britain in regard to British relations with the world. The Abyssinian crisis has emphasised and illuminated this change rather than caused it. Where uneasiness is felt in regard to the stand which Britain has taken in this great matter, the reason for misgiving seems to lie in the implications of the arguments used in justification of that stand. Boomerang-like, they seem to fly over the head of Mussolini and strike back at the British Empire, as many conceive it. They fly back with a sort of *quo warranto* impact directed uncomfortably upon ourselves. Hence there is a disposition to ask, 'If Mussolini is now so wrong, how have we in the past been so right?' To many, the urgency of the purpose for which the League stands, itself a new historic force, is a sufficient justification of the Government's attitude for the moment. But the arguments used in defence of it must have their effect, and the crisis is thus forcing many an Englishman to think out afresh his whole philosophy of Empire.

Among those who support Government in the attitude it has taken up there must be many who have not given a thought to all that it implies in regard to our own position among the first of the *beati possidentes*. There are others,

however, who do seem to have given thought to this aspect of the matter, who accept the implications and are prepared to take up a position where the boomerang will miss them. They, it seems, would develop the argument of Trusteeship as against that of Possession in regard to Empire, would regard Empire territories, if held at all, as held in trust for civilisation, and would make privileges and resources in these lands more freely available for mankind at large. Even so, it does not appear that the full length to which the argument can be carried has been generally realised by those who use it. Fresh accusations of hypocrisy from our many critics may not take long to appear.

On the other side are those who likewise see the implications for Empire of the British attitude in the present crisis but who give the opposite answer. Not willing to change their position in order to dodge the boomerang, and so realising that it will have to hit them, they argue, quite logically, that it should never have been thrown. To them the maintenance of Empire in its present form is the supreme interest. While they do not repudiate Trusteeship, they stress Possession and limit the obligations of Trusteeship by that overriding canon.

This reference to the Abyssinian crisis has been made, not in order to pronounce upon the actual policy which has been followed, but because of the effect of the crisis in illuminating the transitional state of British ideas about the Empire.

Certain it is that many of the younger men, by no means revolutionary in temper, are setting out in their thought of it from postulates quite different from those which their elders take as starting-point. The same cleavage is to be observed in the Dominions, and there, possibly, the newer point of view has revealed itself rather more strongly. One finds among many of the younger men an almost passionate revulsion from what they condemn as 'imperialist adventure,' 'power politics' or what not.

Distance from the centre, where the strains and tensions are felt so much more acutely, may have something to do with this attitude, but it is real none the less. Rarely does it go the length of readiness to see the Empire break up. Its real inspiration is the desire to make the Empire *mean* something different from what it has meant in the past, and this

frequently takes the form of turning towards the League and the principles of the Collective System as the readiest and most congenial method both of maintaining the Empire in this new sense and of bringing its influence to bear on the world at large. This tendency was strongly marked in some of the delegates at the important Conference on Commonwealth Relations which was held at Toronto in September 1933.

It seems clear, then, that we are faced by a cleavage of outlook which may be put roughly, very roughly, as one between those who stress primarily Power, and those who stress Influence—a difference of emphasis as between British Power *in* the world and British Influence *upon* the world.

The difference is clearly one of emphasis only, as few would be found to suggest that, in the world which now is, Influence and Power can be sharply separated. But the emphasis upon the first as distinct from the second is likely to grow, and Washington's aphorism that 'Influence is not Government' may be subjected to some revision in the coming years.

Accepting the fact of this changed emphasis, and leaving aside all discussion of questions of power, we propose now to offer some reflections in regard to the new tendency, its possibilities, the forms and directions in which it may take effect, and the spirit in which it will have to operate if it is to be true to itself. But before leaving finally the aspect of power to deal with that of influence, one remark may be permitted. It is that among the reasons for the change of emphasis may be the change in the power-situation itself. The redistribution of power in the world, with the rise of Japan, the regeneration of Russia, and the vast growth of the United States, taken along with the changed *forms* of power, may have had some effect in diverting British emphasis towards influence. Clearly it is no longer possible to take up an attitude which might have been natural enough in the late nineteenth century.

Whether this be so or not, the change of national temper has, as a matter of fact, coincided with far-reaching changes in the power-situation. What is congenial may be affected to some extent by considerations of what is possible. This may be a very good reason for maintaining that in a world

where power will manifest itself whether we will or no we cannot hope to exercise influence out of relation to it.

With that qualifying reflection we may turn to the consideration of Influence. So far is it from being the fact that Britain has all along been Imperialist in the sense of seeking power first and foremost, that, on the contrary, the history of her relations with 'white' Colonies and Dominions has for nearly a century been one of successive surrenders of power. Lord John Russell, when Canada, in the forties of last century, was pressing hard towards full responsible government, could think only in the traditional terms. He could see only that, legally and constitutionally, the attainment of full responsible government in Canada, whereby the Canadian Executive would act upon the *advice* of its Canadian Ministers, and not upon the *instructions* of His Majesty's Government in London, meant a surrender of power. What he could not see was the compensation in terms of influence on the British side, and the enhanced value of a free and unconstrained loyalty from the Canadian side. It was left to men like Elgin, men of more adventurous spirit and robust faith, and gifted with a truer insight into the real forces which hold men together, to catch the true vision. From that point to the passing of the Statute of Westminster, the history, in spite of many vagaries and diversities, is in strict logical continuity. The inner logic of the British spirit, a logic of influence more than of power, has been working itself out. The process has been more chequered and tempestuous in South Africa than in Canada, but it is essentially the same. The story from the end of the Boer War to the passing by the Union Parliament of its own 'Status' Act in 1934 is one of a continuous passage, on the British side, from power to influence. To-day His Majesty's Government in Great Britain is expressly excluded by law from any authority in South Africa over South African citizens. But its sheer influence has probably never been greater.

Thus a relationship of free co-operation and mutual persuasion—one of influence, in short—takes the place of a relationship determined by one central power of sovereignty. Now the same process is being applied to India, and to the more advanced of the old Crown Colonies, like Ceylon. We may differ about the degree of speed that should characterise

the process, but to resist it altogether in face of the present status of the Dominions would be to claim that two diametrically opposed principles of action can be permanently followed in one and the same Empire. The whole tendency can be regarded as involving the break-up of the Empire only by those who, in the last resort, can see no other Commonwealth but that of the sword.

Such, then, is the situation. The process of exchanging power for influence has already gone far and will go farther. This does not mean, of course, abnegation of power in the Empire as a whole (if any meaning at all can be given to such an idea). It means rather the abandonment of supremacy of sovereign power as the principle of relationship between Great Britain and the other units of the Empire.

It would seem that a stage has now been reached, on the one hand in the development of the Empire itself, on the other hand in the present setting of world forces, where the true significance of the function of Britain can be better understood. Influence works by example, by prestige, by suggestion, rather than by force and command; in a word, by communication of *ideas* in some form or other. Education is a typical form of it. So is the propaganda which we used with such effect in the war. (And there was a time, even in England, when the leaflet of the Communist was more feared than the bombs of the enemy.)

What we have to understand, then, is that, far more than in the past, this will be the typical mode of British action both within the Empire and in the world at large. We have, in short, to take full account of the conditions that have been produced by popular education, by the wide dissemination of news and knowledge, and by facilities of communication which mean that men can now converse freely across the world. Political boundaries and organised political units will not cease to have meaning. But they will not mean quite what they did and their maintenance will depend much more upon what happens in this world of universal communication than could ever have been the case formerly.

Political community is, then, more than ever dependent upon conscious community of ideas and ideals, a fact which the Fascist recognises in using the concentrated force of the State to bring it about. From such a standpoint a freely

associated unity of free communities such as is the British Commonwealth begins to look much more like a Church than like a State. It is held together as a household of faith by free acceptance of common beliefs about the way in which men should live together and pursue their common ends, rather than as a *familia* under the authority of a single *patria potestas*. If this is so, education in some form or other is its very life-blood, a conclusion on which more must be said in a moment.

But this is not all. An Empire of Ideas is won and maintained by the inherent appeal of the ideas themselves. And they appeal by virtue of their universality as did those of Christianity. In themselves they know no political boundary, just as, if they are truly universal, they know no boundaries of race or colour. Is there anything of this universal quality in that body of ideas about community of life, worked out originally within the limits of these islands, to which we have given the name of *Res Britannica*? If so, the possibility of another kind of Empire comes into view, less visible but more widespread than the political one. Just as the English language is tending now towards universality, so may the British spirit.

This is what we mean by the title "British" with a small "b". The proper adjective with the capital letter does not cease to have its due application, but there is now taking shape a common derivative.

What has emerged historically as a system of local usage—British Way of Life—has been revealing, for a century or more, the universality that is potential in it. Sovereignty of the rule of law, the free action of groups and communities in the life of the whole, individual responsibility for the common good, responsible government, these and suchlike things are universal values as well as particular achievements of British history. That they should have been worked out at all to such an extent in Britain may be due quite as much to the fortunate accidents of British history as to any virtues inherent in the British people themselves.

Now it would seem that the time has come to draw clearly the distinction between what is locally purely 'British' in what I may call, without offence, I trust, the tribal sense, and what is 'british,' that is, potentially universal and human.

For world conflicts, whatever motives of material interest may be at work in them, will tend more and more to take the form of conflicts between rival *faiths*, rival bodies of ideas each claiming universality. There is no choice for this country but to stand firm on its own traditions, and there was nothing more significant in the Jubilee celebrations last year than the national act of re-dedication to the old well-tried ways and the old ideals, which was typified by the ceremony in Westminster Hall.

But there is more involved than the preservation of a traditional England. There is also the presentation of an example before the world; nay more, action and influence upon the world in the light of a national faith that is so much more than national. Is it fanciful to suggest that the new access of British support for the League may have behind it the force of a new-found realisation that the principles of the League are 'british' principles, and that we cannot betray the League without being false to ourselves?

Clearly the realisation of this new sense of 'Empire' brings with it responsibilities of a difficult and delicate kind. 'Empire' is indeed precisely the wrong word to use for the *rôle* if by it the older 'imperial' ideas are to be connoted. For there can be no thought of any systematic campaign of British propaganda. That would be as uncongenial as it would be ineffective. The force to be used is no more than the force of example and the influence of inherent appeal in the example itself. In a word, in order to be 'british' in the way of effective example we have but to clarify and consolidate whatever is best in our outlook and character. That means re-exploration and re-interpretation of the common inheritance, using for the purpose *all* the forms of it—those in the Dominions oversea as well as those at home. Then, as never before, we have to make its meaning—its philosophy if you like—explicit to ourselves, so that we may make it explicit to others. Finally, as a people of world-wide responsibilities, we have to study the modes of 'translation' of this faith into the social and cultural idiom of widely differing peoples. This process, now at work in India and Africa, perhaps with too little of explicit formulation of the faith, may well prove to be of enormous importance.

The foundations upon which and from which the whole

task must proceed are obviously to be found within the British Commonwealth itself, since that has been the historic ground for the trying out of the tradition, for testing its universality, and for discovering something of the diversity of form it may assume. For transplantation from Britain often has curious effects, upon institutions and usages as upon plants. The study of these diversities may yield surer knowledge of that which is common to them all.

In this way we can come to a more assured and adequate knowledge of the full human meaning of our common world-wide citizenship. We shall then be better equipped for the task of maintaining it in full vigour amid all its rich diversity among ourselves. For it cannot be too strongly asserted or too firmly realised that, in some form or other, education is now the key to Empire in the wider sense in which the maintenance of Empire will have to be considered in the world that lies ahead. So organised efforts in this direction become a matter of urgent practical importance.

Much has been achieved already in this connexion. The Imperial Education Conference was instituted as far back as 1907. It has met at intervals since, the last occasion being in 1927. Periodically, a Conference of British Empire Universities is held, and the Year-book of the Universities of the Empire, published by the Universities Bureau, is now a bulky volume packed with information of high value. The growing practice among British professional and scientific bodies of holding conferences in the Dominions from time to time instead of in Britain does much to strengthen common faith and interest and to build up common standards. There is also a very great deal of intercourse between official authorities of which the world hears little. As for unofficial forms of intercourse, their variety is wide and their total effect is impressive.

Now steps of an even more concentrated and specific kind are being taken to organise in London a centre where the co-operative study of common problems of education throughout the Empire can be pursued by men and women of experience and promise drawn from over the whole range. If such a centre can be successfully organised, if it can draw to itself, on the one hand, a steady stream of keen and eager senior students from overseas, and, on the other hand, the

co-operation of all the 'home' agencies and institutions which have something of value to contribute, a great temple of the common faith may result, in which the universal philosophy of *Res Britannica* can be formulated so as to become the potent sceptre of the new Empire of Influence. The reach of such an institution must extend, ultimately, beyond the Empire, and from the outset there can be no exclusion of the United States. But the primary foundations are to be laid in systematic co-operation among the units of the Empire as such.

One cannot view the scene, even cursorily, without being almost overwhelmed by the richness of its possibilities. Take, for instance, no more than four cities, selected almost at random from those of the Commonwealth: Winnipeg and Brisbane, Johannesburg and Montreal. What does each one of these typify or symbolise? Winnipeg may be taken as standing for the planting of *Res Britannica* on a continental scale and in a climate vastly different from that of the mother country. In Brisbane we have the sub-tropical form of the problem, a reading of British culture in sub-tropical terms. There are those who hold that the white man is biologically unfitted to live and flourish in lands which have no real winter. Queensland is a resolute 'British' attempt to put that to the test, and in the process things British may undergo a strange but enriching metamorphosis.

Johannesburg, another continental effort, may symbolise the ethnographic and cultural as against the climatic problem. Here black and white, Dutch and British, Jew and Gentile meet in a strange and lively amalgam of the most modern industrialism with various forms of primitivism. Yet it is British too.

And in Montreal we find expressed the clash and fusion of two histories, of two old streams in a new land, of France and Britain, Reformation and Counter-Reformation, coming together in a testing to which, it seems, the universalising quality of British principles has proved adequate.

These are but examples taken from the rich and varied trial-ground where the real meaning of *Res Britannica* has so far been worked out into its diverse possibilities. The ultimate test of universality is, undoubtedly, in capacity to transcend distinctions of colour. We say 'transcend'

advisedly, for the distinctions will remain, subsumed in a larger equality. There is no assurance, as yet, that British principles will achieve this final triumph. Should they ultimately fail, then either we have been mistaken about the true universality of our principles or we ourselves have been false to them. Thus we ought to make up our minds about trusteeship, whether we really mean it as a *principle*, that is, of universal validity and to be applied right through, or whether we mean, in fact, something else. Charges of hypocrisy are inescapable otherwise.

As has been indicated, we shall need the co-operation of many agencies to work at this great task where by analysis, by comparison of the variant forms which the common inheritance has now assumed, and by retesting in practice, we may come to a clearer sense of what the *Res Britannica* actually is and how it may function in the world. Such a task is not altogether congenial to the British temper. We have been so accustomed to dominance and success, have managed so well with improvisation, empiricism and intuition in the past, that a new analytic habit may be as difficult to acquire as a surrender of relative dominance may be difficult to stomach. Conscious effort will, indeed, be necessary, but it need not be insuperably difficult, and there is no fear that the traditional national character will be transformed by it.

In fact, nothing but good can come from a resolute effort to understand what is involved in that central activity of 'translation' of which we have spoken. The habit of an unanalytic but dominant people of transplanting its institutional forms into an alien soil, instead of translating them into an alien idiom, costly as it is to the Empire of Power, may be wholly fatal to the Empire of Influence. We shall have to learn more thoroughly the art of separating the universal metal from the purely local ore, and learn also to recognise our own spiritual image when it comes before us in unfamiliar form. It has been said with some truth that if it is the way of the Frenchman to seize upon the universal and call it French, it is the way of the Englishman to seize upon the English and call it universal.

Granted, now, that we have put what is universal in our inheritance into easily translatable form, and that we have undertaken the sympathetic study of the alien idiom into

which it is to be translated, there still remains the all-important question of the *spirit* in which we are thus to exercise influence. There can be no doubt that modest, unaffected, unaggressive self-possession is the only tolerable attitude. The recently formed British Council for Relations with Other Countries has set an admirable example of the quiet, unobtrusive, well-mannered temper in which things should be done. There is no sacrifice of modesty in bringing before the eyes of the world, not indeed those things of which we claim to be 'proud,' but those things which, we are convinced, have some value for mankind.

And other nations, let us hope, will more and more do the same, and in the same temper. Thus only can the League of Nations take to itself that achieved Society of Nations the lack of which is at the root of its weakness. Every people with a history has worked out some achievements which have universal value: our relations with India, for instance, will grow in cordiality as we recognise such things. At this moment, in various parts of Canada, efforts are being made to translate the Danish Folk High School into the idiom of the prairies. Examples of the same kind of thing can be multiplied indefinitely.

Great Britain, granted for centuries a secure retreat in which she could work out the riches of her native genius, and then granted much of the wide world as a school in which to learn the arts of adaptation, is in a position of peculiar privilege and responsibility towards the task of achieving that Comity of Intercourse which has at length become possible in the world. Some, feeling that there is a loss of virility in the new *rôle*, may fear that John Bull is to disappear in order to give place to Aunt Jane. But John grown mellow is John still, stronger and more beneficent, it may be, in an autumn of mature and unselfish wisdom than in a heyday of physical power.

F. CLARKE.

THE RELIABILITY OF EXAMINATIONS

By C. W. VALENTINE

THE reliability of examinations has become an extremely important question in recent years, because the career of so many thousands of young people is largely determined by an examination result. Consider, first, the entrance examination to the secondary schools at eleven years of age. Of the children in the elementary schools about the age of eleven each year some 10 per cent. are picked for secondary schools. This is a vast experiment in vocational selection. For, though many secondary school pupils enter manual occupations and a substantial number of elementary school pupils enter clerical occupations, it is broadly true that the higher professions are recruited from secondary or public school pupils, and, to a very large extent, so are the clerical and black-coated occupations generally.

Probably the very best of the children, as regards fitness for secondary school education, say the top 1 per cent., are secured by the entrance examination at eleven years; but what about the majority of those selected and those who just fail to pass? In an inquiry which I made a few years ago I tried to estimate the reliability of this examination by tracing the performance of the various pupils throughout their secondary school career. In all, ten different examination centres were studied, including sixty different school classes. The performance of the pupils in the entrance examination was noted and compared with the order of merit after four or five years in the secondary school, as tested both by the school's own examination or form work, and the performance in the school certificate examination.

Little resemblance was discovered between performance in the entrance examination and the order of merit at the end of the school career; indeed, there was practically no such

relation in five centres. I may quote some striking examples of differences between the order of merit in the entrance examination and the order of merit in school four or five years later.¹ One boy was eighty-eighth (almost last) in the admission list, yet proved the most brilliant pupil of the year, matriculating at fifteen with three distinctions. Another boy who was twenty-fourth out of twenty-five in the entrance list for one school, thus only escaping rejection by a hair's breadth, was the only one four years later to gain first-class honours in the school certificate examination. The most striking case of all was that of a girl who was really below admission line but who impressed the senior mistress on interview and was allowed to come into the school. At the age of sixteen that girl gained the school certificate with six distinctions and proved one of the ablest girls the school had ever had! The mere examination would have rejected her as unsuitable for secondary education.

The correlations in five examination centres between entrance order and order after four or five years was only 0.1. (It should be explained that complete resemblance between the two orders would give a correlation of 1.0. Mere chance would give, on the average, a correlation of 0.0.) For the other centres it rose only to about 0.3 or 0.4. Subsequent inquiries by independent observers show very similar results in another half-dozen examination centres. Such correlations mean that, even with the best examinations, pupils who barely escape refusal may prove to be among the best in the secondary school, while pupils who gain a high place in the entrance examination, thus winning scholarships, may prove very low in the order of merit at the end of their secondary school career.

In the nature of the case, selection among a very large number of boys and girls on the border line of 'pass' or 'fail' in the entrance examination, and with almost the same mark, must be unreliable. In one examination, for example, 130 boys were within 1 per cent. of the admission mark. Of these 65 had to be accepted and 65 rejected. If a similar examination had been given the following day, or even if the same papers had been marked again by different examiners,

¹ Full particulars are given in Part II. of *The Reliability of Examinations*, by C. W. Valentine in collaboration with W. G. Emmett (London University Press, 1932).

these two groups might very well have been largely reversed, and almost certainly would not have been the same.

The fact is that so many children were of about equivalent merit round this point that no examination, however perfect, could separate them fairly into those worthy and those unworthy of secondary education.

In view of this extreme unreliability of the examination at the lower end, it is thus practically certain that a considerable number of pupils are being excluded from the secondary schools who are better fitted for secondary school work than some of those now admitted. The admission to secondary schools of unsuitable pupils is probably still more frequent, the evidence being not merely (i.) failures in the school certificate examination (over one-quarter of the candidates), but (ii.) the failure of about one-third of the secondary school pupils to reach even the class which takes the examination, and (iii.) the leaving of the secondary school by large numbers with bad reports by the head.²

What are the causes of this unreliability of these entrance examinations? It is not the lack of care and skill in the conducting of the examinations. Nor is it only the special evening coaching of some pupils or the better preparation for the examination given at some elementary schools, though those are sometimes factors. That these are not the sole causes, however, is shown by the fact that the use of intelligence tests, though it somewhat improves the entrance examinations, does not prevent pupils doing well in the entrance tests and yet badly in the secondary schools, or pupils who just scrape in from doing well.

A clue is gained to a further important cause by following the careers of the pupils after entrance into the secondary schools. Analysis shows that the big changes in the orders of merit in secondary schools occur *during the first year*, after which the orders remain remarkably steady. In other words, pupils usually reveal in one year after entrance whether they are going to do the work of a secondary school satisfactorily or not. It would seem to be impossible to test adequately pupils of eleven years by English and arithmetic only, or by general intelligence tests, for the wider secondary school curriculum, for which certain *specific* abilities are important,

² See *The Reliability of Examinations*, chap. iii.

especially those involved in languages, mathematics and science. Some day it may be possible to apply prognostic tests of these specific abilities. Experiments of this kind are already being made, but it is uncertain how early such specific abilities ripen. In view of the errors that seem at present inevitable in the selection of pupils at eleven years of age two suggestions may be made:

(i.) Transference should be possible from the secondary school after one year (or perhaps two) to a central, junior technical, or commercial school, and *vice versa*. Already in some centres the transference after one year from the central school to the secondary has been found satisfactory, though the central schools are said to demur at receiving the failures of the secondary school. Transference back to the senior school may also be considered, but here a stigma of apparent dismissal must be still more carefully guarded against in the case of children who have worked well.

(ii.) A better solution of the difficulties without this possible objection would be greater elasticity in the secondary school curriculum to suit the needs of those who have been wrongly selected at the age of eleven, though this elasticity would be difficult in the smaller schools.

The Association of Education Committees, in its memorandum to the Consultative Committee now considering post-primary education, recommended the selection of pupils at about eleven years for (a) secondary, (b) junior technical, (c) commercial, (d) art, and (e) central schools, with an 'easy system of interchange' at a later stage if found desirable.³ The chief objection to this scheme is the great difficulty in such detailed differentiation between pupils at this early age. General intelligence can be estimated with much greater reliability at this early age than can specific abilities or permanent interests.

University Scholarship Awards

Another example of large-scale vocational selection is that by means of scholarship awards to the universities. About one-third of the students at British universities would probably not be there if they had not won a scholarship.⁴

³ See *Education* for November 23, 1934.

⁴ Ernest Barker, *Universities in Great Britain*, p. 54.

Thus the future professional careers of many depend upon scholarships.

To discover the reliability of scholarship awards I followed up the careers of over 2000 students in five provincial universities (854 being scholars). I took, as the criterion justifying the award of a scholarship, the gaining of at least second-class honours. (In the universities a third class in honours is not regarded as a very creditable performance. It is not a guarantee of greater general ability than a 'pass' degree.) I found that nearly two-fifths of the scholarship holders failed by this criterion to justify their awards. Of non-scholars one-third gained first or second class honours, thus beating about two-fifths of the scholars.

These results suggest that near the border-line the reliability of awards is extremely low. If, however, we consider only scholarships awarded directly by the universities themselves, and not by other bodies, the reliability is greater, the proportion who fail to justify the award being one-fifth, though this group is still beaten by one-third of the non-scholars.⁵

There is no doubt that internal awards to university scholarships are much more reliable than these external scholarships. The student shows his calibre much better after a year—in the university as in the secondary school. There are difficulties in the way of deferring awards to the end of one year; nevertheless, one provincial university has practically abandoned the award of external scholarships and devoted the funds to internal scholarships. At least the renewal of scholarships should be conditional on success in the first year to a greater degree than at present.

If we consider only the award of the *State scholarships*, for which a very high standard is demanded, we find a distinctly smaller percentage of failures. Of 456 State scholars at modern universities for the years 1920–26 only one-tenth failed to obtain at least second-class honours; yet these were beaten by one-third of those who had no scholarship at all, and this was before the number of State scholarships was increased. I may mention, incidentally, that the men

⁵ Fuller details of these and of the Oxford and Cambridge scholarship awards discussed later are given in *The Reliability of Examinations*, Part III.

State scholars gained 'firsts' much more frequently than did the women—52 per cent. against 28 per cent.

At Oxford and Cambridge, where we followed up the academic careers of 4000 students, again only about one-tenth of the open scholars and exhibitioners fail to justify the awards by gaining at least second-class honours. On the other hand, about one-fifth of the awards were misplaced in that they might have gone to commoners who got 'firsts,' instead of to scholars who got only 'seconds,' or worse. In addition, at Oxford the distinction between scholars and exhibitioners is insecure, exhibitioners doing almost as well in the final honours schools. At Cambridge internal scholarships awarded on the basis of Part I. of the Tripos were decidedly more reliable than entrance scholarships.

While we are dealing with university examinations we may refer to a more recent inquiry as to the reliability of estimating students of university standing, of which an account is given in a booklet *An Examination of Examinations*.⁶ The most striking part of that report describes an attempt to estimate the reliability of the kind of interviews given for Civil Service appointments. There were two boards of interviewers, including such well-known persons as Professor Ernest Barker and Dr. W. W. Vaughan, formerly Headmaster of Rugby. A prize of £100 was offered for the student selected so that a genuine effort to please might be assumed. Sixteen candidates appeared before both of the boards, the interviews being not less than a quarter of an hour and not more than half an hour. The boards of examiners discussed their individual impressions and finally agreed on some general mark. The most remarkable result of the experiment was that the candidate who was placed first out of sixteen by one board was placed thirteenth by the second board, while the one put first by the second board was only eleventh with the first board. Of course, there have already been published experiments revealing the extreme unreliability of impressions gained in interviews, but this is perhaps the most striking piece of evidence of its kind gained in this country.

⁶ *An Examination of Examinations*, by Sir Philip Hartog and Dr. E. C. Rhodes (Macmillan, 1935), gives an account of experiments set on foot in England by the International Examinations Inquiry. As I was not a member of the English Committee when these inquiries were made, and as I have recently resigned, both commendation and criticism may be allowed me.

Another section of this report deals with the marking of university honours scripts in History. These were marked by distinguished history scholars and tutors from various universities. Papers were marked by the α , β , γ system, α indicating a first, β a second, and γ a third. The results reveal considerable difference of opinion as to the award of a particular letter to the same script; but an unfortunate omission was the absence of an explicit instruction to the examiners as to what particular sign should indicate the *border-line* of a 'first' or a 'second' or 'third.' Apart from this omission, however, we must bear in mind some most important factors which affect the award of honours. For in the final award not merely one but usually eight or more papers are involved, which greatly decreases the effects of unstable individual judgments on separate papers. Also, in all examinations for university honours degrees with which I am familiar, each honours script must be marked by at least two examiners, differences of opinion are discussed, and often the scripts re-read. Again, the work of a candidate over a period of two or three years is known intimately by the internal examiners, especially in the provincial universities; and in border-line cases the work of the year can be taken into account and a *vivâ voce* examination given in reference to this particular part of the work with a view to discovering *knowledge*, be it noted, not to judging *personality*, which, as the experiment just described has shown, is so difficult to do.

The Reliability of School Certificate Awards

The school certificate examination is again, in a sense, a means of vocational selection. Many business men require the school certificate for admission to their offices. The great banks, insurance companies, and many big business firms require usually 'matriculation,' and others demand at least a school certificate. It is also the minimum necessary for admission to the two-year training colleges. Hence the examination is a critical one for very large numbers of young people. Now the factors which are involved in the validity of an examination are several, namely: the extent to which the questions fairly cover the whole ground prescribed, the varying standards of different examiners, the equality of the teaching in the various schools, and the particular 'form' in

which the candidate finds himself on the day of the examination—a factor which may obviously affect particularly girls at certain times. Let us consider these factors. First, as regards the questions: the great examining boards have now had considerable experience. In some, at least, meticulous care is taken in the selection of individual questions and the balance of the paper as a whole. As regards the individual candidate, however, unless he is well prepared in all parts of the subject, there must be a considerable element of luck.

As regards the marking of papers, the technique has been remarkably developed. For example, in the Joint Matriculation Board all examiners mark a certain number of scripts and then meet the chief examiner to discuss the answers to the questions, then all mark the same set of scripts, and again the detailed marks given by individual examiners are revealed and reasons fully discussed.⁷ Of course, not all scripts can be revised; and there can be great individual variations when there is not this preliminary training of examiners, as is shown in the report just referred to.⁸ Unfortunately, in the Press the records of this report have been interpreted as representing the reliability of the final award of the school certificate even by the most experienced examining bodies; whereas we have to bear in mind that the award of a school certificate depends, not, of course, upon one paper or one subject, but upon performance usually in seven subjects, and on the total reached in all subjects together. Border-line cases can be dealt with in two ways: (a) Under some of the examination boards, if the pupil is just below a border-line, the school's own order of merit is consulted, and if the pupil has apparently failed to do himself justice in the examination compared with his fellows he can be passed. (b) In addition, compensation may be allowed for a weak subject when the general performance is adequate.

Broadly speaking, the schools who know the pupils well, are not gravely disturbed by the results of the great majority of their pupils. Thus, in a school certificate examination in 1935, the results of 2697 candidates were compared with the

⁷ See *Secondary School Examination Statistics*, by J. M. Crofts and Caradoc Jones. The procedure is described in more detail in a pamphlet entitled *School Certificate Examinations: Standardization* (recently published by the Joint Matriculation Board, Manchester, 1936).

⁸ *An Examination of Examinations*.

expectations of the schools as to their candidates' chances of success. The results were as follows, leaving out a few marked doubtful :

(1) Expected by the school to gain a certificate and did so	Per cent. 77.42
(2) Expected by the school to fail and did so	15.02
(3) Expected by the school to gain a certificate but failed	5.63
(4) Expected by the school to fail but passed	1.92

It is thus seen that expectations were fulfilled in the case of 92.44 per cent. of the candidates.*

The greatest dissatisfaction with school certificate results arises in connexion with a relatively small number of hard cases, some of which, however, are, indeed, exceedingly hard. These are usually due to the working of the 'group system.' For the award of any of the various school certificates a pupil must pass in one subject at least of each of the first three groups (English subjects, foreign languages, and mathematics or science). Thus it sometimes happens that a pupil fails to get the certificate because he just fails to qualify in, say, one foreign language or one science or mathematics—although he does extremely well in the examination as a whole. This only applies to a very small percentage of students. For example, in the Joint Matriculation Board only about 3 per cent. of the candidates fail merely through failing to qualify in one of these groups. Nevertheless, sometimes these border-line cases are very striking. One sometimes hears of pupils with three or four distinctions failing to get a certificate. For example, the second boy in a class of twenty (judged by total marks gained in the examination) with 1307 marks (only 21 marks below the top boy) gained no certificate, though the bottom boy with only 877 marks, and all the intervening boys Nos. 3 to 19, did gain the school certificate! Such anomalies might be met partly by allowing a pass in Group IV. (the practical and artistic subjects) to compensate for failure in Group II. or Group III., as the headmistresses have proposed. The opposition to this of the headmasters and others might be lessened if matriculation ceased to be obtainable by any of the

* Quoted from the pamphlet *School Certificate Examinations: Standardization.*

school certificate examinations, as will shortly be the case with that of the Joint Northern Universities.

In the meantime, another solution seems to me possible—namely, that while the varied group subjects should still be prescribed, there should be a very steep sliding-scale of compensations applicable so that a student who was very good, say, in scientific and in English subjects, but showed special disabilities for foreign languages, need not feel that he must concentrate his attention on his weakest subjects in order to reach a certain mark. The inclusion of a foreign language as a compulsory subject would still have some stimulating effect on his work, if that is thought to be necessary. For another candidate the weak subject compensated might be that in Group III.—science or mathematics.

In such a scheme the group system would be retained so far as it applied to compulsory *studies*, but would be partially relaxed so far as compulsory *attainment* was concerned. The main criticism I have heard to this suggestion is that the certificate would suggest a knowledge of one type of subject which the candidate did not possess. This could easily be met by stating on the certificate, opposite the subject compensated, 'Weak—but allowed by compensation.'

The two main facts to keep in mind are these: (1) The evidence suggests that probably one-third of the children in the newer types of secondary schools are not best fitted by the existing regulations for the school certificate examination, which hits unduly boys and girls who are weak in certain specific abilities, though they have greater practical or artistic abilities to compensate for such weakness. Even passing the school certificate examination, with agreement by both examining body and school report, by no means necessarily implies that the course has been the ideal one. (2) The gaining or failing to gain a certificate divides the pupils too harshly into sheep and goats, and severely penalises those who may just fail to gain the certificate and may be in many respects better pupils than those who just obtain it. Some relaxation of the group system would partially remove this evil. The removal of the matriculation qualification from the school certificate will itself have considerable influence, but it is possible that, even together, these would not be found to be satisfactory, and we may have to consider more drastic changes.

I do not believe the country is nearly ready for the award of certificates by the schools themselves, nor do I think the schools themselves would welcome it. As one very wise and successful headmistress said to me recently, it would be throwing an unfair burden of responsibility upon the schools, except for the small minority, perhaps, who would not be sufficiently conscientious over the matter, or who would comfortably think all their geese to be swans. Nevertheless, the giving of greater weight to the testimony of recognised schools is surely desirable, and some features of the former German school-leaving examination are worth careful consideration.¹⁰

Another less drastic but fundamental change would be that suggested some years ago by Dr. Edwards, Chief Inspector for Wales, and recently approved by the Association of Assistant Mistresses—namely, that a school certificate should be given to *all* pupils who passed through the regular secondary school curriculum and classes over a period of, say, four or five years. On the certificate should be stated, first, the report of the school on each subject—whether good, weak, satisfactory, and so forth; then in a parallel column should appear the result in each subject in the public school certificate examination selected by the school. In this way fewer pupils would fail to gain *some* certificate. Business men might say that it was not a sufficiently good guarantee for them, and that the schools' reports would vary in value. On the other hand, local employers would surely soon discover if a local school constantly reported its pupils to be good when they did poorly in the public examination, and *vice versa*. Further, the present crude use of the possession of the school certificate, useful as it obviously is to employers who have many applicants for one vacancy, is most undesirable, especially in view of the unreliability of the award in the marginal cases, and of its pernicious influence in making a certain examination success so important.

There are difficulties in Dr. Edward's scheme with which we cannot now deal. The scheme is mentioned only as one

¹⁰ See the articles by Sir Michael Sadler and Mr. A. E. Twentyman, dealing with the Prussian *Abiturientenexamen* before the Nazi revolution, in *Essays on Examinations* (Macmillan, 1936).

for further discussion.¹¹ In considering it and other alternatives, however, we must not merely have in mind the *general* reliability of school certificate awards, and the relative smallness of the percentage of errors. Our last thought must recall the narrowing influence that the uncertainties, and yet the supreme importance, of an examination may have on the teaching and on the pupils' own work. To lessen in any way the severity of a sudden penalty at a given and sometimes unreliable margin would greatly ease the situation, and help us to put examinations in their rightful but subordinat place in the educational system.

C. W. VALENTINE.

¹¹ Somewhat similar proposals were vigorously advocated by Dr. Clouesley Brereton in an article 'Can the School Certificate be Reformed?' in the *Journal of Education*, May 1933.

WAR, FOOD, AND EVOLUTION

By J. R. DE LA H. MARETT

CAN anthropology, the science of Man, help us to understand, and so to control, the causes of war? In a recent book, written with a wholly different purpose, reasons were offered that seemed to furnish an affirmative reply to this question.¹ In the present article, then, an attempt will be made to summarise the argument as there presented and to show its bearing upon this most pressing of all world problems. The inquiry in question started with the very ambitious design of attempting to marshal such evidence as might throw light on the question how far mineral deficiencies in the diet, such as cause diseases like rickets and goitre, could have influenced the evolution of animals and man. This led to the building up of a composite and interlaced body of theory, most of which requires to be further tested by direct experiment; for the data actually used had been mostly obtained from the study of animal nutrition and related topics of physiology considered in quite another connexion. Nevertheless, in view of the urgency of the problem at issue, and considering the clear-cut nature of the provisional conclusion reached, the matter may perhaps be deemed worthy of popular exposition, even at the present stage of the investigation.

The so-called 'mineral hypothesis' of animal and human evolution rests on the quite justifiable assumption that the environment of a life on land has been subject to constant change, owing primarily to fluctuations in the amount of heat released by the sun, and possibly by the earth as well. This would appear to affect the nutrition of vegetable-feeding animals in a regular and calculable manner. Thus, it is

¹ J. R. de la H. Marett, *Race, Sex and Environment. A Study of Mineral Deficiency in Human Evolution* (Hutchinson, 1935).

suggested that not only the physiology in general, but the very pattern of the heredity governing both form and behaviour, has been so moulded as to favour the recurrence of certain modes of adaptation that had already proved their worth as a means of counteracting the disadvantageous effects of similar environmental changes encountered in the past. To be more precise, heat is presumed to have accelerated atmospheric circulation. There would thus result a heavier rainfall in all areas except within the rings of desert bordering the belt of equatorial rainfall; and, again, in the Tundra margin of the polar ice-cap, the size of which, paradoxically enough, would seem to have increased as a result of heat and precipitation.

The next step in the argument is concerned with the relations of the land animal to the soil and its vegetable resources. Heavy rainfall washes out lime and other relatively soluble plant-foods from the soil. Aridity, on the other hand, conserves these substances, keeping them close to the surface, so that they tend to rise upwards in the water that is drawn from the subsoil to replace the amount lost by evaporation. Thus the principal plant-foods will be more plentiful when it is cold and dry; though some others will no doubt have been more abundant during the hot humid epochs of the world's history. This view receives further confirmation when we consider the workings of the ductless glands, especially those of that master endocrine, the anterior pituitary, the activity of which seems to stimulate a corresponding energy on the part of the remainder. If we combine the later teaching of physiology with these deductions concerning the effects of climatic change on the composition of the food, we reach good grounds for the view that an active anterior pituitary will afford an adequate response to most of the conditions that usually go with cold; and, *vice versa*, that a lowering of its activity will adapt the body to heat and to most, if not to all, of its accompaniments. By way of illustration it may be pointed out that arid conditions not only provide an abundance of lime, but assist the retention of that still more valuable substance, phosphorus. But lime and phosphorus, together with the proteins, which are products of nitrogen and are also abundant in such situations, may be regarded as the body's main structural

substances. Briefly, then, arid conditions supply all the raw material needed for the vigorous growth of a large body. Great size assists the economy of heat and moisture, since the ratio of outer surface to bulk becomes reduced; and this increase in size is secured through an activity of the anterior pituitary. This last fact is well established in view of pathological conditions of acromegaly and gigantism which follow from tumours of this gland. But, besides assisting the mere economising of heat, its production is also furthered by the same means. The mere feeding of an excess of protein food to an animal spurs on the physiological activity; and the secretion of the anterior lobe is known to cause a further breakdown of nitrogenous substances accompanied by a further release of heat. Another significant effect that may be interpreted as an adaptation to periods of cold and aridity is the influence of the anterior lobe in stimulating the thyroid gland. For the latter stores iodine, and yields another heat-releasing hormone containing that element. Meanwhile iodine, as it is now known, is most rare in situations where lime or other substances have destroyed the acidity of the soil. Not only is goitre, an effect of iodine deficiency, common in limestone mountains, but I have found its incidence to be strongly correlated with a lack of rainfall—a fact that was to be expected in view of the influence of aridity in causing a surface deposition of lime salts.

Now it has been assumed that the endocrine system, which is known to control behaviour as well as growth, has been built up in response to constant changes of the environment. It would follow, therefore, that a fuller understanding of organic evolution, more especially in so far as it depends on nutrition, should throw a light upon the biological reasons why the various instincts of our species have been developed. Moreover, since it seems most probable that the races of mankind are ultimately subject to primal instincts still at work beneath the very foundations of all rationalism, there is good hope of bringing the leading aspects of human culture—including that age-long institution, war—within the frame of an evolutionary hypothesis largely concerned with questions of diet. So far we have only proceeded up to the point at which cold is held to cause aridity, while the latter in

its turn brings about an abundance of biologically structural substances, of which the full utilisation depends upon an activity of the anterior lobe of the pituitary. What, then, of the pattern of behaviour that such external conditions are likely to demand? For, if we can reconstruct the psychological requirements of such a situation, we may expect to find these associated with a type of physiology strictly answering thereto.

At this point the argument thus turns upon that curious paradox of evolution, the survival value of the aggressive instinct. For, among land animals, most species are herbivorous, even if the first land forms may have emerged from the water as carnivores. Thus fighting does not seem to be in the first instance a device whereby one group preys upon another. Rather is it a method whereby males of the same group decide which of them is to father the most offspring. The closest analogy in human affairs is that of such warlike tribes as likewise kill their own males in raids in the course of capturing another clan's women for wives. For, although this tendency to internecine strife might weaken a group subjected to great pressure from without, it seems probable that normally this danger will not be great, and will tend to be offset by the advantage that constant bickering within the tribal association develops a military skill that can usefully be employed against the rest of the world. What, then, is the main value of sexual combat? Surely it will always serve as a eugenical instrument whereby a group can determine its own heredity, so that only the biggest and strongest members are suffered to survive. But size may be of the utmost physiological advantage in situations where the body must withstand cold. Cold, on the other hand, is predominantly associated with aridity, which furnishes food of a quality well able to provide material for the manufacture of natural armaments such as teeth and horns, and likewise offers the wherewithal to back them by an abundance of muscle.

Of course, it was Darwin who pointed out how the fiercest competition is that between those who are most closely related. Now the considerations just adduced suggest a much-needed explanation for this fact. Rivalry within an interbreeding group no longer figures as a patho-

logical extension of a warfare only useful when waged between members of rival societies. Rather is it a carefully arranged competition whereby Nature succeeds in picking out a few champions—the herd sires. These must thereupon, by virtue of their heredity, not only fight against human foes, but likewise protect the species against that more insidious enemy, the change of climate responsible for causing cold and a consequent disorganisation of the food balance. This method of survival could not only have come into play at moments when the world in general was going through a cold phase, but, by continuing at the Tundra borders of the northern ice-sheet, it could have perfected species capable of flourishing in a habitat impossible to smaller and weaker forms.

But combat is only one way in which man and other species could have become modified in response to alterations in their surroundings. It seems legitimate to regard it as an outcome, if not exactly an intrinsic part, of a larger process of sexual selection; and the latter, as it is hoped to show, stands as the biological alternative to another more drastic, if in a way more certain, method—namely, incest. Perhaps the rôle of sexual selection can be best understood if its genetical similarities to incest or inbreeding are pointed out. First of all, then, the automatic effect of an adverse environmental change will be considered, it being assumed that the result would be a reduction of fertility, such as is known to follow from mineral deficiency, and that this would offer incest as the only available means of finding a mate.

Now of course it is true that no certain knowledge exists as to how new species arise. Nevertheless, breeders of domesticated animals have long been aware, first, that inbreeding produces a large proportion of degenerate offspring, and, secondly, that a sound inbred bull or ram is more likely to pass on its own good qualities than one of similar appearance but of more mixed ancestry. Moreover, the reasons for this are sufficiently understood. Inbreeding is known to increase the chances whereby one Mendelian character may meet and combine with another part of itself. New characters arise by what is known as mutation, which can be produced artificially by the bombardment of cells by short-wave radiation—a process almost certainly occurring in Nature

as the result of cosmic rays. New mutations, however, seldom reveal themselves except when inbreeding has taken place; for they are almost always Mendelian recessives. That is to say, they cannot assert themselves if inherited in company with an older and better-established unit character, but only when 'doubled up' with part of themselves—*i.e.*, with a factor similarly derived from the initial mutant. It is in the matter of selection, rather than in that of the inbreeding employed, that the methods of Nature and those of the breeders of pedigree livestock are apt to differ. The latter has usually decided upon the surroundings in which his stock will be grown. All he wants is distinctiveness and uniformity of type; and he gets this result by doubling the good and bad characters by inbreeding, and then chooses a few 'pure-bred' animals that exemplify and exaggerate all the previous features that have already won his admiration as characterising the ideal possibilities of the breed in question. Thus he follows Nature, but helps to further her ends.

Curiously enough, this scheme of inbreeding, as used by the livestock breeder, corresponds closely with the employment of sexual selection when Nature similarly perfects a newly arising type. Under Nature, however, the novelty itself would seem to be chosen from among the apparent degenerates, the types that would suffer ruthless culling by the farmer. For these last, for the very reason that they will be less suitable for survival under unchanging conditions, stand, nevertheless, a better chance if these conditions should change. In particular are they more likely to prove superior should a change of climate reduce the proportion of any structural substance contained in the food. Most mutations tend to impair growth and vigour rather than to encourage it. Thus, disastrous though this might be in the case of a numerous and vigorously competing species, it is arguable that an apparently degenerate specimen might nevertheless prove less liable to extinction through the error of demanding more of some rare substance than the chemical nature of its food could supply. Thus there is reason to think that land animals might derive benefit from the existence of recessive mutations of a sort liable, when doubled by inbreeding, to reduce the activity of the anterior pituitary, and through it that of the remainder of the growth process.

But it is time to get back to the question of sexual selection. If this depends upon an admiration of like for like, a tendency which in some cases can be proved, it will follow that, just as inbreeding served impartially to double up dominant or recessive factors, so sexual selection will intensify the display of any character that can make itself externally noticeable. But there is this important proviso: the character to be recognised in one sex by the other must imply not only an anatomical expression of itself such as can attract the eye or other sense organ, but it must likewise be capable of acting on the nervous system—in other words, of affecting the mind—so that the character in question is duly admired, and sexual congress is brought about as a consequence. This theory, incidentally, suggests how the psychology of the unconscious—already so closely identified with an interest in sex—must sooner or later find its roots in genetics. Moreover, from the standpoint of philosophy, it hints at a purposiveness in the gene, or unit character, of a significance no less striking than that of its purely physical potentialities. For whatever the ultimate nature of these helmsmen of life may be, ideal considerations of fitness would appear to have played as big a part as material conditions during their slow shaping by mutation and natural selection.

As far as humanity is concerned, then, it seems probable that inbreeding was responsible at the outset for the stupendous change from ape to man; whereas the subsequent differentiation of the human race into yellow, black, and white, with hair varying from the short tight 'peppercorn' curls of the Kalahari bushman to the long, straight 'pigtail' locks of the other yellow and so-called Mongoloid branch, has been due to sexual selection. Space will not permit more than the briefest recapitulation of the argument. Suffice it to say that the white skin, arising initially through an arrested development encouraged by iodine deficiency, and hastened by inbreeding at the dawn of humanity, is deemed to have won admiration, and so continued survival, owing to its capacity for permitting the synthesis of vitamin D; and that despite the shading from ultra-violet rays caused by the clouds of the Atlantic region. The yellow and black skins, on the other hand, are held to have been superior each in its own environment, the desert and the forest. Assuming the skin of the

human embryo to retain some of the capacity for colour change observed in fish and amphibia, we can argue that an intensification through sexual preference of the negroid skin would not only confer protective colouration in forests—a minor point in the case of man—but would also encourage an hereditary activity of two endocrines, the posterior pituitary and the adrenal cortex; of which the former seems able to encourage the storage of sodium in the skin, while the latter prevents its escape through the kidney. The adrenal cortex, incidentally, causes a masculinisation of the body and its behaviour. It can be contended, therefore, that a lack of sodium, such as is characteristic of the food grown in the tropics, has directed the selection of this type of physiology. The process, however, has been accelerated, first, by a sexual admiration of a black skin, and, secondly, by warfare. For, since too much activity of the adrenal cortex has been known to cause a pathological masculinity to overtake women, and likewise to produce an 'infant Hercules' form in children, and, again, since a main function of the internal part of the adrenal glands is to cause men to 'see red,' as well as to protect the body from loss of blood when wounded, it thus seems fairly certain that the mechanism of masculinisation has been evolved largely in response to the demands of war.

Almost the exact opposite seems to hold good of the yellow skin. A desert environment in which salt abounds might be expected to encourage a type of physiology that was better able to retain water, but was less active in its retention of the over-abundant salt. These advantages are assumed to have been provided by a weakness of the adrenal cortex, which causes the kidney to retain sodium. A second cause would be a corresponding lack of activity on the part of the posterior pituitary—the gland supposed to have encouraged a tissue storage of sodium in the negro, while it is certainly responsible for a constriction of the capillaries that must reduce the volume of the circulatory system and impair its value as a fluid reserve. Moreover, the part of the theory relating to sex also seems to fit in. If the negroid physiology and the warlike behaviour that goes with it be classed as ultra-masculine, that of the yellow-skinned artistic bushman should be ultra-feminine. Moreover, the sexual selection in the latter case might be expected to focus itself upon a dis-

tinctly feminine feature. Now this supposition would seem to agree with the facts. The capillary dilation useful in providing a reserve of fluid is intensified in the buttocks, which project more in the females than in the males, and undoubtedly act as a means of sexual attraction. It seems thus legitimate to conclude that both the anatomical character itself, and the instinct to admire it, have alike been intensified by sexual selection, all but the more extreme individuals having succumbed to the common terror of the desert—namely, death from thirst. The further point, however, to note is that such a system of sexual selection operating through the admiration of a feminine character must preclude any further elaboration or intensification through combat. Unless racial feminisation involved a repression of the aggressive instincts, the system would not work.

So much, then, for the negro and the bushman. Let us now take stock of the straight-haired Mongoloid race common to Asia and America. Here a secondary feature of aridity, iodine shortage, rather than drought itself, seems to have been the main selective agency. The long coarse hair of the head is considered to be in man the advertisement for sexual purposes of a type of mammalian physiology likewise developed by those other long-haired inhabitants of the same cold area—the mammoth, the musk-ox, and the yak. The tendency may date back almost to the origin of all mammals, and may thus remain within recall even in the heredity of species that have now no need to display it. This sort of hair probably involves fewer cell proliferations than a fine fur would do, and for this reason may economise the iodine used in the thyroid hormone. In any case, as is well known, failure of the thyroid gland, such as is liable to overtake individuals of the white race, may result in various symptoms showing a close resemblance to characters that are perfectly normal in the Mongoloid stocks.

Now, we may well ask whether such slow evolutionary processes as have been described can have much bearing on the study of Western civilisation, or on our own conduct of practical affairs. After all, organised warfare is no older than any other of the more advanced forms of human culture. Men's bodies have changed little since it began. Why, then, should we expect the instincts energising their minds to have

undergone any greater degree of variation? The objection is a real one. Within the history of civilisation there have probably occurred certain changes in man's bodily form, but these may have been due almost entirely to the influence of environment upon the growth of the individual as such, and not to a natural selection whereby some hereditary strains were weeded out while others survived.

The point is that science cannot as yet determine the causes of the changes that do, undoubtedly, overtake men or animals transplanted from one country to another, or subjected to a sudden change of food such as a cultural advance—from stock-raising to corn-growing, for instance—may impose on a given population. But even if we do not know, we can guess; and one hypothesis having much to commend it is that the degree of ontogenetic (or individual) plasticity in a race depends upon the initial variability distributed among its components. If this is true, it may mean that by changing our food we could change the outward expression of our heredity, thereby not only altering our bodies but changing the instinctive bias of our minds as well. This link in the chain of reasoning is not so weak as it might seem. For, if we are to follow Darwin in his hypothesis of evolution through natural selection, our path is made infinitely smoother if we likewise accept the theory arrived at independently by Lloyd Morgan and by Mark Baldwin—namely, that it is the reactions of the individual to the environment which pave the way for the more permanent and irreversible adaptations of the race. Moreover, the acceptance of this last doctrine is in its turn facilitated if we go a step further, and regard the reactions of the individual as so many reflections of a previous racial experience, the effect of which has been masked, but never quite eliminated from the heredity. On these grounds, then, it seems legitimate to expect changes of environment to exert calculable influences within the space of a few generations.

How, then, has civilisation affected diet? Further, what influence might this cause be expected to exert upon the body, the mind, and the social behaviour? To be brief, civilisation seems everywhere to have been based upon the culture of grain—wheat, barley, rye and oats in Europe and Western Asia, rice in China, and maize in America. The advantage of

those grain crops is that they allow a vast amount of easily stored food to be gathered from a small area. The disadvantage is that they provide a minimum of calcium, protein and other substances used for bodily structure, as contrasted with what it needs as mere fuel. I suggest, therefore, not only that the use of grain foods has tended to eliminate the hereditary factors making for an active anterior pituitary, but that it has likewise depressed the activity of this master endocrine by favouring the expression of characters evolved in areas of food deficiency at the expense of others adapted to times of plenty. Indeed, since the thin skin, the abundant subcutaneous fat, the fine bone, and small size of the female seem explicable as devices useful for the conservation and storage of calcium, it may be contended that civilisation would encourage a racial femininity similar to, though of course not identical with, the tendency postulated in the case of the bushman. In the latter a weakness of the adrenal cortex was held to be of direct value in that it permitted escape of redundant sodium. In the case of a man or woman starved of calcium, the same lack of sodium would probably be of value in creating an acid condition of the blood and the tissues whereby the more valuable base—namely, calcium—would be attracted.

How, then, does all this bear upon the subject of warfare? We have seen that a release of the aggressive instincts is probably associated with an activity of the anterior pituitary such as would be expected to occur among peoples whose food provided them with an abundance of structural material wherewith to build up a strong, if uneconomical, frame. In confirmation of this view we have the well-founded observation that pastoral peoples tend usually to be taller than their agricultural neighbours, whom they find little difficulty both in conquering and in ruling. At first sight, then, it would seem that all that is required is to starve the world of calcium and proteins. Thereupon peace ought to follow from that repression of the aggressive instincts which might be expected to result.

But history, unfortunately, does not bear out this assumption. The quality of the diet has deteriorated since the introduction of grain food; yet wars have become more fierce. Thus it seems legitimate to have recourse to the Freudian idea of repression, and to inquire whether even an hereditary

and physiological inhibition of the aggressive instincts may not *ipso facto* be responsible for an additional tension—one liable to periodic explosion for the very reason that it is normally held in check. The same theory of a repressed pituitary resulting in a repressed aggressiveness would account for the simultaneous rise of civilisation among peoples that had already travelled far along the road towards such a physiological condition. Indeed, this possibility illustrates the theory of the individual reaction paving the way for the racial adaptation. Those that were least aggressive towards each other would be best fitted for a co-operative existence such as is implied by the cultivation of crops and the specialisation of artisans necessary if the culture is to progress. And once firmly fettered to the grain lands, the physiology would suffer a still further deflection in the direction already responsible for the formation of the culture acting upon it.

To conclude, then, cold and good food—consisting of animal, and especially dairy, products, and of vegetables other than grain—may be expected to create a race of aggressive individualists such as will compete vigorously among themselves, and may also tend to prey upon their neighbours. Grain foods, on the other hand, or a hot habitat, may be expected to produce peoples having greater powers of peaceful co-operation, but more prone to outbursts of paranoic patriotism, even at times when their real safety remains unthreatened. On these lines we may perhaps explain why the Baltic countries that once produced the Norse sea-rovers can now take peacefully to trade and agriculture, while the grain-growing peoples of the Continent, once the serfs of pastoral lords, now face each other in hatred and fear. For if there is any value in the much-abused Nordic myth it would seem to lie in the probability that the tall coarse-boned pituitary type, being more naturally and consciously aggressive, has been better able to develop a rational personality, such as is less subject to periodical swamping by mass suggestion, and is thus better forearmed against the dangers of war without profit.

J. R. DE LA H. MARETT.

THE MAKING OF MUSEUMS¹

By K. DE B. CODRINGTON

THERE is in existence a very voluminous literature on the subject of Museums, but I admit that a survey of it has not led me to any very definite conclusions. To begin with, I am left with a rather embarrassing sense of the elevation of the ideals that have inspired, not only curators—there is, I suspect, a connexion between professional idealism and bread-and-butter—but our critic, *Outside Opinion* in all its variety, ranging from self-centred specialism to visionary reform, through every conceivable mode of approach, private, public and political. It is, however, only too evident that the ideal museum has been built many times verbally. What has never been done is to pin the ideas that lurk behind all this well-intentioned idealism and so to clear our minds as to what can be done with a museum and, conversely and even more pertinently, what cannot. Now it is usually admitted that it is the business of the trainer of horses to have ideas on the training of horses: however freely the owner and the punter and the public in general may be led to express themselves, their opinions are no substitute for professional ideas. It is possible that, under pressure from *Outside Opinion*, or as the result of our remarkable idealism, we may be attempting what lies beyond reach.

In 1889 Sir William Flower told the British Association that

what a museum really depends upon for its success and usefulness is not its specimens, but its curator . . . the curator and his staff are the life and soul of the institution upon which its value depends; and yet in many—I must say most of our museums—they are the last to be thought of.

¹ Read before the Museums Association's Conference, Brussels, 1935.

A boast is a kind of ideal, and anyhow the bread-and-butter basis must here be admitted, for Flower was in the game. His successor at the Natural History Museum, Sir Ray Lankester, was, perhaps, a little too professionally sensitive when he roundly asserted for the benefit of *Outside Opinion*, United Philistia Unlimited, that

most museums in this country have such a peculiar ancient history, are subject to the government of such strangely ignorant boards or committees, are so ill-supplied with funds and so completely misunderstood or else neglected by the community in the midst of which they are placed, that the hands of their curators are tied—

and their functions aborted. In opposition to which it must be remembered that Gladstone declared that

he would never be a party to raising the salaries of the gentlemen of the British Museum for he could imagine no more delightful existence.

It is, of course, evident that in these days of enlightenment institutions dependent upon public support must show returns. It is equally evident that a statement of quantity—visitors per day, for instance—is more easily comprehensible by *Outside Opinion* than any pretensions to less precise values put forward by professional idealism. As a matter of fact, we have presumed a good deal in the statement of our professional case. I will quote the advocacy of yet a third Museum Director, Sir Frederic Kenyon, in his Romanes Lecture at Oxford. He boasts that museums are no longer 'old curiosity shops or fortuitous collections of . . . junk,' and claims that they are

an integral and not unimportant element in the system of national education, a part of the nation's contribution to civilisation, and the evidence that the nation cares for the things of the Spirit.

As for our root and origin, Sir Frederic holds that

museums are part of the response to the need that man has for quality in his life as well as quantity. They appeal to three special motive forces in his nature, the sense of beauty . . . the sense of curiosity . . . and the sense of continuity, which compels him to take interest in his foundations in the past.

As to method, it is quite simple:

First arrangement, then labelling, then guide-books, then cheap photographs, next guide-lecturers, and finally the assistance of the Press—all governed by the idea that the person to be aimed at is the non-specialist.

The main assumption here is that man in general has a basic need for museums. In any case, beauty is hard to define, curiosity evasive if not vulgar, while the sense of continuity is obviously only co-extensive with the humanities and cannot be used as a support for museums in general. Speaking professionally, remembering the past and not forgetting the logic underlying the matter of the training of horses, I am led to suggest that museology, which is the art of making museums—historically speaking, quite a new art—is arrangement, first *and* last. For it is only when you have arranged your museum that you can produce your guide-books and unkennel your guide-lecturers and call upon Fleet Street to gild the lily—or white the sepulchre.

If it is necessary to specify some definite quality by the presence or absence of which the museum, as we have made it, is to be judged, I suggest that the least ambiguous word to use is 'interest.' The validity of the use of the word, however, depends upon our ability to make it clear, first whose interest, and secondly how it is to be created. Furthermore, with regard to the past, we must avoid the error of confusing the endurance of the ideal humanities with the weather-cock changeability of historical man. In other words, we must realise at the outset that interest changes.

Looking back at our origins, it is noteworthy that Bacon in the *New Atlantis* made his Solomon's House a laboratory, that is to say, a centre of practical inquiry and experimentation rather than a museum. Indeed, a perusal of the early Quichelberg and Gesner museum catalogues suggests that the *New Empirism*, in its very width of ideas and appreciation of facts, found itself antagonistic to the collecting zeal of the pickers-up of trifles from whom our descent must be confessed. Our own English '*Musæum Tradescantianum . . . a collection of rarities preserved at South Lambeth, neer London . . . 1656*' is typical. We may depreciate as merely quaint such entries as 'Some Kindes of Birdes, their Egges, Beaks, Feathers, Clawes and Spurres,' 'Divers Sorts of Egges from Turkie, one given for a Dragon's Egge,' and 'Two Feathers from the Phœnix Tayle.' Yet, at the same time, it must be realised that a basis for authority is sought. The entry 'Claw of the Bird Rock' is glossed—'who as authors report is

able to trusse an Elephant.' Moreover, in point of fact, the Tradescants' efforts were the means of preserving a number of important objects, including 'the King of Virginia's habit' and 'the Dodor from the Island of Mauritius—it is not able to fly being so big,' both of which survive in the Ashmolean at Oxford, though, as it is, all but the head and one foot of the latter have disappeared. Thinking functionally, it may therefore be claimed that museums have, from the beginning, set out to give things their proper names and to preserve them against time.

As for the quaintness of these early professional documents, it must be remembered that humour, conscious or unconscious, is usually the result of the incongruous apposition of the disparate or unforeseen; any list of odd objects tends to be humorous. The essential difference between us and our forebears is that we have realised that museology is not mere acquisitiveness. It is not until the acquired and duly registered object is taken into the museum, and put in a definite position in context with other objects, that it achieves meaning in any real sense. The value of a museum is the value of an ordered series, and the curator *is* the museum, not merely because he selects individual objects, but because he does so with an idea, and so creates order out of chaos. In other words, we are dealing in a kind of interest that is not intrinsic, but contingent. The whole is greater than the parts.

In 1621 Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel, charged the great Sir Thomas Roe, then Ambassador from James I. to the Ottoman Porte, to obtain Greek sculptures on his behalf for his cabinet. The marbles so collected were received at Arundel House in 1623, and in the following year was published the famous *Marmora Arundelliana*. Meanwhile the Duke of Buckingham was using his great influence as a rival collector in the field; and there were others, the Earl of Pembroke, for instance, and the King himself. Arundel died before the end of the wars and, as is likely to happen to private collectors, his heirs were unworthy of him; only the remnants of his collections survive to-day at Oxford. It would not be untrue to say that our museums exist as the result of the private activity and personal enthusiasm of such men, fashion playing no small part in the event. The field of

interest was later widened by publications, initiated by simple narratives of exploration, such as Wheeler's *Journey into Greece*, published in 1682, expanding into the conscious scholarship and formal beauty of Stuart and Rivett's *The Antiquities of Athens*, published exactly eighty years later. Stuart, it is as well to remember, began his career as a fan painter in gouache under Goupy, and first got to Rome in 1742 by walking there.

We are apt to underestimate the pioneer ardours of our own neo-classicism and to give priority to Winckelman and Lessing. In the eighteenth century the artistic pilgrimage to Rome had, of course, long been an established fashion. Evelyn, replete with the statuary, painting, antique gems and water-works of his Italian travels, had returned to play the major part in the acquisition of the Arundel remnants for Oxford. In 1734, however, 'some gentlemen . . . desirous of encouraging at home a taste for those objects which had contributed so much to their entertainment abroad, formed themselves into a Society'—and so brought into being the famous Dilettanti, that illustrious body of whom Walpole wrote that 'the nominal qualification was having been in Rome and the real one being drunk.' In 1761 this Society turned their attention to the organisation of a collection of casts. The project was not original; it was actually lifted bodily from the Duke of Richmond and, in any case, the demand had long been evident. It was all very well for the Dilettanti to go the rounds and for those of the professional virtuosi who had the means. For the rest there was nothing, in spite of the fact that the museum idea permeates Reynolds' teaching. He writes, in 1759, in one of his notes for an unpublished *Idler* paper:

It is absolutely necessary that a painter as a first requisite should endeavour as much as possible to form himself on ideas of perfection, not only of (abstract) beauty, but of what is perfect *in a picture*.

In the same year the Duke of Richmond threw open his collection of casts 'from the best antiques . . . for the use of those who study Painting, Sculpture and Engraving.' Here, it will be noted, the interest of the specialist dominates; it is clearly not sought to titivate the senses of beauty or curiosity or antiquity of mankind in general. The project,

however, was in advance of the times and ended in disaster; even selective admission on a professional basis could not save it. The needs of proper conservancy must dominate all public exhibitions. The gallery had to be closed because 'some young men . . . mutilated . . . the statues by wantonly breaking off fingers, thumbs and toes.' The demand, however, was there, and in 1761 the Dilettanti revived the scheme, proposing to establish a collection of casts 'in order to produce something . . . that may be beneficial to the publick.' The phrase marks an epoch. It was not altogether new, nor did it mean then what it means now; but here it is, for the first time, deliberately used of a definite scheme, the difficulties of which were known and the demand for which was clear. Nothing, however, came of it.

Meanwhile, the artists themselves had got their own ideas. A charitable collaboration of certain painters, gathered about the unique personality of Hogarth, had brought about the decoration of the Court Room of the Foundling Hospital, in return for which certain of the collaborators had been elected governors of the hospital and had so acquired the right of attending the governors' dinners. So came about the occasion for the formulation of what was spoken of as Hayman's plan, the further co-operation of artists to form 'a great museum of our own.'

The Dilettanti played their part in these preambles to the formation of the Royal Academy. In 1755, rumours of Hayman's plan being in the air, the Society, in accordance with their pretensions as promoters of the Arts and their real wealth, took up the idea of an academy. Strange, the Academy's historian, writes:

After various conferences, the Dilettanti, finding that they were to be allowed no share in the government of the Academy or in the appropriating of their own funds, the negotiations ended.

Actually, the would-be benefactors' demands were considerable. They wanted *ex-officio* membership of the proposed academy for all Dilettanti, at the same time reserving the presidency and half the executive votes to themselves, with a casting vote for the president.

Nothing further was done till 1759, when at a Foundlings dinner Hayman's plan was revived and an advertisement drawn up calling a meeting at the 'Turk's Head' to consider

'a proposal for the honour and advancement of the arts,' under the chairmanship of the notorious Wilkes. The result was the series of spring exhibitions held in the Society of Arts room, it is interesting to note, on the express condition that admission should be free, with the result that later two constables had to be provided to keep order, and, as it turned out, eight were necessary.

There were, also, other difficulties. It was the practice of the Society of Arts to offer prizes for paintings and drawings of set subjects and to exhibit the successful works in the spring. The applause of the public was naturally attracted to these starred works, which introduced an entirely false element of competition. The society not only rejected all proposals to clarify the situation, but proceeded to vote themselves the sole power of selection and hanging. All rights being taken from them, the artists were forced to change their ground and a room was found in Spring Gardens. In 1761, the first year of the new series of exhibitions, a charge of 1s. was made for the catalogue, and in the following year a fixed entrance fee of 1s. was demanded. In 1765 the success of these annual exhibitions had been such that the artists incorporated themselves by royal charter under the name of the Society of Artists of Great Britain.

So twice within a decade the difficulties of the vested interest implicit in organised benefaction made themselves evident. The Academy had to wait till 1768 and was then brought about by the personal efforts of one man, the architect William Chambers, who had been one of the King's tutors and, therefore, had access to the palace. Sir Joshua Reynolds, who had refused the chair of the old society, making deafness his excuse, found himself P.R.A., was knighted, painted his only portrait of the King and was lampooned for his pains. Johnson remained sceptic about the whole movement: 'Surely life, if it be long, is tedious; since we are forced to call in so many trifles to rid us of our time.'

The British Museum was officially founded by Act of Parliament in 1753, for the benefit of 'the learned and the curious,' but it originated in the enthusiasm of three men, Sir Robert Cotton, Robert Harley and Hans Sloane. Cotton, friend of Camden, Elliot and Pym, was primarily a bibliophile; indeed, he and Camden share between them the

honour of having first conceived the project of a national library; Elizabeth listened, but did nothing. His private library was presented to the nation in 1700 by the Cotton of the day, who relied upon the mechanics of trusteeship familiar to us. In 1712 it was moved to Essex House in the Strand, and in 1730 back again to Westminster, to the ill-fated Ashburnham House, where all but the manuscripts were destroyed by fire. This disaster served a purpose; it led a certain Major Edwards to leave the remainder of the sum of £7000 to be devoted eventually to housing the public collections, so making them accessible and useful. At this time the sum total of the Cottonian MSS. and the King's Library is given as about 12,000 volumes. To these were added, in 1741, the Harleian MSS. for which Parliament was willing to vote £10,000. Eight years later Hans Sloane, physician, collector, and President of the Royal Society, prudently made his will and took steps to ensure his treasures being preserved 'to the glory of God and the enjoyment of mankind.' The trustees undertook to raise the necessary money, £300,000 in all, by means of a lottery, the shares to be sold at £3 and the prize money to amount to two-thirds. The affair was rigged, but the money was forthcoming. Montague House, in Bloomsbury, was chosen to house the collections, and in 1759 the British Museum came into being.

The first book of Statutes is cautious as to wording, but clear in intention:

This Museum, tho' chiefly designed for the use of learned and studious men, both natives and foreigners, in their researches into the several parts of knowledge; yet being a national establishment . . . it may be judged reasonable that the advantages accruing from it should be rendered as general as possible.

True to its descent, the library dominated the museum. At the head was the Chief Librarian, whose appointment lay in the King's hands, since he was also Keeper of the King's Library. Under him were three Keepers, severally responsible for the three departments of Printed Books, Manuscripts and Natural History.

As for the services the new museum provided, Gray is eloquent. He had installed himself near by in Southampton Row and was eagerly awaiting the official sesame. The museum he found 'indeed a treasure,' though to begin with

the twenty chairs provided in the reading room were totally inadequate and places had to be booked a fortnight ahead. The attraction, in this case, was certainly curiosity, for six months later there were only five regular readers. Meanwhile, the trustees were spending £500 a year more than their income, and Gray predicts that before long the whole thing—books, crocodiles, Jonah's whale and all—will be in the auctioneer's hands. Horace Walpole, an early trustee, gives judgment :

Sir Hans Sloane valued his museum at £80,000 and it is worth it—to any one who loves hippopotamuses, sharks with one ear, and spiders as big as geese.

It would seem, as often happens with official actions, that the machine had been provided and the motive power and goal forgotten. So things continued without any definite improvement till 1777, when it was worth Wilkes' while to agitate, not only for an increase in the estimates for the British Museum, but for the foundation of a National Gallery of Painting. The motion stood in the name of Burke, and it must be admitted that Wilkes used it for his own ends, to reprove the Throne. He was, however, of the generation of the Dilettanti and had himself done the proper thing by travelling in Italy. He supported the acquisition of the Houghton collection, as a basis for the proposed gallery, on the ground that :

it would in some degree alleviate the concern which every man of taste now feels at being deprived of seeing those prodigies of art, the cartoons of Raphael.

He continues :

"King William, although a Dutchman, really loved and understood the polite arts. He built the suite of apartments at Hampton Court on purpose for the reception of those heavenly guests. The nation at large were then admitted to the rapturous enjoyment of their beauties. There they remained, until this reign—

when they were allowed to moulder unseen in a deceased baronet's house at the end of the town. The passage is good Wilkes; its existence is proof that the artistic ramp was worth the candle, even on the political hustings. But the National Gallery remained unfounded until 1824.

Actually reaction had already set in. In 1761 Hogarth had provided a tail-piece for the catalogue of the artists'

exhibition at Spring Gardens. It represents 'a travelling monkey in full dress . . . industriously watering three withered and sapless stems . . . inscribed "Exotics".' The motto runs : *Esse quid hoc dicam? Vivis quod fama negatur?* Here Hogarth expresses pictorially the dominant theme of his professional philosophy. This generation, which makes sophistication a boast and is not careful to distinguish it from boredom, chooses to forget that until quite recently naturalism, or realism, has been the professional boast of artists and the standard of excellence of critics. Leonardo himself compared pictures to rather defective mirrors which necessarily lose brilliance in the process of reflection : of Raphael, Vasari writes : 'the paintings of the masters are properly to be called paintings, but those of Raphael may be called Life itself,' and over his tomb stands Bembo's couplet :

*Hic est ille Raphael; timuit quo sospiti vinci
Rerum magna parens et moriente mori.*

When Raphael died, it would seem nature died, leaving Raphael as the painter's ideal.

For Hogarth, the opening of the Spring Gardens exhibition was the beginning of a new era, a return to a fresh reality, which was English, not Italian, or classical or antique. For him, instead of burdening the memory with musty rules, or tiring the eyes with copying dry and damaged pictures, studying from nature was the shortest and safest way of attaining knowledge in art. But that was not all; he also waged war upon the artistic ramp as a whole, dilettanti, virtuosi, dealers, collectors and artistic exploiters of all sorts, especially the 'phiz-mongers' and drapery-hangers. His tirade had little effect. Walpole's comment was that Hogarth had not seen enough great art, and the Strawberry Hill catalogue provides the standards of his verdict. In the refectory or great parlour at Strawberry Hill stood 'over against the chimney, a bureau of black japan; on it a clock, supported by a bronze figure of a woman reclining; beneath an Etruscan vase, between two white old china vases.' The greatest of all dilettanti had himself added the horrors of the Gothic revival to the Italianesque bric-à-brac of the Grand Tourist. As for the sense of curiosity, on a famous occasion in 1789, when he boasts that 'Strawberry was in

great glory,' he met twenty-four guests 'at the gate of the porch . . . dressed in the cravat (wooden) of Gibbons' carving and a pair of gloves embroidered up to the elbows that had belonged to James the first.' From Hogarth springs the best of English painting. Walpole and his kind remain what they are, their taste preserved to us in numerous collections in our museums; for the private collector has a certain power over the institution.

