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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JULY 1936.

THE ROOT OF THE MISCHIEF.

JOHN BRIGHT told a friend in the year 1850 that he was in "desperate puzzle what to do" about the Hungarian question, which was then exciting the public. He and Cobden were taking a leading part in the reception of Kossuth in England, but, while honouring the patriotic exile, they were extremely uneasy at the dispatch of British ships to the Dardanelles to stiffen the Turks in their refusal to surrender Hungarian rebels against Austrian rule at the dictation of Russia. They were agreed that Kossuth deserved a hero's welcome, but the principle of non-intervention, to which they were both wedded, required that he should not be encouraged to think that he would be assisted by British arms. Bright solved the problem by attending the reception and then shortly afterwards making a speech in which he pointed out that "by perfecting our own institutions, by promoting the intelligence, morality and health of our own country, and by treating all other nations in a just and generous and courteous manner we shall do more for humanity than by commissioning Lord Palmerston to regenerate Hungary by fleets in the Black Sea and the Baltic." It was observed at the time that this was cold comfort for Kossuth, who may well have replied that the perfecting of British institutions and the promotion of the intelligence, morality and health of the British people were exceedingly indirect ways of helping Hungarian patriots.

A great many Englishmen, I imagine, felt in the same state of embarrassment as John Bright on this occasion, when Haile Selassie, the Emperor of Abyssinia, landed in England at the beginning of last June. He too deserved all the honours due to a heroic fight against overwhelming odds, but it was doubtful if he had not already been misled by the hope of assistance which never came, and a too effusive sympathy might be interpreted as a pledge to stand by him which was even less likely to be made good. An unqualified pacifist might find the way out by offering this sympathy and explaining that his principles precluded him from doing

more, but for the great majority the occasion was clouded by a certain shame about the past and doubts about the future.

These feelings are well justified, but they will not help us to avoid similar catastrophes in the future unless we are clear in our minds about what has happened, and why it has happened. In the last four years the League of Nations has suffered two serious reverses in its attempts to vindicate its Covenant against the aggression of first-class Powers, the first in the case of Japan, the second in the case of Italy. Both need to be examined.

There was much recrimination after the first failure. It was suggested that if the British Government had taken a firmer stand or if it had acted in closer co-operation with the Government of the United States, Japan would have submitted. Some Labour critics of the Government gave it to be understood that if they had been in power, they would have gone the whole length of making war on Japan, when she persisted in occupying Manchuria. I do not believe they would have done so, or that any concerted action short of war by the British and American Governments would have influenced the Japanese. Everything that has since happened in the Far East leads to the conclusion that they are—for the time being—absolutely convinced of the impregnability of their naval and military position and of their ability to defy the Western Powers. What is more, they have serious ground for that belief. When, as a consolation to Japan for the loss of the British Alliance, the Powers assembled at the Washington Conference undertook not to provide themselves with advanced fortified bases in the Far East, they made her coercion by naval or military means all but a physical impossibility. To attack her without naval bases or repairing stations would have been a tremendous hazard for even the most powerful fleets, and it was beyond all reason to suppose that either the British or the American Government would undertake it even for so good a cause as the vindication of the League Covenant.

This situation may not endure, but if we attribute it to a mere failure of diplomacy or pusillanimity on the part of the Western Powers, we shall go astray. Briefly stated, the truth about the Japanese affair is that up to the last moment the Powers composing the League had confidently believed

that Japan would yield to their remonstrances, and that when she did not, the task of coercing her was beyond their capacity. Fault may be found with the diplomacy which led up to this impotent conclusion, but we are building on a false foundation if we suppose that Governments will or can make sacrifices of the order which the coercion of Japan would have required at the call of the League or in defence of its principles.

We speak of the League as composed of "fifty nations," but on these critical occasions very few of its members count. This is not because the others are lacking in zeal or goodwill, but because they either do not possess the necessary forces or because they are too remote from the scene of action. For the purpose of coercing Japan, Great Britain was to all intents and purposes the League; she alone had the force necessary even to start on that operation, and upon her must have fallen practically the whole of its risk and cost, with a possibility, though by no means a certainty, of American assistance. In the case of Italy, there were two Powers that counted, France and Great Britain, and unquestionably they had between them an abundance of naval and military power to bring Signor Mussolini to reason provided they kept step and acted promptly and energetically. They did not do so, but this time for causes peculiar to Europe, which were equally fatal to effective action.

From the beginning the two Powers had divergent views about the main objectives of their policies. The British regarded fidelity to the League and vindication of the Covenant against the Italian aggressor as objects of intrinsic importance to be pursued independently of all other purposes. This cause kindled a real emotion in the British mind, which thought of "collective security" through the League as the way of salvation, the way to be followed in all circumstances. The French acknowledged their legal obligation to the League, but regarded the coercion of Italy as no more than a hateful necessity, a necessity in order to avoid a breach with Great Britain, but hateful, in so far as it alienated Italy, who after great efforts had just been conciliated and brought within the Franco-British-Russian orbit at the Stresa Conference. As the French saw it, there were two treaty-breakers, Hitler and Mussolini, and of the two Hitler was far the more dangerous. Any action, therefore, that destroyed the unity of the League which would presently be needed to deal with Hitler was in

their view highly impolitic, however repugnant to League principles Mussolini's proceedings might be. We might argue that Mussolini's act in falling on a defenceless fellow-member of the League was much more heinous than Hitler's in defying the Treaty of Versailles, but the latter touched French security, and the former did not.

The sequel followed from this initial divergence. The time to restrain Signor Mussolini was in the spring of 1935, when he had begun to proclaim his intention of invading Abyssinia, but was not yet committed to it. This, unfortunately, was also the time of the Stresa Conference, and in the French view it was inexpedient to let so uncomfortable a subject as the threatened act of aggression break in on the delicate business of adjusting French, British and Italian relations. There was, therefore, silence about it among the principals, though some interchange of views between the Permanent Officials who accompanied them. Diplomacy has its own code of signals; and Signor Mussolini appears to have inferred from this way of handling the question that he would not be seriously challenged if he went forward. Forward he went, and before the summer ended was so deeply committed to his enterprise that he could not have yielded to the remonstrances of the League except at the gravest risk to his own position, and might well commit some desperate act if pushed too far.

Accordingly the League, which for this purpose meant France and Britain, compromised on a mild form of sanctions which needed a long period of time to make it operative. The effect of this was to speed up the Abyssinian campaign and afford the Italians an excuse for the bombing and gassing which brought it to a conclusion before the rains set in. The experts, who advised the League, appear to have greatly miscalculated the effect of these modern weapons upon a primitive people. Instead of being the long, dangerous and heroic enterprise that they predicted, the military part of the Italian expedition proved to be little more than a procession of tanks, armoured cars and engineering appliances under a screen of bombs and gas, with a loss of life less than in almost any skirmish in the Great War.

Signor Mussolini, in fact, outwitted and out-manceuvred the League at every point. In the circumstances nothing else was to be expected. The "sanctions" applied to him

were vexatious but not dangerous, and they had a considerable offset in that they enabled him to whip up opinion in his own country by representing Italy to be the victim of a jealous persecution at the hands of Great Britain. When the possibility of war came in sight, Great Britain reassured him by announcing that she would not fight single-handed, and France by letting it be known that she would not fight at all. The collective principle was thus its own undoing, and from the beginning of the year the road to Addis Ababa was open and clear.

If we apply the pre-war diplomatic tests—those of the so-called "old diplomacy"—to these proceedings, they must be pronounced execrable. The League had no common diplomatic front; its principal members, France and Britain, made separate and often unconcerted communications to Italy which made the game of dividing them ridiculously easy. Signor Mussolini knew just how far they would go and within what limits he could pursue his enterprise. The old diplomacy would at least have kept him in a state of suspense, and even if it failed to stop him would probably have obtained a settlement—much on the Hoare-Laval lines—which would have saved something out of the wreck for everybody, including the Abyssinians. This it could have accepted on its own assumptions without disgrace and even with credit, whereas the Hoare-Laval settlement was rightly judged to be a defeat for the League. For the time being the League has landed us in an *impasse* in which it has failed to make its principles prevail and yet has vetoed any compromise falling short of them; a position in which the idealist cries out against the withdrawal of sanctions or any recognition of the accomplished fact in Abyssinia, and worldly wisdom protests against the continuance of measures which exasperate without effecting their object. We are thus in danger of losing the advantages of ordinary diplomacy without gaining any of the benefits of the new order.

If for one moment we try to get behind words and appearances, we shall find that in both these leading cases—the case of Japan and the case of Italy—"collective security" meant in the last resort Great Britain. There was no other League Power but Great Britain which could have coerced Japan, and when the question arose of pushing sanctions against Italy beyond the point of peaceful pressure, she alone

showed any zeal in the cause. But however zealous she might be, Great Britain was in a serious difficulty. If she had led where her partners refused to follow and had taken upon herself to coerce Italy, she would have broken the League as effectively in this way as any other. The war which would have followed would have been not a League war but a British-Italian war, and would almost certainly have been judged by the world to be a clash between British and Italian imperialism. In the end she paid for her zeal in the good cause by having to bear almost the whole of the discredit for its failure, when it failed. Here the practical and the ethical became sadly entangled. British public men, British newspapers, and British bishops and clergy used language about the delinquency of Italy which could ill be adjusted to the cautious qualification accompanying it that we should not fight single-handed. In the cause thus described, the cause of righteousness and justice, there seemed to be no room for this reserve; the policeman on the track of a criminal cannot stand still until another policeman appears on the scene. The general judgment was that Great Britain, who had used the highest language, had suffered the heaviest defeat; and if the standards of absolute right and wrong can be applied to the conduct of nations, it is difficult to gainsay this judgment.

Burke said that it is a great part of wisdom to know how much of an evil it is necessary to tolerate, and in the present state of the world it is impossible to shut statesmanship off from this kind of expediency. However Signor Mussolini's offences might be characterised, and whatever retribution they may deserve *dentro al consiglio divino*, it was necessary in the end to decide whether to leave him unpunished or to risk the incalculable consequences—in the present state of Europe—of making war with him, was the greater evil. It was a detestable choice and not made easier by the shouts of triumph raised by those who had espoused the Italian cause, but the choice of the lesser evil was in the end imperative. Europe at the present time is in no condition to risk new experiments in the application of force.

But let us be under no delusion. The League has suffered a disastrous defeat and we shall not re-establish it unless this time we go to the root of the mischief. The plain fact behind all the appearances is that there is not as yet the

necessary foundation of mutual confidence to enable the nations to devote themselves with an undivided mind to any object conceived as a common interest. Not aggressive nationalism, but cautious regard for their own safety prevails with the principal League Powers. The French have been much blamed for their half-heartedness in the affair of Italy and Abyssinia, but it was beyond reason to expect that with the formidable situation developing on the Rhine they would pledge themselves unreservedly to the cause of the League against Italy. So long as potentially the greatest military Power in Europe stands outside the League and is suspected of watching for any opportunity to assert itself, the League will not be a supreme cause with any of its neighbours except in some emergency that affects their own interest. It was put to the French that if they were not energetic in support of the League against Italy, they would not be able to rely on it to support them against Germany, to which they replied that their entanglement in the Italian affair was precisely the opportunity for which Herr Hitler was waiting. When presently he marched his troops into the demilitarised Rhineland, they claimed to have been more than justified, and wished to know why we thought it essential to apply sanctions to Signor Mussolini but objected to their being applied to Herr Hitler. This was not an easy question to answer to the satisfaction of Frenchmen.

We may think French fears to be exaggerated, but while this atmosphere exists it is useless to expect that the nations will dedicate themselves impartially to the principles of the League or the maintenance of collective security. Thus, the first thing necessary if we are to re-establish the League is to heal the feud between France and Germany, and Germany and her eastern neighbours, and without it no reforms or changes in machinery will avail. After, as before, the war the central source of mischief in Europe is the schism between France and Germany, and from that springs nearly all other mischief. France, Germany and Great Britain in mutually friendly relations could secure the peace of Europe, and make the League of Nations a powerful instrument for the settlement of disputes and the disarmament that would follow. In the hope of this event the League must at all costs remain alive. But while France and Germany are in mutually hostile relations it is idle to suppose that the former will regard as

other than quite secondary any question affecting a third Power which may come before the League, or that Germany will refrain from seeking her advantage from any emergency with which the League may be faced. It is a misnomer in such circumstances to speak of "collective" security, for on nearly all issues League action means British action, and if Britain is unequal to the burden, the League fails.

Mr. Eden, therefore, is quite right in pursuing indefatigably his researches into Herr Hitler's overtures for an all-round European settlement. To build a bridge between France and Germany is now as before the war the special task indicated for British statesmanship, and there are grounds for hoping that the Germans have studied pre-war history sufficiently to understand and avoid the mistakes which doomed it to failure in the former years. To leave the Italian question alone while this line is developed and to seek its solution in the all-round European settlement which must be the aim of all the Governments is imperative good sense. Whether we like it or not, we cannot imagine any prudent man wishing to add a fresh *démarche* against Italy to the other troubles of Europe.

Too much stress is laid on rearmament as a contribution to collective security. According to all measurement of armed strength hitherto accepted the joint power of France and Great Britain was overwhelming against Italy, and no addition to our strength which we were at all likely to have made, if we had increased instead of diminishing our armaments in recent years, would have affected this result. What weighed with the two Governments was the uncertainty which hangs over the whole world as to the efficacy of the old armaments in the new conditions of air-power. The fear that battleships may be sunk, docks and harbours destroyed, cities laid waste, and innocent people poisoned by thousands and tens of thousands by attacks from the air may be exaggerated, but there has so far been no decisive test of it, and no one wishes to be the subject of the first experiment. I do not think the French can be blamed if they were unwilling to expose their coasts to be bombed for the sake of Abyssinia, or either we or they, if we shrank from the thought of pouring reprisals upon the ancient and beautiful cities of Italy. Any false bravado on this subject seems to me highly undesirable. There is a new kind of fear hanging over the world, and it introduces an element of blackmail which is new to diplomacy.

It is difficult to do impartial justice when judge and defendant are both sitting in a powder magazine, and the latter is well provided with matches. I believe this to be the penultimate stage before the abolition of war, but a world accustomed from the beginning of time to think of war as a legitimate instrument of policy takes time to adjust itself to the new conditions. In the interval it is all-important to avoid an explosion, but we shall scarcely do this if all weighing of lesser against greater evils, all concessions to expediency, are to be ruled out in the name of a principle which is not yet established. To establish mutual confidence, to get rid of the element of terror, is the first task in front of us, and it is useless and dangerous to act as if it were already accomplished.

J. A. SPENDER.

ROOSEVELT VERSUS LANDON.

THE choice of Governor Alfred M. Landon as the Republican candidate to oppose President Roosevelt in the November election is an event in the genuine American tradition. It was, however, unusual, because Mr. Landon had acquired a large body of press and popular support in advance of the party convention, although a few months ago he was unknown to the American public, and because also, in a gathering of delegates which seemed likely to be the scene of a many-sided faction fight, the hostile minorities melted away as soon as the bargaining among the State delegations began. The Governor of Kansas in his new eminence may be taken as indicative of the present condition of the Republican party, so remarkably different from its triumphant power half a dozen years ago. Mr. Hoover and Senator Borah, for example, the only Republicans of national and international standing in the field, could make no showing at all in the Cleveland convention; and as a consequence the electoral battle of 1936 will be a duel between two men who, as regards political experience and personal endowment, are more strikingly contrasted than any presidential candidates known to the America of our time. Franklin D. Roosevelt is one of the most celebrated men in the world. His opponent is a Middle-Western business man, whose public life has been wholly restricted to the agricultural State over which he has presided for three years. His nomination proclaims once more the unchanging American principle that any native-born youth may aspire to the headship of the Republic.

During the three-quarters of a century since the Civil War presidential elections have fallen roughly into two classes—those managed smoothly by the dominant party machine, and those which have turned upon the personality of an explosive leader. Periods of dominance by the Republicans have usually seen the return of a man chosen on account of his party regularity. Theodore Roosevelt was the only Republican President who could not be so described. With this single exception it has been the Democrats who have provided the storm-centres, in candidates who awakened the passions of the electorate—Bryan, Wilson, Al Smith. Franklin Roosevelt is in the same category, and a grave fact of the present contest is the extraordinary ferocity with which he is

being assailed. This it is which more than anything else underlines the central contradiction of the President's second candidature. His opponents have entered the campaign admitting that, unless some utterly unpredictable stroke of fortune should be theirs, they cannot beat the President in November. The fear of defeat has come upon them in the past six months. At the end of 1935 Republican hopes were running high, for the common belief was that Mr. Roosevelt was, as they say, slipping fast. Those hopes, however, began to ebb after an event which at least one powerful section of the party believed would prove to be a beginning of the end for the President.

On January 20th there was held the banquet of the Liberty League, at which Al Smith made a calculated assault upon Mr. Roosevelt in a broadcast address that provoked more debate than any speech in Washington since the time of Woodrow Wilson. It seemed to portend a great schism in the Democratic ranks, but was almost immediately recognised as marking a fresh start for the President in the country. No one in America is able fully to explain these tides of popular feeling, and yet in the present case the reasons are not so obscure as the press comments implied. The series of crushing judgments by the Supreme Court have virtually destroyed the structure of the New Deal but, so far as can at present be seen, they have not damaged Mr. Roosevelt's standing with the American people. He has stood up under a succession of blows such as no previous President has had to endure. His spirit is certainly not broken, his courage apparently is unimpaired. And it may be noted in this connection that, so long as the President finds himself able at the regular press conferences in the White House to confront the hardest group of correspondents in the world (the majority representing anti-Roosevelt papers), there cannot be much danger that tendentious gossip concerning an alleged loss of mental grip will be widely believed. Two further reasons, of perhaps equal importance, for the President's recovered position may be mentioned. The first is the continuance of improved business conditions—partial no doubt, and insecure, but undeniable; and the second is to be found in the state of the opposition party, its confused counsels and extraordinary lack of leadership. In the later months of 1935 optimistic Republicans were heard on all sides declaring that with a

fairly good candidate (or even, as Mr. H. L. Mencken and some others said, with any candidate) they could unseat the President. They might, I believe, have maintained this belief if, following upon the most impressive of the Supreme Court judgments—that upon the Agricultural Adjustment Act—they could have agreed upon a presidential candidate of national standing, proved competence, and unimpeachable record. So far, however, were the leading Republicans, East and West, from being able to do this, that since the opening of the campaign they have been to all intents and purposes echoing the lament of the rank and file: “We haven’t got a man!” The situation is unparalleled. The great Republican party has often enough been content to nominate and elect a candidate of average abilities; but never before, I believe, has a similar confession of bankruptcy been made by the party which, for so long the most powerful political organisation in the world, was once described by its most eminent elder statesman, Mr. Elihu Root, as alone fit to govern. In June 1936 the nominating Convention of this famous party met in Cleveland, confessedly defeatist in temper and prepared to accept whichever candidate might emerge from the conflict of regional and sectional interests.

And yet nothing in the proceedings of the Cleveland convention was more noteworthy than the smoothness of the nomination. The bulk of the press correspondents were convinced that “the Kansas Coolidge” was assured of the nomination. His supporters, with their badges and vaudeville demonstrations, behaved from the outset as though there would be no contest, and they were fully justified in doing so. Mr. Landon was accorded the tribute of a virtually unanimous vote. The proceedings covered four days. They were universally described as tiresome and unreal, and, although the Republican Old Guard was engaged throughout in a desperate effort to dictate the platform and keep control of the party machine, a marked feature of the assembly was the absence of any dominating party boss. Governor Landon was not the choice of the bosses or of those powerful elements for which Mr. Hoover had been energetically at work. His position was made by the newspapers, and to a considerable extent by the Hearst Press, the repute of which, by general consent, has never been lower than it is to-day. Mr. Landon, it is clear, will need to decide before the autumn

whether he can afford the discredit that is inseparable from this most embarrassing ally. In addition to the relative freedom from boss control there was one other feature of the Cleveland assembly that should be noted—namely, the absence of oratory. Here is a development which, as we can see, must bring to an end the wonderful and elaborate ritual as practised in all party conventions from a time long anterior to the classic description in Bryce’s *American Commonwealth*. If either Senator Steiwer, who delivered the keynote address, or Mr. Hoover, upon whom the delegates bestowed a prolonged and rapturous farewell, had been able to command the resources of the spell-binder the convention might have been storm-swept. But neither of them counted in terms of personality. In America for the time being political rhetoric has ceased to work. The microphone and the ghost-writer have been joined to other agencies of the hour for the destruction of the rostrum as an institution. The broadcast speech is as yet without an effective technique and, moreover, the radio listener becomes increasingly sceptical as to the authorship of any political discourse that comes over the air, except in the case of President Roosevelt himself. The style and accent of the White House are not suspect on this account.

Mr. Roosevelt has rendered many services to his country, and not least is the shattering effect he has had upon the established party system. In the whole wide world of party organisation there has been nothing quite so strange, and nothing so extensive, as the old division of thirty or forty millions of American voters into Democrats and Republicans. The party which was originally called Democratic Republican, a recent biographer of Thomas Jefferson remarks, became known as Democratic. But one party is not more baffling than the other in its composition or inclusions. The Democratic label has been attached to Alfred E. Smith and Mr. J. W. Davis, the former Ambassador to England, to Franklin Roosevelt and the late Huey Long; while on the other hand, Mr. Hoover and Senator Borah, Mr. Andrew Mellon and Senator Hiram Johnson of California have all alike been representative Republicans. It is true that nearly all the older Democrats who are widely known in the United States are now against the President; and as to the Democrats of the New Deal, Senator Carter Glass of Virginia has angrily declared: “Why, Thomas Jefferson would not speak to these people

except to denounce them." That is true enough. But what, on the other hand, could Jefferson have to say to the many prominent men of the opposite party, identified with those monopolist interests which were to him the great evil of American society, if he could hear them to-day, in their rage against a Democratic President, reiterating certain Jeffersonian sayings, deferring to his authority as though they had at last come to recognise in him a truer and greater embodiment of the American principle than Alexander Hamilton, and proclaiming as their own the basic Democratic doctrine of States' Rights? Such examples as these illustrate the remarkable change which has come over the party scene since Mr. Roosevelt was elected, while the enormous enrolment of Democrats in the primaries would seem to imply that the heavy Republican losses are making an end of the regular majority position enjoyed by that party until 1932.

This achievement is, for better or worse, Mr. Roosevelt's own. It would not have been possible to any leader unless he were ready to disregard party labels (as the President did in forming his Cabinet) and to experiment with policies which had not previously come within the range of his party associates, or even been heard of by most of them. Certainly Mr. Roosevelt has been startlingly independent of the commitments of his own party. The Democratic platform in the year of his election contained no hint of the New Deal experiments, and in fact was a document which, in the most specific terms, condemned by implication nearly all the policies now regarded by the public as Rooseveltian. The Democrats in 1932 adopted a platform which was notable alike for brevity, definiteness and conservative progressivism. It demanded economy in administrative expenditure and a balanced budget, and in his campaign speeches Mr. Roosevelt condemned the Hoover Administration for its spendthrift character. Four years afterwards, of course, this accusation sounds ridiculous. Mr. Roosevelt, moreover, provided a rod for himself by announcing that he looked upon the party platform as a covenant to be observed by the new Administration, and then—as his opponents scornfully assert—he forgot all about it. This charge can scarcely be rebutted, and there is no doubt that the President's opponents will strive to make the most of it: notwithstanding that, as Mr. Shane Leslie lately reminded us, every President has repudiated his pre-election pledges since

Lincoln in 1860 promised not to interfere with slavery. But as a matter of fact it will not be possible to pretend that the present campaign could be fought upon platforms genuinely opposed to one another, since Republican candidates in all parts of the country will be fighting the Democrats by offering New Deals not materially different from the Rooseveltian. And in one State after another the old party alignment will be treated as non-existent. Some millions of citizens will this year vote for the re-election of Franklin Roosevelt, knowing his policy and the record of his Administration, whereas in 1932 they voted for him in order to record their resentment against Mr. Hoover and their insistence upon a change. There will, as always, be a vast amount of mechanical voting, but unless all the evidences are misleading, we may see for the first time in America some approach to a division between Conservatives and Liberals or Progressives. And one more point in this connection. Mr. Roosevelt, while breaking the old alignment, has virtually ensured the continuance, for the time being, of a two-party system. There has been no little of the customary talk this year of a new third party, in addition to the Socialists who, of course, constitute the permanent if still very small third party. That able and devoted New Yorker, Mr. Norman Thomas, is once again the Socialist nominee. His poll will be insignificant, since his supporters in the ranks of organised Labour are, of necessity, few in number. And, once again also, the hopes of a new political organisation made up of Labour in the East and the insurgent agrarian vote in the West have had to be abandoned. Mr. Roosevelt makes an end of those ever-recurrent hopes. In 1936, as in 1932, the mass of farmers and urban workers may be expected to cast their votes for the saving of the Democratic President.

The opinion, first expressed by Mr. James A. Farley, Postmaster-General and head of the Democratic party machine, that the election of this year would be the dirtiest on record, has been everywhere repeated in America. It can hardly be accurate, for the annals of the United States contain many campaigns in which the frontiers of decency have been mercilessly violated; but that the campaign is to be exceptionally malignant no observer can doubt. "They Hate Roosevelt" was the title given to his article in *Harper's Magazine* for May by Mr. Marquis Childs, an able representative of Middle-Western journalism. His analysis of a most

singular aspect of the presidential conflict is entirely accurate and not a little disturbing. Mr. Childs is concerned with the existence of a widespread bitterness which those whose knowledge of America goes back to the war would liken to the mass hatred of which President Wilson was the victim. In the case of Mr. Roosevelt, one would say, the political enmity and personal malice are almost universal among the professional and employer classes which, speaking generally, were free from any strong feeling of hostility towards the head of the nation during the twelve years between the collapse of Woodrow Wilson and the depression that caused the fall of Mr. Hoover. By these classes Mr. Roosevelt is loathed. I think that all European visitors who travel extensively in the United States would find themselves in agreement with a professor of my acquaintance who, summing up the attitude of business men in Cleveland, said: "The topic for some time past has been outside the field of debate; it is now impossible for conversation." Here is a very curious phenomenon, and perhaps a convincing proof that political memory is not brief but non-existent. For Mr. Roosevelt in 1933-4 certainly rendered great services to his country, services which at the time were enthusiastically applauded, especially by the business world, and might well have been beyond the power of any other leader in that emergency. He entered the White House in America's zero hour. When the banks were closed on March 4th there was hardly a financial or industrial concern in the country that could declare itself sound. There was not an investor, large or small, who could have told what his holding of securities was worth. Confidence in the banking and investment system had disappeared; and more than this, there were millions of American citizens who for the first time in their lives were despairing of the Republic itself.

We could not easily find in the United States anyone who would dispute the accuracy of the foregoing summary, or would wish to deny that the executive acts and general leadership of the President made an immediate change in the emotional climate of America. By his assurance and decisiveness he supplied the one thing needful. The evidences of national recovery were apparent from the first months of his term. Partial and irregular as that recovery was, and, after the outrageous ballyhoo connected with the N.R.A. in which business and the Press co-operated, extremely

disappointing, there could be no denial of the central fact—that American industry and business have in the past three years offered a spectacle that is strikingly in contrast with the stagnation and despair of 1932-3. "That is so," the President's opponents would reply, if they were moderate, "but look at his reckless relief projects, his prodigal expenditure, his hit-or-miss finance, his defiance of the Constitution," while those who make no claim to moderation would go on to denounce Mr. Roosevelt on the ground that he is an enemy of the American system and is driving the Federal Government towards (according to the critic's individual standpoint) either Fascism or Communism. Mr. Hoover inclines to the first hypothesis, the Hearst Press and its allies to the second.

The decisive stage of the electoral struggle will begin in September. By that time the fighting qualities of the Republican candidate will have been disclosed, while it should be possible to form a fairly accurate estimate of Mr. Roosevelt's strength in the country. The leaders themselves, we may be sure, will have no part in the odious practices which, as many Americans other than the Postmaster-General are persuaded, cannot be kept out of the campaign. Mr. Roosevelt has no interest in them, and the Governor of Kansas has revealed himself as a modest and good-tempered representative of his order. Alfred Mossman Landon fulfils all the requirements of the traditional candidate for the Presidency—except that his money comes from petroleum, which may be a slight handicap. He is the product of a small-town upbringing, of the Methodist Church and the University of Kansas. By virtue of a brief term of army service in the last months of the War, he is a member of the American Legion. Entirely ignorant of politics, he attained the governorship of his State in 1932, and was fortunate enough to achieve re-election two years later when hardly a Republican could keep his footing in the prairie regions. He is a competent Governor, of the decidedly provincial type, a thorough Middle-Westerner, which means a Conservative with certain progressive leanings.

The delegates *en masse* were for Landon, a man of the prairies. It was the election platform which caused the struggle in the Republican central committee, after Senator Steiwer's keynote speech had seemed to indicate that the party might commit itself to a set of formularies belonging to 1900 or earlier. The official platform, however, is always much

ess important than the one made by the candidate himself under stress of the campaign. The Cleveland document is the usual compromise, but it registers a decided victory for Middle-Western opinion. Senator Borah, personally overwhelmed, was able to insist upon an anti-monopoly plank, an uncompromising re-statement of American isolation and a reference to war-debts. The Republicans stand as of old upon high and hard tariff protection, but it is notable that most of their proposals do not contradict the New Deal. For example, they declare at last for a social-security plan with old-age pensions and unemployment insurance, while they concede the right of labour to bargain collectively—this being the core of that section of the defunct N.R.A. against which Big Business mobilised two years ago with deadly effect. The agricultural clauses, again, include a bounty for soil conservation, which has been the central part of the President's agrarian policy since the Supreme Court destroyed the Agricultural Adjustment Act. A balanced Budget is perforce demanded, but without any suggestion as to how the necessary large-scale economies can be made. Emphasis is laid upon the full responsibility of the separate States for unemployment relief and other social services, so that in this great matter of the powers and rights of the States the Republicans have formally abandoned their historic position and adopted that of the Democratic party. They come out for sound money and no more devaluation of the dollar; and Mr. Landon here, unexpectedly, added "currency expressed in terms of gold and convertible into gold," thus inviting the hostility of Senator Borah. The candidate goes beyond the platform also on labour regulation, a question made urgent by the recent surprising judgment of the Supreme Court invalidating the New York State minimum-wage law. The party approved "laws to abolish sweat-shops and to protect women and children"; and Mr. Landon avers that if such laws are impossible under the Constitution, he is for constitutional amendment to fulfil an obligation which must not be evaded.

The delegates at Cleveland were led to affirm that the platform as approved carried an undertaking by every good Republican candidate to be true to its principles, "as a matter of private honour and public good faith." Nevertheless we may be sure that Governor Landon will be driven in the contest to illustrate the many-sidedness of truth. Republican

candidates everywhere will be called upon to explain the strange unwisdom of the party leaders who resolved to conduct the national convention without attempting to confront the spectre of unemployment. There are to-day certainly not less than 8,000,000 American workers—that is, voters—and their families dependent upon public relief. It is they who will determine the result of the election. Moreover, Mr. Landon and his supporters will be told in all parts of the country that the States cannot but resist the doctrine that the vast burden of unemployment relief should be shouldered by their authorities, rather than by the Federal Government. Nor will they, or the Democrats, be allowed to overlook the newly acknowledged fact of North America—namely, that flood and drought and the advance of soil erosion are proclaiming the relative insignificance of political boundaries drawn for the Federal Union in an earlier and simpler age. Nature makes her own implacable comment upon all such things in a land of continental extent and of terrifying physical change.

These pages are necessarily being written before the Democratic convention meets in Baltimore, so that we do not yet know the lines upon which the President's party is commending the New Deal afresh. The election, however, will not be fought upon platforms or issues of policy. It will turn upon the actions and character of the President alone. Mr. Roosevelt has attained a position of provocative centrality and, by reason of the emptiness of the field, a loneliness such as no American statesman of the past has experienced. He must make his own fight, and he will make it with assurance and gusto in the well-known Rooseveltian manner. He is extraordinarily gifted and resourceful, and his political talent is unexcelled. In the hour of his renomination opponents and adherents alike believe that his re-election is almost certain. But the interval of four months before November 3rd is incalculable, and the President's antagonist is anything but negligible. He is forty-eight years of age, a good acceptable member of the commonalty, a product of the still almost unaltered Middle West, with its small towns and scattered rural communities, from which the most typical Presidents have always come. Landon challenging Roosevelt should mean at least a serviceable and educative combat.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

THE SITUATION IN AUSTRIA.

THE present state of affairs in Austria is definitely clearer and simpler. In my last article (CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, February 1936) I expressed the opinion that serious encounters between the forces round Chancellor Schuschnigg and the Heimwehr were not to be expected. Events have fully justified this view. The severest test we have already stood—the sudden resignation of the Vice-Chancellor, leader of the Fatherland Front and head of a very important para-military formation, to whom several ministers and members of provincial governments are strictly loyal. The fact is that under present conditions every government system possesses an overwhelming static power. The means of which the Government disposes to enforce its will are tremendous, and the universal longing for peaceful development is so strong that private individuals, whatever their influence or following, have very little chance of making a successful stand against the iron will of authority. Even so important a personage as Starhemberg, constantly in the limelight, extolled by many, with powerful social support and an undeniable gift for captivating large popular audiences, has fallen through underestimating the real dynamics of the political forces and indulging in illusions, now destroyed by reality.

An impartial analysis of his character must consider the man apart from his political philosophy which is naturally distasteful to convinced democrats. Even when full allowance is made in this respect he will be pronounced to lack a certain sense of realism, and his steadfastness and clearness of purpose will not be found equal to his impetuous temper. Dash he certainly showed at the commencement of his career. When still a youngster he joined the German Free Corps in Upper Silesia and served as a private in the "Black Reichswehr." He also took part in the Kapp-Putsch. Almost in *condottiere* fashion he began the campaign for the fascisation of Austria, supported by Dr. Seipel and favoured indirectly by all the faults which the Austrian Social Democrats had committed in the heyday of their ascendancy. Already before the time was ripe for such an undertaking, Starhemberg during the chancellorship of Vaugoin had flattered himself with the hope of annihilating the opposition, and this plan was thwarted

only through the heroic resistance of the President of the Police, Dr. Schober. From that time the alliance between the right wing of the Christian-Social party and the Heimwehr grew very close, and there is some justification for saying that Dr. Seipel as well as Dr. Dollfuss with the aid of the Heimwehr combated their own party as far as it clung to democratic and parliamentary principles. Dr. Dollfuss and Starhemberg jointly planned and effected the transition to the corporative and authoritarian system. Jointly they passed the watchword that in the attempt to meet the Nazi threat socialist forces were not to be enlisted, and that in the case of an outbreak there must be a fight to the finish against both adversaries.

When Dr. Dollfuss fell under the bullets of Nazi murderers the bond between the former Christian Socialists and the fascist auxiliaries seemed to become still closer. In the first panicky feeling which had seized the population Starhemberg might have been able to grasp the reins of Government. A *coup d'état* was in the air and the smoke of powder befogged many brains. At that time nothing seemed to matter except the rescue of the country from anarchy and the restoration of law and order. That Starhemberg refrained from making a bid for supreme power and contented himself with the second place in the Government was certainly an act of political wisdom. Broad sections of the population, which were out of sympathy with the extremist factions, also approved of his proclaimed intention to refrain from terroristic repression, from hopelessly embittering the elements of the left, and from overdoing the religious zeal. His journeys to London and Paris seemed to denote a desire to observe for himself the mental outlook of statesmen of a different cast of mind. The sharp refusal which he opposed to all attempts at a hollow compromise with the Nazis, which might have endangered Austria, was also applauded. "Never," he exclaimed, "shall I forget the assassination of Dr. Dollfuss," and all good Austrians felt reassured by what was plainly his genuine conviction.

If these things deserve to be placed to the credit of Prince Starhemberg's political account, the debit side unfortunately presents a serious aspect. He never could bring himself to keep regular hours of work. Highly placed personages frequently complained of their inability to "get at" the Vice-Chancellor and to maintain the official contacts indispensable

for the despatch of important business. Always a "guest" only in his office, a very pleasant person in social intercourse, an excellent sportsman, keen on outdoor exercise, he has so far lacked the stamina which distinguishes the amateur from the expert, the orator from the administrator. A popular orator he certainly is, but this gift is sometimes a danger to him. In private life a quiet and unassuming person, in front of a large audience the atmosphere of the place and the influence which thousands of listeners have on a speaker carry him away, and then he issues "orders" and battle-cries.

This being his nature, he was bound sooner or later to clash with Dr. Schuschnigg, whose principal characteristics are severe austerity, balance in public utterances and untiring industry. This temperamental difference was not irreconcilable in itself. However, not only temperaments clashed but agreement, full and unreserved, in political practice proved impossible. Already, immediately after the Chancellor's departure for Prague, Prince Starhemberg made a serious tactical mistake. Inopportunely, as was presently seen, he placed the monarchical question in the foreground of the political scene. Dr. Schuschnigg could not wish that the move following the first attempt to improve relations with Czechoslovakia should be one which was certain to be received at Prague with particularly painful surprise. Also during Prince Starhemberg's stay in London some of his utterances, well meant as they doubtless were, had to undergo official editorial corrections from Vienna. The Heimwehr leader also disagreed with the policy of the Minister of Social Welfare, Dr. Dobretsberger. Even the tiniest spark of a democratic spirit had to be smothered, avowedly to nip in the bud any bolshevik tendencies. The situation finally became unbearable through the conflict on the question of the disarmament of the para-military formations, through the collision between partisans of the Heimwehr and of the Freiheitsbund on the occasion of a parade of the latter organisation in the streets of Vienna, and through the diplomatic protests of England and France after Starhemberg's telegram to Mussolini.

As regards the disarmament question, the Government rather more than half a year ago had resolved to organise a militia by drafting into such a body the serviceable elements of the Heimwehr, the Ostmärkische Sturmscharen and the Freiheitsbund. The heavy charge which the upkeep of these

para-military formations laid on the treasury and on voluntary contributors could not be borne any longer, nor was the keen competition, which had arisen between the three formations in regard to enlistment, employment and publicist representation, in the best interest of the State. If these forces had been left free play, Austria, after having got rid of the party system, would have returned to it by a roundabout way. Within the Fatherland Front chaos would have developed. The followers of political leaders, by the sheer weight of numbers, might have compelled those leaders to fall out among themselves. To bar contingencies of the kind, the creation of a single militia, formed on the Italian model, was decided, and Prince Starhemberg was foremost in demanding, with dire threats against opponents of the plan, the unconditional amalgamation of the para-military formations. The former Vice-Chancellor, Major Fey, in particular became the object of Starhemberg's anger, obviously because, disliking the idea of the disbandment of Heimwehr troops, he showed no spontaneous inclination to follow Starhemberg in this respect. It was all the more astonishing therefore that Starhemberg himself did not stick to a resolution for which he had made so vigorous a stand. Not only did the organisation of the militia hang fire, but a few weeks before the last Cabinet crisis Starhemberg dramatically proclaimed that only over his dead body could the disarmament of the Heimwehr be carried out. This clearly showed that conflicting convictions and a certain amount of opposition from the ranks of his supporters had unbalanced him, or had at least disgusted him with the old plan. Dr. Schuschnigg showed great patience, continuing the partnership with Starhemberg for many months under the stress of this conflict. However, there was no backing out for the Chancellor if he was not to lose all authority. On the contrary, he had to go a step further: he introduced his military defence scheme, the re-enactment of compulsory service which, in point of fact, makes the existence of all non-statutory armed formations superfluous. At the same time he gave orders for the one-sided disarmament of his Sturmscharen, with the obvious object of setting an example to the Heimwehr and of emphasising their hesitation to redeem a pledge.

This was the real root of the conflict. But there is reason to believe that, in view of Prince Starhemberg's ability to change his mind, the gulf might have been bridged if other incidents

had not further compromised, beyond the hope of repair, the harmony in the Government camp. One of these was the issue by the *Freiheitsbund* of a pamphlet against the *Heimwehr*. The publication created a considerable stir. It should be observed that the *Freiheitsbund*, whose leaders are Herr Stand, president of the Workers Union, and the former member of parliament Herr Kunschak, has among its membership many working men recruited from the former Christian-Social trade unionists and partly also from former Social-Democrats. The *Freiheitsbund*, therefore, is a very democratically-minded (though unfortunately at the same time a rather anti-Jewish) organisation, whose political philosophy is naturally greatly at variance with Prince Starhemberg's fascist creed. Despite the common ground provided by the Fatherland Front both sides frequently resorted to a policy of pin-pricks. A cartoon published in a paper of the *Freiheitsbund*, representing a tank rolling over the emblems of fascism and also depicting a cock—the *Heimwehr* wear cock-feathers in their hats—with its tail sorely plucked, caused the ire of *Heimatschutz* partisans to flare up fiercely. The tension grew to a dangerous point, though the Government showed its disapproval of such demonstrations with extreme vigour. When the *Freiheitsbund* turned out in considerable numbers to parade on the Ringstrasse the *Heimwehr* staged a counter-demonstration and indulged in some booing of the Government. The former minister Fey was seen on a balcony on the Ringstrasse, though he later solemnly affirmed that his presence there was purely fortuitous and not meant as a hostile demonstration. However, only Dr. Schuschnigg's extraordinary courage prevented a serious clash; for the Chancellor decided to march in the ranks of the *Freiheitsbund*, though he is far from sharing all the aspirations of that organisation. Unfortunately, however, *Heimwehr* partisans, taken into custody, were set free again without an observance of the legal forms—so at least it was asserted—and rightly or wrongly the unlawful release was laid to the charge of Prince Starhemberg.

The serious mistakes alluded to above were followed by a final blunder which exhausted the Chancellor's patience. The telegram which Prince Starhemberg sent to Signor Mussolini on the occasion of the proclamation of the Abyssinian Empire referred to "Genevèse hypocrisy," and bitterly

taunted all democratic countries, contrasting them with the States under a fascist régime in a manner most unflattering to the former. Starhemberg may have considered the telegram as a private affair, and as one of his habitual extemporisations. England, France and Rumania took a much graver view of the matter and their diplomatic representatives lodged a protest with the Austrian foreign office. The ill-feeling created by this incident within the Government camp rapidly developed a cabinet crisis. In the cabinet council which sat the whole night the dyarchy instituted by Dr. Dollfuss broke down. The new cabinet was constituted in the early hours of the morning. As had been the case when Dr. Dollfuss abolished parliamentary government and again after the socialist rising, after the attempted Nazi putsch and after the enforced resignation of Major Fey, the central authority gained its point. No hand was raised against it, nobody dared openly grumble at the decision, the *Heimwehr* ministers remained in the cabinet from which their leader had resigned, and one of them, Major Baar-Baarenfels, accepted the Vice-Chancellorship. The *Heimwehr* chiefs received Starhemberg's statement on the situation without refusing their further allegiance to the present system, and Mussolini solemnly assured the Chancellor of his confidence and friendship. Thus one of the most complicated and risky operations of political surgery in Austrian history was accomplished with success. Dr. Schuschnigg acted as Mussolini has repeatedly done when without hesitation he parted company with his best collaborators as soon as the separation seemed necessary or opportune.

The cabinet reconstruction also entailed the withdrawal of some men whom many would have liked to see longer at their posts. The organiser of the Fatherland Front, Colonel Adam, a man of proved ability, has been succeeded by State-Secretary Zernatto, who has made a name in literature and is an excellent speaker, but has still to prove that he possesses all requirements for the successful administration of so gigantic an organisation as the Fatherland Front. The place of Dr. Dobretsberger, Minister of Social Welfare, who held advanced ideas on the subject of labour legislation, has been taken by Dr. Resch who, though slightly more to the right, also possesses the confidence of the working population. Finally, the young and very able Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Strobl, was forced out of the cabinet by the opposition of the National

Peasant Leader Reither. All these changes are of secondary importance compared with the fundamental questions: What will be the policy of the new Government? Will Starhemberg remain content with an unofficial position, accustomed as he is to his vote on all affairs of State carrying equal weight with that of the head of the Government? Will he not be more powerful outside the cabinet than inside, and can a stop be put to the dyarchy in the administration when so many Heimwehr men, accustomed to receive their orders from him, are in Government offices? It is almost certain, however, that the course which Dr. Schuschnigg intends to steer will not in essentials deviate from the policy he has pursued so far. The Heimwehr men cannot think of looking the regular army in the face, even if they wished to. No para-military formation, be it the best drilled and most highly disciplined, can face a regular army with its incomparably superior technical equipment. The Heimwehr men have also cause to hope that, if they peacefully submit to the inevitable, the majority of them will either be drafted into the new militia or given preference when competing for employment in private enterprises. Should Nazi elements or communists have found admission to their ranks, it is plainly more in the interest of the Government that such interlopers should be open enemies rather than disguised as friends.

There is, besides, a major consideration governing Austrian policy, namely that the country to-day is under the same iron law of self-preservation as before the fall of Prince Starhemberg. The political meaning of self-preservation is, above all, protection against the aims of the National Socialists, and Italy alone can lend such protection direct. Political self-preservation, however, also demands the avoidance of all extreme courses and a renunciation of attempts to introduce political systems which are foreign to the spirit of the country. Finally, it presupposes a broad-minded toleration of all schools of thought whose attitude towards the existing status of the country is unreservedly positive. It is with a view to these political necessities that Dr. Schuschnigg contemplates the constitution within the framework of the Fatherland Front of councils composed of representative personages, the object being to provide greater facilities for contact between the leading men and the rank and file of the movement. This is to enable frank discussion and the free formation of an enlightened public opinion.

It is gratifying to record that the Austrian currency has remained perfectly stable. The only drawback is that Austria, unwillingly, has become a creditor country as against Hungary, Germany, Yugoslavia and, in a particularly marked degree, Italy. From the point of view of State finance she has shown amazing powers of resilience, Government revenue in the first quarter of the year having exceeded last year's figure by not less than 51 million schillings and the budget estimate by 22 millions. Not only the produce of the sales tax, always an excellent barometer of economic conditions, has been larger, but personal taxes, long a disappointing item in the financial returns, have yielded more owing to a number of companies having resumed dividend payment after a long interval. The visible import surplus only amounts to about 300 million schillings annually, and this adverse balance is easily covered by invisible exports and the foreign tourist traffic which authorises favourable expectations. Not even the Phoenix affair has been able to shake the economic structure. Thanks to skilful handling by the Government, the consequences of this regrettable business have been circumscribed within relatively narrow limits. It would be untrue, of course, to deny that great hardship still exists in large sections of the population. On the other hand some signs of improvement are in evidence. In the first five months of 1936 more motor-cars were purchased than in the whole of last year, while the number of bicycles bought—about 200,000—is fifty per cent. larger than in the same months of last year.

Despite regrettable conflicts, in the absence of civic liberty and in the midst of grave anxiety regarding the international situation, Austria has shown remarkable forces of resistance. Yet only Mussolini's rapid victory has saved her from a fresh catastrophe. In some countries of Central Europe influences by no means favourable to Austrian independence continue to make themselves felt. Nothing is more urgently to be desired in the interest of Austria than that an agreement between the three Western Powers should be speedily arrived at and that England, as the Power least directly interested in Central Europe, should give a firm lead in support of the existing international status.

ERNST BENEDIKT.

Vienna.

MONSIEUR BLUM AT THE CROSSROADS.

IN the last few years the world—but especially a none too friendly public opinion in England—has begun to identify France with MM. Laval and Flandin and a monetary policy calculated to maintain the franc at any price. The average small man was forgotten. The recent elections have reminded us forcibly of his existence. It is his discontent which elected the Chamber, and it is he who—instead of the usual mass of barristers and other professional men—has been elected to the Chamber in a large number of constituencies and will determine its character.

"The more it alters, the more it remains the same thing." Will that old French proverb be true again? This is not the first but the third time that the co-operation of the parties of the Left has secured for them a majority at the elections. In 1924 and again in 1932 they were victorious; yet they soon succumbed to the difficulties—especially financial and monetary—which their very victory created. As soon as they assembled in Parliament their cohesion dissolved and Cabinets were formed, policies followed, all of which had little to do with the result of the election. The Right Wing joined hands with the Centre, and the result was that "men of the Left" became protagonists of "measures of the Right." The country has clearly shown that it wants a change. It has had enough of the depression. The really remarkable feature of the election was the shift towards the extremes, and not only to the Left. The losers were the Centre, especially the Radical Socialists; the compromises which stultified the electorate's mandate to the Cartel of 1932 were bitterly revenged.

After three weeks of negotiations, panics, rumours and denials, the new Chamber came into being on June 1st, and for the first time the French Cabinet was formed by a Socialist as the representative of the strongest party. Foreign observers who have seen so often the stultification of Left-wing Cabinets, not only in France, in consequence of the economic and financial difficulties which their coming into power evoked, look forward with some scepticism to this new experiment. Recent history has shown that the economic development of the country has a decisive influence upon political evolution in democratic countries. Failure to promote recovery has always been followed by a wreck of the party in power, or even of the

system which it represented. Success on the other hand has made its position almost unassailable. It is obviously more difficult for Socialists or Left-wing parties to succeed than for those who enjoy the backing of the economically most powerful groups instead of being exposed to their hostility. The developments of the last few weeks in France, but especially since the new Government came into being, tend to justify scepticism.

Scarcely was the result of the first ballot of the election known—at which only an absolute majority of votes secures a mandate—than rumours started. The coalition of the Left, the "well-informed" on the Conservative side said, will never hold; its bourgeois elements would not stand down to further Communists in whatever patriotic guise they clothed themselves. They were mistaken and lost the first round, the election. Then the financial crisis—the second round—began. The export of capital threatened to overwhelm the Banque de France, well endowed as it still is with gold. The Government in being, led by a Radical Socialist but of the Right Wing and comprising the whole of the Centre, threatened to resign, refusing to take any drastic measures to embargo the export of gold or to restrict dealings in foreign currencies. Those were measures which they had opposed during their whole term of office. The policies which led to the discontent and their downfall at the polls were only instituted to avoid them. They could hardly be expected to take them at the last moment and thus invite all blame for a dismal failure.

Heartened by their victory over the Conservatives and Fascists, at a moment when an increasing tension in foreign affairs presaged—at least for the foreign onlooker—a popular rally to their opponents, the Left could have waited. In fact the supposed friendliness on the part of the Croix de Feu towards foreign dictators was at least as strong a cause for the success of Socialists and Communists as their newly emphasised patriotism—though in France the revolutionary parties have of old been the most intensely nationalistic. They were not responsible for the deflation. Standing by they had a chance to reap the ultimate fruits of the decisive break with that policy, though that break might seem a catastrophe to many and would therefore still be politically dangerous if it had to be consciously inaugurated. But they did not remain passive. The probable explanation is that M. Blum was

unwilling to form a Cabinet prematurely and in the midst of a panic. He made a speech—which could be interpreted in a way reassuring to the small capitalist, whose fright was the cause of the withdrawals of savings deposits and sales of securities—the rich made their preparations long ago—which was threatening not only the monetary but also the financial structure. The Conservatives speedily took up the clue. M. Blum disclosed almost nothing of his future plans. He said he was hostile to devaluation, but did not suggest in the least that he would demand fresh sacrifices to avoid it. In fact he minimised the importance of monetary matters in general in comparison to the “real problems.” The Press, especially of the Right, nevertheless acclaimed him as the protagonist of sound monetary management; the banking community whole-heartedly co-operated in rendering the export of capital extremely difficult for those who are not well instructed and who do not possess considerable means, and whose safeguard against a depreciation of the franc consists in hoarding foreign banknotes and gold. Selling on the Stock Exchange ceased. The fateful decision was left to the new Chamber and the Government. In the meantime its enemies hope that it will be transfixed between the horns of the old dilemma, and do their best to keep it in that uncomfortable place. Predictions about the fall of a Government—a new failure in Parliament—are rife. This anticipation is no doubt premature. The complexities on the other hand are great.

Emphatic as it seems, the verdict of the election was basically a negative one. Deflation, which has been preached year in and year out, wage and salary cutting as the only positive policy, the hated decree laws of M. Laval were certainly beaten. The goose-step of the Croix de Feu, the surging hatred of the great trusts and monopoly profits did the rest. The positive platform which so divergent parties as the Radicals and Communists could accept as a common basis is only clear in its political aspects, the defence of liberty against the Fascists and of peace through effective collective security. It is in the economic and financial programme that the difficulties arise, the differences start. The basis of this programme is formed by far-reaching economic reforms, which include the nationalisation of the Central Bank, the railroads and certain industries, and the strict control of banking in general. An increase of

direct taxation, and the introduction of the forty-hour week without wage-cuts is demanded, and at the same time the restoration of prosperity by vast public works is planned. Salary cuts are to be rescinded; on the other hand the maintenance of the present gold value of the franc is promised.

This heterogeneous and fundamentally contradictory mixture of policies is moreover to be introduced at a juncture when the economic and financial position is already most unstable! The deflation necessary to defend the present gold value of the franc, of which the sacrifices imposed by the hated decrees were only the first part, was in fact never achieved. The pressing need for rearmament, the falling tendency in the revenue, produced a stupendous deficit in spite of the sacrifices imposed, which had to be financed by loans. These loans could not be placed on the internal market, but had to be contracted abroad and with the Banque de France. In their wake there was a certain revival in business activity. In spite of the depression in the export trades and tourist industry and the other, less indirect but scarcely less important consequences of the too high external value of the franc, the object of the decrees was however lost.

In the teeth of an increasingly strict regulation of imports, the deficit in the trade balance has been growing, and to the pressure on the gold reserve from the export of capital has been added that due to the necessity to pay for these imports. The contemplated further expansion, to be financed by the Government and not resulting from an international revival, must intensify the trouble. On the other hand it is hard to imagine that such revival can at all take place if radical measures threaten not only the temporary profitability but the very existence of capital investments. The increase in investment by Government works would be offset by the reluctance of the private capitalist to enter into new commitments. The American example shows that very forcible stimuli must be given to capitalists in order to offset the depression in their incentive caused by the threat of reforms. The formidable dilemma of previous Governments has been very much increased by the result of the election; and it is not to be doubted that a failure to revive business within a measurable time would prove fatal to the new Government also. The opposition thus has some grounds for its glee. In fact

some of them now openly abandon their previous point of view and advocate devaluation.

This sudden conversion does not ease the task of M. Blum. It must rouse the suspicions of his adherents; and there are in any case powerful factors which influence him in the direction of continuing the policy of maintaining the franc. Only the groups on his Right, including the Radical Socialists, have actively participated in the formation of his Cabinet. The moderate wing of the latter would not follow his lead if the direction was too obviously Left. Indeed, even Daladier, who is certainly not a Conservative, felt constrained to declare that nobody's legitimate interests could possibly be hurt by the programme of the Popular Front. As long as M. Blum remains on the middle road, he can count on the co-operation of those groups at the Centre, who, like the followers of MM. Flandin and Piétri, are just about to withdraw from the Government. The great bitterness which characterised the victory of the Left Cartel in 1924 is absent to-day. The defence of the franc, accepted officially by Groups on both his flanks, could be used as a powerful weapon to cool the ardour of his friends on the Left, which are his more embarrassing allies. The Communists have from the start refused to enter his Cabinet; they declare that outside the Cabinet they are in a position better able to ensure by pressure in Parliament and in the country that the social reforms promised in the electoral programme are in fact carried out. A powerful threat—especially if one realises that the Socialists have used their analogous position with regard to the successive Governments having been formed either by or with the participation of the Radical Socialists to win their latest victory. In so far as the Popular Front (including the Communists) have permanent organisations, the so-called Popular Assemblies in each constituency, the Communists are enabled to render this pressure more immediate and effective than their tactical predecessors, the Socialists. M. Blum may well want to keep the present parity of the franc as a political measure. The whole-hearted acclamation of his speech prior to his taking office by the Right showed very distinctly the dangers of this policy. One might also wonder whether the Communists are against devaluation merely because of their ignorance of elementary economics or because they hope that yet another disillusionment of the masses in a moderate Government would strengthen their position. This hope they share with

their most extreme opponents. It is questionable that they possess the approval of Moscow, which cannot possibly rejoice at a weakening of France in international relations, which this disillusionment implies.

The Government having seemingly decided on the maintenance of the franc, it was only to be expected that they would fit the execution of the other points of their programme to this one aim. That would have meant a very slow and timid attitude towards reforms, both financial and economic, in order to maintain confidence. By small and formal rather than effective measures the most patient demands of their followers could have been satisfied without giving real offence to those who still command economic life. M. Blum, surprisingly, did not follow the cautious attitude of most Left Governments of the post-war era. Urged by the wave of strikes, the extent and spontaneity of which was astonishing, he showed initiative. The Government not only took charge of the negotiations for a settlement of the disputes—and secured an almost complete victory for the workers, but tabled and put through in the Chamber with a speed hitherto only experienced in dictatorships measures actually giving effect to the election promises. The most important of these is the—partial—rescinding of the deflationary decrees, the reform of the Banque de France, the nationalisation of armaments, and last but not least the establishment of a forty-hour working week. The enthusiasm roused by this bold attempt must very much aid the Government politically in its difficulties, which are not negligible. Aside of the divergencies in the views in the coalition, resistance by the more Conservative Senate has to be reckoned with at some point.

It is, however, on the economic front that the battle will eventually be won or lost. From that point of view these measures magnify the dilemma of the Government. The increase of the cost of production due to the terms of the strike settlements may be put at ten to twelve per cent. The general improvement of working conditions and the incidence of the legislative measures will not be less. The over-valuation of the franc with respect to the other main currencies, the dollar and pound, was at least fifteen per cent. already before these victories of the working class. The pressure on the balance of trade, which was not negligible even in the later stages of the so-called deflationary policy, must be very considerably

increased. Exports must fall off if bounties are not granted in accordance with the German example. France, however, has no foreign creditors who could be forced to shoulder the cost. The profitability of industry already waning will be completely destroyed. Nor is it to be expected that the flight of capital will cease. The threatened tax reform alone is a potent deterrent. To stop the further weakening of the capital market M. Blum will have to inaugurate not only an embargo on capital (and banknote) exports, but probably a growing control of economic life, especially transactions with foreigners, for this policy.

It is questionable whether public works, which seem to be the mainstay of the monetary programme, under these conditions afford an even temporary relief. All we can hope for is that the period which M. Blum judges necessary to prove to even his most stubborn supporters, like his Finance Minister, that devaluation is inevitable if economic frustration is not to produce political chaos, will not be too long.

The later M. Blum takes the fateful decision to devalue, the greater the risk of his being annihilated by the storm which such decision must arouse, because the greater the blame which is attached to him and which cannot be shifted back on his predecessor. The vacillations, the cautiousness, the niggardliness—especially in commercial policy—which the policy of restrictionism entails must weaken the hold France still possesses on the loyalty of her allies, former and present, and her own internal power of resistance. Internal social trouble, which it may well cause in the end, would certainly result in such a loss of her effectiveness in foreign affairs as to be tantamount to her elimination from the balance of power in Europe. The consequences of that possibility are infinite and not reassuring. The reversal of a policy once decided upon is difficult, and much longer time is required for success. And time is the most precious political asset in Europe to-day. M. Blum is indeed at the crossroads. Conditions and prejudices urge him to choose the path of momentary least resistance, a path which may well lead to catastrophe. It is to be hoped that his subtle sense of political tactics will soon show him the road back to prosperity and stable political power.

THOMAS BALOGH.

THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES IN EUROPE.

THE refugees, like the poor, are always with us. A feature of the post-war world is the growing practice of the totalitarian State to drive out masses of its citizens because they will not accept the political views of the governing power, or because they are of a different race from the majority. In some cases the refugees are not directly expelled; but life is made so intolerable for them in the State of which they are citizens, that they emigrate and seek refuge in other lands. At the end of his *History of Europe*, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher records as one of the striking circumstances of our day that "refugees from tyranny flock into the free countries: Greeks in flight from Asia Minor; Jews in flight from Nazi Germany; Russians who crowd into Prague and Constantinople, Paris and London, rather than endure the rigours of Soviet rule; Venizelos, the liberator, is a fugitive in Italy."

It is another feature of our time that several of the strong rulers of Europe have themselves been refugees, and known the heart of the homeless stranger. Masaryk and Benes, Lenin and Trotzky were war-time fugitives in England; and amongst the refugees to-day from Italy, from Spain, etc., there are probably lying hid some of the future political leaders of those countries. The presence abroad of a number of political individuals exiled from their country, which has been common in all ages, did not constitute any general problem. On the other hand, the presence of a mass numbering some hundreds of thousands does create grave social, economic and financial as well as political problems for the State of asylum; and it has been recognised for fifteen years that the solution of those problems requires international collaboration.

The Covenant of the League did not prophetically contemplate the new international complication; but in 1921 the League's intervention was required by the Red Cross Society and other philanthropic organisations on behalf of the million and more of *émigrés* who fled from the Soviet revolution in Russia. The Council of the League appointed Dr. Nansen, who had just carried out a great work of salvage of prisoners of war in exile, as High Commissioner for refugees. It may be

recalled that Sir Samuel Hoare was appointed a little later Deputy High Commissioner, to furnish a report on the condition of myriads of destitute exiles in Constantinople and the Near East. To the problem of Russian refugees there was soon added that of one and a half million Greeks who, in 1922, were forced to leave their homes in Anatolia. It was a problem equal in quantity, but less baffling than that of the homeless, stateless Russians, since the expatriated Greeks had a friendly State to which they could turn. The task of the League was to assist their absorption and settlement in that State, and not to provide a State and a home for aliens. The achievement of the Greek Refugee Commission, which completed its work of settlement in less than ten years, is one of the bright spots in the history of international co-operation under the League.

Yet a third category of exiles was entrusted to the High Commissioner, some 350,000 Armenians who had fled from Asia Minor with the Greek population, and were assimilated in status to the Russian refugees. The task of the High Commissioner as outlined by the Assembly of the League in 1921 was :

- (a) To co-ordinate the action of governments and private organisations for the relief of the refugees ;
- (b) To regulate the legal status of those who had been rendered stateless ;
- (c) To assist those in need.

For a time steady progress was made with the absorption of the Russian and Armenian refugees in the countries of Europe, Asia, and America. When Nansen died in 1930 and the Nansen International Office was established, as an autonomous body attached to the League, to continue his work, it was possible to contemplate a gradual but definite liquidation of the problem. The Assembly of the League fixed a period expiring in 1938, during which the assistance of the League was to be reduced ; and in preparation for the final liquidation an International Convention was drawn up in 1933 which prescribed an international status for the Russian and Armenian refugees. Nansen had already obtained international recognition of a document of identity and travel to take the place of a national passport for his charges ; and so provided the third necessary element of personality, which, according to the Russian definition, consists of a body, a soul

and a passport. The Convention went further, and defined the rights not only concerning documents of identity and travel, but also concerning conditions of labour, public assistance, assurance against accident, sickness and unemployment, admission to schools and universities, the fiscal régime, etc. But few countries signed it, and fewer have ratified it.

It was just at the moment of the preparation of the Convention that the problem of the refugees began to take on a more sombre hue. The economic blizzard, which affected all populations and all sections of the inhabitants, rich and poor, national and foreign, and multiplied unemployment everywhere, tore up from their slender roots the masses of the refugees and drove them helpless before the winds of adversity. It was inevitable that when workmen had to be discarded, because of a catastrophic decline in demand, the alien in the land, and more than all others the stateless alien, would be the first victim. Hence in some countries more than half of the Nansen refugees were unemployed. They became again helpless flotsam and jetsam on the international sea, unwanted wanderers on the face of the earth, thwarted at every turn by Government action as well as by economic circumstance. Government measures of relief for the unemployed amongst its own citizens are not generally applied to unemployed stateless aliens ; and in consequence of the legislation in many States, which prohibits the employer from engaging a foreign workman save in very restricted measure, thousands were turned out of employment and forced to resort to illicit means of livelihood.

At this moment, moreover, two new cares, a major and a minor exodus, were added to the burden. The Assembly of the League in 1933 was faced with the request of the Netherlands Government to consider action on behalf of thousands of Jewish and other refugees from Germany who had fled because of racial and political persecution. The Assembly recognised that the new problem could only be solved by international collaboration ; and in order to overcome German opposition to the constitution of a League body—Germany being still a member of the Assembly and the Council—resolved to appoint a High Commission for the German refugees and a Governing Body, detached from the League.

A few months later the Council of the League was faced

with the minor care of the 25,000 Assyrian Christians of Iraq, for whom life in their adopted country was impossible after the murderous outburst of the Iraq army, and new homes had to be found. A Committee of the Council was formed to negotiate resettlement of the ancient Christian community; and, after several vain explorations, found a land of refuge near the exiles' old home in the Valley of the Orontes in Syria. For them, as for the Greek refugees, a State was found which was willing to grant asylum; and the British and Iraq Governments have contributed the larger part of the cost of settlement. It has been otherwise with the larger mass of those driven from Russia and Germany.

During the last two years there has been an incessant struggle between the humanitarian consciousness of the peoples, and the political caution and resentment of governments unwilling to tackle seriously the hard problem of the refugees. The peoples, moved by philanthropic bodies like the League of Nations Union, ask that the most elementary human right, the right of existence, should be granted to the stateless, as well as to the citizen; the bureaucracies are worried by the presence of the *déracinés*: Governments are often embittered against refugees from their own State. The Soviet Government, for example, is willing that the League should help German socialist refugees, but objects to collective action on behalf of White Russians. The Nazi Government, while willing to collaborate in the Nansen Office for the White Russians, will do nothing to help the hundred thousand who left Germany, and obstructs the transfer of their capital and the income from their property in Germany.

The economic crisis has aggravated the difficulties. As it was set forth recently in the report of an Experts Committee of the League, "the majority of Governments which have applied the right of asylum in a liberal spirit have found that their obligations in the matter of assistance, already complicated by unemployment, were further increased by the influx of the refugees, and that there was an inextricable network of countless general and individual cases in connection with the admission of refugees, public safety and police regulations . . . the elementary right to subsistence, provision for the sick, the children and the old, conveyance to other countries and deportations." So, while the Assembly of the League reluctantly has had to recognise the existence of an economic and

social problem which can be solved only by collective action, both the Assembly and the Council have hitherto resisted proposals for the unification of the work of juridical and political assistance in a single League organisation.

At the last Assembly in 1935, the Norwegian Government, acting in accordance with the principle "*Nansen oblige*," asked for the question of "assistance to international refugees"—as they are elliptically called, because they are scattered among the nations—to be placed on the Agenda. They summed up the present chaotic position as follows:

- (a) The Nansen Office is to cease to exist in a few years' time, thus depriving the refugees of necessary services.
- (b) The High Commissioner for German refugees is not placed under the control of the League of Nations, and receives no assistance from Governments.
- (c) No provision has been made for a great number of refugees belonging to various categories.
- (d) There are some 100,000 stateless persons in Europe whose political and economic position is one of great insecurity.

They put forward the proposal for a single organ which should deal with all exiles. The proposal encountered (a) the antipathies of several countries against their own refugees; (b) the French unwillingness against the League embarking on any new enterprise which would involve an additional *sou* of contribution from the States, and (c) general apprehension of further commitments. In the end a Committee of the Assembly reported that the problem had political, legal, humanitarian, administrative and financial aspects, and required further examination within the limits of the existing decisions of the Assembly. It advised the appointment of a Committee of Experts. That device for shelving immediate decision was adopted; and the Committee met at Geneva in November and December. It included an English member, Sir Horace Rumbold, a former Ambassador to Turkey and Germany, the Czech Minister in Paris, a Frenchman who had been Préfet in Strasbourg, an Italian who had been Commissioner of Emigration, and a Norwegian who had been President of the Mixed Courts in Egypt. The Committee heard the evidence of the representatives of the organisations dealing with the refugees, official and private, and submitted its report without delay. Divided in its opinion about any

permanent organisation, it was agreed in its recommendations for the temporary measures to be adopted till the next Assembly, which will have to consider the main problem again.

A new head of the Nansen Office, which was to remain separate, should initiate reforms in the internal plans of the office, and submit to the Assembly a revised programme of liquidation; while a League High Commissioner for the German refugees should convene an inter-governmental conference, with a view to establishing a system of legal protection for those refugees, and possibly for all refugees, consult governments as to the extent to which they would be prepared to receive and find employment for refugees, and establish a programme to facilitate emigration and the transfer of capital of the refugees from Germany.

Before the report of the Committee was brought up to the Council of the League in January there was a new and dramatic development. The American High Commissioner for the refugees from Germany, Mr. James G. McDonald, who had held that office for two years, tendered his resignation; and in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the League made a full statement of the grave and tragic position of the Jewish and "non-Aryan" population in Germany. He concluded that

desperate suffering in the countries adjacent to Germany, and even more terrible human calamity within the German frontiers, are inevitable unless present tendencies in the Reich are checked or reversed. . . . When domestic policies threaten the demoralisation and exile of hundreds of thousands of human beings, considerations of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of common humanity. I should be recreant if I did not call attention to the actual situation, and plead that world opinion, acting through the League and its Member-States and other countries, move to avert the existing and impending tragedies.

The Council, at its meeting in January, considered the report of the Experts Committee, and took note of the letter of resignation; but it was concerned to limit its action to immediate practical measures, to avoid any action directed towards Germany, and to defer to the next Assembly the larger issues of the ineluctable problem. It adopted the recommendations of the Committee as regards the Nansen Office and as regards the appointment of a League High Commissioner for the German refugees, though restricting

somewhat his functions. Judge Hansen, a Norwegian, was appointed as head of the Nansen Office; General Sir Neill Malcolm as High Commissioner for German refugees, both till the next Assembly.

The League tends to take up the attitude that it should be concerned only with the juridical and political protection of the exiles, while the task of assistance and settlement must be borne by the philanthropic associations. Clearly there must be the combination of an international organisation with co-ordinated philanthropic effort. What has been done for the refugees from Germany during the last two years, particularly for the Jewish refugees, is an example of this combination. The large majority of the Jews who have left Germany have been settled either in Palestine or in countries overseas, or in Europe, through the co-operation of Jewish organisations in all countries. The High Commission established by the League—but immediately orphaned from its parents—has been concerned to co-ordinate the work of the societies, to obtain from Governments passports and other papers for the exiles, and to negotiate—with limited effect—with Governments about the reception of the emigrants and about permits to work.

The League should be able, as its Experts Committee advised, to establish a single juridical régime applicable to all exiles; and there is need of an organisation, under the League, for an indefinite period, to act as pro-Consul for the scattered refugees who, deprived of the protection of a State, must obtain the protection of the international society, in order to enjoy a minimum of civil rights. The making of international Conventions is not enough: for the International Hell, it is said, is paved with good conventions. Experience has shown that national Governments, in time of difficulty, are disinclined to respect their obligations towards the stateless stranger within their gates; and an international authority is required to hold them to their undertakings, and also to assist the philanthropic bodies to find homes for the ever-growing number of exiles.

As Lord Cecil declared at the first meeting of the Governing Body of the High Commission for the German refugees, there are still physical spaces and intellectual spaces in the world to be filled. The difficulty is, in time of exaggerated economic nationalism, to bring home to Governments the truth that

energetic and intelligent emigrants bring wealth to a country and do not take the bread from the mouths of the inhabitants.

There is, too, an aspect of the problem which concerns closely international peace and well-being. The present disorder in dealing with masses of homeless and stateless persons menaces the future of two generations. Dr. Nansen pointed out to the Assembly of the League seven years ago, when conditions were less grave :

If intelligent human beings are forced to brood over a situation so much against their wishes and efforts that they come to regard it as an injustice, and if they are denied the most elementary forms of protection, there is a danger that their physical and intellectual energies, instead of being turned into constructive channels, may be exploited in ways which will exact a heavy reckoning.

It will be for the next Assembly, it is hoped, to take clear and decisive action on a problem which has been too long deferred, and which will not be solved by walking away from it.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

WILL SPAIN FOLLOW RUSSIA?

THE partisans of Communism and its opponents both look towards Spain with anxious eyes. The first see a numerous and pugnacious working class, bred in a tradition of political violence, which must surely favour at a not very distant date a general rising of the proletariat. Events in Spain during the last few years seem to them to hold out hopes of the country becoming "the first Communist state in Western Europe." Their optimism is strengthened by the revolution of October 1934. That revolution failed, their opponents will say. Materially and immediately, yes; morally, no. So far from the revolutionary organisations being crushed, as they were in Italy in 1922, in Germany in 1933, and in Austria in February 1934, they conserved in large measure their leaders, their rallying-cries, and even their arms. It is a fact that machine-guns and even field-guns captured from the authorities during the October rising were never recovered. That was under a reactionary government bent on a policy of repression. Spain to-day has a Left Wing government ready to grant every possible concession to the workers.

Now a social revolution does not spring ready-armed from the sea of events. It has its germ deep down in the structure of a nation, and this structure has been formed through history by natural characteristics: climate, character of the soil, which are the controlling factors in the life of primitive communities; disposition of seas, rivers, and mountains, which determine the grouping of the population and the routes for trade and migration; distribution of natural resources, which decide the growth of industry. If Russia to-day has a Communist régime it is largely because the character of the territory, formative of the social character of the race, rejected a system which could permit of no further development. How far is the case of Spain analogous? Let us examine the two countries—Russia in 1914 and Spain to-day—side by side, and see where the parallel leads.

Economically, Spain is a Russia in little. She is a country of vast distances mainly dependent on agriculture. Her soil, except for the littoral, is poor, and to increase its fertility requires methods of intensive cultivation and irrigation works which are beyond the scope of the private landlord. "The

winds," wrote Trotsky, "worked for centuries to form the Russian peasant." How true this is also of great tracts of Spain, especially of the high Castilian Steppe with its yearly alternation of drought and frost. In these two wheat-producing countries the yield per sown area is almost the lowest in Europe. Russia produces about 8.3 quintals per hectare, Spain produces 8.0 quintals. This should be compared to the United Kingdom yield of 20.3 and the European average of 12.8. Spanish agriculture, although it can hardly "feed its man," employs seventy per cent. of the working population, which is only ten per cent. below the Russian figure for 1914. The majority—the exception prevails in Catalonia—are labourers employed on large estates, where living conditions and dependence on the landowners liken them more to the mediæval serf than to any surviving type of European peasant. Some, even on the vast estates of the south and west, rent the land and cultivate it for their own profit. But the terms of lease have been such that the landlord has been able to dispose very much as he liked of the prosperity of his peasant-tenants.

The cultivation of a rocky and arid soil is further hindered by the inadequacy of means of communication. The mountainous relief of the Peninsula, the scarcity of roads and, above all, of motor vehicles to use them, result in the isolation of the provinces and of the small and scattered hamlets within them. Hundreds of thousands of the agricultural population can never reach the central markets. The consequent loss to themselves, lack of fluidity in the circulation of agricultural products, and domination of the markets by a few big, unrepresentative interests, were exactly paralleled in the Russia of 1914. In Spain, as in Russia, the apparent solution lies in collective farming, with the complementary state control of prices, transport, and methods of production.

The industries of Spain are confined to a few definitely limited areas. They are incapable of supplying all the needs of the home market. They are very largely controlled by foreign capital. They have developed quickly in a series of jumps rather than by a steady curve of growth. The industrial population is thus divorced from the agricultural population in outlook and ways of life. While the peasant tends to react as he might have done in the eighteenth century, or even in feudal times, the industrial worker has a twentieth-century

mentality. He can be handled very easily in the mass, since his class has not passed through the artisan stage, and has hardly been touched by Liberal-democratic doctrine. In this the workers of Barcelona and Bilbao resemble those of Petrograd and Moscow.

Closely allied to the economic factor is the social factor. Spain is marked out from the other countries of Western Europe by the weakness of its middle class. To explain this it is necessary to look for historical causes. The formation of a strong and numerous middle class derives in such countries as England, France, and Germany, from the prosperous mediæval city. Invasion—in Russia of the Tartars, and in Spain of the Moors—and the subsequent struggle to evict the invader, impeded the concentration of wealth in the hands of the burghers. The population was in constant movement and never acquired that stability necessary to the establishment of great centres of production. Later, when the invaders had been expelled or absorbed, another factor militated against the rise of a middle class. In Russia the progressive and energetic peasant, who might have been expected to become an artisan, and later a burgher, had two other roads open to him. In the west, falling within the orbit of foreign industrial methods, he became a factory worker; in the east he pushed further into undeveloped lands, and became a backwoodsman or a nomad trader, but rarely an artisan. Two similar currents have diverted the Spanish population from its rise from peasantry to bourgeoisie. Hundreds of thousands of the most active peasants were absorbed in the nineteenth century by emigration to America, in the twentieth by industry.

That part of the population which has remained agrarian is little better off than was the French peasant in 1789 or the Russian peasant in 1917. Furthermore the gulf between rich and poor is at least as evident. There is not now in Spain, as there was then in France, an intermediate class capable of bridging it. Marxist writers, obsessed by the attempt to apply a rigid abstract doctrine to varying realities, are over-prone to see in the march of Spanish politics the hand of the *petite bourgeoisie*. With the exception of Catalonia and the Basque Provinces, that class is neither sufficiently numerous nor sufficiently independent to exert any appreciable influence. Outside the industrial areas its principal representatives are the commissioned ranks of the army and the civilian employees

of the state. These are swept aside in the direct struggle between the big capitalist or landowner and the property-less proletariat. The population, as in pre-Soviet Russia, is thus divided into two economically formed classes, the wealthy landowner, and the peasant who is almost a serf, and a third politically formed class, the state-dependent official.

Yet—and here we are in the political domain—the Spanish Republic is surely a bourgeois institution. Whatever “republican” may have meant in 1789, to-day the word implies nothing that should frighten the smallest bourgeois. Far from invalidating what I have written, the example of the Republic only goes to prove the nullity of the Spanish middle class. The Republican Constitution, which was drawn up by a body of slightly puzzled men, is in the main a progressive bourgeois document. It has, however, never been applied as such. From 1933 until February of this year it was interpreted according to the interests of the landowning and Catholic majority. During that period the government of Spain seemed to many to be less democratic than it had been under the Monarchy. Since the elections of last February, when the coalition of the Popular Front was returned to power, the Constitution is being applied for the benefit of the workers. Spain has no political party comparable to the French Radical-Socialists. There is no basis for it in her electorate.

The absence of a powerful middle class has resulted in Spain, as it resulted in Russia, in the absence of a Liberal-democratic revolution. Such a revolution, which England achieved as early as 1649, and France in 1789, marks the passing of political power from the hands of the aristocracy into those of the burghers. The moment when this revolution occurs is when the aristocracy is becoming stagnant and the merchant class is in full activity. In “advanced” countries it preceded the Industrial Revolution. In time—such is the theory—the merchant class also becomes stagnant, and the proletariat grows strong and active enough to achieve a revolution in its turn. Whereas in England and France the middle phase of Liberal-democracy has lasted many years, and may last many more, in Russia there was of necessity no such phase. What happened was a brusque transition from a feudal-bureaucratic autocracy to Communism. Conditions in Spain appear to favour a similar telescoping of political history. As I have shown above, the present régime is not a Liberal-democracy,

and it is too late to expect one now. The human material lacks and, even were it present, the Spanish workers, controlled by powerful unions of a political character, would be unwilling to support a movement which they are taught to look upon as contrary to the interests of their class. If they fight again it will be to impose, as in Russia, the “dictatorship of the proletariat.”

A further element, into which the question of class does not enter, favours the implantation of Communism in Spain. It is the tendency to decentralisation, and the desire for autonomy in the two chief industrial regions, Catalonia and the Basque Provinces. Catalonia already has partial autonomy. She is jealous for what she has attained, and hopes to achieve more. Her experience, both under the Monarchy and during the 1933-6 period, is that a Right Wing government exercises a policy of ruthless centralisation, whereas a Left Wing government favours the extension of her independent rights. Hence the apparent anomaly of a temporary alliance in Catalonia between the *petite bourgeoisie* and the proletarian parties. They are all Left, without distinction of class interests, when faced with encroachments from Madrid. The Catalan workers and middle class rose together in revolt in October 1934, and a reactionary central government would no doubt provoke them to do the same again.

In the Basque Provinces the situation is even more anomalous. The Basque statute of autonomy, which has figured on the republican programme since 1931, has not yet become law. The present Popular Front government is ready to vote it, with the minimum possible delay. The bitterest opponents in Madrid of Basque autonomy have always been the Catholic Right Wing. “One King, one nation, one faith,” is their constant answer to all questions of separatism. On the other hand the staunchest partisans of Basque autonomy are not the workers, but the industrial capitalists, who in this region are strongly Catholic. We therefore have the curious spectacle of the bourgeois democrats in Catalonia and the Catholic Right Wing in the Basque Provinces pledged to the support of a Left Wing government in Madrid. The further that government goes to the Left, the more fully it is likely to accede to their autonomist demands. It should be remembered that the Communist plan for Spain is the Union of Spanish Soviet Socialist Republics.

Having seen that the economic, social, and political structure of Spain is roughly comparable to that of Russia, let us return to the question which heads this article. To many that question would not appear sufficiently urgent. They ask not, Will Spain follow Russia?, but, Can she help following Russia? The answer may well be contained in events of recent years, which are the logical development of those general postulates which I have laid down. The Russian Revolution passed through three main stages: that of 1905, when the revolutionaries failed, that of February 1917, which resulted in the fall of Czarism and was followed by a brief period of confusion and compromise, and that of October 1917, when the Bolsheviks rose unequivocally to power. Assuming that Don Alfonso's abdication in April 1931 was the counterpart to Nicholas II's abdication in February 1917, Spain is now heading for the final triumph of the proletariat. But is this a fair assumption? Surely not. If Don Alfonso had shown in his reign more wisdom and less subtlety the problem of abdication need never have arisen in his lifetime. Even at the last moment, had he been as resolute, or as stupid, as Nicholas, he might still have kept his throne for several years. The pressure put upon him was not a tenth of that put upon the Czar. He prudently anticipated history rather than follow desperately in its wake. Nevertheless he abdicated, and since he went the pendulum of government has swung Left, Right, and back to the Left. Its swing has obeyed parliamentary considerations quite as much as the dictates of the people. Parliamentarism is a force in Spain—even, perhaps, a growing force. The Spanish equivalent of the Soviets, which are the Socialist *Casas del pueblo* and the Anarcho-syndicalist and Communist executive committees, have not yet finished with parliamentary government. As long as it will yield good results they are unwilling to destroy it. It is indeed doubtful whether they could. Many of the leaders are so far identified with it, and many of the led are so far satisfied with its working, that a general call to revolution might well go unheeded at this point.

Let us take a concrete example. The October Revolution was admittedly the nearest that Spain has yet come to the setting-up of a Soviet régime. It failed in its immediate object because its causes were political and not economic. The Asturian mining communities, the spearhead of the

movement, were, except for strictly local unemployment, the most prosperous workers in the country. Their average earnings were 22 pesetas daily. It was certainly not hunger which drove them to arms. On the other hand the country labourers, many of whom had to support their families on 5 pesetas daily, took no part in the Revolution. It was not that they were unorganised or temperamentally incapable of revolt. The agricultural general strike of June had proved the contrary. It was that, wretched though their living conditions were, they had not reached that pitch of misery at which a revolution is inevitable.

Herein lies the chief difference between Spain and Russia. In the latter country Communism would no doubt have emerged triumphant sooner or later. "Later," however, might have meant 1940—but for the War. In 1914 the Russian industrial workers had been educated for revolution. They had their leaders, their organisations, their slogans. They were in a similar position to the Spanish workers now. But in spite of the plans of their leaders, they would not have moved effectively lacking the spur of hunger and the economic disruption of the state. Leaders can prepare the way for a social revolution, but only the masses, impelled by something more than faith in a demagogic abstraction, can carry it out. The bread-queues in Petrograd and Moscow were the surest omen that the hour of the proletariat had come. Such, at least, is the opinion of Trotsky. In Spain such conditions did not exist. They do not exist to-day. To proclaim, as the Spanish Workers' Alliance did in 1934, a preventive rising against the counter-revolution, was not enough. For vast numbers of the population the point was too subtle, or too remote. Purely political revolutions are generally carried out by small groups of men, never by the masses.

A second factor is almost as important. Who can say that the Bolsheviks would have triumphed without the support of the army? And how could the army, goaded beyond endurance by three years of mismanaged warfare, fail to support them? It had made possible the February Revolution. Half the able-bodied workers of Russia were in its ranks. The decision of Kerensky to get rid of the revolutionary Petrograd garrison set a spark to the fire, the troops gave arms to the workers, and made common cause with them. From that moment the fall of the Coalition government was assured.

With the Spanish army it is far otherwise. Certain sections of it, particularly in the artillery and the aviation, which are recruited from industrial districts, are revolutionary. They are exceptions. Discuss the army with any Left Wing Spaniard and he will deplore its reactionary tendencies. In October 1934 the army, on the whole, stood by the government. If in places it was considered too risky to use the troops in the work of repression, there were no recorded examples of military units siding with the movement. Between the Russian army, sickened by blood and filth, and the Spanish army, well-fed, well-housed, and well-officered, the contrast is significant. Only an external war, or conceivably an economic crisis of the first magnitude, could reproduce in Spain the conditions which made possible the establishment of Communism in Russia.

GEOFFREY BRERETON.

THE TEACHING OF ECONOMIC HISTORY.

IN order adequately to discuss the teaching of economic history, or accurately to determine the place that economic history should occupy in the scheme of education, it would be necessary to begin by considering both the aim of history teaching in general, and the ultimate object of education itself. Nay, further, it would be necessary to treat of still more fundamental problems of knowledge and of being, questions involving the basal principles of philosophy. Clearly, in a brief discussion such as the present, something, indeed much, must be taken for granted. Hence for the period of this argument I will assume that one of the primary purposes of present-day public education is preparation for citizenship, and that among the particular objects of the various subjects of instruction "the great aim of history teaching must be," as Professor Eileen Power well says, "to show mankind its common heritage in the past and its common hopes for the future."

The common heritage of mankind in the past is something far larger and richer than mere material wealth. It includes all those treasures of art and science, literature and law, politics and religion, without which the possession of all the pelf of Plutus would leave us poor indeed. Economic history may cover much of the record of primitive man during times when the desperate struggle for mere existence against callous Nature, ferocious beasts, and starving fellow creatures absorbed the whole of his energies. But as soon as developing civilisation gave to man increasing command over Nature, supremacy over beasts, and community with his fellows, then the economic concerns of the human race began to yield precedence to the concerns of the mind and the soul. Similarly, mankind's common hopes for the future are no longer limited to desire and expectation of food, clothing, and the other requisites of animal subsistence; they extend rather to hopes of widening knowledge, loftier speculation, deepening culture, expanding community, sublimer faith, a more enduring peace.

History, therefore, has to survey the whole of this heritage of the past, in order that it may help to lay firmly the foundations of a rational anticipation of a realisation of these hopes for the future. In other words, history, like philosophy, like science, like all the other major categories of knowledge

indeed, must, if it is to fulfil its function, "view life steadily, and view it whole." Thus, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as "economic history," any more than there is such a person as the "economic man." The "economic man"—the individual moved exclusively by the desire to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market—was an abstraction of the nineteenth-century Manchester scholiasts. There never was an actual human being exactly corresponding to his exceedingly unattractive idea. Similarly "economic history"—the record of a race wholly engrossed in the production, consumption and distribution of wealth—is a figment of the specialists' imagination. It is really no more than an aspect of general or universal history. It merely envisages the great men and the outstanding events of past times from a peculiar (and often novel) point of view.

That the economic aspects of history are important will be denied by no one at the present day. There have, in fact, been few, if any, great movements among masses of mankind from which economic causes have been wholly absent. Even such unworldly or other-worldly enterprises as the founding of the Christian Church were not wholly unconnected with the problems of poverty and slavery as they existed in the Roman Empire, while such apparently mad adventures as the Crusades were undoubtedly stimulated by a passion on the part of the poverty-stricken barbarians of the West to acquire the comforts and luxuries of Byzantium and the Orient. There can be no question that skilled investigations into the economic aspects of history have thrown valuable new light upon both the causes and the consequences of many familiar events. Professor Thorold Rogers' pioneer work on *The Economic Interpretation of History* (1888), for instance, emphasised not only the focal importance of the Black Death and the Peasants' Revolt in the evolution of English society, but also the decisive influence of the wool trade in the first Hundred Years' War with France (1337-1453), and of the cotton industry in the second (1689-1815). It would be easy to multiply examples of the way in which later writers on the economic aspects of history—Cunningham, Ashley, Unwin, Clapham, Knowles, and their fellows—have elucidated many dark places in our annals, and have brought to light for the first time large regions of unexplored social phenomena. The cumulative effect of their work, indeed, although it is as yet far from

complete, has been appreciably to modify our whole conception of the course of human evolution. For economic historians, above all their compeers, stress those facts and features of human existence which all kindreds, peoples, and tongues have in common, rather than those which divide them into nations and sects: their subject transcends the boundaries of states and reveals the solidarity of the race. Again, it penetrates beneath the anecdotal surface of society, and treats of the life and livelihood of the common folk by whose efforts and upon whose achievements the fabric of all the communities of men is constructed. Further, it emphasises the continuity of history, showing how the ages are linked together, and how the phenomena of the present can be used to illustrate and interpret the past—and vice versa.

Nevertheless, important as the economic interpretation of history is, and novel as many of its revelations may be, it should never be forgotten that it is not the only aspect of history, and indeed that it is not the dominant aspect. I should feel disposed to maintain that political, constitutional, ecclesiastical, and cultural aspects should all of them take precedence of the economic. Just as "life is more than meat and the body than raiment," so more potent in their influences upon human character and destiny than any system of industry and commerce are the sort of community to which a man belongs, its mode of government, the type of its religion, the state of its civilisation. Well says the great economic historian, Dr. William Cunningham: "After all, the Body Politic, with the institutions by which free men govern themselves, is a more admirable creation of reason than the Economic Organism in which men cater for each other's needs. The development of the State is the final object of research." Similarly, Sir Alfred Zimmern, an eminently sympathetic witness, remarks: "Economic or industrial history is a tributary stream and not the main stream. . . . Economics is not the whole of life. The soul is higher than the body, and life is more than housekeeping. Liberty is higher than riches, and the welfare of the community more important than its economic and material progress." Professor H. E. Bourne of America, indeed, utters a grave warning to the economic enthusiasts of his country: "It is possible," he says, "that a less industrial age may regard with disdain the supreme importance which this generation attaches to

economic facts, and may ask if the historical process has no deeper central purpose than the organisation of industry and the exploitation of the earth's natural resources."

That the economic aspects of history were unduly neglected and ignored in the past by the generality of writers may be freely admitted. The causes of this neglect and ignorance are not hard to discover. Economic processes are slow and gradual, e.g. the transition from slavery to serfdom and from serfdom to freedom; the change from status to contract; the movement from mercantilism to free trade and from free trade to tariff reform; the transformation of agricultural England into industrial England, and so on. Moreover, not only are these processes slow and gradual, they are frequently quite imperceptible to contemporary observers. Consequently, they are wholly unmentioned in the chronicles upon which historians mainly rely for their facts, and even the more authentic records yield their secrets reluctantly and only as the result of laborious cross-examination. Further these economic processes are rarely associated with the personalities of conspicuous men, and still more rarely are they marked by the occurrence of sensational events. They tend to be impersonal, statistical, and flat.

It would not be correct, however, to say that none of the older historians took cognisance of economic causes and effects. The great Thucydides himself stands as a venerable demonstrator of the contrary; he recognises some, if not all, of the economic causes of the Peloponnesian War. In our own country and in more recent times, the seventeenth-century historians, led by Thomas Hobbes (translator of Thucydides) laid strong stress upon the economic aspects of the tremendous struggle enacted before their eyes. In the eighteenth century Gibbon assigned a prominent place to the economic influences that tended to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. But it was, of course, his great contemporary Adam Smith whose classic study of *The Wealth of Nations* showed in a manner never yet excelled the cardinal significance of the economic factors in the development of English national policy. The nineteenth-century historians were, in consequence of Adam Smith's influence, almost compelled to take note of economic phenomena in their works. Thus we find writers such as Macaulay, Carlyle, and John Richard Green, paying formal tribute to the importance of industry and commerce, wages

and prices, poor laws and settlement regulations, chartered companies and trade unions, and other economic institutions, in the national life.

The formal study of economic history, however, as a separate branch of knowledge, began on the Continent with the work of the great German writers Roscher, Schmoller, and Wagner. Now respecting these eminent men two things must be noted. First, they were economists rather than historians: they were concerned primarily to combat *Manchesterism*, that is, the abstract or *a priori* school of Ricardo, Malthus, and Mill. Secondly, they were politicians even more than economists; they were vehement opponents of *laissez-faire*, eager to enlist the authority and power of the State on behalf of protection as against free trade, and of collectivism as against individualism. So, too, in England the early economic historians were politicians and men of affairs. Thorold Rogers was for several years actually a Member of Parliament; Cunningham and Ashley were both active and aggressive tariff reformers.

From the first, indeed, most unfortunately, the study of economic history, in isolation from general history, has been involved in the passions of political propaganda. It has been pursued, just as the study of ecclesiastical history was pursued in the sixteenth century, by zealous partisans who have gone to it as to an armoury in which to find weapons with which to slay their opponents. The outstanding example of this unhappy fact is, of course, provided by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels who, on the one hand, so gravely exaggerated the importance of the economic factors in human evolution as to deny that any others need be taken into account, and, on the other hand, used their materialistic philosophy of history as the main weapon in their communistic attack upon capitalist society. The deplorable bias thus given in the mid-nineteenth century to economic history has most lamentably persisted, and all too often it is still treated not by dispassionate men of science bent solely on the discovery of truth, but by eager advocates anxious primarily to find arguments in support of some cause to which they are *a priori* committed. The garbled accounts of the Industrial Revolution given by writers on the one side is offset by equally prejudiced descriptions of the Free Trade Movement propounded by partisans on the other. It is, indeed, this painful fact that economic history

has become so inextricably bound up with political controversy that makes the teaching of it in schools and colleges so difficult a problem. There are other more technical difficulties, moreover, to which I will advert in a moment.

Before doing so, however, I wish freely and fully to admit that the wiser and more cultured teachers of economic history to-day make no such exaggerated claims on its behalf as were made by Marx and Engels, and as are still made by their disciples in Russia and elsewhere. Professor Eileen Power of the London School of Economics, for example, clearly and explicitly recognises the fact that the economic aspect of history is only one out of many aspects, and that it is not always the most important. Nevertheless, even Professor Eileen Power sometimes seems to over-emphasise the economic factor. For instance, in a brilliant essay on *The Teaching of History* she says: "Consider the usual treatment of the seventeenth century. There is probably not a textbook which fails to mention that in 1649 King Charles I lost his head. There is probably not one of them which mentions that in 1645 the turnip was introduced into England. Yet the turnip has had more effect upon the history of England, political as well as economic, than King Charles's head, for all that the Mr. Dicks of the history textbooks may say." Now I am far from wishing to argue that intrinsically or in itself King Charles's head was in any way superior to a turnip. I have no great admiration for King Charles's head, nor even for his heart. On the other hand, I have profound respect for the turnip. No person who, like myself, during the later stages of the war, subsisted largely on that Scandinavian variety of it known as the swede, can feel for it anything but gratitude, tempered by a strong desire never to taste it again. Nevertheless, even if the turnip was introduced in 1645 in intelligent anticipation of the decapitation of the King in 1649, and even if (as seems to be implied by Professor Power's statement) its introduction was regarded as a compensation for the decapitation, I should contend that it did not really provide an equivalent. For however small was the intrinsic value of King Charles's head, its violent and spectacular removal from his body was a symbolic event of quite primary significance and importance. I should indeed be almost prepared to argue that it was the central or cardinal event of European history in the seventeenth century. For it marked the stemming of the tide of

divine-right autocracy which had been running strong for nearly a couple of hundred years, and the beginning of that flow towards constitutional government which characterised the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I cannot conceive that anything which the turnip has done during the three hundred years that have elapsed since its introduction can possibly have been comparable in importance to that.

Apart, however, from the implication of economic history in party politics, and apart from the manifest peril of the over-emphasis of economic causes in history teaching, there are three technical objections to its introduction as a subject into a junior school curriculum. It is emphatically a subject for senior scholars and adult students. For children under fourteen or even sixteen years of age it is, first, too difficult; secondly, too doubtful; and, thirdly, too dull. I will not labour these points.

1. *It is too difficult.* "Economic history," says Professor H. W. C. Davis, "is that kind of history which requires a knowledge of economics." And, with the exception of metaphysics, economics is the most difficult of studies. No one who has wrestled with theories of international commerce, with the principles of currency and finance, with the problems of wages and prices, with the intricacies of Malthus's statistics concerning population, Ricardo's theory of rent, or Marshall's doctrine of marginal utility, will have any hesitation in saying that a study which involves any sort of acquaintance with these things is one suited only to mature and highly disciplined minds.

2. *It is too doubtful.* Professor G. N. Clark in his inaugural lecture at Oxford was compelled to admit that "the foundations of economic history are not yet well laid." Its very plans, indeed, are still involved in a storm of controversy. On practically nothing of primary importance is there agreement. If, for example, Professor Thorold Rogers asserts that the fifteenth century was "the golden age of the English labourer," Denton follows with a demonstration that the Professor's figures are all wrong, and that there is ample evidence to show that the century was one of unprecedented misery and destitution. Again, if Mr. and Mrs. Hammond paint lurid pictures of the appalling conditions of the agricultural and industrial labourers at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Dr. Buer and Professor Clapham, on the other hand, show that

these pictures are grossly overdrawn, and that the condition of both town and village labourers was one of steady and rapid amelioration, except in so far as this amelioration was checked by the labourers' own reckless over-production of children. Countless other examples might be given of this clash of opinion on primary issues. As Professor Clark says, the foundations of the study have yet to be laid.

3. *It is too dull.* The proper subject-matter of economic history is statistics. And statistics are not only difficult and doubtful, but also dull. Of course, a certain amount of interesting talky-talk can be extracted from the stories of merchant adventurers, geographical explorers, mechanical inventors, and others, but these merely skim the surface of the subject. They do not penetrate to its dark and deadly depths. These are dim and dense with statistics and ever more statistics. Hence Dr. Cunningham, who knew what he was talking about, said: "Economic history is not a branch of learning which can be wisely included in a school course . . . the subject is deficient in direct human interest and deals with the deeper and less obvious causes of change. It may well be deferred till it can be entered on as a subject of academic study." Professor Lilian Knowles, of the London School of Economics, a pupil of Dr. Cunningham, does not go quite so far as her master; but she says of economic history: "It is taught only to adults and older children. If the teaching of the subject should become more general in schools, it would probably be taught only in the higher forms." In other words, if economic history should ever be filmed, it would be marked by the censors "A" and not "U."

We look forward to the day when economic history, or rather, history in its economic aspects, shall be emancipated from its thralldom to politics; when its foundations shall be well and truly laid on the rock of indisputable fact, and when its more repellent features shall have become humanised. For there can be no doubt that it has a great service yet to render to mankind. Its assistance is essential to the solution of many of the problems of the present day, and until these problems are solved there can never be that economic stability on which the future progress of the race depends.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

DOWNLAND VILLAGES AND THEIR LOCAL ARCHITECTURE.

WHERE local materials have been used in the building of the English village, it is certain that the tradition will have a tremendous pedigree. It does not matter what the geological basis of these materials may be, whether granite or limestone or chalk—their architectural history will reach back into the beginnings of organised human settlement. Here I propose to take one stratum only, the chalk of our unique downland which in the south extends from Beaminster in Dorset as far as Beachy Head, and again from the Vale of Blackmore to Dover; and in the Midlands from the Berkshire Downs at Streatley north-east over the Chilterns and through portions of Hertfordshire, Cambridgeshire and West Norfolk up to the Wash.

The proper building materials of the chalk are flint, chalk rubble, "clunch" or the chalk blocks of the harder seams underground, and "sarsen" stones, a fine grey stone deposited by the primeval sea on the chalk downs of North Wiltshire, and so of limited application in building. It follows that settlements within the area of the chalk downs, and previous to the era of mechanisation, mass production and speedy transport, have been in the main built out of the materials yielded by the chalk. This is the basis of the correlation between a specific geological deposit and the kind of building erected upon it. But inasmuch as the chalk itself is liable in various parts of England to interference from or intermixture with or imposition by other strata, notably the later Tertiary beds, the building materials of its human dwellings are correspondingly modified in relation to those alien contacts. Let me take Wiltshire first of all. There is more pure chalk in Wiltshire than in any other county, and, though cloven in half by the Vale of Pewsey, it is spread over three-fifths of the county area in a more or less even, if undulating, plateau. We should, therefore, expect to find in Wiltshire a more highly skilled and developed craftsmanship in the chalk materials than in counties whose chalk is less uniform and widely diffused. This is so, and a comparison between the characteristic villages of the Dorset and Wiltshire downlands makes it still clearer. The valley villages of the Dorset chalk show the familiar combinations of flint, chalk

and brick with clusters of thatched roofs. But the architectural workmanship is inferior to that of Wiltshire, where brick, flint, chalk and sarsens are built in together with bold experiment and resource. Cerne Abbas is an exception, and it is interesting that it should occur in a district where the chalk is less adulterated than in other parts of the county. It is unusually lavish in half-timbering, while the combination of black flints with light stone, gables with bow windows, is a reminder of the best village architecture of Wiltshire.

Aldbourn, which lies between the Lambourn Downs to the east and the Marlborough Downs to the west, is the truest *downland* village in Wiltshire. That is partly because it is upland and rests between the shoulders of some of the grandest downs in the county. The gentle Atlas of the chalk bears it aloft. Secondly, the character of its houses spells chalk more articulately than at Ramsbury or Chilton Foliat, villages of the Kennet Valley, or than among those of the Wylde Valley, the stone of many of whose cottages is drawn from the Chilmark quarries, the raw material of Salisbury Cathedral. Aldbourn, on the contrary, lives on and from the downs; its building materials are of flint and clunch, of sarsens and thatch. Cushioned in by elm and beech and yet open to the spaces of sky and land, it is thus an oasis of the waste, umber-roofed from afar, white among its airy, many-cornered streets. The cottage roofing is mainly thatch or red tiles whose warmth tones perfectly with the earth-browns of the thatch, together with the mass-produced blue slating, which many feel to be much too abundant in the chalk-lands. But blue slates agree fairly well with chalk and flint walls, while upon brick or stone they are the crudest imposition. The only serious fault of slate in chalk areas is its stubborn resistance to weathering and its chill to the eye. Only the russet and orange lichens that cling to it can save it from the last. The virtue of the Aldbourn chalk and flint walls is not only local individuality and so truth to chalk nature, but their variety. Some of the walls are not only bonded with brick courses in the old Roman fashion but built up of alternate courses of brick, flint and chalk in such a way as to create a kind of rippling movement and liveliness of effect. I believe this sense of movement to be vital to the architecture of a chalk country. W. H. Hudson once wrote that the spire of Chichester Cathedral contributes and gives

value to the downs landscape because it pulls it together, while the spire of Salisbury Cathedral "receives nothing from and gives nothing to nature." We admire it for itself alone. But surely what the great spire, soaring from downs to sky, does give both to us and to nature is aerial motion in stillness, and that is the essence and the secret of the chalk downs themselves. Their still forms move under the roving eye, their grasses under the wind, the shadows over them from the clouds. Salisbury Spire is thus in integral relation with the uplands from whose surround it rises.

Aldbourn is the chalkiest of the Wiltshire villages and Wiltshire is the heart of England's chalk. Yet beauty and service in the proper materials of the chalk are lavished not upon the great buildings but upon cottages and barns. For magnificence in flint architecture we have to go to the flint-built perpendicular churches of East Anglia, whose chalk is overlaid by the boulder clays of the glacial drift. Many of the towers and spires are constructed of the fine, jagged, translucent black flint which is a natural local product. The prosperity of the wool-stapling industry in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries enabled churches to be built whose wonderful flint-work in its pearly lustre and complexity of design achieved for Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire what the local masons at the zenith of their wool trade achieved for the Cotswolds from their exquisite limestone. Another type of flint used in the churches of East Anglia are the nodules water-rounded from the polishing of ancient tides. Not only in East Anglia but along the Sussex coast in the neighbourhood of Brighton where the downs march to the sea edge, most of the older houses are panelled with beach pebbles in pictorial designs of different colours and sizes. Thus, the style of the Roman wall which specialised in big round nodules at Portchester and Pevensey was elaborated into a variety of techniques sprung originally from the inspiration of the chalk and developed into a definite traditional æsthetic through the Norman bailey, the Saxon church, and the buildings of the Middle Ages to still later times. The one difficulty of this large style is in turning the corner, and accordingly you find many of the flint and chalk houses in the chalk areas made firm by brick angles to supplement their lacing courses. These club-like nodules of flint in a building reflect the austerity of the downland scene, as the colour-washed cottage with its

snugness and homeliness fails to do. In the same way, the flint tower and high-pitched sweep of thatch or red tiling catches up the theme of the downland folds and the balance of its swinging lines. The surface both of chalk and clunch is also beautifully responsive to the carver's art, as testifies many a church in the chalk districts of Bedfordshire and Cambridgeshire. When clunch and flint are combined in chequer-work without the use of brick, they play into one another's hands to achieve a unique decorative art.

The influence of the South Downs upon the architectural materials of the Sussex village both in its regional and traditional aspects has been profound. The continuity in the use of flint, for instance, is wonderfully clear and tenacious. The Roman walls of Anderida or Pevensey show that the common use of metals had ousted flint as a domestic and agricultural implement in the human prehistory of Sussex only to endow it with a new life in architecture. After and, indeed, before the Romans abandoned Britain, this fair island became the quarry of Saxon pirates and bandits, and Sussex is more Saxon than any other county. The Saxons were possessed of an absorbing hunger for land which has deeply influenced the distribution of the Sussex villages, as we see them at the present day. These villages are strung out at short intervals close under the steep northern rampart of the downs, along the passes and river valleys carved athwart them between north and south and among the folds and hollows and combes of the gentler southern gradient. As their names readily betray, the sites of the great majority of them are precisely those on which Wulfic and Ælfic and their kind planted their tuns and hams and ings.

Thus the geographical influence, and the architectural follows. The effect of such changeless and so timeless centuries upon the village architecture of Sussex is to create a kind of regional uniformity which inclines to the will of a particular geological area. So chalk and flint (unknapped pebbles, for instance, in the neighbourhood of Brighton) are of abundant and traditional use within the area of the chalk. The villages—those that are still spared the merciless contemporary standardisation of the invasion from the towns which wipes out all local differentiation—are not, being Saxon, bold in stylistic adventure nor lavish of experiment. Witness the number of squat towers and shingled spires in the happy,

serene, doll-like (whether large or small) but plain churches in village after village. But because they bear the local imprint of the elemental chalk free from alien imposition, it is impossible to get tired of them. They are plain in the fine Miltonic sense. Take the villages that lie snug under the wing of the West Sussex Downs, West Stoke, Singleton, the two Deans and others. Dwarfish as the buildings are, most of them, particularly the tiny church of West Stoke with its harmonious interblending of the masonry thought out by different periods and cultures, they are not belittled by the primeval architecture of the flying buttresses and bays and recesses of the green hills above them. The villages of the mightier and barer range of East Sussex—Jevington and Lollington, Alfriston and Alciston, Wilmington and Folkington and Littlington, West Firle and Piddinghoe and the rest—are even more diminutive than those of the more wooded west. Yet how effortlessly each of them preserves a particular identity of its own!

Half-timbering is commoner in the Sussex village than in other counties blest with chalk downs, even than in Kent. Here is where the regional element comes in, and the proximity of the oak-woods of the Weald accounts for the prodigal use of timber. But the inspiration of the chalk was not put out of countenance by Anderida Silva's tide of dense jungle creeping up the foothills of the downs. You speedily get to recognise the difference between the timber, brick floors and Horsham stone of the wealden villages and the chalk and flint and thatch, the tile-hanging and weather-boarding of the villages dropped into the pockets or over the scarp of the South Downs. Thus there are old houses of timber uprights filled in with clunch under Bury Hill. It is a short journey from Petworth on the northern edge of the Weald across it to Up Waltham by way of Duncton Down. But you pass from the stuffy picturesque to the clean, austere, linear forms of the barns and farms and of the bantam church with its wooden bell-cote and rounded apse of flint.

Regional modification also plays its part among the villages of the Berkshire chalk. There are very few villages in the heart of the downs, such as Aldbourne, Imber and Buttermere in Wiltshire. Lambourn, West Shefford, Compton and the two Ilsleys are the only important ones I can call to mind. Of the rest, the more numerous congregate among the

corn-lands and fruit farms of the lower, north-eastern plateau. Others perch among the foothills of the northern escarpment near its junction with Wiltshire or are lightly scattered among screens of elm and beech in the more wooded eastern area. Those that survive the anonymity of contemporary building retain the high traditions of Berkshire craftsmanship, and the western group is architecturally distinct from those of the east.

Thus Kingston Lisle, Uffington, Woolstone, Ashbury and the rest are strongly influenced by the tiled roof of Cotswold limestone which reaches them from the Vale of the White Horse. Consequently there is less thatch here than in the more characteristic villages of the chalk. There are chalk and clunch and a little flint, but more sarsen stone than either, and it is plain from the famous Blowing Stone and the chambered long barrow of Wayland's Smithy between Uffington and Ashbury that here, on the borders of North Wiltshire, we are back in the sarsen country. Unless it be Cotswold or Northamptonshire stone, there is no building stone in England (even Bath stone) to equal the primeval sarsen, and it is the noblest material of all for the cool and subtle harmonies in light and shade of the downland scene. Avebury among the Marlborough Downs is, of course, the classic example of a sarsen village. But its sarsens were originally the monoliths of the great megalithic temple, and it is hard to see "the beautiful parasite," as Lord Avebury called it, with an eye whose æsthetic values are superior to the emotional indignation behind it. The pleasure of seeing Ashbury, softly luminous pendant of the great downs above, is heart-free: there the Berkshire mason has triumphed by using sarsens of varied sizes and irregular shapes. Timber is sparsely used in these villages and the chimneys and many of the quoins are of the mellowed downland brick from the "clay-with-flints" stratum that caps some of the lower slopes. String courses of brick are commoner in the east. The materials of lower villages like Uffington or elmy Woolstone show the same allegiance in their building materials to the downs as do Bishopstone, Idstone, and Little Hinton over the border.

The Berkshire villages of the lower eastern plateau are all sequestered partly by trees and partly by trivial dips in the ground. They make more use of flint than do Ashbury and

its kin, and the more purely downland villages of Chaddleworth, Fawley, Lambourn, the Sheffords and the Ilsleys are of their kidney. Flint walls with quoins and string courses of brick share Aston Tirrold and Aston Upthorpe, Upton, Blewbury, Harwell, the Hendreds and the Hagbournes with brick and half-timbering. An unusual number of their churches are of Norman origin, whose solidity is delightfully relieved by the graces of a fifteenth-century roof, a thirteenth-century lectern, fine carvings of human heads, richly tinted old glass or some elaborately decorated old monument to show how the cloth trade once prospered here. The splendid towers of Wallingford and Cholsey are both Norman and flint, while the latter, alone among hedgeless tilth, has a flint barn to keep it company.

There are no chalk villages in Kent to offer local comparisons with those of Wiltshire and elsewhere. The villages that embroider the skirts of the downs eastward from Maidstone—Hollingbourne, Harrietsham, Lenham, Charing and the rest—are half-timbered with sparser use of tile-hanging and weather-boarding than in Sussex. They are the consequence of the North Downs of Kent being, with some exceptions, heavily wooded. But the flint tradition is strongly maintained from the Roman walls of the "Saxon shore" to recent and even contemporary buildings. It is the same in Hampshire, crossed from boundary to boundary by the North and the South Downs as far as the main Wiltshire block of chalk. The pearl that hangs from the shoulders of the Hampshire highlands is the Meon Valley, settled by the Jutish tribe of the Meonwara. The majestic semicircular curve of the chalk downs above the "Happy Valley" from Old Winchester Hill to the swart crown of Butser close to the Sussex border gives to this most favoured vale one of the grandest settings in the South of England. The Meon Valley has learned from the chalk as well as rested in its shelter. The combined Norman and Early English cruciform church of East Meon is mainly flint-built, while the Saxon portion of Corhampton church carries the tradition farther back by its walls of old chalk rubble.

The plateau from Henley to Watlington is not only the most secluded and unspoiled of the Chilterns massif, but conspicuous for the good style and quantity of its flint architecture. Many of the churches (Nuffield, for instance,

with its weather-boarded tower) are mainly of flint, including the nobler ones of Ewelme, Checkendon, Hambledon and Fingest. Ewelme church with its memories of Chaucer combines flint and stone in a bold, chequer-board pattern of alternate squares in each material, while the lovely Norman church at Checkendon, with its delicate, Moorish-looking arches spanning chancel and altar, uses stone for the quoins and flint in courses. The lofty and monumental tower of Fingest church is also of flint but faced, and surmounted above the four-sided double Norman windows by a pair of red-brick gables. This tower is so archaic-looking that it might have been Saxon except that the masonry and proportions are too good. After all, what is Saxon architecture but a cruder adaptation of the Continental Romanesque which the Normans magnificently anglicised? You can see the naïve embryo of the self-confident Norman style in the little pre-Conquest church of Swyncombe.

The villages of these sequestered hills, happy in woodland bowers and arcades, dangling beech-woods, juniper-studded slopes and tousled commons, are not behindhand with their flint cottages and groups of barns. For mile after mile the eye is pleased with variants in the combination of flint with brick. The commoner phenomenon of flint with string courses of brick is sometimes reversed as at Northend and Turville, approached by its cloister of columnar beeches. Here seams of flint lie between upper and lower bands of brick. Near Cookley Green, where the houses (several of flint) make a haphazard necklace round the common, through the middle of which flows the beech-lined road, there is a handsome group of flint-walled and tiled barns. The most perfect cottage of and for the wooded Chilterns range stands opposite Fingest church. Its base is of flint, the first story of brick between half-timbering, and the whole is crowned with little twin gables and beflagged, as it were, by a tall, brick, Tudor chimney poking up flush with the back wall. This is tribute taken of and equally paid to the chalk, its crust of clay-with-flints and the woods under the shadow of which the cottage rests. Farther afield, too, as at Radnage, West Wycombe, Bledlow and elsewhere, flint is in abundant use. The surprising thing is that there is hardly a single thatched roof (proper to the chalk) throughout the Chilterns.

H. J. MASSINGHAM.

THE SOVIET-MONGOLIAN PROTOCOL OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE.

PRIOR to the official publication of the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol of Mutual Assistance on April 8th, 1936, its existence was indicated in a dispatch from Ulan-Bator (Urga) dated March 27th, which speaks of the full approval accorded by the 20th Session of the Little Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to the foreign policy of the government, expressed in particular in the agreement between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic on mutual assistance.* This was confirmed by Mr. Stomoniakoff, Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, on April 1st. He informed the latter that the obligation undertaken by the Soviet Union to render assistance to the Mongolian People's Republic, in the event of a third party attacking it, had actually been in existence since 1921, when the Soviet and Mongolian Governments, defending themselves against a common attack on their territories, agreed to render each other mutual assistance. This oral obligation, he added, took the form of a protocol on mutual assistance signed in Ulan-Bator on March 12th, 1936.†

It may be recalled that in 1921 the Japanese troops which took part in the Allied Intervention in Siberia had not yet been withdrawn; Baron Ungern von Sternberg was using Outer Mongolia as a base of military operations against the Red régime; and China was bent on drastic measures against the Mongolian insurgents and their anti-Bolshevik reactionaries. Ungern's operations gave the Soviets a good excuse for intervention. Despite China's protests, a combined force of Red and Siberian troops, together with the Revolutionary Mongolian Army which the Soviets had helped to form in Soviet territory, swept down upon Urga and succeeded in completely annihilating Ungern's forces. A People's Revolutionary Government was immediately set up. One of the first acts of the new government was to appeal to the Soviet Government not to withdraw its forces "until the complete removal of the menace from the common enemy," to which appeal the Soviet Government "in complete harmony with the People's Revolutionary Government, notes that

* *Izvestia*, March 28th, 1936.

† *Ibid.*, April 1st, 1936.

this moment has not yet arrived.”* In further expression of its friendship for the new government, the Soviet Government concluded on November 5th, 1921, a secret treaty with Outer Mongolia, virtually recognising its independence.†

It is interesting to take note here of the nature of the relations between the two governments following the conclusion of this treaty. On January 3rd, 1924, Mr. Alexei Vasilieff, in presenting his credentials to the Mongolian Government as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union, while making it clear that Soviet Russia was not yet willing to recognise the independence of Mongolia, said that after all the difference between independence and autonomy was more imaginary than real.‡ Again, Mr. Chicherin, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, in his report on the international situation to the Third Session of the Central Executive Committee at Tiflis on March 3rd, 1925, says: “Our contact with the Mongolian Republic is much closer. We recognise the Republic as part of the Chinese Republic, which is so broad that not only does Mongolia not permit any interference in the internal life on the part of China, but also pursues its own independent policy.”§

The Soviet campaign against Ungern left no less than 6,500 Red troops on Mongolian soil. Their continued presence proved to be one of the main stumbling-blocks in the resumption of Sino-Soviet relations. Mr. Karakhan succeeded, however, in concluding a treaty with China on May 31st, 1924. According to Article V, the Soviet Government recognises that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of China and respects China's sovereignty therein.|| Following 1924, Mongolia relegated itself to the back stage of international politics, but forged again to the forefront with the birth of the so-called independent State of Manchukuo. The crux of the situation is that any dispute that may arise between Manchukuo and Mongolia is in reality a dispute between the two Asiatic giants, namely Japan, ally and protector of Manchukuo, and Soviet Russia, friend and ally of Mongolia.

Japan desires to enter into closer relations with Mongolia

* Leo Pasvolosky, *Russia in the Far East*, p. 176; Weigh, Ken-Shen, *Russo-Chinese Diplomacy*, pp. 208-9.

† For text of treaty, see Scott, J. B., *Treaties and Agreements, 1919-1929*, pp. 53-6.

‡ *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 582; *North China Herald*, CL, March 15th, 1924, p. 402.

§ *China Year Book*, 1925, p. 428.

|| For text of treaty, see Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-44.

for economic and strategic reasons. Economically Japan wants to open the doors of Mongolia just as Commodore Perry eighty years ago opened the doors of Japan.* Strategically, a control of the northern regions of Mongolia would present a formidable threat to the rear of the Soviet Siberian defence in the region of Lake Baikal, and if the Soviet front should collapse here, the Japanese would have no fear of the 200,000 Red troops and 600 aeroplanes concentrated along the Soviet-Manchukuo border.

The security of the Mongolian frontiers is, however, concomitantly the security of the Soviet frontiers. As the saying goes in China, without the lips the teeth are exposed to cold. The oral understanding of which Mr. Stomoniakoff spoke was, therefore, strengthened. A “Gentleman's Agreement” in the form of another oral understanding was reached in 1924, both parties confirming their obligation to render mutual assistance, including military assistance, in the event of an attack upon their territories on the part of a third party.†

The situation in 1935 was accentuated by a series of border incidents between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia. At one time it was so serious that war seemed inevitable. The Mongolians considered the actions of the Japanese-Manchurian troops as aiming at the abolition of Mongolian independence and its conversion into a second Manchukuo, whence it would be easy to prepare for future attacks on China and the Soviet Union. In such a contingency they expected that the Soviet Union “which is unselfishly interested in enabling the Mongolian People's Republic freely and peacefully to develop and prosper” would support them in the event of their becoming a victim of attack from invaders.‡

The Mongolian expectations of Soviet assistance were more than realised. When the tension at the Manchukuo-Mongolian border was at its height, Mr. Stalin made a most important statement on March 1st to the effect that “If Japan should venture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic. . . . We will help the Mongolian People's Republic just as we helped it in 1921.”§ It was not

* *The Times*, London, July 25th, 1935.

† *Izvestia*, April 8th, 1936; *Pravda*, April 9th, 1936.

‡ *Izvestia*, December 29th, 1935.

§ *Ibid.*, March 6th, 1936.

divulged whether at the time when Mr. Stalin made his statement, a protocol of mutual assistance had already been prepared and was only waiting for signature. Subsequent information brought forth the facts that the Mongolian Government had early in January 1936 and again shortly afterwards addressed a letter to the Soviet Government requesting that the Gentleman's Agreement of 1934 be formulated into a written agreement. The request was conceded, and hence the Protocol of March 12th was signed at Ulan-Bator.* The Protocol, consisting of a Preamble and four Articles, provides for immediate consultation and mutual assistance in the event of an attack by a third party.† It was signed on March 12th, but was not published until April 8th. An advance copy was, however, handed in person on April 2nd to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Soviet Ambassador to China.

The Chinese Government on April 7th lodged a strong protest with the Soviet Government which, after recalling the paragraph of the 1924 treaty relating to Outer Mongolia, states that the conclusion of the Protocol by the Soviet Government, in breach of its pledge to the Chinese Government, constitutes without doubt an infringement of the sovereignty of China and a violation of the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924, that the act is illegal, and that the Chinese Government can in no circumstances recognise such a protocol and is in no wise bound by it.‡

The Soviet Government replied to the Chinese Note on April 8th to the effect that the Agreement of 1924 in so far as it related to the Soviet Union retained its force, that neither the fact of the signing of the Protocol nor its separate articles violated to the slightest degree the sovereignty of China, did not admit nor contain any territorial pretensions whatsoever on the part of the Soviet Union towards China or the Mongolian People's Republic. As regards the question of the formal right to conclude an agreement with the autonomous sections of the Chinese Republic, the Soviet Government recalled the conclusion of the Soviet-Mukden agreement of September 1924, which it alleged did not call forth any protests from China. The Soviet Government reinforced its

* *Izvestia*, April 8th, 1936; *Pravda*, April 9th, 1936.
 † For text of Protocol, see *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, April 8th, 1936.
 ‡ For text of Chinese Note, see *Izvestia*, April 9th, 1936.

argument by the fact that the Protocol was not directed against the interests of other countries, since it would come into force only in the event of the Soviet Union or the Mongolian People's Republic becoming victims of aggression and being compelled to defend their own territories. In conclusion the Soviet Government expressed the conviction that the Protocol responded to the interests of the Mongolian and Chinese peoples.*

As a reply to the Soviet Note the Chinese Government sent a second Note on April 11th, renewing its protest that the conclusion of the Protocol "constitutes an infringement of China's sovereignty and is a complete contradiction of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924," and reiterating its stand in that regard as enunciated in its last Note of protest on the same subject.†

With regard to the Protocol and the subsequent Notes in reply thereto, firstly it is to be noted that it is evidently the intention of the authors of the agreement to give the instrument concluded a less formal character than a treaty, convention, or pact. As it is an agreement with an autonomous section of the Chinese Republic, without the knowledge or consent of the Chinese Government, the term "protocol" is naturally more suitable. Again, the title "the Mongolian People's Republic" appears throughout the document, a terminology denoting more of independence than autonomy. It should be borne in mind that the Mongolian People's Republic was created in 1921, and had since declared its independence of China. To address it as the Mongolian People's Republic, instead of Outer Mongolia, a title hitherto used in all documents denoting this part of the Chinese Republic, is to favour it with the attributes of independence to which it pretends. The Protocol thus sets a precedent and is a departure from recognised and traditional usage.

As a whole the Protocol may be viewed from two aspects, legal and political. Legally the Soviet position is untenable. As Outer Mongolia is an integral part of China, which is recognised by the Soviet Government, no foreign State has the right to conclude any treaty with it. The Soviet argument is that the Protocol in question is a sectional agreement;

* For text of Soviet Note, see *Izvestia*, April 9th, 1936.
 † For text of Chinese Note, see the *Ta Kung Pao*, or the *Shun Pao*, Shanghai, April 12th, 1936.

against the conclusion of which, for example the Soviet-Mukden agreement, the Chinese Government did not make any protest. This is exactly contrary to the facts. It may be recalled that when the conclusion of the Soviet-Mukden agreement became known, China lodged strong protests, calling the attention of the Soviet Government to the fact that it was contrary to international practice for a friendly Power to enter into an agreement with a "local official" without the consent of the government concerned, and that the act was tantamount to recognition by the Soviet of Manchuria's independence.* It is true that the Peking Government afterwards issued a Mandate recognising its validity. But as the Chinese Note has it, "it was not until the said agreement had been approved and all the legal procedure had been complied with" that the subsequent rectification was made.

The Soviet Press commenting on the Protocol advances the argument that as the measures provided for in the Protocol are in the interests of the safety of the frontiers, for which the second paragraph of Article V of the treaty of 1924 provides, they are perfectly justified. It is to be pointed out, however, that the said measures are the subject of discussion between the Central Government of China and the Soviet Government, and are not questions to be discussed between the Soviet Government and the autonomous government of Outer Mongolia now in rebellion against the Central Government.

The Soviet Note also says that the Protocol is not directed against the interests of other countries, etc. In view, however, of the uneasy situation prevailing in the Far East during the last few years, the threat of a military attack has existed and the parties are, therefore, entitled to take such measures as are necessary for the defence of their frontiers. That Outer Mongolia is too weak to lend any assistance in the defence of Soviet frontiers is obvious. The undertakings are more unilateral than bilateral in character. In the execution of its obligations, the Soviet Union on its part has the right to take in Outer Mongolia "all the measures which might be necessary to safeguard the security of the territories." Defensive and preventive measures are necessarily wide and extensive in scope. They call not only for arrangements by the general staffs, but also for industrial mobilisation and the multifarious

* *North China Herald*, CLII, October 4th, 1924, p. 2; and October 11th, 1924, p. 57.

preparations attendant upon modern warfare. Outer Mongolia is at once to be placed under the full protection and tutelage of Soviet Russia in all affairs, political, military and economic, to assure a successful campaign. In these circumstances to say that the sovereignty of China is not violated to the slightest degree is to mince words.

According to the terms of the Protocol, Outer Mongolia should lend all the assistance at its disposal to Soviet Russia in the event of the latter being attacked. But as Outer Mongolia is an integral part of China, it is not illogical to infer that in such a case China should be on the side of Russia and make common war with the enemy. That this will preclude China from the right of taking an attitude of neutrality and from fulfilling her treaty obligations towards friendly States is self-evident. Further, let us hypothesise that the enemy proves in the end to be victorious and demands among other things the annexation of Outer Mongolia. We have then a situation the consequences of which are unparalleled in history. China will have to sacrifice an integral part of her territory in a foreign war in which she is not technically involved. Even if we take it for granted that it is a local affair and that China as a whole is not concerned, the result is the same.

Since 1921 Outer Mongolia has assumed, despite China's displeasure and admonition to the contrary, more or less a state of rebellion and of independence. There has also existed between the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia an "immutable friendly attitude" since the same date, amounting in reality to a *de facto* recognition of its independence. The question arises, in the event of the Chinese Government finding it possible and expedient now or in the near future to turn her face towards Outer Mongolia and to bring it more into line as an integral part of the Chinese Republic, first through political persuasion and failing this by resort to the use of force; in such a contingency is China to be considered a "third party" in the sense of the Protocol? Inasmuch as Soviet Russia recognises Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China and respects Chinese sovereignty therein, she has no right to veto whatever measures China may deem necessary and compatible with her sovereign rights.

At the moment of writing the case seems to have rested with the exchange of Notes. Failing a satisfactory reply,

what further steps the Chinese Government has in contemplation remains a conjecture. It is China's right and it is well within her competence, of course, to bring the matter to the cognizance of the League of Nations, of which both China and the Soviet Union are Members. Or she may propose to submit the case to the adjudication of The Hague Court, of which the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance is a precedent. On the other hand the Soviet Government may itself register the Protocol with the Secretariat of the League under the terms of Article XVIII of the Covenant. Failure to do so would render the instrument null and void.

The Soviet Press dwells at length on the political aspect of the Protocol. The *Izvestia* in a leading editorial says that it is quite superfluous to prove that the Nanking Government at the present time is in a less degree able to warrant the inviolability of the territory of Outer Mongolia and the safety of the frontiers than was the Peking Government when the 1924 Agreement was signed. If the Chinese Government is unable to defend the territory of Outer Mongolia which is under its sovereignty, neither can it preclude Mongolia, exposed to attacks and robbery, in the name of Chinese sovereignty, from seeking help from those who are able to render it. In this situation, the editorial goes on to say, the Chinese Government should regard it as a blessing that the Soviet Union is coming to the aid of one of the territories under China's sovereignty and that the Mongolian people, thanks to Soviet assistance, will not become a victim of imperialist plunder. In concluding, the paper says, "We are deeply convinced that the assistance rendered by the Soviet Government to the Mongolian People's Republic will only strengthen the friendship which links together the masses of the Soviet Union and China."*

The Soviet Press also alleges that the Chinese protests were written under the pressure of Japan and that failure to protest would be interpreted by Tokyo as proof of the existence of a secret pact between China and the Soviet Union and of the consequent strengthening of the communist menace in China.† Irrespective of the truth of the allegation, it is sufficient to point out here that it is China's right and duty that she should

* *Izvestia*, April 8th, 1936; *Pravda*, April 9th, 1936; *Moscow Daily News*, April 10th, 1936.

† *Ibid.*

protest, with or without extraneous compulsion, on a matter of such gravity as the conclusion of the Protocol which involves an integral part of her territory and her sovereign rights therein.

Finally, it must be said that the two greatest dangers confronting the Chinese Government and people to-day are external aggression and the communist menace. Which of the two is the lesser evil is a matter of opinion. China, as her statesmen have repeatedly declared, only asks that she be allowed to put her house in order and to work out her own destiny without interference one way or the other.

W.

April 20th, 1936.

UNANIMISM AND JULES ROMAINS.

SOMETIMES the critics of the day, after having labelled a writer, wrongly or rightly, as belonging to a certain group or circle of friends, believe themselves to have gauged his intrinsic literary value in this way. Thus we are used to speak of Jules Romains only in relation to his "Unanimism," which finally became the symbol of his poetical expression. But if one thinks of his literary growth, beginning with the *Vie Unanime* of 1906 and ending with the *Men of Good Will* (*Hommes de Bonne Volonté*), one wonders what the unanimism of Jules Romains really is and how far he remains loyal to his own doctrine.

Let us trace the origin and root of his conception of unanimism. The term appears first in an article in the *Penseur* (1905) and is defined by the novelist to be the feeling of common existence, the world vision of life, of creation and of the things in it. In *Vie Unanime*, however, the idea is fully developed in poetic form. It presents in its entirety a poem about collective forces, crowd consciousness and groups in action. From beginning to end the book is an imperative appeal to the single general will, to the unanimous mass of spirits and hearts, in which the individual, emptied of all breath of personality, is but a particle of the unanimous :

All the minds, all the senses, all the bodies of man work together
To forge the great unanimous joy,
And the individual is dissolved. No one thinks any more
Of the little bit of body and soul he has once been.

According to Jules Romains unanimism is the law proper to that modern reality of the soul, which tends to absorb all spiritual streams of humanity. This unified consciousness will end by involving, as by electric wires, the races, the earth, the universe, and will, like the red orb of the rising sun, bathe the whole world in its light. That is the belief of the young unanimist who, after violating reality to prove his thesis, has yet the merit of having created, at the age of twenty, a work of vitality and freshness of expression, which is truly remarkable in French literature.

The *Manuel de Déification* (1910) marks a second phase in the development of the same subject, published as a sort of unanimist catechism, offered by the author to society. Jules

Romains tells us to join the masses, to swell their forces and to make fire spring up in their midst. He calls upon the youth of France to rouse the groups from their torpor and even to do violent deeds, to explode the ancient world which is the enemy of the new gods. He exhorts young fighters to shake off all personal feelings, the "putrefaction of centuries," the love of country, of God, of father—this "parasitical emotion"—and "over the fields, cleared of the old herbage, will arise a new god, the god of the unanimous city." Such are the last words of Jules Romains, to which he returns often in the books of his youth.

• *Puissances de Paris* (1911) and *Le Vin Blanc de la Vilette* (1920) are related in inspiration to the two preceding works, but they present specially urban unanimism, the continuous excitement of the big modern cities. The ecstatic author sings in turn of the "crowds of men," who are engulfed in the *metros*, of those mass-agglomerations which swell and disperse again in one single heart-beat, of the snorting, whistling mobs on the Places de l'Etoile, de Trinité, de Bastille, and de Montmartre, who bulge out by a very excess of circulation. He adds to these kaleidoscopic pictures the noise of motor cars and motor buses, the spasms of speed, in short, all the jerking, mad movement of the capital cities of to-day.

I will not dwell any further on the unanimist works of Jules Romains ; his conception is clear and I can pass on to another question which alone stands out : Is Jules Romains the father of unanimism ? Did unanimism not exist before him ? Such a collective sentiment indeed has been manifest at all epochs when common passions agitated humanity, transforming their aspirations into one act. It has been so among savage tribes, it has been so in religious struggles, in the revolutionary parties of former times as well as of the present. Moreover, if we probe to the bottom of things, shall we not arrive at the fact that primitive literature, as well as songs and dances, are born at the very heart of the unanimity of the primitives, nourished by their general æsthetic sense, feeble as that may have been ? Think of mythology, of the *chansons de gestes*, of all that popular lyricism which, rising from the lips of simple folk, eternalises their deep or naïve ideals ; think of the twelve knights of the Round Table, of the legends of the Holy Grail, which are but the symbols of the single aim to which former

centuries aspired. Are not the *chansons de toile* the expression of the women of the Middle Ages, who, sharing unanimously their sad fate, composed their sweet, melancholy songs in unanimous rhythm, thus affording an example of unanimism of historic value, which cannot be disputed?

It is true the unanimism of Jules Romain is nearer to us, can be communicated more easily to our modern sensibility, and echoes more vividly the giddiness and automatism of our life. Above all, it is more external, more materialist, more obvious, because the author is never tired of proclaiming his doctrine at all times and of waving it in front of the reader like a torch; whilst the unanimism of primitive peoples remained unconscious of itself and natural, and retained in this way its purely psychological expression.

But if Jules Romain does not suspect the existence of unanimism before his time his error becomes all the more astonishing when he writes in his preface to the *Hommes de Bonne Volonté*:

I have had the satisfaction of seeing abroad, especially in Russia and in America, the opening out of certain principles of composition which I have tried myself—and the development in a number of young novelists of a technique in novel-writing which one must call unanimism—and I have seen, if that was necessary, my belief in that formula justified.

For unanimism, as Jules Romain understands it, exists not only in the modern literature of Russia, but also in France, in Germany and in Belgium, and in a form very characteristic of the last two centuries. It is quite unnecessary to insist on how far literature is inspired by the emotions of the masses, by their sympathy or reaction to such and such a social event. Indeed, Victor Hugo, although a romantic, and in love with his poetical personality, cannot resist the suggestive force born of a revolutionary people, and he becomes ecstatic in front of that

. . . enormous crowd, which shudders
And is moved and agitated, however good and calm otherwise,
That great ant-heap of working-men;
The steps, the brows, the eyes, the workers with strong hands,
The waves of vast multitudes. . . .
The city of a thousand living noises, sweet and grave. . . .

Can one have any doubt about a unanimist expression such as the following, so deeply felt and in a form so eminently poetic:

The vast human swarm, sonorous and awake
Flies up into the azure and works for better days. . . .

But it is really Zola who is the master of large unanimist pictures in the deepest meaning of the word. His last literary period is essentially fed by the collective and social emotions of his day. The unanimist perception of the author of *Travail* is psychologically right and is never thrown out of shape by the necessity of upholding his thesis at any price. While Jules Romain wants to crush the ego, "that wild beast," Zola puts the individual into harmony with the group, without in any way weakening the predominant power of the latter. *Copains* (J. R.), although it is amusing as adventure, seems rather a novel of unanimist anecdote when put side by side with works like *Germinal*, *Oeuvre*, etc. . . . The seven companions (*copains*) having decided to destroy two *sous-préfectures*, "the provocative look of which was displeasing on the map," give the impression of *enfants terribles* engaged in a foolish joke, as compared with the starved unemployed of *Germinal*, sullen and resolute, bound in their collective consciousness as with bars of iron. The natural instinct of the French novelist could infallibly detect the dynamic moment of unanimism, and provided some fine examples in the art of prose: ". . . the men rolled on, two thousand wild men, down-and-outs, dockers, repairers, a compact mass, moving in a single block, pressed together—blended to a point at which one could no longer distinguish their trousers, their ragged sweaters—all effaced in one dusty uniformity" (Zola).

Another comparison suggests itself, that of the *Bourg Régénéré* by Jules Romain with Zola's *Travail*, owing to the same initial idea. *Bourg Régénéré* is the story of a sleepy little town, egotistical and greedy, which creates a social life, becomes active and unites its whole population in a single class of workers, thanks to an inscription put up in a public place: "The man who possesses lives at the cost of the man who works." This rational and simplifying work is a significant proof of the falsification of the elementary psychological sense resulting from Romain's absolute conviction that the thesis is all-important. And it is because of this unanimism of Romain, which forces and violates reality, so that it becomes

doubtful, without solid foundation or human truth, and the reader is left with an impression of an artificial, literary, quite successful, but little-persuasive piece of work. How different is the novel *Travail*, that moving unanimist epic: unwearied we follow those thousands of persons, melted together into one single body and soul, and we support their supreme effort to build a "new city, that of a happy and free humanity."

Let us look at what was going on in Russia before Jules Romain arrived; and we shall understand how illusory was his affirmation that he had suggested unanimist art to Russian writers. A careful study of the thoughts of Tolstoi about war reveals one truth:

Because of many years of military experience Kutusoff knew and with the old man's intelligence he understood that it was impossible for one man to lead hundreds of thousands of men struggling with death, and that not the decisions of a field-marshal, not the number of guns and of killed men are responsible for the issue of a battle, but that intangible power called the spirit of the army. . . .

The author of *War and Peace* does not attribute the final result of 1812 to the strategy of the Russian generals or to the weakness of Napoleon, but to the demoralisation of the French army which was bound to succumb before that ecstasy in which the soul of a little soldier was involved with thousands of others of the Russian people. Moreover the very appreciation of the march of history is purely unanimist: "For the study of the laws of history we must entirely alter the subject of our observation, leave in peace the czars, ministers and generals, and study homogeneous infinitesimal elements that lead the masses," says Tolstoi further on. With the Tolstoian conception we come to psychological and moral unanimism, which Jules Romain never really discovered in his passion for the purely external movement of our actual existence.

But the Russian poet Mayakowsky, who died in 1930, presents the kind of urban unanimism, which is analogous to that of Romain, though he had never read his French contemporary. Serge Mayakowsky, futurist in his youthful vocation of poet, at the first rumour of the Russian Revolution threw himself into the teeming multitudes of Muscovites; his trumpet resounded with wild songs of brotherly union, of machines, of human progress; he called upon the "army of art to mount the barricades! barricades of hearts and souls, the

streets—our palettes, the market places—our colours!" We shall find unending examples, especially among Soviet writers, which would prove that Russian unanimism is not a seed planted by Jules Romain, but that it existed always in a more or less active form, according to the social movements which provided favourable soil.

It remains to be seen whether Jules Romain has really succeeded in organising the groups of unanimists, as some critics affirm. Georges Duhamel (a friend of "l'Abbaye"), tells us frankly that he has "sought isolation and does not find anything in the unanimist adventures but suspicion, regret or disgust." And in reading such books as *Lucienne*, *Le Dieu de Corps* and *Quand le navir* . . . one finds that the unanimism declines even in Jules Romain himself.

Before analysing his literary output of the last ten years, let us glance back over the past. Already in *La Vie Unanime* alarming signs appear which cause us to doubt the future of Romainian unanimism. This comes partly from an excess of exaggeration, which kills the sincere expression of the poet. The "unanimist filaments," which come from without, penetrate the walls of Romain's study and make him "jump with universal energy," appear quite simply as a mystification, like so many others to which the writer has recourse in order to show the efficacy of his doctrine. Certain other facts suggest that the unanimism of Romain, having become an intractable discipline, will inevitably be rejected by literature itself, as will every system which tends in vain to capture within its limits the free and constantly renewed stream of artistic creation. *La Mort de Quelqu'un* presents some symptoms of this; somebody, who remains unknown all his life and quite indifferent to the whole world, dies; his neighbours assemble, buy a wreath and follow him to the cemetery. This unanimism of one hour round a hearse, after the effort of a whole volume, is absolutely devoid of vital force and remains purely formal.

Passing over Romain's dramatic pieces, such as *The Trouadec Seized by Debauchery* and *Knock*, which are remarkable for their vigorous characters, but devoid of any trace of unanimism, let us look at *Psyche*. This work in three volumes reveals an amazing quality in Jules Romain, that of analysing with infinite subtlety the soul and sensibility of woman, but neither has this anything unanimist. On the contrary, the world in which these two lovers live is terribly narrow and

isolated, because almost throughout the whole 700 pages we see nothing but Lucienne and Pierre living "in the kingdom of the things that are carnal." But the last work of Jules Romain, *Hommes de Bonne Volonté*, is very interesting from that point of view; the author considers it the most important creation of his whole life. *Hommes de Bonne Volonté* promises, according to the title, a certain unanimist synthesis of human conditions, but in reality it is the very negation of unanimism. With the exception of a few relatively sympathetic personalities we find ourselves throughout the book in the company of morally unworthy and imperfect people, of criminals, each of them pursuing his own mercantile interests, his unclean gain, living in repugnant promiscuity.

What does the action in this series of novels consist in? There is none. One has the impression of being at a cross-road, where thousands of people brush past one another for a moment, indifferent or strangers to one another, and disappear again each along the way of his obscure little existence. Wazemmes is preoccupied with finding a good job, and with certain promises of pleasure on the part of an unknown woman whom he met in a motor bus; Germaine Baader, after having taken her bath, exhales an "atmosphere of sensual love," while waiting for her lover Gurau, on whom she counts a great deal with regard to her oil business; Champcenais, Sammecaud and Gurau commit shameful deeds in the interest of their petrol affairs. A murderer enters suddenly into the shop of the bookbinder Quinette, and asks to be allowed to wash the blood from his hands. This same Quinette, who becomes the principal personage of the second volume, makes it his task, one does not quite understand for what obscure reason, to save the unhappy man; he does so, protecting him in a tyrannical way, until one day, when he is confronted with some danger from the police, he decides to get rid of the murderer; through a lie he entices him into a dark gallery where he kills him by a revolver-shot, and afterwards pours a green liquid on to the face of the corpse which disguises it completely. This book leaves a most discouraging impression of degraded humanity living on adventure, in a heavy atmosphere of intrigue, of materialist calculations among men, of concubinage and adultery among women.

The two young students, who are would-be representatives of the youth of France, tormented by social and political

problems, have no sensibility whatsoever; although very intelligent, they are very rationalist, with a biting scepticism and wild egoism. "The essential thing," says Jean (pupil of the École Normale Supérieure), "is to be twenty years old. When I say that the world begins with myself, I am an idiot if I count on it so that everything shall arrange itself for my benefit. But I am wise if I understand by it that I make my life a perfectly new series of events, for which the rest of the world must serve as scene and opportunity. It is up to me to be so strong that even the convulsion of a continent becomes only one of my episodes." Some chapters only, dedicated to Jaurès, to the poet Moréas and to the socialist-syndicalist movement redeem to a certain extent this disappointing if voluminous work; there is also a fine description of Paris at five o'clock in the afternoon, in which the author shows his extraordinary skill as a poet of the city. The form itself of *Hommes de Bonne Volonté* is in the main contradictory to the conception of the unanimist novel; deprived of a common background, the parts succeed one another with no organic link, they are desultory and frayed, so that all technical means are uselessly expended without creating a unifying synthesis of the whole work.

What is the position of Jules Romain in the contemporary literature of France? That of the unanimist writer? Certainly not; Romain's unanimism has passed, leaving no important trace behind it. Jules Romain succeeded in literature without becoming the leader of a school and he abandoned himself to his one and only inspiration, free from the fetters of the theory he adopted at the beginning of his career. The author of *Hommes de Bonne Volonté* now studies modern society with its very pronounced materialism and a certain moral breakdown after the war. Though one may be much discouraged on account of his heroes, or can hardly bear at times this inexorably intellectual literature in which the slightest spiritual movement is analysed, explained and in the end killed by the intellect—all this cannot gainsay certain great qualities of the author. For the artistic creation of Jules Romain may certainly be the subject of very interesting study and will show, among his other literary merits, that of an admirable stylist of prodigious output. He knows how to paint marvellous pictures of urban life in our mechanical century, and the spiritual crisis resulting from it.

I. KOUCHNER-LUND.

THE ARMENIANS.

HAPPY the nation that can boast of a quiet and unmolested prosperity in constant progress for any length of time, for such a thing in modern history is rare indeed, a kind of *lusus historicæ*. Even so, the course of the history of any national group in recent times has been relatively calm and prosperous and, in some respects, progressive when compared with that of the Armenian people. If the history of other peoples shows some lapses and aberrations from the norm ideally pictured by the utopian philosopher, the history of the Armenian people shows sudden and abrupt breaks; if the history of others is often separated from the past by a wide gap, theirs is cut off by an impassable chasm; if the chronicles of other nations are marked by hardships and turmoils, theirs is literally replete with terrors and tragedies. Perhaps no single term is so fit to describe the general character of their history as the one closely associated with the Armenians: massacres. In that word may be summed up their history for the period of about twenty-five years, beginning in the mid-'nineties of the last century.

Many are the causes that have darkened the recent history of this people with an unbroken chain of misfortunes and miseries, of tragedies and calamities. These may be grouped under four headings and examined in the order named: the government of the Ottoman sultans; the diplomacy of the Powers; the country in which the Armenians lived; and, lastly (and this is of more importance than has been deemed by many observers and commentators), the peculiar national characteristics of the Armenian people.

Ever since Asia Minor became the home of the Ottoman Turks the majority of the Armenian people lived there under the Ottoman régime. There they lived as the subjects—but not as citizens, be it noted—of the Ottoman Empire. As members of the Armenian community they enjoyed many privileges, in some respects perhaps more than they enjoyed under the Byzantine emperors, and these privileges have been often badly confused with rights. All such privileges were gracious concessions by one sultan, concessions that might be withheld by his successor; and though the Armenians, as well as all other non-Mohammedan elements of the Empire, were free by the terms of such privileges to follow their

particular creeds, educate their children as they chose, accumulate wealth, grow rich and enjoy the fruits of their trade and profession, yet, as against the Moslems, they had no rights. They were, as far as the laws of this theocratic Moslem state were concerned, placed outside the pale: legally they were outcasts. They remained, as has been aptly stated by Professor W. A. Phillips, slaves, "liable at any moment, by some caprice or greed or suspicion on the part of their masters, to be hurled from wealth and power into penury and death." Under such a precarious uncertainty, subjected to an unequal system of taxation, barred from the military, naval and other government services (until 1908), not infrequently exposed to the unlicensed brutality of his neighbours for which there was no redress, the Armenian led a prosperous yet not a happy life in the Ottoman Empire. That precarious uncertainty became aggravated towards the end of the nineteenth century when his material well-being was looked upon with jealousy and envy, jealousy and envy which were soon transformed into hatred and enmity, by his non-Christian neighbours. That partly explains why up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Armenians did not turn into a revolting and volatile element in the body politic of the Ottoman state, whereas from the 'seventies onwards their case became a prominent concern in the history of that state as well as in the history of European diplomacy.

When on the Day of Judgment the long array of diplomats who have conducted the affairs of the great European Powers during the period falling between the signing of the Treaty of Berlin and that of Lausanne (1923) take their stand before the Judgment Seat, there is no doubt that they all will have many unpleasant confessions to utter. It may be safe to add that many of the diplomats will have to endure some embarrassing and arduous moments—and no moment more embarrassing than when they confess their sins in regard to the Eastern Question. Yet it is doubtful whether any or all of the confessions made would prove as embarrassing and humiliating as that uttered over the Armenian Question.

Perhaps no other acute problem has so often beset Western diplomacy during the period mentioned; none other embodied more human elements and ideals and deserved a more prompt solution for salvaging the fate of an unfortunate people; and none was left in such a state of confusion. By

including an article in the Treaty of Berlin (Article 61), the Powers encouraged the Armenians to look to Europe with some hope ; by the reform scheme of May (1895), formulated and advocated by the Powers, the Armenians were induced to think that at long last and after many years of procrastination and deception, the burdensome yoke of their overlord, the Sultan, would be alleviated, and they hoped to be freed from the depredations committed by the Kurds. The failure to carry out the reforms anticipated in Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin was a great disappointment to them ; the failure to execute the provisions outlined in the May Reforms led them to despair. Yet in the absence of any other course (open revolt against the Government being out of the question, since the success of such a bold move, however justified, seemed highly questionable even to the optimistic and inexperienced Armenian leaders) they still clung to the workings of European diplomacy. Once more their dying hopes were revived, and this after the dismal failure of the picayune Turkish Revolution of 1908, in the reform schemes of February (1914). But what followed a year later as a most tragic climax in the history of a people is only too well known ; their hopes and ideals, and, to some extent, they themselves, were hopelessly and irretrievably submerged in a bloody deed unprecedented in modern history.

The efforts of the Young Turks who shielded themselves with the armour labelled "The Committee for Union and Progress," partly in order to disarm some of their critics and partly to win some sympathy abroad, have also become a part of this human tragedy. Suffice it to say that they succeeded in settling an affair essentially human in a manner positively inhuman. And what they failed to do was left to their successors to complete. There are people who idly wonder why the Armenian is not willing to dissociate the deeds of Enver and Talaat from those of Ataturk and Inonu (the latter two better known as Kemal Pasha and Ismet Pasha), just as there are others who cannot understand why a German could not cherish any admiration for the Tiger of France, or why a Frenchman refuses to rank the Iron Chancellor of Germany among the great men of his age. It was Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu who gave the finishing touch to the work begun by their unworthy predecessors and, by the Treaty of Lausanne, successfully barred (thanks to the

war-weary diplomats and concession hunters) the Armenians from laying a claim to their just rights and possessions. Their work differed from their predecessors in one respect only : if the Young Turks carried out their villainy through massacres in defiance of the Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary excepted), their successors deliberately set about their tasks and deprived the survivors of those massacres of their homes and of their historic habitat with the approval, not to say with the encouragement, of all the Great Powers. Such is the inglorious and shameful rôle of Western diplomacy in the reducing of almost an entire nation to destitution and beggary.

But if the Turks and the diplomats were the two principal causes for the mishandling of the Armenian Question and for the present plight of the Armenian people, the geographical location of the land in which the Armenians lived had hardly less to do with that mishandling. No doubt the geography of other countries has played an important and, sometimes, decisive rôle in the history of many peoples, but perhaps none has played such a fateful rôle as the territory lying between Anatolia and western Iran, known as the Armenian tableland. Besides being a favourite battle-ground for contending interests throughout the course of known history, it has also been a converging point of diverse civilisations, which, largely perhaps because of the misgovernment of the Ottoman rulers, failed to produce an atmosphere conducive to their harmony and fusion. Under the rule of the sultans this region was crowded with Kurds, Turks and Armenians—to name only the three principal elements in a medley of races—who differed as much from each other in their modes of life as in the ideals which they cherished : each had his own jealously guarded religious creed.

In such a triangular setting in which the Turks represented the governing element, and the Kurds a ready tool in the hands of the government, it was inevitable that the third, the Armenian, had to be the underdog. To have been outwitted and outclassed in such a situation was critical enough ; but to have been Christian and to have cherished ideals, emanating from the Christian West, while surrounded by hordes of non-Christian fanatics proved tragic. And no matter how critical and tragic the situation was, no matter how much sympathy the victims could arouse in the Christian West, no matter how solemnly and profusely the diplomats of the same

Christian West could make promises for the rescue of a "most unfortunate Christian race," yet the West could or would (here the reader may choose for himself either of the auxiliaries to suit his own predilection) extend no effective aid to the victims placed far in the hinterland of Asia Minor. Perhaps Lord Salisbury was coining just another epigram when he said that H.M. warships could not be expected to sail over the top of Mount Ararat and protect the Armenians, yet nature was on his side and geography helped him when he sought a subterfuge to escape from the fulfilment of a treaty obligation of long standing, incurred both through the Cyprus Convention and by the Treaty of Berlin.

The Turks, the diplomats, and nature—this trinity of causes—have done all they could in bringing about a situation that is at once the most disheartening, the most appalling and perhaps the most hopeless in the contemporary history of any nation. But the mischief done by these factors was intensified and aggravated by the victims themselves, or rather by the leaders of the victims. And the writer, who pretends to know something about the national characteristics of this unfortunate people and possesses some knowledge of its recent history, cannot plead the case of the Armenians on the ground of their Christian virtues with the zeal of a missionary; nor can he pose as a spirited champion of a cause forlorn. It is a fact that since 1878, when their fate was thrown into the fray of European diplomacy, they were no more masters of their own destiny. Yet they could, on some occasions at least, have prevented the Powers from trifling with it and from using it as a pawn in their diplomatic deals. In other words, it was equally within their right and within their power to refuse to be used as diplomatic pawns by the Powers. Such remarks, recorded in retrospect and that after many years of fatal tragedies, undoubtedly smack of post-mortem prophecies; yet it is difficult to suppress them after getting acquainted with the rather inexperienced, superbly over-confident, and hopelessly optimistic set of men who aspired to train and educate their unfortunate compatriots and bring them under the toxic influence of *coquetterie occidentale*.

Referring to the Greeks and the Turks, Professor Toynbee states that "optimism in politics is their one common natural characteristic." The same must be said of the Armenians; and this "common natural characteristic" they have guarded

with an uncommon jealousy. The study of their literature for the last fifty years reveals, to the astonishment of all, how the pamphleteers and journalists, teachers, preachers and priests were fed, and how they in their turn fed their followers, with a brand of false optimism that had all the fervour of a religion. Of course optimism as such is not the wisest of counsels to be administered to young people and to people politically young, but to advocate optimism in politics, and that a false one, is a sure way to court disaster. The people themselves have at times shown an ineptitude and ignorance in politics and diplomacy that is quite the reverse of their remarkable aptitude and acumen in business and trade. The game which Morley once described in his epigrammatic statement as "neither a science nor an art, but a 'dodge,'" has never been properly understood by the Armenian leaders. Probably they had as much contact with European diplomats and had as much occasion to learn some of the niceties and *nuances* of Western diplomacy as did their adversaries the Turks; yet the latter succeeded in outwitting them in that game at every turn. True it is that the Armenians have been under handicaps; it is also true that the Turks usually had the best argument, that of force, at their disposal. Yet the failure of the Armenians to take that into proper account has been their cardinal fault, a fault neither easily forgotten nor readily forgiven.

The people are easily roused and still more easily placated; after all they have much in common with the Levantines. They are easily led and of course still more easily misled; somewhat sensitive and quite sentimental, they are sadly lacking in a touch of realism and vision. This partly explains, though only partly, why they were the first among their neighbours to be infected with romantic nationalism, and also its most ready victims. They are compassionate towards other people and think that others are the same. Their plight was, and still is, most pitiful, and they all hope that others will have pity for them. They have, time and again, tried to make up for their faults and failures by repeated restatement of their righteous and humanly just cause. But they have seldom taken account of the fact that the cold-hearted diplomats of Europe, who so often acted as dispensers of liberty and life to many peoples kept in chains, are not swayed by appeals based on abstract justice and Christian righteousness. Expediency is the most ready means of the diplomats, and practical

realism is the aim of diplomacy. "In countries like England and the United States," said Bryce, "the rhetoric of after-dinner speeches is known clearly and consciously . . . by the bulk of the audience to be mere rhetoric." The failure of the Armenians to take warning from this statement of their sincerest friend, and their inability to distinguish mere rhetoric from solemn promises, have brought disaster upon them.

It is a profound pity that a people unusually gifted in some respects and almost universally commended as "the most industrious, the most interesting and the most promising of all the peoples in Asia Minor," should have shown such inordinate immaturity in their judgment of men and manners in politics and diplomacy. While many of the mistakes they made could be excused on the plea that a sinking man clings to a serpent, yet such a plea fails to secure them absolution from the consequences of many tragic blunders. As Professor Toynbee writes, the case of the Armenians "has been a remarkable triumph of emotion and of the Western idea of political nationality over interest among a people who set a high value upon material prosperity"; and they hoped to attain the realisation of the idea thus set before them. They became involved in an unequal, decisive, and fatal struggle, and there they staked their all: their fortunes, their lives, their ideals, their worldly as well as spiritual possessions. Having lost irretrievably, they then posed as suppliants at the door, pleading for their very existence in the name of the heroic sacrifices they made and the invaluable services they meant to render to humanity, never reflecting for a moment that it was for their very heroism and human services that they were ruthlessly mishandled by their adversaries. And in the game of casuistry they fared no better. Through the working of forces in the success of which some detect a Divine hand while others call it mere luck, and mostly through the unholy alliance of Angora and Moscow, they were, as far as diplomacy was concerned, hopelessly cast out from the pale of civilisation, just as they had been placed without the pale of Moslem law under the government of the sultans.

These faults of the Armenians are not exposed with a view to alleviating the burden of responsibility which the diplomats and the Turks have cast into limbo. The plea of the thief that the watchman was asleep while the theft was being committed

is not enough to release him from the jail; nor would such testimony induce a judge to modify his verdict. These characteristics are examined here in an effort to furnish a proper setting for the misfortune which is the lot of a large body of Armenian refugees, numbering several hundreds of thousands. Post-war peace treaties have been noted more for their iniquities than for the lasting and just provisions which they embody. But it may be permissible to say that no treaty or series of treaties exhibits more wicked and iniquitous provisions than those which have deliberately deprived the most unfortunate of war victims of all their worldly possessions. The new generations growing up in defeated countries may chafe under the burden of paying war indemnities; they may drink deep from the cup of revenge and work hard for the recapture of some outlying territories which, in certain cases, were snatched away by mere right of conquest. But the growing Armenian generation, whether it be in the refugee camps in the outlying *faubourgs* of Paris and Marseilles, or in the Balkan countries, or in the mandated territories of the Near and Middle East, or even in the far-away pampas of Argentina (where they have settled to the number of some 25,000), brood over and rage under the most severe humiliation, and feign to believe that the punishment meted out to the Armenians was an unjust retribution.

If the recent history of the Armenians is depicted in terms of tragedy and massacre, their present history is being shaped out of chronic misery and endless suffering. Since 1923 their lot has been sad, and their future is hidden in dark political uncertainty and insecurity. The plight of almost an entire nation of refugees (excepting of course those under the Soviet régime in the S.S. Armenian Republic) has become an acute problem of the day; and no satisfactory solution has yet been worked out. Indeed, it has defied all attempts at solution, including that of the League begun under the leadership of the late Dr. Nansen. The only practical solution—that of settling them in the S.S. Armenian Republic—has been again and again defeated by the Soviet authorities. In this connection it is impossible not to lend an ear to the ominous rumours that Moscow's opposition to such a scheme is stiffened at the bidding of Turkey. Some credibility is lent to such rumours because of the very close and friendly relationship existing between Moscow and Angora. It may be that the Turkish

Republic, not fully content with inflicting mortal injury upon its victims, is firmly determined to have them suffer to the end. The Angora-Moscow alliance may thus be construed and conceived as a bar, a kind of Chinese Wall, against the repatriation of the Armenian refugees.

In a world distracted and among peoples discontented, the Armenian refugee is a despairing soul in a class by himself. The Greek refugees were received in their historic homeland and taken care of by the Greek Government. The Jewish refugees are being settled in Palestine and elsewhere. Even the Assyrians, who only recently shared a sad fate at the hands of the Iraqi Arabs, are at last about to be provided with a homeland on the Khabur River in Syria, with the financial aid of Britain, Iraq, and the League of Nations. But the Armenian is left in the cold, and the dark cloud hovering over his head is getting thicker. Until recently he was a ready victim of political nationalism; now he has been caught in the grip of economic nationalism. And the labour legislation enacted in some of the countries where he has found a shelter has caught him between two fires. No place to go, no work to do. In the midst of diplomatic crises the League has not been able to lend an ear to the pleas and petitions presented on his behalf. The fate of some 55,000 in France, 40,000 in Greece, 25,000 in Bulgaria, 20,000 in Roumania, 130,000 in Syria, 25,000 in Egypt, besides the 50,000 or more who are held in involuntary servitude in Turkey since 1915, is hardly better now than it was during the War years. To use the words of Carlyle, there seems to be for them "no help on earth, and, in an age of no miracles, no help from Heaven." Sad indeed is such a fate, and sadder the future outlook.

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ARCHÆOLOGY AND THE BIBLE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

THE archæological discoveries during the twentieth century in Palestine and in the surrounding lands have increased our knowledge, and broadened our views concerning the ancient customs, religions and civilisations of the Near East. As at one time the Bible was the only source of ancient history, except for Greek writers, the task now arises as to how best we can correlate "The Book" with the increased and increasing knowledge of the past, acquired from other sources, more especially from contemporary records and remains. Anthropological research in this area of the origin of man, as distinguished from archæology as the study of the works or products of man, has been rewarded by the discovery in caves near Mount Carmel by Miss Dorothy Garrod and Mr. Theodore McCown of complete skeletons of persons akin to Neanderthal Man (but, although a modification of this type, not an intermediate stage between Neanderthal Man and *Homo Sapiens* as was at first hoped). This shows, according to Sir Arthur Keith, that mankind lived in this area before the last Ice Age, i.e. thousands of years ago. A study of the remains of Hittite civilisation, referred to later, shows facial expressions of the Hittites, hooked noses and thick lips, similar to those of some types of Jews, which tends to show that the Jews, who later inhabited Palestine, may have intermingled with the Hittites, and may not all be of pure Aramaic descent. In the Old Testament we have incidents mentioned which show a certain amount of intermingling (see Genesis xxxiv and xxxviii).

The twentieth-century archæological discoveries may be divided into three groups, excluding the continuation of discoveries in Egypt and those in Crete.

1. The discovery at Susa, in 1902, of Hammurabi's Code of Laws (dating from about 2000 B.C.) engraven on a stone which had been taken away by an Elamite conqueror in the twelfth century B.C., and the later discoveries of Mesopotamian tablets and of the Royal Tombs at Ur.

2. The discovery in 1907 in Asia Minor of definitely recognised Hittite remains, with the subsequent tracing of a powerful Hittite Empire which was in conflict with the earlier Amorites, and later with Egypt, and which extended at one

time, during the period of, say, 1600 to 1200 B.C., from the Black Sea to the Levant and from Syria to the Ægean Sea.

3. There were small discoveries in Palestine in the earlier part of the century in pre-war days, but much more extended discoveries after the war, since Palestine came under British mandatory control.

An examination of the Laws of Hammurabi and of the various clay tablets found in Mesopotamia gives a greatly increased knowledge of the type of civilisation and religion existing at the time of Abraham, with also a better possibility of understanding the origin of some of the traditions which are the probable source of some of the earlier Bible narratives. In 1923, and again in 1927, original and contemporary tablets were found relating to Mesannipadda, of the first Dynasty of Ur, about 3100 B.C., and prehistoric tombs of 300 or 400 years earlier were also found. The contents of the royal tombs at Ur show that an advanced kind of civilisation and a superior stage of culture existed there about 3500 B.C., a culture which spread northwards and westwards. Later conquests by Sargon of Akkad and Hammurabi of Babylon deepened the influence of Sumerian laws and customs in Syria and Palestine.

Abraham would appear to have been accustomed to a city civilisation rather than to the nomadic life of the desert, which is to some extent contrary to our former ideas. At Harran the chief worship was that of Nannar, the Moon God, and he would be familiar with the sight of the Great Ziggurat of Ur. In Palestine he bought the cave of Machpelah, according to the form and with the currency of Babylon (Genesis xxiii), while his dealings with Hagar appear to have been in accordance with the old Sumerian law which Hammurabi codified. During the excavations numerous teraphim (small clay figures) were found, the gods of the domestic hearth, such as Rachel hid when she left her father with Jacob (Genesis xxxi. 34).

About 2000 B.C., Sumerian scribes compiled a digest of history containing a list of kings which we now possess, and in this list a "Flood" appears to have been an epoch-making historical event, dynasties "before the Flood" being distinguished from dynasties "after the Flood." Mesannipadda mentioned above belonged to the Third Dynasty "after the Flood." Some years ago the mention of the Flood in any record tended to discredit the record, but discoveries of

remains of Mesannipadda, one on the list of kings, and then of tombs 400 years earlier, brought history much nearer to this reputed Flood. Then further excavations in the district showed that deep down below several superimposed remains of cities which have successively occupied a site, there was a thick bed of sedimentary clay. When first discovered this was taken to be the natural site, but on excavating still deeper it was found that there were remains of cities under this sedimentary layer. This proved that at some time in the distant past there had been an inundation in the area which, on account of the thickness of the clay, must have been a great one, and it was traditions of this destructive flood which had been handed down. These traditions form the real source of the Babylonian, and probably of the Bible, stories of "The Flood."

A continuation of the history of Mesopotamia may be gathered from a recent discovery of a body of Assyrian laws dating from about 1500 B.C., from the Middle Assyrian Empire, which give evidence of a civilisation in Mesopotamia comparable with that of Hammurabi some centuries earlier. The discoveries, by Hogarth, of Hittite remains in Anatolia and at Carchemish, enable us to see that the Hittites were not merely a small tribe of Canaanites (e.g. Hivites and Jebusites), but with their powerful empire and warriors they affected materially events in Palestine during the earlier period of the Jewish occupation. A code of Hittite laws dating from about 1350 B.C., deciphered by Hrozný and published in 1922, shows a civilisation in this area less advanced than that of Mesopotamia, Babylonian and Assyrian, of earlier dates. There is, however, a striking resemblance between the customs of the Old Testament and of the Hittites. We have evidence in their laws for the inheritance of women, like the daughters of Zelophehad (Numbers xxxvi), of Levirate marriage and of a sabbatical year.

When we come to consider excavations in Palestine itself there is a wonderful story to tell of the changes since this country came under British mandate. Now public security is better, and the need for bribery of Turkish officials has ceased. This is illustrated by the following extract from Rostovtzeff's *Caravan Cities* (page 37) :

Some years ago when I first went to Palestine, the starting point for a visit to Petra, Ammon and Jerash, it was not only a lengthy

and difficult, but also a complicated and expensive business to attempt to see those cities. In those days in order to explore the ruins it was necessary to equip a caravan, to find guards and to obtain an *iradé* from Turkish officials. In the Palestine of to-day this is all altered. The English have appeared bringing in their wake, like the Romans before them, order and safety, good roads and modern means of transport. The motor car has replaced the camel, whilst the Sultan's *iradé*, the consular *kavass* and the Turkish *zaptieh* have been replaced by Cook's agent and the police force of the Transjordan Emir.

A "Department of Antiquities" was set up by the new Government, which is supported by the International Advisory Board, and the Department controls the work of officially recognised bodies of workers who are conducting excavations under university or museum or other public institutions. The Department endeavours to prevent the exploitation of the historic "Tells" (or mounds, or hills) by natives who may thereby hinder subsequent scientific work. The various groups of workers are supported chiefly by voluntary subscriptions, e.g. the Palestine Exploration Fund, the Oriental Institute of Chicago, the Pennsylvania Museum, etc. There have been munificent gifts from Mr. Rockefeller (including a very large gift for a Jerusalem Museum), also Danish national funds have been provided for work at Millo and Shiloh. The Department of Antiquities had as its first Director Professor Garstang of Liverpool University, who had distinguished himself personally by excavation work in Asia Minor, in Africa and in Palestine. As the work proceeds, one point is emerging more clearly, and that is that so many of the Biblical narratives are supported by the newer knowledge which enables them to be viewed from a fresh angle. We can see that many of the traditions enshrined in the Bible, in spite of the liability to changes through oral transmission, or through copyist errors, or through errors of translation, possess a considerably greater basis of truth than was thought, say, thirty years ago, by some who feared, and by some who openly stated, that the Old Testament was absolutely unreliable as a source book for Ancient History.

Consider, for example, the fall of the wall of Jericho, an incident which has been openly derided. A considerable amount of work has been done at this important historic site. Work

is still going on there with the object now of trying to fix more exactly the date of Joshua, the Ephraimite's, conquest of part of central Palestine, because this date will help in fixing other events chronologically more correctly. According to Joshua ii. 15, Rahab dwelt in a house "upon the town wall." Excavation has shown that there was "a parapet on the wall," and consequently the house would be built on this parapet. Then Joshua vi. 20, says the "wall fell down flat." This does not say that the whole of the wall round the city fell, although many may have implied that. Now the Hebrew word may mean "the wall fell under itself." Owing to the difficulty of understanding this phrase, the Revised Version repeats the Authorised Version "fell flat," but gives a marginal reading of "fell in its place." The wall falling "under itself" would be possible, if a section of the under-wall fell, and the upper wall or parapet slid down and stood on the ruins of the lower wall, or if it fell on the ruins of the lower wall. Now excavation has revealed that from the existence of both an upper parapet and a lower wall, this interpretation is quite possible, so that whether the Israelites undermined the lower wall, while the noise of their work was masked by the blowing of the rams' horns on each of seven days, or attention was distracted by daily spectacular perambulations, or whether the lower wall was shaken by an earthquake, to which the district is liable, and the top wall fell on it, it would appear that a breach was made in the wall, and Joshua's men entered. Further excavation has shown that although a village community had settled on the ruins, the city was not fortified again by walls until about 900 B.C. (cf. 1 Kings xvi. 34).

Again, the excavations at Beth-Shan reveal the fact that the remains of Hellenistic occupation arise immediately on remains dating back to about 1000 B.C., when David must have destroyed the city. This site was never fortified by walls for seven centuries, and the wall there discovered is presumably that on which the body of Saul was fastened. The greatest interest of the excavations at Beth-Shan now lies in the lower strata, antedating 2000 B.C., and scarabs found bearing the name of Pharaoh Tuthmosis III (*circa* 1501-1447 B.C.) assist in fixing more definitely the dates of some of the cities successively existing on the site, and also show the intimate connection of Egypt with Palestine.

Another interesting site is that of Megiddo. Here in a Vol. CXLX.

stratum of the seventh century B.C. altars of incense and figures of Astarte were found, showing an intimate connection between Phœnicia and Israel at that time, but the most important find was the discovery in 1928-9 of well-built stables, of long stones, rectangular in shape, such as were used in the tenth and ninth centuries B.C. This type of masonry was introduced by Solomon, probably from Hiram's men, and the buildings and stables here found provided accommodation for 300 horses with space for chariots and for attendants. These remains of one of Solomon's chariot cities show that Solomon's kingdom was not so unimportant as some historians endeavoured to make out a few years ago.

The work of excavation is still progressing in many parts. In July last (1935) the Wellcome Archaeological Research Expedition had an exhibition in London of some of the results of their three years' excavations at Lachish, another of the chariot cities. Here some seventeen potsherds, written upon with ink, were found in a guardroom of that gate which gives access to the fortress at the S.W. corner of the Tell. These are letters belonging to the period immediately before the destruction of Lachish by Nebuchadnezzar in 598 B.C. They have been translated by Professor Torczymer of Jerusalem University. There is, among the list of names of individuals included in the correspondence, a form compounded with Yahu, a form of invocation of Yahweh, predominating, but one among the names of the fathers of the individuals cited is given, not as a Yahu compound but as an El-compound. (See El-Natan below.) This suggests a change from El-worship to Yahweh within the lives of the father and son, possibly a result of the reforms of Josiah. There is among other items a reference to a prophet who had been causing a disturbance, and also of the passing of a commander-in-chief Akhbor-Yahu, son of El-Natan. This confirms the incident mentioned in Jeremiah xxvi. 22. A seal also was found on which is engraven the words "Gedalia who rules the House." This probably belonged to the man whom the King of Babylon had set over the cities of Judah after the Captivity (Jeremiah xl. 5), Gedaliah the son (or grandson) of Shaphan the Scribe who brought the Book of the Law (Deuteronomy) to Josiah.

Remains have been found to the east and south-east of the Dead Sea, at Bab-el-Dra, of a fortified camp and of a number of tombs. There are no cities near, and the place appears to

have been abandoned after the early Bronze Age. Here the question arises as to whether this was a necropolis for a fertile and prosperous district which was changed completely in type by the catastrophe spoken of as the Destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah.

In addition to recent research in Palestine itself, discoveries in Asia Minor have altered our views concerning the Hittites as mentioned. Reference may also be made to the work of Sir Arthur Evans, whose excavations at Knossos, in Crete, have given us an entirely new outlook on pre-Greek civilisation and its connection with the Philistine invasions of Palestine before the time of David and Solomon.

The question of the dating of ruins is now one which requires expert knowledge, and to Professor Flinders Petrie, the doyen of archaeologists, is due the method of dating them to some extent on remains of pottery. Articles of wood may perish, metallic articles rust away, but pottery, broken or whole, is more permanent. From his work in Egypt, Petrie had learned that Egyptian pottery varied both in design and decoration through the centuries, and he employed the principles underlying this fact at Tell-el-Hesi, in Southern Palestine, in 1890. He had sections dug on the tell or mound; he noted the level of each article found, and was enabled to formulate a time-scale for Palestinian articles. The recent excavations at Beth-Shan, where pottery and other articles were found with Egyptian scarabs whose date is otherwise known, has confirmed the system, and the latter have given definite points on the scale, so that when pottery of a particular type is found elsewhere, that will be *prima facie* evidence of the date of the particular stratum in which it was found.

There are, however, many problems which have not yet been solved in connection with the deciphering of ancient writings, whether engraven on stone or incised on clay tablets and burnt. The greatest difficulty at present in a number of cases is that the language in which the inscriptions are, is unknown, even if the letters forming the words themselves may be known, nor have we as yet anything corresponding to the Rosetta Stone for these later-discovered scripts. The Hittite inscriptions on pillars and tablets, the Minoan scripts of Crete, and the very recently discovered scripts in the Punjab district present considerable difficulty. Among the Hittite discoveries a number of clay tablets were found

written in the Babylonian language, analogous to the letters found at Tell-el-Amarna, which shows the great use of this tongue as a diplomatic language. The decipherment of some Hittite laws is referred to earlier, but unfortunately these lend no help to the decipherment of the other Hittite hieroglyphics; although a seal with a bilingual inscription has been found which may point out some line of attack for the problem. For the Minoan scripts, however, there is as yet no clue to their meaning, but work is proceeding with the hope that, as in the case of Egyptian and Sumerian hieroglyphics and signs, posterity may yet be able to possess contemporary records of the ancient history of these other peoples of the Near East.

Summing up the results I may repeat what I stated earlier in this article, that renewed confidence is being gained in the value of the Bible, as containing far more truth in many of the traditions which are incorporated in its narratives, so far as ancient history is concerned. This will help to renew our faith in other aspects of the Bible concerning the wise purposes of God, as shown from a consideration of the meaning underlying the writings, which have a religious value rather than a purely historical value. We can visualise better the setting of the events recorded with the gradual development in the minds of the Israelites of ideas of God, from that of a pastoral God: then of the powerful War God of a Chosen People: then of one God who even used other nations to work out his purpose, a God of all the earth who desired righteousness rather than sacrifice; culminating in the idea of God as a loving Father, as made manifest in the life and teaching of Jesus Christ.

A. E. IKIN.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN EUROPE.

UNTIL May of this year France had stood high and dry, untouched by the social revolution that had swept over Europe. At the beginning of May a French general election produced a clear Left majority (that is a majority of the Front Populaire consisting of Socialists, Radical-Socialists and Communists) and with it a clear prospect of the first virtually Socialist government known to the Third Republic. Before that resultant government could take office France was plunged into revolutionary strikes. Factories and business premises were "occupied" by the strikers on the approved model of the contemporary European practice. M. Léon Blum, whose uncomfortable fate it was to be the first Prime Minister in a Socialist Government in France, promptly capitulated and granted everything that the strikers demanded.

But that was not the interesting thing. What was interesting was that for nearly eighteen years after the Great War, which destroyed so much, including the social order of Europe, France persisted in ignoring the signs of the times and contrived for so long to avoid the penalty. The famous "two hundred families" of France, symbolic of the privileged class, took no precaution for the safeguarding of their privileges, threw no sops to the advancing *cerberi*. Until M. Léon Blum took office there was no social legislation in France.

It was an almost odd spectacle. The Great War massacred the very flower of Europe's manhood. In 1914, for example, there were some 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 men in England between the age of twenty and forty-five. One in every four of those men was killed, and he was the best man of the four. The next best man was maimed. The worst two were preserved intact. As an experiment in dysgenics—if one may coin a word to express the opposite meaning to that of eugenics—it was a devastatingly effective process. The chain of tradition upon which true progress depends was broken. A link in it was removed and could not be replaced. A generation of the best men was destroyed. They had received the training and traditions passed down by the former such generation. They

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could not pass it on. The new generation was denied the heritage of their forefathers. Education, commerce, the moral, intellectual and spiritual standards were all as a result debased. A chaos of bewilderment, despair and disorder spread unchecked.

The so-called upper classes, who up to 1914 did effectively control the affairs of mankind, had committed one of the greatest blunders recorded in history by consenting to allow a war of such a kind to devastate their earth. In them happened to be vested some of the best qualities in human life. But as a flower flourishes and dies, so the pre-war ruling classes brought about their own downfall. Greed, whether manifest in the commercial practice which refused to temper capitalist prosperity with a fair consideration of the workers' part in producing it, or imperialist greed which led to diplomatic extravagance abroad, was the cancer which ate into the pre-war body politic.

Results follow causes as the night follows the day. In Russia the change was swift and complete. The "lower" classes seized political power and the commercial system of capitalism was destroyed. Gradually and with greater or less palpability the social revolution spread over Europe. Except in France the entire rentier class of continental Europe disappeared. In Great Britain for the most part violence was sidetracked by rapidly cumulative socialist legislation. The attempted general strike of ten years ago could get no "bite" in general discontent.

Democracy or fascism? These are the words of politicians, meaning little. The theoretic system in Great Britain is that of democracy. Has that system any effect in curbing the power or the rapacity of governments? Can income tax, rates and other taxes—the means to governmental and municipal dictatorship in social and commercial life—be withstood in democratic Britain any more than in fascist Germany? And what does "fascist" mean in practice? Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler are labour leaders. They depend for their power, not upon upper-class or middle-class, but upon lower-class support. In Italy and in Germany, nationalisation in every sense is the order of the day; and it is to the masses of the people that Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini make their frenzied emotional appeals as the indispensable routine method of maintaining their authority.

Great Britain differs from every other country in Europe, except France, in having a middle-class. But if one judges by the extent to which the British Government confiscates the property of that middle class and redistributes it annually in one form or another among the lower class, Britain in operative practice is the most socialist country in the world, without any single exception.

France alone until this year has seen the socialist waves lapping round her frontiers without being submerged by them. It was manifestly unwise of the privileged class in France to be so rigid and so unimaginative as not to soften the blow by timely, spontaneous concession or benefaction. When the blow did fall it fell with crushing force.

FRANCE THE LAST STRONGHOLD.

Recent events in France may therefore prove to be of historic interest. The first ballot in the election took place on April 26th. By the French constitution a second ballot is necessary when a candidate fails to obtain an absolute majority the first time. That arrangement nearly always leads to complicated party manoeuvring, as when Tories vote Communist at the first ballot with the only object of keeping out the Radical candidate, their calculation being that at the second ballot it will be easier to defeat a Communist than a Radical. Before this particular election took place, the issue was generally regarded as uninteresting. There was the old question whether the franc could continue to be defended by the Laval policy of deflation by economies. There was the question of Germany and the League Covenant; but foreign policy no more divided French opinion at this than at any other election. In short there was nothing of much interest in it.

That diagnosis proved to be true only in the sense that the calm that precedes the storm may be uninteresting. The result of the first ballot was that only 185 out of 618 deputies were elected outright. No fewer than 433 remained to be elected at the second ballot, which always takes place a week after the first, Sunday being the day in both cases. The voting of April 26th showed a wave of Communist success, pronounced enough to produce an immediate slump on the Paris Bourse. But confidence quickly returned, because it could

never be known how far the first ballot had been abused by such tactics as the Tory tactics aforesaid.

The second ballot took place on May 3rd, with immediately alarming consequence to the privileged class. For the first time in French history the parties of the Left had won a clear majority. It became certain that France would have a Socialist Government under M. Léon Blum. On the following day the quotation of the Bank of France stock fell by about thirty-three per cent., a startling enough fall to indicate the ravages made upon financial confidence. Everyone assumed that the now certain Socialist Government would pass a new law for the Bank, in the sense of nationalising it, but it was recognised by sensible people that such a change would not be necessarily or wholly bad. None the less, as a precautionary measure on the part of the monied class, there did set in a somewhat spectacular flight from the franc, and gold left the country in large quantities.

M. Blum, promptly recognising that a major *crise de confiance* might ruin his Ministry at the outset, devoted himself in the few weeks that remained before his Government would be formed, to stemming the flight from the franc. He made a speech on May 10th, a week after the second ballot had taken place, in which he announced that his policy would be to defend the franc and to resist devaluation. On parliamentary grounds he had no alternative to such a protestation, because the election result placed him at the mercy of the Communist vote in the Chamber, even though the Communists would not participate in his Ministry. The state of parties resulting from the second ballot was that the Left group had an aggregate of 381 seats, including 146 Socialists (49 gains), 116 Radical-Socialists (42 losses), and 82 Communists (62 gains). The Right group had an aggregate of 237 seats. If therefore the Communist vote were switched from the Left to the Right (not an impossible contingency in parliamentary practice) the Left group aggregate of seats would be reduced to 299 and the Right group aggregate increased to 319. M. Blum therefore had to dance to a Communist tune.

The paradox was that such a necessity should impose upon him the duty of defending the franc and opposing devaluation. The fact was that the Communist party at the election had committed itself to the defence of the franc and resistance to devaluation. The explanation was, not that the

Communists wanted to keep up the value of the property it was their ultimate purpose to confiscate, but that they had appealed for and had won many bourgeois votes on a promise of financial correctitude.

It did not take big capital long to find refuge abroad and the initial panic therefore abated within a fortnight. The loss of gold to the Bank of France by the same token slowed in its tempo. Political opinion in Paris settled down to such harmless speculation as the probability of M. Herriot's refusal of the Foreign Office portfolio and the rival chances, in such an event, of M. Chautemps and M. Bonnet. Abroad there was little excitement because it was surmised that M. Blum's policy at Geneva would be indistinguishable from that of M. Laval or M. Flandin.

Suddenly the blow fell. On May 27th strikes broke out in Paris aeroplane and motor works. The strikers occupied the factories. They maintained the strictest discipline and took elaborate precautions against fire, theft and damage to plant. They demanded a forty-hour week as the chief item in their programme. Within twenty-four hours the strike assumed grave proportions. Thirty thousand workers seized the big Renault works at Billencourt. The Ministry of Labour thereupon consulted with representatives of both employers and workers and arranged a conference for May 29th. The conference could not take place because the employers insisted that the works be evacuated and work resumed before a settlement could be reached, the workers demanding a settlement as a condition precedent to the resumption of work. On May 29th 20,000 more workmen struck. The disturbing aspect of what was taking place was that it took place with such clock-work precision and discipline, and it took place a week before M. Blum was due to form his Ministry. Only a short time before a similar experience had fallen to Spain, where a victory of the Left at the polls had excited appetites among the extremist agitators such as the Left Government itself could not satisfy. The French extremists were too impatient to wait even for the formation of the Blum Cabinet they had themselves produced by their votes; and the occupation of factories as a strike technique was obviously copied from the many other contemporary preludes to the overthrow of governments democratically elected.

There was some ground at first to suspect that some of the

misguided big industrialists in France had deliberately encouraged the strikers in the political hope of upsetting M. Blum at the outset of his Ministerial experiment. They calculated that thereby M. Blum's position might be so weakened as to prevent his even forming a Ministry, for they knew that the Radical-Socialist leaders were at the same time threatening M. Blum to withdraw the 116 votes at their disposal in the Chamber unless he ejected the strikers from the factories.

The new Chamber duly assembled on June 1st without ceremony and without uproar. Indeed it looked on that day as if the strikes were dying down. Many works had been evacuated as the preliminary of negotiation for a settlement. But on June 2nd the disturbance broke out afresh. Some sixty odd factories, not confined to Paris, were again occupied by about 20,000 strikers. Within twenty-four hours the resumed strike spread so rapidly that some 300,000 workers were now involved, and sundry forms of violence such as the imprisonment of directors had begun to be practised. The strike had become national in its scope and the strike leaders were losing control. The flow of gold from the Bank again began to increase, the total loss of gold estimated up to that time being the equivalent of some £50,000,000. It was in such a background that M. Blum formed his Government on June 4th. It was composed of Socialists and Radical-Socialists, supported by the Communists. The portfolio of Foreign Affairs went to M. Delbos. M. Herriot was elected President of the Chamber.

M. Blum took prompt steps to stem the tide of disorder by promising immediate legislation to give effect to the strikers' demands. In a broadcast statement he made on June 4th he announced that he would forthwith present bills to the Chamber to establish the forty-hour week with holidays on full pay and the right of collective contracts. He appealed to the workers throughout the country to restore order so that the necessary legislation could be promptly promulgated. His appeal was somewhat circumscribed because at the time there were no newspapers being produced and he could reach only those who actually listened in to his talk. On June 6th the strike again died down, and that same day M. Blum's government received a vote of confidence in the Chamber by a majority of 174 (384 against 210). The Government had

declared its intention to table bills on the following day for granting all the workers' demands, for reforming the Bank of France, for nationalising war industries and starting a programme of public works. The necessary revenue would be raised by levies on large private fortunes, by tightening the collection of income tax and preventing fraud, and from the general economic recovery the Government prophesied. Finally, the Government said, there would be no devaluation.

M. Blum outlined such innovations as old-age pensions and unemployment insurance. In his speech he declared that "he and his friends remained Socialists and they would not have accepted their present task if they did not believe that its accomplishment would help to prepare for the later establishment of the social system they desired. But the Government was that of the Front Populaire, not of Socialism; their task was to carry out a limited programme, not to change the basis of society. As for the strikes, no one must expect him to disown a section of the working class who were fighting to improve the hard conditions of their lives. From the point of view of order, the occupation of workshops was perhaps less dangerous than battles in the street and clashes between police and pickets at the locked gates of factories."

What was obviously true was that though shop strikes had now been added to the industrial strikes, though the newspapers were almost wholly suspended and the food supply threatened, there had as yet been no bloodshed. Many of his hearers no doubt remembered the horrible outrages that accompanied the strikes thirty years ago.

On June 9th M. Blum tabled the first five of his promised bills. They proposed (1) to establish a forty-hour working week without reduction of wages; (2) to establish an annual fifteen days' holiday on full pay in commerce and industry, with provision for the later extension of the measure to the liberal professions and to agriculture and domestic service; (3) to provide for the conclusion of collective labour contracts in industry, the Government reserving the right to institute negotiations between employers and employees when necessary and, if they failed to agree, to make a settlement by arbitration. (The provisions of this Bill were to be made applicable to industries which had not yet been represented in the recent negotiations.) (4) To repeal the Decrees by which civil servants were deprived of certain allowances last year

and those which delayed their promotion, the Government reserving the right to raise the minimum salary rates for civil servants above the minimum ; (5) to restore the exemption of ex-soldiers' pensions from income tax, pending the creation of a general pension fund before the end of the year.

BRITAIN, ITALY AND THE LEAGUE.

The Negus of Abyssinia arrived in London on June 3rd. A forlorn figure, he was greeted not only with general courtesy but with a large measure of general sympathy. He had in one sense been the victim of the unfortunate Covenant of the League of Nations : unfortunate because it lacked the necessary sanction of universal application.

It soon became clear that the Negus was hardly likely to stay long in this country. His advisers were driven to the conclusion that he could not prolong his stay without raising a question of some embarrassment. When he came to London he did so on the distinct understanding that he should come incognito. The condition was thus expressed by Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons : " He (the Negus) has renounced the direction of affairs, and it is reasonable in the circumstances that he should be expected not to participate in any way in the furtherance of hostilities." Now it was soon made known that the Negus, though he had renounced the direction of affairs, had not renounced his former title to sovereignty in Abyssinia. If, therefore, his stay in London were to be prolonged, it might be necessary for him to abandon the status of incognito and to claim recognition from the British Government as Emperor of Abyssinia.

Meanwhile a great change was diagnosable in the relationship between the British and Italian Governments, and therefore in the prospect of profitable business being done when the Assembly and Council met at Geneva. The Argentine Government had proposed that the general question of sanctions in the light of the Abyssinian experience be submitted to the Assembly. It was therefore decided that the Assembly should meet on June 30th and that the Council should sit at the same time. It was announced on June 6th that Sir Samuel Hoare had been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in succession to Lord Monsell. Sir Samuel's return to office started a wave of Italian popular enthusiasm for the recapture

of British friendship. Signor Grandi in London and Sir Eric Drummond in Rome had already embarked on the informal stages of exploring avenues to an understanding. Signor Grandi paid a second visit to Mr. Eden at the Foreign Office on June 3rd.

The urgent question was the removal of sanctions. Although it was a matter of elementary diplomatic form that negotiations for the settlement of questions raised by the Italian conquest of Abyssinia could not be pursued unless the technical State of War connoted by the operation of sanctions—and, indeed, even specifically established by the wording of the Covenant—be first brought to an end, it was recognised in Rome that the technique of calling off sanctions presented some novel problems. The Covenant is not only a vaguely worded document, but has never before been put into operation. The contingency of sanctions being prolonged beyond the end of a given war is not even mentioned in it, and there are international jurists who claim that sanctions in present circumstances are not only an absurdity but an illegality.

But the " fifty-odd " States were all involved, and fifty-odd national faces had to be saved. Hence it was that the Argentine proposal for transferring the question from the Council to the Assembly was almost universally welcomed. It would be possible for the Assembly to take an initiative, such as the Council could not take, for calling off sanctions as the first step towards a general revision of the Covenant itself. Although the British Government was committed to the general policy of revising the Covenant, it was in no obvious hurry to construe that policy in any specific detail. Indeed, it is coming to be more generally acknowledged that the problem of reforming the League is one that will have to be approached on a wider basis than that of the League's present membership, and that the work is likely to be spread over a long period. Before it can be seriously begun it will be necessary to receive the German answer to the British questionnaire, one point in which was concerned precisely with the reform of the League.

On the same day that the Negus arrived in England Marshal Badoglio arrived ceremonially in Rome. The coincidence of those two events caused some embarrassment in British official quarters. It seemed to emphasise the association of Great Britain with Abyssinia's cause in the recent war.

British politicians have never tired of protesting that the issue with Italy over the war in Abyssinia was not a British, but a League of Nations' issue. The real difficulty created by the presence of the Emperor and his family in London was that it fanned public emotion over what had taken place in Abyssinia at a moment when the British Government was necessarily considering what changes could be proposed in the Covenant of the League of Nations to ensure the future continuance of the League itself. It is taken as an obvious premise by official thought in London that the League in its present state has failed in its main object. Its main object is clearly to prevent war.

The resultant question to be faced is : how can the League of Nations be preserved ? To answer that question one must go back to the original discussions about the framing of the Covenant that took place in 1919. Then as now we have to decide whether the League of Nations is worth while as a purely moral instrument. Unless the League be a super-state, that is unless it be composed of every government on earth and unless every government on earth surrenders to Geneva its sovereign right to make war, then sanctions are an impossible thing. Within the frontiers of a given country the police sanction against crime is a possibility because it can be universally applied in that country, and because the individual subjects themselves are not allowed to be armed.

A League of Nations capable of enforcing peace would be possible, therefore, only if it were universal in its jurisdiction and if the constituent countries entirely surrendered their national armaments. Is that a reasonable thing to hope for in the world as we know it ? If not, what alternative form of League of Nations is possible ? Many people in Great Britain are beginning to wonder if it would not be best to regard the League of Nations simply as a league, or a society, or "club" of pacific nations. Article 16 would in such a case have to be eliminated from the Covenant. The club members would undertake never to go to war. In so far as a member violated that pledge he would automatically cease to be a member. That is all.

If such a League of Nations had been in existence last year, what would have happened would have been that Italy would have ceased to be a member of the League of Nations. Abyssinia would have known that she could hope for no help

from Geneva. She would therefore, no doubt, have come to terms at once, and Central Amhara at any rate might have been saved for the Negus. It is arguable that Abyssinia would not have suffered so much if the League of Nations had not attempted to impose sanctions on Italy. The lines, therefore, on which certain sections of British thought seem to be moving is in the direction of eliminating sanctions from the machinery of the League of Nations and of making it into an instrument of exclusively moral or psychological value until such time as the world may be ready for the establishment of a super-state. That looks a long time ahead.

In a speech he made on June 6th, Mr. Anthony Eden said that "The League of Nations had suffered a setback, and whenever respect for law and order was weakened, at once a number of new anxieties arose to confuse the present and to perplex the future. That was as true of international as of national affairs. The very fact that the League found its authority weakened placed an obligation on all its members to examine recent events and to attempt to remedy, in a spirit of candid realism, the defects which those events had laid bare."

Mr. Neville Chamberlain, in a public speech he made on June 10th, went even further. He said : "It is no use for us to shut our eyes to the reality. The fact remains that the policy of collective security based on sanctions has been tried out and has failed. It failed to prevent war, it failed to stop war, it failed to save the victim of the aggression. If we have retained any vestige of common sense, surely we must admit that we have tried to impose upon the League a task which was beyond its powers. Surely it is time that the nations who compose the League should review the situation and should decide so to limit the functions of the League in future that they may accord with its real powers. Is it not apparent that the policy of sanctions involves—I do not say war, but a risk of war ? Is it not apparent that that risk must increase in proportion to the effectiveness of sanctions ? Is it not also apparent from what has happened that in the presence of such a risk nations cannot be relied upon to proceed to the extremity of war unless in fact their vital interests are threatened ? If that be so, does it not suggest that it might be wise to explore the possibility of localising the danger spots of the world and so trying to find a more practical method of ensuring peace by means of regional arrangements which

could be approved by the League, but which should be guaranteed by those nations whose interests were vitally connected with those danger spots?"

Mr. Chamberlain therein indicated the lines on which at least some members of His Majesty's Government were exploring a remodelling of the League. But no sooner had he spoken than a new commotion broke loose, reminiscent in a mild degree of what took place last December. Had the British Government decided to advocate at Geneva the lifting of sanctions? If so, would Mr. Eden accept that decision or would he resign? Such questions were discussed among the pundits.

It was clearly not the case that before Mr. Chamberlain spoke the Government had reached any formal decision on this matter, nor even that an informal understanding had been reached. A report was published in a London newspaper on June 13th to the effect that a "secret note" had been sent by the British to the French Government a week before to intimate that it was now a principle of British policy to call off sanctions? That report was promptly described in British official quarters as "wholly untrue." Nor was there any difficulty in believing that denial. It was a well-known fact that certain members of the Cabinet still stubbornly opposed the policy of lifting sanctions or of emending the Covenant of the League in the sense indicated by Mr. Chamberlain on June 10th.

At the time when this paper had to be written the outcome of the British Government's deliberations on the subject were unknown. Nor had there emerged any indication of the policies that would be advocated at Geneva when the Assembly met at the end of the month. It is true that the Chilean Government had presented a memorandum, dated May 18th, both to the United States Government and to the States members of the League of Nations, making certain proposals. But it was not clear what the proposals in practice would amount to. Their main sense seemed to be that the cardinal obstacle constituted by Article 16 of the Covenant (the sanctions article) should be obviated by a provision that the "sole sanction" to be employed in the future against an aggressor should be "the suspension of diplomatic relations."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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LORD PARMOOR'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY.*

Lord Parmoor's *Retrospect* will be read with great interest by his many friends and by a far wider circle of people who are concerned with the public life of our time. It is a story, simply and modestly told, of a long, strenuous and useful career. Few men of our era have touched life at so many points and rendered valuable service in so many fields. By profession a lawyer, he developed in his later years into a national and international figure, playing his part on the great stage of the world's affairs, and meeting the leaders of thought and action in other countries on equal terms. If happiness is self-realisation, the author is a happy man. The one great shadow in his life, the sudden death of his first wife, is in some measure compensated by the perfect harmony of his second marriage.

The author, now in his eighty-fourth year, wisely devotes two-thirds of his book to the War and its consequences. The catastrophe stirred him to the depths, as it stirred many others, driving some from left to right, others from right to left. Starting life as an old-fashioned Liberal, he was driven into the Unionist camp by Home Rule like his brothers-in-law,

* *A Retrospect*. By Lord Parmoor. Heinemann. 15s.

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Leonard Courtney and Henry Hobhouse. His ardent championship of church schools identified him still further with the Conservative camp. The War started him on a new course, as it started Lord Cecil, and the two men strove hard to apply the principles of Christianity to international relations. The League of Nations brought a new life into the world, and Lord Parmoor transferred his political allegiance to the party which seemed to him most sincerely wedded to the cause of Peace. He has angry words for none of the men with whom he has worked, and kindly words for many. The highest marks go to the men who, in his opinion, have done most for his ideal of an organised world, such as Arthur Henderson and Archbishop Söderblom of Uppsala.

From the historian's point of view the most important chapters are those devoted to the Geneva Protocol of 1924 and the two Labour Governments of which he was a member. He deeply regrets the rejection of the former by the Conservative Government which came to power at the end of 1924, and summons several statesmen, among them Briand and Branting, to testify to its merits. Equally he regrets the decision of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald to combine with the other parties in 1931, without consulting his own colleagues. The financial crisis, he argues, was much less serious than was generally believed. This forms the most controversial portion of the book, and not all his readers will accept his version and verdict. But the tone is irreproachable, and indeed the whole work is a model for autobiographers. Lord Parmoor loves his fellow-men, and his heart is free from bitterness. The fall of the second Labour Government in 1931 ended his public career, but his interest in events remains as keen as ever. He has carried into his retirement the respect of his political opponents and the affection of his friends.

G. P. G.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE HANOVERIAN DYNASTY.

It is forty years since Professor Michael's fine volume on the beginnings of the Hanoverian dynasty first appeared, and the longer it has been used the more it has been valued as an authoritative and illuminating record of the very complicated

events with which it deals.* In an Englishman it would be looked on as a superb piece of research, but what are we to say in the case of a German? In German his volume reads well, and in its English dress it also reads well. The editor of this series of *Studies in Modern History*, Professor Namier, may take credit to himself in adding to it a notable book. Our Record Office, the diplomatic reports preserved in Continental archives, notably the Hanover archives, have all been laid under contribution. The outcome is a monumental piece of work, monumental by the widespread research involved and in the many-sided interpretation of events. For carefully as he reads his archives, he no less carefully interprets them. The situation towards the close of Queen Anne's reign, her possible successors and the immense troubles seemingly involved in the accession of the House of Hanover, combined with the real ease with which this accession was accomplished—all this stands out in these pages with the force of a drama. It is pleasant to note that Professor Michael paints the Old Pretender for the gallant gentleman he undoubtedly was. We can never forgive Thackeray for the portrait of him he drew. Henri IV might think Paris well worth a mass, but James II's son could not descend to the depth of thinking London well worth a mass. Curiously enough, he was present at the coronation of George I. There is a spirited account of the Jacobite rising of 1715 with its failure and the aftermath. It is easy to conjecture that if Louis XIV had been a younger man, or if he had lived a little longer, the invasion of Scotland by the Old Pretender might have turned out a very different matter from the confused battle—if it was a battle—of Sheriffmuir. There was also the possibility of help from Sweden; but help from France might have proved far more potent, though no doubt the English navy had attained a far higher position in the scale of naval supremacy under Anne than under James II.

For many the strength of this book will consist in the vigorous consideration of the foreign policy of George I. The Barrier treaty and the "old system," Spain and the commercial treaties, the northern policy of the new sovereign, and the Quadruple Alliance, all receive the setting necessary for their clear grasp. Professor Michael adheres closely to his

* *The Beginnings of the Hanoverian Dynasty.* By Wolfgang Michael. Macmillan. Vol. 1. 21s.

documents, and it is therefore certain that all his conjectures rest on a solid basis. What impresses us most is the lucid fashion in which many seemingly disconnected facts are linked together and their connection duly established. It is to be hoped that in its new form this volume will attain the circulation to which its merits pre-eminently entitle it. Up to now there has been nothing so massive in English, and with this massiveness is combined a rare gift of relating the sequence of events, notably diplomatic events, in such a fashion that they appeal to the understanding.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

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THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES.*

The first volume of the Cambridge Medieval History was published in 1911, and now the appearance of the final eighth volume in *The Close of the Middle Ages* marks the completion of a great undertaking planned by the late Professor Bury and edited by a succession of distinguished Cambridge scholars. Changes in editorship are inevitable, but it is most satisfactory that the present editors, Dr. C. W. Previté-Orton and Dr. Z. N. Brooke, have been concerned jointly in the production of the last five volumes. The Medieval History now links up with the Cambridge Modern History, so that with the exception of two outstanding volumes in the Cambridge Ancient History, which are to cover the short, but pregnant, period from Vespasian to the accession of Constantine, the Cambridge Histories provide a continuous survey of Western civilisation from the earliest times to the end of the nineteenth century.

These Histories make, of course, no claim to be exhaustive. There are inevitably topics for which the student must look elsewhere; as, for example, in this volume, for a proper account of the relations between Louis XI and the Papacy. This restriction to broad issues is clearly necessary in a volume which not only deals with the momentous and widespread movements of the fifteenth century, but also covers a far longer period in the history of minor States. Professor Edgar Prestage has to compress within a short compass four

**Cambridge Medieval History*. Vol. VIII. Cambridge University Press, 50s. net.

centuries of Portuguese history. Two centuries of development are covered, for example, in single chapters by Dr. Halvdan Koht on the Scandinavian kingdoms, by Professor A. Bruce-Boswell on Poland and Lithuania, and by Dr. Bálint Hóman on Hungary; while similarly the late Dr. Goddard H. Orpen has written on Ireland, and Professor C. Sanford Terry on Scotland during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The outstanding merit of this volume, as of its predecessors, is that it embodies the conclusions of modern research in articles contributed by the most eminent scholars at home and abroad. It is an example of balanced scholarship free from the fancies which distort so many contemporary history-books.

This volume naturally opens with the Conciliar Movement, and the late Professor W. T. Waugh has contributed a careful and judicious review of the Councils of Constance and Basle, apart from the trial of Hus, which, with the subsequent Hussite wars, is dealt with by Professor Kamil Krofta. In his view the basic cause of the death of Hus lay not in his condemnation of immorality and other abuses in the Church, but in his substantial acceptance of Wycliffe's tenets. "It was above all a question of several grave differences in belief." In this Hus was fighting for liberty of conscience, and by his life and death he impelled his nation "to a grand and successful struggle for that right"; thereby, says Dr. Krofta, contributing very substantially to the eventual liberation of thought. Whatever its contribution to tolerance, the Hussite schism is in direct line with the Reformation, which, along with ultramontaniam, emerged from the failure of the Conciliar Movement. Professor Laski, in his valuable estimate of later medieval political theory and its influence, compares its reactionary consequences with the French Revolution. The anti-papalists and the opposers of the *ancien régime* were impotent until "a lever of action" appeared respectively in the Great Schism and in French national bankruptcy. In each case "as is the historic nature of revolutions" the result seemed to recreate "a more powerful, because purified," centralised autocracy. But failure necessarily led to further disruption.

Just as 1789 was a link in a chain of which 1830 and 1848 are other links, so the Conciliar Movement is the necessary prelude of Luther and of Calvin. And just as the principles of 1789 drew new

life from each effort at their restatement in novel terms, so do the principles of the Conciliar Movement lie at the root of all subsequent effort at ecclesiastical reorganisation.

The influence of the movement reached beyond ecclesiastical to secular government because it was concerned with the very nature of sovereign power in a perfect society. The conciliar theory of constitutionalism remained, through an age of rigorous despotism, to inspire the restoration of free government. As Professor Laski says: "The road from Constance to 1688 is a direct one. Nicholas of Cusa, Gerson, and Zabarella are the ancestors, through pamphlets like the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos*, of Sydney and Locke."

The Conciliar Movement failed mainly because the practical application of its theories in feudal society was discredited and obsolescent. "Monarchy was the only force," says Dr. Previt -Orton in his concluding Epilogue, "which could compel order and give security" and foster expansion. Natural law became associated with the whim of the king. The emergence of autocracy was strikingly expressed in the case of France. Professor Joseph Calmette deals with the successful conclusion of the Hundred Years War and the process of consolidation begun by Charles VII, including the creation of a potential standing army, fiscal reorganisation and suppression of the States-General. The subjection of the great feudatories, notably the Duke of Burgundy, and economic recovery were the tasks of Louis XI; upon whose qualities rather than vices Dr. Petit-Dutaillis, in his brilliant and vigorous estimate, lays emphasis. In spite of his cynicism, brutality and lack of all moral sense, Louis' aims "were grand in their conception, remarkable for their originality, and usually well judged, and he devoted to them the striking qualities of a true leader of men." In England conditions were very different, though both Mr. K. B. McFarlane and Professor C. H. Williams, who deal respectively with the Lancastrian and the Yorkist kings, are anxious to show that the degree of disorder has been greatly exaggerated and that the century was not one of stagnation. Mr. McFarlane concludes that the Lancastrian years are memorable for "their artistic achievement and their bright promise of intellectual growth." He also recognises the period's constitutional importance. In the view of Professor Williams, who writes cautiously, being sensible of the paucity of available

material, the Yorkist *r gime* shows signs of prosperous trade, the advancement of education and humanism and constitutional experiments preparatory to the Tudor elaboration of conciliar administration. A concise outline and appreciation of the Renaissance comes from Mr. Arthur A. Tilley. Concluding that outside Italy "its positive results were practically limited to the field of Humanism," Mr. Tilley tends to underestimate the new spirit in art, which, as Professor W. G. Constable shows in his important survey of medieval art, was widespread over Europe. In the words of Dr. Previt -Orton: "If we can only speak of the fifteenth-century Renaissance in respect of Italian art, the essential realism, the sense of the individual, external fact, from which it grew, was rife in Europe, and so was the technical proficiency which was its condition."

Space forbids mention of other articles in this comprehensive work except to state their high standard and importance as contributions to the study of the age. The portfolio of eleven maps has been prepared by Dr. Previt -Orton.

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THE JEWS AND CHRISTIANITY.*

Dr. Parkes' vindication of Jewish religion to fellow Christians will enlighten a wider public by this popular exposition of his cause. Inevitably he is restricted by compression and concentration on one aspect of Our Lord and St. Paul, namely their relation to Judaism. That much of Our Lord's teaching was based on the noblest tenets of the Pharisees no student of the subject will deny; and all Christians will agree that "the originality of Jesus as a teacher lay in Himself and His Person" (and His Cross) "rather than in the novelty of His thought about man and God." Our Lord's declared aim was to fulfil Torah (the Rabbinic law) and not destroy it; but the author hardly conveys the fundamental challenge to contemporaries of the reforms He proposed. Similar proposals have often appeared to Christian churchmen as shaking the foundations of their faith. The best Pharisees, the author stresses, agreed with Our Lord's condemnation of externalism, but were alienated by His scorn

* *Jesus, Paul and the Jews*. By James Parkes, D.Phil. Student Christian Movement Press. 4s. 6d. net.

for "Halachic details" and observances and by "His concern for the man in the street." That they included the most liberal-minded and the best Jews of the time Dr. C. G. Montefiore has already shown; and Dr. Parkes, like him, deplores the unfair portrait of them conveyed by the Gospels. Its explanation lies, he reveals, in "the steady intensification of the conflict between Gentile Christians and Jews" amid which the Gospels were written, by authors "personally unacquainted with Palestinian Pharisees or Rabbinic Judaism" who gave "Gentile interpretations." But the bias of the Gospel authors, though it has led to unfair deductions, none the less conveys an impression which subsequent centuries have justified—that between a prophet like Jesus and religious circles acute conflict is bound to exist.

Dr. Parkes' treatment of St. Paul's relation to Judaism is more controversial, as it obliges him to invade an inner fortress of theologians who see in Paul, "the twice born," the great exemplar of Christian faith. He agrees with Dr. Montefiore that the Law (Torah) which the apostle opposed to Christ was not that of Rabbinic Judaism, but the inferior version recognised by Jews outside Palestine, to whom the epistles were addressed. The author spoils his case for many Christians by refusing to recognise the profound implications of the Epistle to the Romans and by a regrettable denunciation of its exponents. In contending that neither Our Lord nor St. Paul envisaged that separation of the Christian from the Jewish community which he deplores, Dr. Parkes surely ignores the pressure of historic circumstances in a world under Roman sway. But whatever disagreement his conclusions provoke, it cannot annul his emphasis on the spiritual values of a religion which has sustained Jewish saints and martyrs through centuries; nor the fact that Jews have been asked not only to turn their back entirely on their Law, "but also to accept the Christian interpretation of their history, an interpretation which was an insult not only to their pride but also to their intelligence." His vivid portrait of St. Paul (whose fidelity to Jew and Gentile involved a liability to misapprehension which the author shares) is illuminating.

Mr. Cecil Roth's *Short History of the Jewish People** provides the necessary background for Dr. Parkes' exposition

* *A Short History of the Jewish People* (1600 B.C.-A.D. 1935). By Cecil Roth. Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 18s. net.

and should be recommended by bishops for the perusal of Christians. This amazing epic of his race is recorded within 426 pages by a Jewish scholar, whose graphic pen holds the reader enthralled from start to finish. Loving his race and its lore, he writes from the standpoint of the modern critic; and the plethora of his material never obscures the proportion or lucidity of his tale. From their tribal beginnings in ancient Palestine until the recent return thereto under a British Mandate, he depicts the fortunes and occupations of his people during their diffusion throughout the world. While stressing their contributions to European civilisation (notably in medieval Spain and later on in Germany), he shows how persecution and segregation inevitably concentrated their mental powers on the preservation and interpretation of their faith. That Talmudic studies were "futile and wasteful," even "pernicious" at times, he admits; but justifies them as a training by which the Jewish mind became "preternaturally sharpened." "The Talmud" also "gave the persecuted Jew of the Middle Ages another world into which he could escape, when the vicissitudes of that in which he lived had become too great to bear." The author's fairness and moderation intensify the recurrent tragedy he depicts which is at last dissipated—outside Russia—by the liberating influences of the nineteenth century. He writes, alas, under the shadow of revived tragedy, but is confident that the people who managed to survive its terrible experiences during the Crusades can also survive those under the Nazi régime. (Nazis fortunately have rendered the Christian church a service by repudiating its Gospel.)

"It is a fact," he concludes, "that the Jewish people is beset to-day with dangers which, in any other case, might well prove fatal." Observance of their faith, "perhaps, is on the downward grade," as it was in ancient Alexandria; assimilation and intermarriage are rife, as they were to a greater extent in classical times; and "an attempt to re-establish a national centre after an interval of nearly two thousand years is hazardous, difficult, and supremely illogical."

"But when a people has lived for thirty-five centuries, it has witnessed most of the possible vicissitudes of existence; and it can afford to look the gravest dangers and difficulties of the moment in the face, in the calm confidence that each has been encountered, and surmounted, at least once before."

D. P. H.

GOOD TALK.*

Fair speech, says Ptah Hotep the Egyptian, some thirty centuries B.C., is like an emerald picked up among pebbles. His description, in the earliest book we have, of good conversation stresses "tact and urbanity" as among its chief requirements, thus strikingly anticipating a disquisition by Lord Chesterfield. Mr. Wingfield-Stratford, who quotes both, discusses this many-faceted jewel from every angle. He imagines the origins of talk in the cries of the caveman; carries us from one golden period in Athens (a brief "life that flowered in talk, and talked itself away") to another in Renaissance Italy; then on to the "formal perfection" of the French *salons* in the eighteenth century, with their deliberate limitations and preponderatingly feminine influence. This style of talk is contrasted with that of our own greatest conversationalist, Dr. Johnson; in the vexed question of the value of the spoken as against the written word, his talk would certainly bear away the palm from his prose. But did not Boswell perhaps retouch, asks our author? Any attempted "anthology of conversation" would, he maintains, mostly "consist of more or less plausible fictions"; the difficulties of reconstructing talk for the stage or for print are almost insuperable. The reader requires a "point and finish" to spoken remarks, so that the novelist or historian perforce "tidies up the talk." Some instances of surmounting these difficulties are, however, given: Shakespeare's "exuberant fertility of conversational invention" had been preceded by the talk of Chaucer's Pilgrims, "set down with a simple directness that is the supreme triumph of art." In Victorian days, George Meredith understood the conversational art, but found no "capable audience"; Wilde's brilliance was "too emphatic and self-conscious." Our author contrasts oratory with talk; he discusses taboos; the hypnotic effect produced by mass-shouting of such words as "Duce" or "Führer"; the promoting of masculine good-fellowship by wine and by the sort of talk that often accompanies it; the ruin of conversation by monologues or verbal quibbles; he laments the decay of interest in good talk to-day, owing to our preoccupation with machines. We are

* *Good Talk: a Study of the Art of Conversation.* By Esmé Wingfield-Stratford. Lovat Dickson & Thompson. 1936. 6s.

in danger of forfeiting "our human birthright of living well," since "it is when we down tools and start talking that we become human, for then we are no longer enslaved to things, but free for the cultivation of our very lives, of which talk is the flower."

The book is mainly delightful, full of human and literary interest, but a few passages will not be to everyone's taste. We could wish that Harold Monro's charming couplet from *Weekend* had been included:

There's lovely conversation in this house;
Words become princes that were slaves before.

E. G. S.

AN ESSAY IN SOCIOLOGY.

It may be that, by now, even in England, Luigi Sturzo is no longer known merely and mainly as the ex-leader, now living as an exile in London, of the Italian Partito Popolare and as a strong opponent of Fascism, but also and above all as the author of a masterly essay on the *International Community and the Right of War*. Still his new book, just published in French, with the title *Essai de Sociologie* (Blond and Gay, Paris, 1935) is surely going to enhance his renown as a thinker and to be extremely actual and suggestive. The first part of the essay is devoted to an endeavour to show the ultimate impossibility of a positivistic sociology as well as of a sociology grounded on a purely idealistic and immanent view of history; for both these two types of sociology abstract from the concrete fact of personality and have no room for it, whether their ultimate reality be conceived as a bio-psychological social organism or as a developing spiritual structure of which man is an organ or an expression. Sturzo holds that a sociology aiming at being adequate to facts must start from concrete history, and defines his own historicism as the systematic conception of history as human process realising itself through immanent rational energies moving from and tending to a transcendent absolute unification. In this way he accepts Croce's historicism while at the same time placing it within a wider context, so that eternity inspires, upholds, permeates and perfects history and the dialectical aspect of history does not suppress freedom but serves it.

The whole essay is an exhibition of how the many-sided fact of society is an expansion and concretisation of individual conscience.

The chapters to which we would most call the reader's attention are those in which the author illustrates the ineradicable duality, within every social-historical whole between *authority* and *liberty*, *morality* and *law (droit)*, the organisation and the ideal, dynamic or mystical spirit. Especially the chapter on *Authority and Liberty* as complementary to one another is eminently significant of the way in which a thorough orthodox Roman Catholic priest may hold what are practically Liberal views. Don Sturzo discriminates between *the method of liberty* in practical politics and the positivistic, rationalistic and idealistic philosophies which Liberalism as a political force has now and then adopted as its intellectual justification. Extremely interesting for their actualities are also the two chapters on *Duality and Diarchy* and on the *Modern State*, in which the untenability and monstrosity of the Totalitarian State are mercilessly exposed. The first chapter shows how the advent of Christianity has immensely and indelibly deepened the dualism between purely cultural and spiritual interests on the one hand (concretised in Churches as institutions) and purely economico-political interests; so that the existence of Churches aware of their nature and task is the greatest obstacle to an almighty all-absorbing State and the greatest bulwark of freedom and, vice versa, the existence of a State aware of its own nature and task is the greatest obstacle to a Church usurping rôles not its own.

The chapter on "The Modern State" has a most interesting paragraph in which the State-worship now exacted by the different existing Totalitarian States, is shown to be only the culmination of a long historical process. In the course of this process on the one hand, the religious background, presuppositions and atmosphere within which modern civilisation grew and out of which developed the loyalty to the State, gradually faded away, and on the other hand the State had to foster a new loyalty to itself, a new ethic in the place of that once inculcated by the Church.

Don Sturzo's essay does therefore deserve the greatest study on the part of all who are aware that the very foundations of our civilisation and culture are at stake.

ANGELO CRESPI.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Mr. Stephen Gwynn has done a considerable service in publishing, in *The Anvil of War*,* a selection of war-time correspondence by the late F. S. Oliver, whose remarkable power of assessing political conduct and gifts for characterisation and literary expression were displayed most recently in his unfinished historical work, *The Endless Adventure*. In these letters, regularly written to his brother in Canada, Oliver recorded his reactions to the passage of events and gave his frank opinion of the leading figures in England, with most of whom he was in close, if not intimate, touch. "His judgment," says Mr. Gwynn in his introductory appreciation, "seemed to go to the heart of things; it had weight and it had wit; and though he had a humorous love of denunciation, his humour went too deep not to make for broad tolerance." Writing in the heat of the moment many of his views are highly critical without always that proper allowance for mistakes which in perspective he made. Looking back in June 1918, at the emergency war organisations, "imperfect and wasteful as they are . . . any fair mind must be impressed with the extraordinary energy and resourcefulness of our fellow countrymen, as well as by their indomitable spirit." At times Oliver showers high praise on individuals, for example on Sir Roger Keyes after Zeebrugge. Although natural prejudice might affect an early estimate of character or conduct, Oliver's judgment never remained simply static and obdurate. He mistrusted politicians instinctively. His contempt for Asquith was scathing, and he disliked particularly Mr. Lloyd George; and it is a remarkable feature of these letters how this latter opinion turned into a high, though always critical, admiration for Mr. Lloyd George as the man most fitted then as Prime Minister. He includes "my old enemy" with Milner, Sir Henry Wilson and Sir Maurice Hankey as the men at home who "were most responsible for the winning of the war." Oliver describes in detail a visit to France in the autumn of 1917, when he was with Gough at Passchendaele and subsequently spent a week at General Headquarters as the guest of Haig, for whom he acquired a fond admiration. Oliver did not place him in the highest rank as a soldier, but recognised him as a lovable and "very great character—a perfectly true and simple-minded man, who sees the facts, and can't see the frills and theories."

The approaching retirement of Professor Gilbert Murray from his Greek Chair at Oxford has afforded a splendid opportunity for publishing *Essays in Honour of Gilbert Murray*† by some of his many friends and admirers. This volume, which is produced simultaneously with a specialist volume on *Greek Poetry: Essays to be Presented to Professor Gilbert Murray* from his fellow Greek scholars, covers almost the whole

* Macmillan. 12s. 6d. net.

† Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

range of his many-sided interests. Each contributor writes upon some topic or movement which is dear to Professor Murray. Lord Cecil in his sketch of the history of the League of Nations Union pays high tribute to the qualities of its chairman. Mr. J. L. Hammond writes on Gladstone as a good European and Señor S. A. de Madariaga discusses the historic background and purpose of the League. Dr. H. Granville-Barker pays tribute to his living interpretative translations of Greek tragedy, which, declares Mr. John Masefield, "lifted, broadened, and illuminated the taste of a decade." Dame Sybil Thorndike is equally enthusiastic of his work as producer. Professor J. A. K. Thomson writes on the present and future of classical scholarship, and Professor A. J. Toynbee discusses the Greek approach to the study of history. Another side of his interests is found in Mrs. W. H. Salter's essay on "the evidence for telepathy." She describes Professor Murray as "in his own field one of the most successful telepathic percipients on record." Dr. H. A. L. Fisher, Sir Hubert Murray, Professor Alfred Zimmern, Dr. Edwyn R. Bevan and Professor F. M. Cornford are among other distinguished admirers who write in honour of one of the most outstanding figures in contemporary England.

Mr. Douglas Woodruff has edited, under the appropriate title of *Dear Sir*,* a selection of letters to *The Times*, written for the most part during post-war years, and which display "without ostentation or boasting, a wealth of cultivated humanity." This book is not concerned with great issues but with a host of lesser questions which affect us no less and interest many people far more. These letters are loosely arranged in sections under general headings (with sub-titles), including links with the past, language and literature, education and the young, food and dress, health, animal life and a final residuary mass on "all manner of things." Everyone of whatever taste must find surely something in this medley of correspondence to interest a leisure moment, to revive a lagging conversation, or even something to learn. For instance what officers, if any, in the armed forces may say "God bless him" when honouring the loyal toast? Was the colour of Mary Queen of Scots' eyes hazel or blue? Do razor blades retain their edge longer if kept in orientation to the north? Similarly, does the ringed plover invariably and knowingly keep its eggs arranged on the points of the compass? Here the gourmet will enjoy his fill, including an Italian and Grecian delicacy of chopped-up octopus, while the sufferer from insomnia will be recommended a variety of soporifics. This diverting and useful volume should certainly find a place among the holiday luggage.

The Director of the British Museum, Sir George Hill, has produced a comprehensive and erudite work on *Treasure Trove in Law and*

* Methuen. 8s. 6d. net.

*Practice** in which he traces its legal development in many countries from antiquity until the present time. The importance and complexity of treasure trove are due largely to the conflicting theories enunciated by the Roman and Germanic systems of law. While the former vested the treasure in the finder and the owner of the land in which it was found, the regality conception of the latter system recognised the ownership in the king or feudal overlord. The survival of the regality theory was dependent upon the influence of Roman Law. While it survived in England, the interaction of the rival systems in France, for example, led to a variety of local rules, until uniformity was given by the Code Napoléon. The modern tendency in the law of treasure trove is to give the owner of the land and the finder the property in the treasure subject to a right of pre-emption by the State. The author has deliberately provided in this book by dint of extensive research, material to enable the lawyer and legal historian to produce a comprehensive comparative treatment of the laws of treasure trove in all countries. Sir George Hill also has sought "more especially with reference to Great Britain, to describe methods of administration and to digest the more important cases." Museums, public officials and the public at large will find here a useful account of the existing law and practice.

The Legacy of England† is a companion book to that admirable appreciation of the English country-side contained in *The Beauty of Britain*. The new volume, described as "an illustrated survey of the works of man in the English country," is contributed by a series of well-known writers, who together provide a vivid and comprehensive picture of the main aspects of rural life. The approach is historical and for the most part the reader will enjoy in each chapter an outline of the evolution, and maybe decline, of an outstanding country institution. There is, intentionally, little criticism of the present, although as Mr. Bernard Darwin says in relation to rural sports and pastimes, there is inevitably at times "a mood of gentle melancholy." But above all this volume is an appreciation of a splendid heritage to which all the contributors pay their homage. The volume opens with an essay on "the landscape" by Mr. Edmund Blunden; and the succeeding chapters on "the farm" and "the village" are contributed respectively by Mr. Adrian Bell and Mr. Charles Bradley Ford. Mr. G. M. Young writes on "the country house," while an imaginative picture of his real country town comes from Mr. R. H. Mottram. Mr. George Birmingham provides a most interesting account of the parish church, while Mr. Ivor Brown is responsible for an attractive and balanced appreciation of the country inn. There are 114 illustrations from photographs which the reader will greatly appreciate.

* Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 21s. net.

† Batsford. 5s. net.

An interesting volume of reminiscences and reflections will be found in *The Adventures of a Schoolmaster*,* by Mr. Hubert W. Ord. For a number of years, Mr. Ord was a master at the famous Blackheath Proprietary School and after resigning through ill-health in 1904 he devoted his time to private coaching and lecturing. Apart from dwelling upon his diverse experiences and many interests, the author has much to say on the practice and theory of education. As Sir Frank Dyson remarks in his Foreword, "he has taken education as a link which joins together the succeeding phases of his life."

Mrs. Steuart Erskine's valuable book *Palestine of the Arabs*† is of particular interest at the present time. She writes on the Palestinian question from the Arab standpoint, and has deliberately made a study of it after finding that no such work existed. There was, on the other hand, however, plenty of literature dealing with the Zionist policy and colonisation schemes. During her visit of 1934-5 she met important members of both parties, and in her book endeavours to state facts without bias. Mrs. Erskine ends her very interesting volume with a chapter on a suggested solution of the problem, "that known as 'cantonization.'" This scheme has met with the approval of the British, Jews and Arabs, and therefore seems worthy of serious consideration.

The admirers of Dame Laura Knight will enjoy and appreciate her vivid recollections in *Oil Paint and Grease Paint*.‡ It reveals her struggle for recognition, and is a volume of striking contrast from the early years of want when she made her wedding dress from her mother's linen sheets to the time when she earned four hundred guineas in a day. Dame Laura gives a lively impression of well-known figures she has met and scenes of her travels, including the circus life with which so many of her later pictures are associated. The book is lavishly illustrated with good reproductions of her work.

The collection of *Poetical Works of Robert Bridges*,§ excluding his eight dramas, in the Oxford Standard Authors series has been augmented in a new edition. *October and Other Poems*, collectively published in 1920, has been reprinted with the exception of some war poems. The volume of *New Verse*, written in 1921, has been included also, while other additions to this book are two pieces not included previously in any collection, namely *Verses Written for Mrs. Daniel* and *The Widow*.

* Simpkin Marshall Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.

† Harrap. 10s. 6d. net.

‡ Ivor Nicholson & Watson Ltd. 21s. net.

§ Oxford University Press. 3s. 6d. net; India paper, 8s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

AUGUST 1936.

LOST BEARINGS.

SOME years ago I took a turn at the tiller of a yacht that was making for a certain point on the coast of Northern Brittany. It was a breezy, not to say a squally, afternoon. Canvas was double-reefed and close-hauled; and the old fisherman who served as sailing-master had his work cut out in attending to it. A strong tide was running athwart our course. We were crossing the mouth of a treacherous bay, full of submerged shoals of which some were buoyed. Between them ran a narrow channel, and it was my business to keep the yacht close to the windward side of it. Astern, on a rocky eminence, stood a little church; and ahead, on the farther coast four or five miles off, another church. These were the landmarks from which local pilots took their bearings. We got across safely, thanks less to my struggles with the kicking tiller than to the warning refrain sung out at intervals by the old fisherman: "*Restez dans les marques! Restez dans les marques!*"

Of late the British Government and, to some extent, the people of this country have lost their bearings. Bewilderment and anxiety are widespread and deep—much deeper than His Majesty's Ministers seem to understand. We are not pleased with ourselves, we are not far from being ashamed of our Government, and we know not what course, if any, it is shaping. Worse still, for the repose of our souls, is the thought that we cannot wholeheartedly throw the blame on to others. The sudden collapse of Abyssinian resistance last spring, under the impact of Italian bombs and "mustard" gas, was like the snapping of a mainstay in a sharp puff of wind. We had counted upon Ethiopian valour to hold up the Italian advance until the big rains should bother Mussolini and give time for half-hearted "sanctions" to bother him till more. Then, perhaps, the face if not the honour of ourselves and the League might be saved and the wind tempered to a Negus shorn of some territory and authority. These hopes were dashed when the Lion of Judah suddenly fled. As an Oriental diplomatist pungently put it: "Shameful! These niggers have betrayed white civilisation!"