For many years restricted entry was allowed to survive at the British Museum, for no reason at all, it would seem, except that the idea of the private collection was allowed to obscure the true functions of a public museum. In 1808 the 'studious and curious' still had to apply for admission and were only allowed to examine the rooms in eight parties of fifteen each day. In 1833 Cobbett made hay of the whole thing. For his own part, he did not know where the British Museum was and did not care, but he did want to know to whom and what class of persons it was useful. Why should tradesmen and farmers be called upon to pay for the amusement of the curious? Two years later he was still throwing bricks at 'the old curiosity shop in Great Russell Street.' These charges bore fruit. In 1835 a Parliamentary Committee was appointed to inquire into the administration of the museum, and in 1841 a Royal Commission followed.

The reign of *Outside Opinion* had begun. Meanwhile the art ramp continued. Hogarth's inception of the great period of English painting and sculpture bore surprising fruit. Whereas thousands had been spent on classical marbles and Italian paintings earlier in the century, now as much or more was spent on contemporary art. Lord Elgin's reward for bringing the Elgin marbles to England was to be scorned by the illustrious Dilettanti, insulted by the pedant Payne Knight, thwarted by the Government and lampooned by Byron. It was left to Haydon, backed by an imposing array of practising artists to force action. The marbles were purchased in 1816 for £35,000, a price which entailed a heavy loss for their owner.

So times and opinions may be seen to change and policy to have a tendency to lag. It is as well that we should be aware of the gyrations of *Outside Opinion*. Here the reason is discernible. So completely had the craze for contemporary

art seized upon the collectors' minds that they could think of nothing else; so profitable had art become that the professional artist could afford to be open-minded. Nollekens' profits were staggering. Frith records that Sheepshanks snapped up Landseer's 'Highland Drovers' for a mere £500, and values it himself, twenty years later, at ten times the sum. Professionally speaking, it is not merely a question of the price it would, or would not, fetch now. This was the great period of expansion of the museum idea and the Sheepshanks of the day, embodying *Outside Opinion*, were public-spirited. As a result of their beneficence whole herds of Highland cattle still occupy our walls, the relics of fugitive taste and only temporary value.

K. DE B. CODRINGTON.

POSTAL REFORM

HALFPENNY LETTERS

By EDWIN WELLS

BESIDES being one of the largest employers in this country, the great State undertaking administered from St. Martin's-le-Grand probably influences the daily life of the nation more intimately and diversely than any other business concern. The ubiquitous Post Office has become the indispensable handmaiden of almost every activity. Its *clientèle* is the nation.

The harnessing of electricity has enabled the Post Office to apply a series of scientific miracles to the everyday needs of the public. But though the marvels of telecommunications may perhaps stir the imagination more than the older branch of the Post Office is able to do, the mail service possesses potentialities for a development little less spectacular in its effects on the national life. The conveyance of mails is still the greatest of St. Martin's-le-Grand's activities on the criteria of volume of business, number of personnel, and the amount of turnover and profit.

The mechanisation of the mail service has been proceeding apace in recent years, and the process seems likely to continue. Nevertheless, the silent and invisible mechanism of postage rates is still perhaps the most important of all postal machinery.

The tercentenary of the Post Office last year reminded us that, since Thomas Witherings laid the foundations of the modern Post Office in 1635, inland postage rates in this country have only once been fundamentally revised—the reform of 1840. Broadly speaking, postage rates are much the same in essence to-day as they were nearly a century ago; the charges are uniform, irrespective not only of distance but also (save for an exception in London and large towns, referred to subsequently) of time of posting and delivery.

The introduction of cheap postage and the invention of the locomotive engine occurred about the same period. But whilst the development of the latter has made giant strides, that of the great national mechanism of postal rates has remained almost stationary. Although the fabric has been turned, patched and repatched, the fashion is still early Victorian. It is as though our locomotives were still of the type of the *Rocket* and *Puffing Billy*.

In early times practically the entire cost of treatment of a letter was that of its conveyance between town and town, and Witherings consequently fixed charges on the basis of distance—twopence for eighty miles, and so on. This system persisted until 1840, although conditions had altered considerably, mainly as a result of the supersession of the post-horse system by stage-coaches, towards the end of the eighteenth century.

When Rowland Hill initiated the movement which culminated in 1840 in penny post his original object had merely been cheaper rates, leaving charges by distance undisturbed. It was only his accidental discovery that the cost of conveyance of a small letter between places as far apart as London and Edinburgh was negligible—only one thirty-sixth of a penny—that led him to advocate uniform inland postage. This uniformity was advantageous in that it enabled the cumbersome system of accounting necessitated by charges according to distance, together with payment on delivery, to be replaced by prepayment in stamps. As a result, working costs as well as postage were greatly reduced.

The Post Office considered prepayment of postage objectionable, and pronounced Rowland Hill's plan to be 'fallacious, preposterous, utterly unsupported by facts, and resting on assumption.' The Postmaster-General, Lord Lichfield, declared that 'of all the wild and visionary schemes which he had ever heard or read of, it was the most extraordinary.' In fact, only the casting vote of the chairman on a Select Parliamentary Committee saved that great reform.

Probably a greater change has taken place in postal conditions since 1840 than during the two preceding centuries. In particular, the sprawling dormitory areas of the large towns render an early completion of the first morning delivery a prime essential.

There are obvious objections to starting this delivery much earlier than at present, even if this were practicable. Under the existing system of postage rates an earlier completion could, generally speaking, only be effected by resort to part-time labour or other unsatisfactory expedients.

This position arises from the fact that postal correspondence comes in two great waves—one for delivery in the early morning, the other consisting of the postings for the night mails. The morning rush takes place between about six and half-past eight, the other almost exactly twelve hours later. That is to say, the bulk of postal work has to be done before and after normal working hours. This incidence of traffic is plainly uneconomic from the standpoint of administration, inconvenient to the staff, and not conducive to the best service.

The heaviness of the night as compared with the day mails has long presented a serious postal problem. As early as 1849 Rowland Hill (who had become adviser to the Postmaster-General) succeeded in establishing a 'book post,' with a low rate of postage in exchange for a slower service, with a view to relieving night mail pressure.

Seven years later the book-rate postage was reduced, printed papers of all kinds being allowed at the cheap rate. Unfortunately, when the minimum charge was reduced to a halfpenny—in 1870, six years after Sir Rowland Hill's retirement—the principle of confining the book post to non-urgent matter was abandoned, invoices and other partly written urgent documents being admissible at the cheap rate.

The year 1870 witnessed another innovation—the postcard, the originator of which was the German postal official Hermann von Stephan. This relatively small category of postal correspondence is diminishing in volume. During the last two decades the annual total of postcards has dwindled from one-fifth to one-fifteenth of the combined total of letters and printed papers. Although the loss of privacy involved often annoys the recipient, the use of the postcard is of no advantage to the Post Office. On the contrary, it is less convenient to handle than the ordinary small letter.

The case of book packets, or printed papers, as they are now called, is still more anomalous. The printed paper is more inconvenient to deal with even than the postcard. Its

size is often awkward, and the open flap retards disposal treatment, besides occasionally catching up and delaying other items of correspondence. The chief drawback of the printed paper, however, is that it involves examining the contents to see that the regulations are not infringed.

One of the arguments used by Rowland Hill for the reform of 1840 was that the charge according to the number of sheets (a feature of the old system) instead of by weight, as under his proposals, necessitated holding the missives up to the light. But the present procedure entailed by printed papers is still more troublesome, and large numbers of insufficiently prepaid items pass unchallenged because examination of the contents would cost more than the revenue raised. This state of affairs must conduce to haziness in the public mind regarding the printed paper regulations.

The object of these regulations is to keep the number of missives sent at the cheap rate within reasonable limits so that the revenue from the letter post may not suffer unduly. These rules have been repeatedly assailed because of their number and complexity. It is fair to remember, however, that the present halfpenny rate was introduced by House of Commons resolution in the face of the strong opposition of St. Martin's-le-Grand; the dead hand of a mid-Victorian Parliament lies heavily on the Post Office of the twentieth century.

The decision to admit partly written documents at the halfpenny rate was followed by a series of demands and concessions, chiefly in the direction of allowing more manuscript additions. Eventually, a few years before the war, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Henniker Heaton pressed in the House of Commons for the revision of the halfpenny post regulations, urging that the *Post Office Guide* contained more than two pages of definition and that '*there are only two persons in the Post Office who know what can and cannot be sent by the halfpenny post, and that these two disagree.*'

These regulations now occupy nearly twice the space referred to by Heaton. Furthermore, the night mail problem has since led to a complication in the following circumstances: The minimum postage for printed matter had been raised during the war to a penny, and the occasion of the restoration of the halfpenny rate in 1922 was seized to effect at least some

mitigation of the night mail pressure. The minimum postage on printed papers posted after 4.30 p.m. or thereabouts in London and certain large towns for despatch by the night mails was therefore fixed at one penny, those not exceeding two ounces and prepaid a halfpenny being retained for despatch next day.

The fundamental defect of this arrangement is that it permits late posting of cheap-rate matter. As a consequence, the advantage that might otherwise be obtainable is greatly diminished. Moreover, the anomaly arises of virtually dearer postage on correspondence posted in London and large towns—*i.e.*, precisely where the cost of treatment is less than elsewhere. Surcharge is the recognised penalty for infringement of other printed paper regulations, but disregard of this additional rule peculiar to London and large towns results in delay, usually till the last delivery on the day after posting—*i.e.*, often after business hours—or till the second day after posting. Such long delay is obviously a serious drawback in the case of invoices, orders for goods, and other urgent correspondence.

This rule governing late halfpenny matter operates at the business premises, but not at the home address of the increasing numbers of those who work in but reside beyond the postal boundaries of the great cities. The regulation in question thus constitutes a standing trap for the unwary, and probably only a tiny fraction of the public is conversant with the rule. Curiously enough, it escapes mention in the recent Post Office publication—Green Paper No. 13, *The Printed Paper Post*. This arrangement as regards late halfpenny matter eases somewhat the evening pressure at the larger post offices; but its value elsewhere is dubious, and the net advantage, if any, is small, and leaves the problem of the 'peak load' practically untouched. Nearly three years after its introduction—in January 1925—an eminent authority, writing in *The Journal of Public Administration*, declared that 'Any reformer who can find the solution of the problem of the "peak load" in the postal service of the country will deserve a name in history second only to that of Rowland Hill himself.'

Another development since 1840 is the altered character of postal correspondence. Side by side with more than a forty-fold increase in volume, due largely to the growing

use of the post for advertising, has come the introduction of telegraphs and telephones. The inevitable result has been that the proportion of non-urgent postal matter has grown and is steadily increasing.

What this proportion is must necessarily be conjectural, but it is probable that at least 50 per cent. of letters and postcards and 90 per cent. of printed papers are non-urgent. That is to say, of about 6,570,000,000 inland postal packets delivered in 1934, over 4,000,000,000, or nearly two-thirds, were non-urgent. Of this last-mentioned figure, something like three-fourths, or about 3,000,000,000, fall into the morning and evening peaks.

Can any means be devised whereby these 3,000,000,000 non-urgent packets can be handled in normal working hours instead of during the peak periods? Even if the appeals which have long been made for voluntary early posting had proved completely successful, the evening peak only would be relieved, leaving untouched the morning peak, which presents perhaps the greater problem, taking the country as a whole.

What I suggest, therefore, is that the dividing line between the ordinary and cheap rates for postal correspondence should be determined solely by the urgency or non-urgency of the contents. Put another way, in place of the present classification of letters, postcards, printed papers and (in London and large towns) late halfpenny matter, I propose two categories only—urgent and non-urgent correspondence. The two new classes might be termed 'Ordinary' and 'Midday' letters.

Ordinary letters would be sent by the quickest available means (*e.g.*, air transport as and where established), and would generally obtain a better service than letters do at present, particularly an earlier finish of the first delivery. The minimum charge for an ordinary letter would be three halfpence for four ounces. The charge for midday letters would be a halfpenny for one ounce and a penny for two ounces. Midday letters would be postable only between 8.30 a.m. and 3 p.m., and would generally be delivered the following forenoon. As examination of the contents would be unnecessary, midday letters could be sealed. There would no longer be a separate postcard rate, but postcards could be sent under either of the two categories proposed.

No change would be made in the postage on newspapers. Though a relatively small category—much less than half as numerous as postcards—newspapers are generally urgent. They would therefore obtain the improved service accorded to 'ordinary' correspondence.

The truism might here be reiterated that the real postage on a missive is, not the amount ostensibly so paid, but the actual cost of dealing with the letter in the post. A fond delusion seems to be nursed by many that the machinery of the post can carry an indefinitely heavier load without extra expense—apparently on the principle of the old lady who averred that the large trade she did enabled her to sell at a loss. Under the present system of rates, involving two lofty peaks, costs rise almost proportionately with increased business. The present so-called cheap rate (provided at the expense of so much trouble through the medium of the printed paper regulations) is illusory. The public transfers money from one pocket as taxpayer to another as user of the post, some being lost in the process—the cost of examining the contents of millions of printed papers annually. Besides dispensing with that process, the proposed charges would flatten the two peaks, and convert the midday valley into a plateau. The continuous flow of traffic in normal working hours thus provided would enable existing machinery to carry the large increase of correspondence resulting.

This increase would fall under four main headings: (1) business letters; (2) private correspondence, including picture postcards; (3) various classes of matter for local addresses at present delivered by the senders or their agents; and (4) advertising circulars (because of their greater effectiveness through being sealed and delivered after, instead of by, the first morning distribution).

The amount of this increase would, I estimate, absorb any staff that might otherwise be released under the proposals, as well as provide full-time employment for all part-time postmen desirous of this. Should any margin remain, the advantage could be divided between the staff and the public. For example, the postal facilities might be restored at those places where they have been discontinued in order to give the staff a weekly half-holiday, this privilege being extended

to all sorting offices. The State would thus in the great business undertaking under its control set an example to industry of sharing the advantage of improved machinery between consumer and worker—of reducing working hours while increasing output.

The principle of giving rebates with a view to relieving peak pressure is a familiar feature to-day. It has been applied, for instance, to telephones and cablegrams. But in those cases the pressure is in the day, the objective being more night and less day work. With the mails, however, the position is reversed. More day and less night work would result. The conditions of employment of tens of thousands of postal workers would therefore be greatly improved even if the increased traffic precluded shorter hours for the time being.

The proposed first-class matter (ordinary letters) would be better adapted than the present first-class matter (letters and postcards) for relatively costly air transport. Conveyance by air of printed papers (largely advertising circulars) is not economically justifiable. This class of matter already yields little or no profit. On the other hand, invoices, orders for goods, and similar documents now transmissible as second-class matter, though more urgent than many letters and postcards, would replace the non-urgent moiety of letters and postcards as first-class matter, thus increasing the utility of air mails.

The chief advantage from the public standpoint, however would be the great simplification and the broadened basis of the cheap rate. In this connexion perhaps I may quote from the Post Office Green Paper No. 13, *The Printed Paper Post*, already referred to. It runs:

A careful scrutiny of the regulations [the italics are mine] governing this reduced rate of postage will demonstrate that the public, particularly the section engaged in commerce, is very well served. It is possible, for example, for firms, whose business arrangements can be appropriately systematized, to conduct a large part of their correspondence by means of partly printed forms.

It seems clear from this that the present printed paper post is adapted for 'big business' rather than the general public. The much larger benefits conferred by midday letters, however, would be fully available to all users of the post, large and small, in business and private correspondence.

Perhaps a specific case may be taken for the purpose of illustration—the recent concession under which applications for employment may pass at the halfpenny rate. As Green Paper No. 13 puts it,

... it is only necessary ... for an unemployed person to take a blank sheet of paper and stamp at the head of it (any type of handstamp will do for the purpose, even one cut out of a piece of cork or linoleum, so long as the characters used are not like those of a typewriting machine) the words 'application for employment,' and his letter written on the form will pass for one halfpenny if enclosed in an open envelope.

Besides the special knowledge, trouble and loss of privacy involved by the present procedure, long delay may result if the application for employment is posted after 4.30 p.m. or thereabouts in London and the large towns. The value of the concession must therefore be extremely limited. Under the proposals, however, not only the unemployed, smaller in number than they would otherwise be, but also countless people little better placed, could, subject to one simple rule that should become common knowledge at once, send all communications without loss of privacy for a halfpenny. Many of the younger generation of the distressed areas are scattered over the country. These would no longer have to pay three times as much for a letter (for which non-urgent treatment would usually suffice) as is paid by luxury businesses for much of their correspondence.

But what, it may be asked, would be the attitude of the public to an essential aspect of the proposals, the surcharging of matter prepaid at the midday rate but posted after 3 p.m.?

There is, of course, no inherent difficulty in the dividing line between ordinary and cheap rates being determined by the time of posting. The rule 'post midday matter by 3 p.m.' is simplicity itself compared with the literature which has grown up around the present line of demarcation between the letter and printed paper rates.

If in fixing a cheap rate the choice lay between so simple, definite and intelligible a rule as posting by a certain hour, or whether the missive and its contents comply with regulations occupying nearly four pages of the *Post Office Guide*, the arguments would of course be overwhelmingly in favour of the single rule from the point of view of simplicity alone.

In the case of orders for goods and similar urgent matter,

surcharge (with the option of refusal) would be preferable to considerable delay. But if there is one thing the sender of a letter is anxious to avoid, it is that the recipient should pay the postage. The public could therefore be relied on to observe the single rule proposed, which could be made practically fool-proof.

After all, the change of habit of the posting public involved would be trifling compared with the revolutionary alteration when prepayment of postage was introduced. All that would be required to take advantage of the non-urgency of a letter to obtain a rebate up to 66 per cent. would be to post during banking hours.

It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the single simple rule proposed would secure more general compliance in a few months than the printed paper regulations have secured after more than two generations. Nevertheless, the charge might, for a time, be at the single instead of the double rate.

Fortunately, this vital aspect of the plan could be tested on a small scale without difficulty—before the scheme was generally adopted—say, in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. It may be remarked that pillar-boxes were first tried in Guernsey.

To sum up, under the scheme outlined, the postal service would be improved—in particular, the first delivery could be completed earlier; advertising circulars would be more effective, and, instead of being carried at about cost, would yield a substantial profit; one simple rule would replace numerous printed paper regulations, including the arrangement as regards late halfpenny matter; the basis of the halfpenny rate would be greatly broadened, London and the large towns being raised to equality with the rest of the country and the poor user of the post with 'big business'; and one of the greatest measures of improvement of the working conditions of the staff in the history of the Post Office effected. In addition, the utility of air mails would be increased; the large economic waste arising from the present incidence of postal traffic would be eliminated, working costs in a great national pivotal business being reduced substantially; the reduction in postage would be real, not a mere budgetary adjustment; something better than penny post on pre-war lines would be given at about half the cost; and,

finally, a substantial contribution would be made to the solution of the problem of unemployment.

But what, it may further be asked, is the Post Office attitude to the scheme? The answer appears to be that the plan is admittedly attractive, but, as questions of national policy are involved, the impulse for its adoption should come from outside the Post Office.

In this connexion I may observe that it is most unusual, if not without precedent, for a State department to permit one of its officers to publish articles or lecture on questions of departmental policy. Such a privilege (which I here gratefully acknowledge) has, however, been accorded me by several Postmasters-General.

A shrewd observer has remarked that about a generation usually elapses between the inception and adoption of larger administrative changes in this country; but perhaps a shorter period will suffice in the present case, particularly as actual trial on a small scale is easy.

Notable men in industry and commerce, science and finance, public affairs and trade unionism are either keenly interested or already convinced of the inevitability of the scheme—including such diverse names as the Earl of Lytton, Viscount Elibank, Sir Roger Keyes, M.P., Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke, Mr. Irving Albery, M.P., Mr. Handley Page and Mr. Sydney R. Wells, M.P. The Premier himself has declared that 'the scheme seems of value,' and Viscount Snowden has been 'impressed with its possibilities.' The Postal Reform League, whose object is the adoption of the scheme, has for president Mr. C. R. Attlee, M.P. (a former Postmaster-General), with Viscount Hampden, Lord Rhys, Sir Eugene Ramsden, M.P., Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P., Mr. Louis H. Gluckstein, M.P., Mr. H. G. Wells, and Mr. Colin Clark as vice-presidents. The comment of the last mentioned is as follows:

The more I look at your proposals the more convinced I am of their soundness. They seem to me so extraordinarily sensible and obvious that, once they are adopted, . . . we shall wonder how we ever got on without them.

Perhaps the small-scale experiment suggested can now be made.

EDWIN WELLS.

ARISTIPPUS

By LLEWELYN POWYS

'The senses are liars. Do not believe them!'

'Know then, that all this is but an empty store of words, which has been drawn up and arraigned against the senses.'

So it has gone from the earliest times as though two opposing 'Jacks' were alternately striking the great resonant clock-bell of life every few minutes—ding, dong, ding, dong! Aristippus, the master of the Cyrenaic school of hedonistic philosophy, lit upon his illumination of 'the true word' through his contact with Socrates, and his plain speaking has had, ever since, a deep effect upon the thought of mankind. How many great Epicureans in every country have done honour to this teaching from the sunny seaside colony on the coast of Africa!

Even amongst Greek philosophers Aristippus was remarkable for his frolic wit. Less timorous than Epicurus, he appears in the world of thought as a kind of Panurge passing gaily from city to city with a cock's feather in his cap. 'He was ever one,' wrote Diogenes Laertius, 'who derived pleasure from what is present and did not toil to procure the enjoyment of something not present.'

Apparently it was on the occasion of his visiting the Olympian games that he first fell under the influence of Socrates. He had crossed over from Cyrene to attend the classical celebrations, and while mixing with the fair-field crowd happened to fall in with a pupil of the famous philosopher. Being a young man who steadfastly believed that progress was possible in philosophy as in all other matters, Aristippus was not slow in accepting an offer of an introduction to the notable Athenian. Already acquainted with the assertion of Protagoras that the sensation of the moment was 'the only ultimate reality,' he required but a hint from

his new master to appreciate, in a flash, how unsure were the foundations supporting orthodox thought and morality. Socrates had always insisted that virtue was the true human good, though conceding happiness to be a subsidiary end. The daring and brilliant mind of his new pupil pounced upon this adjuvant thought, and, forthwith denying to virtue any especial virtue *in itself*, pronounced that it was the business of every wise man to direct his entire attention towards the attainment of pleasure. Socrates had always placed intellectual pleasure above those deriving from the body. Aristippus would have none of this, boldly declaring that such scholarly pastimes could not be compared with the direct, and far more satisfying, ecstasies of the body.

Even the undelusive consummations incident to higher mathematical studies were depreciated by him. He placed such diversions below handicrafts, seeing that in them 'the better and the worse played no part.' The practical conduct of life was all his cry, and its main purpose he took to be a scrupulous garnering of the rich harvest of the senses. In so far as intellectual sophistications interfered with this supreme aim, he rejected them out of hand, holding that any absolute knowledge was beyond man's reach for all time—accepted knowledge being merely a relative convention, an unreliable mental mirage of what appears to each separate individual to be true—feeling offering, in his opinion, the only valid criticism of both behaviour and knowledge. 'As modes of being affected alone are knowable,' it followed, as the day the night, that the past was nothing, the future nothing, and that the sensual experiences of the moment were alone of consequence. Of such experiences none could possibly rival for depth and intensity the delights of love-making. It appeared to Aristippus that the basic principle of all life was to be found in two states of being, the state of happiness and the state of pain—the one the child of wisdom and the other the child of folly, the one agreeable and the other repellent to every living thing. Epicurus taught that if the mind could be freed from anxiety and the body from physical disorders happiness would inevitably be present. So tame a form of happiness would have been repudiated with contempt by Aristippus, who believed it was possible to plan for pleasures, and in some cases to snatch them from the hands of envious

Fate, as a dog will snatch a cold woodcock from out of a pantry window. It seemed to him that happiness was as accessible to the poor as to the rich and was a condition that could be induced by a cunning wisdom. In order that a man should never become a slave to his passions, complete self-mastery was essential. A man should be able to curb his desires or abandon himself to them in accordance with the dictates of prudence and good sense.

Cyrene, the home of Aristippus, was the most ancient of five Greek colonial towns situated on the coast of Libya. It was built far up on a terraced slope in a locality so fresh and fair that it was calculated to incline men's minds to pleasure-loving conclusions—to those philosophic conclusions, in fact, that Pascal disparaged as being 'pernicious to all who have a natural tendency to impiety or vice.' The thought of these Cyrenaics became as light as the mountain air they breathed, as light as that wonderful rarefied air that was said to nourish and refine the fleeces of their sheep—fleeces unsurpassed for a particularly high-class staple—and which was also rumoured to impregnate the very mares as, ready to start at the rustle of a green lizard, they faced the breeze on those upland pasture-grounds with quivering nostrils miraculously receptive to so vital a breath.

As this favoured and chosen people rested beneath the shadows of conduit-cooled fig tree or clambered along steep and lonely slopes above the sea in holiday mood, they refused to be intimidated by the morbid deceits of either metaphysics or supernatural religions. The human predicament appeared to them clear as day. The gods, if there were gods, remained entirely unimplicated in mortal affairs. Human beings were allotted a few vanishing moments for gladness 'in the coasts of light,' and then soon—too soon—all their careless surrenders cancelled, they were laid away in the sepulchres which, like so many bakers' ovens, honeycombed the sides of their winding mountain roads. How beautiful those familiar rock-strewn slopes were, balanced firm between the blue of the sky and the blue of the Mediterranean, green with prosperous spurge bushes, whose yellow blossoms to sauntering twilight lovers would appear like the eyes upon the outspread tails of a hundred flaunting peacocks!

What wild imagining was it that could venture to attribute

to life any other meaning than that of life? In such a privileged locality death itself lost half its terror. Gone overnight were the nervous apprehensions inherited from the Stone-Age ape men, apprehensions that had bred in far-off days the superstitious rituals darkening the lives of the ancient inhabitants of the Greek peninsula with rites of sacrificial expiation, rites even yet lingering on in Attica. These sinister thought-infections—the legacies of a barbarous antiquity—melted away in the Cyrenaic sunshine. In an environment where the very corpses in their sandy hollows remained dry and ‘gay’ it was not easy for spiritual disorders to thrive.

Aristippus brought all considerations down to practical decisions. As Timon of Athens sarcastically remarked, ‘Such was the delicate nature of Aristippus that he groped after error by touch.’ And true enough it was that the senses, the senses were his sole concern. He did not give an African rush for the academic jargon of the schools, but confounded all broody doubters by boldly cutting the Gordian knot of epistemological speculation with one shrewd stroke. He agreed that the evidence of the senses could not be entirely trusted, the senses at best being but an irresponsible rabble, though, this admitted, he argued that the sensations of each individual possessed a qualified validity which, combined with other processes of consciousness, afforded the best proof we could ever hope to gain of the existence of the objective world, making up also a sum of knowledge ‘adequate for all human purposes.’ ‘What is perceived is real’—on such a rough-and-ready axiom he set about to construct his philosophic pleasure dome. To seize with a ruthless greed upon every indulgence that was presented to the senses would clearly be a mistaken method of life and one calculated to bring down upon the head a thousand distracting complications.

The expediency of every action must be judged, then, by the amount of happiness or unhappiness that it was likely to carry in its train. For Aristippus morality was a matter of right judgments, but right judgments uninfluenced by moralic acid or theological decalogues. The first duty of man was to be happy himself, and when this had been achieved every soul who came in contact with him should share the largesse of his freedom.

A peculiar radiance is given out from a delighted spirit, and this God-like lustre indicates how the demand of the ego may eventually be reconciled to the necessary exactions of society. Aristippus used to teach that it was sufficient ‘if we enjoy each single pleasure that is presented,’ and he himself indulged every luxurious whim that came into his head and yet always studied to retain the play of his inner life uncorrupted. He remained undaunted before each vicissitude of fortune, robes or rags becoming him equally well. There was in his opinion no absolute morality. The golden rule to remember was that there was no golden rule. Every situation in life was absolutely unique, never to be repeated again through all eternity, and for this reason must be considered entirely on its own merits. Sensitive discriminations would go far to ensure for an individual fortunate days, with a mind at peace and the carnal desires of the body satisfied.

Aristippus himself possessed that kind of ‘natural superiority’ which often accompanies a disregard of conventional prejudices. Cicero, recognising his personal distinction, coupled him with Socrates, declaring that ‘the great and divine excellences’ of the two men went far to annul their offences ‘against custom and tradition.’ ‘The multitude,’ Heraclitus once said, ‘are like people heavy with wine led by children knowing not whither they go.’ Aristippus valued above everything the ‘subjective reality’ of the individual as it gradually took form under the impacts of life. He felt nothing but contempt for the banal conceptions accepted as reality by the world—false conceptions projected by commonplace minds swarming like bees on a June morning.

Aristippus was no insincere or unpractised philosopher. He was able easily to adapt himself to every occasion. Plato is reported to have said to him: ‘You alone are endowed with the gift of being at ease in circumstances of wealth as in circumstances of poverty.’ This faculty of affable adaptation is well illustrated by the anecdotes that have to do with his stay at the court of Dionysius of Syracuse. Though the man ‘of superior refinement’ suffered a thousand humiliations in the proud halls of this tyrant, he preserved intact the essential integrity of his character. Diogenes, jeering from his tub at Aristippus, called him ‘king’s poodle,’ but at every turn the

Cyrenaic's witty quips prove that his mind suffered no degradation. Even when the tyrant spat upon him he merely remarked: 'If the fishermen let themselves be drenched with sea-water in order to catch a gudgeon, ought I not to endure to be wetted with negus in order to take a blenny?'; and when Dionysius, exasperated by one of his sallies, sent him to sit at the lowest place at the table he was overheard saying that the tyrant 'must have wished to confer distinction on the last place.'

In spite of his free views he was a man of fastidious personal habits. He felt no compunction about declaring that pleasure was *always good* even if it proceeded from the most unseemly conduct, but certainly his own behaviour was distinguished for its rational self-mastery. In his private life he appears to have been the reverse of riotous. When Dionysius, for once in a genial mood, offered him his choice of three alluring flute-girls, he took them all away with him, excusing himself by saying: 'Paris paid dearly for giving the preference to one out of three'; but on reaching the door of his house he let them all go again. In his youth he was privileged to enjoy the favours of Lais, but even in such exceptional circumstances he still remained 'a child of herbs and abstinences.' This celebrated courtesan used to amuse herself at the expense of those who pretended to have gained a superiority over their passions. 'The sages and philosophers,' she lightly laughed, 'are not above the rest of mankind, for I find them at my door as often as the rest of the Athenians.' Aristippus being reproached by some sulky moralist of the day for his frequent visits to her house, replied after this fashion: 'I have Lais, not she me; and it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted'; and again when he observed a young man of his train—a disciple—blushing to see him enter a bawdy-house, he defended himself by remarking: 'It is not going in that is dangerous, but being not able to come out.'

It seems he was never at a loss for a pat retort. When someone criticised him for leaving a room in the middle of an angry argument, he answered: 'Because it is your privilege to use foul language, so it is my privilege not to listen.' On his first arrival at the Sicilian palace Dionysius, wishing to

humiliate him, asked him why he, a philosopher, should have come to his court. Aristippus answered: 'When I was in need of wisdom I went to Socrates; now that I am in need of money I come to you.' Dionysius, continuing his banter, asked him to explain how it came about that philosophers visited rich men but rich men did not visit philosophers. 'The one,' replied Aristippus, 'knows what he needs, while the other does not.' And when he was derided for accompanying a petition with prostrations at the feet of Dionysius he said: 'It is not I who am to blame, but Dionysius, who has his ears in his feet.'

On one occasion when he was sailing to Corinth a sudden storm arose, and it was observed that he displayed every sign of extreme perturbation. The seamen, noticing this, said: 'We plain men are not alarmed; and are you philosophers, then, turned cowardly?' To which he coolly replied, in a style reminiscent of one of Oscar Wilde's effronteries: 'The lives at stake in the two cases are not comparable.'

He was reckless and extravagant in his attitude to money, and once when he saw his slave overburdened with a bullion-bag he called to him to 'Pour away the greater part of the coin, and carry no more than you can conveniently manage'; and many times he was heard to remark that 'Riches were not like shoes which when too large cannot be used.' It was observed, however, that in the process of imparting his wisdom to his daughter, Arete, he especially taught her 'to despise excess.' Aristippus died in the eightieth year of his age, 356 B.C. Arete, however, instructed her son with such understanding that he was able to develop still further the philosophic system of his grandfather. Possibly the most interesting of these later Cyrenaics was Theodorus. Diogenes Laertius tells us that he wrote a treatise entitled *Of the Gods* which was 'not contemptible.' Theodorus was a convinced pacifist. He declared himself to be a citizen of the whole world, and thought it reasonable for the good man not to risk his life in the defence of his country, 'for he should never throw wisdom away to benefit the unwise.'

The exact position of Cyrene was a little to the east of Tripoli, in the vilayet of Barka, and surely the passing of the centuries does not seem to have brought any large increment of wisdom to that quarter of the world. When will men

learn that 'every violation of justice strikes at the very life of society itself and threatens the destruction of the indispensable conditions of all happiness'?

Many of the problems of life and death that were approached with so much spirit by these lively thinkers remain still open questions. Men, as of old, are easily betrayed by the more obvious allurements of life. They seek happiness by acquiring more riches than they can possibly use, by exercising power over others, by satisfying uncivilised personal ambitions. Scarce one in a thousand is content with the simple natural heaven-sent rewards of life. The bones of Aristippus have long since crumbled to dust. The airy breath of his wisdom remains with us. Yet how few are the fowlers, either in the Occident or in the Orient, whose nets are fine and strong enough to catch the careless seaside wind of his pure happiness:

The world being fleeting, I practise naught but artifice.
I hold only with happiness and sparkling wine;
Forsake not the book, and the lover's lips, and the green bank of
the field
Ere that the earth enfolds thee in its bosom.

LLEWELYN POWYS.

BOOKS RECEIVED

NEW LIGHT ON MILTON

(1) *Milton*, by Hilaire Belloc (Cassell, 12s.).

(2) *Milton's Lament for Damon and his other Latin Poems*, Walter Skeat and E. H. Visiak (Oxford University Press, 5s.).

(3) *Milton. Private Correspondence and Academic Exercises*, Phyllis B. and E. M. W. Tillyard (Cambridge University Press, 10s. 6d., 1932).

The name of Milton is his monument; but the poet has too long eclipsed the man, and his less-known essays, pamphlets and letters, including much written in Latin, have not hitherto received the attention they deserve, although on the rare occasions when they are quoted they receive enthusiastic acclamation. Now that Mrs. Tillyard has translated his *Prolusions*, and—with a singular felicity—Mr. Skeat his Latin poems, the time has come for the revival of the study of Milton in a more adequate fashion than hitherto has been the case in our schools and colleges. His works have long been buried, long neglected; but they have lost none of their efficacy, and they appeal no less insistently to the ear, no less insistently to the reason, than at their first appearance. Although they deal with things temporal, they are in no sense temporary.

John Milton was a teacher: his teachings provoked criticism in the seventeenth century; they are more appreciated—and more needed—in the twentieth, an age if not 'more pure of heart,' conceivably 'more ripe of brain.'¹

The main cause of the unpopularity of his writings in so many quarters was the odium originally excited by his polemical works, and the resultant vilification. Mr. Belloc should have been living at that period. He supplies the

¹ Silva x., *Milton's Lament for Damon and his Other Latin Poems*, p. 109.

omissions of animosity. Salmasius forgot to accuse Milton, as Mr. Belloc does (p. 7), of 'taking pleasure in contemplating suffering.' In the single evidence, according to Mr. Belloc, of Milton's having shown intense affection—*i.e.*, for Diodati—he 'left no sufficient monument' of the friendship (Milton's poems to his father and to his old tutor, Thomas Young—so movingly translated by Mr. Skeat—of course go by the board). Almost the only failing of which Mr. Belloc does not accuse Milton is immorality. But that libel was furnished (anonymously) by the son of Bishop Hall. 'He never made a friend again,' says Mr. Belloc (p. 124): yet Andrew Marvell was a great friend of Milton; and it must have required the influence of other Parliamentary friends besides the member for Hull to save the prescribed poet, after his arrest upon the Restoration, from perishing along with his writings against Charles I. Again, on the back of the famous Cooper portrait it is written: 'The Painter and Poet . . . were Companions and friends till Death parted Them.' In addition to Marvell, Aubrey mentions as his 'particular friends that had a high esteem for him' the subjects of Milton's Sonnets, 'young Lawrence' and Cyriack Skinner. The Cooper portrait, we are told, 'belong'd to Deborah Milton, who was her Fathers amannuensis' (*sic*). Deborah, we may be sure, was not one of those daughters of Milton who united with his servants, when he was blind, to 'cheat him in their marketings, and sell his books to the dunghil women'; but Mr. Belloc says (p. 38) that Milton 'was at odds with them all.'

There must have been something peculiarly lovable about Milton, who was not crabbed and harsh, as most people seem to suppose. He was 'delightful company,' says Deborah, 'the life of the conversation, and that on account of a flow of subject²; and an unaffected cheerfulness and civility'; 'extreme pleasant in his conversation,' notes Aubrey, if 'satyricall. He would be chearfull even in his goute fitts: and sing.' He might have been 'chearfull' even with Mr. Belloc, if 'satyricall'!

It is true that Milton became a member of the Puritan party; but, as Mrs. Tillyard shows in her admirable volume of translations, he was almost pathetically anxious that his anti-Catholic principles should not alienate his Catholic

² Cp. Ben Jonson's description of Shakespeare's copiousness in conversation.

friends. He praises some Catholics ardently—notably, Cardinal Barberini. Also, the Puritans were not all extremists of the *kill-joy* order. Many of them delighted in music, for instance; and Milton himself criticised those who, as he said, had made for themselves 'a Razors Edge to walk on,' denying that any man was called upon to give up his personal pleasures, or luxuries, unless they began to injure his spiritual health. He himself indulged occasionally in what he calls a 'gawdy day'—a *jolly day off* in congenial company; for, as he writes in his *Tetrachordon*:

We cannot therefore always be contemplative, or pragmaticall abroad, but have need of som delightfull intermissions, wherein the enlarg'd soul may leav off a while her severe schooling; and like a glad youth in wandring vacancy, may keep her hollidaies to joy and harmless pastime: which as she cannot well doe without company, so in no company so well as where the different sexe in most resembling unlikenes, and most unlike resemblance cannot but please best and be pleas'd in the aptitude of that variety.

Thus Milton was personally very different from the sour and frigid popular impression of him. As a young man, before he left Cambridge, 'he was lov'd and admir'd,' his nephew Edward Philips tells us, 'by the whole university, particularly by the fellows and most ingenious persons of his house.' A single experience of his company, before he started on his Italian tour, induced in Sir Henry Wotton an 'extreme thirst for more'; while, during that Italian tour, the enthusiasm and devotion that he inspired in Manso, the munificent Marquis of Villa (who must surely have been a veritable connoisseur of personality), as also in the Italian *literati* in general,³ are sufficient testimony of Milton's personal charm. Doubtless his character underwent dynamic changes in that controversial 'troubl'd sea of noises and hoarse disputes' into which he was constrained to plunge, his matrimonial calamity, and the collapse of all his political ideals; but, as Deborah tells us, he never lost his 'unaffected cheerfulness'—at least, in company. How it was with his lonely and desolated heart any man of imagination (which, in the fundamental sense, is nothing else but *sympathy*) should be able to divine—and to respect.

³ See Mr. Visiak's Introductions to *Silvæ* viii. and ix. in *Milton's Lament for Damon and his other Latin Poems*.

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Mr. Belloc shows neither sympathy nor veneration—not a gleam, so far as I can discover. He has not even a word of appreciation for the generous way in which Milton harboured the family of his delinquent wife in his house, while he used his influence with Cromwell to get their estate restored. Great, dynamic personalities evoke both love and hatred; Milton's personality and character continue to do so after the lapse of three centuries! Perhaps the most flagrant misrepresentation—the most virulently twisted distortion—of Mr. Belloc is his assertion (on p. 143) that Milton regarded 'Christian marriage as a thing odious to the freedom and dignity of man.'

Mr. Belloc descends into the most trivial bickerings, delighted, apparently, if he can detect the tiniest hair on Milton's coat—at any rate, in regard to his personal character and his prose: he behaves with more respect towards his 'singing robes.' Thus, he discusses on p. 130 'how clumsily he handles a relative'; and on p. 220 himself 'handles a relative' in much the same fashion. In another place he carps at Milton for writing 'Ebrew' instead of 'Hebrew.' But so did Shakespeare before him, and so also did Bailey a century later. There is no hair, or segment of a hair, in this, although there would be plenty of mud on Milton's coat if Mr. Belloc could manage it!

All this is regrettable, and the more so because Mr. Belloc says some really valuable things about Milton's poetry. He observes, for instance: 'In a sense he created English blank verse, for he lifted it from stage use to pure literature, from the spoken, acted and emphasised thing, to the thing read alone.' He makes some especially illuminating remarks about Milton's Sonnets. Yet he shows miserably little appreciation of the prose works, and, in the very middle of a beautiful quotation, interjects a joke. However, Mr. Belloc gives Milton the credit of possessing courage (even Satan in *Paradise Lost* possessed that!); and, upon the admission, there follow two pages of astonishing excellence. Even in its animus the book is not without value. Hatred, for all its distortions, has a kind of insight, and qualified Miltonians will be able to distil something out of Mr. Belloc's extravaganza.

It is refreshing to turn to Mr. Skeat's scholarly translations of the Elegies and *Silvæ*; wherein, as in his own

characteristic atmosphere (sensitively recreated in these renderings), a youthful and attractive figure is vividly revealed, the young Milton 'letting his wings grow' portrayed ingenuously by himself—*puellis nuper idoneus*. Writing in a dead language, he indulged in a frankness not permissible in the living tongue. In his first Elegy he speaks thus naïvely as a Cambridge undergraduate enjoying his rustication in his father's house. He goes out for a walk, and admires the suburban beauties:

A park invites, where elms close-neighbouring grow,
And grove's suburban shade
Renown'd; where thou shalt mark thee, maid by maid,
Glide past the virgin quires.
Star-like they shine, forth-breathing softest fires;
Whence some much-marvell'd charm
Hath smote me oft, that might (as me appears)
Make Jove forget his years!

(The various charms are duly disclosed.)

He visits the theatre:

Me overply'd, then draws
The curving theatre's show,⁴ and all my applause
The rattling stage requires:
Now speaks some grey-beard Rogue, some wastethrift Heir
Suitor, or Soldier, bare
Of helm; some Counsel, flown with ten-year case,⁵
In court devoid of grace
Thunders his Norman jargon of the laws.
Or Slave's sly help, that's lent
To enamour'd Son, throws hard Sire off the scent,
Or Maids, new fires that prove,
Of love naught knowing, yet—unknowing—love.

In his sixth Elegy, he betrays his love of music and dancing:

Next Orpheus' harp shall hold thy sense in thrall
(Of gold y-wrought, soft-touch'd by tuncful hand),
Or where the tap'stry'd hangings round thee fall,
Virginals, at whose trembling strings' command
Trip the fair dancers' feet.
Long be thy Muse detain'd by pageants meet
As these, and may they back to memory bring
All sullen surfeit errs in banishing!

⁴ Compare also *L'Allegro*, 131-134; *Il Penseroso*, 97-102; *Paradise Regained*, iv. 261-266.

⁵ Compare the scornful reference to legal jargon in his seventh Prolusion.

Then, while the feastful throng,
 Consenting with the quill-beats' harmonics,
 Floodeth with dance and song
 Those perfum'd halls, while leap the ivory keys—
 Like unsuspected flame
 Thrilling through all thy frame
 (Trust me!), the Muse through every sense thou'lt find
 Creep, while from maidens' eyes and fingertips
 Melodious, the Lyric goddess slips
 Through every porch and inlet of thy mind.

He praises wine :

What did the Muse—his Muse whom Teos bore—
 In her brief lyric line
 Sing but of rose and wine
 And those close-clustering locks that Bacchus wore ?
 Nay, who but Bacchus of the Theban steep
 Could with such tones inspire
 The chords of Pindar's lyre,
 Whose every page breathes of the cup drain'd deep ?

Three of his early poems were obituaries, one being written at the age of seventeen, on the death of the Bishop of Winchester. They contrast vividly with his fifth Elegy on the approach of spring, written in his twentieth year in the Ovidian mood and manner, and luminously translated by Mr. Skeat ; as also with his seventh, written when he was nineteen, in which he describes his first encounter with Cupid :

A crowd that seem'd to show
 Like goddesses, were passing to and fro ; . . .
 I fled not sternly from that pleasant sight
 Averse, but walk'd where bent of youth might lead,
 Letting my eyes meet theirs with little heed—
 Nor from their gaze might I withdraw mine own !
 One that outshined them all, I there beheld
 (That first of days did I
 Count the beginning of my malady) : . . .
 At once strange passions new my heart invade :
 Consum'd with inward fires (that love confest),
 I turn'd to total flame ! . . .
 Stunn'd—doubtful half, half wishful of return—
 My whole self rent in twain,
 The body doth remain ;
 The soul to follow her desire doth yearn :

These poems of the young Milton are elemental in their response to the appeal of awakening life around him ; they

express the emotions excited in his soul by the stimulus of 'spring-burgeoning sex,' to use a phrase of Mr. Visiak. In them Milton's personality is revealed as nowhere else, and for the first time not inadequately in English.

It was a crisis in his life. How he surmounted it may be surmised from the fact that, a year later, he wrote his great ode 'On the Morning of Christ's Nativity'—which I, for one, would sooner know by heart than anything else that he wrote. Three stanzas may suffice to remind my readers of its glories :

This is the Month, and this the happy morn
 Wherein the Son of Heav'n's eternal King,
 Of wedded Maid, and Virgin Mother born,
 Our great Redemption from above did bring ;
 For so the holy Sages once did sing,
 That he our deadly forfeit should release,
 And with his Father work us a perpetual peace.

It was the Winter wilde,
 While the Heav'n-born childe,
 All meanly wrapt in the rude manger lies ;
 Nature in awe to him
 Had doff't her gawdy trim,
 With her great Master so to sympathize :
 It was no season then for her
 To wanton with the Sun her lusty Paramour.

The Shepherds on the Lawn,
 Or ere the point of dawn,
 Sate simply chatting in a rustick row ;
 Full little thought they than,
 That the mighty *Pan*
 Was kindly come to live with them below ;
 Perhaps their loves, or else their sheep,
 Was all that did their silly thoughts so busie keep.

The Epilogue which, some years afterwards, Milton appended to Elegy vii. is significant :

Vain trophies these of idleness that I
 With care low-thoughted and perverse of mind,
 Erected. 'Twas mine own delusion blind
 That drove my steps awry,
 And youth, ungovern'd, evil schooling gave ;
 Till from her shady bowers the Academy
 Proffer'd cool streams of the Socratick wave,
 And taught me to unlearn the yoke I tried.
 At once, for aye, the flames of passion died.

Arm'd as with solid ice, my breast congeals.
 Fear lest his shafts should freeze, young Cupid feels ;
 And lovely Venus dreads to find indeed
 In me the vehemence of Diomede !

He had come to discern the sham of facile infatuation.

Milton's *Silvæ* are even better than his *Elegies* ; and Mr. Skeat has succeeded in rendering them faithfully and adequately where Cowper, within the limits of his line-for-line translation, was bound to fail. *Silva* i., written when Milton was seventeen, is on the death of a University Vice-Chancellor. He was a physician ; and the following is an epigrammatic reference to his calling :

But, alack, Persephone
 Slit thy thin-spun life when she,
 Fired with indignation, saw
 How many thou from Death's dark maw
 With med'cine's arts to save didst use
 And with herbs of virtuous juice !

Silva ii., 'On the Fifth of November,' is a forecast of *Paradise Lost*, and, as Mr. Visiak observes, 'discloses an astonishingly dark region of imagination for a boy of seventeen.' It is a miniature epic, with Satan as the villain and Guy Fawkes and the conspirators as his dupes. Satan is the crude original of the magnificent fiend of *Paradise Lost* :

O then indeed forth from his bosom brake
 Such sighs, hell-flames, and lurid sulphurous reek
 Stench-breeding as Typhæus wont of old
 (Portentous bulk, whom Jove 'neath Etna pent)
 Spew forth with noisome gape in Sicily.
 His eyes blaze sparks, and like to clatter'd iron,
 Or spear-point against spear-point harshly jarr'd,
 His adamant fangs, edge gnash'd on edge,
 Grind !

Mr. Skeat's rendering of this poem is extremely powerful
 I quote from the description of the Temple of Fame :

There is a place ('tis said)
 From Asia as from fertile Europe far,
 Looking towards the Marcotick Lake :
 Here Fame, the Titans' sister, situate hath
 Her Tower exalted, brass-built, echoing, broad ;
 Uplifted nearer to the glittering stars
 Than Athos, or on Ossa Pelion piled.
 Here stand a thousand gates and porches wide ;

A thousand windows, and her spacious courts
 Gleam through thin walls transpicuous. A throng
 Thick-swarming here a confus'd murmur makes,
 Like cluster'd flies that round the milking-pails
 And o'er the wattled sheepcotes buz and hum.
 When to the cope of heaven in summer's drouth
 The Dog-star climbs. Here Fame as mistress sits
 (Her Mother's veng'ress) on her pinnacle
 Aloft ; and all around her lifted head
 Innumerable ears prick up, in sort to take
 The least of sounds and catch the lightest breath
 Whisper'd from the ends of this far-spreading earth ;

The more mature *Silvæ*—'To my Father,' 'Mansus,' etc.—reveal Milton's qualities of heart, his gratitude and courtesy. It must suffice with regard to these fine poems to refer my readers to Mr. Skeat's text and to Mr. Visiak's Introductions, the distinction of which, besides their knowledge and *readableness*, is that they are completely subordinated to, and, as it were, blended with, their subject. Only, I give brief extracts from the beautiful and moving 'Lament for Damon' :

Who shall unlock my heart henceforth, or show
 To swage the heavy wound of biting cares ?
 Who with commercings sweet
 The livelong watches of the night shall cheat,
 When hiss i' the genial glow the juicy pears
 And crackle of chestnuts all the hearthstone-floods ?
 Without, the felon South to shreds doth blow
 The world, while o'er the elm his thunder broods.

Home, lambs, unfed ; grief tasks your herdsman now !

Companionless, the fields, the farms, I rove
 And where the valley's bowers
 With thickest-woven branchings dark the grove,
 Wait night. O'erhead, the gale moans with the showers ;
 'Thro' shuddering dusk the shipwrack'd forest lowers.

Home, lambs, unfed ; grief tasks your herdsman now !

Alas, what gadding folly drew me astray
 To visit shores I knew not of, and led
 To cross high-climbing crags, and Alpine snow ?
 Was there such need to see Rome's grave (although
 Rome were as Tityrus saw her when he left
 His flocks, his fields ?)—of thee to mourn bereft,
 Who wast so pleasant, friend ! How could I dream,
 'Twixt thee and me so many a deep to spread—
 Woods, rocks—so many a range and roaring stream ?

Ah, at the end I could have else compos'd
 Thy dying eyes, thy hand in mine have clos'd,
 That last farewell to say :
 ' O love me still upon thy starward way !'
Home, lambs, unfed ; grief tasks your herdman now !

In Mrs. Tillyard's *Milton: Private Correspondence and Academic Exercises*, to which a tardy tribute is here offered, the subject-matter of the work is dealt with in a masterly fashion ; and the book is no less necessary to an understanding of Milton as a young man than the one I have just reviewed. Mrs. Tillyard shows in her translation of the seventh Prolusion with what intense excitement Milton betrays the ardour of his own ambitions ; how he divulges the scheme of knowledge which he has set himself to pursue until the day ' when universal learning has once completed its cycle,' and ' the spirit of man, no longer confined within this dark prison-house, will reach out far and wide, till it fills the whole world and the space far beyond with the expansion of its divine greatness.'

His ambition was to be a truly learned man who in private life might aspire ' to be the oracle of many nations, to find one's home regarded as a kind of temple, to be a man whom kings and states invite to come to them, whom men from near and far flock to visit, while to others it is a matter of pride if they have but set eyes on him once. These are the rewards of study, these are the prizes which learning can and often does bestow upon her votaries in private life.'

Scholars have been industrious in seeking the origins of *L'Allegro* and *Il Penseroso* : Mrs. Tillyard has elucidated the matter by giving us good reasons for believing that both poems grew out of Milton's first Prolusion.

Professor E. M. W. Tillyard, who writes a valuable Introduction to the book, has also written revealingly, one may recall, upon Milton's earlier poems, both English and Latin, in his *Milton*.⁶ In that book, however, he surveyed the whole scope of Milton's life and work, with breadth of outlook and a peculiarly sympathetic discernment. His analyses, literary and psychological, of *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*—especially of *Paradise Regained*—and *Samson Agonistes* are unsurpassed. Yet, for all the con-

⁶ Chatto and Windus, 1930.

siderable attention that he devoted to them, he failed to bring out sufficiently the qualities of the prose works : the sublime grandeur of particular passages (in which Mr. Belloc can see no sublimity) ; the extraordinary brilliance of the invective and satirical style in the *Apology for Smectymnuus* ; the moving ratiocinative eloquence of *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, the thought and feeling of which is so far in advance of Milton's times—even of our own !

In one important respect Milton differed from the modern view. Professor Tillyard, after stressing the importance attached by Milton to the operation of the ' conscious will,' remarked :

It may be surmised that if Milton belonged to the present generation he would have distrusted profoundly the idea that a good deal should be yielded to our subconscious desires. He would have felt that the danger of encouraging latent barbarity by fostering them was far greater than the dangers following their repression.

An appropriate treatment of Milton's prose works remains still to be written. Mr. Visiak has incidentally revealed their quality—but only incidentally ; for his *Milton Agonistes*—that remarkable *tour de force*—was directed to another object. Their autobiographical content is as revealing of Milton in his maturity as are his Latin poems in regard to his youth. It is the more lamentable, therefore, that they are so little known. It is also ironical, since our vernacular is indebted to them for some of its most familiar idioms—' wool gathering,' ' take the face ' (to do something), ' mincing the matter,' ' a chip of the old block ' (Milton seems even to have originated the humorous term ' bull ' for a blunder). Very few people, comparatively, have read what is surely the most dynamic prose passage in English literature :

O Sir, I doe now feelee myselfe inwrapt on the sodaine into those Mazes and *Labyrinths* of dreadful and hideous Thoughts, that which way to get out, or which way to end I know not, unlesse I turne mine eyes, and with your help lift up my Hands to that Eternall and Propitious *Throne*, where nothing is readier than *grace* and *refuge* to the distresses of mortall Suppliants : and it were a shame to leave these serious Thoughts lesse piously than the Heathen were wont to conclude their graver Discourses.

Thou therefore that sits't in Light and Glory unapproachable, *Parent of Angels* and *Men* ! Next thee I implore Omnipotent King, and Redeemer of that lost remnant whose nature thou didst assume, ineffable and everlasting *Love* ! and thou, the Third subsistence of Divine Infini-

tude, *illuminating Spirit*, the Joy and Solace of created *Things*! one *Tripersonall GODHEAD*! looke upon this thy poore and almost spent, and expiring *Church*, leave her not thus a prey to these importunate *Wolves*, that wait and thinke long till they devour thy tender *Flock*, these wilde *Boares* that have broke into thy *Vineyard*, and left the print of their polluting hoofs on the Soules of thy servants. O let them not bring about their damned *designes*, that stand now at the enterance of the bottomlesse pit, expecting the Watch-word to open and let out those dreadfull *Locusts* and *Scorpions*, to re-involve us in that pitchy *Cloud* of infernall darknes, where we shall never more see the *Sunne* of thy *Truth* againe, never hope for the cheerfull dawne, never more heare the *Bird of Morning* sing. Be mov'd with pittie at the afflicted state of this our shaken *Monarchy*, that now lies labouring under her throwes, and struggling against the grudges of more dreaded Calamities.

O thou that after the impetuous rage of five bloody Inundations, and the succeeding Sword of intestine *Warre* soaking the Lande in her owne gore, didst pittie the sad and ceaseles revolution of our swift and thick-comming sorrowes when Wee were quite breathlesse, of thy *free grace* didst motion *Peace*, and termes of Cov'nant with us; and having first welnigh fred us from *Antichristian* Thraldome, didst build up this *Britannick Empire* to a glorious and enviable heighth with all her Daughter Ilands about her; stay us in this felicitie, let not the obstinacy of our halfe Obedience and will-Worship bring forth that *Viper of Sedition*, that for these Fourescore Yeares hath been breeding to eat through the entrals of our *Peace*; but let her cast her Abortive Spaunc without the danger of this travailling and throbbing *Kingdome*: that we may still remember in our *solemn Thanksgivings*, how for us the *Northern Ocean* even to the frozen *Thule* was scatter'd with the proud Ship-wracks, of the *Spanish Armado*, and the very maw of Hell ransack't, and made to give up her concealed destruction, ere shee could vent it in that horrible and damned blast.

I wish that I could quote the whole passage.

The memory of Milton deserves a 'chair'—or, at least, an annual lecture—at some university devoted to display to the notice of successive generations fresh views of that many-sided genius: of one who never tired of proclaiming lessons which we in this century must learn afresh—the high value of *virtus*, distrust of religious or civil tyranny, and the inevitable punishment of wrongdoing which is the lot of nations, as of individuals, who fall below the level of the moral evolutionary tide.

ARNOLD WILSON.

MILTON MECHANISED

Further Studies Concerning the Origin of Paradise Lost (the Matter of the Armada), by H. Mutschmann (Tartu University, 4s. 6d.).

These are scientific and analytical times; and the technical

spirit has invaded even the field of literary criticism, which is in process of being mechanised. No great writer, except Shakespeare, has received so much analytical and psycho-analytical attention as Milton. The Americans—most literary and psychological, in this sense—have issued pamphlet after pamphlet concerning him.

Dr. H. Mutschmann is not an American—he is Professor of English in the University of Tartu, in Esthonia—but he has published an analytical pamphlet on Milton, which is the subject of the present review. It is, indeed, a highly systematised production.

In a former treatise Dr. Mutschmann argued, from the existence of many verbal parallels between Milton's *Histories of Britain and Moscovia* on the one hand and *Paradise Lost* and the minor poems on the other, that the *Histories* were largely built up out of materials originally collected by Milton for the composition of heroic epic poems on Brutus, Arthur, and, conjecturally, on the first discovery of Russia 'by the North-East.' In the present treatise he traces concordances between the Armada passage in *Of Reformation in England*—Milton's first pamphlet (1641)—and *Paradise Lost*, and connects both with the aforesaid collection of source-materials. (He makes no reference to Milton's manuscript notes, preserved in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge, and merely mentions Milton's *Commonplace Book*.) He proceeds, by means of a system of cross-references, to indicate and co-ordinate a series of 'parallel word-constellations'—a 'word-constellation' being a 'grouping-together, within the limited space of a comparatively few lines, of a number of significant words; two such constellations in two different texts are said to be "parallel" if they contain identical words, and if they prove similar in general character.'

This is a valuable method of detective criticism, if it is kept within reasonable bounds; but Dr. Mutschmann's excursion among these 'word-constellations' seems, at times, to be a little nebulous. Also, he tends to antagonise rather than persuade, by opposing the 'trained observer' to the mere 'critic.' There is, in fact, nothing esoteric about the matter: both evidence and proof are intelligible to ordinary judgment. Dr. Mutschmann asks that the 'unprejudiced reader' will refrain from taking parallelisms in isolation; but the space at my disposal is strictly *finite* and cannot admit of whole 'word-constellations.' The citation of the following 'correspondences' will not be found unfair.

Camden (one of Milton's source-authors) writes in his account of an engagement with the Armada:

These ships were far mo in number, of bigger burthen, stronger and higher built: so as from those which defended aloft from the hatches,

nothing but certain death would hang over the heads of those which should charge from beneath.

Dr. Mutschmann compares 'stronger and higher built' and 'aloft from the hatches' with Milton's

Had not the Eternal King Omnipotent
From his strong hold of Heaven high over-ruled
And limited their might.

He then relates 'limited their might' to 'the king [Philip II.] had limited him' (the Duke of Parma) to a certain time for a certain naval action, which occurs in an Armada narrative by Petruccio Ubaldini.

Among another cluster of 'correspondences' between a later passage from book vi. of *Paradise Lost* and Camden's and Ubaldini's respective descriptions of the routed Armada and the English triumphal celebrations, he compares the Spanish king's extraordinary care in relieving (*sublevando*) his distressed soldiers and sailors to

The overthrown he *raised*, and, as a herd
Of goats or timorous flock together thronged,
Drove them before him.

He then points out that *afflictos*, in close contact with *sublevando* in the original Latin, is reproduced in English in a closely preceding line in *Paradise Lost*.

He does not fail, of course, to connect the verses with the actual rout of the Spaniards, pointing out that they are described in a contemporary document as 'running like sheep before the English fleet.'

He has some really striking parallels in the following:

While thus he spake, the angelic *squadron* bright
Turned fiery red, sharpening in *moonèd horns*
Their *phalanx*, and began to *bem* him [i.e., Satan] round
With ported spears. . . .

The word *squadron* is a general naval term, and is often used in the English version of Camden. In the Latin text it appears as *phalanx*, the first occurrence of the plural *phalanges* being interpreted by *squadrons* in the margin. The hapax legomenon *moonèd horns* reminds one of the following most impressive passage in the English Camden: 'The next day the English descried the Spanish fleet with lofty towers castle-like, in front like a *half moon*, the *horns* stretching forth about the breadth of seven miles. . . .'

A good many of Dr. Mutschmann's 'correspondences,' amid their 'word-constellations'—attenuated into single common words

and even prefixes and suffixes—seem extravagant. The first example that I have cited—the one about death overhanging from the hatches—is representative of his almost uncanny ingenuity in producing 'parallelisms,' reminding us of the feats of the psychoanalysts, or of the dichotomy of dreams. In that field (for genius is made of such dream-stuff) it may be valid. If the Professor were engaged in tracing subconscious origins and repercussions, his operations and hypotheses would be the more convincing. But he is proposing that these fantastic parallels are the effect of *deliberate* transformations and adaptations—importing into *Paradise Lost* material which Milton had collected for an Armada epic. Dr. Mutschmann appears to have gone to work with an intensity which has dazzled his vision. In one place, indeed, he misinterprets obvious fact.

In *Of Reformation* [he writes] the use of artillery is specifically ascribed to the Spaniards as a distinctive feature: by them, 'the very maw of hell was ransacked, and made to give up her concealed destruction, ere she [i.e., the Armada] could vent it in that horrible and damned blast.'

Milton, of course, is referring, not to the Armada, but to the Gunpowder Plot, which is the subject of one of his Latin poems: he is grouping together the discovery of the mine under the Houses of Parliament and the defeat of the Armada as the 'former deliverances' for which he is returning thanks.

In another place Dr. Mutschmann is at fault, as it seems to me in judgment. After giving a series of quotations from Milton's *History of Britain*, which he thinks that Milton wrote as a prosaic substitute for his discarded Epics on Brutus and Arthur, he attributes his failure to write them partly to the 'physical and mental peculiarities of his constitution, and partly' to 'the change of taste among his prospective public. The Elizabethan temper, so favourable to imaginative poetry of the boldest type, became more and more superseded by the Puritan mentality. When the aging poet put on his singing robes for his grandest bid for fame, he wisely fixed upon a biblical subject to conceal from the eyes of his public . . . his real intentions and opinions.'

The change in the public taste was certainly unfavourable to imaginative poetry on mundane subjects, but this was not the real reason of the change in subject and character of Milton's Epic. This change—from patriotic to religious—was integral in Milton's development, induced by his political disillusionments; but the nucleus of *Paradise Lost* was precipitated about 1640 in six verses of Satan's address to the sun; while the early manuscript notes at Cambridge are mainly on Biblical subjects and designs for Scriptural

poems. Dr. Mutschmann calls Milton a pacifist—and so he was when he wrote *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*. There is much patriotic bellicose sentiment in the prose works; but there is none at all in the whole tract of *Paradise Lost*.

To return to the 'correspondences,' the precariousness of this 'word-constellation' criterion is shown by the fact that at least two of the parallels are more obviously referable to *Ad Patrem*, which was written before Milton went to Italy and conceived the intention of writing in blank verse. They are contained in the wonderful lines:

Nos etiam, patrium tunc cum repetemus Olympum,
Aeternaeque morae stabunt immobilis aevi,
Ibimus auratis per caeli templa coronis,
Dulcia suaviloquo sociantes carmina plectro.

Ourselves await (regain'd our native Sky)
Time's halcyon pauses, transcend Eternity,
When we, our brows with golden circlets proud,
Progressing each celestial sanctuary,
To soft-tongu'd quill-beat marry our dulcet lays.

(Walter Skeat's translation.)⁷

See 'progressing the dateless and irrevoluble circle of eternity' (p. 17).

He celebrated, rode
Triumphant through mid Heaven, into the courts
And temples of his mighty Father throned
On high (p. 21).

Dr. Mutschmann never mentions *Nova Solyma*, and this is astonishing. That strange medley in Latin of romance, poetry, idealism, and philosophy—brought to light in 1902, and ascribed to Milton by its discoverer, translator and editor, the Rev. Walter Begley⁸—contains, indeed (if it really is the work of Milton), the very Armada Epic which Dr. Mutschmann argues that Milton intended to write. There, in Miltonic circumstance, is the description of that fight between the Angels which Dr. Mutschmann believes, from the Battle in Heaven passages in book vi. of *Paradise Lost*, was going to be introduced into the Armada Epic. There, also, is the prototype of Abdiel's travel 'through Heaven's wide champaign' (p. 26): in *Nova Solyma*, 'through all the courts of Heaven'—which, of course, connects up with the 'Triumphant through mid Heaven' passage above. There, too, just as Dr. Mutschmann has imagined, the slow sailing of the Spanish fleet in

⁷ Milton's *Laments for Damon and his other Latin Poems* (Oxford University Press).

⁸ *Nova Solyma: The Ideal City; or Jerusalem Regained* (John Murray).

Camden is converted into the 'furious expedition' of the Satanic legions in *Paradise Lost*. There is the phrase 'spawn of hell' (for 'maw of hell' in *Of Reformation*), and Dr. Mutschmann's hapax legomenon, *displosa* (*tonitrua*); there the approaching ships are described as 'Spain's wooden castles huge' and their formation is compared to the crescent moon. But the parallels with *Paradise Lost* and the rest are numerous, and the 'word-constellations' are assuredly without number.

Nova Solyma was published, anonymously, in 1648, in six thick volumes, and, according to the editor's reckoning—in view of Milton's dilatory habit in publishing his imaginative work—it was probably written 'either during his last years at college or during his peaceful retirement in his father's house at Horton.' If this is so, it would account for the extraordinary resemblances between the Armada Epic (supposing it was written by Milton) and the Gunpowder Plot poem: for example, in the detailed itinerary, in the one case, of Mars, in the other, of Satan—until they alight, the one on Romulus' citadel, the other on the spires of Madrid; the similarity of their behaviour at the bedsides of their respective victims: Mars in the guise of a monk, Satan as a 'youthful shape' much resembling Cupid in Milton's seventh Elegy; the conformity of their glozing, ratiocinative incitements, or emphatic exhortations, to take action against Albion.

In *In Quintum Novembris* Satan calls for vengeance for the shattered fleet and the drowned ensigns; and this reminds one of the coupling together of the Armada and the Gunpowder Plot in *Of Reformation in England*.

No less remarkable is the resemblance between the description of the Cave of Terror in the Armada Epic and that of the Den of Murder in *In Quintum Novembris*:

Nova Solyma

Far from all places known to men, his cave,
Of amplitude almost immense, was fixed
In those far limits of the Arctic seas
Where dwells perennial Night. Huge beetling crags
Loomed all around; uplifted, imminent,
They seemed about to fall on that strange shore
Beneath, where sea-calves played, and unlicked bears,
And many a monstrous form of Nature's sport,
While harpy-footed vampires fluttered by,
Foreboding ill. Around the entrance stand
A crowd of lemures, ghosts, and spectres dim.

There, too, were evil signs and prodigies,
And dangers hazardous to fame and life,
With cowering Fear, and Horror brooding vast.

In Quintum Novembris

There is a place with everdaring gloom
 Of darkness girt, where huge foundations lie
 Of architecture ponderous—ruins vast
 Age-old, but now the den of Murder foul
 And fork-tongu'd Treason (both of Discord wild
 Whelp'd at one birth) : here amid rended rocks
 Of quarry'd stone, inhumate bones of men
 And sword-slain corpses lie ; here blackmoor Guile
 Sits ever rolling eyes askance, and Strife
 And Calumny, whose jaws grow venom'd stings,
 Pale Phrenzie and Death in thousand forms appear ;
 Here Fright, here blanc-check'd Horror, flap their wings
 About the place ; here without cease the thin
 And unessential ghosts through mute silence
 Howl, and the conscious Earth clots, soak'd with gore.*

As a techno-psychological flight in scientific criticism, Dr. Mutschmann's work is both interesting and valuable ; and if the Armada Epic for whose phantom traces he is searching exists in fact, this would only make his adventures among the 'word-constellations' the more fascinating.

E. H. VISIAK.

* Walter Skcat's translation : *Milton's Lament for Damon*, etc.

Since the publication, in our February number, of Mr. A. Trystan Edwards's article 'Gentlemen of the Slums' we have received several letters on the subject, in particular one from Lord Marley, who was the chairman of the Ministry of Health's Departmental Committee on Garden Cities and Satellite Towns. He takes exception to some of Mr. Edwards's statements with regard to the findings of his Committee's Report. Pressure on our space prevents our publishing the letters in our correspondence pages ; but we suggest that those of our readers who are interested may care to form their own opinions on the subject, after a perusal of the Committee's Report, which may be obtained from H.M. Stationery Office, price 6d.

EDITOR, *Nineteenth Century and After*.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

ON December 6, 1905, two bays of the roof of Charing Cross Station collapsed without warning, killing half a score of workmen and officials and wrecking the Avenue Theatre and nearly killing Mr. Cyril Maude. On the same day Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman took Mr. Balfour's place as Prime Minister, and a few days later formed a Government in which Mr. Winston Churchill, a recent convert from Unionism, was Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, and Mr. R. B. (later Lord) Haldane entered the Cabinet for the first time as Secretary of State for War. The appointment was not popular : he had no experience in such matters ; his main interests had been in other fields ; he had been offered the War Office because, as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman admitted to him, 'Nobody will touch it with a pole.'

History never repeats itself, but it repeats the same lesson. The appointment of Sir Thomas Inskip as Minister to the Crown to co-ordinate the Fighting Services is criticised to-day on grounds not unlike those which were urged against Lord Haldane, who, like Sir Thomas, was just sixty years of age when he took office. Arthur Balfour, who had created the Committee of Imperial Defence, thought the appointment a good one : I predict with confidence that Mr. Baldwin's choice will be justified by events. The Services are content : they were known to be apprehensive in some quarters of Mr. Churchill's appointment, lest his energies should overcome his judgment and that of the Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, whose temper seems to have been shaken by recent events, went out of his way at Birmingham, once more unhelpfully, to condemn Mr. Baldwin's conduct of affairs, regretting that he had not nominated to the new office Mr. Churchill, in view of his 'great courage,'

infinite energy and wide experience,' and adding that there would be many of the House of Commons who would regret Mr. Baldwin's choice. My own observations suggest that Mr. Baldwin, as usual, is a better judge of men and of public opinion than his critics. Mr. Winston Churchill's alarmist speeches and his attacks on Germany in the *Strand Magazine* and elsewhere would make his presence in the Cabinet an embarrassment. Sir Thomas Inskip shares with his chief the gift of inspiring confidence in plain men and women and of knowing, less by instinct than by close observation and experience, what they are thinking. And his powers of decision and action are unimpaired by the successful practice of advocacy.

* * * * *

The unmistakable determination of the man in the street to dissociate himself from demonstrations against Germany has startled many observers. I am not concerned here to discuss the rights and the wrongs of the disputants, but only the attitude of mind of some scores of men in all walks of life with whom I have talked in half a dozen different counties during the past fortnight. They were, without exception, in favour of making a fresh start: they viewed the passing of the Treaty of Versailles without alarm, the demise of the Locarno spirit without regret, for the fact that it imposed obligations on us came to most of them as a surprise.

A member of Parliament's first duty, once he is elected, is to represent his constituents: the second duty, if he is a supporter of the Government of the day, is to justify its ways to his constituents. As he listens to speeches from the front bench, and as he reads his daily paper, he has to picture himself explaining the policy of the moment from a public platform. What arguments can he use, what phrases can he employ, to carry his audience with him? Rearmament, reasonable tariffs, mining royalties, tithe reform, national roads and shipping subsidies offer little difficulty: the facts are there. Raising the school age is harder, for sixty years of compulsory education have failed to convince those who must send their children to school till fourteen that 'another little year won't do them any harm': there are no 'facts' which will serve the speaker's purpose.

But what if a member of Parliament is asked to-day to make recruiting speeches to help man the armed forces of the Crown—now misnamed 'defence services'? 'What's up?' says the young man at the back of the hall. 'Is anyone wanting to attack us?' It is not enough to reply, as one Minister replied on March 13, 'We must be mighty in order that right may prevail.' An appeal to join the Army to defend the League will be received in stony silence, and someone in the hall will say, 'Whereabouts?' The speaker has recourse to incantations and proclaims his belief in 'collective security.' A lady in the front row asks him whether in his opinion China would help us against Japan, and whether the Czechoslovaks and Poles and Russians would help us against Italy. The member tries to imagine what Mr. Anthony Eden would say in such circumstances, and says it, but soon finds his audience to be less respectful than the House of Commons and less easily impressed.