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Last autumn we were indignant because M. Pierre Laval had betrayed "white civilisation" in the guise of the "collective security" which Sir Samuel Hoare had tardily espoused by proxy on our behalf. In December we deplored Sir Samuel's infidelity to his/our bride. One day, when archives and diaries give up their secrets, students of history may determine exactly how faithful he meant to be when he made his vows at Geneva on September 11th, 1935. But we know that as soon as somebody said "Sanctions mean War!" he and his colleagues paused and shuddered and looked round for a lady of easier virtue. At all events Sir Samuel, restored to office after temporary wanderings as scapegoat in the wilderness, showed no disapproval when his predecessor at the Foreign Office told the House of Commons on June 23rd, in the name of the Government, that "With Europe in its present situation, and with the great dangers surrounding us, we are not prepared to see a single ship sunk in a successful battle in the cause of Abyssinian independence."

"Abyssinian independence," forsooth! As though it had not been a question of our own ultimate safety! Three days earlier the Prime Minister had said at Wishaw: "You cannot have security, collective or otherwise, on the cheap and second-hand, or any system of limited liability"—the same speech in which Mr. Baldwin repeated with emphasis his words to the House of Commons two years ago: "If you are going to adopt sanctions, you must be prepared for war. If you adopt a sanction without being ready for war, you are not honest trustees of the nation." On this showing what are we to think of Mr. Baldwin and his colleagues who, in the autumn of 1935, adopted sanctions without being prepared for war, and thereafter made it clear that no risks could be run in support of them? So we are now in the summer of our discontent. We are not proud of having led the League in restraint of aggression, only to lead the retreat from what the Chancellor of the Exchequer—with Signor Mussolini's hearty approval—was presently to call the "midsummer of madness." As Sir John Simon characteristically confessed to the House on June 23rd: "Nothing could be more distressing. . . . It is widely felt to be an injury to the cause of international morality"—a cause so sacred that it must not be sullied by the loss of a single ship sunk in a successful battle.

In the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for July Mr. J. A. Spender wrote—and on this point I agree with him—that any false bravado on this subject seems highly undesirable. If we have done with international morality, collective security, the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy and all the other "slogans" wherewith we have sought to bamboozle ourselves and the world, is it not time to get back into that ethical vacuum which the "old diplomacy" (beloved of Lord Rennell and others) found so congenial an atmosphere? Judging by the terms of the draft British proposals submitted to the Montreux Conference on the rearmament of the Turkish Straits the other day, our Minister's lungs have already adapted themselves to this moral void. There we read of "the rights of a belligerent" in the Straits during war, "Turkey being neutral." We cannot have it both ways. We cannot pretend to be members of a war-renouncing international community and at the same time talk of "war," and of "neutrality" towards what may be the international crime of war.

In his July article Mr. J. A. Spender also wrote—and here I do not altogether agree with him—that "there is a new kind of fear hanging over the world, and it introduces an element of blackmail which is new to diplomacy." Blackmail is not new to diplomacy. It was the essence of the "old diplomacy," the *ultima ratio* of monarchs and States, the thing against which the Balance of Power was contrived. Blackmail is the soul of "power politics." The League of Nations and the ideal it stood for were departures from "power politics," in the ordinary sense of that term. They were attempts to get away from blackmail and to set up, in an international community, the very principle upon which law and order are founded in this country. Maybe the makers of the League put the cart before the horse by laying down laws for a community of nations before those nations were willing to obey them. But unless the will of a law-abiding community to suppress disturbers of its peace and rebels against its laws is to be called blackmail, the aims of the League were as different from those of the "old diplomacy" as the purpose of a sheriff's posse is from that of a band of brigands.

Within limits it may be true, as Mr. Spender suggests, that there is a "new kind of fear" hanging over the world,

though I think it is new in degree rather than in kind. It is the old fear intensified and unchecked by anything like the old firmness of resolve to withstand terror. It is an International Terror which has been expanded out of the national terrors set up in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. This expansion of terror is a very subtle process. After having been used to demoralise wide sections of the people in Russia, Italy and Germany, it is now being made an agency of demoralisation in what we fondly supposed was a civilised and therefore, to some extent, a moral world. As a shrewd American observer, Professor Calvin B. Hoover, wrote three years ago in his thoughtful work *Germany Enters The Third Reich*, this sort of terror "may be the negation of civilisation." Professor Hoover had previously lived in Russia where, as he said, terror was a well-established and a normal part of life. But in Germany he saw its beginnings and watched its growth as a "fascinating though fearful thing." He saw it "develop and lay its hand on men, consuming their characters and leading them to save themselves from conscious submission to it by trying to identify themselves in some way with the power which exercised it."

It is easy to condemn those who yield to this form of persuasion. We may perchance find extenuating circumstances for ourselves if we yield to the International Terror. Some of our Ministers are certainly terrified; and we have the assurance of Mr. Duff Cooper, Secretary of State for War, that "It is the duty of all those persons in authority to frighten the people of this country out of their wits." He sees the danger and is scared. But whatever the uses of panic as a stimulus to wisdom, I think that conclusions quietly reached by cool thought are preferable; and since we are now committed to a policy of rearmament on sea and in the air, without the certainty that our Government will in future be more steadfast in its support of collective security or community-action against war than it has been in the past, we need calmly to reflect upon our national and "imperial" position and painstakingly to weigh our chances in the light of such knowledge as we possess.

It may be taken for granted that our Ministers are appalled by German rearmament* and by the use to which that rearmament may be put. To do them justice they were not really afraid of Italy. They feared what might befall in

Europe should Mussolini attack the British Fleet in the Mediterranean or invade Egypt or the Sudan. Such "complications" might, they thought, give Hitler an opportunity to make hay while the sun shone. So they thought discretion the better part of moral and political valour—just as M. Laval had thought it when his policy in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict virtually invited Hitler to send troops into the Rhineland. By starting the stampede away from "sanctions" our Ministers deprived the League of its remaining authority, with the natural result that Dr. Greiser, the Nazi President of the Danzig Senate, "cocked" his "snook" at Geneva. There may be worse to come if the simplest foresight still be lacking. The Austrian "arrangement" with Hitler shows how the wind is blowing. He has preferred—as he did when President Hindenburg let him into the German Government—the tactics of the Trojan Horse to those of a frontal attack.

Now there is talk of "reforming" the League. What will come of it nobody knows. Probably nothing. A thing fashioned in faith and hope cannot well be refashioned in fear. The central problem is not now the League. It is fear of Germany; and this fear finds opinion, in official quarters and elsewhere, distracted and divided. Hitler's repudiation of "Locarno" has transformed that dubious arrangement, for the time being, into an Anglo-Franco-Belgian defensive alliance. But the Franco-Soviet pact makes France, in given circumstances, the ally of Bolshevik Russia. May we not be drawn into war against our will by the indirect workings of these instruments? In his much-criticised Paris speech Mr. Duff Cooper suggested that the frontiers of France are our own, and Mr. Baldwin has said that our frontier is on the Rhine. But *The Times*, which sometimes represents powerful tendencies, threw out a curious suggestion on July 6th. Writing upon "The League and Germany" it observed that "It might be supposed, if military alliances were really in question, that a prudent diplomacy would select the strongest partner." The allusion was to Germany. *The Times* went on to say that "A clear understanding with Germany would not solve all the problems of the world; but it would be a strong foundation on which to build, and British opinion means to try it out."

What "British opinion" may be at this moment is itself a

matter of opinion. The result of the Derby by-election forbids dogmatism. If "a clear understanding with Germany" would be a strong foundation on which to build, an understanding that was not clear might be a shaky foundation.

In 1912 and 1913 we sought a clear understanding with Germany by making the Baghdad Railway Agreement and refurbishing up the old treaty for the eventual partition of the Portuguese colonies. This done, we sent a British Fleet on a visit of friendship to Kiel in June 1914. Then Germany, seeing in these things a clear understanding that we should be neutral in a European war, straightway urged Austria-Hungary *on that ground* to attack Serbia, and struck at France through Belgium—which was not at all what we had meant. Let us be on our guard lest another "clear understanding" with Nazi Germany expose us and Europe to analogous risks.

One thing is plain to all who, knowing the facts, have eyes to see. (It may not be so plain to City magnates who, bemused by Dr. Schacht, yearn to lend Germany yet more millions.) It is that the purpose of German propaganda in this country—propaganda even stronger and more pervasive than it was in 1913 and 1914—is to make sure that we shall hold aloof whenever Hitler chooses to strike. Strike he must and will, in some direction, within a calculable future unless he can secure by mingled blandishments and terror the rewards of war without making war. Few British partisans of an understanding—clear or otherwise—with Nazi Germany seem able to put themselves in Hitler's place or to think things out from his standpoint. Nazi Germany has spent a huge sum, perhaps £1,500,000,000, on armaments during the past three years. Most of that sum has been raised in the form of a semi-clandestine floating debt. For various reasons there must be a time-limit to this process. Hitler has told his people that he does not look upon armaments as play-things. We may well believe him, just as we may take him at his word when he writes that alliances are useless unless they have war as their object. Intrinsically, the position in Germany must reach a definite turning-point, one way or the other, before many years are out. Extrinsically, circumstances tend to shorten the period. Of these circumstances the unknown strength of Soviet Russia is the principal. In

1935 a concerted attack upon Russia by Germany and Japan might have had a good chance of success. In 1936 what one of Hitler's Generals deplored as "the relative invincibility of Russia" has become less relative. By the end of 1937 or in 1938 it might be absolute unless conditions especially favourable can be created. What are these favourable conditions?

Chief among them would be the financial help and the assured neutrality of Great Britain. France, Hitler may imagine, would think twice of going to the help of Soviet Russia if Great Britain were a neutral friend or quasi-ally of Germany. Czechoslovakia could then be reduced to subjection or obliterated by surprise attack, Austria absorbed, Roumania coerced into acquiescence, Yugoslavia dominated and, at long last, a German Mitteleuropa established. Italy and Poland could either be bought off or intimidated while Germany and Japan tackled Russia with some prospect of success.

There is more than meets the eye in Dr. Greiser's "snook" at Geneva as a pendant to the deliberate affront which, acting on orders from Berlin, the officers of the German cruiser "Leipzig" offered to the League Commissioner at Danzig. A hint of what is afoot was given, perhaps unconsciously, in the telegram from Warsaw to *The Times* of July 9th. After foreshadowing an agreement between Poland and Germany upon Danzig, the telegram stated that the Polish Government feel that the changes desired by the Nazi Senate of Danzig can "at least be discussed and the *quid pro quo* considered so that the rights of Poland in the Free City would not be weakened." "This" the telegram concluded, "does not exclude the possibility that in the process of revision the minority parties in Danzig might suffer some loss of their present rights and privileges." In other words Poland may be ready to give Hitler a free hand against the non-Nazi Germans in Danzig provided that "the rights of Poland in the Free City" be not weakened. Colonel Beck would thus allow Hitler to make good the boast that he is "stronger than the League"—and incidentally to convey that warning to all Germans who, living outside the present borders of the Third Reich, are nevertheless counted by the Nazis as members of the German Nation.

This is a matter of great importance. Of the 65,000,000 Germans in the Reich, one-third may be reckoned as, at

least, passively hostile to Nazism. Among them are the soundest elements of the German people who feel themselves betrayed when England and other countries curry favour with Nazism, turn a blind eye to its doings, and attend the Olympic games. In Europe, outside Germany, there are about 15,000,000 Germans of whom the great majority are hostile to Nazism though they fear it and the consequences for themselves of an extension of its sway. Throughout the world are scattered another 33,000,000 Germans who are being steadily "doped," organised and terrorised by Nazi propaganda. Few more telling strokes of this propaganda could be conceived than proof that Hitler can not only insult the League and its Commissioner with impunity but can bring Poland to acquiesce in the suppression, by the usual Nazi methods, of the stalwart Danzigers who last year prevented the Nazis from getting the two-thirds majority prescribed for the amendment of the Danzig Constitution.

In the very able British reply to the German Note of March 31st, our Government asked Hitler a number of questions so shrewd that he has not yet seen fit to answer them. The Note was written in the special jargon of the German school of political geography, or *Geopolitik*, among whose adepts is Herr Rudolf Hess, Hitler's own Deputy. To the uninitiated this jargon seems innocent. The initiated know what it means; and, on receiving the British request for a more precise definition of what the words "Volk," "Reich" and "Nation" might imply, Hitler may well have felt an uncomfortable suspicion that somebody in London had guessed what he was driving at. Most insidious was his statement that "The German Government have just received from the German people (*Volk*), among other things, a solemn general mandate to represent the Reich and the German Nation." Since this "general mandate" had been symbolised by the inclusion in Hitler's new Reichstag of Austrians, Czechoslovaks and Danzigers, it followed that Hitler was claiming the right to represent the whole German "Volk" or "Nation," that is to say, all Germans outside Germany. The British answer treated the expressions "Volk" and "Nation" as a "further cause for uncertainty"; and observed that the question is really whether Germany "now considers that a point has been reached at which she can signify that she recognises and intends to respect the

existing territorial status of Europe, except in so far as this might be subsequently modified by free negotiation and agreement."

Herr Hitler cannot answer that question in the affirmative without disavowing the whole "blood and soil" mythos which forms the stock-in-trade of Nazi propaganda. His sympathisers in this country have deplored the publication of the British inquiries, and have urged that controversy be ended and direct negotiation begun between British and German representatives. British negotiators, ignorant of "geographico-political" German jargon, and German negotiators skilled in its use might doubtless reach an understanding; but whether such understanding would be marked by the "clearness" necessary to make it "a strong foundation on which to build" is quite another matter.

Behind the various influences that are seeking to turn British policy in favour of Germany lies an issue of which the public is hardly aware. It is whether this country is or is not to take sides against Soviet Russia. Behind this issue, again, lies fear of Bolshevist propaganda and almost equal fear of "Socialism" in Great Britain. Those who harbour these fears look upon Hitler, as they once looked upon Mussolini, as the paladin of private property, "capital," and all the rest, against Communism and revolution. They whisper that the downfall of Nazism in Germany or of Fascism in Italy would entail the "Bolshevisation" of those two countries and presently of Europe. Weighing dimly in their minds the dangers of a European war (from which, they hope, this country might hold aloof) and the terrors of the "Red peril," they secretly prefer the dangers of war.

However misguided they may be, these fears are genuine. Apprehension lest we be exposed to attack, were we to stand with other anti-war countries in the League of Nations against aggression in Europe, must be added to them. For this apprehension there is some reason. If Nazi Germany cannot persuade us, by means of a "clear understanding" or otherwise, to stand aside or tacitly to abet her enterprises she may attack us without warning, in devastating force, counting that the spectacle of an England crippled or smashed would frighten France into submission. On the other hand, if we come to a "clear understanding" with Hitler and help to finance him, France may be suddenly attacked in the

expectation that we should then be too frightened to intervene. Best of all would it be, from the Nazi standpoint, if a "clear understanding" could be reached both with Great Britain and France so that Germany would be free to pursue her "blood and soil" policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Then she could deal with Western Europe at her leisure.

These are not fantastic imaginings. They represent, however inadequately, the daily musings of the powers that be in Berlin. Hitler and his helpers have not lost their bearings. They are merely uncertain, for the moment, by which landmarks to steer their course. For us it is fast becoming a truly vital question again to find bearings by which we can steer a course. As we are not yet living under a dictatorship it seems expedient that any British Government should be able to command the confidence of the people in the pursuit of whatever policy it may adopt. This confidence could hardly be gained by rearmament, for its own sake, or by "isolation" or by limited military alliances.

As to Soviet Russia, one consideration appears paramount. Notwithstanding the delinquencies of Communist propaganda, Soviet Russia is not yet, and may not be for years to come, if ever, under any compulsion from the inner nature of her social and political structure to seek profit or glory in war. For this reason Great Britain should not hesitate to work with Soviet Russia, France and other anti-war countries against systems which, by their very nature, are bound to be aggressive. As things now stand, after our record in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, this course might not now avail to avert a major European crisis. But, should war come in despite of it, our people would know what they were fighting for. And there would always be the chance, nay, a probability, that England might again save Europe, including the German people, by her example.

Any other course, especially that of association with terror by trying to find extenuating circumstances for it, would be likely to land us in a predicament from which there would be no ultimate escape save through abject surrender or a devastating fight to the death.

WICKHAM STEED.

FRANCE'S FOREIGN POLICY.

BEFORE a country can have a foreign policy it must veritably exist. It must exist in the sense of being united.

If it is in process of revolutionary changes, if it is torn by dissensions, if its government fails to govern, if its internal problems absorb all its attention, it can have no effective foreign policy. Now the assertion has been made that France—not as a result of the triumph of the Front Populaire in the general elections this year, but as the result of the conditions which assured the triumph of the Front Populaire—is becoming a relatively negligible factor in the European scheme. One important English newspaper has indeed bluntly stated that France for some time to come may be safely ignored in our diplomatic calculations. Against this view should be set the advocacy of a new Franco-British alliance—or its foreign-named British equivalent, an *Entente Cordiale*—by a leading British Minister. Against whom?

What is the truth? Has France not only lost her initiative but also her influence in international councils? Is she so hopelessly in the throes of political convulsions that external affairs have ceased to interest her? Superficially a case could easily be made that France too meekly follows the lead of others. She is so deeply engaged in the perplexing process of finding herself, that she would seem to attach only secondary importance to the grave external problems. Certainly she possesses no Foreign Minister of the calibre of Poincaré, Briand, or even Barthou. These men may have directed France rightly or wrongly, but at least they had a purpose, and under their guidance France made herself felt. Poincaré undoubtedly was able to impose the will of France on Europe, and came near to establishing a sort of hegemony of victory; Briand gave France the ideological leadership of the Continent; while Barthou reverted vehemently to the system of an association of states, large and small, grouped around France. Circumstances were constantly changing, and the manner and methods of these men were different; but they all succeeded in keeping France at the head of a European coalition.

Laval may properly be said to have resembled Briand rather than Poincaré and Barthou. He lacked inspiration—he was not capable of arousing enthusiasm; but he was subtle

and steered a zigzag path between extremes. He signed the pact which Barthou had negotiated with Russia, but he allowed it to be believed that France was not committed to Russia, and left it to his successor, Flandin, to ratify the alliance. He pursued the policy which made Italy a "friend" of France, but when, as a result of the accords of Rome, Italy embarked on the Abyssinian enterprise, Laval never ventured to separate himself from the sanctionist policy of the British Government at Geneva. He suggested the possibility of a *rapprochement* with Germany, but did little to assure such a *rapprochement*. He showed nothing like the same eagerness as Barthou in bugling the Little Entente to the French banner, yet he was by no means disposed to abandon the Little Entente. On the whole Laval, like Briand, was a dissolvent; but Briand, unlike Laval, held the particles in place.

It was largely because Laval was unable to choose between Great Britain and Italy, between Germany and Russia, that he was displaced on the eve of the elections. In my view he really represented the average Frenchman, who does not want to be compelled to make a definite choice. But it is difficult for a negative policy to succeed. There are coalesced against it all the more eager policies. The anti-Fascists, though comparatively few in numbers, were zealously against Laval. Even the pro-Italians were disappointed in Laval. The pro-Russians were furious with Laval. The anti-Communists found Laval feeble. The strong anti-British feeling which was whipped up did not benefit Laval, while the pro-British feeling injured him. Those who wanted to make peace with Germany could not accept him as their leader, while those who considered peace with Germany impossible suspected him. Thus the man who best represented the vague sentiments of the ordinary Frenchman was faced by an irresistible combination of the more active sections of public opinion.

During the electoral period in France I was perpetually told by Frenchmen that they meant to cast their votes in favour of peace. What ruined the chances of the Moderates and Radicals, and swung the country completely to the Left, was the mishandling of the situation created by the German remilitarisation of Rhineland at the beginning of March. The Prime Minister, Sarraut, and the Foreign Minister, Flandin, took up an attitude which alarmed the French citizen. It is possible that, if they had followed up their verbal violence with resolute

action immediately, they would have found considerable support; but, as it was, they merely emphasised the danger and induced the French to vote for those parties which they hoped would be more conciliatory. I would not care to say that the majority of Frenchmen consciously reasoned, but at least they became aware of the troubled state of Europe, and instinctively regarded the Socialists, and even the Communists, as the parties which were most likely to keep them out of war. In some respects it may be, they were shortsighted; they did not wish to think the matter out clearly; they simply trusted that somehow the pacific mysticism of the Socialists, and the social preoccupation of the Communists, would prevail. They sought an escape from what they deemed to be the somewhat perilous patriotism of the Radical Sarraut and the Moderate Flandin.

A political observer who applies psycho-analysis to public affairs would, indeed, be inclined to assert that the concentration on domestic problems—though it is possible to justify it on other grounds—was an instinctive diversion from popular reflection on the external dangers. When the French, far more than the British, first realised that sanctions would logically lead to war with Italy, they discovered that Italy was their Latin sister, that the Italians had fought by their side in the Great War. In point of fact there had been no love lost between Italy and France for a number of years; and the sentiment of comradeship with Italy was a convenient excuse for their reluctance to follow the British on the road to conflict. The essential pacifism of the French may, in accordance with one's viewpoint, be praised or deplored on this occasion; but it is a fact—it is perhaps the most outstanding fact in present-day French mentality. When the German menace manifested itself the essential pacifism of the French took refuge in a concern for the high cost of living, the economic crisis, the inadequacy of wages, the need of sweeping reforms even at the expense of incipient revolution.

No one has written more about the lamentable conditions of government in France than I have; and assuredly the time was ripe for changes. It is probable that a serious attempt to effect them would have been made in any case. I will not again repeat my description of the unsatisfactory state into which France had fallen as a result of a strange mixture of incompetence, complacency, and unreality in the parliamentary

régime. A revolt, a renovation with all its risks, was overdue. Yet the determining cause of the success at the polls of the Front Populaire, and of the vast extra-parliamentary movements threatening to overwhelm the new Government by a series of strikes which ignored the laws of property and personal liberty, and of demonstrations which by their substitution of the Red Flag for the Tricolor were equivocally anti-national, lies, strangely enough, not in the internal conditions of France, but in the external conditions which induced a sudden introversion. If, for the sake of clarity, I am permitted an exaggeration, I should be tempted to affirm that the French would prefer revolution to war. That is, of course, an epigrammatic statement, not to be taken literally. Yet in all sobriety it is fundamentally correct to suggest that France would like, were it possible, to turn her eyes away from the European scene and to fix them on the French scene.

It is, however, difficult to view without apprehension the enfeeblement of France as a consequence of her social divisions and agitations. Although there were good economic reasons for the stay-in strikes which spread like wild-fire throughout the country, although there was the subconscious reason I have emphasised, which, together, render other explanations superfluous, there were nevertheless ominous signs that the perturbations were encouraged and exploited by sinister outside agencies. What were those agencies? In an attempt to exculpate the Socialist, Syndicalist and Communist parties, it was found necessary to invent the existence of a party hitherto almost unheard of in France—or elsewhere. That pernicious party, bent on producing chaos, was the Trotskyist party. It would be interesting to know how many members of the Fourth Internationale exist in France. Certainly amazing powers, altogether out of proportion to their numbers, are attributed to a handful of sympathisers with a sick exile. It would be ludicrous to accept this theory of hidden revolutionaries. It would appear more reasonable to suppose that the Communists got out of control of their chiefs.

Since Russia is the ally of France, and since the French Communists take their *mot d'ordre* from Moscow, and since the support of the Communists is absolutely indispensable to the continuance of the present French Government, it would appear that the chief business of the Communists should be to strengthen France as a military and diplomatic force,

precisely as Russia herself has devoted all her energies to the creation of an immensely powerful army and the establishment of a commanding diplomatic position. Paradoxical as this may appear, Communism, in so far as it counts in France—and it counts greatly in Parliament and in the country and in the Government, although it refuses to accept Ministerial posts—must help in building up a strong France. If Germany is regarded as the fanatical enemy of Russia—which has also to encounter a progressive Japan in the East—it is necessary, from the Russian viewpoint, that France should be able to hold Germany. Looked at in the light of real politics, the action of Communism in France must, then, be anti-revolutionary. A France enfeebled may mean the end of the Russian régime and of France as a first-class power.

It is certain that this kind of reasoning has been encouraged. Stalin himself told Laval that he desired a militarised France, and warned the French Communists to call off their anti-militarist propaganda. It is not betraying the smallest animus against Russia to say that she occupies to-day—at least in intention—first place among the highly militarised and military-minded nations of Europe. It would seem to follow that subversive and provocative campaigns in the workshops and streets of France, in the barracks and in the ports, would run counter to the designs of those who take their instructions from Moscow.

Yet things are never quite as simple as they would appear. Doubts are entertained by adversaries of the Government of the actual objectives of the Soviet organisations which exist in France. Perhaps, after all, they would prefer not to lose the opportunity of striking another blow at capitalist institutions. Ingenious theories which purport to be based on the significance of a thousand incidents of the past few months are formulated. I can best suggest them in quoting from the able commentator, Pierre Bernus :

Many naïve persons imagined that Moscow, of which the French Communists are the agents, is above all anxious to see—through fear of the Third Reich—a strong France. I believe that is a complete mistake. The veritable idea of the directors of Bolshevism appears to be more and more to use France as a lightning conductor on which will fall the Germany fury—and so they endeavour to stir up troubles which will tempt Germany. The activities of Moscow cannot be otherwise explained; particularly those which are preparing the uprising of Northern Africa.

Similar statements can be found elsewhere in the French Press. According to them, Germany is bound, sooner or later, to employ her arms ; and the question is, whether she will turn her arms against Russia or against France. The Maginot line of fortifications, to which Germany is now replying by the rapid refortification of Rhineland, served to divert the German attention to the East. But if an impression can be produced that France is the prey of convulsions, that attention may still be directed to the West, Russia will profit in a double sense—she will spread revolution abroad, and she will obtain a respite for herself.

I confess that all this seems too Machiavellian to be true. It smacks of political romance. It has a touch of the "two-penny coloured." Nevertheless it is indubitable that no greater invitation to calamity for France and for Europe could now be imagined than social turbulence, monetary difficulties, diplomatic abdication, and military unpreparedness in France. No one can yet estimate all the possible consequences of the Italian attack on Abyssinia and the subsequent application of sanctions. The moment was seized by Germany to reoccupy Rhineland, and so cut off France by an iron curtain from the Little Entente and her Eastern allies. This meant an unquestionable lowering of French prestige and usefulness. It made it much easier for Germany to pursue her task of winning over the nations along the Danube, or, it may be, in some cases, of placing them under an imminent menace of aggression. Nor, as I suggest, can that same sanctions policy be held altogether innocent of political consequences in France which will further stimulate the German spirit of revenge. It is now an open secret that when Hitler decided to move troops in the Rhineland he did so against the advice of the military men, and that had France taken immediate counteraction the German troops would have been compelled to withdraw. It was a terrific gamble, but Hitler guessed aright. Since the advent of the Front Populaire he has shown far less inclination to negotiate. He unconscionably postponed his reply to the British questionnaire. He considered it good tactics to wait and see and in the meantime to hasten the construction of impregnable military works.

The speculations on France's internal preoccupations may prove to be mistaken, as they were in 1914. I well recollect that a somewhat similar belief was widely entertained twenty

odd years ago. It was commonly supposed that France was in decadence. But when the danger declared itself, the French reacted energetically. They forgot their quarrels. They rose to resist as one man. Nor do I doubt that in similar conditions to-day there would be an instant rally. The point is, however, that the peace of Europe will not be assured by the spectacle of partisanship in France. Nor will it be assured by the repetition of the more or less meaningless formulas which have done duty for the past fifteen years, and which can be found accumulated in the French document on foreign policy. Something much more realist than the old phraseology about European union, disarmament, fidelity to the League, pacts and still more pacts, collective security, and peace indivisible, is now required. Carefully balanced sentences, the incantation of the diplomatic litany with which the peoples have been lulled for too long, are singularly out of place in a Europe where, as every observer knows, each country is preparing intensely for a war which most of them consider inevitable at no distant date unless the miracle of intelligent statesmanship occurs quickly.

Nothing in the mass of verbiage is more characteristic of the French desire for peace than the passage in the declaration read by Léon Blum in the Senate, and by Yvon Delbos in the Chamber, regarding the possibility of a Franco-German understanding. The parties which compose the Front Populaire have, we are told, always striven for a Franco-German understanding. The name of Jaurès is invoked ; a martyr for peace. Briand also figures in the hagiology of peace. Herriot is applauded for his efforts. Hitler himself, we are reminded, is an ex-combatant who for four years endured the miseries of the trenches ; and his sincerity cannot therefore be doubted when he proclaims his hope of an accord with France. It is true that France cannot overlook the accelerated rhythm of German rearmament ; it is true that Germany has violated the Locarno Pacts by remilitarising the Rhineland ; it is true that Berlin, after the confrontation of German and French peace plans, delayed her reply to the British questionnaire ; but France will still examine German suggestions with a real desire to find a basis of accord. This language is not the language used by the predecessors of Léon Blum and Yvon Delbos. It is an invitation to talk. Nothing could be more ironical than the offer of France's first Jewish Prime Minister

to enter into conversations with the Nazi Government which has indelibly stamped itself with anti-Semitism.

With the realisation of the fact that the first and only business of Europe at this time is to save itself, if it is still possible, from the wrath to come, the Blum Government, like its predecessors, at once perceived that it was sheer lunacy to push Italy into the arms of Germany. Whatever we may think of the crimes of Italy, they cannot be weighted for a moment in the balances against the crime of constructing an Italo-German alliance which would yield up Europe to the domination of the dictators. The combination, were it effected, would be irresistible. Nor is there anything, in the nature of things, to prevent an Italo-German understanding. The importance of the Austrian question has been greatly exaggerated. It mattered to Italy chiefly inasmuch as it provided an opportunity for the assertion of Italian strength and thus increased Italian prestige. It would matter to Italy in a more material manner were Germany and Italy rivals in Central Europe. But its importance is immensely diminished if the postulate of an Italo-German partnership can be accepted. It is an obstacle to that partnership only if either party chooses to regard it as an obstacle. So that while Léon Blum and Yvon Delbos were ready enough to declare themselves sanctionist when they were in opposition, they were driven by the necessities of the case to become anti-sanctionist in office.

If the problem were not so grave—grave because it involves the whole equilibrium of Europe—one would be tempted to indulge in sardonic laughter at the fond and persistent belief of certain British politicians that a change of Government in France would bring about a change of policy in regard to Italy. Flandin like Laval, Delbos like Flandin, knew that it was suicidal folly to push sanctions to the point of permanently alienating Italy. The pressure of an unfriendly Italy in the south-east would render untenable France's position in the north-east. No kind of ideology can alter geography. It is true that when Blum came to power the Abyssinian war was over, but even had it not been over, he could not have behaved differently from his predecessors. As it is, he is criticised for leaving the initiative of lifting sanctions, which had failed as they were bound to fail from the beginning, to Great Britain. The Ministerial statement on the

subject reads uncommonly like an apology to Italy and a plea for Italian support.

For no statesman in France with the smallest consciousness of his responsibilities can afford to forego Italian support. I read in the *Petit Parisien*, which closely follows Ministerial thought :

The interest of Italy is in complete conformity with our ardent desire of a general and durable peace. If Great Britain is hesitant in its intentions, and necessarily slow in bringing its eventual assistance in territorial forces, Italy, on the contrary, can throw in the balance very important contingents, ready at all times. We can communicate with our friends of the Little Entente only across Italian territory. It is necessary, therefore, that Italy and France should adopt a Danubian policy compatible with the interests of the Little Entente. If not, Germany will become the arbiter of an inextricable European situation. If the hope of a Franco-German *rapprochement* formulated by Marshal Pétain is not to be a mortal illusion, it can only be effected in an indispensable framework of nations who will sincerely guarantee the present frontiers, and will admit no other revision than that which is freely consented. In order to realise this hope, the unreserved help of Italy and that of the Little Entente are required. . . . There is not a moment to lose, nor another fault to commit.

That is the plain truth, and the delusion which apparently some British statesmen still cherish of an Anglo-Franco-German understanding from which Italy is excluded may have fatal consequences. The sooner they see that France cannot consent to come into what would really be an Anglo-German alliance in which she would figure without force, the better it will be for Europe. France needs British friendship ; she would like to be on good terms with Germany, provided such relations do not imply the abandonment of the Russian and Little Entente alliances ; but she knows that without Italy she would be at the mercy of Great Britain and Germany, and therefore diplomatic conceptions which are circumscribed to the so-called Western powers are merely another blunder—which may be fatal this time—added to the staggering succession of blunders of the past year. If we want to work with France we must work with Italy. Without a Four (or more) Power Pact there can be no assurance of peace in Europe. To put any Great Power in a rival camp infallibly means war.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

IS SIR NORMAN ANGELL RIGHT?

I

IT is with hesitation that I take up the cudgels against my friend Sir Norman Angell. I am so deeply in his debt—I have learned from him so many vital truths in international policy—that I am conscious of something like presumption in criticising his arguments. But the net effect of his recent writings, culminating in his book *This Have and Have-not Business* has been so dangerously misleading—from my point of view—that I feel impelled to point out some features of the present international situation to which he pays insufficient attention.

According to him, the evil from which the “dissatisfied” Powers are suffering is not a material disability of any kind, but an illusion—the illusion that colonies are of value to those who control them politically. Colonies being the only thing they want, they would be no better off than they are—nor any more contented—if they got them. “They are possessed by a false doctrine.” The only possible remedy is to “teach” them. The conclusion which imperialists draw from this argument is that we ourselves have a perfect right to monopolise one quarter of the globe. They look on Angell’s support as invaluable—not on his theory, for which they care nothing, but on his apparent conclusion. It is a strange thing to me to find him in such company. I ask myself, with the angry father in Molière’s play, “*Mais que diable allait-il faire dans cette galère?*” I do not say that he admits no qualifications to his main doctrine; he does mention some. But, in my view, it is precisely these qualifications which need to be emphasised at the present time.

I would point out, first, that the claims with which we have to deal are not claims to acquire colonies only. No doubt the demands often take this crude form; but many other things besides this are included in them. There has been no formulated programme. The claims of a “dissatisfied” Power depend to a great extent upon what other Powers do. If concessions are made in one direction, less is claimed in another. If we had disarmed, the claims made upon us would have been different. The claim for facilities for migration is an example of a different kind of claim. Angell quotes Dr.

Warren Thompson to the effect that “almost never does emigration actually reduce the numbers of the homeland” (*Danger Spots in World Population*, p. 133). I rubbed my eyes when I read this quotation; for it seems to suggest that this well-known authority is belittling the importance of emigration. The exact opposite is the case. Even on this page he contends that emigration does good by taking off the “surplus.” And the whole theme of his book is that emigration *does* contribute to a “permanent solution of the problem of pressure of population in any country.” “I believe emigration to be,” he says, “the only way out of the difficulties arising out of differential population pressures during the next few decades. The alternative to voluntarily providing for the expansion of certain of the nationally strong peoples of high birth-rate, into the unused areas of the world, is war.”

My next point is that, under the present system, it is not true that advantages would not be gained by a Power which acquired colonial territory. As to raw materials, there are differential export duties; there are restriction schemes; there is the practice of granting concessions to citizens of the mother-country alone. Political control would enable the country concerned to avoid these obstacles. Then, as to markets, it is not true that there is nothing to be gained, under present conditions, by a Power which acquires new territory, if it follows the example of other Powers—as it naturally would under present conditions—in reserving the market for itself. It is indeed one of the worst features of economic nationalism that it makes the possession of territories, in the circumstances, economically valuable.

Further, great advantages accrue to those who have the administration in their own hands—even in a Mandated territory, where the Open Door nominally prevails, and still more in a colony. There are a score of “invisible preferences,” such as the placing of all Government contracts in the home country. All colonial governments, moreover, though not owning the wealth, have the power to develop one form of production or another—whichever suits them best—a power of no small importance. There are vast resources untapped; and the degree of development rests largely with the Government concerned. None of these points is, in my view, sufficiently emphasised by Angell. The restrictions on raw materials occupy three pages. The qualification as to markets, four

pages. The Ottawa Agreements are dismissed in a page or two.

I must add a word as to the argument which Angell apparently regards as the most convincing, because he puts it in the forefront—that Germany had all that she now claims before the War—and yet, in spite of all, she took up arms. Therefore she would be no better satisfied if we granted all these claims now. This is apparently used as an argument against the claims of “dissatisfied” Powers in general. What it proves as to Japan and Italy, however, I fail to understand. The case of Germany is a totally distinct one. Japan and Italy have different grounds of complaint, owing, among other things, to the more rapid increase of their population, and to the crushing restrictions placed since the War upon their migration. But let us deal with Germany alone. This argument assumes that Germany made the War—that no other Power was responsible. For if that was not so, then Germany’s claims were not the cause of the War, and the fact of the War is wholly irrelevant to the question: “What would satisfy Germany now?” As a matter of fact, Germany’s claim, whether a bad or a good one, is not a claim for what she had before the War.

My last point is that Angell proves too much. He proves that—if all that Japan, Italy and Germany desire would in fact be useless to them—it must also, by the same process of reasoning, be useless to us! He may think that it is. But he never develops this point, which strikes the impartial reader at once. I suggest that, if he does believe these things to be useless—believes the British Empire to be useless—he ought to say so, and to emphasise the importance of this view in relation to the world’s discontents. If he is right, the really important conclusion for us British is, not that Germany’s claims are an illusion, but that our Empire is an illusion. If these things are useless to us, then why not make some at least of the concessions so urgently pressed on us? By a gesture which (according to Angell) would cost us nothing at all, we should secure great credit for ourselves, earn a reputation for disinterestedness and international goodwill, and thus promote world peace. The whole of this side of the question, which it is so essential to deal with, is practically ignored by Angell. Will it be believed that he devotes eight lines to it, in a book of two hundred pages?

CHARLES RODEN BUXTON.

II

First as to the quotation from Dr. Warren Thompson. I was dealing at that point of my little book with the relation of colonies to the population problem, notably their relation to some permanent solution (for really we do not want to find ourselves, twenty years after the next settlement, still discussing grievances as we are now discussing them twenty years after the last “settlement”), and quoted from Dr. Thompson’s book *Danger Spots in World Population*, this actual passage:

It must be recognised that Colonial expansion is no solution of the population pressure in Japan or any other country if it is not accompanied by the practice of birth control. . . . It should also be recognised in connection with emigration as a solution of problems of population pressure that almost never does emigration actually reduce the numbers of the homeland. Ireland is the only example of a European country in which population has decreased since emigration set in on a large scale. (pp. 132-3.)

I might also have quoted what Dr. Thompson writes immediately following the above. This:

Emigration can, therefore, only be regarded as a temporary expedient for any people. It will keep the pressure on certain areas from growing much greater as long as there is abundance of new land, but it will not actually reduce the pressure to any great extent, especially among such large and dense populations as we find in the West Pacific.

Or further passages in which he points out that where an area it is proposed to colonise already possesses an existing population of a lower standard of life than that of the homeland, it cannot furnish an outlet. Thus:

It may be profitable, both individually and nationally for a time to have colonies which can be thus exploited, but as an outlet for relief of population pressure these lands can be of little value. (p. 39.)

Or long passages in which he shows that the Japanese (for instance) “have made little headway in colonising even their own northern territory,” still less in colonising Korea or Manchuria (pp. 44-5). Or, as bearing upon the question of food and raw material resources, such passages as these:

It is obvious that natives in tropical countries with very low standards of living and very low productive capacity cannot be

large purchasers of manufactured goods from northern countries. This being so very little trade can be expected from these regions. The common expectation that the Northern lands can get great quantities of food from the tropics in exchange for manufactured goods is not likely to be fulfilled. The very conditions necessary to increase considerably the productive capacity of natives in the tropics also make inevitable a rapid increase in their numbers. These grow very rapidly until they are again up to the limits of the means of subsistence, and the surplus available for the exploiters is but little. (p. 40.)

Or passages in which he forecasts the probability that Japanese colonies would go the way of British "colonies" and become Dominions (and Dominion status to-day includes the right to exclude emigrants from the mother country). Dr. Thompson writes:

Japan has to learn the further lesson regarding the economics of colonies which Gt. Britain is learning to-day with much pain and bitterness of heart; namely, that dependencies or colonies never feel such a warmth of affection for their protector or mother country that they are willing to trade with it on any but strictly economic terms. Even preferential tariffs prove a mockery when they are sufficiently high to permit of the development of home industry. (pp. 41-2.)

Particularly in this connection might I have quoted Dr. Thompson on the real value of colonies:

The day of the profitable exploitation of colonies and other dependencies is rapidly passing. Another fifty years may see its end. Japan should realise this and govern its conduct accordingly. (p. 42.)

How far all this justifies the desirability or adequacy of certain territorial transfers which he suggests (merely as providing a "breathing space," be it noted) seems very questionable, and would have involved a discussion carrying my little book far beyond its possible limits as an attempt to indicate the broad outline of the "Have and Have-not" issue, particularly as my own recommendations (of which a word presently) cover what Dr. Thompson seems to regard as the main needs of the situation, indicated in this passage referring to Japan:

From the standpoint of population growth, industrial growth and its accompanying urbanisation of population lead to checking

of rates of increase. Hence, if Japan had access to new lands for settlement, and to reasonably abundant material resources, there is every reason to suppose that, after two or three decades, its rate of growth would slacken and in another decade or two, the Japanese, too, would cease to be a "swarming" people. (p. 132.)

I have quoted at some length from Dr. Thompson both in order to show that my citation was no "torn from context" distortion, and because the further quotations from him touch on points which Mr. Buxton raises.

But my real reply to Mr. Buxton is in the main proposal which I have made, not obscurely as he seems to suggest, but very prominently, with all the emphasis I could give to it. My book is divided into two parts, the second entitled "The Line of Solution," the first chapter of which is headed "First Make Known the Facts," and urges that Britain should move for the setting-up, first of all, of an international fact-finding commission, an international investigation into the whole colonial, raw material, population and market problem; that there should be put up to such a preparatory commission, definite questions as: "Have British users of raw materials an advantage in British colonial territory over foreign users?" The very first need of all, I have insisted in this book as a hundred times on platforms, a score of times recently in articles, is to drag the facts into the light, and then to guide policy in the light of those facts. This is an indispensable preliminary because certain existing misapprehensions push towards an entirely fallacious and inadequate policy which can only make confusion worse confounded.

The facts are entirely ascertainable, measurable, ponderable. An eminent German is reported as saying the other day, that return of colonies was economically a matter of life and death for Germany. Before the war, Germany drew about one-half of one per cent. of her raw materials from her colonies; most of the material could have been purchased if the territories had not been colonies; her sales to her colonies represented about one-half of one per cent. of her external sales, and most of the one-half of one per cent. would have been made if the territories had been native or foreign instead of German. As to population: more Germans were earning their livelihood in Paris in 1913 than in all the German colonies put together; Italy, whose spokesmen talk of "great outlets for population in Africa," managed in forty

years to establish something less than a hundred genuine colonists in Eritrea ; and in 1930 the number of foreign-born whites in New York was seven times the total European emigration to Africa in the past hundred years. Self-sufficiency, even if possible (and it is quite impossible), has little relation to prosperity. The larger South American states are much more self-sufficient than, say, Sweden. The former have usually a desperately low standard of life ; the latter, one of the highest in the world. Similar comparisons and such facts could be multiplied indefinitely.

Incidentally the position I have taken on this matter is precisely the position which I took when I began writing on it thirty years ago, and have taken ever since. It is that one of the main impulses to war is an obsession about the need for the acquisition of territory : it was the main motive behind the Japanese war, behind the Italian war, behind terms of the Treaty of Versailles which now threaten new wars ; it is an obsession which, so long as it endures, will present us with quite insoluble problems, putting national right and economic need in opposition and conflict. If the same obsession dominates our forthcoming Economic Conference it will be as futile and disastrous as was the Disarmament Conference.

This does not mean maintenance of the *status quo*. That term is used carelessly as having reference only to frontiers. I would profoundly modify the *status quo* by the establishment of economic codes which would, by opening markets, make raw materials available to all, and frontiers of less importance. The very real difficulties which the "have-not" states encounter are due far more to causes like tariffs, currency restrictions and over-valuation, various forms of economic nationalism, than to the existing territorial distribution. But economic nationalism is not the special attribute of empires. (The United States tariff constitutes a greater obstacle to the "have-not" states than did the "possession" of empire by Britain in the pre-Ottawa period, while certain of the lesser states are themselves great sinners in the matter of economic nationalism.)

We need, as I have put it in the little book under criticism, "economic rules of the road, not exclusive possession of separate bits of it." Yet we are so hypnotised with the illusory advantages of possession that we would rather have exclusive possession by war than the rules by peace, as the

behaviour of Japan and Italy have recently shown. Until we can undermine the "possessive illusion" we shall never get the rules ; and we shall get war.

Mr. Buxton implies that I am making a case for imperialism. It is a strange reading of my arguments. The fact, of course, is that it is *his* arguments, not mine, that Mussolini and the Japanese imperialists will quote in justification of their policy. If, Mr. Buxton asks in effect, the empire is of no value to us, why cling to it, why not give it up ? We are giving it up : the Dominions are already independent states on equality with ourselves ; India is on the road to Dominion status. If "making concessions" means creating equality of economic opportunity in our non-self-governing territories, I am all for it ; if it means increasing the element of international control in colonial administration, I am all for it. All my arguments, tending to show the illusory character of the advantages of exclusive "possession," support such a policy ; Mr. Buxton's arguments which insist that we do get advantage from our possessions are, in so far as economic considerations weigh, an obstacle to that policy. I oppose any policy of redistribution, "handing back" or "handing over," in part because the policy misconceives the whole nature of the economic problem ; in part because the people concerned are not "ours" to hand about like groceries or livestock in settlement of our quarrels ; in part because I do not want imperialism "redistributed," but abolished ; I do not want the "property" concerned scattered among a larger number of owners, but the whole method and conception ended, once for all.

NORMAN ANGELL.

CHRISTIANITY IN GERMANY TO-DAY.

THE present state of the Christian religion in Germany is a matter which interests many in Britain and throughout the civilised world. To Protestants Germany is the sacred land of the Reformation. Roman Catholics know well that there is no more vigorous, healthy, and promising national or racial section of the international Church than the German. Rationalists, free-thinkers, and modernists, however sadly out of conceit with recent developments in the Reich, cannot but remember at times how the extreme critical spirit—developing (they often assert) from the very body and spirit of Protestantism itself—found on German soil, in generations past, a city of refuge, and in German minds a classical and prophetic expression. The fate of Christianity in Germany is a central problem, and its present strength or weakness, its hopes and fears, dangers and safeguards, call for attention and interest, if not for sympathy. There has been plenty of vehement, sometimes wild and unbalanced, speaking and writing on this subject of late. Present-day Germany is sometimes pictured (or at least suggested) almost as if it were a second Soviet-Land of the militant godless, where Christianity had sunk down to be the faith of a poor, persecuted, insignificant minority. While the Reich, as a whole, was witnessing the triumph of Nordic heathendom, a Twilight-of-the-Gods reversed, and the intruding Christ, after so many centuries, was being deposed by a restored All-Father Wotan and Trusty Thor. From what one reads at times in certain newspapers—and has read, off and on, for years—one might almost expect to find most Christian churches now closed, or ruined, in the country of St. Boniface and of Luther, heathen shrines and festivals triumphant, everywhere the swastika replacing the cross. Yet during all my experience of Germany in recent months—the last thirty or thirty-five—I have never come across traces of such revival or relapse, except for certain half-poetic, half-rhetorical, expressions in speeches and writings. “Field Marshal, enter into Valhalla,” was Hitler’s farewell to a dead President, his Chief, his friend, and his ally, well-known to be a practising Evangelical Christian. It did not imply that Paul von Hindenburg had become a pagan, even if his most famous war-colleague had done so. We know

that General Ludendorff has championed the anti-Christian tendencies among older men, since the Great War, just as Alfred Rosenberg and Baldur von Schirach have championed them among the younger. (All these men are lineal successors, in a manner, of Nietzsche and other German Antichrists of the nineteenth century, who made the Fatherland so menacing to Christian orthodoxy). But to say, or suggest, that a new heathenism is sweeping victoriously over Germany as a whole is ridiculous now. It was seriously hoped, or feared, by some, in 1933—when National Socialism captured the country. Unbalanced extremists at that time, exalting nationalism above the skies, cried out for a restoration of the old national racial religion, real or supposed. Not, perhaps, a wholly unnatural extravagance. But an extravagance it has remained, and its attraction, even for enthusiastic youth, has markedly lessened. Never more than the obsession of a small if vocal minority, it has almost ceased to be heard. To find it out you have now to ask questions and to search. It is practically confined to certain extremist groups of the National Socialist Party. And even here it is discredited. Ludendorff has not the *allure* of a master in these fields. Rosenberg has somewhat receded, and is surely and obviously not the figure he was in the councils and the diplomacy of the régime.

As to church life and its evidence, I have never seen better congregations in Roman Churches, never so good in Evangelical, as of late. It is notorious, I may repeat, that (as for a century past) there is no part of the Roman communion with a more active and healthy life, more devout and serious worshippers, more keenly-interested laity. Nowhere in the Roman Catholic world has the worship been (or is it now) more congregational. It is also notorious that in Evangelical churches, under the stress of recent events, there has been a much-needed improvement, both in quantity and quality. Under the stress of recent events, indeed. But if any imagine that these events include such a destruction or closing of sacred buildings, such an execution of ministers of religion, as in Soviet Russia, he is absurdly in error. The brown uniform of the dominant party is abundantly in evidence in churches to-day, especially perhaps in Roman Catholic churches.

There is indeed a tendency, especially in the most recent months, which is in surprising contrast to ideas that are often

current. Many Germans, and particularly Germans who gave a nominal adhesion to the once powerful, but now extinct or at least excommunicated, Social Democratic Party and creed, now do homage in Christian churches to the Christian ideal: "Fear God, honour the Ruler." Here again it may be often, even usually, from policy rather than conviction; but the point is that these ex-Democrats attempt in this way to divert from themselves any suspicion or ill-will that might attach to them from their old allegiance, and try to propitiate—believe that they will propitiate—the Powers that Be by a certain Christian profession. This tendency is particularly noticeable among officials. It is as if "chapel" had again become fashionable among undergraduates of Oxford and Cambridge colleges, anxious to atone for past misdeeds in this way.

Somewhat illustrative of the decline of definite anti-Christian or New Religion movements in the Reich is the recent history of the "German Faith" sect or school, founded and championed by Professor Hauer of Tübingen and by the well-known politician and author, especially prominent as a publicist, Count von Reventlow. The definite Christian communities regarded this movement as a form of New Heathenism. The more definite and extreme New Heathens themselves, such as General Ludendorff and his school of racial religionists, looked on this German Faith appeal as a poor, weak, inconsistent compromise. Now, quite recently, the sect has shown signs of disintegration. Reventlow and Hauer have withdrawn altogether, declaring that they had no wish to create an anti-Christian organisation, but merely desired to promote an independent religious movement free from the compulsions of the older Christian societies and creeds. Will the ranks of the "German Faith" now melt into those of Ludendorff? Will they return to some form of Christianity? Or how will they face the future? In any case, they have not done much to prove that the Christian religion is extinct in Germany.

German Christianity, then, has by no means been extinguished by the National Socialist Revolution. It may even prove to be invigorated and revived. But both with Evangelical and with Roman Christianity the new political system, the Totalitarian State of the Third Reich, we all know well, has had a severe struggle. The Nazi extremists, represented

in religion by the more violent wing of the "German Christians," have demanded a more thorough Act of Uniformity, a completer bringing-into-line, a *Gleichschaltung* which shall carry into the religious sphere the unity achieved in the political. In opposition to this a vigorous stand has been made, "for conscience sake," by those who stood firm in St. Paul's ideal, the historic Christian tradition of a Religion transcending race and country, and rejecting racial and national limits and restrictions—"Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all and in all").

Those Protestants who stood fast by this creed, and who called their communion the Church of the Confession, the *Bekenntnis-kirche*, refused to bring the Aryan paragraph into operation. They refused to forbid men of Jewish descent to officiate or to preach. They also refused to belittle, or in any way reject, the Old Testament, as part of a Divine Revelation. German "Higher Criticism," indeed, so largely proceeding from clerical scholars of the Evangelical Church, had, in the past, done wild anarchic things, as well as just and enlightening things, with both Jewish and Christian Scriptures. But German Evangelical Christianity was now roused to rather different sympathies and temper. The outlook of a Wellhausen was no longer very suitable.

In Berlin and the Berlin region, above all, are the folk of the *Bekenntnis-kirche* strong and vocal. And their movement in the capital has been described by sympathisers as almost assuming the proportions of a religious revival on the great scale. Here above all pastors of the Confession, who have most openly and courageously defied restrictions and warnings, have been especially successful. Crowded congregations have rallied to them. And although the hand of authority has fallen upon some, yet on the balance, at the present moment, they seem to stand on the brink of achievement. It has been a new *Kulturkampf*. And, again, the *Dunkelmänner*, the spiritual leaders, the ecclesiastics and their friends, have not been without a measure of glory, perhaps of victory. And as in Bismarck's Prussia from 1879, so now in Hitler's Reich, there is some reason to think that the Central State-Authority is not wholly dissatisfied with the result; is not sorry to check its own extremists; and is inclined towards reconciliation. That Central State-Authority has

not only discouraged and cold-shouldered, but also at last practically superseded Reichs-Bischof Müller, whose Laudian "thoroughness" has not appeared to win the entire approval of the Chancellor. Further, it has surely made a gesture of moderation and peace, in practically replacing Müller by Dr. Kerrl, the new Minister for Church Affairs, a man of some tact, kindness, and balance; no sworn foe to possibilities of compromise; and not too much in love (like so many of the *Deutsche Christen*), with the falsehood of extremes. (For so he is considered even by opponents of the régime.)

I can hardly avoid the impression that the "German Christians" are disappointed by the present position of affairs; and that they are venting their annoyance in the bitterness of their books, pamphlets and newspapers. While the Government, to increase their irritation, tends more and more to let the Church of the Confession go its own way, its next interference in religious questions may well be in the way of restraining the extravagances of the more extreme advocates of *Gleichschaltung*. For, here as elsewhere, the dominant movement has not repudiated that principle of the original Munich programme which declares that the Party as such adopts the standpoint of a positive Christianity (*positiven Christentums*) though without pledging itself to a definite form of creed. This very point has recently been emphasised afresh by Dr. Frick, as Minister of the Interior: "We stand on the foundation of Positive Christianity."

The National Socialist Revolution did not shake, endanger, or (by reaction) invigorate an evangelical Christianity hitherto unassailed and impregnable. The condition of that German Protestantism, for a century at least, had been weak, with all the weakness of traditionalism and indifference. Intellectual scepticism was really dominant among the better educated, who professed only a very attenuated and nominal creed. Various types of humanistic neo-heathenism were not unfashionable. Nor were the masses much more in touch with evangelical christianity in all the time I have known Germany (since 1885). Evangelical churches, even in the 'eighties and 'nineties, were surprisingly empty and lifeless. Church-going was on a most modest plane of performance. It was rather an extravagant piety which thought of "attendance" oftener than once a month.

An observer, indeed, in pre-war days, might well doubt (and many have frankly expressed their doubts) whether evangelical Christianity had any longer a deep hold on the religious feelings of Northern Germany. Even if such observers remembered that religious coldness and shallowness were features common to spiritual and intellectual life throughout the Protestant world, of late, yet they could not but admit their melancholy pre-eminence in recent Germany. So many buildings in a state of comparative neglect (and this in a country of unparalleled neatness, order, and upkeep); such a lack of numbers and of reverence in congregations; so moderate a respect to the ordinary Protestant Ministry.

There was respect, however, intellectual respect, inside and outside Germany, for the great theological scholars and thinkers who even in the early nineteenth century gave Germany an easy primacy in critical and philosophic study of the Christian religion, its spirit, history, and documents. For however reckless might have been the extremes to which advanced and higher criticism was carried by some; yet, as a whole, these workers (who were far from being always destructive) threw an unequalled amount of new light upon their great subject. All Europe, all Christianity, became their debtors. In this field, as in so many others, no nationality approached the German.

Yet sacred scholarship was one thing. The ordinary Christian life, worship, and community were (in some measure) another—outside learning. And that learning (for a century before National Socialism) had often seemed so much under the influence, even the leadership, of an advanced rationalism as to be in some conflict with the main stream of Christian belief, with Luther's spirit in Protestantism itself. From the days of the Tübingen School, the most famous and prominent Protestant Doctors of the Church, men often said—not without exaggeration—were more engaged in destructive criticism than in useful and durable "architecture." "I say nothing of Germany," exclaimed a great French opponent, almost exactly a century ago, "Germany remains the seat of the war against Jesus Christ. Our unbelievers go there to seek their weapons." David Strauss is to Lacordaire the chief exponent of German theology. And David Strauss was frankly and gleefully destructive. It is a different spirit which now animates and invigorates German evangelical Christianity.

With the Roman Catholic Church, we know well, the new régime has also had severe and prolonged tension. The Führer is still a nominal Roman Catholic, but doubtless his religion is fundamentally his patriotism. "Just Germany, and all for Germany." His remarkable and most surprising success in suppressing the Centre Party, along with all other definite opposition parties and groups—in abolishing the particularist element in German politics—and so in crushing separatist tendencies in the South, especially in Bavaria ("We are all Germans now, only Germans, and nothing but Germans") involved a remarkable victory over what Bismarck, in times of conflict, had called the "Black International." But some clergy, and some devoted laymen, successors of Windthorst, have sadly missed the old political power of the international Church in Germany. They have not always been able to let well alone. And they have sometimes involved themselves in serious trouble.

The Roman Church, as a whole, has shared with the Church of the Confession an invincible reluctance to carry anti-Semitism to the point of rejecting or depreciating the Old Testament, or treating the Jewish race as essentially tainted. Yet Rome is, and always has been, far less tolerant than Protestantism of Jews and Judaism, and in her persecuting ages there have been outbursts of furious hostility against Israelites which are (we may even yet hope and think) almost impossible in a modern state. Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich is perhaps a thoroughly representative spokesman of his Church in all this. And in a famous sermon (of December 20th, 1933) preached in early and very violent days of the new régime, he defined the position in words that are worth quoting: "We do not wish to revive the Mosaic regulations of life and law. But we must recognise this: The Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament have also furnished the social life and order of the ages with abidingly valuable material. . . . We believe that the Spirit of God has inspired these laws and utterances (of the Old Testament). And we therefore repeat that the Sacred Books of the Old Testament remain intact for the cultural life and the schools of the German People."

Under the tremendous pressure of this great surge of German nationalism the Roman Church has surrendered—has allowed to disappear (let me rather say) its famous and

dreaded political organisation—once extolled, abused, or exaggerated, as a marvel of skill, sagacity, and success. It has also, under the same pressure, allowed to pass out of its hand the youth clubs of which it was so proud, and many of its social organisations. It has even, with bitter feelings, surrendered its separate newspaper press, its religious journals. (So that the Pope, on May 12th of this year, laments the absence of Germany from a Vatican Press Exhibition—because "against every canon of justice, and through the deliberate and artificial confusion between religion and politics" Germany "does not wish a Catholic Press to exist"). On all these matters the Church has yielded with an astounding obedience and docility, astounding, in spite of the severity of the pressure, in spite of every reason and excuse that can be given. But on the vital matter of religious education it is not ready to yield. Here the situation is still full of tension.

RAYMOND BEAZLEY.

SLAVERY: A WORLD REVIEW.

AT the July meeting of the Council of the League of Nations there was presented what may be described as a World Review of Slavery in all its forms. The phrase, "all its forms," is now the accepted term embodied in all slavery treaties and conventions. This review has been prepared by the seven experts appointed for the purpose by the League of Nations, and it portrays not merely crude slave owning and slave trading, but all those forms of servitude which disguise their hideous lineaments under titles less malodorous than slavery, but which come within the 1926 Slavery Convention. The report, being based wholly upon official documents and statements, needs to be read in the light of unofficial descriptions as to the numbers of slaves and as to the demoralisation, degradation and measures of cruelty which everywhere attach themselves in varying degrees to slavery. But the vital point to bear in mind is that every system dealt with by the Committee of Experts reposes upon the principle of a property ownership in human beings. It was not until 1926 that the official world possessed any definition of a slave, and it was largely due to M. Briand and Lord Cecil that the property ownership of a person became the official designation of a slave. The fact which will probably surprise the public most is the incessant struggle which British officials are still compelled to maintain against forms of slavery in territories under British control or British influence, a struggle involving an expenditure of energy and even personal sacrifice which deserves the admiration and thanks of the civilised world.

The second surprising disclosure is the large number of administrative areas where slave owning or slave trading, in one or other of their many forms, are either known to exist or there is good reason to suspect such existence. The number of areas mentioned exceeds twenty separate territories, the principal ones being:

Adamwa	China (Mui Tsai)
Aden Protectorate	Egypt ("secret transit")
American States, certain Central and South (Peonage)	Ethiopia
Bechuanaland	Hong Kong (Mui Tsai)
Cameroons	India, certain Native States of
	Koweit

Liberia	Saudi Arabia
Malaya	Shihr
Morocco	Sudan
Muscat	The Trucial Oman
Northern Nigeria	The Yemen

The Expert Slavery Committee, whilst mentioning at least twenty areas brought under review, have classified the different forms of slavery under ten headings: slave raids, slave trade, captured slaves, born slaves, debt slavery, pawning, peonage, *mui tsai*, quasi-adoption, serfdom.

China. There is, of course, an official defence made by most administrations, but there is nothing new in it; "there is very little actual cruelty," says one report; "this system is not really slavery," says another; "the slaves don't mind," says a third, and so forth. But the Experts clearly have their own views, for they say with regard to one system: "it is possible that there is more human misery as a result of debt slavery than there is anywhere as a result of domestic slavery!" The Chinese Government has taken the welcome decision to commence the abolition of the Mui Tsai system, and has informed the Slavery Committee of this intention. It is true the Chinese Government contests the view that the Mui Tsai system is slavery, but Sir George Maxwell, the British Expert, has no doubts, for as he has pointed out in his official memorandum, "Powers of Ownership" are inherent in the system, therefore it comes within the terms of the 1926 Slavery Convention. Sir George Maxwell thus sets out the status* of the Mui Tsai:

1. The child is always of a tender age. She is not able to give her consent and her consent is not required.
2. The girls are often terribly overworked, and sometimes are cruelly beaten and maltreated.
3. Enforced and unpaid labour over a period of years from childhood to the adult age is not the "fair and humane treatment" which is required by Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
4. "Powers of ownership" are inherent in the system (unless the system is modified and regulated by local legislation and unless the legislation is actually enforced by the executive action of the Government), and the system is, therefore, one of "Slavery"

* Copies of this authoritative memorandum can be obtained from the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, Denison House, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, S.W.1.

within the definition of that word in Article I of the Slavery Convention of 1926, which is as follows :

“ Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”

In point of fact, there is no saving moral or practical difference between a Mui Tsai and a slave—the slave is bought and sold, the Mui Tsai is bought and sold, the owners can sell without reference to the slave, the owner flogs and tortures the Mui Tsai, as countless well-authenticated records show. Again, what is the use of denying cruelties as its apologists do—when frequently the newspapers, Government reports, missionary letters, court records, reek with the abominations inflicted on the wretched little Mui Tsai. How can it be otherwise? Bought at the tender age of say three years for 5s. apiece, bought for lucrative appreciation, schooled and “broken in” to degradation by drudgery and oppression so as to be ready for the purchaser at an enhanced price at about eight to ten years. Strip the Mui Tsai system of the whole gamut of shuffling excuses and hypocrisies and it stands out in all its hideous nakedness as one of the most revolting and cruel systems of slavery the world has yet witnessed. The Committee of Experts, whilst showing full appreciation of the decision of the Chinese Government to “decree” the suppression of the system, plainly hint that they will look for some early evidence of abolition. But the work of setting free and of giving a new life to the estimated number of two to three million slave children will be a prodigious task. The most encouraging feature is the limited but steadily growing support for emancipation amongst the Chinese people themselves.

The Indian States. There is one section of the report of the Experts which will assuredly give rise to grave concern and possibly alarm to the British public. The section in question indicates that there is something very wrong in certain of the native States of India. The action taken by the Slavery Committee ought not to have been taken unless there was the strongest reason to suspect the existence of systems of slavery in some of the hundreds of native States of India! In April of last year the Slavery Committee “recommended that the Indian States under the suzerainty of His Majesty, in which slavery might still exist, should be asked to declare their

intention of taking action as soon as possible for its suppression in their territories.”

On the face of it, this was a very proper and simple suggestion to make, and one which any ordinary student of political affairs would think would be adopted with alacrity. Alas! the Government of India have “not found it possible” to accept the advice! “The Government of India have not, for constitutional and other reasons, found it possible to call upon individual Indian States to make specific declarations on the lines suggested by the Committee.” Those who know what was behind the suggestion are not surprised. But the public will almost certainly, and probably rightly, assume that there are systems of servitude and slavery in some of the native States of India of a character and upon a scale the disclosure of which would give rise to widespread public concern.

Ethiopia and Arabia. Westward from China, India and Malaya, is a wide area where slave conditions on varying scales are to be found, right away from the Persian Gulf through Arabia, the Red Sea, Abyssinia, Morocco and Nigeria, to the Atlantic seaboard. To the Committee of Experts the interior of Arabia was a closed land; that slavery prevails over wide areas there was and is no doubt, but facts were not made available to the Committee. The Italian Government submitted a report upon those parts of Abyssinia at present occupied by Italian troops.

The areas covered by the Italian report do not however go much beyond those comprising the Tigre Province. Signor Suvich informed the Experts that the character of slavery in the Tigre was the most complete form of property slavery, giving to the owner the right “to sell, beat and kill” his slaves. With regard to numbers, Signor Suvich puts the slave population of this province of Tigre at 20,000, and further, that in the South Ras Desta alone owned 10,000 slaves; finally, that in the Tigre, slaves represented one-twelfth of the population. If this proportion is correct as to average, then the total number of slaves throughout Abyssinia would be about 1,000,000, or one-half the generally accepted, and the officially estimated, figure (by Italy) of 2,000,000 slaves.

But the Italian report is profoundly disappointing because, while advertising Marshal Badoglio's Proclamation of Liberty for the slaves, there is not one word upon the machinery for setting free, and what is much more difficult, keeping free, the

slaves. Nothing whatever is said about financial or legal measures. Across the border, in the Sudan, British officials provide every slave with manumission papers and complete registers are kept. The Emperor of Abyssinia set up courts to deal with slave disputes. Britain in nearly every effort of emancipation has allotted large grants for the beneficent work; not one of these essential measures appears to have been taken by Italy. The costs of emancipation are nearly always heavy; the West Indian emancipation cost Britain £28 each slave for the 700,000 slaves set free. In modern times the Nepalese liberation in 1926 cost the Maharajah £4 each slave, that of Burmah in 1928 cost the Indian Government £4 10s. each slave. In 1914, in East Africa, the German Reichstag refused to emancipate the 185,000 slaves primarily because of the estimated cost, namely £2 10s. for liberating each slave. The British Colonial Office was only able to abolish slavery finally in Kenya as recently as 1916 at a cost of £4 per head.

If the total Abyssinian slave population should prove to be the lower figure of 1,000,000 the task of emancipation will still be formidable—far more so than either in Tanganyika or Kenya. In Abyssinia slavery is much more closely interwoven into the religious, economic and political fabric of the country than in the case of any other African territory. In terms of money alone it could hardly cost less than the neighbouring countries, which would mean at least £3,000,000. But in addition there is the costly machinery of courts to settle the inevitable disputes and all the administrative machinery for applying the decrees—if emancipation is to be carried out effectively.

British spheres of influence.—The disclosure of systems of slavery in territories under British protection or influence will come as a shock to the British people. But some compensation can surely be found in the self-denying efforts of British officials who spend much of their energy and resources to setting the captives free. The Report of the Experts shows once again how true it is that "slavery dies hard!" The whole position is confused from Koweit in the Persian Gulf round the coastal provinces to Jeddah in the Red Sea. In the Aden Protectorate the owning of slaves is recognised; in the words of the Experts: "the legal status of slavery still exists throughout the Aden Protectorate." The number of slaves

in the Protectorate, we are told, is "not less than 4,000 to 5,000." In Koweit the number is unknown, but is said to have decreased from the estimate of 2,000 in 1930. In the sheikdoms of Trucial and Qater "the number of slaves employed in pearl diving is not known, but it is estimated at several thousands." There are in addition small numbers of slaves held by individual rulers. Across the continent of Africa the Slavery Experts report that there is a slave-trading route through the north-east of Bornu and another through parts of the Cameroons, many of the slaves being taken away for sale in the region of Lake Chad. Some parts of these West African territories are under British control and some under French influence.

The Committee of Experts in reviewing world conditions are clearly of the opinion that slave raids are everywhere diminishing in number under the steady pressure of civilisation. They are obviously less happy about slave trading. But if they accepted without demur the report of one government they would have to agree that in this territory the "raids for the capture of individuals for purposes of slavery are continuing on a large scale" and that "the slave trade is still practised"; further that the "Government participate directly in the slave trade by accepting slaves in payment of taxes." The Committee agree, however, that there is much secret selling of slaves in different parts of the world.

But with regard to slave-owning systems the experts have to admit the wide prevalence of slave owning not only of the recognised type, but of new systems and the intensification of other and older systems of servitude. The experts are satisfied that most emancipations have been beneficial to all concerned, and they reproduce an interesting report from the Sierra Leone Protectorate. It will be remembered that owing to a case in the Supreme Court in which runaway slaves had been recaptured, it was decided that slavery was a legal institution in the British Protectorate of Sierra Leone. Thereupon Mr. Amery took such vigorous action that over 200,000 slaves were set free on January 1st, 1928. This emancipation seems to have been eminently successful. In most areas some eighty per cent. of the slaves remained with their old masters and worked for them as before "except that there was no compulsion"—they were given land, food and some "consideration." A small number of slaves left

their former owners and settled in unpopulated territories elsewhere. In the Southern Province over eighty per cent. of the ex-slaves remained where they were, cultivating the same land as before but being absorbed into the ranks of the free-born.

The one bright chapter in the Report, and it is indeed a bright one, depicts in the briefest "as per margin" manner the activities of a British official stationed at the little port of Jeddah, in the Red Sea. What an epic story must lie behind this laconic account of the release after years of captivity of one hundred and thirty-six slaves who from 1930 to 1935 obtained their liberty by fleeing to the Legation and claiming the protecting folds of the British flag! The very fact of this human struggle for liberty shatters to fragments and wholly renders absurd the claims advanced by some that the slave really likes slavery—as well say that the fox just loves being chased and torn to pieces by the foxhounds! In this list of slaves set free, the Experts were informed that some of the slaves were brought all the way from West Africa, some from Morocco and North Africa, several from Abyssinia and the Sudan. Many travelled thousands of miles and were sold and resold again and again before final shipment to Arabia. In some cases they were kidnapped, one was brought "with thirty-five others to Tokai," others were taken as pilgrims and then sold, another was stolen by Nigerian merchants from French West Africa and taken across the Continent and sold in Medina—and so forth.

But easily the most dramatic story is the long and weary search for her child by a Sudanese mother. The boy was captured by the slave dealers in the Sudan and was ultimately sold in Arabia. By that almost uncanny second sense which Africans seem to possess—or was it maternal instinct?—the mother was assured that her boy was alive in Arabia. Once a year that mother crossed the sea and tramped the deserts of Arabia searching, searching, for her boy. Years rolled on and still the mother failed to find the lad. But apparently natives of Arabia or other slaves became interested in the yearly search by the mother and told the story of her search in the slave's presence. The boy learned too that if he could reach the British Legation at Jeddah and claim the protection of Britain's flag he was free! He made the attempt, reached the Legation, and the kindly British Minister sent

him to Suakim and thence to Kassala, where he is now happily settled with the mother who had sought him so vainly for years.

The most disappointing feature of the Report is the lethargy of Governments. More than forty Governments have signed and ratified the Slavery Convention under which they are pledged to do all in their power to abolish slavery. Less than ten of them have sent in any reports. China has not said one word about the actual setting free of Mui Tsai. The United States of America not only signed and ratified the Convention, but expressed a wish that it could have been made stronger, and has ignored her obligations from the time she signed it! Liberia for the second year in succession has sent in no report upon the progress of the abolition of slavery or of pawning.

Most Governments now are saying a good deal about "reforming the League," "strengthening the League." It is not so much the League that needs reforming as the attitude of the constituent members of the League! The most concrete evidence of reform would be a real effort to carry out written obligations and in the direction of slavery to give the Slavery Committee further powers, first to let the members meet at least once a year, secondly, if Governments are too lethargic to send in evidence of slavery to let others: travellers, missionaries and officials who do know and do care, to have access to the Slavery Committee and give them the evidence they possess and, finally, to permit the members of the Slavery Committee to make their own enquiries. Given a real desire on the part of all Governments, civilisation might then witness total suppression of the crime of slavery in this generation.

JOHN HARRIS.

THE LOST KEY.

I HAVE just returned from a three months' visit to Scandinavia and north-eastern Europe. In the nine countries I visited (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Free City of Danzig) I had the opportunity of many long and most instructive conversations with a very wide range of people. These included royalty, prime ministers and other members of the various governments in question; opposition politicians, members of the press, central bank governors and private bankers, merchants and industrialists, representatives of the free professions, just ordinary "men in the street" of all kinds, and finally, diplomats—both British and foreign. Perhaps I should also mention that travelling in a purely private capacity and being privileged to know most of these people from previous visits, I could rely on getting—and did get—very frank and very informal opinions. Moreover, the fact of being able to converse with a large proportion of my friends in their own tongue greatly contributed to make them feel at their ease and enabled them to express themselves very freely. Indeed, using a picturesque Americanism, I may claim to have "done" that part of the world most thoroughly, and the reason I venture to begin with these egotistical remarks is this: the impressions gathered and the conclusions to be drawn from them are not pleasant. Hence I would like to state from the very outset that they are based on a very large, very variegated and very substantial volume of evidence.

The first and strongest impression to be put on record here is the complete collapse of British prestige in all the nine countries I have visited. This is particularly striking, because in most of them, and especially in Scandinavia, Great Britain used to enjoy a goodwill in the past that was truly unique. It can be said that nowhere was England more genuinely liked and admired than in northern Europe during the last few years. This feeling was very deep indeed, and was quite independent of the solid commercial considerations which also formed a powerful link. It must be realised that while England is the best customer of each one of these countries, the Scandinavian "unit" i.e. Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland, taken together are in their turn our best

customers in Europe and second best customers in the world. With 16·3 million inhabitants they took in 1935 as much as 8·4 per cent. of England's total exports, whereas India with her 350 millions (Britain's best market) only took 8·9 per cent.

It is doubly painful therefore to report that what England is doing there now is neither good politics nor good business. The same very largely applies to the Baltic countries and to Poland and Danzig. It is quite astonishing to what extent little countries like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had managed to develop trade relations with Great Britain, or how Poland—a country rich in coal and possessing a large textile industry, i.e. in many ways our competitor—also established a considerable export and import trade with England. The political influence of Great Britain in all these countries, particularly in the three Baltic republics, was enormous. It is also worth mentioning that of late considerable efforts had been made from this side to expand our cultural influence out there, the British Council for Foreign Relations having sent no end of lecturers and having also sponsored various other manifestations in Scandinavia, Poland and the Baltic.

In the circumstances the utter collapse of England's prestige in that part of the world is particularly significant and alarming. First of all there is the question of this country's foreign policy. There is not a person—however great or however humble his or her position—who did not express to me a profound disillusionment or even disgust with the behaviour of England in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. What Mr. Lloyd George said in the House of Commons on the subject, or Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Attlee, is only a feeble expression of these people's feelings. Quite apart from the question whether they believe in the League and in sanctions—and by no means all of them do—the indignation and disappointment aroused by England's attitude is universal. "What are we to make of a country," most of them say, "which first allows or even encourages Mussolini to take action in Abyssinia; then, when he has committed himself to it, professes to be outraged and calls upon the whole world to help her in stopping him; and finally, having got the whole world following her lead, drops it all without any discoverable reason?" It is often argued that it is all very well for these small nations to criticise Britain, since

they are far removed from the centres of action and have not got our responsibilities. In this case, however, such an argument hardly applies. When the countries of northern and north-eastern Europe whole-heartedly accepted England's call to take a firm stand against Mussolini, they also accepted risks. For sanctions meant a possible heavy blow to Norway's shipping, or to Sweden's iron ore exports, for instance, while the precedent thus created put them in a very vulnerable position (especially Denmark) *vis-à-vis* Germany if ever a conflict with that country were to arise. Yet they were quite prepared to run these heavy economic and even military risks and to follow Britain's lead, because it was *this* country that was leading—the greatest democracy in the world, the pillar of parliamentarism and freedom, the champion of law and justice against a wanton aggressor. For years all the European democracies had cherished the hope that one day England would wake up from her exasperating lethargy and lead the world, and nothing is more ardently wished by these countries than a strong and vigorous Great Britain. "Of course," will the sceptics say, "they all want this country to police the world for them; why should we?" But in the first place, these particular countries were quite prepared to take an active part in the "policing," and in the second place Britain is never really doing it for anybody else. England's power and wealth admittedly depend on satisfactory international trade and that in its turn depends on peace, the maintaining of which is far more profitable to this than to any other nation.

The Hoare-Laval plan literally stunned the people of northern Europe. By the time they came to, this painful episode was dead and buried. It badly shook but did not as yet completely destroy their belief in this country. As a prominent Scandinavian said to me: "We felt we still loved England even though we had ceased to admire her." Worse was to follow. The extraordinary move of first sending the Home Fleet into the Mediterranean and then telling the world that it could not have been used without the help of the other Powers created a devastating impression. Local papers started printing articles about Jutland and comments on Jellicoe (whose obituaries were still fresh in everybody's mind), asking how it was that the British Navy—supposed to be the strongest in the world—had avoided a decisive

action against the Germans in the war and was now unwilling or incapable of showing its alleged power in the conflict between England and Italy. Did not the British authorities know how vulnerable it was, or realise the naval base difficulties before sending the Home Fleet to the Mediterranean? they said. They were not impressed by statements of British politicians that they were not afraid of the Italians and just did not want to use the Home Fleet. The whole thing shook England's prestige in an incredible way. Then came the trouble in Palestine. "Don't you realise," people said to me, "that it is not the Jews who are being attacked by the Arabs, but Great Britain? These Arabs are challenging England's authority; is England going to swallow that too?"

England's attitude towards Hitler is yet another thing they fail to understand. The Scandinavians are omnivorous readers of newspapers and have every reason to follow developments in Germany very closely. After all, Denmark is directly threatened (Sleswig-Holstein!), while Sweden is nervous too. As to the Baltic countries or Poland, jammed in as they are between Germany and Soviet Russia, their interest in Hitler's movements is obvious. They saw Hitler walk into the Rhineland without England or France meeting the challenge; they knew that England had used considerable pressure to stop France from acting. They said: "Afraid of Mussolini. Afraid of the Arabs. Afraid of Hitler. Weak, vacillating and undecided everywhere. Is *that* our leader, the country we have admired most during all these years?" They also argued, and it is difficult to disagree with them, that if England had done nothing when directly challenged, it was hardly likely that she would come to the rescue of friends in distress—signatures or no signatures. The idealists, of whom in northern Europe there are many, felt profoundly disillusioned. Those who take a more practical view of things were greatly perturbed. But what is unquestionable is that all of them felt it was impossible to trust England and rely either on her wisdom, or on her courage, or even on her honesty any longer.

The people I have seen, from the greatest to the humblest, have all expressed that very forcibly. A more impressive unanimity I have yet to find, and I regret to say that from my observations there is not a responsible politician in any

of the nine countries I have visited who will stake anything on England's word now. "We hate the Germans," a very high personage told me, "but do you think we will wait till England or France sell or abandon us to Hitler? If there is any business to be done we will do the transaction ourselves." Another statesman, who in the past has rendered England the greatest services in Geneva and elsewhere said: "I am sick and tired of British foreign policy. One never knows what your people want, or whether they mean what they say. As far as I am concerned I have done with supporting them." Statements of this kind could be multiplied *ad infinitum*.

To pass from the chanceries to the street—here is a typical remark addressed to me by a news vendor on the day the unfortunate Negus was taken to Palestine: "Well, I suppose he will give the Jews in Palestine as much help as you gave him in Abyssinia." The taxi-driver, or the porter at the hotel, or the barber, all spoke in a similar strain—and the "*vox populi*" in these highly cultured and genuinely democratic countries should not be ignored.

Perhaps the following is also worth mentioning. Not only through the press, but through the news-reel and through broadcasting, British public men are well known and familiar figures in northern Europe. Moreover many people have either seen or actually met Mr. Eden when he visited Scandinavia in 1934. Both he and Mr. Baldwin were held there in the highest personal repute, and great faith was placed in them as men, as well as politicians. This is most certainly no longer the case now, indeed the extent to which our elegant young Foreign Secretary has fallen from Olympus in that part of the world is hardly believable.

"England has held the key to the European situation and to the Scandinavian hearts," wrote recently a brilliant Swedish editor, "and she has lost it—has thrown it away." But my point is that she has done so not only over the general issue of her foreign policy—which, after all, is not shaped to please or annoy any particular group of nations—she has also "thrown away the key" in a much wider sense than that. It may be argued that we do not care whether all these small nations approve or disapprove of what we are doing, in fact that we are completely indifferent to the opinion of say, Norway or Lithuania. When the now immortal

Colonel Blimp told David Low that "the government must absolutely refuse to wish foreigners a merry Christmas" he was no doubt expressing the feelings of many an Englishman. But presumably even those people would admit the value to England of the Scandinavian and north European market. Can we be indifferent to that too? And here again a very substantial volume of evidence can be produced to show that things are far from satisfactory in our commercial relations—quite apart from the wider issue of this country's foreign policy.

Mr. D. E. Kidd, who has the double honour of representing the Federation of British Industries and *The Times* newspaper in Sweden, can hardly be suspected of any bias. This is what he said in a most illuminating article called "A British Businessman looks at the Swedish Market" some time ago:

British indolence so far as Sweden is concerned has left this lengthy peninsula to the energetic efforts of the German traders, and the latter have certainly made the best of their opportunities. Sweden has been neglected and underestimated. The present writer strongly advises British manufacturers to study the possibilities of trading with Sweden. . . . I beg him not to send an underling or immature representative, but some person with authority, who can make decisions on the spot, should occasion arise. . . . Woe unto the concern which sends over a junior member of the staff with no personality, and not even a well-pressed suit.

Exactly the same could be said of our handling of the Danish, Norwegian, Finnish and Baltic markets. Moreover, it is strongly resented that very often British firms appoint foreigners as their agents, e.g. Danes in Sweden or else Germans in all these countries. Here is another quotation from the journal published by the Swedish Chamber of Commerce in London:

. . . the way British manufacturers frequently handle their Scandinavian agencies is detrimental to the promotion of interest in Sweden for British goods . . . it is to be strongly recommended that British exporters should learn to count in metres, or in any other metric units, instead of in yards and inches or other British measurement units . . . the same recommendation applies to price quotations, at least in some cases. As an instance, British dog biscuits are mostly quoted in cwts., even though the selling price must be fixed per piece or per packet. . . .

Here again the criticism applies to all the other countries. When the Germans want to sell something there, they study carefully what England is doing and then go into the same markets and compete with us. British business men do exactly the same thing; they too study what England is doing and then go into the same markets and compete with—each other! I know that the coal interests have had to use a great deal of pressure on some of the British exporters to prevent them from cutting each other out and ruining an excellent market. For England's coal trade with Scandinavia is admittedly one of the rare things that now function perfectly—very largely as the result of our Trade Agreements that have made these markets. But in a number of other industries, incredible though this may seem, it is the irresponsible competition of British firms with each other that has produced some of the greatest difficulties. A most interesting case in point is the export of British textiles to Denmark. Here are some Board of Trade statistics:

	1932	1933	1934	1935	Increase + Decrease — in period 1932-5
I.—Cotton, yarns and manufactures:	£	£	£	£	
(a) Yarn ...	172,341	240,644	274,762	297,355	+ 125,014
(b) Piece goods	876,132	1,189,328	1,206,215	1,150,775	+ 274,643
(c) Thread in lengths not exceeding 1,000 yards ...	114,426	99,503	102,944	100,993	— 13,433
(d) Cotton manufactures excluding (a), (b), (c) ...	99,843	136,715	161,268	120,035	+ 20,192
II.—Woollen and worsted yarns and manufactures	1,207,003	1,450,816	1,580,589	1,621,727	+ 414,724

It will be seen that, apart from a small reduction in the thread business, our textile exports to Denmark have increased enormously. Yet it is the textile trade that suffers most from the Danish foreign exchange regulations and complains loudest about not getting sufficient licences. The truth of the matter is that while the volume of licences has been more or less maintained by the Danes, there is an ever-growing number of British firms competing in this market, with the inevitable result that some of the old established

exporters have had their business ruined or seriously impaired by their own colleagues and fellow-countrymen.

The question of Anglo-Danish trade is interesting, because it reveals a peculiar kink in the national psychology of certain influential interests in this country. From 1931 to 1935 Denmark's purchases of British goods have risen from £8.6 millions to £13.8 millions—an impressive record. But far from expressing satisfaction with this most laudable effort of a small nation of only 3½ million inhabitants, we spend all our time kicking and cursing them for not buying still more! Is that good salesmanship? Surely, the way to sell goods is to encourage your customer and to study his requirements and not a continuous effort to bully him into taking what you want to sell. In the normal commercial intercourse between shopkeeper and client, such a ridiculous situation would be quite impossible. There is, moreover, something extremely offensive in the attitude which seems to imply that by purchasing more in Denmark, or for that matter in the whole of Scandinavia and the Baltic countries, than they purchase from us, England is doing them a good turn for which they should be profoundly grateful.

After all, one does not trade out of charity, and presumably we buy these people's agricultural produce or timber, or paper and pulp, because we want these goods. And, far from being the crime it is sometimes purported to be, surely it is northern Europe's unique achievement to have built up an agricultural industry, or a timber trade or a woodgoods industry that are to-day considered the best in the world, and that deservedly sell their output on the strength of its unrivalled quality.

And is it fair or reasonable to expect these small nations to buy as much from England as 45 million Britishers buy from them? Ample proof has been given by all these countries of their sincere desire to increase their purchases in England. They realise full well that if they are to go on selling in the British market they must also buy in it. It is significant that in Denmark, for instance, several organisations have been created by the Danes themselves to make propaganda for British goods. The Danish-British Association deserves special mention for its active "Buy British" campaign. When it is realised that it is a non-trading organisation, i.e. does not stand to make any direct profit by

its activities, and that it is composed of that country's leading business and public men, who devote a great deal of time and energy to sponsor the expansion of British sales in Denmark, one is bound to admit that these people are really doing their best. A little recognition and encouragement from this side is much overdue and would be sure to have most beneficial effects.

Another interesting case is that of Norway, whose commercial relations with England are absolutely "water-tight," for she sells us exactly as much as she buys—in fact the balance is slightly in England's favour. The Norwegians, who have to rely for a large part of their national income on their most wonderful shipping industry—(there are only 3,000,000 of them, yet they are the third maritime nation in the world—larger than any other country, except England and the U.S.A.), have reached this unique position through sheer hard work and efficiency. There is no subsidy or help from the State of any kind, while the standard of wages and upkeep is second to none. The British shipping subsidy, introduced without warning or consultation, has dealt them a severe blow. As to the continuous encroachment of our trawlers on Norway's territorial waters, with its ruinous effects on Norwegian fishing—another key industry—it has aroused the deepest indignation among these fundamentally pro-English people. It is really a pity that the admirable speech of that great Anglo-Scandinavian, Sir Karl Knudsen, at the recent meeting of the Norwegian Chamber of Commerce in London, did not receive wider publicity. His comments were absolutely to the point and emphasised the unsatisfactory character of England's commercial policy in northern Europe.

It is often said these days that diplomats are more concerned with trade than with foreign policy. England is fortunate enough to have in Scandinavia and north-eastern Europe one or two diplomatic or consular representatives who are first-class men and who do splendid work in that direction. But they are rather exceptional, whereas their chiefs and colleagues are as often as not quite hopeless. What is the point of sending out these gentlemen—however distinguished—whose health or education or social and other propensities make them profoundly antagonistic to the countries to which they are accredited? In all these capitals

the British Minister should be by far the most influential member of the Corps Diplomatique. He most certainly is not. Our legations—with rare personal exceptions—have no local contacts and no knowledge of the countries where they are supposed to represent Britain. It has been my privilege, repeatedly, on this and on many previous journeys, to introduce some of our diplomats residing out there to leading business men or state dignitaries or even most important representatives of the local Foreign Office. One might have imagined that these would be the sort of contacts they would go out of their way to establish, yet this is by no means the case. The few efficient diplomats or consuls, or commercial secretaries, England happens to have in Scandinavia or north-eastern Europe, are severely handicapped by ignorance and indolence both at home and on the spot. I hate having to say all this, but anybody who has had the opportunity of looking under the surface of things in these countries knows it is true.

One more observation, which calls for a little serious thinking. Many English lecturers have visited these capitals in the last year or two. The one who went down best was Miss Rebecca West, because she treated her audiences as the grown-up, well-informed and highly civilised persons that they are. But numerous others bored them stiff, either by the selection of the subject or the manner in which it was treated. The fact of our ignorance of these countries is no justification for supposing that they in their turn know nothing about England. It is amazing how much they do know. They learn it at school, they read it in books, they hear it over the radio, and they see it in the cinema. Moreover, all those who can—take the first possible opportunity of visiting England and seeing for themselves.

There is no end to the possibilities England had—and in a way still has—in Scandinavia and north-eastern Europe, if she only learned to treat these people properly. To fool away a political and cultural goodwill of this importance, and markets that are both prosperous and willing, is indeed unpardonable. Are we so rich and successful elsewhere that we can afford to behave like that? Unwillingly one thinks of a saying of Axel Oxenstierna, the famous Swedish statesman, who remarked: "You should know, my son, that the world is governed by very little wisdom."

GEORGE SOLOVEYITCHIK.

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION.

SELDOM before has Germany been spoken about, written about, pondered about, as in these days. Neither has her situation in the heart of Europe, at the cross-roads of the world, nor have her statistical figures, nor have the frequent speeches of her leaders and competent economists seemed sufficient to lift the veils surrounding, in the eyes of other peoples, the "German mystery." As under a dictatorial rule all activities of a nation, in the field of economics as well as in the political, are subordinated to the task of the community as set by the leader, all data given officially are more or less criticised abroad, and a legend evolves easily enough. It seemed a mystery to the world at large when Germany during the war was able, notwithstanding the blockade, to keep up her industrial and economic activity and to supplant foreign raw materials by home-produced *Ersatz*; a mystery again, when she arose with unparalleled rapidity out of the hell of her inflation at the end of 1923 by means of an artificially and artfully created stabilised money, the *Rentenmark*. And it seems a mystery at present when she is evidently able to overcome an unemployment of nearly one-third of her working population—as in 1932—without any help from abroad and against that heavy embargo laid upon her world trade by all sorts of measures such as tariffs, quotas, depreciation of currency, control of *devisen* and even boycott.

Such phenomena cannot be explained by referring to the natural capacities, the training and the toiling of a population whose foremost creative qualities had evolved during a century of individualistic principles. The discipline of a people which had willingly, almost enthusiastically, submitted to compulsory military service has something to do with it, and on the other hand a clever psychology of Germany's present rulers. But there must be, and is, a stronghold somewhere in her economic structure itself to make possible ever and anon such recoveries after a deep downfall, such resistances against a whole world. The comparison with a human being imposes itself—with a man still young, who, exhausted by hardships incredible, undernourished and stricken by tuberculosis, regains his strength and sets his power of resistance at work, as soon as a change of air and a few rays of sunshine afford a chance to his natural resources.

For Germany's economic life the power of resistance is her extraordinary capacity for organisation, combined with that for invention, so to say, on command.

The importation of textiles, such as cotton and wool, has become difficult, with the scarcity of gold and foreign currency? Well, we will produce "Vistra," rayon and other artificial textiles out of cheap wood-pulp, of which we have plenty, and they'll do just as well or even better under a certain angle and after a certain time. Copper, manganese, tin and other foreign ores are unobtainable? Then let us evolve new and more resistant light metals, based on bauxite or other earth found at home or to be bought abroad for a trifle as compared with the price of foreign ore. Crude oil and petrol are weighing heavily on our trade balance? Then let us draw them from our own coal and lignite, of which there is plenty, and create liquid fuel of every description. It was the same with artificial fertilisers when Chile saltpetre became unobtainable, with synthetic or reconstructed rubber when the scarcity of natural rubber was felt. That vicious circle of inventing or creating under the stress of a necessity, and of supplanting established goods and raw materials by newly created ones, will be going on with an ever-increasing speed and efficiency until some sort of real international free trade is re-established. And during that process the hardships undergone by the seventy million Germans will be one of the principal factors, if not the motor, whose terrific power is driving the wheels, forcing competition, reducing capital and labour in far-off countries to nought, depreciating the value of heretofore indispensable commodities, depriving young nations and colonies of their means of exchange, and increasing, under the perfectly justified title of progress, unrest and instability the world over.

It need not be repeated that the background of the present situation is the extremely shortsighted way in which economic and financial matters were dealt with at the Peace Conference, to say nothing of the political mistakes made in splitting up national and economic units after centuries of natural growth. And that the post-war struggle in the economic field, going on now for nearly two decades since the so-called peace treaties have been signed, has done more than even those treaties themselves to bring about a world crisis, one of whose most striking examples is to-day's Germany.

With these fundamentals in mind, it seems less difficult to outline the actual state of things as to the economic conditions in Germany. She had become, in the last decades of the previous and the first of the present century, one of the principal powers on the world's market, selling as well as buying in the last years before the war to an extent of more than ten milliard marks—more than 500 million pounds of yore. She had undergone, immediately after the war, a process of artificial recovery of her former activity in that field, selling out her goods and offering facilities, such as transportation, in a currency rapidly depreciated to practically nothing, and making up for the considerable bleeding undergone that way by contracting formidable loans in America and elsewhere. The natural consequence was a passivity of the trade balance, to such an extent that the most drastic measures of a deflationary character had to be taken in order to avoid a complete breakdown. For, whereas in the last pre-war year, 1913, the imports with 11,206 million marks as compared with exports to the value of 10,199 million showed a state of things where Germany's various income sources abroad—colonies, foreign investments, shipping, royalties and so forth—contributed the amount covering the comparatively small deficit, in 1928, imports to the extent of fifteen milliards stood against exports valued at 11.4 milliards. And instead of property granting an income, some eighteen milliards of foreign debts, to say nothing of the "reparations," asked for payment of interest at high rates and for amortisations for which no adequate willingness or capacity of absorbing German goods existed anywhere.

A reduction in prices, in wages, in buying power, and finally in employment was the fatal result, each step increasing at the same time the financial burden and reducing the budgetary receipts. At an early moment, and in order to withstand the general "run" of the creditor countries in 1931, legal restrictions had to be laid on the exchange of currencies. And although they were, with ever-increasing speed and thoroughness, extended and completed to such an extent, that at present nobody may leave the country with more than ten marks or enter it with more than thirty—in the latter case, if in German bank-notes only, foreign currency being welcome—without a special permit extremely difficult to obtain, the gold reserves of the Reichsbank dwindled away in a steady and alarming flow. They are to-day—and have been practically

for over a year—not more than 1 to 2 per cent. of the value of bank-notes in circulation. Their internal value and buying power having, notwithstanding that fact, remained steady, as was the much-admired Rentenmark of 1923 with no gold covering at all, the German experiences in currency seem to disprove all classical and adopted theories on money. But what seems, at first sight, an outstanding phenomenon in the field of economic science is more or less the result of Dr. Schacht's extremely clever handling of a hard task and with the hard means of a dictatorship, economic as well as political. He had to subordinate all other exigencies, legitimate as they might have been, to the threefold and intimately entwined necessity of:

- (a) finding work for the unemployed and keeping them at work,
- (b) getting the necessary raw materials for that purpose, and
- (c) providing the population with the necessary food-stuffs.

This threefold aim was, is and will be essential, whatever else in the field of Germany's economic activities may seem to prevail at a given moment or from a special angle. There are ramifications leading from one to the other, or from the solution of the unemployment question to the political aim of keeping the population under a steadfast political control, from the raw-material problem as such to the specific requests of rearmament, from the foodstuff question to the requirements of an agriculture in a difficult position; there are questions of prestige, of rivalry between different authorities, there are questions of propaganda and of that quasi-religious intolerance characterising a revolutionary political creed. But steady and unwavering the leading economic authority in Germany plods along on those simple lines, and so far has been able to oil the screeching machinery.

With what means becomes clear when one goes into the intricate problem of the different categories of German marks. To know them all demands a scientific study; for according to the degree of freedom allowed for their use in business transactions of every description they vary in denomination and, officially or unofficially, quoted value on the international money market. The controlled Reichsmark, no longer subject

to free market operations, is stable and even keeps firm as compared with the pound, the dollar or the gold currencies. It is obtainable, however, only for a limited range of operations under special permission in each case, so that its official quotation applies practically to cheque transactions exclusively. Mark-notes, since their repatriation has been made dependent upon permission towards the end of 1935, are dealt with at a discount on foreign markets. The "blocked marks"—results of outstanding arrears in Germany owned by foreigners—are subject to discounts varying from 20 to about 80 per cent.; "Registermarks," the category allotted to visitors from abroad in order to facilitate their travelling in Germany, being known best, and "Aski"-marks, results of new sales from abroad against German currency and permitting a free utilisation for purchases in the country, being quoted comparatively highest. There are other categories of different denomination, such as "credit-marks," resulting from previous loans, "Effektenmarks," the products of shares and securities sold by foreigners, "Emigrants' marks," the money left behind by Germans going abroad, and so forth. The amounts involved, although still considerable, are reduced progressively by a skilful system affecting them to a planned facilitation of German exports and a transfer of foreign—and of Jewish or "non-Aryan"—property into German hands.

Summing up the results of that particular and complicated policy, one cannot fail to observe that from the German point of view it has been and is still successful. The *Währungs-Ausgleich*—equalisation of currency margins—by allotting to the German competitor in certain more or less complicated ways a sort of premium through employing depreciated blocked marks for certain transactions, carefully investigated in each single case by special authorities, has helped a lot in making it possible to keep the price of German products abroad on the level of the international market, when within the country, and compared with those abroad by means of the official rate of exchange, they were considerably higher as in countries with depreciated currency.

Somebody has to bear the burden of that discrepancy. It seems particularly hard in the case of emigrants who have to abandon homes, professions and activities established by themselves or their forefathers, to pay a heavy "Flight tax" of 25 per cent. and eventually to sell what is left to them in

blocked marks at a rate of, actually, less than 30 per cent. Foreign investors, however, in so far as they tried in previous years to benefit by the usurer's interest yielded by the loans, granted and taken in a more than speculative spirit, can hardly complain that the crisis of a world imprudently misled by those responsible for the Paris "settlements" of 1919-20, deprives them of a part of their capital. A wiser course might have shown seventeen years ago to what extent and in what proportion everybody has to contribute towards the reconstruction of a world ruined by four years of bombing and shelling.

The point of view of the German exporter, as shown above, has to be co-ordinated with the necessity for importation of certain raw materials, of foodstuffs, and for complying with the most urgent exigencies of certain countries whose capacity for absorbing German manufactured products has to be safeguarded. No easy task, indeed, what with British markets protected, first by the 1931 devaluation, then with a new tariff policy abandoning the old free-trade principle, and finally by the Ottawa agreements, with the new U.S.A. policy of subsidising agriculture, public works and other activities and strongly protecting the economic frontiers with tariffs and administrative measures, with the dependency of other countries, as the Scandinavian kingdoms from England, the "gold-bloc" countries from France, Germany had, finally, to submit to a system under which her exchange of goods with the majority of her customers became a compensation business of some kind. Whether there was set up a certain key, as the three to five in the Anglo-German agreements—meaning that for each five pounds' worth Germany sold to or in Great Britain she had to buy at least three pounds' worth of British goods, certain financial settlements to be made out of the surplus resulting in favour of Germany—or whether goods of specific interest, such as grain and meat from Hungary, oranges and wine from Italy and Spain had to be taken in exchange for German industrial products: the fact is that finally hardly 20 per cent. of the all too small and difficult exportation of the country remained cash transactions, so as to bring in the badly needed foreign currency. With a monthly average of about 400 million Reichsmarks on each side, and with usually a slight activity that leaves hardly eighty to a hundred million marks every month at Dr. Schacht's

disposal for the free direction of German purchases—oleiferous products for human and their residuals for cattle feeding, butter and other supplementary food, iron and other ore, textiles and so forth. The consequence was, amidst struggling interests sometimes very hard to overcome, a dividing of all import necessities into classes according to their actual value for the community and the task set up for it by a National Socialist government. There is no formal statement to that effect, but one may, without making a serious mistake, give the classification as follows :

1. Necessities of national defence, i.e. rearmament.
2. Supplementing nutrition with indispensable foreign goods.
3. Keeping industry, and thereby employment, afloat as well as possible.
4. Every other kind of useful activity—if there is a penny left over.

There is an intimate connection between German rearmament, the battle against unemployment and the general "educational" trend of National-Socialist ideology. It seems to me a somewhat unjust exaggeration when abroad the spending of milliards on "useless" armaments is often contrasted with what the German budget allots to other activities. Clemenceau's unfortunate phrase of the "twenty million Germans too many" has been true in quite another sense than meant by him : one-fourth to one-third of the population was, even in settled pre-war times, forced to live on what German industry could sell abroad. That meant a quota of from five to six million out of roughly twenty million hands employed in industry ; at the present moment, and with an increasing effort to force exportation by all means, which has given more than a quarter of a million workmen new employment, the number engaged in industrial exportation is 1.7 million at best. And compared with an increase in home trade of 40 per cent. as from 1932 to 1935, Germany's foreign trade has decreased in the same period by 18 per cent. Something has to be done to make up for that loss, which could not be overcome by ordinary means under a régime of bartering, clearing and compensation, clever as it may be in forcing creditor countries to favour German activity on their own soil, as by Dr. Schacht's recent arrangements in the Balkans..

In early times the slaves—the army of unemployed of yore—were set to work building pyramids. The Middle Ages saw the construction of cathedrals as a means of overcoming unemployment, perhaps without anybody being aware of that economic task. And many a little township undertook the construction of a marvellous church, worth in workman's hours, if not in material, many times more than the whole fortune of the community. No crisis in modern times has been solved otherwise than by large public works, whether directly useful or just for the public health, for the pleasure of the eye, or what not. The much-criticised previous German governments undertook the provision of playing-fields, stadiums, palatial school buildings, the erection of modern homes on a large scale. Their adversaries and successors, the National Socialists, go on doing the same thing in a still larger style, with larger means and with their own special stamp. The stronger discipline, a more military trend of the whole system, later on the cancelling of the military restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and the Naval Agreement with Great Britain, afforded opportunities for building and industrial activities on the same broad lines as the aforementioned public work. It would be extremely difficult to state whether German rearmament was more furthered by the necessary struggle against unemployment, or whether unemployment was more relieved by rearmament. If not for precisely the same purpose, similar amounts ought to have been spent for other, seemingly likewise "useless purposes." This statement, which has to be made for the sake of justice, has nothing to do with the principles of the international competition in armaments, whose dreadful consequences the world had to undergo from 1914 to 1918, and whose evident renewal is laid by every nation at the door of some other. In the drastic failure of a disarmament begun at her expense and in the economic necessity of an initial spark for her industrial recovery, an *Initialzündung*, Germany certainly has the most striking arguments in forcing that, humanly speaking, condemnable activity.

To a certain extent the question of nutrition, the secondary point of Germany's "New Plan," is a corollary to the rearmament. To gain independence from abroad for the essential foodstuffs, such as grain, meat, fat and oilseeds of every description, being the aim of her agricultural policy, sufficient stocks for the raising and feeding of cattle, poultry, etc., and

an importation of food in order to increase the home livestock seem necessary. Frequent clashes between the demands of industry for raw materials, often destined for armament purposes, and those of the agricultural departments, have been the consequence, and are partly responsible for the recent arrangement by which General Goering was made arbitrator with dictatorial powers in settling such conflicts. That certain industrial activities in the textile and similar lines with a more private field of activity have to suffer under that scheme of a complete rationalisation of imports, and that exports under a price subsidy system demand heavy taxes, are evidently unavoidable consequences; such taxes were, however, found in 1935 and seem not to have affected a steadily increasing income of the Treasury. It was able to register a revenue more than a milliard above last year's, and was with 9,319 millions from 200 to 300 millions above the highest figures of the seemingly successful pre-crisis years. At the same time Germany can register a decrease of her foreign debts from 26.8 milliards (as in 1930) to 13 milliards in 1936, partly, of course, in consequence of the devaluation in her most important creditor countries.

Thus the picture of German economic life presents itself at a superficial glance in a rather favourable light. But some facts and data cannot be neglected in appreciating that situation. A search of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* comparing 1935 with 1932, and corroborated by the German Institute for Trade Research comprising the period from 1928 to 1934, shows a steady and remarkable decrease of consumption goods in favour of production goods, and a backward trend in the amount of wages and salaries as compared with the increasing work and output. In the said four years the taxes paid have risen by 58 per cent., the amount of wages and salaries by only 21 per cent. The industrial output increased by 64 per cent., but for production goods by 113 per cent., for consumption goods only by 14 per cent. For the last two years, 1934 and 1935, that comparison is even more striking, as the output of production goods increased by 26 per cent., that of consumption goods fell by 2 per cent. Taking into consideration that from 1932 to 1935 the prices of export have fallen for finished goods by not less than 35 per cent., and that in the meantime more than four million unemployed, some 30 per cent. of the industrial hands, have gone back to work again, these data

seem to prove that Germany's "economic miracle" is the result of a continued shattering of her industrial balance in favour of investment-goods industries. In practice that means not only a slow but unavoidable transformation of movable into immobilised capital, but also a decrease in income for the large majority and finally the totality of the population. It means—if the correct fundamental idea of the *Initialzuendung* for the creation of work has, after three years, not yielded sufficient sparks to make the economic machinery self-sustaining—a continual forcing of investment-capital still available into State activity, a State capitalism hardly compatible with the safeguarding of private capital as proclaimed by the leaders. That this danger, with all its consequences, exists is shown by official research data, giving for 1928 a part about equal of public bodies and industry in the total investments, with 19.3 per cent. for the first, 19.1 for the second claimant, and for 1934 already a complete turning of the tables: public bodies got 35.7 per cent., industry only 11.5 per cent. of the investments, notwithstanding the necessary increase of the latter's activities with the decreasing unemployment.

Without diminishing Germany's astonishing "economic miracle" and the extreme cleverness and ability of her financial and economic leadership, there is but one possible conclusion. In a country where there are no politics and but one policy with the clause *Ne varietur*, it is perfectly possible to speed up and keep going the economic activity for a considerable time, in submitting every enterprise to the primary task of the common weal—here the creating of work. But it is not possible to do it without draining sources of welfare, future wealth and initiative, and without diverting private capital and even the trickling stream of income into some sort of State-owned or State-organised economic machinery. It remains to be seen whether that and a necessarily decisive bureaucracy will in the long run, and with an ever-diminishing possibility of creating or liquidating capital for such purposes, prove capable of supplanting the strongly individualistic and personal economic creator of the Germany of yore, even if the interference of party doctrinaires and enthusiasts, which seems to have created much trouble to the responsible authorities such as Dr. Schacht, will make way by and by for a more conservative conception of the heavy burden Hitler has laid in plain confidence upon his economic dictator.

EDGAR STERN-RUBARTH.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE BETWEEN THE TWO FASCISMS.

THE Little Entente, the alliance between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Roumania planned by Masaryk while the world war was still in progress, is based on the common interest of the three countries in the maintenance of peace and of the *status quo* in central and south-eastern Europe; negatively expressed, its purpose is the common defence against those Powers which are out to produce changes in this part of the Continent by resort to violence and breach of treaties. The forces threatening the *status quo* are in part Fascist and imperialistic, notably so the dictators of Berlin and Rome, and in part of a more sentimental character, such as the movement for the restoration of the Habsburgs, centred in Vienna, and the revisionism of Budapest, which aims at the recovery for the great Magyar landowners of the estates split up under the Czechoslovak and Roumanian land reforms. Defence against these two permanent sources of danger to their existence is the common interest of the States of the Little Entente.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that there is such divergence of interest between Berlin and Rome on the one side and Vienna and Budapest on the other as to make it possible for the Little Entente to prevent any serious threat to peace merely by playing off the Fascists and the Revisionists against one another. From time to time, it is true, it has been evident that Berlin's opposition to the restoration of the Habsburgs can be availed of as a stabilising element, and similarly the very strong Habsburg movement in Austria can be brought into play against the *Anschluss* idea, the idea of union with Germany. And the Hungarian "gentry" represented by the present Gömbös Government, mainly Protestant and mostly large farmers, tending to agrarian Fascism and to hostility to the big financiers, have little liking for the pro-Habsburg Catholic nobles, mainly industrialist, of the party led by Count Bethlen. Add to this the almost irreconcilable conflict of interest between Berlin and Rome in regard to the independence of Austria, and it might be inferred that the various Fascist, restorationist, and revisionist movements are so difficult to reduce to a common denominator that their differences provide the best security for the three States of the Little Entente.

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Unfortunately this inference takes too little account of the special forms of Fascist activity and of the efforts made by the Fascist States to join hands regardless of differences in the field of foreign policy. Moreover, the Habsburg movement in Austria and the revisionism of Hungary must not be regarded as entirely different in character from the Fascism now at the helm in Rome and Berlin. The truth is that the movements in Germany, Italy, Austria, and Hungary are simply varying manifestations of Fascism, which is availing itself of various points of view and working by varied methods in its attack on the democratic countries of central Europe. On the question of the partition and destruction of the central European democracies associated together in the Little Entente these movements are united, and the main difference between them, arising out of their varied imperialist interests, is the point at which to make a beginning in the desired complete subjection of the whole Danube basin to Fascist rule.

These various methods of Fascist attack have produced various methods of defence in the States of the Little Entente. At times there have been attempts to lean on one Fascism in the belief that this is the best way by which the others can be resisted. But in reality it is impossible to combat one Fascism with the aid of another, and the development of the Little Entente has shown again and again that this simple truth is realised in Prague, Belgrade, and Bucarest at every critical moment, although every attempt has been made from the other side to conceal it. This was shown plainly in the course of the efforts made about a year ago to drive a wedge between the Little Entente States. The clear and consistent policy pursued by Dr. Benes at Prague and by Mr. Titulescu at Bucarest defeated every attempt to direct this thrust against Czechoslovakia or Roumania. But Yugoslavia's special situation after the assassination of King Alexander laid Belgrade open to a Fascist attack. It must be admitted that extraordinary skill was shown in the effort made to detach Yugoslavia from the Little Entente. Berlin sought to produce by economic and political methods the conviction that Italy was Yugoslavia's real enemy and her only one, and that the Italian peril could only be averted in Belgrade by the closest possible association with Germany.

The efforts of Hitlerist Fascism to detach Yugoslavia from the Little Entente and to make her, by means of intensive

propaganda, into an important ally by the Adriatic and a valuable shelter in carrying out the *Anschluss*, the conquest of Austria, date back to the first months of the Hitler régime; as early as that time the propaganda journeys undertaken by General Göring and other National Socialist functionaries were plainly devoted to the encirclement of Austria on the south and the acquisition by this means of a counterweight against Prague, which has at all times put up the most vigorous opposition to the *Anschluss* idea.

Last year, after a short interval of relative inactivity, the moment seemed to Berlin to have come for an extension of its past propagandist successes in Yugoslavia and for bringing that country completely to heel by reducing it to economic dependence on Germany. The starting point of this move was the serious loss of Italian trade suffered by Yugoslavia in consequence of the country's participation in sanctions against Italy. Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, and France jointly bore a share of this loss, but no more than 25 per cent. in all, while Berlin declared its readiness at once to take up 60 per cent. of the Yugoslav export goods hitherto supplied to Italy. Berlin was already enjoying what amounted to a forced loan from Yugoslavia, since that country had claims outstanding to the amount of 450,000,000 dinars in respect of supplies made to Germany for which payment had not been received. Berlin thus killed two birds with one stone. It was scarcely able to get credits for raw materials and foodstuffs anywhere in the world, but now it vastly increased its forced loan from Yugoslavia. And at the same time it was able to come forward in the guise of a friend in need and acquire fresh popularity, since the Germans were declaring their readiness to make further purchases of foodstuffs and ores in Yugoslavia to the value of 450,000,000 to 500,000,000 dinars, while France, Yugoslavia's ally, had only agreed, after lengthy negotiations, to increase her quota for Yugoslav imports by 20,000,000 dinars. Under the complicated system of settlement in the clearing arrangement with Germany the Yugoslav farmers and mineowners generally failed to realise that this transaction meant a fresh squandering of Yugoslav national wealth, to the amount of almost half a million dinars, in return for vague hopes that it might later be possible to obtain some sort of German industrial product or factory equipment hitherto bought from Yugoslavia's allies.

The aspect of the transaction that appealed to Yugoslav opinion was that it brought liberation from the unpopular Italian market and provided an immediate substitute in Germany. It was felt to be only right and proper that the Munich agreement between the Third Realm and Yugoslavia placed German industry in a position of privilege in the Yugoslav market, since it was neither the Czechs nor the British and French who had taken from the Yugoslav farmers their almost unsaleable pigs, but the Germans. In any case, German goods must now be preferred to all others, regardless of price and quality, because every increase in imports from Germany automatically reduced the frozen Yugoslav assets in that country.

From the economic to the political was no more than a few steps, since this approach to Germany provided the best means of keeping at a distance the unwelcome Italian neighbour. Perhaps insufficient consideration was given in Yugoslavia to the circumstance that these sympathies for German Fascism as a counterweight to Italy incidentally raised a large number of other central European questions. A restoration of the Habsburgs would be extraordinarily dangerous for Yugoslavia in view of the feeling among the Croats; and in some quarters in Belgrade it was hoped that this peril could most quickly be averted by Austro-German union. There were others who welcomed the idea of the *Anschluss* as providing the best counterweight against Italy. This view was widespread in Yugoslavia at one time, but is not so now: it is entirely in conflict with Yugoslavia's real interests. Yugoslavia has never had Germany for a neighbour, and, above all, never Hitlerist Germany. A Swastika Germany reaching from the North Sea to the southern frontier of present-day Austria, a vast Colossus dividing the Continent into two parts, would not be likely to stop short seventy miles from the Mediterranean. A German thrust against the Yugoslav port of Susak would then find Yugoslavia helpless, for Czechoslovakia, her best and truest ally, would be immobilised as a central European Power by the extension of Germany to the Yugoslav frontier, while of the other neighbours of Yugoslavia neither Roumania (after the destruction of the Little Entente by Yugoslavia's own action), nor, needless to say, Yugoslavia's arch-enemy Hungary, would stir in her defence against entire subjugation by Fascist Germany.

A glance at the map is sufficient to show the importance of Yugoslavia as a source of food and raw material supply to a Germany preparing for war, and this is equally plain from the commercial policy pursued by Berlin in regard to Yugoslavia. The temporary and superficial alleviation of Yugoslavia's economic situation amounts in reality to a stripping of the country's agricultural produce and raw materials without equivalent payment; and in the long run it would be paid for by the isolation of the country from its allies and its subsequent colonisation by Germany. Such a development would be bound soon to bring a fearful penalty for the mistake made in supposing that the situation of the country could be improved by turning for help to German Fascism.

Since the Belgrade Conference of the Little Entente in the middle of May 1936 the Yugoslavs have been convinced of the terrible consequences involved—a dissolution of the Little Entente and unconditional dependence on the Fascism of Berlin. It is significant that the opposition to Yugoslav dependence on German Fascism was expressed not only by Czechoslovakia, as the ally most closely affected, but with equal vigour by Roumania. The *communiqué* issued after the Belgrade conversations gave expression to the indestructible unity of the three States of the Little Entente in face of each of the neighbouring Great Powers; and it was followed by a statement from Mr. Titulescu, the Roumanian Foreign Minister, in these emphatic terms:

The Belgrade discussions are a well-earned punishment for those who fish in troubled waters. Nobody has attempted to divide us, but there was of talk it. Every attempt, however, of this nature is condemned to failure, for the thing that unites us is a vital common interest—the necessity of preserving the frontiers of our countries.

And Mr. Stoyadinovitch, the Yugoslav Premier, declared at the time in an interview for a Roumanian government organ:

There are no differences of view between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. . . . It is absurd to suspect the present Yugoslav Government of pursuing a pro-German policy. Nothing will induce Yugoslavia to deviate from the path she is following. Nothing will separate her from her allies, with whom she remains bound for defence. Those who have hoped for success in an intriguing manœuvre have made a mistake.

The Belgrade Conference has thus made an end of the efforts of Fascist Berlin to drive a wedge into the Little Entente and to detach Yugoslavia from that grouping.

The statement had been spread by the "fishers in troubled waters" that Prague was not an entirely dependable ally for Belgrade because Czechoslovakia would assent to a Habsburg restoration, although, in view of Croat feelings, restoration would endanger the existence of Yugoslavia. Dr. Krofta, the Czech Foreign Minister, disposed of this suggestion in the course of a speech in Parliament on May 28th. He said:

The Little Entente intends to work in unison with the western Great Powers for the preservation of the independence of Austria. It is determined to oppose revisionism with the same resolution as it will the restoration of a dynasty whose presence in central Europe would produce grave conflicts in the Danube basin. The policy of the Little Entente is entirely unanimous, whether with reference to relations with Austria, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, or the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, during the Anglo-Italian conflict there were those in Czechoslovakia who advocated a pro-Italian policy, and who clearly looked forward to an official decision to go over to the side of Italian Fascism in the interest of the preservation of Austrian and Czechoslovak independence, and thus to take up a position against Great Britain and the League of Nations. Under the clear and consistent policy of President Benes and Dr. Krofta these ideas, directly opposed to every principle of Czechoslovak foreign policy, have no chance whatever of success, for Czechoslovakia is indissolubly attached to the principle of collective pacts under the League of Nations. Every attempt from those quarters which are inclined to flirt with Fascism will come to grief in Czechoslovakia at least as quickly as in Roumania and Yugoslavia, because those who control the foreign policy of Prague are very well aware that the mission of the Republic of Masaryk and Benes is to maintain democratic principles in central Europe. Any departure from these principles of the founders of the young State in the form of association with Italian or German Fascism would imperil the basis of the existence of the Republic, and so of the Little Entente. The restoration of the Habsburgs might in the first place be more dangerous for Belgrade than for Prague, but it would soon justify

Dr. Benes' phrase of years ago: "*Les Habsbourgs sont la guerre.*"

It is necessary also to consider the Hungarian repercussions to any association of Prague with Italian Fascism (which would involve the absurd idea of an anti-British policy). The Rome Pacts between Italy, Austria and Hungary have produced a very close political and economic association between those three States, and although Mussolini has not officially and expressly seconded Budapest's revisionist aspirations (which are concerned mainly with Slovakia and western Roumania, but also with the Croat territories of Yugoslavia), one may search in vain in his speeches for any plain rejection of them. Any unconditional approach of the Little Entente, and particularly of Prague, to Italian Fascism would hamper if not wreck Czechoslovakia's vitally important defensive against Hungarian revisionist plans. Moreover, such a policy would be incompatible with friendship with Roumania and with loyalty to the League. Czechoslovakia's defensive attitude, imposed on her by her geographical situation, against all imperialist aspirations of German Fascism can never produce dependence on Roman Fascism, because the latter, with its Hungarian ally, represents just as great a menace to Czechoslovak democracy as German Fascism. Dr. Krofta gave clear expression to this view in the speech of May 28th already mentioned. He said:

We feel secure because we are conscious of our strength. Supported by our allies, militarily prepared, and economically consolidated, we need have no fears for our future. At the same time, there must be no remission of our efforts to increase our own moral and material strength and to consolidate all the guarantees of our external security.

On the other hand Yugoslavia's opposition, due alike to her geographical situation and to her history, to any advance of Italian Fascism in the Balkans, cannot be assisted in the long run by submission to the economic and political protectorate of Hitlerist Fascism. Finally, Roumania, who has to defend herself not only against Hungarian revisionism but against the threat to her democratic system from certain Fascist currents within her own borders, will always make common front with her allies against Fascist influences, whether set in motion from Rome or from Berlin. Mr. Titulescu's almost

dramatic exclamation at the London Conference may be recalled in this connection. With plain reference to Italy's breach of the peace in East Africa and to Germany's treaty breach in the occupation of the Rhineland, he repeatedly declared: "The peace of Europe is indivisible!"

Unlike the Western Powers and Soviet Russia, the countries united in the Little Entente are of only secondary importance as States, but their value in the maintenance of European peace is not to be underestimated. In spite of temptations offered by the two Fascisms, the Little Entente remains the principal defender of European peace in this particularly disturbed part of the Continent. Between the two Fascisms the Little Entente States are pursuing undeviatingly their democratic policy of peace. For any one of them to depart from it in order to become dependent on either of the two Fascist neighbours would be to jeopardise the existence of each one of the three member States of the Little Entente, and therewith the indivisible peace of Europe itself. With every effort to preserve tolerable political and economic relations with Italy and Germany, and to do all that is possible to avoid friction with these great neighbour States, the Little Entente will steadily adhere to its policy of loyalty to the League idea, maintenance of the collective pacts, and preservation of democracy, rejecting alike the schemes for *Anschluss*, for Habsburg restoration, and for territorial treaty revision. In spite of the increase in the strength of the two Fascisms, the Little Entente will remain, with its architect President Benes, alike in broad principles and in day-to-day practical politics, the indispensable guardian in central and south-eastern Europe of western ideas.

GERHARD SCHACHER.

Prague.

IN THE HAUNT OF THE SPOONBILL.

WE were camped on the windward side of the island, where the waters of the open lake came lapping to within a few feet of our tents. Island we called it out of politeness to our host, its owner, for it was really little more than a glorified sand-bank with a fringe of tamarisk scrub growing along its crest. Beyond it, on the far side from our encampment, lay a vast sea of reeds, rippling in tawny waves to the very foothills of the mountains.

As a camping ground the island was not without its drawbacks; there was no fresh water to be had, and water drawn from the lake—even some distance from shore—was always tepid and unpleasant to drink: at night our sleep was disturbed by legions of musical frogs which, from dusk to dawn, raised their shrill voices in continual chorus, while most unpleasant of all, though at first sight it may seem the least of the evils, was the wind. Day after day it blew across the lake, thumping with furious hand upon the tents, humming a mournful dirge among the guy-ropes and—despite all our efforts to prevent it—whipping beneath the tent-flaps a continual shower of sand, sand so fine that it quickly found its way into everything, clothes, beds, food and ourselves included.

Yet we really had much for which to be grateful to the wind, as we quickly discovered when one evening, following a violent thunderstorm which nearly carried away our largest tent and which completely demolished the cook's little sanctum while that stout gentleman was within, engaged with the mysteries of his art, the wind suddenly dropped altogether. As soon as the sun dipped out of sight behind the mountains, the insect legions bestirred themselves for the invasion of our camp, and within a few minutes had swept all before them, and the garrison—ourselves—had fled supperless to the refuge of its mosquito nets. With the dawn the wind rose again, to continue with varying force throughout the whole of the rest of our stay on the island and when, nightly, the mosquitoes left their swamps and tried hopefully to come at us across the island, the strength of the wind, blowing directly from us to them, proved always too much for their wing power, and we were left in peace, rejoicing.

However, once we had begun seriously to explore the lake

and the neighbouring swamps, it would have needed something more than insects, however virulent, and a lack of drinking water, to drive us away, for to anyone interested in wild life the island and its surroundings proved a veritable paradise. Within fifty yards of our camp a pair of spur-winged plover had a nest on a stretch of bare sand, and in a tamarisk bush just outside my tent was a black-headed warbler's nursery containing half-fledged young. At first the parent birds were highly indignant at our invasion of their privacy, cursing us with vigour whenever our ways met, but before the end of our stay they had become so used to our presence that they would come right into our tents in order to forage for tit-bits beneath the tables. On one occasion, while paying me an early morning visit, the cock bird discovered and bore off in triumph the chrysalis of a "painted lady" butterfly which had pupated in a chink of the canvas within a few feet of my head.

The reed-beds growing along the landward side of the island were the haunt of countless warblers and bearded tits, while on the open stretches of water that lay between, grebes, purple gallinules and many species of duck and herons were always to be found; and when, for some reason or other, we were compelled to remain in camp all day, there was plenty to interest us in watching the pratincoles, terns, cormorants and white egrets whose lawful occasions took them to and fro all day long over the camp.

For some reason the open lake was generally shunned by the majority of birds except an occasional gull and the pair of pied kingfishers which haunted the shore, but regularly each morning we were treated to the spectacle of five pelicans forging their lusty way in line close to the shore. Every now and then one or other of them, with a lightning sweep of its bill, would scoop up from the shallows some luckless fish which was pinched and shaken into merciful unconsciousness before being thrown into the air and gulped down head foremost: after which process the successful fisherman would take a few sips of water to speed the morsel on its way and then hasten to form line again; and later, gorged to repletion, the five old gentlemen would repair to a neighbouring sandspit, where, having put their plumage in array, they would stand with heads sunk between shoulders and great flaccid bills a-droop until digestion should have played its part and they felt light enough to undertake the homeward flight across the lake.

Our nearest neighbour, a fisherman who lived on an islet among the reeds and in whose flat-bottomed punt we made daily excursions into the surrounding swamps, assured us that the pelicans nested on the other side of the lake, but unfortunately it was so far off that we were not able to verify the truth of this statement. He did promise, however, that given a suitable day he would take us to a spoonbill colony which was also situated on the lake, but since in order to reach the colony it was necessary to cross an arm of the open lake, which on windy days would have proved too rough for his frail punt—the only boat available—we had to wait with what patience we could muster for the wind to go down.

But day after day went by and still the wind blew with unabated force, and each morning in reply to our anxious questions the boatman sadly shook his head and pointed to the troubled surface of the lake. So we had to be content with drifting about among the more sheltered reed-beds, where, in truth, we had plenty to interest us in the ducks and galinules, the herons and the great marsh-harriers, which beat backwards and forwards above the reeds, ever on the watch for some unwary moorhen chick or duckling. Twice we prolonged our stay in the hope that the wind would moderate, and at last our patience was rewarded, for early one morning, on almost the last day we could afford to spend on the island, we were roused from our beds by the unusually cheerful voice of the boatman, informing us that the wind had dropped and that the sky gave promise of a calm day. Half an hour later we were ready to embark in the punt which, in celebration of the occasion, had been freshly equipped with a carpet of green rushes; no seats being provided, we had always to sit on the floor-boards of the boat, and generally, after a few minutes afloat, in about two inches of bilge water as well.

An hour's steady travelling through the reeds brought us at length to the arm of the lake on the far side of which lay the spoonbill colony. The open stretch looked considerably wider than we had been led to expect, and in fact it proved to be nearly a third of a mile broad, but from a distance at any rate it seemed calm enough, so with hopes running high we pushed out on to the open water. Once, however, we were well away from the shelter of the high reed-beds we quickly discovered that the lake was by no means as calm as had at first appeared, and every moment the breeze seemed to be freshening. Sharp

little waves came slapping along the sides of the punt, which, carrying one more than her usual complement of passengers, was trimmed perilously low in the water, and before we had been long afloat my companion and I were soaked to the skin by the spray which broke in showers over the bows.

It required all the skill of our boatman, balancing bare-footed in the stern, to keep the punt head-on to the waves, while to add to his difficulties the water soon became so deep that even with his fourteen-foot pole he was frequently unable to touch bottom, and what with the rocking of the boat and the strength of the wind, we expected him every moment to lose his balance and precipitate us all into the water. The wiry little Kurd, however, proved completely equal to the occasion, and though our hearts were frequently in our mouths as some particularly large wavelet broke over the bows and the punt swung half round with the wind, yet he always managed to regain control in time, and so yard by yard we fought our way across until at last we came into calm water on the farther side under the lee of a spit of reeds.

Before us stretched a long narrow inlet, entirely covered with a growth of water-lily leaves and clumps of flowering rush. Among the lilies a colony of white-winged black terns were busy nest-building and at our approach the whole flock came wheeling about us, screaming and scolding and making determined stoops at our heads. Our attention, however, was soon distracted from our attendant terns, by the sight of a flock of white birds which were feeding in the distance at the edge of the reeds. At first we took them to be spoonbills and were busy trying to reckon up their numbers, when the whole flock took wing, revealing themselves, to our disappointment, to be Squacco herons. However, as if to encourage us on our way, at that very moment a spoonbill did fly past close overhead, disappearing beyond the reeds in the direction in which we were travelling.

For some distance we cruised along the edge of the reed-beds, searching for an open waterway which the boatman had used on previous occasions. When at last we found it, it proved to have become completely overgrown with yellow and white water-lilies, while on either side the tall reeds rose up as straight and apparently as impenetrable as the walls of a house. Yet, when presently the channel ceased any longer to lead in the right direction, our pilot struck boldly off from it

into the reeds where his narrow, sharp-stemmed boat proved admirably adapted for cleaving an easy way through the tangle.

Crouched as we were in the bottom of the boat, my companion and I were unable to see a yard in any direction through the reed-stems, and moreover we were kept so busy protecting our faces from being cut by the sharp-edged leaves that we were forced to rely entirely on the boatman, who was standing up and so had a clearer view through the tops of the reeds, to tell us when we were approaching the spoonbill colony. Presently he informed us that he thought it was not far off, and then a few minutes later the boat slid quietly to a stop, and the little Kurd began whispering and pointing eagerly ahead. Kneeling forward in the bows I was cautiously parting the screen of reeds in front of me when suddenly there sprang before my gaze one of the most beautiful sights birdland can possibly have to offer anyone. Not five yards from me, standing by their nests in an opening among the reeds, were two magnificent spoonbills. The nearer bird was asleep, with one leg drawn up beneath it and wings hanging half open, while the other, leaning gracefully forward, was tugging fussily at something in the structure of its nest. In the sunlight, against the background of green reeds, the birds' plumage shone dazzling white and I was near enough to see not only the blood-red colouring of their eyes, but even the curious and intricate pattern in grey, black and orange which decorated their bills.

For perhaps half a minute I watched this charming scene undetected, and then the more wide-awake of the two spoonbills looked up and saw me or the boatman behind, and with a harsh croak of alarm took wing and, followed by the other, sailed away over the reeds to swing round above us in ever-widening spirals. As soon as the old birds had gone we emerged from our ambush and gently edged the punt alongside the great mat of floating vegetation upon which the nests were built. They were placed edge to edge, each one being about five feet in circumference and built chiefly of sticks and dried rushes, while the great shallow cup was lined with the flower heads of reeds and sedges. One nest contained three eggs, while the second held three young birds of various ages, the youngest apparently only just hatched. They were odd-looking little creatures these nestlings, clad entirely in white

down, that on their heads being so long that it stood up like a halo about them, while the size of their fleshy yellow feet and bills was out of all proportion to the rest of their bodies.

While we were preparing to photograph them they raised their spindly necks on high and gaped for food, but finding none forthcoming presently collapsed into the bottom of the nest and there lay gasping, quite overcome by the heat. Anxious to protect them from sunstroke while we photographed the other nest, I covered them with my hat, and in its shade they went off happily to sleep. At all the bird colonies we visited on the lake we noticed the same thing, that where the nestlings were exposed to the direct rays of the sun one or other of the parents stayed constantly by the nest to shield its offspring with its own wings and body. All this while the four old spoonbills—for the two we had disturbed from their nests had been quickly joined by their mates—were circling round overhead uttering anxious croaks, and fearing to keep them away from their nests any longer—especially as we could hear a party of hooded crows somewhere in the vicinity—we backed the punt off into the shelter of the reeds and very soon had the satisfaction of seeing two of the spoonbills drop down again to their nests.

We now decided to make a search for the main colony, of which these two nests were an offshoot, and which the boatman knew to be situated somewhere close by, though he had never visited it himself. Accordingly we set off in search of it, in what we took to be the right direction, but every yard we progressed the reeds became taller and the undergrowth of sedge more dense until at last we found ourselves moving in semi-darkness, with the tops of the reeds forming a green canopy eight feet or more above our heads. Unaided the boatman could scarcely move us, and even when we lent a hand, and by grasping the reeds on either side helped to pull the boat forward, we progressed only in a series of jerks and were constantly running the prow into a tangle of stems, from which it took us some time and a great deal of labour to extricate ourselves.

Finally, almost worn out with our efforts, we were just contemplating giving up the search when a spoonbill was seen to rise from somewhere close in front of the boat, and forcing our way in that direction, we suddenly came out into a small clearing, surrounded by particularly tall and dense reeds, at

the farther end of which, huddled together where the overhanging reeds cast the deepest shadow, were some thirty young spoonbills. The raft of sticks and sodden reeds upon which they were assembled and which had once held their nests—though these had now been trampled quite out of existence—was in a great state of putrefaction, yet the young birds had somehow managed to keep themselves clean enough; with most of them white feathers had taken the place of the nestling down, while the largest, which was about the size of a pheasant, was already assuming the black-tipped primaries that distinguish the immature spoonbill from the adult.

They none of them seemed particularly disturbed by our presence, continuing to preen their feathers and to snap languidly at the flies which hovered in clouds about them, and when they had no other occupation, staring at us with a look of faint astonishment in their kitten-blue eyes. However they objected most strongly to being handled, squeaking plaintively and struggling to escape, and when, in order to try and photograph him, we took the eldest into the boat and pushed out with him into the sunshine, he promptly jumped overboard and without the slightest hesitation swam back to his companions.

Had there been time to spare we should have liked to hide up in the reeds in order to see whether, when the old birds returned with food, they made any attempt at distinguishing their own offspring or merely handed over their load to the first nestling they encountered; but the boatman was anxious about the return crossing of the lake, which in point of fact proved a highly perilous undertaking, since the wind had risen still further—so regretfully we took leave of the little spoonbills and made for the open water.

W. H. PAYN.

JAPAN'S NEW OUTPOSTS.

OLD patterns of thought persist. We are accustomed to think of Japan as a small group of islands in the northwestern Pacific. It is hard to realise that the Japan of to-day extends in one unbroken sweep from the snows of Siberia to the equator. One can hardly appreciate the extent of this empire (or these two empires in "indivisible relationship," to quote the very apt expression of the Emperor of Manchukuo) without travelling the length of it. In the latitude of Alaska's Aleutians stand on the Manchu-Siberian border among heavy-booted, horse-odorous Mongols and bearded Russian lumberjacks, and look down a well where the July heat has not yet dissolved the ice of last winter when the temperature was forty degrees below zero. Then move southward, ever southward, through White Russian Harbin, through construction-crazy Hsinking, through Manchu and Chinese Mukden, through Korea, land of galvanised hermits, then through the feverishly overflowing ant hills of Japan proper, on south through the brawny Bonins, through Formosa where Chinese have forgotten China but savages have not quite forgotten head-hunting, through the Marianas where half-Spanish Chamorros go to early mass, wear mantillas, and play guitars, through Polynesian-Melanesian Yap of the crimson loin cloth and grass skirt. Tie up at last to the equator and watch canoes of bronze gods coming across the blue blaze of the lagoon in search of a bit of ice from the ship's refrigerator with which to temper the heat of eternal summer. And try to realise that you have been in Japanese domains all the time!

Not the least of the stakes Japan has driven to hold her claim on the Orient of the future are the more than fifteen hundred islands that peg the ocean at close intervals all the way from Japan proper to the equator. Most important of these are the fourteen hundred South Sea islands which Japan retains under mandate from the League of Nations. These islands appear on the map as Micronesia, comprising the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall groups. The Marshalls were annexed in 1885 by Germany, who went on to acquire the Marianas and Carolines in 1899 by purchase from Spain. Germany was relieved of all of them by Japan during the

first days of the World War. Secret understandings with other Allied powers confirmed Japan's claim to the islands. Hence she was taken aback when Peace Conference idealism substituted the locution "mandate" for "annexation" and placed ultimate control of the islands in the hands of a body not yet in existence, to be known as the League of Nations.

Japan accepted this phrasing as a mere pleasantry in no wise affecting her complete proprietorship over the islands. This was demonstrated clearly enough when Japan resigned from the League of Nations. She then made it unmistakably plain that if the League should attempt to withdraw the mandate from her on the ground that she was no longer a member she would maintain her position in the islands by force. The League took the hint and refrained from any discussion of the possibility of withdrawal—but took equally good care not to commit itself to the view that the mandate-giving power could not also be the mandate-withdrawing power if and when need be. Thus the question has been left wide open; fertile ground for later trouble.

The map reveals good reason for the remarkable importance Japan attaches to these islands. They are her "life-line to the south." They are her "first line of defence." Not so much perhaps the defence of Japan as the defence of Asia. Taken together with the Bonins, the main islands of Japan, and the Kuriles, they form a breakwater across the entire front of the Asiatic continent against the advance of the West. They are a smoke screen over Asia. Behind it Japan hopes to work undisturbed on her great plan of Far Eastern co-ordination.

Foreign observers who wish to enter the mandate have some difficulty in securing permission. Japanese officials use the argument that the islands offer few conveniences for travellers. It must be granted that the argument is sound. There are no hotels. Mrs. Price and I lived with Chamorro natives, Kanaka kings, and missionaries. Two or three foreigners each year pass through the islands, stopping at each as long as the ship stops, usually one day. "It isn't done," such a traveller told us when we proposed living for four months on the islands. But it so happened that all the world was reading at that moment the League of Nations Mandates Commission's criticisms of Japan for barring foreign ships and foreign travellers from the islands. The

suggestion was made repeatedly by various members of the commission that Japan could remove suspicions regarding fortification of the islands by allowing foreigners free entry. Whether or not there was any relationship of cause and effect involved, the bars were at least temporarily let down and we passed through.

Four months of scrutiny failed to reveal anything in the nature of a fortification. It does not appear to be Japan's policy to fortify the islands. But no one can doubt for a moment that if war did break out Japan would promptly make use of the islands as naval bases. Many of these reef-barricaded atolls, notably the Palau lagoon and the Truk lagoon, are admirably suited to this purpose. The mandated islands are peppered over an area roughly one-third of the breadth of the Pacific and extending from the Tropic of Cancer to the equator. No enemy, unfamiliar with the hiding places of cruisers, submarines, and aircraft, could hope to get through this labyrinth. It is small wonder that Japan regards the islands as of first-rate strategic value. "Too much emphasis can hardly be placed on the necessity of Japan maintaining them at whatever sacrifice," writes Commander Tadashi Kojima of the Imperial Japanese Navy. "Japan must combat at whatever cost and if necessary by force any foreign attempt to interfere unduly in the affairs of these islands."

While defying external interference, Japan is building up internal resistance. She is converting the natives to the worship of the Emperor. "Do you like Japanese rule?" I put the question to natives on islands far enough removed from government offices to be fairly sure of getting an unofficial reply. Not a man would say, "I like it." Doubtless that is human nature. Who will say that he wishes to be ruled by anyone else? "Would you prefer to have the Germans back?" I asked. "No. We prefer the Japanese." "Why?" "Because they belong in the Orient. They understand us better. We are not afraid of them. They are more like us."

One said, "The Germans told us, 'Do this or go to jail!' The Japanese say, 'Are we asking anything unreasonable of you?'" An old chief who loved his toddy raised his coconut-shell cup to his lips and gave what he considered a conclusive argument: "The Germans used to fine us

twenty-five yen for getting drunk. The Japanese charge us only five yen." "Then if you don't want the Germans, how about the Spaniards?" This question was usually met with a horrified silence. The brutalities of Spain in the South Seas will never be forgotten. "How about the English or the Americans?" I would ask, assuming that they would give me the courtesy of a favourable reply. But the Anglo-Saxons they best remembered were whalers who had brought plagues, kidnapped their women, and raised hob generally. No, they would not care to be ruled by them.

"Then how would you like to rule yourselves?" A Ponape chief said, "That would never do. When we ruled ourselves every chief was at war with every other. It is better to have some higher authority." So it would seem that, making allowance for the dislike of human beings for any control over their actions, the rule of Japan is as satisfactory as any could be. Certainly it is beneficial. Whether the Kanaka wants to be benefited or not, he is being taught to work, to study, to eat proper foods, to go to the hospital when sick, to keep his house and village clean, and to know something of the world outside his own little island.

Before the Japanese régime, mission schools were relied upon to teach the native. Only two government schools were built, one in Saipan and one in Truk; but the latter had not been opened when the Japanese navy arrived in 1914. The navy built six schools and navy officers turned teachers. In 1915 teachers from Japan took their place. By 1922 the number of schools had become 17. To-day there are 25 schools for natives. This year native school attendance has reached 98 per cent. in islands such as Yap where communication is easy, but stands at a little more than 50 per cent. in Truk. It is not practicable to build a school on every one of the 245 small islands of Truk, and going to school by canoe over miles of stormy lagoon has its difficulties. The schools supply books, pencils, clothing, and sometimes food also, without charge. The cost of native education to the government is more than four times the total of the poll tax received from natives.

"Why does Japan do this for the natives?" the cynical visitor asks. He is sure there must be some ulterior motive. He is told quite frankly that there is. Japan believes thoroughly in education of natives—not only because of its

value to the natives, but because it will make the natives more valuable to their community and their government. A different theory is seen at work in some colonies where white overlords fear that common education of their wards may cause cleavage between them and their government. Japan has so much faith in her pedagogic and propagandist ability as to believe that education will cause the natives to cleave to the government. It will, she believes, make them better members of society, more useful industrially, more loyal to Japan. Knowledge of Japanese institutions and respect for the Emperor are taught in every school. This Japonising is defended as legitimate according to the terms of the mandate by which the territory is to be administered "as an integral portion of the Empire of Japan." The Japanese language is taught in these schools. No instruction is given in the native language. The result is not wholly satisfactory. After five years of school (in some islands it is only three years) the graduate cannot easily read a Japanese newspaper and finds a magazine or book quite impossible. Nor can he read in his native tongue. He is a man without a written language. He can speak Japanese imperfectly but soon forgets what he knows of it when he returns to the jungle. Japanese is hard to learn, the native language easy. Moreover, the Kanaka child can of course already speak the native language when he begins school, and he could readily be taught to read and write it.

"The Kanaka should be taught in the Kanaka language," is the first-day conclusion of the visitor. As he studies the question he may change his mind. In the first place, he discovers that there is no Kanaka language. Or, rather, there is a different language for the Kanakas of every island. Saipan cannot understand Yap; nor Yap, Palau; nor Palau, Truk; nor Truk, Ponape; nor Ponape, Kusaie; nor Kusaie, Jaluit. Put them all together and you have a confusion of tongues. But with fast ship service linking the islands and the movement of natives from one island to another it is necessary that they should all be able to speak one language. The only language common to the islands is Japanese. In the second place, even if the native learned to read his own language, there would be nothing to read (except the Bible, provided by the missionaries). No

commercial publishers could be persuaded to print newspapers, magazines, and books in a language read by only two or three thousand people. It would not pay. Hence a literature in an island language is impossible. The natives' only hope to tap the literary knowledge of the world is to learn a language in which the world's literature is published.

Another consideration: The Palau language contains only 6,000 words, the Truk language 3,000, the Yap language only 1,000. The Japanese language includes well over 300,000 terms. A few eating-and-sleeping words did well enough in the isolated tropical isle. But times have changed. Making shift with a small coconut vocabulary in this modern complex world into which the native has been introduced would be like paddling a canoe in a motor-boat race. New words make new horizons. The mind is expanded as it finds new ways of expression. But teachers admit that the native is not getting enough Japanese at present to give him much in the way of new horizons. The answer would seem to be not to quit teaching Japanese but to teach more of it. A five-year primary course is not enough. Until higher schools are established the natives will be without a written language.

On the whole, education seems to be intelligently adapted to the native's own surroundings and needs. He studies an arithmetic of coconuts and pigs, a geography that concerns chiefly his own islands, although it never slights Japan, the natural science of his jungle and lagoon, ethics stressing the importance of keeping promises and the virtue of hard work. Nor is it all book-learning. The boys learn agriculture in the school farm and the girls learn how to cook, sew, care for babies, and nurse the sick. Schoolchildren receive free treatment in the hospital. Their elders pay a penny for a treatment that would cost a crown in London. Natives are showered with bonuses for every pig born, every tree planted, every copra shed erected. They are protected in their land rights. They are given a considerable degree of self-government through their native chiefs. As a result of all such benefits, while they can hardly be expected to hymn the praises of the dominating race, they would be unwilling to change it for any other. The inability of the League to find fault with Japan's treatment of the native population settles Japan more firmly in her mandate. She

is obviously abiding not only by the letter but by the spirit of her duties as a mandatory.

Japan is further consolidating her position in the islands by industrial development. The price paid by Germany to Spain for the islands does not equal their present trade in a single year. Japan encouraged the development of the islands with heavy annual subsidies, gradually diminishing year by year to the vanishing point in 1932. The mandate had already begun to pay handsomely. Exports reached seven and a half million yen in the "boom year," 1929. Then, instead of declining, they climbed steadily upward through what the world understood to be "depression years" to more than sixteen million yen. But that is only a beginning. Officialdom bristles with "Plans." There is the "Twelve-Year-Plan" of aviation, the "Five-Year-Plan" of immigration and, most important, a "Ten-Year-Plan" for the spending of large sums on the industrial development of the islands. All three of these projects are launched in 1936. The probability is that the next ten years will see the islands become overwhelmingly Japanese, will eliminate the last chance in the South Seas to study untouched native life, and will mark a greater economic advance than the four centuries between the first visit of Magellan and the arrival of the Japanese navy in 1914.

The coconut, hereditary king of the South Sea islands, is being dethroned or at least superseded by greater kings . . . sugar, tapioca, pineapple. Scientific experimental stations are developing the agricultural possibilities of the islands along new lines. Land regarded as hopeless is being put to good account. On coral reefs where soil does not exist, it is being brought from volcanic islands. Angaur is a phosphate treasure-house. The phosphate is now being mined at the rate of 70,000 tons a year. There is enough left for another thirty years. It will go to Japan and be used as fertiliser to perform Japan's favourite feat of magic—making one acre do the work of twenty.

We landed and walked back along narrow tracks to the interior of the island. There, for square miles, the surface of the island has been taken off—to a depth of forty feet—girdled by a white cliff of phosphate which the picks and shovels are gradually driving back. Where the phosphate has been entirely removed, the coral reef upon which it was

laid is exposed . . . pock-marked by great holes where the diggers for phosphate have painstakingly picked the reef's teeth. Swarms of monkeys in the surrounding jungle protest against the daily encroachment upon their domain. Every time a ton of phosphate comes out a tree must fall. Ultimately Angaur will be nothing but a bare, jagged reef.

The workmen come from many different islands and are in all stages of barbarism and undress. Here is a Kanaka of Uleai clad in a feather. It rises erect a foot high out of his bushy hair. His body is statuesque. Others are clad in fantastic bits of costume, civilised and barbaric mixed, the effect being more barbaric than when nothing civilised is worn. The Kanakas come on a contract for about six months; alone—no wives or children allowed—the island is too small. Formerly, it is said, labour was forced to come. The fact that it is no longer forced may be due not so much to the advancement of humanitarian ideals as to the fall in the price of copra, making natives glad of the chance to earn. They get little but they need little. We are used to thinking of Japanese standards of living as low. They are lofty as compared with Kanaka standards. At least, so it would appear from the steep, sliding scale of wages on Angaur. The average daily wage of the Kanaka is 77 sen; of the Chamorro, 1.41 yen; of the Chinese, 2.13 yen; of the Japanese, 3.19 yen. Of course even the Kanaka might admit that native ability is far inferior to Japanese; but whether Chinese skill is to Japanese skill as 2.13 is to 3.19 may be open to question.

The labourers are decently treated. They have good medical care. They live on shelves in a long wooden shed like a loggers' bunkhouse but not so comfortable—yet much more airy, light and sanitary than the average Kanaka home. Their food is evidently sufficient since they go home heavier and in better health than when they came. They may enjoy pool, ping pong and many table games in a dingy clubhouse. And their working day is merely eight hours . . . which not a few of Japan's industrial and office workers would regard as a half day. On the whole, Angaur labour conditions would serve as an object lesson elsewhere in the Orient.

To serve the industrial growth of the islands, the number of annual sailings has been doubled within the past two

years. A commercial airline has been established and airports have been built upon Saipan and Palau. In the vast Truk lagoon an island is being converted into an airport by the drastic method of cutting down a hill a half-mile long and three hundred feet high and dumping it along the shores. The result will be a larger island, and level. A herculean task . . . but, as usual, being performed with an eye to the far future. If Japan is not building naval bases in the islands, she is at least immeasurably strengthening her hold upon them by this industrial expansion which entails building airports, constructing roads, laying piers, dredging channels, and enlarging harbours. All such operations that I saw had sufficient industrial motivation—but their value in a case of trouble cannot be questioned.

Perhaps the chief reason for the lack of man-made fortifications is that they are not needed. Nature has raised defences that man could not excel. Wilhelm's Military Dictionary includes in its definitions of the various types of fortification the "natural fortification" which "consists of those obstacles which nature affords to retard the progress of an enemy; such as woods, deep ravines, rocks, marshes, etc." In that sense the islands are heavily fortified. There are numerous harbours admirably sheltered by mountainous peninsulas or high islands and guarded by reefs. Not only are there many perfect natural bases for destroyers and submarines, but, in the words of Admiral Suetsugu, "These islands are naturally built aircraft carriers," and again, "These islands are apparently made to order for Japan. In fact, the Pacific equilibrium can be maintained only when Japan holds them." The "Pacific equilibrium" means to Japan her undisputed sway over the western Pacific. The Micronesian maze of fourteen hundred islands which, together with Japan's other islands, fling a chain from Soviet Kamchatka to the Australian mandate athwart the entire Pacific seaboard of Asia, should prove of great value in the maintenance of that equilibrium.

WILLARD PRICE.

MARINE RESEARCH AT THE TORTUGAS.

THE tropical seas are the home of an amazing diversity of animals and plants. The polar seas have actually a much denser population, but this is made up of comparatively few species, each being represented by innumerable individuals. Life is shorter and reproduction correspondingly more frequent in the warmer waters and, probably as a result of this, evolution has had greater scope. Moreover the western shores of the tropical oceans are the site of immense coral reefs. These are of compelling interest, not only on account of the corals and calcareous algæ which are primarily responsible for their formation, but also because of the great wealth of life which grows upon them, burrows into them or swims about in the water around them.

The establishment by the great German zoologist, Anton Dohrn, of the Stazione Zoologica at Naples in 1874 led during succeeding years to the foundation of marine laboratories around the shores of the civilised countries in the temperate zones. At the present time Europe possesses some fifty of these, the United States sixteen and Japan ten. But despite the wealth of problems they present to the marine biologist, the tropical seas can boast of only a handful of such research stations. The Dutch have established a laboratory in the Bay of Batavia on Java, there is another at Saigon in French Indo-China and one at Honolulu attached to the University of Hawaii. The marine station at Bermuda, although situated some ten degrees north of the Tropic of Cancer, is surrounded by water essentially tropical in character. The Great Barrier Reef Expedition established a temporary marine laboratory off the coast of North Queensland and, despite the ravages of a cyclone in 1934, this laboratory, seven years after its inception, is still in use. More recently the University of Egypt has built a marine laboratory on the shores of the Red Sea.

But the oldest and most famous of these tropical marine laboratories is the Carnegie Laboratory at the Tortugas Keys in the Gulf of Mexico. Its origin is intimately connected with the history of the science of zoology in the United States. Louis Agassiz, a Swiss from Neuchâtel and one of the greatest of America's adopted sons, who founded the magnificent Museum for Comparative Zoology at Harvard, visited the

Tortugas in 1851 in the course of a survey of the coral reefs off the coast of Florida. He was succeeded in control of the Museum by his son, Alexander Agassiz, a man of very different character but no less eminent as a zoologist. The exploitation during his early years of one of the richest copper mines in the world gave him the means to gratify to the full in later life his passion for marine biology and he scoured every tropical ocean, dredging in the deepest waters and studying the formation of coral reefs.

Alexander Agassiz spent several weeks on the Tortugas in 1881 studying the formation of the reefs. In a letter written to Charles Darwin and headed, Tortugas, April 16th, 1881, he says: "The greater part of my time I spend in running around inside the reef in the launch and getting at the distribution of the different genera of corals. The number of species here is not great, so that it makes their mapping out a simple matter. The Tortugas being the very last of the Florida reefs I find much that has not been noticed before and helps me to explain, somewhat differently from what was done by Father, the formation of the reefs." The work of which he speaks later formed the subject matter of the first detailed account of the Tortugas reefs, admirably illustrated, like all Agassiz's publications, with photographs and maps.

On January 28th, 1902, Andrew Carnegie founded the Carnegie Institution of Washington which he ultimately endowed with the munificent sum of twenty-two million dollars. Amongst the early trustees of the Institution was Alexander Agassiz who served during the years 1904-5. It is to his influence that we may trace the addition of the Department of Marine Biology to the many-sided activities of the Institution, and the erection in 1904 of a laboratory on Loggerhead Key, one of the islands of the Tortugas where he, and his father before him, had worked. More important still he provided, in the person of one of his former scientific assistants, A. G. Mayor, a Director who, long before his untimely death in 1922, became recognised as one of the supreme marine biologists of the twentieth century. The history of the Tortugas Laboratory until 1922 is the history of the achievements of its Director and his more intimate associates. Mayor's greatest work was on jellyfish and on reef-building corals, which he studied as living animals. He made expeditions to the Bahamas, to the West Indies, to Samoa where

much of his finest work was done, and to Murray Island at the far northern end of the Great Barrier Reef of Australia. In every case his main object was the elucidation of the baffling mysteries of coral reefs.

Since his death the laboratory has been open annually for a three months' season in the summer. Dr. W. H. Longley, one of Dr. Mayor's earliest associates and an authority on tropical fish, is the Executive Officer in charge. The only member of the staff permanently employed is Captain John Mills, an engineer and seaman of unfailing energy and ingenuity. He accompanied Dr. Mayor on all his expeditions where his capacity for making all manner of apparatus from the most unlikely material rendered him indispensable and compensated, in the eyes of the South Sea Islanders, for the incomprehensible and apparently childish behaviour of the scientific members of the expeditions.

A visit to the Tortugas Laboratory involves the long train journey from New York down the Atlantic seaboard to Key West, the southernmost town in the United States. The small coral Key on which it is situated is connected with the mainland by the Florida East Coast Railway which runs for over one hundred miles from island to island, almost as much over water as over land. Key West was at one time a flourishing town, but its various industries have all decayed and to-day a walk through its streets, lined with Oleander and Hibiscus trees, is a depressing experience. One leaves it without regret outward bound for the Tortugas on board the *M.V. Anton Dohrn*. Owing to the influence of a counter-current created by the Gulf Stream the terminal members of the Florida reefs curl away in a westerly direction. Thus it is that the Tortugas Keys, the extreme tip of these reefs, lie some seventy miles due west of Key West. The channel lies to the south of the reefs which are surmounted by a series of islands. The largest are Boca Grande and the Marquesas Keys, the latter of especial interest because, although they form a perfect atoll ring, they are not of coral origin. Instead they are formed of calcareous material of mixed origin which has been thrown up above the surface of the sea, the ring formation being due entirely to the moulding action of the prevailing trade winds. West of the Marquesas is shallow water covering quicksands, then a deep channel broken by the dangerous Rebecca shoal and, finally, there come into view first the tall

lighthouse on Loggerhead Key, then the massive expanse of Fort Jefferson and, finally, the various islands of the Tortugas group.

The dry Tortugas, dry owing to the absence of fresh water, Tortugas because they were the breeding place of innumerable turtle when the Spaniards discovered them, consist of an irregular ring of reefs on the surface of which a number of sandy islands, or Keys, have been thrown up. On the north-east, the weather side, the reefs descend somewhat abruptly into deep water and here the force of the sea is such that coral fragments, uprooted from beneath the surface, are piled up to form a long rampart. Here the longest expanse of reef is exposed at low water spring tides. The summit is never covered except at the highest tides, but the force of the sea is too great to permit the formation of an island, although in the lee a few small mangrove trees maintain a precarious existence and indicate the manner in which the extensive mangrove formations on the Marquesas and other islands nearer Florida have originated.

Protected by the rampart are other reefs on which a series of islands, Bird Key, Bush Key, Garden Key and Long Key, have been established. Bird Key was once the nesting place of vast flocks of sea birds but recently it has lost its vegetation and the birds have transferred themselves to Long Key. This is the most thickly vegetated of all the islands, covered with coarse grass and low bushes. In the early summer it is alive with birds. Thousands of black and white sooty terns rise in screeching clouds before the steps of the interloper. Eggs are laid, without the pretence of a nest, on the grass and sand, and only with the greatest care does one avoid treading on them or on the fluffy brown chicks. In August the birds collect in battalions along the shore in preparation for migration. Brown noddies make rough nests of interleaved twigs in the bushes or in the tangled driftwood at the top of the beach. These are larger birds than the terns and much more ferocious. They resent keenly the appearance of an intruder, uttering menacing cries and flying directly at him, on a level with his eyes, turning sharply upwards when only a few feet from his face, in a highly disconcerting manner. This avian population is dominated by a colony of frigate birds, majestic animals with a great span of wing and effortless flight. These batten on the smaller birds, pursuing them until they disgorge

for the benefit of their masters the fish they have recently caught and swallowed.

The surface of Bush Key is completely covered by the now derelict mass of Fort Jefferson, one of the most preposterous erections ever constructed in the supposed interests of national defence. Louis Agassiz states that it was still under construction in 1851 when he visited the Tortugas but that the foundations had been laid five years before that. It is, therefore, somewhat older than the numerous but very much smaller forts of a similar type which encircle Plymouth and Portsmouth. But whereas these forts were constructed by Palmerston as the British reply to the supposed threat of invasion by the forces of Napoleon III, it is impossible to imagine against what danger Fort Jefferson could have protected the southern shores of the United States. It is seventy miles from Key West and a much greater distance from New Orleans and the other ports on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and no fleet intending to attack either of these regions need have passed anywhere near the Tortugas.

Two months passed in constant sight of the fort failed to dispel the feeling of amazement at the incalculable labour which must have gone to its construction. It is roughly hexagonal in outline with a massive bastion at each angle. A deep moat, originally in free communication with the sea at two points and some twenty-five yards wide, encircles it. Beyond this on the east there is a deep water channel bordered by a now dilapidated landing stage from which a bridge across the moat, reduced to a few precarious planks, leads to the massive gateway of the fort. Towering walls of immense thickness with long galleries and concealed powder magazines, and originally mounted with three tiers of guns, surround a wide parade ground many acres in area and overgrown with trees and shrubs. One side of this is occupied by the long extent of the roofless barracks. Fort Jefferson's only claim to a somewhat ignominious fame is that within it was imprisoned until his death the unfortunate doctor who, in all innocence, attended Booth, the assassin of Lincoln, for the injuries he received when he jumped from the box after firing the fatal shot in the theatre at Washington. For long years his family sued the American Government for unjustified imprisonment and at long last, after the death of this victim of injustice, they obtained financial redress. During

the Spanish-American war the Fort became a coaling station for the American fleet, and two great iron sheds with overhead cranes were added. In 1919 a hurricane of unusual severity struck the Tortugas. The moat at Fort Jefferson was breached and the iron cranes twisted like thin wire. Shortly after this the Fort was abandoned by the naval authorities and in 1934 the ironwork was sold to a firm of contractors who were engaged in pulling down the old coaling sheds during the author's visit. This, it was rumoured, was being sent to Japan. It may eventually return to America in another form.

But whatever may have been the thoughts of the American citizens who paid for Fort Jefferson, or of the unfortunate soldiers who passed monotonous days in garrison, or died there of yellow fever, the marine biologists who have worked at the Tortugas Laboratory have had good reason to be thankful for its construction. On the steel piles which support the landing stage grow a wide variety of corals and other animals which can be collected with ease when the tide is low. The deep shade cast by the woodwork of the wharf overhead permits the establishment of animals which are normally found in much deeper and less accessible water. Until the moat was breached in 1919 there was a free flow of water through it and here, easy of access in all weathers, flourished a wealth of animals and plants characteristic of the reef flats. The breaching of the moat changed all this. The western side silted up and the remainder of the moat was converted into an almost stagnant stretch of water with an ever-increasing accumulation of fine mud at the bottom. But even this was proved of the greatest interest because it has been possible to follow the change in the population which has accompanied this change in the environment. A natural experiment on a large scale has accidentally been carried out.

On the lee of the circle of reefs lies Loggerhead Key. This is the largest of all the islands. The set of the currents has moulded it into a long spit, some three quarters of a mile in length, but very narrow, running from south-west to north-east. In the centre is the lighthouse, a graceful tower of white rising one hundred and fifty feet above the sandy surface of the Key and the related buildings which cluster around its base. The island is buttressed by flat, overlapping slabs of consolidated sand, forming beach limestone, which extend between tide marks. Its surface is covered with dense

vegetation, the most conspicuous members of the flora being, however, plants which have been introduced, to afford shade or beauty, since the establishment of the laboratory. These include coconut palms, the Australian iron wood tree which now seeds itself and is rapidly increasing, Agaves or century plants which end their lives by producing an inflorescence twenty to thirty feet high, Hibiscus and a very beautiful lily, which runs riot everywhere, called *Hymenocallis*.

The Carnegie Marine Laboratory is situated at the northern extremity of the island. It originally consisted of two wooden buildings, constructed in New York and transported in pieces to Loggerhead Key where they were erected on the bare, unshaded surface. During the thirty years which have followed, additional buildings have been constructed by Captain Mills and his men while the old ones have been largely swept away by age and the fury of hurricanes. At the same time abundant shade has been provided by the growth of trees planted, with such foresight, in the early days.

On the shore at the end of the wooden wharf where the investigator lands after his journey from Key West there is on one side the dining hut and on the other the kitchen and mess for the attendants. A cement path leads between these to the new laboratory hut behind. This is well equipped for chemical and experimental work of various descriptions and affords space for eight or ten workers. Behind it is the aquarium with glass-fronted tanks and zinc-lined tables and with constantly running sea water supplied from a large tank above which is pumped full at regular intervals. To the south of this hut is the old laboratory which is divided down the centre. The Tortugas Laboratory has one very rigid rule, only men are allowed to work in it, and this has simplified the domestic arrangements. There is a machine shop between the old laboratory and the shore and there is little that Captain Mills cannot make with the machinery at his disposal. Here are situated the motors which drive the pumps for sea water and the dynamos which provide light and power.

The flagship of the little fleet of collecting vessels is the *Anton Dohrn*, a twin-screw motor vessel of 100 horse-power. She carries a powerful winch and is capable of dredging and trawling in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico. She makes regular fortnightly trips into Key West. Voyages to the adjoining reefs and islands of the Tortugas group are made in

the two motor launches, the *Velella* and the *Darwin*, one of which is equipped with a pump and diving helmet and is used by those who wish to study the fauna and flora of the reefs at close quarters. A smaller motor vessel is fitted with a glass bottom through which the reefs can be observed as the boat moves over them. Collectors go out daily in these vessels to gather material needed by the research workers. From the surface of reefs exposed at low tide are collected spiny sea-urchins, starfish, brittlestars and a variety of molluscs, worms and crustaceans. Amongst the eel grass on the sand in the lee of the reefs live detached corals, large conchs and helmet shells, fan-shells or "spanish oysters" and commercial sponges. The moat at Fort Jefferson still provides a breeding ground for black sea-squirts and certain corals while it contains a boundless wealth of sea weeds. In deeper water interest centres round clusters of growing coral. The most important reef builders form massive rounded colonies up to a yard in diameter. Branching elk's horn coral which forms great tree-like growths is the most beautiful. Towards the end of the last century a mysterious contamination of the water killed off this coral and it is only of recent years that it has begun to flourish again. The reefs everywhere are covered with the waving branches of horny corals, allied to the stony corals, but with a horny axis. They form branched or fan-shaped colonies, yellow, brown or purple in colour, and are the most conspicuous members of the reef fauna. A descent in the diving helmet is to enter a marine forest through which wander shoals of fish, brilliant in colour and often bizarre in shape, which gaze in curiosity at the stranger who wanders in their domain.

A great mass of scientific work has been produced at the Tortugas Laboratory during the past thirty years. Advances have been made in almost every branch of biology; in oceanography, the study of the sea; in taxonomy, the study of systematics; in morphology, the study of structure; in physiology, the study of function; in embryology, the study of development; in genetics, the study of inheritance; in ecology, the study of the organism in relation to its surroundings. These testify to the success of this isolated laboratory, to the foresight of its founders and to the ability of A. G. Mayor, who presided over it for so many fruitful years.

C. M. YONGE.

HOSPITAL LIBRARIES.

THE earliest reference to a hospital library is to be found in the records of St. Bartholomew's Hospital in the year 1463. That library was despoiled, and when two centuries later another was founded it appears to have been available for the governors as well as the students. It was not, however, until the nineteenth century that books began to have a definite place in medical education. A medical library was established at the Bristol Royal Infirmary in 1826. Sometimes the medical practitioners of a town had a library at the hospital. Reading provides the oldest example outside London. The Royal Berkshire Hospital has housed the library of the Pathological Society since 1841. The first librarian was appointed at St. Thomas's Hospital in 1842. The same hospital supplies an early example of any provision of books for the patients. At the beginning of the nineteenth century it was customary for the governors at their annual view of the hospital to bring "parcels of small books of piety and morality which they distributed to the patients." For many years the only form of literature for patients in hospitals was devotional and the chaplain was the official responsible for any books reaching them. In many of the older foundations he still holds that position. In the latter part of the last century ladies' associations connected with hospitals in Australia as well as in England made themselves responsible for the collection and delivery of books to the patients among other activities to brighten their lives in hospital.

Since the war there has been a remarkable development of the systematic organisation of libraries for the patients under the auspices of the British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John of Jerusalem. The arrangements originally established by Mrs. Gaskell and her co-trustees for supplying men on active service were maintained upon the conclusion of peace for the benefit of civilian patients. Individual hospitals like King's College, Middlesex and St. Bartholomew's, have collected their own supplies and enlisted the co-operation of voluntary librarians to distribute them regularly. In London a comprehensive service has been established for the council as well as the voluntary hospitals. The London County Council subsidised the British Red Cross Society in order to maintain the supply of books which are collected by gift.

The organisation of the service by voluntary librarians has been made more systematic and complete than in other parts of the country to meet the requirements of the Council as well as the voluntary hospitals. As voluntary workers cannot devote the time necessary to training similar to that of professional librarians, there has been established a simplified technique of which full particulars are given in a pamphlet on "How to run a hospital library," recently published by the British Red Cross Library. There is the beginning of a system of teaching centres by which the librarian to be in charge of a library can gain guidance and information from those who have had experience. The work of a hospital librarian is presented as "one of the most attractive forms of personal service to those who are anxious to do something of a practical character for the patients." The addition of accommodation for private patients has introduced a new factor in the situation as regards supply as well as demand. Many of the patients have a number of books merely to pass the time and are quite willing to leave them behind to augment the patients' library. Others may find that they are able to read more than they anticipate or for other reasons welcome an opportunity to draw upon the hospital's supply, though it is intended primarily for those who have not the means to provide for themselves.

The public library authorities approach the subject of the supply of books to patients in hospitals from a somewhat different angle. The City Librarian of Sheffield, Mr. J. P. Lamb, for example, maintains that if the municipality recognises the claim of a citizen to a library service in health it surely cannot deprive him of that claim when he is in hospital. "On the contrary," he adds, "it should rather take the view that his illness makes the need of a book service more urgent, and as the citizen is unable to come to the library, the library should be taken to him."* When the library service was brought into operation in that city four years ago it was provided for all the hospitals, but after a short time it had to be confined to the city's own hospitals, while the voluntary hospitals have a separate service provided by voluntary librarians with gifts of books. The municipal service is organised and financed jointly by the Health and Libraries Committees for the City General

* Unfortunately, the lecture from which the quotations are taken has not been printed, so the writer is indebted to Mr. Lamb for the use of the manuscript.

Hospital. The hospital authority fitted up the library room and office with shelves and desk, provided the book trolley, bore half the cost of the initial book stock, and pays for re-binding and replacing worn-out or lost books. The library authority organises the service and now wholly administers it, supplementing the books by special loans from the public library stocks. In considering the question of book choice Mr. Lamb maintains that "it is necessary first of all to abandon the idea that a hospital patient is in any way different from an ordinary person." Accordingly the hospital library service is organised as part of the Home Reading Section. A sick person, he argues, should be treated exactly as a healthy one as regards his reading; therefore, book choice should in general follow normal lines. Certain important qualifications arise, however. There should be a large proportion of light reading, and a complete absence of anything which might have the effect of depressing the reader. If the hospital library can call on a public library for books for advanced readers, it can confine its own stock to something like ninety per cent. fiction and a careful choice of light essays, travel, popular biography and some books on popular sciences. The library service is organised by the trained librarians on the staff of the central library.

Outside London and the Home Counties there are several cities where the organisation of a hospital library service has been undertaken by the public library service. Manchester and Cardiff provide notable examples of public libraries co-operating with voluntary associations in this work. One of the most interesting developments of this library service is the provision for patients in mental hospitals to whom reading may and oftentimes does have a directly curative value. For some years the Board of Control have urged that a good supply of books should be available for any of the patients who are able to appreciate them and that there should not only be a central supply in each hospital, but also shelves in each ward to which the patients may have free access. The public libraries have not yet taken an active part in this work, but the Mental Hospitals Association in a recent report dealing with libraries in mental hospitals recommend that each hospital should have a special library connected with the librarian of the local county or public library as a member in a consultative capacity, through whom co-operation might be

established between hospital and library. The representative of the public library might also act as chief librarian of the mental hospital to direct the activities of voluntary librarians. Hitherto most of the libraries have been under the control of the chaplain or other officer of the hospital, and have obtained their supplies by various means, including funds raised by the staff, gifts from the British Red Cross Library and other sources, including public libraries.

Whether the arrangements are carried out under the auspices of the British Red Cross Library or the public libraries, it is equally clear that the efficiency of a hospital library, like any other kind of library, must depend upon the librarian. Accordingly two years ago the Guild of Hospital Librarians was formed primarily "to invite all persons engaged or interested in library work in hospitals and kindred institutions by means of meetings and correspondence for the discussion of questions and matters affecting such libraries, to promote the establishment of libraries in hospitals and kindred institutions and to further their better organisation and administration and to promote whatever may tend to the improvement of the qualifications of their librarians." To further these objects the Guild has a quarterly periodical, the *Book Trolley*. Interest was aroused in foreign countries as well as in the British Dominions. In France a national society has been formed with the Duc de Broglie as president, and under its auspices the second annual meeting was held in Paris in May. The varying conditions in the different countries call for corresponding diversity in organisation. In Denmark and the United States, for example, the professional librarians are taking the lead, while the representatives of Belgium and Roumania at the Conference suggested that the Red Cross Society could interest themselves as in England. France, whose public library service has not attained the same stage of development as in England, has established an organisation in Paris by a happy collaboration between the public library authorities, the public assistance local authority, which is responsible for the hospitals, and the voluntary social service for hospitals. The principle of the centralised system in operation for other hospital supplies has been adopted by the establishment of a central depot at the Hôpital de la Pitié under the direction of a professional librarian with voluntary assistants, from which the books are issued to the other

hospitals. The one exception is the fine new Hospital Beaujon which has its own library. The charitable concern of the promoters is primarily for the patients, though experience suggests that members of the staff, especially the nurses and maids, welcome the library. It is possible that the hospital library of the future may become one in fact as well as in name, instead of being, as it is generally now, only a patients' library. The fine library in the Royal Victoria Hospital, Montreal, for example, is available for staff as well as patients, while Guy's and other English hospitals have recognised the advantage of providing for the nursing staff. It is in fact the hospitals with medical schools which may be expected to present a further conception of a hospital library. Economy oftentimes might be effected by a combined catalogue of the books in use by medical staff, students, nurses, masseuses and radiographers, for professional purposes on the one hand, while patients, nurses and resident medical officers might have access to a unified supply of recreational literature. The professional librarian in charge of the medical school library might direct and co-ordinate the activities of voluntary librarians assisting to make these supplies available for the various classes of readers. Other hospitals might have a modified arrangement according to their particular scope and the requirements of staff and patients. In the meantime the growing recognition of the value of books to those who are sick in mind or body may claim the sympathetic interest of all who enjoy the solace of reading.

C. E. A. BEDWELL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE GERMANIC RACE

WHAT took place on July 11th, 1936, seems likely to stand out as one of the landmarks in post-Versailles Europe. On that day the German Government reached an agreement with the Austrian Government to establish a form of political solidarity amounting in effect to a moral *Anschluss*. The news was flashed upon the world with dramatic suddenness and with a precision that argued a careful preparation even in the form of the announcement. The news may prove to be good, or may prove bad. On the one hand it was in effect a German conquest. On the other hand it was a conquest achieved without war. There is little that really matters in diplomacy so long as the next war is postponed to the maximum possible limit. If Germany makes her conquests without war it is less serious for the immediate present than if she makes them by war. The only uncertain thing is whether Germany's unchecked exuberance postpones or brings nearer the next war. To ninety-nine per cent. of all people on earth the only thing that matters in diplomatic affairs is that they and their friends shall escape from war. To the remaining one per cent. who are informed about affairs and are not so learned as to have lost their common sense, war is never anything more than a low political muddle.

It must therefore be left to the future to determine whether from that point of view the event of July 11th last will be good or bad. Austria's "independence," it is true, was safeguarded, so far as words can safeguard anything. But no serious person was much impressed. The importance of the event consisted in this, that the German Government thereby achieved its first substantial success in its object of expansion through the means of recapturing the lost Germans. Eighteen years after the Great War ended Germany's resurgence was thus spectacularly illustrated. In the eyes of those men and women throughout the world who study high diplomacy and are guided by broad and level realism, this was one of the ritual foundations of the new epoch in Europe. Post-war Germany has passed through many phases. The initial phase of prostration resulting from military defeat gave way to the Brüning-Stresemann phase of subdued and

patient correctitude designed by those two men to encourage the victor to make the experiment of safeguarding the peace by a voluntary gesture of goodwill based upon an equality of status. But the victor of 1918, having repeated the blunder of the victor of 1871, incorrigibly persisted in his error. Herr Hitler was the result of German exasperation. From the moment in January 1933 when Herr Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, there began in Germany a process of unilateral and defiant resurgence which not only never halted, but which gained enormously in pace as the months passed into years. In 1936 Germany was again the strongest military power in the world. She ignored the victors of 1918. She pursued, regardless of any factor, diplomatic or military, except her own armed strength, a policy of expansion. She regained the Saar territory in January 1935. She reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936. In July 1936 she announced at Geneva that Danzig was rightly German, and challenged the competence of the League of Nations to exert any control over that territory. In the same month she recaptured the solidarity of Austria's 6,000,000 Germans.

So much of her programme she accomplished without recourse to war. Great Britain was by comparison disarmed. The realist few in Great Britain who regarded what was being done by Germany as the overwhelmingly important thing in all diplomacy cried in the wilderness. The mass of British people were still following the gleam of the League of Nations. They had just spent a whole year antagonising Italy and forcing her into sympathy with Germany. By the summer of 1936 the pre-war position had been reconstituted, whereby Russia, France, and potentially Great Britain were the main components of one of the two European camps. The other was composed of the expanding German race, with Italy almost driven into it by the action of her former allies of 1915-18. There were differences. In 1914 Japan was an ally of Great Britain. In 1936 she is almost certainly an enemy. In 1914 the United States could be counted on to supply munitions, food and clothes to Great Britain and her allies. In 1936 her Neutrality Act wholly forbids the repetition of such a service. In 1914 Great Britain had at her disposal the accumulated wealth of a century and an income tax of 1s. 8d. in the £. In 1936 that reserve of wealth has been lost, Britain is in effect one of the chief socialist countries of the world, and

income tax stands at 4s. 9d. in the £. Yet even that circumstance, depressing as it may be to those who regard war—"defensive" war, of course—as a form of heroic duty, has its cheerful aspect to those who are not the victims of prejudice. It seems likely that the *moral* is not the same now as it was in 1914. Certainly Great Britain could not now financially stand a war costing £7,000,000 a day for several years. There is no money in Germany, nor in Italy. The United States is precluded now from lending money even to Great Britain for belligerent purposes. The uses of adversity may be sweet. It is at least possible that an outbreak of war might promptly lead to a general revolutionary breakdown. The war, at least, would stop.

The event of July 11th came as no surprise to informed people. It was known that Herr von Papen, German Minister in Vienna, had been engaged in discussion with Herr von Schuschnigg for several weeks. Herr von Schuschnigg had also visited Signor Mussolini. It was also known that the fact of the Franco-Russian Pact and of the Czechoslovak-Russian Pact had as one of its effects the provoking of Herr Hitler into redoubled efforts to form a counter-grouping. The consummation was announced without any previous warning on the evening of July 11th, both by Herr Goebbels in Berlin and by Herr von Schuschnigg in Vienna. Dr. Goebbels broadcast the full communication:

"Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution towards the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore normal and friendly mutual relations. It is therefore declared:

"1. In the sense of the statement made by the Führer and Reich Chancellor on May 21st, 1935, the German Government recognises the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria;

"2. Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence.

"3. The Austrian Federal State Government's general policy and its policy towards Germany in particular shall be

constantly guided by the principle that Austria recognises herself to be a German State. The Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936, and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary as partners in the said Protocol are not hereby affected.

"Recognising that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary conditions are established by the Governments of both countries, the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary conditions."

Herr von Schuschnigg that same evening in a broadcast message said that he was "filled with happiness that, despite past incidents, the feeling of a common destiny for Germans and Austrians had enabled the attempt to be made—with justifiable hope of success—to remove barriers apparently insurmountable." He asserted that Dr. Dollfuss himself had always emphasised the Germanism of Austria. He insisted, however, that the constitution of May 1934 stood fast as did the Fatherland Front as the exclusive framework within which political activity was to be allowed. The Rome Protocols providing for collaboration with Hungary and Italy were also to hold good, but there would be considerable cultural intercourse between Austria and Germany. He concluded with greetings to "all fellow-countrymen at home and all Germans on the other side of the frontier."

In conformity with the spirit of the agreement it was announced from Vienna, concurrently with the announcement of the agreement itself, that two Austrians of pronounced German sympathy had been taken into the Cabinet. Herr Miklas, the President, on the proposal of Herr von Schuschnigg, nominated Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, Director of the Austrian War Archives, to be Federal Minister without portfolio, and Dr. Guido Schmidt, the Vice-Director of President Miklas's Cabinet, to be Secretary of State at the disposal of the Chancellor in the conduct of foreign affairs. The immediate questions asked on every hand were: does this in effect, though not in form, imply the end of Austrian independence? All the official Austrian comment, so far as it was directed to non-German opinion, emphasised the fact that Austrian independence had been safeguarded. Herr Zernatto, for instance, the Austrian Secretary of State, on July 11th publicly recalled

Herr Hitler's declaration of May 21st, 1935: "Germany has neither the intention nor the wish to interfere in internal Austrian affairs—to annex Austria or to unite with her."

But the really interesting psychology of the matter was revealed in the messages that were exchanged between Herr Hitler and Herr von Schuschnigg on July 11th. They both laid the emphasis upon Austria's membership of the German race. Dr. von Schuschnigg's message to Herr Hitler ran thus: "The conclusion of this agreement, the aim of which it is to restore neighbourly relations between the two German States, affords me the welcome opportunity to greet your Excellency as Führer and Chancellor of the Reich, and, at the same time, to give expression to the conviction that the effect of this treaty will bring profit to Austria and the German Reich and thus prove a blessing to the entire German people. I believe myself to be of one mind with your Excellency that, beyond this, we have by the agreement between the two States rendered valuable service to the general peace." And Herr Hitler's to Dr. von Schuschnigg ran thus: "The greetings which your Excellency has transmitted to me on the occasion of the conclusion to-day of the Austro-German agreement are reciprocated sincerely. I join to it the wish that by this agreement the traditional relations resulting from a community of race and historic identity through hundreds of years may again be restored, in order to clear the way for a further common task to the advantage of the German people and for the consolidation of the peace in Europe."

The third attempt is proverbially lucky. Twice before Germany had tried to consolidate Austria with the Reich. The first attempt was made in 1931. On March 21st of that year the Austrian Minister in London called at the Foreign Office to inform the British Government that the German and Austrian Governments had decided at once to start negotiations for the conclusion of a customs union. The Austrian Ministers in Paris and in Rome gave the corresponding information to the Foreign Offices in those capitals. The treaty had in fact been already negotiated and was merely pigeon-holed to wait the right opportunity of declaring it. Dr. Curtius had gone to Vienna at the beginning of the month and had drafted the complete protocol, the object of which simply was to amalgamate German and Austrian territory as a single customs unit. The principle of independence was

duly safeguarded, as was respect for existing treaties. In 1936 by contrast no mention is made of existing treaties. The first paragraph of the first Article of the 1931 Protocol read thus: "I. (1) Under full maintenance of the independence of the two countries concerned and with due respect for their obligations entered upon with third Powers, the treaty is destined to mark the beginning of a new order of European economic conditions on lines of regional agreements."

Considerable diplomatic interest attaches to the reactions produced in 1931 by the attempt at a form of union which ostensibly safeguarded Austria's independence. The issues raised then were substantially the same as those raised now. What they produced in the formulation of non-German diplomatic feeling five years ago has something more than an academic relevance to what is happening now. The proposed customs union was then regarded in Paris, London, Rome and Prague alike as the first step to the *Anschluss*, and as a violation of all the relevant treaty provisions; for instance, of Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which enjoined upon Austria the maintenance of her independence, of Articles 217-22 of the same treaty, which forbade Austria to differentiate between other States, and of the whole Protocol of October 1922 by which, in return for a British, French, Italian and Czechoslovak guarantee of an international loan, Austria undertook to refrain from any negotiations or economic or financial engagements which might directly or indirectly compromise her independence (although she retained her full liberty in the matter of customs, tariffs, and economic agreements, provided her economic independence were not jeopardised by agreements with other States). The Czechoslovak reaction was more interesting. Dr. Beneš had been informed about the matter by the Austrian Minister in Prague on March 21st, when the information was supplemented by a formal invitation to Czechoslovakia to join the customs union. Dr. Beneš at first reserved his view; but the view was soon formulated. While it was generally foreseen that the proposed customs union would excite some initial misgiving in Prague, where the *Anschluss* is a contingency of some concern in view of the circumstances in which the new Central Europe came into being, the particular form into which that misgiving came to be crystallised was not generally foreseen. Czech views were clearly revealed in an article published in the March 27th

edition of the *Central European Observer*, a semi-official Prague periodical, published in English, French and Russian. One short passage put the essential point thus: "For the Little Entente the plan is unrealisable and unacceptable. Although it appeals to the principle of regional understandings, so often emphasised by Dr. Beneš, it is fundamentally at variance with the policy of these States, which have always had in mind an economic co-operation of small States to the exclusion of any Great Power, whose presence in such a combination would condemn them to the rôle of mere satellites. If the premature plan of a German-Austrian customs union was accelerated, as was stated by some German newspapers, by the fear lest Austria should be coaxed into a Central European combination eventually directed against Germany, such apprehensions were unfounded in view of the fact that it was impossible for any Central European group to adopt an economic policy which would run against the interests of 65,000,000 people."

An indication of the seriousness with which the prospect was regarded in Prague was given by the fact that on April 2nd the *Prager Presse*, the semi-official organ of the Czechoslovak Foreign Office, which is published in German for wide circulation throughout Central Europe, printed an article by a young Czechoslovak historian, Dr. Jaroslav Papoušek, under the heading "The Austro-German Preliminary Agreement in Historical Perspective." In that article a review was made of the customs agreements made between Prussia and the other States, beginning with the customs agreement (Zollverein) between Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Hesse Darmstadt of February 14th, 1828, from which resulted the whole subsequent history of the German customs union. "If," wrote Dr. Papoušek, "we compare the present Preliminary Agreement with the agreements in question which came into existence from 1828 to 1834, it is surprising to find to what extent these agreements, separated as they are by a period of a hundred years, coincide." He went on to compare article by article the Austro-German Protocol of 1931 with the Prussia-Hesse-Darmstadt Agreement of February 14th, 1828, and discovered a remarkable likeness even to the extent of verbal coincidences. He concluded that as the customs agreements of a century ago were the foundation of political union, so the 1931 agreement was the foundation of the

Anschluss. The official Czechoslovak attitude was expressed by Dr. Beneš in the Foreign Committee of the Chamber on March 26th. *The Times* report of his statement ran thus: "He said that both from the political and economic point of view the plan could satisfy the Czechoslovakia only if it were carried out so as to embrace the whole of Europe. A limited conception such as the one proposed would affect Czechoslovakia vitally, and might also create for Central Europe new difficulties dangerous to peace. Indirectly it raised the question of the *Anschluss* in connection with which the Czechoslovak standpoint was known. The Government could not therefore accept this plan."

The British reaction was expounded by Mr. Henderson in a statement he made to the House of Commons on March 30th. He made it known that it was himself who would raise the question at the next meeting of the League Council. Mr. Henderson had already informed the German and Austrian Governments that in his view the matter was serious and was one which properly fell within the province of the Council of the League of Nations. The two answers received by Mr. Henderson from Berlin and Vienna were substantially the same. There is no doubt that they were drawn up in collaboration. Their substance was that although the German and Austrian Governments had no objection to submitting the matter to the Council of the League of Nations in its juridical aspect, that is to say in its bearing upon existing treaties and obligations, they could not agree to the Council of the League being asked to express an opinion on its political implications. The German and Austrian argument amounted to this, that a purely economic arrangement of that kind fell wholly within the competence of German and Austrian politics.

Mr. Henderson made it clear that he regarded both the German and the Austrian answer as unsatisfactory. He proclaimed his intention of supporting the procedure of submitting the juridical aspect of the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice, in addition to raising the question of its political aspect before the Council of the League.

Such was the diplomatic commotion created in 1931 by the proposed customs union and its implication of political union, that even before The Hague Court could consider the matter, Herr Schober and Dr. Curtius informed the Commission of Inquiry for European Union that the project had been

abandoned (September 3rd, 1931). Yet the "advisory opinion" only given by the Court had something of morbid interest in it: morbid, because it showed how difficult, indeed impossible, is the idea of a League of Nations at the prevailing stage of human evolution. The Court was a judicial body, composed of eminent judges, but the judges belonged to different countries. There was submitted to it a quite simple juridical issue: whether the proposed customs union did or did not conflict with the existing treaty obligations of Germany and/or Austria. So simple was the matter that if the Court had been what it was supposed to be, namely a bench of competent and learned judges, working objectively, it would not have failed to reach a prompt and unanimous verdict. Yet eight of the judges voted "yes" and seven "no." The eight came from those countries which were politically opposed to the customs union, and the seven from countries not opposed to it. It is a charming but sometimes a dangerous thing that the heart so consistently triumphs over the head in human affairs. The question submitted to the World Court by the Council of the League in 1931 could, *mutatis paucis mutandis*, be submitted to the Court in 1936, if any remnant remained of general faith in the League of Nations. The question was "Would a régime established between Germany and Austria on the basis and within the limits of the principles laid down by the Protocol of March 19th, 1931, be compatible with Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain and with Protocol No. 1 signed at Geneva on October 4th, 1922?" On the one hand the Court had before it the text of the Austro-German customs union. On the other hand lay the text of the two instruments mentioned in the question submitted to the Court, of which the main relevant phrases were these and which are as applicable to the issue of 1936 as to that of 1931. "The Independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently, Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power." (Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, September 1919); and the "Government of the Federal Republic of Austria undertakes in accordance with

the terms of Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain not to alienate its independence; it will abstain from any negotiations or from any economic or financial engagement calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this independence. This undertaking shall not prevent Austria from maintaining, subject to the provisions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, her freedom in the matter of Customs tariffs and commercial or financial agreements, and, in general, in all matters relating to her economic régime or her commercial relations, provided always that she shall not violate her economic independence by granting to any State a special régime or exclusive advantage calculated to threaten this independence." (No. 1 of the Protocols signed at Geneva on October 4th, 1922.)

The Court's judgment was delivered on September 5th, 1931, to the effect that a régime established on the basis of the Protocol of March 19th, 1931, would not be compatible with Protocol No. 1 signed at Geneva on October 4th, 1922. The eight judges whose vote established that verdict put on record the following view:

"... if the régime projected by the Austro-German Protocol of Vienna in 1931 be considered as a whole from the economic standpoint adopted by the Geneva Protocol of 1922, it is difficult to maintain that this régime is not calculated to threaten economic independence, and that it is, consequently, in accord with the undertakings specifically given by Austria in that Protocol with regard to her economic independence."

The seven dissenting judges made use of the right conferred on them by Article 17 of the Rules of the Court to issue an explanation of their disagreement with the verdict. In it they protested that the Court was not concerned "with political considerations nor with political consequences," but only with "a legal question." They stated that they could find no provision in the 1931 Protocol of which the consequences, so far as could reasonably be foreseen, would, accordingly, be incompatible with Austria's independence, and which would, accordingly, be incompatible with Austria's continued existence as a separate and independent State.

The 1931 attempt at an *Anschluss* having thus failed, a second was made in July 1934, when other, more violent methods were introduced into the enterprise by Herr Hitler and his men. The chief method used was the murder of

Dr. Dollfuss. The outcry immediately raised, especially in Italy, had the effect of defeating Herr Hitler's purpose. Therein lay one of the essential differences between 1934 and 1936. In 1936 Italy had been forced into a position where she no longer objected to an Austro-German understanding. On July 11th, 1936, Herr Hitler could do what he did without fear of an unfavourable reaction south of the Brenner. There is perhaps something to be gained from recalling the conditions of two years ago. Herr Dollfuss staked his career—and, as it later proved, his life also—on an attempt to maintain the independence and integrity of Austria. Signor Mussolini, whose relations with Hungary had been friendly since 1927, saw in the Hitler-Dollfuss combat an opportunity for the fulfilment of his own Danubian dreams. He cultivated good relations both with Herr Dollfuss and with General Gömbös. On March 17th, 1934, a three-Power series of agreements was duly initialed in Rome, the express object being, to quote the words of the official text, to "concert together on all the problems which particularly interest them, and also on those of a general character, with the aim of developing, in the spirit of the existing Italo-Austrian, Italo-Hungarian and Austro-Hungarian treaties of friendship, based upon the recognition of the existence of their numerous common interests, a concordant policy which shall be directed towards effective collaboration between the European States, and particularly between Italy, Austria and Hungary. To this end the three Governments will proceed to common consultations, each time that at least one of them may consider this course to be opportune."

Only a few weeks earlier, on February 17th, 1934, Herr Dollfuss had induced the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy affirm jointly the necessity of "maintaining Austria's independence and integrity in accordance with the relevant treaties." Herr Dollfuss personally had become the great symbol of Austrian independence. When on July 25th, 1934, he was murdered, the importance of Austria's independence seemed to overshadow every other factor in European security. On it seemed to depend the very peace of Europe. Informed people had known that the blow was being prepared. What they did not know was precisely when it would fall. Not only had Munich frankly broadcast the threat; there was other evidence in appalling abundance.

There is no room even for doubt about the facts, or the method employed for the murder. On July 25th, 1934, the murderers forced their way into the Chancellery and held up the Cabinet, then meeting, at the point of the revolver. Herr Dollfuss was shot. The diplomatic results were as bad as could be. In the summer of 1934 European nerves were as jumpy as one remembers them to have been since the War ended. Even before Herr Dollfuss was killed, Signor Gayda wrote in the *Giornale d'Italia* (July 20th) something like a blunt warning to Germany that she should keep her hands off Austria, lest trouble brew for Germany. The moment the news of Herr Dollfuss' murder was received in Rome an Italian army and air force were dispatched to the Brenner and Carinthian frontiers. That fact was announced from Rome in an official statement issued on July 26th. On that same day Signor Mussolini sent a telegram to the Austrian Vice-Chancellor to assure him of Italy's determination to safeguard Austria's independence. Three days later (July 29th) there began a spirited campaign against Germany in the Italian Press, which on that day had been released from an official restriction against such outbursts.

The Italian troops which had been stationed along the Austrian frontier were not withdrawn till August 16th. But Signor Mussolini's diplomatic activity was thereupon redoubled. On August 21st he was visited at the Villa de Marinis near Florence by Herr Schuschnigg, and immediately thereafter issued an official statement, in which these sentences appeared: "There was found to exist an effective community of views upon guiding principles, and on the methods to be adopted as regards the independence and integrity of the Austrian State. Those guiding principles, which were initiated and championed by the late Chancellor Dollfuss, will govern in the future also the relations between Italy and Austria."

Signor Mussolini's full opposition was on that occasion provoked by Germany's attempt to obtain a hold over Austria. In 1936 by contrast Italian neutrality made all the difference, and Germany succeeded without opposition in achieving one of her main post-war objects.

July 15th, 1936.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH.*

In the third and latest volume to appear in the Oxford History of England, Professor J. B. Black deals comprehensively with the Elizabethan period. His learned work is an admirable example of careful and lucid presentation and will be appreciated by those who look for a sound judicial treatment of a period still torn between rival theories and emotions. His approach is objective while bearing in mind "the paramount necessity of placing the reader at the standpoint of the queen and her ministers." The subject-matter is treated generally in chronological sequence, with specialised studies of catholic and puritan unrest, of constitutional progress, economic and social development, and literary and cultural aspects. Allocation of material is well-balanced, although some topics, such as the poor law settlement, call for fuller consideration.

In a volume which essays to be a standard work, Professor Black rightly leaves undetermined controversial questions which are strictly immaterial to his study. He is not, for instance, enticed into the controversy over the Darnley

* (1) *The Reign of Elizabeth, 1558-1603*. By Professor J. B. Black. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d. net. (2) *The Babington Plot*. By Alan Gordon Smith. Macmillan. 12s. 6d. net.

murder; although he dismisses simply as an "unconfirmed hypothesis" the ingenious theory of the late R. H. Mahon that Darnley was the victim of his own plot to murder Mary. But, as Professor Black says, the all-important fact was not the queen's guilt, but her guilty mind. In 1568 the Queen of Scots took refuge in England and, in the author's view, Elizabeth should have allowed her defeated enemy "to go whither she pleased." Discredited as a catholic "she would have sunk into comparative insignificance, suffered, it may be, complete political eclipse; and her name would have left no mark on history." On the contrary, she might well have been infinitely more dangerous as a rallying ground, if at large abroad. It must be wrong not to accept fully Elizabeth's very real dilemma. Professor Black's opinion of Mary's intrigues during her twenty years of imprisonment and finally of her complicity in the Babington conspiracy accords with the judgment which the evidence demands. Her death eventually became necessary for the safety of the régime and the peace of England, but it was not accomplished till the proof of her guilt was plain. The author agrees with Professor Neale and other authorities when he declares that "the evidence against her was overwhelming, irrefutable."

The question has been reconsidered at length by Mr. Alan Gordon Smith in *The Babington Plot*. Although a Marian sympathiser, he is constrained to admit the legal, as against the moral, guilt of the conspirators and of Mary. Indeed, his chief complaint is with the methods employed by Walsingham. He appears to regard "the whole affair as merely typical of a form of tyranny by the endurance of which a nation's history and honour are defiled." The plot was "certainly originated by the government" in the sense that by providing Mary with a "secret" post, she was invited to conspire. Moreover, the youthful and reluctant Babington was pressed forward by the government agent, Gifford. The degree of provocation, however, in this conspiracy is quite obscure. In his book Mr. Smith gives an exciting narrative of the progress of the plot, first from Babington's viewpoint and then from the government aspect. "I have been careful," he says, "to set down nothing but accepted fact, or such probabilities as the evidence must necessarily suggest." The core of the plot lies in two letters, namely a reply by Mary to a treasonable scheme outlined in a letter from

Babington. In a long dramatic passage Mr. Smith pictures Gifford inducing Babington to write this letter. The author, however, has to admit in his notes at the end of the book that the timing of this visit by Gifford before the despatch of the letter is "largely conjectural." Mr. Smith's descriptive story must be read with caution. The Babington plot cannot be isolated from the continuous intrigues which centred round Mary during her long imprisonment. Chances of condemning her, such as the Ridolfi plot had provided in 1571, had been let slip and fresh proof was wanting. Walsingham set out to trap incriminating evidence. Professor Black's conclusion is eminently fair.

It is not necessary to suppose that he invented the plot that lured the queen of Scots to her doom; but the measures he adopted were such as to make it practically certain that, if Mary was bent upon the queen's destruction, she would become hopelessly entangled in a conspiracy against her life, and therefore liable to the penalties laid down in the statute.

An account of Elizabethan constitutional development by itself cannot be wholly satisfactory, since it forms essentially a part of one continuous growth towards the attainment of complete Parliamentary sovereignty in the succeeding century. The death of Elizabeth forms no break in continuity except that the process was accelerated by the Stuart temperament. Professor Black is thus confined in his valuable study to considering the early manifestations of Parliamentary opposition to the royal dominance. He discusses the immense and dictatorial powers exercised by the Crown, though apparently he omits the dispensing power which Elizabeth frequently used. Professor Black, however, is not quite clear when stating that the Elizabethan Parliament "enjoyed a very restricted sphere of activity" and that "the queen in council could issue proclamations with the validity of law without its sanction." The Statute of Proclamations, for what it was worth, had been repealed in 1547. The legislative supremacy of Parliament was legally recognised and proclamations, which might not be contrary to statute or common law, were treated by Coke and others as administrative regulations rather than legislative enactments. In practice these rights and limitations were frequently not observed, although as the reign progressed the Commons were increasingly

restive. It is important, however, to appreciate the advanced formal condition of the constitution in the sixteenth century, because up to 1642 so much of the Parliamentary case was based upon legal rights rather than revolutionary innovation.

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TWO VIEWS OF ROMAN CATHOLICISM.*

Dr. David Mathew has published a very interesting account of the Roman Catholic Church in England from the breach with Rome, in Henry VIII's reign, until the present time. He describes his book as the "*Portrait of a minority: its culture and tradition*." The volume admirably fulfils the author's design, for the history is presented in a very interesting way that shows evidence of careful research. It should be added that while the sympathies of Dr. Mathew are throughout with the Roman Catholic minority, the account is given temperately and with the utmost detachment of which the author is capable. The only criticism that can be offered in this respect is that the persecutions of the Tudor and Stuart periods are somewhat lightly touched upon. In particular, the implication of Roman Catholics in political intrigues consequent upon the Papal Bull of Pope Pius V, excommunicating Queen Elizabeth and freeing her subjects from allegiance to her, is, in the judgment of the reviewer, unduly minimised. In spite of this defect, however, the book can be strongly recommended as a valuable historic statement, of which due account must be taken by all who are concerned with this troubled history, either from the Roman Catholic or from the Protestant point of view. The narrative shows that the minority was almost altogether composed of the old families who continued to hold the Roman allegiance, and that they never commanded or even sought any popular support, except in the risings that took place. These influential families vacillated considerably between the Roman Catholic and the Anglican Churches throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Their attitude manifested at times heroic devotion, carried on occasion to treasonable extremes.

* (1) *Catholicism in England, 1535-1935*. By David Mathew. Longmans. 9s. net.
(2) *Roman Catholicism and Freedom*. By Cecil J. Cadoux, M.A., D.D. Independent Press. 5s. net.

At other times, notably during the eighteenth century, the minority acquiesced in their difficult position, to which they accommodated themselves without serious complaint. The Catholic Emancipation was brought about not by the English minority, but by the pressure from Ireland, led by Daniel O'Connell, that followed upon the Act of Union. The subsequent history of the Roman Church in England is well told, and the notices of Cardinals Wiseman, Newman and Manning show true insight and are strikingly presented.

The second book, of a totally different character, has been published by Dr. Cadoux, and is entitled *Roman Catholicism and Freedom*. The author is already well known for his more comprehensive and important book entitled *Catholicism and Christianity*. This new volume is intended as a warning to those Protestants who are accustomed to think that the Roman Catholic Church has by this time abandoned its attitude of intolerance towards what it regards as heresy, and would not in any circumstances apply the methods of persecution had it the power to use them. In regard to this, Dr. Cadoux cites ample evidence, both from official documents and from individual statements, that the claims of Rome make the Church so intolerant of heresy that, if possible, the old methods of proscription and punishment would be revived, if the Church became dominant, with perhaps some mitigation owing to the humaner temper of modern times. Dr. Cadoux has made good his contention; he presents his evidence with moderation. Despite his grave warning he is not insensible either of the nobler elements of the Roman Catholic Church or of the defects of Protestantism. His closing words exhibit the spirit which pervades his volume. He concludes:

All Christian efforts to revivify Protestantism will be fruitless and indeed (in so far as they involve religious strife) inglorious, unless they are rooted in a deep love for God as revealed to us in Christ Jesus and a true reverence for His Will as it affects human life. Only so can we hope to have the driving-power needful for success, and the chivalry and charity which alone can make our striving worthy of the Cause."

This work also merits careful consideration.

J. S. L.

MR. NEVINSON'S REFLECTIONS.*

Mr. Nevinson's latest work adds a few details to his familiar autobiography. But it is for the reflections, rather than the recollections, that it will be prized by the great army of his friends. As his eightieth birthday draws near, he looks back on a life of stirring activities at home and abroad. He has seen so much and shared in so many historic events that we are eager to know what he thinks of it all. For he is a thinker no less than a man of action, a scholar as well as a journalist, a lover of good literature as well as of good fellowship. Every reader of this book will be struck by its range of knowledge, its mellowness of tone, its intimacy, its subtle charm. No man could be less of a cynic, though he has known wars and revolutions at first hand and seen mankind in undress. He ends his life as he began it, a soldier in the army of Humanity.

Apart from studies of his old schoolmaster, of Hampden and of Galsworthy—and we have few better portrait painters than Mr. Nevinson—the most arresting essays come at the end. The Holy Spirit, Death's Losses, and Colophon summarise his creed with a dignity and eloquence which ensure their survival. He has many heroes and masters, with Goethe at the top of the list; but, like most of us, he has made his own creed as he went along. Like most thoughtful men, he is an eclectic—a rebel who loves tradition and the fundamental pieties, a humanitarian who thrills to the excitement of battle, a patriot who is also a citizen of the world, a reverent agnostic who bows in awe before the unfathomable mysteries. For the pageantry of life he has an insatiable interest, for liberty in all its forms a burning passion, for his friends a gratitude which never dies. After an experience so prolonged, after a creative activity so fruitful and sustained, it is no wonder that he regrets that the end draws near. "I am one with all the great literature I have known. Compared with a scholar's knowledge, mine is small and fugitive. But such writings as I have known and admired and loved are part of myself. It is hard to think that all the knowledge and appreciation that I have gathered up in the passing years should perish in the waste of nothingness. And there is great music also to be lost; and the joy in buildings and painting

* H. W. Nevinson, *Running Accompaniments*. Routledge. 10s. 6d.

and sculpture." After enumerating some more of these "ecstasies of life" he cries aloud that the waste in death is deplorable. Yet, as he confesses on the closing page, he has no ground for personal complaint. For he has been granted the priceless boon of time for "the complete life" desired by the Greek philosopher, opportunity for the release of all the potent energies of mind and soul. If happiness is self-realisation, Mr. Nevinson has been a happy man.

G. P. G.

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THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY.*

Sir Arnold Wilson here records the impressions he received during European travel between January 1934 and April 1936. It is a puzzling book, because it mixes obvious good doctrine with equally obvious bad. In other words, the author suffers the defects of his own qualities. On page 65 he refers to "soldierly virtues of honesty, straightforwardness and strength of character." Those virtues all shine brightly throughout this book. What is lacking is a sense of humour. Now such qualities, so conditioned, have a deeply practical effect on Sir Arnold's value as a commentator. What he writes of Germany and Italy so far as their internal present arrangements are concerned is enormously valuable. He sees that Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini alike are revolutionaries. In that sense he brackets Germany and Italy with Soviet Russia. In England the paradoxes and muddles of public opinion in this matter seem to be endless. The British Left, for example, totally fails to recognise Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini as the Labour leaders they undoubtedly are, and fails to appreciate the "socialism in our time" that is operative in both those countries. Sir Arnold Wilson performs a valuable public service in giving the simple honest straightforward facts of the internal situation in those countries. He is good about finance and economics.

But he becomes so keen an explorer of the truth that he loses his sense of relative values. In the diplomatic implications of his subject he is almost perversely wrong. It is not merely that he ignores *Mein Kampf*. He accepts uncritically

* *Walks and Talks Abroad*. By Sir Arnold Wilson. Oxford. 6s. net.

what the German propagandists tell him. In Europe the foreign policy of the German Government is probably the factor of decisive importance. Yet Sir Arnold hardly seems to recognise its importance. To many serious-minded, well-informed and balanced students of Europe in its present phase, the relationship between Germany and Czechoslovakia appears to be matter of supreme delicacy and supreme gravity. The real European danger-point is the German-Czechoslovak frontier. Every good student, except apparently Sir Arnold Wilson, appreciates that fact. One knows the German propaganda on that subject. It is a matter of profound disappointment to find that Sir Arnold has accepted that propaganda so uncritically as hardly to recognise its import. Herr Henlein has been to Chatham House and said it all. But among his audience there were those who knew the facts and could correct him. Yet Sir Arnold repeats what Herr Henlein continues to assert, that the economic hardships have been deliberately engineered by a wicked Czechoslovak government to fall with special ferocity upon his *Sudetendeutsche*. He does not even mention the Czechoslovak analysis of that charge. He does not even attempt to answer the obvious, simple rejoinder that in a period of economic distress it is necessarily the most industrialised parts that suffer most. Sir Arnold writes (page 251) "Czechoslovakian trade, in common with that of other Central European countries, had suffered, but I was assured that it had been the principal care, particularly during the last five years, of the Central Government at Prague to ensure that suffering and sacrifice should fall, so far as possible, upon the German districts." Could *naïveté* go much further? By whom had he "been assured"? He states that "almost all the German mayors had been ousted and their places taken by Czechs"—an allegation he could himself, had he investigated, have found to be untrue. The glee that will be caused in Berlin when he writes (page 254) "unless the Government of Czechoslovakia mends its ways, and that soon, a situation will arise which will set Europe ablaze . . ." will be as nothing to the glee caused when he writes: "We have a weapon, although a small one, in our commercial treaties with Czechoslovakia, and we have an unimpeachable title to intervene." Is this a suggestion that the most-favoured-nation clause be withdrawn and that, in effect, economic

sanctions be applied by Great Britain against Czechoslovakia? That is a current German suggestion whose ulterior object is all too clear. By the operation of sanctions against Italy, Germany's foreign trade has enormously benefited. If the like opportunity were given to Germany by the cutting off of our trade with Czechoslovakia, German gratitude would know no bounds. It is a matter for real regret that Sir Arnold should spoil the otherwise undoubted value of his book by thus consenting (if one may call a spade a spade) to be misled by astute German propagandists. Masaryk, Beneš, Hodža, these are the names of peaceful men. Herr Hitler, by contrast, has even boasted that his purpose is militarist. Why *encourage* aggression?

G. G.

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THE MAID OF FRANCE.*

Miss Sackville-West has succeeded in her avowed intent of keeping her heroine "consistently in the foreground" of her book. With a background of rapidly changing scenes, a crowd of personages, great and small, and a very complicated political situation, our interest is throughout centred on Jeanne. It never flags as we follow her brief, marvellous career almost from day to day—so detailed are the records from which her biographer skilfully draws—to its inevitable, heartrending conclusion. She stands revealed as no conventional saint, but forceful, impetuous, shrewd, undeviatingly honest, devout, fearless, tender, inspired; she is set in "ironical contrast" indeed to that "weak, knock-kneed, pious little cad," the Dauphin, who at the end stirred no finger to deliver his deliverer.

In any consideration of St. Joan, the two most debated questions must be her supernatural experiences and her military genius as a commander. Miss Sackville-West treats the former phenomenon dispassionately, from the psychological standpoint, wisely refraining from pronouncing a verdict; she gives reasons for her inclination to believe that the voices and apparitions were objective rather than subjective. The two incidents most difficult to explain are, she

* *Saint Joan of Arc*. By V. Sackville-West. Cobden-Sanderson. 1936. 10s.

considers, the finding of the Fierbois sword, and Jeanne's leap, unhurt, from the tower of Beaurevoir. It seems indubitable that on several occasions she showed a knowledge of the future. On the second point, Miss Sackville-West admits that the storming of the Tourelles at Orleans, which won that city, was due entirely to Jeanne's insistence; that "for a week (June 10th to 18th) Jeanne . . . was engaged almost daily in a series of victories," while "one by one the English strongholds were falling before her," the week concluding with their rout at Patay. Yet, to counterbalance this, she gives instances in which the Maid neglected to follow up her successes, and others in which the French captains deliberately excluded her from their counsels, and suggests that it was her forceful personality, the assurance of victory that her presence in the thickest of the fight conveyed to the armies, rather than any exceptional gift for strategy, which made her so astonishingly successful a leader. (The failure at Paris was due to treachery.) One can understand the conviction of the English that it took nothing less than the sorceries of a "limb of the Fiend," as Bedford called her, to inflict defeat after defeat upon them, but that French clerical and legal judges, who were cognisant of her simple, pious practices, her constant confessions and attendances at Mass, should have similarly suspected her is incredible. There were, of course, other sufficient motives for condemning her, as this book sets forth; these made the trial, for all its solemn staging, a "pre-ordained and tragic farce." Most readers will be grateful to Miss Sackville-West for refreshing their memories as to the characters and parties and their grouping, and for her summary of the Hundred Years' War. The maps and tables are very serviceable and the illustrations attractive. The bibliography of sources, medieval and modern, shows the scholarly manner in which Miss Sackville-West prepared for this task; among English biographies of St. Joan she thinks Andrew Lang's the best. Here and there, as for instance in the description of the Dauphin already quoted, some who have been accustomed to historians of an older school may criticise her style as too informal; it certainly makes scenes and characters live. Altogether, a fine study of one of the noblest figures in history.

E. G. S.

THE ORIGINS OF JANSENISM.*

To estimate the origins of Jansenism it is necessary to glance at the circumstances of the Church of the time. This is the course that the author pursues, and it adds not a little to the worth of his work. Dr. Abercrombie perceives that the Counter Reformation had spent itself. It had won back for Roman Catholicism much of the ground lost in the sixteenth century; but to bring about this result factors of unequal ethical value had combined, and this too is brought out with pith and point. That zeal and piety were among the number is beyond question: it is equally beyond question that forces of a more than doubtful character had been their active allies. Custom, fear, cupidity—all these motives had been at work; if a Francis de Sales did not disdain the appeal to them, we may conceive their prominence in the policy of men less virtuous and less humane. One appeal—that to the understanding—had been overlooked; and without this no religious institution endures. For this appeal means, in the last resort, truthfulness; and truthfulness in the teacher is the condition of belief in the taught. The enemies of Jansenism committed the mistake of those who denounce the understanding as blind, cold and barren, an obstacle to be overcome by faith. It would be a poor religion indeed which stopped short at the understanding, leaving the heart and the will untouched. But intellectual assent, while not itself religion, is the soil in which religion takes root; if it be wanting, the plant withers away. This is why revivals are transient; they come and go. If the ground under them is solid, they have their powerful uses; but they are supported, not supporting; conviction is the rock upon which creeds are built. The learning of the Counter Reformation was a *parergon*: its aim was the silencing of opponents, not the attainment of truth. Could this be effected, truth for its own sake was of small account; and the evil tradition was not soon overcome. We meet it at every stage of the controversies of which Port Royal became the centre, and it is nothing like so prominent in this volume as we could desire.

Remarkably enough, Dr. Abercrombie has taken considerable trouble with the difficult theology of Jansenism. The teaching known inaccurately as Paulinism has been from the

* *The Origins of Jansenism*. By N. Abercrombie. Clarendon Press. 158.

first a ferment in the Church. Marcion, Augustine, Calvin, Jansenius—such are the names that it recalls to us; it has played a leading part in every attempt at reformation or revival. Inaccurately, for this teaching is precisely what that of St. Paul was not, i.e. systematic. His epistles are essentially *Flügschriften*—addressed to individuals or to local communities destined to meet temporary ends. The theories respecting grace, the fall, predestination, and the like, read into the Epistle to the Romans, reflect the mind of a later age. The writer had in view certain questions at issue between the Synagogue and the Church at a critical and now forgotten period of history; in discussing them he worked on the material taken from the Rabbinical schools and familiar to his correspondents; it was not his intention to communicate an inspired psychology, to reveal the secrets of the Divine purpose in creation, to foreshadow the ultimate destinies of mankind. Augustine, not Paul, is the father of Paulinism; it was from Augustine that Jansenius took the rigorous dogmatic system which is associated with his name. Among the merits of this capable book it is pleasant to note the care with which Jansenism is traced back to one of the most influential men who ever lived, and indeed in the judgment of Harnack he is the first modern man.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

DIPLOMACY AND PEACE.

Professor Mowat's *Diplomacy and Peace** contains short studies of various aspects of international relations. He carries his learning lightly and his pages are never overloaded with detail. He is profoundly interested, not only in the problems of foreign affairs, but in the technique of diplomacy. Despite the telegraph and the telephone, the diplomatist is still a maker of history. "The profession has always been and remains high and noble, responsive to a great demand." How many qualities, moral and intellectual, are required of them is illustrated by numerous examples. They need long training, high culture, exact knowledge, tact, serenity, presence of mind, and above all the capacity to win and retain confidence. Their importance as the first line of

* Williams & Norgate. 10s. 6d.

defence against war is only realised to the full by specialists like Professor Mowat, who is not only saturated with the literature of the subject but is also the biographer of that consummate diplomatist Lord Pauncefoot. He pleads for Foreign Ministers to be left in office as long as possible, since there is so much for them to learn and constant changes are very unsettling. In an interesting chapter on Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries he reviews the varying relations of the holders of the two most important posts in the British Cabinet. Asquith left everything to Grey, while Lloyd George left too little to Curzon. The ideal, in the author's opinion, is "an intellectual Prime Minister, capable of advising and controlling, but not anxious to dominate and direct." How many influences, visible and invisible, share in the making of policy is known to or guessed by us all. "The record of the Press in great international crises," writes Professor Mowat, "is not very encouraging." The whole book is a thoughtful and earnest plea for the study of foreign affairs.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Mr. J. P. T. Bury deals with the rise of Léon Gambetta as a republican politician under the Empire and his subsequent direction, as virtual dictator, of the national efforts of resistance to the German occupation in 1870-1 in his able work on *Gambetta and the National Defence*.* This book will go far to meet a long-felt need for an English appreciation, based upon all relevant and available material and which is fair, balanced and lucidly presented. Mr. Bury is faced with the fact that Gambetta's policy of war to the knife resulted in a colossal military failure. Well realising that the fall of Paris could add nothing to the German demands, he drove French resistance to the point of utter exhaustion. It is thus Mr. Bury's task to justify both the policy and strategy of Gambetta which have been so fiercely assailed. It is so easy to be wise after the event that Mr. Bury very properly stresses "the injustice of judgment merely by the immediate practical result." Under the inspiration of Danton and 1792 Gambetta saw that the national mobilisation of resistance might well wear out the invader and obtain an alleviation of terms which could not be worsened. Marshal Foch has easily discredited Gambetta's strategy; but as Mr. Bury points out, the moral and political demands of the situation required the relief of Paris, and Gambetta came very near to success. But it was to be one consequence of Gambetta's work to raise the prestige of

* Longmans. 21s. net.

the departments and destroy the platitude that Paris is France. Gambetta the politician was, above all, a patriotic republican, and, as Mr. Bury shows, he associated the permanence of the new republic with the success of his war policy. His prognostications, however, as to the effect of failures were unfounded. He himself contributed enormously to the moral bases upon which the Third Republic could endure. Not only had he "showed the immense possibilities of a well-organised national defence," but "helped to restore the self-respect of the French people, to save its honour, and by identifying every citizen with the national defence to revive the idea of the 'Patrie' in all its full significance." He infused France with the determination for revenge. If Gambetta was a revolutionary, his foresight and realism condemned, as the author shows, the use of violence as a political weapon. By largely directing the September revolution along peaceful channels, by asserting some reality of order and semblance of freedom during his months of power and finally by refusing to resist forcibly the Government after the capitulation of Paris, he enabled the Third Republic to emerge and grow without the taint of terrorism hitherto associated with French republicanism. It is, perhaps, here that Gambetta's most lasting achievement lies.

Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell enters into the difficult and controversial question of *The Role of British Strategy in the Great War*,* in a short monograph containing the substance of lectures recently delivered at Cambridge. In his opinion British influence upon strategy is to be confined mainly to that of British soldiers upon their Allied colleagues. The scheme of British ministers, particularly Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill, "never received an impartial examination." Mr. Cruttwell, in surveying the successive phases of the conflict, concludes that our actual share in determining land strategy "remained surprisingly small." A decisive contribution was possible in 1915, but the Dardanelles expedition "remained to the end a complicated and exceedingly expensive diversion. . . . Generally speaking, in 1915 Great Britain acquiesced in and subordinated herself to French strategy, and by so doing went far towards renouncing for the whole war her proper share in its direction, except in naval and economic policy." The decisive struggle was to be fought in the West. It was, however, the British direction of the naval warfare which made possible the successful termination of the continental conflict.

Mr. Gerald Heard's *Exploring the Stratosphere*† is a timely little book, written for the general public. It explains in clear and simple language the significance and potentialities of this great aerial belt some ten miles above the surface of the earth, and gives a short account of its

* Cambridge. 3s. 6d. net.

† Nelson. 3s. 6d. net.

exploration during recent years. Mr. Heard is not too dogmatic, appreciating how comparatively little science has yet been able to disclose. Moreover, "practically every expectation, every supposition, about the Stratosphere has been mistaken and belied by actual test and discovery." He mentions the flow and ebb of the "vast electric tide" of the Heaviside layer within the Stratosphere "which may with fair certainty be linked up with the anomaly of its temperature and the tornado winds." Mr. Heard briefly discusses the importance of the Stratosphere as the key to weather conditions and accurate forecasts. Through growing knowledge of its nature, science is discovering "still more and neater ways of constant radio inter-communication." The author goes on to consider the potentialities of Stratosphere flight and envisages the eventual use of rocket planes. Finally, he mentions the peculiar filtering effect of the Stratosphere over cosmic radiation and states the need for observation beyond the insulating area to obtain a fuller appreciation of this barely known phenomenon.

*As Time Went On . . .** covers a period of three years only of Dame Ethel Smyth's vivid life. With an introduction of twenty pages of synopsis of her book *Impressions That Remained*, covering her early musical training and experiences in Leipzig, and an Epilogue "A Life Summed Up" at the age of 75, the picture is well framed. Its setting is Victorian, but much of the interest is due to Dame Ethel being herself a triumph of expressionism, characteristic of a later period. She is frank and self-revealing in her relationships with her closest friends. The portrait of Lady Ponsonby, wife of Sir Henry Ponsonby, Queen Victoria's private secretary, is lovingly and discriminatingly drawn. Royalty itself is encountered and fully appreciated. The Empress Eugenie figures frequently and is helpful, especially in the musical career. Then there is Mrs. Benson, the wife of the Archbishop, who is a faithful "father confessor" as well as friend. Henry Brewster is revealed in Letters, especially in the Letter Section of the book. Finally, General Smyth, Dame Ethel's father, grows on one as the story proceeds, with other members of the "Smyth Family Robinson." Vernon Lee is a visitor and a very interesting chapter is given to that learned personality. Altogether this is a fascinating record, full of humour and good stories and a growing philosophy of life. Ever and anon one is entertained with Dame Ethel's desperate struggle to get recognition for her musical compositions. She succeeded to some extent in Germany, but is up against "the machine" here. However, in 1933 a Festival of her music was given in her honour in the Albert Hall, London.

"But all this will be told in what should be a really comic paper I hope to write some day, called *The Wrecks of the Wreckers*. Did not Heine say, 'Out of my great sorrows I make little songs'?"—

* *As Time Went On . . .* By Ethel Smyth. Longmans. 15s.

the moral of which is : better put your past tragedies to some sort of use! ”

One of the uses Dame Ethel puts her tragedies to is to enthrall her readers.

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An excellent addition to the “ Things Seen ” series will be found in Mr. A. L. Maycock’s little book* on Cambridge. Introductory chapters dealing with the nature of a university and in particular with the character and life of Cambridge are followed by descriptive and historical accounts of the colleges, university buildings and other features of interest. This particular volume serves well the dual purpose of this series, to help the visitor to appreciate the atmosphere of the locality more fully than the usual guide book allows, and to prove of permanent value and interest to the stay-at-home. The book includes a sketch map and numerous illustrations.

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The late Franz Mehring’s great biography of *Karl Marx*† has been made more generally accessible by Mr. Edward Fitzgerald in his translation from the German. This classic first appeared in 1918 and in 1933 a new edition was published containing an appendix, prepared under the direction of Herr Eduard Fuchs, which dealt with new material brought to light, particularly at the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. This English translation is made from the 1933 edition, includes the appendix and contains also an extensive Marx bibliography and a few explanatory footnotes.

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Mr. Keith Bushell, in *Papuan Epic*,‡ relates his experiences as a Native Police Officer and Magistrate in New Guinea, which results in a book of great adventure. Cannibals and savages, crocodiles and alligators, are part of everyday life in primitive Papua. It is remarkable that so small a force of police can keep such wild people in order. The life story of an old white savage found by the author in isolation in New Guinea is not the least fascinating part of the book. The descriptions of people and places, and the fine illustrations, result in an attractive book to all interested in anthropology and travel.

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In *Sword and Stirrup*,§ Major Hervey de Montmorency relates the experiences and memories of an adventurous and widely travelled career. His interests have been many and diverse, including treasure hunting in the Cocos Islands and oil prospecting in Georgia. For a time he took to the turf, riding his own mounts in English and French races, including the Grand National. He has seen military service in South Africa, in the Great War, and in Ireland in 1920. Many will enjoy this breezy and outspoken book, full of incident and life.

* Seeley, Service & Co. Ltd., 3s. 6d. net.

† Seeley, Service & Co. 12s. 6d. net.

‡ The Bodley Head. 15s. net.
§ Bell. 16s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

SEPTEMBER 1936.

THE SESSION.

THE Session which began after the General Election has been dominated throughout by the increasing gravity of the international situation. When the House met, fresh from the polls, the Government, with its triumphant majority secured on the basis of a strong League of Nations policy, appeared to have a clear course marked out for its navigation. It was not long, however, before the amazing episode of the Hoare-Laval negotiations appeared on the horizon. The arrival of this pirate ship staggered the House of Commons and the country. It seemed incredible that Ministers who had given such solemn assurances when votes were needed should have found so soon that, however unwittingly, they never meant what they said. It rapidly became clear that the country had a quite definite conception of the meaning of ministerial promises and intended them to be kept. The continued existence of the Government itself was for some days in doubt ; it only remained in office by an abject and humiliating surrender.

The Prime Minister has never recovered from the moral blow that he received at that time. The sacrifice of a colleague whose conduct he had approved was contrary to the Baldwin legend, and his apparent willingness to place the old school tie before the peace of the world showed a singular lack of proportion. It was cynically remarked at the time that Sir Samuel Hoare, maintaining that he had been right, resigned, while Mr. Baldwin, admitting he had been wrong, remained in office. It would have been a far more straightforward course for the whole Government to have resigned. They had blundered into a policy which was quite indefensible, contrary to their so recent electoral pledges and obviously repellent to the whole House of Commons.

A new Government, with Sir Austen Chamberlain as Prime Minister, should then have been formed with, no doubt, many members from the late Government, and these could have retained office for the normal period with dignity and consistency. As it was, an exceedingly painful impression

was left on the public mind; the Prime Minister's stock sank very low, and under the stress of circumstance he made up his mind to retire from the premiership not later than after the Coronation. He appeared at moments in the spring to have lost grip of the situation, and certainly was no longer master of the House of Commons, as he had been during the last Parliament. There were even moments when his attitude on the Front Bench, and apparent lack of interest in what was going on, made one wonder whether the Government could last the week out. Assailed on every side, a successor openly designated, the Prime Minister reacted, as he always does, and expressed a determination to go only when he chose to do so. Fresh vigour animated his appearance and the Session ends with his influence certainly higher than it has been at any time since the lamentable episode of December. This is not putting it very high, however, for few think that, with all his agreeable qualities, he is the man to cope with the grave situation in which the country finds itself. The exact date of his departure will doubtless depend, in the last resort, on the state of his health, but as he will not be forced out when the going is bad, and sees no urgent necessity to depart when the going is good, the present administration might well last on into next summer.

As things are, there can be no question but that his successor will be Mr. Neville Chamberlain. There is no real competitor of like authority. He has indeed for some time supplied such drive and direction as the Government possess. Without the agreeable human qualities of Mr. Baldwin, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will provide firmer control of policy, and this is badly needed. At present it often appears that the Government have no settled policy; under him they should have a clear, definite objective. It might be a narrow one; it might be limited, but many think that even that would be better than a policy of drift. From a purely party point of view, the Opposition welcome the transition, believing that a much less broad and more narrowly reactionary emphasis will be given to the Government's policy; driving progressives nearer to the Left.