* * * * *

But what if a member of Parliament is asked to-day to explain our foreign adventures at successive meetings of the Locarno Four? I sought the guidance at this point at the Athenæum of a Spaniard of distinction—my friend and sometimes my mentor, a scholar and a man of letters of repute in three countries, whose acquaintance with the past does not disqualify him from a lively interest in the problems of the present day. He loves and knows England, which he has made his home. He had that evening returned from lecturing at the Sorbonne, and had dined and lunched with a French Cabinet Minister, several professors, a journalist of repute, and a distinguished politician.

'You may tell your constituents,' he said, 'that a large section of French opinion—since the real difficulty is to be found in the peculiar English reaction to France and everything French—is far more reasonable than would be gathered from the popular Press, which in France, as in this country, panders to the herd instinct. The fact that there has been no mobilisation is proof of restraint in official circles. There can be no doubt that a real effort was made to prevent a panic in Paris when the German troops marched into the Rhineland. In this manner I interpret the publication in

practically all Paris papers of articles on the Maginot-line of France's eastern defences and the insistence of an increasing, if hypothetical, *rapprochement* between the English and the French point of view. The left wing, which is likely to secure a large majority at the next election, holds far more practical and realistic views than is generally realised.'

'Where,' I asked, 'do such views find expression? They are not quoted here.'

'They are not quoted here because enlightened French opinion is, for many reasons, less vocal than the opposite, although far more influential than is commonly imagined. There is, for instance, *La Flèche*, a very aggressive, but, I think, effective, weekly paper which sells 80,000 copies. For concrete expression of opinion, I would cite the views of my friend M. Gaston Bergery. He was Secretary-General of the Reparations Joint Commission: he has no illusions as to the follies committed by that egregious body. He was formerly Chef de Cabinet to M. Herriot, and is a mortal enemy of all that M. Poincaré stood for—such as the Ruhr invasion. I wish I had before me an article which he wrote a few days ago on the ways open to French foreign policy. His attitude, as I understand it, is roughly as follows: Hitler's coup is legally indefensible. When Germany denounced the fifth section of the Treaty of Versailles and decided to rearm, she had in law and, certainly, in equity a very definite excuse for doing so. Her disarmament had been imposed by the Treaty of Versailles (although it may be argued that all treaties have always been imposed in some measure by force, even if only force of circumstances). Moreover, the disarmament of Germany was to be preparatory to the disarmament of the other Powers, and these, after fifteen years, had not yet disarmed; in fact, they had done the opposite and rearmed to the limits of their capacity, except England. The denunciation of Locarno and of the 42nd and subsequent Articles of the Treaty of Versailles is without such legally tolerable excuse, for Herr Hitler pretends in vain that the Franco-Russian pact constitutes a violation of Locarno.

'I might add,' continued my friend, 'as my own opinion, that it is in the highest degree likely that, whatever popular feeling may be in England, this violation will be openly

recognised by the Locarno Powers and that Germany will be condemned for it. If Germany wishes to test her interpretation, she can address herself to the Tribunal at the Hague. This is the legal position; but in fact the situation is a very different one. The "demilitarisation" of the Rhine provinces was a unilateral fact imposed on Germany only; it was, if I am not mistaken, one of the last clauses that had remained over from the Treaty of Versailles which discriminated between victors and vanquished, and as such, therefore, is contrary to the principle of equality. "Now," M. Bergery writes, "France, to her imperishable honour, declared 150 years ago that there can be no social peace except when the principle of equality before the law is recognised." He argues that it should be her honour to-day to declare that there can be no permanent international peace except between nations possessing equal rights in fact and in law. Any other form of peace is nothing but an intermediate period between two wars. If it is true that there can be no peace without equality, it is further true that there can be no peace without respect for treaties. What ways are now open to France and, *mutatis mutandis*, to the other Powers? In the first place, to make the fullest use of this dramatic opportunity, perhaps the last, to abandon the tradition of fifteen years of error.'

'M. Bergery has a right to speak clearly' on the subject, for when he was working on the Reparations Commission he was one of the most passionate advocates of the reduction of Germany's war debt to reasonable proportions—if I am not mistaken, to a sum payable over a period of five years.'

'Yes,' replied my friend—whom I may here identify as Professor Pastor—'but he also insisted in those days that, if Germany did not meet her reasonable commitments, she should be faced with formidable and quick-acting sanctions. Are the Powers now going to continue in the same manner? Is France really going to appeal to the august body of Geneva and succeed in obtaining one more legal condemnation; and will she really, having succeeded in this, try, to the embarrassment of England, to get sanctions imposed?'

'In the face of all this absurdity M. Bergery outlined to me a dignified, strong and pacific policy, for which he claims the support of a very considerable number of his countrymen. "Let us," he said, "make Germany come out into the open

where she will have to choose between two ways—the way of violence and the way of peace; but she must learn that violence and war will mean for her an immediate catastrophe, and that the peace will be a peace which a great nation can accept without suffering in her ideals, in her honour or in her prosperity. Such a peace must be a peace between equal partners based upon the following three principles: it must be understood that the peace of Western Europe cannot be achieved at the expense of a war in the East.” This point has been almost entirely lost sight of in London, as far as I know, except by the Labour Party,’ continued Professor Pastor. ‘It is ridiculous to imagine, on the other hand, that the Germany of Hitler should enter a pact of mutual assistance with Russia which would imply the absurdity, even if only a theoretical one, of the Reichswehr coming to the help of Russia or a Red army rushing to the rescue of Germany. But it is reasonable to ask Germany to sign, or at least to confirm, pacts of non-aggression with Lithuania and the Soviet Republics. It is a matter of extreme urgency to bring to an end the armament race, the outcome of which, as everyone knows, can only be a war. No less than ten times—eleven now—the Führer and Chancellor has declared that he is ready to accept any limitation of armaments which was equal to that of all the other Powers. His good faith must be tested at once.

‘Finally,’ concluded my friend, ‘it is necessary to negotiate with Germany for her return to the League of Nations on the basis of a convention which will give real life to Article 19 of the Covenant. All treaties have always been revised in history, and generally by war. The first thing to do is, therefore, to provide for the possibility of a peaceful revision. What is the corollary or complement of this policy? It is necessary to show Germany that the ways of violence will mean for her the way to ruin, and, what is more, immediate ruin. She must be told that if sanctions are applied these will not be sanctions of a kind applied to some transgressor in order to please pacifist opinion before an imminent election. They will be real and terrible sanctions. There is no contradiction between the necessity for such measures and the obvious necessity of negotiating on the basis which I have outlined. Bergery maintains that

only a firm determination to undertake extreme measures makes it possible to negotiate, and only the will to negotiate as free and equal partners makes it possible to agree to such formidable penalties.’

‘So long as force dominates human affairs,’ I observed, ‘it is not possible to exercise influence out of relation to it. The Locarno Treaty was concluded, not voluntarily, but under the shadow of the Ruhr occupation; it was there that Nazi Germany was created.’

‘Nevertheless,’ observed my friend, ‘Germany received a valuable *quid pro quo*—the evacuation of the Rhineland several years before the date fixed in the Treaty; and, though the Ruhr invasion may have been a blunder, I do not remember any protest from the British Government, and the renewed acceptance of the demilitarised zone by Germany was the only item of military security that France got out of Locarno, and, indeed, out of the war.’

‘Does the left wing follow M. Chautemps and M. Flandin in insisting on maintaining the validity of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties?’ I asked.

‘You have already heard my interpretation of the views of one of the most subtle and acute left-wing politicians, the real architect of the *Front Populaire* in France. If France could obtain some reasonable arrangement without those treaties, especially the former, you can be sure that we would never hear of them again. The English people cannot understand the formidable realities which stand behind these treaties; they cannot realise what invasion means, especially invasion by Germans. But let me tell you that the voice of reason is every day becoming more audible in France, and that it is fully realised that fear is a bad counsellor. It is our duty, as I conceive it, to encourage such enlightened opinion, and not to ignore it by referring indiscriminately to French intolerance and unreasonableness, which has so often been joint intolerance, both French and English. You demilitarised to sinking point [self-inflicted] the German navy, and you are largely responsible for depriving Germany of all her colonies—a question which has created a situation which, I fear, will in the near future give you much trouble.

‘The end of the matter is this: People like Bergery are as convinced as we are that law and equity are not identical.

We have heard too much of law and not enough of equity. We know that Versailles is a monstrosity ; but Locarno is different. We may condone, but we must first condemn, a breach of faith so flagrant. It is indeed in the interests of Germany to wind up the past, and to ignore the past is not to wind it up. In the words of Maritain, "*faut-il abolir l'histoire pour faire de la politique ?*" In order that the past may be liquidated it has to become the past—that is, it should be the past and not hang over into the present. That Germany would reoccupy *manu militari* her own territory in the Rhineland, and exercise a primary function of sovereignty in one of the richest and most thickly populated of her provinces, was obvious to anyone with a clear vision. One of my friends in Paris used the adjective "*ridicule*" when talking of French illusions on the subject, and added that French policy in the past had always been to demand of Germany the impossible and then to scream shrilly when she did not fulfil the impossible conditions. But, in any case, granted that Germany was bound one day to recover her sovereignty there, it should not have been done in this way. My impression is that Hitler, having launched his soldiers, does not quite know how to continue, and is likely to play his cards very badly ; what a pity that Germans and German collective opinion is so cut off from the common sentiment of Western Europe ! One feels rather like the soldier in one of the Spanish civil wars of the nineteenth century who, when he was taken prisoner by the troops of the Government, was carried away when he saw their bad shooting, and, being an excellent marksman himself, seized a rifle and began a deadly fire on his own comrades ; having suddenly realised what he was doing, and being invited to continue, he burst into tears, saying " But I belong to the other side " !

' Does M. Bergery and his friends admit that the Franco-Soviet pact was a breach of the spirit of Locarno ? ' I inquired.

' No,' replied my friend, ' they do not, although they look upon it without enthusiasm. It was dictated not only by fear of Germany but by a desire to bring the French Communists into the national fold, who resemble the Russian Communists so little that they felt bound to press for the pact as an outward sign of an inward and spiritual solidarity. They know very well that France will

'Will the French press for sanctions immediately?' I asked. 'They have not availed in the case of Italy to stop the war, or even to shorten it. They have caused intense bitterness in France and in Italy, which has found in them a fresh source of national unity.'

'Temperamentally France is not inclined to sanctions, and the French, being soldiers by instinct, know that there is only one form of effective sanction, and that is war; and that, in any case, what begins as sanctions ends in war very shortly if these are effective. My own feeling is that "sanctions" is becoming a polite word for war, and, as such, has the advantage of satisfying the tender conscience of the irresponsible supporters of the League while satisfying their very war-like righteousness.'

'What will they do, then? Accept Hitler's proposals?'

'Yes, most certainly—as a basis of discussion. Hitler says he desires world peace: that is an advance; it was not always foremost in his mind. He has sketched the outlines of an agreement: he shall have our co-operation in working out the details. But, say the left wing, we will hold him to his word—*I hier ist Rhodus, hier springe*. It shall be a voluntary agreement in the fullest sense of the word. Other Powers, less immediately concerned, can come in later and make their own agreements with Germany whether at Geneva or elsewhere; but we will make sure that this, the latest Treaty, is also the one that shall be a charter of liberty for Germany and France.'

'What about England?' I asked. 'Where do we come in?'

'A composite French reply would be somewhat in these terms: We have both sinned; we have respected your instincts even if some of us could not understand your views. We ask this of British statesmen, and of all who can influence British opinion, that you should cease to harp upon our past errors, for every one of which you, did you but know it, were in some measure jointly responsible. Cease to discourage those of us who wish to come to an understanding with Germany by urging isolation, on the one hand, or, on the other, a "League policy," which would fail because it would be too extensive in its scope to be of value.'

'Face the facts and face Hitler. It is true that your forces

on land and in the air are small; but your prestige is great. Tell him that he is now being put to the test: does he wish to promote the interests of peace in Europe? If so, let him prove it by deeds and on parchment. Having done so, you must be his guarantors, unreservedly undertaking to use the whole force behind you if he abates a jot or a tittle from his new covenant. He has likened Germany to a hedgehog, which requires spines for its defence. The parable is inept, since this little animal is a born isolationist, rolling himself incontinently into a ball if touched however lightly, and thus remaining, if prodded from time to time, till his reflexes cease to act by inanition.'

I agreed that the simile was unfortunate and proves that Hitler is not La Fontaine and has not studied Pavlov. That is a pity, for La Fontaine is one of the greatest literary geniuses on a minor scale of all time, whilst Pavlov was a retiring scientist. He should be remembered in Germany for the abuse he heaped on the U.S.S.R., which, be it said in its honour, replied by heaping honours and distinction on him.

'It occurs to me,' continued Professor Pastor, 'that we must define *Europe*. Is it France? Catholic Germany? Italy? Spain, Belgium and Portugal? or modern Greece, beloved by our Don Miguel de Unamuno, who was lecturing in this country at King's College a few days ago?—in any case a very small part of the earth's surface, but just that part where the guiding ideas of civilisation took root. Their origin matters little.'

'England possesses two souls, hence her charm and interest: with one she still hankers after the forests of Germany and the flats of Angria, in Schleswig-Holstein, and when Siegfried blows his horn the Englishman feels elemental forces calling. But the Roman Legions came, and, what is more important, Saint Augustine arrived just in time; and whether England likes it or not, she belongs to Europe irrevocably.'

'You may be right,' said I. 'Yet I think that if any Government in this country tried to enforce the observance of the Treaty of Locarno to honour England's signature to the full there would be some kind of revolution. I have no doubt that public opinion is overwhelmingly against any foreign commitment.'

'The fact is,' said my friend, 'that the traditional balance-of-power policy is the only foreign policy that is instinctively accepted as right and reasonable by Englishmen. It is a kind of geographical conscience, and it is also a fact that the League of Nations only has a success here because in the popular mind both policies, in their essence diametrically opposed to each other, are, or were, confused and intertwined. Equal partners! Yet it is true that the decisions of the International Court at the Hague are held up to scorn because the judges are not British, nor always even French! Strain every nerve to ensure that Hitler's offer may not be treated in this country with the contempt of intellectual righteousness; do not, on the other hand, try to make the best of two worlds. Do not allow confused thinking and maudlin sentiment to destroy the foundation of your greatness, which is based on right effectively backed by force; but do not look upon yourselves as arbitrators rather than influential collaborators. What is right in politics, which are, in their essence, not the reign of law, but of life? Surely adaptation to environment and circumstance in a rapidly changing world. Perhaps you know that there is a whole school of German jurisprudence which maintains that there is no such thing as international law at present which the Spanish scholastics did so much to found. You remember Grotius, but we speak of his forerunners, Vitoria and Suarez. International law derives from Roman law, and its validity depends on the dominance of one power, Rome in antiquity—the Holy Roman Empire during the Middle Ages. There is no such predominant power in Europe at present. Do these jurists and historians think that Germany will in the future be that predominant power and fountain of law? Let them remember in regard to the force that must back law that its nature is spiritual rather than material. It is as important to build up the spirit of an army as to equip it with the latest and most effective armament. I wish that you, as a soldier, would tell me something about the present spirit of the British Army.'

I was not slow to accept his challenge, and the conversation continued, notwithstanding the rigour of British Licensing Laws, until the early hours of the morning; we went to bed, but the Locarno Four were still in session.

That afternoon I heard Mr. Eden make his statement in Parliament: the proposals made to Germany were received

in silence by a House clearly anxious not to embarrass him, but equally clearly convinced that they would prove unacceptable to public opinion in this country or in Germany. A few hours later I attended a political dinner in my own constituency: the trend of conversation confirmed this impression, as did a long conversation on Sunday with one of the German delegation. On Monday *The Times* gave prominence in its later editions to the public refusal of the Dean and Chapter of Liverpool Cathedral, of recent years a somewhat lawless body, to pray or to lead the congregation in prayer for a blessing on the King's Ministers, in view of the proposals made to Germany by four of the Locarno Powers, with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations. This decision was explained from the pulpit by a canon in the intemperate language which laymen too often hear from the lips of politically minded clerics. Thus is counsel darkened by words without wisdom uttered by men without responsibility.

On Monday, March 23, I received a letter from an Englishman resident in a European capital whose experience and judgment of European affairs entitles him to a respectful hearing. His views are complementary to those of Professor Pastor:

The European stage is now set—for the greatest Act since that of Versailles.

In the foreground France and Great Britain, the delegate of the latter vacillating between the commonsense British point of view and a desire for 'solidarity,' which means acceptance of the French thesis.

In the wings Czechoslovakia, goading France on to be 'firm.' For the Little Entente will not support Czechoslovakia, and M. Benesh knows well enough that unless Great Britain can be made to pull his chestnuts out of the fire without Germany being able to state her case, that country must stand before the bar of British public opinion and answer for its violation of the Minority clauses of the Treaties. And behind the stage, as in 1914, stands Russia; as to whom there is evidence of a Soviet Government plan—still up its sleeve—for forcing Germany into a 'holy war' by trailing Soviet coat-tails (in the shape of aeroplanes nominally bound for France) along or over the German border; thus making of the inevitable German counter-action an 'act of aggression' which would involve Czechoslovakia and France in support of Russia.

Each of these three sets of actors seeks to force Great Britain

to take a stand against 'Treaty violation' that would obscure the underlying reasons for this violation behind a smoke-screen of League condemnation, and so—regardless of consequences, or perhaps even knowing that their hour has come if Great Britain takes stock of the arguments on both sides—driving us to support war. For Englishmen just out of Germany whom I trust, as well as Germans whom I believe to be honest as well as patriotic, tell me that Hitler has 'gone the limit' in concessions; has made an offer, in the shape of the twenty-five-year Eastern and Western Guarantee Pacts, that goes perilously near outstripping German readiness to follow him; and cannot make a further concession of any consequence lest 'events be left to take their course.' That, of course, would mean war; and are we, as Englishmen who believe in weighing our actions and seeing if possible that our consciences are clear, convinced that such a war is necessary and right? Hitler's Munich speech (on March 13) said: 'I have made my utmost gesture; I will make no more.' Is he not right?

A western frontier made well-nigh impregnable on both sides; eastern frontiers guaranteed by a twenty-five-year pact, which to break means an automatic upon Germany by the air forces of France, Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Russia, to mention no others, a blockade of Germany and sanctions which can be made automatic if we mean business and forthwith take Hitler at his word. The southern neighbours (Czechoslovakia and Austria) are a more delicate problem; for when negotiations commence Germany will ask the Great Powers to guarantee equality of treatment to the minorities in both countries—which in Czechoslovakia means 3½ million Sudetendeutsche and in Austria the majority of Germanic-minded Austrians. But Hitler has more or less made an offer of twenty-five-year pacts with them; and what better offer can we hope to get for these countries now or later on?

If there are middens (such as economic and political strangulation of Germanic culture in Czechoslovakia) to be cleaned up we do no good by refusing to see them; for their continued existence merely condemns the body politic of Europe as a whole to sickness, wars and gradual decay or swift destruction. The Powers at Geneva have too long turned a blind eye to one minority petition after another, thereby making those whose rights we guaranteed when we handed them over to the 'Succession States' (whose ruling elements are their hereditary enemies) spread the common belief that the League is a 'combination of the strong for perpetuation of their injustices.' It is for us, therefore, to warn Czechoslovakia no less sternly than Germany of our refusal further to countenance continued and actually increased persecution of a minority, whose position on the Czecho-German marches makes of them (a compact

and now desperate group of 3½ million people of Germanic blood and feelings) the greatest potential danger to peace in the near future.

Even supposing Hitler could bring his people to countenance these fresh humiliations, is there any precedent for giving Germany confidence in the results that would follow? Did we not persuade Stresemann and Brüning over and over again into making a gesture, the implied result of which was to be successful pressure upon France to disarm, to meet Germany's demands, or to cease her everlasting policy of encirclement? You have read Lord D'Abernon's Memoirs, so I need not remind you of the monotonous repetition by German leaders of the pertinent question, 'But why can we not get a *quid pro quo*?'

Was not the underlying basis of Locarno a half-promise of gradual French disarmament; and was that undertaking—which exerted no small influence on German leaders—even partly honoured? If it had been, I doubt if 'Hitlerism' would have replaced constitutional government in Germany. But no: always the French cry is, 'Back to your cells and we will negotiate—then and not before'; and we go to Germany, as Eden did last week, with a request for a 'gesture' which restores the old order, and puts the French thereafter into a mood in which we have to go back to Germany and say, 'We are very sorry, but with the best will in the world we cannot get our friends to concede your demands.'

Eden's 'offer' to Germany was, 'You must *act* and we will then *try* to get your demands satisfied in whole or in part.' I deplore the German reply; but, in view of endless similar occasions since 1918, I see no sense in expecting Germany now to accede. The time has come for a firm British stand, which I venture to outline as follows:—

(a) Great Britain declares, as an earnest of its resolve to prevent violation of the Franco-German frontier, that any proved armed aggression of Franco-Belgian territory will automatically involve from now onwards:

- (1) The use of the full fighting forces of Great Britain for the purpose of blockade, economic sanctions and defence of the country attacked until such time as the League of Nations—to be called at once—has pronounced its verdict.
- (2) A British demand for similar automatic assistance to Italy and all other members of the League of Nations.
- (3) An appeal by a special League committee to all non-member States to help, by such means and at such time as may seem right to them, in containing the aggressor or denying him assistance.

(b) Great Britain accepts Herr Hitler's offer of Eastern and Western Security Pacts and is prepared to guarantee the former as suggested by Germany.

(c) Great Britain is prepared, on the assumption that Germany will forthwith return—as a free and equal partner—to the League of Nations, to vote for Germany's readmission.

(d) Germany on her part agrees to take no action contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to her Treaty obligations; and to submit to international arbitration all differences that may arise during the next twenty-five years between herself and her neighbours.

This does not cover the *whole* ground—more particularly Czechoslovakia and Austria; but I submit that it accomplishes the *essential* objects of:

- (1) Avoiding war now;
- (2) Removing the main causes of war in the future other than the 'minority' cancers.

With the latter I would suggest dealing by a warning to both France and Czechoslovakia that unless the minority in Czechoslovakia obtains equal treatment within a year Great Britain would not be prepared to renew her most-favoured-nation agreements with this country. Or, alternatively, Great Britain might guarantee the Czechoslovak territories by a declaration, valid for a year only, and subject to satisfactory proof of equality of treatment of all races and creeds in Czechoslovakia. This agreement would not be renewed unless such proofs were afforded.

Such conditions would, I believe, achieve our object by securing relatively fair treatment for the Sudetendeutsche, who, I am convinced, want to remain part of Czechoslovakia and are not wanted as Germans by Germany for economic reasons; though Germany is determined, for cultural and sentimental reasons, to secure them against the present gross discrimination, which is neither denied nor deniable.

This will not be easy to accomplish, but if we fail to secure a settlement on these lines, and remain with our 'honour' rooted in dishonour, we shall suffer the consequences: a war of extermination.

Virgil began the Sixth *Æneid*, or, as some believe, ended the Fifth, with the words—

'Sic fatur lacrimans, classique immittit habenas.'

('Then he spake, weeping, and bid the fleet set sail.')

Let not our statesmen despair.

'Fortitur age et confortetur cor tuum et sustine Dominum.'

ARNOLD WILSON.

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GERMANY'S REARMAMENT

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

By PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. BONE, F.R.S.

THE question of the extent of Germany's rearmament has recently loomed large in the public mind and parliamentary debates, and as it is inseparable from that of the Rhineland reoccupation and the problem of European peace, it should be visualised in its true setting and perspective without the exaggeration of fear on the one hand or indifference as to its significance on the other.

As an example of how palpably it is being exaggerated in certain quarters, it needs only to be recalled how in the House of Commons on March 10 last Mr. Winston Churchill declared that 'since the arrival of Herr Hitler in power three years ago the Germans have spent about £1,500,000,000 sterling upon warlike preparation directly or

indirectly,' and that in a single year (1935) from £600,000,000 to £800,000,000 was 'spent on armaments in Germany.' And on March 26 he said that he had been 'occupied with the idea of the great wheels revolving and the great hammers descending day and night in Germany, making the whole industry of that country an arsenal, making the whole of that gifted and valiant population a great war machine.' On April 20 *The Times* printed a letter from him to the same effect, claiming that the figures he had given were undisputed.

Such being the Churchillian nightmare, it is perhaps not surprising that it scared Miss E. Rathbone, M.P. for the Combined English Universities, into inditing forthwith a letter to the *Manchester Guardian* in which she alleged as a 'fact' that 'Germany had spent £600,000,000 to £800,000,000 on rearmament in 1935 alone; perhaps £1,500,000,000 from 1933 to 1936, much of it secretly while the Disarmament Conference was still sitting,' adding that the object thereof was 'prestige' and 'the annihilation of France.' But when challenged by the writer to produce her evidence for such serious allegations, she had no more to say than that 'I took my figures from Mr. Churchill's speech on March 10; . . . if they are gravely exaggerated, it is strange that the absence of any convincing refutation should have enabled Mr. Churchill to repeat the earlier of them after an interval of some weeks.' And as that gentleman had already put responsibility on to the *Daily Herald* and an unnamed 'financial authority' who had worked out 'how money has been secretly found for these purposes in the German finances,' nothing is left but to exclaim, in Gilbertian phrase:

Tale tremendous, Heaven defend us,
What a tale of Cock and Bull.

Unquestionably Germany has been rearming since April 1934, when Hitler, having had his conciliatory offers turned down by the French, issued orders that rearmament should forthwith proceed rapidly and efficiently; and after the French had extended universal military service from one to two years, on March 16, 1935, he signed the new conscription law and proclamation to provide a standing army of 450,000

men. And such a force needs arming at least up to equality with the power of France; but, for reasons which will presently be given, the notion that during the past three years Germany has spent on rearmament anything like the colossal sums alleged by Mr. Churchill may be dismissed as fantastic.

The expenditure of £1,500,000,000 on armaments in three years by any country would involve such prodigious industrial effort as could not be hidden; and it would assuredly be reflected somewhere in its finances or industrial statistics. For the sum in question is nearly twice the present total annual revenue of Great Britain, 50 per cent. greater than the whole of the capital sunk in British railways, and more than three and a half times greater than the capital sunk in all British authorised gas and electricity undertakings put together. It would suffice to build nearly 200 35,000-ton battleships, or as many *Queen Marys*. And it certainly could not have been effected without such serious dislocations in Germany's iron and steel industries as would, so to speak, have shouted from the housetops, but which in fact seem not to have been observed, save in Churchillian dreams. Let us, however, consider some facts bearing on the situation and judge accordingly.

Public Finance.—According to the *Economist's Commercial History and Review of 1935*, the gross Reich revenue from taxation in the year 1934-5 was 8,223,000,000, as against 6,846,000,000 reichsmarks in 1933-4; and during the past nine months of 1935-6 it was 7,190,000,000, against 6,081,000,000 reichsmarks during the corresponding nine months of 1934-5. The Reich's total debt on October 31, 1935, was given as 14,142,000,000 reichsmarks, although it is admitted that this return omits large undisclosed liabilities for armaments and public works, which are officially said not to exceed 9,000,000,000 reichsmarks, but in some quarters are put much higher. The Review in question also says that during 1935 'the recovery of trade, which began in 1932, proceeded at a slackened pace, and was, in general, marked only in trades favoured by rearmament and public works schemes.' The wholesale prices index number rose from 101.0 to 103.4, and the agricultural index from 122.2 to 123.0, while the average wage of skilled industrial workers remained

unchanged at 0.783 reichsmarks per hour during the year. The total income from wages and salaries in 1935 was returned at 31,190,000,000 reichsmarks as compared with 29,500,000,000 reichsmarks in 1934. In December 1935 there were 2,507,000 unemployed, as against 2,604,000 in December 1934 and 4,058,000 in December 1933, the general industrial output during 1935 being estimated at about 94 per cent. that of 1928, although for the whole year only 64 per cent. of all industrial working-places were occupied. Such official figures do not suggest any such severe industrial dislocations as a rapid change over from normal to a highly intensified armament production would involve; and, unless indeed seriously wrong and misleading, they should be regarded as incompatible with Mr. Churchill's fears. There are, however, other and more general but equally cogent grounds for dismissing the latter as chimerical.

Population and Employment.—The present population of Germany is 67,000,000, of whom 22,500,000 are males between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five years; and after deducting those unemployed, there would remain about 20,000,000 employable and employed males. Of these about 5,750,000 are engaged in agriculture, about 8,000,000 in industry, another 4,000,000 in trade and transport, the remaining 2,250,000 being occupied mainly in professional and official work.

Agricultural Production.—Agriculture is by far Germany's greatest single industry, much of it being on a co-operative basis. Altogether some 13,000,000 men and women are employed in it. In 1934 she had 36,500,000 acres of arable land under grain or root crops, as against our 11,500,000 acres in 1933, as well as 13,667,000 acres of meadow land. Her horses numbered three and a third times, her cattle nearly two and a half times, and her pigs more than seven times those in Great Britain, while in 1934 her wheat crop was three times ours. In 1928 her wheat and barley crops averaged about 4,000,000 metric tons and her rye crop nearly 12,000,000 metric tons per annum. Since then she has increased her wheat and diminished her rye production. And there is nothing in her agricultural returns for 1934 and 1935 to suggest any recent transference of labour from agriculture to industry. Thus we find:

LIVESTOCK CENSUS

	Dec. 1934	Dec. 1935
Horses . . .	3,360,000	3,380,000
Cattle . . .	19,190,000	18,910,000
Pigs . . .	23,100,000	22,820,000
Sheep . . .	3,480,000	3,920,000

CEREAL CROPS (Metric Tons) ¹

	1934	1935
Rye . . .	7,610,000	7,550,000
Wheat . . .	4,530,000	4,670,000
Barley . . .	3,210,000	3,360,000
Oats . . .	5,450,000	5,370,000
Total . . .	<u>20,800,000</u>	<u>20,950,000</u>

And although the potato crop of 1935 (41,000,000 tons) was some 4,000,000 tons below that of 1934, some industrial raw-material crops showed large increases. Clearly, then, whatever new mischief our friend Fritz may have been up to during the past three years, he has not been diverting labour from his land into his mines, forges and factories.

General Industrial Production.—In regard to industrial production, it must always be remembered that, in common with ourselves and the world generally, Germany experienced the disastrous effects of the economic blizzard which set in during 1930 and culminated in the unprecedented slump of 1932. In the last-named year her industrial production fell to about 40 per cent. below 'prosperity' level, the decline for steel being about 60 per cent., machinery 57.5 per cent., pottery 55 per cent., motor cars 38.5 per cent., finished textiles 32 per cent., paper 22.5 per cent., and for footwear 18 per cent. During 1933 an industrial revival set in, and has since continued, but in general production is still below the 1929 level. Such conditions are reflected in Germany's consumption of black coal and lignite, which (including the Saar in 1935) were as follows:

¹ In 1933 our British corn (*i.e.*, wheat, barley and oat) crops amounted to 4,274,000 long tons, and potato crop to 4,555,000 long tons.

CONSUMPTION OF BITUMINOUS COAL AND LIGNITE IN
GERMANY (Million Tons).

	1929	1932	1933	1934	1935 (estd.)
Bituminous coal .	144.5	90.6	94.6	108.0	125
Lignite .	143.3	115.3	125.7	138.6	145
Total	287.8	205.9	220.3	246.6	270

$$\text{Ratio } \frac{1932}{1935} = 0.715; \frac{1935}{1932} = 1.31.$$

In Great Britain the home consumption of bituminous and anthracitic coal was approximately 175,000,000 tons in 1929, 145,000,000 tons in 1932, and 165,000,000 tons in 1934, and will probably work out at about 170,000,000 tons in 1935. And, seeing that bituminous coal and not lignite would be consumed in armament production, Germany's consumption of 125,000,000 tons thereof, as against ours of 170,000,000 tons, in 1935 does not, on the face of things, suggest any Churchillian scale of armament production within the Reich during these years.

Supposing, however, that £1,500,000,000 had been expended upon armaments in Germany during the past three years at a progressively increasing rate—or (say) £300,000,000 in 1933, £500,000,000 in 1934, and £700,000,000 in 1935—and that the average wage of a skilled industrial worker was 2000 reichsmarks (an equivalent to £160 at the current rate of exchange) per annum, it would have meant the full-time employment of no less than 1,800,000 men in 1933, 3,125,000 in 1934, and 4,375,000 (or more than half Germany's available industrial force) in 1935. Moreover, seeing that the official 'unemployment' figure was 4,000,000 persons at the beginning and 2,500,000 at the end of the period in question, it follows that, had armament production really been on such supposed colossal scale, there would have been a diversion during 1934 and 1935 of something like 2,500,000 persons (or about 30 per cent. of Germany's available industrial force) from the production of useful commodities for general consumption to that of unconsumed armaments, a condition which certainly would have resulted in a marked shrinkage

of goods sold in German shops. Yet although during 1935 (to quote the *Economist's* review again) 'the pace of recovery in wholesale trade slackened and in retail trade almost ceased,' there was no evidence of any great shrinkage.

Iron and Steel Production.—The manufacture of armaments involves chiefly steel and copper, together with smaller amounts of such metals as nickel, chromium, etc., as are contained in the special alloy steels used in making guns, armour plates, and war machines generally. It is perhaps difficult to say precisely what will be the cost of a ton of steel when ultimately worked up into such finished products, but the fact that a 35,000-ton battleship and its armament, principally composed of steel, costs something like £230 per ton will suffice to show its order. And it would appear that if in 1935 Germany had really spent as much as £700,000,000 on armaments, probably not less than some 2,000,000 tons of steel would have been involved, the larger proportion of which would not have been ordinary mild steel sections but crucible or electric steel and/or special steel forgings or castings. For any abnormally large armament production would assuredly be reflected in the output of the last-named products.

Also, in considering the relevant iron and steel statistics, it should be borne in mind that 'rearmament' was certainly nowhere in the air during the post-war 'boom' year of 1929, and that however busy the Devil may have been rearming Germans in 1935, he had not in that year included Britons in such attentions. Hence, unless the 1935 iron and steel statistics (and especially those for steel forgings and the like) show a much greater ratio to those of 1929 than do the corresponding British figures and ratio, or unless they reveal some exceptionally high 1934 and 1935 figures for steel forgings and the like, any alleged colossal German rearmament during those years may be gravely doubted.

Bearing all such considerations in mind, and discriminating between (a) such items as steel forgings, castings, etc., as enter largely into armaments, and (b) such as rails, sleepers, girders, etc., which do not, the following comparative figures for (I.) Great Britain and (II.) Germany and the Saar may be cited as significant in regard to the point at issue:

OUTPUT OF IRON, STEEL, STEEL FORGINGS AND OTHER SECTIONS (Million Tons)

I. Great Britain						Ratio	
	1929	1932	1933	1934	1935	$\frac{1935}{1929}$	$\frac{1935}{1932}$
Pig iron	7.59	3.57	4.13	5.97	6.42	0.85	1.8
Total steel	9.65	5.26	7.02	8.85	9.84	1.02	1.9
(a) Steel forgings	0.243	0.103	0.146	0.212	0.261	1.075	2.55
(b) { Rails, sleepers, etc.	0.750	0.360	0.337	0.457	0.455	0.58	1.21
(b) { Girders, joists, etc.	0.414	0.281	0.330	0.446	—	0.68	—

II. Germany and Saar						Ratio	
	1929	1932	1933	1934	1935	$\frac{1935}{1929}$	$\frac{1935}{1932}$
Pig iron	15.5	5.28	6.85	10.86	12.65	0.82	2.4
Total steel	18.45	7.23	9.28	13.85	16.15	0.85	2.24
(a) Steel forgings	0.258	0.115	0.144	0.259	0.337	1.31	2.95
(b) { Rails, sleepers, etc.	1.67	0.497	0.731	0.907	0.889	0.53	1.79
(b) { Girders, etc.	1.247	0.368	0.517	0.983	1.073	0.86	2.93

Such figures suggest little more than that in both countries iron and steel production had slumped heavily between 1929 and 1932, but had since substantially regained the lost ground, on the whole rather more so in Great Britain than in Germany. Indeed, except that in both 1934 and 1935 the German production of steel forgings went somewhat ahead of ours, there is nothing suggestive of any marked difference between 'armament' production in the two countries during 1929-35. Moreover, in neither country has the recovery in regard to 'railway' materials been nearly so marked as that in those used for building and public works.

The inference that Germany's recent 'armament' steel production has not been on anything like a 'war' scale is supported by the following figures for the total German production of crucible and electric steel and steel castings for the years 1913 (pre-war), 1917 (mid-war), 1929 (post-war 'prosperity' year) and 1934, respectively:

GERMAN PRODUCTION OF CRUCIBLE AND ELECTRIC STEELS AND STEEL CASTINGS (Million Tons)

1913	0.536	1929	0.484
1917	1.844	1934	0.498

Nickel Importations.—Nickel being an essential component, to an average of about 3 per cent., of the special steel alloys used in the manufacture of heavy armaments, as well as of much other apparatus and plant used for entirely peaceful purposes, the following figures deserve examination, especially as Germany is dependent upon overseas supplies of the metal:

GERMAN IMPORTS (LESS EXPORTS) OF NICKEL (Long Tons)

	1929	1932	1933	1934	1935
Metal	2,353	nil	1,937	3,996	5,836
Ore	13,303	16,909	33,639	36,399	28,500
Estimated total metal, assuming 10 per cent. in ore	3,683	1,690	5,300	7,635	8,686

It will be seen that the retained nickel imports have been rapidly increasing since the 'slump' of 1932; yet even during 1934 and 1935 they did not exceed our home consumption of nickel, which may be computed at about 10,000 tons per annum. And it will scarcely be suggested that our consumption in these years had any sinister 'armament' implication, for never perhaps had our innocence been more patent. Nor is there necessarily any such implication in regard to Germany, seeing that in normal times about 90 per cent. of the world's nickel consumption is for non-armament purposes.

The German figures are complicated by the fact that so much of her nickel imports have been in the form of ore the average metal content of which is difficult to estimate, although probably it would not have exceeded 10 per cent. and might have been lower. Assuming, however, 10 per cent. as a possible maximum, Germany's *net* nickel imports would have been as shown in the last line of the foregoing figures, which would give not more than 7635 tons in 1934 and

8686 tons in 1935—i.e., less than our own computed home consumption. And if even the whole thereof had been absorbed in the production of a 3 per cent. nickel steel, such as is used (*inter alia*) for armaments, its total output in 1935 would not have exceeded some 290,000 tons, of which the greater part, probably three-quarters, would have been for non-armament purposes. Yet even assuming that as much as *half* of it had gone into armaments finally costing (say) £250 per ton on the average, an expenditure of the order of some £36,250,000 on heavy armaments in 1935 might be visualised; but by no possible stretch of imagination could it have approached anywhere near the astronomical Churchillian dimensions.

Chrome and Tungsten Ore Importation.—As both chromium and tungsten enter into the composition of special alloy steels, chromium to an average of about 1 per cent into nickel-chrome and chromium steels used in gun forgings and the like, as well as up to 12 per cent. into 'stainless steels,' and tungsten to an average of 16 to 20 per cent. together with 3 to 5 per cent. of chromium into those of high-speed self-hardening cutting tools used (*inter alia*) in armament-making, the following figures for British and German importation of chrome and tungsten ores throw some supplementary sidelight upon the question under discussion, both countries being almost entirely dependent upon overseas supplies of both these commodities.

Chrome ore, which consists essentially of $\text{FeO} \cdot \text{Cr}_2\text{O}_3$, may contain anything between 40 and 60 per cent. of chromium oxide Cr_2O_3 ; and if an average of 50 per cent. be assumed, it would be equivalent to about 35 per cent. of metallic chromium.

Tungsten ore, which nowadays chiefly comes from China, Burma, Malaya and the United States, usually contains between 60 and 70 per cent. of the oxide WO_3 , or from 47.6 to 55.3 per cent. of the metal. For our present purpose an average metal content of 50 per cent. may be conveniently assumed. It must, however, be borne in mind that both chromium and tungsten, or their oxides, are used for other purposes than alloy steels, the former for chrome-plating and the latter for electric lamp filaments, though chiefly they go into steels.

BRITISH AND GERMAN IMPORTS OF CHROME AND TUNGSTEN ORES (Long Tons)

(a) Chrome Ore (Cr = *circa* 35 per cent.)

	1929	1932	1933	1934	1935
Great Britain . . .	27,276	21,664	28,985	36,553	—
Germany . . .	41,036	41,979	46,951	75,767	93,930

(b) Tungsten Ore (Tungsten = *circa* 50 per cent.)

	1932	1933	1934	1935
Great Britain . . .	3,631	4,117	4,331	6,536
Germany . . .	3,714	1,688	3,766	4,385

It will be observed that in both 1932 and 1934 the German imports of chrome ore were approximately twice ours; and although the British figures for 1935 are not yet available, they will almost certainly have exceeded those of 1934, and probably be not much less than half those of Germany in 1935. And as regards tungsten ore, our importations have always exceeded those of Germany—e.g., in 1934 by about 50 and in 1935 by rather more than 25 per cent. In neither case do the figures seem to indicate any greater rate of increase between 1932 and 1935 than might be attributed to the general trade revival, although some part of Germany's increased importations during 1934 and 1935 has probably been due to armament.

Non-ferrous Metals.—Finally, an examination of actual German consumption of such non-ferrous metals as copper, lead, zinc and aluminium, as compared with ours, during recent years has revealed nothing of sinister import, although the fact that recently in Germany aluminium has been substituted for copper for certain purposes may be viewed as probably having some bearing upon 'armament.' The following comparative figures from *Quin's Metal Handbook and Statistics*, 1936, published by the Metal Information Bureau of London, will perhaps suffice to make this clear:

CONSUMPTION OF NON-FERROUS METALS IN THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS

	Copper				Lead			
	1932	1933	1934	1935	1932	1933	1934	1935
U.K. . .	131	145	221	275	240	270	330	345
Germany . .	137	170	221	200	113	146	165	175

CONSUMPTION OF NON-FERROUS METALS IN THOUSANDS OF
METRIC TONS—*continued*

	Zinc				Aluminium			
	1932	1933	1934	1935	1932	1933	1934	1935
U.K. .	110	132	180	198	20	21	23	29
Germany .	127	148	182	194	18.5	27.5	32.5	70

General Conclusion.—Having thus endeavoured to examine dispassionately, in the dry light of such relevant statistics as are available, Mr. Winston Churchill's recent allegations in the House of Commons about Germany's huge expenditure upon armaments during the past three years, and having failed to discover the slightest grounds for his statements as to the magnitudes of the monetary sums involved, the writer concludes that they should be dismissed as gross exaggerations unworthy of credence. And it is hoped that the facts and considerations put forward herein will ease both his and the public mind on the subject. At the same time, however, there is evidence that the extent of German rearmament during 1934 and 1935, though nothing like that alleged, has not been negligible, but is a factor to be reckoned with and duly laid to heart.

WILLIAM A. BONE.

COLLECTIVE INSECURITY

By WALTER SIMONS, Ph.D.
(former Chief Justice of Germany)

It has for many years past been the kindly habit of Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, the great president of a great University, to send to his friends, at the New Year, a printed card containing some appropriate reflections from the mirror of his own mind. At the end of 1935 I received from him a card adorned with the following sentences :

No people is so insecure as one which is heavily armed. At any moment tens of thousands of its youth may be hurled to a cruel death. Security is collective security built upon a foundation of international co-operation and supported by an international police. The alternative is international chaos, mounting armaments, world-wide economic depression, paralysis of trade and persistent lack of confidence. The only certain way to keep out of war is to join in preventing war.

In this statement I find what seem to me manifest truths, but also hidden fallacies. Six months ago collective security through the League of Nations was the watchword of respectable politicians and responsible statesmen. Mr. Hodza, the Czechoslovakian Minister, proclaimed the new Creed with missionary zeal in the capitals of Europe, though with less success than he expected; Mr. Baldwin declared it to be the basis of British policy, and vindicated it stoutly against France, the first defender of this Faith. It was supported by British public opinion, to the detriment of the Hoare-Laval plan, which contemplated a more individualistic solution of the Italo-Abyssinian riddle. But the Negus did not gain by this return to orthodoxy.

What is wrong with this principle? In theory, it looks convincing; in practice, it has embarrassing and disagreeable consequences. Is it a true principle, or a pseudo-concept?

I suggest that it is both, according to the medium and the spirit of its application. To live in security is an aim which mankind shares with the animal world; the sole difference is that humanity needs security more than most animals, whose safety in this dangerous world has ever been the care of Dame Nature. Men must gather food into barns, and procure warmth by means of fuel, clothes and shelter; and they must be armed with weapons against all comers. Under primitive forms of civilisation this sort of security was a matter for the individual; but the basis of every human social order has ever been collective security, whether through the family, the *gens*, the tribe, the *polis*, or the nation. European philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries held that the desire for security was the motive force of the 'social contract.' If that be so, why not apply this *modus procedendi* to an even wider circle—to the society of nations, in fact? Such an application is the logical consequence of earlier security, a panacea against international discord and war. The rational and logical mind of the French people rightly acclaimed with enthusiasm the idea embodied in Articles VIII. and XVI. of the Covenant. But it took root also in sober-minded and realistic England, though not without some insular misgivings.

Nevertheless, if tested by the touchstone of social history, this conception of collective security reveals itself as an illusion which has often developed in the past from irrational sources, either by natural processes of growth, like plants or the British Constitution, or imposed, on a chance medley of quarrelsome States, by the superior will of a great king or statesman. The only notable exception to this general rule is that offered by the United States of America. The British Colonies which founded this great political system were driven by circumstances to create collective security for themselves, and did so. This 'New Commonwealth' was rooted in the Puritan faith, and was the embodiment of that belief in individual and political Liberty for which their forefathers had sacrificed individual comfort, the security of a life surrounded by the amenities of European civilisation—even life itself. For the New Englanders, this political creed, strengthened by religious fervour, played the rôle of those divine patrons who guaranteed collective security of old—the sanctuaries round which the Ionian League, the League of

Delos, and the Amphictyonian League were assembled at the greatest period of Greek history, the *penates* and the *laris* of the Roman family and *gens*, the altar erected to the emperor and to be adored, on pain of death, by every Roman subject.

Yet, paradoxically, the American people eschew every external form of collective security as an 'entanglement.' This aversion caused the downfall of President Wilson: it caused the repudiation by the United States Senate of the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations, and the Tripartite Guarantee Pact promised to France by President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George. It underlay more recently the adoption by Congress of the New American neutrality system, one of the most significant and important political facts of the present time. Its growing strength sounded the knell of Britain's policy of collective security and support of the League of Nations. The advocates of collective security regard these facts as showing that the system must be worldwide. They cannot deny that it has failed hitherto. China reaped no advantage from it; it has not saved Manchukuo from Japan, nor Outer Mongolia from Russia. It has not stayed the hand of Italy in Ethiopia. In each case the identity of the aggressor was never in doubt and was duly recorded at Geneva. In each case the parties were bound by the Pact of Paris as well as by the Covenant.

The advocates of collective security claim that these failures are due to the abstention of the United States and certain European Powers. I confess that I hold the contrary opinion. I believe that the main cause of the failure of the League of Nations is not to be sought in its lack of universality but, in present circumstances, to the fact that it embraces too many discordant entities. The rationalistic and idealistic inventors and founders of this institution omitted to examine the real qualities of the subsoil. They created a society in which there was no fellowship, and besmirched the ideal of a collective security by basing their own common security on the insecurity of their neighbours. The structure, when tested, proved at the same time too big and too small. If the United States had been told that their responsibility for collective security was limited to the continent of America, they would not have refused to enter the League, because they could have done within the League what they were already doing

outside it. Had Japan been told it was left to her to watch, with her neighbours, over the security of the Far Eastern nations, Japan would still be a member of the League. Instead, the Covenant embraced the whole *orbis terrarum* jointly and severally pledged to guarantee the security of the world. The League failed ignominiously in Manchukuo and the Chaco, both distant regions for which Europe felt little responsibility. It failed here because it was too big. In Europe it failed because it was too small. Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria were allowed to enter the League, but on terms which deprived them of their individual security and independence. They were destined to be treated in perpetuity as second-rate members whose only concern with collective security was anxiety lest it should be used to hold them in bondage. Briand tried in vain to found security on a purely economic basis. Even the limited aim of European collectivity in the pursuit of peace was thus missed. This defect in the prevailing system of collective security has hitherto escaped the attention of League politicians. It required the drastic methods of the German Führer to open men's eyes to the necessity of assuring real equality between the peoples of Europe and to assure the rights of individual security before contemplating a system of collective security. Denial of equal rights was the cause of Germany's departure from the League; practical acknowledgment of equal rights will be the condition of her return. Thus alone can the basis of collective security be broadened.

The defenders of collective security are inclined to ascribe the failure of the League to defects in Article XVI. of the Covenant. It is not enough for them that every member of the League is bound to partake in the sanctions decided on by the competent organs of the League; the task of co-ordinating the contributions of the different members leaves room for so many evasions and procrastinations that the effect of compulsory measures ordered by the League under Article XVI. may be greatly reduced. So they demand, like Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, an international police force, administered by the League, always ready to strike rapidly and effectively at a recalcitrant member State or a lawless aggressor. This idea has always found favour in France. Her chief proposal, often reiterated, was to internationalise

aircraft in order to equip the League exclusively with this most modern and most impressive of military weapons. Since France was assured for many years of predominance in the air, she could exercise a powerful control on the proposed air force of the League.

How was the fact of aggression to be decided, and by whom? The League has discussed three tests of aggression.¹ One test proposed in connexion with discussions on disarmament is to regard that State as the aggressor which is responsible for the first 'act of war,' especially he who first invaded foreign territory. Another test was mentioned when the League had to deal with claims for reparation maintained before it after hostilities had ceased—namely, to regard that State as the aggressor which was under the least necessity of defence at the time hostilities began. A third test seems to have been finally adopted by the League in most of the cases brought before it for decision where the Council had to consider the consequences of hostilities. Instead of trying to state which party was actually the first to commit 'acts of war,' or which was morally bound to defend itself when hostilities began, the League inquired which party was willing to stop fighting when invited to do so. None of these tests facilitate prompt action against an aggressor. As to the first, it suffices to look at the difficulties of the Wal-Wal case; as to the second, a moral judgment respecting the necessity of defence between two States, both declaring and feeling themselves attacked, presupposes a knowledge of all circumstances existing at the outbreak of hostilities: that is in most cases impossible without a lengthy judicial inquiry. The attempt made at Geneva in 1924 to define the aggressor by an additional protocol to the Covenant, destined to fill the famous 'gap' left in Article XV., and to remove thereby, in the interest of collective security, the last possibility of a permitted war, was likewise abortive. The third and last test is easily evaded: both parties declare themselves ready to stop fighting, but are unable to do so because the measures taken by the enemy compel them, in spite of their good intentions, to continue their operations. The truth or falsity of such statements can, like the complaints referring to lawless

¹ See the articles of Quincy Wright in the *American Journal of International Law*, vol. xxix., p. 381ff; vol. xxx., p. 52f.

warfare, in most cases only be determined by a close investigation on the battlefield.

This uncertainty as to what constitutes aggression detracts greatly from the advantages expected by optimists from collective security. It would develop into a real danger if the League controlled a combined land, sea, and air force under the name of an international police, for as yet neither the League nor a League police can be really international. The League is composed and directed by nationally and even nationalistically minded politicians whose influence varies but is never without some national bias. The contingents used by the League as its own police will, in spirit if not in law, remain nationals of that State to which they owed allegiance before they entered the League's service. 'Collective security' would, in such conditions, entail the security of every nation at which the leading Powers of the League looked askance.

The sanctions of Article XVI. of the Covenant, even if not strengthened by an international police force, are themselves likely to render the political situation of many member States not involved in the difference extremely insecure. Under that Article every member is bound to take hostile measures—economic, financial, and military—against a State with which, probably, it wishes to live in peace and to sustain friendly commercial intercourse. Each member of the League has lost the '*jus belli ac pacis*,' the rights of neutrality, and must submit its political and economic interests to the decision of a number of gentlemen sitting in Geneva, who will settle in what manner it must participate in sanctions. Every such member must undergo hardships, in varying measure, imposed on it, by way of retaliation, from the State which is the object of League disapproval. Is it likely that the populations will accept the sole consolation offered by their leaders—that it is an honour to suffer for the ideal of collective security—*dulce et decorum est pro patria alieni mori*? Such has recently been the position in relation to the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, which transformed the collective security of the League into a collective insecurity; in the case of Manchuria, even great Powers refrained from inaugurating collective sanctions because they feared the insecurity that was bound to result.

Of the States which, after the foundation of the League,

welcomed collective security, France was for many years the foremost. Nevertheless, her own faith in this sacred cause was not strong enough to prevent her from seeking more effective guarantees of her own security. So she concluded those very military alliances, so earnestly condemned by President Wilson, which are contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Covenant and can be justified only on the ground that collective security, in the sense of the Covenant, is of no value.

In reality France has added one collective insecurity to another. The world knows that the Quai d'Orsay always favoured a future reinstatement of the Hapsburgs on a reconstructed throne of Austria as the surest guarantee against the *Anschluss*. The other Succession States of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire are resolutely opposed to such a change and are ready to wage war in order to prevent it. In this way France could be compelled to join arms with her allies in waging a war on behalf of a cause against her own political interests. France has concluded a military alliance with Soviet Russia, manifestly directed against Germany, under which she would, in certain circumstances, be obliged to assist Russia in a war against Poland, her old friend. True, Poland has made a non-aggression treaty with Russia, and war between these two Powers is unlikely. But so has Germany; and her treaty with Russia of 1925 has been recently renewed. Poland fought against Russia in 1920 on behalf of her eastern border, and the causes of this war have not been removed. There is, implicitly or explicitly, a term to all treaties. Has not France, by these treaties, created for herself a very dangerous 'collective insecurity'? And will not every Power that follows her example lose, in the same degree, its individual security and the sovereign liberty to decide for which cause it will risk the wealth and the life of its subjects?

The conviction that collective security, in the sense hitherto given to this concept, is no real security brought the peoples not only of Europe but of the whole world to the conclusion that individual security, besides the collective one, must be based on national armaments. The lesson of the Great War to belligerents and neutrals alike seems forgotten. Unlimited national armaments—that was the gist of the homily read from a thousand platforms—inevitably lead to

war. Collective disarmament is the Usher posted by Justice at the entrance to the Temple of Peace. To make sure that the Usher could be installed in his functions Germany was forced under the Versailles Treaty to prepay her share of the salary by disarming, not collectively, but unilaterally. Likewise, in order to prevent a new clash of arms between France and Germany, Germany was required unilaterally to demilitarise the Rhineland zone. The German delegation at Versailles—whereof I was Commissioner-General—accepted these conditions, without protesting against them on principle, because by virtue of the preamble to Part V. of the Treaty they were assured that a reciprocal development of these measures would follow. When the Treaty had come into force, Germany had therefore good reason to demand an equal measure of disarmament by the other Powers. To President Wilson's mind that measure should have extended to a limitation of the armed forces of every State member of the League, and to a police force sufficient to assure internal order. The French amendment to the Covenant succeeded in transforming 'internal order' into the 'national security' which, according to the original plan, was to be assured through 'collective security.' Indeed, to contribute to the sanctions prescribed by the League against a law-breaking State the police force of every member State should be strong enough to devote a section of relative efficiency to such a purpose. But this obligation assumes a different significance when it relates to the provision of armaments sufficient to secure the defence of a nation against a potential aggressor, in addition to, or in fact as a substitute for, collective security. To cover such a *volte-face*, Powers augmenting their armaments seek to justify their action by pointing out that, in neglecting their military forces, they would be defaulting with regard to their obligations under the Covenant.

France has done that many times since the Great War, and Great Britain is doing it now. France, once the foremost protagonist of collective security, has nowadays less faith in her old fetish. Her readiness to join in the sanctions decreed by the League against Italy was impaired by her Latin sympathies. Before these lines appear in print the world will know whether France is willing to strike a bargain with Great Britain—namely, to join in further sanctions

against Italy on condition that Great Britain joins in sanctions against Germany, both parties endeavouring to be prepared.

I assert with some confidence that since the foundation of the League none of its members have gained from collective security, none have willingly accepted the obligation to resort to collective sanctions. Even Great Britain, into whose hands the banner of collective security has been delivered by France, seems to feel not at all comfortable in waving it now; for who can say to what lengths it may lead her? And if she should, against her inherited traditions, shut her eyes to the consequences, the Dominions would hasten to open them again. What is at the bottom of the inability of the League system to procure for its members a durable feeling of rest and peace? It is not the lack of an international police force, but the fact that the members of the League, instead of joining their forces, are pooling their fears. The system of collective security is based on the assumption of a collectivity that does not yet exist and cannot be created by sanctions. The collective security of the Roman *familia* and *gens* centred in the common worship of a Divine Presence, in whose name collective interests were cared for and differences between members composed or arbitrated. The League of Nations has no common worship, no common religious ideals, no common faith. It is no more a 'Holy Alliance' than was that union of autocrats who, after the Napoleonic Wars, strove to maintain in Europe a *status quo* of fettered nations.

It seems impossible to find a common religion or political faith binding all peoples of the earth together; that may come, but we shall not live to see it. What we need to-day is European team-mentality; without that concert Europe will end by falling under the domination of foreign races and other continents. Team work and comradeship once secured, collective security will follow without sanctions. By the Great War and the world-wide economic depression we have experienced in Europe a solidarity of sorrow; why do we live in fear, arming against each other, seeking collective or individual security against each other? Why cannot we feel as comrades of one team, as sailors in the same ship? Because the peoples of Europe are slow to forget their bloody history; because the victors of yesterday seem unable to look at their

foes of the past as companions on the way to a better future. With perfect reason French politicians have demanded moral before material disarmament; unhappily for Europe, they addressed this demand exclusively to foreign peoples, not to their own. In consequence, every attempt of German statesmen to reach an open and comprehensive understanding with France has, to this day, been suspiciously, even disdainfully, rejected.

The second condition of comradeship is equality. It was, theoretically, conceded to Germany by the League in vague terms more than a dozen years after the Peace of Versailles, but shortly afterwards denied in practice by Sir John Simon on behalf of the League. So the present German Chancellor, with the full consent of the German people, was forced to leave the League and to assert Germany's equality in virtue of his people's inborn right of liberty and self-determination. True, he acted in contravention of the written articles of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact; but the Powers now ready to sit in judgment on Germany are neither impartial nor without guilt in respect of similar acts. Herr Hitler is not willing to retract or to repent, but is ready to devise, in counsel with every other European Power, a new and better collective security, a system which will not tempt the nations ruinously to increase their armaments, nor to devise new forms of economic self-sufficiency destined to save them from strangulation by economic or military sanctions.

Material security is not a very grand or lofty ideal; it is the typical ideal of the bourgeois. Better to live dangerously and free than secure and in chains. And what is worldly security? In most cases an illusion. Trust your neighbour, and in nine cases out of ten he will show himself trustworthy. Leave the anxiety respecting the tenth case to God Almighty; He has yet a share in distributing security. Dare to take a risk on the right side, on the side of international understanding, instead of taking it on the wrong side, on the side of international sanctions. Schiller ends one of his most beautiful poems with the apostrophe:

*Du musst glauben, du musst wagen, Man must trust, and man must dare.
denn die Götter leihn Kein Pfand; God does not give 'security.'*

WALTER SIMONS.

PEACE THROUGH EFFECTIVE DEFENCE

By SIR NORMAN ANGELL

It is far easier to deal with error, with folly, with definite wickedness, than with confusion. And the fact which stands out as marking the whole international scene to-day is confusion: confusion of plans, confusion of responsibilities, confusion of needs, confusion of causes. We have had conferences innumerable, pacts without number, new treaties endlessly replacing old, until in this ever-thickening maze the ordinary citizen has become hopelessly lost. There is no agreement as to responsibility: some blame France, some Germany, some Russia. So with remedies: some are clamant for the abolition of the League; others as insistent for its strengthening. One group stands for the abolition of Article XVI.; another for fortifying it. We should abandon sanctions; we should stiffen them. Remove the economic causes of war. Economic causes have little to do with it.

When a discussion has reached that point of confusion it is time to go back to the beginning, to ask what it is all about; to restore some intellectual order and orderliness. We can do that best in the ancient Greek fashion, and by the Greek method—by asking the most rudimentary and elementary questions of all: What do we want? Want, that is, not as the result of next week's manœuvre in the political game, but ultimately. For what are we all striving as the final end? What is the common need, and the common aim, if common aim there be? It is clear that we seldom ask those questions with sincerity and seriousness, careful of the meaning of the words we use. For each nation professes to state what it wants, and then by what it does, denies what it says.

Each nation concerned in these negotiations says that its first and last objective is Peace. On unnumbered occasions

our statesmen, for instance, have declared that the greatest interest of the British Empire is peace. Even States which are supposed, in a sense, to expect war, if not to welcome it, in which professions of pacifism are a qualification for the concentration camp; even statesmen who, like Mussolini, declare that 'war alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it,' or who, again, tell us that 'Fascism believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace'—even these tell us that their supreme purpose is the maintenance of peace. Germany imprisons pacifists, teaches her youngsters that man's noblest occupation is war; but Dr. Goebbels tells us also that 'Germany has furnished abundant proofs of her love of peace' and desires it above all things. Mussolini, who tells us that 'renunciation of war-like imperialism is a sign of decay and death,' also tells us that Italy wants, beyond all else, 'to be let alone in order to realise the beautiful and noble principles which she has proclaimed.'

The purpose of reminding the reader of these declarations is not to imply that the professions of peace are insincere, or hypocritical, in any ordinary sense. It is to illustrate the point made above that the confusion which marks this subject extends to the ordinary use of words—a confusion so great that the words are apt to become almost meaningless; and to support the contention that we have not, in fact, asked ourselves what we want, and the price at which we want it.

When our statesmen join the chorus and proclaim that 'the greatest interest of the British Empire is peace,' they are doubtless just as sincere as the others. But yet, like the others, they do not believe what they say. They say what they do not believe, not from any desire to deceive, but from failure to examine the real meaning of the words they use. That they do not believe peace to be the first interest is, again, proved by what they do. They, like the statesmen of every great nation, arm their State, give it instruments of war, which means that they do not put peace first, or regard it as the greatest interest of the Empire. The fact that they maintain their arms, are exceedingly nervous about possible deficiency of arms, means that in certain circumstances they would fight—go to war; do not, therefore, regard war as

the worst thing which could happen, do not put peace before all else. It means that they put defence first, before peace—regard domination and conquest by a foreign State as worse than war—and that they would go to war to resist that condition.

That nations should make defence their first objective of policy is certainly entirely natural, as it may well be entirely moral. For the purpose of this explanation its morality will be accepted as unquestionable. Self-preservation is the first law of life, the deepest instinct of every living thing, and 'defence' is merely the act by which that instinct is fulfilled. But the truth that all great nations—including our own—do, in fact, put defence before peace constitutes a most important qualification to these statements which we make about wanting peace before all else. It is not true that we want peace before all else, or that the objective of our policy is peace. Our objective first is defence; and our problem is not to discover the policy which will give us peace. It is to discover the policy which will give us peace plus defence. That distinction is not something which is merely verbal, or hair-splitting, or academic. It goes to the very root of our confusions and our failures. No clear thought about policy is possible unless the distinction be kept in mind.

In our efforts at peace heretofore, we have tended to separate defence from peace: the pacifist has tended to disparage pre-occupation with defence—to imply that nervousness about its means and instruments is exaggerated; the patriot to disparage the attitude of the pacifist as implying indifference to the needs of national defence.

It is here implied that we shall have solved the problem of peace when we have solved the problem of effective defence; when we have made the defence of one great State compatible with the defence of others. War might quite correctly be described as due to the adoption by nations of a method of defence which certainly does not defend and as certainly does produce war. There is nothing singular or new, incidentally, in the instinct of self-preservation prompting a reaction which is, in fact, destructive instead of protective. It is the instinct of self-preservation, uncontrolled by social discipline, which produces most of the loss of life in the panic of a theatre fire, or in the rush for the boats in a ship-

wreck. It is the instinct of self-preservation which prompts the amateur sailor to run for harbour when he ought to keep the sea; it is that instinct which in a hundred situations prompts action or policy the very reverse of what is defensive. Instinct, uncorrected by discipline, the first thought as distinct from the second, becomes more and more inadequate as our social organisation becomes more and more complex; when society, that is, develops more quickly than our biological make-up.

What is usually the 'instinctively' defensive policy of a nation? It is to say, 'We must be stronger than any likely to attack us,' and virtually to leave it at that. We argue—as every great nation argues—'We are a peaceful people. The world knows that we want peace. Any increase of our power must therefore be a factor of peace. Effective defence consists in being so much stronger than a rival that he will not dare to attack you.' So be it. In any contest we must be the stronger. Then what becomes of the defence of the weaker? Is he to go without this first right of every living thing—defence? The policy begins with a denial of right: a denial to the weaker of the right of defence by superior power we claim for ourselves. By that method it is possible for both to be secure only when each is stronger than the other.

However one may argue the case, this primary inequity, and primary defiance of arithmetic, remains. Commonly we refuse to go on with the argument because we have a feeling that the only result of going on with it would be to establish a moral or mathematical case for the surrender of defence, which is 'against nature'; or that the point is sophistry.

Not uncommonly the reply would be: 'You do not want equality of right as between the householder and the burglar: if the burglar desires to be secure from the effectiveness of your arms, he has only to keep out.'

But do we—does any great nation—mean by defence what the householder means when he locks his doors at night? We have fought many foreign wars since the Norman conquest: they have all been fought in other countries; often on the other side of the world. Is it argued that *all* those wars were burglary? Our history is not peculiar in the fact that most of our wars were fought on the

soil of other countries. The United States, a country proud of its remoteness, basing its foreign policy on 'disentanglement,' on the assumption that it has no concern with the affairs of the outside world, has in its short history landed its soldiers about a hundred times on foreign soil: on the shores of the Mediterranean, in China, in Japan, in the Philippines, in Pacific islands, in Cuba, in Haiti, in Porto Rico, in Mexico, in Nicaragua, in Russia, in France, in Germany. It has fought one war with Great Britain, been near to several more; was once virtually at war with France, been near to another. Not one of these wars, or near wars, was to defend American soil; in several cases was not even remotely connected with the defence of American soil. So with our wars: whatever their cause or their justification, that justification was not the actual expulsion or repulsion of invaders, of burglars entering the house.

This does not mean that they were unjustified; that they were not defensive. They may well have been defensive. But plainly they were not defending the national soil. They were defending the national interests and rights, interests which may clash with those of other countries the world over.

National defence thus really means being able to keep our end up in disputes with other nations when we are not in agreement with them; being able to enforce our view of our rights when that view differs from theirs. But that makes the moral dilemma of defence by the individual power of each nation worse than ever. The stronger says, in effect: 'I will use my power purely for defence. And by defence I mean that when we get into a dispute as to our respective rights I alone shall be judge of the dispute.' The assertion of such a right, and the power to enforce it, kills any equivalent right on the part of the other party to the dispute. These are not academic considerations: they are of the essence of the motives which have underlain the policy of European States for centuries. A nation confronted by the overwhelming power of another knows that it is at the mercy of that other in any dispute which may arise and will react against that position of inferiority if it possibly can. It underlay our own hostility to Germany before the war, a hostility which was evinced long before any Belgian question

arose, which was expressed in scares about German attack and German invasion; which prompted the writing of a number of prophetic romances of German invasions; the appearance on the London stage of plays revealing the presence of the German invader. Plainly the feeling was all but universal: If Germany becomes much stronger, we shall be without defence. We knew, indeed, that we could not wait till the point of invasion; that a power which dominated the whole of Europe, which could direct the policy of satellite States 'from Berlin to Bagdad' and from Antwerp to Vladivostok, would not need to trouble about invasion to impose its will. Little Falls, Arkansas, the smallest back block settlement of Australia, shared with us the misgivings which that sinister possibility provoked.

But our alternative to a situation in which we were at Germany's mercy was to create one in which she was at ours: to impose upon Germany the very position of inferiority of power which we refused to accept for ourselves. The result for her was the Treaty of Versailles. That is the gift which she owes to the power of the British Navy, in the sense that without the British Navy that Treaty could never have been made. The moral for Germany is: 'That is what comes of being weaker than your enemy. You cannot hope for justice.' She reacts against that situation by an attempt once more to be predominant. If she succeeds in that effort, she will rewrite the Treaty, redraw the map of Europe according to her view of the rights of Germany. But they will be Nazi views of Right, Nazi views of what German power and influence in the world should be. There is the possibility—to put it very moderately indeed—that the position for Germany, which Nazi doctrine and a Nazi Party think fitting, will be a position hardly consonant with what we regard as the due security of British interests and rights: as the result of which situation there will, of course, be a new contest of power, a new war treaty, worse than its predecessors, *ad infinitum*, *ad nauseam*.

We have in the past, of course, managed to obscure this dilemma by euphemisms—e.g., 'Balance of Power.' But it is clearly impossible to say when a balance of power has been established, because it is quite impossible to equate varying factors of power. One nation has a larger standing army,

another a larger population, a higher birth rate, and greater industrial resources. How is it possible to say when the two are equal in power? To that difficulty of computation one must add the complication of geography, strategic position of bases, and much else. Overwhelming preponderance can be recognised; but 'equality' is so impossible of precise establishment as always to justify, in the sincere view of one side, a demand which, in the sincere view of the other, is inequitable.

'Defence by equilibrium of power' is not only impossible for this reason, but also for the reason that the power of a nation is determined ultimately, not by its military or naval, but by its political position—who is to be with it and who against it; by its own alliances, that is, and the alliances likely to combine against it. It is this fact which renders so much of the discussion at Disarmament Conferences futile and beside the point. Behind the discussion is some vague principle of 'parity' or 'defensive needs,' irrespective of the country's alliance position. That reduces the whole discussion to nonsense. Has a given nation, A, 'enough' ships, 'enough' aeroplanes? But enough to meet whom? One State or half a dozen? And to meet them alone or with others? Enough for what political situation? Until those questions are answered the very words 'enough forces,' 'adequate armament,' are quite meaningless. The ultimate factor of defence is only secondarily military or naval. Primarily it is political: Who is with you and who against you?

It will be noted in this connexion that Herr Hitler did not cite the armaments of France as adequate cause for his remilitarisation of the Rhineland, but France's alliance. And that, so far as it went, was perfectly logical. What is the sense, in some attempt to secure 'equality of power,' of establishing elaborately the armament of 'France,' when the whole world knows that the unit which we have to take into account in establishing France's power is, not her own armament, but her own armament plus that of a number of allies, and that the whole computation of equality or 'balance' can be upset overnight by the making of a new alliance? If the next Disarmament Conference is to discuss realities at all, it must cease discussing the relative power of

single States, and consider power in the terms of the units with which we shall have to reckon if ever the instruments are to be used—Alliances. It is true that that will immediately introduce political considerations. But it is precisely the political considerations which are the realities of the problem of defence. That fact also, of course, disposes of Armed Isolationism as a possible policy for a State in the position of Britain. Indeed, if we are really determined to 'keep our end up' as against the power of a possibly rival State or combination, it is almost a contradiction in terms.

Armed defence means something approaching equality of power as against the prospective or potential enemy. Suppose you have that equality. You are equal to the next man. Then that other makes an alliance, so that the unit against which your power is now pitted is, not one State, but two. What do you do? Double your power? So be it. And then the rival dual alliance becomes a triple alliance. What do you do then? You make an alliance. And that is the end of Isolationism. An alliance is a source of power like the air arm or the submarine. If the other adopts it, you must adopt it, too, or drop out of the race.

It is worth noting in this connexion that Britain was concerned with the power of Continental States—affected by that power—as early as 55 B.C.; that there has never been a century since that time in which we have not in one way or another been brought into Continental politics. We are not likely for long to be able, in the day of the aeroplane, to maintain an isolation which was not possible in the century before Christ.

If it were possible for one power—the British Empire, or an Anglo-American combination—to become so overwhelmingly preponderant as to be able to forbid war, the world would doubtless accept the fact and manage to arrange its differences by means other than war. That was the story of the *Pax Romana*, which gave peace to the civilised world for nearly 300 years; it was the story of the *Pax Britannica* in India, which gave peace where endless wars had previously raged; it was the story of Spanish power over the South American continent, where the break-up of that power has been followed by ever-recurrent war between nations that once made a single State.

But history has now made that method of emergence from anarchy impossible. Only the co-operation of several States can now do what has in the past at times been done by one. (The Great War proved that even an Anglo-American Alliance would of itself be inadequate, even if Anglo-American co-operation were the easiest form of international co-operation, which one may doubt.) Any combination forbidding war will be brought into being, if at all, as the result of a number of States recognising its need as a measure of defence for each. The Great War at least proved this: No nation, whatever its military or naval force, can to-day depend upon its own power alone for defence. Britain had twenty allies. The defeat of France would have been Britain's own defeat. No nation to-day can stand alone. Yet an alliance which, as it grows, merely provokes counter-alliance fails of its purpose: each side is where it was originally, so far as its defensive position is concerned.

As we have already seen, we (like all great States) refuse to accept the preponderance of another State or combination, because the fact would place us at its mercy, deprive us of all means of defending our interests, or rights. But note that there are circumstances in which we do *not* resent the growth in power of another nation or combination—when we welcome it; when we believe that it adds to our own security instead of endangering it. It happened to us recently. Not only did we welcome additions to the armaments of other nations, we made heavy sacrifices, financial and other, in order that foreign States might add to their naval and military equipment, become more powerful—more powerful as a whole—than we were ourselves.

What were the circumstances in which, instead of calling conferences for the limitation of the armaments of others, we called conferences for the increase of the armaments of others? They were, of course, the circumstances of war, when the foreign States in question were our allies. We rejoiced at the increase of foreign military and naval forces because they added to the power of the international combination upon which our own defence depended. We welcomed the increase of foreign power because we were reasonably certain of the purpose of that power, reasonably certain that it would be used to resist

the common enemy. We knew which way the guns would shoot.

Note also in this connexion that in an alliance we are dependent on an agreement: upon other nations keeping their agreement, upon their not changing sides, for instance (which sometimes happens). Into every method of defence this element of dependence upon treaty-keeping enters. In war-time we are disposed to trust our ally because we know that he is in the same boat as ourselves, is menaced by the same danger; and are pretty sure, therefore, that his guns will not be turned against us. But normally in peace-time, when a foreign power adds to the number of its guns, we are not quite sure which way, ultimately, the guns are going to shoot. We are uncertain as to their purpose. We know that nothing in history is commoner than for the ally of yesterday to become the enemy of to-morrow. Can we define in peace-time the purpose of armaments as clearly as circumstances define them in war-time?

Imagine an alliance being formed and its constituent States making this declaration:

The purpose of our combination is, in alliance, to repel attack. By attack, we mean military or naval action against us. And by 'us' we mean any one of us. Being an alliance, an attack on one is an attack on all. Our combined power is the unit with which any nation going to war against one of us has to reckon.

As the single purpose of the alliance is to repel attack, it is open to all whose military or naval power is directed at the same purpose of repelling attack. Those States, therefore, which feel themselves encircled, can immediately break the encirclement by joining this combination.

Now it is quite clear that if that declaration really means business, the results achieved are these:

- (1) The defensive position of each is enormously strengthened.
- (2) The forces operating as a check on war, aggression, are strengthened.
- (3) The 'other side' is no longer in the position of having no alternative but resistance to the combination so formed—there is the alternative of joining it, not

merely without sacrifice of defence, but with additional effectiveness therein.

But something else will be required in 'the articles of association.'

When we say to a State, 'If you are attacked we will stand by you,' there is, of course, an implied condition—namely, 'Provided that your political conduct is not outrageous. You might adopt a policy towards some neighbour so provocative that any nation would retaliate by blows, however expensive the blows might prove. We can guarantee defence and peace, but not bad political behaviour.' That guaranty need not be elaborate, for it can be simply an undertaking to submit disputes to third-party judgment in some form—arbitration, court, what not. Indeed, what we really guarantee is the right to third-party judgment—arbitration, peaceful settlement; in other words, 'Collective Security.' But it is Collective Defence—begun and developed by methods very different from those with which post-war history has made us familiar. Instead of beginning with a somewhat elaborate international constitution which sixty nations undertook to defend, we would have done better perhaps, so far as the security side was concerned, to have created a nucleus of great States really meaning business about mutual and collective defence, and then to have allowed the necessary institutions of law to have grown round that nucleus. One hears repeatedly: 'The British public will never fight a war in which British interests are not directly and vitally concerned,' the implication being that we would never fight merely to preserve the collective principle. Is defence a 'direct British interest'?

Suppose that Italy, in her search for 'outlets,' for colonies, had pitched upon, say, British Guiana, or a West Indian Colony, or the Seychelles, should we have risked war with Italy for the defence of such minor outposts? They are of extremely little economic or strategic value—economically, indeed, as much a liability as an asset. Yet we know that had Italy begun landing troops in a British Colony, however valueless that Colony, the national sanction would have been applied immediately, and we should not have hesitated to risk war, to declare war. And we should, from the point of view of defence, have been right. Surrender the principle

of defence in the case of territory of small value, and you have surrendered it everywhere.

To say, as the public commonly does say, 'We will fight to defend ourselves, for our territory, but not for the Collective Principle,' means simply that we do not believe that the Collective Principle is really defensive at all. To say, as our statesmen do almost daily, 'The Collective System is Britain's sheet-anchor, her life-line, its maintenance the first principle of her policy,' and then to add, as some of our statesmen do, 'We would fight to the death to defend the Seychelles or St. Kitts, but it would be outrageous to take the risk of war on behalf of the Collective System,' shows that they have not looked at the meaning of the words they use.

'Sanctions mean war.' But we never say 'defence of our territory means war' in the sense that we will engage in war in order to defend our territory. And because it is known that we *would* fight in order to defend St. Kitts it is not necessary to do so.

Why, after all, did Signor Mussolini pitch upon Abyssinia, which is defended only by the Covenant, instead of upon Kenya or some other Colony more desirable than Abyssinia? Obviously because while he knew that the national sanction would be applied to the defence of Kenya he doubted (and was justified in his doubt) whether the international sanction would be applied to the defence of the Covenant. Had he believed that one State (Britain) would defend the Collective System as she would defend Malta, he would no more have dreamed of attacking Abyssinia than he thinks of attacking Malta. It is not, therefore, sanctions which mean war, but uncertainty as to their application. Had sanctions been certain (as they are certain for the defence of British territory even though they be only national sanctions) there would not be war in Africa to-day. The certainty that a given military or naval action will be taken is usually the one fact which will make it unnecessary to take it. When we really believe in the collective method of defence, are prepared to defend its principle in the same way in which we would defend the tiniest British Colony, then it will become, without war, a political reality, a means of reconciling defence, justice and peace. But not before.

NORMAN ANGELL.

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE CRISIS

By MAJOR E. W. POLSON NEWMAN

THE present European crisis, although precipitated by the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, is the natural outcome of European interference in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. This interference came about as a result of the League recording a judgment against Italy for aggression. Not only was this judgment given with inadequate information as to the true facts of the case—Abyssinia perpetrated many acts of aggression long before armed action was undertaken by Italy—but the method of recording the votes of the League Assembly is open to the most severe criticism. I have it on the highest authority that the method of 'silence meaning consent' was employed with the deliberate object of preventing free discussion on a case about which there was within the League much divergence of opinion. This effort to safeguard the League from any appearance of discord over an African issue has brought war in Europe dangerously near and has thereby made more precarious than ever the position of the League member in whose primary interests this ingenious procedure was devised.

Although the League's subsequent action against Italy, led and persistently spurred on by the British Government, has not succeeded in seriously hampering a resolute nation at war, it has succeeded in producing a transformation of the effects of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict into a grouping of European Powers according to their respective interests in other questions. Mutual fear and suspicion is more real than apparent; armaments are being piled up nominally for defensive purposes; and the people are considering more and more what they think to be their vital interests in preparation for something, to most of them, indefinable. This indefinable 'something' is war, although few are willing

to admit it. As Central Europe is the cockpit of the existing mass of conflicting European interests, the attitudes of Vienna, Budapest and Prague present an illuminating picture of what may be described as a reluctant but inevitable return to the edge of a precipice. Perhaps the most deplorable aspect of this movement is the apparent inability of its participants to arrest it. All eyes are turned on London, and it is more than disturbing to find that there exists in Central Europe a certain fear that the British attitude in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict may plunge Europe into war. Having recently returned from a study of the situation in the capitals of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where I have had conversations with leading statesmen and diplomatists, I shall endeavour in this article to show some of the reactions to League policy as manifest in Central Europe, and to give some indication of the prospects of that policy reaching a logical conclusion materially successful in the interests of collective security. Future action in the interests of preserving peace will also be considered.

As the most important reactions to the Italo-Abyssinian conflict and its sequels hinge on the independence of Austria in view of German rearmament and Italy's African commitments, let us first examine the position of that unfortunate but courageous country. In the action of Italy in Africa the Austrians have seen a virtual collapse of the *Stresa front*, although they have more recently received adequate assurances from Rome of Italy's sustained interest in upholding their independence. Nevertheless, the Austrians find themselves in a position where the only sound policy is to try and please everyone. Fortunately, their careful diplomacy and natural courtesy enable them to carry this out with singular success in spite of the material difficulties with which they have to contend. Owing to a close racial, linguistic and economic association with Germany, but a strong disinclination to become absorbed within the German Reich, the Austrians find it difficult to know which way to turn. Their present Government is one which inspires little confidence, and only remains in power because there is nothing better to replace it. The Austrians have no particular political aims except to be left in peace and to regain a measure of prosperity corresponding to their country's size and position in Europe.

They have never so much as mentioned the question of treaty revision, although they have suffered more than almost any other nation from the Peace Treaties of Paris. They have preferred to concentrate all their attention on internal reconstruction and the re-establishment of sound national finances. Whether Austria is absorbed by Germany in the near future or not is impossible to foretell; but it is significant that at present the influence of the Nazi Party in Austria is on the decline, although German Press propaganda was recently on the increase, especially in the Press of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, where feeling against Austria is unusually strong. Whatever may be said one way or the other on the prospects of an *Anschluss*, the fact remains that Herr Hitler, an Austrian by birth, will never be content until he can raise his standard in Vienna, thereby reaching the culminating point of his retaliation for early ill-treatment at the hands of the Jews. As a large part of Herr Hitler's policy with regard to Austria, as well as to the Jewish race, is of a personal nature, it may be expected that he will continue this policy with determination as long as he remains in power, irrespective of all other considerations. If this were not so, it might be possible to detract his attention from Austria by means of other inducements, but the only hope of such a possibility rests in his outlook being changed by time and circumstances. It seems, however, at present unlikely that the Germans will be so foolish as to try and annex Austria by an act of armed aggression. It is much more likely that, if the two countries do unite, the union will be brought about through the pressure on Austria of political and economic circumstances over which she has no control. There is no question of a plebiscite in Austria on this question, as this form of referendum is, according to the Constitution, solely confined to internal matters. The Austrian mentality is one of *laissez-faire*, and the tendency is to go whichever way leaves the people undisturbed and with sufficient means to make possible a life of high culture without too much work. The Austrians have a wonderful capacity of extracting from life all that is intellectually and materially pleasing, and they are likely to follow the policy least calculated to deprive them of making use of this national characteristic. Nevertheless, these same people, always

with these objects in view, have made a most remarkable effort to achieve economic recovery, as shown in their recent trade balances. But in this there stands out the fact that Germany is Austria's most important market, on which the people depend to a considerable extent for their livelihood.

A strong Austrian desire for independence, however, brought about a desire to overcome differences with Italy, partly traditional and partly caused by the position of the German-speaking minority in the Southern Tyrol. As Italy saw in a much closer relationship with Austria the only means of meeting the menace of Nazi Germany towards the Brenner, a tie of close friendship arose between the two countries, cemented by political and economic agreements embodied in the Pact of Rome and given additional impetus by the personal friendship of Signor Mussolini and Dr. Dollfuss. It is largely as a result of these economic agreements with Italy that Austria has been able to improve her trade position; and it is altogether owing to Signor Mussolini's prompt action in sending Italian troops to the Brenner Pass on the occasion of the revolt of July 1934, and the assassination of Dr. Dollfuss, that Austrian independence was preserved. In these circumstances Austria owes a double debt of gratitude to Italy, which makes it quite impossible for her to co-operate in the League policy of sanctions, apart from the fact that Austria needs Italian support politically and cannot economically afford to indulge in such a course of action. But if Italian action at the Brenner can be effective in the protection of Austria, it can be equally effective in compelling Austria to fall in with an Italo-German *bloc* stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and brought about by the sanctionist and *status quo* policy of the League Powers. It is as well to remember that the distance at this point between the German-Austrian and Austro-Italian frontiers is a matter of a comparatively few miles. Although Austria is little affected economically by sanctions, and does not benefit from the German-Italian transit trade, which is chiefly confined to the St. Gotthard route, she is affected politically by Italy's commitments in Africa and the attitude of the League Powers towards Italy. While in the first case she is compelled to seek some alternative protection against German designs, in the second case she has to keep on good terms with Italy's

chief opponents. This has caused Austria to resort to a policy from which she formerly abstained through a disinclination to risk offending a most friendly Italy—namely, an effort towards the restoration of the Central European economic unit formerly embodied in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This has taken the form of an attempt to bring about an economic *rapprochement* with Czechoslovakia to supplement her commercial agreement with Hungary, as shown in the recent visit of the Austrian Chancellor to Prague. But, in addition to her desire to rectify her trade balance with Czechoslovakia, Austria has shown distinct signs of supplementing the protection provided by Italy with an understanding with the Little Entente, which shares with France and Britain a strong interest in Austrian independence. A serious check has, however, been given to this movement by Austria's resort to conscription in defiance of the Treaty of St. Germain.

This new and supplementary orientation of Austria introduced the question of the Hapsburg restoration, which has been a source of much misinterpretation in the European Press. Much as may be said and written to the contrary, there is no question of the Archduke Otto returning to the Hofburg at present, partly owing to Austria's inability to shoulder the financial burden of a royal court in Vienna, and partly because of the strong opposition of Germany and the Little Entente to such a course. It is also felt that a restoration of the monarchy at the present time would make matters worse instead of better, with the result that Austria's position would thereby be more seriously jeopardised. At the same time, the Austrians are monarchists by nature, and they look forward to the day when a Hapsburg can return to rule over them under favourable conditions. The chief reasons for Little Entente opposition are fear among the Czechs of a Hapsburg disintegrating influence with the Catholic population of Slovakia, and a still stronger feeling in Yugoslavia that the Catholic Croats and others would be induced to return to their former allegiance. On the other hand, Nazi Germany sees in a Hapsburg restoration an unsurmountable obstacle to her Austrian designs, so much so that any attempt to restore the monarchy at present might well bring Germany more into line with Czechoslovakia, and also with Yugoslavia,

where her propaganda against Austria has already made considerable progress. In these circumstances the Austrian Government have explained the whole position to the Archduke Otto, whom they are keeping as a trump card to play in the event of Germany attempting to realise her Austrian aims. In such a case much of the opposition from Czechoslovakia and elsewhere might well be overcome.

As far as Hungary is concerned, there is no question of submission to the rule of an Austrian monarch of the House of Hapsburg, and the Hungarians seem to look forward to satisfying their monarchist desires by the choice of a Hungarian claimant to the Crown of St. Stephen. The Archduke Joseph and his family, the Hungarian branch of the House of Hapsburg, already reside in Budapest, where they take precedence next to the head of the State. As, however, the sovereignty of Hungary is vested in the actual crown of St. Stephen, and not in its wearer, the continuity of the monarchy is preserved in principle, and the actual work is carried out by the Regent with efficiency and unassuming dignity. The attitude adopted by Hungary towards the League policy of sanctions is that, having been compelled by the League to remain in a position of inequality in the matter of armaments, etc., she feels under no obligation to co-operate with the action of the League against Italy. When the Hungarians consider the political and economic support which they have received from the Italians and their interest in maintaining Italo-Hungarian friendship, they are convinced that the only sane course is to abstain from a sanctionist policy. Not only has Italy consistently supported Hungary's claims for treaty revision, but has been of considerable assistance to Hungary in her difficulties with Yugoslavia over the assassination at Marseilles of King Alexander. Hungary is also reluctant in these times of distress to do anything likely to deprive herself of the economic benefits of the Rome Pact. It is, therefore, towards Italy that Hungarian policy is chiefly oriented, the people regarding an admission of Italy's needs for expansion as consistent with their own demands for a rectification of frontiers. Although little is heard in Hungary to-day of 'treaty revision' as such, this question remains the fundamental basis of Hungarian foreign policy under the name of 'minority grievances,' which continue to exist in deplorable

reality. But, although the Hungarians naturally turn towards Italy for protection and in their hopes for the future, there is at the same time a tendency to see in German friendship a means of obtaining satisfaction of their grievances. Those who take this view seem to disregard the rapidity with which Hungarian grievances would be swallowed up by Nazi propaganda. While General Gombös and the present Hungarian Government hesitantly look towards Italy and Germany owing to the position of virtual isolation into which they have been forced, the opposition have a leaning towards Britain, France and the Little Entente. The mass of the Hungarian people, however, are chiefly interested in Britain owing to Anglo-Hungarian financial ties and a strong natural sympathy between the two nations. At the same time, the Hungarians find British policy with regard to Italy and Abyssinia difficult to understand, convinced as they are, notwithstanding the Maffey Report, that the British attitude is based almost entirely on Imperial interests. They deeply deplore the differences which have arisen owing to League action against Italy, but they are convinced that the British nation will ultimately take a sound and unprejudiced view of the case. Hungarian criticism of Italian action is chiefly based on Italy's preoccupation elsewhere, but, like Austria, Hungary hopes for an early settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, and the return of Italy to take her full share in the political development of Central Europe. The recent meeting in Rome between Signor Mussolini and General Gombös, accompanied by Signor Kanya, went far to reassure the Hungarians on this question. The principal reaction of recent events elsewhere has therefore been to place Hungary in a position of almost isolation, not knowing which way to go owing to the uncertainty of which courses others will take. Although Nazi ideas may appeal to General Gombös and others, the Hungarians, as a whole, view with strong disfavour the possibility of an Austro-German *Anschluss*. They believe in the straightforward integrity of the Italian Duce, and his capacity to overcome present difficulties. They also have confidence that the time will come in the not far distant future when their friendship with Italy will not affect their good relations with Britain.

The attitude of Czechoslovakia is of quite a different

nature owing to her geographical position and strong minorities. Although the Czechoslovaks have no direct interest in Italy's African enterprise, and have a natural friendly feeling towards the Italians as a result of the sympathy extended during the Great War to the Czech legions, they followed a policy in principle of opposing anything that might appear a precedent for aggressive action against themselves. They therefore decided without hesitation to support the League policy of sanctions. Yet public opinion in Prague longs for a rapid Italian victory in Abyssinia, so that Italy may be freer to contribute to the security of Central Europe from any German attempt to absorb the German peoples of the Danubian area.

With a large German minority close to the German frontier, in industrial areas seriously handicapped by industrial development in Czech areas and consequent unemployment, the Czechoslovak State realises what would happen in the event of an Austro-German *Anschluss*. In the event of war the German minority would become enemies; the Hungarian minorities would rapidly free themselves of Czech rule with assistance from Hungary; the Slovaks would be unreliable; and the Czechs, themselves a minority, would be at the mercy of a host of enemies. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Czechoslovak Government regards every German move with apprehension, and takes a grave view of Herr Hitler's reoccupation of the demilitarised zone in the Rhineland. In Dr. Benesh Czechoslovakia has a fervent believer in the League of Nations and its capacity to preserve peace. The people, on the other hand, are more practical with their eyes on the Brenner. Although the Czechoslovaks have applied sanctions against Italy—they are less affected than many others by Italian trade—they deeply regret that the marked improvement in relations between Italy and Yugoslavia has been more or less nullified by the sanctionist policy; and they cannot fail to see that, as long as sanctions continue, there can be no prospect of any tangible results from the attempt to bring about an economic understanding among the Danubian States. This being so, the prospects of any form of political agreement developing from an economic beginning must be postponed indefinitely.

Yugoslavia has become more alienated from Austria

and Hungary, partly owing to German propaganda and fear of a possible Hapsburg restoration with strong influence from Vienna, and partly on account of serious discontent caused by the loss of her valuable market in Italy. Sanctions have caused widespread unemployment in Yugoslavia, so much so that the chambers of commerce of Zagreb and other important centres have made strong representations to the Central Government in Belgrade. It is as well to consider this aspect in the light of the traditional sympathy existing between the Italians and the Catholic Croats, whose differences with the Serbs are proverbial. There is also serious discontent in Bosnia, whose people are deprived by sanctions of their chief means of livelihood. Although Great Britain has granted a special preference to Yugoslavia in order to indemnify that country for losses incurred in the export of farm produce to Italy, this does nothing to compensate her for losses in the export of timber, and does little to reduce the dissatisfaction and unrest. Unfortunately, these economic reactions are having their effect in Hungary, whose position in the British market has been prejudiced by the special preferences granted by the British Government to Yugoslavia. However, the most serious and permanent effect of sanctions in the Central European countries affected by Italian commerce is the way in which Italy is, as a result of sanctions, becoming more and more self-contained and independent of external trade.

But the issue causing most concern to the Little Entente in general, and Czechoslovakia in particular, is the attitude of France *vis-à-vis* Germany over the Rhineland in conflict with that of Great Britain with regard to the Italo-Abyssinian War. While in the former case they hope that France will be firm and resolute with a Germany insufficiently prepared for war, in the latter case they follow the British lead in League action against Italy, thereby antagonising the very Power from which they may expect practical help in the event of German aggression. On the one hand, their interests lie in the success of French action against a Power whom they fear as a potential aggressor; on the other hand, their interests are wrapped up in stopping 'aggression' in principle. The situation is as absurd as it is complex.

Meanwhile, the application of sanctions is causing

growing discontent of a political as well as an economic nature, and nowhere is this more apparent than in Central Europe, where the economic crisis has been more severe than in most other areas. Owing to the varying degree in which different countries are affected, new animosities have arisen, and such political stability as existed has been severely shaken. The uncertainty of the future is bewildering to all in a region whose equilibrium is easily upset, and evil forebodings loom large on the horizon. There is a fear that Italy may willy-nilly be compelled to join hands with Germany, who sees in European disunity an opportunity favourable to her forward policy. This has already been proved in the clearest possible way in the Rhineland. Herr von Papen, German Minister in Vienna, assured me that Germany does not aim at any alteration of frontiers, but only desires a synchronisation of German and Austrian external policy in political and economic matters. Soft and pleasing as these words may sound, they carry little conviction in face of the more downright interpretation of German policy given by Herr Hitler himself and represented in the output of the armament factories. The fact remains that the soft words of Vienna and the hammerings of Essen differ merely in mode of expression. Perhaps the most severely criticised reaction of the collapse, temporary at any rate, of the Stresa front has been the increased inclination of Czechoslovakia to seek protection from Russia; and there is a fear lest Russian influence be dragged into a region with its full quota of explosive material. This feeling is intensified by a further apprehension of what might happen in Italy, if sanctions proved successful, with Communism already a power to reckon with in the Balkans. The introduction of Russian influence into any part of the Little Entente has extremely dangerous possibilities, whatever other possibilities there may be elsewhere of pursuing policies of mutual assistance with beneficial prospects.

While time and experience are showing the dangerous and dislocating effects of sanctions, there are many who maintain that, if Italy is allowed to escape unpunished, encouragement will thereby be given to others to follow a similar course in their desire to obtain redress of their grievances. They ignore the fact that the action of a European

Power trying by force to rectify injustices, whether real or imaginary, in Europe would be vastly different from that of a European Power taking similar action in Africa against an uncivilised and undeveloped country. They also fail to realise that, if the League of Nations wants to check action of this sort, it must first provide a satisfactory substitute. This the League has failed to do. Unless adequate measures are taken to rectify legitimate grievances at Geneva, the only alternative is the battlefield. It is a common practice for people in England to blame Italy for not submitting the whole question to the decision of the League; and these same people are horrified at any suggestion to give up any British territory, however small, in the interests of maintaining peace. If Great Britain and other predominating influences at Geneva adopt this firm refusal to make sacrifices, and show this example to smaller nations, they cannot blame those with long-standing grievances for resorting to other methods which offer the only hope of obtaining satisfaction. Should force be used for this purpose in Europe, the action of the Central European Powers would be dictated by their own respective interests in a case of grave emergency rather than by a desire to uphold League principles. Smaller nations having common frontiers with the aggressor State would have little choice in the matter and those with large minorities would be in a very difficult position. They would have to decide, as Belgium did in 1914, in which direction lay their ultimate interests, and decisions would rest on community of interests rather than on the principle of collective security. The success, or even the increase, of the present application of sanctions would be a strong incentive to Italy to join hands with Germany, in which case the League would be faced with an immediate threat of war unless some serious attempt were made to redress the grievances of these two great Powers. Should this contingency arise, involving Europe in a struggle for justice based on force, sanctions even amounting to a blockade could not achieve their object without the co-operation of the United States and Japan. In any case, experience has shown what can be done to counter the effects of such measures, and that considerable time must elapse before the complicated machinery of sanctions can become effective. Furthermore, there is every likelihood that the decisive phase of such an armed

struggle would be over before pressure of this kind could be felt.

At the present juncture it is of the utmost importance to remember that the attitude of Nazi Germany is largely one of our own making, being the direct result of a punitive and exclusionist policy carried out in varying degree ever since the Treaty of Versailles. Although time has clearly shown that this policy is not conducive to the maintenance of peace, the same process is being repeated in the case of Italy. If this policy continues, war is inevitable. Yet it is surely not too late to profit from our past mistakes, and to realise that the only way to peace lies in co-operation with Germany on a basis of complete equality, at the same time taking steps to reorganise the League so as to offer equal justice to all nations. While it is obvious that this means sacrifices on the part of certain Powers, surely such sacrifices are infinitely preferable to a general war in Europe, from which no nation could possibly benefit and in which some would be swept out of existence. Indeed, some of those who now refuse to consider treaty revision would be the first to disappear. If the League Powers refuse to reorganise the League, so as to make it possible for such nations as Germany, Italy, and Hungary to see at Geneva reasonable prospects of satisfaction, they will have to wage a war with the object of perpetuating the injustices of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon, which cannot commend itself to any fair-minded nation.

If the present crisis is that which I have long regarded as necessary for the salvation of Europe, the hour has struck for profiting from the lessons of the last two decades, and for applying these lessons to the realities of the present. The Peace Treaties, as they appear to-day, have little justice left in them. The League Covenant is merely being made use of as an insurance policy for the protection of property by the ex-Allies. As Italy has not received what she was solemnly promised in return for her war effort, she is conveniently classified in this connexion as an ex-enemy. All this must cease if peace is to be maintained. There must be absolute equality among nations, with the removal of all restrictions imposed by some on the sovereign rights of others. The greatest measure of security a nation can have is the contentment of her neighbours. Sacrifices are the price of peace,

which cannot be obtained on a system of credit. If the various peace plans, recently drawn up, are to contribute to a satisfactory peace settlement, it must be in a spirit of trust based on the rectification of grievances. To achieve this nations must be willing to give and take. If the Geneva spirit of keeping everything and giving nothing is to continue, the peace plans are a waste of time, which would be better employed in preparing for war. Germany transgressed Locarno because she saw no hope of France ever agreeing to the restoration of her full sovereignty in the Rhineland. Italy took armed action in Abyssinia because she knew she could never obtain justice at Geneva. Germany and Japan left the League because the dice were loaded against them, with the result that the League is now more one-sided than ever. The injustices of the so-called peace settlements in Central Europe cannot survive any genuine peace effort. The position of the Hungarian minorities in the Succession States and the restrictions on the monarchy in Austria and Hungary are examples of what the League Powers seek to perpetuate. In these circumstances it is not surprising that there is a growing tendency in this country to regard the League in its present form as a public danger.

The British public were induced to take a view about the Italo-Abyssinian dispute which led to the shelving of the Hoare-Laval proposals last December. This most unfortunate event has not only prolonged the war in Africa with greatly increased casualties on both sides, but has intensified the serious reactions in Central Europe and paved the way for the Rhineland crisis. In the light of recent events, the very fact that British public opinion rejected the Hoare-Laval proposals out of consideration for the Abyssinians shows how little the situation was understood. Fortunately, the British public are now gradually realising the true facts and dangers of the situation, and they will not easily forgive those by whom they were deliberately misinformed. A repetition of this deception will not be tolerated, whether it be in the name of righteous indignation, the sanctity of treaties, collective security, or any other catchwords. The British people want to utilise the present situation to remedy the mistakes of the past, but are apprehensive of dangerous League experiments involving the risk of war.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

TURBULENT SPAIN

By W. HORSFALL CARTER

It was a Spanish writer, Jose Ortega y Gasset, who described the ferment of post-war Europe in terms of the 'rebellion of the masses.' Actually, he was discoursing on the phenomenon of the apotheosis of the mass-man observable in Germany, in Russia, and to some extent in Italy, as a new reading of the well-worn text of democracy. Recent events, however, have given poignant application of that remark to his own country. After five years of chequered history as a 'democratic Republic of workers of every class,' with a model Constitution conceived in the spirit of twentieth-century Liberalism—which, however, has been in abeyance most of the time since its promulgation, as far as ordinary civic rights are concerned, owing to the violence of political passions—Catholic Spain *seems* now to be heading straight for Bolshevism, and exceedingly likely to fulfil that never-forgotten prophecy of Lenin (or was it Trotsky?) that, because of the persistence of semi-feudal conditions on the land, a Church loaded with political chains and a half-baked capitalist oligarchy, Spain would be the first country to follow the example of the Soviet Union. The general election of February 16 bore witness to the strength of popular feeling against the forces of tradition which have been trying—unsuccessfully, on the whole—to recapture the ground lost while the Constituent Assembly was translating into concrete fact the political and social conquests of the 1931 revolt against the Bourbon Monarchy, supported on its twin-pillars of Church and Army. It also spelt the complete failure of the somewhat *gauche* attempt on the part of the head of the State, Señor Alcalá Zamora, to stem the flood by putting in a veteran political trickster, Señor Portela Valladares, to 'make' the election in the approved style. The object of creating a Centre, *alias* Presi-

dential, Party to hold the balance between the fiercely contending and seemingly irreconcilable factions of Right and Left was laudable enough—in the abstract; but it was asking for trouble, in the peculiar circumstances of Spain's political evolution; and the first victim has been Señor Alcalá Zamora himself, who was summarily dismissed by a vote of censure in Parliament on April 7. This initial act of the new Cortes is symptomatic of the Jacobin spirit animating the cohorts of the *Frente Popular*; and it is no wonder that, in spite of the assurances of Don Manuel Azaña, the Prime Minister, that the Government's programme goes no further than Liberalism *plus* a dose of State intervention in matters of production and labour to correct social injustices, the propertied classes are thoroughly 'rattled' and obsessed by the Russian bogey. As they see the situation, the 'stagnant pools' (in M. Briand's famous phrase) administered by local *caciques* (political bosses) for the benefit of middle-class politicians in Madrid have been transformed into volcanic streams belching forth mud and blood which threaten to destroy the whole fabric of the State.

That Communist doctrine has made headway during the past two years of stern repression of the Left there is no denying. The party numbers some 50,000 only, but it has sixteen deputies in the new Parliament as compared with a solitary one before. Almost as strong as the official party, however, and more violent, is the *Alianza Obrera* (A.O.), which represents the fusion of the one-time 'Workers and Peasants Bloc' captained by Joaquin Maurin with the Left or Opposition Communist Party, of which the author and begetter is Andres Nin. (These are the people who accuse Stalin of 'selling the pass' by concentrating on the achievement of a new Russia, and they reject the new tactics voiced by Dimitrov of co-operation—*cf.* France—with social democracy and bourgeois parties.) This A.O. has its main strength in Catalonia, where it keeps up a persistent opposition to the old-established Anarcho-Syndicalist militants; but it has gained ground everywhere, with increasing unemployment and distress, especially among the agrarian proletariat of Andalusia, and it is actively prosecuting its tactics of building up from below workers' and peasants' soviets, independent of the orthodox Marxist parties. It claims chief credit, incidentally, for the Asturias insurrection of October

1934, but the Socialist U.G.T. (*Union General de Trabajadores*), of course, hotly disputes the claim. Then there is the official Socialist Party, which is busily engaged in shedding its traditional 'reformist' and bourgeois trappings. Don Indalecio Prieto, an adroit tactician and one of the most effective speakers in Parliament, is still the nominal head of the party executive. A fugitive in Paris for a year or so after the failure of the Asturias insurrection, as so many times under the Monarchy, he returned to Spain last winter disguised as a friar—incidentally, he looks the part to perfection—and is generally regarded as the chief artificer of the Popular Front grouping all the forces of the Left from the mildest of progressives to Communists and Syndicalists. But, except among his own people in the Bilbao region, Señor Prieto no longer enjoys the confidence of the Socialist movement. The latter has been undergoing a constant process of radicalisation, and the forthcoming annual congress, which is to take place in Madrid on June 29 and the following days, will probably see the party nailing its colours firmly to the mast of revolutionary Marxism. A section of the party, under the leadership of Señor Largo Caballero, was very reluctant to accept the expedient of a *Frente Popular* for the elections in the form of a Republican-Socialist alliance to restore the battered Constitution. The recipe of these left-wing elements is a 'united front' of all proletarian parties, and the popularity of integral Marxism is spreading like wildfire, the more so as Señor Azaña can be represented as being gradually drawn into the capitalist net. In the name of the Madrid Executive Committee of the party these militants have issued proposals for a new party programme shorn of all 'gradualism' and compromise. This document proclaims the intention to advance to the conquest of power 'by any means whatsoever,' thus implicitly rejecting the constitutional path; it endorses the doctrine of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' as being a necessary stage during the transition from the Capitalist to the Socialist State; it proposes nationalisation of the banks, of the means of production, workers' control, etc.; it demands the suppression of the Army and its replacement by an armed workers' militia (as Minister in a former Azaña Cabinet, Don Largo Caballero twice proposed this, but got no support), and it concludes with a salute to the sister revolutionary force

of Catalanism by a demand for 'confederation of the distinctive nationalities of the Iberian peninsula, including the Moroccan protectorate.' This programme is in keeping with the 'general line' marked out by the Comintern, which has naturally been showing increased activity with regard to affairs in Spain. But it is noticeable that representatives of the Spanish Communist Party are much more mild and circumspect than Socialist doctrinaires like Julio Alvarez del Vayo and Luis Araquistain, who are the chief members of Señor Largo Caballero's brain trust. Indeed, one of the Communist speakers at a meeting in the cause of Marxist unity on March 29 is reported to have said that the dictatorship of the proletariat would in the long run be fatal to the working masses themselves, and that it was necessary to attract the support of the middle classes for the social revolution. The Russia-mimicking of the more vocal Socialist leaders is, of course, having precisely the opposite effect. But, if the orthodox Communist leaders in Spain are more what we should call Radicals and, apparently on the instructions of Moscow, are disposed to co-operate for some time with the bourgeois-democratic régime of Señor Azaña, provided it takes measures calculated to appease popular discontent and distress, the rank and file are certainly prepared for the development of the 'revolutionary situation' which is the constant preaching of the Comintern. And there is a new danger-signal in the recent merging of Socialist and Communist youth organisations, which means over 100,000 braves disposed to carry out the Largo Caballero programme to the letter.

Now, it is true that this Socialism constitutes a highly organised and well-disciplined force, that without the support of the rebelling masses the present Administration could not survive a week, and that the occupation of local town and village councils throughout the country by Socialists committed to a revolutionary programme (many of the latter are already in their possession) is a grim prospect for the property-owning classes; hence the great relief when Señor Azaña endorsed the view of the head of the State that the municipal elections fixed for April 12 had better be postponed *sine die* to give time for passions to cool. And yet—and yet . . . A recent visit to Spain—to Barcelona, Madrid, and the south-western provinces of Extremadura (where the Azaña Govern-

ment is engaged in the first phase of an improvement of social conditions for landworkers)—has left me sceptical as to the imminence of the 'Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Iberia.' That observation of Karl Radek—'Revolutions are not carried in suit-cases'—sticks in my mind. He meant, of course, that Marxist doctrine is all right, entirely sound and accurate on the plane of thought, yet its translation into terms of State organisation depends not so much on what Lenin said in 19—, or the great St. Marx himself sixty or seventy years ago, as on the distinctive conditions of the moral climate, on the varying features of social geography in the different countries. So it is necessary to examine more closely the surge of revolt and the continuing turbulence in Spain in terms of the Spanish temperament and Spanish history.

It began, of course, with the *coup d'état* of General Primo de Rivera in September 1923. Although in appearance a military *pronunciamiento* of the traditional nineteenth-century type, the advent of the dictatorship was really the first phase of Spain's awakening. In the name of national decency he came to cleanse the Augean stables of 'politics,' to break the power of an upper-middle-class oligarchy, with their local boss rule in their respective provincial fiefs; and in his sincere efforts to dispel the mists of corruption and stagnation, to stir those 'stagnant pools,' he had the support of the vast majority of the nation. His methods, it is true, were patriarchal, and those around him saw to it that he should leave untouched the privileges of the traditional castes of Church and Army, the core of the feudal structure; but he did inflict mortal injury on *political* feudalism and thus initiated the dislocation of the monarchist State. His rough-and-ready measures—administrative and economic—did more for the well-being of the poor and needy than any of Spain's rulers since Charles III. Above all, either by intuition or because he felt the need of a prop, he appreciated the value of trade union organisation for the benefit of the workers and as an element of social discipline; he interfered as little as possible with the progress of the U.G.T. And Don Largo Caballero, the promoter of the first big revolutionary strike in 1917, became, under the dictatorship, a Councillor of State. So it was that, when Don Alfonso 'dropped the pilot' in the autumn of 1930—an act as unworthy as it was fatal in its

consequences—the working classes were ready (and rural Spain, even, was wakened from century-old slumber) to constitute the electoral ballast whereby the fit but few Republican idealists and agitators rose to power at the April 1931 municipal elections.

From another angle it may be said that the reaction against the seven years of dictatorship—in those days parliamentary democracy and the Liberal creed were still not without honour and prestige—had created an impetus of revolt, of 'rebellion of the masses,' which could hardly be satisfied with the mere extrusion of the King. The dominant feature of the 1931-32 period was, indeed, that it represented the impulse of a *political* and *social* revolution rolled into one: in that respect Spain resembles the Russia of 1917. The appetite of the latter, however, was still anything but voracious. In retaining the framework of the bourgeois State while providing for possible socialisation of property and wealth as required by 'social utility' (article 44 of the Constitution), Señor Azaña's Republican-Socialist coalition Government faithfully interpreted the popular demand. On the political side, however, there was a determination to break the political power of the Church, to cut the claws of the Army lest it be tempted, as in the past, to rescue Spain from the politicians and at the same time to continue the Primo de Rivera mission of disinfecting local and national politics, so as to deprive Army officers of their last excuse for meddling. Hence the anti-clerical clauses of the Constitution, which prohibit the clergy from engaging in teaching or commerce, place all religious orders under the surveillance of the State, suspending a Damocles sword over them that they will be dissolved if their activities endanger the security of the State, but only actually dissolving the Jesuit Order, its 'dangerous' character being taken for granted, as a *chose jugée*: the admirable Army reform measures for which Señor Azaña was mainly responsible as Minister of War: and the propaganda for civic responsibility and cleaner politics, which, however, never got much beyond the crusading phase.

That singling out of the Jesuit Order for special treatment was, of course, indefensible by ordinary Liberal standards. So, too, of course, was the Law for the Defence of the Republic under which Señor Azaña instituted emergency

measures for the maintenance of public order almost at the same moment as his Government sponsored the new Constitution with its guarantees of personal rights and liberties. But that both these measures were a 'political necessity,' in the Shavian phrase, no one familiar with conditions in Spain will dispute: at all times the maintenance of law and order in Spain is a whole-time job in itself. After all, the Jesuits had been bundled out neck and crop, without any warning, by Charles III. in 1767—and he was scarcely a revolutionary, Jacobin or Marxist; in 1835, too, all the religious orders were dissolved and their possessions expropriated. During the whole of the nineteenth century anti-clericalism was constant and intense, and the burning of churches and convents as a symptom of popular discontent—or even as a hooligan pastime—has a history dating back a hundred years; neither the Republic nor 'Marxism' can be accounted the culprit. How unexpected popular sentiment on the question of religion may be is well illustrated by an incident in the Holy Week processions at Seville the other day, when (vide *The Times*, April 10) a man suddenly showed his head from under a huge float carrying the image of Our Lady of La Macarena and shouted: 'I am a Communist, but let anyone touch the Virgin and I will kill him!'

It must be admitted, of course, that in the execution of the principles of the lay State many Spaniards are guilty of hopelessly sectarian behaviour. That 'intolerance which is the shadow of the light of faith,' in Señor S. de Madariaga's phrase, is a feature common to all, whether Right or Left. (The way in which Don Marcelino Domingo, Minister of Education—an embittered Radical-Socialist of the old school—is proceeding now to restore the system of 1932-33, particularly co-education, which is strongly disliked by many good Catholic families, is typical.) Consequently it was not difficult for the parties of the Right in 1933—when the original Republican-Socialist alliance was beginning to disintegrate—to work up a campaign on the basis of religion and tradition, being endangered by a man like Señor Azaña who had once dared to proclaim in the Cortes that 'Spain had ceased to be Catholic.' That made him an obvious target; it was only necessary to add that *either* he

was a Socialist wolf in lamb's clothing, *or* was at the mercy of Socialist and trade union domination.

These are a sample of the calumnies that brought about Señor Azaña's downfall in October 1933, and thereby checked the progress of the new dispensation just when it was beginning to show results. Even so, no irreparable damage would have been done had not the intervention of the President, Señor Alcalá Zamora, introduced a further element of bitterness and confusion. Sensing a shift of opinion in the country, he dissolved the first Cortes (the Constituent Assembly), although Señor Azaña still had a handsome vote of confidence in his pocket. The result of the elections of November 1933, which returned a Right-Centre majority, seemed to show that he had accurately gauged popular feeling. But it meant that the *Acción Popular* Party, led by Señor Gil Robles, became the strongest party in the Chamber, a party that was known to be the instrument of the hated Jesuits, and, moreover, was entirely suspect as regards its Republicanism: it had gone to the polls in alliance with the Monarchist parties, as it did again in February this year, and it has still never publicly given assurances of allegiance to the *régime*. On the other hand, the Radical Party, with the ineffable Alejandro Lerroux at the head, became the governmental party—which meant a reversion to the worst type of *caciquismo* and corruption. No wonder, as Señor Azaña said in his great speech in the Cortes on April 3, people began to lose faith in the capacity of the Republican *régime*, to despair of progress along the lines mapped out in the first two years' period.

This background sketch is necessary to an understanding of popular discontent with regard to the *bienio negro* of the Lerroux-Gil Robles *régime*. The period from November 1933 to February this year was, indeed, completely barren of achievement. The parliamentary situation was one of stalemate, with Señor Lerroux, in the light of his anti-clerical past, having the grace, at any rate, to resist the designs of the Catholic groups on article 26 of the Constitution, but becoming a willing tool of the forces resolved to undo the work of social progress effected in the first two years, and, if possible, to break the morale of the Left parties by stern repression following upon the luckless Asturias episode of October 1934. Not a single budget was passed by the Cortes.

Unemployment increased, the efforts of Señor Jimenez Fernandez, a Minister of Agriculture from the CEDA ranks (Catholic parties), to continue in a slightly more conservative spirit the agrarian reform were sabotaged by the landowning backers of his own party, wages dropped below subsistence level in Andalusia and Extremadura, where the agrarian proletariat is still, by its lack of organisation, subject to feudal abuses, and the old stinking corruption came to taint the political atmosphere, culminating in the *straperlo* and other scandals which marked the final discrediting of Lerroux and his Radicals.

On top of all this was the suspicion—scarcely justified—that the head of the State, Señor Alcalá Zamora, was not averse to ‘playing politics’ in the bad old style which had cost the previous Moderating Power his throne. One cannot appreciate the reasons for the gathering tempest of fury against the President, unless one realises that the Left had never forgiven him for his dissolution of the first Parliament in October 1933, just when the constructive work of the Republic was getting under way, and that non-partisan opinion, as well as the Left, held the President mainly responsible for the bloodshed of October 1934, with all its consequences, since all the other party leaders with one accord warned him that if members of the *Acción Popular* Party were given office there would be an armed revolt in the name of the sacred right of rebellion. The Right parties likewise had it up against him because, having once admitted their representatives to office, he refused pointblank last October to give the premiership to Señor Gil Robles—although his party was the majority party in the Cortes—and preferred the hazards of a second dissolution, with the idea of creating a centre party to try and break the deadlock between the two fiercely antagonistic and irreconcilable factions of Right and Left. Finally, Señor Alcalá Zamora had committed the crowning blunder—Spaniards are surprisingly touchy sometimes on matters of form—of drafting a long screed in January 1935 with his own proposals for reform of the Constitution. As was said at the time, the one person who could not make suggestions for changing the Constitution was the President who had taken the solemn oath to observe it and see that it was observed. In the election campaign it was actually the

Acción Popular Party, with the slogan ‘*A por él*,’ which raged the most fiercely against the presidential person.

The ousting of Señor Alcalá Zamora was then a foregone conclusion—which does not alter the fact that the way in which it was done was highly irregular. The Left parties had been clamouring for a dissolution for months. Every one of the party chiefs and other political figures whom the President consulted last autumn advised it, until finally he acceded. Then, after the sweeping triumph of the *Frente Popular*, you had these Left parties, under the impulsion of the Socialists, solemnly voting that, in the meaning of article 81, the dissolution was not ‘necessary’—thereby, as one of their opponents on the Right pointed out, publicly affirming the illegitimacy of the present Parliament. The pretext was, of course, transparent, and nobody in Spain seems to mind very much. But an Englishman may perhaps be allowed to point out the danger of the situation now created. It means that the idea of a *national* figure at the head of the State embodying neutrality and impartiality goes by the board; any future President is likely to be hopelessly involved in the party-political struggle, and the Right have a powerful weapon in their hands against the ‘dictatorship of Parliament,’ which was already the cry in 1933.

To explain and justify the Asturias insurrection and the revolt of the *Esquerra* and various Catalanist parties in Barcelona in October 1934—which was, technically, a treasonable act—one’s Spanish friends talk of the need of saving Spain from Fascism, from the fate of Austria. But that is using Central European terminology which really does not apply to Spanish conditions. There is no Fascism to speak of in Spain; it is the *dada* of an insignificant minority, and its only able champion is the spirited son of General Primo de Rivera. (The recent suppression of *Falange Española*, after an attempt to assassinate Professor Luis Jimenez Asua, the eminent Socialist lawyer who had a big hand in the elaboration of the Constitution, does not, therefore, amount to very much.) What is really serious for the future of Spain is that the CEDA, under the leadership of Señor Gil Robles, with the great Jesuit-trained organiser, Angel Herrera, at the back of him, maintains its equivocal attitude on the question of the *régime*. Twice it has gone to the polls in alliance with

Monarchists, and afterwards relations have apparently become very strained: just lately there has been violent recrimination in public between Señor Gil Robles and Señor Calvo Sotelo, the ablest of the Monarchists, each side blaming the other for the defeat of the Right in the elections.

It may be hoped that this situation of the CEDA—which is obviously split between those who want to form a normal Opposition party in the Cortes and those who, without much 'Monarchist' hope, still hanker after a *coup d'état* to be executed by some Army officers (this was a real danger on the morrow of the elections)—will be cleared up soon. At a recent party meeting Señor Jimenez Fernandez, a rival for the leadership, bluntly posed the questions Monarchy or Republic?, Democracy or Fascism?, Social Justice or not?, and demanded that the party should make an unequivocal public pronouncement on these points. No such statement, however, has yet been forthcoming; the party's representatives are one day withdrawing from the Cortes on the grounds that the Right is not enjoying the necessary guarantees of fair play—as they officially proclaimed a boycott of the municipal elections which were to be held, although many local groups refused to fall in with it—and the next they are demanding the status of a proper Opposition party. One would feel much happier about the future of the country if only an unmistakable Catholic-Conservative party could emerge having as its object the reform of the existing Constitution, perhaps, but by the legal means provided in the Constitution itself.

The eight weeks' period since the triumph of the Left at the polls have certainly not been edifying. Daily, almost, there have been reports of political murders or hooligan exploits of arson. The kind of vendetta which seems to have developed between Fascist and Socialist gunmen poses an almost insoluble problem to the authorities. Formidable enough is the cumulative effect of a list of the outrages in the various provinces—which one's friends on the Right delight to show, though, of course, the continuing Press censorship and other appurtenances of the 'State of Alarm' screen the facts from the public, or, rather, cause them to be distorted by fantastic rumours. But it is well to remember that they are spread over eight or nine weeks, and that Spain

is a very big country. I sometimes wonder whether, if Spain were involved to the same extent as other countries in the issues of high policy, we should hear so much of the tumult and turmoil! The spectacle of Parliament spending its first three weeks examining charges and counter-charges of manipulation of voting lists, pressure of every kind on the voter in remote districts, etc., and revealing all the old electoral malpractices which the Republic came to sweep away, is certainly depressing. Less than half of the deputies' credentials came out 'clean'—that is to say, unprotested.

The one redeeming feature of these weeks has been the evidence of calm and good sense of the Prime Minister himself, Señor Azaña, who is by common consent the one big personality standing between Spain and chaos. His preliminary speech of April 3 (which he followed up with a Ministerial declaration on April 15, mainly on the distressing economic situation) was a most statesmanlike performance which did a great deal straightaway to restore the confidence of the business classes, without alienating the support of his allies on the Left. He found extenuating phrases for the 'hungered multitudes' fresh from prison, some of whom had been guilty of rioting and worse, but at the same time he insisted on the need for vindicating the State's authority. 'My method,' he said, 'is not that of the club or the bag of gold' (with which Spaniards have so often been 'governed'), 'it is by an appeal to reason and common sense.' And he went on to utter three times the solemn warning that the present dispensation represents the last chance of reconstruction of the national life by evolutionary and parliamentary methods. I think the best comment on that April 3 speech of Señor Azaña's came from Señor Gonzalez Peña, the man who was president of the Revolutionary Committee in the Asturias revolt, but, nevertheless,—or possibly learning from bitter experience—is now on the side of the moderates in the Socialist Party. He said: 'Magnificent. . . . The pity is that Señor Azaña is too *elegant* a ruler for a nation like the Spanish; still, this nation of ours is on the way to being educated up to this kind of policy. . . .'

There is the situation in a nutshell. Given a period of stability and continuity, the majority of the nation will respond to Señor Azaña's treatment and will imbibe the lessons of

civic responsibility—of which the Socialist Party gave the example until its active elements had their minds warped by the corrupt, feckless, and cruel Government of the *bienio negro*. The Lerroux remedy of the police-State has proved an ignominious failure; you cannot break a Spaniard's spirit. Señor Azaña is adopting precisely the opposite policy. As much as was compatible with the stability of the State he has let the popular agitation rip, though gradually, without making any fuss about it, tightening up the police control. To Catalonia he has restored *in toto* the Statute of Autonomy—*i.e.*, all that was demanded at present by a nascent revolutionary nationalism; and his Government will no doubt in due course sponsor a similar process of devolution when the Statute of the Basque Provinces, which has already been acclaimed in a plebiscite (in 1933), comes up for discussion in Parliament. In the rest of Spain he proposes to turn the edge of popular discontent by providing a generous supply of money for public works—with careful administrative control to prevent corruption—and by accelerating and extending the land reform which figured so prominently in the early promise of the Republic, but which made little headway against the resistance of the landowners and the stratagems of local 'bosses.' The fundamental assumption—which is surely justified—is that the spirit of violence, which undoubtedly exists, is a temperamental feature, having little or no inherent connexion with the social revolution as preached by Socialists and Syndicalists, and that 'the rebellion of the masses' can be canalised away from the Moscow road.

Land reform is probably Señor Azaña's best trump card. I have no space in this article to explain its purport and range. But I may perhaps just indicate the broad lines as explained to me by Señor Vazquez Humasque, Director of the Institute of Agrarian Reform—the Government's agent—before I paid my visit to Extremadura to see for myself. The immediate problem is to meet the dreadful social distress in the west and south-west provinces and Andalusia, where there is a mass of agrarian proletariat which is the ready prey of the agitator. It is a question of first-aid measures before the real problems of modernising production, etc., can be tackled, of getting back on to the land the 12,000 or 14,000 *junteros* in the two provinces of Cáceres and Badajoz (Extremadura) who

have been ejected on one ground or another during the past two years, and also of distributing land to cultivate to some 400,000 *braceros* (agricultural labourers) in all. (The *juntero* is the labourer possessing working capital in the shape of a couple of mules or donkeys and primitive implements who, by tradition, depends on some landlord or administrator of one of the huge estates, *latifundia*, for the chance of land to work.)

Something had to be done quickly if there was to be plough-land ready for sowing next autumn, and if revolutionary violence was to be averted. The Institute, therefore, has been pushing on with its policy of *asentamientos*, settlements of tracts of land taken from the big estates—which are so huge that the land can well be spared—and distributed to groups of labourers for them to plough and till, either by family units or collectively. The average size of each *asentamiento* is 15 to 20 acres. The settlers pay a nominal rent through the Institute and retain the produce. The rent is guaranteed to the landlord by the Institute—the principle of the reform being to leave the right of property intact but limit the usufruct. But in certain cases, where the land has been deliberately left fallow or neglected, the Institute has power to expropriate, compensation being paid to the owner on the basis of the value returned for taxation purposes. There are also other recent decrees, providing for 'temporary occupation' and confiscation for social utility, and the province of Badajoz witnessed on March 25 last an impressive concerted action of 'symbolic' occupation by organised groups of would-be settlers who declared they could wait no longer for the slow processes of bureaucracy to carry out the Government's promise in the election platform. Eventually the idea is to create a class of peasant proprietors, where that is possible, and alternatively some kind of collective exploitation of the land for which the special conditions of the soil are more suited. Then, perhaps, it will be possible to introduce modern methods of production and up-to-date machinery. At present the labourers will have none of it, and their attitude is backed by the Federation of Landworkers, affiliated to the U.G.T., until such time as the land is nationalised and removed from 'capitalist' hands. This process of breaking up the big estates will take many years, but at any rate a beginning

has been made; and now that the agrarian proletariat is 'awake' there is no going back. In his speech of April 3 Señor Azaña proclaimed his intention of destroying 'improper concentrations of wealth.' (Actually, the Socialist U.G.T. only has in its organisation some 15 per cent. of the landworkers of Spain; in Andalusia it disputes the *terrain* with the C.N.T. (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajo*), which cleaves to Anarcho-Syndicalist doctrine.) There are still, of course, too, powerful means of holding landworkers to the Catholic and Conservative cause, though the Christian-Social efforts of the Catholic political forces have been successful only in the central provinces of Castile and Salamanca.

The F.A.I. (Iberian Anarchist Federation), which is the political aspect of the C.N.T., still rules the roost in Catalonia. 'Marxism' has been making gallant efforts—even to the extent of swallowing its former phrases and wooing Catalanism—but it fails to take root there. The Syndicalists have been weakened considerably by internal dissensions and by severe measures of repression by the autonomous Government of Don Luis Companys and colleagues in the period before October 1934. But they are still strong enough to put a spoke in the wheel of any Socialist bid for proletarian unity. Their creed of 'direct action' has an inordinate appeal to the emotional intensity and anarchical proclivities of the ordinary Spaniard.

Here, indeed, in this persistent centrifugal tendency, which makes the solidarity of the working classes still a distant dream, is a negative, but not to be neglected, factor to be considered when we are weighing up Señor Azaña's chances of beating 'Russia' in the race for leadership of the effervescent Spanish masses. And finally a third trump card is provided, oddly enough, by Catalonia. Superficially the groundswell of the Spanish *Frente Popular* is the same throughout the country. Actually, the driving forces of revolt in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain are very different. Catalan nationalism has the dynamic quality of a revolutionary movement, and the record of Barcelona and its *pistoleros* would seem to cast that city for the rôle of the Petrograd soviet. The fact is, however, that the rich and industrialised area of Catalonia, which by all the rules of Marxism should be

the spearhead of the Spanish revolutionary movement, is actually its despair.

Catalanism is an essentially *petit bourgeois* phenomenon. By its very nature it drives a wedge into the platform of the Left extremists. And Catalans are an active, energetic but essentially bourgeois community, with many points of resemblance with the Swiss. The *Esquerra*, which is now again in office, has always paid special attention to the interests of the small-holders, petty capitalists and craftsmen. And it happens that the factory workers are well paid in contrast with other parts of Spain, not the least likely to aid in setting up a 'dictatorship of the proletariat.' Whether Señor Azaña is Machiavellian enough to exploit this force of Catalanism, looking forward to a federal Spain, as a barrage against the tidal wave of social revolution that threatens I am not prepared to say. But stranger things have happened. One thing is certain. Spanish 'Communism,' if it ever materialises, will be, *sui generis*, refractory to any Moscow discipline.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

TWO VICEROYS

By PATRICK LACEY

THE end of Lord Willingdon's term as Viceroy closes an epoch in India's history and a great career of personal devotion to her service. To many he must seem to have made the past five years a period complete and characteristic to himself, and there will be attempts to assess his stewardship in that light. Others will think his greater achievement has been the corrected development of the policy bequeathed to him by his predecessor—its adjustment to a new *tempo* of his own making, and its inspiration with his special brand of optimistic realism. His *régime* began on the turn of a crisis, and its appraisal is impossible without due reference to the crisis itself and the personality dominating it.

If a perverse taste for metaphor may be excused for a while, I should like to compare the situation in 1930 with the troubles of a s.s. *Indian Empire* (Captain Irwin) carrying a polyglot host of travellers. By an arrangement that had worked pretty well, however unconventional it might be, some of the officers and crew had been recruited from among the passengers very early in the voyage; and the ship's owners, far away, had promised further enrolment from the same source at the beginning of each new stage of the journey. Among the shareholders in London, and their handful of representatives cruising in the ship, there was disagreement about its proper course and speed; but the majority thought that it must continue steadily towards the destination advertised in its sailing orders and claimed by most of the passengers as their lawful objective.

The next port of call was already signalled when a section of the passengers mutinied on the ground that they wanted to miss out that halt and take a short cut—with themselves in command—at accelerated speed to the journey's end.

This was hardly possible, for the ship must pick up fuel, ballast, and instructions at the next port. The situation became serious enough to disturb even the Europeans in the smoking-room and the minority shareholders in London. They suggested that the captain should not only knock the mutineers on the head at once, but snub them either by turning back to a port left far behind, or by dropping anchor very firmly just outside the next harbour. They thought that this was the only way to secure the ship. They fancied that the 'native' stewards attending them were in obedient agreement with them. What the other peaceable passengers felt or hoped was immaterial.

Lord Irwin (with Mr. Wedgwood Benn dictating or assenting from London) knew that no captain as good as his word and salt would let a mutiny irritate or alarm him into abandoning a course well set and a purpose publicly pledged, unless it drove him to extremity or virtually paralysed his engines. Retreat would be unfair to the peaceable passengers and would alienate their sympathies, with hazard to the ship. But he seemed rather to forget his responsibilities to the whole of his charge in the attitude he adopted towards the mutineers. He appeared to think that because they only wished to exceed the speed limit, to the scheduled end of the voyage, he must not seem too intolerant of their mutiny, and could not reconcile conscientious consistency of purpose with sanction for his officers to suppress the revolt in the usual way. So he temporised with the mutiny's leaders; and as he became preoccupied with this temporising and could not keep an eye all the time on the charts, the mutineers became strong and reckless enough to hazard the ship, and the peaceable passengers felt that they were being relegated to the background.

Lord Irwin is the perfect patriot—so much so that he was too sensitive, perhaps, to meddlesome foreign opinion of British policy in India. His England revered Joan for her revolt against English mastery in France. It had made a hero of Garibaldi as the champion of Italian freedom. It had called on Indian troops to fight for 'the liberties of nations,' and had raised the Arabs against their alien rulers under these troops' very eyes. It gave an honoured place to a statue of George Washington. It taught Indian students

to read Burke and Mill, but forgot to warn them against their mechanical assumption that because Burke and Mill were British their ideals were the creed and practice of the British race at home. Yet British politicians openly hedged and quibbled over promises to India. With the eyes of the world upon him—pending the incentive of a 'world depression' to make them mind their own business—Lord Irwin possibly felt that he must not further prejudice his country's good name, or condone sneering doubts of its honest purpose, by using the big stick against an Indian movement for rights and liberties that England professed to cherish. Or if the big stick *had* to be used, there must be slightly apologetic explanations of its appearance, and officials must be invited to wield it delicately.

Another difficulty may have been due to the simple piety and strength of his faith, which India sincerely admired, plus the ordinary Viceroy's isolation and brief sojourn in India. It has been said that Lord Irwin's judgment of character often went awry, and made him credulous of the plausible. If this is true, it explains much. In India it is a notoriously common habit to tell Authority what it likes to hear, whether it knows better or not. At the beginning of 1930 the Government of India underestimated the Congress's strength and readiness for 'war.' Then there was that queer lacuna in their religion which allows certain Hindu politicians to reconcile conscientiously the most amoral, 'cheap-and-nasty' tactics with irreproachable convictions, strategy and objectives. Lord Irwin *may* have suspected this. But if he did, he seems to have rebelled instinctively against personal recognition of anything so alien to his own faith and character. It was hardly in him to believe that popular idols with honourable reputations, aims and eloquence could be responsible for base tactics, or consciously encourage widespread roguery, mischief, bullying and violence either by strictly passive resistance to it or by negative toleration of it.

So for weeks or months after they had declared 'war' many of the Congress leaders were free to organise sedition, undermine authority and administration, pervert the country's youth, exploit the emotionalism of half-formed understanding, inflame mob disorder. There was a good deal of official

pruning of the smaller, less dignified poppies. It consisted mainly in dumping them into gaols and prison camps where they enjoyed themselves tolerably well, sometimes greatly. But no firm foot was allowed to be set on the weeds that were tall and mature enough to scatter their seeds, until at length, in one or two provinces at least, the State was so obviously hazarded that intervention became imperative. The action taken then was gentle compared with French, German, American or any other colonial Power's methods in lesser crises. It was drastic only by comparison with what would have sufficed much earlier. The Congress protagonists were at last removed to comfortable prison quarters; their 'martyrdom' created an uproar in proportion to its delay (for their guilt then was no greater in principle than it had been before); and for days or weeks on end the crowds that they had seduced had to be hammered and smashed.

On the other hand, Lord Irwin may have been less ingenuous than this and other efforts to consider his policy. Even some of his die-hard critics in India have said that Gandhi's failure at the Round Table Conference justified all that was done to get him there. They forget that in the end it was Lord Willingdon who sent Gandhi off to London; but undoubtedly his predecessor paved the way and strewed it with alluring roses. The Congress was India's one big political organisation in daily working order. It boasted considerable power, and claimed that it represented 'the nation's united voice' with the world's ears turned towards it. Did Lord Irwin really believe this? Did he therefore doubt whether Indian reform would be any good at all unless Congress were reconciled to it, so that any risk in getting the party's co-operation was worth while? Was he convinced that Gandhi would achieve great things at the Round Table Conference, or at least do something to unite and satisfy all schools of Indian opinion?

Such a hope was so baseless, and so few and odd were the people believing in it, that it is difficult to think Lord Irwin was one of them. He may have wanted the Congress to see what it could do at the Round Table, since the mere fact of its representation there would improve the Conference's reality and prestige in India, and contact with better minds might revive the party's latent wisdom. But Gandhi was

most unlikely to succeed in a test of straightforward, constructive statesmanship, and his failure under the fierce limelight thrown on him in London would have salutary effects. I am not now trying to be 'wise after the event.' I am only repeating an opinion often heard before it was certain that Gandhi would go to London. Perhaps Lord Irwin foresaw the result quite clearly, and so gave the Congress as much rope as he dared, not only in a genuine wish to conciliate it, but in order that the truth might explode the party's pretensions. It was wrong that India and the world should be deluded into expecting great achievements in statesmanship by men incapable of producing them. The fallacy could not be disproved merely by repressing its authors. The more they were allowed to preach and boast it, and the greater their opportunities for justifying themselves, the more complete would be the lesson that they and the world might learn from their exposure of their own shortcomings.

Lord Willingdon, on the other hand, would probably accept, with one verbal amendment, the late Lord Esher's remark: 'The moment that, in a great controversy, a politician finds himself struggling not for a principle, but for an expedient, his battle is half-lost.' This was written thirty years ago, at a time when it may have been applicable to politics. But if we substitute 'administrator' for 'politician' we may find that Lord Willingdon has made the saying good, for by acting in tune with it he has scored over the intransigent politician time and again.

He arrived in India in 1931 with an experience of the country such as no other Viceroy proper has ever had. He had been one of its Governors for ten or eleven years before he became Governor-General of Canada. Except for the pandits of the United Provinces, the types and even some of the individuals most conspicuous in Indian politics to-day had been familiar to him in Bombay and Madras. To this great advantage he added two others in his sound judgment of men and their capacities, and in his consequent choice of an admirable private secretary outside the I.C.S. He combines a shrewd, straightforward realism with the urbane humour and gaiety of an incorrigible optimist; and, since it is not in their nature to believe that these two traits are reconcilable, the agitators who avoided contact with him suspected that

he did not take their noise quite seriously enough. It is doubtful whether he has invariably appreciated what might have been made of small opportunities. Thereby again he made his opponents fume and fret, since they cannot understand a man guided inflexibly by principle, and they think he must be wooden and obtuse if he does not avail himself of any expedient that offers itself. But Lord Willingdon has seldom if ever failed to see into, round, behind, and ahead of, a really 'big situation.'

In a notable speech on the Government of India Bill in the House of Lords Viscount Halifax said:

I do not believe that either I or anyone else representing the King in India can hope to justify to Indians the privilege and duty of remaining loyal to the Crown and the British Empire unless he is able to assure them that we do at some time, when India has fitted herself for it, envisage for India a status not necessarily identical but most carefully equal with that of any self-governing Dominion.—*H. L. Debates*, vol. xcvi., June 20, 1935, cols. 668-9.

Lord Willingdon seems to have realised this from his earliest days in India (*vide* Lloyd George's *War Memoirs* and E. S. Montagu's Indian diary). And having known it for so long, he thought the time had come to do something more than talk about it.

In 1890 Lord Esher had said of British policy in Ireland: 'Formerly we bribed with money, now we seduce with promises.' In 1931 Lord Willingdon perhaps felt that the same device had nearly exhausted itself among Indians. It was excellent 'to assure them that we do, at some time, envisage,' etc. But we had been assuring for decades, and on both sides there were rights, privileges and duties independent of ulterior motives. India was saying 'Lord, how long?' To this Lord Willingdon replied, in his first political speech as Viceroy, that he wanted to be the country's first constitutional Governor-General before his five years of office ended. And having said so much, he did not think it enough merely to repeat it in various forms of words. It became the keynote of his Government's actual policy, of its day-to-day work; and he made it his own personal responsibility to accelerate the machinery of reform.

Because it also meant a resolute control of lawlessness, 'Willingdonism' has been called a dual policy. This is a

misnomer. 'Complete' would be a better word. It is every Viceroy's normal and absolute duty to preserve order. Lord Willingdon could not see why this obligation should be neglected on the pretext that abnormal duties had been added to it. He would not temporise with mutineers, at hazard to his ship, just because they happened to have an eye on its advertised destination: on the contrary, the entry to that harbour would be so tricky and beset with reefs that the very approach to it made order on board doubly necessary. He had no use for the defeatist idea that disorder and tribulation must be tolerated as inevitable in constitutional change: if any new *régime* was to have a chance it must at least be born in healthy and peaceful conditions.

In 1929-30 there had been some excuse, perhaps, for doubt whither India was bound. Her politicians had not yet been offered much occasion, consistent with self-respect, to take their minds off their doubts. But things became very different with the beginning of 1932. The first Round Table Conference had given India a new and tolerably clear objective and a push towards it. A risky 'pact' with the Congress intransigents had secured their assent to this objective and their co-operation at the second Conference. Here they had failed completely; and in a 'fit of the sulks' they tried to cover their failure by resuming civil disobedience.

From the very first Lord Willingdon made it clear that he saw this campaign's rigorous suppression, and the advancement of constitutional reform, to be mutually essential concomitants. He acted accordingly. And he would not repeat the mistake of letting the Congress engage both his hands—one of them patting the party's leaders on the back and cajoling them to 'come into line,' while the other punched the heads of its deluded rank and file. This policy in the past had not only given the intransigents publicity, it had also seemed to condone the Liberals' fretful aloofness. It had left out in the cold the communal minorities and the other middle elements whose co-operation in the coming reforms was not less desirable, and was more safely predictable, than the extremists'. Anyone could recognise the Congress as India's only big political party organised and functioning as such on a 'national' scale. That was obvious: there were instructive parallels in Germany, Russia and Italy; and it was

possible to dislike Nazi, Soviet, and Fascist politics without disputing their native countries' right to govern themselves. But this experience only made it the more difficult to see how a parliamentary system of government could be expected to work in India if a Viceroy lightly tolerated the swamping of all other political influences by Congress Nazidom. Even an extremist might grow tired of haranguing an empty or unresisting waste of Opposition or Treasury benches.

For some years it had been a common complaint in India that the Government let down its friends—so much so that, if the complaint were true, it was often difficult to discover whether, where or why the Government had any friends at all. Lord Willingdon sought to invalidate the grievance, even if he could not wholly cure it. We have seen a little of what he did to rally constructive nationalism in general. He also had to reassure the minority communities. At one time or another they had been given minor reforms of their own within the compass of an existing Constitution that remained otherwise unchanged. This procedure had all but exhausted itself. The minorities were now as keen as anyone that there should be a generous measure of constitutional advance on a broad basis, whether in the provinces especially, or equally at the Centre. The trouble was that since 1929 or earlier the Government's preoccupation with the Congress had made its method of advance look rather like a process of piecemeal concession to militant Hinduism only—to the extremism of a single party dominated by a certain type or clique of Hindus. Lord Willingdon sought to redress the balance and perspective of the picture.

Imagine, for a moment, that a man is walking down a street between two rather different crowds who give him different welcomes. On his right there is silence except for occasional murmurings, with some sullen or watchful countenances, but very little real hostility and a good deal of friendliness. From the left come cat-calls, violent abuse of the man and his kind, occasional brickbats and revolver shots at his followers. By no means all the people on that side are taking part in the demonstration, but the peaceable among them make little serious effort to restrain the obstreperous, and it seems probable that the other side will be the more hospitable and helpful in case of immediate need. The man

has some property and other benefits for distribution among all the people in the street. Presently a deputation from each side approaches him to claim what he has to give it. He cannot please them both equally, for there is too much conflict between their claims; and the more fairly he tries to adjudicate between them, the more surely will both accuse him of partiality. Which of them is he likely to hear the more sympathetically when he finds that the people from the right side, by comparison with the left, seem to appreciate his offer more, and to be less uncertain what they want to do with it?

This is one possible answer to those who have questioned Lord Willingdon's impartiality between Hindus and Moslems, and in conversation I have even heard it ventured by Hindus. It may be the right answer. On the other hand, it is arguable that the Viceroy has done no more than raise the minorities from a neglect so firmly established in custom that it had seemed to be normal and proper, whereas he saw it to be inconsistent with justice, principle and expedience alike. Events, of course, all but forced his hand. The communal massacre at Cawnpore, just before he became Viceroy, had shown what might happen if the Congress Hindus felt themselves able to treat the Moslems much as the Nazis have treated the Jews and Catholics. The attitude of the Congress Press to the trouble in Kashmir State was even more illuminating. The Kashmiri Moslems—miserably poor, and oppressed by a Hindu clique, although they formed a great majority of the State's population—were scarcely within sight or rumour of elementary reforms that British India had enjoyed for generations. They began an agitation. The Congress newspapers howled at it, superfluously clamouring for its repression by the very means which they condemned in British India, whether such methods were used there or not. Could any Viceroy ignore such candid evidence that the Moslem minority in British India needed some make-weight against the great Hindu majority's domination?

The Communal Award closely followed the end of the Kashmir trouble, and Lord Willingdon undoubtedly had much influence on its drafting. The Moslems like it; most Hindus hate it. Inferences are drawn accordingly; but are they right or fair? In three of the provinces where the Moslems com-

prise a majority of the population they get smaller majorities in the councils. In the fourth (Bengal) they are reduced to a 'statutory minority' by the immense weightage given to the Europeans, who hold the balance of power. In the seven other provincial councils and the All-India Central Legislature the Hindus get majorities not commensurate with their population ratio, but absolutely unchallengeable. The rigidity of these arrangements springs from the Lucknow Pact, the only formal agreement yet reached between the two communities on the subject. Does the plan suggest unjust partiality for the Moslems? History may rather prove it to have been a considerable feat of statesmanship by a Viceroy who could see India both as a whole and as an agglomerate of components that must be nicely balanced.

With the same vision before him, and again with precedents tying his hands, he had to prop up the rickety structures of various Indian States. It was his duty under the Crown and Constitution to advise their rulers. By plumping for Federation (before ever Lord Willingdon became Viceroy) the Princes had set the course for the country's future reform; and, since most of them certainly owe their survival to support by successive Viceroys and Governments, Lord Willingdon was entitled to commend their decision and advise them to stick to it. On this simple fact his opponents in England reared a sand-mound of absurd calumny. One episode alone sufficed to show what sort of trickery they were ready to exploit and he had to contend with. Its story need not be repeated in detail. It was likened in India to the imaginary analogy of forty odd peers and M.P.'s secretly advising the President of the United States in 1917 that the British Government was foolish to continue the war, and that America should on no account join the Allies.

What, then, is the political meaning of the difference between Lord Willingdon's and Lord Irwin's hold on Indian imagination? At no time in the last five years has the outcry about repression been shriller than it was under Lord Irwin and Wedgwood Benn. For weeks on end in 1930 Bombay city alone suffered more casualties in a single day's action by the police than the whole of British India saw in any fortnight, or perhaps month, after Lord Willingdon became Viceroy. His single batch of emergency regulations against

civil disobedience was less oppressive and irritating than his predecessor's series of ordinances, issued one after another. In one or two frank sentences, and by practical achievement, he associated himself with Indian aspirations as no Viceroy had ever done before. He has been readier than any other to consult elected members of the legislatures on matters of administration. His Indian critics allow that he has no atom of racial snobbery in him. Some of them even published, with grudging appreciation, a photograph of him that might well have horrified a Curzon—a delightful unposed snapshot showing him squatting among gay little urchins on the steps of a Lahore hospital, while he chatted with Boy Scouts and signed their autograph albums. Left to himself, he is a natural democrat in the best sense of the word. Why is it, then, that in India his name is identified with repressive and unpopular government as Lord Irwin's seldom was?

The reason may be that, though he makes admirable speeches in the conversational manner, he lacks the flair or disposition for stately orations about what he has in mind or what he is doing. He seems to charm everyone whom he talks with *à l'intime*, unless the visitor comes with prejudice too stubborn, a guile too insidious, or an intent too mischievous, to deserve the effort of patient sympathy. Wherever he has had intercourse at close range with people other than place-seekers, time-servers and popular careerists he has won devoted loyalty and affection; and this has meant more for India's recovery than the country is ever likely to know. But that is not enough for his Government's enemies if they feel less bound to recognise another's merit than to proclaim their own among the uninitiated. Even when they know the truth they cannot afford to announce an alien Viceroy's worth from their house-tops if there is any risk that their public may doubt their word or be over-persuaded by a more vitriolic rival. In the usual course of events this public's opinion of a Viceroy must depend on his reported speeches, on the colour these give to his public acts. And 'golden phrases' are not in Lord Willingdon's nature or capacity. It is enough for him that his course is clear and based on first principles. He can appeal strongly to a sense of duty: some of his hearers would have preferred more comforting appeals to their self-esteem.

He has been consistent from first to last where a virtue, almost, is made of inconsistency.