In the circumstances of political development, Mr. Eden has come to occupy a key position. This singularly attractive figure was, a year ago, the idol and hope of millions throughout the world. His passionate attachment to peace through the

League of Nations had captured the imagination of the public who believed that they could place their whole trust and confidence in him. The Government had no greater asset at the General Election. To-day that idol is shattered; he still enjoys the personal goodwill of his former supporters, but confidence is gone after the abandonment of sanctions and the betrayal of Abyssinia and the League. No more remarkable scene has occurred in Parliament for many years than the debate on this subject. Feelings of genuinely passionate indignation were aroused in the breasts of the Opposition. Rarely can a Government have found itself in such a contemptible and humiliating position. It was one of the most shameful days in recent English history.

Owing to the nature of the representation in the House, Mr. Lloyd George has not had many opportunities since 1931 of pulling off a really great performance, but on this occasion his speech was masterly, and left the Government cowering and ashamed. In view of the fact that the policy adopted by the Government was a complete reversal of everything that Mr. Eden had stood for up to that time, his well-wishers could have desired that he should have refused to accept responsibility for the change, and the fact that he was willing to go on and to defend the change was a great shock to many.

The part played by Mr. Churchill has been full of interest. The Indian controversies having now passed into history, he is much more in tune with his Conservative colleagues. He has spoken often with great vigour and argumentative force on all aspects of foreign policy and defence, and has presented a clear policy of re-armament, overwhelming, closely coordinated and adequately prepared, against the aggression which the present temper of the German Government so obviously threatens to Europe. Mr. Churchill has not been able to hide his contempt for the abilities of the present and last holders of the chief political office in the State, and this has marred his effectiveness on occasion, but he has been careful to pay court to the Premier-Designate, and many by no means confined to the ranks of Government supporters would not be averse to seeing him with the responsibility of high office. It is significant that Mr. Churchill has accepted the position of President of the Parliamentary Group of the New Commonwealth Society which has for its two-fold object the establishment of an International Police Force to maintain

world order, and a Tribunal in Equity for the purpose of peaceful change. The address which its new President gave to the members of this all-party Group in July was a very remarkable statement of the case for the collective system, wholehearted and unreserved. Mr. Churchill would no doubt have made an admirable Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, but personal difficulties stood in the way, and we have to consider the performance of Sir Thomas Inskip in this important office.

Sir Thomas has brought to it fine gifts of courtesy, thoroughness and unflagging zeal, and within the limits of his authority and intellectual powers has striven to do all that a man could. It cannot be said, however, that there is confidence that he is handling the situation adequately. He is too much inclined to plod honestly on the beaten paths with modesty and competence, and he would seem to be more interested in acting as Minister of Supply than in bringing within one circumscribed area the activities of the three fighting services. Until there is some firm hand controlling, directing and co-ordinating these hitherto separate weapons of defence, neither efficiency nor economy can really be obtained.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the dangers of the international situation; created, as they are, very largely by the weakness, irresolution, and the lack of a clear, consistent policy of the British Government. Many opportunities have been missed in the last five years where firm British leadership would have turned the world into a new channel of steady progress towards settled peace, the most notable of these being, of course, the opportunity to prove the successful application of collective force against Italy. This could easily have been done if business had sincerely been meant. The result is that neither the people of this country nor the Governments of other countries have any confidence in the willingness of the National Government to give real support to the collective system. The nation, which was united behind the Government in its foreign policy last October, is now deeply divided and suspicious. It is really impossible to carry through an effective re-armament programme in such circumstances. It might well be that if the country found itself unhappily involved in some continental quarrel of the old national pre-1914 type, with no clear League objective, internal

resistance on a large scale would arise—a refusal to serve or to make munitions, for instance. The position could still be saved and national unity obtained if the Government were to return to the policy on which it won the General Election, and it may be that the increasing peril of the situation at home and abroad will force this issue to the front.

In home affairs the long-awaited Means Test Regulations evoked the first personal test which the new Minister of Labour has had to face. His personality is combative, and the speech in which he introduced the Regulations, though intended by him to be non-provocative, was highly aggressive, but by a strong combination of voice, knowledge, persistence, and courage, he drove through the interruptions to a successful end. In remarkable contrast was the Under-Secretary, Colonel Muirhead, at the close. With infinite patience and courteous firmness he obtained a good hearing. The Regulations themselves have not produced the outburst that was expected in some quarters. Indeed, this could hardly be otherwise, because no one can say exactly how they will work out. The real test will come after November 16th, when the payment of the new allowances is actually made. Mr. Brown has certainly up to the present made the best of a most difficult situation. He has won the first round.

His predecessor, Mr. Oliver Stanley, has sunk rather into the background as Minister of Education. Disappointing as Mr. Stanley's Bill has been to educationists, he has carried it through quietly and successfully, and has secured a real achievement in obtaining agreement among religious bodies with regard to grants.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore has well deserved the advance which has taken him to the Colonial Office. He brings with him a fresh enthusiasm for liberty, and has already laid vigorously about him in its defence. His control of the situation in Palestine commands much greater confidence.

A word must be said about the most painful personal episode of the Session, involving, as it did, the disappearance from public life of the late Colonial Secretary. There was a feeling of general satisfaction at the rapidity and thoroughness with which the Tribunal conducted its proceedings and the definiteness of its conclusions. In no other country in the world would action so swift and so far-reaching have been taken. Mr. Thomas' final appearance in the Commons was

as dignified as the circumstances permitted, when he accepted without question the decision arrived at.

Sir John Simon, now removed to the comparatively minor responsibilities of the Home Office, has conducted himself in that position and as Deputy Leader of the House with courtesy and ability. His great gifts are devoted to work he is eminently qualified to carry through successfully, but neither he nor Mr. Runciman, who continues to conduct the affairs of the Board of Trade with his usual competence, are anywhere suggested as likely successors to the Premiership. It is taken for granted that a Conservative alone can succeed to this office, though three or four years ago the contrary view was held in many quarters. Mr. Runciman has had certain measures to bring forward, such as the Cotton Spinning Industry Act and the Coal Mines Bill, which were evidently distasteful to him, and in introducing them he made no attempt to give any other impression. In those circumstances it was hardly likely that anyone else would show much enthusiasm for them. The manner in which the latter Bill was handled was a good example of the lack of courage and leadership in Government policy.

Mr. Elliot has introduced his usual list of subsidy measures with great gaiety and volubility, but he has hardly increased his prestige, except amongst the major recipients of the benefits he has conferred. A newcomer to the Government Front Bench who has won golden opinions is Mr. W. S. Morrison, the Secretary to the Treasury. His manner of answering questions is admirable, and his general approach to the House combines just that blending of seriousness and wit, resourceful handling and lightness of touch, which make him very acceptable. Captain Margesson is acclaimed on all hands as a first-class Whip, highly efficient in practice, straightforward and trustworthy. As an example of a man who has come to the House with a reputation already made, Mr. Harold Nicolson may be instanced. He has fitted in well to parliamentary life, and his speeches are looked forward to both for their style and matter.

Turning to the smaller of the Oppositions, it cannot be doubted that Sir Archibald Sinclair has fully justified his election as Leader of the Liberal Party. It has been his duty to speak often, and he has done so very well. In particular, on League questions, he has put the case for the Collective

System more effectively than any other Member. On ceremonial occasions, too, his words have most aptly enshrined the views and feelings of Members as a whole. The Liberal Members, often criticised in the past for their divisions, have maintained excellent unity in action. Amongst an excellent debating team may be mentioned Sir Francis Acland, Mr. Graham White, Mr. Kingsley Griffith, Mr. Foot, Mr. Holdsworth, and the junior Lloyd George's. Two newcomers, Messrs. Roberts and Acland, have also done much useful work in debate and Sir Percy Harris has been a hardworking and popular Chief Whip.

The official Opposition, though still small in numbers, has been greatly reinforced since the low ebb of 1931, and front bench speakers, backed up by the strong vocal support of their followers, are able to put up an effective performance on all important questions. Messrs. Attlee, Greenwood, Morrison, Alexander, Lees-Smith and Dalton make up a good side, though it is difficult to distinguish among them any personality likely to impress itself deeply on the country as a whole. Mr. Attlee, the new Leader—a clear thinker, firm and sincere in his views—has worked hard in his position and brought all his powers to its service. Mr. Greenwood has great knowledge and resources, but over-emphasises. Mr. Morrison is too seldom heard. Mr. Alexander, though good, would be an even more effective debater if his language and manner were more measured. Mr. Dalton has rich gifts. One can imagine the tones of his voice filling the long drawn aisle of some cathedral. It fills the House of Commons also most effectively.

The Labour Party has found itself in a difficult position in connection with the defence programme. Distrusting the purpose for which the arms will be used by the Government, they have voted against the Service Estimates. This has secured unity and made possible joint action with the very limited number who are opposed to all armaments, but it has seriously compromised them politically. Technically, from a House of Commons point of view, their attitude is defensible, but it lays them open to the embarrassing taunt that they will not provide the means for the collective system to work, and many Labour Members feel that it would have been tactically wiser to adopt the same course as the Liberals, who have supported consistently the main Army, Navy and Air Force Votes, though they have opposed those for the

Foreign Office and other Departments in order to emphasise their disagreement on policy.

One supreme fact which stands out with crystal clearness is that, much as the National Government may be disliked and distrusted, the electors can see at present no alternative that they are prepared to trust. All the bye-elections show this. The Labour Party alone is not going to obtain a majority within any foreseeable future, and if this position persists we are doomed to a continuance of some version of the National Government, or the Conservative Party camouflaged under such a name.

On the other hand, if the electors did see clearly an effective alternative on a broader basis than the Labour Party alone, there can be little doubt that they would turn eagerly towards it, and much has been written in the Press about the possibilities of a Popular Front, or a National Government of the Left. The one electoral contest where some attempt, though none too wholehearted, was made to put this into effect, produced the triumphant return of Mr. Noel Baker at Derby. Many in the Labour Party who three or four years ago would have scoffed at the idea of such a movement are now frankly friendly towards it, and realise its vital importance if any real progress is to be made in home or foreign affairs. It is no use pretending that there are not serious obstacles and much local prejudice to be overcome, but much more important things are in the balance than the fate of Parties. The future of civilisation is in peril. If the present foreign policy of the Government is continued war seems inevitable. Only by a union of those in all Parties who believe that the world can still be saved by determined and unflinching application of the principle of collective security can peace be maintained, and democracy vindicated.

This Parliament will run its full course, though the higher command will change. It is a great improvement on its one-sided predecessor in life and interest. Many of the Conservative new entrants and younger Members are moderate men who would respond, as would the country, to a courageous policy worthy of our great position in the world. Let us hope that by one influence or another, through the dark menace of the international skies or the home pressure of progressive feeling, such leadership and unity may arise before the night falls.

GEORGE MANDER.

SPANISH TRAGEDY.

I

STRIPPED of the garments of partisan fantasy with which, in this age of propaganda, it was inevitably bedecked, Spain's bloody reckoning is seen in its true proportions as a contest of democracy and stratocracy. Government by an Army oligarchy is common enough on the Continent: in Poland, in Bulgaria, in Yugoslavia it is the rule—and intermittently in Greece. In Spain it furnishes the substance of the political history of the past hundred years.* Only in the countries which have won through to the goal of government by consent of the governed does it seem such an anomaly: and England, too, we should remember, had her civil war wherein the temper of the people was forged. With us the brief experience left such a legacy of resentment against "the Army" as an institution—an anti-military "complex," which, be it noted, does not apply in the same way to the Navy—that it has inspired three-quarters of the traditional peace sentiment of this country, and notably that sterile clamour for "disarmament" which ignores the very texture of international politics.

Granted that the daily dope—*bouillage de crâne* in the apt French phrase—of the newspaper is so heating the blood of the present generation as to inflame all but the most phlegmatic or clear-visioned to a crusade for "Fascism" or "Communism": and Spaniards, alas! from a tardy experience of literacy, are voracious readers of newspapers, as any traveller can confirm. That, moreover, in the latest exploit of Spain's salvation Army the hierarchies of the Church and land-owning class have been militant on the one side, the forces of trade unionism and the liberal professions on the other, is a conspicuous and significant fact: for the class war is a reality, even though it is only one of the many sides of truth. Nevertheless, Spain's sickness—and indeed the international—is fundamentally a crisis of *government*: the problem is one of working out and operating the complex of institutions appropriate to the peculiar psychological and physical conditions of the Peninsula. There was surely

* For an admirable survey of the rôle of the *Cuerpos Armados* in Spain's State life, the reader should consult *The New Spain*, by Sir George Young. 1933. Methuen.

never a greater illusion than that of the stay-at-home Englishman who imagines *democracy* to be synonymous with our parliamentary system: its essence is a state of mind which I have called "*consent*," i.e. majority rule, and actual political forms are a secondary albeit crucial consideration.

Now in this twentieth century the will of the majority in Spain is emphatically on the side of social justice and against reaction and privilege, from which, as every schoolboy knows, the country has suffered more and longer than most. Hence the galvanic impetus of 1931 which swept away the Monarchy and struck at the foundations of the power of Church and Army. After two years that current was spent. Yet the Right-centre Parliament which followed dared not make any frontal attack on the achievements of the Republic garnered in the Constitution. The Catholic parties made haste to restore the clergy benefits which had been cut off, necessarily, with the establishment of the lay State; but that was the limit of their ransom. And it was, of course, on grounds of social justice, for the sake of the impoverished parish priest, that the claim was made. Spokesmen of the *Acción Popular* party led by Señor Gil Robles always professed a passion for social service—which the practice of their backers as continually belied. In recent newspaper interviews, notably in the *Diario Español* of Buenos Aires, Señor Gil Robles abounds in protestations of democratic faith and promises to be "implacable" on the score of social justice. The party's record, however, when it had the levers of power in its hands, is not exactly encouraging. There was, for instance, the famous unemployment insurance scheme of June 1934, when the C.E.D.A. tabled a bill for providing insurance, "crisis funds," relief works, and also voluntary labour service on quite a generous scale; when it came to the point, however, no more than 200 million pesetas was scheduled for the years 1935 and 1936, and of that sum 108 millions took the form of subsidies and premiums for the employer class, seventy for public works, twenty for construction of official buildings—the contracts for which would obviously go to the politically "right"—and two millions only were left for the actual insurance! Such is the politician's penalty for dependence on the oligarchies which, in Spain, have never learnt the meaning of wise concessions.

But, to return to our political muttons. The graceless régime of Señor Lerroux, 1933-5, permitted the infiltration once more into key positions of men who cared not a jot for the democratic ideal, who had precious little use for the Republic. The good work of Señor Azaña at the Ministry of War, in particular, was undone, and some of those Generals whose names are now familiar to us, Generals Queipo de Llano and Mola, for instance, were restored to high commands, though their talents had always lain rather in the field of political intrigue than soldiering. Meanwhile the system of propulsion of the governmental machine by a central Parliament, which for its successful working requires, above all, toleration and a spirit of compromise, was manifestly ceasing to function, as in sober truth it has broken down in all countries (not excepting our own where the breakdown is characteristically disguised by the expedient of a "National" Government) under the impact of new physical and economic facts. In October 1934 a curtain-raiser to the present drama was presented in the armed rising of the workers in Asturias, with the subsequent ruthless repression. (Whatever the enthusiasts for the U.H.P. (Union of Proletarian Brothers) may say, the documents signed by the principal labour organisations are there to prove that the purpose was not social revolution.) Had the moderate Right during its spell of power done something on behalf of the community as a whole, had it ever proved its fitness to be regarded as an Opposition *within* the Republic, there might well have been an *ambiente* for the conservative, capitalistic régime to which Señor Alcalá Zamora, the Republic's first Prime Minister and President, aspired. In Catalonia a combination of firmness and unquestioned democratic purpose had achieved, in the few months of effective autonomy which preceded the tragedy of October 6th, conditions of stability and euphoria which were almost unknown. Instead . . . the conduct of the most crass and short-sighted Conservative class in Europe had fed the demagogic clamour against "Fascism," on the one hand, while reinforcing the alliance of all the Left groups, from Communists to the mildest of progressives, in a Popular Front which is actually a more impressive achievement than the *Front Populaire* in France because of the refractory material.

Now, the major portion of the Socialists, the Communists

and the anarcho-syndicalists, have never pretended to any faith in Parliament as a remedy for their country's obstinate ills; nor did the proletarian leaders relish the prospect of power and responsibility in the circumstances of turbulence and revolt which the restoration—not indeed of the monarchy but of its charioteers—of 1933-5 had provoked. First things first, they said; let us concentrate on reconquering the essence of the Republic: and so, with scarcely a dissentient voice, they bestowed the leadership on Señor Azaña. The ten-point *Frente Popular* programme is pure social reform, without one iota of Socialism: if left-wing Socialist leaders occasionally expressed doubts whether Spain's acute economic and social problems were soluble under the capitalistic system, they never swerved in their resolve to give Liberalism its last chance. As the champions of the ascendant working class saw it, the immediate need was to educate and train a new élite from among labour leaders and *petite bourgeoisie* to replace the priests and soldiers of the old order. The question of superseding Parliament by new institutions more in consonance with the popular will could wait—had to wait: their outlines only could be faintly discerned in the gradual devolution of political power to the self-conscious regions, on the one hand, and the corporative organisation of economic enterprise, on the other—along the trail which had been blazed by General Primo de Rivera with his River Confederations. A comprehensive national plan of irrigation and hydrographic exploitation had been worked out in 1933 when Don Indalecio Prieto was Minister of Public Works, under the inspiration of Señor Lorenzo Pardo, assisted by first-class engineers: and only a period of stability was wanting for this to be set into operation, with tremendous consequences for the land reform timidly initiated by the first Azaña Government.

These optimists reckoned without the sectarianism of the national character. No sooner had the election results become known—a handsome majority for the Popular Front—than headstrong elements of the Right took the bit between their teeth, and attempted the traditional solution of a military *coup*. It was frustrated, thanks to the Intelligence service of the Socialists, but only just in time, for, as Señor Azaña remarked in his first big speech on April 3rd, there was a moment in which all authority had abdicated.

"When we came into power," he said, "we found a country which had been abandoned by the authorities before us—and moreover with a national ulcer in the most sensitive parts of Spanish political sentiment. . . ."

General Francisco Franco was promptly removed to the military governorship of the remote Canary Isles, General Goded posted to the Balearics; Señor Gil Robles, the political tool, they say, threw a fit (he is said to be subject to epileptic seizures) and retired to lick his wounds in the country.

Good Republicans interpreted the reference to the "national ulcer" to the reinstatement of Monarchist and politically suspect officers during the Lerroux régime, and particularly to the part played by the Moroccan command and the Foreign Legion in the cruel repression of Asturias. The Socialists were obviously thirsting for revenge—and the abortive Franco-Goded plot seemed to be their opportunity. But Señor Azaña stood firm, refused point-blank once again to consider the proposal for disbandment of the Army and its substitution by an armed workers' militia which Señor Largo Caballero had been pressing; and, after some incidents in which Army officers were insulted in the streets by militant Socialists, even issued a public certificate of good character for the "Army" as a bulwark of the Republic. At the same time every precaution was taken, and the process of weeding out Monarchists and "Fascists" began all over again.

Subsequent alarums underlined the danger from the military. There was the demonstration on the occasion of the shooting in Madrid on April 16th at the funeral procession of a Civil Guard. There was the mutiny of two cavalry regiments at Alcalá de Henares on May 18th. Finally, under sustained pressure from Socialist and Communist elements, Señor Casares Quiroga, then Minister of War as well as Prime Minister, gave orders for the removal from their posts of a number of the senior officers in Spanish Morocco. As a matter of fact, but for the murder of Señor Calvo Sotelo on July 13th, the Cortes would have been investigating clamorously that very week "responsibilities" for massacres, etc., in Asturias. The temptation for the Army leaders involved to get their blow in first was irresistible. It is known that Major Doval, the butcher of Oviedo, as he was called on the

Left, was engaged in organising—from far-away Cuba!—a large-scale military rising timed for the autumn. If for various reasons, among them the international situation, General Franco and “the Army in Morocco” decided to move two months early, they knew that military garrisons in a number of towns were prepared to stake their heads on a desperate gamble. They counted on dissensions within the Popular Front—indeed the *leitmotif* of political developments since February had been the widening split between the two sections of the Socialist Party captained by Señor Largo Caballero and Indalecio Prieto respectively—and on the hunger of the neutral mass, that “invertebrate” middle class of which Señor Ortega y Gasset wrote so pungently, for discipline and order, which soldiers have a way of regarding as their own patent.

Those dissensions, as a matter of fact, ceased magically on the morrow of the brutal murder of Señor Calvo Sotelo, and Socialist and Communist groups, including the militant Marxist youth organisation, combined to testify their full support for the Government in defence of the régime against any “subversive movement.” As for support by the “forces of order” for the Army’s treasonable enterprise, one must carefully distinguish. Property owners devoid of any political sense may have readily welcomed the Army shelter—from “Communist” storms to come: in districts such as the north-west they had no choice. A certain number of more or less Fascist youths, burning with patriotic zeal, may have rushed into the fray against the Government—and, of course the Spanish Monarchist exiles who had been biding their time across the frontier in Portugal. But to represent the ghastly blood-letting of the past month as an all-in combat between the haves and have-nots is a complete distortion of the facts. The British—and French—Press bears a heavy responsibility, not least the serious organs, for suppressing certain salient facts which must have conveyed a very different impression. Thus, on the first day of the rebellion, Señor Lucia, who was a Minister in one of the Right-centre Governments of 1935 and is among the leaders of the C.E.D.A. (Confederation of Autonomous Rights)—he leads the *Derecha Regional Valenciana*—telegraphed his complete loyalty and support to the Government “above all political differences,”

and there were many similar testimonies, quite apart from the intellectuals’ manifesto and the document published by the Supreme Court reminding magistrates that all activities of the military rebels are seditious. How our leading papers could go on describing the Government supporters as Communists or Reds after the forthright world broadcast by Señor Martínez Barrios, President of the Chamber, on August 1st is one of those sordid mysteries which the ordinary man simply cannot understand.

It is alleged that from the time the popularly elected Government came into power in the middle of February there was a surging wave of anarchy and violence which had utterly discredited the Republic in the eyes of all good Spaniards. How far is this true? Immediately after the election there were prison riots—which forced Señor Azaña’s hand and compelled promulgation of the promised amnesty decree without due process of Parliament: but the responsibility for this decision rests with the all-party Permanent Committee of the former Cortes, with an anti-Left majority, which read the danger signals aright. There was “symbolical” occupation of land on the big estates in the province of Badajoz by labourers who could not afford to wait upon the slow processes of bureaucracy if the soil was to be prepared in time for this year’s sowing. There was the expected decree for the reinstatement of workers who had taken part in the Asturias rising or had been dismissed on suspicion of revolutionary sympathies. The majority of the employers cheerfully accepted this hazard of political fortune, and only jibbed when they found they were expected to pay compensation into the bargain! There were the sporadic outbreaks of arson and the sacking of political clubs associated with the *Acción Popular* or Radical parties, i.e. those political groups which had given “the people” such a raw deal during the *bienio negro* (1933-5). There were a number of political murders which were an indication of the temperature of political passions. And there was a certain amount of arbitrary exercise of power by Socialist municipalities or local *casas del Pueblo*. On top of this characteristic exuberance, which had far more to do with the Spanish temperament than with the social revolution, came the succession of strikes, general and particular, which incidentally were

accompanied by no greater disorders than the strikes in France. The very success of the Government's first-aid measures on behalf of the landless proletariat of the south and small tenants had caused, naturally, a slump in land values, which was distressing the landed gentry for whom Señor Calvo Sotelo in the Cortes so passionately spoke. And it was fair to complain that the Government officially adhered to capitalism, yet took measures which made it impossible for capitalism in its pure state to work. But, after all, that is happening in every country, and Señor Azaña had duly given warning that he was going to drain the vast amount of idle money available for his projects of land reform and public works, "to break up all abusive concentration of wealth, wherever it may be." Opponents of the Government made much of the resignation of Don Gabriel Franco, the young financial expert, at the time of the Cabinet reshuffle in May, when Señor Azaña was translated to the Presidency, and of his declaration that the public finances had never been in such straits since the loss of the American colonies. League of Nations figures certainly show increasing unemployment over the last two years and a drop in the value of exports. But we are learning not to place too much reliance on the indices of economic prosperity applied by orthodox economists: and, of course, the selection of February 16th, 1936, as the starting-point of the *descensus in Averno* is entirely arbitrary. Similarly, when people point to the continuance of the State of Alarm and the Press censorship—I am speaking all the time of the period before the "civil war"—they seem to forget that suspension of constitutional guarantees is almost the norm in turbulent Spain, under Monarchy or Republic; the effort to maintain law and order, to uphold the principle of authority, is a whole-time job at the best of times. It has been aggravated for Señor Azaña and his colleagues by the explosion of popular fury consequent on the previous two years' repression. How much of the continued turmoil must be put down to Fascist provocation will, I suppose, never be known. That the possessing class never lifted a finger to help the Liberals to stem the effervescence of the masses is alas! a fact of history; the political wire-pullers of the Right, on the other hand, were up to the same game that they had played so successfully in 1933—to

pose the dilemma: *either* violent coercive measures against the popular agitation, and in particular the exploits of anarcho-syndicalist mischief-makers intent on outbidding the Socialist U.G.T. in revolutionary zeal *or* apparent failure to do their duty. Señor Azaña in his speech of April 3rd forestalled these tactics when he proclaimed that "we are neither executioners nor puppets. . . . My method is not that of the club or the bag of gold (with which Spaniards have so often been 'governed'), it is by an appeal to reason and common sense." The comment of Señor Gonzalez Peña, the man who was president of the revolutionary committee in the Asturias revolt and is now a leading figure on the side of the moderates in the Socialist Party, was apposite:

Magnificent. . . . The pity is that Señor Azaña is too *elegant* a ruler for a nation like the Spanish; still, this nation of ours is on the way to being educated up to this kind of policy.

That is the truth. The intoxication of victory was wearing off, the Largo Caballero wing of the Socialist party had lost its battle with the Prieto moderates; all sections to the left of the Catholic Jesuit-inspired party of Señor Gil Robles were rallying to the evolutionary conceptions for which Señor Azaña stood; the decision of Señor Azaña to step back into the reserve trench of the Presidency was no bad thing, since in the circumstances, the central fact being a formidable workers' and peasants' movement on the march, a thorough-going bourgeois like himself had no place in the front line, and he was preparing to make way for Señor Prieto "one of themselves" . . . when the criminal Army rebellion was let loose, and all is once again in the melting-pot.

Assuming a Government victory—and the alternative is well-nigh inconceivable, now that the "people" in Spain is awake and conscious of its strength—there is no need at all to expect anarchy and red ruin; and for the reasons given by Mr. Geoffrey Brereton in the July CONTEMPORARY the question of the implantation of Communism simply does not arise. What is inevitable, of course, is that Labour triumphant will insist on a legally constituted workers' militia to replace "the Army," that professional caste on the Prussian model which has signed its death-warrant in this last desperate

enterprise. How far the workers' leaders can cast off the blinkers of the class war and show themselves fit for public responsibilities remains to be seen. They will be on their mettle, even as they were in those fateful days of 1931, when their conduct was irreproachable. The pessimists will say that the hegemony of the anarcho-syndicalists in Barcelona will mean a return to the rule of the gunmen, and that stagnation at the centre will prevent any progress with social reform or socialisation (the latter permitted under Article 44 of the Constitution). I am not so sure. I can imagine capable men borrowing from the Syndicalists their conception of a new social structure built up on the foundations of the commune, the municipality—hence the term, "libertarian communism"—which will be in line with the trend to decentralisation that alone can "save Spain." Never again, one hopes, will Army officers be in a position to make the attempt.

The consequences of Spain's tragic ordeal can only be another of those leaps into the unknown which constitute the vital impetus of history. If we would appreciate the truth of Mr. H. G. Wells' remark* that

the original structure of the sovereign State . . . was a force organisation. It was designed to enforce peace at home and contemplate war abroad. Such economic, educational and other functions as it exercised were partial or incidental. It taxed, but chiefly for revenue to support its armed forces. . . ."

and recognise the need for as speedy a transition as possible from the power-State to the welfare-State (which does not mean, of course, dispensing with police duties such as working-class elements are perfectly fitted to perform), we should not mourn the passing of the traditional Spanish State and we should appreciate that this conflict of Army versus people has been indeed the testing-time of the Spanish Republic.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

II

The storm which has been menacing Spain since 1931 has burst at last. It is the clash of two Spains with

* *The Times*, May 5th, 1936.

practically nothing in common. This article is being written with the struggle in full swing and in a moment when it is not easy to settle down to write a calm analysis of the internal situation as a whole. As far as it is possible to ascertain the truth as to the preparations for the movement, it seems likely that this was precipitated by the murder of Don José Calvo Sotelo. It had apparently been designed for a rather later date. Its preparation probably goes back to February, when the elections were lost by the Right. It is a movement which on the surface seemed to be a certain proposition. Nearly the whole Army and part of the Navy has been involved. If co-ordination had been better the Government must almost certainly have collapsed. But timing was bad. First one garrison commenced, then twenty-four hours later another. The Government was thus able to keep control of Madrid and of the towns in its immediate vicinity.

But if this actual movement has only been planned since February, a revolt of the military elements has loomed big on the horizon since 1931. The adventure of August 1932 when General Sanjurjo rebelled in Seville was isolated adventure without any adequate preparation. Yet the gulf between what we are apt to call rather loosely Old Spain and New Spain remained unbridged. Spain had a civil war running sporadically for forty years on this issue during the nineteenth century, but it ended with the return to the throne of the Bourbons in 1875, and from then onwards until 1931 Spain practically stood still. The aristocrats, the military and the clericals became again accustomed to having decisive influence. They lost it with the advent of the Republic, but this was in a moment of surprise and they did not resign themselves. For these people the Republic constituted the collapse of the ideals they cherished, in part also the collapse of their privileges. But their reaction was not entirely materialistic, and they undoubtedly felt bitterly the attacks on religion and on many other of the standards which they had regarded as indispensable to maintain.

The Republicans for the most part tried to avoid the provocation of civil war. It is difficult to see that when a calm objective history of this period comes to be written the historian will be able to avoid heavy censure for the

Republicans. Their attitude since the advent of the Republic and particularly since last February has always been one of hesitation. If they had taken very decisive steps during this spring to have implanted drastic agrarian reform, to have nationalised certain key industries and institutions and to have thus calmed the workers, they would probably have avoided the constant unrest, the burning of churches and other disturbances which have helped to incense the Right. They had moreover a duty to the régime in seeing to it that the military force of the nation was in loyal hands. Here they failed totally.

Apart from the bad organisation on the other side and a very great deal of pure luck, the factors which saved the situation in Madrid were: the loyalty of the police; the preparations of the socialist and communist militias, and the final decision of the Government to arm the people. When on Saturday afternoon, July 18th, the trucks of the shock policemen commenced to race through the streets of Madrid loaded with rifles, machine-guns and ammunition to the centres of the militias and of the political parties, it became evident that the Government had realised that it had its back to the wall. The loyalty of the *Guardias de Asalto* (Shock Police) and the *Guardia Civil* caused a good deal of surprise in many circles. The explanation is probably that the reaction of the masses during the last months has been so intense that these forces came to be influenced and caught up by the contagious enthusiasm of those around them. Whatever the explanation may be, the fact is that the Civil Guards and Shock Police, who were roundly hissed by the crowds during the parade of April 14th, had by July 18th gone over. Spain, it must be remembered, has lived months of febrile intensity since the elections of February; an enormous propaganda against "fascism" has been made.

I put the word fascism in quotation marks because I feel that a great deal of misunderstanding is caused by the use of this term even if its use does make things apparently clear to those who like their news expressed in general terms. The fascist movements of Italy and Germany have not really much in common with what is going on in Spain here and now. What we are witnessing in Spain is a crude and terrible battle between the remnants of feudalism and the upward drive of

masses anxious to push out into new fields. It is inevitable that this struggle should take on modern labels—and also modern forms—but withal it remains a typical and belated rising of the people for their liberties.

Those concerned in this *pronunciamiento*—probably the most extensive any nation has ever suffered—are actuated in great part of course by noble motives. They are dying for their ideals. But it is difficult to see any man of the stamp of Hitler or Mussolini in their ranks. General Franco is a clever officer, but no outstanding personality. General Mola is a quiet, reserved little man who brought down on himself the imprecations of both sides when he was chief of police under General Berenguer in the period 1930-1, just prior to the fall of the monarchy. The Left said he repressed them cruelly, the Right claimed that his lack of energy and foresight was responsible for Don Alfonso's downfall. General Queipo de Llano has always been a man of violent reactions. He had to resign from the post of commander of the military household of ex-President Alcala Zamora because of his indiscretion in alleging in public that a statement made by a Cabinet Minister in office at the moment was completely false. General Cabanellas is also a man easily swayed by sentimental reactions. Don José Antonio Primo de Rivera is in prison in Alicante, but if he were free he hardly seems to have the stuff to make him the leader of a great national movement; he is youthful and romantic. There may be some inspired leader behind the scenes, but as far as can be judged here from Madrid the rebel movement lacks both leadership and a programme with any kind of appeal to the masses.

On the Government side, on the contrary, the answering movement is typically one of the masses. Civilians do not pick up weapons and rush off to get shot unless they really are worked up about something. The man in the street is really taking this business very seriously. Everybody is, of course, prophesying troubles to come. But at the date of writing—August 5th—this is all very premature. The battle—or battles—continue in the mountains near Madrid, and from the wildest Anarchist up to the Republicans of Martínez Barrio and Azaña there is complete solidarity of view, namely to defeat the enemy. It is therefore rather putting the cart before the horse to commence elaborate discussions as to

whether or not the people will be content with this Government or whether they will want something more radical when the rebels are finally subdued.

I should say that this depends a good deal on what the Government does. If the Republicans step forward briskly with plans to build up a new Spain and to straighten out the chaos in which Spain must inevitably find herself when the struggle ends, there seems no reason why they should not stay in office. If they fumble the situation they will find themselves pushed aside by more decided folks. The Socialists are the decisive force which has buttressed the situation in its most critical phase, and they doubtless will have claims to make later on. With the struggle still in progress there is little use in prophesying, but as far as Madrid and the parts of Spain largely influenced by Madrid are concerned it seems to me that the fears of the situation degenerating into pure anarchy are much exaggerated. For regions such as Catalonia I cannot even advance any supposition, for I have not enough information as to what is going on.

The Government has done itself much harm in Madrid during the conflict by the extraordinarily strict censorship which has been imposed. This has been done with such a narrow outlook that correspondents have been unable to give objective information. The result has been that the outside world has discounted information from Madrid. Indeed until the last few days when there has been some improvement, the Government instead of seeking the help of the foreign correspondents has made their mission difficult and the procuring of information at times almost impossible. Perhaps it is this lack of information abroad which has created what, judged from Madrid, appears to be a certain coolness in official circles in some nations, which might have been expected to have had more sympathy concerning the fate of the Spanish Republic.

Whatever happens this is going to be a long and ugly business. It is war; civil war of course, but still war. And a war on which one side is composed for the most part of civilians. There is bound to be a great deal of cruelty. But when it is possible to check up it will doubtless be found that this goes for both sides and is not altogether one-sided.

The humble people of Spain and the lower middle classes

are to-day fighting for their right to take an active part in framing the destinies of their nation. Even with victory in their hands an enormous task will remain before them, the task of building out of the ruins a new and better Spain. It would indeed be a tragedy if certain aspects of the struggle or the lack of adequate information as to what is going on here should cause any chilling of the friendship which for long has linked the British and Spanish peoples. The fact that we went through the phase of internal history through which Spain is now passing over two hundred years ago should not be forgotten when we set out to judge objectively the great struggle in the Peninsula.

SPECTATOR.

Madrid.

Immediately after his return from the April visit to Rome, Dr. Schuschnigg discarded Prince Starhemberg and the Heimwehr, who blocked the road to Austro-German reconciliation. Prince Starhemberg vainly tried to upset the Chancellor by summoning a Cabinet Council before he could get back from Rome and by launching the Austrian Phoenix insurance scandal with a dangerously worded *communiqué*, mentioning "grave irregularities," but was stalemated owing to Schuschnigg getting hold of lists—still unpublished—of those bribed by the Phoenix which compromised the Heimwehr far more than his own followers. For his part the Duce jettisoned Signor Suvich, a stout anti-Nazi and patron of a Habsburg restoration. Throughout May and June Herr von Papen worked on the Austrian Chancellor, finding powerful Clerical allies, particularly Dr. Funder of the Reichspost. The Clerical argument, as that paper has now revealed, was to bring Austria into an anti-Socialist international with Germany and Italy, to improve the situation of Catholicism in Germany, and to stop what the Reichspost describes as the appalling losses of Catholicism in Austria through "conversions" of Austrian Nazis to Protestantism. Forced by the approaching meeting of the Locarno Powers, and in face of Dr. Schuschnigg's refusal to help him out, Herr Hitler dropped his last demand for face-saving in the matter of a plebiscite on the *Anschluss* question (the cardinal point of the Austrian Nazi programme) and the Austro-German agreement was signed on July 11th. Immediately afterwards Italy left the Stresa Front and Germany told Great Britain that in view of her own "pacific gesture" towards Austria, the questionnaire would not be answered. Germany hastened to recognise the world in recognising Italy's rape of Abyssinia. Eighteen days later, Austrian Nazis celebrated the new agreement by the biggest demonstration ever seen in Vienna against the Government, and it was soon evident that the Fascist International was well established in Rome and Berlin.

The astonishment frequently expressed outside Austria that within two years of the murder of Dr. Dollfuss, and after apparently fighting Nazi Germany up to the last, Dr. Schuschnigg should suddenly have concluded this agreement with her, is due to the fact that so many foreign observers have completely misread the Austro-German quarrel from the start. Millions of Catholics and Jews throughout the world,

who were deceived into supporting the present Austrian régime as a bulwark against the "brown flood," now realise bitterly their mistake. So do many thousands of Jews in Austria, whom the Jewish Socialists, who never had illusions as to what the end would be, contemptuously called "Dollfuss-Juden." The outlook of these Jews in Austria has now become a tragic one. The Austrian Press says correctly that the agreement is no treachery to the memory of Dr. Dollfuss. Dollfuss never wished to make Austria a barrier against the expansion of German influence. Like Dr. Schuschnigg, he inherited and pursued the Austrian Clerical counter-revolutionary policy devised by Austria's greatest post-war Chancellor, Monsignore Seipel. The latter set out with the determination to destroy the democratic republic established in 1918 and substitute for it a sort of "Papal State" where the political power of the Catholic Church should be supreme, in close alliance with Germany, but ruled by the Habsburgs. He intended the Habsburgs to become the crystallisation point for a new Austro-Hungarian union and the means for despoiling the Succession States of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania of at least the Catholic section of their populations—i.e. of Croatia, Slovakia and Transylvania. He saw even a vision of an all-powerful Catholic bloc in Europe to which the Catholic States of the German Reich should be added at the expense of Protestant Prussia, whom he hated. This great priest-politician unobtrusively removed brick after brick from the foundations of Austrian democracy so that Dr. Dollfuss could effect its collapse and Dr. Schuschnigg begin the new anti-democratic building.

The quarrel with the Nazis was an incident, due to the fact that a new reactionary star arose to the north and inflamed the pan-German section of Austrian reaction with a desire to see democracy destroyed, not on Catholic but on German Nazi lines. Dr. Dollfuss refused to deviate from the path of Catholic reaction within Austria, but he never even opposed an eventual *Anschluss* until the Nazis tried to sweep him aside. Now that Herr Hitler has promised to abandon interference (of course in the belief that by exercising a little patience Austria will fall into his hands like a ripe plum) the existing régime has agreed to friendship and co-operation with Nazi Germany. That, either through agreement or violence, Austria would eventually come into the orbit of Nazi Germany

was evident from the day when Dr. Dollfuss decided to destroy Parliament and the Socialists. His programme—the arid Clericalism of the Papal Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*, plus the dead bones of the imported Fascist corporative state into which even Signor Mussolini had failed to instil life, never had a chance against the more vital opposing doctrines, both native to the country, of Nazism and Socialism. Had the call for resistance to the “brown flood” been made by a socialist government, or had Dr. Dollfuss summoned to his standard the Socialist forty-two per cent. of the population to make Austria the home of German liberty exiled by the Nazis from the Reich, the support of democratic Europe would have ensured Austria becoming a permanent barrier to Nazi expansion. But the Austrian Clericals insisted on attaining the first objective, the destruction of liberalism and Socialism, before joining apologetic battle with the Nazis. A great weakness of the Austrian dictatorship has always been, so far, its reliance on Italy; Great Britain and France, while they talked of Austrian independence, did nothing to guarantee it, but preferred to let Signor Mussolini and the Heimwehr destroy all independence for individual Austrians in the counter-revolution of 1934. Had Austria wished, she could on many occasions have obtained solid guarantees of her independence from Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente in conjunction with the formation of a Danubian bloc, but the Clericals hated democratic Czechoslovakia, Hungary vetoed any close connection with the Little Entente for Austria, and the Austrian aristocracy and the Imperial military remnants and Legitimists were bitterly hostile to Yugoslavia, successor to hated Serbia, to whose narrow frontiers they hope one day to see the Southern Slav State reduced. But the choice of Italy as protector meant that to the active hostility of Socialists and Nazis the régime added the passive resentment of the great bulk of the peasantry, who refused to stomach the Italian *Katzelmacher*—“kitten-eaters,” a bunch of “dagos,” who were one of the old Monarchy’s “inferior” races and who had betrayed the Triple Alliance to the Entente in the Great War—as protectors against the “German brother.”

In his important confidential talk in Prague this spring with Dr. Beneš, Chancellor Schuschnigg admitted the failure of *Quadragesimo Anno*, corporations and dependence on Italy

to secure popular support, and he explained that he was going to revive Habsburg traditions in the hope of evoking a more popular response, yet not to the point of restoration. Sufficient official support, however, was given to restorationist propaganda during the late spring and summer to arouse feelings in the Little Entente states that the Chancellor was not keeping strictly to his bargain. It became obvious that if Otto broke his engagements (as his father did before him) and created a *fait accompli* by dashing to Austria, Dr. Schuschnigg as a self-proclaimed Legitimist could no more have opposed him than Dr. Maniu was able to oppose King Carol’s dash for the Rumanian throne. The orgies of Legitimist propaganda then in progress might well have persuaded a wiser head than Otto’s seems to be to try to rush matters. Through the official organ of the foreign office, Czechoslovakia in June accused the Austrian Government of supplying Otto with public funds, declaring that restoration would be treated as a hostile act and prevented by every one of Austria’s neighbours, “without exception.” From Germany Yugoslavia received a private promise of full support in any measures she might take against a restoration, and Von Papen, I have good reason to believe, told Schuschnigg that he was empowered by his Government to warn him that Germany would take “appropriate measures” in the event of attempted restoration. It must have become clear to the Austrian Government that Otto’s return would mean the immediate recall of the diplomatic representatives of the Little Entente, Germany and possibly of Goemboes-Hungary, the occupation of Tyrol and Salzburg by Germany and of Carinthia by Yugoslavia as “pledges,” the friendly invasion of Carinthia by Italy against Yugoslavia, and the reluctant occupation of territory by Czechoslovakia to protect her own interests—in short, the partition of Austria, and Armageddon. Since the Austrian dictatorship would not—and never will, as democrats outside Austria should at last be convinced—consider compromise with the Left, there remained only compromise with the German dictatorship.

The efforts made in certain quarters in Great Britain to represent the Austro-German Pact as advantageous to ourselves and the cause of peace, can be ascribed to only one of three causes. These are either such panic fear of Germany that it seems worth while purchasing provisional assurance against a *coup d’état* overnight, however high the cost in

increased German imperialist influence in Austria, failure to grasp the meaning of Germany's successive moves towards the domination of Europe and her frenzied rearmament, or a secret sympathy with Fascism so strong as to prefer the sacrifice of British interests to the weakening of any branch of that international Fascism which is heading so obviously for war. Since the *blamage* of the Dollfuss murder during the 1934 Putsch, Herr Hitler has been telling excited Austrian Nazi leaders who visited him: "There is no hurry about Austria; that will fall into my lap anyway in due course. I have bigger things on hand." I have yet to meet anyone in a position to judge who believes that Hitler has weakened one iota in his determination to achieve ultimate triumph in his native Austria. In exchange for the slight sacrifice of prestige involved in the declarations of July 11th—recognition of Austrian independence, non-intervention in internal affairs and characterisation of National Socialism in Austria as an Austrian affair—he has had the doors thrown open to propaganda through the readmitted German newspapers, tourists, Austrian legionaries and émigrés and amnestied prisoners. How can it be called "interference in Austria's internal affairs" by Germany, if the flames of Nazism in Austria are fanned through these various agencies generally lauding the Führer, conditions in the Third Reich and its "admirable" treatment of the Jews? Pronounced National and Nazi leaders in Austria say that the settlement between Schuschnigg and Hitler is no settlement between Schuschnigg and themselves, but that the former merely clears the ground for the latter. After the August vacation they are going to develop sharpest opposition until their demands are met—a compact Nazi group under some other title within the Fatherland Front, more definitely Nazi Ministers than have yet joined the Cabinet, anti-Semitic measures primarily in the fields of the Press, finance, law and medicine (in which they will have discreet Catholic support) and constitutional revision. They claim that one of their friends, Dr. Srbik, has had private intimations from the Chancellor that he is prepared to accept constitutional changes and some anti-Semitic measures:

"The Chancellor," a pronounced National leader told me recently, "imagines the German agreement will enable him to ignore us. That is foolishness; he has not gained one adherent in Austria by the agreement, but to his loss of the Heimwehr has

added that of the Legitimists. When the still-armed Heimwehr under Starhemberg start causing trouble in the autumn, Schuschnigg will be forced to grant our demands. The agreement assures us already some liberty of action, relaxation of official persecution and free cultural contact with the Third Reich. It is certain that Hitler will never again furnish an excuse for complaints of German interference, but Dr. Schuschnigg must expect sharpest opposition from ourselves and unfortunately violence also from our extremists until he comes to terms."

It should be added on the other hand that when the Duce pressed Dr. Schuschnigg to come to terms with Germany promptly, he made the proviso that the Chancellor must first be sure that it would not mean an increase of Nazi influence in Austria. Dr. Schuschnigg replied that he was sure. Most people here in Vienna fear he was far too optimistic. According to private utterances of Prince Starhemberg to his friends, the Duce has allotted to him and the Heimwehr the role of Italy's watchdogs in Austria, to see that Dr. Schuschnigg (whose origin and upbringing incline him far more towards Germany than Italy) is not forced into the Nazi camp. Dr. Schuschnigg appreciates the value of the Italian connection which prevented an invasion by the "Legion" from Bavaria in July 1934, but at the same time he was shocked when he first met Mussolini at Florence after taking office, at the extent to which Dollfuss had committed himself to Italy.

The three dictators of Austria, Italy and Germany have not sat down to a cordial banquet, but to a game of poker. Each watches the other closely. There is one court card in the pack which everyone is afraid to play except in the last extremity, since it might upset a great deal more than their game. It is a King—of Austria. Why Dr. Schuschnigg might be forced to play it against Herr Hitler is obvious. There is good reason to believe that the Gentlemen's Agreement includes a three-year "cold storage clause" for the Habsburgs, with a proviso that if Germany does not play fair, Dr. Schuschnigg recovers a free hand. That Germany might so far oust Italian influence in Austria as to overcome the Duce's reluctance to put Italy's traditional foe, the House of Habsburg, once again in a position where they might be able to found a rival imperium by the Adriatic, is also easy to understand. Less obvious is the third alternative, that Germany might restore the Habsburgs as a move against Italy. The Reichswehr, there is reason to

believe, prefer a nominally independent but really vassal Austria to the *Anschluss* for the furtherance of their schemes. Whereas the *Anschluss* would tend to make the Austrian frontier the limit of German influence, the Habsburgs restored by Germany and forced by an alarmed and hostile Little Entente and Italy into absolute dependence on her, might be the cover for the gradual extension of German political influence to all the lost Habsburg domains, and the realisation of German *Mittel-Europa*.

The chains of Germany's economic domination of Central and South-Eastern Europe have now been firmly riveted by Dr. Schacht, whom I just had the interesting experience of accompanying—at a very respectful distance—on part of his flying tour in these areas. At first sight one would not suspect an evangelist in this typically Prussian figure. Yet it was in this guise that he recently descended from the clouds in his special plane to proclaim to Balkan bankers and industrialists Germany's new evangel—"Give unto Germany your foodstuffs and raw materials without expectation of cash payment! Have faith and accept instead our machines and munitions, thus storing up treasure which neither moth nor rust can corrupt—the friendship of mighty Germany." This is the evangel of *Mittel-Europa*, the wedge which Germany is trying to drive between Britain, France and Italy on the one hand and Russia on the other, with the thin end directed towards Britain's vital communications with the East. Thanks to the vast bad debts she began by making, Germany left these countries no option but to accept her industrial products instead of payment. She is trying to lay hands on desperately needed foodstuffs by extending the system to Austria and perhaps also to Czechoslovakia. In those Balkan countries where she has already either a stranglehold or a foothold, I found the whole system regarded with the greatest misgiving and anxiety. But France—at any rate prior to the People's Front Government—gave no economic help, and Sir Montague Norman and Sir John Simon did not flatter and impress the Balkans by aeroplane tours like Dr. Schacht and General Goering. Sanctions closed what markets were still left open by the world economic crisis, but from Germany huge orders still poured in. Simultaneously, German political money is being spent lavishly in these countries for whose imports Germany will not pay cash. I say advisedly "will

not pay," for the German dictatorship is depriving the country of food and raw materials of all kinds, and forcing on it all kinds of *Ersatz* products, year after year, in order to use the available foreign exchange almost exclusively for armaments. "Guns are more important than butter," as Goering has said (except when it is necessary to bluff Olympic visitors with evidence of a sham prosperity for a few weeks. To produce eggs and butter for the Olympic Games fortnight ordinary Germans have been starved of them for six weeks).

Penetration is easiest in Hungary and Bulgaria, former war allies, more difficult in Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece (although the newly proclaimed Metaxas dictatorship suggests the German hand again). Germany works both through the compact German minorities in each country and through national reactionary parties, whom she lavishly supports. The Hungarian "Arrow-Cross" Nazis claim to be a million strong; the Hungarian Government, having stamped out Socialism by terror among the most destitute class in Europe, the starving landless peasantry of Hungary, has allowed these illiterates, who do not speak a word of German, to be persuaded into believing that the greeting "Heil Hitler" is somehow going to fill their empty bellies. In Rumania the anti-Semitic organisations of the aged Dr. Cuza and Octavian Goga have been fused into the pro-Nazi National Christian Party—"Goga and gaga," as the irreverent say. Together with ex-Premier Vajda's "Rumanian Front" they equal in strength in the present Parliament the great National Peasant Party. The anti-Semitic Iron Guard of Zelea Codreanu which murdered Premier Duca and has just murdered Stilesco, head of a rival Fascist body, is again active under an alias. Two years ago there was only one anti-Semitic daily in the country; now every town has its Fascist newspaper (many displaying the swastika), with no advertisement revenue, but handsome subsidies, the source of which is obvious. To what this interference by international fascism leads has been seen in Spain, where Fascist Italy and Fascist Germany have been openly supporting the rebellion against the lawful government by supplying arms and aeroplanes to the rebels, and it seems quite possible that it was the two great Fascist dictators who were largely responsible for the slaughter in Spain.

The Austro-German agreement is a new link which, when

firmly welded, will give a great Fascist chain of states, including Poland, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy. How the rival German and Italian designs on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Rumania will work out, remains to be seen. Czechoslovakia, owing largely to Yugoslav hostility to Russia and the strength of reactionary opposition to M. Titulescu in Rumania, stands in danger of being virtually forced out of the Little Entente into a humiliating pact with Germany, lest worse befall her. We are approaching rapidly the "line-up" of 1914, but with German influence much stronger and with a new aim, the destruction of democracy and socialism by international reaction. Russia, absorbed in economic reconstruction, is essentially pacifist and non-imperialist; France on the threshold of great internal political and economic struggles, and the traditional stand of the British people on the side of democracies against dictatorships is impaired by the ogling of Nazi Germany in many influential quarters and the skilful agitation of the Bolshevik bogey before the eyes of the propertied classes. On balance, it is hard to say that the Austro-German agreement under these conditions really serves the cause of peace; on the contrary, taking the longer view, it is revealed as one more step towards the launching of war by the Fascist states against the democratic or socialist countries whose very existence is a reproach and a nightmare to the Fascist dictators.

Vienna.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

MR. GLADSTONE.*

IT has become a happy custom to recall upon this anniversary at Hawarden what Mr. Disraeli once termed the "continuous success and splendour" of Mr. Gladstone's "illustrious career." And, though I cannot speak of him, as some others have done here, with the intimacy of an old personal friend, I would ask leave to remind you of certain aspects of his policy as a statesman and of some of his characteristics as a man.

I suppose we should all agree that three outstanding subjects played the chief part in Mr. Gladstone's political career—Ireland, which he spent a lifetime in trying to render loyal and contented, Foreign Affairs, which meant to him unceasing efforts to make the influence of Britain an influence for freedom, right and peace abroad, and, thirdly, all that is included in that vast and inexorable term Finance. There were other chapters of course in a singularly rich and varied story, subjects even closer to his heart. There was the deep preoccupation with religion which dominated and inspired his life. And there was his devotion from boyhood up to the "God-fearing and God-sustaining" University which bred him, the love of which stayed with him even on his death-bed. But the three topics which I have mentioned cover, I think, the most strenuous political achievements of a life ever, as he once delightfully said, "greatly absorbed in working the institutions of his country."

Of Ireland I will say only this. For nearly sixty years, from the day when, a young man of twenty-five, Mr. Gladstone made his first speech on the Irish Church in the House of Commons, to the day when, an old man of eighty-two, on the eve of his fourth Premiership, he told Mr. Morley that they were both chained to the Irish oar, difficult questions of Irish government, of the Irish Church, of Irish Land, of Irish University Education, again and again engrossed him, and stimulated to astonishing triumphs that ever fresh and fearless mind. Many men have criticised Mr. Gladstone's Irish policies. In 1871 Mr. Disraeli denounced them as legalising confiscation, consecrating sacrilege and condoning high treason. Some may still doubt the wisdom of Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bills. But the bitterness infused

* The Founder's Day Address in St. Deiniol's Library, Hawarden, June 1936.

into that controversy has been forgotten, and very few will question the absolute sincerity of Mr. Gladstone's motives now.

If you will allow me one personal reminiscence, that controversy was extraordinarily exciting to young men living in Oxford, as I was, some fifty years and more ago. There was among us on one side a flame of passionate devotion, and on the other side a flame of indignation and resentment, not often seen in politics since. Edward Grey was one of the few men who kept cool. The fierce battles over the Land League, the Phoenix Park murders and Parnellism and Crime, Mr. Parnell's personal triumph and tragedy, Mr. Gladstone's memorable pilgrimage in 1888 to Birmingham, when, on the verge of eighty, he spoke for nearly two hours to 16,000 people, and the scene at the close, said Mr. Morley, who sat by him, was "indescribable, incomparable, overwhelming like the sea"—episodes like these added a zest to life. How vividly one still recalls debates at the Oxford Union in the eighties, when a stern young orator from Glasgow and Balliol, who now sits on the throne of Augustine, denounced Home Rule with a sonorous eloquence long since familiar to the world, and when some of us fought for it unashamed! Three years ago my old friend Archbishop Lang was speaking at this anniversary. He has long since realised the noble motives which inspired the last great battle of Mr. Gladstone's political career.

One is tempted to ask, suppose Mr. Gladstone had succeeded? Suppose in 1886 he had been able to persuade all parties to carry a measure of self-government which the responsible representatives of Ireland would accept, is it not possible that both countries might have been saved some shame and tribulation, and that the union between them might have been closer and happier than it is to-day? We may not all agree on that. But we shall all agree in treasuring as a jewelled page in the history of Parliament the picture of that heroic figure at the end of life, battling through eighty-two exhausting sittings on his last Home Rule Bill—the tireless work, the wonderful vitality, the infinite resourcefulness of argument and charm and humour, the "vulnerable temper" exquisitely disciplined, the matchless power of language fused with faith and fire. What wonder that his younger followers loved him with devotion, or that, when

his voice at last was silenced, we felt as if a glory had departed from the earth?

Turn to another theme—Foreign Affairs. There is a theory, I see, creeping into history books, that Mr. Gladstone took little interest in Foreign Affairs—surely the oddest delusion ever indulged in by historical minds. I am not going to take you over the history of Europe for sixty years. But let me remind you of a few big questions into which Mr. Gladstone was inevitably drawn. In 1848, when he was in the prime of life, two great principles or sentiments, Liberty and Nationality, woke Europe from its sleep afresh. In 1850 Mr. Gladstone went to Naples, saw as a shocked and startled observer the iniquities of Neapolitan rule, insisted in spite of official frowns in drawing the world's attention to them, and set flowing a tide of sympathy and indignation which no official apologies could withstand. Years of agitation were still needed to set the victims of that tyranny free. But Mr. Gladstone had already become a hero to the Italian people.

In 1858 a curious little episode, told in Lord Morley's pages with a delightful mixture of amusement and romance, made him the rather reluctant hero of the Ionian islanders also, in their vehement but unauthorised agitation for union with Greece. He went out as Commissioner to those ill-governed islands, and nearly forfeited his seat at Oxford by doing so. He found a system in existence which, in his own words, "not Cherubim nor Seraphim could work." He visited Corfu, whence Octavian had sailed to the battle of Actium. He danced at a ball in Ithaca, where Penelope had waited for Ulysses. He found in Athens—where they were snow-balling in the Parthenon—such a welcome as Demosthenes might have received on returning from the dead. He talked to the people in Greek or Italian, amid shouts of *Ζήτω ὁ φιλέλλην Γλάδστον*, and Mr. James Lacaita, a Neapolitan refugee, whom many of us may still remember, filled up intervals by reciting sonnets from Petrarch. Mr. Gladstone made one mistake; he kissed the hand of an orthodox Bishop—an incident on which, the Colonial Secretary observed uneasily, a question might be asked in Parliament. He hired a house in Corfu, and a story was circulated that Mr. Disraeli wished to make him King of the Ionian Isles. In the end nothing very definite came of Mr. Gladstone's labours and suggestions,

but Lord Palmerston finally decided to hand the islands over to Greece. On his way home from that mission Mr. Gladstone was presented to Cavour. A year later he stood staunchly by Lord John Russell in his fine vindication of Italian freedom. A few years later still he was paying tribute at Stafford House to Garibaldi, and dwelling on his striking union of tender humanity with fiery valour. To the last Mr. Gladstone believed in Italian gallantry and Italian freedom. He did not live to see them forgotten or misused.

It has been said that Mr. Gladstone combined the shrewdness of Lancashire with the grace of Oxford. And he inherited, from his Highland ancestry perhaps, a passionate and indomitable spirit. He joined the instincts of a fighter to a deep and inextinguishable love of peace. He would justify the Crimean War as an attempt to vindicate the public law of Europe. But he never liked it, and in 1855 he argued powerfully that the time for peace had come. He would take great risks in foreign policy, but only if he felt that it was necessary. His speech as Prime Minister in April 1885, when the attack of Russian troops on the Afghans at Penjdeh brought us within sight of war, was a striking example of spirit and firmness. But when trouble threatened between England and the United States, over those once famous now forgotten *Alabama* claims, he showed as striking self-control. He carried through, under very difficult conditions, a wise and generous act of arbitration, which prevented, as we trust for ever, a war between the British and American peoples. All his hope for the future lay in the triumph of appeals to equity like that. Peace and freedom were indeed the lodestars of his public life. "You want," he argued in 1857, "to place a living barrier between Russia and Turkey. There is no barrier like the breasts of free men." The free men whom he helped to liberate, not in Greece and Italy only, but in Bulgaria, Roumania, Macedonia, Montenegro, paid touching tributes to his memory later. In Bulgaria his son Herbert had the reception of a conqueror when he visited that country a generation after his father's death.

The love of freedom may be called a sentiment. But in Mr. Gladstone's case deep sentiment went hand in hand with deep practical wisdom. He would not waste strength, he said in 1870, in laying down general principles when nobody would attend to them. But he would never spare either his

own strength or his country's in resisting, when it was possible to resist, oppression, injustice and wrong. During the Chinese War of 1857 he pleaded in a magnificent speech for that justice which binds man to man, and which is older than Christianity itself. He returned to the same theme often, not least in those marvellous Midlothian campaigns—marvellous, surely, in their sustained exhibition of moral, mental and physical power. Lord Morley cites one day at Glasgow (on that occasion a mere adjunct of Midlothian), which even Mr. Gladstone, then not quite seventy, described as "overpowering"—a breakfast-party first with a great flow of talk, then a long Rectorial address at midday, then a luncheon with speeches which lasted till four, then a meeting of 6,000 people for an hour-and-a-half's oration in St. Andrew's Hall, then a dinner-party, not devoid, we may be sure, of conversation, and finally an immense gathering at the Town Hall after that.

The essence of the Midlothian speeches was an appeal from false aims of conquest and supremacy to human fellowship and human justice, to the common conscience of mankind. It was a demand for that "enthronement of public right as the growing idea" of policy, which the League of Nations is endeavouring amid disappointments and confusions to promote to-day. Rhetorician, no doubt, the speaker was, if words which touch the heart are rhetoric. But Mr. Gladstone's idealism was after all accompanied by an unparalleled experience of government, and by an unrivalled power of appealing to that "under-sense of greatest" things which is found even in the minds of humble men. "Quench the spirit of Midlothian," said John Morley, "and you may leave Machiavelli master of the world."

There are many other examples of Mr. Gladstone's keen interest in foreign affairs. He found time to denounce with fearless vigour the opium traffic which we forced on China. He restored independence to the Transvaal—it needed moral courage—after Majuba Hill. He treated generously with Afghans and Zulus. He established, most unwillingly, a virtual Protectorate in Egypt. He pleaded to his latest day for the Christians of Armenia. He speculated on the influence of Assyria upon Homer. He took a deep interest in the problems of India, where, for many years, he had a son to correspond with, a son dear to him all his lifetime and dear

in memory to many here. Little interest in foreign policy! Was there in fact any issue of importance in any continent or any country which escaped the review, was untouched by the ardour, of that far-ranging and stimulating mind?

Go on for a moment to Finance. I suppose no subject in the world to-day is more important, or less agreeable, to the rulers of mankind. Of no department of affairs was Mr. Gladstone more universally admitted to be master. And in none, unhappily, has he left fewer successors or disciples. Perhaps the most astonishing thing about Mr. Gladstone as a statesman was his combination of deep sentiment and flowing oratory with the close and patient mastery of complicated practical details, with solid and laborious legislation, with the reorganisation of British finance and the emancipation of British trade.

The great Budget of 1853 made him decisively the first figure in the House of Commons. The Budget of 1860, helped by Cobden's invaluable treaty with France, proved an even greater triumph. Over 370 taxes were swept away. The customs duties, which in 1845 had numbered 1,163, were now reduced to 48. The trade of Victorian England, released from its shackles, went up and up. The more the wizard took off his taxes, the more the revenue rose and the surpluses increased. The paper-tax went and we had a cheap Press: how far that has proved an unmixed blessing critics of the twentieth century may dispute. The soap-tax went and we had cheaper washing. The tea-tax and sugar-tax went, in part at any rate, and we had cheaper tea and sugar. The malt-tax went and even the brewers were pleased. The income-tax went down to fourpence—its proper rate, Mr. Gladstone argued, in time of peace—and for years he clung to the hope of abolishing it altogether. No financial triumph seemed to be impossible. Not even Peel or Pitt, men said, had laboured so successfully to make us in finance and commerce the leaders of the world.

For thirty years, from 1853 to 1882, this great Minister's principles and practice dominated the finances of this country. He reared a school of Civil Servants at the Treasury, a school, it may be, now extinct, who made his financial methods an inspiration to the public service. And the splendour of his thirteen Budgets, their grasp, their mastery, their understanding, alike of the widest economic issues and

of the special necessities of this country, stand out in fine but melancholy contrast with the aims and methods of some later days. To his last hour Mr. Gladstone fought against expenditure on armaments. He retired finally from public life upon that issue. He could not join, he said, in plunging England into the "whirlpool of militarism." And he dreaded the growth of expense. In 1896 he thought the financial prospects of this country darker than he had ever known them. What would he think of our estimates this year?

Do you remember some of Mr. Gladstone's maxims for a Chancellor of the Exchequer? He is not worth his salt if he "makes his own popularity either his first consideration, or any consideration at all," in administering the public purse. He is "under a sacred obligation with regard to all that he consents to spend." He is "chicken-hearted" if he shrinks from small savings, cheese-parings, economy in detail. His duty is to "exorcise" the spirit of expenditure, not to bow weakly before it. How penurious such theories seem beside our magnificent expenditure to-day, when Budgets soar to £800 millions, and supplementary estimates are confidently promised, and subsidies and doles have become an accepted part of our administrative system, and the chief aim of many social reformers is to prevent any impertinent enquiry into the means which those who ask for public money may possess!

May I venture to put beside Mr. Gladstone's exhortations four significant facts in our Budget to-day?

1. We have saved lately £82 millions a year in debt services: but we have made up for this by spending £80 millions more.
2. We are proposing to spend £300 millions during the next five years on a new programme of defence. But, lest anyone should think this disproportionate, we hope to spend in the same period £130 millions more on roads, in addition to the millions "normally spent" on roads each year.
3. We have spent £1,000 millions since the War on housing: yet a high authority tells us that that problem "remains in some respects as acute as ever."
4. We propose to spend, out of rates and taxes together, on civil and social services some £529 millions this year. Yet few reformers will allow that the results to our people are satisfactory in education, health, prosperity or employment.

Is this startling expenditure really due to public needs or to the public conscience? Or is it due to the ever-increasing disregard in our administration of those rules of discrimination, watchfulness, economy, which were the basis of Mr. Gladstone's great success?

It is a characteristic of the mischiefs that arise from financial prodigality that they creep onwards with a noiseless and a stealthy step; that they commonly remain unseen and unfelt, until they have reached a magnitude absolutely overwhelming.

Let me leave those prophetic words, hoping that they may not prove to be a prophecy, and add a word or two on the personal characteristics which made Mr. Gladstone not only wondered at but loved. We know him nowadays—for many men have written about him—as we know few of the heroes of English History. In a beautiful tribute to his old chief Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Gladstone spoke of his great simplicity, and added that there were also secrets of character, “a treasure-house within him, which he kept closed against the eyes of men.” Mr. Gladstone himself had the same fine and strong simplicity of nature, joined with a singularly subtle and complicated mind. And yet no man perhaps had fewer secrets; “nobody,” said Lord Morley, “ever lived and wrought in fuller sunlight.” With this simplicity there went a fearlessness which made him, not indeed indifferent to opinion, but wholly indifferent to anything mean or base. Once sure of his ground and of his duty, no risk of misunderstanding would restrain him, no clamour make him draw back. His pride was as noble as his courage, and no man of greater courage ever lived. This gallant, simple-minded, courteous gentleman could be very formidable in the face of wrong.

To his children, however, who learned both to love and to revere him, Mr. Gladstone was never formidable at all. Do you remember Herbert's story of how, when he was acting as his father's Secretary in 1889, there came a letter about Home Rule from Dr. Kane, the redoubtable Grand Master of the Irish Orangemen? Herbert asked if he might see Mr. Gladstone's reply. “Kane, Kane,” said Mr. Gladstone, “I have no letter from him.” On the floor there was a post-card, rather curt, and addressed to “—Kanelk Esq.” Dr. Kane had had a habit of putting *clk*, meaning Clerk in Holy

Orders, after his name, and he did not write very clearly. Herbert suggested a letter less curt and differently directed. Mr. Gladstone agreed to write one, and brought it presently to Herbert's room, knocking, as his custom was, on his son's door. Herbert read it and shook his head. Mr. Gladstone—he was eighty and at the top of his fame—took it back like a school-boy, “like an angel” says his son, and presently brought a third copy. “Will this do?” Yet this patient scribe would turn like a lion on a Secretary who failed to remember at once what the Sugar Duty had been in 1842, or what Fra Paolo Sarpi had said about the Council of Trent.

That home life at Hawarden I cannot dwell on; but it must have been a refreshing and inspiring thing—such a father, mother, sons and daughters, such character, talent, vivacity, goodness, such able, happy and great-hearted people! Mr. Gladstone's habits of order and exactness, carried into extraordinary detail, were essential if he was to get through the vast labours of his life, the endless occupations, the immense correspondence—we hear of 140 letters in a single day. Yet he found time for everything, for politics, statesmanship, literature, for reading voraciously, writing incessantly, speaking perpetually to every kind of audience with the same irresistible effect—time for sport and exercise and music, for society, hospitality and friends, for the dear companionship of his children and his wife. When he was working 14 or 15 hours a day on his first Budget, he still gave his second boy a Latin lesson every morning. His physical energy, the walking and wood-cutting especially, became a legend. He did not, as one fanciful Frenchman has stated, while waiting for election-results at Hawarden, walk 33 miles a day! But he did some remarkable feats in walking, and continued them almost into old age.

The love of order and hatred of waste were most marked perhaps in money matters. The tireless steward of the national finances was, unlike Mr. Pitt, just as wise and careful in managing his own. Little boys sent to Eton had only ten shillings each, increased by one shilling every half. Mrs. Gladstone, who had not the same love of method, saw that they did not run short. For Herbert at 15 ten brief financial principles were jotted down, beginning, “Give a tenth; not less; save a tenth, if you can”; and ending, “Keep your wants within your means.” There were other

suggestions for Herbert when he went to Oxford, especially one, that he should keep a journal, "most valuable as an *Account Book of the all-precious gift of Time*." There was one shining precept for all his children. "Make the best you can of everybody and everything." His determination to waste nothing, to save scraps of paper and scraps of string, to wash his hands in an inch or two of water during a drought, to write, if he wished to, on both sides of a post-card—a point on which he fought and beat the Post Office—were very characteristic of the man. And hand in hand with his keen and resolute thrift there went a boundless generosity. Between 1831 and 1898 he gave £83,000 to objects of charity and religion, in addition to the £30,000 which he set apart to found the noble building where we are assembled. His sons kept up this great tradition, not least the son whom, with his father, we specially commemorate to-day.*

One revels still in the conversations, the personal traits and stories and absurdities, which Mr. Gladstone's friends recall; his love of fun and doggerel verse—he was as good at that as at translating hymns into Italian; his temptation to exceed in strawberries and gooseberries—supposed to be innocuous when personally picked; his rules for packing—the only way to pack a sponge was to put it in your bath-towel and stamp upon it—he had no great respect for young men who could not pack for themselves; his hatred of the small print in Bradshaw, and his delight to find that the proprietor was a descendant of the Regicide—one could expect nothing else; yet Charles I "was, no doubt, a dreadful liar"; and Cromwell perhaps "did not always tell the truth." Mr. Gladstone himself was sometimes accused of equivocation by over-simple men, who had never studied, as some of us have tried to do, the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages. There is the story of the famous slip in 1862, when, during the American Civil War, Mr. Gladstone was incautious enough to say that the leaders of the South had made a nation—and of the explanation which his Private Secretary offered to critics afterwards:

Mr. Gladstone desires me to remark that to form opinions upon questions of policy, to announce them to the world, and to take or be a party to taking any of the steps necessary for giving them effect, are matters which, though connected together, are in

* A memorial to Lord Gladstone of Hawarden was unveiled that day (June 26th).

themselves distinct, and which may be separated by intervals of time longer or shorter according to the particular circumstances of the case.

There are of course many tales of Mr. Gladstone's reading. At Oxford once the Bible, Alfieri, *Wallenstein*, Plato, Gifford's *Pitt* and *Biographia Literaria* are jotted down as the studies of a young man of twenty-three. In later years the "grey-beard," as he once called himself, read everything omnivorously. Aristotle, Augustine, Blackstone, Byron, Burke, Wordsworth, Tennyson, Heine, Marbot's memoirs, Max Müller's *Anthropological Religion*, Mackail's Greek Epigrams, and above all Homer and "great draughts of Dante," are among the references to innumerable books.

There was a tussle with John Morley one day at breakfast over John Locke. Mr. Gladstone was suspected by Morley of believing that contempt for Locke was the beginning of wisdom. There was a question at another time whether the breeding of Plato or Cicero was better or worse than the breeding of the Eastern Bishops at Ephesus and Nicea: I think Mr. Morley declined the argument there. But Mr. Gladstone's conversation, with its variety and liveliness and modesty, was of course extraordinarily good.

I never knew anybody less guilty of the tiresome sin of arguing for victory. It is not his knowledge that attracts; it is not his ethical tests and standards; it is not that dialectical strength of arm which, as Mark Pattison said of him, could twist a bar of iron to its purpose. It is the combination of these with elevation, with true sincerity, with extraordinary mental force.

I like one episode which took place at The Durdans, when Lord Rosebery deliberately asked him to meet a party of racing men. "At any rate," they said, "we shall be up to him about horses." Not they. The subject inevitably came up at dinner. But Mr. Gladstone had just been writing on the Homeric horse, and he plunged at once into an intensive study of the evolution and distribution of the Perissodactyles, which silenced though it fascinated them all. So Mr. Asquith, you may remember, shortly after his engagement to Miss Margot Tennant, confounded a smoking-room of racing-men by reciting without a stumble the list of Derby winners since the beginning of the race.

Some of Mr. Gladstone's judgments on individuals, given

in casual talk, are full of interest. Moses was beyond doubt a fine fellow; but he "could not honestly think that any figure in the Old Testament was comparable to the heroes of Homer." Cranmer, poor Cranmer, like Stafford Northcote, had no backbone; but Northcote had a perfect temper, and Jeremy Collier's description of Cranmer's courage at the stake was superb. Wordsworth as a man he had always found polite and amiable. When he came to dine in the Albany, he would change his silk stockings for grey worsted ones on going away. Peel was very helpless against Disraeli's mischievous sallies, answered them "with a kind of righteous dulness!" Lord John Russell once committed himself egregiously by promising a loan—a loan to Morocco—without consulting the Cabinet or the Chancellor of the Exchequer! John Bright Mr. Gladstone could never quarrel with, whatever the bitterness over Home Rule. He never knew Bright make a slip in his pure English, save once when he used the "transpired" instead of "happened." Dr. Johnson—no mean talker that—was perhaps the best product of the eighteenth century. As for Marie Antoinette—"I suppose we must say she was, what shall I call it—a very considerable flirt?" Yes, Mr. Gladstone loved and excelled in talk. Sir Andrew Clark, he complained, seemed to expect him "to keep silent almost like a Trappist" when he had a bad throat once in 1885.

I must stop. Shadows of course there are in that great picture—errors, miscalculations, disappointments. Could such things be avoided altogether in a life filled for over sixty years with the greatest issues of "an agitated and expectant age"? I am here to-day not to criticise but to pay homage to a majestic figure, to noble achievement, genius, self-command, to an undaunted and untiring sense of duty, to an ever-deepening love of human freedom. "You have so lived and wrought," said one, "that you have kept the soul alive in England." May we, when our day ends, be fitted to share in tributes such as that!

CHARLES MALLET.

DANZIG: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM.

A GESTURE often lays bare feelings whose existence the written or spoken word has hitherto failed to reveal. At the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva on July 4th the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig made a gesture that was as symbolic as it was unmannerly. Herr Greiser on leaving the meeting cocked a snook at the benches on which sat the Press representatives from all countries. His action serves better than any of his speeches to show the contempt in which the Nazi Government in Danzig holds the free expression of opinion. At the same time it indicated the quarter from which that Government has most to fear—world opinion. The Danzig Government can indeed—and actually does—stifle all public expression of opinion within the territory of the Free City by employing such means as the suppression of newspapers and the intimidation and imprisonment of its opponents. It cannot silence the foreign Press.

In the speech which he delivered before the Council immediately prior to his gratuitous insult to the Press correspondents, Herr Greiser posed as a champion of democracy. It was obvious to the audience that Herr Greiser felt ill at ease in his unaccustomed role. The arguments which he brought forward in support of his complaint against the Council, and more particularly against the High Commissioner in Danzig, were too patently fallacious to have deceived anyone acquainted with the true character of the Danzig problem. Nevertheless his arguments deserve examination and refutation if only because they serve indirectly to set that problem against its present—Nazi—background. First, however, it is necessary to recall the circumstances that preceded Herr Greiser's appearance at Geneva as a champion of democratic government. For a long time past it has been one of the principal charges brought by the Nazi Government in Danzig against the League High Commissioner that he has unnecessarily interfered in the domestic concerns of the city and even encouraged the Opposition parties to appeal to him in order that their complaints of injustice and ill-treatment might be brought before the notice of the Council of the League. The High Commissioner—Mr. Sean Lester—retorted in his

report to the Council on July 2nd by accusing the Nazi Government of seeking to intimidate the Opposition and acting in an unconstitutional manner. A few days previous to this report the German cruiser *Leipzig* paid a visit to Danzig, and the officers—contrary to all precedent—declined to attend a reception given by the High Commissioner in their honour. It was understood in Danzig that the officers acted on instructions given to them by the Reich Government in Berlin by wireless. Hence it became obvious that Herr Greiser could count upon the support of the Reich Government in his campaign against the League and its supervision of Danzig affairs. The fact that Herr Greiser visited Berlin on his way to Geneva only served to demonstrate still more clearly that his actions were inspired by a higher authority. It was therefore in the dual capacity of a member of the National Socialist Party bound to obey the Leader's orders and of a President of the Danzig Senate responsible both to the Danzig electorate and to the League for his actions that Herr Greiser appeared before the Council on July 4th and delivered a speech that occasioned much comment throughout the world.

As a champion of democracy Herr Greiser signally failed to gain the sympathies of his audience. Nevertheless it is significant that he should have sought to play this part on the international stage. His choice of such a role was indeed tantamount to an admission that public opinion throughout the world was largely hostile to the National Socialist authoritarian conception of government, and that National Socialism could not afford to ignore that opinion. Hence Herr Greiser proceeded to argue that the Danzig Senate, as the properly constituted governmental authority in the Free City, must be free to pass such legislation as it deemed necessary. The Senate, he declared, had been elected in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Constitution and possessed a majority in the local parliament (*Volkstag*). It was therefore a violation of democratic principles for the High Commissioner to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Free City and to declare that certain laws introduced by the Senate and passed by the *Volkstag* were incompatible with the Constitution. At this stage Herr Greiser suddenly exchanged his official character as President of the Senate for that of a local Nazi leader in declaring that it was in any

case immaterial whether or not such laws complied with constitutional provisions, since the Constitution itself had been forced upon the acceptance of the Danzig population. The Constitution, he said, had been imposed upon Danzig by an outside agency. Once again Herr Greiser exchanged his roles and reverted to his official character. As Head of the Danzig Government he declared that if only the League ceased to meddle in Danzig affairs the Danzigers and the Poles would speedily achieve a settlement of any issues arising between them. This was at least an argument with which the Council was thoroughly familiar. It had been used on many occasions in the past by Herr Greiser's predecessors in office.

The importance of Herr Greiser's speech does not consist in the arguments with which he endeavoured to convince his hearers that the supervisory authority of the League in Danzig affairs was only productive of dissension and disorder and should therefore cease. In the long and acrimonious history of the Danzig problem, July 4th, 1936, will always be remembered as the day on which a President of the Danzig Senate openly challenged the right of the League to intervene in Danzig affairs. No previous President has ever put forward such a claim. Time and again during the last sixteen years there has been disagreement between the Danzig Government and the League over matters arising either out of the internal administration of the Free City or out of its relations with Poland. On no single occasion has the Head of that Government publicly repudiated the Constitution of the Free City and denied the right of the League to occupy itself with Danzig's domestic affairs. The gage thus defiantly flung down by Herr Greiser in the presence of the Council must be taken up if even the semblance of the League's supervisory authority in regard to Danzig is to be preserved. For that reason alone it is urgently necessary that there should be complete and widespread understanding throughout the world of the exact relationship between the League and Danzig and of the mutual rights and obligations arising out of that relationship. Any attempt to define that relationship involves an examination of the essential nature of the Danzig problem.

In its simplest form that problem arose out of the necessity to afford Poland a free and secure access to the sea. It is too

often forgotten in justice to the much-decried work of the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919 that it did not approach its task with free hands. The Fourteen Points enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson, and accepted by victors and vanquished alike, laid down the bases of the future territorial and political reorganisation of Europe. The Thirteenth Point declared that the newly established Republic of Poland "should be assured a free and secure access to the sea. . . ." Inasmuch as the Fourteen Points had been accepted both by Germany and the Allies the Conference could not do otherwise than honour its obligations. Nevertheless it found itself on the horns of a dilemma. Where was this "free and secure access to the sea" to be found? Obviously it could not be achieved by way of any German port like Königsberg or Stettin. On the other hand, Danzig had historic associations with Poland and had previously served it in the same capacity for more than three centuries to their great mutual profit and satisfaction. It was true that for a hundred years past Danzig had been an integral part of Prussia and had served that State as a naval dockyard and important military centre. But historical precedent again pointed a way out of the difficulty. For seven years (1807-14) Danzig had been a Free City under French domination. Why should it not once again be severed from Germany and restored to an autonomous condition? A Danzig freed from German control might very well serve Poland as its outlet to the sea. At the same time it was recognised, notably by Mr. Lloyd George, that there could be no question of placing this predominantly German city under Polish sovereignty. That the Polish Government wished to see Danzig incorporated with the Polish State was no less certain. The only reasonable way out of the difficulty therefore seemed to be to accord Poland special rights in regard to the harbour of Danzig and to confer upon the city a semi-sovereign status. The reason why complete sovereignty was not conferred upon the Free City is not far to seek: its own resources were inadequate to enable it to defend its independence against aggressive designs from whatsoever quarter they might come; and the newly created super-national institution of the League of Nations appeared to afford an excellent means of protecting Danzig from the covetousness of its neighbours at the relatively small sacrifice of its full legal sovereignty.

The Peace Conference therefore resolved to make Danzig a Free City under the guardianship of the League of Nations. Poland was accorded far-reaching rights and privileges in the harbour of Danzig, and "the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when abroad" was placed in her hands. It was because Article 104 of the Treaty of Versailles placed the conduct of Danzig's foreign affairs in Poland's charge that the Council of the League, after hearing Herr Greiser's speech on July 4th, resolved that the Polish Government should be asked to treat of the incident of the *Leipzig* with Germany through diplomatic channels, on the ground that the failure of her officers to render the customary courtesies to the representative of the League in Danzig fell within the sphere of Danzig's foreign relations. Nevertheless the incident of the *Leipzig* is no more than the straw which reveals the direction from which the wind is blowing. It is the challenge to the League's authority implicit in that incident as well as explicitly contained in Herr Greiser's speech that is a matter of international concern. Hence it becomes necessary to ask what are the rights and duties given to the League in its capacity as the guardian of Danzig's independence.

It is frequently taken for granted in discussions of the Danzig problem that two Great Powers alone are intimately interested in the issue: Germany and Poland. Actually the League is still more closely—and certainly legally—associated with the fortunes of the Free City. Article 102 of the Treaty of Versailles expressly placed Danzig beneath "the protection of the League of Nations." The succeeding Article put the Constitution of the Free City under the "guarantee" of the League, and also provided for the appointment of a representative of the League who was to reside permanently in Danzig and to be given the title of High Commissioner. He was to be entrusted primarily with the duty of dealing "with all differences arising between Poland and the Free City of Danzig in regard to this Treaty or any arrangement or agreements made thereunder." Furthermore, Article 5 of the Constitution placed upon the League the responsibility of granting or withholding permission to Danzig to serve as a military or naval base or to erect fortifications or authorise the manufacture of munitions or war material upon its territory. Finally, it would certainly appear from Article 42

of the Constitution that the League was intended to supervise the conduct of public affairs in Danzig inasmuch as that Article states clearly :

The Senate of the Free City shall furnish to the League of Nations at any time upon the request of the latter official information regarding the public affairs of the Free City.

It is true that the wording of this Article does not of itself confer upon the League any right of active intervention in Danzig domestic affairs. Nevertheless, when read in conjunction with Article 49 and with Articles 100-8 of the Treaty of Versailles, it is indisputable that the League is responsible not merely for the preservation of good relations between Danzig and Poland, but also for the maintenance of the Constitution of the Free City and of law and order on its territory. For the Constitution itself—the particular object of Herr Greiser's vehement attack—cannot be altered or amended without the express consent of the League, despite the fact that an amendment may have passed the *Volkstag* or received the support of a majority of the electorate at a referendum. It has been a bitter disappointment to the Nazi rulers of Danzig that they have hitherto proved unsuccessful in gaining the two-thirds majority in the *Volkstag* necessary to enable them to alter the Constitution. At the same time it would seem that they had forgotten until very recently that even a two-thirds majority would not suffice for their purpose. In order to amend the Constitution in conformity with National Socialist principles the Government in Danzig still requires the assent of the League. As it stands at present, the Constitution guarantees to every citizen of the Free City the civic rights and liberties customary in democratic communities; it safeguards the Polish minority in its "free racial development . . . in particular as regards the use of its mother-tongue in the schools and in the internal administration as well as in the administration of justice . . ."; and it forbids the use of Danzig as a military or naval base without the previous assent of the League of Nations. Is it possible that the League could assent to a "reform" of the Constitution in a National Socialist sense that would inevitably mean not merely the destruction of whatever vestige of individual liberty still remains in Danzig but which would also pave the way to making the Free City a German naval

and military base? If it were to do so its authority as a guardian of international law and order as well as of the rights and liberties of the political and racial minorities committed to its charge would be irretrievably lost.

It is even possible to experience a feeling of gratitude to Herr Greiser for having confronted the League with an issue from which there can be no retreat without loss of moral prestige. Either the League is the guardian of the Danzig Constitution—or it is not. That Constitution guaranteed civic liberty and the right to the public expression of opinion to every citizen of the Free City within the limits set by the law. The Articles conferring those fundamental rights upon the citizens of Danzig have latterly been more honoured in the breach than in the observance. The meetings of the Opposition Parties (it should be recalled that there is a strong Opposition to the present Government in Danzig that holds thirty out of seventy-two seats in the *Volkstag*) have been broken up, their leaders thrown into prison on vague charges of "political activities antagonistic to the State," and their newspapers ruthlessly suppressed on the barest pretexts. All this has happened in a Free City whose Constitution is under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The Opposition Parties availed themselves of their right of appeal to the League through the intermediary of its High Commissioner in Danzig, and their petition was heard by the Council at its meeting on September 23rd, 1933, when the Council decided that the Senate should be requested to conform its actions to the Constitution and that the President of the Senate should report to the Council that its recommendations had been carried into effect. Meanwhile the legality of the Senate's actions was tested by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which found in its judgment delivered on December 4th, 1935, that the decrees issued by the Senate violated both the principles and provisions of the Constitution and were incompatible with the guarantees which it provided for the fundamental rights of individual citizens.

Nevertheless the Senate did not mend its ways. At the Council meeting on January 20th of the present year Mr. Eden, as *rapporteur* for Danzig affairs, was forced to admit that there was reason to doubt the Senate's good faith and that the Council's recommendations had not been carried into effect. His statement provoked the retort from Herr

Greiser that in fact four of the six recommendations made by the Council had already been carried out. Whatever may have been the truth of the matter, the rebuke administered by Mr. Eden combined with the condemnatory Judgment of the Permanent Court resulted in a change of attitude on the part of the Senate which now professed its willingness to comply with the Council's recommendations and also to amend the two decrees declared to be unconstitutional. This change of attitude towards the League on the part of the Senate nevertheless proved to be more apparent than real. Within six months the good relations that had thus been laboriously established were again disturbed by the fresh attack on the League's authority launched by Herr Greiser in his speech on July 4th. In such circumstances it is inevitable that the question should openly be asked on all sides: "When will the next offensive begin?"

It is clear from the foregoing recital of the recent relations between the Nazi Government in Danzig and the League as the guarantor of Danzig's liberties, that that Government is determined to restrict severely—if not indeed to destroy entirely—the right of supervision and intervention possessed by the League in regard to Danzig domestic affairs. Furthermore it would seem probable from the arguments advanced in Herr Greiser's speech on July 4th that his Government will seek to declare that the German-Polish Pact of Non-Aggression and the resultant *détente* in German-Polish relations has rendered unnecessary the intermediary of the League in the settlement of Danzig-Polish disputes. One thing alone is certain: In whatever guise it may come, the renewed attack upon the League that is to be anticipated from Danzig will be of a fundamental nature that will not admit of evasion or of any settlement that does not radically alter the protective relationship in which the League at present stands in regard to the Free City. The choice before the League is a clear one: either it must find some means of enforcing its decisions or else abandon Danzig to its fate. At present the Constitution which is the League's special trust is being violated with impunity almost daily, both in the letter and in the spirit. A continuance of such a condition of disregard for the rule of law in Danzig must involve a similar contempt for international law and order. Inasmuch as it is expressly placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations the Constitution

of the Free City forms part of the public law of Europe. Any violation of its provisions is therefore tantamount to a violation of an international agreement. President Wilson declared that the "real authority of the League must be moral, not legal; it must depend on 'an attitude of comradeship and protection'; should a State be tempted to violate the spirit of its undertakings, 'the only restraining influence would be the public opinion of the world.'" The "public opinion of the world" on the subject of Danzig has been given clear expression in the columns of its Press in recent weeks. It is for the League of Nations to give practical effect to that opinion by discharging the moral as well as the legal obligations that have been placed upon it in regard to Danzig.

IAN F. D. MORROW.

UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE: THE SECOND EDITION.

THE Unemployment Assistance Board is at once a brand-new department of state, a new departure in centralised social administration and an experiment in political adjustment. It was set up by the Unemployment Act of 1934 as a new national service, with local offices, to take over from the county and borough councils the care of practically all unemployed and "able-bodied" persons who had been a local responsibility in any form. The Board commenced operations with the off-insurance unemployed in January 1935, but suffered partial shipwreck in the first three weeks. As a result, a curious measure, known as the Standstill Order, was passed in February 1935 in order to modify the effects of this too sudden centralisation of relief and to leave local scales in operation, wherever they were higher than the national scale of the Board. Moreover, some 200,000 of the potential clients of the Board were left entirely to the local public assistance authorities (who were already providing for them), pending the appointment of a date of transfer indefinitely postponed. Corresponding financial readjustments were made with the local authorities. That was eighteen months ago.

In June 1936 the Unemployment Assistance Board presented their first annual report, and in July the Minister of Labour laid before Parliament the long-delayed new edition of the Board's regulations, the main purpose of which was to liquidate as from November 16th next the awkward compromises of the Standstill Order. The new regulations could not be amended, but the House of Commons debated them for three days and a whole night. It was a crude discussion and showed once more that Imperial Parliament cannot handle the scales and details of poverty relief with any advantage to the country or credit to democracy. Incidentally, it is strange to remember that the Act of 1934, which placed these matters full in the lap of the House of Commons, was acclaimed by its sponsors as an Act to take the dole out of politics!

The Means Test.—Politically the issue has been simplified to a frontal attack upon the test of means and needs which, under the Act, must govern the distribution of these non-insurance relief payments. Other important administrative

difficulties have not been much considered. Socialist politicians still believe that their agitation against the means test is the most effective plank in their platform. In a few areas it may be so, but elsewhere the plank shows signs of wearing a bit thin. In practice it is the 13,000,000 insured wage-earners more than any other class that would reject a policy of adding equal non-contributory doles to unequal incomes. And, further, when they realised that such a plan meant the end of their cherished insurance scheme, which now covers more than three-fifths of their spells of unemployment, their resentment would be unmistakable. Insurance payments can and should be fixed according to scales and non-discretionary rules, but when it comes to relief of distress as such, whether due to unemployment or other causes, then the amount of public assistance offered to the individual must be measured according to the formula "needs *minus* available resources." That at least is the agreed view of the National Government groups and of the Opposition Liberals. Doubtless they represent mass opinion and one may doubt whether any Labour Cabinet, however powerful, would actually venture to offer full-scale payments, without any test of need, to all comers who claimed to be willing to work, but unable to find an employer to take them on. Even with industrial conscription as its logical counterpart the plan would scarcely be practicable, and one notes that Soviet Russia never dreams of making any such reckless offer.

The new regulations continue the means test, both for the individual and for the household, but they make a new attempt to solve its chief difficulty, i.e. the help in cash which earning members of a home are expected to give to their unemployed fathers and brothers and sons. In future, sons and daughters over 18 will not be called upon to help their families at all up to the first 20s. of their earnings. Over the 20s. limit they will have to make a contribution, but it will be less after November 16th than it is at present. Thus a boy of 19 earning 25s. will be expected to give up only 4s. 6d. instead of 9s. to-day, and, if an older son or daughter earns 50s. a week the expected contribution to the home will be 17s. instead of 25s. as at present. The earning member will, of course, have to pay also for his own keep.

A more flexible scheme.—The effects of the new regulations may be summarised under three general heads: they make

increases in payments to various types of applicants; they introduce a wider range of discretion in the handling of individual cases; and they appear to give local Advisory Committees a real status in the administration. Their immediate aim is to undo the effects of the Standstill Order as gently as possible.

As to the wisdom of the increases there is room for doubt, but there can be no question that the other two changes are in the right direction. Unofficial observers who have experience of relief technique usually agree that the Board's original attempt to lay down national rules for every kind of case and for every district was overdone. They tried to be too specific and they are, in this second edition of the scheme, moving towards a greater flexibility. The change is welcome, but it will call for a well-trained staff to serve in the "front line," and for much goodwill and common sense on the Advisory Committees. Few people who have not tried it realise how hard it is to distribute public money to one's fellow citizens, both adequately, equitably and uniformly. Human circumstances in poverty vary almost infinitely. Certain general types may emerge, but there is nearly always some individual factor of major or minor importance. Even where there are no resources of any kind, the back history of the case, arrears of rent, health conditions all vary—and the man may have a promise of work for next Monday. In other cases earnings go up and down, resources are difficult to measure or are actually concealed. There are twenty-eight different kinds of lodger. In such a maze the administrator cannot help feeling that, as G. K. Chesterton used to say, "the golden rule is that there is no golden rule." Scales and regulations are all very well; you cannot do without them; but the best poverty service is that which can be trusted to treat the rules as a guide and the scales as subject to adjustment to meet the need of the individual case. After all each "case" is a human group, not a standardised unit, of society.

Increases and cuts.—The official estimate is that over 200,000, say one-third of the applicants, will get increased allowances, and they will get them forthwith after November 16th. That is why the new scheme is to cost more, in spite of a scaling down in certain districts. The gains will affect several types of case, including many households where the income of persons other than the applicant affects the amount

of allowance granted to the latter. It is less possible to estimate the number of the cuts in allowances, partly because the reductions are to be only gradually enforced and partly because the new Advisory Committees are to have a considerable say in the matter. Moreover, the Board themselves are positively anxious to see plenty of appeals brought before the 138 Appeals Tribunals. Finally, there is the overriding consideration that no one can foretell the composition or number of the personnel coming to the U.A.B. six months ahead. Whatever the number of cuts, there is quite likely to be trouble in South Wales and one or two other places where people, with resources, have benefited by exceptionally high local assessments under the Standstill Order. In many areas the strain of the transition period on the new advisory committees will be severe, and it is perhaps unfortunate that these committees were not appointed months ago so that they could have learnt their job and settled down before this invidious task of liquidating the anomalies had to be tackled. Not before eighteen months have passed will it be possible to say that the critical period is over.

Other problems ahead.—Altogether the year 1937 will be a testing time for the U.A.B. and for the whole experiment involved by Part 2 of the Unemployment Act, 1934. What will be the relations between the Board sitting at Thames House and the 150 representative but non-elective bodies giving advice in the localities? How far, under this centralised scheme, will the new principle of flexibility be allowed to go? That the central-local partnership should succeed is of vital importance. This or some other method, perhaps a more drastic method, of regional devolution of responsibility has always seemed to the writer to be not only desirable but inevitable.

Then there is the urgent necessity of putting a little more bone into this flaccid policy of handing out maintenance to 620,000 able-bodied people, nearly all men, and leaving it at that. In a large proportion of the cases maintenance is not enough. Something more is needed if we are to counter the moral and physical damage that is being suffered. The problem of devising the right kinds of restorative or disciplinary measures has not yet been solved. Voluntary occupation of many kinds is one resource; official training in centres provided by the Ministry of Labour is another. But

neither in the depressed areas nor elsewhere is the field covered. There are, in fact, 500 vacant places in the excellent Government Training Centres waiting for youths from the special areas. Yet they do not come forward. In all districts there are clients of the Board who have lost the will to self-support and are content to live (and to leave their families to live) on the low standard of the dole. And the trouble will spread further with the higher allowances and easier conditions that are to prevail after November 16th. Many of those who need some stimulus are sympathetic cases, but some are not. In either event something in the nature of work centres to which they would be required to go would be a boon. But the scheme of treatment should be differentiated. The collier of 50 in Wales, whose condition resembles that of compulsory retirement, obviously belongs to a different category from the man under 50 who is *continuously* unemployed for six months in a place like London or Birmingham. There is no industrial excuse for the latter. Indeed, as trade improves personal characteristics are an increasing factor in the unemployment which falls into the U.A.B. net. Probably the delicate political position of the Board has made it difficult for them to tackle the less sympathetic side of their task, and by now they have considerable arrears to catch up. But they are not without powers of discipline under the Act (sections 40 and 41). They can give relief only in kind. They can send men to institutions. They can even expel temporarily or permanently from the scheme applicants who have proved really troublesome—all subject to the applicant's right of appeal. A month or two ago the Minister of Labour informed Parliament that only sixty cases had been dealt with under these sections of the Act. Yet in the period of sixteen months covered by the answer, the number of applicants passing through the Board's hands must have been over a million. As things are, the Board's clients may leave jobs voluntarily, may refuse suitable employment or be discharged for misconduct, and they can at once resume their weekly allowances from the Board and nothing said. Under Unemployment Insurance rules there would be a penalty of six weeks' disallowance in these cases, imposed after a hearing by a local Court of Referees. But these matters, both the "crimes" and the "punishments," are irrelevant to a *needs* service, and that is what the U.A.B. is. It is a new kind of national poor

law. The word "unemployment" in its title is either a misnomer or has a quite different connotation from that which it bears in "Unemployment Insurance."

The Second Appointed Day: April 1st, 1937.—The poor law aspect and functions of the Board will be greatly emphasised and magnified on April 1st, 1937. On that date the U.A.B. will have to take over from the local public assistance committees the remaining section of the so-called able-bodied poor—at least 200,000 of them. As a class these unfortunate people are of far lower average quality and fitness for work than the ex-insured unemployed now cared for by the Board. They are a marginal industrial group of dependent persons under 65 years of age who cannot be classed as sick or widows. They include not a few ne'er-do-wells, many who are really infirm and many who for various reasons will never work again. At the same time there are among them a number of good men and juveniles aged 16 to 18 who have had bad luck and are as fit for a job as the best of the U.A.B.'s existing clients. What is the Board to do with this miscellaneous class, some of whom are inmates of poor law institutions? The latter will presumably not even have an address. They present a baffling problem to a Board which is supposed to be specifically an *unemployment* authority, which possesses no institutions of its own and has not even got the work-centres which have been so useful under the poor law ever since Mr. Arthur Greenwood prescribed them in 1930. Can the Board, on top of all their other tasks next winter, put themselves in a position to face their new responsibilities as early as April 1st next? It is difficult to believe it. Obviously the real motive for so precipitate an arrangement is that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is impatient to tidy up his financial relations with local public assistance authorities. Admittedly the latter may also, for the most part, be eager for the transfer of duties, which they were promised in the Act of 1934. But none of these arguments should outweigh the argument for the humane and orderly ministration to a particularly helpless class of citizens. That is the dominant consideration.

The wider issues.—There are those who think that this further raid by the central authority upon the local public assistance services of Great Britain should not be permitted at all, that it will only add to the confusion of our social machinery already created by the U.A.B. and by the Act of

1934. They argue that the trouble goes very deep. Was not the basic conception of a centralised needs service geared neither to unemployment insurance on the one hand nor to the complementary local social services on the other a fundamental error? The simple notion of making all unemployment a national charge is turning out to be a very inadequate guide to policy and has already led us into a quagmire. We failed to define our terms and the words "unemployment" and "the unemployed" have many meanings. If the Government could be persuaded to think again they might discover that to give the country the social equipment it needs two broad courses of action were open, and that at the moment they are following neither of them. In the first place, the Unemployment Assistance scheme might be recast and restricted in scope so that it dealt only with the off-insurance class and only with the regular industrial types. It would be an appendage of unemployment insurance on the same principle as the Transitional Payment scheme which worked by no means badly between 1931 and 1935. Secondly, they might face the necessity of rebuilding a unified public assistance service, administered over regional areas, to deal with the whole assistance (and prevention) of poverty. They would recognise that in setting up national machinery for a separate class of poor persons, called the "able-bodied unemployed," they had imagined a false category. Where family need is concerned, including the infinitely varied needs of mothers, children and the elderly, such a category is meaningless. No specifically *unemployment* service can cope with human poverty in the round. It can only confuse our social administration and overlap with the work of the local social services, that is with public assistance, both domiciliary and institutional, with public health, and with the physical side of education. The latter are the real "needs" services, and it is only by developing them that Great Britain can make a permanent advance in its social equipment.

RONALD C. DAVISON.

ITALIANS AND YUGOSLAVS.

THERE are two types of men that follow one another uninterruptedly in Italy throughout the long history of our country. Between them the opposition is only apparent. The one is the man of realistic thought, who derives his philosophy from the cold observation of social life; it is Machiavelli who opens up in Italy the era of modern thinking (Machiavelli whose true character is so different from the Machiavellism of manner invented by superficial strangers); it is Cavour, the most complete statesman of the nineteenth century; it was, only yesterday, Giolitti with his somewhat pragmatic simplicity, his hatred of all rhetoric. The other type is that of the human saint, from Saint Francis of Assisi to Filippo Neri, to Mazzini, to the Bandiera brothers shot by the Habsburgs and the Bourbons, to Mameli, the young hero-poet killed by a French bullet during the siege of Rome in 1849, to Garibaldi, to Battisti, the pure Trentino hero.

It is worth while to note that both the great classical types of Italian genius harboured, during the nineteenth century, the same ideas and the same hopes concerning what then constituted the problem of the Southern Slavs. Our eastern neighbours, during the first half of the nineteenth century, were undergoing the first conscious aspirations of their national awakening. And Mazzini's *Lettere Slave* constituted the first and most eloquent defence of the reasons for life of the Yugoslav people. Spread in France, in England, they put the Yugoslav problem in the minds of the thinkers of liberal Europe. All the Yugoslavs know—or should know—these pages which are still so much alive to-day. The Italians all knew them, or at least did until Mazzini's ideas were repudiated by a régime that censored and suppressed books as never Austria had dared to do under Francis I. It is probably on account of the numerous extracts from the *Lettere Slave* which it contained that a little book on Mazzini which I had published at Milan in 1925 was, by order of the Fascist government, suppressed even in the catalogues of the firm who brought it out.

The fact is less well known that an Italian of a type directly opposed to Mazzini's wrote—a few years after Mazzini—pages inspired equally by deep sympathy for the independence

of the Yugoslav people. The Italian war against Radetzky's Austria was in full swing: the Croatian troops were fighting in the plains of Lombardy with a dynastic loyalism which their Kaiser a little later rewarded with the characteristic Habsburg ingratitude "that astonished the world," even the world of the other sovereigns—which is saying a good deal. And Cavour, in his newspaper, was saying from Turin to the Italians: "It is useless and futile for you to hate the Croats; they are like yourselves, the victims of a selfish power setting its subjects, with their eleven languages, against one another. These Croats must one day become, with their brothers the other Southern Slavs, the best friends and allies of Italy."

The memory is still fresh within me of one of the long walks I sometimes took in Corfu during the war with Prince Alexander, the future king of Yugoslavia. I quoted to him the articles written by Cavour in 1848 on the Slavs. He knew Mazzini's *Lettere Slave*, but not Cavour's writings. He asked me for them. As I did not have them at Corfu I had them sent from Rome to him at Salonica. In thanking me he added: "Cavour's thought must one day become the reality." I am certain to-day, as I was then, that his words on Cavour were much more than a compliment to me, for he knew how deeply convinced I was of the need for our two peoples to come to a fruitful understanding after the fall of the Habsburg monarchy—a fall I never doubted for an instant, even during the most critical moments of the war. I met Alexander Karageorgevich so often, in moments when there was no room for diplomatic attitudes, that I can assert he never ceased to wish for a real understanding as the only means of ensuring final security for his country. For my part I never forgot, even when he launched—for the better, he thought—on a dictatorship from which, I dared to tell him, he would find no issue, the loyalty and fervour with which he always endeavoured to promote anything that might further the cause of friendship between Italians and Yugoslavs—a cause so dear, one century earlier, to the hearts of two great Italians like Mazzini and Cavour.

How did it come to pass that so many Italians failed to agree on this policy after the war, the only policy, to my thinking, that would guarantee the security and the prosperity of our people? It is historically interesting to make out

the causes which have, in Italy, created such wide differences of opinion even amongst men who all equally desired the good of their country. I was myself the promoter of a decisive turn in Italo-Yugoslav relations; and as I wish to avoid the risk of apologetics, I shall limit my efforts to stating rigorously established facts.

Everybody knows that, when war broke out in Europe in 1914, Italy could do nothing but proclaim her neutrality, since Vienna, having prepared the ultimatum to Serbia without informing her of the fact, had thereby violated the most essential clauses of the Triple Alliance. But when, in September 1914, San Giuliano began to study the conditions and aims that would justify Italy's entrance into the war on the side of the Entente, I found his views much clearer than his dilettante scepticism had led me to expect from him. Though death was waiting for him, he continued to work stoically for his country. His ideas—as I was able to make out later from his correspondence and notes—may be summarised thus: To make sure that the Entente, which would be inclined to consider Germany as the sole enemy, would not be tempted to spare Austria, the direct cause of the crisis; to enter the war at the same time as Roumania; to acquire the national Alpine frontier everywhere, as well as some Dalmatian islands, but to refrain from territorial conquests in Dalmatia, an essentially Slav province; to wage war in complete political agreement with Serbia, who also had a vital interest in the disappearance of the Habsburg monarchy; after the war to continue a policy of collaboration with Belgrade with a view to ensuring Italian political influence in the East.

When San Giuliano died on October 16th, 1914, his ideas and plans had not taken definite shape. His successor was Sonnino, the only first-rank Italian statesman who had considered the possibility, when the world war broke out, of Italy siding with the Central Empires. It happened with Sonnino as it often does with honest, but narrow, minds which can only realise immediate possibilities and have no vision of the future. Worse still, they are suspicious of anything that seems to them "idealistic" or "sentimental" and only feel safe on the solid ground of "realities," which only proves that they are not sufficiently broadminded to see all the "realities." San Giuliano may have been right

or wrong in the practical means he contemplated ; but at least he had perceived that an old world was falling to pieces and that something new would take its place. Sonnino saw nothing in our relation to Austria but a juridical problem to solve. He never faced the assumption that Austria might disappear as a Great Power, and that the new national states might arise which Mazzini, with his prophetic insight, had foreseen. He brushed his predecessor's comprehensive views aside as so many intellectual acrobatics. He fixed his mind on Article 7 of the Treaty of Alliance which bound Austria-Hungary and Italy, if they should change the *status quo* in the Balkans "by temporary or permanent occupation," to come to an understanding "by preliminary agreement on the principle of reciprocal compensation for any advantage, territorial or otherwise, that each might win." It was on this point that he started discussion with Berchtold, who answered with pitiable distinctions between "temporary" and "momentary" occupation. The two men seemed to have one idea in common : that the life of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was not really at stake. Thus it came about that Sonnino, his legitimate demands for compensation having been rejected, came to sign his Treaty of London with the Entente Powers, by which he secured for Italy a large portion of Dalmatia. This latter fact alone should have made him forgo any thought of a lasting agreement with Belgrade, such as San Giuliano had wished ; on the contrary, Serbia became for him a potential adversary.

When it became evident in 1918 that the arbiter of the peace negotiations would be Wilson, I wrote to Sonnino asking him again to allow me to come to a complete understanding with Prince Alexander and Pachich. "If," I wrote, "we come to the Peace Conference with our Oriental problem settled, we shall be able to look for a much greater influence on world affairs ; otherwise we risk spending all our forces in a sterile struggle with the Yugoslavs." Sonnino, who knew what I meant by an honest complete agreement (more or less what I did at Rapallo), wired me that he authorised my conversations with Pachich. But a few days later he wired again instructing me to suspend all conversations and await "final instructions," which never arrived. When I saw him again and told him that his way of considering

the problem struck me as rash, he only answered (somewhat embarrassed, since he knew how deeply I felt that the method I urged was the only one which could guarantee the interests of our country) : "You know, I am like the Tuscan peasants ; I prefer to lower the price of my cattle during the last hour of the market."

Such on both sides of the trenches were the leaders of a war in which Europeans died by the million. Sonnino had always contemplated a short war, and his Treaty of London with Allied loans that would hardly cover a few weeks of hostilities proves it. He had imagined a war ending without the destruction of Austria, and he had never resigned himself to the fact that history might evolve along different lines from those he had imagined. Sometimes his prejudices looked very much like mental obsession. Italy had, on the Macedonian front, a body of troops which often exceeded 70,000 men. Officers and men always entertained the most cordial relations with their Serbian companions in arms. But this contingent, so important and highly appreciated, was never officially called anything but the 35th Division. As names count in foreign politics, I had insisted several times that the name in this case should become as important as the thing, and that it should be called an Army Corps. Sonnino always vetoed the suggestion. He was quite willing to help Serbia, but he did not want it to be known. At the end of the war Italy would have been entitled to tell herself that six hundred thousand of her children had not died in vain. Not only had she reconquered her natural frontiers, but the downfall of Imperial Austria had given her back full diplomatic liberty ; for, before the war, Italy had been bound by an ever-present dilemma : friend or foe to Austria.

Austria gone, the international influence of Italy, now entirely free in her decisions, increased. Even the gropings and contradictions of Fascist diplomacy have not succeeded in obliterating this influence, at least not in Central Europe and in the Balkans, where I was sure, when I was in charge of the foreign policy of my country, that it should become preponderant in the interest of the organisation of peace. But Sonnino was the same in peace as he had been during the war : convinced that Italy would have fought in vain if the letter of his London Treaty was not fulfilled. Like all those who cannot imagine victory otherwise than armed and

threatening someone, he considered in good faith that she would lose the fruits of her victory if, like a new Austria, she did not settle in Dalmatia. It is useless to recall here what happened at the Peace Conference in connection with Dalmatia and Fiume. Is anything more natural than that an important part of public opinion—led on in its errors by an over-excited press—should imagine that victory had been “mutilated,” and that the fault lay with those Slav neighbours, half of whom had fought against us fiercely under the Austrian colours? Moreover, it is natural, alas, that after the violence and the sufferings engendered by four years of war, the generous and prophetic words of Mazzini should be forgotten—Mazzini who had preached the European need for, and Italy’s interest in, the resurrection of the nationalities subject to Austria. Few generous thoughts withstand the atmosphere of war—and of victory. The childish and aggravating exaggerations of the young Yugoslav nationalism, for that matter, helped the anti-Slav propaganda of Italian nationalists in Italy.

When I became Minister for Foreign Affairs in June 1920, my personal attitude towards my two predecessors Tittoni and Scialoja might seem paradoxical, but only in appearance. Tittoni had not yet rejected the offer of a border line a few kilometres from Trieste which Lloyd George had suggested to him at Clairfontaine in the autumn of 1919; Scialoja had been ready to break the geographical unity of Istria by accepting a frontier line that cut it in two.* I considered that, after four years of war and more than half a million dead, Italy—so often invaded in the course of her history—should stretch to her most perfect natural frontiers: the Alps, and as Dante had said, *presso del Quarnaro, che Italia chiude e i suoi termini bagna*.† But on the other hand I was ready, for the sake of the supreme interests of my country, to face an unpopularity which would not have been entirely artificial.

* Ambassador in Paris in 1915 during the negotiation of the London Treaty, Tittoni had been definitely opposed to Sonnino’s views on Dalmatia; and he did not hide from Sonnino, in his despatches, that he thought it dangerous to render future Italo-Yugoslav relations difficult. His accurate appreciation of Italy’s interests at that time should have made Tittoni more uncompromising on the question of the natural frontier in 1919; for he could have proved to Wilson and to the latter’s representatives that he had been in favour of a policy of friendship with the Slavs long before Wilson himself.

† *Inferno*, IX.

A few days after the constitution of the Giolitti Cabinet, in which I had taken the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, I was given an opportunity, during the Spa Conference (July 1920) to probe the real intentions of the Belgrade government and to expound my own views. This I did with Trumbich, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the neighbouring kingdom, whom I had met during the war at the time of the Corfu pact between Serbs and Croats. At the same time I made it clear to my Spa colleagues, Millerand, Lloyd George and Curzon, that I was resolved on an early and final settlement, if possible in full agreement with Belgrade, but, if necessary, independently of Belgrade as of London and Paris.* Millerand and Lloyd George understood; indeed it was at Spa that the atmosphere was built up out of which, five months later, arose the Treaty of Rapallo.