The *enfants terribles* of Indian agitation were dazed and put out of countenance when he took up their challenge and 'sat' on them swiftly and surely. This was all wrong, they felt: it had become the convention to give them a run for their money, so that they could make the Government look a bit foolish before they went into 'seclusion,' leaving a legacy of violent sedition and disorder. How could they now 'court imprisonment' in the popular fashion if arrest forestalled the courting? And the break with convention (as they thought it) shocked other people too, inasmuch as Lord Willingdon could not or would not explain his actions against the lawless in a pleasing *apologia pro vita sua*. It was not in him to expatiate repeatedly on his principles, policy, hopes or fears in classic speeches and gratifying eloquence perfectly attuned to the collective heart, tastes, and emotions of those whom they chid or cajoled. Had he combined this valuable gift with all his other accomplishments, his greatness as a Viceroy might have been undisputed. Perhaps it will be when the ship that he set on an even keel reaches the end of the course which he steadied and straightened for it.

PATRICK LACEY.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT—THE TRUTH

By B. S. TOWNROE

THE picture of corruption in the Local Government service given in two articles in the *Nineteenth Century and After* published last November and February is overdrawn and at times distorted.

Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis, an architect by profession, in his first article has rehashed nearly all the cases of wrongdoing which have occurred during the past ten years, and, while this aggregate looks formidable, it gives quite a wrong impression of the 'average' conduct of local government. It is necessary to keep a proper perspective in considering bribery and secret commissions, which are not unknown in private business. We must admit that in this imperfect world there are black sheep in every profession.

As in architecture, medicine, law, and the other learned professions, so in the local government service, both voluntary and paid, the man with a yellow streak in his make-up still works mischief. He is ready to accept bribes, from a bottle of whisky to some carefully concealed commission, and has to be guarded against. That is the root of the trouble, for the first move usually comes from the other side, and very often innocent-looking offers of hospitality lead to other offers and further trouble. It would, indeed, be nonsense to state that there have never been instances where local government officers or councillors have fallen to the temptation of accepting bribes. There is, however, no proof whatever of the charge made by Mr. Williams-Ellis that corruption is 'rife' in municipal administration. He has undoubtedly a case to make for the utmost precautions being taken so that the expenditure of every penny taken from the pockets of the ratepayers may be watched, but he has overlooked the dull and sober facts of the situation.

The preparation of the 'budget' of a local authority is usually governed by its standing orders, and practice varies according to the size and type of authority and local circumstances. This qualification must be borne in mind in considering the following outline of procedure :

- (1) Before the commencement of the financial year to which the estimates relate, each head of a department prepares, in consultation with the chairman of his committee and the treasurer, the first draft estimates. These, naturally, are based on the policy and known programme of the local authority ;
- (2) The draft is then passed to the treasurer for the insertion of figures which he alone can supply ;
- (3) The draft estimate is next considered by the appropriate executive committee (sometimes by a sub-committee before coming before the full committee) ;
- (4) When approved by the executive committee, the estimate is sent to the finance committee, and it then receives independent detailed consideration, usually by a special sub-committee. The chairman of the executive committee and the head of the department may be invited to attend the meeting when their estimates are under consideration. Any amendments desired by the finance sub-committee are effected by sending back the draft estimates, accompanied by an appropriate recommendation, to the executive committee. Alternatively, or in addition, conferences may take place between the finance sub-committee and the chairmen of all other committees with a view to securing agreed reductions of estimates in order to keep the total rate within a certain figure ;
- (5) When all departmental estimates have been approved by the finance sub-committee an aggregate summary is prepared by the treasurer and submitted for the consideration of the finance committee ;
- (6) The detailed estimates are then submitted to and must be approved by the council before the amount of the rate can be determined. It is customary for the chairman of the finance committee to explain the estimates to the council in considerable detail.

Although the steps outlined above may not apply in every case, the procedure is invariably designed to secure full consideration of every penny of public money to be spent. The foregoing paragraphs relate to estimates of revenue expenditure to be met out of the rate. Many authorities compile similar estimates, either for one year or a period of years, of expenditure to be met by borrowing.

Mr. Williams-Ellis evidently does not appreciate the thoroughness of the procedure described above, or the strictness of the audit applied by the Government. This applies to all local authorities, with the exception of municipal corporations. But even for the latter a large number have now been brought under the Government audit, and, furthermore, the Poor Law accounts of all authorities, county boroughs included, where there are obvious possibilities of bribery and corruption, are also under Government audit. The Government auditor checks the accounts, of which education is the principal, of all authorities towards which specific grants are made from public funds. In short, the Government audit extends largely to municipal corporations as well as to the other local authorities.

A district auditor is no ordinary auditor. He has very large powers of disallowance and surcharge. He is in the position of an independent officer and he is not subject to the direction of the Ministry. If the audit of commercial firms were nearly as thorough as that made by the Government, the public might indeed call themselves blessed.

The Government auditors cannot, of course, take action unless proof is forthcoming, but all those who have had practical experience of local government in this direction know how they are always on the watch for evidence of wrongdoing. The chief difficulty is to obtain reliable evidence and proof of statements made. In this direction Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis can perform a real public service if he will support the general accusations of corruption which he makes in his article by sending to the Minister of Health reliable evidence which he may have discovered in the course of his work.

Apart from the close control by the district auditors there is in addition in almost every local authority—certainly in all county councils, county boroughs and metropolitan

boroughs—a running internal audit carried out under the chief financial officer. This is a perpetual check carried out partly by constant supervision and partly by surprise visits. In the case of municipal baths, for example, one or other member of the staff of the municipal treasurer will daily be examining the cash received at the turnstiles. This examination is subject to constant check and also sudden and thorough audit.

These various checks, which are constantly being improved as the result of practical experience, are normally sufficient to prevent grave scandal, but there are at times complaints of personal favouritism. Here, again, there has been considerable improvement in recent years, and the present-day councillor is as a general rule particularly careful, even though it may mean the loss of personal popularity, to maintain complete impartiality. The mayor of a Midland town told me recently that he was the first Labour J.P. and the first Labour mayor of his local authority and recounted the following incident. A member of his council had been out of work for over a year, and the suggestion was made that he should resign and be given a paid job under the council. The clerk, on being consulted, replied as follows: 'Well, Mr. Mayor, of course it can be wangled, but I have never known you, in all your public life, a party to wangling.' Needless to say, the suggestion was turned down, and the mayor in question told me that he was convinced that in his district the amount of bribery was negligible and at the worst was confined to a box of cigars at Christmas.

In the words of Sir Gwilym Gibbon, the late Director of the Local Government Division of the Ministry of Health: 'Some corruption there undoubtedly is, more than comes to light, and occasional corruption there is always likely to be in so expansive a service unless human nature is transformed. But I know that every local government organisation is anxious to take every possible measure to prevent it.'

A further safeguard is the supervision exercised by all the principal officers. In the majority of cases the town clerks are members of the Law Society; borough treasurers are members of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants; borough engineers are members of the Institute of Civil Engineers or of Mechanical Engineers or

their equivalent professional organisation; and librarians are members of the Library Association, which works under a Royal Charter created in 1898. These institutions require a standard of competence, and have done much in recent years to raise the standards.

The National Association of Local Government Officers has also under consideration the question of a code of professional conduct for the whole of the local government service. So far back as January 1932, Mr. S. Lord, who was then president of the Association, in an article entitled 'Am I my Brother's Keeper?' said:

It should not be difficult, in co-operation with the professional bodies interested, to prescribe a code of professional conduct and insist on its observance. I have sufficient confidence in the sound judgment of the leaders in the local government service to know that they would use a feature of this kind with discretion and fairness. There is a recognized standard of conduct attaching to membership of the Law Society, the British Medical Association, the Royal Institute of British Architects, the Institution of Civil Engineers and the National Union of Teachers, and I am not prepared to admit that any one of these professions has a greater claim to such a code than the local government service, which is, in essence, a series of specialized professions. I am not visualizing a standard of conduct which would be limited to the government of the attitude of an officer to a local authority, but one which would also ensure a recognition by the officer of his obligations to his brother officers by including a fine spirit of comradeship and integrity and efficiency in his official duties.

Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis, apparently, as he wrote his article, began to realise that it was difficult to play the same tune of corruption all through, and therefore introduced a variation in the form of an attack upon aldermen and councillors for their inefficiency. His exact words are: 'the general incompetence and unsuitability for their work of the unpaid elected representatives of the ratepayers.' This is no new charge. Indeed, Aristotle in his *Politics* gave a warning of the difficulties of democratic government in the city-state of Greece, and unfortunately our English system is not free from some of the weaknesses to be found in Athens about 300 years before Christ, and councils still attract a proportion of windbags and demagogues. Slowly and gradually our British local government system has been developed and reformed. It is, of course, subject to the imperfections of

human nature, but Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis again spoils his case when he asserts that comparatively few councillors possess either business knowledge or knowledge of local government administration 'to more than a superficial degree.' There are incompetent men in all democratic bodies, for democracy has always attracted a certain number of men and women who rely on tub-thumping and intrigue for success rather than on study and hard work. No one who has had first-hand experience of the local government of to-day will deny that it is served diligently by men and women ready to give freely of their time, leisure, and experience.

I have met personally representatives of many local authorities—metropolitan, county, urban and rural—during the last sixteen years, and am impressed by the serious way in which the majority of the councillors take their unpaid duties and how only comparatively few are blatant self-advertisers or stupid self-seekers.

One of the examples given by Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis of the 'inefficiency of local government administration' is the architect of council houses who, in his view, 'defaces the countryside.' The Royal Institute of British Architects has again and again pointed out the comparatively high architectural standard of much of the housing carried out by local authorities since the war. Sir Raymond Unwin, when he was Chief Architect of the Ministry of Health, raised the standards of the lay-out and design of working-class houses so that they are now envied by other countries. The good design and dignity of the housing estates directed by the city councils of Liverpool, Birmingham, and other bodies are so well known as to need no extravagant eulogy. Among the smaller housing estates, that planned by Mr. Curtis Green for Winchester has been judged by many architects to have added beauty to an already beautiful city. Of course there are council houses badly designed and constructed of materials which are out of harmony with the countryside, but these are few as compared with the million houses and flats which have added to much to the architectural amenities of this country.

Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis is not content with pointing out that some private estate developers have been responsible

for such atrocities as certain bungalow towns allowed on the South Coast, or with condemning those persons who have erected villas with salmon-pink roofs in a stone country like the Cotswolds. He proclaims that the amenities of the countryside are being destroyed through 'the ignorance, incompetence, stupidity and roguery of the elected representatives and paid servants of our municipal authorities.' He then goes on to declare that the bill for the maintenance and repair of our roads and bridges is mainly due to incompetence. Mistakes have admittedly been made, but surely the increased number and heavier weight of motor traffic is the main cause of the cost of our roads.

It may be germane here to quote from a pamphlet issued some little time ago by Dr. W. A. Robson entitled *Civic Planning*.

If [he wrote] the community were to realize fully the immense possibilities of social enrichment through the use of civic planning which now lie within our control, these great economic changes would be directed with reference to a 'Design for Living' (to borrow a playwright's suggestive phrase). By that means the country could be made far more attractive, convenient and healthy than it now is. It is indisputable that the local authorities in this country have already taken the first steps towards planning the social environment both in town and country. At the same time it is clear that this movement, possibly the most creative of all municipal services, has not realized anything like the achievements of which it is potentially capable. Local authorities and their officers are but the reflections of public opinion, in this matter as in so many others.

Mr. Williams-Ellis's love of exaggeration is again exemplified in his assertion that the authorities build 'houses that will be in ruins before the next generation is dead.' Here again the Ministry of Health have exercised considerable care and only allowed loans for a period of sixty years on dwellings which reach a certain standard of construction. A distinction must be made between municipal housing—not always, of course, beyond reproach—and the houses erected for quick sale by the speculative builders, who are sometimes outsiders who have come into the industry without any training or experience.

Finally I would ask Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis and those who may have been influenced by his criticisms to consider seriously whether they will not pull their weight in the boat

of Local Government instead of standing on the bank and throwing stones. All of us who know local government from the inside realise how difficult it is to find good candidates at municipal elections. There is a feeling on the part of the younger generation, especially if they have had the advantages of a university education, that they will have to associate on the local council with 'butchers and candlestick-makers.' The preliminary electioneering is never pleasant, and councillors are regarded in every locality as subjects for abuse or ridicule. The gross failure which has taken place in public assistance administration during the past few years shows how difficult it is to find men and women of sufficient leisure to take up local government work.

There are, however, many signs to show that local government service is being more and more recognised as an important public service. The late King and the present King have again and again paid their tribute to the responsibilities and influence of municipal officers and councillors. During the Jubilee celebrations last year King George gave up four separate afternoons in order to meet personally the mayors and town clerks of various metropolitan boroughs. When King Edward VIII. initiated the King George Jubilee Trust he summoned the lord mayors, lord-provosts, mayors and provosts to meet him at St. James's Palace. In the words of the late King: 'In no department of our life is the spirit of public service more clearly manifested than in the sphere of local government.'

B. S. TOWNROE.

BISHOP BUTLER AND HIS 'ANALOGY OF RELIGION'

By R. E. STEDMAN, Ph.D.

IN May 1736 Joseph Butler, Rector of Stanhope and Chaplain to Lord Chancellor Talbot, laid down his pen on finishing the second of his two not very bulky books, *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*. Ten years earlier he had published his *Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel*; two years later he was elevated to the Bishopric of Bristol and shortly thereafter to the Deanery of St. Paul's. He died in 1752, at the age of sixty, Lord Bishop of the Palatine Sec of Durham. To this high ecclesiastical dignity he rose from the obscurity of a provincial merchant's home; while by his mere couple of books he gained a secure, if not pre-eminent, place among the dozen or so immortals of British philosophy. As his elevation among men owed nothing to influences other than those justly due to acknowledged merit, so his posthumous reputation gained no impetus from advantages of style or circumstance. As a philosopher he suffered from severe limitations both of interest and opportunity; as a writer even his warmest admirers can concede him no more than qualified praise.

Neither of his publications made any great stir on its first appearance, though both manifestly commended themselves to the judicious. The general reading public looked in its ethics for the urbanities (dare one say evasions?) of a Shaftesbury, and in its theology craved the more satisfying sound and fury of a Warburton. Byrom's *Journal* (1737) finds him 'a little too little vigorous,' and wishes 'he could have spoken more earnestly.' The fact remains, however, that, by the inevitable permeation of superior thought, moral theory after Butler took new and certainly more profitable lines, and no

more (except by way of historical comment) was to be heard of the hitherto endemic Deist controversy. With the *Analogy* this particular phase of the perennial theological debate reached its term. If the effect of Butler's work upon his own, and the immediately succeeding, generation was quiet and, so to say, subterranean, from the last quarter of the century his name became more and more a thing to conjure with. The early nineteenth century did him unceasing (if not always intelligent) homage. Editions, tracts, and eulogies poured from the press, while a filter of detraction grew into a not inconsiderable volume of criticism—some significant, much absurd. In ethics his *Sermons* became virtually standard doctrine; while his *Analogy* filled a similar rôle in apologetics, until rising evolutionary notions drove it (with the more clumsy arguments of Paley) into relative neglect. Thus W. E. Gladstone came, in his age, to mourn the days when his University read Butler, and to set himself the pious task of reviving true religion, and the Bishop's reputation, by means of a new and sumptuous edition. But Gladstone, with so many of his admirers, claimed for Butler too much (or, at any rate, more than his time could grant), and no substantial effect ensued. In 1908 Canon Scott-Holland, in his sympathetic *Romanes Lecture*, describes his work as remaining still 'outside the current of living speculation.' This could not be otherwise (so far as the *Analogy* is concerned), for where the conflict lies between naturalism *pur sang* and theism Butler's limited theological arguments, taken at their true estimate, are of relatively little consequence. Nevertheless, Butler's fame in its darkest hour is far from eclipse. Witness, for example, the publication in 1903 of Bernard's fine and impartial edition, and—of greater import—the appearance of the *Analogy* in *Everyman's Library*. For signs of a present renewal of interest in Butler's work we need only survey the past decade. That thinkers so divergent and so eminent as Professors A. E. Taylor and C. D. Broad should think it worth while to write at some length about aspects of his thought is sufficient contemporary testimony of his continued vitality. Would that Butler had always been as fortunate in his critics!

Dwarfed by the larger movements of the immediately preceding centuries and by the conspicuous intervention of

subsequent events, the early eighteenth century takes on a flat and unemphatic appearance in which, to those then flourishing, it would be unrecognisable. For in reality the period introduced by Locke's *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding* (1690) and his *Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695), and terminating, perhaps, in Hume's *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751), or in Richard Price's *A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals* (1757), comprehends an intellectual development which for variety and vigour is (in its kind) unparalleled in our history. It is the day of both British mental and moral philosophy. It saw, too, the whole of the Deist controversy, which, notwithstanding its narrowness of aim and the crudity and indecisiveness of its methods, serves as a notable example of that lively theological activity—that concern for ‘evidences’—which is the only alternative to simply authoritarian and clerical religion. This controversy marks the changes of the times. In the seventeenth century Episcopalians and Independents sought a decision on the field of blood, whereas the Deists and their opponents waged inky and acrimonious warfare from the armchair. John Toland, it is true, saw his book (*Christianity not Mystical*, 1696) publicly burned, and felt himself somewhat harried; but his person was not so much as singed, there being left no zeal for further martyrdoms. As the new century waxed, even Toland's minor discomforts could not be repeated.

If, however, the intellectual life of the period was illustrious and memorable, its public and social life was unworthy, exhibiting many unlovely features which, perhaps somewhat coloured up, have made it a byword for grossness, corruption and levity. Butler's own judgment upon the temper of his time is characteristically moderate, and—as an example of the manner in which he works around and about his subject—may be quoted in its entirety.

It is commonly observed [he remarks in one of the *Sermons*] that there is a disposition in men to complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they live, as greater than that of former ones; which is usually followed by this further observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all times. Now not to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts of history; thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly take different turns, and some particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages than

in others: and I suppose it may be spoken of as very much the distinction of the present to confess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly.

Butler's philosophical work is throughout shaped by his concern for the practical and pastoral problems with which the life of his day confronted him in his capacity as a clergyman. Even his driest speculations and analyses have the improvement of life and conduct in view.

What, then, is the main purpose of the *Analogy of Religion*? Is it, as is generally the case with apologetic works, an attempt to prove the existence of God? On the contrary, Butler is willing to take this for proved. This he can do, since his opponents, the Deists, did not question it. To this we may add that the admission of God's existence, and even of His intelligence, is of relatively little consequence until He be further characterised, and our relation to Him specified. The insignificance of such admissions is shown (as Professor N. Kemp Smith has recently pointed out in the valuable introduction to his edition of the *Dialogues on Religion*) by the willingness of even Hume to allow them. The Bishop's book may succinctly and sufficiently be described as an attempt to show, not that God is, but that His existence *matters supremely*; that, in effect, it is not all one whether we live consciously as God's creatures, or as self-sufficing beings. Butler found his fellows all too ready to amuse themselves with paper proofs and disputations in these spheres—a form of entertainment he deeply deplored, as weakening, by familiarity, the sense of the gravity of the matters thus amiably (or irascibly) debated. To evoke and enforce a sense of the serious consequences properly following from even the minimum admissions of light-minded disputants was his primary aim. On every side he fancied he saw men scoffing and making light of religion. Hence, in the Advertisement to the *Analogy*:

It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of enquiry; but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus much, at least, will be here found, not taken for granted, but proved,

that any reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his own being, that it is not, however, so clear a case that there is nothing in it. . . .

The criticism, therefore, generally levelled at his time, that it saw nothing in religion but 'something to be proved,' manifestly flies wide of Butler and his work, in which religion is regarded first and always as *something to be lived*. His 'proof'—or, more strictly, his argumentation—aims directly at enforcing this practical conclusion. In his own phrase, his design 'is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men: it is not to justify His providence, but to show what *belongs to us to do*' (my italics). Men's achievements, however, seldom coincide precisely with their proposals, and the *Analogy* is no exception. Its total effect extends beyond its primary objective. For example, it raises in an acute form the whole problem of analogical reasoning in theological and philosophical subjects, at the same time laying down with precision and assurance the criteria appropriate to this method. Hence, as a study in the principles and application of probable arguments to things unknown, on the basis of things known, his book deserves a closer attention than many—repelled, perhaps, by its apologetic aim—have paid it. No work in the language more justly assesses, or more scrupulously uses, analogical argument—which is to say, that mode of reasoning which covers virtually all subjects which really matter to man.

Probable evidence [he begins] is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. . . . In its very nature [he continues] it affords but an imperfect kind of information; and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities . . . *for us probability is the very guide of life* [my italics].

Butler finds, upon examination, that arguments in divinity are generally founded upon 'hypothesis' (as in Descartes), or upon 'vain and idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been framed otherwise than it is,' and concludes 'that we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation.' It involves us in 'a train of folly and extravagance.'

Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent employment . . . turn our thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of Nature with respect to intelligent creatures; which may be resolved into

general laws of administration, in the same way as many of the laws of Nature respecting inanimate matter may be collected from experiments. And let us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is said to be the moral system of nature, the acknowledged dispensations of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with what religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece.

Butler's use of his argument from analogy is directed chiefly at the disposal of *objections* to the principal religious positions affecting ourselves, taken as so many facts, and to a less extent towards a positive substantiation of these positions. He proposes first to undermine every alleged ground for the *incredibility* of religion; to show grounds, uncertain yet probable, for its positive *credibility*; and finally to refute any objections to the *evidence*. The positions he considers in Part I. are (a) that man has in prospect a future life, (b) that this life is one of reward and punishment for conduct in the present, and (c) that our present life is essentially one of trial and discipline. He chooses these, to the exclusion of others in a sense more central to philosophical theology, because they concern us most closely, and because his opponents were more prone to doubt them. In the absence of any substantial ground for disbelief, and granting any degree of probability in favour of belief, the only path of reason and prudence is to act (as we do in all other situations affecting ourselves) as if the matter were demonstrated. Degrees of assent there may be, but in action one must either do or leave undone.

Butler's treatment of revealed religion is of a like kind, with the exception that the Deists' tendency to reject revelation *in toto* as a usurpation of the function of reason or the 'light of nature' caused him to take a more comprehensive view. Again it is with the *importance* of Christianity, on the supposition of its truth, that he deals. Then, granting this, he proceeds with minute care to eliminate one after another of the objections to revelation in general, and to the particular content of the supposed Christian revelation, thereafter showing some positive analogies for its doctrines, and combating objections to its evidence. On the relation of natural and revealed religion Butler takes a line inevitable in an age dominated both by the work and by the temper of John Locke. He will not grant the popular prevailing opinion that revela-

tion is *merely* a 'republication' of natural religion; though he allows that it is this. It imports fresh religious data concerning which reason cannot 'judge beforehand,' but which, once disclosed, cannot contradict what is plain by the light of reason. He makes the significant observation that revelation is the source of even natural religion, by which he paves the way for a more adequate treatment of this intolerable antithesis. Both natural and revealed religion are, he insists, 'schemes imperfectly comprehended,' and it is therefore no argument against any particular point in either that we can place our finger upon no precise analogy in the course of Nature. If it is not incredible, it is credible; and the slightest presumption in its favour turns the scale, and ought likewise to determine our conduct.

It is manifestly the vast *ignorance* of man which is here, as throughout his work, shaping Butler's attitude to every problem. Yet it is quite unfair to infer (with some of his critics) that he is making this ignorance a premise of his argument. Such an attack might be relevant to Mansel, a century later; but the Bishop was far too alive to the principles of his method to fall into so open a fallacy. There can be no denying that it is a sufficient objection to an objection taken on grounds of alleged *a priori* impossibility to urge that man is no less ignorant of the scheme of God's moral government than of the whole system of Nature. Thus, formally, the objector is silenced; but, it must be granted, even as a weapon against objections, ignorance is double-edged. Thus, to one less prone than the Bishop to take even the minimum positions of religion on trust, the disposal of the objection would not incline him in any degree towards actual belief. Here Butler, if he is to make progress, must rely upon his admittedly weak analogies positively buttressing the religious position. For himself (and rightly for many) the removal of obstacles is sufficient, but for another it may equally well come short.

It is manifestly quite out of the question in a paper such as this to trace, much less to estimate, Butler's detailed argument; hence a few observations of a general kind must suffice. It is at once clear that his method is severely limited on several sides. As I have remarked, he takes the content of both natural and revealed religion, in a quite unhistorical

fashion, as so much given fact, and is concerned almost entirely to prove it not incredible. In this by no means unimportant task he is completely successful. Furthermore, he is able to identify pain and punishment in a manner which will to-day carry no conviction, yet which is essential to many of his analogies involved in the proofs of his positions. Perhaps the best general comment we can make of his argumentation as a whole—and this is true equally of his positive as of his negative considerations—is that he consistently *understates* his case. Only to light, or unpractised, minds does this encourage (as some of his more timorous commentators have alleged) sceptical tendencies. His own generation, certainly, desired more clamorous and belligerent advocacy, and was inclined to poke fun at Butler's intellectual scrupulosity. Bolingbroke, for example, with manifest malice turns a phrase of the Bishop against himself. Queen Caroline, he remarks, has read the *Analogy* 'with much application.' 'She understands the whole argument perfectly, and concludes with the Right Reverend Author that it is not so clear a case there is nothing in revealed religion.' Sir Humphry Davy, noting the meticulous honesty of Butler's statement of the objections to religion, dubbed his book a 'fruitfull parent of error.' Similarly a certain unhappy Miss Hennell: 'Oh, lame and impotent—ph! profoundly SKEPTICAL conclusion!' To the judicious, however, the effect of this systematic understatement is greater than that of heaps of unsupported asseveration. The tendency of too many of Butler's judges, whether for or against his profession is to suppose that he ought to have attempted a task which in fact he did not attempt. So Sir Leslie Stephen's brilliant essay in *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* moves upon the assumption that he ought to have compiled a complete philosophy of religion, and especially should have proved God's existence, intelligence and natural government of the world. This is what Sir Leslie wished to see proved; but his wish, it is plain, imposes no obligation upon the author he is choosing to discuss! The same critic, furthermore, fails consistently to recall the hypothetical character of the argument, which throughout is *ad hominem*. (In a long chapter, for example, Butler seeks to show that his general argument is unaffected by the admission of determinism. Yet he is no determinist.) Thus, in his conclusion, Sir Leslie supposes the

groping and hypothetical character of the *Analogy* to be evidence of Butler's own purblind and hesitant religion. But this is in contradiction to his own implication (for which there is more substantial ground) that it is Butler's personal religious assurance which, for those lacking the same, weakens to some extent his conclusions.

A very proper question to ask at this stage is this: On the supposition that Butler has persuaded some doubter that Christianity (or natural religion) is to a reasonable degree probable, and further, that he must therefore act as if it were true, what, we may inquire, is the religious value of the conduct ensuing? The reply depends, of course, upon the precise motive at work. If he feels it *incumbent upon* him, or his duty, so to act, then the position should not be seriously in doubt. But how would it stand if the motive were mere self-interest? Now not a little of Butler's argument is intended to awaken a sense of interest even desperately (in which, of course, he has been likened to Pascal) at stake. I do not think it can be doubted that the Bishop really desires to make people feel that *it will pay* to take Christianity as true. A very moderate statement of his oft-repeated position runs:

... the proper motives to Religion are the proper proofs of it from our moral nature, from the presages of conscience, and *our natural apprehension of God under the character of a righteous Governor and Judge* [my italics].

For the apprehension to which Butler refers there is ample Scriptural authority; nevertheless, if it become too central, it may very well betoken an inadequate view of religion. Butler's age was still strongly affected by the Calvinism of the seventeenth century, and, comparatively, his attitude towards 'the wrath of God revealed from Heaven' is temperate enough. His own judgment on the case I have advanced would in all probability be that he takes man as he finds him, in religion as in morals, and that, while he recognises the superiority of religious acts and attitudes springing spontaneously from the Love of God, he is not willing to deny the limited, but still great, value of more interested kinds of religion. In this connexion his appreciation of the force of habit in human affairs would bear him out. In more than one connexion he does explicitly allow that there are degrees in religion, and it would be foreign to his whole nature to

strike those 'all-or-nothing' attitudes which have never been congenial to the English character.

A further criticism of his view is suggested by the passage cited—namely, that he makes assent to propositions too crucial to religion, or, in other words, that he is over-intellectualist. This criticism has some point, and it applies equally to his time. It must be remembered that Butler is in all things, in his weakness as in his strength, through and through of the eighteenth century. I must add, however, in his defence, that his purpose in the *Analogy* exaggerates any intellectualist tendencies he may share with his generation. And again, he by no means identifies religion with assent to propositions. As I have already insisted, it is its practical character, rather than its doctrinal content as such, which is always foremost in his mind.

I have already observed that since the middle of the nineteenth century Butler's *Analogy* has lapsed into the estate of a 'classic'—which is to say, a work generally honoured yet seldom read. The reason for this is not far to seek. Those positions which Butler granted were no longer part and parcel of the world-view of virtually all educated persons. As Sir Leslie Stephen rightly points out, it was precisely these which it was increasingly commonplace in educated circles, not so much to doubt, as uncritically to reject. Furthermore, as Professor A. E. Taylor has remarked:

When the ardent youth of our Universities were being taught, with abundance of persuasive eloquence, that in philosophy Kant and Hegel had made all things new, men were not likely to see much merit in the 'home-keeping' wits of the eighteenth century, even if they condescended to study it at all, except in so far as, in the case of Hume, some knowledge of it was necessary for the understanding of Kant.

In both of these respects the present situation is unlike that of seventy-five years ago. The naturalism and loose-ended evolutionism of that period has been long played out as a factor in contemporary thought, its place to be taken by either frank nescience or by compromising positions—by vaguely expressed belief in the 'spiritual' character of the world. Just what these mean is not, as a rule, clear; yet, perhaps, not a few of them, if they could but be clarified and committed to admissions and rejections, would amount to a kind of Deism. To revive this question-begging label would be

nothing short of calamity ; but, terms apart, it is not unlikely that at several points the subtle persistencies of Bishop Butler would find joints and openings. Our categories, it is true, have undergone two centuries of development, and the face of religion (or of any complex historical fact) does not wear for us the rigidity that it once did. It may be true that ' evolutionism ' (even of the ' emergent ' kind) is no longer a possible philosophy, but its effect upon our modes of thought cannot now be rooted out. The clock cannot be put back to tell for us Butler's time ! Nevertheless, notwithstanding the severe limitations imposed upon him by his purpose, as by the somewhat crabbed categories of his age, Butler's argument has a permanent place and value which is not by any means solely historical. If he will but put forth the effort required to break through the crusty exterior, the sensible reader, whatsoever his private views, can scarcely fail to discover something to his taste and service.

Similarly, the force of Continental idealism in this country is fully spent ; and a reaction in favour of the realistically minded philosophers of our empirical tradition, and even more so of their method of inquiry, is definitely in being. This reaction is making itself felt in all departments of philosophy, and notably in ethics—a subject upon which Butler's final views appear as a Dissertation appended to the *Analogy*. His contributions to moral philosophy are, in my judgment, more notable than those he made to apologetics. Yet to do them justice in the closing paragraphs of a short paper is clearly impossible ; hence it might well be better to say nothing than to offer merely vacuous generalities. It may serve simply to remark that his value as a moralist lies just where our survey would lead us to expect—namely, in his honest and undistorted transcript of moral experience. And it is surely this, rather than a new ' metaphysic of ethics,' or wire-drawn distinctions, which is most deeply needed. Upon the basis of such a transcript speculative construction may be possible, but it must be admitted at once that the Bishop would expect little to come of it. Here he is with Aristotle in eschewing demonstration in moral subjects. He is with ' the Philosopher ' again in the view he takes of the moralist's task—which is not merely to tell men what goodness means, but to *make them good*. In morals as in philosophical theology it is

ever the practical problem which bulks largely before his mind's eye.

This practical concern and his empirical method count with his countrymen for righteousness. Bishop Butler's reputation, I think, is secure, since his sober turn of mind, his aversion from fine-spun theories, his forthrightness and fidelity to the facts, endear him to his compatriots, who (how justly I shall not try to judge) like to consider themselves embodiments of these very characters.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

SAMUEL PEPYS, NAVAL ADMINISTRATOR

By LIEUT.-COMMANDER MELVIN F. TALBOT (SC), United States Navy

THREE centuries ago a fifth child, Samuel Pepys, was born into an obscure Puritan household. The event was doubtless called blessed in his father's humble tailor shop off Fleet Street, though times were hard, and already there was a muttering in the City against King Charles I. and his arbitrary imposition of 'ship money.' To the child's distant and wealthy cousin, Sir Sidney Montagu, whose son was destined to bring back the House of Stuart in the person of Charles II., Samuel's birth must have seemed merely an annoying addition to an already long list of poor relations. And yet, of the great men who pass with pomp or with tragedy across those troubled pages of English history, none is better known to-day than this son of the journeyman tailor. His claim to immortality in this world—and it was to this world rather than to the next that he dedicated his busy life—is twofold: first, the energy and skill with which he administered the affairs of the Stuart Navy, and secondly, the diary in which for nearly ten years he recorded with engaging frankness, humour, and insight the actors, the events, the *mise en scène* of that gay, dissolute, and entirely human period known as the Restoration.

Samuel Pepys rose to fortune with his cousin, Edward Montagu. Montagu himself rose, not merely from his demonstrated capacity as an admiral under the Commonwealth, but more from the turn which he gave to events in the momentous year of the Restoration (1660). Pepys had already left college, had married a beautiful and penniless girl of fifteen (one of the very few imprudent acts of a very prudent life), and had found employment as a 'mean clerk' in the Exchequer Office. With no money in the Commonwealth

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treasury, there was little work and much time for observation and for letters to his powerful cousin, then unemployed and watching the trend of events from his country estate.

The Puritan revolution had shot its bolt. England was ripe for change. The Rump Parliament was slowly expiring in its own fierce contentions, and already the King's arms were secretly displayed in London. As is ever the case, the real power to shape events rested with those who could hold the Army and Navy firmly in hand. The history of all revolutions is the history of the armed forces, of a Guards' mutiny or a 'whiff of grapeshot.' While Westminster rang to the empty oratory of the Rump, in the north General George Monk crossed the Tweed at the head of his disciplined veterans.

Ever solicitous of 'my Lord's interests,' Samuel Pepys borrowed £5 and sent off word post-haste to Edward Montagu that he could have the fleet for the asking. Montagu hurried up to London. Taking Pepys aside in the garden, he told him that the King would soon be restored. Would cousin Samuel like to go to sea as admiral's secretary? Long into the night Pepys lay awake 'in discourse thereupon' with his wife. And when in April Edward Montagu hoisted his flag in the *Naseby*, in a little room next the admiral's great cabin, cousin Samuel was very busy arranging naval documents, and, vastly pleased and not a little surprised at his suddenly acquired importance (for which he duly thanked God), was setting it all down in shorthand on the first pages of his immortal diary.

'So to sleep,' he writes after three weeks at sea; 'each day . . . a fresh sense of pleasure of my present life.' He filed the admiral's correspondence, played on the treble, 'sang a psalm or two,' drank ale with the purser, and ogled the ladies on a passing ship, 'they being pretty handsome.'

The time had now come. To his great delight, Pepys was ordered to read the Royal declaration to the generals by land and by sea—first to the assembled captains in the great cabin, and then on the quarterdeck where 'the seamen did all cry out "God bless King Charles!"' Late that night, writing up the copies of the vote by which the Council of War accepted the King, the secretary adds his own name, 'that if it should come into print my name may be at it.' Already he feels himself afloat on that full tide which, taken

at the flood, leads on to preferment when Government jobs are to be handed out to the faithful. Montagu directs him to write for 'silk flags and a rich barge, for a noise of trumpets and a set of fiddlers.' Such were, and will perhaps always be, the outward and visible trappings of greatness. And so on May 12 the *Naseby*, soon to be renamed *Royal Charles*, set sail for Holland. The influence of sea-power? Perhaps. Not the silent pressure of blockade, not the thunder of broadsides, but the decision of a very young admiral who realised that the hour had come to exchange the empty aftermath of great events for a 'sound of trumpets and a set of fiddlers' and a royal house, which, with all its faults, promised some semblance of tranquillity after the stern rigours of Puritanism triumphant.

Although a pleased witness to great events, Pepys gave much thought to his own personal affairs. He finds himself worth £100 over and above the 'present' he bought for himself and the less expensive one for his wife. He is delighted when the Duke of York speaks to him by name. And Montagu promises something in the future. 'Have a little patience and we will rise together.' So, kissing 'a good handsome wench' who happened to be on the dock when he landed (Samuel seems to have taken very readily to all sides of the sailor's life), he returned to London.

Within three weeks Montagu was elevated to the peerage as the first Earl of Sandwich, and on the same date he secured for his cousin the post of Clerk of the King's Ships or Clerk of the Acts at the Navy Office. The position carried a salary of £350, plus quarters, plus considerable perquisites. Of these, more anon.

Pepys now had his foot on the bottom rung of the ladder. He was to climb, and to climb far, by his own native keenness and his untiring industry in the 'King's business.' The post was an important one, combining the secretaryship of the Navy Board with the executive authority now vested in the Paymaster-General. At the head of the Stuart Navy stood the Duke of York, the Lord High Admiral of England. His council was the Navy Board, a mixed commission of civilians and sea officers, who shared in a rather haphazard manner the details of naval administration. Technical problems were few, for the simple reason that the technical era, if we may so

refer to the naval administration of to-day, was still some two centuries in the future. But there were the old eternal problems which are ever with us—provisions and clothing, pay-rolls and balances, fraudulent contractors and 'careless store-keepers, enraged admirals to cry out against the curtailment of funds and harassed Treasury officials to protest against every increase, letters and conferences; men coming and going—the whole familiar pageant of affairs that sets our typewriters clicking to-day and will keep them clicking as long as fighting ships sail the seas. Into this welter of naval business Samuel Pepys, aged twenty-seven, plunged with the valour of ignorance.

The diarist served thirteen years as Clerk of the Acts. He was then promoted to the more important post of Secretary to the Office of Lord High Admiral, to be swept out of office by the 'Glorious Revolution,' which marked the end of the House of Stuart and the beginning of that romantic tale of loyalty and intrigue that closed with the butchery of the Highlanders at Culloden. For fourteen years Pepys lived on in tranquil retirement, a Fellow of the Royal Society, friend and correspondent of Isaac Newton and Christopher Wren. He arranged his beloved books and wrote the introduction to an unfinished naval history. In 1703 he died, full of years and honours, bequeathing to his college a naval library and the records of a distinguished career. Among his books were six small volumes closely written in a well-known shorthand system. When, in 1825, parts of this diary were finally transcribed and published, another Samuel Pepys stepped out of those little books, a man of the world with boundless curiosity to see life and unblushing frankness to record it—a strange, contradictory fellow, at times mean, at times generous, always with a canny eye to appearances and his own advancement and ever faithful to the King's service in which he rose from obscurity to power.

*No detail of naval affairs escaped the young Clerk of the Acts. 'Myself very studious,' he writes, 'to learn what I can of all things pertaining to my place . . . reading lately what concerns the measurement of timber and a knowledge of the tides.' Paper-work was to be understood, not merely lifted from one basket, signed, and deposited in the outgoing. He early resolved 'to understand the method of

making up a purser's account, which is needful to me but very hard.' Then there were contractors to interview, tiresome contractors and dishonest contractors who charged the Navy what the traffic would bear. In the purchase of supplies Pepys seemed to have had a kind of sporting instinct. He entered the battle of wits with a genuine relish. But, with all his efforts, he sadly concludes that the King's business can never be done as cheaply as the same business in private hands.

Not that he could be bribed. He was not averse to taking a 'present' now and then, nor to 'borrowing' £100 from a contractor. But not openly. A barrel of oysters from a merchant whose business was already transacted, surely that was only a gift, and a pair of gloves for Mrs. Pepys merely a natural courtesy! But one day a heavy envelope came. Pepys left it for a while on his desk. After all, the mail must be read. So, closing his eyes, he opened the envelope. He could have sworn with a clear conscience that he saw no money in it. Curiously enough, a couple of gold pieces were found on the carpet that night. The Clerk of the Acts pocketed them.

'Hypocritical rogue!' we say. And yet a man of the world must be judged by the standards of the world in which he lives. Samuel was neither a saint nor a prude. He felt keenly the need of money-getting. He knew the power of money to motivate the actions of men. 'Though I really believe I did what is to the King's advantage in it, and yet, God knows, the expectation of profit will make a man more earnest.' Always the King's business first. But a little profit for himself without injury to the Navy? Yes.

The Stuart Navy could well afford what Pepys took in the way of perquisites. To the student of the times—or to the student of government to-day, for that matter—the wonder is that he took no more. Presents!—why, everyone took presents. Some even took bribes, openly, boldly, and then boasted about it afterwards, like Pepys' friend who told him that 'his horse was a bribe, and his boots a bribe, and . . . that he was made up of bribes, like an Oxford man is set off with other men's goods . . . and invited me home to taste his bribe wine.'

Whatever the shortcomings of the young clerk, laziness

was not among them. He worked early and late. He found himself not a little unpopular with his fellow-commissioners, old retired admirals who loved the even tenor of routine and worshipped the god of things as they are. The Navy was at a low ebb, and Pepys knew it. The days were big with danger. The dockyards were busy across the narrow seas—the *Mare Clausum* of Selden's prodigious boast, waters in which England would have all shipping strike topsails to her flag. A vaunting policy and a weak fleet, how often has this fatal combination led to war and to national peril!

The problem was the old eternal problem—money. The Commonwealth had bequeathed to the Restoration not only the stirring memories of Blake's victories at the Kentish Knock and at Santa Cruz de Teneriffe, but also a prosaic naval debt of some million pounds with not a single penny provided to meet it. King Charles and his brother, the Duke of York, well knew the needs of their Navy. In all justice to the Stuarts, let it be remembered that they were soldiers. They personally faced the stern music of the guns with as good a grace as they faced the music of the dance. The Duke was often to command at sea, and once to emerge from battle bespattered with the blood and brains and wounded by the splintered bones of three friends killed at his side by the same chain-shot. Yet bravery alone cannot build and sustain a fleet. At home there must be humdrum stores and docks, and these, as the late Admiral Lord Jellicoe once remarked, 'cost a great deal of money.' So to the problem of money Pepys applied himself. The bills which the Navy Office sold were at 15 per cent. discount. Pepys notes the 'extraordinary good news' that they were as good as any merchant's upon 'Change. And little wonder, with the Navy constantly in arrears and forced to pay its crews in 'tickets.' Unpaid sailors rioting in the streets or crouching in the alleys with no riot left in them, a fleet at sea with 'stinking victuals,' all that a bankrupt Navy Office could get on credit, and, at the paymaster's door, a crowd of Navy wives and Navy widows, some weeping, some swearing 'good mouth-filling oaths,' all clamouring for money—money, the eternal sinew of war.

There were days when Pepys was glad to escape from the throng that besieged his combined office and quarters in

Seething Lane and go away on his dockyard inspections. His comments have a curiously modern sound. 'To Woolwich,' he writes, 'and viewed all the storehouses, and then . . . to view their books, which we found not to answer the King's service and the security of all as to the stores.' One might search the pages of our bulky navy manuals to-day and find no keener summary of stores accounting than that. The Clerk of the Acts knew well enough where to look for fraudulent records and padded inventories. He was soon to be inspected himself and to experience that 'mighty fear and trouble' attending auditors who are 'in very ill humour.'

Nor did he fail to note the more human and amusing side of dockyard life. Admiral Batten's wife had her eye on Commissioner Pett's quarters. 'And here my Lady Batten walked up and down with envious looks to see how neat and rich everything is, saying she would get it for herself, for it formerly belonged to the Surveyor of the Navy.' There are other aspects of naval affairs than the official and technical problems.

Work in the King's service. 'Up early and to the Office.' 'To the Office, where I stayed late . . . my mind in good case when I did mind my business.' And in reply to an angry officer who objected to night work, 'I answered sharply that I did not make, nor did any honest man, any difference between night and day in the King's business.' Pepys was rising in the world, and mightily pleased at it. 'Lord to see how I am treated that come from so mean a beginning, is a matter of wonder to me.' And the triumph of going for official funds to his old desk in the Exchequer Office, 'That I, from a mean clerk there, should come to strike tallies for myself for that sum . . . is a stupendous mercy to me.' Then home, where, perforce, Mrs. Pepys must share her husband's pride in his success; 'there with my wife . . . talking all the evening, my mind running on the business of the office.' Pepys had found his vocation.

Let it never be thought that all work and no play made Samuel a dull person. Far from it. Even in his busiest years he found time for numerous pleasures, some trivial but harmless pleasures—the theatre, good food, good drink, and good clothes, other really substantial enjoyments, serious books and good music (always music), and some pleasures,

alas! for which he paid and repented, and went right on paying and repenting, up to the last syllable of the recorded diary.

For there is no denying that this outwardly respectable and respected naval official had an eye for feminine charm that led him into dark and devious ways. He amused himself in church by searching the congregation for pretty faces, and was 'vexed' when the lovely neck he was gazing on proved to belong to an old and ugly woman. He stared at the ladies of the Court—Mrs. Stewart, my Lady Castlemaine, the incomparable Miss Hamilton, those 'all too famous' beauties whose loveliness looks down upon us yet from the canvases of Lely. He kissed the carpenter's wife and the bookseller's wife, and wondered himself at 'the strange slavery I stand in to beauty, that I value nothing near to it.' The Navy house in Seething Lane rang with high words and tearful reproaches. There were angry and unseemly epithets, such as 'beggar,' and 'baggage,' and 'louse'; there were 'nose-tweakings' and even blows, goings-on that scarcely befitted the family of a high official in Government quarters. Pepys was a very busy man. Mrs. Pepys was childless, lonely, and discontented. The husband bethought him of a lady companion for his wife—a whole series of lady companions. And here the trouble started. It is all set down in the diary with an almost brutal frankness, the sleepless nights of tears and recriminations, the husband's good resolves and sincere prayers that he keep them—poignant human tragedy which makes the modern novel seem insipid by contrast.

One wonders how Pepys lived through it all and kept at his work. But he did, and with such success that the Duke called him 'the right hand of the Navy,' and the King, on meeting him, exclaimed 'Here is the Navy Office!'

When Pepys first entered the service a few ships undermanned and ill-found were all that could be mustered to 'support the King's honour in the narrow seas,' and that at a time when another war with Holland was inevitable. The Restoration had brought with it a grave abuse—gentlemen soldiers appointed over the heads of the old sea officers, the 'tarpaulins' who had commanded for the Commonwealth under Blake and Penn. And, as ever, the press gang was relied on to bring crews up to war strength by sweeping into

the fleet the dregs of the water-front. The diarist amusingly notes his surprise, and even annoyance, when, in a burst of patriotic enthusiasm, the Lord Mayor impressed 'some people of very good fashion.' We are all familiar with Macaulay's summary—'there were gentlemen in the navy of Charles II. and there were seamen, but the seamen were not gentlemen, and the gentlemen were not seamen.' To this statement the Duchess of Albemarle—'dirty, sharp-tongued' Nan Clarges, whom soldier Monk had married long before he ever dreamed of a dukedom—bore witness, 'crying out mightily against the having of gentlemen captains with feathers and ribands, and wished that the King would send her husband to sea with the old plain sea captains he had served with formerly, that would make their ships to swim with blood.' (Nan had never read the military philosophers, but she had an uncanny understanding of their message.)

Such was the situation, as we see it in the diary, when, after a year of hasty preparation, England faced Holland in the second Dutch War. Through the darkest days of that hard-fought conflict Pepys kept bravely to his post. Not that the conduct of the war alone interested Samuel. He was more than ever absorbed in the business of his office, and yet he found time for his wonted recreations. 'To the Duke's . . . all the pleasure of the play, the King and my Lady Castlemayne was there, and pretty, witty Nel . . . which pleased me mightily.'

Early in 1665 the English fleet under the Duke of York and Prince Rupert, with Samuel's cousin, the Earl of Sandwich, as the only professional admiral, was manœuvring for position against the Dutch under Opdam. De Ruyter, with a second Dutch fleet, was returning from his daring raid on the Guinea coast. Would the Dutch succeed in concentrating, or would England strike and defeat their fleets in detail? Great issues hung in the balance as the long lines of sailing-ships stood off and on, 'the fleet with about 106 sail upon the coast of Holland in sight of the Dutch within the Texel.' Pepys realised that England was courting grave danger. 'We are unable to send out another small fleet if this should be worsted,' he writes. 'Wherefore God send us peace! I cry.' The month wore on with rumours, dark rumours of

defeat at sea and whisperings of 'great fears of sickness here in the City . . . God preserve us all.' Better to be busy, busy at the office, or even at the theatre, than to wait and to worry in the face of the dreaded plague and the unfought battle.

And so the days dragged on. May passed, and still no news. Already, on the doors of many houses, a red cross, and, written below, the anguished prayer, 'Lord have mercy upon us.' Back to the office or off to the play, to work, to laugh, to forget. Then suddenly 'the great news at last newly come . . . that we have totally routed the Dutch!' The battle of Lowestoft had been fought. For a few brief days the bells rang out in public rejoicing, drowning the sombre, insistent burial bells. Pepys rushed to his tailor and bought a 'coloured silk farrandin,' and was vexed at his wife for saying that he looked better in his accustomed black. War and pestilence, and, in the very shadow of their awful presence, new clothes and domestic bickerings. Man bracing himself to the heroic, yet vastly concerned with trivialities! Human nature does not change throughout the centuries.

Neither the victory at sea nor the public rejoicing brought peace. There was still another Dutch fleet approaching north about, and the toll of dead was mounting in the City: 2000 in the last week of July, 6000 in the last week of August. The City became as a city of the dead, 'till the nights, though much lengthened, are grown too short to conceal the burial of those that died the day before.' And through it all Pepys stuck to his post. There was still a war and an English fleet at sea, needing food and stores and replacements. It was in the London market that these were to be had—if, indeed, they could be had at all. Pepys' fellow-commissioners, men who had faced the enemy's guns on many a hard-fought field, moved their offices away from the horror of the plague. But the meticulous civilian clerk, the man of pleasure, the heartless philanderer, kept his rendezvous with death. 'You took your turn at the sword,' he wrote to Admiral Coventry; 'I must not grudge to take mine of the pestilence.' Brave words, deserving a place in the brightest pages of naval history.

Meanwhile, de Ruyter had eluded the victorious fleet and

had escaped into the Ems. The war dragged on, though the plague had run its deadly course. Then came the great fire which laid much of London in ashes. France had joined Holland in the war. The bowels of wrath were full. Lack of stores, of powder, of food, and lack of the money with which to buy them and to pay the mutinous crews, kept the English Navy impotent. Seamen were actually starving in the streets. 'It is now two months,' writes Pepys, 'since this office has felt one farthing of money . . . to save the life of a man by paying his ticket.' And, a few days later, the sombre picture of a 'poor seaman almost starved for food, lying in our yard, a-dying.' Not a pleasant sight from the windows of the Paymaster-General!

Never has a maritime Power sunk to a lower ebb and survived as a great nation. 'God keep us,' writes Pepys, 'for things look mighty ill. . . . Our enemies the French and Dutch, great, grow more by our poverty.'

In June 1667 the Dutch, with some seventy sail and attendant fireships, broke through the boom at Sheerness and fired the shipping in the Medway. Less than a century before Drake had bravely advised a different monarch 'to seek God's enemies and your Majesty's wherever they may be found,' and now the enemy was at the gate. There are never-to-be-forgotten pictures in the terse lines of the diary—the unpaid sailors starving like dogs in the gutter, and the red glare of the burning ships in the Medway with the Dutch vessels crowding in. It is of quick, vivid sketches like these, rather than of ponderous political exposition, that real history is made.

Somehow England muddled through. The war ended at last. Niggardly enough with funds in times of peace, Parliament now turned angrily on the naval administration, seeking to shift the blame. 'Our office,' writes Pepys, 'is cried up for a crowd of knaves and blackguards.' There were doubtless faults behind the scenes in Seething Lane. No Government office is perfect. It was now to Samuel Pepys, the junior civilian official, that the old admirals turned for a champion to defend them before the bar of an ugly Parliament. He was frankly worried, and said so. 'Slept three hours, but then waked, never in so much trouble in all my life . . . thinking of the task I have upon me.' He screwed up his

courage to the sticking-point with the aid of 'half a pint of mulled sack' taken in a Westminster tavern and 'a dram of brandy' drunk in the very hall itself. Warmed with these, he felt himself 'in better courage truly'!

For three hours he spoke with vigour and with eloquence. He knew the Navy and he loved it. The very mass of his ready detail seems to have won the day. By dinner-time many members, who had already heard enough, went out and returned somewhat in their cups. The Navy had triumphed.

Never was Samuel happier than in the shower of praise which greeted his speech. He put it all down that evening with almost breathless delight. 'Every creature I met there of the Parliament . . . did salute me with honour;—Mr. Godolfin, Mr. Sands, who swore that he would go twenty mile . . . to hear the like again. . . . Everyone do say that the kingdom will ring of my abilities . . . for which the Lord God make me thankful.' On that momentous afternoon the Clerk of the Acts was, indeed, 'the Navy Office.' It was his day of days.

Fate had still greater work in store for this energetic little man who had already worked himself so nearly blind in the King's service that he must soon bring to a close his beloved diary. The many books and papers over which for more than seven years Pepys had burned his midnight candles must ever be the prosaic tools of naval business. Samuel Pepys was to prove that for the shore official the mastery of clerical details can be the path, if not to the closed cult of executive command, at least to the scarcely less important post of administrative and political management. Beneath the sneer there is an unseen truth in the Gilbertian gibe:

I copied all the letters in a hand so free
That now I am the Ruler of the Queen's Navee!

Political events were destined to play into the hands of Samuel Pepys. In 1673 the Duke was forced out of office by the Test Act. The Admiralty was now 'put into commission' under fifteen of the kingdom's greatest statesmen. And 'Samuel Pepys, Esquire,' became Secretary to the Office of Lord High Admiral. Henceforth he was to occupy in relation to this august Admiralty Board, and even to the King himself, the same position as the only working official

which he had formerly held in relation to his colleagues at the Navy Office. This same year witnessed Pepys' election to Parliament. His was now the peculiar key position of administrator and parliamentary secretary combined. From the councils of state to the dockyard storehouses the channels of business were clearly marked, and, for the next six years, at the centre of affairs sat England's most competent naval official. In the House of Commons Pepys now went by 'the envious name of admiral.' To the larger phases of naval administration he now applied himself with all his wonted astuteness and energy.

Living as we do in an age of technique when the nations think to measure fleet strength merely in terms of tons and guns, we are apt to forget that 'men fight, not ships.' Better men as well as better ships, this was the sound policy of the newly appointed Admiralty Secretary. At last Pepys was in a position successfully to attack the old tradition that God Himself had ordained that only the gentleman soldier was fit to command. Who, after all, Pepys later speculated, is this special manner of man called a gentleman? And, even were that difficult question to be answered, what actual use are gentlemanly qualities at sea? 'Four or five captains,' he sarcastically notes, 'were once footmen but now reckon themselves as fine fellows and gentlemen captains.' But what of 'honour,' which tradition ascribes as a characteristic peculiar to an inherited aristocracy? The tailor's son was frankly sceptical. 'There may be room,' he thinks, 'to examine whether as great actions in honour have not been done by plain seamen.' Could he have glanced down the untitled list of Nelson's captains, his doubts would have been verified.

It was not that Pepys disliked a gentleman as such. He disliked incompetence. Seamanship and sea fighting were professions not to be learned in a month. Yet it was not till his fourth year at the Admiralty that the grade of lieutenant was made subject to examination. Thereafter 'the bastard breed pressing for employments' had to compete with boys of less exalted parentage, and even with the humble sons of seamen officers. The Navy, formerly a field for patronage, became what the Anglo-Saxon navies have since remained—careers open to talent.

A generation of corruption had taken from the fleet the stern and practical virtues of the Puritan days when Cromwell called on his soldiers to 'trust in God and keep your powder dry;' and an Anabaptist admiral wrote, 'Those who hold to Zion should keep Christian communion.—We now have all our guns on board.' Fighting ships, Pepys notes, were unnecessarily 'pestered with cabins,' a criticism not entirely without its modern application. Captains who left their commands for weeks at a time to partake of the pleasures of the London season, chaplains who forgot their cloth and posed as hard-drinking seamen, the King's ships 'upon the coasts of Portugal, drunk and merry'—to rid the Navy of all this undisciplined looseness seemed to Pepys 'a work . . . little less than . . . cleansing the Augean Stables.'

A better-manned and better-disciplined Navy must have better ships. Here Pepys had perforce to apply himself to the old and probably insoluble problem of naval types. In his day, as in ours, the 'big-ship school' stood opposed to the 'small-ship school.' In what types, he asked himself, should new construction be undertaken?

Considering the strength of timber, the weight of ordnance, and considering, above all, trends in foreign design, Pepys argued in the House for the second-rate ship of three decks. She seems to have been a ship-of-the-line which had attained to that elusive optimum point, always slightly below the largest size technically possible, a point later attained by 'that splendid type the . . . middling 74' of Nelson's fleets. Never, we may note in passing, has mere bulk been the sole aim of the naval architect. Thirty new ships and victory over her enemies in the war to be fought a generation later, this was the bulwark of maritime greatness which Samuel Pepys, once a mean clerk in the Exchequer Office, now built for England.

Not all his sober and continuous labour with the seapower of England—ever in view—saved Pepys from the dangerous backwash of the Popish Plot. He had been but six years in office when he found himself a prisoner in the Tower on a trumped-up charge of treason. After thirteen months the charge was dropped from lack of evidence. And, with the fall of the Whig Government, Samuel Pepys was again employed on an expedition whose mission proved to

be the destruction and evacuation of Tangier. Only the naval officer long 'on the beach' can fully appreciate the genuine joy with which Pepys wrote :

I shall go in a good ship, with a good fleet, under a very worthy leader, in a conversation as delightful as companions . . . can render it . . . with the additional pleasure of concerts . . . and to fill up all . . . good humour, good cheer, [and] some good books.

Lucky, indeed, is the officer who, forsaking all else, can find at sea that isolated completeness of work and comradeship which is the greatest gift of the naval service.

There is much in the *Tangier Journal* to remind one of the diary. 'Up betimes and to the office,' 'and so to bed'—familiar phrases which once marked the opening and close of so many recorded days of work and joy back at the old Navy Office. There is criticism, too, and regret that discipline in the fleet is 'not as it was in my time.' And, withal, the same human interests. 'Myself to dinner to Sir J. Berry on the *Henrietta*,' Pepys writes in his familiar style. 'He . . . played on the violin and . . . good talk. . . . In the evening . . . late looking upon the stars to learn them.' Ashore at Tangier, 'to walk . . . by moonshine in the fields under the wall, thinking of our affairs here. . . . I found a glow-worm shining, but a very small one compared with what we have in England.' Surely neither greatness nor adversity had changed the beloved Pepys of the little house in Seething Lane. Nor had he lost his aptness for criticism of men and of affairs. In a few caustic sentences he pictures the social degradation of this first British Mediterranean base, disappearing as he wrote in the dull thud of blasting at the Mole. 'Everything runs so to corruption here . . . the stone pillars . . . being eaten quite away almost, with merely the wind and spray of the sea.' 'More men [are] killed in this place by brandy than by the Moors.' And, 'the women of the town are, generally speaking, whores.'

With his journal and his *Notes General*, a collection of naval data amusing in its quaint completeness, Pepys returned to England. Again, as at the landing of Charles twenty-four years before, affairs of State had been transacted and Pepys' name 'was at it.' Dartmouth wrote to him from the flagship :

The Duke . . . hath an opportunity to bring you to the Admiralty ; and . . . with your assistance, may again put some life into the sea-service.

Political currents were now setting in favour of the Crown. Pepys soon resumed his former office of Admiralty Secretary.

Had James been a king acceptable to the people of England he might have made the Navy invincible. But Pepys was powerless to alter the King's professed Catholicism, though he wrote that he would have gladly given his life to win James to the Church of England. He could and did recreate an efficient shore establishment and a well-found and well-disciplined fleet. But loyalty to the person of James II. was beyond the ability of any Englishman to create.

Late in 1688, when William's Dutch armada forged down the Channel with the Protestant wind astern, the fleet which Samuel Pepys had so long laboured to build and to sustain ceased to exist as an instrument capable of maintaining the Stuart dynasty on the throne of England. On the gun deck discipline remained, but in the cabin loyalty was gone. And, knowing as we now do the Protestant temper of the times, we realise that the Navy of 1688 remained the Navy of England.

For the last time Pepys now found himself swept from office by the swirling currents of politics. Reluctantly he left the service that had been his life's work, and even his life itself. Sadly he laid down the records that had robbed him of his eyesight, the work which had ever been his solace and his joy. There was still the Royal Society, Trinity House, Christ's Hospital, his beloved books, still something of the old interest in men and in events. But the busy, changing, fascinating affairs of naval administration, these lay behind him now, a task well done.

Effingham, Grenville, Raleigh, Drake,
Here's to the bold and free !
Benbow, Collingwood, Byron, Blake,
Hail to the Kings of the sea !
Admirals all, for England's sake. . . .¹

The very name Pepys suggests a pale, careful paper-work fellow—a mere clerk. Beside that sonorous list of sunburned heroes it sounds strangely insignificant and out of place. And yet, it belongs there.

MELVIN F. TALBOT.

¹ Sir Henry Newbolt, *Admirals All*.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Documentary Film, by Paul Rotha (Faber and Faber, 12s. 6d.).

Mr. Rotha's book comes out in a timely hour. In a world apart from the much advertised feature films, which follow each other from their *premières* in a weekly procession through the picture-houses, many intelligent people are vaguely aware that there has been growing up quietly of recent years a genuinely creative and English school in the art of cinema. They may have heard of Mr. Grierson's *Drifters*, and more recently of Mr. Rotha's own *Face of Britain*. They were puzzled by the name 'documentary' when they read in their papers lately that a string of English films, led by Mr. Wright's *Song of Ceylon*, had swept the board all but clear of awards in the documentary class at the International Cinema Festival which formed part of the Brussels Exhibition.

The story of the movement was worth telling. It will be surprising if in the next few years its significance does not stand out in deeper relief than it can even at present. It has an obvious bearing on the future not only of the screen but also of broadcasting and emphatically of television. Mr. Rotha tells it well. He describes how, under the unpromising protection at first of Government and more lately of a few far-seeing industrial concerns, a group of more than usually gifted young men and women has been drawn together from journalism, art and music to employ for a social as well as an artistic purpose the medium which weekly draws eighteen million people to the cinemas of Great Britain. He hints at the zeal with which they studied from the outset the developments of their art in other countries. He mentions the quota handicaps unwittingly imposed upon this type of film by an Act framed before such pictures had begun to be made. He smiles, where the trade has always contemptuously laughed, at the comical lack of resources which the school has endured.

He tells something of the discouragements in face of which, until quite recently, they have had to work. There were grounds for official apprehension in 1928 when Mr. Grierson, who had never made a film before, was pushed out into the North Sea to 'shoot' the herring fishery, and brought back *Drifters*. There was less excuse for the Estimates Committee of the House of Commons in 1934. An enlightened Post Office had recognised, when the Empire Marketing Board came to its lamentable end a year before, that the Board's Film Unit was capable of rendering good service to a great and modern-minded Government department. The Committee, remembering perhaps Lord Melbourne's saying, 'God help the Minister who meddles with art,' or anxious to keep in step with the American purity code dictator who was to insist on the exclusion from a film as indelicate of a scene in which a dragon appeared, were at pains to deprive other Government departments of the skilled service with which the Post Office had equipped itself.

In spite of trade opposition and official discouragement, the young school has survived, and has now won its spurs. The story of its early days might be told in the same words as Mr. Fay has lately used of the young Abbey Theatre in Dublin: 'Instead of waiting until time and circumstances brought us proper conditions, we were content to suffer all manner of inconvenience and abuse, provided we got on with the work, which was what mattered.' To some of us at times the English documentary school has seemed, in spite of happy veins in such films as Miss Spice's *Spring on the Farm* and Mr. Legg's *The New Generation*, to reject too sternly from their pictures the gaieties and graces of English life. They have remembered, perhaps, too seriously the comical day when Turin, the director of *Turksib*, was shocked by the incident in *Drifters*, where the fireman turns aside from his labours to light a cigarette with a red hot ash held in his tongs. No gesture this, remarked Turin, for a down-trodden capitalist wage slave! It is our own fault if their work has not been supported by some passionate feeling for a common cause such as breaks through and leaves so memorable the sequence of the Odessa steps in *Potemkin*, the funeral in *Earth* or the May Day procession in *The Deserter*. But these reflections scarcely touch the measure of their remark-

able success. Its secret has lain in the quality exacted from those whom the school enlisted, in their unsparing mutual criticism and in the fine spirit of loyal co-operation in which they have worked. Their very lack of resources has produced a thoroughness in their approach and a streamlined shape in their product which give great promise for the future.

What is that future to be? On this subject Mr. Grierson, in a preface, written later and, at Mr. Rotha's request, largely directed to this very point, dwells with the surer touch. His excellent study should, like the whole book, be read in full. But in brief his argument maintains that no rarefied debate of the social problems which surround our generation can do justice to their complexity. The England of 1936 'asking to be brought alive to itself that it may feel its destiny and will its life' demands, not the finished conclusions of the council chamber, but the raw material of experience. Documentary cinema, seen as a new method of intimate reporting, is uniquely equipped to enable this sharing of experience. That is the sense—the honourable and the only sense—in which its propaganda functions should be regarded. 'If, however, propaganda takes on its other more political meaning, the sooner documentary is done with it the better.' His essay will leave in every imaginative mind a challenging outline of how cinema, employing what Henry James once described as 'a deep-breathing economy and an organic form,' might help in the interpretation of the great social problems which hedge about this modern world.

Every reader will enjoy sixty 'shots' from films with which Mr. Rotha's book is illustrated. Those who are interested in film technique will find in its latter part valuable guidance, written with the authority of successful practice and in more straightforward language than most film experts seem able to master, for the making of documentary films. It contains also, in a useful appendix, a list of documentary directors and the principal films for which they have been responsible. But both book and introduction will find their widest audience amongst those who are interested in the employment for honourable purposes of the new arts of world-wide range with which science has so suddenly endowed our time.

The first persons to study it should be the members of the British Film Committee, set up last month by Mr. Runciman, under the chairmanship of Lord Moyne, to consider the future of the Cinematograph Act of 1927, which imposed a minimum quota of British-made films.

STEPHEN TALLENTS.

The Twilight of Treaties, by Y. M. Goblet, translated by W. B. Wells (Bell, 7s. 6d.)

Monsieur Goblet deserves our gratitude, and Mr. Wells and Messrs. Bell our thanks, for making this important little book available to English readers. It is not authoritative: a few weeks spent at Chatham House in the study of authoritative public documents, a few more weeks spent in submitting the books to persons with first-hand knowledge, would have saved the author many minor slips of the pen and deprived his narrative of some idle tales. (The story of the Sheikh of Mohammerah at p. 94, for example, is wholly untrue.)

But the author's thesis is important, and is very clearly set forth. Ever since the treaties of 1919 and 1920 were signed, what has been in progress? There has not even been any attempt to put certain parts of them into force. Their financial clauses have been periodically 'adapted' to the economic situation, real or supposed, of the parties concerned. What, in short, have those bound by these treaties been doing but gradually getting out of them, just like conjurors out of any number of sealed bonds, and suddenly presenting themselves free before the eyes of an astonished audience?

All this reveals a profound change in accepted ideas about the meaning and the value of titles of sovereignty, whether they be historical or based on recent treaties. Nevertheless, odd as it may seem, we cannot accuse our contemporaries of being any more contemptuous than their forefathers of treaties which they have inherited, or of the undertakings which they themselves have given. Apart from moral principles—and there is no proof that such principles used to exist and have now disappeared—the conviction is universal that contracts are no less essential between nations than they are between individuals; the tendency of our time is to

regard treaties, contracts, agreements, titles of sovereignty of every kind, as documents that must, from time to time, be brought into harmony with the evolving material with which they are concerned.

Contracts may become incapable of execution in their original form. There are even such things as contracts signed by parties who have ceased to exist. Soviet Russia would not recognise the treaties of Czarist Russia which, it was claimed, had disappeared. Nazi Germany feels, if it does not say, the same of treaties executed before Hitler came to power. The Fascist calendar runs from the day that Fascism seized the reins. Turkey and Persia have done as much. In strict law, however, contracts remain valid though the conditions in which they were made have changed, and legalists insist on the immortality, not of the soul, but of a parchment deed. That is precisely what is making our contemporaries lose their respect for contracts. They come to look upon them as no more than dead things, blocking the path of evolution, which have to be circumvented in order to get on.

Jurists are not arbiters of the modern world, but technicians, expert consultants, like generals or engineers. If treaties are not respected to-day, it is not because there is no police to enforce them but because they do not meet present-day needs. A decision of qualified arbitrators, appointed by consent to consider a dispute on merits, will always be received with respect: a decision of judges based on purely legal and documentary considerations is liable to be rejected by the conscience of mankind. Facts alone give sanctity to treaties: every dispute should be regulated in the light of Article XIX. of the Covenant.

If debate be confined to texts and their annotations; if each side, backed by its legalists, sticks more and more stubbornly to formulæ, then no understanding, no arbitration, will be possible, and war will inevitably come. If, on the other hand, judgment be based on knowledge of the natural elements in the case, geographical and human, economic and political, then solutions will be fair, and they will be accepted and supported by international opinion.

In the case of Manchukuo, the Lytton Report was disinterested and objective; but it must be added that though this Report assembled data for analytical study, the analytical

study was not made. The work of the commission of inquiry certainly helped to enlighten international opinion; but if the League of Nations had had at its disposal the politico-geographical analysis which it might have drawn from the Lytton Report and the Japanese and Chinese memoranda, among other sources, it would probably have been moved to act with more prudence.

It was formerly assumed that experiments in political science are impossible. By deciding upon the temporary organisation of the Saar territory, the creation of the Free City of Danzig, and the bestowal upon Powers—and not only European Powers—of mandates over former territories of the German and Ottoman Empires, the League of Nations has instituted experiments which, provided they are properly conducted and properly observed, constitute, if nothing else, at least great experiments in political geography. The scientific value of these experiments is unquestionable.

Whatever the success of these experiments may have been or may prove to be—and ventures of the kind are too novel, and have in some cases been made in conditions too unfavourable, for all of them to succeed fully—they will not have been in vain. Even if every one of them ended in complete failure from the point of view of the object to be attained, it would be no less useful, no less suggestive, so long as the trouble be taken to devote strict critical analysis to it.

Political geography is a science of observation and analysis, which prevents juridical discussion from assuming a Byzantine character prejudicial to the dignity of law, and it demonstrates the emptiness of mystical nationalism, which is only too easy to exploit. Geography possesses a natural strength due to continuous contact with the earth. It helps to keep international life in the sphere of concrete realities; and it is in this sphere that the prospects of practical, pacific understanding among nations are most numerous.

• We are witnessing to-day, concludes Monsieur Goblet, whose thesis I have sought in the foregoing pages to set forth as closely as possible in his own words, the negative phenomena of dissolution, and the positive phenomena of evolution. The sight of the former is discouraging. The latter herald new ideas tending towards security for the world. They enable us to catch a glimpse of a *régime* gradually replac-

ing that of the old treaties, which were purely juridical, were supposed to be eternal, and could be transformed or abolished only by force—a new international order of living and evolving agreements; an experimental order, which may go as far as the creation of regular synthetic States.

Every act of destruction occasions reconstruction. Whenever an historical right or a treaty falls into desuetude, beneath the momentary disorder we can see a new order germinating: a new order based upon new facts, or facts hitherto disregarded. To prepare this new order it is essential to make a close study of phenomena, a study that we might call political anatomy; and of such a study political geography is one of the essential bases. Sciences such as historical geography are now proving indispensable for the study of nations and States. For, without such sciences, the natural idea of international relations cannot become definite.

The twilight of treaties heralds but a short night. Then will break the dawn of new conceptions of international intercourse: the issue of fresh title-deeds, which the human race of to-morrow will respect all the more because they will be based, not on old parchments, registering victories by force or fraud, but upon real, concrete facts; upon the mutual actions and reactions of the earth and mankind; upon scientific analysis of these actions and reactions; and upon the natural sciences—economics, geography, and demography—upon history and upon political geography.

Here, idealism and disinterestedness are as essential as scientific objectivity. It is by giving ourselves up to the service of life that we can best accomplish, in all its magnificent plenitude, that task which destiny entrusts to every generation.

Such is Monsieur Goblet's thesis, here set forward in great detail, with abundant documentation which deserves most careful study. The book is critical, and new: the facts, ranging from the Polar regions to the Saar, are well marshalled, and lucidly explained. It is a real contribution to political thought.

Hero and Leander. The Divine Poem of Musæus. First of all books. Translated according to the original by George Chapman (1616). At the High House Press, Shaftes-

bury, 1936, printed by James E. Masters with the assistance of his wife Beatrice. 75 copies. 11½ by 8½ inches. 30 pages, hand-set in 18-point Cloister type. (Price £1 1s.)

A superb setting of a great poem of love and adventure which would make a glorious short-film if the censor could be persuaded to pass it. But would he?

Dumb she was strook; and down to earth she threw
Her rosy eyes, hid in vermilion hue,
Made red with shame. Oft with her foot she rac'd
Earth's upper part; and oft (as quite ungrac'd)
About her shoulders gathered up her weed.
All these foretokens are that men shall speed.
Of a persuaded virgin, to her bed
Promise is most given when least is said.

How little of our Greek and Latin classics would pass, in English, the scrutiny of the League of Nations Union and other guardians of our morals? And yet how much the richer would the masses be could such glories be brought to them.

Wayward Youth, by August Aichorn, with a foreword by Sigmund Freud (Putnam, 10s. 6d.).

The author is a believer in and an exponent of psychoanalysis: he has long experience of juvenile delinquents in State institutions, and his methods are world-famous. This work is a substantial contribution to the subject, based upon detailed description of a number of cases not all successful.

The value of this type of work must not blind us to the broader issues involved. Delinquency is less frequently connected with bad homes or unsatisfactory parents than is commonly supposed. It has not been mitigated, but apparently increased, by compulsory elementary education. Some children revolt from life in the herd: the revolt will be more marked when the leaving age is raised. It is partly due to inborn mental defects. Mental deficiency is four times as common in Great Britain as in Northern Europe: it is above all an urban problem, and the proportion of our population who live in cities is about four times as great as in the countries of Northern Europe. The writing on the wall is plain. When will the Belshazzars of Whitehall and Westminster call upon a modern Daniel to read it?

Annual Report of the Director of the Institute for Science of Labour, 1934, and Report of the Institute, Nos. 1-32 (Kurasaiiki, Japan). Those who believe that the strength of Japanese competition in the markets of the world is due mainly to a lower standard of living than obtains in the West, to longer hours, and to the more extensive use of adolescent labour, combined with depreciated currency and large subsidies, would do well to study these reports. Much may be learned from them even by our own Industrial Health Research Board. They testify to scientific research, pursued simultaneously along several lines, into conditions of life and labour in town and country. Industrial physiology and psychology, hygiene and nutrition, living conditions, traditional and ideal, optimum conditions of work, and of rest periods, for growth in adolescence and for maternity—all are under close examination by qualified men and women, who are not subservient to industrialists or trades unions. In order better to protect human life, every aspect of factory construction and management is constantly under review. Illumination, ventilation, humidity, temperature at different seasons. By means of elaborate data the best form of seat and of posture for various manufacturing processes is studied and large-scale experiments conducted.

The watchword of the Institute is—'human nature must be respected, and human life protected.' The profound changes of social custom in the last half-century are recognised: the dietary evolved in the last 2000 years has been vegetarian, for an agricultural community; it is not in all respects suited to sedentary workers under urban conditions.

There is evidence that the conclusions of the Institute carry great weight in industry, which is increasingly national, not in financial structure, but, as Dr. Guenther has observed, in outlook.

Much that is being done by the Institute in Japan has been or is being accomplished in this country by the National Institute of Industrial Psychology and by the Industrial Health Research Board. Whether our industrialists are as ready as are the manufacturers of Japan to give effect to the conclusions reached is an open question. It is, however, fairly certain that our mining and textile industries would gain by closer attention to the human aspects which predominate in all these reports.

Planning under Socialism, and other addresses by Sir William Beveridge, K.C.B., Director of the London School of Economics (Longmans, 3s. 6d.). This is a book full of ripe wisdom cast in the form of lectures and addresses. A fair indication of the under-

lying ideas may be found in the following quotation (p. 29) from an address delivered on May 31, 1935:

It is common to-day to talk as if man had solved the problem of wringing wealth from nature and had easy abundance in his grasp. 'We have passed from the economics of scarcity to the economics of plenty.' Who has not heard that phrase, spoken with such assurance that it seemed beyond question?

Yet one has only to open one's eyes to see it as a dangerous delusion. The great majority of mankind are still poor; condemned, for all the help of the machines, to labour longer than they desire and to go without many things that they want; the equal addition to the poor of all the seeming superfluities of the rich, if it could be brought about without general loss, would be quite insufficient gain.

The triumphs of mass-production are confined to a few industries and a few countries. To judge how far the world is from plenty, we have only to look at its richest people, at the home of mass-production. We have only to see how little prosperous the bulk of American farmers were, even at the height of the broken boom, or to study the standard of life in all the Southern States. We may turn from America to consider how far life in these islands falls short of sufficiency, how much additional power over nature would be needed to secure—say, good housing for all, adequate help to every working mother, escape from the grime of cities and from pollution of the air.

Wassmuss, 'The German Lawrence.' *His Adventures in Persia during and after the War*, by Christopher Sykes (Longmans, 10s. 6d.). Herr Wassmuss was sent by the German Government to Bushire in 1909. On the outbreak of war with Turkey in October 1914 he commenced to raise the Persian tribes in order to embarrass the British in Persia and the Persian Gulf. He was very successful, as were other Germans who were working in Baluchistan and elsewhere. He was soon taken captive, but escaped from custody, and for three years was a thorn in our flesh.

Mr. Sykes has not done his work well: there are many inaccuracies; his spelling is shaky and his narrative in places awkward. Had he consulted Sir Percy Cox or Mr. Chick, who knew Wassmuss well, or Lieut.-Colonel Noel, who arrested him, he might have given life and intimacy to his picture of the man. Had he consulted published documents and contemporary British authorities he could have added much that is of interest. What he has given, so far as it goes, is of great interest. Wassmuss was a typical German official—harsh, stern and determined, patriotic and single-minded, with a somewhat narrow outlook. But he had personality and genius, and he dominated all those with whom he came in contact.

ARNOLD WILSON.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

WALKING through the less prosperous part of the East End of London I passed a funeral *cortège* such as I had not seen since I was a boy in Lancashire, except once in Buenos Aires. The hearse was surmounted with black ostrich plumes; the horses, finely caparisoned, were black; the coachman and groom were in deepest mourning. Six mourners in silk hats with heavy bands of black silk, and black gloves and black scarves, walked alongside. The polished coffin was bright with brass fittings and carried a profusion of wreaths and flowers. The relations, in deep mourning, were in four-horsed carriages, well turned out.

I asked who the dead man was—a mayor or a wealthy merchant at least? No, he was no one in particular: he never made as much as £3 a week, but he had paid 'the Company' three shillings or more a week for half his working life in order to ensure for his relatives the satisfaction of a good funeral, and they had not failed him. The dead man had paid for the hearse and coffin, for the flowers and coaches, for the 'new rig-out' of the relatives and for the funeral tea that would follow. It was the custom: £50 would not cover the outlay; it might be half as much again. They had six or eight miles to go to the cemetery.

* * * * *

A week later in a country parish in Buckinghamshire a very old lady, bearing a name which appears in the earliest registers and is still well known and respected, was taken to her last resting-place in the churchyard from the alms-houses where, as an old-age pensioner, she had spent her declining years. Her coffin was of varnished deal, made in the village and sold at no profit: her old friends themselves placed her in it; her grandchildren carried her out and placed the coffin

on the wheeled bier that is always ready under the tower in the church hard-by. A group of bonneted and bowler-hatted relatives and friends followed her. There was no lack of flowers on the bier; but they came from the gardens of those who knew her in life. The bell tolled: the parson spoke the familiar words, beginning with that amazing and vital passage 'I know that my Redeemer liveth,' taken from one of the oldest, as also the most glorious, books of the Old Testament, Job,¹ and invoked at the last a blessing on the party. All was over in half an hour from the time the procession left the tiny room in the alms-houses.

An hour or two later I met at the railway station some of the older mourners—none of them under seventy—and they began to speak of old days recalled by the memory of 'the old lady.' 'The first time I saw that field,' said one, 'was before the railway came: I was a little 'un, standing like this'; and he spread his arms.

'To open your lungs?' asked a young woman, not of the original party. 'No, to scare the birds, that was what I was paid for. Sent off first thing, I was, to a corner of the field, with breakfast and dinner too, and told not to come back till supper-time; but, Lord, I was only eleven, and had no notion of time. By ten o'clock I'd eaten the lot and was main hungry by twelve. But I learned things, mind you. I watched the birds and the beasts and the cattle, and the foxes and rabbits and voles and things. I got to know 'em; many's the pheasant

¹ As Froude reminded us eighty years ago, the Hebrew text bears little relation or is contrary in meaning to the accepted English versions.

Great Bible of 1539.

I know that my redeemer liveth and that I shall rise out of the earth in the latter day: that I shall be clothed again with this skin and see God in my flesh. Yea, I myself shall behold him, not with other but with these same eyes.

Authorised Version, 1611.

I know *that* my redeemer liveth and that he shall stand at the latter *day* upon the earth: and *though* after my skin worms destroy this *body*, yet in my flesh I shall see God: whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold and not another.

Revised Version, 1885.

I know that my redeemer liveth, And that he shall stand up at the last upon the earth: And after my skin hath been thus destroyed, yet from my flesh shall I see God: Whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another.

'From my flesh' is better translated 'without my flesh': the writer refers, clearly, to a resurrection, not of the body, but of the spirit. Neither the compilers of the A.V., nor of the R.V. 250 years later, nor of the so-called 'New Prayer Book' in 1927, had the courage to revise the erroneous translation of Miles Coverdale.

I snared in that wood'; and he pointed to a copse whose owner was better known to me than to him.

'Wages was low,' he continued, 'and food none too cheap; but living was cheap, for folk wanted less of other things. Candles was good enough for anyone in winter, and the sun in summer: wood was good enough for firing and cooking; if we was lucky and had a joint it went to the baker or else we boiled it. The old mill was working and ground our own grain—we got a sack or two from the farm we worked on. Father kept a few pigs and mother a goat or two. There was no cinema, but beer was cheap and butter-milk easy to come by. Girls were as good-looking and boys as troublesome then as now.' He did not criticise the present, he accepted it, but had his doubts as to whether 'progress' was a reality. His fine old face was furrowed, but his teeth were his own: his hands were gnarled, but his gait was that of a much younger man. As I listened to him I reflected, not for the first time, that of all the principles now being applied in Germany, that of discouraging large cities and of decentralising industry is likely in the end to prove the most important and the most enduring in its results. We cannot breed that sort in towns. He and his wife had brought up a large family—all healthy because they knew how to do so. They ate plain food, but it was well cooked, and they lived a fuller life than many younger folk do to-day.

* * * * *

I met last month a young man who left the sixth form of a public school with credit only two years ago and was now a private soldier in a line regiment. Seldom have I enjoyed anyone's company more than his. Instead of attending League of Nation Union meetings and passing resolutions demanding 'drastic sanctions,' 'a world economic conference,' or 'a fresh appeal to the conscience of the world,' or going elsewhere to demand 'prompt rearmament,' he had decided to play a part himself. Ill content with the life of a clerk in a great London office, a dispirited cipher, dealing with commodities he would never see, bought from and sold to persons he would never meet, for the profit of anonymous shareholders at the behest of directors with whom he had nothing in common, he had boldly 'chanced his arm' in the ranks.

Army life clearly suited him: he carried himself better and he looked healthier. He was happy with his comrades-in-arms and did not lack friends. He hoped to attain commissioned rank later: he would sit for the examination in due course; whether successful or not, he was certain that he would leave the Army, after his term of service, better fitted for the world than when he entered it. He is probably a generation ahead of his time; but I think all the better of him for that. The fact that young men, drawn from every walk of life, live and work together in barracks is a great source of strength to European nations, in which the army is not only a fighting but a social force, an integral part of their national system of education. Some day we may awake to the fact that a citizen army makes for peace and that demands for warlike measures by persons who are unable or do not know how to fight, and cannot learn till too late, are either useless or dangerous.

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It is generally agreed that popular feeling in Britain inclines on the whole to support the German rather than the French point of view: it is, moreover, fairly certain that this tendency, which dates from the Armistice or earlier, has recently grown much stronger. I have gained the impression, from many conversations with the rank and file of the British Legion and in other quarters, that the publication in serial form in a popular Sunday newspaper of Lord Haig's *Diaries* is partly, perhaps largely, responsible for the sudden, almost violent, reaction against France. Mr. Duff Cooper is not to be suspected of any partiality towards the German thesis: he will not have forgotten the virulent misrepresentation, not many years ago, in the columns of that very newspaper which to-day is most actively sponsoring Herr Hitler's views, of the 'Apology for England' which he delivered at Berlin. But the *Diaries*, under his editorship, reveal Haig's difficulties with the French, perhaps somewhat one-sidedly, and have awakened responsive and bitter memories in many hearts. Mr. Edwin Montagu and Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, to mention only two great figures, would, were they still alive, have deeply regretted the publication, at full length, of their letters and diaries which were never intended to be used as biographical, still less as historical, material. I am

inclined to think Lord Haig would feel the same. Voltaire wrote, '*on doit des égards aux vivants, on ne doit aux morts que la vérité,*' but he is not always a good guide.

* * * * *

An interesting and encouraging feature of the new year, as contrasted with the old, is the emergence of Parliament as a public institution of importance, and of back-bench opinions as a factor which foreign Governments as well as those of this country must take into account. Twice in the past four months, the first occasion being on December 19, the views held by members at large have, rightly or wrongly, exercised a more immediate and decisive influence upon international affairs than those of the Cabinet. Whether the outcome of this repercussion of insurgent opinion has been or will prove to be of value remains to be seen.

The fact places a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of those who seek to move public opinion in their constituencies or elsewhere. The immediate issues are clear, the indirect consequences are not apparent, and the utterances of public men reveal a deep cleavage of thought. The Archbishops of Canterbury and York, with the approval of their brother bishops, in a letter read in all churches in December 1935, said that a new generation had grown up forgetful of the horror and foolishness of war. The Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, on the other hand, recently claimed that the present generation of undergraduates was so conscious of it that nine out of ten would refuse to bear arms on any pretext.

Who shall decide, when Doctors disagree
And soundest casuists doubt, like you and me?

Like Doctors thus, when much dispute has past,
We find our tenets just the same at last.*

I doubt whether there is any real substance in either view.

'If the trumpet give an uncertain voice, who shall prepare himself to the battle?'—whether for peace or for war, in the interests of justice, or the converse. The recent display of bad theology, poor judgment, and worse manners by the Dean and Chapter of Liverpool Cathedral was in no sense

* Pope, *Moral Essays*, III.

an indication of the trend of public opinion, which is becoming increasingly independent of guidance by leader-writers, clergy and dons: When a clear moral issue arises, and vital British interests are involved, the country at large, including the four million males of military age who might be called upon to serve with the colours, will not flinch from a recourse to arms if all else fails. Working-class and lower middle-class opinion is more steadfast and better balanced than that of the minority which claims by voice and pen to represent the views of the universities and of 'intellectuals.' To a clear call from the nation there will be a clear response from the leaders, which will surprise the most observant student of politics.

* * * * *

Some eight months ago a Committee was appointed to inquire into social services in courts of summary jurisdiction. It reported last month,³ in terms which afford no ground for complacency.

Many offenders who might have been suitable for probation continue to be sent to prison. In 1933 2253 youths and 1279 girls between 16 and 21 were sent to prison, of whom 34 per cent. and 40 per cent. respectively had not been previously found guilty of offences. It would appear unlikely that in all these cases committal to prison was necessary in the public interest.

Even in the case of lads and girls sent to Borstal institutions there is evidence of over-hasty recourse to institutional treatment. For instance we find the Governor of the Feltham Institution using these words:

'Probation was never tried with 32.5 per cent. of lads received during the year. . . . It is almost incredible that in anything like a third of cases probation could not, properly, have been tried, and it is quite incredible that the circumstances . . . justified the imposition of shorter sentences of imprisonment in 12 per cent. of cases.'

Many thousands of adults are every year sent to prison for short sentences, many of whom in the view of the Prison Commissioners would be suitable subjects for probation.

I sometimes wonder whether any steps short of the establishment of a Ministry of Justice will suffice to bring about serious measures of reform in the administration of

³ Stationery Office, 1935.

justice in this country. Neither the Lord Chancellor, the Home Office, nor the High Courts exercise real control over police or coroners' courts. Every recent official inquiry confirms the popular view that those institutions stand in need of a drastic purge. The prospects of action were, however, never better than they are to-day, for a great lawyer is at the head of the Home Office, and Parliament is very ready to give a favourable hearing to any legislation which he may decide to promote. But in these courts he has a very dirty lumber-room to clear; this Report alone, if acted on, will require half a dozen Bills, which should be followed by as many measures of consolidation.

The urgency of drastic changes in the administration of justice was well understood by Lord Sankey, whose departure from the Woolsack is a real loss to the cause of legal reform. He found some of his Cabinet colleagues who were learned in the law unenthusiastic or even recalcitrant; he was unable during his tenure of the office to make or initiate a tithe of the changes that should be made in the interests of justice.

Judge Crawford in his lively and intimate *Reflections and Recollections*,⁴ just published, has indicated some of the points which most need attention at the hands of 'the politicians who are supposed to watch over the interests of the humbler classes with such peculiar care and attention.' His practical experience as a county court judge entitles him to speak with authority. It is a pity that in a House of Commons in which lawyers of eminence abound there is no group or informal committee pledged to keep reform of the law and of judicial procedure in the foreground.

The scathing satire and biting sarcasm of Mr. Justice Maule eighty years ago aroused public opinion and compelled the Government of the day to establish Divorce Courts. We need something of the sort to-day to bring to public notice the inadequacy of our judicial procedure to give justice to those who seek it. Judge Crawford's book is a valuable contribution to this end, and should be carefully studied by laymen who care for the good name of our courts.

ARNOLD WILSON.

⁴ Marchand Press, Ltd., 12s. 6d.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCCXII—JUNE 1936

THE REPUBLIC ARRAIGNED

By RANDOLPH HUGHES

ᾧ δημοκρατία, ποῖ προβιβῆς ἡμᾶς ποτε;—ARISTOPHANES, *Aves*, 414 B.C.

Chez nous, c'est la constitution même, la forme et jusqu'à un certain point l'existence de la société qui sont perpétuellement en question. Un pays peut-il résister à un tel régime? Voilà ce qu'on se demande avec inquiétude.—RENAN.

PROPERLY considered, the most notable and significant event for many years in French political life is the withdrawal therefrom of M. André Tardieu, and the publication of the work, entitled *Le Souverain Captif*,¹ in which he sets forth the reasons for this highly dramatic action. A gesture of this kind is not altogether without precedent in even contemporary history; not long ago a gentleman withdrew from politics in England to mark his lapse of faith in democratic and especially parliamentary government: in this

¹ Flammarion, 1936 (12 francs).

case, the gesture hardly so much as aroused comment: and not unnaturally, for the gentleman in question could only by courtesy be called distinguished, and it is not certain that his defection or retirement from any cause would leave that cause sensibly weaker. At the best his action was symptomatic, and as such it should have received more notice than was accorded it; but intrinsically it was of no importance. The case of M. Tardieu is altogether on a different level. Here is a man of real and very high distinction, at least in the world of politics, to which he has given the best of his activity for the past twenty years; he has several times occupied exalted offices of State, including that of leader of the Government; eleven times he has been head of Ministries, those of Mercantile Marine, Home Affairs, War, Public Works and Foreign Affairs among others, and he has been Prime Minister no less than three times. Moreover, he might easily have multiplied this impressive number, for on some nine other occasions he was offered portfolios, which for different reasons he refused. He has represented his country abroad in a major capacity: for two and a half years, as Special Commissioner in the United States, he had the delicate task of organising Franco-American collaboration in the Great War (in which he himself had taken part as a combatant), and in this stewardship he was entirely successful. He was an influential force at the Peace Conference, and had a large share in drawing up the territorial and political clauses. He has presided over various committees, such as that of the Saar, occupied with the settlement of important international questions.

Not only has he devoted the last twenty years of his life to the present *régime* as a practising politician and statesman, but he served it for another twenty years before that as a public servant, journalist and writer of books of varying scope and size. At the age of twenty-one he was attaché at the French Embassy in Berlin; for three years he was principal private secretary to Waldeck-Rousseau; he was a lecturer not only at the School of Political Science, but also at the Staff College; and in this pre-war period he was for twelve years on the staff of the *Temps*, where he wrote the leading article dealing with foreign politics. His activity as a journalist and author did not end with his election to Par-

liament in 1914; he continued to produce books on current events, and in 1920 he helped Clemenceau, whose confidence and friendship he enjoyed, to found the *Echo National*, a paper no less able than it was gallant.

His career then, on the face of it, has been in a marked degree successful, as successful as that of any of his contemporaries in France, and even as successful as that of any political figure in present-day Europe, with the exception of one or two of the dictators, who have the immense advantage of not being subject to many of the handicaps imposed by democracy. And he is still in his best years, in the prime of his life, and might still look forward to a further period of distinguished leadership. And yet he has chosen this moment, on the ascending height of his career, to abandon that career altogether, and to retire completely from the world of practical politics, with the firm intention never to return to it as it is at present constituted.

Why? Because he has ceased to believe in the system which he has served so long with the fidelity of high idealism. Little by little, with many misgivings and doubts, with much searching of heart, he has come to lose all faith in it. He believes it to be essentially bad, to be dangerous for France, and he is persuaded that it can only end in disaster. Therefore it must at all costs be reformed or changed or replaced. The only way to do this, he thinks, is to convince the country that it must be done. The country, and not the country's 'representatives' in Parliament—it is useless to talk to them. In fact, nothing of what is really urgent can now be done within the parliamentary arena; any attempts there are doomed to frustration. If he wishes to do any real service to his country—and he is bent on doing it the greatest service of all—the first condition of that service is that he must cease to be a member of Parliament.

This constitutes the most serious indictment of the democratic and parliamentary *régime* ever formulated, the most telling blow ever aimed at it. The calling in question of the *régime* is of course by no means a new or unique thing. To speak only of contemporary critics, M. Maurras, for example has pleaded very forcibly against it. But that has been his attitude from the beginning; he has never believed in it; and he has never in any way served it. M. Daudet, too, has

said very rude things about it; but he also has been its avowed enemy for nearly forty years; it is true that he has been a member of Parliament, but his chief aim as a member was to help to reverse the system by which he had been elected; and in any case he has never been a Minister, has never occupied any kind of office. As M. Tardieu himself says, his particular action may rightly be called unique. Nobody before, in like conditions, has ever done what he has done.

Like all men of his kind, all men who are worth anything, he has enemies, and his action will be subject to malignant misinterpretation. He therefore quite rightly forestalls a certain amount of such criticism by giving a short account of his origins, his education and his record as a statesman. His breed is unquestionably pure; he is not an interloping foreigner or outsider of more or less distant remove, whose understanding of, and loyalty to, the country and its genius may be suspected of not being at all points entire. His family, he tells us, have been good and true *bourgeois* of Paris for the past three and a half centuries, and they have probably always been of liberal tendencies in the matter of politics; at the same time, they have always been partisans of the Church. His father was a staunch, almost a fanatical, Republican, and had an illimitable belief in the rightness and success of parliamentary government, and he brought his son up in this belief. One of M. Tardieu's most vivid recollections is that of the day when Boulanger defeated the Republican candidate for the Paris seat: the whole Tardieu household, including the little André, was plunged in the most disconsolate gloom. It was only natural that at last André Tardieu should himself become a *député*; but three months after he took his seat in the House the Great War broke out, and his true parliamentary career was interrupted for a number of years. He might have escaped all dangerous service, and at first he was allocated to pleasant, decorative and highly-paid posts. But, contrary to most men in his position, he stubbornly worked his way downwards, until he finished up as a company commander. This latter experience he found extremely valuable, and he thinks of it as a time of moral transformation. He learned to know the real people, he says, a thing he had never done in his middle-

class home and in the places where he had received his education; and he discovered that politics is not an affair of abstractions worked out on paper, but an action exercised upon life itself. Then came his mission to America, whither he went in 1917, so that, as he tells us, he missed seeing many ugly things that were going on in France. Had he seen them, his faith in the *régime* that made them possible, or rather which brought them about, would not have remained entire. The victory, he knew, was costly, far too costly, but it was a victory all the same. The *régime* had defects, he argued to himself, but it at least could claim the credit of this victory. And so when after the war he resumed his parliamentary career, it was with a fervent belief in the *régime*, and a desire to serve it to the best of his ability.

Before passing in review his parliamentary achievements, he examines certain serious charges which have been brought against him regarding financial, educational and insurance measures, and the withdrawal of French troops from the occupied territories of the Rhineland. We will not follow him into this examination; it is enough to say that none of these charges really touches his honour; if they were true, they would prove that he was lacking in initiative, independence and political sagacity; however he has no difficulty in disposing of them all, and in completely vindicating himself.

When one assesses his actual parliamentary record, it must be remembered that he was at the head of affairs in singularly troublous times. When he first became Prime Minister, in 1929, France was in a chaotic condition, financially, economically, socially, and with regard to foreign affairs. The world crisis pressed on her from all sides. The majority which M. Poincaré had succeeded in forming in the previous year had been dislocated, and it had not been found possible to re-establish it. Then conditions were far from propitious in the House itself; every clause, every line of any important measure proposed by M. Tardieu was attacked mercilessly by Socialists, Radicals and Communists. And yet, in spite of this systematic opposition, he succeeded in having carried, either unanimously, or else by more than three-quarter majorities,

nine out of eleven considerable projects concerning the general welfare of the country at large.

His achievement may be summed up briefly as follows. During the three periods of his Premiership public order, the authority of the State, was constantly maintained. It was not an easy time; a few months before he first assumed control of affairs Communists had pillaged one of the busiest thoroughfares of Paris, and bodies of malcontent policemen had attacked their superior officers. These movements went on while he was at the head of the Government; once 500,000 turbulent Communists and pacifists were running or shuffling wild in the streets of Paris, and something like a riot on a big scale was threatened. Strict repressive action was called for over these years, and it was always forthcoming, and in no case was it unsuccessful; what is more, it was always prudentially applied, so that it led to no disorder, and never once was a life lost, and there was nothing in the way of bloodshed. All those implicated in big financial scandals were arrested and condignly dealt with, and none of those connected with these affairs met his death in what may euphemistically be called mysterious circumstances.

As regards foreign policy, he prevented a purely gratuitous and unconditional cession of the Saar to Germany, and he imposed the Young Plan upon her. At the London Naval Conference (1930) he manœuvred to the best possible advantage of France. At the Geneva Conference of February 1932, he brought forward a plan for the limitation of armaments and the ensuring of collective security, the main lines of which are still accepted as an ideal to be aimed at; but, as he himself justly remarks, this plan has come to nought because there has been none of the organisation that should precede any effort at application. In the same year he elaborated a scheme for the economic organisation of Central Europe, and many still consider that this scheme, which has not been put into effect, is the best one for the circumstances. He insisted that France should have a redoubtable system of frontier defences, and to this purpose he allocated the necessary funds. He unified the three Ministries of Defence, and brought them under the general supervision of a superior Minister: an idea which his successors have abandoned, but which England has seen fit to adopt.

As for finance, he had the piloting of only one budget. He himself exercised control over every section of it. It is the only post-war budget (save those of the *décrets-lois*) which, compared with its predecessors, has shown a reduction of expenditure. He succeeded in diminishing the national debt to the extent of 19,000,000,000 francs; it has since increased enormously. Under his administration the floating debt was reduced by 50 per cent., and the stabilisation of the franc was maintained. And this does not exhaust the list of his financial achievements.

As regards the economic sphere, he introduced derating measures which represented a relief of 5,000,000,000 francs for French industry. He found French agriculture in a very bad condition, and helped to set it on the way to recovery. In his attempt to deal with unemployment, he initiated a scheme which would have provided labour for 250,000,000 working-days; this scheme was killed by obstruction, but parts of it have since been adopted by other Governments.

It has been worth while giving this rapid summary, for it at least shows that M. Tardieu cannot be said to be retiring because he has been a failure as a statesman. On the contrary, most other men of his own party or persuasions would be highly gratified if they could point to such a performance. As M. Tardieu himself claims, in the comparatively short space at his disposal, he gave post-war France more material and moral stability and calm than it has known before or since in that period. And yet he is not satisfied, and so great is his dissatisfaction that he has taken this drastic decision of giving up politics altogether. And thus we come back to the question as to why he has thought it necessary to do this. I have already stated that reason in general terms; it is interesting to see by what gradual steps, and under the pressure of what forces, M. Tardieu was led to his main conclusion. There is nothing aprioristic in his action; theory in his case has been painfully evolved out of a series of events of the most practical and workaday kind.

As I have said, his absence in America prevented him from being acutely conscious of certain shameful and disturbing things in the course of the war which would have sadly shaken his faith in the virtues of democratic government. He began to receive shocks, however, soon after his return

to the business of parliamentary life. His feelings were outraged by the manner in which his old chief Clemenceau, who had done so much to help win the war, was thrown over as soon as the organisation of peace began. They were again outraged when M. Poincaré, who had ensured the financial salvation of France, was thrown over by the Congress of Angers in 1928: an act that M. Tardieu stigmatises as a political murder. And once again by what he calls the throttling, in 1934, of M. Doumergue, who had been summoned from retirement to save the country. And by other things again, of a like degree of heinousness and significance. If, remarks M. Tardieu, one were to say to him, with Bismarck, that disgust and indignation are not political attitudes, he would reply that he has never been concerned to maintain attitudes that are simply political. With him, human ones have always had the precedence.

Then, once installed in office as a Minister, and anxious to make the best of his opportunities and get something substantial done, he found that he had practically no opportunities and that he could get done only a miserable fraction of all that he had it in mind to do. Being in power, he discovered, meant a loss of time, a loss of freedom, and a loss of authority. He is sick, he says, of wasting his time in Ministries that are no Ministries at all; of throwing away his time on the accomplishment of trivial and tiresome tasks; of being tied to men, as one must always be in parliamentary life, who do not share his ideas or his ideals; of suffering the discredit that always in the public estimation goes with the being a member of Parliament.

'It is more than doubtful,' said Lord Rosebery,² 'indeed if it be possible in this generation, when the burdens of office have so incalculably grown, for any Prime Minister to discharge the duties of his high post with the same thoroughness or in the same spirit as Peel.' Peel himself found it extremely difficult, and indeed impossible, to be as efficient as Lord Rosebery praises him for being. 'I defy,' he said, 'the Minister of this country to perform properly the duties of his office and also sit in the House of Commons eight hours a day for 118 days.'³ But the conditions under which Peel worked are idyllic compared to those under which M. Tardieu

² *Sir Robert Peel.*

³ *Papers.*

had to labour, and M. Tardieu's case may be taken as being on the whole representative. Being a member of Parliament, and especially a Minister, he holds, is the most engrossing and the most humiliating of all professions. 'It makes one a sort of super-bureaucrat and at the same time a *commissaire* or odd-job man. It forces one to give careful attention to thousands of private interests that have nothing at all to do with the interest of the State; it makes one the recipient of a vomitous correspondence, which one has constantly to keep in mind. It is not only with the private affairs of one's constituents and their dependents that one is harassed. The House itself causes an enormous waste of time. Precious hours are lost on committees and in debates that are perfectly fruitless. In the lobbies, one has to listen to the same old gang repeating the same old twaddle, and it nearly always has at the back of it purely personal and selfish considerations; if one is a Minister, one is beset daily by hundreds of parliamentary mendicants with petitions for all sorts of favours; one would like to shut the door in their face, but that would only mean committing political suicide.

But that is inevitable, people tell you, it is part and parcel of the battle of politics. But what real political issues are involved, retorts M. Tardieu, what real battle is being waged except, in the great majority of cases, that for the furtherance of not very lofty personal aggrandisement? What truth of general and national importance, what sure advantage to the country, results from all this wrangling? Can anyone pretend that time spent in this way is not to be counted a pure loss?

Not only are these struggles of no real interest, but the men who take part in them are not really free. There is never any true freedom in Parliament. Mere number is there dominant and sovereign, and to get anything done one must have it at one's command. A man who remains an individual is powerless in circumstances such as these. If you are anxious to advance an idea, you must take care not to remain alone; you must win to your side what, M. Tardieu remarks with superb irony, are strangely called friends, and thus you begin to compromise, and so your idea is mutilated; the more 'friends' you enlist in your favour, the more your idea loses its original character. It is not only a desire to have one's way that imposes this

crippling compromise ; one may have to submit to it through deference to senior authority or out of regard for friendship, but it none the less remains a very serious disability.

One is still less free if one is a Minister. Solidarity with the Cabinet as a whole or with the party obliges one to acquiesce in measures which one cannot honestly approve. Thus, in 1929, M. Tardieu gave his support to a bill (relating to the Press) which he thought thoroughly detestable ; but if he had not subscribed to it, the Government could not have carried on, and he considered that general considerations made it imperative that the Government should survive.

As Prime Minister, one is scarcely any better off. M. Tardieu gives instances of cases where the very reforms which had saved the country in a crisis had subsequently to be rescinded under pressure which it would have been fatal to ignore ; and of cases in which a highly desirable measure, for whose acceptance he had, with a certain amount of success, fought over a space of months, had finally to be abandoned for purely tactical considerations. There are other very serious drawbacks of a like order. A Prime Minister may be preoccupied with momentous international issues (often necessitating his absence abroad), while at the same time he knows that his Government is in danger of defeat owing to the intrigues of party politics, and therefore that all his generalship is required in that direction. Thus while M. Tardieu was busy at the London Naval Conference things were going on in Paris which made it uncertain whether he would be Prime Minister the next day ; and, indeed, he was thrown out of office on the most crucial date of the Conference in question. What a dilemma : one must either cease to give adequate attention to problems of the first importance, or else put in jeopardy one's very existence as a Prime Minister.

As things are at present constituted, then, there is a fundamental contradiction between the powers of the two Houses of Parliament and the freedom, the power of initiative, enjoyed by Ministers. There is also, M. Tardieu maintains, a great loss of authority attendant upon the being a member of one of the two Houses. A large amount of suspicion now attaches to parliamentary life on all its sides. A candidate is suspected of aiming primarily at becoming a

member, and at enjoying the accompanying advantages ; a Minister, whatever he does, is suspected of wishing to remain a Minister ; and, when he is no longer one, of wishing to become one again. M. Tardieu's experience as a candidate in different parts of France has often illustrated this fact ; as soon as he has ventured to defend the House—on points where it is worthy of defence—his audiences, warmly enthusiastic up to that stage, have suddenly lapsed into a cold and indifferent silence.

(The French *député*, it is perhaps not otiose to remark here, draws a salary of 60,000 francs a year, travels for nothing on the railways, has at his disposal a magnificent library, and can, if he is shrewd—to put it mildly—make some 50,000 francs a year in pickings ; moreover, if he is elected a second time he becomes the happy recipient of a pension of 40,000 francs a year. To reap these not contemptible advantages, he need do absolutely nothing at all. M. Léon Daudet, giving official figures, affirms that twenty new deputies, from 1919 to 1924, never once put in an appearance at the House—save to draw the instalments of their salary.⁴ With these conditions in France, it would be interesting to compare the corresponding ones in England.)

More and more, the candidate is in the esteem of the electors nothing more than a place-hunter, a man soliciting their favour, and in return ready to do what he can for their private interests. They do not really believe in him ; if one seeks to be believed of the people when one addresses it on politics, the first condition is that the people cannot possibly think one has any personal axe to grind. M. Tardieu, therefore, who is earnestly anxious to achieve certain high and disinterested political objectives, will never again come forward as a candidate.

It is not that M. Tardieu has up to now passively accepted conditions which he finds deplorable, and has not energetically sought to remedy them. By the time he first assumed supreme responsibilities, he had come to the conclusion that

⁴ *L'Action Française*, April 22 and April 23, 1936. *The Times*, apparently knowing nothing of these facts, remarks with pathetic naïveté, speaking of the recent French elections : 'The increasing competition for membership of the Chamber would seem to indicate that the current belittlement of politicians does not really express public feeling.' (Leading article, April 25, 1936.) As if, anyhow, an increasing scramble for seats were evidence of the feelings of the electors, and not merely of those of the gentlemen desirous of gaining access to the House.

parliamentary institutions were urgently in need of reform. So long as this reform was not effected, it would be impossible to secure the passage and application of certain measures, political, financial, economic and social, which were imperatively necessary to the vital well-being of the nation. As things stood, the conditions governing national life were nothing less than a menace to the destiny of France. And so he tried to enlist public interest by making speeches outside the House; he carefully thought out the means of constitutional handling of the problem, but regretfully decided that nothing could be done that way: it would have been necessary to call a meeting of the two Chambers, but he had no support in the Senate, and in the other Chamber his majority was a very precarious one. He published a book on the subject, and about the same time M. Doumergue was summoned to form a Ministry in circumstances of exceptional gravity. This gave him some hope, and indeed M. Doumergue approved of his plans; but M. Doumergue's Cabinet fell, and with that M. Tardieu saw that it was futile to go on hoping. And yet he had ventured to propose a mere fraction of what he thought necessary; his ideas were in no wise revolutionary, they remained strictly within the limits prescribed by the Constitution; but he was hailed as an enemy of the Republic. His attack was directed simply against the subjecting of the Legislature, the Executive and the electorate to demagogic oligarchies; the lessening of the authority of the State in inverse ratio to the enlarged volume of the latter; the permanent intrigue carried on against the State by civil servants who owe everything to it, and by citizens who expect to receive everything from it; the ruin of the financial system and of the civic conscience; and the triumph of a multiple, muddled and blind despotic authority.

What Government, he asks, could hope to accomplish anything in such circumstances? There have been thirty-seven Governments in France in the eighteen years since the end of the War, and what is their record? Two have crashed in financial disaster, two have gone down in shame and bloodshed, and it is difficult to see what substantial good any of the others have been able to do for France. Is this due to incompetence on the part of the governors, or is it

rather due to radical vices in the *régime* and its institutions? M. Tardieu has no doubt: it is the very nature of the *régime* that is responsible for this sad record of failure. In such conditions, he says, he found it absolutely impossible to govern efficiently; and he found it absolutely impossible to bring about the necessary reforms within the framework of the two Houses of Parliament. Besides, he discovered that certain what he calls 'occult forces,' which were exploiting the State, were determined to frustrate all his efforts at reform. There was only one thing to do—to withdraw altogether from the House and the paralysing system of which it is part, and that is just what M. Tardieu has done. As he himself says, with a pride that only fools could find fatuous, this is an exceptional act of character. Such an act was necessary: it was the only way to impress public attention. His chief feeling on leaving this show is, he tells us, one of joy. He is relieved to be free of an occupation that leaves little or no time for real thought, and in the long run acts upon the mind with the stupefying effect of a drug. But he has not withdrawn with the idea of being better able to entertain his soul. His aims remain precisely the same as before, only he is going to set about realising them in a different way. He will now address the people of France through books, and seek to convince them of the grave errors and dangers implicit in the present system, and so lead them to take the necessary action. For he is convinced that ultimately ideas govern the world, even though they be contemned and ridiculed. His main object is to give an analytical account of contemporary France in its intimate structure, and particularly of France from 1880 to the present day, for he believes that a new France has come into being in those years. His ambition, he says, is to be the painter of that France, and to view and judge it with the calm detachment of a modern historian depicting Athens or Florence, say. One is glad to notice that he was inspired with the idea of writing this work by a reading of Taine: perhaps the finest all-round intellect in nineteenth-century France, and certainly one of its best writers and most noble characters.

The work is to be in five volumes, of which that which we have been discussing is the first. It deals with the fundamental principles upon which are erected the structure of the

Republic and the various institutions of French democracy. In particular, it sets out to trace them as they have received application in history. Subsequent volumes will deal with the mechanism of Parliament and the pernicious forces controlling it; with the value, the actual yield, of the present *régime*, from the point of view of the major interests of the country; with the moral doctrine implicit in the *régime*, and the generations of the future which it is in process of shaping; and finally with the possible ways of escape and salvation from the dangerous situation brought about by the evils of the *régime*.

I shall now attempt to sum up rapidly the principal conclusions set forth by M. Tardieu in the historical and doctrinal sections of his first volume. These should be interesting, and more than merely interesting, to English readers, for many of them are, in greater or lesser measure, true of democratic polities other than France, and to a by no means negligible extent of England. Few, if any, of them are entirely novel; but never before has the whole corpus of them been brought together systematically within a critically analytic conspectus; never before, then, have they been so formidable.⁵

In brief, M. Tardieu shows that the basic principles of modern French democracy have their origin in a body of thought which found practical political expression in the Revolution, and he examines how far these principles are rationally valid; then, passing from the abstract to the

⁵ Mr. Ramsay Muir, in his admirable *How Britain is Governed* (3rd edition, 1933), shows with an alarming wealth of illustration that all is not well with democracy in England, particularly in so far as parliamentary government is concerned. For the most part, however, he confines himself to the present, and does not disengage and define the origins, and the historical development of the origins, from which the evils of the present derive. Moreover, in spite of the ultimate implications of the evidence he has so cogently presented, and his consequent very serious misgivings, he is intent at all costs on remaining a democrat. And so in the upshot he is reduced to tinkering with the present system: M. Tardieu, on the contrary, makes it quite clear that the present system itself must be swept away, or at least so radically reformed that it becomes virtually transformed. Sir John Marriott, in his very useful *English Political Institutions* (3rd edition, 1925) and *How We are Governed* (1934), is conscious of a few of the vices and perils which have so impressed Mr. Ramsay Muir, but he hastens to draw a pious veil over them, and relapses into reverential awe before the august majesty of the British Constitution.

concrete, he considers the fortunes of these principles in actual history, and he demonstrates that all of them, Liberty, Equality, the Sovereignty of the People and the General Will, although they are religiously invoked by democrats as sacrosanct and inviolable, have constantly been infringed or abrogated under democratic Governments, and have barely any existence at all in real fact.

The basis of the thought from which the democratic conceptions of the Revolution proceed is a thorough-going rationalistic optimism. The notion of original sin—original in the ordinary or in the theological sense—is strenuously rejected; Nature is in its essence good, and man as part of Nature is good, fundamentally and to begin with, and not in virtue of any grace bestowed from outside. Moreover, man is perfectible to an unlimited extent; history is, or there is no reason why it should not be, a progress. From these premisses it follows that man is or should be endowed with the attributes of freedom, equality and sovereignty, which may be taken to define his character. Being good, he should be free, for goodness stands in no need of checks or controls. Equality follows immediately: all men being good and free, they are alike, which is another way of saying that they are equal. No castes, therefore, no orders, no privileges. Equality in all respects: before the law, in the matter of taxation, and in the matter of employment; and some would even say in the matter of wisdom as well. Being good, free and equal, men, all men, are the only true sovereigns. For what sovereignty could be set above goodness, freedom and equality except that which is inherent in these attributes and proceeds directly from them? Men, then, all men, the people, should make the laws, and by the same reasoning it is they who should apply the laws. The highest authority in the State is the general will.

Such are the postulates to which, ultimately, the chief articles of democracy are reducible. M. Tardieu (again after many others) has no difficulty in making mincemeat of this neat set of formulas. He begins by maintaining that an exclusively rationalistic philosophy is incomplete, and that it cannot take account of many of the facts of existence. Science is concerned only with phenomena, and never deals with ultimate causes and values. There is a world of the spirit, a

world accessible only to intuition. . . . There is much truth in this, but it was quite unnecessary for M. Tardieu to invoke it in refutation of the aforementioned postulates of democracy; reason and common sense are sufficient here, and other considerations only make the issue seem more complex than it is. In this matter, it is necessary to insist upon the greatest number of points which the greatest number of men will agree in accepting as indisputable. Anyhow, M. Tardieu himself in the end returns to purely rationalistic discussion, and points out (or rather repeats) that the conception of natural man is not one that imposes itself as something axiomatic. One meets individual men, of different gifts, classes and nationalities, but who has ever met a 'natural man'? Is not this latter creature a pure abstraction, like the Ideas of Plato (which have been responsible for so much bad and dangerous thinking)? In talking in terms of such a person, we have abandoned history and reality.

Likewise, there is nothing axiomatic in the conception of natural goodness. On the contrary, nearly all experience, nearly all history, testifies against it. Those who have had more than a superficial experience of life will be inclined to agree with Taine (who does not speak as a Christian): 'Our ancestors cut one another's throats with stone knives for a piece of raw fish. Men are in reality the same to-day, the only change is that their ways have become less rough. War is still the rule of the world.' (More than one war in the past twenty years has shown that modern man cannot be said to be less rough than his most animalistic ancestors.)

Next, what grounds are there for supposing that the human race is indefinitely perfectible? Is there any real progress? Is there such a thing as a law of progress? Is there anything more than an alternating succession of advances and retrogressions; can it be said that the total movement amounts to a progress? To this question no dogmatic answer can be given.

As for freedom, the deterministic conclusions of science are against it. (M. Tardieu does no more than skirt this very vexed question.) There seems to be small place for it in the evolutionary process, as also for equality and brotherhood. Science apart, the conception of freedom has been subjected to the most damaging assault from the most divers quarters.

Monarchists (J. de Maistre,⁶ Bonald and others), Hegelians and Marxists have denounced it for different reasons. With much destructive and irrefragable argument, it has been accused of being philosophically unsound, and extremely dangerous in practice. The most serious and the most often repeated charge against it is that it inevitably issues in disorder and anarchy. Even such a figure as Louis Blanc is among its enemies. It might even be maintained that Poland died of it.

As for equality, history and common sense and honest observation all show that there is no such thing. There is no trace of it in Nature. The civilisation of Greece and Rome reposed upon a negation of it. As Auguste Comte said, it is nothing more than a 'mystification.' The attempt systematically to translate this conception into action in practical life has never been fortunate in its consequences.

As for the sovereignty of the people, it, too, like the other grand concepts, is usually taken for granted, as a self-evident truth standing in no need of justification. When everybody governs, it is assumed, the general interest must necessarily be served, for no one would go counter to his own interest. But this concept also will not survive intelligent inspection. The sovereignty of the people is exercised by universal suffrage—it is, in other words, the law of number. But what is the number which is counted? Is it a number of reasons or even of wills? Hardly, if at all. It may be a number of disparate velleities and instincts, but it proves nothing that has any value. It is not the rule of all, it is the rule of the majority, and there is no surety that the majority is right; on the contrary, the chances are that it is wrong. In any case a minority, which may be considerable, is deprived of any voice; as J. de Maistre said, universal suffrage is nothing more than the organisation of ostracism. And does it follow that a government based on number is faultless, or more capable than another? Is politics simply a matter of arithmetic? And if one is going to count, why merely count

⁶ G. Lowes Dickinson, in his *Revolution and Reaction in Modern France* (2nd edition, 1927), with no shade of qualification dismisses as 'ridiculous' the ideas of Joseph de Maistre. G. Lowes Dickinson is a good specimen of the English Liberal mind at its very frequent worst—a mind that disports itself in a region of patterned theory lying beyond realities and true values. J. de Maistre is always acute, forcible and logical, rarely unrealistic and fantastic, and very often profound. He is as profound, indeed, as G. Lowes Dickinson is facilely shallow, which is saying a lot.

individuals; why not, as Proudhon urged, count property, capital, industries, professional and other groups? Otherwise, it will be impossible for the true country to be represented. The law of number can only issue in incompetence, corruption, and in the last resort disaster. To quote Proudhon again, the institution of universal suffrage in 1848 gave electoral power to ten million people whose intellectual equipment was no higher than that of the Plebs in ancient Rome. The sovereignty of the people, said Comte, results in a state of things where tyranny is everywhere and responsibility nowhere: it is the most shameful of lies.

Besides, certain of these articles of democratic faith are logically irreconcilable with others. For instance, if all men are equal, and should remain equal, then there can be no freedom. For the exercise of freedom inevitably leads to inequalities. Again, if the sovereignty of the people operates through the majority, what becomes of the freedom and the equality of those who do not happen to belong to this majority? Here we touch the chief problem of democracy: the difficulty, the impossibility, of reconciling the rights of the people and the rights of man.⁷

These considerations, which have never been convincingly refuted—for indeed they are irrefutable—are on the whole doctrinal or philosophical. The next point is to see whether the great principles of democracy, be they right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, have really been given effect in practice in the years that have followed the Revolution. The majority of democrats fondly believe that on balance they have; M. Tardieu shows quite clearly that they have not.

Before passing on to this matter I would venture to disagree more than a little with M. Tardieu in his estimate of the eighteenth century. I consider that in many important respects his presentation of that century is far from being just, in the two senses of that term. This is not a side-issue, for it would be unfortunate if adverse (and perhaps unscrupulous) critics seized on these errors, and held them up to the unwary as a sample of the book as a whole. This would be

⁷ Cf. '... le difficile problème de la conciliation de la liberté et de l'égalité politiques. Ou il faut désespérer de l'humanité, ou il faut admettre que ce problème n'est pas insoluble.' (Barni, *Histoire des idées morales et politiques au 19^e siècle*.)

a very easy way of damaging badly the very large authority that properly belongs to it. M. Tardieu and those who share his chief political theses are in such a strong position that they can afford to give a lot away; it will cost them nothing to give the eighteenth century its full due. Many of M. Tardieu's pronouncements apply only to the revolutionary period, and not to the greater part of the century preceding the Revolution, or at least, are not true of the bigger men, the leaders of thought. The century is not nearly so Cartesian as he makes out, it is very far from being exclusively rationalistic. On the contrary, in the persons of Voltaire, Diderot, and others of its more notable and more influential thinkers, it is very largely a reaction against the pure rationalism of Descartes. This is part of the meaning of the influence of Locke, whom M. Tardieu mentions, but seems to estimate amiss. The eighteenth century was, indeed, a century of Reason, and as such it performed very valuable and necessary services against the impeding forces of various kinds of obscurantism. Its greatest intellectual achievement, however, was the establishment of the experimental attitude, as opposed to the processes of mere reasoning exercised upon abstractions. Voltaire adopted this attitude even in political matters; he had no political system: from first to last he was a realist; and an Englishman might call him a good Tory (of a very intelligent kind). And this applies also to Montesquieu. Diderot pleaded powerfully, and successfully, for the adoption of the experimental attitude in science, and as a consequence the natural sciences begin to make immense advances, and take precedence from now on of the mathematical sciences. One is astonished to find M. Tardieu declaring that 'positive science' made no progress at all in the eighteenth century. To name only one or two things, what about the work of Lavoisier, who founded the science of modern chemistry? What about the brilliant anticipations of Diderot, who formulated and inculcated the main lines of the methods of modern research now associated with the name of Claude Bernard (whom M. Tardieu mentions with veneration), and, before Lamarck and Darwin, enunciated clearly the central principle of evolution? Then M. Tardieu, with a great derisive sweep, says that no one at all in the eighteenth century had any sense of history. Not

to mention Montesquieu and others, what about Voltaire, who, before Michelet, created what the French call *l'histoire intégrale* (the sort of thing Mr. Wells has attempted to do in our time), and has every right to be regarded as the founder of modern history? More than once M. Tardieu is grossly unfair to Voltaire, who cannot be dismissed as a sycophant and a liar lacking in all sense of decency. By adopting such a puerile judgment M. Tardieu only does harm to his own cause. M. Tardieu's chief charge against the eighteenth century, which he develops at great length, is that it was inordinately arrogant and proud, to such an extent that it lost all sense of realities. M. Tardieu should read Voltaire's *Prayer to God* in the twenty-third chapter of the *Traité sur la Tolérance*, and many other similar expressions of benevolent humility. Science, says M. Tardieu, is not all-competent and all-comprehensive; it deals only with the how and never with the why; after all it has done, life remains a mystery. Quite so: but Diderot said it all in the eighteenth century. 'It is not for man to explain the ends of nature'; 'the business of science is with the how and not with the why'; 'the thread of truth has its origins in darkness and disappears into darkness': all that—and much more of the same kind could be cited—is not the utterance of arrogant pride. And did the eighteenth century—or its better men—say that mind was a product of matter? Did it not, anticipating up to a point present-day physics, rather say something like the opposite when it affirmed that 'matter' in its ultimate constituents was nothing else than movement, feeling, and even mental activity? As for human perfectibility, constant progress and the rest, the finer minds often showed that they were sceptical, and something more than sceptical, about it. What is *Candide*, one of the most typical productions of the century, but a deadly satire of the whole repertory of illimitable optimism?

Let us proceed to M. Tardieu's investigation as to whether freedom, equality and popular or national sovereignty really exist in post-Revolution French democracy. Here he is on much surer ground, and it is most improbable that anyone will be able to impugn his array of facts and his conclusions.⁸

⁸ M. Tardieu says he believes he is the first person to devote a whole book to this part of his subject; this is not exact, however. Faguet examined many of the main

As M. Tardieu, after other writers, points out, freedom or liberty in the modern sense is a modern creation. There was no such thing in the democracies of the ancient world, and very little of it in later times until the eighteenth century; and the eighteenth century itself was on the whole authoritarian. However, the institutions of the *ancien régime*, in spite of a belief to the contrary, were on the whole liberal in their structure and spirit. They suffered from grave abuses, which called for reform, but for nothing more than reform: a revolution was quite unnecessary. When the Revolution did arrive, it talked much and noisily about liberty, but it almost entirely abolished it. Its first care was to sweep away altogether the collective liberties of the *ancien régime*, and it put nothing substantial in their place. Sovereignty had not been completely absolute under the Monarchy, but under the Revolution it was. The odious persecution of the Royalists left the latter no rights at all; 400,000 of these people were in gaol on the eve of the 9th Thermidor: as for killing, the record of the Revolution beats that of any previous 'tyranny' in history. The remainder of the citizens were little better off as regards rights; a measure of universal suffrage was introduced, but it was quickly replaced by the far different measures of the Terror, and it was more than half a century before it was brought in again. The excesses of the Revolution were such that they turned the population into slaves, and prepared the way for the despotism of Napoleon, just as the movements of 1848 prepared the way for the despotism of the latter's namesake. The Revolution destroyed the sense of human rights, and left the citizen, deprived of the right to form any sort of collectivity, a helpless individual in face of an all-powerful State from whom there could be no appeal. Undoubtedly, it cannot be claimed that liberty was one of the guiding principles of the Revolution; on the contrary, it practically ceased to exist with the advent of the Revolution. Nor were things made any better by the Charters of 1814 and 1830, and by the political acquisitions of 1848 and the Second

questions treated by M. Tardieu, and came to several of the latter's conclusions, in a work entitled *Le Libéralisme*, published in the third year of this century. It is an excellent production, and, so far from having received the credit due to it, it is now as good as forgotten.

Empire. Those who strove for these acquisitions were thinking, not really of liberty, but of equality, of which they imagined that universal suffrage was a sufficient expression and guarantee. The confusion between the right to vote and true liberty has persisted right up to our own day. As for the Constitution of 1875, which is the basis of the present Republic, it does not so much as mention liberty (nor, for that matter, does it mention equality or sovereignty). It simply hands over the population to the good will or the caprice of the majority. The Third Republic has suppressed religious liberty and many forms of civil liberty (M. Tardieu is not discussing whether this is expedient or not: he is simply registering the fact that there is no liberty). Only the other day, for instance, the *liberté d'association*, the right to form groups or societies, was seriously curtailed, and the law guaranteeing it was at the same time abolished. There has been a like curtailment of the liberty of the Press, and of the liberties protecting commercial and industrial transactions.

And the French citizen, unlike the American or the Swiss, say, has no possibility of appeal against this state of things. The makers of constitutions in France in 1789, 1793, 1795, 1848, and 1852 drew up certain Declarations of Rights, but these were made effective by no sanctions. As for the present Constitution, that of 1875, it discreetly omits to make any mention of such Rights. It furnishes no guarantee of liberty, or equality, or national sovereignty. If any French politician has ever sought to remedy matters, he has at once suffered defeat. Suggestions of a Supreme Court, of a Referendum and other protective measures, have never stood a chance of being accepted. There is the alternative of insurrection, and more than once Frenchmen have turned to it in despair; democratic France has been responsible for the shedding of more working-class blood than any country in Europe.

But, it will be objected, the citizen always has the protection of an impartial judicial system. But the French judiciary is simply a body of State officials; they are appointed, paid, promoted and decorated by the State; it is true that, unlike other officials, they are appointed for life, and this is supposed to guarantee their impartiality. But the State on more than one occasion, when it has found this guarantee embarrassing, has not scrupled to suspend it.

And, after all, judges are only men. It is a very exceptional man who is indifferent to considerations of promotion and honours: M. Tardieu, speaking as an ex-Prime Minister, is not inclined to believe that this man exists: He reports a good *mot*, said to him by an official very high in the judicial world: 'Our judges are as incapable of accepting a bribe from a litigant as they are of turning a deaf ear to demands from high quarters.' And he gives instance after instance of shameful judicial servility and corruption which makes melancholy reading for any lover of France. It appears that it is never certain that the French judiciary is not virtually at the command of the all-powerful State.

Georges Sorel, the only professor of revolution whose disciples have succeeded in establishing States, said that a modern democracy means the end of liberty. Who can say that this dictum is not borne out by events?

But what about equality? It may be, as some actually aver, that the loss of liberty is the price we pay for equality. Once again, however, M. Tardieu has no difficulty in proving that in democratic France equality is no less a myth than liberty. As for electoral equality, it did not exist under the Revolution; at this period, the right to vote was decided by property qualification, and citizens such as Corneille or Rousseau would have had no vote. At last a measure instituting what was called 'universal' suffrage was carried in 1848, and this measure was confirmed by Napoleon III., and later again by those who made the Constitution of the present Republic. But the suffrage was far from being universal, and it was far from guaranteeing equality, as we shall see at a later point. The suffrage, instead of securing political equality, has simply consolidated the privileges enjoyed by a very small section of the nation. What about civil equality—equality before the law and before the administrative powers of the country? On the surface, things are better here, and yet we have seen that there is room for misgivings with regard to the judiciary, and the conduct of the Stavisky and other affairs is not of a nature to alleviate them. And equality in the matter of military service? M. Tardieu affirms that even here there is a large amount of favouritism exempting from onerous or perilous duties. And fiscal equality? M. Tardieu points to very striking disparities:

for instance, only some 6 per cent. of the nation pay direct taxes to the State. The most important, the most vital, of all kinds of equality is that having to do with employment of labour. It may not worry a man very much if he has not the right to vote, in most cases it is a matter of life or death to him whether he has a fair chance of finding a position in which he may use his capacities. Here, again, the favour or disapproval of the majority, as represented by the Government and the Administration, may make for scandalous inequality, and M. Tardieu shows that in effect it does. He cites startling cases of Ministers issuing formal orders that favours governing promotion, etc., should be reserved, in the civil service and in the army, for those who were in sympathy with the *régime*; and cases of Ministers instituting a system of delation with a view to having an exhaustive record of the political leanings of all those engaged in these two professions. The evil does not stop there: through the favoured servants of the State it acts on the whole population. A State official can, discreetly and even brazenly, and with complete impunity, accord grossly inequitable preferential treatment in a hundred ways: in the matter of taxation, subsidies, fines, abatements, allowances, remissions, indemnities, technical, fiscal, judicial and military privileges, promotions, pensions, decorations of all sorts, scholarships, and a variety of other things constituting an important part of the life of the ordinary citizen. Here, too, M. Tardieu cites cases of confidential Ministerial memoranda issued to officials all over the country instructing them to favour those who have given evidence of the right political sympathies; the official, of course, in addition, may have his own purely personal and private reasons for bestowing favours. The citizens concerned, of course, or the vast majority of them, adapt themselves to the situation. And so the *régime* corrupts not only its servants, but the great mass of the population as well. The much reviled privileges of the *ancien régime*, of which the glorious Revolution made a clean sweep, have been replaced by others, far more numerous, far more arbitrary, and far more iniquitous; and, what is worse, these latter are an insidious creation of hypocrisy.

In the matter of classes too, particularly with regard to the question of property, there is no real equality. The

propertied middle and upper classes have been spoliated and victimised throughout the history of democratic government in France. Concessions have from time to time been granted to the so-called working classes, but nothing really essential has been done for them. The Republic has left the working man tied to his condition as a wage-earner, without securities and without guarantees of any sort. He still sells the service of his arms, as if it were a mere commercial commodity, and he enjoys very few of the privileges of civilisation. In the ancient world there was the master and the slave; to-day there is the master and the workman.⁹ So all the profound causes of social inequality, which inevitably make for class-hatred and strife, have been maintained in the years since the Revolution.

Wherever we look, then, we find, not liberty and equality but, on the contrary, a negation of them. This may be so, it is sometimes argued, but their loss is retrieved by the exercise of sovereignty through the vote. This argument is on the face of it flimsy, and only a numskull could be consoled by it; but in any case the facts are all against it, for the people possesses virtually nothing at all in the way of sovereignty. The population of France numbers 40,000,000; when all due deductions have been made, only a quarter of this number has the right to vote—in other words, to give expression to the ‘general will.’ Moreover, instead of valuing this right as a privilege, a large number of those entitled to do so never exercise the vote; this means that sometimes no more than a bare tenth of the nation has a share in the ‘general will,’ and the average number is not considerably higher than that. Again, owing to certain jealously guarded devices, the two Chambers never represent a majority of the population. Invariably, the successful candidates have to their credit less votes than those who have suffered defeat. This is owing to disparity in the sizes of the constituencies, which makes it possible for a man with 76,000 votes, say, in one constituency to be defeated, while a man with only 24,000 votes in another constituency is successful in obtaining a seat. Only a quarter, then, of the total population has the right to vote, and not even a majority of this quarter secures representation;

⁹ Mr. Hilaire Belloc has treated this matter at length, with his usual clarity and cogency, in his volume entitled *The Servile State*.

practically 90 per cent. of the nation is at the mercy of the other ridiculously small fraction. So that in this democracy it is not a case of a majority tyrannising over a minority, it is, on an alarming scale, altogether the opposite. And the French people have no redress against these conditions, as have the Americans, say, or the Swiss. They have no right, where legislation and the Constitution are concerned, of ratification, veto, revision, initiative or referendum; they have no control over the election of their President, their judges, and their State officials; they have no opportunity of making themselves felt as intellectual, moral or professional units: they are a mere mass of individuals; and in 1884 they allowed to be passed a law forbidding them ever to call in question the beautiful structure of the *régime*; and the men who have always been most adverse to any suggestions of extensions of popular sovereignty have been the politicians of the Left.

M. Tardieu gives other details (such as those relating to the *décrets-lois*) which show that the Chambers more and more cease to represent the nation. But we have no space to follow him further here, and he is going to devote all his next volume to this question of parliamentary government.

The most disquieting part of M. Tardieu's book is the concluding chapter, entitled 'The Nullification of the General Will.' In this he maintains, with much supporting evidence, that from the Revolution onwards French democracy has been to a very great extent controlled by a number of *comités* or societies or inner rings. These societies exist to further certain interests which do not coincide with those of the State; their rank and file is recruited from the gullible and feckless and unsuccessful sections of the population: fools who believe that a good time is coming, barristers waiting for briefs, doctors waiting for patients, down-at-heel journalists, incompetent and disaffected public servants. These societies are secret and permanent, and thus they have no difficulty in securing the upper hand over the temporary and public parliamentary assemblies. They have no fixed allegiance to any political party in the State: they always lend their support to the party or person who happens to be strongest, and thus best able to serve their interests. They bring all their power into play at election times, and it is enormous and decisive. They work cunningly upon the

electorate, and influence it in favour of the candidates they are backing. And of course they work upon the candidates too, whose chances they can make or mar to a degree that no political aspirant can ignore. They also work upon the State officials, a large number of whom are among their adherents. Thus these secret societies, manipulating the suffrage, are a controlling force in politics, and with them we get government by the 'machine.' Moreover, they are organisations, and the running of organisations is a costly affair. And so, by this channel, the forces of finance get a hold on public life. And the force which can pay most—it may be an individual swindler like Stavisky, or an institution like a bank—is the force which commands the resources of the machine. Thus votes are bought, members and Ministers (and hence Judges) are corrupted, and public life is demoralised on a large scale. In other words, the State is at the mercy of Finance.

It is not the nation, therefore, the people, the general will, which decides any of the big events of public life. M. Tardieu shows that in the time since the Revolution it has wanted none of the large international undertakings: wars, colonial adventures, etc., and none of the crucial incidents of domestic history: change of government, various laws, virtual dictatorships, etc.

The sovereignty of the people, then, like liberty and equality, is no more than a fiction, it has no existence in reality. French democracy, concludes M. Tardieu, is based upon a lie. The system, he says, may survive for years yet, but in its essence it is condemned. The longer it survives, the greater will be the final disaster. For France it can be nothing but catastrophic.

What, then, would M. Tardieu do? We shall have to wait for his fifth and final volume to learn what he would recommend in the way of reform and reconstitution of the political system of France. A certain amount of this, however, is deducible from his very drastic criticisms, and each reader will make the deduction for himself. But on one point, and it is a cardinal one, M. Tardieu is already quite positive and explicit, and his decision is the gravest of the many grave things in his book. It is obvious, he says, that it is no use hoping for any remedy through the constitutional channels of parliamentary procedure; therefore, in face of what he calls

the 'obtuse conservatism of the legal powers,' the only way left available is that of revolution. It is perilous, he admits, but we know whose fault it is if it is the only alternative. This point has so much importance for M. Tardieu that it has dictated the covering and general title of the whole of his five volumes: *La Révolution à refaire*: the work of the Revolution has to be undertaken all over again: and this time it will be an inevitable and wholly necessary revolution. Here we will take leave of this extremely valuable work of an exceptionally able, honest and fearless personality.

M. Tardieu's testimony is by no means the only one of its kind. Over the past 140 years the best—or an overwhelming majority of the best—minds in France have come to the same conclusions regarding the philosophy and the working of the democratic system in France. And in our own day there is no lack of other books all converging, from different starting-points, to the same melancholy and anxious judgments. There is, for example, the late truly lamented Jacques Bainville's *La Troisième République*, a good detailed account of the past sixty-five years of French history¹⁰; from the same camp there is M. Maurras's *Pour en sortir* (which may be translated *The Way out of the Mess*), an admirable summing-up in some 100 pages of the doctrines and objectives of the Monarchist Party¹¹; and, from an altogether different quarter, there is M. Jacques Bardoux's *La France de demain: son gouvernement, ses assemblées, sa justice*, which was published only the other day¹²; M. Bardoux has lived a life far removed from the strife of party politics; a distinguished historian and sociologist, and a specialist in particular on English affairs, he is a member of the Institute and President of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences; one of the arresting judgments of his

¹⁰ Fayard, Paris 1935. MM. R. Lanson and J. Desselgnat, in their *La France et sa civilisation* (Harrap), admit that the present régime has 'une assez mauvaise réputation,' but they brush aside all criticisms as being negligible, and hold it up to the admiration of the world. This book is used in English educational institutions, and this is the sort of stuff that is imposed upon the young in England. French studies in this country, from the universities downward, are in a shameful condition; I speak from first-hand, inside and intimate knowledge; I do not, of course, suggest that all professors and teachers of the subject are incompetent: there are some very honourable exceptions to a rule that should be viewed as a national disgrace.

¹¹ *Librairie de l'Action Française*, 1935.

¹² *Bibliothèque constitutionnelle et parlementaire contemporaine*. (Recueil Sirey, 1936.)

book is that the conditions of French political life are such that they call for none of the qualities of a gentleman, and leave no scope for their application. Then there is concurrent witness elsewhere, and sometimes in the most unexpected places: in solemn and purely formal meetings of the French Academy, for instance.¹³ A recent Prime Minister, a moderate, M. Doumergue, tells a newspaper (*La Liberté*) that 'the very existence of the present democratic régime is exposed to the most serious dangers.' The *Journal*,¹⁴ which is what the Marxists would call a *bourgeois* paper, realising that the country was passing through some sort of crisis, and desirous of knowing what the man in the street and the field and the shop was thinking about it, set on foot a pretty exhaustive inquiry; it sent seven reporters to different regions of France, and published their findings from day to day. Ordinary citizens of all classes, occupations and political opinions were consulted in each region. What is the general state of mind of the bulk of the French people as revealed by these investigations? It may be summed up as follows: a resentful consciousness that in all domains French prestige was suffering a decline, that all was not well with the country, that the situation was becoming more and more grave; an uneasiness, a profound anxiety regarding the future; a lack of confidence in the chief political parties; a wonder as to why any suggestion of constitutional reform was so obstinately opposed by those parties; and a half-expressed menace that unless something was done quickly, drastic measures would have to be resorted to: in other words, a threat of revolution. The *Journal* also invited the expression of opinion by correspondence, and it received thousands of letters: they went to confirm the findings of the reporters. It also instituted a referendum as to what was the reform most urgently called for by the present condition of France. An enormous majority of scores of thousands of readers put the revision of the Constitution first. Complete abolition of the Chamber secured third place on the list of desiderata.

Another paper, the *Intransigeant*,¹⁵ invited various men of

¹³ See the indignant utterances of M. Pierre Benoit and M. Claude Farrère, two novelists entirely outside politics, regarding the 'disorganisation' and the 'anarchy' of the country, on the occasion of the reception of the latter to the bosom of the august assembly.

¹⁴ See a number of articles appearing in the course of last month.

¹⁵ April 26, 1936.

different parties to say what they would do if they had their own way. M. Franklin-Bouillon's first care would be to make the country, to whom the politicians, he affirms, have been lying for the past fifteen years, realise exactly the deadly perils which beset it. The head of the Fascist *Croix de Feu* would (among other things) introduce proportional representation, make it obligatory for electors to vote and for members to put in an appearance at the Chamber, and would check severely the excesses of finance. Certain gentlemen on the Left would also attend to this latter evil, and in particular would take very stringent measures against the Banque de France. The most interesting, and the most definite, of these declarations are those of the Comte de Paris, who would probably occupy the throne in the event of a Restoration.¹⁶ Like thousands of the readers of the *bourgeois Journal*, he would abolish the parliamentary régime altogether; during the 100 years it has been in operation, he says, it has undermined the country morally and materially. Like the politicians of the Left, he would 'put in their place the financial and economic oligarchies,' and the big trusts, with their pernicious international ramifications. He would revive the corporative system, and thereby suppress class-struggle. A vast undertaking, all this, he says, and he admits that a revolution would be necessary to accomplish it.

And so once again we come back to revolution. People of the most different temperaments, training and political allegiance agree in deciding that it is inevitable. This is one of the most significant things in the world of politics to-day. It is highly probable that in the next few decades the intelligent men of good will in France (and in other countries besides France) will gradually come round to M. Tardieu's opinion; avoiding on the one hand the cramping system of the Fascist totalitarian State, and on the other the entirely insensate plan of a revolution carried out under the exclusive control of the proletariat.

In any case, democracy, for which a no doubt well-meaning American pedagogue wished the world to be made safe, has more and more been shown to be unsafe for the world; to be as unsatisfactory in practice as it is untenable in philosophy. There can be no doubt that in France at least it is a serious

¹⁶ His father, it is thought, would abdicate in his favour.

menace, and Frenchmen may well repeat—with no humorous intention—what the great Athenian master of comedy said exactly 2350 years ago. 'O Democracy, whither at last wilt thou lead us?'

RANDOLPH HUGHES.

THE CHURCHES AND POLITICS

By EARL WINTERTON, P.C., M.P.

RECENT speeches by the Secretary of State for War on the subject of the Churches' attitude towards recruiting for the Forces have focussed attention upon a matter which has been troubling many thoughtful people for years. What should be the attitude of the Christian Churches, and especially the Established Church, towards national and international questions which, from their very nature, cause political issues and honest differences of opinion among men and women of equal goodwill?

We are told that the Church must speak, if possible with a united voice, on a 'grave moral issue.' But what is a 'moral issue' where a question of public policy is concerned? Clearly, if any person, or body of persons, were to advocate polygamy as a cure for certain evils of modern civilisation, or to stop a falling birth rate, the Churches would be entitled unitedly to oppose them, since monogamy is an almost universally accepted Christian doctrine. Equally, an attempt to set up the Soviet system of unrestricted divorce could, and ought, to be resisted by the Churches. But individual clergymen, purporting to speak for the congregation of their church, frequently claim that the provision of a new licence to sell liquor raises a 'grave moral issue.' Yet we know, on the 'highest authority, that the act of consuming alcoholic liquor is not in itself wrong. What the Church leaders mean, one must presume, is that in their opinion the grant of the licence will lead to drunkenness, or at least unnecessary consumption of liquor. But other people, no less opposed to either, deny that this will occur. To speak of a 'grave moral issue' arising is to use the language of exaggeration. The question is on which side lies the balance of public convenience, health and good order.

But it is when matters of international or external policy arise that it is most dangerous to assume that all the ethical arguments lie on one side. It is true that others besides Church leaders in this country incautiously advance this contention. Indeed, our national habit is to assume that we are always actuated by a high moral purpose in taking any particular line in foreign relations. Certainly, we frequently do adopt an almost foolishly Quixotic attitude which is intended to benefit others but cannot possibly be of any advantage to ourselves. It is unfortunately also true that we often recede from that attitude when we discover that we cannot persist in it without causing a conflagration, the harm of which would outweigh the good which we can do to the recipient or recipients of our benevolent intentions. Our motives are perfectly sincere at both stages. Nevertheless, someone is 'let down,' and once again, say foreign commentators, perfidy is proved to be the hardest perennial in the garden of British policy.

It is needless to add that the spearhead of opinion in favour of the first stage which I have described almost invariably comes from the Churches and bodies under Church influence. So far as the altruism is genuine, that is as it should be; but more is required. For if there is one sound principle of Christian polity, it is that we should take responsibility for the ultimate consequences, so far as we can, of our acts. It is only right, even in the best of causes, to promise aid and succour if we have fully weighed what may result from putting those promises into action. It is even better to tolerate injustice, oppression, or a breach of international law, than loudly to proclaim our intention of intervening and then refusing to face sacrifices, even though they be of our own lives. That in itself alone should make ministers of religion hesitate to dogmatise on questions of foreign policy. Their profession, in this country, precludes them from bearing arms. Yet every important international question must, and does, involve the possible risk of war, with all that it means to individual lives. We may lessen, though even that is disputed, the risk of war by our support of the League of Nations. What is indubitable is that membership of the League does not preclude armed action in certain circumstances. On the contrary, it involves it. It is this fact which makes the

attempt of the Churches to control and direct such public opinion as it can command in favour of this or that policy in League affairs at once so dangerous and so lamentably inconsistent.

Let me attempt to describe the initial errors and the subsequent course of this League advocacy by the Churches. When the League was first formed its advocates claimed for it that it would settle disputes between nations by the method of sitting round a table and resolving differences instead of by war. This was and is a most laudable object, and one which, despite recent almost insuperable difficulties, may be attained, but only if and when the world as a whole accepts and is really bound by the principle of international law. Quite naturally and properly the Churches in Great Britain commended this method and ideal to their adherents. But in their commendation they gave the impression that the League was a Christian institution of the highest order which it was the duty of all good Christians to support.