As soon as Europe had become convinced that the disorders which were sporadically breaking out in Italy in those days were nothing but a transitory result of post-war neurasthenia, and that the clever legend of Bolshevik danger (kept up later by Fascism for publicity purposes) had vanished from all clear-thinking minds, thanks to the sober but firm measures taken by Giolitti, I summoned the Yugoslav plenipotentiaries to Rapallo to settle the Adriatic question at last. The Treaty of Rapallo (November 12th, 1920) secured for Italy Alpine frontiers more perfect than even those under the Roman Empire, the whole of Istria, the islands of Lussin and of Cherso, privileges for the Italians in Dalmatia, the sovereignty over Zara and the independence of Fiume.

The moral value of the Rapallo Treaty consisted mainly in this, that it constituted the first post-war treaty to be concluded not only freely, but also with the active will of both countries to collaborate in the future. The anti-Habsburg convention we signed on the same day was the first proof of this, reinforced by the adhesion to it of the Czechoslovak and Roumanian governments, given to me with a broad understanding of the higher interests of the Succession States, which Beneš had been the first clearly to

* My idea, in case of Yugoslav intransigence, was formal unilateral annexation of all the regions—not one more—which later on the Treaty of Rapallo acknowledged as Italian; and simple continuation, under some sort of autonomous rule, of military occupation in Dalmatia, pending Yugoslav conversion to the advantages of Italian friendship.

formulate. Twelve days later in Parliament, in answer to a member who argued from the nationalist benches that I might have asked for more, I said: "Is it wise to build a Chinese wall where we want free and fertile outlets to the East? Mr. Federzoni says that, had we gauged the international situation more accurately, we could have asked for more. No, we knew the situation quite well. But had it been a hundred times more favourable to us, I should have considered still that I was betraying the future destinies of Italy by asking for more. And you know quite well, Mr. Federzoni, that my opinion has never varied on this point."

European history has more than one example of great states whose diplomacy considered that their interest lay in having small neighbours only. But Italy, sure of her strength and her vitality, can only witness with satisfaction the old animosities between Serbs and Croats, and even more between Serbs and Bulgarians, giving way to an intimacy that may one day become the kernel of a free union between all the Southern Slavs, in which none shall pretend to the part of guide or umpire. There again the magnificent story of the Italian *risorgimento* could be studied with profit by our neighbours. If the unity of Italy was secured so quickly, it was thanks to the abnegation of Piedmont, who, having risked and given everything, stoically coalesced with the other regions of Italy while losing all her ancient privileges.

SFORZA.

THOUGHTS ON AUSTRIA.

SEVERAL months ago at a military review in Vienna might be seen an antiquated uniform of a type rather rare even in this city, which under the present régime enjoys a revival of all kinds of odd uniforms of those "merry days" of Old Vienna so beloved by the film managers. It was the uniform of a Prussian dragoon worn by Lt.-Col. Franz von Papen, who happens to hold the office of a plenipotentiary Minister, not generally considered a military one. Those people who had witnessed the months preceding the Nazi dictatorship in Germany, were reminded by this uniform in Vienna of an historical date, September 2nd, 1932. On this day the said von Papen, the new Chancellor of the Reich, reviewed on the Tempelhofer Feld on the outskirts of Berlin an army clad in old uniforms. Remember the date—the second of September—it was not merely by chance the anniversary of the Battle of Sedan! The Stahlhelm held a parade in the presence of the Governmental personages, thus reviving a tradition of Hohenzollern times. There are some differences, it is true, between the two military reviews, the one in Berlin then and the one in Vienna this year. Herr von Papen has made in one respect considerable progress. On the former occasion he was only wearing a top-hat and a simple frock-coat; now he was seen on horseback, in full uniform, the *Pickelhaube* on his head. Yet unfortunately for the world there was a disquieting similitude. Then, as now, there was at his side the uniform of Imperial Austria, worn by the same man, Prince Starhemberg, who went to Berlin in 1932 to greet the reborn army of the old brothers in arms. If, besides being a witness of Hitler's coming to power, you are happy enough to be a former subject of the Habsburg Monarchy, some words spring to your memory, such as *Nibelungentreue*, "Shoulder to shoulder," the Central European Alliance "built out and deepened." And you will (unless you like gas and devastation if they serve German superiority) be somewhat afraid that soon you will hear some other words even more fatal, which also still live in your memory: for instance, the words of Count Berchtold "Now the Army speaks" (*Die Armee hat das Wort*), or the ominous statement of Bethmann-Hollweg, "Necessity knows no law" (*Not kennt kein Gebot*).

Foreign opinion has believed that there were two possibilities for Austria's future, either the maintenance of the present régime with the help of Italy, or its overthrow by a victory of Nazism. Little attention has been paid to a third possibility, which however seems to come true, as it is supported by tradition: an agreement between Berlin, Vienna and Rome in the spirit of the old Triple Alliance. Such a development is signified by the recent Austro-German pact.

It is useful to remember certain facts. There is a great affinity in the origins of Hitlerism and the Austrian Heimwehr movement. They represent the counter-revolution of Central Europe, the restoration of those forces which at the end of the World War were overthrown by a democratic revolution. There are some differences, it cannot be denied, between the Catholic South and the Protestant North of the German-speaking world. There cannot be a merely Austrian nationalism, and German nationalism in Austria hurts the Roman Catholic Church, which is in a fundamental, though unfortunately much too diplomatically expressed opposition to the Fascist ideal of a barbaric tribal nation. The strength of the Roman Church prevented excesses of a certain type in Austria. The counter-revolution did not become there an expressly anti-Christian movement, proud of separating the nation from the European and Christian community. Further, it conserved more of the ideology of the old counter-revolution, and made less pretence to be a working-class movement with socialistic and revolutionary aims. The Austrian idea of counter-revolution is sincerely anti-democratic, based on authority and submission. Its notion of authority is rather impersonal, traditional and bureaucratic. Its authority is supposed to act according to law and principles, not by mysterious inspirations of racial and personal genius. That is to say that some political and moral conceptions of present-day Austria remain in harmony with the generally recognised moral values of the civilised world. Moreover, in the Austrian system, which is after all a system based on principles and not on persons, a possibility of evolution remains. Persons might be replaced by more qualified persons, and institutions might be brought nearer to their fundamental Christian principles. A certain number of Austrian Catholics sincerely

try to fill the present institutions with the social spirit of the movement initiated by the *Rerum Novarum* Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. A conservative conception of European community, a conservative form of European conscience, must not be confounded with the conscious anti-Europeanism which is the pride of the Nazis.

Unfortunately there are other forces of historical weight inside the Austrian system. The Austrian counter-revolution is not simply identical with the Catholic-social movement. It started, like all counter-revolutions, under the leadership of the former privileged classes, among which the military caste was the most important. We may again remind the reader of the recent past. The Austrian counter-revolution had German General staff officers among its initiators. Major Pabst and other men had played a part in the Kapp-Putsch of 1920. Prince Starhemberg was at the beginning of his career a member of a semi-military organisation in Munich shortly after the war, at the time when the Bavarian capital was a centre of the whole German reactionary movement and the starting-point of Hitlerism. The University of Vienna was the centre of Nazi agitation. As early as 1923, after the Hitler *putsch* in Munich, Professor Otmar Spann, not to speak of less-known Nazi professors, propagated racial theories with an anti-working-class bias. For a long time the world looked at Austria as an experimental ground for German Fascism. Secret ammunition transports from Italy to Hungary went through Austria as early as 1928; and in the rather rare cases of legal persecution of Nazi individuals by the representatives of the Weimar Republic, the Brown Shirts used to find not only hospitality on Austrian soil, but even the possibility of military training. The attitude of Italy towards the Nazi movement was not very different at that time. There were German military camps in Italy too. Classical diplomacy, of course, does not favour a common frontier between Italy and Germany. It is, however, not yet decided whether reasons of classical diplomacy will be stronger than Fascist solidarity. Origins in present-day Germany, Italy, Austria and Hungary are too much alike, and one may doubt whether a separation of these systems will be possible in the long run.

Every system has a source of energy in its origin, to which it will turn back and out of which it will draw its strength in

times of crisis. There are many modern instances of this old truth, already pronounced by Machiavelli in his discourses on Roman history. In spite of all the various social and political transformations since the French Revolution, it was the Jacobin energy which inspired Clemenceau and the French Army in the hour of extreme danger. The restored and reconciled Stuarts and Bourbons were somehow bound to become rulers of divine right and of autocracy. After so long a period of liberal and constitutional governmental practice, Francis Joseph became a true Habsburg in 1914, when he appealed to monarchical solidarity to punish a subversive nation, like the Leopolds, Ferdinands and Metternichs before him.

The common basis, the common source of energy, of the present systems in Germany, Italy, Austria and Hungary, is the anti-Socialist counter-revolution, and the artificially nourished, and excited even if not entirely unjustified, national dissatisfaction. It is not very clear at the moment what aims might unite them for common action. One would even think that there are aims separating the counter-revolutionary governments. The idea of pan-Germanism and the idea of an Italian hegemony over the Danubian countries are surely incompatible. The restoration of the Habsburgs is surely **contrary** to the idea of the Austrian *Anschluss*, though it is less **contrary** to a combination with Germany than is usually believed. For the Habsburgs before 1914 were the most docile helpers of German eastern projects, of the *Drang nach Osten*. The great trouble remains just this confusion of aims and ideas, the main characteristic of which is however the desire to restore the order of things which existed before 1914. It is even not sufficiently precise to say "the European order which existed before 1914." The common desire is rather to create the order of things at which the extremists of the Triplice of the epoch before 1914 were aiming. The implicit aim is to give to Germany and Italy an "equal position in the world," equal to that which their Western rivals held in the centuries previous to German and Italian unity. The ruling elements of Austria and Hungary were useful instruments of this policy in the past and, though deprived of their former empire, they are perhaps as useful at present.

If we try to reduce the present opposition between Central

and Western Europe to a brief formula, we may say that it is the conflict of two different epochs. The main difference and the main opposition are in the political dictionary. "Hegemony" and "Supremacy" are expressions most popular in the world east of the Rhine and south of the Alps. The political dictionary has conserved the mark of the late nineteenth century. European community, internationalism, collective security, and the acceptance as a fact of the new national revolutions in the Slavonic world are ideas unable, as it seems, to penetrate into the mind of the ruling elements of these late nineteenth-century Powers. When we are speaking of the "ruling elements," we do not mean a small group of big capitalists or militarists. This would be a simplification. The ruling and decisive elements to which we allude are unfortunately a very large group, too large to be defeated with a simple *coup*, as some revolutionary optimists might imagine. They are the classes who had the advantages of the prosperity of the time of Bismarck, Francis Joseph and Crispi. All these forces of former ruling classes had great difficulty in accommodating themselves to the new conditions, to the peace which created new States in Central Europe, and with the new States new centres of power, of economic activity and cultural life.

Perhaps in no country did the position of these classes become so critical as in Austria and Hungary. By the **diminution** of their territories they and their capitals ceased to be the centres of industry and prosperity. They have two ways open to them, either to transform themselves according to the new realities and to decide to live as small countries should do, or to try to reconquer their former territories. For the first way there are, of course, examples in history. Holland, Sweden, Portugal, former first-rate Powers, did not cease to be nations by ceasing to be Great Powers. Spain and Turkey were Great Powers once. They were reborn as nations after a long process of dissolution. Austria and Hungary could follow the same path and organise their life on the basis of self-sufficiency and co-operation with their neighbours, as for instance the Scandinavian countries do at present. But the illusion of the possibility of the opposite way is being systematically nourished and maintained by Germany and Italy, who are aiming at the restoration of the world in which mere military power can play an imposing part.

The illusion is dangerous indeed. The lack of realism does not diminish but rather increases the danger. Wars in modern times are not made by reasonable people for reasonable purposes, but by unreasonable people for unreasonable purposes. The Austrian illusion, of which it is difficult to describe the exact aims, but which may be defined as a desire for restoration of the Past, is excited sometimes by the Prussian uniform of Herr von Papen and sometimes by the Roman symbolism of Mussolini. Diplomatic matters may cause conflicts between Germany and Italy, and it may be considered that some of the final aims of Berlin and of Rome are opposed to one another, if consistently carried out. But greater than the opposition between Pan-Germanism and Italian hegemony is the affinity of the two régimes. They are the spectres of a past epoch, opposed to the world as it is formed by the Great War, which was in its essence, to use Masaryk's expression, a World Revolution.

People thinking only in diplomatic terms may have found it useful to exploit the conflicts between Berlin and Rome. This method is short-sighted. Berlin and Rome are historically opposed to the post-war conception of Europe. To make of Austria and Hungary factors of peace there is only one way, to give them the Western and democratic idea of a Nation to replace the anachronistic ideas of "Supremacy," "Hegemony," "World-Power." They need a new dictionary of politics—to become nations among nations. In a word, the only solution for Austria is a combination of the two opposed watchwords of her Past: *Los von Berlin! Los von Rom!*

But what is to be affirmed after these two negations? After the Hungarian experience of 1919 and the experience of Austrian Socialism between 1918 and 1934, there seems little possibility for a Socialistic predominance or for a proletarian Dictatorship, as rightly embittered Austrian working men, who do not forget the gallows of 1934, seem to believe. Austria and Hungary, especially in their peasant population, attached to small property, are little likely to adopt Eastern Communism. It would be natural for them to adopt the Western idea and the Western system. But is there at present any Western idea and system other than that of mere stability? Will there be any in future? This is the decisive question on which not only the future of Austria and the Danubian countries but of the whole world will depend.

BÉLA MENCZER.

THE CASE FOR AUSTRALIA.

IN view of the current suggestions for the revival of migration, it is urgent that the Australian standpoint should be clearly understood in Britain. There is no justification whatever for the belief, unfortunately widespread, that Australians wish to keep the continent for the locally born, and that the Englishman particularly is unwelcome. There is, it may be admitted at once, a small element which would oppose British migration in any circumstances. It provides the only really discordant note in Australian politics, and it need scarcely be said that its colour is either pink or red on a green background. It professes a fervent local patriotism and it makes more noise than its size and importance warrant. But its utterances invariably find their way into the British press and are apt to be taken for the voice of the whole continent. The great bulk of the Australian people definitely wants British migration, but it wants it effective. In the past it has too often been the reverse, hence the present general attitude of caution.

The average Britisher can scarcely be expected to take an interest in the physical or economic conditions of countries so different and so far removed from his own. Yet Australia and New Zealand, more than any parts of the Empire, have a real meaning, if not to him, certainly to his children. They are the only parts of the Empire peopled exclusively by his kindred in blood, tongue, and tradition. In years to come they may be the British Empire. India, spectacular as it is, is peopled by an alien race; its place in the Empire is by no means secure. South Africa has its British-Dutch-Kaffir problem; after several hundred years of white colonisation it carries less than a million people of British blood. Canada has a minor internal division in speech and creed. Southern Ireland speaks for itself. But Australia and New Zealand have none of these handicaps. They are still as they were in 1914: British to the last man and the last shilling. If, remembering past mistakes, action is taken now, they can be kept securely British for all time.

The old theory that the true function of a Dominion lay in exchanging raw produce for home manufactures has had its day, for no Dominion once it emerges from its early struggles will be content to hew wood and draw water.

The demand in Australia for manufacturing industries which would provide diversity of employment together with the arts and sciences of life has been growing steadily. Federation with its accompanying tariff gave secondary industry its first real boost, the world war and necessity its second. The position drifted badly while the disastrous borrowing boom supplied Australia with easy money and spurious prosperity. Coincident with the drop in export prices, the flood of borrowed manufactures ceased, and Australia compulsorily woke up. Its favourable trade balances of recent years are proofs of a determination to pay its way. To remain solvent Australia must, with the best Empire spirit, sell more to Britain than it buys, by at least the amount of its annual interest bill. When British industry boycotts Australian produce because of a contracting Australian market, it should at least remember that the interest on its bonds is being paid nowadays out of income. Australia is paying cash for its cotton goods to-day. It is borrowing neither them nor the wherewithal to pay interest on their loan.

True to the traditional association of an overseas Dominion and food production, all migration schemes have been based on land settlement. With a world at peace and a more or less expanding market abroad they were at least understandable. But the growth of economic nationalism, the determination of nations—including Great Britain—to depend less and less on imported foodstuffs, calls a definite halt to such programmes, particularly so in Australia. The local market is of course many times over-supplied. In order to compete in the open market—and it must do so to pay its interest from income—practically every staple export is subsidised by bounties or local price-fixing. (One can buy Australian butter more cheaply in Devon than one can in Sydney.) Wool is the main if not the sole exception. It began with unrivalled climatic conditions of which the genius of the Australian sheepbreeder was quick to take hold. It has never had a serious foreign competitor, hence its life without subsidy. But no one believes that foreign countries buy Australian wool except because they must. For that reason wool is the one primary industry which could be expanded to the utmost limit of the continent's capacity, by improvement of pastures, growth of fodder and water conservation. Unfortunately it does not conduce to a dense land population. If

merino wool is to be kept to its present high standard, there is a limit below which individual flock numbers cannot safely go. Scientific breeding and handling must have numbers to work on.

Obviously, then, it is not to Australia's present advantage to speed up the production of foodstuffs by migration to the land unless guaranteed a market. Unless Britain can do that, of what use is it to transfer a dairy farmer from Devon to New South Wales, or an Essex beef raiser to Queensland? The one cannot eat all his own butter any more than the other can his beef, and Australia has more of both commodities than it can do with now. If, of course, Britain said to its migrants: "Send over butter and beef of a certain grade and quality and we will tax Denmark and Argentine out of our markets"—it might be another story. But that will not happen—in the case of Argentine beef at any rate. It, too, has an interest bill to meet in London, and money talks. It is interesting to listen to a Kenya coffee-grower on this point.

There is also a prevalent impression in Britain that there are vast spaces of fertile land unoccupied in Australia. There is very little of any real pastoral or agricultural value which is not held by *someone*, under some tenure or other; and many a stock-raiser in the dry areas has been heard to wish that his country had never been stolen from the blacks. The great bulk of the continent is climatically unsuited for the small settler, especially if he be an inexperienced migrant. Practically all of what is suitable, except in Queensland, has long since been alienated from the Crown, or is held under some form of long leasehold. There are few areas of any size and value remaining for original selection. It must be emphasised, too, that unlike the Canadian prairie, non-timbered land is rarely of agricultural value in Australia. The soil of the open plain, where timber has never grown, is unploughable at most times and unsuited to crops. But it provides the bulk of the country's richest pasture land, the home of its merino sheep and cattle.

Some thirty-odd years ago, the New South Wales Government, in response to an agitation for resumption of large estates in favoured districts, passed a compulsory subdivision law. It had the effect of freeing land-locked towns from monopoly, and the resultant rise in land values led to a

good deal of voluntary subdivision amongst large landholders. The law is more or less inoperative to-day, and the cost of the land acquired under it is prohibitive to the assisted migrant. The man with capital who is prepared to spend some time in first gaining experience of local conditions will have no difficulty in ultimately establishing himself. He will not be at the mercy of officialdom. The assisted migrant always is.

In Queensland the position of the land-seeker with little capital is better. The great bulk of the state is still Crown Land and small areas in its rich coastal belt may be acquired for dairying, fruit-growing or cotton. But they are—in their virgin state—heavily timbered, and mean an uphill struggle for men of stout heart and experience. Still, they do offer an opportunity, and if Queensland could provide a market there would be a good living on a small area. This coastal strip is extraordinarily rich. If anything it gets too much rain. It has little if any winter. But by the time its bananas, pine-apples, pawpaws and early tomatoes are sent a thousand miles to Sydney, freight leaves little for the grower. Under the Queensland law land seldom becomes freehold. Its tenure is, in the farming districts, mostly ninety-nine years' lease at low rentals subject to periodical appraisements which may operate either way. The large grazing leases of the west and north are resumed and subdivided as they expire. They are opened for selection as grazing farms in areas according to their stocking capacity. They need a lot of capital and years of experience, and the best of them is not gilt-edged as an investment.

Western Australia's land position was somewhat similar to that of Queensland, that is, it had land to give away, although between the two states there is no comparison. Its south-west corner is well favoured by Nature, and Western Australia made a spectacular attempt to absorb the loan-assisted migrant. Its failure was equally spectacular. In its zeal to show results, it pushed wheat-growing settlements into localities which were doubtful in the extreme. Some two thousand of its partly prepared farms financed by its Agricultural Bank are back on its hands, and some of the "settled" migrants are back in Britain. Under even the most favourable conditions the assisted migrant is set a formidable task. He starts without experience of any real value, for the most practical British farmer soon discovers

that he has to start at the bottom of the class in a completely new—and different—school. He has to make a living while he pays off the debt on his farm—in other words he has to make something out of less than nothing. In the case of men wrongly "selected" by Government officials the result is a foregone conclusion. There have been, of course, exceptional cases of those men who would make good in any circumstances, but the main results from the assisted-migrant-cheap-loan combination are legacies of debt and bitter feeling. It is little wonder that the most favourable Australian opinion calls a halt rather than risk a repetition of such disasters, and demands a recasting of the whole technique of migration. And as a result Australian Governments seem to be forgetting a little and learning a lot.

There have been some significant news items cabled recently from Australia. We learn, in effect, that land settlement from a migration standpoint has been found out for what it long has been, an expensive risk. There is a definite market, small perhaps but guaranteed, for the products of manufacturing industry, now imported. Capital will be sure of a reasonable return and labour of a weekly pay envelope. Tariff protection where necessary, and in some cases a Government guarantee, will be forthcoming. The manufacture of engines for motor-cars and aeroplanes is suggested for a start. After a while further land settlement may be undertaken on the sound basis of increased local demand. British capital and labour are invited to take a hand in the new deal.

From Australia's point of view the suggested scheme seems eminently sane. The local manufacture of aeroplane engines is necessary from a defence standpoint, and the market for motor-car engines is substantial. The workmen who will make them will still be fed on Australian beef, bread and butter, in Melbourne instead of Birmingham. There are many other industries calling for establishment in the same way. It may be economic nationalism, a doctrine anathema to the economist and blamed for most of the world's troubles to-day, but if this suggested manufacture of aeroplane engines is the entering wedge of industry which will pour some hundreds of thousands of well-paid, well-fed Britons into an empty continent, helping to keep that continent British, there is everything to be said for it.

Will such a policy suit Britain? According to a recent article in *The Times*, the day may not be far distant when the Dominions will be obliged to look elsewhere for their annual increase of man-power. The declining birth-rate will, in a few years' time, mean a stationary population many millions below its present figure, and the powers of economists and statesmen will be taxed to prevent a further decline. Coincidentally there have appeared in the British press statements to the effect that four million people in these islands spend an average of four shillings a week on food! It may be possible to remedy this deplorable position without placing further intolerable burdens on stable industry. But unless it is quickly altered, it would appear that the sooner Britain's population shrinks the better, especially if the surplus can be gradually and happily absorbed under the Union Jack elsewhere. It might easily be that Britain with a population of thirty million people would be a much more effective place than it is at present.

The possible "loss" of population seemed to trouble *The Times*. Population transferred to happier conditions in Australia or New Zealand is no more "lost" to Britain than it would be if moved from Northumberland to Cornwall, especially as its effective transfer would strengthen the nation at both ends. Even to-day there is scarcely such a thing as distance. Already a journey from London to Melbourne has been made over the week-end. In ten years' time it will be a twenty-four hours' run, non-stop. The invitation to British capital to follow its former trade to Australia, taking its men with it, is sound. There is a worth-while motor-car industry—even for less than seven million people—waiting to be wrested from America. And there are many others.

Still, even if such opportunities were fully seized, it would mean adding further population to the bigger cities on the continent's eastern seaboard, and it would leave the northern danger zone still unpeopled. At present the Gulf country of North Queensland, the Northern Territory and the Kimberley district of Western Australia hold a mere handful of whites. The Northern Territory is the local Cinderella. Originally administered by the State of South Australia, it was taken over by the Federal Government some years after federation, and it has been a nuisance to politicians at Canberra ever since. It contains some good stock country, but the

bulk is of doubtful value except for possible mineral discoveries. Ministers of the Crown make periodical visits there—in the winter-time—and return to Canberra to incubate schemes for the Territory's development. Whether good or bad, they are never hatched. The railway from north to south is still unfinished, the cattle-breeders are in despair, and unless another Kalgoorlie is discovered in its hinterland, the Territory will remain as it is for many years to come.

The Kimberley district, the north-west corner of the continent, is still less developed. It has not even an unfinished railway, but of all Australia's isolated areas it is easily the most promising. It has a few scattered seaports where the pearling industry has been established, a handful of whites inland raising cattle and sheep, a small coloured coastal population of doubtful parentage, and a few aboriginals. But it has harbours, rivers, and an adequate rainfall, with areas of good pastoral land. The mineral wealth which undoubtedly lies in its rugged hinterland is untapped. On its coast lies an island of iron ore said to be one of the richest and most easily worked deposits in the world. Local enterprise is spasmodically exporting iron ore to Japan.

One wonders what Italy, Germany, or Japan, any nation with a congested population problem, would do with Kimberley? If their cry for a "place in the sun" is genuine Kimberley would supply their needs, literally. There is certainly no doubt about the sun, but a healthy white population can live there provided it works and keeps sober. It would not offer the conditions of other Crown Colonies, the black man doing the spade-work under the supervision of the younger son. There is no Kaffir, Negro, or Hindu problem; if the white man cannot or will not work there, he may stay away. In pursuance of the White Australia policy several thousands of Kanakas who had been brought to North Queensland to work in the cane-fields before federation were repatriated. Australia was warned then that no matter what price it was prepared to pay, it could not produce sugar in its tropics by white labour. The sugar industry of North Queensland—after thirty years—is sufficient answer. It had not occurred to the critics that the Australian tropics alone in the world possessed no large indigenous black race. The retail price of sugar in Australia is high—it is fourpence a pound. It is a price worth paying.

The country has been saved a serious racial problem, and the experiment has proved that the white man both can and will work in the tropics, if he has to. What holds good in Northern Queensland applies equally to Kimberley.

If neither Britain nor Australia can do anything with Kimberley, it is certain that, sooner or later, some other nation will at least make an attempt. All the self-governing Dominions originally trod the path of the Crown Colony, and the possibilities of reapplying the system to Northern Australia should certainly be seriously considered. The suggestion has never been officially made, and how it would be received at either end is unknown. This much however is certain: that Australia has a large and attractive area lying practically empty, and Britain has surplus population. It is not proposed merely to dump one on to the other with no settled scheme for development, although something very like that has been done in the abortive land-settlement attempts elsewhere on the continent. Quite recently British capital to the extent of thirty millions was advanced to various Australian Governments with the proviso that for every thousand pounds spent, one migrant was to be established on a farm. Thirty millions of money to help thirty thousand people to a better chance in life! Some of the results we have noted. Such an amount, properly handled, would have gone a long way towards establishing a successful Crown Colony at Kimberley. The land is there, and Britain has money and organising genius. The colonising spirit can still be found, provided the task of finding it is given to men who know it when they see it. Will some statesman able to look ahead take the project up, remembering always that the capital and men whether transferred to factories in Melbourne or a Crown Colony in Kimberley will still remain in Britannia?

GEORGE BERRIE.

P.S.—Since this article was written, Australia has taken drastic tariff action against Japanese Cottons, an action which will chiefly favour Manchester. It has jeopardised the sale of a quarter of the Australian wool clip, and has caused bitter comment. Now—say its opponents—we shall call the bluff of those in Britain who talk Empire trade and relationship. A golden opportunity is being offered. Australia has placed the wedge in position—will Britain drive it home?

CANNIBAL POETS.

THREE-QUARTERS of a century ago our knowledge of the social life of the population of Melanesia was culled exclusively from a sheaf of travellers' tales, and tinctured with the prejudices and the outraged sensibilities of a few missionaries. Anthropophagy, necrophagy and infanticide were represented as typical items of savage behaviour; and the news that these depraved specimens of humanity were a rapidly decaying race was received with anything but regret. Then the anthropologist, with an annoying disregard of the dangers attendant upon the cannibals' cooking-pot, coupled with the touchy temper of these dreadful savages, went—unarmed it is needless to say, and, which is more, unsupported by government prestige—and paid a social call upon the savages of the Pacific. These unbidden guests returned home safely, and reported that savages were not wild animals in human shape—werewolves by birth and upbringing—but simple, kindly folk whose social organisation we might profitably study, with a view to repairing many an obvious breach in our own civilisation.

Universities and learned societies immediately sent expeditions into the field. Government officials and missionaries proved their eagerness to assist by endeavouring to make systematic observations; and the cascade of sociological literature that resulted year by year gave the impression that the ground had been adequately covered. Certainly one would not have expected to find an uninvestigated island in the Pacific by the end of the third decade of this century. Yet such there was. South of the Trobriands, south of the Amphilets, in the volcanic district of the d'Entrecasteaux group, was the unmissionised, outlying island of Tewara, inhabited by the Dobuan people of whom even Malinowski knew nothing more than could be gleaned from the stories current among his own light-hearted Trobrianders; stories as lurid and as horrifying as any told by European traders and sailors in the days when clipper ships brought tea from China.

The Trobrianders regarded the Dobuans as disgusting cannibals, head-hunters and sorcerers, who had queer customs, including a mysterious form of mother-right; so we may surely be prepared to find here the typical savage of hearsay. Yet, if we consult Dr. R. F. Fortune, who recently

made an anthropological exploration of the territory, we shall learn that these cannibals are an æsthetic people, delicately susceptible to the rhythm of words, and sentimentally poised so that each man among them is a poet whose spontaneous verses may catch the public fancy.

Dr. Fortune was luckily present on the occasion of the making of a song that "caught on"; but before quoting this it is necessary to point out that the Dobuan native does not recognise accident: all mishaps are considered to be the outcome of magic, which is customarily resorted to by the men as a means of avenging insult or injury; if, however, one's conduct has been so exemplary as to preclude the likelihood of a secret foe, it follows that one's misfortunes are attributable to the general maleficium of the womenfolk, for they, one and all, are shrewdly suspected of practising witchcraft for the love of it. No man, waking suddenly in the dead of night, can be quite sure that the sleeping form in the hut is his wife; it may be only a semblance of herself lying there, while she is far away, flying about in search of opportunities to work off her spite on innocent menfolk. This she frequently does by influencing storms, and so causing canoe disasters. It is not difficult to perceive when these good ladies are about, because of the sparks they strike "on the tops of the masts and the tips of the spars"—let Europeans call it St. Elmo's fire or what they will.

Thus, when a certain native named Alo, who was out with a party of friends, found that his canoe, Siwabu, which had been beached on a coral outcrop, had taken the water and floated away while the party was at rest, he entertained no doubts concerning the cause of the disaster: men do not sleep so soundly unless they have been bewitched! It was still dark, therefore it is worthy of note that these highly superstitious fellows went into the water and swam about in search of Siwabu. At first they each swam in a different direction, displaying what a hard-headed European would describe as "sound common sense"; but when one of the number—manifesting native caution—cried out, "Let us swim all close together—the witches are at work!" the swimmers, with one accord, made for a local sand-bank, the home of the sea-bird, bwebwesala, where they scrambled to safety; and much to their surprise and joy—for evidently the good magic was now with them—they found Siwabu. So far so

good; but the flying witches are very destructive: not content with having, in the first place, pushed the canoe adrift, they had broken the outrigger off and flung it aground some distance away where it lay undiscovered till morning.

The outcome of so exciting an incident was the production of a song—Alo's song. His, not only in the capacity of author, but also in that of proprietor; for, though it became popular, it could not be publicly performed without his consent. The words are:

tube gibwogebwobwoi	swim in close formation
siwabu i damanaia	siwabu is sunken
wa da tube gibwobwoi.	you swim in close formation.
bwebwesala ina saru	the bird bwebwesala's island
ta enaienaiida	we ask of one another
wa da tube gibwobwoi	you swim in close formation.

The songs, together with the rhythm of drums, are employed as an accompaniment when the people dance, a form of expression resorted to only when special events are being celebrated. Alo's song was featured in the concluding phase of the Kula ceremony for that year.

An interesting point concerning the Dobuan songs is that, unlike most savage chants, they translate into intelligible English, although it must be admitted that Alo's song will remain something of an enigma unless the reader is equipped with an explanation of the circumstances attending its birth. Nevertheless, the emotional value is conveyed to the foreign mind by the words and rhythm, even if the literal meaning is obscure. Exactly the same objection might be applied to a great deal of English poetry. A foreknowledge of Francis Thompson's tragic life leads to a fuller understanding of such a monumental work as his *Hound of Heaven*; and notwithstanding its excellence in English, if rendered in a foreign tongue it runs the risk of becoming burlesque. The title alone could easily degenerate into *God's House Dog*.

In civilised communities, love has ever proved a ready source of inspiration to the bard, and the savage, in this susceptibility, again belies his reputation. A typical example is:

iyano masaliguia	You had me awake night long
budia wainena	budia woman
lololi iyanoguia	flute playing arousing me
iyano masaliguia	you had me awake night long

ida tana u naba be	our basket you carry and
ta sulu dimwadimwaro	we shall dip up sand
oraia numa toli	sea water we'll drink
lololi iyanoguia.	flute playing arousing me.

The rhyme "and" and "sand," as may be observed, does not appear in the original. Rhyme is a medium which the natives do not employ, their reliance being placed exclusively on form and rhythm. The latter is sometimes enhanced by adding the meaningless suffix "bi" to a word, and usually the last word of the line lends itself to this addition. Apart from this very slender licence, the Dobuan poet does not take liberties with language. Love songs, war songs, and songs concerning cannibalism are among the oldest in currency in Dobu. It is usual, there as here, for a popular song to expire in the course of time; but the savages have the advantage over us inasmuch as their forms are traditional and enduring, the subject-matter alone being transitory. Our latest popular songs may be inferior in every respect to their predecessors.

The idea of a people proudly preserving songs connected with cannibalism perhaps induces a shudder of horror; yet this respectable European reaction is wholly unjustified so long as the mention of war songs is not equally revolting. With all due deference to Lord Alfred Tennyson, *The Charge of the Light Brigade* records facts no less barbarous than does the most detailed specimen of Dobuan poems connected with anthropophagy. The songs of mourning are particularly plaintive. Death is never supposed to manifest itself from natural causes, but, as in the case of accident, is thought to occur following the malefic machinations of some ill-disposed member of the community; hence the advent of death is viewed with terror by the population on account of the existence of such strong magic in the neighbourhood. The most fearless man among them does not dare to venture out of doors after dark, and distrust and isolation render everyone very miserable. At length, with a view to the restoration of social equilibrium, a series of public feasts is organised, with dancing as the concluding ceremony. Gala enlivens Dobu; and the lone spirit of the departed, unwilling to leave the gaiety, dawdles while on its way to Bwebweso, the home of the dead, which is located back in the hills.

bwebweso lagalaga	I go hillward to bwebweso
dokwabu saliwin	by dokwabu's white sagusagu
bwebweso lagalaga	flower
	I go hillward to bwebweso
saliwisaliwina	the white, white sagusagu flower
saliwega ya mwera	from the palm I have climbed
ya keseasearu	I look out upon the path behind
dobu ya mweroroi.	me
	I mourn for dobu.

The mysterious form of mother-right alluded to by Malinowski's Trobrianders, and other even less well-informed people, not excluding missionaries, is expressed in an institution known as the "susa"—a degree of relationship existing between a man, his sister, and his sister's children. A man inherits a house and a burial site in the village of his birth, but he cannot marry a woman of that village; therefore, in the event of his becoming a widower, he is bound to return to his own susa, and his own birthplace. His children remain the property of his late wife's susa, and are prohibited from entering their father's village. The break-up of the family does not take place till the man has spent a year mourning his loss and serving his relations-in-law. In the performance of this duty he becomes little short of a slave, or prisoner; for he must remain isolated, his body covered in a thick layer of charcoal as a sign of bereavement. He may take no part in any form of celebration, not even in the singing of, "I go hillward to bwebweso," when it is performed in the obsequies of his dead wife. But at length the year draws to its close; the women attire themselves in their long, red, dance skirts; the men, standing in the customary circle, beat the drums; and the lyric of the occasion is the traditional widower's song.

kenolokenologwai	lie awake, lie awake and talk
maniuniuwanina	at the midnight hour
u gimi kenologwai	first lie awake and talk
kenolokenologwai	lie awake, lie awake and talk
maiwortu kam gatu	maiwortu your charcoal body
mwaniwara kubunaia	covering by mwaniwara below
tomwai i bwegabwegai	dawn breaks the black of night
u gimi kenologwai.	first lie awake and talk.

The tragedy of the situation vibrates from these simple words with a force sufficient to stir a sympathetic chord in the

hardest of hearts. The father says to his children, "Let us lie awake and talk"—there is so much to say and, alas, so much more that must be left unsaid, for inevitably, "dawn breaks the black of night." The sun's appearance over the horizon is the signal for the widower to retire to the outskirts of the village where the "charcoal body covering" will be removed and his skin anointed and adorned. A subtle reference to this ritual is contained in the words, "dawn breaks the black of night," for they signify that the man's emergence from the mourning pall is, in effect, a "dawn" for him. No longer is he Maiwortu, which is the nickname bestowed upon the charcoal-enveloped widower; he is now freed from servitude, and he may depart. But fierce man-eating savage though he is, we may picture him, flower-bedecked yet stricken with grief as he sets out on a journey that severs him from his children for ever.

The spirit land of Bwebweso is not reserved exclusively for the shades of human beings; it is made gay with an avian population; and the living birds in Dobu, irrespective of species, mourn the loss of their companions. Dinegwa is a small bird of insignificant plumage; yet at the demise of his gaudy compeer, a black bird of paradise, he manifests no gleeful triumph, but sadly laments.

i dogu idoguragura manucodia! mwawasaia dinegwa! doguragura	he mourns and he mourns black bird of paradise is dead dinegwa he mourns
bwebweso manucodi nina kaena lomena ta nono manucodia i mwawasaia dinegwa i doguragura.	black bird of paradise from bwebweso low falling your lament we hear black bird of paradise is dead dinegwa he mourns.

A bond of sympathy seems to exist between birds and human beings; the former mourning not only for each other, but also for mankind; or perhaps "Mwatebu the maiden" was a type of St. Francis, and is specially favoured. In any case, the song is exceedingly tender.

i lulu i lululaga natuwa lekawaaga suau i lululaga	he is singing, singing inland from the straits of natuwa black satin bird singing inland
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'lologea i kwaia mwatebu gomagweine kewabum ladiladi i lului lululaga suau i lululaga.	at kelologea one lies dead mwatebu, the maiden her mourning sweet sounding he is singing, singing inland black satin bird singing inland.
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Canoe songs may be either of a sentimental or a spirited character. There is languorous ease expressed in:

kana kwadima panamoti kebwaga i oleole panamoti kana kwadima bwaruada ya tolaiane kwadima egweguguia i saisai oleole panamoti kana kwadima.	o star of panamoti the south night wind ascends o star of panamoti at bwaruada I disembark star peering in the cooking-pot he rises and ascends star of panamoti.
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The star of panamoti is Venus, and the song immortalises a gentle voyage to a place called Panamoti, eastward of Dobu. The "star peering in the cooking-pot" calls to mind W. B. Yeats' lines:

Where the wandering water gushes
From the hills above Glen-Car,
In pools among the rushes
That scarce could bathe a star.

A stirring canoe song is:

to waga bwaina sana basima lobuninaia i lobulobuninaia koianiya kenokeno waibudo kaniyana yaloa si delideli basima lobuninaia.	a fine canoe it was capsized by basima blown over, blown over. the hill lay there rain fell for waibudo the clouds rushed over it capsized by basima.
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Waibudo is the name of the canoe owner, and sympathy is extended to him on account of his loss. A "civilised" person, learning that a friend had sustained the misfortune of losing his yacht, would hardly rise to a poem; his condolence would probably amount to "Hard luck, old chap!—Insured, wasn't she?—Oh, well, jolly lucky you're alive!"

Early in November the arrival on the coral reef of multitudes of palolo worms heralds the change of season; and to the natives these marine invaders are as gladdening a sight as are

purpose tea, condiments, and so on, to be added by purchase in the ordinary way.

Anyone would be at liberty to buy supplementary amounts of the Guaranteed Food Supply (or to ignore it entirely, continuing to buy all their food as at present), but actually the suggested quantities are better than those on which 50 per cent. of the population at present exist, and equal (except in the case of vegetables and fruit, where the allowance is for only the common varieties) to those enjoyed by the next 20 per cent. of the population. Nevertheless it might be considered desirable to increase the milk allowance, making it half a pint for adults and one pint for children daily. We need have no doubts about obtaining the various additional supplies, averaging some 15 per cent. in excess of total current consumption, required for the proposed new national service; there would be considerable scope for a revival in agriculture (and fisheries), and in the import and export trade, particularly with Empire countries.

It could be arranged that existing retailers should distribute to the public, free of charge, the items comprising the Guaranteed Food Supply, receiving payment, including profit, direct from the State. Supplementary amounts of the various foods could be sold at the settling-up prices agreed between retailers and the State, which presumably would be fixed on a regional or national basis—the price of bread is already so fixed. (Retail prices to-day include in some instances a charge for delivery. The State, of course, would not meet this charge. Those members of the public who wished to have the Guaranteed Food Supply delivered—or part of it, such as milk and bread—could individually pay their retailers for this service.) All other foods would still be sold in the usual way, but it would be equally to the interest of retailers to hand out free food as to make cash sales, because in each case they would be getting their profit.

Some sort of supply card, a designation preferable to ration card since there would be no restrictions on total consumption, would appear to be essential. It could be arranged that the various foods concerned should be handed out in exchange for vouchers from this card, which vouchers could then serve as the basis for settling up between retailers and the State; costs of administration would be of negligible

proportions. It would be desirable for smooth working that the public should register at certain shops, of their own choosing, and draw all of the items included in the Guaranteed Food Supply from those shops. These arrangements would cover residents in hotels and boarding-houses, and could without much difficulty be extended to include the cheaper types of restaurants.

Though receiving the Guaranteed Food Supply free of direct charge the public would still have the freedom of choice which is theirs to-day, selecting either white or brown bread; the usual varieties of butter and common cheese (some additional price complications behind the scenes in these two cases); pasteurised milk, higher grades on paying the extra 1d. or 2d. a pint; eggs of good grade; cabbage, carrots, and so on; apples, bananas, and other common fruit. In order to overcome the difficulty as to who should have the best cuts of meat and bacon, it could be arranged that only the first 6d. per lb. of the cost of meat, and the first 9d. per lb. of the cost of bacon, should be included in the proposed new national service; thus leaving the best cuts of imported meat, together with the better cuts of home-killed meat, and of bacon, to those who were prepared to pay the few pence extra.

Taking, for those items for which the rate of expenditure has not already been determined, the average of retail prices during the financial year 1935-6 as recorded monthly in the *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, the cost per head of the Guaranteed Food Supply would be 6s. 4½d. weekly. (These recorded prices, applying to a working-class trade, may perhaps be regarded as average retail prices throughout the country, exclusive of any charge for delivery; though if this charge is included in the case of milk and bread there would be a perceptible reduction in the above figure.) Owing, however, to the great increase in the quantity of food being distributed, to the far more regular rate of demand, and to the elimination of bad debts, retailers could work on a considerably lower gross profit margin than at present, and we shall assume a saving to the State equivalent to at least 10 per cent. of retail prices, in which event the cost per head of the Guaranteed Food Supply would be 5s. 9d. weekly. Assuming further that the price level will remain substantially unchanged, the aggregate cost during the current financial

year (1936-7) of the proposed new national service for the population of Great Britain (45,598,000, 79th Statistical Abstract), would be £682,000,000.

As is to be expected, a considerable proportion of this comparatively modest cost could be met by transferences of expenditure from certain of the existing social services. Once the proposed new national service was in operation, then (for reasons which will become apparent below), unemployment would diminish to such an extent that the whole cost of maintenance of the unemployed could again be put on a contributory basis, thus releasing the current expenditure by the State on Unemployment Assistance. Further, an unemployed man would not need the same degree of financial assistance which he at present receives. The Guaranteed Food Supply could replace the State contribution (and incidentally the employer's contribution) to the Unemployment Insurance scheme, which in future could be maintained solely by the workers' contributions, thus reducing benefits in the aggregate to about one-third of what they are to-day, but there would be no need to continue the special allowances for dependants. It could similarly replace the State (and employer's) contributions to National Health Insurance, which could be maintained by the workers' contributions, somewhat increased in this case, though with everyone assured of an adequate diet the cost of the scheme would probably fall remarkably. The proposed new national service could also replace the State contribution to Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions, which would thus be reduced by approximately one-third; and it could similarly replace one-third of the cost of non-contributory Old Age Pensions; actually, of course, pensioners' real incomes would be increased from 10s. to approximately 13s. weekly. On the basis of the 1936-7 estimates these suggested annual transferences of State expenditure would total £105 millions.

Local authorities would be saved a large proportion of their expenditure on poor relief, and rates on property could be reduced. These reductions, and the cessation of contributions by employers to Unemployment and National Health Insurance would largely, if not entirely, offset the extra cost which would fall upon industry if the annual relief at present given through derating was discontinued. The saving to

the State (allowing an approximate figure of £4 millions for the continuance of derating in the case of agriculture) would be £41 millions annually.

It would undoubtedly be possible to suggest other transferences and savings of expenditure, mostly of a minor nature. Allowing, however, for those as above totalling £146 millions, the remainder of the cost of the proposed new national service could be met in two ways. Firstly, by a duty of 4d. per lb., over and above any existing duty, on tea, coffee, cocoa, and sugar, which, allowing for a 15 per cent. average decrease in consumption (26th Customs and Excise Report, Table 132), would yield £73 millions annually. Secondly, by replacing the existing rate of income tax—4s. 9d. in the £ with its personal allowances, deductions, and reliefs—by a flat rate of 3s. in the £ on all incomes, with no exemption limit. Putting, then, "actual" and "taxable" income, as defined by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, at £4,000 millions in 1936-7, and deducting the estimated yield (£259 millions) of the prevailing income tax, the net increase in yield from the suggested rate of tax would have been £341 millions.

The transferences, savings, and increased revenue available in the current financial year would thus have amounted to £560 millions, £122 millions short of the cost of the proposed new national service. Expansion, however, of 10 per cent. in total revenue (existing revenue is estimated at £798 millions, of which £146 millions have already been taken into account) would have been sufficient to balance the budget—and we have yet to allow for the trade revival.

At first glance the suggested rates of taxation may appear, to the less well-to-do members of the community, to be a staggering burden. In practice, a wage-earner drawing £3 a week would be obtaining the Guaranteed Food Supply for himself and his family in return for 9s. a week income tax (which could be collected by deduction from wages and the stamping of an income-tax card by his employer), and not quite 7½d. per head per week additional indirect taxation through their consumption (allowing for 15 per cent. reduction) of tea, coffee, cocoa, and sugar. The staple foods for this family, say five persons, would thus be obtained for about 12s. 0d. a week; or 15s. 0d. if, additionally, another member of the family was earning £1 a week. With few

exceptions the purchasing power of wage earners would be remarkably increased. (The previously noted extra charge for National Health Insurance, only 1s. or so a week, would be no burden.) The worst-paid workers of all would be enjoying the greatest proportional increases in purchasing power; in fact, those who to-day form the most poverty-stricken section of our population would, in addition to enjoying better food, be able to afford a higher general standard of living, which would almost certainly prove to be the best safeguard against what might be considered any undesirable increase in their birth-rate.

Blackcoated workers, professional men, independent business men, and retired people, with earned or unearned incomes ranging up to £1,000 a year would—after setting off against the increased taxation the reduction in their food bills calculated at 6s. 4½d. per head per week, i.e. the cost of the Guaranteed Food Supply—be better off than they are to-day except in the following cases. Many single persons, some persons over sixty-five years of age with unearned incomes, and many childless married couples with earned incomes, would be up to, at the most, £18 a year less well off than at present; but bachelors, even with very small incomes, would really find it as cheap to be married as single. Married couples with one child and with earned incomes of from £325 to £700 a year would be up to £12 a year less well off; and with two children and earned incomes of from £450 to £750, up to £8 annually. Apart from these exceptions, blackcoated workers and others would all be gaining financially, but by far their greatest gain, as it is certainly their greatest need, would be from the increased feeling of security. We need hardly consider those with incomes in excess of £1,000 a year, all of whom would be gaining substantially.

It is clear that payment for the staple foods could be transferred quite simply, and without causing any hardship, from an individual to a collective basis. At the same time we could move a step nearer to that ideal: equality of taxation as well as of representation. Lastly, a certain measure of redistribution of purchasing power could be effected.

The fact that for the first time everyone would have enough to eat would mean a considerable increase in the volume of trade in exchanging goods and services for food,

both home grown and imported, benefiting every industry, most noticeably railways and shipping, with far-reaching effects even in the depressed areas. Additionally, the increased purchasing power of, in particular, wage-earners and the lower-paid blackcoated workers would probably be expended on in the first place clothes, to the great advantage of the depressed textile trades, and secondly on better housing accommodation (would housing subsidies still be required?), thus further increasing the building activity which has been such a great factor of the present trade recovery. Again, there would be substantially increased expenditure by all other sections of the community. In short, there would be a trade revival of unparalleled proportions. The battle against unemployment would be more than half, perhaps completely, won. With everyone assured of their food many social injustices which it has not been possible entirely to suppress by legislation would tend to disappear, such as the sweating of labour; events would probably prove that good employers could view the change with equanimity. The unprecedented trade revival would certainly ensure that the yield of taxation would be sufficient not merely to balance the budget but to provide a substantial surplus, by the end of the second if not the first year. How should this surplus be used?

Our first obligation, indeed our interest, should be to ensure that farmers at home and, if possible, overseas, should receive a price for their produce which was equal to the cost of production; this is more likely to be achieved by extending the system of marketing schemes and agreements than by *laissez-faire* methods, since our demand for food is naturally limited, but the supply can be almost any quantity we care to make it. The increased prosperity of agriculture would once again focus attention on the land question; possibly this question will be finally settled if and when we approach even nearer to equality of taxation—complete equality would mean only an income tax. Many agricultural problems, such as “surplus” milk, could be kept in check by progressively increasing the suggested allowances in the Guaranteed Food Supply until saturation point of consumption was reached, production then being adjusted as nearly as possible to it, which would assuredly be as cheap as, and preferable to, subsidies or other devices. In time it would become necessary

to include all the easily produced foods in the proposed new national service, otherwise, as the suggested quantities per head in the Guaranteed Food Supply were increased to saturation point, producers of alternative articles of diet, such as poultry, would be unable to sell a fair proportion of their output in competition with freely distributed foods.

Considering particularly Great Britain, though the argument is of universal application, once everyone in this country had as much to eat as they required for the maintenance of perfect health, of the best-quality food obtainable, for which we were paying a price equal to the cost of production, we should then, if trade was free from tariffs, be exchanging the optimum value, per head of the population, of goods and services for food. In other words: there is a definite limit to trade expansion in the direction of exchanging goods and services for food, a limit to which we cannot attain whilst anyone is under-fed, a limit directly dependent upon the health of our people (whatever their numbers, but surely not of a Malthusian order). Health and trade are interdependent.

The establishing of the proposed new national service would be the next step in our economic progress, more—the next step in the march of civilisation. I look forward to the day when food will be available free to every citizen of the world, leading to an increased feeling of goodwill not only between man and man, but between nation and nation.

EDWARD CORDEROY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS?

WE are promised, somewhat half-heartedly, it must be confessed, by the chief Powers constituting the League of Nations, that this autumn an attempt shall be made to reform the League. The need for such reform arose from the failure of the attempt made during the past twelve months to use the Covenant as a means of preventing a war engaged in by a Great Power. There were those who always thought that the League of Nations could not be used for such a purpose. Yet so strong was the faith of many people in Great Britain that the League of Nations provided the only safeguard against war, and that if the League failed there was no hope left; so determined were such believers to prove the efficacy of the League; that they forced the League into an experiment which in the nature of things was bound by contrast to prove the opposite. To accept the League's failure as final and decisive is in the view of many idealists to accept the inevitability of war. Yet it is at least equally arguable that if a League of Nations which in the last resort must logically depend upon a "sanction," but which in fact has no effective "sanction" at its disposal, is taken at its face value, then the only probable result is disaster.

It is now nearly seventeen years since the League of Nations started functioning. In 1919 the men who framed its constitution worked under the spur of the still fresh wounds of the greatest war known to history. The whole world was in a chastened mind, possessed of an almost holy frenzy of impulse to banish war from the habits of men. The motive was unanimous and strong. Those who remember the appalling difficulties of the Paris deliberations even upon so relatively non-controversial an issue as the League of Nations were even then in some degree disillusioned. In the very circumstance of honest repentance, it was found impossible to construe the repentance into reform. For four and a half years Europe had been a shambles. Ten million young men had been killed. Twice as many hearts had been broken. Homes were shattered. When it all came to its bitter end, could any honest man say that any decent thing had been achieved at such a price? The whole war from beginning to

end had been a nightmare of human folly. It must never happen again, said everybody at the end of 1918. If it was not to happen again there must be some arrangement to prevent it. What arrangement? Obviously, as war was waged by nations, nations must agree never again to go to war. Moreover there must be a "sanction" against a violation of the pledge.

The analogy was ready at hand. "Civilisation" consists merely in the communal organisation of societies who for mutual convenience agree that property shall be safeguarded and life protected. That simple premise demands a central "government." That government needs a "sanction." The obvious sanction is that murderers and thieves shall be punished by the collective action of the community. It is a true case of collective security. Murderers are hanged, thieves imprisoned or fined. As a result the system of collective security within well-defined civilised communities does indeed work. Could not a similar system be made to work among nations? Is there not an analogy between an individual person in a community who commits an aggression against his neighbour and a nation which commits an aggression against its neighbour? If the former can be deterred by punishment, could not the latter? Such a thought was the pure and simple genesis of the League of Nations in 1919.

Now it was obvious even then to all simple people, that is to the people who were capable of clear thinking, that collective security among nations was a harder thing to achieve than collective security among individuals belonging to the same regional community, speaking the same language, trained in the same traditions, sharing the same interests. If therefore the "sanction" of collective security in its international scope was to be made effective, it was clearly necessary that the logic of the principle should be applied with even stricter thoroughness than within homogeneous communities. Within a community every single citizen is subject to the national law. Every single citizen contributes to the "sanction." Therefore an aggressor knows for a certainty that if he be found out he will be punished. In the international field, if the experiment of organising a "sanction" against war was to succeed, it would be necessary that every aggressor state should know for a certainty that his crime would be punished by the operation of the sanction.

The only sanction that could be thought of in 1919 and the obvious only sanction that can be thought of at all, is the collective action of all of the other members of the international society against the aggressor and for the protection of the victim of the aggression. Such a sanction is the exact analogy to the sanction used within national communities. When a man commits an aggression against his neighbour, he is punished by the collective action of every other member of the community acting through the agency of the "government," which is the embodiment of the aggregate force of the community.

It was perfectly obvious therefore in 1919 what were the simple principles that must be observed if a League of Nations was to be made an effective instrument for safeguarding the peace. They were: (1) that the membership of the League must be universal; (2) that every member must contribute to the "sanction"; (3) that the League must have at its disposal the corresponding power to that of a national government, to put the sanction into operation. These were the three simple, obvious postulates. No. 1 implied logically that every single civilised government on earth should become a member of the League. But the question, what is a civilised government, is itself a difficulty. It was doubtful from the beginning whether absolute universality was practicable. But the moment such a difficulty was examined it disappeared. All that would be necessary was that every great Power in the world should be a member of the League. In such an event every other Power would inevitably want to become a member. There were seven great Powers in the world: The British Empire; The United States of America; Germany; France; Italy; Russia; Japan. If the combined forces of those seven Powers were engaged in the punishment of aggression, the sanction obviously would be irresistible. And no sanction is effective unless it be unquestionably irresistible. Principle No. 2 given above implied that the constituent members of the League of Nations should subordinate their national sovereignty to the international sovereignty of the League, just as a private individual within a community subordinates his freedom to the national government. No. 3 principle implied that every constituent member of the League should be totally disarmed, and that the only armed force in the

world should be that used by the League of Nations. The analogy was self-evident. Within a community the police force is the instrument of the government. Individuals must neither be armed themselves, nor have a private organisation of force. To the extent that that principle fails within a community, the principle of collective security proportionately fails. America's gangsters are a case in point.

What emerged therefore clearly enough was that a League of Nations must be complete in its membership, must be a super-state in authority over the constituent national states, and must itself have force at its disposal, while the constituent states must be disarmed.

In such things there is no room for compromise. Either there is a sanction or there is not. And a sanction by its very nature must be a "100 per cent." sanction, or nothing at all. It is a choice of absolute extremes. If human nature is not ready for a League of Nations then there can be no League of Nations, and the old habit of war must go on. The question is: is the world ready for a League of Nations? Obviously not. There can be no shadow of doubt about the answer. Even in 1919 when the psychological incentive to the formation of a League of Nations was at its strongest, the world's representatives concentrated in Paris wholly failed to constitute a real League of Nations. They broke every principle upon which a successful League of Nations depended. There never was anything but a grotesque travesty of a League of Nations. At the very outset two of the Great Powers were deliberately refused membership, namely Germany and Russia. That single fact in itself destroyed the League of Nations before it was born. Next, the United States for her part refused to be a member. That fact by itself would have destroyed the League if the League had not already been destroyed.

The human capacity for self-deception is such, however, that the remaining four Great Powers, Britain, France, Italy and Japan solemnly proceeded to stage the pantomime of a League of Nations. When in January 1920 the first meeting took place, the gods, if gods there be, looked down and this unnatural scene they laughed at. Shakespeare's gods have a wicked sense of humour. For sixteen and a half years the political organisation at Geneva went on functioning after its manner. It was

not a League of Nations. Germany came in, and went out. Japan, being in, went out. Russia came in, and stayed in. The United States stayed out. Italy played truant. The Box-and-Cox Club at Geneva lasted nearly seventeen years. Much of its time was spent in negotiation, indulged in by the members themselves, for the achievement of one of the precedent conditions of its own very existence; namely disarmament. And even during the long years of the work done at Geneva, first by the medium of committees, then by the medium of a world conference, towards the disarmament of the constituent members, it was not a true or genuine disarmament at all that was the object, but the eternal disarmament only of Germany.

And then, last year, a Great Power member of the League went to war. At that time the United States, Germany and Japan stood outside the League. Italy being the aggressor, there remained in the League three out of seven great Powers. One of them, France, had not the slightest desire or intention to do anything so foolish as to pretend that there was in fact any such thing as a true League of Nations. British public opinion, however, by one of the most grotesque manifestations of mass emotion known to history, blindly, obstinately demanded that the theoretic "sanction" of a theoretic and in fact non-existent League of Nations should be put into operation against Italy. If the gods laughed in January 1920, it was because they did not believe that anybody could take this comic thing so seriously. If they have any saving grace of pity in their temper, they must have wept in December 1935. The British people, who have a greater gift of self-deception than probably any people on earth, who "never know when they are beaten," wilfully blind, obstinately unpractical, quixotically and magnificently sincere, led the world the most fantastic dance on human record. Even when the dance ended and a dispirited world was inclined to recognise its folly, British opinion imperturbably clung to its heroic delusion.

We are promised a "reform" of the League to the end that "collective security" the next time shall be a winner. How, no single individual in the length and breadth of the British Isles has the slightest idea. Is there any reason, even any common sense, in the expectation that in 1936, when the whole world is madly arming and when human nature is in

the raw, there is a better chance of constituting a true League of Nations than there was in 1919, when the whole world was prostrate, sick of war, and repentant of folly? It is the fashion among pacific-minded British students of diplomacy to argue that the alternative to a League of Nations is the old system of alliances and inevitable war. But the question of alternatives does not even arise. There is not, never was, any League of Nations at all, except in name. Even now those same apostles of a League theory without a League practice refuse to face the very basic implications of a true League of Nations. The universality of membership or at the minimum the inclusion of all the Great Powers, the total disarmament of the constituent members and the creation of an international police force: these are the three obvious conditions precedent to the very possibility of instituting a League of Nations. Until those conditions can be created, there can be no League of Nations.

The truly pacific-minded people, those whose idealism is governed by the consideration of what is possible rather than by what would be desirable if it were possible, cannot for a second time lend their support to the framing of a sham League of Nations. The United States, Japan, Germany, Italy; these states must be in it before the work of re-drafting the Covenant can be even started. Let a beginning be made with the United States. If it be found impossible to obtain the consent of the United States to join a League, then there can be no further discussion of a League. Is it not possible, some people ask—did not Mr. Bernard Shaw ask it in 1919?—to do the thing gradually, and to begin for example with a European League of Nations? It needs only a moment's reflection to be convinced that such a method is wholly out of the question. Italy, a European Great Power, made war on Abyssinia, which is Africa. Britain, whose empire, our schoolboys are taught, is so big that the sun never sets upon it, cannot act without the Dominions. Russia is both a European and an Asiatic Power. Is Turkey a European Power? Is the Black Sea in Europe? It is obviously impracticable to circumscribe the geographic competence of a League of Nations. It must be the League, the whole League and nothing but the League, or the enterprise must fail.

THE FINAL SCENES AT GENEVA.

Italy began her invasion of Abyssinia on October 3rd, 1935. On October 7th, 1935, the Council of the League declared Italy to be an aggressor. Sanctions were put into operation at various dates in the second half of October. The Italian conquest of Abyssinia was completed on May 2nd, 1936, when Negus Tafari, the Emperor, fled from Addis Ababa. The Council of the League met on June 26th. It met privately for the main purpose of relegating to the Assembly the initiative in deciding the course to be pursued now that the war between Italy and Abyssinia was over. The Assembly met on June 30th, its technical occasion being a resumption of the Sixteenth Assembly, its practical purpose being to consider how sanctions were to be brought to an end. Having been imposed during the war, sanctions automatically were continued after the war until they were called off.

Mr. Eden on July 1st delivered to the Assembly what is necessarily a speech of historic interest, for he had to announce the British Government's view that sanctions, having failed to achieve their theoretic purpose, could now serve no purpose at all. He first of all spoke of the past, and made this confession: "Not one of us here present can contemplate with any measure of satisfaction the circumstances in which the Assembly meets on this occasion. It is an occasion painful for us all. In my belief it is the more necessary, therefore, in the interests of every member of the League, and of the League itself as an organisation, that the facts should be squarely faced. What are they? So far as the application of sanctions in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute is concerned, the members of the League have together and in common applied certain economic and financial measures which they were in a position to impose, and which they thought could be made effective by their own action alone—yet we are all conscious to-day that these measures have failed to fulfil the purpose for which they were imposed. It is not that the measures in themselves have been without effect, but that the conditions in which they were expected to operate have not been realised. The course of military events, the local situation in Abyssinia, have brought us to a point at which the sanctions at present in force are incapable of reversing the order of events in that country. That fact is,

unhappily, fundamental. Let me make, then, the position of the Government I have the honour to represent quite clear. Had His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom any reason to believe that the maintenance of existing sanctions, or even the addition to them of other economic measures, would re-establish the position in Abyssinia, then, for their part, they would be prepared to advocate such a policy and, if other members of the League agreed, to join in its application. In view of the facts of the present situation in Abyssinia, His Majesty's Government find it impossible to entertain any such belief. In our view it is only military action that could now produce this result. I cannot believe that, in present world conditions, such military action could be considered a possibility. This is the situation with which we are confronted. The realities have to be recognised."

He next spoke of the future of the League in this way: "Are we to say, because we have failed on this occasion to make the rule of law prevail over the rule of force that we are therefore finally to abandon this object? Certainly not. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a view. How many efforts have been needed in history to realise objectives of far less significance to the ultimate destiny of the human race? With such an objective as this before us our endeavour must be centred upon the task of reconstruction. I heard with the greatest interest, as I am sure we all did, those passages in the speech of the representative of France in which he spoke of the determination of his Government and of his country to seek to rebuild the authority of the League. In that all-important task I can assure him at once of the fullest collaboration of His Majesty's Government. It is, however, clear that the lessons of the last few months must be embodied in our practice. Some people may say: It is the men and not the machinery that have failed. No doubt there is force in that contention, but we have to probe a little deeper than that. What were the reasons for the failure? Let us consider this matter for the moment, for it is of vital importance to the future of the League. Was failure due to the fact that there are certain risks which nations are not prepared to run save where their own interests are more directly at stake than they were in this case? Clearly the ideal system of collective security is one in which all nations are prepared to go to all lengths—military lengths—to deal

with any aggressor. That is the ideal, but if such an ideal cannot be at present attained—and I agree with the Prime Minister of France that a heavily armed world greatly increases the difficulty of its attainment—and let us not forget how much it has increased the difficulty of our task in the last few months; if such an ideal cannot be attained at present it is surely our duty to amend, not necessarily our rule of life, but the methods by which it is to be enforced, so that these may correspond to the action which nations are in fact ready and willing to take."

Mr. Eden, therefore, in short gave it as his view that if a true League of Nations was an impossibility, then something short of a true League of Nations was better than nothing. He was entirely reserved as to what he might mean by a League short of a true League. M. Blum by contrast, but with equal vagueness as to details, gave it as the French view that the reduction of the League to a debating society would be preposterous, and that the only hope would be to create a real and effective League of Nations. M. Delbos two days later elaborated M. Blum's argument by submitting that the implications of Article XVI of the Covenant be not weakened, but specified, so that precise military commitments should be known in advance of the hypothetical contingencies. Mr. Litvinov delivered a glowing speech (July 1st) to the effect that though the League had failed this time, it was reasonable to hope that the next time it would "rise to the full level of League ideals, and the victim would be saved from the aggressor altogether." He added that what was necessary was a general confidence that in all cases of aggression, independently of the degree of interest involved to the particular parties, sanctions would be applied by all the states members. He drew the conclusion that sanctions for the future must be made obligatory.

Here then were the representatives of the only three Great Powers within the active body of the so-called League of Nations: Mr. Eden for Great Britain; M. Blum and M. Delbos for France; Mr. Litvinov for Russia. From the lips of not one of those men did there fall one single sentence which suggested that they had thought seriously about the matter at all, or had any constructive thing whatever to say. The very poverty of political thought is another of the

reasons why the League of Nations has proved in our time an unpractical dream.

Can it surprise anyone that this historic Sixteenth Assembly, whose distinctive business it was to record the failure of the League, ended its session on July 5th by agreeing to a "recommendation" the sense of which would baffle the keenest wit? In all solemnity the Assembly of the League of Nations by the votes of forty-four member states to one—the one dissentient being the victim of the aggression, Ethiopia—passed this motion:

"I. The Assembly, (1) having met again on the initiative of the Government of the Argentine Republic, and in pursuance of the decision to adjourn its Session taken on October 11th, 1935, in order to examine the situation arising out of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute; (2) taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on this subject; (3) noting that various circumstances have prevented the full application of the Covenant of the League of Nations; (4) remaining firmly attached to the principles of the Covenant, which are also expressed in other diplomatic instruments such as the declaration of the American States dated August 3rd, 1932, excluding the settlement of territorial questions by force; (5) being desirous of strengthening the authority of the League of Nations by adapting the application of these principles to the lessons of experience; (6) being convinced that it is necessary to strengthen the real effectiveness of the guarantees of security which the League affords to its members: recommends that the Council, (a) should invite the Governments of the members of the League to send to the Secretary-General before September 1st, 1936, any proposals they may wish to make in order to improve in the spirit or within the limits laid down above the application of the principles of the Covenant; (b) should instruct the Secretary-General to make a first examination and classification of these proposals; (c) should report to the Assembly at its next meeting on the state of the question.

"II. The Assembly, taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on the subject of the situation arising out of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute; recalling the previous findings and decisions in connection with this dispute; recommends that the Co-ordination

Committee should make all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken by them in execution of Article XVI (Sanctions) of the Covenant."

That is indeed an empty and a melancholy historic document, showing the vanity of human affairs in their political aspect. It remains only to chronicle the fact that sanctions were formally abandoned at midnight of July 15th-16th. What of the future?

THE FUTURE.

The most striking fact that followed Geneva's dropping of its sanctionist experiment was the utter demoralisation of diplomatic practice. With the spectacular stultification of the League Covenant there seemed to disappear the last traces of the Versailles system in Europe. Even the Locarno Treaty had disappeared with it. By reoccupying the Rhine-land zone in March the German Government in effect tore up that treaty as it had already in effect torn up the Versailles Treaty. In its Western aspect the Locarno Treaty had five signatories: Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Italy. As a result of the Italo-Abyssinian war the Italian Government lost interest in the Locarno Treaty as completely as it lost interest in the League of Nations. Germany was the party that had torn up the treaty. Ever since Germany reoccupied the Rhine zone therefore the three remaining signatories, Great Britain, France and Belgium, had been discussing the desirability of holding a conference to discuss what next to do about the emergency.

The British Government on April 15th was requested by the French and Belgian Governments to transmit to the German Government a series of questions designed to elicit a statement of Germany's further intentions in Europe. The questions were submitted to Baron von Neurath by Sir Eric Phipps on May 7th. No answer was given by the German Government. It was therefore decided that Great Britain, France and Belgium should by themselves hold a "Locarno" meeting. There was certainly something to discuss. But the whole essence of the Locarno Treaty was the mutual guarantee of peace by the five Powers. Was there much hope or even sense in three of those Powers holding a meeting, even if it were called (as it was called) "preliminary"?

What they said in official London was that Germany's refusal for more than two months to answer the British questionnaire about her intentions in Europe made it impossible to invite Germany to the "Locarno" talks in the first instance. What France said was that the meeting resulted from Germany's violation of the treaty, and therefore, in the first instance, concerned only the non-German Powers. But Italy was one of the non-German Locarno signatories. She, too, was not to attend the meeting in the first instance. Would not wise statesmanship have sought privately to induce both German and Italian participation before holding the "Locarno" meeting?

The misfortune that had radiated from Geneva was due to the simple fact that the existing League was impotent from the beginning, because it was incomplete. The exactly parallel misfortune was invited by an incomplete "Locarno" meeting. Both the League and the Locarno principles depended wholly for their virtue upon the completeness of their respective membership. To violate common sense not once, but incorrigibly again, was the very travesty of statesmanship.

In truth these "Locarno" talks were as much an anachronism as the League of Nations. The overshadowing fact in Europe is the expansion of Germany. The overwhelmingly important object for all serious people is to evade for as long as possible the war with Germany. Was it an accident that Germany made her agreement with Austria, the agreement that secured the consolidation of the 65,000,000 Germans of the Reich with the 6,000,000 Germans of Austria, on July 11th—just four days before the ritual burial of the League's sanctions? Or was the one event the nemesis of the other? It was at any rate obvious that a new epoch had begun in Europe. The Versailles epoch lasted nearly eighteen years, though it progressively and in recent years rapidly lost its hold. It has now been added to the academic body of things that are past. Henceforth it is not the virtue of any juridical instrument fashioned at Versailles, Saint Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, Sèvres, or Lausanne that will decide any single thing in Europe or the Near East. The Covenant of the League of Nations was one of those instruments.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

August 15th, 1936.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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TWO LIVES OF HITLER.

Of the many books about Hitler those of Konrad Heiden and Rudolf Olden are the most valuable.* No objective survey of his extraordinary career is possible at present, for his biographers, like his subjects, either admire or detest him. That he is a remarkable man is incontestable. That he is a singularly complicated character is equally clear. Lenin and Mussolini are much easier to interpret than this queer mixture of the prophet and the demagogue. Future biographers will have the advantage of knowing how he turns out, how far the experiment of personal autocracy in such a civilised country as Germany succeeds, whether, like so many other dictators, he plunges into war and goes down amid the ruins. To write of his rule after three years is like attempting to appraise a drama after the first act.

Realising as they do that the personality of a dictator is the key to his achievements, both biographers devote by far the larger part of their space to the period before his accession to power. Both are accomplished and experienced publicists, who have studied the evolution of post-war Germany at first hand. Heiden is known to English readers as the author of an admirable *History of National Socialism*, Olden as the author of penetrating biographies of Stresemann and Hindenburg. Though their verdicts on Hitler are equally severe, the tone

* (1) *Hitler*. By Konrad Heiden. Constable. 10s. (2) *Hitler the Pawn*. By Rudolf Olden. Gollancz. 12s. 6d.

of the two books differs a good deal. Heiden is dramatic, sometimes melodramatic. Two of his chapters are written in the sensational style which has become fashionable in recent years. That on women could have been omitted with advantage, not because the subject is irrelevant or unimportant, but because our knowledge is so incomplete. That on June 30th, 1934, with which the story closes, will haunt the reader to his dying day. Hitler's "Bartholomew" massacre, like his attack on the Jews, leaves an ineffaceable stain which can never be wiped out by his constructive work, such as it is. "Among the victims were men of whom he had never thought and whom he would gladly have saved. Restlessly he darted in his aeroplane over Germany whose soil by his command reeked with innocent blood." How many were shot will not be discovered till after the fall of the Nazi régime, perhaps not even then. Hitler's own figure, in his explanatory speech to the Reichstag, was seventy-seven. "Possibly there were at least 300, and not impossibly a thousand." Life is cheap in countries ruled by irresponsible autocrats.

The amazing story of Hitler's rise is told with great spirit, but the most interesting chapter in the book is the analysis of his character entitled *The Two Hitlers*. He is certainly not a normal human being. There is a cleavage of personality, we are told, between Hitler and the Führer, the man and the stage hero. Though he abhors the theory and practice of the Nazi chief, Heiden recognises his extraordinary gifts.

He created the mightiest supremacy over Germany that has ever existed—mightiest because magical. It is vain to seek in the shadow of the Brown House for clever, hidden wire-pullers, who manipulated this puppet and finally had him crowned; there is none. As though a colossal mental endowment were always necessary for great achievements! There are other forces beside the mind. Yet he should not be regarded as mindless; he possesses considerable intellectual gifts. The masses feel that this man is themselves, an aggregate and personification of their own forces. Hence that intimate relationship to him. And what sort of masses are they? They are the impoverished, beaten, famished German nation; at the beginning of the century almost the most arrogant in the world; now bewildered by the war and its aftermath, without self-confidence, weighed down by feelings of inferiority. . . . This man who fights his way up out of insignificance is the darling of the masses, as no prince or general could ever be. . . . Only the ruin of all made him ruler over all.

Olden's thoughtful book is equally worthy of careful study, and the differences of approach add to its interest. It deals more fully with the early years, so fully indeed that we realise how extraordinarily and deliberately misleading is the narrative presented in *Mein Kampf*. Hitler's poverty was more severe, his shifts were more desperate, than he allowed his readers to know. His sufferings were intensified by the fact that he was a *petit bourgeois*, not a member of the working class, with which, according to our author, he has very little sympathy. The title of the book, *Hitler the Pawn*, indicates the author's conviction that the achievement is far greater than the man. In his biography of Hindenburg he stressed the decisive importance of the army and its Junker chiefs, through every phase of Prussian and German history since Frederick William I, not excluding the Weimar Republic. In the present work he stresses it again. Hitler had the insight to realise that the army was stronger than the Government and infinitely stronger than the Socialists, who, after the collapse of the Hohenzollern Empire, found themselves for a brief space on the crest of the wave and had no notion of what to do with their victory. Both before and since his accession to power Hitler has taken care to be on the side of the Reichswehr.

He can be hard to every one but the army . . . the totality to which Hitler so often pledged himself has been abandoned in the interests of the army. The old dualism of powers, which has always hampered Germany's development and which ruined the Republic, continues as before. . . . The Dictator, the Leader, is the creature of the army.

With the big industrialists on his side and financing his movement, he, the arch-enemy of Socialism and Communism, was irresistible.

Olden portrays Hitler as a small man, the most skilful demagogue in the world, no doubt, yet not a real leader, an orator with little to say, a child of the World War and of the vast confusion, material and spiritual, which it left behind, a great destroyer, not the architect of a better world. In his gospel he sees nothing that is new—merely a challenge to the institutions and ideas which the most civilised nations have developed in Western Europe during the last few centuries. Writing as a German Liberal he denounces "this crude, wild,

outrageous attack on humanity." But the same object takes on very different hues according to the spectacles through which it is surveyed. Hitlerism, like Italian Fascism and Russian Bolshevism, has its millions of devotees, especially among the young who see in it the emancipation of their country from weakness, humiliation and despair. The man who has been able to satisfy the longing for leadership, despite his foreign origin and lack of education, his coarseness of fibre and crudity of thought, must have remarkable qualities. Is he so entirely the pawn as Olden maintains? Readers of these two biographies, while thanking the authors for their valuable assistance, must answer the question for themselves.

G. P. G.

A GREAT BISHOP.*

By her Life of Bishop Talbot Lady Stephenson has discharged an indispensable task and has done it with such distinction as completely to satisfy the innumerable friends and admirers of one who was among the most influential Christian leaders of recent times.

Three men stood out during the past half-century as carrying on the Tractarian tradition, and yet as combining with it both a broad and enlightened outlook upon modern thought and life and also a more generous attitude towards non-Anglican Communions, especially towards Protestant Nonconformists. These three great leaders and inseparable comrades were Henry Scott Holland, Charles Gore and Edward Stuart Talbot. While their ecclesiastical principles were identical with those of Keble, Pusey and Liddon, no greater contrast could be imagined than that between the rigidity and exclusiveness of these earlier leaders of the Anglo-Catholic movement and both the spirit and the outlook of their great successors. It is safe to say that without the influence of Holland, Gore and Talbot Tractarianism would have withered and become fossilised owing to its inability even to tolerate the advances in scholarship, criticism and social life that marked the latter half of the nineteenth

* *Edward Stuart Talbot*. By Gwendolen Stephenson. S.P.C.K. 10s. 6d.

century. The three younger leaders not only tolerated these advances, but welcomed them, absorbed them and courageously proclaimed them. The publication of *Lux Mundi* in 1889, which so greatly distressed Pusey and Liddon, opened a new and most fruitful chapter of Anglican thought, while the influence of Professor Thomas Hill Green and of the Christian Socialists enabled the younger leaders to transcend the limits of narrow ecclesiasticism and to give both impulse and guidance to the growing sense of the wholeness of human life, with its practical consequences in political, economic and social concerns. Biographies of Scott Holland and Gore have already appeared, and now the trilogy is completed by that of perhaps the most sagacious of the three, Edward Stuart Talbot.

Born in 1844 and of aristocratic parentage on both sides, everything favoured Talbot from the first. The devout and austere religious life of his parents, the wide circle of highly placed friends, intimate relations with both the Gladstones and the Cecils, all enriched his early development and gave him the sense of prospective leadership from the start. His intellectual capacity and thoroughness, together with an original and cultivated austerity of life, enabled him to equip himself by a successful career both at school and at Oxford. Then followed in succession his appointment to the wardenship of Keble College, which owed everything at the outset to his influence and that of his gracious and charming wife, his remarkable parochial service as Vicar of Leeds, and as the inevitable sequel his consecration to an episcopacy, which was exercised successively at Rochester, Southwark and Winchester. His influence both in the Church and with Balfour enabled him to inaugurate the educational legislation of 1902, the stormiest achievement of his life. The high motives which actuated him in this most controversial endeavour are clearly set out by Lady Stephenson, and won the respectful appreciation even of those who opposed him. Finally, the experience of the Edinburgh Missionary Conference in 1910 and his association, then inaugurated, with the Student Christian Movement led the Bishop to a new appreciation of the faith and work of non-Anglican Christians, and thus prepared him for that fatherly co-operation in guidance that marked his closing years, making him an outstanding leader in efforts towards Reunion and closer

co-operation with all Christian bodies and activities. The story of this great and uniformly successful career is told in the volume before us with admirable lucidity and fullness.

Fatherliness was the supreme characteristic of Bishop Talbot throughout the long years of his eventful ministry. Kindliness, austerity and humility were the features that distinguished his character. Weightiness, not brilliance or originality, was the distinguishing feature of his intellect, the working of which was always controlled by the gravity of his moral outlook and self-discipline. Slow in arriving at a judgment, either on large affairs or on personal problems, he was strong in acting upon the decisions at which he eventually arrived, after setting out and balancing the alternatives which confronted him. Severity and tenderness were remarkably combined in him. The result of all these qualities and of his appreciation of good wherever he found it was seen in the steadily advancing growth of comprehensiveness in thought and conduct, which eventually made him a venerated leader of Christian thought and effort, whose influence reached out to all the religious and social movements of his time. The study of this book must be recommended to all who would understand the spiritual movement of the past century. It is at once a source of indispensable information and a valuable moral tonic. What more can be said?

J. S. L.

* * * * *

JEFFERSON.*

An American professor, well versed in the history and politics of his country, once remarked to me that Thomas Jefferson's influence on political ideas has exceeded that of all the other Presidents of the United States put together. Wherever you find a Jeffersonian to-day—and there are many in America, and especially in Virginia—you find what we in England would call a Cobdenite or Gladstonian Liberal. Those familiar with Jefferson's career and writings and with the standard biographies from Tucker and Randal down to that of Professor Gilbert Chinard (which embodies a good deal

* *The Living Jefferson*. By James Truslow Adams. Scribner's. \$3.

of new material) will welcome this new work. Mr. James Truslow Adams has made his mark, not only as an American historian, but as an independent publicist who keeps a critical and vigilant eye upon the political or financial misdemeanours of successive Congresses and Presidents. In this his latest book we recognise the political pamphleteer as well as the historian. Jefferson and Hamilton have served for more than a century to represent two opposing schools of political thought, and consequently their biographers have frequently been inspired by a political purpose. But Mr. Adams' preference for Jefferson has not poisoned his mind against Hamilton as the late Mr. Oliver's preference for Hamilton poisoned his mind against Jefferson. From his fair and skilful handling of the main episodes in Jefferson's life, it is clear that Mr. Adams has read with critical care all the available material. In describing Jefferson's controversies, we feel that he has studied well the parts played by Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall, John Adams, James Madison and other contemporaries with whom Jefferson wrestled or co-operated. Though he pauses from time to time to illustrate the width and variety of Jefferson's mental and moral interests—his devotion to his wife and daughters, the firmness of his friendships, his love of music, his artistic gifts, and above all the breadth and depth of a humanity which embraced the negro race and won the devoted loyalty of his own slaves—yet we feel throughout that our author's main business is with Jefferson's statesmanship and political ideas. Even while he adorns the tale, he is pointing the moral; and in the last two chapters "the Living Jefferson" is brought to bear with severity upon the Democratic Party of to-day and its popular President. From first to last Jefferson is presented as the founder and inspirer of American Liberalism. He is not only a great Liberal, but a great gentleman, an aristocratical Democrat whose ideal of government was a nation mainly agricultural, based on the popular vote, but governed by men of virtue and capacity.

There is an acute discussion on the theory of natural rights as understood by Jefferson. In his hands the doctrine served not only to assert the rights of the American Colonies against George III's Government, but also to provide a basis for maintaining individual freedom and state rights against a centralising Federal Government after the Constitution was

adopted. Jefferson drew a distinction between natural and civil rights. Natural rights were those which we can exercise fully and perfectly as individuals, such as the right to freedom of thought and expression. Civil rights comprised the rights to personal security and the possession of property, because in those cases the individual is dependent on society and on the guarantee of a good Constitution and a good Government. This philosophic distinction helps to explain why Jefferson attached so much importance to a Bill of Rights as an element in the American Constitution. Whatever philosophic difficulties may be felt about the doctrine, we can agree with Mr. Adams that it "played an enormous part in the gaining of freedom for the modern world."

There never was a statesman or legislator whose actions and proposals throughout life were more consistent than Jefferson's with his theories of human happiness and human government, though he always thought first of his own State and of the Union. In framing the Declaration of American Independence and the Statute of Religious Freedom for Virginia, in repealing the Virginian law of entail, in founding the University of Virginia, in opposing protective tariffs and monopolies, and in keeping his country, once it had attained independence, by all the means in his power out of foreign wars, he was interpreting as a statesman the same moral ideas of individual liberty and national progress, of equality of opportunity and the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which inspired Adam Smith, Bentham, Cobden and Gladstone.

Jefferson's advocacy of sound money, balanced budgets and avoidance of debt proceeded from a deep conviction that national insolvency and a depreciating currency are mischiefs fatal to the happiness of a nation and to its internal and external strength. It was not through any lack of love for the poor that he opposed the spoliation of property. He valued good government, but he hated over-government. The State, in his eyes, existed for the benefit of the individuals who composed it. Ministers and officials were to be the servants, not the dictators, of the people. All this, and much more, is admirably expressed in Mr. Truslow Adams' portraiture of his hero.

F. W. HIRST.

THE FINE ARTS UNDER THE GEORGES.*

The appearance of this very attractive book is opportune, public attention having been so recently drawn to English *chinoiseries* at the Burlington Fine Arts Club and elsewhere, and to the work of the Adam brothers at Adelphi Terrace, while George IV's merits as a Man of Taste and art patron are receiving belated recognition, and the Baroque is once more in favour.

Tastes proverbially differ, but the eighteenth century seems to have been peculiar in having a canon of taste regulated by the governing class, "an apparently general agreement upon what constituted correct taste." The Grand Manner in painting was officially expounded by Sir Joshua Reynolds in his *Discourses*; it was seen in the numerous great houses built for nobles and gentry, who themselves felt, or affected, an enthusiasm for the Fine Arts, as evinced by the foundation of the Society of Dilettanti about 1730. Mr. Steegmann ably reviews the different branches of art: painting, architecture and decoration, sculpture, landscape-gardening, of the period. He traces the foreign influences on the English tradition—in painting, of the Italian and French masters; in architecture, of the Palladian, Baroque and Oriental styles. Most of the leading architects, Chambers and others, worked in several styles; Wren himself had experimented with both Gothic and Rococo. This accepted standard of correct taste resulted in a certain frigid formality (as seen, for instance, in Holkham House), and there were reactions from it, like the Gothic and Chinese. In painting, "Hogarth alone revolted, and alone he was never accepted." In Nature, which itself had been subjected to rules, and "improved" to resemble art, a "studied informality" succeeded the laying out of parks and gardens with "prospects" and "approaches," inimitably described in *Mansfield Park*: these, however, continued to be adorned by Chinese or classic temples and sham ruins. Horace Walpole's Strawberry Hill, and his careful notes of various country seats, find mention, needless to say, in these pages; the simple dignity of the smaller Georgian houses, such as delight us in any country town, is also remarked.

The "Gothic revival," sneered at as it has been, was, we are

* *The Rule of Taste from George I to George IV.* By John Steegmann. Macmillan. 1936. 10s. 6d.

reminded, based at first on a real archæological interest, an effort "to conjure up the past"; later, it became an affectation, and with the substitution of stucco for stone, a dishonesty. Chinese style applied to architecture, of which Sir William Chambers's Pagoda at Kew is an outstanding example, proved less successful than in interior decoration, where Chippendale and others introduced its *motifs* into their furniture and mirrors to blend with the fashionable wallpapers. A note of graceful elegance introduced by the brothers Adam temporarily modified the austerer rules of taste; Greek influence, under the Regency, produced stately and beautiful work such as Nash's in London and Brighton; his Terraces round Regent's Park have still happily escaped demolition. Among the illustrations, all interesting and admirably chosen, one may mention those of three ill-fated structures, each of which stood for a few years only—Canaletto's drawing of the Chinese bridge over the river at Hampton Court (1754); Beckford's extraordinary, melodramatic Gothic erection, Fonthill Abbey (1807), and the conservatory "built in the manner of a cathedral," exemplifying the "inspired confusion" of taste which reigned at Carlton House. With the rise of middle-class democracy at the time of the passing of the Reform Bill, the control of taste passed into other hands, and foreign influences were superseded by a "native modern art," romantic and naturalistic, of which Wilkie and Constable are here mentioned as representative.

E. G. S.

THE STATE OF RUSSIA.*

The state of Russia has been so variously interpreted by well-wishers and critics of the Soviet régime that the experiences of recent visits by Sir Bernard Pares and Sir Walter Citrine provide welcome material for acquiring a further insight into Russian conditions. In the course of a short visit to Moscow in the new year, designed primarily for the purpose of promoting a real contact between English and Russian scholars and students, Sir Bernard inspected local factories, schools and social institutions and surveyed the

* (1) *Moscow Admits a Critic*. By Sir Bernard Pares. Nelson. 2s. 6d. net. (2) *I Search for Truth in Russia*. By Sir Walter Citrine. Routledge. 10s. 6d. net.

state of a city with which he had been intimately connected up to 1918. His unrivalled knowledge of the old Russia and his antipathy to the post-war system render the conclusions from his visit of particular value. "There is no doubt, as far as Moscow is concerned, that a definite stage of achievement and prosperity has been reached." Sir Walter's testimony covers a wider field. In the course of a month last autumn, he toured a large area of Western and Southern Russia, travelling from Leningrad to Moscow and thence to the Ukraine and on to the oil-fields of Baku by the Caspian Sea. Treated as a specially privileged visitor and accompanied by an interpreter and guide, Sir Walter made an extensive inspection of industrial and social conditions. He insisted upon seeing everything he wished. With the experience of a previous visit in 1925 and supported by a grasp of official and other information about Russia, he was frank in his comments and openly critical with many of the officials with whom he talked. His long diary proves him a discerning observer and a collector of a mass of knowledge, particularly of prices, wages, living and labour conditions.

Both visitors are agreed, from what they saw and believed, upon a number of major points. Since 1933 great changes have been in progress. The emergence of a self-contained nationalist outlook, prompted by foreign menace, is evident, and a coercive policy has been somewhat relaxed, particularly towards the peasants, who can now own their livestock. The collective farms, with the growing goodwill of their operators, are likely to succeed. While communist control remains dictatorial, there is a reduction of propaganda in the schools; and both visitors were impressed by non-political shows at Moscow theatres. Elsewhere, however, government propaganda remains intensive. The institution of a seven-hour day is an advance and they agree that unemployment has been abolished. Sir Bernard, however, admits that he can only speak for Moscow, whence all non-workers have been deported; and Sir Walter did not visit areas beyond the scope of the Plan. In his view no recurrence of unemployment is likely, because in this Socialist State demand will always outbid supply. The factories are in a feverish state of production, particularly for defence purposes. The people appear to be well fed, if poorly clothed, and the shops less bare of everyday necessities than heretofore.

The standard of living is rising, although, as Sir Walter says, it remains greatly below that of the British working class.

The policy of intensive industrialisation and craving for ever greater output is outrunning itself. Factories not only produce goods that are usually shoddy or inefficient, but fail to absorb economically the growing number of industrial workers. The result is low wages and low living conditions. In Moscow, says Sir Bernard, the housing problem is "probably the sorest spot in the present situation," and his hope of early remedy is not borne out by Sir Walter's analysis. The latter stresses throughout his book the appalling shortage everywhere. The official standard of accommodation is fixed at nine square metres per head. The present housing programme can provide for only half this space. One family per room is most common. New buildings are "jerry" built and incomplete, and squalor is widespread. Rents, however, are low, usually 10 per cent. of earnings. On the other hand, the new factories are extremely spacious and well laid out from an æsthetic and productive point of view.

To foster industrial productivity, which increased by 20.4 per cent. in 1935, well-known methods are employed. "Piece-work is aimed at everywhere," with the alleged purpose of guaranteeing a wage proportionate to output. But in practice the "norm," or wage measurement standard, is raised to meet an increased rate of production. Sir Walter applauds the Stakhanov Movement so far as it makes for greater efficiency, but he has no doubt whatever that "there is coercion of the slow worker," at least morally by such means as black lists. Moreover, "equality of wages is scouted as an impossible and undesirable thing." Rates are usually divided into eight categories and range from 100-120 roubles a month up to a 1,000 or more for especially skilled or Stakhanov workers and members of administrative technical staffs; the average wage is 200-250 roubles. In addition, the "socialised" wage, to cover the factory's social services such as children's crèches and holidays, is about one-third of the monetary wage. Taking the value of the rouble at 3d., Sir Walter estimates that the total weekly wages of a shoe operative yield 21s. 1½d. and those of a metal-worker 27s. 9½d. In most cases this is doubled because the wife goes out to work and receives the same pay. Women do similar work to men, including heavy

manual labour such as road-mending and even mining. Sir Walter despairs of the trade unions. They are in fact State organisations and instruments of the government in forwarding production. Their nominal function of safeguarding the workman's welfare is quite illusory.

The general impression from these two books is that Russia is progressing in her Plan while reflecting more and more the outlook and many features of the so-called "capitalist" State. Meanwhile living conditions remain terribly low with little prospect of great alleviation in the immediate future. On the other hand there is everywhere a spirit of great energy and determination. In Sir Bernard Pares' view the Soviet Government is "certainly much more representative of Russia as a whole than it was in the time of conflict two years ago." But whether the working of the new constitution will allow any freedom remains to be seen.

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A DEFENCE OF BULGARIA.

Mr. George Clenton Logio was formerly one of Dr. Burrows's lecturers at King's College. He was Secretary to the Board of Trade Mission to Bulgaria (1919) and is known as the author of good books on Bulgaria and Roumania. In the present book* he boldly attempts a defence of Bulgaria against his post-war critics, especially those whose fingers were burnt in the League of Nations Loans. Mr. Logio states frankly:

As a result of the world war Bulgaria has sustained further mutilations. She has been incapacitated and disabled, and turned into a mendicant among the nations. Loans have been floated under the sponsorship of the League of Nations to succour her. The author canvassed at the time all his acquaintances and friends in favour of the loan which was raised on behalf of the Bulgarian refugees. The disillusion and loss this Refugee Loan has caused to the author's acquaintances has been the chief moral incentive which has urged him to compile the present book. He feels he owes them a full explanation, and he, in a special chapter, has attempted to give a complete version of the story of these loans, so that it may become clear that the responsibility for the partial default of their country does not weigh solely on the Bulgarians.

* *Bulgaria Past and Present.* By George Clenton Logio. Manchester: Sherratt & Hughes. 12s. 6d. net.

Mr. Logio's contention is that no blame can possibly attach to Bulgaria, for default was inevitable as a result of the discriminatory and unfair conditions imposed by the Finance Committee of the League of Nations, especially the payment of the pre-war loans in gold francs instead of in paper francs. In addition Mr. Logio gives us a valuable complete picture of Bulgarian politics, economics, finance, education, agriculture. An honest and trustworthy exposition of this kind is exactly the sort of thing we have been led to expect from Mr. Logio, and will be of immense service to his many British readers. The book is printed in Bulgaria, which fact leads the author to make this frank and disarming plea: "The forbearance of the reader is solicited for the numerous typographical errors, such as the occasional omission or substitution of letters, disseminated throughout the book, and due to the total ignorance of English of the Bulgarian printers." It is indeed a remarkable feat for printers to print blind, as it were, and the result is a magnificent tribute to their resource. There are remarkably few errors.

G. G.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

In his life of the late Earl of Inchcape,* Mr. Hector Bolitho has endeavoured to draw a fair and objective portrait of one of the greatest brains in commerce and finance during the last generation. His task is rendered especially difficult by reason that Lord Inchcape kept no personal diary and had his intimate correspondence with Lady Inchcape regularly destroyed. Moreover, no detailed record exists for some of his most remarkable efforts, such as his sale of prize vessels for the Government after the war; so much of his work was done by word of mouth. On the other hand, the biographer has derived great assistance from former colleagues, friends, servants and business competitors. Mr. Bolitho properly prefers a general picture to a detailed account of his commercial career. We get little impression of the purely callous and ruthless man of business, although admittedly Lord Inchcape could be "hard" with his rivals and always demanded of his subordinates every ounce of loyalty and energy. A man of the utmost integrity and sense of duty, he was determined to secure efficiency at all costs. He expected the same application to work which had seen his rise from a scrivener in Arbroath to chairman of the P. and O. and

* James Lyle Mackay, first Earl of Inchcape. Murray. 15s. net.

the driving force in numerous other concerns. Acknowledged a just and grateful man, he drew from those under him, in particular his personal servants, a spontaneous expression both of affection and awesome respect. The reader appreciates from this biography his lightning grasp of an issue and an equally rapid power of decision, and his boldness and foresight, exemplified in the P. and O. building policy in the post-war years of depression. If there were "few high lights" in his career of unbroken success, he was ever willing to share in public work. Continual advice to the government and work upon committees and commissions, such as the Geddes and Indian Retrenchment Committees, were of immense value. It is to this side of his life that Mr. Bolitho gives particular prominence. But such official contacts never prevented outspoken criticism of government policy, especially on questions of interference with trade and expansion of the social services. Above all an individualist, he believed in the strictest form of *laissez-faire* in government, placing the claims of commercial enterprise before those of social and cultural development. But within the former sphere his capacity was unsurpassed.

* * * * *

General Sir Charles Harington served under Lord Plumer as Major-General, General Staff, for a long period during the Great War, in the defence of the Ypres salient. He has now written a vivid and sympathetic memoir of "a great, straightforward, God-loving soldier."* General Harington wisely makes no attempt at fine writing. He states his facts in the simplest language and thereby allows his facts to constitute their own eloquence. The affection inspired by Lord Plumer in every sphere of work is abundantly proved by the fullest illustration and example given in the book.

We see him in South Africa, France, Malta and Palestine, working as administrator as well as soldier. He was one of the warmest contributors to the success of Toc H. To the military men the author's account of the Passchendaele campaign of 1917 will be of particular interest. General Harington, who knew at first hand what the Second Army did in the Ypres Salient, has no hesitation in plunging into the controversial field. What he writes commands attention. It is a book of deep human sympathy and of historical value.

G. G.

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Two volumes from Batsford will appeal to lovers of British scenery. Mr. Edmund Vale writes from an unusual angle in *The Seas and Shores of England*†: "Our cliff scenery is probably the most varied in the world," and the author uses his wide personal knowledge and literary talent to provide an attractive appreciation of England's five seas and

* *Plumer of Messines*, by General Sir Charles Harington, G.C.B., G.B.E. Foreword by the Archbishop of Canterbury. John Murray. 12s. 6d. net.

† Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

her coastal scenery with its fishing villages and harbours, ports, and coast resorts. As Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch points out approvingly in his Foreword, this book is distinctive in considering the beauty of the coast from the aspect of the sea. Mr. Hugh Quigley's delightful volume on *The Highlands of Scotland** is not a guide book, although the reader will find in it descriptions of many walks and places of outstanding beauty or grandeur. It contains rather a vivid and fresh estimate of Highland country which will appeal to the stranger and recall to others the scenes of former visits. In an outspoken introductory chapter, Mr. Quigley deplores "the prostitution of the Highlands to the deer-hunting interests" and welcomes the prospect of more electric power and roads which can assist "the resurrection of the Highlands . . . based on an understanding of what the landscape can give," and as an expansion of small home industries, increased marketing, or a well-controlled tourist industry. In both volumes the magnificent photographs, in the latter book taken by Mr. Robert M. Adam, greatly enrich and illuminate the text.

Dr. Werner Picht has published a book† on adult education in Germany which became so remarkable a movement in the post-war years. He is well equipped for the composition of this book, having himself been one of the most active theorists of the movement. He makes it grow before our eyes and come to life again; we see its endeavours, its life and death struggle, the integrity and breadth of purpose. And we see its achievement and the inevitability of its fall. It represented an actual phase in the development of the German people and had to succumb to a later phase in which it has no place. Its findings, however, remain and must sooner or later emerge into prominence, not only in Germany. Dr. Picht's book reminds us that adult education in his country realised first the hollowness and lifelessness of academic teaching and that the essence of all study can only be life itself. Only so far as learning contributes to a constructive and creative development of the student himself as a thinking member of a community, can it be of value. There is much reading of general as well as of specialised interest in this work, nor is it of little importance that a movement, so full of promise and doomed to, at any rate, a temporary eclipse, should receive such careful and competent treatment. No future movement in adult education in any country can fail to gain by the perusal of this accurate, objective, detailed and inspired account that promises to preserve from oblivion what must be of great value to present and future generations of workers in that field. Dr. Picht closes his book with a tribute to the memory of one of the greatest of these: Dr. von Erdberg, whose name alone serves to urge others to follow in the path he strode with such high-minded tenacity and courage.

* Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

† *Volksbildung*. By Dr. Werner Picht. Verlag Die Runde, Berlin.

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY OR MONROE SYSTEM?

THINKING workers for peace are gradually coming to see that the root cause of the disappointment and frustration which has beset the League of Nations is not so much the policy of governments, but the fact that it leaves unimpaired the national sovereignty of its members. More and more they are recognising that neither heroic sacrifice nor the most wishful thinking can turn a League of sovereign States into the instrument of world peace of their dreams. It is only when public opinion realises that it is national sovereignty which is the fundamental cause of armament and war and the real enemy which has to be overcome that we shall begin to approach the problem of achieving the great ideals which lie behind the League of Nations movement in a more practical and realist spirit than most of the leaders of the peace movement are doing to-day.

A League of sovereign States cannot end war or create a reign of law upon earth, for three inexorable reasons. In the first place, it cannot alter the treaty *status quo* except with the consent of all the States immediately concerned, a consent which in important matters can hardly ever be obtained. Yet without such revision there is no chance of lasting peace. In the second place, it cannot restrain economic nationalism, and it is economic nationalism which is the main cause of those social dislocations that have largely destroyed international trade, created intolerable unemployment everywhere, and so caused dictatorship to replace democracy all over the world. And in the third place, when one or more nations refuses to conform to a League decision or resorts to aggression, the instrument which the League must use to impose its will, at any rate against a great Power, is war—police war, for economic sanctions not backed by a willingness to go to war are ineffective. And most nations shrink from resorting to the terrible arbitrament of war except when their vital interests are engaged.

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The League therefore has no means of reconciling differences of opinion between its members, for it cannot proceed by majority decision, and if it tries to use force it must resort to war. No peace system can be built on foundations such as these. Even the proposal to create a League army or air force is utterly futile in the world as it is to-day, because the League has no power to raise by taxation the immense sums necessary to finance a dominant air force or army; the loyalty of the individual is legally owed to his own State and not to the League, and unanimity in providing finance or contingents, in appointing a commander-in-chief, and in agreeing on the purposes for which armed forces are to be used is utterly out of reach in the world of sovereign nations as it is to-day. The plain truth is that nothing but a federation of nations, a federation in which the national State surrenders some part of its sovereignty to a common authority representing the whole, which alone can impose tariffs, can raise armies and navies and air forces, can levy taxes from and enforce its laws upon the individual, and which alone wields the powers of sovereignty within its own sphere, can end war and poverty or create the reign of law upon the earth. Even a world of socialist States would find themselves in as great difficulty as a world of capitalist States. If capitalist States tend to quarrel about markets, socialist States would tend to quarrel about the supplies each should give to or receive from the others, because of the immense dislocation of internal capital and employment which would be continuously necessary in order to make these barter exchanges, in sum total, balance. Until we grasp clearly that it is national sovereignty which is the basic cause of war and of our more serious present-day troubles we shall continue to be led up the garden path of disillusionment and frustration by idealists who have not thought out the only means by which their noble aim of ending war can be attained.

But it is often urged that even if the League system cannot to-day be made to operate all over the world, the principle of "collective security"—the principle that an attack upon one shall be treated as an attack upon all—can still be successfully applied in Europe. It is now admitted that economic sanctions are quite ineffective for this purpose. Such sanctions, if universally applied by the whole world, might be effective at least against a small State. But they

are clearly impotent to produce speedy and decisive results if only applied by a section of the world. We have, therefore, to think of collective security not in terms of economic sanctions but of military sanctions, and such sanctions directed against nations highly armed for war, with aerial striking forces of immense power, and in which victory will depend upon the continuous production of immense quantities of men, aeroplanes, tanks, ships, and munitions to replace those which are destroyed in the wastage of war. The conception on which the theory of collective security rests is that the military power which will be wielded by supporters of the League will be so much greater than that wielded by an aggressor as to deter him from action or be promptly and decisively victorious in the event of war. But will that be so?

While the co-operation of small States is vital for the success of economic sanctions, it is fatal from the point of view of military sanctions. Small nations such as Holland or Denmark or Estonia or Switzerland are liabilities and not assets when it comes to war. They would be almost instantly conquered by a modern great military Power. The only hope for them is to preserve a strict neutrality, and that is what a League applying military sanctions would probably ask them to do. This factor itself removes a considerable part of the imposing League structure of collective security. A second part will certainly disappear through the unwillingness of many of its members to incur the risk of war. If no member of the League was prepared to face the risk of war with Italy, how many will be prepared to incur it as against an armed Germany or Russia or Japan? This second fraction of the League will not be far short of all those nations whose own vital interests are not actually engaged, or who are liable to counter-attack by superior Powers.

Any system of "collective security," therefore, in an armed world depends in the final analysis upon the great Powers. They must be the framework, and to this framework a certain number of minor Powers may attach themselves. Who are the great Powers to-day? There is Russia with perhaps 1,500,000 soldiers and 3,000 to 5,000 front-line aeroplanes. There is Germany with 35 divisions and 35 to 50 divisions in reserve—perhaps 90 in all—and now creating a front-line force of from 2,400 to 4,000 aeroplanes. There is France with

an army of 530,000, perhaps two-thirds that of Germany, and building up to, say, 2,000 front-line aeroplanes. There is Italy with something less. And there is Japan, again with something less, but with a powerful navy, in the Far East. All these figures are necessarily of the roughest possible kind, and their value in war depends on other imponderables, morale, the capacity of the General Staff, and the industrial, food and raw material resources in support.

But however we estimate these forces, one thing is clear. In Europe to-day the overwhelming military preponderance behind the League has vanished. How many of the great Powers will be behind the collective system and how many against it? Who knows? The United States will stay outside. So will South America. If it applies to Europe only will the Dominions come in? And will our own intervention be conclusive? We have a good fleet—but the blockade took four years to produce decisive effects against Germany during the Great War. We may soon have an air force of 2,000 machines. But our expeditionary army is to-day certainly far smaller than the six divisions we sent to Flanders in August 1914—a mere bagatelle among the colossal armies now massing in Europe.

Moreover, the essence of any "collective security" in an armed world must be rigid military engagements specifying exactly what contribution each member is to make, and the occasion which will call the obligation into immediate fulfilment. If there is another European war, it will not break out slowly, after long deliberations at Geneva. It will come even more suddenly than in 1914, like a thief in the night, with a smashing blow from the air at the nodal points of concentration and industrial power and transport, and if a collective system is to give protection to its members it must be able to act with equal speed.

Further, if we pledge ourselves to a system of European collective security, we must be amply prepared for prompt participation in war if we are not to let our friends down or to incur defeat ourselves. To make a system of collective security really effective in Europe we should probably not only have to be ready to go to war anywhere in Europe, but to adopt universal national service and conscription of wealth, because, as was shown in the last war, it is the only democratic means of putting people in the places in which they are

needed, quickly, and of distributing risk and sacrifice fairly among all classes.

Finally, there is the question of national and imperial morale, a question which recent events have tended to make more difficult to answer. There is no use in undertaking commitments involving liability to war, only to find a divided country and a divided Empire behind the Governments of the day. Increasingly, the continent of Europe and the Far East seem to be aligning themselves for a new war of religion between Communism and Fascism. British public opinion is certainly not prepared to go to war for either. Both are based upon the subordination of the individual to the omnipotent Moloch State and the party which controls that omnipotent State. Both substitute the duty of obedience to authority for the responsibility of the free citizen as the foundation of the State. If this alignment develops there is certainly no possibility of national unity by undertaking obligations which bind us to go to war for either of these systems. There is only one thing that this country or the Empire will then fight for with substantial unity, and that is for the defence of the system of free institutions represented by the British Commonwealth system and any democracies which may be associated with it.

Does this mean that we must abandon the League altogether? Certainly not. The League has done and can continue to do an immense amount for mankind in bringing nations together, in making them understand one another, in securing publicity for all sides in a dispute, in breaking down prejudice, in prompting social reform of every kind. Its record in these respects is very remarkable. Where it has failed, and must always fail so long as it is a League of sovereign States, is when it attempts to use force. The function of the League, so long as power and sovereignty reside in the member States, is to act as a moral and not as a coercive agency. In point of fact, as a League, it can only exercise moral influence. As Lord Halifax said recently in the House of Lords: "The League has responsibility but not power." That is precisely the vice of the Covenant to-day, for power alone has responsibility, and power rests, not with the League, but with the member States. The League has neither army nor navy nor air force, nor the means by which it can raise them. When the question of using force arises, it is the nations which must decide, and the League, as such, must stand aside.

When the member States are ready to transfer to it part of their own sovereignty it will have power commensurate with its responsibility. They are not so ready to-day, and the sooner the dangerous and dishonest pretence is abandoned that peace can be maintained in a world of discordant and armed States by the automatic and compulsory obligation to use force under Articles X and XVI of the Covenant, the sooner will the League, shorn of its coercive functions, recover that immense moral influence which would come from universal membership.

But we are still left with the problem of security. If there is no means by which we can ensure peace by assuming universal and automatic obligations in a world of sovereign States, and especially a world of sovereign States as divided in purpose and ideal as the world of to-day, how are we to proceed? As I see it, the practical problem which confronts us is twofold. First, even if there is no automatic way in which to ensure universal peace is there any considerable area of the world in which we can obtain peace and make effective the ideals of the League? And, second, can we preserve democracy and free institutions in that part of the world which is still faithful to them as against the attacks of dictatorship both from within and from without? Those are the limits of attainable ideals at the present time, and if we try to go farther we may lose both.

Perhaps the most vital question in the world to-day is whether free institutions, with all they have meant for civilisation and the spirit of man, can survive. The most ancient struggle of history, the struggle between authority and freedom, which we thought finally won in 1918, is once more upon us, and in a more dangerous and insidious form than ever. To the idealist, as to the authoritarian, the short cut to an end by dictatorship is always attractive. A nation can be quickly regenerated and restored to influence in the world by a discipline and an enthusiasm imposed from above. The socialist goal whereby the earth and its fruits are exploited and distributed for the benefit of all can be achieved almost overnight by a resolute minority using dictatorial power ruthlessly. Even the League of Nations enthusiast is inclined to believe that the supreme ideal embodied in that institution can be established better by resort to war than by the slower processes of reason, understanding and goodwill.

But all history shows that those who resort to the short cut of violence, dictatorship or war as the means of imposing their own ideals fail, in the long run, because they undermine in the citizens the highest functions of man, the capacity for independent thought, initiative and decision.

The greatest achievements of the human spirit, the highest levels of civilisation, have invariably been reached by those democratic societies which have been able to combine individual freedom and responsibility with national discipline and obedience to law. So to-day the supreme issue is whether a sufficient abatement of national sovereignty can be made to make possible the beginning of a federation of nations and whether the reconciliation of individual liberty with the socialist ideal can be effected by democratic process, or whether we plunge into the devastating destruction which will end anarchy by empire and the domestic crisis by the triumph of Fascist or Communist dictatorship. There are those who believe that nationalism will not surrender its absolutism or property or its excessive rights except to a dictatorial violence which will destroy the human spirit. But those who believe in a free humanity will cling to the faith that these things can be best and in the long run most quickly accomplished by the processes of free government.

It is only the democracies, too, which during the slow transition to federation are likely to preserve peace and the ideals of the League among themselves. If the major democracies choose, there are already in existence two systems not based on a compulsory and automatic obligation to use force, but none the less possessing force as the ultimate defence of their own freedom, which can be made the basis both for peace and the preservation of free institutions over between a third and a half of the globe. For 110 years the Monroe Doctrine has given to all the nations of North and South America the opportunity to develop along their own lines, because it has been known that political interference in the North and South American continents would be regarded as a hostile act by the United States. The United States has not interfered in the internal affairs of the American Republics, save in Central America when there has been a breakdown of order. But the Monroe Doctrine has been sufficient to prevent interference from Europe or Asia and so to create the beginnings of the reign of law there.

Since the middle of the last century the old British Empire has become more and more like the Monroe system. There has been a steady growth both of individual liberty and of national autonomy within it with a similar security against interference from without, because it was known that interference would be regarded as a hostile act by Great Britain.

These systems are clearly in transition. To meet the needs of the modern world they will have to develop. In the first place, if some way could be found by which the American and the British systems could co-operate, liberty and peace would be secure over at least half the globe. In the nineteenth century there were wars but no world wars, because no war could be a world war in which the world-wide British Empire was not engaged, and no European or Asiatic State, at that time, was prepared to challenge the paramount British Navy. This system for giving some stability to the world has broken down because Great Britain alone is no longer strong enough to maintain it. But if the British and American systems were to agree on a common sea policy, there would be no world war, for no State or group of States, however powerful, would dream of challenging, simultaneously, the gigantic resources they control. This solution is at present out of reach. Great Britain is still too entangled in the politics of Europe, the United States too wedded to isolationism, to make discussion profitable. Great Britain has to abandon the illusion that she can keep the peace in an armed Europe, and the United States has to realise that the only lasting basis for her own peace is a control of the seas by the free peoples, which it is only possible for her to establish in association with the British Commonwealth.

But the situation is changing in another way. The Monroe Doctrine no longer depends upon the United States alone nor the security of the British Commonwealth on Great Britain alone. They produce the big navies and air forces. But the South American Republics and the Dominions are now in a position to contribute not only to their own defence, but to the security of the system of which they are part. Moreover, as both recent meetings of the Imperial Conference and of the Pan-American Conference have shown, each system is developing methods of its own for settling disputes between their members by pacific means.

Finally, is it not conceivable that within these zones of

stability and freedom the first substantial steps towards reducing the barriers to trade and migration might be taken? It is often said that political stabilisation must precede a relaxation of economic tension, that nations will not lessen their efforts to be self-sufficient, or assist the recovery of others, until the risk of war and aggression has lessened. Within or between the great stabilised zones of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the American Monroe System there is no serious risk of war, the units between them produce every kind of foodstuff, raw material and manufactured article, tropical and temperate. May not they be the first to stabilise currencies and relax those barriers to trade and movement which are the greatest cause of social unrest, dictatorship and armament to-day, and so show the world the road to prosperity as well as to peace?