The settlement of disputes between nations or between individuals by conciliation and compromise rather than by force is not an exclusively Christian doctrine. It is a fundamental tenet of faith in other great religions. Moreover, the League of Nations has never been a Christian institution in the sense that all member States were or are Christian; indeed, on a basis of the population of the States comprising the League, Christianity is in a minority. I have listened to many speeches and sermons from the clergy about the League of Nations, and they have always ignored this fact. The result has been that many uninstructed persons have supposed when a decision has been reached by the League that it was that of the 'Christian Powers,' and frequently in speeches and letters to the Press they have expressed their indignation at what they regard as a departure from Christian principles by its temporal guardians. We have also had astonishing *obiter dicta* by eminent divines to the effect that if the League fails, Christianity fails. I believe that statement to be offensive, untrue, and indeed blasphemous. If the League comes to an end, if European civilisation crashes in general war and upheaval, the truths of Christianity will remain, for they are eternal.

From the earliest years of the League's existence until

recently no real attempt was made by the League of Nations Union in this country to explain the commitments of member States under the Covenant generally, and especially under Article XVI. in regard to war on behalf of the League. The impression was sedulously given that the League could and would, if properly supported, abolish war. Only a very few speakers had the courage to tell the truth that while war for national aims or gains is forbidden by the Covenant, war to enforce League principles is, in certain circumstances, expressly permitted.

The bishops and clergy of the Established Church and ministers of the Nonconformist Churches have laid upon them, when speaking or preaching on the subject, an especial duty to make this clear, since they claim to be representing or guiding the opinion of the laymen of their communities. The 'Peace Ballot' furnished a glaring example of the muddle into which public opinion was led by leaders of the League of Nations Union, acting in complete accord with many of the clergy.¹ The clear suggestion was that the public were being asked to vote for or against peace. Yet one of the questions to the voter was whether he or she would support military sanctions. Only a small number said that they would, yet the ballot was claimed as a 'victory' for the League of Nations. Even in this country, where inconsistency is regarded almost as a moral principle, it would be hard to find greater confusion of thought.

When the Italo-Abyssinian War broke out the truth about the obligations of League membership could no longer be concealed. The result was to show a division in ecclesiastical opinion professing to speak for the Churches to which they belonged, which will do no good to institutional religion in this country. Some clergy protested loudly that they had never accepted the idea that any member State could be asked to fight with its ships, planes, and men on behalf of the League. They could never support such a policy. All war, even defensive war, was wrong; force was never justified even against an aggressor. One can only deplore the lamentable ignorance or lack of mental concentration which has caused them all these years to support the League with fiery

¹ Prayers for the success of the ballot were offered in many churches, and appeals for financial support to enable it to be taken made in others.

emotionalism, and then, in its hour of crisis, to repudiate its principles. Others went to the opposite extreme. One very distinguished man, occupying one of the highest positions in the Established Church, is reported in an interview to have said that it might be necessary once again for young men to die to establish the principle of collective security.

Canon H. R. L. Sheppard, the principal protagonist of the first school of opinion, has been angrily assailed by some of his brother clergy. One bishop in supporting Mr. Duff Cooper has stated, without mentioning Canon Sheppard by name, that such an opinion is blasphemous. However that may be, it does seem strange that one of His Majesty's chaplains should regard service in His Majesty's Forces as morally wrong. For there can be no other meaning attached to his *obiter dicta* that no Christian ought to fight. A special niche in the temple of chaotic inconsistency should be reserved for the Bishop of Birmingham. He is reported at the time of writing as having characterised Italian action in Abyssinia in terms which, used by a member of any Government in any country in former times against another Government, would have involved a demand for explanations and withdrawal—which, if not given, might easily have caused war. Yet the bishop, by inference if not explicitly, has done his best to discourage recruiting for the British armed forces. He merits inclusion among those denounced by Mr. Eden in an admirable phrase, whose weapons of offence against nations from which they differ are 'threats, insults, and perorations.' Parenthetically, I may remark that I wonder if he and others realise how deeply we ex-Service men, on behalf of our comrades who fell in the war and ourselves, resent the implication that in fighting for our country we did both a foolish and a reprehensible thing.

Readers of this article thus far may conclude that it urges abstention by clergy of the Established and other Churches in Great Britain from all political activity. That is, however, far from being my contention. It is right and proper that ministers of religion, whether in great or subordinate positions, should express their opinions, speaking not only as subjects and voters but as Christians, on questions of the day. They have a perfect right also to offer guidance to the laity of their particular community as to the proper course to pursue in any

controversy. We are not, as a nation, in these days so rich in men of eminence who can express themselves, whether in speech or writing, in clear and beautiful English as to be able to contemplate with equanimity the loss of the public utterances, on all sorts of subjects, of the Archbishop of Canterbury. In fact, the limited vocabulary and tenuous expository powers of many prominent men in Great Britain is a source of some surprise to intelligent foreigners. But the Archbishop, like all wise leaders of any Church, is concerned to guide opinion when he speaks or writes upon public affairs, not to dagoon it. He suggests that such and such a course is the right one for Christians to follow. He does not dogmatically claim that his views on temporal matters are alone worthy of acceptance, and that it is un-Christian to reject them.

In this lies the root of the matter. It is the self-assertive egoism of many clerical writers and speakers to which exception is taken by an increasing number of people. Statements like 'I claim to speak for the whole body of Christian opinion' or 'It is incompatible with Christian ideals,' applied to one side of a political or international question, are usually inaccurate and nonsensical. The growth of 'Press Parsons,' corresponding to 'Radio Priests' in the United States, has intensified this tendency to didactic assertion. I have no doubt that those distinguished clergymen who write these articles in the popular Sunday or daily Press sincerely believe that they are doing their Master's work. All I can say is that an article by the Rev. — with the dramatic title 'What would Christ do if He were at Geneva?' placed in parallel columns with the last letters of some murderer, or an interview with a film star accompanied by her photograph in a costume which would have been considered exiguous even in the pre-war 'Moulin Rouge,' produces in me feelings of nausea and profanation. However, it may be necessary to win men and women to the Christian way of life by this sort of mass advertisement and glaring contrast. But it is certainly not right for the clergy, in ordinary circumstances, to claim that their office entitles them to dictate to men and women what their political opinions shall be, or to designate all contrary opinions as un-Christian. None of the laity, outside the Roman Church and a few extreme and insignificant Calvinistic bodies, accepts such a doctrine.

There are aspects of the position of the Church of England to-day, as well as that of the Nonconformist Churches, which cause acute disquiet. In general, congregations are progressively declining. It is calculated that not more than 10 per cent. of the adult population of London and Greater London, and not more than 25 per cent. of that in the English provinces, ever attend divine service. Many instances have been recorded of children in elementary schools who are wholly ignorant of the most elementary facts about the Christian religion. The parochial clergy and the ministers in the Nonconformist Churches are in many cases scandalously underpaid, for which the responsibility rests largely upon the laity. Many clergymen of high intellectual attainments, doing splendid work, feel disheartened and almost overwhelmed by the material difficulties and the mass of contemptuous apathy with which they are surrounded. Their ministry seems so infructuous ; they have a sense of frustration.

This is not the place to discuss the evils which thereby result to the nation, but it is legitimate to consider the possible causes. May not the defeatism and anti-patriotic attitude of so many prominent men among the clergy of more than one denomination have something to do with it ? We are not an exuberantly patriotic people, at any rate in expression—partly because we are undemonstrative, and partly because our expository powers are limited. Nevertheless, deep down in his heart, the average Briton, whatever his political views, values immensely the civil and religious liberty, justice and toleration which characterises the national outlook and institutions. They are proud of Britain and the British Constitution, even when anxious to alter its present laws ; they are proud too, in a vague way, of the British Empire. In the last resort, however fervently anti-militarist they may be, they would die for these causes.

Against this ill-defined, almost unconscious but pervasive and sane point of view many clergymen, among whom several prominent Nonconformist leaders have an unfortunate pre-eminence, protest with vehemence. To them Great Britain and the Empire is no more important than Paraguay or Ecuador. So far from being proud of our record, we should be ashamed of it. 'To them, 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that

are God's' has no meaning, for they thoroughly dislike Cæsar. He is an imperialist—worst of all, a 'militarist'—and the Union Jack is his emblem.

'We have no moral right, so they contend, to die, or to ask others to die, for this country. Our best defence against poison gas is to do nothing. To learn to be a citizen soldier by joining the Territorials is immoral.

There is no surer way of emptying the churches of this land than to give the impression that service to God and service to one's country in peace and war is incompatible. Such a doctrine is the very antithesis of Christianity and the negation of common sense.

WINTERTON.

REVISITING THE FAR EAST¹

I. CHINA

By E. M. GULL

My return to territories in which twenty years of work and leisure had been spent occupied the greater part of last year. The visit included Canton, a tour of Chekiang province, a journey through Central China and the province of Shantung, Tientsin and Peiping, Kalgan and the edge of southern Inner Mongolia, Taiyuanfu (the capital of Shansi province), Kaifeng and Hsuehchow (on the Lung-Hai railway), Nanking and Shanghai. It also included Tokyo, Seoul and Manchoukuo as far as Harbin. That part of my visit, with its quite distinct interest, will be described in a succeeding article. Thus may be maintained clarity of themes above the undertone formed by their commingling, which in real life often breaks through into confusing mastery, so that in Nanking one hears only Tokyo and in Tokyo only Nanking. On paper the interaction of the affairs of the two countries can be postponed to a third article designed to indicate where conflict and catastrophe, where fruitful consummation may result. Of the other requisites of drama, unity, who can confidently affirm in relation to the stage of history that any series of events possesses that? Suffice it that, to critical observers, those with which these articles are concerned appear to possess it.

A few paragraphs are required to review the salient facts of the Far Eastern situation as they were when I left China in the autumn of 1926, for it was with that period, naturally, that I compared conditions in 1935. As a member of the British Delegation to the Peking Tariff Conference I had spent the latter part of 1925, and the first part of 1926, participating in a delayed attempt of the Powers to give financial effect to their agreement in the Nine-Power Treaty 'to

¹ Two further articles under this title will appear in successive issues.

provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.' In doing this their representatives went much further than they were required contractually to go, for they agreed in principle that China should have tariff autonomy. Subsequently, however, under the combined shocks of civil war and revolution in the South, the Chinese Government gradually collapsed. 'I left China in complete uncertainty as to what would take its place.

A second salient fact was that the revolution in the South was giving the term 'China' international meaning of a new kind. During the latter part of the nineteenth century 'China' was primarily a geographical expression with economic connotations, interpreted as the States interested in them chose. As far as foreign affairs were concerned, the political unity connoted by the term was convenient but of secondary importance, being characterised chiefly by its defencelessness, and except in 1900, the year of the Boxer rebellion, its submissiveness, for which very reason, in order to maintain equality of opportunity, the doctrine of the open door was developed. But in 1925-26, while political unity was apparently disappearing, 'China' came rapidly to acquire the significance of psychological unity hostile to established foreign interests and to a variety of rights and customs associated with them and jealously preserved. Manifestations of this new unity took the form of widespread riots and strikes, predominantly anti-British. To this phenomenon was given the term 'nationalism,' partly because the sentiments involved were recognised as being akin to emotions which had frequently agitated the West, partly because the party which was giving the sentiments dynamic force called itself the Kuomintang, or National People's Party.

A third salient fact was the nature of this party and its relations with Soviet Russia. The party was the descendant of one organised in 1893 by Sun Yat-sen, who was then twenty-eight. He organised it—to quote one of the historians—'to rid China of the corrupt Manchu Government and save her from the partition threatened by the Western Powers.' The first object was achieved in 1911: partition remained a possibility for years, during which what was

known as the Young China movement acquired increasing strength, especially after 1919, when it incorporated, and was greatly invigorated by, a student movement which drew much of its strength from dissatisfaction with Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles, which transferred Germany's rights in the province of Shantung to Japan.

In 1923 Sun Yat-sen had stated that 'the communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot naturally be introduced into China because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either.' Within twelve months, however, the Kuomintang had been reorganised on Soviet lines largely under the guidance of a Russian who had been the principal representative of the Third International in the camp of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, Michael Borodin. All Communists willing to take the oath of obedience to the party authorities were admitted to its membership. At much the same time, at the instance of Karl Radek, a special training school for Chinese revolutionaries, with Sun Yat-sen's name for title, was established at Canton, with Bukharin as one of its lecturers. Meanwhile, with the help of another Russian, Galens, Chiang Kai-shek, who had received part of his education in Japan, had been training officers at Whampoa, an island near Canton. After the death of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang became in the summer of 1926 the virtual leader of the Kuomintang, with Borodin as adviser, and in July he took the field at the head of a Northern Punitive Expedition against a group of militarists, who between them had brought the government with which the Powers were holding their tariff conference virtually to an end. By September 7 his forces had marched through Hunan and captured Wuchang, on the south bank of the Yangtze opposite Hankow.

These circumstances acquired much increased significance when considered in relation to a forecast made more than twenty-five years before by the late Sir Robert Hart, then Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs. In 1900, in *These from the Land of Sinim*, he wrote :

Of all the Powers it is Russia that can best afford to be on good terms with China : Russia is a neighbour and can wait—has no propaganda—her commerce, though considerable in volume, has, so to speak, but one body, and rolls along over a recognised and beaten track—and

Russia may yet be the first to restore to China her sovereign rights, and so cement for ever the neighbourly friendship that has characterised so much of her action in the past.

As regards extra-territoriality and other privileges provided for in treaties made with China in Tsarist times, this forecast has been fulfilled. Russia divested herself of them on May 31, 1924, almost exactly a year before the anti-British riots alluded to above. To no small extent the riots were the consequence of this step and of propaganda which, in circumstances unforeseen by Hart, Russia had developed to a world-wide extent and a high degree of efficiency. As far as the Far East was concerned, this had resulted not only in uniting Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek in partnership, but in converting Outer Mongolia into an autonomous People's Republic, formally recognised by Russia as 'an integral part of the Republic of China,' but, as Commissar Chicherin said, 'on a basis somewhat similar to the Soviet system,' the similarity being illustrated by the following article in the Declaration of Rights of the Labouring People of Mongolia issued in November 1924 :

In view of the fact that the labouring masses of the whole world are striving to uproot capitalism and to attain socialism, this Republic of labouring people must co-ordinate its foreign policy with the interests and fundamental aims of all oppressed nations and the revolutionary workers of the whole world.

The fact that China was beginning to develop a proletariat to some extent organised in trade unions, which held a national conference in Canton in 1922 and since then had played an important part in the strikes and riots already mentioned, is one of a final group of circumstances noteworthy as salient in the autumn of 1926. A concomitant circumstance was a total of factories several times larger than it had been on the eve of the World War, including some 118 cotton mills with a spindleage of 3,414,000. Another related fact was agrarian discontent, due partly to sufferings occasioned by civil war and taxation, partly to inequities in the land system, one being over-renting. These facts furnished Sun Yat-sen with part of his material for his *Three Principles of the People* and his *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction*, which together constituted the

political bible of the Kuomintang. Forming part of the party's ideology also were a number of new conceptions which had entered the country through a variety of channels, of which the chief were educational and literary. As a result of them China's intellectual and moral life seemed comparable with a turbid and violent maelstrom.

The change in these conditions which within a very few weeks of my arrival in China presented itself as the dominating alteration was the substitution of Japanese for Russian influence. The reasons for this substitution emanating from the other side of the Gulf of Chihli will be recited, as already arranged with the reader, in a subsequent article. The chief reasons arising in China were, first, that Borodin overplayed his hand; secondly, that from the beginning there had been friction and mistrust between the Right and Left wings of the Kuomintang; and thirdly, that, as Sun Yat-sen declared in 1923 and on later occasions, conditions in China were in many respects unfavourable to Soviet Communism.

It has been alleged—I believe with truth, though I am not sure—that before Sun Yat-sen turned to Russia he sought British co-operation and failed to get it. Whether he did or not, it is, in my opinion, certain that, had we 'spotted' him as a winner and backed him, Russia would never have acquired the influence which she obtained. However that may be, in 1927 a violent breach with the Soviet occurred, involving also the eclipse of the nascent Chinese Communist Party. And to-day in Canton, in Central China and in North China, Communism has become, from a practical point of view, synonymous with banditry arising out of agrarian discontent; and the most pressing, the overmastering, subject in everybody's mind is Japan's actual and potential control over Chinese affairs. The very fact, however, appeared towards the end of my visit to be the potential determinant of a new, pro-Russian, policy—an extremely important point to which it will be essential later to return.

A second and not less important contrast of which I soon became aware was the immense clarification which had occurred in China's internal political outlook. During nine years' absence from the country the description of her affairs which I had heard and read most often was 'chaotic.' Knowing from experience how impatiently and haphazardly

Chinese conditions are studied, I was prepared to find them a good deal less confused than they were said to be. I was astonished, however, at the discrepancy between that description and actualities. In the political field, in place of the complete uncertainty which characterised conditions in 1926, I found a government at least as stable as several governments in Europe, and more capable of continued stability than some of them. It was true, as I had heard *ad nauseam*, that much depended on one personality, Chiang Kai-shek, and that there was no more certainty as to what would happen in the event of his death than there was in the case of Hitler or Mussolini. But an aspect of the first of these two facts which few, apparently, had studied was the nature of Chiang's ascendancy, a correct appreciation of which was, obviously, a factor of prime importance in relation to future probabilities.

It was alleged, again *ad nauseam*, that Chiang's ascendancy depended upon the strength of his army and, more particularly, of his air force. Even in England, in moments and periods of emergency what 'goes' is the word of the person or persons wielding the instruments of force. They are wielded in England in the name of laws, institutions, and a public recognition of the State as such, which have had a consecutive history of many centuries. It would be fantastic to suggest that that is the case in modern China. It is not less unrealistic, however, to ignore the following facts: first, that public opinion and sentiment, the consensus of which, in the cities at all events, is behind Chiang, instincts and traditions immemorially opposed to dictatorship divorced from moral sanctions; secondly, that Chiang, while admittedly controlling the organisation of the Kuomintang, is loyal to the party's concepts; and thirdly, that the party, though freely criticised on various grounds, has the moral sanctions of a great cause, the regeneration of the country, which, in spite of many failures, it has done much to promote. A third difference comprises the economic and social changes which illustrate that statement.

Most striking to the visitor with previous experience of travel in the country are the ease and rapidity with which the interior can now be reached and traversed. By air you can reach Sianfu from Canton in two days, and Chengtu

from Shanghai in one day; while by shorter, diagonal routes you can traverse the greater part of the remainder of the country in three days. In 1926, as for years before that, you could travel by rail from Peiping to the Yangtze: by the end of this year it will be possible to travel by rail from the Yangtze to Canton, while east Central China—Chekiang and Kiangsi provinces—is already traversed by a railway. Roads usable by motor traffic in fine weather cover most of the country; roads similarly usable after heavy rains cover large areas where ten years ago one either plodded along on one's own feet, or sat in a chair swinging rhythmically upon the shoulders of coolies. The freight transported along these roads is at present small: that it was larger in 1935 than it was in 1932 is proved by comparison between my own observations and those of visitors during the earlier year.

Hardly less striking is the rapid modernisation of ancient towns, such as Nanking, Kaifeng, Tsinanfu, Chengtu, Sianfu and Canton. Of these let us glance briefly at two—Nanking and Canton.

Ten to fifteen years ago, though close to the world's activities, Nanking seemed quite unaffected by them. She lay inert under the tragic experiences and great memories of the past—experiences of slaughter and devastation, memories of splendour and renown. Both, she seemed to say as one walked along the north-west portion of her splendid wall, or wandered through the fields and copses lying below, are ill or sad dreams which I am glad to forget in the placidity of peaceful insignificance. To-day no city in Asia is more obviously anxious to be in the very thick of affairs, is clutching more eagerly, not only at all the comforts and contrivances of modern urbanisation, but also at the ambitions and security signified by military zones and forts.

The Canton of to-day is almost unrecognisably different from the Canton I knew intimately when I lived there in 1912 and 1913, and very different from what it was when I visited it on my way home in 1926. In 1913 it was a walled mediæval city of narrow stone-flagged streets, crowded, murky and fetid, albeit picturesque and fascinating. In deeply recessed silk, jade, and silverware stores sat pawky owners, often naked to the waist, who had the yellowness

and rotund smoothness of seated Buddhas cut from old ivory. Lintels gilded and exquisitely carved, the gold upon black of hanging shop-signs decoratively suspended in flowery script, caught here and there the slanting rays of sunlight. Single-wheeled barrows, loaded on either side with bales, or pigs or fowls or women with tiny bound feet, were skilfully propelled by straining coolies. The air was filled with the chaffer of incessant bargaining, punctuated by high-pitched cries and with laughter flying spray-like from group to group. Around and below all lay grim poverty, an intense struggle for existence, and an almost suffocating sense of congestion. Such were some of the memories evoked by sight of the city as it now is, with streets as broad as London's, with omnibus services, cars for hire, efficient traffic control, smart uniformed police using, with nonchalant perfection, all the latest gestures, hotels with roof gardens and bedside telephones, department stores, picture-houses, loud-speakers, electrically lighted advertisements—most of the paraphernalia, in fact, of Western urban civilisation. Similar transformations are occurring all over China with a rapidity which makes it safe to predict that, given another ten years of peace, urban mediævalism will to a great extent have disappeared.

This provision of modern facilities is part of a general scheme of reconstruction which is supervised by a National Economic Council, helped by technical experts selected by the League of Nations. It includes agricultural and sericultural reforms, afforestation, irrigation, flood prevention, and the institution of co-operative societies and public health centres. It interlocks with a large and varied number of industrial activities, outstanding results of which are, on the one hand, a greatly increased capacity to supply consumable goods from domestic sources; on the other, a marked increase, as compared with ten years ago, in the value of goods manufactured for export. It interlocks also with much of the Board of Education's work, which has achieved great results during the past ten years, notably in the provision of primary schools. To convey in a few words, without appearing to exaggerate, the vitality and enthusiasm which permeate educational circles throughout the country is difficult. Fortunately one can cite in support of the statement that probably no country in the world is working harder in

this sphere the undeniable fact that none has a longer record of respect either for the teacher or the student. To-day, however, the educational outlook is incomparably broader than it used to be, for not only does it include regard for all the subjects taught in the West, coupled with a rapidly extending appreciation of the importance of encouraging all forms of recreation conducive to physical fitness, and of providing adequate means thereto, but also practical recognition of the right of girls to be given the same opportunity as boys.

Here, indeed, is a change which is simply astounding, one which is already affecting, and in the space of another decade is likely greatly to modify, the whole social structure, the plinth of which, family life, with its traditional features—on the one hand ancestor worship and patriarchal subordination, on the other procreation as a transcendent duty—has hitherto been at once the foundation of China's immense stability and the source of many of her weaknesses. The liberation of women from the chains represented by the second and third of these features, and their increasingly rapid acquisition of educational, recreational, matrimonial, clerical, professional and even political equality with men, will in due course free China from the vicious circle of ancestral loyalties, over-population, economic distress and political revolution, and at the same time provide her with an immense addition of mental and moral strength. In Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, and other centres one meets to-day women who could hold their own in any society in the world: in schools and colleges girls are as unrestricted in dress, deportment, outlook and spirit as girls in England, while one is struck by the security, decency and politeness which encompass women young and old everywhere, notwithstanding their new enfranchisement.

Having regard to all these changes, is it still correct to apply to China's mental and moral life the simile used at the beginning of this article? Maelstrom is the term given to a particular whirlpool in Northern Europe. The action of a whirlpool is to suck down and engulf. In 1925-26 not a few persons thought that to be sucked down and engulfed was in fact the fate to which political China was swirling. To such an extent was this feared that a Defence Force was

sent to Shanghai to protect British subjects. There are arguments for keeping the reduced force there, but they are not furnished by existing governmental conditions. Of the pacification and clarification of the latter a good deal has already been said. Some may dispute the propriety of the second of those words: none can dispute the accuracy of the first. One cannot, needless to say, infer moral and intellectual from political pacification. When, however, the inference to be drawn from the facts reviewed above is that, to the extent to which they are involved, China is thinking clearly and collectedly—an inference strengthened by her handling of her currency problems—it seems reasonable to conclude that the term 'maelstrom' has ceased to be applicable to her moral and intellectual life, or at all events that it retains only academic significance.

There are, however, stark contrasts and immense difficulties which cannot be omitted from this or, indeed, any picture of modern China. Between 40 and 50 per cent. of her peasant families, it has been authoritatively estimated, have insufficient land to provide them with food, apart from other requirements. 'They are a propertied proletariat, which is saved—when it is saved—partly by its own admirable ingenuity and fortitude, partly by the communism of the Chinese family, partly by reducing its consumption of necessities and thus using up its physical capital. . . . The small incomes,' to combine together quotations from two different specialists on this subject, 'reduce most of the farmers and their families to a mere subsistence basis. In fact, the people feed themselves in winter, just as one "roughs" labour animals through the winter, by consuming as little and as poor food as possible.' Periodically the country suffers from appalling famines and floods. The latter, with their consequences, I witnessed myself last summer in Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi and Shantung. Taking the country as a whole, not fewer, probably, than 100,000,000 persons were affected. The total of casualties of one kind and another in Shantung and North Kiangsu alone was estimated at 10,000,000. As already indicated, the Government's reconstruction programme includes agrarian reforms, drought and flood prevention, but its existing financial and administrative resources are inadequate to deal

with these problems. Moreover, while literacy, which in China involves mastery of a minimum of 1500 to 2000 characters or symbols, has made great strides amongst men and women under forty, especially in the cities, many millions of older people, especially in the country, cannot read more than two or three hundred symbols, if as many, a handicap only to be overcome rapidly by the adoption of an alphabet, a debatable step much more difficult to take—as experiment has shown—than to advise. And last, but not least, the Kuomintang Party has done relatively little to improve and extend the practice of self-government.

Thus China is faced by two sets of circumstances, both of which may result either in disaster or in what has already been called fruitful consummation. One set comprises relations with Japan, which in this article have been merely referred to but in a subsequent one will be described, the possibilities involved being conflict or co-operation. The other set comprises the manifold efforts which are being made to solve the difficulties and to renovate or reconstruct the institutions inherited from the past, a process which involves the creation of entirely new institutions and assets of various kinds. These efforts have been postponed so long that they may be too late. On the other hand, they are being made so earnestly that they should, and, in my belief, will, succeed, provided that they are not interfered with from outside. But the chance of failure cannot be ignored, and failure in either set of circumstances must inevitably have appalling consequences.

E. M. GULL.

DANEGELD

By PROFESSOR R. B. MOWAT, D.Litt.

THIS word, or at any rate the idea which it represents, has been frequently in English people's minds during the last few months. It was nearly a thousand years ago that the Anglo-Saxon king, Ethelred the Redeless, began the policy of buying off the Danes, seeking by payment—and, in the event, by repeated and in the end quite useless payments—to obtain immunity from the alternative of war which the Danes offered him.

It is obvious that if most peoples or States not only desire peace, but would rather make substantial concessions than allow the peace to be broken, then any nation which is willing to make war will have an enormous advantage over the rest. Any demands that it chooses to put forward, provided that no single one seems to destroy the security of the State to which the demand is presented, is almost sure to be granted. This was the calculation, the 'risk theory,' on which Admiral Tirpitz justified his big navy to the German Government in the period 1898-1914. He calculated that the British Government, rather than risk its navy over a question which was not intrinsically worth a war, would yield and concede what Germany wanted. And the more truly peace-loving the nations are, the more they realise the wastefulness and stupidity of war, the greater will be the advantage of the 'Berserker' or 'Viking' people or Government which is prepared to take the risk and does not count the cost. And the worst thing about the 'risk theory' is that it defeats itself in the long run: it brings at last the peace-loving peoples to the point at which, after they have conceded repeated demands, they say, or one of them says, when the next demand comes along, 'This is intolerable!' Then the great catastrophe arrives—a catastrophe which would, per-

haps, never even approach them if the peace-loving peoples only were resolute from the start. This seems to be what Mr. Baldwin meant when he said in the House of Commons (March 9, 1936):

We are brought to a very terrible conclusion. That is, that if the countries in Europe desire to stop an aggressor, whoever he may be, by making that aggressor realise that his actions will bring all the other members of the League upon him at once, the countries in Europe—and, as I say, it is a horrible thing to have to say—will have to be much more ready for war than they are to-day. Otherwise the aggressor will have his own way.

In the remarkable debate which took place in the House of Commons on March 26, Sir Austen Chamberlain gave his view of the practical working of the 'risk theory' as he remembered it and had observed its effects:

If there be any division among us, it is not between those who want peace and those who want war; it is between those who take a short view of what lies in front of us and those who, looking farther ahead, cannot feel it in their conscience to accept an easy settlement to-day if they know it will bring disaster upon their children a few years hence. I, too, recall the pre-war years. What happened then is ominously like what has been happening recently.

Here an ultimatum and there another ultimatum, each time confronting this country or that with brutal force if it does not surrender; each time that diplomacy by force, with the mailed fist and the shining armour, prevailing over reason, over argument, over treaty obligations in some cases; and then the same procedure tried once too often and a world in arms to resist the aggression. Unless we learn that lesson, unless the world can assert that it is not in this way that our quarrels are to be settled, we are steadily marching back to a new 1914.

Europe has travelled an astonishing distance since January 30, 1933, when Herr Hitler became Chancellor. Until then, for fourteen years, Germany had been largely disarmed and generally submissive. To-day Germany is highly armed and anything but submissive; and the rest of Europe lives under a kind of nightmare of alarm. 'Power-politics,' openly preached in Italy since the Fascist revolution, are believed to have revived in Germany. As a matter of fact they were never really absent from the rest of Europe; for what was France's invasion of the Ruhr, when as an alternative an appeal to the League of Nations was open to her, except power-politics? Putting this question, how-

ever, aside as to the existence of power-politics before 1933, there is no doubt that they are the rule to-day. We can apply to the present time a statement which Sir Charles Dilke made in a celebrated article in 1890, that naked force now governs the affairs of the nations.

Yet since 1918 large numbers of people in Europe—the populations of all the 'small States' and of more than one of the Great Powers, as well as an extra-European Great Power, the United States—have been pursuing earnestly, if not always energetically, the aim of the Rule of Law. Without force behind it, however, the Rule of Law has proved to be ineffective. The League of Nations was defied by Italy over Corfu and Abyssinia; by Japan over Manchuria; by Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco. The 'Locarno Powers' have been defied by Germany over the Rhineland. The French always advocated the attaching of military force to the League. Mr. Churchill, who is a strongly 'realist' statesman, has frequently supported this view in Parliament. Lord Davies has for years been arguing with unwearying patience that an international army is the *sine qua non* of the Rule of Law.

There is no overwhelming force at present behind the League of Nations and supporting the Rule of Law, although, as political development is rapid in this age, there may be an international force in the more or less near future. Meanwhile, what we see existing, or disappearing or arising, are 'hegemonies,' dominations, in various parts of the world.

A hegemony which is disappearing, or has actually gone, is that of France. From 1918 to 1933 or 1934 France had the unchallenged dominion of Europe—at any rate, of Western and Central Europe. The French army was, outside Russia, the largest, its equipment the most powerful. Did France use her dominant position beneficently? Except for the calamitous invasion of the Ruhr, she cannot be said to have used it badly. And in Briand's time she used her preponderant force, without menace, on the side of stability and international appeasement. Briand was able to declare in 1929: 'As long as I am Foreign Minister there will be no war.' But he died in 1932, and thereafter French policy lost its tact and sense of direction. By refusing any concession to Germany on the question of armaments French statesmen

made certain the loss of military ascendancy; they could not bring themselves to sacrifice the existing temporary superiority of France. The great refusal was M. Barthou's 'No' of April 17, 1934, when Herr Hitler offered to treat on the basis of 300,000 men for each Power's army, and a German air force equal to 50 per cent. of the French. Within a year from that date French military ascendancy disappeared. And now people are wondering if Germany is aiming at European domination. Herr Hitler's speeches contain no such suggestion. His race theory, he has explained, is the opposite of domination. Because the National Socialists believe in the absolute value of race, they cannot, he contends, possibly wish to dominate any other race. Nor would it be of any use if they tried to do so. In the now famous speech of May 21, 1935, Herr Hitler declared:

Our racial theory regards every war for the subjection and domination of an alien people as a proceeding which sooner or later changes and weakens the victor internally and eventually brings about his defeat. We do not believe for a moment that in Europe the nations whose nationalism has been completely consolidated could in the era of the principle of nationalities be deprived of their national birthright at all. . . . The blood shed on the European continent in the course of the last 300 years bears no proportion to the national result of the events. In the end, France has remained France, Germany Germany, Poland Poland and Italy Italy. What dynastic egoism, political passion and patriotic blindness have attained in the way of apparently far-reaching political changes by shedding rivers of blood has, as regards national feeling, done no more than touched the skin of the nations.

In No. 8 of the 'Thirteen Points' of the same speech Herr Hitler declares that Germany is ready at any time to limit its armaments to any degree that is adopted by other Powers. He also stated that 'in no circumstances' would Germany depart from the announced extent of the expansion of the Reichswehr. And in regard to the naval ratio of 35:100 with Great Britain, he said (this is in heavy block-faced type in the approved text): *For Germany this demand is binding.* Nothing in all this suggests an aim to dominate Europe, but the contrary. Nevertheless, it is very difficult for a man, or a Government or a people, if they possess overwhelming power, not to use it for 'power-politics'; and, as Sir Austen Chamberlain pointed out in the speech already noted, the actions of the German Government, in the pre-war

era when it had a dominating military position, do not offer reassuring evidence.

The League of Nations aims at being a world alliance for peace and international co-operation; and the Covenant of the League contemplates subdivisions of the world by regional pacts, each especially guaranteeing the regional security. There is, however, a danger that instead of regional pacts there may grow up regional dominations, some of which, indeed, already exist. Great Britain has always had a certain ascendancy in the English-speaking world (outside the United States), although this ascendancy seems to be giving way to equal partnership in the Commonwealth of Nations. The United States has undoubted, if not unquestioned, dominance through both the Americas south of the Canadian border. Russia will probably have domination in the Baltic and from there eastward to the Pacific at Vladivostok. Japan obviously aims at domination in 'Eastern Asia.' Germany has probably already sufficient physical power to aim at domination in Central Europe; nor is the Little Entente big enough to be a counterpoise to this. Only in the Balkan region is there no obvious dominance of one Power. There is a Balkan pact which may be able to do instead of a master. Wherever a Great Power dominates, it says that it does so for the sake of peace and declares that it has a mission within its own region. Instead of the old 'Balance of Power' in Europe there is tending to come into being a 'Balance of Dominance' in the world.

One thing is certain—that the system of 'Great Powers,' which was the most obvious feature of international politics before the war, has revived. A Great Power is a State which, generally speaking, can do what it likes without being stopped by the rest, as Italy, for instance, has been asserting that it can do, and in fact has done, in regard to Abyssinia. 'We and we only,' said Signor Mussolini, are the judges of our interests (*Giudici dei nostri interessi, garanti del nostro avvenire siamo noi, soltanto noi, esclusivamente noi e nessuno altro*). And Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons on March 26, 1936, quoted from Herr Hitler: 'No power in the world can deflect Germany from her purpose. She recognises only one supreme authority—the nation itself.' Sir Austen commented on this: 'They could not support the League

of Nations on that basis. They could not have courts of international justice on that basis. They could not have collective security on that basis.' Evidently Sir Austen was not assured about Germany's intentions.

If the system of Great Powers has revived—as it obviously has done—then one of two things will happen. Either each Power will act for itself, as Italy has done, or they will form a 'Concert of Powers,' as they did, though very imperfectly, in the nineteenth century. If left each by itself in isolation, every 'unsatisfied' Great Power will be sorely tempted to use 'power-politics,' to 'hunt for compensations,' to exact Danegeld. It will practise the 'risk theory,' knowing that its neighbours, rather than face the risk of war, will yield, except on the most vital issues. Then at last comes a demand which the other people will not stand; the 'risk theory' breaks down, for the challenge is accepted, and the conflagration has begun. This is the probable future course of events if any Great Power is left in prolonged isolation. Clearly, we must seek a more excellent way.

Obviously, then, Great Powers must not be left in isolation. Herr Hitler said in the memorandum put forward on March 7, while the troops were marching into the Rhineland, that in 'a reasonable space of time' the German Government, in the League of Nations, would expect the problem of colonial equality of rights to 'be clarified in the course of friendly negotiation.' What exactly is meant by the 'problem of colonial equality of rights' is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that if Germany is outside the League of Nations there will be a very strong impulsion upon the German Government to settle the colonial question, little by little, through the 'risk theory.'

For during the last year or so the German Government has been putting the risk theory into practice. The rearmament programme has been conducted on this theory; the reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7 was the theory put into practice. On this occasion it just succeeded; how near the French Government was on March 7 to facing the risk and replying with force is known only to the French statesmen, but the margin was obviously narrow. Herr Hitler has now said, in effect if not in so many words, that

March 7 is intended to be the last occasion. It was done to remedy the last inequality and it wiped out the last 'servitude,' which contained in itself the seeds of its own undoing. This done, he has offered a new start. The slate is clean. All the Powers start fair and the concert of the nations can be resumed.

This is the judgment of General Smuts, speaking at Cape Town on March 22 :

After the war we had a peace which is no peace. I regard this trouble as a great opportunity when peace can be rewritten. I shall not be surprised if this will lead to a great peace settlement for the world. I look forward to a great peace conference coming in a few months. When we condemn Germany's high-handed action, do not let us forget that the German Government has simultaneously made far-reaching proposals for the peace of the world, if the proposals can be worked out.

On the whole, it is probably correct to say that General Smuts' view represents the view of most Englishmen. It is not yet the view of French statesmen. The outstanding obstacle to harmony in Western Europe is now, as it has been for the last ten years, the inability of French statesmen, not merely to make political agreements with Germany, but to make any genuine *détente*. It would be easy to compile a list, beginning with January 30, 1934, before the Saar Plebiscite, of Herr Hitler's offers of a moral *détente* with France, of 'a final burying of the hatchet' (the phrase used on January 30, 1934), down to his election speeches between March 7 and 28 of this year, when he appealed again for a 'burying of the hatchet' and challenged the French statesmen to ask their people whether it wished this or not. Briand would have met such offers half-way, and it is still to be proved that Briand was an 'illusionist.' It is said that on his death-bed Briand muttered the name of Stresemann, whom for years he had regarded as a colleague. It would be sheer pessimism to hold that these two men had been all the time pursuing a phantom.

The policy which the British Government is pursuing throughout this most critical year of post-war history is 'conciliation,' which means bringing France and Germany into some sort of co-operation, and as soon as possible within the League of Nations. But, as Mr. Maxton, who cannot be accused of bellicosity, declared in the House of Commons

on April 6, the League needs physical force. In the same debate Mr. Eden said :

If I may be frank with the House, I would say what is the view of the Government, which we would wish to see realised by the end of the summer. We should wish to set up a European membership of the League, all the nations of Europe members of the League. We should wish to see a new structure of security in Western Europe to take the place of Locarno.

A European membership or union within the League was the project which Briand put forward in 1930, and which, if adopted then, would have anticipated and probably prevented both the economic depression and the political crisis. It is still a practicable policy, and the alternative to it is a series of independent adventures with devastating results like the Italo-Abyssinian War, which showed the possibilities as well as the inadequacies of the system of collective security. Mr. Eden said wisely (April 6) in the House :

It may be that when the history of this difficult post-war period is written, when the time comes to assess the attempt to make collective security operative, that this unhappy, tragic war, and the lessons derived from it, will be found to have played an important part in establishing lasting peace.

After the fall of Addis Ababa and the conquest of Abyssinia, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not lose faith. On May 6 he declared in the House of Commons :

It is clear that the League must go on ; in a modern world it is absolutely indispensable to the organisation of international affairs. That is clear. Something else is clear—that there must also be a stock-taking.

Sir Austen Chamberlain in the same debate indicated that something more than economic pressure was necessary to prevent aggression of a Great Power, or to meet demands of a Great Power for compensation backed by threats of aggression. 'Nothing will deter such a Power except the massing of overwhelming force against it.' This obviously cannot be the force of any single State, but of a combination of States. A European organisation within the League, accordingly, seems to be indispensable, something like Briand's union, outlined in 1930, or indeed like that which Castlereagh and Metternich brought into being in 1815, but improved in the light of a century's experience.

R. B. MOWAT.

THE ETHICAL CASE AGAINST THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By OLIVER E. BODINGTON

ONCE more the world is immersed in the age-old conflict between Universal and National Ethics : we are witnessing the ideals of Universal Benevolence embodied in the League of Nations challenged arrogantly by a perfervid exhibition of ultra-nationalism on the part of a great European Power. The merits of that particular controversy do not, however, concern us here ; the sole object of the ensuing remarks being to inquire whether, if the League's universalist scheme were to achieve its ends in whole or in part, this achievement would, ethically and in the outcome, be of benefit to humanity or the reverse. In furtherance of this object it is necessary to take a backward glance at the history of the last century or so.

In the earlier years of American independence the policy of the emancipated States, so soon as they had attained to the cohesion of a separate nation, was at least a subconscious trend towards a system of universal ethics. It was tacitly assumed that no obstacle stood in the way of the unrestricted immigration of the downtrodden and disinherited inhabitants of older countries, and that these immigrants could, in unlimited numbers, take their due share in the boundless prosperity, moral and material, which that happy country held out to them. All were equal before the law, and all equal in opportunity. America was to be a land of Cockaigne where each could enjoy unrestricted liberty and material abundance, limited only by his own efforts. No restrictions whatever were placed on the number or quality of immigrants, and naturalisation was made absurdly easy.

This golden dream was, none the less, shattered within a comparatively brief period. It was painful, possibly, even to

those very American statesmen who helped to destroy it to discover that they were compelled to abandon the promptings of universal ethics in obedience to the more urgent calls of the national welfare. They may not have been realists by conviction, but realism was forced upon them by the paramount importance of safeguarding national standards of life, both moral and material. These the unrestricted invasion of pauper and illiterate immigrants was tending to lower rapidly. So, therefore, limitations, growing more and more stringent as time wore on, had to be imposed, both as to number and quality; until finally we have arrived at the rigid system of supervision and exclusion which prevails to-day. Patriotic motives dictated these restrictions, motives drawn from the domain of national ethics which sooner or later come into conflict with undiluted universalism. History teems with instances showing that this conflict is the invariable outcome of any benevolent system which derives its inspiration solely from the domain of universal ethics.

Now the main objections to any universalist scheme designed for the betterment of mankind are that, under the conditions of social and political equality which it would bring about, peoples of low culture and a high birth-rate would multiply enormously; peoples of high culture would not multiply nearly so rapidly, or would even dwindle; and there would ensue inevitable miscegenation. The tendency would therefore be, not towards improvement, but towards the swamping of the standards—material, moral and intellectual—of the diminishing number of people of high culture by the lower standards of the constantly rising tide of people of lower culture.

The League has not yet pinned its faith solely to the canons of universal as contradistinguished from national ethics. It has not, indeed, gone as far on this road as some of its wilder adherents, such as the League of Nations Union and the extreme Socialists, would like. It has not yet made a frontal attack, officially speaking, on national ethics or patriotism, although it has committed the grave error of placing nations of inferior standards of living on the same plane as the most highly developed nations. Nevertheless, if anyone wishes to convince himself that the League is, fundamentally, the enemy of national ethics, let him, in presence of

some dyed-in-the-wool partisan of the League of Nations Union, say a word in defence of patriotism and national standards, and mark the abuse with which he will be received. It will not take him long to find out that the League will surely come out as the declared enemy of patriotic ideals if ever these extremists gain control of it. It is hardly necessary to enlarge here on the doctrines of extreme Socialism as a force destructive of national ideals and patriotic fibre.

Nevertheless, national ideals which embrace enlightened patriotism are entitled to the highest respect, for they occupy a prominent place in the ethical scale. Nationalism, despite the disruptive forces which are working against it, is to-day full of vitality and tough in fibre; it will certainly only succumb at the last extremity. This has been strikingly evidenced quite recently in the case of Japan, Germany, and Italy. Quite 90 per cent. of Italians would deny that they are the aggressors in the present conflict; and be it said that the determination of the aggressor is often a matter of extreme difficulty and is by no means established by the mere fiat of the League. Likewise Germans, rightly or wrongly, deny with practical unanimity that they were the aggressors in 1914. Both Italy and Germany are Christian countries, and many of their ministers of religion would undoubtedly be ready to preach these views with perfect sincerity. Surely some importance must be attached to this overwhelming manifestation of national opinion, despite the recent fulminations of English prelates launched in the name of Christianity.

In the United States the national view prevailed in 1919 when the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty and Covenant. The Covenant was rejected on purely nationalistic grounds. The general conclusion arrived at after a searching examination of President Wilson himself, amongst others, was that either it was a futility or that it involved grave dangers, and that, on the most tolerant interpretation, its acceptance would involve a breach of the Constitution.

Undiluted universalism must, then, in the long run produce all-round deterioration of national standards of life. We can, unfortunately, already see that process at work in more countries than one. In the United States, for example, the universalist trend was not checked in time; so that the

better elements have not been able to assimilate those which make for disintegration of national standards and ideals. The dominant white race has never yet been able to absorb the negro population, although numberless schemes have from time to time been propounded for the solution of the negro problem. To illustrate its enormous difficulty, the late Booker T. Washington, himself partly a negro, was wont to mention the plan of repatriating the negroes back to Africa, and described the sailing of a ship from Savannah for Liberia filled with a contingent of negroes; but, he added, people forgot that on that very day a much larger contingent of negro babies was born in the black belt of Alabama.

Little or no progress has been made since Booker Washington's day. Individual negroes have, no doubt, distinguished themselves in the domains of art, literature, music and science; but the general average of negro intelligence and morality remains indisputably inferior, as can be demonstrated by numerous examples.

America, like Australia, has been saved from an indiscriminate invasion of Asiatics by means of rigid exclusion laws; but, so far from assimilating the negroes, she has not even been able to assimilate entirely the influx of immigrants, despite their stringent sifting by means of latter-day restrictions. There can still be found within the United States colonies of Germans and other nationalities speaking their own language, printing newspapers in their native tongue, and preserving generally their own customs, who thus seem to have attached more importance to achieving freedom from oppression and poverty, while preserving their national idiosyncrasies in a new and more felicitous atmosphere, than to a whole-hearted desire to embrace a new and vigorous patriotism.

There has thus been made manifest in the United States a deterioration, perhaps not in material, but in moral and intellectual standards, and genuine patriotism seems to have fallen somewhat below the sturdy type which still predominates in Europe. This must not be taken to convey that there are not in America men of the very highest attainments, character, and patriotism; but it is the mass that are here being dealt with, not the *élite*; and the *élite*, up to the present, have been powerless to counteract the sagging of the standards.

It may be doubted whether Prohibition was the cause of gangsterdom, racketeering, and the general lawlessness which is too prevalent in America to-day. It is more probably one of the numerous symptoms of that deterioration which has proceeded from a too protracted devotion to a universal ideal. Possibly Prohibition may have operated as an aggravation of this lawlessness: it could hardly have been the prime cause of it.

It was perhaps natural that the patriotic stimulus should have become dormant in America, a country so remote from the European cockpit, and believing itself immune from danger. It was not through pusillanimity that the Americans did not come into the war earlier, but rather from their ineradicable desire to be kept free from foreign entanglements. Woodrow Wilson accurately diagnosed the average American's reluctance to be dragged into a great adventure at such a distance, which apparently concerned him so little, and whose ideals he did not immediately appreciate. This prompted the slogan 'he kept us out of the war,' which sentiment prevailed until the Germans pushed truculence to the extreme, when patriotism, so long dormant, was at length aroused and America whole-heartedly joined in.

The case of America has been dealt with at some length because everything there is enacted on a much larger stage than in other countries, and also because the problem seems to present itself there under more varied aspects. The evil is certainly more profound, if less varied, in other countries. Indeed, while the deterioration of standards in the United States is widespread, it has not yet acquired such intensity as to preclude the hope that Americans, with their well-known elasticity, may yet cure it by their own combined efforts.

The evil is particularly less grave in America as regards over-population, which in most countries of Western Europe is fast becoming a nightmare. Indeed, apart from any League action, it is already difficult to believe that the awful problem of over-population and propagation of the unfit can be seriously grappled with and overcome by any human agency except sterilisation and birth-control, which, in addition to the practical difficulties of their application, in every country involved, offend the religious convictions of a

large section of the community. We cannot drown the unfit as we do surplus puppies.

Take the case of England, where the 'differential' birth-rate is beginning to be a grave problem. There, that class which most easily assimilates the current culture and possesses a high standard of living shows a restricted birth-rate; whereas the class with lower standards maintains a natural birth-rate, or one even increased by over-breeding, perfected hygiene, and ultra-humanitarian conservation of the unfit.

On October 21, 1935, the Bishop of Durham wrote to *The Times* mentioning as one of the causes of the poverty he saw around him the over-production of the unfit, and citing one extreme case of a couple who had produced no fewer than seventeen children although their only source of income was the dole, adding that when they received the dole they spent it on drink. How can we conceivably maintain in the long run standards of even mere decency while such things are going on in our midst unchecked?

France has been cited as the only nation which has been able to stem the current of deterioration of national standards, or perhaps, rather, prevent its flow; for France steadily refuses to indulge in that expensive luxury, a high birth-rate, which is, in the long run, a sure factor of biological decay. So she has been able to preserve her national ideals and standards of life almost intact. As an example, the vigour of her young surviving soldiers at the end of the war, by comparison with the weedy Germans and English, has been the subject of frequent comment.

Is it not now evident that the ultimate realisation of the League's ideals would involve a still further and more marked contribution towards that ethical decadence which proceed from this extravagant over-production of undesirables? For if without achieving the complete abolition of war it merely secured the spacing-out of the intervals between wars, would not one of the obvious results be the gradual, or even perhaps swift, filling-up of the available spaces of the earth by swarms of people of low ethical standards? Thus general deterioration would ensue and the problem of over-production of the unfit, which is already getting almost beyond our control, would be immensely aggravated.

From a cold biological point of view it seems almost for-

tunate that Nature, still, as ever, 'red in tooth and claw,' finds other scourges besides war to redress the balance of over-population: such are famine, pestilence, earthquakes and like world convulsions. War is no doubt the most devastating of them all, because it most often kills off a majority of the highly trained and gifted portion of the community—the *élite*, in a word. Plague, earthquake, flood, and famine are less discriminate in their operation; and famine is probably the most effectual as a cure for over-population, as it falls usually hardest on the poorest and least desirable section. That these biological phenomena are not imaginary, though they are cruel remedies for over-population, can be appreciated from the illustrations given by Professor E. W. MacBride in a letter to *The Times* of November 15, 1935. He first recalls how the British Government by the use of scientific discoveries increased the yield of the soil of certain regions in India by 20 per cent. Meanwhile, however, the population of the same regions had increased by 50 per cent., so that the improvements proved futile and the peasant was worse instead of better off than before. Next he quotes Dean Inge, who called attention to the ravages of the 'Black Death' in fourteenth-century England as a cause of enhanced prosperity among the survivors of the working class, because the evil of over-population had been, at all events, temporarily checked. Similarly there happened at one time a great deluge in the Ganges delta, and on one of the numerous islands in the delta more than half the population of the island were drowned. This island, by reason of its diminished population, soon after became the most prosperous of all the islands in the delta.

It is conceivable, though not probable, that the League may ultimately succeed in achieving its full programme of universal philanthropy; but how can anyone possibly approve of a plan which, ethically speaking, as the foregoing examples show, must ultimately tend, not towards the betterment of humanity, already jeopardised by the evils of over-population, but towards its certain degradation?

OLIVER E. BODINGTON.

DANGER ON THE DANUBE

By C. F. MELVILLE

THERE is no immediate danger of conflict in Western Europe. But the shadow of war lengthens over Eastern Europe. There are storm clouds over the Danube. Herr Hitler's declaration, in his recent peace proposals, that Germany does not intend to attack France, together with his oft-repeated claims that where the German race is concerned frontiers present no barriers to National Socialism, makes it clear that Germany is not contemplating a trial of strength in the west, but is preparing to expand in the centre and the south-east. The Führer's own statements may be taken without reserve as a true expression of his present foreign policy. For it is an article of faith of the Nazi political creed that the new Germany is concerned primarily, not with the annexing of territories peopled by non-Germans, but with the incorporation in the Third Reich of the greater part of *Auslandsdeutschtum* (i.e., the Germans outside the Reich, and meaning specifically, in this case, the Germans of Austria and of the Sudete in Czechoslovakia). Germany's expansionist movement, therefore, will not be in the west. It will be a combination of *Drang nach Osten* and *Drang nach Süden*.

It was because of this that the British Questionnaire, sent to Berlin early in May, sought to induce Germany to agree to her proposed non-aggression pacts with eastern and south-eastern neighbours being made compatible with the operation of mutual assistance obligations under the League Covenant. For Mr. Anthony Eden hopes, at a later stage, to put forward a new European security scheme which would bridge the gap between the German and French proposals, and, by a series of regional pacts linked together by the League, render aggression no less impossible in the east than in the west.

It is evident, however, from what is known of Herr Hitler's views on the subject, that he will not agree to the application of the mutual assistance system to his eastern and south-eastern borders. He is willing and ready to bolt and bar the door in the west. But in the east, the centre, and the south-east he proposes only to leave it on the latch. There are two fundamental reasons for this: one is his genuine apprehension in regard to Bolshevist Russia; the other is his desire to have a free hand to create a greater and united Reich by expanding south-eastwards. Not towards the north-east; for there is little or nothing in the much-rumoured German schemes for attacking the Russian Ukraine. The cool heads at the Reichswehr Ministry are not disposed to support the grandiose schemes of this nature sponsored by the ideological Herr Rosenberg.

It is the centre and the south-east which present the line of least resistance, and it is along this line that Germany would best be able to realise the greater part of her expansionist aspirations without having to commit a technical breach of the peace. The new Germany is equipped with a weapon for this purpose which was lacking from the armoury of the old imperial Germany. This is the racial doctrine which will enable her to include within the Third Reich the Germans of Austria and the Sudete without removing one frontier post. I refer to the process known as *Gleichschaltung*, or the creation of uniformity of régime. War would not break out during the initial stages, but the completion of the process would create a situation which would result in war.

Already, although there is not yet a united Reich, there is a united Reichstag. At the last German elections four Austrians (the Herren Harbich, Frauenfeld, Hofer and Roscher) and two Czechoslovaks (i.e., Sudeten Germans—the Herren Krebs and Jung) were returned to the Reichstag. Both Harbich and Frauenfeld were intimately connected with the events which culminated in the July *Putsch* and the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss in Austria. Herr Harbich conducted the Munich broadcasts inciting the Austrian people to revolt. He holds the position of National Socialist Chief Inspector for Austria, and Austria herself is termed 'Gau 16' (District 16) of the German National Socialist Party organisation.

The eventual outcome of Germany's expansion in the

Danubian regions would, of course, be something much more far-reaching than just the incorporation in the Reich of the Germans living outside it. Events of their own momentum would necessarily go further than the Führer's present avowed and more limited aim. They would inevitably lead to a revival in a new form of the old German dream of *Mitteleuropa*. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, it is enough to consider the situation from the angle of Herr Hitler's own admitted objective—the incorporation of *Auslandsdeutschtum* in the Third German Empire—and to accept it as the sincere expression of his conscious purpose.

I propose, therefore, in this article to deal with the situation in Central and South-Eastern Europe, in the light of what is, for all the countries in these regions, the one and all-absorbing question: the development of Germany as the predominant Power in Europe and her inevitable expansion in the centre and the south-east. I would stress the word *inevitable*. In the course of a recent journey of investigation in these parts I found it expressed everywhere.

Unanimity was lacking, however, when it came to the framing of policies to deal with the situation in advance. At this point all manner of conflicting political aims and national interests entered in. The pivot upon which they all turn is, of course, Austria. And the Austrian problem is seen mainly as a struggle between Germany and Italy for the mastery of the Danube. Germany and Italy are friends or foes in accordance with circumstance. An Italian *débâcle* in Abyssinia would have compelled Italy to seek a compromise with Germany over Austria. Italy's success in Abyssinia has obviated that necessity. So Italy will continue to maintain her 'watch on the Brenner'; and the preservation of Austria as a buffer State between herself and Germany will remain one of the cardinal points in Italy's European policy.

With Austria's own position in the matter I will deal later. I propose first to deal with her problem in the light of the reactions of those neighbouring States for whom her destiny is as much a question of their existence as it is of her own. For it is the unique thing about Austria that her European importance is mainly on account of what she means to the security of other countries.

Czechoslovakia, being even more exposed than Italy to

the dangers of German expansion, is ready to support most policies other than the restoration of the Hapsburgs in order to preserve Austrian independence. If this was the case before the advent of Hitlerism, it is all the more so now that Nazism has made of the German minority in Czechoslovakia a Germanic Wooden Horse of Troy within the gates. The 'activist' German parties in the Republic—the Christian Socials, Agrarians and Social Democrats, who have always participated in the political life of the country along with the Czechs—lost heavily in the last elections to the Nationalist (and Nazi in all but name) party known as the *Sudeten Deutsch Heimat Front Partei* of Herr Konrad Henlein. This party is composed of the one-time Nationalist and National-Socialist Parties (the latter having been proscribed), swelled by converts from the ranks of the activist German parties. It professes loyalty to the Czechoslovak State, but in actual fact is organised on the same lines as the Nazi Party in Germany. It is based on the same *Führer prinzip*, and, to a considerable extent, takes its instructions from Berlin and Munich. Its young and efficient leader, Herr Konrad Henlein, is believed to be a moderate man, but there are certain elements behind him, among the more radical wing, whose nationalist aims go a long way further than the party's avowed purpose of adjusting the grievances of the German minority.

So long as Austria remains independent the Henlein party will not cause undue anxiety at Prague. But in the event of the Nazification of Austria it is feared that a vast Germanic bloc would be formed in Central Europe, of which the *Sudeten Deutsch* would form a part. Such a situation could but result in the disappearance of the Czechoslovak State as it is at present constituted.

It is mainly because of this menace that Dr. Edward Benesh, Professor Masaryk's successor in the Presidency and the erstwhile 'permanent' Foreign Minister, signed the mutual assistance pacts with France and Soviet Russia. I spoke with Dr. Benesh immediately after his return to Prague, from Moscow. 'I want good relations with Germany,' he said, 'but now that Germany has left the League it is necessary to redress the balance by bringing in Russia.' Dr. Benesh, who is at once a practical and far-sighted statesman, was, I feel sure, thinking more in terms of immediate political than

in potential military terms. For Soviet Russia's military aid to France or Czechoslovakia is, to say the least of it, an uncertain quantity. The Soviets are much more concerned with having their European back door secured against Germany in the event of their having trouble with Japan in the East than they are with coming to the assistance of their friends in the West. The rumoured grandiose plan for the use of Czechoslovak air bases by the Red air fleet for action against Germany is very largely a myth.

Dr. Benesh has for years cherished the idea of a solution of the Austrian problem within the framework of a wider Danubian arrangement. At one time I was privileged to hear it from his own lips. In general terms it means economic collaboration and political *détente* between the Danubian States, each one at the same time to retain its complete independence. More recently M. Hodja, the Premier, has been trying to put this plan into effect by stages. He has already accomplished the first step by concluding a commercial treaty with Austria, which, it is anticipated, will be followed later on by cultural exchanges and eventually by a treaty of friendship. His ultimate aim is to build a bridge between the Little Entente group—Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia—and the Protocol of Rome group—Italy, Austria, and Hungary. The larger part of this project has not made much progress to date. There are many reasons for this, and these are bound up with the different policies and interests of Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Roumania.

Hungary is reluctant to agree to any widespread scheme of economic collaboration between the two groups except on the terms—which the Little Entente rejects—of territorial treaty revision in her favour. Moreover, General Gömbös, the Premier, is frankly an admirer of Herr Hitler, and the advocate of a German-Polish-Hungarian-Austrian-Italian *bloc*. He is not more than platonically attached to the idea of Austrian independence. He would favour a bargain over Austria between his old friend in Rome and his new one in Berlin. I believe that there is opposition in some quarters in Hungary to the pro-Nazi leanings of the Prime Minister. But, as he is in charge of Hungarian foreign policy at the moment, it is impossible not to take into account his sympathy for the aims of the new Germany. All this was apparent

behind the scenes at the recent meeting of Signor Mussolini, Herr von Schuschnigg and General Gömbös in Rome. The Duce succeeded, as it happened, in inducing General Gömbös to agree to the principle of economic collaboration between the Little Entente group and the Protocol of Rome group, but the General succeeded, for his part, in preventing any comprehensive attempt being made in this direction by the insertion of a clause in the new protocols to the effect that any such collaboration should only be by means of bilateral agreements.

It is also interesting to note that the Hungarians, who until recently were at daggers drawn with the Yugoslavs, made on this occasion a friendly gesture towards Belgrade. The reason for this was that although her old friend, Italy, is on bad terms with Yugoslavia, nevertheless Yugoslavia has certain parallel interests with Hungary's new friend, Germany. Also, it seems that General Gömbös remembered the suggestion made in Budapest last year by General Goering, the Prussian Premier, to the effect that Hungary should soft-pedal on her revisionist claims against Yugoslavia and concentrate on her revisionist claims against Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslavs have shown no signs of reciprocating the Hungarian gesture.

The Yugoslavs are loyal members of the Little Entente, and they share with their Czechoslovak and Roumanian allies the same interests in what might, perhaps, be termed the negative questions. By all this I mean that the Little Entente has a policy one and indivisible for preventing both territorial treaty revision and the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Vienna or Budapest. All three follow a policy of formal support of the League. But there are *nuances* in their individual policies in regard to active questions such as the Austro-German problem.

The official policy of Belgrade, as of Prague and Bucharest, is that the solution of the Austrian question is to be found neither by means of the *Anschluss* nor the Hapsburgs, but through Danubian co-operation. At the same time, whereas for Prague Austro-German union is a direct menace, for Yugoslavia it is by no means so direct, a fact which explains why Czechoslovakia is content with an informal assurance from Vienna that Hapsburgism is not an immediate or

practical question, whereas Belgrade requires more concrete and formal guarantees. It was due partly to this, partly to suspicions of Italy's rôle in the background, and partly to practical economic reasons that Yugoslavia, while approving M. Hodja's plans, was not in a hurry to join in. Yugoslavia, without helping to promote the *Anschluss*, nevertheless feels it to be a lesser evil than either a Hapsburg restoration or the continuance of the present situation of a virtual Italian protectorate in Austria. It is in this respect that certain parallel interests exist between Berlin and Belgrade. Yugoslavs, mindful of Signor Mussolini's policy of Balkan and Danubian penetration, his various attempts at the encirclement of Yugoslavia, and, finally, the Italian sympathies for the Croatian and Macedonian revolutionaries who eventually assassinated King Alexander at Marseilles, are very suspicious of Italy's policy in Austria. Hence, in the struggle over Austria between Italy and Germany, Yugoslavia's sympathies are more with the latter.

There has been a noticeable drift of Yugoslavia away from France since the Franco-Italian *rapprochement*. The various schemes put forward by the Quai d'Orsay for mutual assistance and non-interference pacts between the Danubian States and Italy have not appealed to the Yugoslavs. Loyal to France in matters of treaty obligations, and supporting her on the principle of upholding the *status quo* of the Peace Treaties, nevertheless Yugoslavia sees no reason why she should expose herself to the risk of being embroiled in war with Germany in the interests of Franco-Italian policy.

In this connexion the fact must also be taken into account that Germany is conducting a very substantial trade with Yugoslavia. Having made considerable economic sacrifices by her participation in League sanctions in respect of the Italo-Abyssinian War, Yugoslavia feels that she could not afford to lose the German as well as the Italian market. Furthermore, Germany has not been slow to follow up this situation with a very assiduous propaganda and a patient courting of Yugoslavia's political sympathies.

When I was in Belgrade recently and discussed these questions in authoritative circles, it was made clear to me that Yugoslavia had no intention of pulling the Austrian chestnut out of the German fire for the advantage of Rome

and the convenience of Paris. When I asked about the proposed pacts of mutual assistance I was answered with the counter-question: 'Who will assist whom? Will Italy assist us against Hungary, for example, or will we assist Italy against Germany? Where is the reality in all this?' Belgrade is not unaware that Germany's expansion to the south and the east, when it comes, will eventually constitute a danger to herself. She would prefer the continuance of the present system of smaller mid-European States to the appearance of a Colossus on her frontier. But she argues that, on the other hand, the weight of the German *Drang* will be felt by Italy before it is felt by Yugoslavia. When Germany does arrive at the Balkans, Yugoslavia hopes to be able to live in normal political and economic relations with her whilst trusting to her own strength to resist Germanic penetration.

The Yugoslavs are essentially realistic. On the wider issue of the situation created by the Rhineland *coup*, Yugoslavia, like her partners in the Little Entente, supports Britain and France on the principle of the sanctity of treaties, but, contrary to certain reports, she never had any intention of supporting sanctions against Germany. Yugoslavia, therefore, is neither pro-German nor anti-German. She is simply pro-Yugoslav. It must be admitted that amongst the younger *intelligentsia* there is a certain feeling of admiration for the new Germany. Germany to-day represents a new, young and vital force, as compared with the older traditionalism of France and the quasi-detachment of Britain, and there is much in the German nationalistic spirit, strong discipline, unity of purpose, and military efficiency which can but make a definite appeal to a people like the Yugoslavs, themselves a young, vigorous, nationally minded and militarily efficient race. This is a factor in the situation which cannot entirely be ruled out of account. But it would be misleading to over-estimate its influence on policy.

Likewise, the Yugoslavs do not share the belief of their Czech and Roumanian allies in the efficacy of Soviet Russia. They have not the urgency of the German menace at their very door as in the case of the Czechs. Neither have they M. Titulesco's partiality for the kind of diplomacy which seeks to bring Soviet Russia into a Danubian pact for the preservation of Austrian independence. There are also

reasons of a dynastic nature why Belgrade has not accorded diplomatic recognition to the Soviets.

Roumania, on the other hand, released now from fear of Russian irredentist designs upon Bessarabia, is very much in tone with the Paris-Prague-Moscow line as far as policy towards Russia is concerned. M. Titulesco and the Quai D'Orsay speak a diplomatic language which each finds no difficulty in understanding. There has been a good deal of German penetration in Roumania, and there exists in that country an incipient Nazi movement, strongly anti-Semitic, known as the 'Iron Guard.' At the same time there has been a good deal of Russian penetration, particularly of a cultural nature. But Germany has done something in Roumania, as she has also done in Yugoslavia, which has had the double effect of arousing acute annoyance in those countries and yet further entrenching German interests there. I allude to the fact that Germany, having bought huge quantities of agricultural produce on credit, now claims that frozen currency and transfer difficulties render it impossible for her to pay, and that the only way of liquidating her debts is by the Roumanian and Yugoslavs taking German manufactured goods, at the expense of other countries' exports, as an offset against these debts.

With regard to Austria, it may be said that until Germany's Rhineland *coup* altered the European situation over-night, the Austrian Nazi movement was definitely on the wane. Germany's great success in the west has, however, given an enormous encouragement to the Austrian Nazis, who are again active.

It is idle to assess political alignments in Austria in terms of percentages. The estimate made by some foreign observers that the Nazis represent some 50 to 60 per cent. of the population is inaccurate. The actual out-and-out Nazis probably do not normally amount to more than a fairly modest proportion of this figure, and even amongst themselves there are various shades and grades of political feeling, ranging from the more moderate conception of a National-Socialist but independent Austria to the full-blooded radical pan-German conception of an Austria completely absorbed by the Third Reich. The suppressed Social-Democrats are still numerically strong, and, no less than the Communists on the one hand

and the Nazis on the other, are opposed to the Government. The Government party, the Patriotic Front, which is a Clerical-Fascist combination, is the smallest of them all. The Clericals of the Chancellor, Herr von Schuschnigg, and the Fascists or Heimwehr of Prince Starhemberg are not always easy bedfellows, as recent events have shown. Their internal rifts are, of course, to the advantage of the Nazis. What makes the Nazis seem stronger than they really are is the fact that they have the support of a fairly large and indeterminate section of the population, people without fixed political ideas, who gravitate this way or that according to external political events and internal economic circumstances, and who, without any positive belief in National-Socialist ideas, incline towards the Nazis from the negative motive of their dislike of the Government's Italian backing.

At the moment Austrian Nazis are feeling encouraged because, externally, Germany now seems stronger than ever, and, internally, the Schuschnigg-Starhemberg dispute would appear to offer them opportunities. On the other hand, the Chancellor's bold move to curb the Heimwehr and broaden the *régime* may strengthen his position. Much will depend upon Prince Starhemberg's attitude.

Under normal conditions—if conditions in modern Austria can ever be described as normal—the Government should be able to keep the situation in hand. They are more strongly entrenched than before, and they have the means for keeping order. Likewise, their efforts to encourage 'Austrianism' amongst the population have met with a certain measure of success. But conditions are no longer normal. The Nazi threat is imminent. Hence the Austrian Government's continued dependence on Signor Mussolini.

There remains the alternative of a Hapsburg restoration. Most of the present Austrian Government are monarchists at heart. But the restoration of the Hapsburgs is not likely to be regarded in Vienna as practical politics for some time to come, because of the violent opposition it would provoke from the Little Entente, and particularly from Yugoslavia, as well as from Germany. Archduke Otto is more likely to be a card held in reserve.

Complete agreement does not exist amongst the Nazis themselves as to the exact nature of the next move to be made,

although there are no differences of opinion as to the ultimate objective. The more radical elements favour the engineering of another internal *coup* in Austria, to be followed by a move on the part of Germany which would face Europe with the *fait accompli* of the *Anschluss*. The more moderate elements, supported by the Reichswehr chiefs, by the regular diplomats of the Wilhelmstrasse and by the group around Dr. Schacht, are against violent measures. Herr von Papen, the German Minister at Vienna, is also an exponent of what might be called the homœopathic method. I had occasion to ascertain the views of an Austrian Nazi who, after the departure of Harbich, came to occupy a leading position in the party. His view was that a National-Socialist Austria could be created without violence and that it would be possible for it to maintain its formal independence and preserve its essential 'Austrian' character. Such a Nazi Austria would, he said, maintain the closest political, cultural, economic and military relations with Germany. A common foreign policy was indicated, and a customs union was probably in the background. I have reason to believe in the sincerity of my informant. At the same time it is difficult to imagine how, in the long run, such a solution could be in any way different in essentials from an open and avowed absorption of Austria by Germany; for the latter is Herr Hitler's aim, and, in any case, whatever the intermediate stages, this would be the final and conclusive one.

In the circumstances neither Austria nor Czechoslovakia can regard with enthusiasm the idea of non-aggression pacts with Germany, unless these be accompanied by pacts of non-interference and mutual assistance. Neither can they be expected to place their trust unreservedly in the League of Nations. For they have had the opportunity to observe how collective security, in the sense of Article XVI. of the League Covenant, nearly started an Anglo-Italian war, which might have led to a European conflagration, yet failed to protect Abyssinia.

There would seem to be only one thing which is clear in this highly complicated situation in which little, admittedly, is ever clear: it is that unless some international attempt is made to solve this middle European problem peacefully, it will be solved by the arbitrament of the sword. I have

suggested in this article that Germany would very probably be able to carry out the greater part of her expansionist process in the Danubian regions without recourse to war, but that the completion of the process would create a situation from which war would eventually result. For a Germany supreme in the centre and the south-east would be so strong that she would be in the position to challenge the west. There is, however, another school of thought which believes that war will come much more quickly than this. According to this view, the Nazification of Austria would be a challenge which Signor Mussolini would instantly take up by sending an army across the Brenner; and that immediately this happened the Yugoslavs would march into Carinthia and the Germans cross over the Bavarian frontier, as neither Berlin nor Belgrade could watch complacently the Italians marching on Vienna.

In either case, war would come to the west by way of the east. All Europe would be drawn in, including Britain. One is compelled, therefore, to ask: Is there not in Europe to-day statesmanship equal to the task of finding a solution to this problem? Upon the answer to that question may depend the issue of peace or war in Europe.

C. F. MELVILLE.

THE NAVAL CONFERENCE. 1935-36

By REAR-ADMIRAL H. G. THURSFIELD, R.N. (retired)

THE Naval Conference of 1935 was convened in accordance with Article XXIII. of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, which provided that, within twelve months of the necessary two years' notice being given to terminate the treaty, all the signatories—the United States, Japan, France, Italy, and the nations of the British Commonwealth—should meet in conference. In order to assess how far the recent Conference has been a success or failure, and what is the value of the new treaty which it has produced, it is necessary to look back at the Washington settlement, the circumstances in which it was conceived and the results which it has produced in the last fourteen years.

Up to 1914 naval rivalry seemed to be accepted as a normal feature of world affairs. This country, in a world in which recurrent wars were ever to be expected, had relied upon sea power for its defence since the days of Queen Elizabeth. It was vulnerable by sea alone, and could hope to survive wars only by the maintenance of a supreme Navy. Its vulnerability had been increased by the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, which left it in a commanding position industrially and commercially, but unable to feed itself—relying upon the security of its sea communications not only for the means to maintain that position, but even for its daily bread. The British Empire, too, had been born of sea power, and could only hope to survive a war in which the mother country was engaged through the same agency. From time to time in the nineteenth century British sea supremacy was challenged by the increase in time of peace in one or other European navy—that of France, after the brief *entente* during which she was allied with Great Britain in the Crimean War; after 1900, that of Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II. Such

challenges were met, almost automatically, by corresponding increases in the British Navy. No British Government experienced any difficulty in persuading a reluctant Parliament to vote the money necessary for the purpose; Governments were more often attacked for not making sufficient provision to that end. There were other naval rivalries—that between Italy and Austria, for instance—on a smaller scale, which had the effect of raising the scale of naval armaments all round. But the 'race of armaments' on the sea on which we now look back arose chiefly from the threat to the security of the British Empire which was always seen by this country in the growth, however caused, of foreign navies.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century naval rivalry, however, was not in numbers alone. With the development of steel construction, armour-plate and rifled guns, began a growth in size of ships, in weight of armament, and consequently in cost per ship. From time to time a ship was designed for one or other navy which was hailed as 'rendering all earlier warships obsolete'; and straightway the particular rival of that navy felt obliged to begin the process of providing at least as many of the new type of ship or, if possible, improving on it. This process had its repercussions on all other navies, and the competition thereby engendered was the more feverish since the new type of ship was usually shrouded in secrecy until its producers had a good start on their rivals.