But if we are to give stability and security to the democratic world, to realise the ideals of the League of Nations among the like-minded nations of the British and American systems, adequate military, naval and air strength is essential. In the modern world of armed sovereign States, war, if it comes, will catch the unprepared at a hopeless disadvantage. If there is one lesson the General Staffs have learnt it is the disaster that inevitably follows a protracted war. The next war, if it comes, will be designed to be a quick war, to overcome the resistance of the other side by a few weeks of overwhelming and irresistible attack. The General Staffs will only consent to war when there is a reasonable certainty of speedy and decisive victory. If the democracies are to make themselves secure against attack, to ensure that the great oceanic system around which they live cannot be broken up in detail by force, and are in a position to negotiate freely about such things as colonies and economic reconstruction, they must be strong enough and united enough to convince the dictatorships that attack on them cannot succeed. In a world of armed dictatorships to be weak is to invite coercion in power diplomacy and defeat in war. To be strong is not only to give security to free institutions but to give support to France and Belgium also and to exercise a great influence for peace in Europe and Asia as well.

LOTHIAN.

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY.

A GERMAN publicist writing in an English periodical on his country's foreign policy must be pardoned for emphasising, at the outset, two facts which he considers important: first, some of the views put forward by him are likely to differ from those held by his readers; and second, the subject discussed is one with which he—being German—is better acquainted than most other people. My subjoined remarks should thus be regarded as an honest attempt to state the facts as they really are and to prepare the way for a mutual understanding and for permanent friendly collaboration between the German and British peoples.

No thinking and fair-minded observer can deny that some important lessons can be learned from a study of the past, even though it is true that the situation as it now is is in many respects different from what it was in 1914.

This remark, of course, also applies to the dictated peace of Versailles and to the attitude which some Powers have adopted until recently (and, to a certain extent, still adopt to-day) towards Germany. Let me assure my readers that the present Germany is unthinkable without the sinister background created by that "treaty." It is wholly due to the unprecedented denial of elementary justice, to the methods of violence, and to the undisguised attempts at the permanent humiliation of a great people which had made a heroic stand against a world of enemies for four years, that Germany has regained the strength which enabled her to re-establish her position as speedily as she actually did. For nearly eighteen years she was without the means of successfully defending herself against the ever-present menace of powerful coalitions. Political decisions affecting Europe were either made against Germany or without her. Now, however, our country has regained, through her own action, the status she had lost. The period initiated by Versailles has come to an end.

It is well known that Germany has also made her return to Geneva conditional upon the severance of the League Covenant from the Versailles Treaty. Germany has once more become an important factor, and European politics can no longer be carried on without her. This change is an historical event of first-class significance; and the consequences resulting from it must be proportionate to the extent to which

other countries had based their political calculations upon a state of things in connection with which Germany simply did not count. No unbiased historian will acknowledge the charge that Germany, by acting as she did, "broke the law." Every nation has the sacred right to enjoy unrestricted freedom within its own boundaries. The decisive steps taken by Germany are justified because they were directed against the injustices embodied in the Versailles Treaty or were prompted by the failure of other Powers to carry out promises solemnly given by them, or were meant to protect the safety of the country. She has merely altered, within her own frontiers, the conditions created by the "treaty," and has re-established her full sovereignty. She has been accused, more than once, of an intention to take aggressive action outside those boundaries; but nothing of the kind has happened or will ever happen. Whatever problems there are, they are such as can be frankly and openly discussed.

Before explaining the objects aimed at by Germany's foreign policy, I shall briefly describe the present state of Europe as seen through German eyes. We are by no means surprised to observe that the re-establishment of our sovereign status has given rise to resentment and dissatisfaction elsewhere. We know our thousand-year-old history. Its ups and downs, and the foundations on which it rests, are familiar to us, more especially the Bismarckian era, the rise of Prussia, the jealousy with which other Powers witnessed her ascendancy, the foundation of the Second Reich, its greatness and its collapse. Our fight against the "war-guilt lie" has given us an intimate insight into the rivalry among the European Powers, the tendencies that manifest themselves, and the complications to which it leads. We know the great difficulties we have to overcome in order to safeguard the independence of our nation and to provide the means that will secure our future progress. We fervently wish to see the Third Reich taking its legitimate share, as a powerful factor making for peace, in the work of European collaboration and consolidation, and to do so as the result of peaceful negotiations with the other Powers. But we are also resolved to follow unswervingly our Leader, who, discarding obsolete and dishonest methods of negotiation, proceeds from one determined action to another, because he realises that the innumerable speeches made at international conferences

have obstructed rather than opened up the road that will lead to a better future. Such is, briefly stated, the attitude which the German people take up towards the political events of the past few years and towards the aims which their Government has openly proclaimed.

What, then, are the resistances that have to be overcome? What are the conditions that must be put right before Germany can obtain the recognition that is due to her and before the political and military antagonisms in Europe can be replaced by a lasting pacification?

In 1919 France appointed herself the leader of a group of countries whose aims are the perpetuation of the conditions created through their victory in the war, the suppression of Germany and her former allies for as long a time as possible, and the establishment of a system of alliances thinly disguised by being somehow associated with the League. The slogans used to that end are "security," and "the sanctity of treaties." Thus, France has for a long time been the chief and the most powerful opponent of a Germany which desired to replace the shackles of Versailles by freedom and equality of status. Through her invasion of the Ruhr (1923) she nearly succeeded in bringing about the complete collapse of our country. The methods subsequently employed by her, although less rigorous to all outward appearance, were none the less successful. The stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the possibilities inherent in the Geneva institution were utilised by her with consummate ability. No wonder, therefore, that those elements in Europe and elsewhere who advocated different methods of dealing with Germany found themselves in a difficult position. When Germany tried to steer a clear course between her impossible reparation burdens and political difficulties of every kind, Italy pursued a policy of her own and showed a good deal of understanding for Germany's efforts. The political and economic relations between Germany and Soviet Russia were satisfactorily arranged by the treaties concluded first in 1921-2 and then in 1926. In those years Germany tried to differentiate between the Soviet State and Bolshevism. Great Britain amicably co-operated with France, but evinced at times a certain understanding of Germany's demands and vital interests, although she never committed herself definitely nor ever gave a really new impulse to the policy pursued by the European countries.

That was the period when Germany was a member of the League and when some occasional attempts were made to ease the Franco-German tension by direct contact. Finally, the reparation issue ceased to be practical politics. The setting up of the Disarmament Conference made it necessary to tackle the problem of armaments. Germany found herself compelled, in October 1933, to withdraw from the League because her claim for equality of status continued to remain unsatisfied. But a really new chapter in history was initiated on April 17th, 1934, when M. Barthou, France's Foreign Minister, took upon himself the responsibility for his country's definite refusal to discuss with Germany the question of arms limitation. He then started to strengthen the system of French alliances by extending it to Italy and Russia. The consequences resulting from M. Barthou's grave step made themselves felt forthwith. Germany, by a series of quick decisions, resumed her sovereign status in full. Italy, prompted by her new friendship with France, proceeded from the "Stresa front" to Abyssinia. Soviet Russia joined the League. Thanks to her unrestricted rearmament policy and to the vigour with which she allowed Bolshevik propaganda to penetrate a number of European countries, she began to exercise a sinister influence everywhere. Through the instrumentality of a whole series of pacts, she became, in 1935, the military ally of France and Czechoslovakia. Prominent French politicians declared that they would make an alliance with the devil himself to strengthen the anti-German front. One French Government after the other declined to fall in with the German Chancellor's offer to start upon direct negotiations for a mutual understanding.

Thus, a new page may be said to have been opened once more in the book of history. The chief antagonist to National Socialist Germany is now Soviet Russia instead of France. Just as that country dictates the pace at which the armament race is to proceed, so she has made the politics of France and those of a number of minor States dependent upon her own wishes, which are highly detrimental to the prospects of European pacification. Great Britain has been content, generally speaking, to take up the position of an observer, in so far as these changes are concerned. Her attention has been fully occupied with the consequences resulting from Italy's conquest of Abyssinia, with the future destiny of the League,

with the maintenance of her Mediterranean position and with other Imperial interests. In view of the fateful development of European politics, she is now trying to find—as her Cabinet Ministers and her Press have informed us—a “new line.” In conformity with her traditional policy, she has acted as a mediator between Germany and France. She wants “to reconcile Germany and France.” She has therefore taken the initiative in the calling together of a Conference of the five ex-Locarno Powers, which is to take place in the autumn and which is to endeavour to replace the original Locarno pact of 1925-6, now lapsed, by a “Western pact” consisting of the same Powers as the former. This new understanding is to serve as the starting point of a general European pacification and is to do justice to the altered conditions. What, then, is the attitude of Germany towards these plans?

No man in all the world upon the past has power,
What has been has been, and you've had your hour.

These words should be remembered by all those who regret, for one reason or another, the development I have just sketched. Germany has done all she could to make it take a different course. Her repeated proposals for a limitation of armaments and for the organisation of peace have been rejected or misinterpreted or shelved. Hence, a new situation was bound to arise. Germany has adjusted herself to it. She reckons with the *faits accomplis* and knows that they cannot easily be reversed. She has no alternative but to continue vigorously in the pursuit of her old aim, even though the position has become more difficult than it was. She is willing to try “a new start.” She certainly is no believer in any kind of isolation, either splendid or otherwise. She desires to co-operate with all Powers that stand for justice and order and are inspired by an honest love of European peace, just as she is now doing with Italy, Poland and many other countries. For that reason, she has gladly accepted the invitation to join the Five Power Conference which is to draw up the proposed “Western pact,” and is taking part in the necessary diplomatic preparations. Just as the fundamental principle underlying the first Locarno was sound (even though Germany's acquiescence in a unilaterally demilitarised zone turned out to be a sacrifice made in vain), the plan for the establishment of a lasting peace between

the Western Powers and Germany continues to be a highly desirable object. If it materialises it will conform to the contention always expressed by Germany that peace cannot be secured under the guise of a deceptive “collectivism” through universal and complicated pacts (perhaps not always intended to be honestly kept), but only step for step by sincerely meant understandings between the parties directly concerned.

Now that Article 16 of the League Covenant has proved a failure, the latest slogan adopted by the anti-German forces, in addition to “collectivism,” is “regional.” When we study the proposals put forward by the “regional politicians,” we are forcibly reminded of the tricks played by conjurers. It is quite inadmissible, under present conditions, to look upon the whole of Europe as a “region.” Even less is a “region” an arbitrarily conceived unit composed of geographically distant countries, within which some of the latter describe themselves as “interested” in one another, possibly for the sole purpose of attacking some outside country at a moment they may think fit, or for that of permanently menacing it by their superior military strength and of obstructing its development. Just because Germany's view on these matters is fundamentally important to her, she will not abandon it under any circumstances.

To my mind, it will serve no useful purpose to continue the discussions regarding “the indivisibility of peace” or similar deceptive formulæ. What is now going on in Europe, to the detriment of general prosperity, is a senseless race for armaments and the preparation of an “indivisible war.” It is of the utmost importance to ensure that those forces in Europe which strive after orderliness, honesty and progress should employ new and improved methods to settle their mutual relations. Attempts to add to the existing pacts by patchwork or to modify certain articles of the League Covenant by resolutions would likewise be useless. It would be far better to create something really new and to employ novel methods for that purpose. This applies, among others, very forcibly to the quickest and most terrible of modern weapons—the air arm. Let us therefore establish lasting peace in the western parts of Europe along clear and simple lines comprehensible to everybody and use it as a starting point for further action at a later date in other parts. No other projects,

nor any plan for the reform of the League, should be mixed up with this scheme for the pacification of Western Europe or be made essential conditions to be fulfilled before it can materialise. Whatever useful features such plans may contain can then be turned to practical advantage all the more quickly, the more completely the direct and permanent understanding between Germany, Great Britain and France has been established as the Magna Charta of European politics. To sum up: No decisive progress can be made in the real pacification of Europe unless and until there is a lasting peace between the three Powers named, joined by Italy, Belgium, and—if desired—the Netherlands, all this quite apart from the possibility of Germany re-entering the League, or the limitation of armaments (a matter which Germany continues to regard as highly important), or the necessary economic and financial rearrangements.

My readers are certainly aware of Germany's attitude towards the problem of Bolshevism, the most important one in the domain of foreign policy. (As regards her home policy, Bolshevism has ceased to be a problem affecting Germany.) I may refrain, therefore, from going into all the details concerning it. I know that many Englishmen view these matters in a way differing from our own. You have your own "democracy" and are rightly proud of it and its achievements. You have your own history, your particular frame of mind, your unique geographical position. We Germans are differently situated in all these matters. Whatever tendencies, forces and developments originate on the European continent affect our country to a far larger extent than they affect the inhabitants of the British Isles. We have no "world-political" interests similar to those of the British Empire in Asia or elsewhere, which we might otherwise have to take into account when dealing with the present politics of Soviet Russia. Above all, however, we have our own experience as regards Bolshevism. During the winter months of 1918-19, civil war was rampant in our big cities and industrial districts. In November 1923, when M. Poincaré triumphantly announced before the Chamber of Deputies that the separation of the Rhineland from Germany was merely a question of time, M. Zinoviev thought that the aims of Bolshevism in Germany were approaching their realisation. That danger was overcome at the eleventh hour. Nine years

later, Communism—working in close association with Moscow and in obedience to instructions received thence—had again, under the burden of reparations, become so strong that only the historical events of January 30th, 1933, averted the deadly menace. I therefore ask my British readers to look upon the problem of Bolshevism from a different angle than do those who indulge in the often-heard superficial discussions on "the efficiency of the Bolshevist menace." As regards our country and everything sacred to us as a nation, a Christian people, a partner of Western civilisation and an ordered economic unit, Soviet Russia as a State has become the conscious champion and advocate of aggressive Bolshevism far beyond her national frontiers and therefore our most outspoken opponent.

Conversely, a strong National Socialist Germany exercises a large power of attraction upon other countries and has thus become the biggest obstacle to the Bolshevisation of, let us say, the continent of Europe. This is the plain and naked truth. How can anyone believe that any formulæ devised at Geneva or the machinery of any paper pact can bridge this difference? Germany has offered—in addition to the Western pact—to conclude additional pacts of non-aggression with all her neighbours. She continues to be a signatory of the Kellogg pact; and, above all, her Leader and Chancellor has repeatedly given expression to his firm conviction that the use of violence as an instrument of politics must be eliminated for ever from the dealings of one nation with another. I therefore venture to hope that—in contrast with what happened during the past two or three years—the traditional friendship between Great Britain and France will not induce the former country to pursue unrealisable aims in connection with future "collective" pacts. Instead of carrying on such a "negative" policy, a "positive" one should be pursued, i.e. vigorous efforts should be made to conclude understandings with Germany regarding all those points in which both countries see eye to eye, in so far as guarantees of peace are concerned.

For the rest, the Spanish civil war and the dangerous developments in France's home policy (where the Communist party, playing the game of Moscow, in order to conceal its true aims, temporarily parades in patriotic guise, so that it may in the end secure its own ascendancy over the other

parties of the Left and over the State itself) will and must continue their work of enlightening the nations, including, as we hope, France herself. At any rate, those in charge of Germany's foreign policy find that the recent events in Spain and France have confirmed their warnings sooner than they thought. The German Government will continue to do everything in its power to save Europe from Bolshevisation. It will organise the military position of the country in such a way that it can successfully withstand any attempt upon national security on the part of Soviet Russia or of the forces allied to her.

The political relations between Germany and the countries just enumerated are influenced by the fact that one of the latter—Austria—is a German State, whilst the others either contain or administer a larger or smaller population of German stock. Those engaged in anti-German propaganda have assiduously spread an allegation, which is unfortunately looked upon as true by many of the uninformed, to the effect that the new Germany is inspired by "Pan-German" motives and intends, once "peace in the West" has been established, to attack those countries or to enforce their union with the Fatherland.

Being a German, I would naturally like to refute so malicious or stupid an accusation; but lack of space prevents me from doing so. All I want to say in reply is that those who wish to express an opinion on the problem here involved ought to be acquainted with the thousand-year-old history of Germany. If they are, they must know that the history of the European continent was, at some period, the history of Germany, and that the frontiers subsequently created through partitions, through the marriages of ruling princes or their relatives, through migrations, through the cultural opening up of newly acquired territories, or through religious wars and wars of conquest, never included the whole body of the German nation. A well-known British politician has stated it as his opinion that "Versailles," thanks to the application of the principle of national self-determination, has drawn "the best frontiers that can be drawn between the peoples of the European continent." Although this statement, in so far as it applies to Germany and to people of German stock, is absolutely wrong, she has nevertheless acknowledged the present frontiers. A war for the purpose of altering them by

force of arms would be so incredibly foolish that Germany should not be accused of contemplating it. That has been emphasised by Herr Hitler more than once. This matter, of course, has nothing to do with the relations that exist between the Reich and the persons of German stock beyond the German frontiers. Germany will never renounce the right to feel that these people are linked to her as a State and as a nation by special ties. She will always take a sympathetic interest in their fate, just as every Englishman, every Frenchman, every Italian would do in an analogous case. It is impossible to believe that a policy on the part of other countries which aims at the suppression of those of their citizens who are of German stock can fail, in the long run, to affect the relations between the Reich and them. Moreover, when those frontiers were drawn in 1919, it was done—for various reasons—in a most arbitrary manner, so that the German Government will never waive its right to enter upon peaceful negotiations with the Governments concerned for the purpose of modifying conditions which, if left unaltered, would become a menace to peace. This is the explanation of the importance which Germany attaches to her relations with the countries named.

As to the details, they are different in each case. In so far as Austria is concerned, we have to deal with the relations between two German States. By means of direct negotiations it became possible a short while ago to dispel the existing misunderstandings and to replace them by a lasting understanding. At the same time it has become obvious that the plan for the economic organisation of Central Europe without Germany, of which we have heard so much, is impossible of realisation. As to Czechoslovakia, it must be remembered that the terms of the treaty of September 10th, 1919, which was the essential foundation for the setting up of the Czechoslovak Republic, have been ignored and that not less than 3,500,000 persons of German stock have been made subject to discrimination and to grave moral and economic distress. It is interesting to note in this case that the increase in the strength of the German Reich has apparently caused the Prague Government to realise more and more that the policy hitherto adopted must be altered. We hope that these reflections will make further progress and that they will be followed by practical deeds. As regards Lithuania, we are mainly

concerned with the German Memelland. In this case, too, the fact that Germany's strength is increasing has caused the counsels of moderation to gain ground. In both instances this change would have taken place even sooner had it not been for the influence exercised by Moscow. Lastly, as far as Poland is concerned, the position is this. Although the existing frontier is gravely detrimental to German interests, although the far-reaching encouragement given to the Polish port of Gdynia on the part of the Government is a serious and lasting menace to the German inhabitants of the neighbouring port of Danzig, and although the position of the German minority is not yet what it ought to be, normal and neighbourly relations have been in existence between the two countries since the conclusion of the 1934 agreement. The efforts made by France to disturb these improved relations by means of gigantic new credits for rearmament and to induce Poland to rejoin the anti-German front have been clearly revealed by the events of the past few weeks.

This brief review proves that Germany has to fulfil a particularly difficult task in so far as her relations with those countries are concerned which form the subject of this section of my article, whilst scrupulously respecting the loyalty which the Germans detached from their mother country owe to the countries whose citizens they are. As far as the League is concerned, it has failed to fulfil the extremely important task entrusted to it in this connection. The hopes formerly entertained by Germany have been deceived, although the national minorities are still generally placed under the protection of international law. The real danger to peace, indeed, does not consist in an imaginary or purposely invented "Pan-Germanism," but rather in the fact that, remembering Versailles and the era immediately succeeding it, the Governments of countries inhabited by thousands and even millions of Germans think that they can go on treating these latter as second-rate citizens or even deprive them of their homes and their other possessions. Such a state of things must cease to exist.

To-day, as in the past, Germany's foreign policy is not solely occupied with matters of immediate national interest, but is directed—beyond them—to everything that influences and changes the face of the world, and in particular towards those problems which arise out of the close connection between

her own national economy and world-wide economy. All the same, however, she has imposed limitations upon herself as compared with the years preceding 1914. The naval agreement concluded on June 18th, 1935, is symbolical in this respect. But Germany must live and must provide the means that will enable her 67 million citizens to lead a decent existence. The improvement in the economic situation at home that has taken place since the severe crisis of 1931-2 has been overcome must not induce us to believe that the supply of raw materials, the repayment of debts, the sale of German products abroad, and the relation between our currency and foreign currencies are matters that have been established on a permanently secure foundation. Years, and even decades, will be required to solve these problems.

Apart from new efforts in Germany herself (the Four Years Plan), the solution must be sought by the joint action of all the countries concerned. It is quite impossible to carry on world-wide economy unless at least the chief countries have common interests at stake. Hence, the great work of political pacification will have to be supplemented by the equally great task of mastering the economic and financial difficulties due to the World War and to the unhappy events that took place between 1919 and 1932. The part to be played by colonies under national flags in connection with the problem of raw materials forms the subject of numerous investigations and international discussions. It is well known that the German Government expects that it will be possible by means of amicable negotiations to let Germany have again a due share in the colonising work of the European Powers. Let us not spoil the atmosphere for such negotiations.

A few remarks may be permitted regarding the much discussed question of the organisation, by the National Socialist party, of the German nationals resident abroad. That organisation has proved a complete success throughout the world and the initial difficulties have been eliminated. It provides a common platform for these Germans, fulfils their ideals, is most useful, and is approved of by the overwhelming part of those concerned. Its work deals exclusively with citizens of the Reich, so that it would be absurd to maintain that it interferes with the affairs of the foreign countries in question.

I have endeavoured to show that the comprehensive work

done by those who are in charge of Germany's foreign policy is the natural outcome of the country's geography and history, the lost war, the dictated terms of peace, the nation's striving after renewed progress, and the attitude taken up by other countries towards our own. And here, as everywhere, that which is natural is right. Is Germany's policy in any way a menace to the peace of Europe or of the world? Every German would indignantly repudiate an affirmative answer to that question. More than that, he would fail to understand it, because he feels convinced that a strong, healthy and united Germany is one of the most powerful guarantors of European peace. Every visitor to our country can assure himself that the shaping of the future is the great work that absorbs all the available energies. These efforts would be vain and the country's existence would be seriously threatened once more if we could not look forward to a long period of peace. After all that Adolf Hitler has said about that it is now almost an offence not to believe him.

The second point which I hope I have stressed with sufficient emphasis is that Germany—after all that has happened since 1914—differs from other countries, large and small alike, in that she is not a saturated or satisfied State. Her foreign policy cannot be made to fit into some scheme intended to last for ever. The French claim that, for the purpose of organising European peace, there should be a permanent tribunal on which a majority of countries, consisting of France, her friends and her allies, should settle every question in a dictatorial manner, or any other suggestion intended to ensure the rigid maintenance of the *status quo* for twenty-five years or longer, admits of no discussion in Germany. To prevent war by a wise policy before it is too late is a thousand times better than to prepare for it and organise it by a hundred pacts.

Berlin.

RHEINBADEN.

EGYPT AND THE TREATY.

ON August 26th, in the Locarno Room of the Foreign Office, a Treaty was signed between Great Britain and Egypt, which stands out as the most important event in Anglo-Egyptian relations since Egypt was relieved of the suzerainty of Turkey. In view of the vicissitudes through which these relations have passed, and the continuous crop of difficulties which have stood in the way of agreement satisfactory to both sides, this settlement may be regarded as a remarkable achievement. Throughout recent years there has always been, both in Egypt and in this country, a wish to reach a satisfactory settlement, and the difficulty has been to find means of reconciling the Egyptian desire for complete independence with British interests at a vital point of communication with India and the Far East. Now, at last, the means of bringing together these hitherto irreconcilable claims has been found, to the great satisfaction of those who in both countries have worked consistently towards this end. The length of the negotiations in Cairo and Alexandria is ample proof of the difficulties encountered in reaching a settlement; but this also shows the determination on both sides to reach the object of their endeavours.

It was due to the able statesmanship of Nahas Pasha that these negotiations on a non-party basis were made possible, and it was largely owing to his ability and capacity in conducting the negotiations on the Egyptian side that a successful conclusion was reached. Considering what has gone before, the Treaty is a great personal triumph for Nahas Pasha, which has made a profound impression in this country and holds out good prospects for the future. With so many difficulties out of the way, and with the Treaty question eliminated from party politics in Egypt, the Egyptian Prime Minister should henceforth be assured of general British support in directing the affairs of his own country. Fortunate also has been the British Government to have in Sir Miles Lampson a High Commissioner so well qualified to conduct these negotiations. Not only is his personality most acceptable to the Egyptians, but his experience of the East has enabled him to realise their difficulties with sympathy, and to be patient and persevering on all occasions. "1922 and all that" has been relegated to the archives of the past. Egypt is now an independent

sovereign State in every sense of the term, closely allied to Great Britain in perpetuity. With the accession of King Edward VIII in England and King Farouk in Egypt, the new era in Anglo-Egyptian relations begins in the most appropriate circumstances. All those who know Egypt, and have learned to appreciate the great qualities of the Egyptian people, look to the future with hope and confidence.

The special position of Great Britain as protector of Egypt was fully recognised in 1904 by the other Great Powers, although it was not until the Great War that Egypt became temporarily a British Protectorate. At the end of the war national feeling ran high in Egypt, where great importance was attached to the principle of self-determination and the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918, announcing the proposal of the Allies to liberate the peoples that previously formed part of the Ottoman Empire. While there was a strong feeling in England that Egypt should be incorporated within the British Empire for the benefit of both countries, the Egyptian nationalists under the able leadership of Zaghlul Pasha clamoured for independence. They felt that the opportunity had now come for Egypt, released from Turkish domination, to stand up before the world as the leading Moslem State, and as the modern representative of a wealthy and illustrious civilisation that flourished thousands of years before the name of "Europe" ever entered the minds of men. In order to fulfil this rôle, it was essential that Egypt should be an independent sovereign State. In the opinion of the British Government, however, Egypt was not in a position to manage her own affairs, and her geographical position made the taking of risks unjustifiable. At this time Egyptian aspirations and British interests could not fit in with one another, and Lord Milner's proposals in 1920 for a treaty of alliance, with **military safeguards and some measure of legislative and administrative control**, were rejected by Zaghlul Pasha and his followers. This action was followed a year later by important conversations between Adly Pasha and Lord Curzon, the failure of which eventually led to the British unilateral Declaration of 1922. Although this instrument verbally acknowledged the independence of Egypt, its reserved points*

* The four reserved points were: (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt. (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect. (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities. (d) The Sudan.

deprived so-called "independence" of most of its value, and merely established a new basis for further controversy. Then, in September 1924, Mr. MacDonald raised the matter again with Zaghlul Pasha in negotiations which only lasted till the beginning of the following month; and in 1928 Sir Austen Chamberlain negotiated with Sarwat Pasha, whose Ministry was a coalition practically under the control of Zaghlul. Later still, Mr. Henderson met Mahmoud Pasha in 1929, and in the following year continued negotiations much on the same lines with Nahas Pasha, who like all his predecessors had to return to Egypt empty-handed.

An examination of the nature of these negotiations reveals one most conspicuous fact. In their attempts to compromise with Egypt, the British Government have always been late in coming forward with their concessions; and, when these concessions were eventually granted, the Egyptians were no longer prepared to accept them, but had their minds set on something more far-reaching. The Milner negotiations failed partly because the Egyptians insisted on an official declaration that the Protectorate was at an end, and the British Government refused to make this concession. Yet, six months later, when Adly Pasha agreed to come to London to negotiate with Lord Curzon, he made this declaration a condition of his acceptance and it was granted. If this concession had only been made six months earlier, at the Milner-Zaghlul negotiations, there is little doubt that these negotiations would have succeeded. Again, the Curzon-Adly negotiations failed mainly because Lord Curzon took the view that all communications in Egypt—railways, roads and canals—constituted imperial communications of vital importance to the British Empire, and therefore insisted that the British troops should be free to be stationed anywhere in Egypt, and especially in Cairo and Alexandria. He went back on what Lord Milner had accepted a year before, i.e. that the term "imperial communications" only applied to the Suez Canal, and that the British troops should be confined to the vicinity of that waterway for its protection. Then, seven years later, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha came to terms on practically the same conditions as those approved by Lord Milner with some reservations; and in 1929, in negotiating with Mahmoud Pasha, Mr. Henderson shared the view of Lord Milner that imperial communications were confined to the Suez Canal,

and that the British troops should be confined to that area. The Henderson-Mahmoud draft treaty was a great advance in liberality; but, while Zaghlul Pasha would probably have accepted the Milner proposals in 1920, if accompanied by an assurance that the Protectorate was at an end, Nahas Pasha rejected Mr. Henderson's much more liberal terms nine years later.

These various Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had the effect of creating in Egypt a competition for power, based on the terms which each political party was willing to offer or accept, and it was only natural that the party making the greatest demands of the British Government should make the greatest appeal to the Egyptian electors. Hence, the Treaty issue has all along provided fuel for political unrest in Egypt, and its elimination is a most important feature of the new situation.

Since the Declaration of 1922, the Anglo-Egyptian controversy has hinged chiefly on the four reserved points, the settlement of which is embodied in the new Treaty. Egyptian grievances were based on military occupation by a foreign Power; interference in Egyptian internal affairs in the interests of foreigners; and the inferior participation of Egypt in the affairs of the Sudan. Although the Egyptians realised the benefits of British protection, the means by which it was assured was humiliating to the natural pride of a so-called independent nation with the most ancient traditions. The military occupation was probably the sorest point, and one which was quite understandable. It was humiliating to Egyptians that foreign troops in uniform should be conspicuous in the streets of their principal cities, and that they should be quartered in the ancient citadel of Cairo. This was to the Egyptians exactly the same as it would be to us in England if French or German troops were stationed in the Tower of London. But they also resented the fact that these troops could be used to enforce British interference with their internal affairs for the protection of foreigners, who made fortunes out of the country and were practically exempt from all taxation. This feeling was naturally intensified when on occasions it was found necessary to send British warships to Alexandria.

Although it was largely a question of legitimate prestige, the privileged status of foreigners contributed in no small degree to Egyptian resentment. It is no exaggeration to say

that it has been possible for a foreign resident in Egypt to be a wealthy man all his life and to die a millionaire, and yet neither during his life nor at his death to contribute one solitary piastre towards the administration, whose protection has safeguarded his wealth for himself and his heirs. The revenues of the Egyptian Government have been derived mainly from the land tax, which means that the poor Egyptian peasant has practically been paying for the whole upkeep of the State. Yet, although this system of Capitulations has been a grave injustice to the people of modern Egypt, it has hitherto been impossible to abolish these relics of a former age without the consent of all the Capitulatory Powers.

In the Sudan the Egyptians were in a position of inferiority as regards the administration, defence, and in commercial and immigration questions. The Condominium of 1899 existed only in name, as the Sudan was practically a British Protectorate with the recognition of certain Egyptian privileges. Although Great Britain had declared Egypt to be an independent sovereign State, the Egyptians were surrounded on all sides by glaring evidence that their country was in reality scarcely more independent than at the time of the British Protectorate. This was, of course, fully realised by the British Government, but there was a reluctance on their part to put sufficient trust in the Egyptians to enable the restrictions on their full independence to be removed. The desire to safeguard British interests obscured the benefits to be derived from trusting Egypt. The natural pride of the Egyptian people, with its good and valuable qualities, was not taken sufficiently into account. It has only now been realised that a fully independent Egypt, proud of her capacity for independent achievement and of her alliance with Great Britain, can be relied upon to uphold her national prestige, and to follow what she knows to be the course of her true interests. There is, therefore, every reason to have confidence that in the event of trouble the help of our independent Egyptian ally, freely given, will be much more beneficial than the reluctant assistance of an Egypt under British control.

In the autumn of last year there was a general desire of all parties in Egypt to reach an understanding with Great Britain, and this was everywhere manifest during my visit to Cairo and Alexandria. But the British Government were disinclined to

enter into negotiations, believing that this was merely an attempt to profit from the situation created by the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. Fortunately, the situation so developed that these suspicions were dissipated, and the British Government realised that such an opportunity should not be ignored. After the usual preliminary shufflings, the delegates applied themselves to a task of many months under the most favourable circumstances. Among the reasons contributing to their success was the changed situation in the Red Sea and Upper Nile regions brought about by the Italian campaign in Abyssinia. As a proportion of the Nile waters, which are vital to Egypt and the Sudan, have their source in Abyssinia, anything affecting that country was a matter of concern both to the Egyptians and the Sudanese, especially when Abyssinia came under the control of a European Power. This not only facilitated a settlement of the outstanding questions in Anglo-Egyptian relations, but also made possible an agreement on the question of the Sudan. Also, Nahas Pasha made it possible for the British Government to negotiate with an Egyptian Delegation representing nearly every political party, and during the negotiations succeeded in keeping them together. He worked throughout with a spirit of give and take, which was reciprocated on the British side by Sir Miles Lampson. Both made concessions, and received others in return. Nevertheless, the fact that circumstances made the conclusion of a Treaty most desirable to both countries went far to bring about its realisation.

But there is another important factor to be taken into account. Considering the position since the Declaration of 1922, a great deal of preparation was necessary both in this country and in Egypt to bring about the necessary degree of mutual knowledge and understanding. While in Egypt there was a reluctance to appreciate British needs, there was in England a disinclination to realise Egyptian feelings. Many Englishmen knew Egypt, but few had the privilege of knowing the Egyptian people. Fortunately, Dr. Hafez Afifi Pasha, former Egyptian Minister in London, devoted several years' hard work to fostering a spirit of friendship and understanding between the two countries, and he succeeded in earning the highest respect of all those who came in contact with him. There is no doubt that Afifi Pasha's incessant labours, on the economic side as well as politically, did a great deal to prepare

the way for the conclusion of this Treaty, and this is fully recognised in this country. Since 1922, there has been a marked improvement in mutual understanding, and it is only fair to say that the effort has been made almost entirely on the part of the Egyptians.

The principal articles of the Treaty provide a settlement of the four reserved points in the Declaration of 1922. The military articles agree to the transfer of the British garrisons from Cairo and Alexandria to the Canal zone, where the Egyptian Government will provide quarters and all improvements necessary for their accommodation. There the British military force, limited to 10,000 land troops and 400 air pilots, will remain until such time as both Governments agree that the Egyptian Army is capable of taking their place as guardians of navigation in the Canal. If at the end of twenty years, the present period of the Treaty, the Governments do not agree as to whether the Egyptian Army is fit to defend the Canal, the matter may be referred to the League Council or such other body as may be mutually agreed upon. The training of the Egyptian Army will be facilitated by a British Military Mission, British armaments will be exclusively used and the British personnel serving with the Egyptian Army will be withdrawn. Full provision is made for Anglo-Egyptian collaboration in case of war or international emergency, and the form of Egyptian assistance is specifically laid down. In either of these contingencies Egypt will give Great Britain the use of ports, aerodromes and means of communication, and will provide all the legislative and administrative assistance in her power. The Egyptians have made substantial concessions. Military roads and railways will be constructed or improved at considerable cost to facilitate the quick concentration of British and Egyptian troops as circumstances may demand. Adequate provision is made for the training of the British Air Force and military formations, both of which will be stronger than was originally anticipated, and can be increased not only in the event of war, but during a period of danger or apprehended national emergency.

The Treaty provides for a permanent Alliance between Great Britain and Egypt, subject to revision in detail as circumstances demand, but continuously preserving the principles of mutual assistance and military co-operation in the event of attack upon either country. Owing to the changed

situation brought about by the greatly increased value of aircraft, the time needed to complete the agreed changes, and the possibility of a British naval base in Cyprus, the military side of the Treaty seems to provide adequate safeguards for the protection of British interests and the defence of Egypt. The contention that the British Government are giving away what is vital to our interests is short-sighted. If we are giving, we are receiving something better in return. Wholehearted Egyptian support is much more valuable to British imperial interests than half-hearted co-operation.

Henceforth the protection of foreigners will be entrusted to the Egyptian Government, and the City Police will in the course of five years become free of European personnel. This will eliminate the international factor from the Egyptian pastime of political "street scrapping," and quite possibly deprive this form of entertainment of one of its most alluring features. Moreover, the British Government recognise that the Capitulations are no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times and the present state of Egypt. It is, therefore, provided that Egypt will, with British support, approach the Capitulatory Powers with two suggestions; first, that the existing restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty in applying Egyptian legislation (including financial legislation) to foreigners should be discontinued; and secondly, that a transitional régime should be introduced for a reasonable period, during which the Mixed Tribunals would remain and exercise, besides their present jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts. At the end of this period the Egyptian Government will be free to dispense with the Mixed Tribunals. At the proposed conference of the Capitulatory Powers in Cairo during the forthcoming winter, there is no doubt that objections will be raised both to the change of responsibility for the protection of foreigners and to the loss of Capitulatory rights. But, when it is considered that Great Britain is willing to forgo these rights and privileges, and is satisfied to make liberal concessions where her vital interests are concerned, it is hoped that other Powers will realise that such a course is also in their best interests.

In the Sudan the British Government has gone far to satisfy Egyptian desires. While the welfare of the Sudanese is recognised on both sides to be the primary consideration, the Condominium of 1899 is given a new lease of life. Egyptian

candidates will have an equal chance of obtaining appointments in the Sudan services, for which there are no suitable Sudanese applicants. Egyptian troops will once more participate in the defence of a country for which they have bravely fought in the past; Egyptian officers will henceforth assist the Governor-General in the discharge of his duties; and in questions of commerce and immigration there will be no discrimination between British and Egyptian subjects. In view of the remainder of the Treaty, it is difficult to see how exception can be taken to any of these provisions. Among other arrangements are those for the appointment of Ambassadors in London and Cairo and for Egypt's application, with British support, for membership of the League of Nations, to which any differences arising over the interpretation or application of the Treaty are to be referred. In this connection the agreement presents a questionable feature; for it is in the interests of all concerned that the League Council should never be called upon to decide on the ability of the Egyptian Army to defend what the Treaty describes as "an essential means of communication between different parts of the British Empire."

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

CONSTRUCTION AND DESTRUCTION IN SPAIN.

I.

THE train journey through the tunnel from Cerbère to Port Bou to an ordinarily informed Englishman is like one of those fantastic rides at a fun fair, through lurid caves and so-called "traps of death and horrors of the inferno." Once the vehicle starts, no personal power will stop it. You have decided to be controlled by the fates for a while and you must accept what they provide. And like the journey at the fun fair, this too is not as heroic as you thought. The station is a little grim. Perhaps the sentries would look less stern if they were not in civilian dress with just a Republican armband. There is something very severe in a civilian carrying a soldier's rifle regulating other citizens. I remember the intense relief I experienced when I had finished criticising this man's habit and examined his face; he had aristocratic features. I think I said to a German girl I had met in the train and who was joining a medical unit: "The mass is not armed, then." We had discussed our common fear of Jacobinism often in our corner of the railway carriage.

Activity in the frontier town was unexpectedly conventional. The people seemed as carefree as ever, but when you spoke of the war, they were extraordinarily enthusiastic and unanimous. This was my prevailing impression—even in Madrid and the villages a few miles behind the front. In the fields and vineyards, by the side of the permanent way, the peasants looked up from their work at the passing train, raising a clenched fist above their heads in resolute good humour. *Salud*—the Popular Front greeting. There did not appear to be much need for the patrols which accompanied us from station to station. So whole-hearted for the Government did everything appear—so normal and uneventful. Apparently this was also the opinion of the patrols; most of them sat with us in their blue American overalls, smoking, talking, and letting us play with their rather antiquated weapons.

Barcelona is not the just town by which to judge the rest of Spain. The Wild West film has had more influence than the Anarchists. Unlike most of the other important towns,

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the cars commandeered for police, militia, hospital and administrative services are smarmed with the initials of rival organisations. Some of these are driven by youths, whose first experience it is of the thrill of responsibility. Many react—as is natural—a little dramatically, but certainly not brutally. A fast Hispano Suiza passes through, the sound of the siren trailing behind it. Two newly recruited militia youths stand on the running board, with empty guns aimed forward. But these are rare occurrences, and diminishing fast. Responsibility matures new philosophies and cements together discordant factions.

The control of Catalonia has passed into the hands of a committee which represents fairly accurately the disbursement of power. There are representatives of the Republicans, of the *rentier* classes, of the Anarchists' trade unions, of the Socialists' trade union, of the Anarchist Party, of the United Communist and Socialist Party as well as of the Trotsky Party. The Anarchists are of course the enigma—no election, no activity, no government. Theirs is an invidious position when they are elected by popular approval, when they are in authority, when they govern. Señor Suchi, their secretary in Barcelona, told me that in emergencies such as this the fancy bits are trimmed off ideals. Undoubtedly they are superb organisers. This is evident in the way they distribute food and raw materials, and co-ordinate the work of the comparatively few factories taken over by the workers from their employers. Three months ago they did not believe in any form of control. Experience is a wise teacher. Perhaps in three months more their policy will be akin to that of the Radical Liberals in England—profit sharing and decentralised marketing. Their power is more apparent than real; the majority of the C. N. T. (Anarchist Union), despite Executive orders to the contrary, voted at the last election and contributed to the success of the Popular Front. Many of the most influential Communists belong to the C.N.T. because it provides them with the most advantageous rates of benefit.

The Communists deserve great credit. They will suffer any slur on their pride to get what they want. After a week in Barcelona you become convinced that they are the cement in the mosaic. But let not the general impression leave you—studying intrigues and methods; the crowds parade the

Ramblars, sit at tables on the sides of the pavements, seemingly eternally happy—aware of the war, only at the street corners looking at the maps showing the military position with the rebel forces indicated by swastikas, or clambering over the few remaining barricades left for foreign journalists. Catalonia sends recruits to all fronts; they are some of the bravest.

Madrid is much more conformable. Engrossed in observing its people delight in their ordinary life, you forget for a moment that there is a fierce war about twenty-five miles away. You visit the barracks, the soldiers' enthusiasm is remarkable; it was raised beyond control when they knew that an Englishman was to address them. When I had finished, I feared that I might suffer some bruises from their warm embraces. The same welcome was accorded at a reception on a Saturday evening; they seemed so surprised to find an Englishman amongst them that after their anthem the orchestra played "God Save the King." They are very anxious that English people should understand that they fight for Democracy. The President made this clear at an interview: "Our Government was freely elected by a people who expected much of it and received much of it. The people of Spain defend not only that Government, but the principle on which it was elected—Democracy. If Democracy dies here it may not last long elsewhere."

The formation of a Socialist Government will greatly further the administration of law and order. The previous difficulty was that the Esquerada Republican Government was yielding to a more extreme form of Socialism than existed. Señor Sir Bolea, the Republican Secretary, said: "It is surprising how moderate they are—continually they counsel us not to do the very things which we should have thought they wanted." The previous Government connived at the extremism of isolated groups. These were rare occurrences, but hostile newspaper correspondents make the most of them. The new Government will be very different. Both Señor José Díaz, the Secretary of the United Socialist and Communist Party, and Señor Jesus Hernauvez—the present Communist Minister of Education—emphasised the strict party discipline: "Acts of terrorism and violence are punishable by death." In a war of this type Left forces must show exemplary behaviour." They do so. A man was

executed in Barcelona for stealing a 2s. 6d. watch. It was possibly a severe punishment—he had used the revolver with which he ought to have been defending his comrades' liberty for private purposes. A precedent had to be established. The new Government will adhere to it—as a notice in a militia room says—"with revolutionary vigour."

In these interviews I was anxious to discover what would happen if the Government were successful. I examined the leaders carefully and separately. They were, however, unanimous. In no circumstances would they depart from the programme of the Popular Front—a liberal programme. Spain is too illiterate and unprepared for anything else. They would continue scrupulously to protect the rights of property, liberty and free religion. Whatever their intentions—and good intentions are often diverted by the use of force—they do so now. Town houses in Madrid are larger and more magnificent than many in London. The majority are still occupied. Those which are not belonged to rebels, who have left the town, or are among the 7,000 prisoners in the local gaol. Every detail of furniture and ornament is preserved. Money lies untouched on the mantelpieces. Jewels lie on the dressing tables where they were left. It is reassuring after examining a place like this to see that on either side there are houses equally as large occupied and fully staffed. It is not realised in England the extent to which moderate Conservative opinion supports the Government. A prosperous manufacturer said to me. "I did not vote for this Government, but if it loses I shall never be able to vote for another."

The majority of enlightened Catholic opinion also supports the Government. There are the Basque workers and the Royal Cross Youth who fight for it. I saw one or two country priests with them at the front, and many militia girls wearing their crucifixes. The majority of the priesthood are, however, on the other side. A prominent bishop is reported to have offered a hundred days' indulgence for every "red" killed. There appears to be abundant evidence that on July 19th and 20th, at any rate in Madrid and Barcelona, the clergy fired on the crowds from the church towers. It is also clear that for some time churches, monasteries and convents were used as rebel headquarters and ammunition depots. To confiscate them was the Government's only assurance of safety. They are now used for social purposes—schools, hospitals (where

loyal nuns often become nurses) and rest homes for soldiers. There is little evidence of deliberate sacrilege; statues, tapestries and religious ornaments are respected. "Do not destroy this, protect it. It is thine."

The Government suffer one embarrassing handicap. The civilians in the towns held by rebels are their own supporters. They cannot bomb them, they cannot terrorise them. On the contrary, they must endeavour to prevent panic. Inevitably they must act slowly. They need light tanks, efficient machine-guns, fast accurate bombers. They have not got them. Saragossa, Huesca and Cordova would have been taken a month ago if they had. They must wait, the file of the Army are deserting slowly, slowly too are the Government's own forces combining and yielding to discipline. There is less smoking on parade, they begin to march in step. Restricted as they are, the democratic forces have enthusiastic material and the goodwill of the people. If they can wait a little and react co-ordinatively to their new Cabinet, they will win. Some efficient arms would expedite their victory, especially as the other side have such an abundance of them. A strict observance of the neutrality declarations may, however, end that inequality.

EDWARD GOODMAN.

II.

The long continuance of fratricidal strife in Spain is evidence that its precipitating causes—the retaliatory murder of the Fascist leader Calvo Sotelo, and the removal of unreliable Foreign Legion officers—can explain only the moment, not the motive, of the outbreak. The Spanish nation is engaged in what may well prove to be the final phase of a struggle which has been going on for centuries between powerful factors which have made stable government almost impossible. To get some idea of them we should perhaps go back to the reign of Charles III. In 1767 he, like the reformers of 1931, found himself obliged to expel the Jesuits. The Ministers of his successor gave some attention to the very distressing agrarian problems of the realm, but were unable to effect any general reform because almost all the lands were entailed on the Church and the nobility. It was towards the end of the same

century that the revival of the Catalan language gave the first sign of what was to become a movement away from the somewhat artificial union of Iberian peoples; and not many years afterwards, General Elío made the *pronunciamiento* which returned the ruthless Ferdinand VII as absolute monarch to the throne in defiance of the liberal Cortes and Constitution of Cádiz. Thus, for more than a hundred years Spain has been increasingly troubled by the five major problems which are once again bursting out in open conflict: the power of the Church in temporal affairs; the traditional privileges of the nobility; the misery and maladministration in the rural districts; movements towards regional autonomy; and a continuous chain of military *pronunciamientos*.

By the time of the anti-Isabella revolution of 1868, these issues were permanent causes of social unrest. Had they met with moderately progressive treatment after the Bourbon restoration, the country would have been spared the turbulence of recent years. Many efforts were made to deal with the outward symptoms of unrest by partial reforms or by "resolute methods," but no mere tinkering could avert the inevitable end—the collapse, under intolerable internal strains, of the monarchic system. The republican administration inherited a legacy of political and economic chaos. It has on the whole faced its difficulties with exemplary courage and foresight, and it deserves to be judged as much for what it has in fact accomplished as for the failures which it could not humanly avoid.

The first Minister of War under the Republic, Manuel Azaña, found the military organisation in a state of utter confusion. Treasury control of army expenditure had disappeared altogether; the posts of Secretary and Under-Secretary for War had become military sinecures; there was one officer for every six men in the ranks, and the leisured military bureaucracy turned its attention more and more to politics. Even as early as 1917, the Conservative Premier Maura had protested that the officers were making civil government impossible. Señor Azaña in 1931 was rightly aware that they might at any time endanger the Republic. He therefore reduced the army from sixteen to eight divisions, cut expenditure from 350 million to 150 million *pesetas*, repealed the Law of Jurisdictions which gave military tribunals power to punish libels against the army, decreed that all officers who

wished might retire on full pay (seven thousand applied in four days), and subsequently threatened any retired officer who took an active part in politics with loss of his pension. By the end of 1933 the miracle had apparently been achieved : the army was divorced from politics. But with the swing to the Right in that year, the Officers' Councils again entrenched themselves under the sympathetic War Ministry of Gil Robles, and this time meant at all costs to retain the position they had regained. By the historic expedient of seeking allies in Africa, they have made a well-planned attempt to save Spain for oligarchy.

Conservatism is, however, a new allegiance for the army. It had until 1874 allied itself, not with the Right, but with the liberal cause, in opposition to the Church, which had lost all title to liberalism two centuries previously. By the end of the first Carlist war the peculiar evil of clericalism had alienated the people to such an extent that hundreds of monasteries were burnt and some monks who had fought on the Carlist side were lynched. It is difficult to discover any words of praise for the Church as it was in the nineteenth century ; most comments are similar to that of Sir George Young, who calls it "an institution that had blocked all progress, material, mental, and moral." The amount of anti-clerical rioting and incendiarism which took place during that century clearly indicated the attitude of the people at large. But the Church was certainly, in extra-religious matters, a power to be reckoned with. Even in 1931 it controlled half of the nation's education. It stood behind the throne and the presidential chair. It was immune from all Government regulation, inspection or taxation, so that the religious orders could compete in industry and commerce on very favourable terms : at the time of the revolution the Jesuits are believed to have controlled one-third of the nation's wealth, while the working capital of their enterprises amounted to something like sixty millions sterling. Eighty communities were disbanded under the 1931 Constitution, yet it is reported (in *International Affairs*) that in May 1936 the Jesuits controlled some eight banks, thirty-five large-scale business enterprises, a wireless station, a news agency, sixty newspapers, and many theatres and cinemas. Moreover, in the period of reaction which followed the restoration of the Monarchy in 1874, the Church exacted a compensation which was three times the value of

its confiscated properties. Its revenues were equal to those of the State. With the modern antagonism between Capital and Labour, it is no wonder that there have been public, and sometimes destructive, demonstrations against an abuse of capital that has been repeatedly reformed by the law and as frequently renewed by the evasion of the law.

The first Republican government lost no time in separating the Church from the State, from the national economy, and from public education. It dissolved the Jesuit Order, abolished the Church appropriation, secularised cemeteries, legalised divorce, instituted civil marriage and established freedom of religious belief. But it experienced the very bitterest opposition when it came to confiscate the property of the religious orders (valued at £100,000,000) and to forbid them to practise industry, commerce or teaching (except in schools which existed solely for giving instruction in religion). The Pope issued an encyclical condemning this law, and the bishops of Spain published a pastoral forbidding attendance at State schools. Yet in spite of this very necessary State legislation (which did not touch on any matters of essential religion), D. Américo Castro in 1933 could still complain of "the increasing prosperity of the extinguished Company of Jesus, which, under a different title, multiplies the number of its schools." It was perhaps too much to expect that more than a millennium of Church ascendancy over national life could be brought to an end without violent resistance ; almost inevitably Spanish Catholicism has allied itself with those who promise a return to its long-standing, and, as it believes, divinely ordained privileges.

The ecclesiastical tithe, a long-standing privilege of the Church in this country, has many enemies ; but Spanish farmers have to pay not one but many such dues. The situation of short-term tenants, small-holders and land-workers is if possible more desperate now than in the eighteenth century. Unproductive soil, lack of rain or adequate irrigation, obsolete seigniorial rights, high agricultural tariffs, lack of communications, exceedingly low wages and many other factors have combined to make the life of the Spanish peasant second only in misery to that of the Russian in Tsarist days. This fact is directly connected with the popularity in Spain of extreme political views. Where government initiative brings work and wages, anarchism loses its attraction,

but had the Government not quickly passed its Agrarian Law, anarchism might well have become more a reality than a theory in southern Spain. This law created an Institute of Agrarian Reform with an endowment of 50 million pesetas a year. The Institute was given power to expropriate lands not being efficiently worked by their owners, with compensation based on the taxable value; individual communities might decide, with the advice and assistance of the Institute, whether this land should be individually or collectively farmed. In the South, where the livelihood of a large body of landworkers depended entirely on the cultivation of huge estates whose absentee landlords might or might not allow them to be cultivated—more likely not in troubled times—the Institute was empowered to open up a fifth of the arable area, paying rent to the landlord and wages and expenses to the workers, buying the crop, and redeeming its own expenses out of the purchase price. In other regions other plans have been put into operation, and general measures include the abolition of feudal contributions, the building of roads and the establishment of irrigation systems, agricultural schools and experimental farms.

This law, which had been operating slowly but effectively, was repealed in 1935 by the Government of the Right, so that many peasants failed to get authorisation to work lands which had been promised to them. Soon after the election in February of this year, and before the law could be passed again, they took possession without stopping for formalities in order to finish the ploughing before the soil was caked hard by the sun. The Government took steps to legalise this show of initiative, but not before such incidents had been pointed out as examples of its inability to keep order.

The Government's Labour policy went far towards removing the major abuses in industry. Largo Caballero as Minister of Labour was responsible for the Law of Municipal Boundaries, which forbade the importation of workers from other municipalities until all local residents of any given occupation were employed. Its object was to prevent the tactics often used to force down wages or influence an election. This legislation was bitterly and incessantly attacked by the propertied classes as an assault on their rights. Mixed juries of workers' and employers' representatives were set up to decide labour disputes, a minimum wage was instituted,

a national unemployment fund opened and co-operatives of consumers, labourers, merchants and farmers were established. Full authority for enforcing these laws was vested in the Labour Delegate of each province. A considerable unemployment problem was met by large-scale public works such as road-building, electrification of railways, irrigation projects and a scheme for a central railway station underneath the Plaza de Colón in Madrid.

It is evident that the workers in both town and country have very tangible evidence that the Government is at work on their problems, and they support it for this reason above all others. The people of the Basque country and of Catalonia are also loyal to the Government which is giving them what they have long desired—regional autonomy. Yet there is one other sphere not apparently connected with the motives of the Civil War, yet of fundamental importance; it is that of education.

As recently as ten years ago, half the children of Spain were not educated at all; of the remainder, half were educated in clerical schools and half in State schools under clerical control. Of both types of education the very moderate historian Aguado Bleye could say in 1931: "The equipment of both primary and secondary schools is, with a very few exceptions, very deficient; and the plan of studies recognisedly imperfect." In the country distances were so great and roads so few that schools were not easily accessible, while in the city a "school" might be a single room, imperfectly lighted and ventilated, and without facilities for cleanliness or sanitation. By all modern standards there was much to be done. The hundreds of new co-educational schools, with their roof playgrounds and free dining-rooms, are proof that the educational needs of the nation are being effectively met.

To understand the sweeping reforms which the Republican Government has carried out in education it is necessary to go back to the eighteen-seventies, when Orovio, the Minister of Education, dismissed a number of University professors who refused to sign a declaration of fidelity to the Crown and the Catholic religion. One of these, D. Francisco Giner de los Ríos, whose name is now universally revered, used his enforced leisure to found an independent school which should follow the educational theories then being preached in Germany by Krause. This school, the *Institución Libre de*

Enseñanza, has been called the true nursery of contemporary Spain.

The far-reaching effects of D. Francisco's creative work in education are almost too many to be traced. It stimulated other educational establishments, both friendly and unfriendly. Its influence began to make itself felt on official centres, and it acted as a leaven in the educational and general life of the country, through the young men who went out from it into business, government departments, universities and schools. The *Junta para Ampliación de Estudios*, or Committee for the Extension of Studies, created in 1907, enjoyed a grant from the State but was run on independent and purely scientific lines. The men who made the Republic owe much to these institutions and to their distinguished founder, and the immense advances made in education, largely planned by Giner's nephew, D. Fernando de los Ríos, are in keeping with the spirit of D. Francisco.

Between 1931 and 1933, 9,620 schools were opened, out of the 27,000 required to meet the needs of the children not enrolled in any school. There was a general increase in teachers' salaries, and short refresher courses were organised for all who wished for them. The fifty-four Normal Schools had their standards considerably raised. Equally important developments took place in districts which had lacked any contact with the cultural world; travelling schools, museums, theatres and cinemas were instituted, music was carried to the people by gramophone and wireless, and nearly 1,500 libraries were established. Rural enlightenment was regarded as essential to the life of a healthy nation.

There can be no doubt that the Governments of 1931 and of 1936, both of which have been largely under the directive genius of Sr. Azaña, have been progressive, impartial and energetic. Their surest praise is that criticism has come from the extreme Left as well as from the Right. Their constructive activity has been so immense that even a large-scale civil war can hardly erase all its effects, and it is reasonable to hope that the advances made by the Republic towards finding a middle way between extremes both national and international will not be lost in whatever governmental system may emerge from the present holocaust.

ALFRED JACOB.

THE CRISIS OF THE LEAGUE.

THE crisis of the League is the crisis of Europe. It is impossible to deny that the actual situation to-day is worse than could have been predicted by the most pessimistic observer a year ago. There is not a country in Europe which does not believe in the imminence of war. The so-called "neutrals"—including Switzerland and Holland, besides the Scandinavian nations—are extremely alarmed, and are chiefly concerned with the possibility of keeping out of the war when it comes. Spain is already ablaze, and has become the proverbial torch in the powder magazine. The Little Entente is plainly in danger of dissolution, and its members are unable to decide whether they should join up with Germany or Russia. Turkey has won the control of the Straits—that was part of the price we had to pay for the luxury of applying sanctions—and will be able to choose its allies. Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria will at least supply useful military bases. It is inconceivable that Poland will now range itself with Russia or—since France is the friend of Russia—with France. Germany and Italy, which are armed to the teeth, have been forced by our policy of the past year to come to an understanding with each other.

As for Great Britain, it is difficult to suppose that, in the last resort, it will fight to make the world safe for Communism. If I read Mr. Wickham Steed's article in the *CONTEMPORARY* aright, he would have us plump for Russia on the ground that Russia does not want war, thus repeating the blunder, which may be fatal, into which France has stumbled. Whether Russia wants war or not, it is certainly one of the factors which help to bring it nearer; and it has imposed on ordinarily reasonable people the monstrous doctrine that peace—and war—are "indivisible." For the sake of sanity it is still to be hoped that wars can be localised, but it must be confessed that the preaching of "collective security" has made a general conflagration far more probable. Every country, including those which proclaim their peaceful intentions—particularly those which, on both sides, proclaim their peaceful intentions—is arming itself as it has never been armed before. It scarcely seems as though any country is willing to throw itself on the protection of the League as such, or on the community of nations which profess their confidence in "collective security."

These are the realities of the political position in Europe to-day—compared with which the realities of a year ago were soothing and serene. Why has this change for the worse come about so swiftly and so completely? It is disingenuous and foolish to reply that this or that wicked country is responsible. It is true that the militarists are arming, but it is also true that the so-called pacifists are arming. It is true that the Dictators appear menacing, but it is also true that the Democracies have, first in Great Britain, and now in France, worked themselves up to a perilous pitch of excitement. Now the thought irresistibly occurs to any intellectually honest man: If these are the results of seventeen years of peace-making, of the work of the League of Nations, can it be that our efforts have been badly directed? Can it be that there is something wrong with our thinking about peace and its problems? In particular, have we made a mistake during the past year which has hopelessly shattered the diplomatic map of Europe (to say nothing of Egypt, Palestine, and the Near East in general) and has demonstrably brought us face to face with a catastrophe which we had supposed to be at least ten years away? To call each other hard names will only seal our doom. It would be more sensible for genuine peace-lovers to examine their conscience and ascertain whether the fault is in themselves.

I trust that, as a champion of the League before it was born, but who believes that it has gone astray from its moral mission and is in danger of finding itself in the camp of the war-mongers, I shall be permitted to speak plainly at this critical moment. I imagine there can be no greater upholders of the principle of a periodic "revaluation of values" than Lord Cecil and the other leaders of the League of Nations Union.

Never was it more necessary to clear our minds of cant than when we look at the League of Nations. Unhappily, the League has become for many people a new religion. Its Covenant has the validity of Holy Writ. Its Ministers are heaven-inspired. In its name millions of well-intentioned but misguided people are ready to wage war. The two secular virtues of tolerance and of compromise, which have hitherto guided us, on the whole safely, through the intricacies of foreign relations, are completely discarded by the fanatical supporters of the League, who take it upon themselves to criticise Governments which do not conform to their conception of government, and who call for a crusade against

peoples and their rulers who are deemed to be "undemocratic." Precisely what is meant by "democracy" in this connection it would be difficult to say. Hitler, for example, is unquestionably, whether we like it or not, the incarnation of the German popular conscience, while Stalin, whatever we may think of Communism as a doctrine, is imposed by an elaborate terroristic organisation on the Russian people. Yet in our illogical day the first is regarded as anti-democratic and the second as democratic. The feudal barbarism of Abyssinia is assimilated to democracy, and the worst excesses of Spanish Anarchists are somehow reconciled to good democratic practice. The true crisis of the League is that, in consequence of the strange aberration of the sanctions episode, it is in danger of identifying itself with anti-Fascism. It was my lot to frequent the lobbies of the League during that ill-advised and ill-fated experiment, and I was appalled at the strength of the movement which aimed at turning the League into a new but this time "democratic" Holy Alliance. In the most unexpected places—even among those who should be the servants of an impartial League, taking no heed of political doctrines, religious creeds, international hierarchies, races, classes, parties—there was a hot ebullition of propaganda. Let us trust that this is a passing fever. For, unless the League is absolutely dispassionate and unprejudiced, it will infallibly disappear, though perhaps not before bringing calamity upon the world.

Its failure—which any well-informed and normally intelligent observer could not help foreseeing—in the Italo-Abyssinian affair (or rather in the Italo-British conflict) has discredited the League more than any previous failure, because the League rashly placed itself on the material instead of the moral terrain. It was thereupon thought necessary to start an agitation for the revision of the Covenant, though everybody knows that any substantial formal revision of the Covenant is impossible. There are two or three points—that is to say, the vital points—on which opinion is hopelessly divided. One set of nations is resolved to keep out of entanglements in punitive action which may easily involve them in war. Another set of nations would have no use for the League if it were turned into what they call a "debating society"—though every profitable institution of the civilised world, from the Church to the Academy, from the University to the

Parliament, is, in a sense in which these material-minded men employ the word, a mere "debating society."

To-day the two conceptions of the League are more acutely opposed than ever. On one side the League is looked upon as a peacemaker, on the other side as a policeman. For some it is an instrument of conciliation, for others a weapon of coercion. "Away with cannons!" cried M. Briand in one of his most memorable exhortations. "Give us cannons, aeroplanes, armies!" cry perfervid successors of M. Briand in Geneva itself.

By common consent, there had been, until a year ago, a salutary realisation of the limitations of the League, which cannot go further than its members are prepared to go in any direction, and until Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Anthony Eden led the way it was generally agreed that the League should behave prudently. There was doubtless a deep division between those who thought of the League in its moral aspect, as a conscience for the world, and those who thought of the League in its material aspect, as a potential law-enforcer. But all the authorities were in accord on the undesirability of a premature attempt to exercise temporal power. Article XVI existed on paper, but it was a dead letter in practice. I was present at many private as well as public discussions in 1919, and my clearest recollection of scores of conversations can be summed up in the repeated affirmation: "The League cannot be a super-State." On that there was unanimity. Each nation was to retain its full sovereignty. The League was not recognised as a superior authority, but simply as a free association of equal Powers which abdicated nothing of their rights. Starting from this point, the logical conclusion was that the method of the League must be persuasion—the pressure of general opinion brought to bear upon a nation which broke, or contemplated breaking, the accepted moral code of the moment. But, of course, the Covenant was not logical. Despite the assumption of national sovereignty, the rejection of the idea of a super-State, the perilous and impracticable Article XVI, which made of the League a super-State exercising an authority superior to national sovereignty, was written in. It was clearly a mistake; but it was perhaps a necessary tactical mistake; and if it satisfied those who think only in terms of temporal power, it was held to be harmless because inapplicable by those who knew that any

attempt to apply it would split up the nations and destroy the League.

On the British Statute Book there are, as I understand, hundreds of laws which have never been repealed, so that the average good citizen is perpetually rendering himself liable to fines and imprisonment. Only rarely, however, does somebody discover that (let us say) blasphemy or Sunday entertainment is an offence which must be punished if brought before the Courts. Such legal negligence does not usually have grave consequences; but when it is transplanted into the international sphere it may have disturbing results. It had been taken for granted that Article XVI was still-born. Time after time incidents had arisen which, if it was veritably alive, demanded its application; but nobody even referred to it. Unfortunately, however, if a common informer chose to call attention to it, it could not be repudiated, but it was certain that the nations would fulfil their obligations grudgingly, haltingly, and partially. To ask them to do more was to force war on the world. When Great Britain suddenly employed the text of the Covenant as a weapon against Italy, there was not a single delegate of any country at Geneva who did not suppose that Great Britain was moved by animus or self-interest. Whether that belief is justified or not, it is one which will go on having the most serious results. It has already completely altered the European alignments. It has created two rival *blocs*. They may not be durable; they are subject to all kinds of influences. But there is a beginning of a crystallisation of one group in which Russia and France are to be found, and of another group in which Germany, Poland, Italy, and doubtless a number of the Central European countries are gathering. The terrible scene of havoc presented by the clash of these opposing forces in Spain is, in miniature, a picture of the possible European outcome of the sanctions experiment.

Incidentally, from the viewpoint of the League, it should be observed that Great Britain and France instinctively reverted to the traditional attitude of wise diplomacy when the Spanish troubles broke out. Instead of abolishing neutrality, and obliging everybody to take sides, they saw that neutrality alone could save Europe from a general war. There are naturally considerable differences between the two cases, but the fact remains that "collective neutrality" was substituted

for "collective security," which, a short time before, had been held to justify the most perilous interventions. It is an extraordinary commentary on the looseness of our thinking to-day that these utterly opposite conceptions—of getting in and of keeping out—should have been advocated by the same men in the same year. Be it noted that neutrality and non-intervention are the necessary conditions for the rôle of peacemaker; the task of mediation demands that the mediator should not take sides.

On second thoughts, that paragraph about the Spanish troubles is not incidental. It brings us to the obvious point that no legal document can possibly make provision for every contingency in international life. The League apparently believed discretion to be the better part of valour, and held aloof from the Spanish Civil War. The monstrous excuse was made that no article in the Covenant spoke of civil war. Personally, I think I could show that it would be easy to bring the Spanish Civil War within the text of the Covenant. It is purely a matter of interpretation, and no international jurist lacks the amount of ingenuity necessary for this job. Nevertheless, let us accept the contention that the Spanish Civil War did not juridically concern the League. What then? Has it come to this, that the work of the League is circumscribed by articles and paragraphs—that the League is devoid of imagination, of humanity, of all desire to prevent and alleviate suffering that is not mentioned in the bond? Has the spirit gone out of it? Is it content to be bound by a Covenant, the drudging slave of the letter of its own law, and to ignore the living realities of its mission?

Singular as the proposal may appear to be, I am strongly tempted to urge that instead of trying to revise the Covenant (which will merely provoke interminable legal and political controversy) the League should boldly tear up the Covenant. It would be a better League without a Covenant at all. That sounds like heresy, but it is the simple truth. What has hitherto clogged the operations of the League and squeezed the soul out of it is the badly drafted and contradictory Covenant, which has been the subject of innumerable interpretations by jurists and committees of experts, on which have been grafted precedents and rulings and resolutions. Oh! the brave subtleties, the clever lawyers' phrases, the hair-splitting ingenuities, which have governed arbitrary

action or arbitrary inaction! Common sense will indeed tell us that in the delicate business of international relations the utmost elasticity is required.

Now that the question of the revision of the Covenant has been raised in order to cover up the fiasco of its application (on the principle that the bad workman always complains of his tools) I therefore suggest, in no spirit of paradox, but with perfect seriousness, that the ideal solution would be the abolition of the Covenant and of all interpretations, opinions, amendments, resolutions, and other texts which have gradually imprisoned the League in a corset of red-tape. It would be quite sufficient—and more would be superfluous—to define the object of the League, and then allow it to deal with the world's problems with full freedom. Doubtless certain technical working rules are necessary, as in any association, but they should not interfere with methods, or prevent any decision being taken in the interest of mankind.

Whenever Article XI is mentioned, for example, we are told that it is inoperative because unanimity (which presumably includes the votes of the parties) is required. Now Article XI is that which was designed to enable the League to act in time—before war had broken out, not afterwards. It should enable the League to deal with a threat of war or any circumstance whatever which threatens to disturb the good understanding between nations. (Surely the Spanish situation could be brought under these clauses?) And what is the League empowered to do? To take any action which it may deem wise and effectual. What more could anybody want? Yet a responsible British Minister has explained that, presumably on account of the unanimity rule, nothing could be done last year until a war which had been announced nine months earlier had actually broken out. There could be no better instance of the uselessness, or rather the mischievousness, of a Covenant which many people foolishly hold to be sacrosanct. If the nations really want the League to live, they will give it carte blanche, and not obligingly provide the Foreign Offices with excuses and alibis in the text of a Covenant which can never be perfect and provide for every contingency.

Such a counsel will not, of course, be accepted. The present tendency is not to simplify, but to complicate; not to do away with documents, pacts, and promises of every conceivable kind, but to multiply them; not to examine realities

directly, but to interpose paper screens. Therefore, some pretence will now be made to bring the Covenant into conformity with experience. We must plainly understand our recent humiliation and the humiliation of the League, and not deceive ourselves with fanciful explanations. The moral objection to sanctions lies not so much in the sudden conversion of criminals (under the new international code) into judges, as in the declared intention of Article X to maintain the *status quo*, that is to say, to stick to the ill-gotten gains of previous crimes, by means of Article XVI. Surely it is not necessary to pursue the argument that Article XVI cannot exist, morally, on such an immoral foundation? If Article XVI is to stay at all, Article X must be merged in Article XIX, which must be greatly clarified. Article XIX, in defiance of Article X, does admit the possibility of revision—even of territorial revision, despite the frequent assertion of prominent Central European delegates that “revision means war.” But it does so ambiguously, and no one has ventured to invoke it, and no one has the smallest idea of how it could be made to work. In point of fact, everybody knows that in the present composition of the League, Article XIX cannot work at all. It would always be successfully opposed by interested parties in the Assembly. Even the proposed procedure is vague—though since it could never begin, its subsequent development has merely a speculative interest.

Article XVI, then, is designed to keep the lid on the European cauldron. The result will necessarily be an explosion. It takes no heed of justice, of equity. It pretends to determine aggression by rule of thumb, though every serious student of history and politics knows how difficult it is to determine the true aggressor, and how differently the case looks according to the side from which it is approached. If the League were a sentient being, it would surely be ashamed of acting as the guardian of conquests, some of which—and those the conquests most likely to create strife—were consummated only seventeen years ago, namely, at the very moment that the League was born. Unless the League boldly repudiates that part of its mission—or, in a more positive sense, affirms that its mission is to preside over peaceful changes—it will bear an overwhelming responsibility for the inevitable war. It is impossible to lay too much stress on the need of providing adequate means of revising, quietly, by general consent,

“treaties which have become inapplicable,” to use the expression of the Covenant, though I should bluntly prefer to say unjust treaties, treaties which should never have been made, treaties which possess no validity except that which they derive from the might of the nations which impose them, backed up by the misused League. To foresee the chances of friction, to remove the causes, to revise treaties—this should be the primordial task of the League; and any body which is set up to repair the Covenant and bring it into consonance with the moral and political purposes for which, in the minds of most people, it was originally founded, must put Article XIX first on its tablets.

Even if, and when, the precedence of Article XIX over Article XVI is plainly put into the Covenant, it would be advisable to remember that the League cannot “enforce” peace without stirring up a war psychosis. Whatever national propaganda chooses to be guilty of, the League should be careful not to direct or participate in the preaching of hatred against its own members. It should be a soothing influence in the world. On no pretext should it lend itself to a raging, tearing campaign of calumny against a particular nation. In associating itself with the demagogic attempt to enlist popular passions on the side of sanctions which will logically lead to war, the League covers itself with discredit. It has a right to fail, as all human institutions must, but it has no right to fail in the wrong way, that is, by arousing the very feelings which it is its duty to allay. It may not be able to pacify public opinion, but it should never inflame that public opinion which is the greatest factor making for war. To make use of moral indignation for political ends may be permissible, on the cynical national standards now prevailing; but the League should carefully refrain from joining in such a game. It should especially deprecate the employment of moral indignation on behalf of military policy. The wisdom of mankind has hitherto found the method of negotiation in international differences the best method, and it would be lamentable were the League to discard negotiation for coercion—a method bound to fail, certain to embitter international relations, and calculated to provoke conflict. Nor can the retention of the sanctions clauses have any other effect than to drive nations to economic autarchy with deplorable results on world trade, and to intensive preparations for war not only against a hypothetical

enemy, but against the nations of the League which can be induced by bribery, by bullying, and by blackmail to rally round a prospective powerful adversary.

The half-way house suggested by those who see that never again will nations be lured into the application of Article XVI unless they have vital interests at stake, and who yet cannot bring themselves to the drastic conclusion of abolishing it altogether, is that military commitments should be restricted to those regions which, to use the French expression, are "nearest, geographically or politically," to a particular Power. In other words, there should be so-called regional pacts, doubtless on the model of the Russo-French Treaty. (How is this treaty regional? The parties are widely separated.) In still other words, we should revert to the military alliances of other days. They would, of course, be slightly camouflaged. They would have to be wrapped in the fashionable phraseology. Above all, they would have to "come within the framework of the League"—now a ragbag of bad and good. For my part, I would much prefer to see a frank reversion to the old military alliances *outside* the League. For I want the League to survive, to keep itself clean, to remain aloof from the intrigues of ordinary diplomacy. I do not want it to become, as Pertinax has well said, a fair-ground of alliances, the matrix of military accords. If the time has not come when it can exercise decisive moral authority, that is no reason for dragging it into the sorry political game. If nations feel they need armies and alliances, doubtless they must have them; but let them have them outside the League. The League, after all, represents a great ideal. The Covenant does not begin to do justice to that ideal, and the Covenant can be retained as it is, or subjected to verbal alterations, or (as I should advocate) revised out of existence, and it will not in the least matter, provided we can keep alive the spirit of the League, uncompromised and pure. To this end, League-lovers must learn to distinguish between the temporal institution which has fallen into unworthy hands and is being employed for partial purposes, and the ideal League which has no favourites, no politics, no national or doctrinal passions, and which therefore must eventually command universal respect, which is the forerunner of universal obedience.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

THE "NEW DEAL" IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY.

A GREAT deal has been written in regard to the internal and economic policies of the Blum Government in France; practically nothing concerning its foreign policy. This of course is hardly surprising, for during the first few weeks of its tenure of office the "Popular Front" cabinet was so absorbed by the imperative need to check and canalise the agitation of the masses and to whip through Parliament at an unprecedented speed an unprecedented number of sweeping social and economic reforms, that it had little time to devote to foreign affairs, save when they—as in the cases of the Vienna agreement, Danzig and Spain—suddenly and violently demanded immediate decisions. The result was that, during this initial period, the reins of Foreign Policy hardly left the hands of the permanent officials. Certain friends of France and of peace may be inclined to think that this was unfortunate, since their conception of foreign affairs appears to have become a little vitiated by association with M. Laval and could, in these later stages, be best described as a policy of *laissez faire*. To understand how this came about, and, what is even more important, why and how M. Léon Blum suddenly seized these reins and gave French policy a new "deal," it is necessary to go back and examine very briefly the background of the Laval policy.

When M. Barthou was murdered in Marseilles the stock of France stood high in the diplomatic market. Barthou was a man who had few illusions about anything and none at all about Germany. Almost alone among statesmen in Western Europe he saw very clearly that, just as Hitler had climbed into power in Germany by sheer bluff, so he would inevitably adopt the same method of bluff to secure hegemony in Europe. Barthou believed that the only way to ensure peace was to "call that bluff" at the earliest possible moment. France was unable to do so alone; it was not quite evident how far she could count upon British support, since British policy seemed to oscillate between two widely different conceptions: that of Sir John Simon and that of Mr. Eden. Thus Barthou set about to strengthen France's existing alliances in Eastern Europe and to create a new one, namely that with Russia. In addition, he was anxious to secure, if not the friendship,

at least the benevolence of Italy, but he was not prepared to buy off Italy at any price and above all he would never have contemplated offending London in order to please Rome. His policy had one object: to fortify the European peace *bloc* and to oppose it, like a solid granite wall, to all attempts at aggression from Berlin, Rome or any other capital. He believed in France and in her ability to play what he considered her historic part in world affairs.

M. Laval was of very different mettle and entertained an entirely opposite conception. He did not believe in France's undiminished power—or at least in her ability to play her traditionally leading rôle any longer. In all seriousness he thought France had run her course, as other Powers had done before her: Spain, Portugal, Holland, Austria-Hungary. She must retire gradually and as fast as possible from the forefront of the world stage; she must be content to be a super, one of the crowd at the back. For the accomplishment of this purpose, two things were essential: an agreement with Germany at whatever cost, and the disentanglement of France from her system of alliances in Eastern Europe. It may appear strange that this being the case he should have gone to Moscow to sign a pact with Russia. But it should be remembered that he did so under the irresistible pressure of the French General Staff, and that even then he succeeded in whittling down the draft treaty which Barthou had prepared.

When Pilsudski died and the new head of the Polish Government wanted to dispense with the services of Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister, who for years past had shown himself openly as a friend of Germany and an enemy of France, M. Laval went to the length of sending a letter of fulsome praise to that gentleman expressing the hope that he would remain in office. He did remain in office, to the undisguised jubilation of Berlin. When Masaryk retired from the Presidency of the Czechoslovak Republic and everyone expected the great champion of the French alliance, M. Beneš, to be elected triumphantly in his stead, M. Laval engineered an opposition. The intrigue came near to success, but between it and its realisation there suddenly loomed the shadow of a terrible civil war. For this reason Beneš was elected, despite Laval. In Bucarest, M. Titulescu, that most skilful of Francophile statesmen, who until recently had weathered

storm after storm which would have wrecked most careers, suddenly discovered that the host of his enemies, secret and open, had received an accession of strength. The agents of the Prime Minister of France were in unholy alliance with the agents of Hitler to sap the position of the Rumanian statesman.

In order that France could withdraw into her own back garden and devote her old age to raising cabbages, it was necessary to win over Italy. M. Laval procured her goodwill by giving her leave to attack, conquer and annex Abyssinia without interference. When it came to cashing this blank cheque, Mussolini found that it was drawn upon a joint account and that the signature of the English partner was missing; indeed, that partner was far from sharing the mind of M. Laval. There is no need to repeat the facts now so well known. Suffice it to recall that Laval succeeded in estranging Great Britain and at the same time losing Italy. This was in very truth the crowning achievement of a pusillanimous policy.

At long last M. Laval was—the term is not exaggerated—hounded out of office by popular indignation. He was followed by a Government that from the hour of its birth lay under sentence of death. The General Election was due in a very short time and everyone knew that, whatever its result, M. Albert Sarraut and his Cabinet of shilly-shallying, lukewarm Centrists would be swept away. Yet, be it noted, it was this transitory, shadow-like administration which, inheriting the fatal Laval policy, had to face the crisis of March 7th—a crisis that seemed to render impossible any understanding between Paris and Berlin.

It is necessary, of course, to distinguish between Germany and Hitler. An understanding with Germany is possible. An understanding with Hitler is only possible on the terms upon which the proverbial lady made her peace with the proverbial tiger. The turning-point in Franco-German relations was the Saar plebiscite. In November 1934, a majority for the *status quo* was believed by shrewd Reichswehr judges to be assured, provided that the Saarlanders felt that they could rely upon Geneva, and Geneva in that question was spelled "France." In the immediate Hitler entourage this was recognised and known. The Reichswehr generals, who had never loved the Austrian-born private,

were preparing for the upheaval against Hitler that would, in Germany itself, follow upon his defeat in the Saar plebiscite. They were preparing not to defend Hitler but to supplant him. M. Laval in his desire to propitiate Hitler torpedoed the *status quo* at Geneva. By so doing he gave him the Saar. What is more, he gave him an immense prestige and a stupendous victory; in a word, security of tenure for years to come.

The breach of the Treaty of Versailles by open rearmament was the first consequence. The march into the Rhineland, in defiance not only of Versailles but also of Locarno, was its second. That in its turn made the Vienna agreement, the peaceful penetration of Austria, possible. There followed the Danzig *coup*. Then came the dramatic doubling of Germany's military equipment by the decree of two years' army service. The series is not exhausted. Memel, Czechoslovakia may prove the next milestone on this royal road of Germanic trespass.

The Rhineland *coup* came after Laval had gone. But its success had been rendered almost assured by the atmosphere which he had created. The truth regarding the Rhineland affair is now known to the initiated. First, the German side. General von Fritsch, the German Commander-in-Chief, resolutely opposed the march into the Rhineland. He declared that the Reichswehr was not yet in a fit state to wage war. If, therefore, Hitler insisted, he and every other general of the Reichswehr (with two exceptions, Blomberg and Reichenau) would resign. Hitler told them their fears were in vain; there would be no war. As a guarantee of this he handed them a written order to evacuate the Rhineland again, without firing a shot, if the French should mobilise and cross the frontier. Second, the French side. Sarraut was in favour of a partial mobilisation. Flandin was prepared to support him. Mandel urged that the frontier should be crossed. At that fateful Cabinet Council there would have been a sure majority for "calling Hitler's bluff." That decision would have been taken, notwithstanding the fact that pacifist feeling was running like a river in flood throughout France, and despite the fact that London would have doubtless frowned. Two forces opposed and frustrated that decision, the permanent officials at the Quai d'Orsay and General Gamelin, Chief of the Staff. The former, against their sounder instincts, had been infected by the Laval

theories. General Gamelin avowed that he would require 400,000 men to occupy the Rhineland. That meant the mobilisation of several classes; it meant a tornado of pacifist, anti-patriotic propaganda in France; it might even entail a general strike. The Ministers—these Ministers of a day, or of a month—climbed down. They made beautiful speeches; they invoked the sanctity of treaties; they were in turn pathetic and indignant, but they climbed down. Once more Hitler had bluffed his way to triumph.

Then came the Danzig *coup*. Léon Blum was now in office; he who had just delivered a magnificent speech in Geneva in which he warned the world that France had yielded not from fear but from nobler motives (shades of President Wilson and his "too proud to fight"!) became very angry and wanted to send a French cruiser squadron into the Baltic to, as he put it, "seal up the Danzig harbour." The permanent officials fought against the idea with all the desperate courage of totally intimidated men. They won M. Yvon Delbos, the Foreign Minister, to their side by producing a voluminous *dossier*, prepared by General Gamelin. To run the risk, he said, of offending Germany meant the danger of war with Germany and with Italy at the same time. Great Britain was not to be depended upon: in any case she was still much too weak. The Red Army was much too far away. The French military and aerial forces might perhaps be able to resist the German shock, but not the Italian also at the same time. There was much more to the same effect. M. Blum gave way—fortunately, for one could not well have devised a worse battleground than that of the Danzig issue.

But the check rankled, and when, at the London Conference of the three associated Locarno Powers, the German plans regarding Czechoslovakia were submitted to him, M. Léon Blum rebelled. All the easier because he was momentarily removed from the stultifying atmosphere of the Quai d'Orsay, where apparently no one has opened the windows since M. Laval took his departure. Precisely the danger of Hitler's plans regarding Czechoslovakia is that, unless they are nipped in the bud by a display of resolution, they are likely to succeed as completely and as painlessly as the Rhineland and the Danzig *coups*. Germany herself has not the remotest intention of attacking Czechoslovakia, for that would involve almost immediate war. Prague is allied to Moscow, and to

bluff "Comrade" Litvinoff is much more hazardous than to attempt the same operation in Paris. Litvinoff is no tyro himself at bluffing. He was a master hand at the game when Hitler was in his political infancy. That presents Hitler's primary difficulty. But there are ways round. Poland has deep differences with Czechoslovakia over the Teschen territory, and the Poland of Colonel Beck has been a fairly subservient instrument of Berlin. Prague's protective treaties of alliance only become operative in case of German aggression; no such commitment is made in the event of an offensive on the part, for instance, of Poland. Moreover, there is an alternative even less dangerous. There are three million Germans in Czechoslovakia; that is to say, three million malcontents. Most of them are organised after the approved Nazi fashion and pattern. They live next to the German frontier. An armed revolt—armed and financed by Berlin, which has gathered some experience in the game both in Austria and in Spain—would lead to civil war and anarchy. German interests would be involved obviously. German intervention would be natural and could be so stage-managed as to appear normal and unobjectionable.

Can that menace be avoided? Clearly it can were an agreement to be made between Berlin and Prague. True, it would be an agreement which would make Czechoslovakia just as much a servile State of Germany as Austria has now become. And M. Lacroix, the exceedingly able French Minister at Prague, has pointed out that, unless M. Beneš can rely upon France, he may have to go on the humiliating Canossa-like pilgrimage to Berlin.

M. Léon Blum has been described as an idealist. That is in some respects a true description. But he is also a realist. The Lacroix report brought him face to face with the realities which, as his Danzig impulse shows, he had hitherto divined but had not closely studied. The new tone of firmness which he evinced at the London Conference is evidence of his resolve to get out of the rut of eternal yielding. Not that this will bring war nearer. On the contrary. If anything at this late hour of Europe's fate can prevent war, it will be a policy that will convince the mischief-makers, be they in Berlin or in Rome, that the liberal and democratic Powers, the Powers that stand for peace and freedom, are determined to insist upon the rights of mankind and the sanctity of treaties.

French foreign policy has had a new deal and taken a new turn. Already there are signs that the course of the game has been influenced by the new deal. In Poland, General Rydz-Smigly, the Inspector-General of the Polish Army, has been sufficiently impressed by the new breeze that is blowing from the Quai d'Orsay to commence a campaign against the Beck policy which entailed the abandonment of the French alliance. The extreme cordiality of the reception to General Gamelin, the ostentatious haste displayed by Rydz-Smigly in returning the visit, his careful avoidance of German territory on his way to Paris, his reception in France with honours hitherto accorded only to a Chief of State, culminated in the signing of a new Franco-Polish convention, the importance of which is evident from the care taken to prevent any leakage as to its contents. Whether the agreement goes beyond the reported financial loan of fifteen million pounds to equip the Polish Army is not definitely known. Neither is it yet clear whether General Rydz-Smigly will, in the long run, get the better of Colonel Beck. But one thing at least is certain: whatever its fate the attempt to wrest Poland from German influence at the eleventh hour, when she appeared to be on the threshold of becoming Germany's "cat's-paw" for the purpose of provoking disputes of aggression, would never have been made had its authors not acquired the conviction that France has turned her back once and for all upon the Laval policies.

Perhaps the most significant result of all the "new deal" has been the brusque change which Herr Hitler has found it necessary to make in his own plans. The German intentions in Spain were very evident. That country presented a splendid opportunity for the self-proclaimed saviour of Europe from pernicious Bolshevism to drive France into a corner, to force her into a disadvantageous position from which, short of war, she could only emerge by another humiliating climb-down. If France yielded, she would find a new enemy in her rear; an enemy sitting astride of her vital communications with her North African empire. If she fought, she would fight almost alone and would bear the odium (German propaganda would see to that) of fighting for barbaric and godless Bolshevism against Christian civilisation. It was not conceivable that either Britain or Belgium or the Little Entente would join her in any such quixotic enterprise.

Without the Little Entente, Russian aid would be of little avail to France.

The Spanish card was an ace in Herr Hitler's hand. But France had had a new deal. The German ace was trumped. The very definite and firm stand taken by the Blum Government, in the teeth of the hostility of the Syndicalists and its Communist and Socialist adherents, on the Spanish question undoubtedly impressed the world. It impressed the doubting and distrustful friends and allies of France, who for the first time since the day when Barthou was murdered felt that there was now a strong hand at the Quai d'Orsay. It impressed Signor Mussolini, who hastened to back out of his half-partnership with Hitler in the Spanish arrangement. And, finally, it impressed Hitler himself. For the first time in three and a half years, his bluff had been "called"—called not by sabre-rattling and threats of ultimatum, but by a sound, firm policy which appealed to the common sense of the world, especially when it appeared to be persevered in, despite all obstacles, and which for this very reason showed itself to be inspired and backed by an indomitable resolve.

This Spanish episode affords conclusive evidence of the strength of purpose that lies behind the new deal. There is no doubt—M. Blum has himself so declared in pathetic accents—that every member of the French Cabinet, were he to follow personal impulse, would render the Madrid Government such assistance as international law permits. The very masses who carried M. Blum to power and who keep him there are, in their foreign policy, passionately opposed to the blockade decision. One of the strongest parties in the *Front Populaire* waged an incessant campaign against that decision. But Léon Blum never faltered. He believed that his swift decision on August 8th had saved the rest of Europe from being plunged into war. He adhered to that policy in the teeth of bitter reproaches and the open mutiny of some of the trade unions because he believed that by so doing he could defeat the ends of Berlin and ensure European peace.

The fact that one of the first fruits of the Blum policy was to compel Herr Hitler to relinquish his Spanish ambitions is a proof of the sterling value of that policy in the interests of peace. It has not actually saved peace. For, foiled in the west, Germany has turned again to the east. Having overnight, so to speak, yielded on the Spanish issue, the German

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dictator levelled up by issuing his decree regarding two years' service on the following morning. But that measure is avowedly and actually directed against Russia, and the reply to it may safely be left to the astute politicians who wield the power in Moscow. So far they have cleverly declined to walk into the trap set for them by the unprecedented public attacks in Nuremberg.

So far as France and Western Europe are concerned, M. Blum's "new deal" has scored a brilliant initial success. Whether this French policy will be of a lasting nature is another question.

The answer to that question lies in French internal politics, the development of which can alone determine whether he will be permitted to carry on his ambitious experiment at home and in the field of foreign affairs.

W. WALTER CROUCH.

Paris.

PORTUGAL AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR.

AN impartial observer both of the situation in Portugal and the present international position is led to the conclusion that, in view of the policy adopted by the Portuguese dictatorship towards Spanish events, the result can only mean disaster for Lisbon. We can easily understand that strong and powerfully armed countries, like Italy and Germany, who have nothing or little to fear from Spain, try to help the Fascist military rebels. But that a small country like Portugal, with a reduced and ill-armed army, dares to help them so impudently and on such a large scale against the lawful Government of a friendly neighbouring country, so much more powerful, seems "midsummer madness."

The civil war in Spain has been waged with revolting savagery, and the widespread terrorism by irregular execution squads, the ferocious shooting of wounded, prisoners and hostages, and the deliberate murder of women and children make the hideous carnage more shocking for those whose sensitiveness is not obliterated by political passion. But these are the people of democratic ideals and liberal tolerance, and it seems that they are becoming more of a minority. The Press of the whole world is divided mainly between those who approve of and try to excuse everything done by the Spanish Government supporters and those who praise and exalt all that the rebels do. Whether in Russia for one side, or Italy and Germany for the other, there is no matter for surprise; what is happening in several democratic countries like Great Britain and France, where there is the right of free opinion, is rather alarming. In these countries the Press expresses the feelings of the masses, and we can see that the number of those papers which can judiciously and impartially stand between the two extreme wings is small. Even the more conspicuous papers hardly disguise their sympathies. Humanity is divided into two parties defending entirely opposite principles. Every man of good will must fear the prospect that the present Spanish strife may be the beginning of a world clash. The savagery of the struggle cannot hide the significant fact that Spanish youth are generously giving their lives in defence of the most opposite ideals, the rest of the country having to take sides. The intolerance of both

parties leaves no room for the partisans of democracy; they have to join one of them or disappear. On the battlefields of Spain two ideologies are at stake, and the danger is that of the world being forced to choose between them. Whatever the result, dictatorship may emerge, and the winner will try to exterminate its foe. One wonders if statesmen and diplomatists can prevent the spread of the calamity. Diplomatic conferences are too platonic to oppose the sudden, unscrupulous and realistic decisions of Fascist governments. Those of Italy and Germany have already shown their preference for the latter, and Portuguese dictators, encouraged perhaps by the good results obtained by them, decided to follow the same methods.

Virtually the Portuguese dictatorship is in a state of war with Spain, and no one can have any illusions as to Spain's attitude towards Lisbon in the case of a final victory of the Spanish Government. She will not intend to conquer Portugal, of course, but it is only human that she will give every kind of help to the Portuguese adversaries of the dictatorship, almost all of them republicans and socialists. This will be enough to wipe out the dictators and their camarilla and restore the country to the Republic, but a rather different and more advanced one than before 1926. Though the Portuguese have a marked repugnance for all excesses and bloodshed, there is a great danger for them in the possibility of the retreating rebels seeking refuge in Portuguese territory; they would help the dictatorship against the liberals, bringing their own ruthlessness, and an Iberian civil war, with all its horrors, would continue in Portugal. Should the rebels win, the Portuguese dictatorship would become an appendage of the block formed by Spain, Italy and Germany. Such a block would be most dangerous for France and Great Britain, to whom the freedom of the Mediterranean is a question of life or death. Then, in view of the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the situation of Portugal would be extremely delicate, and her colonial empire in great danger. The importance of the colonies is so great for Portugal that if she lost them she would be politically and economically reduced to a province of Spain. The only suitable policy in the present situation was a strict neutrality. In the case of the rebels' victory Great Britain, in her own interests, would not fail to defend Portugal's integrity, as she

has always done ; in case of a Government victory, the utmost that could happen would be the re-establishment of the liberal Republic in Portugal. But this would be the end of the dictatorship, and the dictators preferred to risk the most sacred interests of the country in trying to prolong their own reign. The Portuguese people will never forgive them their tyranny or their criminal selfishness.

British people are ill-informed about the Portuguese political situation. The Italian and German dictatorships have caused much more misgiving in Great Britain and attracted far more attention than that which exists in little Portugal, and the centre and left wing Press has not troubled about the misfortunes of Portuguese democracy. In this way British public opinion has been fed exclusively with the sympathies of the reactionary Press towards all dictatorships and the propaganda articles published in some leading papers by the Portuguese Government. A brief survey of this decade of dictatorship is necessary to understand the situation, and to realise the differences between Portugal as a nation of old democratic traditions and the military-clerical minority which for ten years has ruled the country.

The political and economic troubles of the post-war era brought the Parliament to such a state of disorder that great discontent arose throughout the country. A group of army officers took advantage of this situation, and on May 28th, 1926, they revolted against the Government, establishing a military dictatorship. They chose for their chief General Gomes da Costa, who had been commander of the Army in France during the war and enjoyed some prestige. After the victory he agreed that one of the organisers of the revolution, Admiral Cabeçadas, who in 1910 was one of the founders of the Republic, should be the President. A few days later Gomes da Costa ejected Cabeçadas, and installed himself in the Presidency of the Republic. Another officer, also of the "Junta revolucionária," was entrusted with the Home Office and Education Office. However, Gomes da Costa substituted for that officer his friend General Carmona. This General managed his affairs so well that during the four years of the Great War he never left Portugal. Besides not taking part in any of the several Portuguese colonial wars, or even in a revolution, he never went to the front. When the revolution of 1926 broke out he was in command in the south,

but he only joined the movement after Gomes da Costa had entered Lisbon, victorious and without a shot being fired. Carmona turned to his own profit some discontent among the supporters of the new régime, plotted and sent a group of officers to the President's palace to arrest his friend Gomes da Costa. Carmona, of course, installed himself as President of the Republic and forthwith deported his predecessor to the Azores. This happened exactly forty-two days after the triumphal entry of the victorious Gomes da Costa into Lisbon. Such behaviour caused great excitement and indignation in the soundest part of the Army and Navy ; but the new President, bribing, and occupying strategic positions with his own party, prevented any serious attempt to dislodge him. Trying to satisfy the Army, which could hardly swallow such an outrage, Carmona promoted Gomes da Costa to the Marshalship, though he remained deported for a long time. Nevertheless he could not prevent a numerous group of officers going to the President's palace, where, after warm discussion, Lieutenant Moraes Sarmento, showing the contempt of all the party, kicked General Carmona. Sarmento then went to Angola, as "chef de cabinet" of the new High Commissioner, and some months later he was murdered under mysterious circumstances.

When in May 1926, Gomes da Costa formed the first dictatorial Cabinet, his Catholic advisers induced him to take Dr. Salazar, a Professor of Economics, as Minister of Finance. After a few days in office he resigned. This was a strategic move. Clever as he is and backed by the brains of the Jesuits, he foresaw the confusion that would result at first from the meddling of the army in the civil administration. It was better to let them entangle themselves in the net of financial difficulties and then, when the chaos should be complete, to appear as a saviour. After the first year of the dictatorship public expenditure rose from 1,539,000 *contos* (*conto* = 1,000 *escudos*) to 2,110,000 *contos* with a deficit of 542,000 *contos*. After the second year the financial chaos was complete, and the dictators went to Geneva to implore a loan from the League of Nations. They were unsuccessful. Meanwhile Dr. Salazar, who always gave technical advice to the Generals, published a series of articles on economics, suggesting his exclusive competence to deal with the financial situation. After being earnestly pressed, he deigned again to

be Minister of Finance in 1928. He imposed hard conditions such as the absolute control of all the financial and economical resources of the country. This involved several clashes with the military; but when they protested, the finance dictator threatened to leave them alone with their financial troubles. In 1930 the Prime Minister, General Freitas, wanted to regulate the abuse of ringing church bells, but Dr. Salazar objected and retired for some days to his country house. Great excitement followed among the military. But Carmona substituted for his friend General Freitas the more submissive General Oliveira, the church bells continued ringing, and Dr. Salazar returned to office. In 1933, as he wished for still more power, he asked Carmona to eject General Oliveira and became Prime Minister.

The propaganda services of Dr. Salazar continually boast of the present great financial prosperity of Portugal, more or less represented by his budget surpluses. However, very few know that only through the raising of taxes was the revenue increased by more than thirty-five per cent. The tax on some commodities such as petrol, sugar and beer has been doubled. Though the value of the £ (gold) was 95 *escudos* in 1925 and 178 *escudos* to-day, the unfavourable balance of trade has increased from 1,222,140 *contos* in 1925 to 1,622,562 *contos* in 1934, a clear index of decreasing prosperity. Nevertheless Dr. Salazar's budgets always close with a miraculous surplus. How can he succeed? He invented a new technique, contrary to all the rules of finance. Unable to obtain enough revenue to balance expenses, he includes loans which are accounted as ordinary revenue. For instance, in the budget of 1934-5 he includes 280,000 *contos* of loans in order to obtain a surplus of 1,504 *contos*. By the same procedure in 1932-3 and in 1933-4 a surplus of 1,673 *contos* and 1,723 *contos* respectively was obtained. The experts of the League of Nations, however, did not agree with this science and did not consider loans as ordinary revenue. Thus we can see in the *Annuaire statistique de la Société des Nations*, 1934-5, page 280, that the Portuguese budget closed with deficits of 4,000 *contos*, 71,900 *contos* and 280,000 *contos* respectively in 1932-3, 1933-4 and 1934-5. The misery of the Portuguese people reaches the limits of tragedy. Their wages are ridiculous, usually under and very seldom over two shillings per day. In many parts of the country, during the winter, the head of the family cannot

obtain more than one or two days' work with wages amounting to one shilling or less. Those who visit the country are deeply impressed by the sadness and suffering stamped upon the faces of the people.

How can this tyranny continue? With the help of a pretorian guard, the terror spread by the secret police, and the censorship of the Press. Only a few regiments of the Portuguese Army are well equipped with every kind of modern weapon, disposing of the arms and ammunition factories; they are commanded by Fascist or monarchist officers entirely devoted to the dictator. This pretorian guard occupies the strategic positions of the country, mainly in Lisbon and Oporto. Some officers informed the writer recently that in almost all the "suspicious" regiments ninety-five per cent. of the rifles are useless, and each soldier has scarcely more than half a dozen rounds of ammunition. The other powerful weapon of the dictators is a huge body of well-organised secret police, terribly expensive but quite efficient. No necessity to be an extremist; during the last years to be a liberal is reason enough to become on bad terms with the secret police. Since 1926 the flow of republicans into prisons, concentration camps in the colonies and exile has never ceased. Many political prisoners have suffered tortures and some have been murdered. To obtain confessions of real or imaginary offences, or just to inflict a political punishment, or for revenge, the prisoners are not only insulted and beaten, but their feet are burned; their hands or head are pressed in copying presses; they are manacled and hung by the wrists, even one wrist, or by the feet, flogged and left there until they faint or die; for long periods they are not allowed to eat, drink, smoke or even use the lavatory; they are thrown, completely naked, into cold and damp dungeons during the winter; they are forced by kicks, lashes and bayonet prickings, to walk round a table until they collapse, this torment being continued for sixty hours at a time; or placed in the famous "electric chair," where during endless hours they receive one after another electric discharges, suffering dreadfully. There is the most rigorous censorship on every word printed or spoken, even on private correspondence, allied to an elaborate expensive service of propaganda in the country and abroad. Consequently we can realise why a people of liberal traditions like the Portuguese have to bear a tyranny of a very small

minority headed by a Jesuit-inspired dictator. The lovers of dictatorships used to say that there is peace and order in Portugal. One can find the same peace and order in any cemetery.

This brief sketch of the Portuguese dictatorship, virtually unknown in this country, enables one to understand the behaviour of the Lisbon Government in the present emergency. Their sympathies with Italy and Germany are but too evident, and if they could they would change the alliance with England for at least an entente with those countries. In 1918 the dictator, Dr. Sidonio Pais, approached the U.S.A., trying though unsuccessfully to replace the Anglo-Portuguese friendship. Present events show clearly enough that the voices from Berlin and Rome arouse much more echo and sympathy in the Lisbon dictators than the wise and friendly counsels from London. But the Portuguese people remain faithful to the old friendship with Great Britain. The intellectual class in Portugal is entirely divorced from the dictatorship, and after 1926 only four or five men among the republicans and liberals of real worth turned to the dictators, being regarded by the great majority as traitors. This policy of duplicity towards Great Britain and France has increased the disgust of the people and the army for the minority which enslaves them, and which in no way represents the sentiments and will of the country. Great Britain and France, in defence of their own interests and the cause of democracy, can have but one wish concerning Portugal—to see again in Lisbon a democratic government.

SPECTATOR.

MADAME ADAM.

(Juliette Lamber.)

“*La Grand'mère de la Patrie Française.*”—JÉON DAUDET.

MME ADAM *la grande Française*, as many have called her, died on Sunday, August 23rd. She would have been a hundred had she lived until October 4th. To few is it given to enjoy such a span of life. Almost a century, and one of the most significant and eventful centuries in the history of mankind in France. Mme Adam's century included the revolution of 1848, the *coup d'état* of '51, the agony of the siege of Paris, the loss and reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine. Through all these experiences she lived intensely, ecstatically, often feverishly. “Love and indignation,” she has told us, “were the mainspring of her education.” To her Maurice Barrès, her friend, might have applied his favourite epithet “apostle of energy.”

Controversy ran in her blood. Her long life was a series of battles for one cause or another. Her first book, the first of the fifty volumes she was to publish, *Idées Anti-Proudhoniennes*, which appeared in 1858, was a bold attack on the anti-feminism of one of the leading economists of that time. It won her the friendship of the two greatest living Frenchwomen, George Sand and the historian of the 1848 revolution, Daniel Stern (la Comtesse d'Agoult). Half a century later, Mme Adam followed with sympathy the English suffrage movement. During the Great War she met and admired Christabel Pankhurst, whose critical *Britannia* articles had driven her to take refuge in Paris.

Among Juliette Adam's many activities, social, political and literary, three are outstanding: her salon, in which she helped Thiers and Gambetta to lay the foundations of the Third Republic; her seven delightful volumes of *Souvenirs*, which no historian of that period of European history can afford to neglect, and *La Nouvelle Revue*, which she founded in 1878 and edited for nearly twenty years. To its pages she contributed those fortnightly articles on foreign affairs which fanned the flame of *la Revanche* and advocated every nationalist cause in Europe. A fortnight after the appearance of the first number of *La Nouvelle Revue*, the Northcliffe of that day, Emile de Girardin, gave a dinner party. Among the guests

were Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone, Gambetta and Mme Adam. Mr. Gladstone raised the question of the objects of the new review. "Three," replied its editress, "to oppose Bismarck, to demand the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, and to encourage our young writers." Maupassant, Anatole France, Pierre Loti and Paul Bourget were among those who received encouragement.

The great ambition of Juliette, as of all gifted Frenchwomen in the last century, was to preside over a salon. She realised this ambition first in her flat in the Rue de Rivoli, opposite the Tuileries Gardens. Later, after her marriage with Edmond Adam, a wealthy politician of the Left Centre, this *salon minuscule*, as she called it, blossomed into something much more important—the salon of the Maison Sallandrouze, in the boulevard Poissonnière. During the last years of the Second Empire, this salon was *le foyer* of the opposition, as anti-clerical as it was anti-empire. One of its most assiduous guests was Peyrat, with whom is said to have originated the phrase *le cléricalisme c'est l'ennemi*.

It was during the six years that followed the 1870 war that Mme Adam's salon exercised its greatest influence over French politics. At this time the existence of the newly established Republic was seriously threatened. Edmond Adam's friend, Thiers, was trying to govern with a monarchist majority and a violently republican minority, inspired by Gambetta. While Thiers, *le vieillard sinistre* as his enemies called him, was carrying on with Bismarck those delicate negotiations which resulted in the payment of five milliards war indemnity two years before the time stipulated by the Treaty of Frankfurt, Gambetta, *le fou furieux*, was stampeding up and down France describing with matchless oratory the agony of Alsace-Lorraine, demanding the reorganisation of the French army and universal military service. Both *le vieillard sinistre* and *le fou furieux* were the Adams' friends. It was due partly to their mediation and to the meeting in the Maison Sallandrouze of politicians of the Left and the Left Centre that no violent breach occurred between the two leaders.

Mme Adam's tact filled with admiration all who attended her salon. Among them was the late Sir Sidney Colvin. He has told how he watched her, the only woman at her receptions, extremely handsome, full of graciousness, tact and good

will, determined to exercise her charm for the cause she had at heart, surrounded by deputies of all shades, wide asunder as the poles, moving from a dry old doctrinaire to a fiery radical from the south, throwing one after another into good humour by sheer womanly cordiality and grace. Despite her determination to mediate between the various sections of French liberalism, Mme Adam could hardly conceal that her strongest sympathy lay with Gambetta. Even before the war he had been the lion of her salon. For some time her friends had hesitated to introduce this uncouth grocer's son, this blustering Gascon into the sophisticated circle of the Maison Sallandrouze. "He is too badly dressed," they argued, "his accent is atrocious, he is insolent in discussion." But Juliette had set her heart on making the acquaintance of *ce jeune monstre, ce dompteur des foules*. She insisted on inviting him to one of her famous Friday dinner-parties. He came, and in his nondescript coat, with a suggestion of flannel shirt between his high-buttoned waistcoat and collar, lived up to his reputation of belonging to the riff-raff of the party. But that very evening the work of sophistication began. Gambetta, no doubt for the first time in his life, apologised to his hostess for not having dressed. Ten years later she thought of that evening when she saw him at the opera, in faultless evening dress, with light gloves, hat slightly tipped over one ear and a gardenia in his buttonhole. By that time Juliette Adam was recognised as Gambetta's Egeria. They were often seen together in society, not in political assemblies only. The widow of Alphonse Daudet, in her *Souvenirs autour d'un Groupe Littéraire*, tells how she saw her at an evening party, wearing a long white gown, her hair crowned with leaves (*coiffée en Velléda*), with great dignity and a radiant smile standing behind Gambetta's chair and advising him which card to play.

Mme Adam came out of the 1870 war *une nationaliste intégrale*. *Madame Intégrale*, Gambetta used to call her. Of a fellow writer, Edmond About, she had written: *il s'est réveillé de l'horrible cauchemar patriote fanatique*. And of herself also this was true. All her hopes at this time were centred on Gambetta. *Adam et moi*, she wrote, *nous n'avons pas d'autre espoir, pas d'autre culte que Gambetta. Il est pour nous la personnification même de la France, l'expression vivante et agissante de notre relèvement, de nos certitudes républicaines*

et nationales. Her fervent patriotism, growing more and more intense as time went on, parted her from some of her friends, from George Sand among others. The latter had written that she desired peace "not for the sake of France alone, but for the sake of Germany, and in order to avert the ruin of two civilisations." Mme Adam exclaimed: "A gulf has opened between me and the friend whom I adored. Never shall we understand one another again. She . . . permits herself to be moved by pity for the Germans."

It was after her husband's death in 1877 that Mme Adam's nationalism became most intransigent. Even Gambetta was ceasing to please her. She feared that his passion for *la Revanche* was cooling. His favourite phrase was now: *pensons y toujours, n'en parlons jamais*. He had come round to Thiers' point of view. Mme Adam suspected her former hero of negotiating with Bismarck, even of visiting "the wily fox" in his lair at Varzin. No good could come of that. Bismarck, as long as he lived, figured in Mme Adam's articles as *l'homme fatal, l'homme fourbe* and his policy as *la fourberie*. She was gratified when someone told her he had been heard to exclaim: "Can no one silence *cette diablesse de femme!*" and had met with the retort: "Only one person, her husband, and he unfortunately is dead."

A useful member of the staff of *La Nouvelle Revue* had from the first been the son of Alphonse Daudet, Léon Daudet, now editor of *L'Action Française*. He was her lifelong friend and admirer. From his chief he may have acquired that gift for invective which enlivens the pages of his newspaper to-day; as, for example, when he described a famous salon of the Left, whose hostess had once been the friend of Mme Adam, as an assembly of "thieves, incendiaries and assassins."

Not only on his attitude towards Germany did Gambetta and Mme Adam disagree. He was strongly in favour of an alliance with England. When Sir Charles Dilke arranged a meeting between him and the Prince of Wales at the Café pressed by the Prince's insight into European politics. But she was afraid that the glamour of such high society was warping his judgment. For her, England, until the Great War, remained *la perfide Albion*. She could not forgive us for holding aloof from France in 1870. Though she admired our Liberal statesmen, notably Mr. Gladstone and

John Bright, she feared our foreign policy, "the insatiableness of Great Britain," almost as much as that of Germany. She deplored that Mr. Gladstone's views had been unable to permeate the British Foreign Office in the matter of Egypt. His goodwill to France she never doubted; but in Egypt she thought his hand had been forced by "British mercantile Chauvinists and Palmerstonians." She was to live almost long enough to see her dream of Egypt for the Egyptians in a great measure realised. For the signing of the present treaty must have taken place within a few hours of her death.

One proposal of Gambetta, that of a Franco-Russian Alliance, met with her complete approval. For she adored the Slavs as intensely as she hated the Germans. *L'alliance russe* seemed to her then, as to many French statesmen to-day, one of the most effective methods for establishing French security. For years, in the pages of *La Nouvelle Revue*, she fought *à plume armée* against Bismarck and for the Russian alliance. To compass her aim she left not a stone unturned. She cultivated friendships with leading Russians, Tourguénieff, General Skobeleff, Mme Novikoff. She kept in touch with the French ambassador at St. Petersburg. She visited Russia as well as the Slav countries of Central Europe. She was always the friend of Poland. And finally, one glorious October day in 1893, she felt her efforts had been rewarded when she saw a detachment of the Russian fleet sail into Toulon harbour. After the signing of the Treaty of Alliance between France and Russia in the previous August, a Russian Minister had telegraphed to her: "To you is due the honour of having predicted the sentiments which unite French and Russian hearts . . . may the bond uniting our two countries endure for ever."

All this time Mme. Adam was moving steadily towards the Right in religion as well as in politics. In her youth she had been proud to call herself a pagan. The kind of paganism she professed may be gathered from her novel *Païenne*, which Jules Lemaitre considered one of the best of her numerous novels. Her paganism was a romantic deism, strongly coloured, like her republicanism, by a passionate admiration for Greek thought and institutions. *Une Grecque résuscitée* Victor Hugo called her. "But she was a pagan who would soon turn Christian," said her friend Littré. Mme Adam never ceased to respect Littré and to admire him as one

of the saints of agnosticism even when his prophecy came true, and when to her novel *Païenne* she gave a sequel *Chrétienne*.

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, Mme Adam, in common with other agnostic French writers, Paul Bourget, Ferdinand Brunetière, Charles Péguy for example, was beginning to ask herself: *l'âme de la France est-elle donc Catholique et ne peut-on être en contact absolu avec elle que par le catholicisme et sa plus pure tradition?* Thus her Christianity grew out of her nationalism and was of the purely gallican type. Like her friend, Charles Maurras (that strange paradox—an atheist advocate of Catholicism), she admired the Church of Rome because she saw in it the highest expression of Latin culture and of that Mediterranean tradition which embodies all that she loved and respected and which was the direct antithesis to the northern tradition, to the *Kultur* of Berlin. Bismarck and his *Kulturkampf* may have played their part in her conversion.