In the former of these two types of rivalry—the quantitative, in the jargon of to-day—the pace was never set by the British Navy. Indeed, the numbers were calculated for many years on the basis of the 'Two-Power Standard'—the provision of a battlefleet equal to the two next strongest Powers. Challenge in numbers was met to the extent of this standard, but it was left to others to be the pace-makers. In qualitative rivalry, however, the British Navy was not so innocent; on the contrary, it usually led the race. In 1894 the Admiralty were building the 'Majestic' class of battleships of 14,900 tons, while few foreign battleships exceeded 12,000. Each new battleship built thereafter was larger than her predecessor, and the intensification of the race by the production in 1905 of the *Dreadnought* is notorious. The constant competitive growth in the size of ships and of guns, in which this country

was for years the leader, was an even more powerful cause of the increase in the world's financial burden of naval armaments than the growth of numbers, of which we were not the chief instigators. Such was the state of affairs up to the Great War.

In 1921 naval rivalry seemed to be dead. The German navy had disappeared from the seas, and, by the restrictive clauses of the Versailles Treaty, could not for many years be resurrected. The French and Italian navies had relatively declined, since few replacements and no additions had been made to them during the war. Japan was still our ally, and the United States—never taken into our calculations even in the days of the Two-Power Standard—was at least an 'Associated Power.' Yet naval competition was still alive. The United States and Japan were proceeding with their immense naval programmes adopted in 1916; and the British Admiralty, having scrapped the greater part of the navy which had served throughout the war, had in 1920 announced a One-Power Standard, and projected the construction of four new battleships which, it was understood, were to be of 48,000 tons each. That was the state of affairs when, on August 11, 1921, President Harding invited the British, French, Italian, and Japanese Governments to a Conference on the subject of the limitation of naval armaments, at which Pacific and Far Eastern questions could also be discussed. The Conference assembled in November 1921 and the Washington Naval Treaty was signed on February 6, 1922, together with several others to which it is not necessary to refer here.

The Washington Treaty put a stop to naval competition for many years by the methods of stabilising the battleship strength of the signatory Powers at their then existing levels, and by setting limits to the tonnage, and to the calibre of guns, of various categories of warships. With small adjustments of detail, the total tonnage of battleships finally agreed upon worked out in the ratios of 5 for the British and American navies, 3 for Japan, and 1.67 each for France and Italy; and the same ratios were adopted for aircraft-carriers. These ratios were to be maintained, as far as the British, American, and Japanese navies were concerned, by a rigid programme of scrappings and replacements, whereby each of those Powers would begin to lay down new battleships in 1931.

France and Italy never accepted the corresponding rigid programmes for themselves, merely pledging themselves not to exceed their total allotted tonnage.

The original American proposal was that smaller classes of ships, cruisers and below, should be limited in the same ratios. This, however, did not command assent. When the British proposal to abolish submarines was rejected by France and Japan, the British delegation refused to consider limitation of the surface-cruising ships needed to counter submarine attack. So the ratios stopped short at capital ships and aircraft-carriers.

Qualitative limitation was agreed on as follows: Capital ships were not to exceed 35,000 tons or their guns 16 inches in calibre; aircraft-carriers were not to exceed 27,000 tons or their guns 8 inches. Any ship, other than an aircraft-carrier, which exceeded 10,000 tons, and any ship which mounted a gun exceeding 8 inches, was to be considered a capital ship; and, as total capital ship tonnage was definitely limited, these figures became the upper qualitative limits for cruisers.

This was the Washington settlement, which has always been regarded with great satisfaction, almost affection, by its authors, the United States. That view has not been shared by all its signatories, but their objections to it are not all identical. Certain of its merits are recognised by all. It put an end, for fourteen years at least, to the unreasoning growth, both in size of ships and guns and in numerical strength of battlefleets, which had been the rule for so long, and thereby saved the navies of the world many millions. But after some years of reflection the various signatories began to find serious defects in it. To France and Italy it had from the first appeared derogatory to them, if not insulting, that they should be permanently rated at little more than half the importance of Japan, and, moreover, France had never admitted the justice of Italy's claim to 'parity' between their respective navies. It was accepted merely as a temporary arrangement which would no doubt, in due course, be superseded by the general disarmament convention to which the world was pledged. In Japan, though the Government of 1922 accepted it as a satisfactory arrangement which ensured security at sea for its country—the Japanese delegate stated categorically

at the Conference that Japan neither desired nor intended to have a navy as big as those of the United States or the British Empire—the attitude thereafter gradually changed. The Japanese Government has, particularly in the last six or seven years, come more and more under the sway of those influences in the country which know little of the world outside the Far East, and care less. The Government of 1922 recognised that Japan, with but 60 per cent. of the naval strength of Powers separated from her by the width of oceans, was absolutely secure in her home waters and in the Western Pacific, in which all her interests lay; and that her geographical position gives her influence in China such as is possessed by no other Power, provided she does not destroy it by precipitate action. But later Governments, their hands forced perhaps by the hotheads of her fighting services for which independence of control by the civilian government is claimed under the constitution, have antagonised other Powers which have interests in China. They became apprehensive lest the antagonism so engendered should lead to active interference with Japanese designs in China, which they were and are determined to pursue. In short, they came to fear attack by the United States, possibly with British assistance, and no longer felt secure under the Washington ratios; they felt that they must free themselves from those trammels.

To the British Government the objections to the Washington Treaty, which only became apparent some years after its conclusion, were two. The first was that the limits fixed for cruisers were too high. When in 1924 it became necessary to build new cruisers to replace those which were nearing the end of their lives, many cruisers were building abroad which mounted 8-inch guns and ranged in displacement up to the limit of 10,000 tons. The British Navy contained no cruiser so powerful, and the majority of those which were passing out of service were small and lightly armed. But for the big cruisers building abroad, the new British cruisers would probably have been comparable to the 4000-ton or 5000-ton ships they replaced. A higher standard, however, had been set by the Washington Treaty, below which the British Navy could not well be allowed to fall; and for several years all new British cruisers were perforce of 10,000 tons, mounted 8-inch guns, and cost over £2,000,000 apiece.

The second objection was that the rigid schedule of new scrapping and construction, together with the great size and gun power adopted for capital ships too, dictated an expenditure on battleship replacement, beginning in 1931, on a level much higher than any British Government was willing to authorise. The Admiralty was naturally anxious not to allow the British battlefleet to become too obsolete, and to that end would probably have preferred to scrap and rebuild rather than continue the process of modernising old ships beyond the age at which it becomes uneconomical. But under the Washington limits the former process was more expensive than could be faced. Thus the British Government was quite ready to conclude a new treaty whereby 'the principles adopted at Washington could be carried further' (in the words of President Coolidge), provided that the direction in which they were carried was that leading to lower qualitative limits.

In the United States the only fault found with the Washington Treaty was that it did not go far enough. The ratios, which stopped short at capital ships and aircraft-carriers, ought to be extended to cruisers and smaller craft. American naval opinion, true to type, favours monster ships, whether battleships or cruisers, for technical reasons which have never been expounded at any of the Naval Conferences, and it finds no fault with the Washington standards. The United States, while insisting for themselves on equality with the strongest, would like to reduce all navies, and for that reason desired to fix for cruisers and smaller craft an arbitrary figure such as that adopted for battleships at Washington. Hence President Coolidge's invitation, sent to the signatories of the Washington Treaty, to the abortive Naval Conference at Geneva in 1927. Since it accomplished nothing and France and Italy did not even attend it, it is not necessary to say anything of that Conference, beyond that in it the United States refused to consider the lowering of qualitative limits, or to recognise that the number of cruising ships needed by the British Navy was not an arbitrary figure, but was dictated by the extent of the interests to be defended.

The attitude of the United States towards naval limitation seems to be different from that of other Powers. Less vulnerable to attack by sea than any other Great Power except

Russia, Americans regard the possibility of a future war from the standpoint of the neutral, since it is their traditional intention to stand aloof from the quarrels of the Old World. Nevertheless, for reasons which seem good to themselves, they intend to have a navy second to none, an intention which no other Power has any right to question. But that intention gives them no title to decide what strength the other Powers need for their defence. Those Powers do not base their naval provision upon the strength of the United States navy. Taught by experience, they do not share American confidence of being able to remain neutral in another war, and they base their calculations of the naval strength they need upon what they have to defend. The cruising strength of the British Navy, for instance, has no relation to the number of American cruisers afloat; it depends upon the extent of the sea communications of the British Empire, which the British Navy exists to defend. That is the real reason, not, as alleged, the failure to secure the abolition of submarines, why the British delegation at Washington did not agree to the extension of the ratios to include cruisers and smaller craft; and it would have saved much future misunderstanding if it had been made clear in 1922.

When the 1930 Naval Conference, prescribed by Article XXI. of the Washington Treaty, was convened, all the signatories had good reasons for desiring a new treaty. The United States wanted to extend the ratios to all classes of ships, and if possible to fix quantitative limits at levels lower than those of Washington. Japan wanted a ratio larger than three-fifths of American strength, particularly in cruisers. France and Italy also were dissatisfied with the ratios, more for reasons of prestige than from any intention of expansion, and moreover they disagreed fundamentally on the question of parity between themselves. Great Britain, failing the adoption of lower qualitative limits, was anxious to postpone the replacement schedules of Washington. Moreover, the Government of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, which was then in power in England, was determined that some further treaty of naval limitation should be concluded, as an encouragement to the Disarmament Conference looming on the horizon, even if it entailed making concessions to American and Japanese desires which would be condemned by naval opinion in England.

Hence the London Naval Treaty of 1930. By it the replacement of capital ships was postponed until after 1936, thereby shelving the question of reducing their size; of the ships which under the Washington Treaty would have been replaced in 1934-35, Great Britain agreed forthwith to scrap five, the United States three, and Japan one. A quantitative agreement covering cruisers, destroyers, and submarines was concluded between the United States, Japan, and the British Empire, in which France and Italy did not join, whereby Japan was accorded increases in her 60 per cent. ratios for those categories, varying up to 100 per cent. for submarines; and the British Empire, while allotted a cruiser tonnage slightly larger than that of the United States, was limited in that and smaller categories to a figure which the Admiralty considered altogether inadequate. Though the United States would not consider any reduction in the qualitative limits for cruisers, it was perhaps a step forward that they should have been induced to divide them into two categories, and to place a definite limit to those in the heavier class. The period of the treaty was fixed at six years, and the Prime Minister later stated that the drastic limitations imposed on the British Navy were accepted for that period only in view of the tranquillity of the existing international situation, and in the hope that before the treaty expired a general Disarmament Convention, encouraged by this example, would have been concluded. It only remains to record that France and Italy have never ratified even that part of the treaty which they signed.

Between 1930 and 1935 the Disarmament Conference sat and adjourned without achievement. Germany threw off the naval restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and began to rebuild her navy. Though she concluded the Anglo-German naval agreement with this country whereby she voluntarily adopted a moderate quantitative limit, that event hardened the determination of France to make an end of the Washington ratios, a determination which was fully shared by Italy. Japan embarked on her Manchurian adventure and left the League of Nations. Her action provoked such reprobation in America, and elsewhere, as to increase her apprehension of interference by the United States and strengthen her revolt against the Washington and London ratios. In December

1934 she gave the two years' notice necessary to terminate the Washington Treaty at the end of this year. Thus the basis upon which the British Navy had accepted the cruiser restrictions of 1930 was destroyed, and there remained serious deficiencies to be made good. This was the state of affairs when Japan's action rendered a Conference in 1935 obligatory upon the Washington Powers.

Even before that action the British Government had begun preliminary conversations with each of the Washington Powers separately, with a view to a Conference in 1935, for the calling of which the 1930 London Treaty provided. These conversations were of great advantage, since they enabled the attitude of each conferring Power to be ascertained in advance, and prevented the Conference itself wasting time over questions on which no agreement was likely to be reached. The attitudes of the various parties thus revealed, and reiterated at the opening meeting of the Conference, were as follows.

The United States, devoted as ever to the Washington Treaty as a pattern of what such treaties should be, desired to continue it, to establish ratios in all categories of ships, if possible at a level 20 per cent. or so lower than those of previous treaties; provided always that the United States be allotted the highest ratio, not less than 100:60 compared with Japan, and that the qualitative limits hitherto in force should not be lowered. On this latter point, however, some slight concession might be made.

France was determined to have no more of ratios. She favoured drastic lowering of qualitative limits, both for capital ships and cruisers. She was in favour of full communication of building programmes between signatories, but was not willing to bind herself to definite programmes for more than a short period. She would not hear of abolition, or even any increased measure of qualitative restriction, of submarines.

Italy's attitude was very similar to that of France, except that she was sympathetic towards the restriction of submarines. She was equally anxious to lower qualitative limits of capital ships and cruisers, and equally determined against the perpetuation of ratios.

Japan's approach to the Conference was curiously obtuse. She seems to have looked upon the earlier naval treaties as a

matter between herself and the United States only—an attitude shared to no inconsiderable extent in America—and not to have considered how her proposals for modifying them would affect the European signatories. For that reason, not content with a proposal to discard the ratios which, adopting the attitude towards them of France and Italy, she denounced as derogatory to national self-respect, she must needs go farther and propose a definite limit of total tonnage to which both she and the United States would be free to build, a level which should preferably be lower than her own existing tonnage. In recognition of the presence of other parties, she labelled this the 'common upper limit,' apparently without consideration of how the proposal could be harmonised with the firmly established naval policies of the European Powers. She advocated the abolition, or failing that the drastic reduction, of all classes of ships designated as 'offensive weapons,' which she defined as capital ships, heavy cruisers, and aircraft-carriers; but she refused to consider limitation of submarines on the ground that they are defensive weapons.

The British proposals were framed to some extent as a result of the knowledge gained of the views of others in the preliminary conversations. The British Government would have been willing to continue the ratios in battleships (though not in cruisers). Recognising, however, that three out of the five Powers would have none of them, they proposed that they should be abandoned, but that quantitative competition should be obviated as far as possible by each Power declaring, for a term of years ahead, the maximum amount of new construction which it would not exceed. In the absence of quantitative limits for capital ships they proposed a 'zone of non-construction' in order to render effective the qualitative limits adopted for cruisers. They proposed to limit capital ships to 25,000 tons with 12-inch guns, cruisers to 7500 tons with 6-inch guns, and submarines to 250 tons. All the Powers, without exception, disclaimed for themselves any intention of starting a new race of armaments, and expressed themselves well disposed towards the principle of limitation, combined with that of equality of security, which, they maintained, could best be furthered by the methods they themselves were advocating.

Evidently there was much upon which, given a general spirit of give and take, a useful agreement could be founded. Perpetuation of 'ratios,' of 'quantitative limitation,' so dear to the American heart, was not practicable; but the general disclaimer of any intention of competition, together with general economic stringency, made it unlikely that anything more than trivial increases were to be expected from its abandonment. If there were danger of that, it could be lessened by the adoption of qualitative limits coupled with the publicity proposals of France and Great Britain. All parties were agreed as to the desirability of some qualitative limits, and it only remained to compromise between the various figures suggested.

The spirit of give and take, however, though otherwise general, was not to be manifested by the Japanese delegation. The exposition of their proposals, including the 'common upper limit,' occupied many full sittings of the First Committee to the exclusion of all other subjects. When it was clear that, although there was much in their qualitative proposals upon which agreement might be reached, the common upper limit was unacceptable to any other party, they would not agree to their proposals being postponed pending discussion of those of other delegations; and on the common upper limit being definitely rejected by all the other parties, acting on instructions from Tokyo, the Japanese delegation quitted the Conference.

Messages from Tokyo seemed to indicate a struggle between opposing schools of thought in the Japanese Government. The more moderate school would have had their delegation, provided the ratios disappeared, remain in the Conference and obtain as much of the rest of their proposals as they could. The more arrogant school, possibly under the sway of the bellicose party which is so strongly represented in the officers' ranks of the army and navy, apparently calculated that the Conference must break up as a failure if Japan left, and that they could therefore get their own way by a threat of obstinacy. Having taken up that attitude, to abandon it would have seemed to entail loss of face, despite realisation that the Conference had no intention of being dominated by the Japanese and would continue its work whether they stayed or left. In the event, though the Japanese view may

be that the Japanese face was saved, to the rest of the world it would rather seem that the Japanese nose had been cut off to spite it.

There is nothing in the new treaty to which the most sensitive of Japanese could object on the score of discrimination; every provision in it applies equally to all the signatories. The qualitative limitations are of just as much advantage to Japan as to any other Power. The abhorred ratios are gone. And if Japan had stayed in the Conference she might well have obtained the re-enactment of that provision of the Washington Treaty which forbade the development by other Powers of naval bases in the Western Pacific, to which she attached so much value in 1922. As it is, the provision lapses.

After the departure of the Japanese delegation, who were replaced by observers at the later sessions, steady progress was made. The British proposals for declarations of maximum programmes were fused with the French proposal for 'pre-avis' into a comprehensive scheme for the exchange of information and advance notification of annual building programmes. Little time was needed to reach agreement on qualitative limits, since the maximum concessions each Power was prepared to make were known from the preparatory talks. Some time was occupied by the vain efforts of the French delegation, distrustful perhaps of the strength of the previous British efforts to the same end, to induce the United States to agree to limits for capital ships lower than those of Washington. The utmost concession the latter would make was to reduce the calibre of guns from 16 inches to 14 inches, and even that reduction was made contingent upon Japan agreeing to be bound by it before April 1937. The tonnage limit remains at 35,000. In the matter of cruiser limits, the utmost the United States would concede was a 'holiday' up to 1942 in the construction of 8-inch gun cruisers and of 6-inch gun cruisers over 8000 tons; even that was made subject to an 'escape clause' whereby the holiday might be cancelled in the event of any Power, signatory or not, building a larger number of small cruisers than the United States (or, indeed, any other signatory) considered to be justified. The 'non-construction zone' was fixed at 10,000 to 17,500 tons. New limits were adopted for aircraft-carriers, 23,000 tons

with 6-inch guns, representing a substantial reduction from the 27,000 tons and 8-inch guns of the Washington Treaty.

There were delays from time to time. Japan's adherence to the treaty having become uncertain, it became all the more desirable that the adherence of those naval Powers which were outside the Washington Treaty should be assured. This was unnecessary in 1922; but now the German navy is an important factor in the European naval situation, and, although it is limited quantitatively as compared with the British Navy, this country could not be expected to conclude a definite agreement for qualitative limitation if there were too many uncertain factors. One might be accepted temporarily, but not two, both outside the League of Nations. It was therefore urgent to find some acceptable method of obtaining Germany's adherence to the treaty which was being negotiated, and this proved no easy task in view of the well-known difficulties of negotiating any agreement on the subject of armaments to include both France and Germany. Fortunately, a means acceptable to all parties was found in the negotiation of an Anglo-German treaty in terms identical with, or at least equivalent to, those of the treaty being framed by the Conference. The negotiations for this began while the Conference was in session, and should be concluded shortly.

The last hitch in the proceedings arose from the action of Italy when the work of the Conference was so far advanced that the conclusion of a treaty was only a matter of days. The Italian delegation then intimated that, while the state of controversy between Italy and the League Powers continued, and particularly while a naval concentration was maintained in the Mediterranean which was obviously directed against Italy, she could sign no friendly treaty of naval limitation with those Powers. The Italian delegation continued to co-operate helpfully in the drafting of the treaty, and, though they maintained reservations on the size limits for capital ships and on the 'non-construction zone' as a reason for not signing, it was hinted that these technical points would probably appear less insuperable as obstacles to Italian acceptance in a more tranquil political atmosphere. If and when Italy's dispute with the League over the Abyssinian War comes to an end, Italy's signature of the treaty is expected.

The treaty contains the 'safeguarding clauses' usual in such instruments, providing for relaxation of the restrictions prescribed in the events of accidental loss of ships, of war, of limits being exceeded by non-signatory Powers, or of any change of circumstances which alters the basis on which the treaty was negotiated. But relaxation of the restrictions is to be preceded by consultation between the signatories, and in any case the provisions for the exchange of information are not abrogated. The treaty remains in force until the end of 1942.

It was signed at St. James's Palace on March 25 by the United States, France, and the nations of the British Commonwealth with the exception of the Irish Free State and the Union of South Africa, who refrained from signing on the ground that, as they neither possessed naval forces nor intended to acquire them, it would be incongruous for them to enter into a technical treaty of naval limitation. It is open for accession at any time to signatories of the Washington Treaty—*i.e.*, Italy and Japan. It has been transmitted to the League of Nations for the information of other naval Powers who are members, with a view to their eventual adherence.

If, as is hoped by optimists, the treaty is in due course accepted by Italy and Japan and the parallel treaty between Great Britain and Germany also comes into force, the chief incentives to any competition in naval armaments between the six chief naval Powers of the world will be removed—for the next six years, at least. At its best, the treaty should constitute a notable advance towards international understanding and a better international atmosphere; at its least, it provides a framework upon which more can be built when the world is in temper to build. In either case, to have brought the treaty into being in the face of many setbacks and discouragements is an achievement of which the British Government may justly be proud, and upon which the member of it chiefly responsible, Lord Monsell, is warmly to be congratulated.

H. G. THURSFIELD.

THE SHADOW OF ADOWA

By MRS. HELEN ROSSETTI ANGELI

Forty years ago, a very young girl, I stood in this same room a newspaper in my hand. The Italians had been defeated by the Abyssinians at Adowa. I was a Socialist—nay, an Anarchist—in those days; and Anarchists (when they were not busy bombing somebody) believed in universal brotherhood. They were against war; the Italian Socialists and Anarchists had taken an active part in preventing the success of Italian arms in Africa. The mass of the Italian people—a very few decades removed from the Bourbon and the foreigner—were still very ignorant: tens of thousands could not read or write, and they were miserably poor. The standard of living was unbelievably low for a great European country; the peasants lacked bread and even salt, and malaria and pellagra afflicted whole regions. 'United Italy' then was still something of a geographical expression. The mass of the people had no stomach for colonial wars, and those enlightened Italians who sensed a great future for Italy and realised her imperative need of colonies tilted at windmills and beat their heads against brick walls. They were regarded as dangerous visionaries.

In those days large numbers of Italians were content to make a good thing out of the 'tourist trade,' to fawn on the foreign 'milords' and collect such booty as they could from them. They sang lovely Neapolitan ditties and danced Neapolitan dances in the gardens of the hotels, and beggars ran after the carriages for alms. Industries were undeveloped, and art was at a wretchedly low ebb; but the museums and galleries were there, and foreigners thought it all very charming and picturesque. 'Italian beggars' became such a byword that the fact that mendicants these many years past have been growing scarce—had quite disappeared in such cities as Rome—has not, apparently, penetrated the mind of

foreigners. English people still talked in superior accents of 'Italian beggars' at a time when none were to be seen in the streets of Rome while bands of them paraded the London thoroughfares, largely ex-Service men (whom you never at any time saw in Italy), hat in hand, and decent-minded passers-by continually had their hands in their pockets.

Masses of Italians emigrated. Whole districts of Italy were abandoned. Emigrants poured into France, England, the Americas. They became hewers of wood and drawers of water for the richer nations—navvies and road-builders (Italians have always excelled in this work, from the days of Rome to the Ethiopian campaign), scullions and waiters, organ-grinders. They populated the poorest districts of great cities; they crowded the filthy 'Bowery' of New York. By hard work, sobriety and thrift, they held their own, however, and many built themselves up honourable positions. They did not forget their native land, and their hard-earned savings, sent home to their families, became a great national asset (an asset which of course ceased with the anti-immigration laws). But the immigrants were despised and regarded as interlopers and black-legs. Aiguesmortes remembers them—or some of us remember Aiguesmortes. In the abandoned cuttings of Panama their corpses polluted the atmosphere together with dead Chinamen.

There were some emigrants of a different calibre. I remember translating an article by Enrico Corradini, a precocious Italian 'imperialist,' entitled 'Emigrati.' It dealt with Guglielmo Marconi. That was just before his triumphal but still premature return to Italy in 1903. He had left Italy in the 'nineties. I was in Rome when he arrived. So great was the enthusiasm that the train could not get into the station for the crowds on the lines, ready to seize him and claim him as their own and carry him in triumph into the Urbe. (Seven years earlier Italian railway lines had been blocked for a different reason. That was when the half-starved peasants threw themselves on the lines to prevent the departure of the trains carrying troops for Africa.)

Times were beginning to change.

I vaguely apprehended many things as I stood with the paper in my hand, telling of the defeat at Adowa and the loss of 6000 Italians. Those were times when peace seemed a

much more convincing possibility than in the days of the Covenant and the League of Nations. It was three years before the Boer War: the Italian expedition to East Africa seemed a mad venture; peace seemed a reasonable reality. I was against wars, against empires, 'agin' the government' generally. But I felt in my bones the tragedy of that defeat and the terrible disgrace or misfortune it was to Italy.

For forty years the shadow of that defeat has lain on Italy. Not even her part in the Great War, not all the blood she shed, nor even her victory, dispelled it. Italy's enemies recognised her heroism and the giant effort she had made (it is recorded in their war histories); but her Allies, especially England, never have. They forgot all about it at the Peace Conference. The country that had been defeated at Adowa had no rightful claim to colonies.

It is a scandalous fact for the enlightened pacifist to reflect on; but that defeat did make a difference. Only students of history knew that, humanly and strategically speaking, it was no disgrace, and that the Italians at Adowa in 1896 fought with unsurpassed heroism, overwhelmed by superior force and numbers. Striking before the hour, the whole venture was doomed to failure. But, rightly or wrongly, reasonably or unreasonably, this event did militate against Italy. It gave rise to the legend that 'Italians can't fight'; and such an impression has a subtle influence even on the councils of Geneva. At the beginning of the war, which, thank Heaven, is now ending, this legend had not been quite dispelled. The newspapers talked of 'Mussolini's bluff.' Half the people here were shocked at Italy's unwarrantable aggression and violence, and the other half were foretelling with pitying contempt what a lesson she would receive from the Abyssinian warriors. They recalled with sneers Italy's previous African experience. 'And you know what the Abyssinians do to their prisoners!' they chuckled. Well, they haven't had any prisoners this time.

Forty years later—forty years too late, some have said. You cannot turn the clock back forty years, they declared. It certainly was a bold and tremendous undertaking, fraught with appalling difficulties, which only genius and iron will, and, above all, the force of historic necessity, could surmount. Italy has had to fight, not Ethiopia alone, but the concert of

Powers, the empires that had got there first. And many Italians who were pacifists at heart and hated 'colonial wars' have rallied to the flag that had so many powerful flags arrayed against it. From a war of aggression this had become a war of self-defence.

Forty years from Adowa to Addis Ababa. You cannot put the clock back forty years! It is more dangerous, perhaps, to try to put it forward forty years . . . or 400? How many years, how many ages, will elapse before men really take a detached and philosophic view of empires and successes and failures? I remember, forty years ago, when I read of the defeat at Adowa, I repeated to myself Walt Whitman's magnificent lines on 'defeat' and 'death and dismay.' . . . But Walt Whitman was a poet and a visionary. Only victory is 'great'—only victory counts in this workaday world.

HELEN ROSSETTI ANGELI.

THE COMING RELIGION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE¹

By PROFESSOR H. E. ARMSTRONG, F.R.S.

In seventy or eighty years, a man may have a deep gust of the world; know what it is, what it can afford and what 'tis to have been a man. Such a latitude of years may hold a considerable corner in the general map of time; and a man may have a curt epitome of the whole course thereof in the days of his own life; may clearly see he hath but acted over his forefathers; what it was to live in ages past and what living will be in all ages to come. He is like to be the best judge of time who hath lived to see about the sixtieth part thereof. Persons of short times may know what 'tis to live but not the life of man, who having little behind them are but Januses of one face and know not singularities enough to raise axioms of this world: but such a compass of years will show new examples of old things, parallelisms of occurrences through the whole course of time and nothing be monstrous unto him; who may in that time understand not only the varieties of man but the variation of himself and how many men he hath been in that extent of time.

In such a thread of time and long observation of men, he may acquire a physiognomical intuitive knowledge; judge the interiors by the outside and raise conjectures at first sight; and knowing what men have been, what they are, what children probably will be, may in the present age behold a good part and the temper of the next; and since so many live by the rules of constitution and so few overcome their temperamental inclinations, make no improbable predictions.

SIR THOMAS BROWNE, *Christian Morals*.

THAT these are words of truth I can vouch: they are from the essay on *Christian Morals* by that most remarkable of writers Sir Thomas Browne (1605-1682). Having seen so much in my 'thread of life,' I am but following his behest if I attempt to paint what can be but an imperfect picture of

¹ Valedictory address delivered at Lancaster, January 17, 1936, by Professor Henry E. Armstrong, at the close of his three years of office as first President of the Edward Frankland Lancastrian Society.

the immensity of our progress during the period and also call attention to some of our shortcomings.

Every day there is cause to marvel more and more at the change that has come over our civilisation, scarce realised by historians, especially during and since Victorian days, as the outcome of the Industrial Revolution, so-called: itself caused not only by the systematic use of a previously little used, because buried, material source of energy but by the discovery and application of a new method—by *the discovery of the experimental method*. I would date the period from the publication of Black's *Essay on Magnesia Alba* (1755). In this, for the first time, we have the method displayed of an advisedly systematic, quantitative, judicial, experimental art of inquiry, spoken of briefly to-day as the Laboratory Method. Lavoisier was its great exponent. Davy and Faraday came next; Berzelius and Liebig reduced the application of the method to a system; the latter even went so far as to make the laboratory method a profession, not merely the work of individual genius.

Less than two centuries ago we had burned up our forests in the South of England and the Midlands in making iron: a fuel famine was at hand outside the area of surface coal. Trevelyan tells us that without the great industrial and agricultural changes of George III.'s reign the population of Great Britain could not have risen much above 7,000,000 without a lowering of the standard of life to something nearer the level of contemporary Ireland. Emphasis may well be laid upon this conclusion, in view of the coming exhaustion of our national coal supplies—shall we say, not much more than two centuries hence? Coal became generally available when James Watt (January 19, 1736-1827), by his invention of the condensing engine (1769-81), made it possible to pump the water out of the mines; still more when this was followed by Stephenson's railway locomotive and coal was easily carried about. The engineering and textile trades were rapidly developed; chemical industry followed in their wake: people began to use soap and ventured to wash, though not too often. Few to-day realise what coal means to us: if they did, they would not use it thoughtlessly, as they do; they would take some care for the morrow; they would glory in saving it; no appeal would be made to waste

it. Our future efforts should be directed, not to employing more miners but to economising the use of coal as far as possible. That coal is our food is clear from the sudden great increase in our population following its use.

To those of us who almost saw the foundations laid, who have seen the up-building of most modern industries, the outlook must be very different from that of those who enter to-day at the housetops and take little notice of the great structure of which these are but the last stage. To have grown up with a civilisation, taking note of stages in its development, is an experience very different from that of looking down upon the shell of an upraised building.

Born in a year of revolution—toddled, if not perambulated, through the great Prince Albert-Paxton-Playfair-begotten 1851 Exhibition in Hyde Park, now the Crystal Palace—as a youth I saw the *Great Eastern* sticking upon the stocks. She was launched in January 1858 and laid the first successful Atlantic cable in 1862: we then ceased to be insular; all the world became our stage. Built by Brunel, largely from the original designs of Scott Russell—six times the size of any earlier vessel (10,000 tons), known at the time as the ‘great and unique’ *Great Eastern*—she was a ship far in advance of the needs of the day: ocean travel was only setting in. Americans had not yet discovered England. The ironclad Navy came into being at about the same time. I saw the *Warrior*—our first ironclad, armed, I believe, with the first breech-loading (Armstrong or Whitworth) cannon—in the dockyard at Gibraltar, together with the last of the wooden three-deckers, in the winter of 1864–65.

I entered the Royal College of Chemistry, as Hofmann was about to leave, in the spring of 1865, the year in which Kekulé first displayed his shield, the Benzene Hexagon, to public gaze—whereat scarcely a chemist uplifted an eyebrow, excepting perhaps Fittig and Tollens, who also had it under design; no one did nor could then foresee that the chemistry of the future would centre so largely upon the hydrocarbon. Though discovered by Faraday in 1825, it was not introduced into industry until after the discovery by Perkin of the first aniline dyestuff, *Mauve*, in 1856. Both structural and especially synthetic chemistry were then only just coming into active being: Liebig’s *Annalen* was the sole focal point of

chemical inquiry—at least up to 1868, when the *Berichte* was started in Berlin. The race only began after the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. I will make no attempt to paint the marvellous progress in the interval. To-day no secret once sought for can withstand inquiry by the chemist. To have the picture of such progress in the mind’s eye is to hold a wonderful possession. The advance in our knowledge and use of electricity has been equally great and even more striking, as so many inventions of direct public use have been developed.

In 1851 we threw stones from our glass-house which violently hit the world outside. The Hyde Park Exhibition was the first concrete witness to other nations of the fruits of our use of coal, especially of our great proficiency as engineers: it was our undoing, as we made other countries jealous of our position. Nay more, free trade was so much buried in our bones that we at once began to sell our machines abroad for others to copy, if not to improve. If engineers are not without conscience, they at least do not recognise that you cannot both have your cake and eat it—this can only be done if in some way more cake be provided. This precaution we have hitherto failed to take. People are now too wide awake to make secret processes possible. In fact, the world is one stage, though the men and women are no longer only players but all ruthless competitors. There is no peace any longer—commercial war reigns everywhere upon earth and sanguinary war, in the future, will be rained upon us from the air. This is our main problem to-day, brought upon us by the advance and spread of knowledge, especially by our power to use it—through the agency of oil. We snuffed dip-candles in my youth and used colza-oil lamps. I have witnessed the discovery of petroleum and its every use developed.

I have seen nearly everything happen that has followed from the general use of steam-power and the rise of electricity, almost from Faraday’s ashes—for its use was scarcely taken seriously until after his death (1867). The first successful Atlantic cable was laid in 1862: even then twenty years or more were to lapse before the dynamo was really pushed into prominence; here progress in its use was much delayed by bumbledom and our lack of imagination. Only since the

Great War have we sought to give free use to our intelligence and our insular conservatism is still a hindrance to our progress. We too often ignorantly put knowledge aside and place management in uninformed hands.

Probably we are at the most perilous period in the history of our country, if not of the world—with little time to look around and put our house in order. *Punch's* fine cartoon of January 1, a graph of the task before young 1936, is a mordant picture of the state of affairs—broken crockery everywhere. Beyond question, we shall be forced to change the Prayer-book direction, 'Let us pray,' into 'Let us think,' a far less easy task: it is easy for the ignorant all to pray; only the few will think, wittingly and wisely.

We are apt to base our philanthropy upon charity rather than upon efficiency: civilisation is fast being developed, if not organised, to promote the survival of the unfit. Already, we are told, our birth-rate is much higher among the dull; we are warned that civilisations in the past have fallen apart because they became thin 'on the top.' Sir William Flinders Petrie (*The Revolutions of Civilisation*), from his Egyptian studies, has drawn the conclusion that civilisation is an intermittent phenomenon, rising to a maximum in each epoch up to the point when democracy has attained full power, the majority without capital then necessarily eating up that of the minority, so causing decay of enterprise.

Sir Flinders argues that man must either strive with Nature or with man or fall back and degenerate; the more easy life is made, the more easy is decay and degradation. The accumulation of the facilities of life or of capital, in every form, diminishes the need for striving; there is so much the less worth striving for, there is so much more to enjoy without strife.

We are already in such position to-day, brought about by our modern discovery of the now irresistible weapons of attack: the developed arts of scientific discovery and invention. The art of using knowledge has been developed to such a system that Nature soon will be unable to keep any secrets from us.

Carlyle has defined man as the tool-using animal. This power, applied with scientific method, more than any other of his attributes, is enabling him to master the world—most

surely only to his own destruction unless he learn to master himself. Intellectually, morally and physically he is being debased by his own inventions.

The process of decay visualised by Flinders Petrie, through the operation of ignorance, has added to it another, more insidious form of attack, exercised not by the ignorant but by a particular class of intellectuals—in fact, by men of many inventions. Men are no longer called upon to use their hands, except in setting machine-tools; labour is discountenanced at every turn. The young are not encouraged—they are not even allowed—to learn a mechanical trade. The picture-palace, with its neon lure, is the universal attraction. 'Listening in' is a second new laziness of modern creation. Aimless cigarette smoking has reached the dimensions of a public vice. Our young women scurry through the air to the Antipodes; but what message do they carry? Whilst positive religion is at a discount, no attempt is being made to establish a new worship.

Great as is the value of our latest form of road traction, in largest part it has degenerated into an aimless rush of empty minds in search of distraction. In large part, industry is concerned with the production of goods in no necessary relation with life.

If we are not at the eve of a new civilisation, if not a revolution, we are in sore need of one. The situation, as I view it, is not unlike that of the great social and religious strife at the time of the Tudors. The religious orders had made themselves not only impossible but hated, through their arrogance and loose habits, especially through their neglect of public education. They were summarily dispossessed. At the same time our State was in conflict with the Pope, seeking to override his authority and substitute the Royal for Papal power. A strong anti-clerical, though not at first anti-religious, feeling was thus aroused. Lutheran Protestantism was making its way in Germany. Meanwhile, a strange mind was at work among us in Cranmer, one of the most remarkable of great historical characters. Nominally a Catholic, Archbishop of Canterbury, right hand of Henry VIII., at heart he was violently anti-Catholic. In his early years at Cambridge he seems to have been absorbed in the study of our English tongue. He became 'a jeweller in prose,' to use Hilaire

Belloc's happy expression. He ultimately gave shape to our Anglican liturgy: the Litany was his work.

The change over from Catholicism was further promoted, at the death of Henry VIII., when it became necessary for the small body of men in charge during the minority of Prince Edward to consolidate their position. The final step was taken when Cranmer, at the coronation of the young king, after celebrating High Mass with fullest pomp, suddenly threw off all disguise and Papal authority, by proclaiming Edward *King by Divine Right*! After a severe Catholic interregnum under Mary, Protestantism was finally established as our positive State religion, during Elizabeth's long reign. That three children of the same man—one a weak boy, two of them strong women—should have played such varied and determining parts is beyond the remarkable.

May we not find a marked analogy between the introduction of Protestantism into our country and that of natural knowledge into world service? The final step—the equivalent of Cranmer's denunciation of Papal authority—has yet to be taken. Edward's short reign was one of education. A beginning was then made towards recognising the right of the people to gain understanding. To-day, when so much more is known, when a method is to hand by which the world must be governed or perish, more open and wider recognition of the people's right has to be made.

Even prior to the time which I overlook, protests were being raised against the action of those in charge of education in restricting training to the classical languages—at the neglect of the new knowledge, more particularly of its spiritual value. Faraday, Lyon Playfair, Liebig, Ruskin, Herbert Spencer, Charles Kingsley, Thring and Huxley were among the objectors. Arnold advisedly put the pursuit of natural knowledge aside at Rugby, from fear of its being too interesting. It was charitable to suppose that the neglect came from lack of understanding, due to the neglected early training of the then teachers. Now that at least three generations have failed to meet the want, to grasp the greatness of our advance, the moral power of the new weapon, it is clear that we are in face of stark inability. Latin and Greek are closed languages: those who profess them, as a rule, are closed minds—men of special mental character, unable to respond to the call of

Nature, unaware of her lure; only masters of words, the greatest of the world's arts but one that is easily made of insidious value.

We have allowed education too long to remain in the hands of a special class of classical schoolmen. I have myself initiated an interesting experiment bearing upon their ability. Years ago I persuaded the first headmaster of Christ's Hospital School at Horsham, the late Dr. Upcott, an open minded cleric and classic, to depart from the custom of the school by teaching systematic Latin, not from the beginning but at a later stage in the school course and then specially only to those who had shown some literary ability. English was to take the place of Latin. After long consideration by a committee of masters, the experiment was begun; it was soon ended. Why? Because the men who had taught Latin could not find enough to teach in their own language—English. So the school lapsed into its former primitive state and still teaches all mainly by and through Latin; indeed, with increasing effort, in order but to win a few university classical scholarships, thus favouring the development of an essentially narrow type. So, more or less, does every public school! As the boys deemed to be of greater ability are set aside for classical studies, other subjects suffer in development and the training in general is lowered. So great is the force of example, so compelling the lure of competitive commercialism, that men who are not classics at the head of schools have followed a similar course; lacking sympathy with the new spirit, they are merely treating their schools as business undertakings. There is little, if any, moral purpose behind our present mechanical system of education.

We must act as ruthlessly, if need be, in changing the school creed and course of education, as was done in the past in delivering religion from Catholic bondage into the comparative freedom of our present Church.

In taking this final step, the difficulty will be to find teachers for the schools. The schools do not provide material suitably grounded for the universities to work upon. The universities, on the other hand, do not give training suitable for teachers. Those who take to teaching are mostly the unadventurous, if not the drones; men of action and ability

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are too much in demand for commercial or industrial posts. Teaching, in the main, is missionary service: it should be accounted the highest man can render. We are moving in a vicious circle. Eventually this must be cut by the universities: at present these are so steeped in professionalism that they are of little use to the ordinary world; they neglect general education, strangely enough on behalf of so-called research. The degree is sought as an advertisement, not as proof of competency.

A new hare has been started recently by a cry for an inquiry into the training of teachers. It will be useless to discuss such a subject until we are clear what is to be the policy of the schools, what is to be taught and how. The universities and the headmasters are the first we should train; the rest will follow, if this be done.

Nominally, we spend a vast sum on education. Actually, the money is mostly spent upon administration, architects' fees and bricks and mortar: the subject itself is not considered. The dead hand of official routine kills all enterprise. No proper spirit either of considered service or of understanding fills the profession. The Board of Education and similar bodies exist but to standardise.

The need to change is urgent. A Church has gained control of the schools which holds a doctrine in no way in harmony with the spirit of the age—an age that is no longer prepared to live by faith but seeks the truth and truth alone. *It has faith only in verifiable fact.* The office of the schools should be to give training in the art of understanding, not merely that of imparting knowledge. Men who have no understanding of the world cannot possibly train for a service of reasoned intelligence.

The course before us is clear. Christ turned out the money-changers from the Temple. They have regained an entry the world over and are in large measure probably the main cause of the present universal unrest: their true place has to be determined. Far more important, however, is it that we should root out the classics—the men of closed mind—from charge of the schools and substitute for them men of charitable mind, who will seek to evoke an understanding of the world in their pupils that will enable them all, with some degree of thoughtfulness, to do their duty with efficiency in whatever state they may be at work.

Let our revolution—unlike those of other countries—be one for freedom of thought and fulness of understanding, not the present pretence of words, keeping in mind that such freedom will always be limited by our ignorance.

It is impossible to overrate the danger of our continued neglect of general education, especially of our failure to place it upon a scientific basis, owing to the incompetence of its present leaders. The mechanism of society is such, so artificial; we are so led by fashions set by the ignorant and often designing few, so carried away by mass suggestion, so accustomed and willing to lisp shibboleths, that it is impossible for all but very few to understand the state of hopeless intellectual bankruptcy that now rules in world affairs. Words everywhere count as deeds. The United States are a sufficient example: an outworn fixed Constitution seems to be a bar to all progress. We rejoice in our great mechanical advance but this is due to the intellectual activity of a few. Meanwhile the dictator is everywhere coming to the fore. Democracy is fast being made impossible by the one-sided application of the skill of the few: it can only be saved from an early downfall by an effective general spread of knowledge—in particular, of the art of using it thoughtfully and with set purpose. We need to use it, without any further delay, especially in the twin services of agriculture and health. Both involve the study of life—the most difficult of all studies. Both are essentially based upon the two interdependent natural sciences—chemistry and physiology. Neither those who practise agriculture nor those who practise medicine are either properly or sufficiently trained in the exercise of these two disciplines: especially are they without systematic judicial training in the art of experimenting. The millions necessarily remain—mostly fools!—willing to be advertised into any quackery. This fooling of the masses is done with such polish and politeness that no one takes offence, sad to say.

Throughout my life I have been, as far as in me lay, an exponent of the educational doctrine so consistently advocated by the great man whom I, for one, would account the wisest of the Victorian period—Thomas Henry Huxley. Warning after warning was given by him of what must be the result if the masses continued to suffer intellectual destitution. This

essay has been revised and completed in the room in which he edited his priceless set of *Collected Essays and Addresses*. He built upon a solid foundation of chalk: the rock of rocks—in the eye of the chemist; a typical salt. Within it he saw written the story of life and of the world throughout the ages. Independently, perhaps even more deliberately, I have been led to form a like opinion of the surpassing value of the rock. It is from this rock, too, that our island home gains the honoured name, our realm of *Albion*. It is our most characteristic possession: knowledge of its history may well be made a test of the extent of our intelligence. Chalk is the Rock of Ages, first cleft by Black with understanding; by him fashioned into the foundation-stone of modern scientific method, whence came the Industrial Revolution—a stone at which all may wonder, upon which we may well strive to build the Church of the future: the Church of Natural Knowledge, foreseen by Tennyson in his inspired verse:

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

To such base use are we brought by the unbalanced classical study of the schools that botany is nowhere yet taught with such object in view. The men who control them are working neither for this world nor the next; they are only to be described in Miltonic terms:

Blind mouths! that scarce themselves know how to hold
A sheep-hook or have learned aught else the least
That to the faithful herdman's art belongs.

H. E. ARMSTRONG.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Italy in the Making: vol. i., by G. F.-H. Berkeley, 1932, 15s.; vol. ii., by G. F.-H. and J. Berkeley, 1936, 21s., Cambridge University Press.

The authors of this important work on the Italian Risorgimento are to be congratulated on the care and impartiality with which they have dealt with a complicated subject and on their brilliant presentation of connected events and personalities. They have consulted a vast mass of authorities, many hitherto unpublished, in many languages; they have delved deep into the public records of many countries.

The first volume sets forth the birth of the idea of a Risorgimento, from 1815 to 1846, and particularly the character and policies of its leading exponents in those early days—Mazzini, Charles Albert, D'Azeglio, and of its chief opponent, Metternich. The author has definite views on the merits and shortcomings of Mazzini; he dwells on what he regards as his finest trait in the belief—that no rights could exist apart from duties, a belief which places Mazzini far higher than most revolutionaries. He also realises that Mazzini's chief contribution to the Italian national cause, at a time when few Italians thought of anything more than a vague federalism, was his insistence on the necessity of unity. His chief error was to advocate a republican form of government, which would never have appealed to more than a handful of men and would have failed to enlist the necessary support of the Piedmontese army, which was Royalist to the core.

The enigmatic figure of King Charles Albert, his still unexplained attitude over the 1821 rebellion, his profound, almost religious, hatred of Austria and his determination to drive her from Italy by force of arms, are admirably presented. Gioberti and his famous book *Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani*, which exercised such a profound influence on the Italian nation, are placed in proper perspective.

The second volume only covers a short period, from 1846 to 1848, but one of supreme importance for the preparation of the revolution. For it was in those few months that the vague hopes and aspirations of the Italian patriots began to take concrete shape and the idea of an Italy independent of foreign rule, united and free, came to be at last regarded as within the sphere of practical politics. The leading personality of this period was Pius IX., who was then regarded as, and to some extent actually was, as Metternich feared, the only real menace to Austrian rule in Italy—a liberal Pope. The authors clearly show the contradiction between the ideas of the Papacy as such and of Italian liberalism, for the Pope, in spite of his own moderately liberal and patriotic Italian sentiments, 'was not merely a temporal sovereign like the others. He was Pope, head of a gigantic world-organisation. . . . Had he been merely a secular ruler it would have been easy for him to resign his will to that of the people, and to found a constitutional monarchy. . . . But as Pope it was impossible for him thus to resign his personal authority and leave the Church to the beck and call of the State.'

In those frenzied months preceding 1848 Pius's name was the most popular in Italy; it was the cry of '*Viva Pio Nono!*' that filled the Italian patriots with enthusiasm, far more so than the name of Charles Albert, whose popularity was limited to his own kingdom. In the Ferrara episode the Papal Government behaved with dignity, and secured not only Italian but world-wide support for its firmness in resisting Austria's truculence. But when it came to war the Pope found it impossible, apart from all questions of internal policy, to lead the Catholic people of Italy against the equally Catholic people of Austria.

The situation in the Neapolitan kingdom is handled less thoroughly than that of other parts of Italy, and this is to be regretted owing to the great importance of those provinces in the Risorgimento, whether as an asset or a liability. The authors might also have dealt more fully with the literary side of the Italian movement. 'Yes, a good deal of this Italy of ours we owe to the poets,' was the judgment pronounced by Garibaldi, himself a poet in spirit, even if he only wrote very poor verse. It is impossible to understand the psychology of the Risorgimento unless we grasp the

significance of the poetry of the period which inspired the patriots quite as much as Gioberti's *Primato* or D'Azeglio's *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna*.

But these are minor blemishes in a really monumental work on one of the most decisive movements in the history of the modern age.

LUIGI VILLARI.

Report on the Health of the Army, 1934 (Stationery Office, 1936, 2s. 6d.).

The statistics of non-notifiable diseases in the Army afford us perhaps the most reliable means of arriving at the fluctuations in the incidence of disease in our civilian population, for the health of the Army is under continuous and careful observation, which cannot be assured in a civilian population, part of which is continually changing its abode and medical attendant. This year's Report shows little change in gross figures from 1913, though there is great variation in the incidence of different diseases. Thus the ratio per 1000 strength of men invalided out of the Service from all causes has come back to the 1913 figure of 8, while that for total admissions to hospital has only slightly fallen from 437 in 1913 to 402 in 1934. The figures of 1934, however, compare very favourably indeed with those of ten years ago, for in 1924 the invalided ratio figure was 13 and that for admissions 484. There is also a slight but definite improvement compared with 1932, when the invalided figure was 8.1 and the admissions figure 412. The present 1934 Report omits the interesting list of 'principal causes of invaliding' found in previous Reports, but the analysis tables giving 'admissions to hospital, deaths, numbers invalided and constantly sick', afford us ample data for comparing different years (see table on p. 766).

The causes of invaliding and number of admissions to hospital have no relation to each other and so must be considered separately. Two-thirds of the invaliding in both 1924 and 1934 fall under seven groups, and if we examine these seven principal causes for invaliding we find that a graph would be very similar to that of a 'head of the river' bumping race. The same diseases occur, but in different

THE SEVEN LEADING CAUSES OF INVALIDING (amounting to $\frac{2}{3}$ of total)

	1924 Total 2500	1934 Total 1447		1924 Total 93,199	1934 Total 74,531
1. Middle-ear Disease . . .	409	95	1. Venereal Diseases . . .	9193	4486
2. Nervous and Mental Diseases . . .	343	345	2. Local Injuries . . .	8742	9538
3. Heart Disease . . .	286	82	3. Diseases of Digestive Tract (not liver) . . .	8524	7283
4. Eye Diseases . . .	268	63	4. Influenza . . .	6654	2996
5. Tubercle . . .	199	187	5. Inflammation of Alveolar Tissue . . .	5689	6654
6. Local Injuries . . .	199	142	6. Tonsillitis . . .	5248	6021
7. Flat-foot . . .	127	36	7. Diseases of Respiratory Tract . . .	4560	2555

order of incidence. Thus in 1924 the 'head of the river' was 'Middle-ear Disease' at 409, which fell to fourth place (95) in 1934, its place being taken by 'Nervous System and Mental Diseases' (345), which was second in 1924 with 343. The third place in 1924 was held by 'Heart Disease' (286), which fell to fifth place (82) in 1934. The fourth place, 'Eye Disease,' in 1924 fell to sixth in 1934, while the fifth, 'Tubercle' (ticing with 'Local Injuries') (199), in 1924 became second in 1934 with 187. 'Flat-foot' took the last place in both years, being sixth in 1924 (127) and seventh (36) in 1934. Under every one of these seven headings the absolute number is lower in 1934 than 1924, with the solitary exception of 'Nervous System and Mental Diseases,' which is 2 higher in 1934 than in 1924 and 92 higher than in 1932. This high incidence of 'nerve trouble' amongst an occupational group of men rather particularly removed from 'nerve strain,' being without financial worries and living a healthy life with adequate food, fresh air and exercise, is remarkable, and suggests that a still greater proportion of the civilian population must be suffering from 'nerves.'

When we consider the admissions to hospital figures

when comparing them with civilian figures, we must be careful not to be led astray by the nomenclature; for instance, tonsillitis, a leading cause of admission in 1934, is classed as a disease of the digestive system in one place and as a disease of the respiratory tract in another. Let us exclude malaria, sandfly fever, and dysentery from our analysis as not likely to affect our home population (after noting that admissions for malaria are only one-third in 1934 of those in 1924; that sandfly fever is less and that dysentery cases have nearly doubled). In 1924 venereal disease led with 9193 admissions to hospital, with local injuries second (8742), while in 1934 venereal disease had fallen to fifth place with less than half its 1924 number (4486). This is exceedingly satisfactory, although a 24.2 ratio per 1000 of strength still seems an unnecessarily high figure in a preventable disease contracted by a voluntary act. It has been proved long ago, both in the Army and the Navy, that immediate self-disinfection, if taught enthusiastically and carried out with care, can practically obliterate venereal disease, and such a high incidence of infection suggests that the teaching or the disinfectants supplied have not been the best. This is the more remarkable seeing that the late Sir W. B. Leishman, when Director-General of the Army Medical Services, in the *Report on the Health of the Army* for the year 1924, put 'prevention' first of the means available for reducing the incidence of venereal disease and wrote: 'The fall in the incidence of syphilis and the progressive decline in the incidence of other venereal diseases in the Army at home during the last four years is attributable to the advances made in the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of these diseases and to the vigorous anti-venereal disease propaganda which followed the wave of venereal infections during the war period.' Curiously enough, no mention is made of prevention in the Report under review. This omission is regrettable. Both in the 1924 and 1934 Reports the comparative proportion of gonorrhœa and syphilis remains unchanged practically at 6:1.

By comparing the Reports of 1934 and 1924 as regards admissions to hospital the following results emerge (excluding venereal disease already mentioned):

- (1) There has been a noticeable and considerable drop in influenza, diseases of the respiratory tract, and

middle-ear disease and only a slight fall in tubercular infection.

- (2) There has been a remarkable increase in gastric and duodenal ulcers (54 to 272) and of appendicitis (881 to 1381), and a slight but very definite increase in local injuries, tonsillitis and septic infection of areolar tissue.
- (3) There has been a great reduction in the number of deaths from influenza (18 to 3) and diseases of the nervous system (24 to 9), and a great increase in the number of deaths from disease of the urinary system (8 to 22).
- (4) The Royal Army Medical Corps can be congratulated on a very decided improvement in the health of the Army during the last ten years.

H. WANSEY BAYLY.

EARLY ENGLISH CAROLS

The University of Rochester, N.Y., has co-operated with the Oxford University Press in issuing from Amen House a notable volume, *The Early English Carols*, edited by Dr. Richard Leighton Greene, of Rochester University, price 30s. The book consists of a complete corpus of Carols down to 1550, some 470 in number, this section, together with bibliographical notes, comprising some 450 large octavo pages; there is also a long and reasoned introduction of 145 pages. These figures are given to show that, dimensionally, the volume is solid. It is equally compact of solid learning, bristling with footnotes on which the interested reader may impale himself, and at every page there is made manifest an exhaustive reading, and deep acquaintance with every literary aspect of the Carol. Unlike many such theses, it is readable, though hardly sprightly: the author bears his learning lightly enough, but it is not in his province, or his intention, to be allusive rather than explicit. It is a work of real value, for which we must be truly grateful to the scholarship of American universities and to their enterprise in publishing the fruits thereof.

The author's first task is to define his term 'Carol,'

which he does in his short preface as 'poems intended, or at least suitable, for singing, made up of uniform stanzas and provided with a burden which begins the piece and is to be repeated after every stanza.' He next fixes his downward limit of time as the year 1550, on the ground that the Carol seems then suddenly to lose its popularity, being supplanted verbally by the rich experiments in varied metre, musically by the air and the madrigal, and socially by the new dances imported from the Continent, so that it became relegated to a less cultivated sphere, completely losing its already waning significance as a 'dance-song,' and becoming a vague synonym for 'song,' in poetic diction. It is merely the older mediæval type that Dr. Greene here collects and analyses. Their division into subjects in his hands shows their great diversity, for it is impossible to divide them into Christmas and non-Christmas—the English 'Noel' explicitly celebrating the Nativity is a modern creation; and anyhow, suitable or not in our view, most of them were actually sung at Christmas-time. Similarly, to class them as religious and secular misses the mediæval point of view which saw both worlds at once. He therefore divides them freely into several specific religious headings—Advent, Nativity, Passiontide, general religious counsel—and then branches off into the mundane divisions of satire, politics, love, and humour. Of such diversity indeed are they.

He would be the first to agree that we cannot set back the clock and exclude from our use Carols that do not conform with the mediæval specification of stanza and refrain. We should bid farewell—a painless one to some of us—to 'Good King Wenceslas' and 'While Shepherds watched,' which would return to their proper category of hymns: we should retain 'The First Nowell' and 'God rest you, Merry Gentlemen' for their refrains; but we should be forced to admit that we have lost the accompanying movement, for the genuine mediæval Carol required the same type of movement as a sea-shanty, namely, during the refrain only. The soloist, the shanty-man, the what-you-will of the carolers, sang his lines while all rested; the movement forward, the tripping step round the capstan, the haul on the bowline, was done with the regularly recurring refrain. Our own *Oxford Book of Carols* has ably urged—but we fear

with no visible results—the adoption of such hilarious modes in churches; but even if we reluctantly admit that the Church of England cannot unbend sufficiently to allow the frolic of a Carol to enrich its noble naves and transepts, and that we shall never witness a real mediæval ‘carole’ dancing its irresistible length up the nave of Ely or Winchester, across the great transepts of York or Lincoln, at least our secular and more elastic bodies might do something to withdraw the sentimental reproach from Carol concerts and substitute that feeling which makes Dr. Greene truly say that when the Englishman of 1400 said ‘Nowell’ he meant a simultaneous ‘Hurrah and Merry Christmas.’ Why not a Carol in the Albert Hall given by a soloist with backing of male voice chorus on the platform to lead the audience in the refrain, while a detachment of dancers trained in the mediæval styles led their true loves to the dance in the arena? In this book are such riches of morality and mirth that it seems sad that we cannot draw upon them, not to recreate ‘Merrie England’ (which was first heard of as a past glory in the eleventh century), but to make alive the deep, passionate sense of beauty that turns all things to true religion, that can write such a refrain as this to a Carol of Christ’s Love (in modern spelling):

Come home again,
Come home again,
Mine own sweetheart, come home again.
Ye are gone astray
Out of your way,
Therefore come home again.

In this homely dignity is the appeal of the ballad and the folksong.

Behind these Carols is the strong light of the Latin hymn, used with the greatest skill and grammatical precision to fit into the delightful macaronics that still give us pleasure—of which ‘In dulci jubilo’ might be cited as a prime favourite. Dr. Greene gives us a notable example (No. 372) of free alternation of Latin and English (modernised here):

Illa juvenis that is so nice
Me deducit into vain device
Infirmis sum: I may not rise
Terribilis mors conturbat me

Dum juvenis fui little I dread
Sed semper in sinne I eat my bread
Jam ductus sum into my bed
Terribilis mors conturbat me

Corpus migrat: in my soul
Respicit demon in his roll
Desiderat ipse to have his toll
Terribilis mors conturbat me

It is only in time a far cry from here to Thomas Hardy’s *Late Lyrics and Earlier* in his ‘after reading Psalms xxxix., xl., etc.’:

Simple was I and was young,
Kept no gallant tryst, I;
Even from good words held my tongue
Quoniam tu fecisti

When I failed at fervid rhymes
‘Shall’ I said ‘persist I?’
‘Dies’ (I would add at times)
‘*Meos posuisti!*’

Dr. Greene stresses rightly the influence of the accentual Latin verse, ‘raised with the lapse of turbulent centuries from the low estate of the labourer’s chant or soldier’s marching song to the highest possible use, the service of God.’ It shared the universal character of the Church which fostered it, and flourished in England abundantly as our language assimilated words of Latin origin. We would like to see this point developed further and some special inquiry given to the reasons for the undoubted fact that our hymns, from the time of Sternhold downwards, all cleave to so narrow a metrical limitation, while the parallel (and equally Protestant) compositions of Clément Marot and Théodore Bèza show so considerable a diversity. Why did Sternhold think that, if he stuck to common and long metres (does not this irresistibly suggest Quince’s prologue to be ‘written in eight and six,’ and Nick Bottom’s immediate overbid with ‘No, make it two more: let it be written in eight and eight’?), his Psalter of 1549 might ‘the more decently, and with more delight of the mind, be read and sung of all men’? Cranmer was saturated in the Latin of the mediæval Church, and he

rendered it into the most majestic prose we know; but his obedient imitators shackled our devotional poetry for all time by their slavish adherence to a few metres. Within the hundred years that separate Sternhold's Psalter from the Commonwealth, English metrical skill reached an almost prodigal degree of diversity; the 400 lute-songs in Dr. Fellowes' collection hardly repeat themselves metrically, and into no single one of their frames will any lyric fit from the plays of Shakespeare. And yet our hymnody tramps its solemn unvarying clanking round like a blindfold ass at the mill.

To us in the present age Christmas Carols are the Carols *par excellence*, and no doubt Dr. Greene is correct here in thinking that the Church used folksongs and ancient traditions such as the honour paid to Holly and Ivy, the reverence for Wells, the solemn occasion of May Day and so forth, as one weapon in her not yet extinct warfare against paganism and superstition. He sees in the Franciscan devotion to animals some reason for the popularity of the Ox and the Ass in the scenes of the Nativity: it is dubious, surely, how far St. Francis was regarded over here—where everyone loved animals and treated them humanely—as remarkable in his view of animal life which was then (as it is even now) received with open astonishment by a Latin race which has no innate consideration for animal happiness. The Ox and the Ass owe their place in the picture to the famous mis-translation of Habakkuk iii. 2, by which 'in the midst of the years thou shalt be known' became 'between two animals thou shalt be known.' This was too much for the early commentator, who saw that the two animals must have been the Ass and Ox of Isaiah who knew their Master's crib; and before the more exact versions of Septuagint and Jerome could get into circulation, this most delightful fable, of the presence at the Nativity of these humble labourers for Man, was established beyond the power of dispute or correction.

Quite apart from the interest in the *genre* of Middle English poetry which he now firmly labels 'Carol,' Dr. Greene has given us some lovely lyrics such as this thirteenth century Carol-in-the-making—this time in its original spelling—which is published for the first time:

Of on that is so fayr and bright
Velud maris stella
 Brighter than the dayis light
Parens et puella
 Ic crie to the: thou se to me
 Leuedy, preye thi sone for me
Tam pia
 That ic mote come to thee
Maria.

Or this sad little song of the Forsaken Maid—also printed for the first time (the burden is given first and recurs after each stanza):

Were it undo that is ydo
I wold be war.

Y lovede a child of this cuntre
 And so Y werde he had do me
 Now myself the sothe Y see
 That he is far.

He seyde to me he wolde be trewe
 And change me for none othur newe
 Now Y sykke and am pale of hewe
 For he is far.

He seide his saws he wolde fulfille
 Therefore I lat him have all his wille
 Now Y sykke and morne stille
 For he is far.

A curious sidelight is cast upon the mediæval mind when a maiden who has been too kind announces cheerfully that her excuse will be that she has 'been on a pilgrimage'; again the Carol of the fifteenth century on the Domination of Women seems appropriate to our time with the burden:

Nova, nova saw you ever such
 The most master of the house weareth no breech.

the earliest example of the proverb. Here is another proverbial saying of the same period:

Winter weather and woman's thought
 And Lord's love changeth oft,
 This is the sooth, if it be sought

ending with the burden containing another ancient proverb:

For service is not heritage.

In what masculine company would such a Carol as this be found inappropriate ? :

*Care away away away
Care away for evermore*

All that I may swink or sweat
My wife it will both drink and eat
And I say aught she will me beat
Careful is my heart therefore.

If I say aught of her but good
She look on me as she were wode
And will me clout about the head
Careful is my heart therefore.

If any man have such a wife to lead
He shall know how '*judicare*' came in the Creed
Of his penance God do him meed
Careful is my heart therefore.

the last stanza containing a delightful equivalent for 'putting the fear of God into one.'

Rightly, Dr. Greene sums up: 'The hermit-saint, the musical theorist, the imitator of classical poetry, none of these sequestered religions could have given us the Carol or its Latin counterpart the *cantilena*. The Latin lyrics in lighter vein were valuable agents in transmitting the popular influence which shows itself in burdens and triply-rimed stanzas, but they were not prime movers. Behind them, as behind the vernacular lyrics of Europe, is the song of the unlettered people, shaped by the physical conditions of its performance—to wit, the relentlessly regular periodicity of the dance and the opposition of leader and chorus.'

STUART WILSON.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

FOR the rest of the session Government business will absorb all the time available in the House of Commons, and no progress can be made there with private members' Billst Mr. A. P. Herbert's Divorce Bill will therefore, to the regret of many, not get a second reading. The annual statistics of the Courts give to many the impression that the marriage bond in this country is being weakened and that divorce and laxity in 'morals' is a mark of modern times. The Homilies appointed in 1562 to be read in churches do not confirm this belief. The 11th Homily refers to 'divorces which nowadays be so commonly accustomed and used by men's private authority, to the great displeasure of God, and the breach of the most holy knot and bond of matrimony.' It refers to loose-living 'grown to such a height that in a manner among many it is counted no sin at all but rather a pastime, a dalliance, and but a touch of youth; not rebuked, but winked at; not punished, but laughed at.' The Golden Age of episcopal imagination recedes upon investigation into a more distant past.

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A young member of Parliament (Mr. C. Taylor) with a nice historical sense, speaking recently on the Foreign Office vote, quoted from *The World Whirlegigge*, by Robert Hayman, who died about 1631¹:

Plenty breeds Pride; Pride, Envy;
Envy, Warre.
Warre, Poverty; Poverty, humble Care.
Humility breeds Peace and Peace breeds Plenty.
Thus, round the World doth rowle alternately.

But it is far older than that.

¹ It was published in 1625 in *Quodlibets*, late come from 'New Britaniola, Old Newfoundland, by R. H. Sometimes, Governor of the Plantation there.'

It was found in Welsh in *The Myrian Archaeology of Wales*, and there ascribed to St. Cadoc (sixth century). The translation of the Welsh version is :

Poverty begets Effort; Effort begets Success; Success begets Wealth; Wealth begets Pride; Pride begets Strife; Strife begets War; War begets Poverty; Poverty begets Peace: Peace born of Poverty, begets Effort; Effort again begets Success, and the round continues as before.

There are many other old versions. One of the oldest, said to be derived from the fifteenth-century manuscript, reads :

Peace maketh Plenty, Plenty maketh Pride, Pride maketh Plea [pleasure], Plea maketh Poverty, Poverty maketh Peace.

Our forefathers wasted no time in seeking a 'solution' of the problem, as though it was a mathematical puzzle that could be solved by the application of the right formula. They murmured '*solvitur ambulando*,' and sought with some success to take the next step along the dark road which their forefathers had trod. They faced the future boldly and without fear; the civilisation we have inherited from them is not what we wish it to be, but, by whatever test we apply, it is superior to any of its forerunners. What we need to-day is fewer scare headlines, less oratory, and more confidence in ourselves and in human nature.

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'A translator,' said Dr. Johnson, 'should not lackey by his author, but mount up beside him.' There are few words in common use for which there are identical equivalents for all purposes in other tongues. The Parisian lady who, on seeing a calf, said '*Quel malheur que ça devient vache*,' would not have regretted that it would one day be a bull. The word '*vache*' is a term of abuse commonly applied to gendarmes by young revolutionaries who court imprisonment. '*La volonté générale est toujours droite*,' wrote Rousseau: he did not mean that the people were always right, but that the expression of their will was direct—*simpliste*. I have taken both these examples from Hilaire Belloc's *Taylorian Lecture of 1931 On Translation*, now, alas, out of print. But it is unnecessary to look further afield than the daily Press for modern instances.

Almost every day one finds *les gâtés et tristesses de la traduction contemporaine*—schoolboy howlers—in the versions which appear in the English newspapers. A signal example is that of the French reply to the German Memorandum, published on April 9 (I refer to the version reproduced in *The Times*). *Under the empire of necessity*, as a rendering of *sous l'empire de la nécessité*, might possibly be passed as the poor effort of a translator of woefully limited resources. And so might *One is forced to note* for *Force est bien de constater*; *to disinterest herself in* for *se désintéresser de*; *would be equivocal* for *se ferait dans l'équivoque*; *misery* for *misère*; *the double necessity* for *la double nécessité*: these, and others of the kind that might be cited from the same version, deplorable as they are, are not of a nature to do any harm; however infelicitous, barbarous or solecistic the English may be, not all of the original meaning is lost beyond recovery. But this ceases to be the case when *que l'Allemagne a entendu détruire* is translated by *which Germany saw fit to destroy*. This is nothing less than a stupid blunder: the French never said that the Germans 'saw fit' to destroy the system of security. Then we read of 'abusive interference on the part of States'; but the English *abusive* is not at all the same thing as the French *abusif*. The pearl of this collection, however, is *mortal rivalry* offered as an equivalent of *rivalité mortelle*. The English here, as every schoolboy, and even schoolgirl, probably knows, conveys an idea almost the opposite of the French which it is supposed to represent. If the rivalry were really mortal—in other words, perishable—in so far it would cease to be perilous.

Again, on May 1 *The Times*, reproducing an important pronouncement of Marshal Pétain's on the present state of France, which he considered to be desperate, represented him as saying that what was supremely needed in a crisis such as this was *national unity*. This quite obscured the force of *rassemblement national*, rapped out with laconic energy by the Marshal when asked for his advice; evidently the translator did not know that *rassemblement* was a common army word of command meaning 'fall in': the Marshal was not content to recommend any such vague thing as 'unity.'

An even worse error occurs in the version given, on April 14, of M. Laval's declarations in the *Moniteur* of Clermont-Ferrand. Here M. Laval is represented as having

said that 'France has been deceived by Great Britain's attitude'—a statement which amounts to a very grave charge against England, and one little calculated to ease the unfortunate tension existing between the two countries. But M. Laval said nothing of the sort; what he did say was: '*En France, on a été déçu de l'attitude de l'Angleterre,*' which simply means that England had disappointed the French. When mistranslation reaches these limits, it is more than ridiculous—it is dangerous. Such a mistake not only gives a false impression of France in England; it makes it possible for French critics to say that the English Press deliberately seeks to create such an impression by publishing completely inaccurate versions of the utterances of statesmen of the standing of M. Laval.

It is only fair to say that errors of this sort are not infrequent in the French Press. Some of the most comical misrepresentations of England are contained in articles from reporters specially sent across the Channel to study what are called our national reactions. One would have thought that a preliminary qualification for this office would have been at least a working knowledge of our national speech; but often the reporter does not possess an acquaintance with even the rudiments. For instance, a few months ago one of these gentlemen, M.-H. Claudet, of *Candido*, no doubt wishing to show his readers how infallibly skilful he was as a translator, betrayed himself by naively putting side by side certain English expressions and what he conceived to be the French equivalents of them. He did not even know that the parliamentary *Hear! Hear!* is not properly rendered in French by *Ecoulez! Ecoulez!* And yet he was supposed to be competent to give an accurate account of the thoughts and feelings of all sorts and conditions of the inhabitants of Great Britain.

The other day the *Action Française*, speaking of the assault on M. Blum's car, flew into a vituperative temper because, it said, *The Sphere* 'had dared' to write that '*plusieurs Camelots du Roi avaient été chargés de participer à cette attaque.*' *The Sphere* did not say that these stalwarts had been instructed or commissioned (*chargés*) to take part in this onslaught; it simply said that they had been 'charged with participation in the assault.' *The Action Française* did not know that this

meant they had been accused, etc., and could not possibly have any other meaning. I understand, however, the *Action Française* had the grace to admit and rectify the mistake.

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The official translation of the Treaty of Locarno, for which the Foreign Office is responsible, is a further example of the pitfalls that await those who rely upon even official translations:

Article IV. 2:

Dès que le Conseil de la Société des Nations aura constaté qu'une telle violation ou contravention a été commise, il en donnera sans délai avis aux Puissances

As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers

This is a bad translation; why not 'it will give notice thereof'? The word 'finding' has no place in the French text.

Article IV. 3:

En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du présent traité ou de contravention flagrante aux articles 42 ou 43 du Traité de Versailles par l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes, chacune des autres Puissances contractantes s'engage dès à présent à prêter immédiatement son assistance à la partie contre laquelle une telle violation ou contravention aura été dirigée dès que ladite Puissance aura pu se rendre compte que cette violation constitue un acte non provoqué d'agression

In case of a flagrant violation of article 2 of the present treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression

Here it was essential to translate *Puissances* and *Puissance* by the same word, to avoid confusion—such as has in fact

arisen—as to the meaning of *ladite Puissance*. Some learned societies wisely insist on retaining Latin as the *lingua franca* of science; it has proved as flexible an instrument of expression as any other tongue, but has not survived widely. Acts of Parliament are often incomprehensible even by judges; the Chancellor of the Exchequer wisely declines to translate even one clause into plain English. How hard the task of those who seek in the constituencies to explain what the experts find it so difficult to define in terms!

* * * * *

The impression left on the public mind by the evidence given at the inquiry into alleged leakages of information regarding the contents of the Budget took me back to Suetonius (Bk. VIII.), who thus describes an incident in the life of the Emperor Vespasianus, of whom he writes:

erat enim dicatitatis plurimae, etsi scurrilis et sordidae. . . . Reprehendenti filio Tito, quod etiam urinae² vectigal commentus esset, pecuniam ex prima pensione admovit ad nares, sciscitans num odore offenderetur; et illo negante: 'Atqui,' inquit, 'e lotio est.'

The passage is best left untranslated: the moral is clear enough.

ARNOLD WILSON.



own in Paris to this day as 'Vespasianus.'

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