Her gallicanism betrayed itself in a letter written during the Great War in reply to an inquiry as to her view of the asserted pro-German attitude of the Pope. . . . *Pour le Pape. Je suis catholique, apostolique et romaine. Revenue aux croyances de ma grand'mère. . . . Vous comprendrez que je n'ai pas, si tardive croyante, le droit de discuter les actions du St. Père. Mais mes vœux étaient pour le Cardinal Rampolla, que l'Autriche détestait et que la France eut tant aimé. Là encore je dois me taire. Vous pouvez seulement dire à quel point mes vœux accompagnaient le Cardinal Rampolla, que j'avais la fierté de connaître.*

During the war Mme Adam was actively engaged in various kinds of war work. In her country house in Seine et Oise, l'Abbaye de Gif, to which she had retired when she resigned her editorship of *La Nouvelle Revue*, her household, she explained to her guests, was on a war footing. But this donkey chaise had met them at the station.

At seventy-nine Mme Adam looked a very old woman; wrinkles and parchment-like complexion were rendered all the more obvious by dark hair barely streaked with grey. But the light in her sparkling eyes was undimmed, and her marvellous energy was unabated. *Elle était en acier*, said her son-in-law Dr. Paul Segond. *Cet acier*, writes Léon Daudet in

L'Action Française,* *se retrouvait dans ses yeux, d'ordinaire bienveillants et rieurs quand elle parlait de l'Allemagne et de son vieil ennemi Bismarck.* She talked as vivaciously as ever, walking briskly in the park round the ruins of the ancient Abbaye, telling proudly that, in the absence of gardeners, most of the ivy covering them was trimmed by her own hands.

Now at last she had a good word to say for the English. *Quelle joie d'apprendre nos alliés si autrement que je croyais les connaître.* In France *l'union sacrée* reconciled her with more than one of those from whom she had formerly differed. With Clemenceau she had crossed many a political lance. But these differences were forgotten, when, in 1919, he sent a military motor car to take her to the Hall of Mirrors, there to witness the effacement of the Treaty of Frankfurt and the humiliation of her lifelong foes.

Since the war Mme Adam has from time to time taken up her pen to write an article for some French or foreign newspaper. One of these was a protest in the *Figaro* against a play produced in London, which turned entirely on the irregularities of George Sand's private life. On summer Sunday and Tuesday afternoons there would gather on her terrace at Gif a company, including a few old friends surviving from the days of the Maison Sallandrouze, the aged Pierre Loti and Paul Bourget, as well as members of younger generations, the faithful Léon Daudet and his wife, Maurice Barrès, General Lyautey and General Marchand of Fashoda fame, her grandchildren and their friends. In the evening young and old would join together with their hostess to act charades in her private theatre. The last news I received of her not long before her death was that she had been seen at Gif engaging in her favourite amusement.

Mme Adam, when she died, was staying with her dearly beloved daughter and only child, Mme Segond, the Alice of her mother's *Souvenirs*, at her home, the Château de Lagnelles in Var, not far from Les Bruyères, the country house where the Adams used to receive many of their famous guests, among them Gambetta and George Sand.

WINIFRED STEPHENS WHALE.

* August 27th, 1936.

THE GREATER LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE NATURE
AND DEVELOPMENT OF UNOFFICIAL
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.

ACCORDING to Deniker, cited by Webster in explanation of the word "international," "the international life of peoples manifests itself in three different ways: either in hostile relations (war), in pacific neutral relations (commerce) or in sympathetic relations (exchange of ideas and feelings, feasts, congresses, etc.)." Three stages of development are clearly indicated: first, *antipathy*—the instinctive antipathy of difference; second, *tolerance*—the tolerance of commerce, to mutual advantage, in things; third and last, *co-operation*—the co-operation of mutual curiosity and interest, leading to sympathy and its celebration at feasts and congresses.

War and commerce are as old as history and have been highly organised for centuries. But organised international exchange of ideas and feelings is of relatively recent origin. The very word international only crept into the dictionaries at the dawn of the nineteenth century; whilst the first organisations that boasted their internationality were the peace societies, founded at the close of the Napoleonic Wars, in London, New York and—interestingly enough—Geneva. The nineteenth century and early twentieth witnessed a remarkable development in the field of international organisation. Utilitarian necessities brought to birth inter-governmental bodies such as the International Postal Union and the Hydrographic Bureau. Common interests and curiosities created a host of professional and scientific organisations, ranging from unions of hairdressers and hatters to societies of adepts in the more speculative pursuits of anthropology and psychics. Politicians, humanitarians and moralists were also on the move. The Interparliamentary Union brought together the practitioners of democracy. The International Red Cross sought to salve consciences by humanising war. Whilst the International Peace Bureau, greatly daring, proposed war's abolition in favour of law. By 1914 some four hundred unofficial international societies were established. Brussels, through the pioneering zeal of

Henri Lafontaine and Paul Otlet, had become the centre of this voluntary internationalism.

The outlook for international organisation after the war, as for so many other things, was radically different from that of pre-war days. The pertinacity of President Wilson, coupled with what has been styled "the internationalism of facts," resulted in the establishment of the League of Nations. The dream of political visionaries had suddenly become concrete reality without that long preparation of thought and experiment which usually paves the way to new institutions. The League was accompanied by the International Labour Organisation, and followed by the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, as well as by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation in Paris. Brussels and Berne, as centres of international activity, found themselves overshadowed by Geneva, suddenly become the "world's capital"; whilst Paris, always an important centre of scientific and professional societies, more than held its own with the added attraction of an Institute, housed in the Palais Royal, which became a focal point of that intellectual co-operation so difficult for Anglo-Saxons, with some notable exceptions, to comprehend.

Hence new wineskins had to be found to contain the vintages of 1920 and onwards. Inevitably these were discovered not in the vicinity of the Palais Mondial (Brussels), but instead in that of the Palais Royal (Paris), and of the Palais des Nations (Geneva). To take Paris first. On December 10th, 1925, representatives of fifteen of the chief international associations working among young people met at the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation and formed what became known as the Liaison Committee, the functions of which were first, to ensure contact and co-operation between unofficial organisations interested in the education, or the leisure, of young people; second, to make a link between these unofficial bodies, on the one hand, and official bodies (i.e. the League, the I.L.O. and the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation) on the other. The Liaison Committee to-day numbers some thirty organisations; it meets three times a year, and annually considers, with the Director of the Institute, in what ways the private organisations can help not only the Institute but international intellectual co-operation in general. It has sub-committees at work, for

example, upon the cinematograph, children's literature, exchanges and travelling of young people and the unemployment of young people.

But, although Paris harbours more than twice as many international societies as any other single city, nevertheless Geneva, because of the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation, became the centre *par excellence* of those unofficial international bodies which exist to promote policies which are concerned actively with one or other of the fields covered by the League and the I.L.O. This was no new destiny for the city of Calvin, Rousseau and the Red Cross, but a natural consummation, as Robert de Traz has so sympathetically shown in *The Spirit of Geneva* (Oxford University Press, 1935). Before the League arrived only three international societies had their headquarters in Geneva. By 1926 this number was multiplied by ten, and by 1929 it had doubled again, having caught up with Brussels and London (each with sixty organisations or so), though Paris was still well ahead with a hundred, a numerical superiority since considerably increased. Space forbids description of the collective activity of the unofficial bodies in Geneva. Suffice it to say that by 1929 a Federation of Private and Semi-Official International Organisations had been established to watch over common interests; whilst, since the summer of 1932, an International Consultative Group (for Peace and Disarmament) has promoted not only regular consultation, but indirectly also co-operative action and co-ordinated policies, so far as some thirty unofficial societies are concerned.

Something must now be said regarding the intrinsic importance of unofficial international organisation in general, though admittedly the value and influence of particular bodies varies enormously. Since emotional elements have played, and do still play, so large a role in both the forced and voluntary contacts between nations and races, it follows that effective inter-governmental co-operation depends to a considerable extent upon the question as to whether a sufficient minority of intelligent and responsible citizens have made the necessary adjustments to the psychological and material facts. As Sir Alfred Zimmern has well said somewhere, "We have an internationalism of *things*—from telegraphs to cinema films—but we have not a generation of men and women accustomed to live, in the fullest

sense of the word, in the larger world thus opened out to us."

This new habituation is a complex process in which all kinds of agencies, e.g. the cinema, the aeroplane and the radio, are having their part. But it is obvious that societies of men and women, drawn from many nations, and the very *raison d'être* of which is conference about the questions of the day, or conscious promotion of common interests and aspirations, are destined to play no mean role. Their gatherings may be likened to laboratory experiments, conducted on a small scale, but designed to point the way to an applied science of international association.

Space precludes detailed illustration of this process at work. But you have only to think of the large numbers of people of all walks of life: scientists, representatives of the professions, teachers, women, students, parliamentarians, business men, ex-service men, peace workers, church representatives, trade unionists, and so forth, who to-day have direct contacts with persons of other countries; and of the infinitely larger number who, through membership in national societies with international affiliations, are indirectly brought into the orbit of the process, to realise the influence upon international politics that this new phenomenon exerts.

In conclusion, one may venture, perhaps, a few observations from a decade's experience at Geneva, in touch with the official and unofficial organisations alike. In an interesting publication of the Geneva Research Centre entitled *The League of Nations and other International Organisations* (Geneva Special Studies Vol. V, No. 6, 1934) Prof. Pitman B. Potter writes as follows on unofficial organisations:—

In one sense it is here that private initiative and variation can and should be given full rein. On the other hand, the extravagant amount of duplication, subdivision and recombination, multiplication and disappearance, of organisations, often without good cause, which goes on in this field, seems to cry aloud for regulation.

At one time it seemed as though the League of Nations itself might become the chief regulating influence. Under Article 24 of the Covenant it is provided: (1) that all existing international bureaux "established by general treaties" (i.e. official bodies) shall be placed, if the parties desire, under the League's direction; and (2) that all new

bureaux of this kind shall in any case be placed under League auspices of one kind or another. It will be seen that no specific reference is made to *unofficial* international organisations. Nevertheless, in the early optimistic days of the League, an extensive interpretation was given to Article 24, witness the fact that on June 27th, 1921, the "Council decided . . . to make it possible for the patronage of the League to be given to all international bureaux," under certain conditions. Two years later, however (July 1923), the Council, at its twenty-fifth Session, reversed this decision, decided that Article 24 could only apply to official (i.e. inter-governmental) bodies, and gave as reason that "it is not desirable to risk diminishing the activity of these voluntary organisations, the number of which is fortunately increasing, by even the appearance of an official supervision."

It may be doubted whether the pleasure of Council members, or of the higher Secretariat officials, at the increasing number and activity of the private organisations was in fact as unqualified as appears. Be that as it may, the Council was wise to limit League patronage to official bodies; whilst many unofficial bodies may well have escaped from a respectable but none the less fatal paralysis arising from financial and bureaucratic control. But, whilst the values and virtues of spontaneity and difference remain, so also does the problem of waste in effort and resources arising from too little co-ordination and co-operation.

There are two alternative methods of meeting this problem: (1) schematic; (2) pragmatic and dynamic. The international movement owes a debt of gratitude to Paul Otlet of Brussels, not only for his pioneering efforts before the war in creating a union of international associations, but also for stimulating the imagination of post-war pragmatists by means of his super-logical dreams of a highly co-ordinated international centre, styled the "Mondaneum." Such geometric plans, however, are wrecked inevitably upon the rocks of man's unmathematical nature, and of fluctuating circumstance. The step-by-step method of organic growth is the only policy that succeeds in practice, though theoretical planning is an influential factor in practical realisation. This dynamic process is not delusion. It is seen at work in a Federation of Private International Organisations, a Permanent Centre of International Information and a

Consultative Group (for Peace and Disarmament) in Geneva; in a Liaison Committee in Paris, and in various *ad hoc* forms of co-ordination, set up for particular purposes, at various times and places. With goodwill and mutual accommodation, wastage of effort and resources is actually being minimised, effectiveness maximised, so that the mission of the unofficial organisations is more conscious and articulate.

In addition to the question of relationships between the unofficial organisations themselves, there is also the important question of their relationship, separately and collectively, to the official bodies, notably the League and the I.L.O. In Chapter XIV of *Ten Years of World Co-operation* published by the League Secretariat in 1930, which chapter discusses "The League and Public Opinion," one section deals with what is styled "Liaison." "A wide field of liaison," so runs the text, "is maintained with unofficial organisations dealing with some aspect or other of League problems." Anyone reading this account concerning the League's relations with public opinion could not but be struck by the relatively small space devoted to liaison with unofficial organisations as compared with that given to the Press. Nothing is further from the writer's intention, however, than to underestimate, still less undervalue, the various forms of liaison established by the Secretariat and Labour Office. Much helpful co-operation is proffered by some Secretariat Services—notably by the International Bureaux Section. But best of all is the generous co-operation given by many individual members of Secretariat who are alive to the advantages of an offensive-defensive alliance between the International Civil Service, debarred from open advocacy of policy, and the unofficial organisations, often insufficiently informed of facts without which policy cannot be accurately devised and pursued.

Such a constructive relationship, experience shows, develops *pari passu* with good personal contacts between the Palais des Nations and the offices of the unofficial bodies. This is an argument, surely, for the concentration in Geneva, if not of the headquarters, then at least of permanent representation, of all those international societies which are concerned to promote co-operation in any of the fields (and they are very wide) covered by the League and the I.L.O.

BERTRAM PICKARD.

THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH FLORA.

THE PROBLEM OF ALIENS AND THE INFLUENCE OF CULTIVATION.

NO one who makes any constant study of the countryside can avoid noticing the changes that are going on in our flora. The great increase of the rosebay willow-herb and the Michaelmas daisy must be familiar to all northern people and there is no doubt that these two plants, which defy the ravages of the builder and the refuse dumper, will be amongst the most numerous wayside plants of the future along with those other increasing wayside flowers, the sneezewort, American rayless mayweed and Canadian fleabane. In these modern times, dictatorial schoolmasters have ridiculed the purpose of field clubs that have survived from Victorian days, but as Librarian of the Liverpool Naturalists' Field Club, which has published its proceedings annually since 1860, I find these annual records of familiar plants, compiled by field clubs all over the country going over the same districts annually for a considerable period, of the greatest value in considering the changing conditions of our country's flora.

In these days of such controversy over rare plants, however, some people have obviously overlooked the fact that rare British plants like starry trefoil, whorled knapweed or adder's tongue spearwort, with very few stations, are naturally scarce amongst us, and cannot be regarded in the same light as the continual reduction of wild hyacinths, wild daffodils, snowdrops, primroses, foxgloves, and lily-of-the-valley from most of their haunts within reach of the vasculum-and-trowel botanist or gardener. It is to be admitted, however, that a considerable number of our native plants are decreasing before the changed conditions of the countryside: one has only to read the literature of the country around London, Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester to appreciate that. But it is often overlooked that many of our plants are increasing and seem well able to find a place in the changed countryside of the future; most important of all is the success of so many aliens, who appear to be making a conquest of the countryside something like that of the Canadian pondweed, *Elodea canadensis*, which, introduced from timber

to the Grand Union Canal branch at Market Harborough in 1847, has since spread to almost every freshwater in the country. Commerce is the chief contributor of aliens to our countryside, but it should be pointed out that, though thousands of foreign seeds fallen by the wayside take root and flower each year, most of these are "adventives" and fail to establish themselves or spread. More aliens have been found in the Merseyside area than elsewhere, owing to the great shipping connections with the world, but surprisingly few of the 150 aliens recorded by my friend Dr. C. T. Green, author of the *Flora of Liverpool*, have established themselves sufficiently to spread from the docks or railway sidings.

While changed methods of agriculture cleaning up the fields better than formerly have been widely announced as reducing the numbers of corncrakes and partridges, it seems to have escaped general notice that this change has also reduced the amount of corn-cockle found in the rye-fields. The influence of the cultivator of plants is, however, the greatest problem in the future of our flora. The majority of our trees owe their presence to introduction and planting, and since the great reduction of woodland during the war, replanting has been largely a matter of spruce, larch, Corsican and Austrian pine and Scots fir. The great increase of pinewoods which this method has ensured the countryside of the future will have other effects on the flora, for the undergrowth of pinewoods is extremely poor. The afforestation of the West Lancashire sand dunes, one of the richest botanical areas in the country, with pines, reduced many interesting plants, but fortunately, when Dr. C. T. Green and I made a special survey of the state of the flora of these dunes and woods for Flora's League, the National Wild Plant Conservation Society, we showed that the duneland orchid, *Epipactis dunensis*, which Col. Godfrey first described from here and which for many years was known from no other place, can establish itself numerous in the less-crowded pinewoods. One feature that will alter the countryside of the future is the great increase of birch trees on so many of the drying heaths and moorlands of the North. The increase of the birch and the bracken is now a serious problem on hundreds of moorland areas, as I know from my own experience on the moors. Already considerable stretches of heath and moor have been lost to encroaching bracken and birchwoods. Mat-grass is also increasing over moorlands,

especially in South and East Scotland and the old Caledonian Forest. The constant burning of the heather spoils the thin layers of peat which is washed downwards by rains, the acid water destroying vegetation on the slopes, so that all around peat-hags dense growths of moor mat-grass (*Nardus stricta*) are spreading, and grazing sheep seldom eat it, so it increases at the expense of bent grass and sheep's fescue grass.

Returning, however, to the matter of alien plants and garden escapes affecting our countryside's future, there are the classic examples of the evening primrose which the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway spread from Liverpool up the sandy West Lancashire coast last century, and which also grows on the Cheshire coast and the North Wales coast at Rhyl; and the Oxford ragwort, really a Mediterranean plant introduced to Oxford Botanic Garden in the seventeenth century, but which was spread by means of its hairy seeds through the development of the Great Western Railway last century from Oxford, appearing at Cardiff, Fishguard, Carnarvon, Bristol; at Birmingham in 1922, in Cheshire in 1926; at Llandudno Junction a friend found it in 1929, and at Speke sidings, Liverpool, in 1930. The spreading of the monkey musk, *Mimulus Langsdorfi*, along damp places in the country is well known, but in recent years my botanical friends and I have come across the old garden musk, *Mimulus moschatus*, famous for losing its scent, growing far from any garden, in damp stream-sides of North Wales and Lancashire, where it is spreading as a wild plant.

One of the commonest streamside plants of the future will be the Himalayan balsam which is already firmly established in our countryside North and South, having escaped from garden cultivation. I have found it in abundance at our sewage farms, for instance. The North American orange balsam is also increasing with us: first recorded wild at Albury, Surrey, in 1822, it spread along the banks of the Tillingbourne to the River Wey, thence to the Thames and London; it also grows along the Test at Stockbridge, Hampshire. Canadian fleabane, first noted in this country in 1690, though not yet a common wayside plant in the North, is very abundant in the Midlands, East and South as a weed; in 1929 a friend told me he had found that this plant, along with willow-herb and *Sisymbrium pannonicum*, appeared suddenly on waste land during building operations in the Strand,

London, recalling the sudden appearance of the London rocket (*Sisymbrium irio*) just after the Fire of London. *S. pannonicum*, by the way, was first recorded in England from the Crosby sandhills of Lancashire (*Proceedings Liverpool Naturalists' Field Club* 1909). The North American rayless mayweed or pineapple weed of Oregon, first noted at Carnarvon in 1871, is now a common wayside weed in most places, its fragrant scent making up for its dull greenish colour. From gardens the winter heliotrope, an Italian relative of our coltsfoot and butterbur, has spread to the wild in many districts, especially in the Isle of Wight, and firmly established itself by its fast-spreading underground root system, so that we need have little fear for its future. In parts of East Anglia and West Lancashire, the fragrant pink Dutch pea was introduced by imported Dutch dyke-diggers who chewed its roots as a chewing-gum, spitting it out later: though it does not seem to be increasing much, this welcome addition to our flora is still firmly established and extending its colonies in most of its haunts.

The ivy-leaved toadflax has, of course, long been a familiar colonist of old walls and quarries in our countryside, and it will probably be one of the commonest plants of the future, its trailing, shiny, deep-green leaves and small lilac flowers being of Mediterranean origin; even in 1724, Dillenius described its escape from Chelsea Botanic Garden to the surrounding walls. The Norwegian cinquefoil, the orange-yellow sickle mallow and the alien field melilot, are increasing inhabitants of waste places in the South. On many estates, snowberry is a quickly increasing garden escape. The beaked hawksbeard, which last century was hardly considered established in the country, is now extremely abundant over the South, Midlands and up to South-west Yorkshire, while its near relative the rough hawksbeard is also increasing at the expense of wayside dandelions. The acrid lobelia, for long confined to moist heaths in Devon and Cornwall, has now spread as far east as Sussex, and has increased much on the New Forest border in recent years: another plant that has extended its range considerably along the south coast is the dog's tooth grass (*Cynodon Dactylon*), and it has been recorded from Glamorgan, Cumberland and Midlothian.

Those seldom-noticed green flowers of the shadier woods, dog's mercury, and the small pinkish-white racemes of

enchanter's nightshade, have increased much in recent years, though they were always common. The yellow horned poppy and the sea-holly of our coasts are, however, definitely losing ground, though their passing seems less heralded than that of the snowdrops and primroses. I blame Primrose Day and the wild-flower contests of many garden shows for much of this loss, not that I wish to discourage the half-crown prizes to village schoolchildren for their wild-flower bouquets, but, from my experiences as a gardening-journalist visiting flower-shows as part of my work, many of the rarer wild-flowers shown are not the gatherings of the children but of professional wild-flower gatherers who collect and sell to competitors. This unfairness could be avoided by making competitors include the name of localities where their specimens were gathered in a prescribed area. Much has been written against too much sentimentalism in wild-flower protection by people who prefer staying indoors splitting hairs over the choice of one out of the numerous scientific names for many a plant in our floras, but while none of us would deny the child its bunch of daisies or the sick patient her vase of bluebells, we know from our own experience what are the future prospects of certain wild flowers we want preserved, because we all like them. As a regular field naturalist I do feel the work of Flora's League, the Cotswold Field Club, the British Empire Naturalists' Association and similar bodies—whose councils contain some of the ablest botanists in the country—essential to the future of our British Flora.

There are some mistaken ideas prevalent regarding the last station of the wild *Cotoneaster vulgaris* on the Great Orme's Head, North Wales; although but few plants remain, I doubt if many plant-collectors would risk their necks taking them from their almost inaccessible places when they can get the same species cheaply from a nurseryman. The chief dangers to this species in its last station seem the wild goats and the mountain-sheep who nibble its foliage: I have seen blackbirds feeding on *Cotoneaster* berries, however. It should be noted, too, that *Cotoneaster vulgaris* is not the only species growing on the Great Orme's Head, and my friend Mr. J. D. Massey, past president of the Liverpool Botanical Society, has pointed out to me *Cotoneaster Simondsii* and *C. microphylla* also now growing there. One of the most successful garden escapes in the poor, sour soil around many of our

northern industrial areas is the knotweed which chokes so many city gardens and waste dumps: in the countryside, as with the balsams, its spread is at the expense of native plants, and in Wales it has increased remarkably in the Aberglaslyn valley.

The reduction of old wells in the modernisation of the countryside has had much to do with the decrease of the hart's tongue fern, and the danger of deadly nightshade as a poison and barberry as a host for wheat rust has been responsible for their considerable reduction. The increasing pollution of the industrial North is spoiling the flora. We have noticed, since the increase of the chemical industry of Widnes, Runcorn and Warrington, the death of pines in the south Liverpool region and the considerable reduction in the number of mosses, lichens and hedge-plants in that area, though pines flourish well to the north of the city where the air is the cleanest in the county. The heaps of chippings dumped by the roadsides in many districts for throwing on the tarred surface are seriously reducing our wayside flowers, and in some stretches of arterial road there is practically no hedgerow vegetation except hedge-mustard and mayweed. Yet in a huge shingle heap near Gresford, North Wales, last summer, I found growing on the top of at least 50 feet of shingle by a works, specimens of groundsel and wild mignonette, the former with a tap root nine inches long into the material. A misunderstanding has arisen over wild mignonette, which has probably not increased so much as is generally supposed. Hooker in his 1884 *Student's Flora* declared of it: "Waste places in England; very rare, and native? Scotland and Ireland," which has been assumed to mean very rare in England whereas as Mr. J. F. Rayner pointed out in *Countryside* in 1933, the semi-colon after England implied it was common there, and very rare in Scotland and Ireland.

Destruction by the vandal is probably the sole reason why the foxglove is decreasing in the countryside, for in the middle of Liverpool slums, despite the polluted atmosphere, there is still a flourishing little colony on the plantation slopes of St. James' Cemetery below the Cathedral and a plant or two in our birds' sanctuary there, for the cemetery gates are locked towards the end of each day and on Sunday afternoons. I mention this because statistics show that Liverpool has the most heavily polluted atmosphere in the country. Yet in the

country around there are many suitable woodlands, but the only ones well stocked with foxgloves are the well-preserved woods guarded by local gamekeepers on the estates of Lords Sefton and Derby and Major Ireland-Blackburne.

Geology has much to do with the flora, one admits, but even this may be altered somewhat. Thus on the little Sahara of sand dunes between Liverpool and Southport, on the edge of the great Lancashire sandstone plain, such limestone-loving plants as ploughman's spikenard are flourishing in conditions which the ever-retreating tide is leaving through the plenitude of shells buried in the sand, though you must go to the limestone area of North Wales to find the same plant numerous again in the Liverpool floral area. Even the increase of sewage farms is affecting the countryside flora, for amongst the commonest plants I have found at our sewage farms are tomatoes, which are springing up everywhere there! The increase of the starling, especially its great communal winter roosts, is increasing the elder. The starling is the commonest feeder on elderberries and these are the plants I find most often spring up amongst the droppings below a winter starling roost, of which the country has over three hundred.

ERIC HARDY.

A DECADE OF PROGRESS IN THE HIJAZ.

ON January 8th, 1926, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud entered Mecca as a conqueror and was proclaimed King of the Hijaz. And during the ten years of his rule in that kingdom he has introduced more changes in it than it had known during the previous two thousand years of its history. Till 1926 the conditions of life in the Holy Land of Islam may be said to have been medieval, but now they are becoming modern.

In order to be able properly to understand the greatness of the change that the Wahabi King has wrought it is necessary to have some idea of the state of the country under his predecessor, King Hussein. King Hussein was an outright autocrat and ruled his kingdom without the help of ministers. If he disliked anyone he sent him to prison and confiscated his property without even the pretence of a trial. The country was overrun with thieves and brigands, and life and property were not safe. The different tribes were continually at war with each other, the pilgrims were overtaxed by the Government, and cheated, robbed, and even murdered by the Hijazi people. The sanitation of Mecca and Medina was as defective as it possibly could be. Water was scarce and there were no hospitals or good qualified doctors to be found in the pilgrimage area, and so mortality was very high among the pilgrims. The charges for the camels—which were the sole means of transport—and the rents of houses were exorbitant. The custodians of the tombs of saints at Mecca used to fleece the sick and the suffering by selling them charms and talismans. Except a few mosque schools, where religious education of the old type was given, there were no educational institutions in the country.

Soon after he had seized Mecca the Wahabi King thought of placing the Hijaz under the joint rule of all Islamic peoples, and so he sent out word to Moslems all over the world that he had expelled King Hussein and was holding the Holy Land of Islam as a trust for them all and requested them to send their representatives to discuss the subject with him at the congress which he was going to hold at Mecca in June that year. But when he met the delegates at the congress he dropped the idea of an international Moslem government for the country and resolved to govern it himself. The reasons why he decided

to do so were : (1) he disliked the arrogant way in which the delegates tried to impose their views on him ; (2) they could not agree among themselves ; (3) he realised that as a great many of them came from countries which were either ruled by or were more or less under the influence of Christian Powers, he would practically place the Holy Land of Islam under those Christian Powers if he allowed their subjects or protégés to have a voice in its government.

And this is what he has done for the country during the ten years of his rule. He has given it a well-organised government, with departments of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Public Instruction, Army, and Religion. The Viceroy—who is at present Prince Feisal, his second son—is helped by an Executive Council which is composed of the heads of the various Government departments and notables nominated by the King. The Finance department has been created with the help of a Dutch expert, and all tithes, taxes, and customs duties are paid into the Treasury and not pocketed on the way as they used to be in olden times. Municipal, village, and tribal councils, composed of notables, and headmen chosen by the people to advise the Viceroy and carry out his orders, have also been set up in some of the towns and villages. The tribal government has been centralised by placing the sheikhs under the authority of the Meccan Government. The sheikhs are now made responsible for all crimes that take place within their jurisdiction and so in their own interests they have suppressed brigandage and greatly reduced theft and murder. Life and property are now as safe in the Hijaz as in any other Central Asian country. To unify his country the King has built many new roads, and a large number of motor-cars have taken the place of camels for transporting goods and passengers. In the days of King Hussein there were about twenty motor-cars in the country, all of which belonged to the King himself, for no one else was allowed to have any. But now there are between 1,200 to 1,300 motor-cars, most of which belong to private individuals. There is a motor-bus service between Jeddah and Mecca and between Mecca and Riyadh. Formerly, when the camel was the sole means of transport, it took twenty-two days to go from Mecca to Riyadh, but now one can make that journey in three days by motor-bus. The idea of repairing the Hijaz railway, south of the Ma'an station, which had suffered

damage during the war, and placing it under a Moslem Board of Control, is being jointly considered by the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Palestine, and Syria. The project for building a railway from Jeddah to Mecca which was formed by some Indian capitalists three years ago, but later on dropped for lack of funds, might perhaps be taken up by the Saudi Arabian Government itself, or by some other foreign Moslem prince or capitalist.

King Ibn Saud has signed the International Postal Convention, maintained and extended the wireless system of his predecessor, King Hussein, and introduced the telegraph, telephone, and modern system of medicine. Travelling dispensaries are sent to the villages and among the tribes, with doctors to instruct people in simple remedies.

Like a good Moslem, King Ibn Saud has based his rule on the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet and so he invariably consults the *Uleyma* (divines) before introducing any reforms in the kingdom. But although he seeks the advice of these holy men he does not always follow it, because he knows that they are incapable of understanding what is beneficial for their country. When, for example, he asked them whether he should introduce modern scientific inventions like the motor-car, telegraph and telephone, in the kingdom, and they told him that as they were "the devil's inventions" they should not be introduced, he ignored their advice and introduced them. In the same way and for more or less the same reason he takes no notice of their disapproval of his friendship for a non-Moslem country like England, or their protests against taxes on the pilgrims and tobacco. But when their criticisms affect him personally, and not the welfare of the country, then he is quite deferential to them. So, also, when six years ago they said that the celebration of the anniversary of his accession to the throne of the Hijaz was "an unnecessary innovation," he at once gave orders that it should not be celebrated any more.

He has introduced the modern system of education in his kingdom. In 1926 he created his Ministry of Public Instruction and appointed Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, the present Saudi Arabian Minister in London, as its head. The Sheikh has established schools in all towns and in some of the larger villages where religious education is combined with a study of Arabic, general and Arab history, geography, mathematics,

and elementary science. And religious education does not now consist in merely learning the Koran and other religious books by heart as it used to do in the past, but in applying them to life. A technical school, where carpet-weaving, shoe-making, carpentry, and other trades are taught, and two girls' schools, where, besides the three R's, students learn domestic science and nursing, have also been established at Mecca.

The Bedouin are encouraged to take to agriculture and modern agricultural and irrigation machinery is imported by the Government from abroad for their benefit. In order to develop the mineral resources of the country, the King has engaged a number of Western experts, in spite of the protests of his subjects and of other Mohammedans in the outside world. Two years ago a concession to exploit all the mineral resources of the Hijaz, except oil, was granted to an Anglo-American company, called the Saoudi Arabian Mining Syndicate; and the concession to exploit oil has been given to the Standard Oil Company of California. More recently the Iraq Petroleum Company has been given a concession for sixty years to exploit oil along the entire Red Sea Coast from Transjordan to Yemen, including the Farsan Islands but excluding Mecca and Medina. The concession given to the Standard Oil Company of California is for Hasa only. The project for starting a bank at Jeddah, which was dropped by the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi two years ago, might perhaps be taken up by some other rich Mohammedan.

A great deal has been done for the comfort of the pilgrims upon whom depends the main revenue of the kingdom. Motor-cars are now available for them at Jeddah and the charges for these as well as for the camels have been fixed so as to prevent overcharging. The sanitation of Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, and Yanbu—the four cities with which the pilgrims are most concerned—has been greatly improved and their water-supply extended. All pilgrims are obliged to produce a certificate of good health, to boil their drinking water, vaccinate against small-pox, and inoculate against cholera. They are allowed to carry umbrellas, a boon for which they cannot be too thankful in that land of torrid heat. Many new wells have been sunk, and shelters, with supplies of fresh water and medical attendance, erected on the dusty road to Mount Arafat. Hospitals, with from 50 to 300 beds, and staffed

with properly qualified doctors, have been built in the pilgrimage area. The long sea-voyage for the pilgrims from Iraq and India is being replaced by a much shorter land journey by motor-bus from Nejed to Medina. The rents of houses, rates, and other dues which the pilgrims have to pay for protection and assistance have been fixed and the right of the Harb tribe to levy duties on the pilgrims has been annulled. And on arriving at his port of destination the pilgrim is met by a guide who sees him through the performance of his religious ceremonial as well as his business affairs.

The army has been greatly improved and an air force brought into being. To create the air-sense in his people the King has established an air club at Taif.

When King Ibn Saud seized Mecca and was proclaimed King of the Hijaz, the majority of Mohammedans outside Arabia were displeased because they thought that he would be intolerant and unprogressive in every way. But they have been agreeably surprised to find that they were mistaken. He is most tolerant to the non-Wahabis and allows them to drink coffee and smoke tobacco. Nor are any more religious buildings destroyed or desecrated at Mecca as they were at the time when he captured the city in 1926. He has set up Committees of Good Morals at Mecca and Medina to suppress certain vices and also to prevent the custodians of the saints' tombs from fleecing people by selling them charms and talismans. These Committees also encourage the inhabitants to keep the streets of their cities clean, pave broken roadways, and repair drainage.

It may be asked: "Will the progress initiated by King Ibn Saud continue after his death? Will not the tribes—who are at present held in check by his iron hand—start fighting one another as soon as he is dead and plunge the country into its age-old anarchy and chaos?" The answer is: "The Emir Saud, who will succeed his father, is a strong and progressive type of man. He has visited Europe and seen with his own eyes how progress is achieved. He will therefore naturally do his best to continue his father's policy, suppress all tribal warfare, and introduce more modern ideas and institutions in the country. And he will succeed because the more influential and intellectual section of his people will support him heart and soul."

VASUDEO B. METTA.

FIRST BY FRICTION, THEN BY RUST.

The mind of Lambert was a machine wasted first by friction, then by rust.—WHITAKER, *History of Craven*.

IT is always fascinating to speculate on the reason for a man's most important choices in life, particularly those of a man of action. The reason is sometimes a woman, and never more often was it so than among the leaders of the English Commonwealth party. Cromwell, Monck, Lambert, Ireton—to name but four, each were strongly influenced by women. Cromwell owed much to his mother; Ireton to his wife, who was Cromwell's daughter Bridget, while Monck's royalist Nan led him upwards to a ducal coronet, and Lambert's downward to exile in Guernsey.

John Lambert's life was a tragedy which has never yet been adequately recorded. The face which looks out upon the world from Walker's picture in the National Portrait Gallery is a memorable one—sensitive, graceful, attractive, above all, ambitious: very different from the solid complacency of Monck, his constant and successful rival. Lambert was a gentleman of Yorkshire, "well born," as the historian of Craven records, "well bred, little tinctured with fanaticism, of a competent fortune, an excellent understanding, and even an elegant taste": on the face of it a potential cavalier. His home was at Calton Hall, a house in Kirkby Malham in the West Riding, and he was intended originally for a lawyer, although his studies appear to have been slight. He was born in 1619.

He was only twenty years old when he married Frances Lister, the daughter of a neighbouring squire, Sir Thomas Lister of Thornton in Craven, and it was through his wife that his decision arose to take the side of Parliament. Frances had a great friendship for the Assheton family, who for many years had been wrangling with Charles the First's most trusted ecclesiast, Laud, who wished to break their lease of a valuable rectory. It is clear that Lambert shared his wife's antipathy to Laud, and at the very outbreak of the Civil War he became a captain of horse in the army of Ferdinando, Lord Fairfax, father of the greater soldier "Black Tom."

From the first, Lambert proved himself an excellent, brave and popular soldier. He served with distinction at the siege of Hull, at Nantwich—where Monck, then a royalist,

was taken prisoner—at Bradford, and at Marston Moor, where, although his own cavalry were routed by a charge of Lord Goring's royalists, he himself, with "Black Tom" and five or six troops, cut his way through the enemy and joined the victorious left wing under Cromwell. From Marston Moor until the time of the Commonwealth Lambert's fortunes rose steadily, until he became one of the most powerful leaders in the army. His "subtle and working brain" was behind Ireton in his many schemes for making the soldiers the dominant factor in the settlement of the kingdom. He became commander of the army of the north; served with valour at Preston and Dunbar—where he and Monck, the latter now a Parliament man, were Cromwell's ablest lieutenants—and in 1651 at Worcester, besides lesser fights.

The war over, Lambert was handsomely rewarded by Parliament, one thousand pounds a year being settled upon him. He was offered the post of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. For this dignity he is said to have laid out "five thousand pounds for his own particular equipage," but as Parliament actually abolished the title of Deputy in 1652, and as Lambert was dissatisfied with any lesser office, he never crossed to Dublin, remaining in England as President of the Council of officers of the Army. Honours still fell thick upon him. He was principal among those who offered Cromwell the Protectorship, sat in his Council of State, was styled "my Lord Lambert"—even Pepys refers to his wife as Lady Lambert long after the Restoration—was made Major-General, and a Lord of the Cinque Ports.

His quarrel with Cromwell, inevitable perhaps with so ambitious a man, arose over the question of kingship. Although prepared to suggest the assumption by Cromwell of the sovereign title, "to try him," he opposed the measure when it was actually raised in Parliament: for "no sooner did he perceive his willingness to have the crown," says Cromwell's biographer, Mark Noble, "than he became a malcontent, refusing to take the oath to be true and faithful to his highness." Cromwell resented Lambert's attitude, deprived him of many of his places, and allowed him to retire to his house at Wimbledon, where for the latter part of the Protectorship he lived in obscurity, devoting himself to horticulture and painting, for both of which he had a talent. "It must have been a bitter pill," says Noble, "as he lost

his pay as a colonel of a regiment of horse, and another of foot, as major-general of the army, and ten pounds a day as a general, besides his salary as president of the privy council and Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports : but to keep him from revolting, he was allowed two thousand pounds per annum." Towards the end of his life Cromwell made some attempt at a reconciliation, received Lambert in London, and made much of him, while his wife, who is said to have had a partiality for the Protector, was equally well received. "Cromwell fell on his neck," runs a contemporary account, "kissed him, inquired of dear Johnny for his jewel (so he calls Mrs. Lambert) and for all his children by name." Nor had he long to wait for further opportunity of advancement. He had retained a strong if secret following in the army, and in 1658, upon Oliver's death, fortune made him her deepest curtsy.

In England, when Cromwell had gone, Lambert had no rival in ambition and ability. "I wish Lambert were dead," wrote a royalist agent, "for I find the army much devoted to him, but I cannot perceive that he is in any way to be reconciled to the King. So that 'tis no small danger that his reputation with the Army may thrust Dick Cromwell out of the saddle and yet not help the King into it." The speculation was accurate. Although Lambert gave an initial lip-service to the Protector's son, Richard, he was soon restored to his former offices, and with his tool Fleetwood quickly dominated the councils of the army. The highest power was within his grasp : the dreams of a lifetime looked now as if they could be fulfilled. Frances Lambert might yet be the first lady in England.

Actually, the country was seething with royalist discontent, but the one serious outbreak, the rising by Sir George Booth and Lord Derby in the north midlands, was suppressed at a single blow by Lambert and a few picked regiments. Booth's rising was so farcical and so boldly countered that the leader himself escaped from the field of action disguised as a woman, only to be captured without a struggle and confined to the Tower. Lambert's position appeared impregnable ; so impregnable that over-confidence led him into a series of errors so grave that the rest of his life presents a decline as astonishing as it was rapid. First he coerced the Parliament to his will (true to the Cromwellian tradition) by setting the army in opposition to them, and putting a force upon them ;

he then called upon Monck, who for some years had shown himself a fine governor of Scotland, to support the military party. Monck's reply was a thunderbolt, the possible force of which Lambert had completely overlooked. Monck had always disliked Lambert, with the dislike of the professional soldier for the successful amateur. Now at last was his chance to show who was the better strategist. Monck declared himself a faithful servant not of the army but of Parliament, whose commission he held, and he backed his words by securing Scotland behind him, and by moving a picked force to Coldstream, where, in the bitter winter of 1659, his men waited for Lambert's English forces to dissolve, before they began their triumphal march to London through the snow.

Monck's waiting game was right. His own treasury was full ; Lambert's men, who now began to advance north, were at free quarters, were unpaid, and were highly unpopular. They dissolved. Monck began his march from the Border on New Year's Day, 1660, and met with nothing more alarming in his progress southward than the cheers of the villagers as the disciplined ranks of his men passed by, the ringing of bells, and deputations in every town praying for the summoning of a Free Parliament. At Newcastle Monck met the City Sword-Bearer, who pressed him to use his influence to restore the London members. At York the aged Fairfax promised the support of Yorkshire for a free election, and in this city too he found the remnants of Lambert's men, their leader having vanished. They were promptly re-enlisted.

Monck reached London to perceive himself virtually master of England. Knowing Lambert to be his most powerful rival in the army, since Fleetwood's men had "spit in his face," Monck procured an order from the Rump Parliament for Lambert to surrender himself upon surety ; and as he was not able to comply with the condition of a bond of twenty thousand pounds, he was confined to the Tower. Pepys, as so often, had a pertinent comment. In his *Diary* under March 7th-8th, 1659/60 he wrote : "My Lord did seem to wonder much why Lambert was so willing to be put into the Tower, and thinks he has some design in it ; but I think he is so poor that he cannot use his liberty for debts, if he were at liberty ; and so it is good and better for him to be there, than any where else."

If confinement had its uses for the prisoner himself, it was essential for Monck to keep Lambert harmless. Monck's settlement of the country; the free election; and the secret negotiations with the exiled King—all demanded freedom from disturbance. But Lambert had good friends, and they were active. Of them the staunchest was one Slingsby Bethell, who was hard at work raising money and support for another move. He had almost succeeded in raising enough when, on April 11th, there came the news that Lambert had escaped. This was accomplished with the aid of his laundress, who impersonated him while the warder was going his rounds by night. Lambert slipped from a window by a silken rope, said to have been made for him by a lady, and found his way down the river in the small boat which two friends had in readiness for him. He was quick to raise men, but Monck, thoroughly alarmed, and with the King's Commission now in his pocket, was even quicker. Monck sent Colonel Richard Ingoldsby against Lambert from Suffolk, and by a series of forced marches Ingoldsby intercepted the rebels near Daventry. When the two forces met, Lambert's men were half-hearted as well as outnumbered. Devoted to their old leader, they yet knew well the general feeling in the country, and knew that their revolt was doomed. Troops began to desert to Ingoldsby, scarcely any shots were fired, and on April 22nd Lambert was again a prisoner. What might have been the outbreak of a new civil war ended in farce.

Poor Lambert actually attempted to fly the field, but Ingoldsby, better mounted, overtook him, and threatened to shoot. Lambert reined his horse. "Pray, my lord," he implored, "let me escape; what good will my life or perpetual imprisonment do you?" Ingoldsby was inexorable, for Monck's orders were not ambiguous. Lambert made one last attempt to gain Ingoldsby's sympathy by offering to help restore the régime of Richard Cromwell, Ingoldsby's kinsman. Knowing the part Lambert had taken during the interregnum, Ingoldsby smiled, and Lambert, his spirit gone, was taken back to London. As he passed Tyburn, he heard the assembled forces drawn up near that place shouting for Monck and the King. His own designs and the hopes of his wife were for ever shattered.

Lambert had always been a dangerous as well as an able man, and it was scarcely surprising that he should have

suffered severely at the hands of the new Royalist Parliament. Although he was not present at the trial of the King—"through cunning or his own good fortune, he commanded at the siege of Pontefract during the time of the King's trial," Whitaker acidly records—he was eventually excepted from the Act of Indemnity, and stood his trial on June 9th, 1661. In striking contrast to the fiery, unrepentant and courageous republican Vane, Lambert's deportment was so meek at this trial that he escaped lightly. He pleaded ignorance of the real intentions of Booth and Monck to restore the King, protested his loyalty, and was rewarded by the lighter sentence of perpetual confinement, to be suffered in the Isle of Guernsey. Even escaping death, he may be accounted unfortunate. Unlike Monck, unlike even Ingoldsby, who was a regicide, he had refused secret negotiation with the royalists, in the natural hope that he had more to gain by adhering to republican principles. "Had he accepted his majesty's proposal sent by Lord Halton just preceding the restoration," says Noble, "he would have secured a pardon, and received an ample reward." Even higher honours were at one time offered by the royalists, when it was feared that Lambert would make himself dictator. Lord Mordaunt proposed a match between the Duke of York and Lambert's daughter, while Lord Halton suggested that the King should marry her himself! His ambition, always stronger than his discretion, had betrayed him completely at last, though his conduct had more nobility perhaps than that either of the dark and superbly subtle Monck or of Ingoldsby, who declared that Cromwell had secured his signature to the King's death-warrant by physical force, and who for his services against Lambert was rewarded with a baronetcy at Charles's coronation!

After 1661 Lambert disappears from history, save for an occasional sad glimpse. He was taken to Guernsey, where once again he employed his enforced idleness with horticulture—the King had indeed chosen well for him—"collecting the finest flowers that could be procured, and superintending the management of them." While in Guernsey he is said to have refused tempting offers for his services made by Louis XIV; but the history of his life in the island is so scanty that Whitaker records that enquiries made ninety years after his death revealed no tradition whatever of his life and dwelling.

Lord Hatton, the Governor, was empowered to give him "Such liberty and indulgence within the precincts of the island as will consist with the liberty of his person." Between the time of the Restoration and of his trial he had already resided in Guernsey, where he had been allowed to take a house for his family. His relations with the Governor were not improved by a clandestine marriage between his daughter and Hatton's son; while in 1666, a plot for his escape having been discovered, he was for a time closely confined. Even now he was not left entirely in peace. Mrs. Aphra Benn wrote a lively play—*The Roundheads, or The Good old Cause*—lampooning his ambitions and, more particularly, those of his wife; while in later years Titus Oates accused him of a part in the Popish plot, though "with so little of an air of truth that even the court was not hardy enough to believe, or pretend to believe it."

It was long believed that Lambert died in Guernsey, but the discovery of *Plimmouth Memories*, collected by James Young in 1684, and unused until the nineteenth century, showed the following entries concerning the Island of St. Nicholas, or Drake's Island, near the entrance to Plymouth Harbour: "1667. Lambert the arch-rebel brought to this island . . . 1683. Easter Day. Lambert that olde rebell dyed this winter on Plimmouth Island where he had been prisoner fifteen years and more." Poor Lambert, his high ambitions reduced to the survey of a little island! Even with the consolation of his flowers and of his paintings, which were good, according to contemporary judgment, but of which there is now no trace, his mind and his memory decayed some years before his death, and his brilliant, thwarted life ended in the most tragic of all obscurities.

Lambert was not only a good and brave soldier, he was a man of wide interests. He is credited with introducing the Guernsey lily into England, and his taste for art led him to buy "divers rare pictures" that had belonged to Charles the First. Charles the Second granted his ancestral estates to Lord Bellasis in trust for Mrs. Lambert, and they were inherited by his son John, who, like his father, was an "exact limner." John died in 1701, being at his death Sheriff of Yorkshire; so that in two lifetimes the wheel came full circle, and fate was once more kind to the Yorkshire family.

OLIVER WARNER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS.

TWO treaties have lately been signed which dispose of long-standing doubts about the future status of two important waterways in the Middle East—the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. The new Straits Convention was signed at Montreux on July 20th, and the new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed in London on August 26th. Neither the one nor the other can be regarded as wholly satisfactory.

I. *The Straits Convention.*

The Montreux Convention replaces the Lausanne Convention of 1923. The main change it effects is that whereas the chief motive of what was done in 1923 was to secure "free transit and navigation" through the Straits, the chief motive of what was done this year was to safeguard the security of certain particular parties prominently concerned in the use of the Straits. By the Convention, Turkey was empowered to refortify the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and she promptly took steps to do so on the very morrow (July 21st) of the Treaty's signature. The three Black Sea Powers, Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria, were given free use of the Straits in peace time, while the use of the Straits by the other Powers, not bordering upon the Black Sea, was subjected to restrictions. The war-time use of the Straits was regulated with the specific object of serving the interests of those Powers who fulfil their League of Nations obligations. The only really relevant question is whether such a Convention can have any value. Will it in the event of war have the slightest effect upon anything? Japan, of course, made a reservation about the League of Nations before signing it. Neither Germany nor Italy signed it. The only obvious theoretic effect of the Convention was to buttress the Franco-Russian Pact and to establish a Russo-Rumanian-Turkish-French solidarity. But such an achievement bore no discoverable relation to the Sèvres-Lausanne tradition, and it was quite obvious that the new Convention could not have any practical value unless Italy could be induced to accept it. Italy was not even represented at the conference. And Italy's acceptance will clearly

depend upon other more general factors of high diplomacy in Europe. It is obvious that unless Italy be a party to it, any Convention relating to the Eastern Mediterranean must be unsound. If a certain thing depends upon the agreement of certain interested parties, unless those parties be all agreed, there is no agreement at all.

Yet the Convention was duly negotiated. The Conference met on June 22nd as a result of a Turkish request for a revision of the Lausanne Convention. Turkey wanted to fortify the Straits and to make provision for the defence of her own territory by her own means. The 1923 arrangement offered the Covenant of the League of Nations as Turkey's only defence: an arrangement no longer satisfactory to Turkey. Before the Conference met, Mr. Rushdi Aras, the Turkish Foreign Minister, had prepared a new draft Convention, in which the chief changes proposed were that Turkey should be allowed to fortify and garrison the Straits; that not more than 28,000 tons of war vessels belonging to States not bordering upon the Black Sea should be allowed within the Black Sea at one time, nor should be allowed to stay there for more than fifteen days; that the Straits be closed to aircraft, civil or military; that the four-Power guarantee of Britain, France, Italy and Japan to defend the Straits against attack should lapse; and that the Black Sea States should be allowed by Turkey to send one of their existing vessels of not more than 25,000 tons through the Straits into the Mediterranean.

In the discussion of the draft, Lord Stanhope, for Great Britain, agreed that the conditions had changed since 1923 and that Turkey should be allowed to fortify the Straits provided an agreed Convention on the general problem could be negotiated. Mr. Litvinov claimed the right for Russia to send as many ships as she chose to send from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and argued that free passage should be safeguarded so that, if the need arose, Russia could carry out her obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations. M. Paul-Boncour, for France, enthusiastically seconded Mr. Litvinov's contention, and even added to it by stipulating free passage not only for ships engaged in League of Nations work, but for those engaged in upholding any regional pact concluded within the framework of the League. A Franco-Russian bloc was thus at once established on the

twin basis of the Franco-Russian Pact and the very League Covenant which France had only lately been reluctant to carry out. In his present exuberance M. Paul-Boncour even claimed that in the event of war those Powers which were engaged in fulfilling Geneva obligations should have the right either to restrict or to extend the principle of free passage according as their plans might demand. Thereupon Mr. Litvinov obligingly proposed that all belligerent naval forces should be totally excluded from the Black Sea unless they were engaged on League of Nations work: a proposal which M. Paul-Boncour at once supported. We were thus given the spectacle of Russia and France attempting in all solemnity by means of an arrangement written on paper to exclude German and Italian ships from the Black Sea in the event of war. At that point (June 25th) the Conference adjourned for the period of the League Assembly which had been called to face the music of the League's sanctionist policy in the matter of Italy.

On July 4th a British counter draft of a Convention was circulated. It was called a "new version" of the Turkish draft. Its main new proposal was that instead of 28,000 tons as the limit for foreign naval forces allowed at one time in the Black Sea, there should be a sliding scale, subject to a maximum of 45,000 tons, to become effective if and when the strength of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea were increased by 10 per cent. Russia protested both that the new limit of 45,000 tons was too much, and that the sliding scale should not operate until the Russian increase amounted to 30 per cent. (instead of 10 per cent.). The parties having decided to make certain minor concessions in order to gain their substantial points, the text of a new Convention was agreed on July 16th. It was formally adopted on July 18th by all the parties to the Conference, namely by Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Russia and Turkey.

Its chief provisions are these. Turkey is authorised to refortify the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The Straits are left open to commercial vessels, but the war vessels of external Powers are subjected to restrictions in number and in size. In peace time, except for "fleet auxiliaries specifically constructed for the transport of combustibles, whether liquid or solid," any foreign Power is permitted by itself to send through the Straits in daytime and after a week's notice a force

consisting of "light surface vessels, small war vessels and fleet auxiliaries" up to a maximum of nine vessels and 15,000 tons. But such a force is not to include vessels of more than 10,000 tons or carrying guns of more than eight-inch calibre, or submarines or military aircraft. External war vessels are not allowed to concentrate in the Black Sea to a greater aggregate tonnage than 30,000 unless and until the Russian Black Sea Fleet be increased by 10,000 tons over its existing strength, in which contingency the aggregate tonnage of external vessels shall be allowed to increase *pari passu* to a maximum of 45,000 tons; and the maximum stay is to be three weeks. Humour being seldom absent, consciously or unconsciously, mostly unconsciously, from diplomatic work, it is provided that external Powers may send an additional 8,000 tons into the Black Sea, if Turkey agrees, for "humanitarian" purposes. In war time and in the event of Turkey being neutral, the Straits are to be completely closed to the passage of belligerent ships except those engaged in missions ordered by the League of Nations against an aggressor, or alternatively, in the event of the League having failed to order such missions, engaged in assisting a victim of aggression by virtue of "a mutual assistance pact engaging Turkey which had been concluded within the framework of the League Covenant, registered and published in conformity with Article 18." In such an event the belligerent vessels of the Black Sea Powers cut off from their base are to be allowed to return. In the event of war and of Turkey being a belligerent, Turkey is given full discretion to close the Straits. She is given the like discretion in the event of her reaching the decision that she is menaced by war, provided only that she must revoke the measures she takes in the event of the League Council by a two-thirds majority deciding that her fears are groundless and in the event of a majority of the signatories of the present Convention agreeing with the League Council's view. For the rest the Black Sea Powers, Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria, retain their right in peace time to send their warships out from the Black Sea without restriction; the international commission is abolished and its powers transferred to Turkey; the Convention is left open for the signature of any Power signatory to the Lausanne Treaty; and the duration of the new Convention is fixed at twenty years.

The Convention was signed on July 20th, when Mr. Litvinov, having in mind the outburst of German indignation over the event, declared murderously that the Convention "dealt the first crushing blow against those who sought the supremacy of brute force." Germany's unquiet interest in the event was explained—not that a little disquiet would do Germany much harm—by the patent fact that the main result of the Conference was that France, Russia and Rumania had succeeded in buttressing their own particular arrangements for mutual assistance against aggression, and that the Franco-Russian Pact had been fortified. Yet it must be regarded as odd that any satisfaction could thereby be felt in Paris or in Moscow. The mere fact that neither Germany nor Italy signed the Convention surely took away any value that the Convention might otherwise have had. Is it not obvious that Germany, being neither bound by the Convention, nor disposed to like it, will not in an emergency be in the least affected by it? There was also something just a little unconvincing in the virtual subordination of the Convention to the Covenant of the League of Nations, although that circumstance in its turn made little practical difference to the prospect.

II. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

The Treaty of Alliance signed in the Locarno Room of the Foreign Office on August 26th was described by Mr. Eden on that occasion as the "successful conclusion of the efforts of the last sixteen years to reach a satisfactory solution of the problems inherent in Anglo-Egyptian relations." In this case also it is not easy to be cheerful over the result. The position of Egypt is such that it constitutes a permanent challenge to the imperialist Powers. The Suez Canal is so important a waterway that it is bound to be the object of constant competitive ambition. Since 1869, when the Canal was opened, it has been the source of endless diplomatic concern. It is not surprising that it was occupied by British military forces as long ago as 1882. Even after 1888, when the Suez Canal Convention was signed by nine European and Near Eastern Powers (including Great Britain) the British Navy has never been far from the spot. The first sentence of Article I of that Convention clearly and simply stated that "the Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time

of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag," and the same Article made the specific pledge that "the Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade." When the Great War started, the British Navy, despite the Suez Canal Convention, prevented every ship from approaching the Canal from either end. When the Turkish forces threatened the "safety" of the Canal, the British Navy wholly closed it. To be sure, the British position has been correct enough. Though Great Britain signed the Convention in 1888 she postponed the ratification of it for the period of the British occupation of Egypt. Egypt has had the status of an independent sovereign state since 10 p.m. on March 16th, 1922. But British forces have never been absent from Egyptian soil. In the past Great Britain has, in fact, controlled Egypt and the Canal. In the future Egypt and the Canal will no doubt belong in effect either to Great Britain or to Italy. The only practical interest of the recent Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is the effect it will have on safeguarding British control of Egypt.

The main provisions of the Treaty may be summarised as follows :

1. *Alliance between the two countries.* The Treaty terminates the military occupation of Egypt by British forces (Article 1) and establishes an alliance between the two countries (Article 4). It continues for a period of twenty years, after which if either party so request, both parties will negotiate with a view to revising its terms by agreement in the light of the then existing circumstances. (Negotiations for revision may, if both parties wish it, be entered into at any time after ten years.) Any revision must provide for the continuation of the alliance in accordance with the principles contained in those articles of the present Treaty defining the scope of the alliance (Article 16). These principles are as follows : Neither party will adopt an attitude or conclude a treaty inconsistent with the alliance (Article 5). They will consult each other with a view to peaceful settlement of any dispute with a third State threatening a risk of rupture with that State (Article 6). In the event of either party being engaged in war the other will come to its aid as an ally subject to its obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Pact of Paris (Article 7, paragraph 1, and Article 10). It is provided in advance that the form which Egypt's assistance

to the British Government is to take will be as follows : In the event of war, imminent menace of war or an apprehended international emergency, Egypt will accord all the facilities in its power to the United Kingdom, these facilities and this assistance including the use of Egyptian ports, aerodromes, means of communication and all necessary administrative and legislative measures including the establishment of martial law and an effective censorship (Article 7, paragraph 2). Among these facilities will be included facilities for the sending of British forces or reinforcements (Agreed Minute, point i).

2. *Protection of the Suez Canal.* Whilst the Suez Canal is an integral part of Egypt, it is stated by the parties to be a universal means of communication and an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire (Article 8, paragraph 1). With a view to ensuring in collaboration with the Egyptian forces the defence of the Canal, Britain is authorised by Egypt to maintain in a zone on the Suez Canal forces not exceeding 10,000 land forces, and air forces not exceeding 400 pilots (Annex to Article 8, paragraph 1), until such time as the two parties agree that the Egyptian Army is capable of ensuring by its own resources the proper and entire security of navigation in the Canal. (These numbers may, however, be increased in the event of war, menace of war, or apprehended international emergency (Article 7 and Annex to Article 8, paragraph 1).

The Egyptian Government will build in the Canal Zone the additional barracks required for the British troops up to the number indicated above with full amenities and an emergency water supply, according to the requirements of the British Government (Annex to Article 8, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5). They will also construct roads, the most important of which are to be that across the Delta from the Canal Zone to Alexandria and that from the Canal Zone to Cairo, and they will improve the railway facilities in the Canal Zone (Annex to Article 8, paragraph 6).

When this work has been carried out to the satisfaction of both parties (an arbitral board will be set up to decide disputes—Annex to Article 8, paragraph 9) His Majesty's forces in Egypt other than those already stationed on the Canal will be withdrawn to the Canal Zone. The forces in Alexandria will remain in their present position for a period not exceeding eight years.

3. *Other Military Provisions.* The British air forces are permitted to fly wherever they consider it necessary for purposes of training, reciprocal treatment being accorded to Egyptian air forces in British territories (Annex to Article 8, paragraph 13), but populated areas will be flown over only when necessity so demands (Agreed Minute, point x). Adequate landing grounds and seaplane anchorages will be provided for the British air forces in Egyptian territory and waters, and additional ones will be furnished if the British authorities consider this to be necessary for allied requirements (Annex to Article 8, paragraph 14).

While British personnel at present with the Egyptian army will be withdrawn, the Egyptian Government in the interests of the alliance will avail themselves of the advice of a British Military Mission in order to perfect the training of the Egyptian Army and Air Force. The British Government undertake to provide appropriate training in the United Kingdom for such personnel of the Egyptian forces as the Egyptian Government may wish to send. The armaments and equipment of the Egyptian forces will not differ in type from those of the British forces (Third note attached to the Treaty).

4. *Sudan.* The administration of the Sudan will continue to be that resulting from the Condominium Agreement of 1899. It is agreed that the primary aim of the administration must be the welfare of the Sudanese; the parties reserve liberty to conclude new conventions regarding the Sudan in the future. The question of the sovereignty of the Sudan is not prejudiced by the Treaty (Article 11, paragraph 1).

The appointments and promotions of officials in the Sudan remain vested in the Governor-General. Where no qualified Sudanese are available the Governor-General will select suitable candidates of British and Egyptian nationality when making new appointments (Article 11, paragraph 2). The appointment of Egyptian nationals must be governed by the number of suitable vacancies at the time of their occurrence, and the qualifications of the candidates. Promotion will be determined irrespective of nationality up to any rank by selection, in accordance with individual merits (Agreed Minute, point xv).

In addition to Sudanese troops, British and Egyptian troops will be placed at the disposal of the Governor-General for the

defence of the Sudan (Article 11, paragraph 3) and the Governor-General will give immediate consideration, in consultation with an Egyptian military officer of high rank who will be sent to the Sudan, to the question of the number of Egyptian troops required, and the places where they will be stationed (Agreed Minute, point xvi).

5. *Security of foreigners and position of foreign officials.* While the British Government recognise that the responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt devolves exclusively upon the Egyptian Government, the Egyptian Government undertake that they will ensure the fulfilment of their obligations in this respect (Article 12).

The European Bureau of the Public Security Department will disappear on the ratification of the Treaty. But for a further five years a European element will be retained in the Egyptian city police. The city police will remain for the same period under the command of British officers. The services of one-fifth of the European police officials will be dispensed with annually (second note attached to Treaty).

When engaging foreign experts the Egyptian Government will generally prefer British subjects with the necessary qualifications (second note attached to Treaty).

6. *Capitulations.* The British Government recognise that the capitulatory régime is no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times and the present state of Egypt (Article 13). They agree, therefore, to support Egypt in an immediate approach to the other Powers with capitulatory rights with a view to agreement on the following points: (i) Disappearance of the existing restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty in the matter of the application of Egyptian legislation (including financial legislation) to foreigners; (ii) a transitional régime for a reasonable and not unduly prolonged period (to be fixed by agreement) during which the mixed tribunals will remain and will exercise besides their present judicial jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Consular courts, which will be transferred to them. At the end of this period the Egyptian Government will be free to dispense with the mixed tribunals (Annex to Article 13, paragraph 1).

7. *Remaining clauses.* The two parties will each be represented in the capital of the other by an Ambassador (Article 2), and as His Majesty the King and Emperor will be the first foreign sovereign to be represented in Egypt by an

Ambassador, British Ambassadors will be considered senior to other foreign diplomatic representatives in that country (first note annexed to Treaty).

Egypt will apply for membership of the League of Nations, and her application will be supported by His Majesty's Government on the conditions prescribed by Article 1 of the Covenant (Article 3).

The rights and obligations of both parties under the Covenant or the Pact of Paris are not prejudiced by the Treaty (Article 10).

Any difference regarding the application or interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty which the parties cannot settle by direct negotiations will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the League Covenant (Article 15).

III. *Palestine and the Mandate.*

Increased discontent and disorder in Palestine have again drawn attention to Great Britain's unfortunate obligations under the mandatory system. For nearly five months the British Government has been involved in a virtual state of war with the Arab malcontents. To argue that British action is the enforcement of the Mandate is to argue an absurdity. What is the Mandate? We are pledged to find a home for the Jews in Palestine. We are not pledged to give to the Jews a preponderant position in Palestine. On the other hand, it is part of our responsibility not to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the Arabs. The terms of the Mandate itself are difficult because they do not specify the practical safeguards for Arab rights. The British Government has tried, with no doubt the best intentions, to combine the best of the Conservative with the best of the Liberal tradition. It has not in the event succeeded. Palestine is not like Egypt. In Egypt there is a clear British interest. In Palestine it is clearly not a British interest to antagonise the Arabs for the sake of the Jews. Other things being equal, common sense demands that government shall not give way to disorder. One of the "other things" is the cause of the disorder. If there be some justifiable grievance, then satisfaction of that grievance is of more immediate importance than the repression of the disorder that results from it.

On September 2nd last the British Cabinet was again

constrained to consider the position resulting from the continued strike and the continued terrorism. It was decided to send out to Palestine a whole army division to quell the disturbance. The new position amounts to one of martial law, whether formally declared or not. But martial law cannot go on for ever. It even creates the danger that when it is withdrawn the position will be still weaker. There is not even the excuse that the emergency is in any sense new. It is at least seven years old. The present outbreaks are merely worse than those of seven years ago. What else could be expected? The same cause, persisting, has gathered momentum. It is a source of deep regret to many people that the Royal Commission did not go out to Palestine before the expeditionary division went out. It is clearly arguable that the defective Mandate itself should be promptly remedied by an intelligent recognition of the relative rights and importance of Jew and Arab. Immigration is the crux. Merely to suspend immigration is useless, except as a stepping-stone to a real settlement. It seems unreasonable to expect peace in Palestine until the principle be put into operation that the Jewish element must not exceed (say) one-third of the whole population. The annual rate of immigration could be adjusted accordingly. To distort the Mandate into an instrument for enabling the Jews to oust the Arabs from most of Palestine is to ask for trouble that will run throughout the world of Islam. Arab unrest is as old as the Balfour Declaration. The intensified rate of Jewish immigration from Poland and Germany during the past few years has had the mischievous effect of presenting to the Arabs the challenge of Zionist supremacy in Palestine. The main body of immigrants have been Polish Jews, who are not the best type of Jews.

How can Arab rights, civil or religious, be safeguarded if the Arabs be displaced from the control of their own country? The Islamic countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East, extending to the eighty million Moslems in India, would no doubt be stirred to their depth if they were presented with the spectacle of British force taking sides against their co-religionists in Palestine. Zionism has done good in Palestine, and may do more, if common sense prevail. It is an equal British and Jewish interest that the Arabs be vouchsafed

what is their right. Merely to accept issue with the discontented Arabs and to be jockeyed thereby into the position of fighting on behalf of Jewish claims which go beyond the Mandate, seems to be an unnecessary perversity on the part of the British Government.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

September 15th, 1936.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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RUSSIA BEFORE THE WAR.*

The last of the Romanoffs, like Charles I and Marie Antoinette, dug his own grave. That is the deepest impression left by the Memoirs of Count Kokovtsoff, Russian Minister of Finance 1904-14, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers 1911-14. Writing in old age during the quiet years of exile in Paris, the author enables us to visualise once more the melancholy spectacle of a good man struggling with adversity. Several of the leading Ministers of Nicholas II, among them Witte, Iswolsky, Sazonoff, Rosen, Taube, have told their tale; but none of them has written with such authority and in so much detail about domestic politics. Kokovtsoff was a moderate Conservative, accepting the traditional system of dynastic autocracy, though prepared to work with the tame third and fourth Dumas. Yet no spokesman of the Left could surpass in severity his implied verdict on the functioning of the machine. It is true that he nowhere passes beyond the bounds of critical narrative to broad political generalisations.

* *Out of my Past*. Memoirs of Count Kokovtsoff. Hoover War Library Publications, No. 6. Oxford University Press. 25s. net.
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But the conclusion is stamped across his pages. Autocracy requires a superman like Frederick the Great to make it work, and supermen, whether good or bad, are very rare. The last of the Tsars loved his country and took his duties seriously enough, but no ruler was ever more tragically unfitted for his task. Behind the façade of Imperial authority we witness an unceasing struggle for power among the servants of the State, a struggle waged not merely by argument but by the most insidious intrigues and the foulest of lies.

Count Kokovtsoff writes modestly of his long services, both in the Ministry of Finance and when he was called to the highest post in the Empire on the murder of Stolypin in 1911. He loved his work, hated corruption, and kept as tight a hold of the purse-strings as he could. This massive volume confirms what we know from other sources, namely that he was the most efficient of the Tsar's servants after the fall of Witte in 1906. But he was never his own master, and Cabinet Government did not exist. Final decisions rested with the ruler, whose judgment was swayed by a hundred influences. The most influential as well as the worst of his counsellors was his wife, to whom the author devotes one of the most interesting of his chapters. Her political philosophy was simple enough—to maintain autocracy unimpaired for the sake of her ailing son. When Rasputin established his nefarious influence at Court, his enemies became her enemies and were marked down for destruction. With a wife in normal health and of sounder judgment, Nicholas might have escaped his terrible end in the cellar at Ekaterinburg. He had no love for "the holy man," but he was unable to stand up against his devoted but neurotic wife. Thus it came about that the best servants of the State, Kokovtsoff among them, were dismissed and replaced by incompetent adventurers and reactionaries.

Every book on the reign of Nicholas II is a gallery of portraits. Kokovtsoff is a narrator, not an artist; but when we have finished we feel that we know his associates better than if he had attempted full-length pictures. Very few of the leading actors on the crowded stage come out well, but there is no doubt which of them came out worst. Witte's ability was recognised by his worst foes, but never have his moral weaknesses been so clearly exposed. His moral sense, declares the author, was completely atrophied, and the terrible sentence is confirmed by the evidence in these pages. In his

unceasing and unavailing struggle to regain power he stuck at nothing, and the story of his lies is a sorry tale. Equally contemptible was the character of Sukhomlinoff, the Minister of War, the most brainless and frivolous of the Tsar's servants, who continually demanded fresh credits for the army and could not spend them when he got his way. Kokovtsoff, though devoted to peace, was as determined to strengthen the national defences as any of his colleagues, and he never opposed military demands. In spite of this complacency Sukhomlinoff endeavoured to hide his notorious inefficiency, and to explain the unpreparedness of the army, by reiterated declarations that the Finance Minister had refused his requests. Yet this contemptible being was retained in office when Kokovtsoff was dismissed at the opening of 1914. He knew that his days were numbered, for the Empress was a foe. The story of the parting interview, when neither could hold back the tears, is vivid and affecting. The ruler must have known that he was doing wrong, for he liked and respected his old collaborator. His two offices were divided, Goremykin, a nerveless old reactionary, becoming Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Bark, an inexperienced official, taking charge of finance. And this was only a few months before Russia's championship of Serbia enlarged an Austro-Serb quarrel into a world war.

Kokovtsoff's narrative of the years following his dismissal is rightly very brief, for he was soon forgotten and could render only minor services to the State. His last interview with his old master in January 1917 filled him with foreboding and grief. "During the year I had not seen him he had become almost unrecognisable. His face had become very thin and hollow and covered with small wrinkles. His eyes, usually of a velvety dark brown, had become quite faded, and wandered aimlessly from object to object." He smiled helplessly, and Kokovtsoff doubted whether he really knew what was happening about him. The revolution came a month later. It was a wonder that it had not come before. The volume ends with the story of the author's imprisonment, release, escape in disguise across the Finnish frontier, and arrival in Paris. Without quite realising it, Kokovtsoff has pronounced condemnation on a system. Even the cruelties of Bolshevik rule cannot make us wish it back.

G. P. G.

CHRISTIAN WORSHIP.*

Fifty years ago, Dr. Andrew M. Fairbairn began his teaching at Oxford, as prospective Head of Mansfield College, the buildings of which were completed in 1889. The Jubilee has been commemorated by a volume of essays on Christian Worship, contributed by a band of distinguished former teachers or students of the College. The volume has been presented to Dr. William B. Selbie, the second Principal of Mansfield, with a Latin inscription, paying tribute to Fairbairn as the founder of the College and to his successor, still happily with us.

For many reasons it is significant and timely that this important occasion should have been used by eminent Congregationalist scholars and leaders to treat of Christian Worship, and their task has been discharged with ability, breadth of view and distinction. The volume opens with an article on the Philosophy of Worship by Dr. A. E. Garvie, and the subsequent essays present successively Biblical, Historical and Contemporary Studies. The first part comprises articles on Old Testament and Jewish Worship, on the Word of God in the New Testament and on the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper as instituted by Christ and as set forth by Apostolic teaching and primitive practice. The second part discusses, in due order, Christian Worship as reflected in ancient liturgies and its development in the Middle Ages, followed by studies of the post-Reformation teaching and practice of Luther, Zwingli, Calvin and the Puritans. The position of the Anglican Church is only treated incidentally, though fairly, and the Methodist Church is left out, perhaps because the writers assume that it has made no independent contribution to the practice of worship and that its theory has oscillated between Anglican and Puritan ideals. The third part deals with the situation at the present time, discussing Psychological Considerations, the Preaching of the Word, Prayer and Praise, and the Sacraments.

It is impossible, within the limits of this brief notice, to call particular attention to the views put forward by the several writers. It must suffice to commend the volume as a whole on the twofold ground of the ability of all the essays, and

* *Christian Worship. Studies in its History and Meaning* by Members of Mansfield College. Oxford University Press. Milford. 12s. 6d. net.

still more, because it shows, in a striking way, the attitude in which typical representatives of the Puritan tradition, while, in the main, upholding that tradition, confront the problems that must arise, if the prospect of Christian Reunion is to be entertained.

The subject of Christian Worship is specially momentous at the present time, for upon the ideals that are embodied in it and the expression that is given to them must depend, not only the health and vigour of the Church and the Churches but the example and appeal that Christians can make to an age, the troubles of which are largely due to the failure of the Spirit of Worship, both in the narrower sense and also in that larger acceptance which is revealed in the mind and teaching of Christ.

A NEW LIFE OF METTERNICH.*

Prince Metternich did not hold the work and personality of Professors in very high esteem, and the Professors find a noble revenge in a passionate discussion of the statesman. This discussion started at the breakdown of the Metternich system. All Austrian defeats and disillusionments seemed to be posthumous failures of Metternich. A profound historical justice was obviously working to bring about these events. Was not the old Chancellor the intellectual father of that curious historical creature Austria, cherishing the pretension of being something apart from Germany and combining with German leadership hegemony in Italy and tutelage over minor Slavonic races? Ottokar Lorenz was the first scholar to re-discover a real statesman, especially fitted to cope with the interests and ambitions of the House of Habsburg. Martin Spahn called Metternich one of the great Master Builders of modern times and ranked him as a Roman Catholic and conservative with Napoleon and Leo XIII. Finally Srbik wrote two large volumes in honour of one of the greatest masters of international policy. Many Austrian and German scholars criticised Srbik's exaggerations, at the same time recognising the value of his research.

A colleague of Srbik, the well-known Professor at the University of Vienna, Dr. Victor Bibl, has just published a

* *Metternich, der Dämon Oesterreichs.* By Victor Bibl. Johannes Günther Verlag. Leipzig und Wien, 1936. 400 pp., with 15 illustrations.

new biography of Metternich, which lays claim to being a final judgment. Life-long study has gone to the making of the book though comparatively few new documents are used. Unfortunately it is a specimen of historical literature which, despite many valuable qualities, is too scholarly for the ordinary reader and too popular for the scholar. The author owes much to the latest English works on the period, especially Professor Webster's books on Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna. It was some years ago my privilege to defend the old Chancellor against the shrewd praise of Srbik. I did not expect to have to defend him a second time against the rather rough criticism of V. Bibl. Was he really the evil spirit of Austria? On the contrary I would say that he created his Austrian Empire, and conserved it with great skill and, for a certain period, with admirable success. He separated Austria from German interests, he sacrificed German political aims and hopes to the idea of the Austrian Empire. He worked against all the progressive spirits of the period, but he did it with the vigour of a cultured and versatile personality. Many of his enemies were obviously right, but unfortunately there were very few of them in any way his equal.

These facts do not justify several of Metternich's great mistakes, but they give the only reasonable interpretation for his success. It is absurd to make him responsible for the failures of Franz Joseph and his ministers. In 1850 Austria enjoyed all the fascinating possibilities of being the leading Central European Power. History knows by what blunders all the advantages of the position were lost. Metternich certainly bears the full responsibility for the events of his own period. In his young days he had paid a visit to England, and there are writers who erroneously try to see in that visit the basis of his political education. He was never able to understand the leading forces of English political life. He sympathised with the Tories, and showed not the slightest understanding for the rising social forces of English society. He never grasped the new idea of social conservatism represented by young Disraeli. In the year of the Centenary of the University of London it might be interesting to quote Metternich's curious notion: "If a university will be founded in London, England will be lost and the world with her." On the other hand, that saying proves the remarkable respect of the Austrian Chancellor for the radical work of modern universities.

I agree with Bibl that Metternich's policy in Italy and Hungary was bad. He is also quite right to put the full responsibility for Austrian home policy on Metternich's shoulders. It would be quite unfair to defend him on this count and to make Kolowrat the villain of the piece. But there are three lines of action taken by Metternich which prove his mastery, if not as a statesman, at least as a diplomat. Firstly, his crafty treatment of Napoleon. Secondly, his manner of dealing with Prussia after 1815. His method of hindering her from playing her historical part in Germany, from inaugurating the necessary alliance with the liberal and national forces in Germany, was really successful; it was cautious, tenacious and cunning. Austrian statesmen after the great crisis of 1848 never showed the same tactical ability. Thirdly, his handling of Russia. It may be that the Russian Emperors gave Metternich an annual allowance. On the whole the history of his financial affairs is very murky. He continued the worst habits of eighteenth-century diplomacy into the middle of the nineteenth. But it cannot be denied that it was a great achievement to transform the vague ideas of European brotherhood preached by the Emperor Alexander into the more sound and efficient system of the Holy Alliance. If one admits that Metternich's policy in the Balkans was too reserved, the agreement of München-Grätz took the right line. This line should never have been abandoned—co-operation with Russia, and, if necessary, a fair division of the Balkan Peninsula into a Russian and an Austrian sphere of influence. The wisdom of that agreement may be understood all the better if one bears in mind the terrible mistakes of Austrian policy during the Crimean War.

VEIT VALENTIN.

* * * * *

DUBLIN UNDER THE GEORGES.*

To have consulted all the contemporary evidence, to have gazed at portraits, to have studied the pamphlets of the eighteenth century—this has clearly been a labour of love. The old prints and portraits, the drawings and engravings have been faithfully reproduced, and the outcome of the joint work of author and publisher is a volume upon which the eyes feast themselves, and scarcely allow the volume to

* *Dublin under the Georges, 1714-1830.* By Constantia Maxwell. Harrap. 12s. 6d.

be closed. We have spent not a little time in the past in poring over the vast collection of Halliday pamphlets, and from these we have mainly taken our ideas of the Dublin Miss Maxwell portrays with such vigour. In no important particular does her description differ from that we have consciously received from these pamphlets and from conversations with such lovers of old Dublin as the late C. Litton Falkiner. As Miss Maxwell lectures in history in Trinity College, we should expect her to feel at home with Addison and Swift, with Berkeley and Burke, with Lord Charlemont, Mrs. Delany, Henry Grattan, Hely Hutchinson. Of course she is intimately acquainted with the *Memoirs* of Sir Jonah Barrington, and realises that they are not to be trusted overmuch. Few men have done so much harm to Ireland in general and to Dublin in particular as Sir Jonah, as by his picturesque and lying *Memoirs* he spread an impression of the stage Irishman that has lingered long in the imagination of the English, and has perpetuated the misunderstandings of the two countries. For novelists of the calibre of Lever and—lower still—of Lover reproduced these impressions, and drove them home to many to whom Sir Jonah Barrington was not even a name. It is a pleasure, therefore, to note that Miss Maxwell discriminately employs Sir Jonah throughout her own lively pages, and after all, truth and a truthful impression are far more important than picturesqueness and the lying that so often accompanies picturesqueness. The author is familiar with the theatre as she is with the Court and the Parliament, nominally independent from 1782 to 1800. Garrick and Mrs. Siddons, Samuel Foote and Tate Wilkinson strutted the boards of the Dublin stage, and we are not likely to forget that Edmund Burke first turned his hand to literature in the enjoyment and the criticism of the plays he saw in the Irish metropolis.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

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THE NOVELS OF ARNOLD BENNETT.*

Mr. J. B. Simons traces the influences which moulded the novelist and provides a valuable summary of contemporary

* *Arnold Bennett and His Novels. A Critical Study.* By J. B. Simons, M.A. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 12s. 6d.

criticism concerning him. Steeped in Bennett's novels and widely acquainted with the work of great novelists, his "critical study" is an appreciation rather than a critique, a garland laid at the feet of his master. To fall under a writer's spell is a requisite for interpreting him, but the critic has also to achieve detachment from that spell. Any adverse or less appreciative estimate of Bennett than his own, Mr. Simons feels bound to combat or minimise, as if recognising that a novelist's limitations impaired appreciation of his achievement. No one, as the author admits, has more enthusiastically discerned that achievement than Mr. J. B. Priestley, who ranges Bennett's creations in that great procession of personages, "which is headed by Hamlet and Falstaff, Uncle Toby and Cleopatra, Becky Sharp and Squire Western, Mr. Pickwick and The Wife of Bath." Yet Mr. Priestley admits "unfortunate limitations"; "a want of values and a certain insensitiveness to the more poetical and mystical states of mind"; and a lack of "philosophic imagination, a quality of mind that is present at their best in Hardy, Meredith, Conrad, but only feebly represented even in Arnold Bennett's greatest work."

The influence of Russian novelists on Bennett's work is over-stressed, although Bennett himself assuredly knew better. As a literary artist and critic he was deeply impressed by the art of the Russian masters, but its informing spirit was too alien for his assimilation. The portrayer of the Five Towns was necessarily immune; and by assimilating French influence rendered those Five Towns immortal. That he lost as well as gained by the Gallic infusion the author does not deny; and emphasises with Mr. Priestley "the literary conscience" which it developed. Bennett's pre-occupation with literary form and the objective function of the novelist saved him from the less exacting standards of journalistic writers, and the distraction of revealing social injustice with a view to its reform. The healthiness of his work and outlook is rightly stressed; he directly described "the realities of life," without unclean or neurotic accompaniment.

As the author shows, he was essentially the *raconteur* and in that lies his abiding power. His tales for all their artistry are told in plain English that exactly conveys his meaning even to the unsophisticated. They chronicle in particular

the lives and exploits of the lower middle class ; the characters are seldom lovable but always vital and arresting ; and the record of their experiences enthralls even the reader who is conscious of not liking it. For the recorder has a rare and miraculous gift : he sees romance in the ordinary ; beauty where its presence is least suspected ; wonder in the daily routine of great cities and ugly industrial towns ; and the vision is irradiated with his humour or rendered sombre by his irony. Bennett himself, as the author points out, explained his own conception of art when he wrote :

To take the common grey things which people know and despise, and without tampering to disclose their epic significance, their essential grandeur, that is realism as distinguished from idealism or romanticism.

Bennett, none the less, thanks to his temperament, inherited the romantic tradition of British novelists. His clerks and shopkeepers and their wives and daughters display the same zest in adventure and power of endurance, but more common sense than romantic predecessors. Blind to perennial sources of life, they devise their code of life's obligations ; deaf to the Christian message, they respect a portion of its ethic. A future generation wishing to know how members of our race lived in industrial England, deprived of their spiritual heritage, will find illumination in Bennett's masterpieces : *The Old Wives' Tale* and *Clayhanger*, the irresistible comedy of *The Card*, and the matchless tragedy of *The Matador of the Five Towns*.

D. P. H.

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ISABELLA OF SPAIN.*

Dr. Alma Wittlin, whose Spanish studies have already borne fruit in several review articles, has now employed them in this able biography of the great Queen who, in some traits and circumstances, was so like our own Elizabeth, so unlike in others. Isabella's psychological development is skillfully traced, beginning with the lessons learnt from her early experiences of exile and suspicion, and it is her reactions to

* *Myself a Goddess*. A new biography of Isabella of Spain. By Alma Wittlin. Translated from the German by Margaret Goldsmith. Ivor Nicholson & Watson. 1936. 15s.

persons and events that are kept before us throughout. There emerges a character of quiet strength and tenacity, of warm and generous affections, with administrative gifts that fitted her for her exceptional position. One notes with admiration the cautious daring she displayed in arranging, while yet a girl, the marriage with Ferdinand of Aragon ; her habitual control, rarely relaxed, of the violent temper hereditary in her family ; her devoted love for her people, heightened by personal contact with them in her travels throughout Castile ; her orderly and economic administration ; her attention to details, such as the commissariat for her army during the long-drawn-out siege of Moorish Granada. In spite of her thrift, however, her Treasury proved, like Elizabeth's, to be in a chronic state of depletion, and Dr. Wittlin shows that it was largely this fact which induced Isabella, gradually and with hesitation, to yield to Torquemada's persuasions, and permit, first, the sale of Indulgences, then the setting up of the Inquisition, and, finally, the expulsion of the Jews. She had been already prepared to mortgage Church property for the benefit of Castile, now the confiscated goods of the victims went to enrich her State funds. But it was at the cost of an indelible stain on the Queen's otherwise noble record. Dr. Wittlin is here scrupulously fair in showing that Isabella was no mere tool in the Dominican's hands, no mere fanatical bigot, although, needless to say, religious motives influenced her strongly, too : this fairness is the more praiseworthy as from several indications one judges the book not to be written from the Catholic standpoint—the description of a crucifix as a “small ornamented idol” is but one of them. One could wish that Isabella were not perpetually dubbed “auburn-haired” ; the intention, no doubt, is to recall her Plantagenet ancestry, but the repetition becomes irritating, and such hair was not unusual in Spain, where there has always been a fair-skinned aristocratic type.

The account of Isabella's relationship, public and private, with Ferdinand is one of the most interesting features of the book. There was something Victorian about it, Castile being the Queen's own patrimony, in the sovereignty of which, for all her wifely submissions, she was determined to remain absolute. The contrast between her concentration on a united Spain and her husband's European outlook is well brought out. The early death of her promising only son and

the madness of the daughter who in consequence became her heiress were terrible blows to her alike as mother and ruler. If the names of "the Catholic Kings," Ferdinand and Isabella, are indissolubly linked, scarcely less are both linked with that of Columbus. The earlier stages of their association are related here, but not the explorer's temporary disgrace and subsequent restoration by the Sovereigns.

The translator is presumably responsible for such curious spellings as Philipp, Alfons, Savanarola, and Otronto, for the use of "Half Moon" for the Crescent, and of "monks" when referring to friars; possibly also for the book's obscure title. Its lack of a map and bibliography is rather surprising. Among the excellent illustrations one may mention the frontispiece portrait of Isabella and the beautiful Renaissance tomb of herself and Ferdinand at Granada.

E. G. S.

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PARNELL.*

The figure of Parnell remains one of absorbing interest and Miss Joan Haslip has produced a sympathetic and valuable biography, composed in her easy and stimulating style which is free from the excesses of sensational writing. She traces with considerable skill the course of his extraordinary career, preserving that balance between his private and public life which is quite essential to any serious appreciation. We have an adequate account of the great Parliamentary tactician, with his hatred of England, haughty, reserved and aloof from his followers for whom he rarely showed friendship or feeling. "He owed his ascendancy to his strength of will and iron self-control which banished every human sentiment and feeling from his public life."

Miss Haslip writes independently and, on a number of points, her conclusions may be questioned. She is disinclined, for example, to accept the common view, most recently supported by Mr. J. L. Garvin, that Parnell in 1881 found imprisonment convenient in avoiding the exposure of his relations with Mrs. O'Shea. After Gladstone's threat of imprisonment, Parnell was, argues Miss Haslip, "bound to make a warlike reply" and hazard arrest. She also considers that

* *Parnell*. By Joan Haslip. Cobden-Sanderson. 15s. net.

for years before the divorce proceedings, Gladstone knew and believed in the liaison. In dealing with *The Times'* onslaught and the subsequent Parnell Commission, the author is highly suspicious of the newspaper's good faith in accepting the famous forged letter as genuine, although the document had been subjected to close expert scrutiny before publication. Her discussion of the Commission is superficial and insufficient. While Miss Haslip portrays Parnell as the autocratic "uncrowned King of Ireland," in many respects she treats him, a little pathetically, as the victim of English political intrigue, of private blackmail and of the dominance of Mrs. O'Shea over a man "singularly austere and pure in his relationships with women." Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Miss Haslip's study is the influence she imparts to Mrs. O'Shea. She it was who inspired the so-called Kilmainham Treaty in 1882 so as to free Parnell to be with her and their dying child. Later "it was she who was directly responsible for the alliance with the Liberals which sapped the independence of the Parnellite party." Finally her counter-charges in the divorce court aggravated his fall.

Miss Haslip has written a somewhat provocative study which merits consideration and is enjoyable to read. The index is inadequate and she has chosen to include numberless quotations without their references.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

A volume of importance to students of economic history and others will be found in *An Historical Geography of England before 1800*,* which is the first substantial work of its kind to be published on England. The "subject-matter is concerned with the reconstruction of past geographies, and aims to provide a sequence of cross-sections taken at successive periods" in the development of England. The work comprises a series of surveys by specialists who deal with successive periods; it is mainly concerned with the existence of conditions within certain limits rather than with questions of cause and effect. Mr. W. G. East, for example, in his able survey of eighteenth-century England, deals with the distribution of population without concern for the causes of its increase. The limits of his subject, however, might have allowed him more discussion of agricultural reform. Similarly, the valuable estimate of the fourteenth century by Dr. R. A. Pelham might have discussed

* Cambridge University Press. 25s. net.

the effect of the Black Death upon the size of the population. But criticisms are small beside the mass of knowledge accumulated and analysed, with the help of maps and diagrams. While the chapters are independently written, bearing their own emphasis and varying according to the character of the particular period and the material available, there is continuous treatment of questions such as the size and distribution of population, the nature and extent of communications, the condition of agriculture, commerce, industry and foreign trade. The first three chapters cover prehistoric South Britain, Roman Britain, and the Anglo-Saxon settlement in contributions respectively by Mr. E. G. Bowen, Mr. E. W. Gilbert, and Dr. S. W. Wooldridge. The editor, Dr. H. C. Darby, is responsible for the period from 1000-1250. The valuable chapters by Dr. R. A. Pelham and Mr. D. T. Williams on English maritime trade in the Middle Ages discuss a subject yet to be written in a comprehensive work. Professor E. G. R. Taylor bases much of his survey of Tudor England on Leland and Camden. Mr. J. N. L. Baker has written a very useful chapter on the seventeenth century. More specialised studies come from Professor Eilert Ekwall on the Scandinavian settlement, and from the editor on the draining of the East Anglian Fens, 1600-1800, while Mr. O. H. K. Spate deals with the growth of London from 1660-1800.

Bertha von Suttner,* by Caroline E. Playne, tells the story of one of the greatest workers for peace that the world has known. A member of the old and illustrious Kinsky family, a daughter of an Austrian Field-Marshal, Bertha married for love and was compelled to earn her living by her pen. Taking war as a matter of course during her early years, she grew in her mature years to regard it not only as a curse but as an evil that could be removed. Her famous novel, *Die Waffen Nieder* ("Down with Arms"), published in 1889, when she was forty-six, made her a celebrity and shaped the rest of her life. Miss Playne's very readable and sympathetic biography, based to some extent on personal knowledge, portrays a woman of considerable intellectual capacity, boundless energy and tender heart. It was fitting that the ex-secretary of Nobel should receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1905. She was fortunate in the moment of her death on the very eve of the world war which wrecked her hopes.

The Lost Historian: A Memoir of Sir Sidney Low,† by Major Desmond Chapman-Huston, preserves the memory of one of the most influential publicists of his time. His biographer laments that he did not find fuller scope for his historical gifts, but most readers will feel that his career was precisely that which suited him best. His most popular and important work, *The Governance of England*, took its place

* Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d.

† John Murray. 12s. 6d.

with Bagehot, Dicey and Anson among the classical interpretations of our constitution. His books on India, Egypt and Italy during the war, like his political history of the Victorian era, were competent if not particularly distinguished achievements. As Editor of the *St. James's Gazette* he won the respect of all his fellow-craftsmen. The supreme interest of his life was the British Empire, which he served with mind and heart. His hero was Milner. Low was a man of wide sympathies and many friends, happy in his work and blessed in both his marriages.

Defender of Democracy: Masaryk Speaks,* by Emil Ludwig, is a record of conversations revised and expanded by Masaryk himself. Taken as a whole the volume is less interesting than the same author's conversations with Mussolini, and less intimate than Capek's talks, a translation of which appeared a year or two ago. Yet the founder of Czechoslovakia is such a great man, as well as such an important historical figure, that we can never hear too much about him. The chief impressions we carry away from these pages are his intellectual independence, his immense range of knowledge, his balance, and his optimism. He believes in human nature and therefore in democracy. He declares himself a theist and finds order in the Universe. He believes in nationality and in the permanence of his State. Like most men of universal culture he is an eclectic, owing much to Plato and other masters, but shaping everything to his own spiritual needs. We hear a good deal about his early life, the war years and the problems of the Presidency; but the chief value of the book lies in the explanation of his attitude to the deepest issues of life and society.

Sir Edward Boyle's Biographical Essays, 1790-1890,† make delightful reading. The volume opens with an elaborate study of Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme*, a book of which everyone has heard and few people have read. It closes with an equally detailed analysis of Goethe's *Italienische Reise*, which is of special interest to readers who have been over the same ground. The shorter pieces deal with Victor Hugo's speeches, Sir John Hawkins's almost unreadable life of Johnson, Paoli the Corsican, Byron's burial, old Samuel Rogers with his bitter tongue, Harriet Martineau with her masculine intellect, and Christina Rossetti. Sir Edward never indulges in purple passages, preferring moderate praise and tempered blame; but each essay is a finished performance. He has read and travelled widely, and we feel ourselves throughout in contact with a thoughtful and observant mind.

The publishers claim that *Nature in Britain*‡ provides a full introduction to our varied fauna and flora, but within the limits of 226 pages

* Ivor Nicholson & Watson. 15s. † Oxford University Press. 3s. 6d.

‡ Batsford. 5s. net.

this is setting the seven contributors an impossible task. Frances Pitt deals with British Mammals in a readable and conscientious survey, in which, however, the Japanese deer, an introduced species, is conspicuous by its absence. She thinks the musk rat has come to stay, and gives us a few delightful glimpses of wild life in Britain. Seton Gordon shows an imaginary foreigner the birds of Scotland and the North of England, and is in his element in the haunts of the Golden Eagle. E. G. Boulenger, writing on Reptile and Amphibian Life, remarks that "the eye that cannot appreciate the beauty of lizards, snakes, frogs, toads and newts must be sadly wanting in æsthetic value." Pond and Stream Life are dealt with by the same writer, and Insects by L. C. Bushby. R. St. Barbe-Baker, Robert Gathorne-Hardy and Edward Gathorne-Hardy have to cram a particularly rich flora into ninety pages. Henry Williamson's Introduction is written in facetious vein; he evidently finds it amusing to poke fun at his own ignorance of natural history. There are 142 illustrations, many of outstanding beauty.

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The Information Papers of Chatham House perform a considerable service in setting out impartially and objectively material necessary to a considered appreciation of current international questions. This is well exemplified in the Paper on *Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1936*,* which sets in an historical perspective the conclusion of the new Treaty. Since the termination of the Protectorate in 1922, there have been successive efforts to settle permanently the four points reserved in the British Declaration. The bulk of this Paper traces with clarity the chequered course of these attempts, with their close dependence upon Egyptian political conditions, up to the renewal of negotiations this year. The text of the draft agreement of 1930, which in many respects closely follows the new Treaty, has been included, as well as the principal articles of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Convention of 1898. Logically, this account might well have commenced with this Convention, whose application, along with the question of Egyptian immigration into the Sudan, proved to be the ultimate obstacle in 1930; now largely resolved in favour of the British view. In addition, other appendices include notes on the Capitulations, the Constitutions of 1923 and 1930, and the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929.

* The Royal Institute of International Affairs, St. James's Square, S.W.1. 2s. net.

We draw the attention of our readers to the opening of a bookshop for the sale of German books of all kinds; Pick's German Books, 326 King's Road, S.W.3. The full discount of 25 per cent. on the official German price is given. If you desire to receive (free of charge) Dr. Pick's *Deutsche Bücherbriefe*, which describe new publications, please send your name and address to the shop.

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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

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THE NEW PHASE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

EVERYONE must feel that during the present year international affairs have entered upon a new phase. The remilitarisation of the Rhineland and the failure of the League of Nations to avert the extinction of Ethiopia together constitute a major change in the European—and, indeed, in the world—situation. That the resulting condition is both complicated and dangerous is evident enough. But to characterise it in detail is exceptionally difficult. Still more hazardous would it be to attempt to discern the prospect ahead. Where the statesmen are feeling their way forward like a driver in a fog, it would ill become an onlooker to pretend that he saw farther than they. His predictions might be nullified before the ink was dry on the paper. What will have happened in Spain by the time that these lines appear in print?

The following pages, then, seek no more than to draw attention to certain tendencies which have emerged in recent months, and to indicate the direction in which events appear to be moving. They are not written in a fatalistic spirit—it is not true that "events are in the saddle"—but rather in the belief that the recent testing that has taken place renders it less difficult to-day than it was a year ago, or has been, perhaps, since 1918, for statesmanship to control and canalise the forces with which it is confronted. What was previously vague and shapeless has become measurable and ponderable. In this sense, what is called realism may have its advantages, however dearly bought.

The first new factor that confronts us is the change in the equilibrium of Europe resulting from the rearmament of Germany and her recovery of complete military control over her territory. The change thus brought about is of a character such as has been generally associated with a victorious war. Germany has achieved it without a war, by the mere process of ignoring treaty provisions that stood in her way. That she has been able to do so is due chiefly to British public opinion.

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Some day the historian will relate and the psychologist analyse the stages of the process through which the British people came to accept, and even, in some quarters, to regard with a certain satisfaction, the disappearance of safeguards for themselves and others, secured at the cost of heavy sacrifices less than twenty years before. No doubt one consideration in the British mind has been that the naval and air provisions of the treaty, whatever might be thought of them from the point of view of abstract justice, had created an artificial situation which could not possibly endure. The new position may be dangerous, but at least it is "natural." Nature has made Germany the strongest Power on the Continent. Let us face the fact without flinching. It is both wiser and manlier to do so than to attempt to hold her in a strait-waistcoat.

Others may attribute our acquiescence not to manliness, but to its opposite. However that may be, the change in the balance of forces has come about. The period in which France was the strongest Continental Power has passed away. Germany has resumed the position which she held between 1870 and 1914, and to which she is entitled by her population, her industrial resources, and her power of organisation. Will Europe settle down to peaceful progress after the shock caused by this change in equilibrium? If "equality of status" were the beginning and end of the problem the question could be easily answered. As it is, it is the riddle of the Sphinx—with this difference, that it is doubtful whether the Sphinx, who is a temperamental person, is himself quite sure of the answer. It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that the surrounding peoples, great and small, ex-neutral as well as ex-enemy, should feel anxious and should be feverishly multiplying their precautions.

To many Englishmen it must be disappointing that after the wiping out of those elements in the peace settlement which seemed to them unjust or inexpedient, Europe should still be overshadowed by a German problem. They do not realise that this German problem, like the kindred Italian problem, was not created by the peace treaties or even by the war. It arises out of internal causes, out of a retarded and distorted political development. Nothing that outside statesmanship can do can solve the German problem. That remains for the German people. But it is at least an advance that we should now realise that there is a German problem

independent of the peace treaties and should be on our guard as to its consequences so far as they concern ourselves and the rest of Europe.

The second new factor is the failure of the League of Nations in what was generally regarded—and not least in this country—as a decisive test of the "collective system." The consequences of this are momentous: and, just because they are disagreeable, they are not perhaps sufficiently recognised.

In the remarkable letter which Mr. Root addressed to Colonel House about the League of Nations' project in August 1918, he concluded with a warning: "No agreement," he wrote, "in the way of a league of peace or under whatever name, should be contemplated which will probably not be kept when the time comes for acting under it. Nothing can be worse in international affairs than to make agreements and break them." We have to face the fact that this is exactly what has happened. It will take many years for the effects of the shock thus given to the whole international system to pass off. It is probably not too much to say that never during the modern period—certainly not since the eighteenth century—has respect for international engagements in time of peace been so low as it is to-day. That the Montreux agreement should be hailed with satisfaction because for once there had been no open breach of treaty is a sufficient commentary on the temporary eclipse of the authority of international law.

It would be a mistake to conclude from this that we are headed for an inevitable catastrophe: it is an historical blunder to assert that a period of rearmament necessarily precedes an outbreak of war. But we cannot conceal from ourselves that statesmen have to confront the risks and dangers inherent in their task with an unusually small margin of safety and general confidence. As things have turned out, it would have been better to have embarked in 1919 on a less ambitious scheme—a mere system of consultation—which would have maintained continuous touch between all the Great Powers, rather than to have elaborated a system of mutual protection for which the mind of the leading peoples—not to speak of the others—was not and could not quickly become prepared. Mr. Baldwin, in the debate in June, spoke about the need for education in the idea of collective security. Wise words! But what an irony that they should be spoken seventeen years after the House that he was addressing had accepted a treaty

in which that obligation was accepted for the British people!

There is a good deal of discussion just now about the reform of the League of Nations and the revision of the Covenant. Much of this would seem to be futile or, at the best, purely academic. The truth of the matter is that the Geneva machinery was set up as part of a system of guaranteed peace. It is only through the working of such a system that Geneva can ever be a vital force in international politics. Institutions are the consequence and the outward and visible sign of a will to co-operate. Unhappily, when the test came, the will to co-operate was found wanting. The world is not yet ready even for that rudimentary stage of social cohesion represented by the hue and cry against a disturber of the peace. That being so, it is idle to delude ourselves that by ingenious draftsmanship, or any other kind of sleight of hand, we can produce a workable set of international institutions. Until the process of education of which Mr. Baldwin spoke has been carried a further stage—and let us hope that it will not be an education through suffering—Geneva can be a useful place of conference and a centre for minor co-operative activities, but the “new order,” of which the League was to be the expression, will remain a distant vision.

It is not easy to face unpalatable facts. It is still more difficult to face them without recrimination. It would be consoling to produce a catalogue of blunders, or of sins of omission, in which successive British governments (not to speak of our neighbours across the Channel) would prominently figure. But if we view the record as a whole, we must conclude that the real fault lay in not taking sufficient account of the attitude and inclinations of the ordinary man in the democratic communities of to-day. Democracy is not, as President Wilson and others imagined, a movement tending naturally towards human brotherhood and the social solidarity of the world. On the contrary, it is a movement which, except at rare moments of generous and then not always clear-sighted enthusiasm, concentrates attention on domestic or local issues such as lie within the range and understanding of the electorate. Thus democracy has in fact created a formidable psychological obstacle to international co-operation. That obstacle can be overcome—but it will take time.

We can see the effect of this centrifugal force, this pull away

from co-operation and solidarity, in the present state of Europe. Throughout the Continent public opinion is relapsing into the mood with which we have long been familiar in North America under the watchwords of isolationism or neutrality. The small ex-neutral States, which had looked to the League for protection, are wondering whether they would not be safer outside it, in other words, whether the nineteenth-century lack of system did not suit them better than the post-war appearance of system. They will probably not leave the League, but they will reduce their commitments to the minimum, as they have already reduced their expectations. Even in some of the larger States public opinion has reacted to the same influences. If the main concern of Belgium, as of Holland and Switzerland, is to keep the enemy off her soil,* this is equally the preoccupation of Poland, who faces a similar danger in the east. The Northern States are now less concerned with general disarmament than with their own safety under the new conditions in which Germany is once more supreme in the Baltic.

During the first post-war period the safeguard of European peace was twofold—the *fact* of French supremacy and the *hope* of an effective League of Nations. Both these have disappeared. Nothing remains but to attempt to rebuild on a new foundation. Few incidents were more significant in the recent League Assembly than the speech in which the Danish Foreign Minister, one of the stalwarts of League doctrine, threw his principles to the winds and called on the Great Powers to come to an agreement between themselves. A few years ago such an appeal would have been heresy. To-day a workable nineteenth-century system is clutched at as a relief from the prevailing confusion and atomism.

Moreover, there is another new factor which must be reckoned with as a danger. As an acute observer at Geneva remarked recently, the failure of the collective system does not leave the individual countries as it found them. It leaves many of them, including some of the leading democratic States, deeply divided. This is partly due to the unwisdom of a section of the supporters of the League, who, unconscious Hegelians as they were, preached a kind of Geneva

* The above was written before the formal pronouncement on Belgian policy by King Leopold, which merely set a seal on a policy the main lines of which were already well known.

totalitarianism which has had the negative effect of sapping existing loyalties. But it is also the result of the spread, by propaganda and advertisement, of the rival but closely related doctrines of Communism and Fascism across national frontiers. The extreme consequence of this can be witnessed in Spain, the one country in Europe which had brought its constitution into harmony with the requirements of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. The renunciation of war as an instrument of foreign policy is no safeguard against civil war when two international doctrines come into collision on the same soil. The constitutional democracies already established in 1914—not one of which has succumbed to the prevailing wave of despotism—will no doubt resist these germs of disintegration. But they represent an additional element of confusion, and the difficulty of dealing with it is increased by the insidious methods employed by the propagandists on both sides.

In this situation, what is the line of advance? So far as Europe is concerned, the task before the British Government, before any possible British Government, irrespective of party, seems clear. It is to work for appeasement by maintaining the closest possible touch between all the Powers. The immediate next step is to bring about a meeting of the Western Locarno Powers: but the West cannot be separated from the Centre and the East. Sarajevo taught us that. We must aim at a general European settlement, a European Locarno. Europe is not two regions but one region.

Does the British people realise what this involves? At the present moment many of them certainly do not. Side by side with the European negotiations, side by side with British rearmament, there needs to be a steady process of education, and education of a much more concrete and realistic kind than that to which the public has been accustomed during the last eighteen years. Until the British people has made up its mind as to its European policy, as to how far it is prepared to go in its own interests and those of its neighbours or of the world as a whole, the entire movement for collective security is held up. The events of the last twelve months have demonstrated that only too clearly. We must cease to hide behind the screen provided by the ambiguity of the word "collective," and assume our own responsibilities. A joint guarantee which is not also a general guarantee is, in

international politics, no guarantee at all: and there is certainly no warrant in the Covenant for casuistical jugglery on this theme. The problem of security must be freed from its associations with the debating society and the Sunday school, and be set before the people in the terms in which it presents itself to the Committee of Imperial Defence. The gulf that has existed ever since the war between the experts and the general public on this subject must somehow be bridged over. For, whether the experts relish it or not, foreign policy is controlled in the last resort by public opinion. The electorate is entitled to the largest diet of facts which can be provided for it without detriment to the public interest.

But Europe is not the whole of the world: nor is it, for Great Britain, the most important part of the world. Our natural affiliations are with the oversea democracies, which are happily remote from the storm centre of European politics. While the League system has been falling into abeyance because there has been no real will to co-operate, a new co-operative system has been developing outside and independently of Geneva. The British Commonwealth has been neatly described by Mr. J. A. Spender as "a League of Nations without sanctions." The absence of prescribed sanctions is a sign of the reality and constancy of the will to co-operate. This co-operation is ensured not so much by the existence of a common political system as by the special character of that system. It is a system in which government is conceived as a means not towards increasing the power of the State but towards providing a fuller and better life for the people. Thus between the members of the Commonwealth there is no competition for power. And the same is true—though it has not always been so—in the relations between Great Britain and the United States. It is also, broadly speaking, true of the relations between our country and the other constitutional democracies in Europe, notably France. Thus an affinity of political ideas, reinforced by the impulsion of economic forces, is bringing into existence a collaboration—*bloc* would be too precise a term—of co-operatively minded States whose policies, dictated by enlightened self-interest, are conceived in inclusive rather than exclusive terms. In this way they provide both an object-lesson and an opportunity for other States, who are free to join in the collaboration if they feel disposed to accept the common co-operative outlook and scheme.

This process has not yet been carried very far. Nevertheless the bringing into line of the monetary policy of the three democratic Great Powers is a most significant event, whether it be regarded from the technical, the political or the psychological angle. Its implications are far-reaching. It establishes a system which rests upon confidence and nothing but confidence—confidence between the governments, confidence between the peoples and, more particularly, confidence between the officials who are brought into daily relations in the execution of a common professional task. It is a good practical illustration of Sir Arthur Salter's conception of an international agency—"not an external organisation based on delegated authority," but "the national organisations linked together for international work, and themselves forming the instrument for that work."

Extend this principle from the monetary sphere to other departments of policy, enlarge its range to include all the leading States, and the outlines of a true co-operative system come into sight. This is, no doubt, to read too much into a single experiment. Nevertheless, at a moment like the present, when so much that was built on sand has crumbled down, it is heartening to turn to one solidly based achievement. If over a large part of Europe the sky is overcast and lowering, there is at least a gleam of sunshine from the west.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

MY IMPRESSIONS OF GERMANY.

BEFORE making any comment on what I have seen in Nuremberg at the Nazi Congress, let me make a preliminary point. It is an evil symptom of an anxious and hysterical time that every visitor to Bolshevik Russia or Nazi Germany should be written down as incapable of dispassionate inquiry or calm observation. Those of us who, many years ago, visited Russia and first broke down the fantastic suspicions of the "Right," experienced the same kind of criticism that we now meet with from the "Left," when we visit Nazi Germany. The fact is that both countries, as a consequence of the War, have passed through great revolutionary upheavals; both are engaged in vast schemes of economic and social reorganisation; and both have adopted régimes utterly alien to British tradition. If, however, peace is to be brought back to Europe, contact must be established with each country and with every type of régime. Nor is there any reason why the visitor should return hoodwinked, or become incapable of offering any opinion beyond indiscriminating praise or hatred.

In 1920 I was in Russia in the third year of the Bolshevik revolution. In 1936 I have been at Nuremberg in the third year of the Nazi revolution. In Russia I witnessed the parades of the Red Army; in Germany, the gathering of the Black Army. With Lenin and Trotsky I discussed the White menace; from Hitler and his colleagues I have heard about the Red menace. In each case, and at a similar point of time in their revolutionary experience, I encountered the same state of mind—a profound anxiety lest counter revolutionary activity should be organised against them, and a consequent disposition to appeal for a world crusade. Russia now regrets much of her external propaganda and wishes she had been content with the establishment of a great Socialist experiment within her own frontiers, which might have drawn all men unto her. She has impeded her success by creating world suspicion instead of confidence, whilst her refusal to join the League of Nations, until it was almost too late, has been a tragic outcome of her policy. As I listened to the speeches at Nuremberg and took part in many conversations with German leaders, I felt that I was confronted with a similar phenomenon. On the other hand, I do not believe that the Nuremberg outburst need create a new and fatal impediment to the peace of

Europe, and my purpose in this article is to explain, from close observation and first-hand knowledge, why I think this profound mistake on the part of Germany could yet be turned to the advantage of peace.

This requires that I should restate my own attitude as to what is necessary for rebuilding the peace of Europe. I have consistently believed that there was only one method by which this could be done, and that was by the establishment of a League of Nations in Europe whose membership was complete and, above all things, included the four countries whose policy dominates the situation. These countries are Britain, France, Germany and Russia. Any alternative method of trying to patch up peace and find security in regional pacts, or making successive efforts to solve first this geographical problem and then this economic grievance, or to beat off in slow stages first this crisis and then that, is bound to fail. I have therefore been quite unmoved by those who say it is now unrealistic to lay emphasis exclusively upon a League of Nations as the means to peace. If that be true there is no other way to peace available. The League was created at the end of the War because modern conditions left the nations with no other alternative. That is still true. Consequently I reject all proposals to bring together what is called a league of "like-minded nations." It seems to me that that must be the prelude to a war of political religions. It may be that the position has deteriorated too far for the League membership to be made complete in Europe. If that is so, then I see little hope of avoiding war. The effort to fan the flame of political hatreds, so that Europe may be divided, is the most deadly of all perils now threatening peace.

The Nuremberg Conference has forced up a new opportunity to restore the League in Europe. It gives us the chance to face the second of those two disadvantages which impeded the League of Nations ever since it was founded. The first of these two impediments has been inequality of status between the State members of the League. The nations could never succeed either in revising treaties, in guaranteeing security, or engaging in confident joint action so long as the League was built upon the principle of inequality of status. While that condition prevailed, it was an instrument by which certain Versailles Powers organised the maintenance of an unequal *status quo*. Fortunately, though far too late, that first impediment is on

the road to being removed. Equality of status is now accepted, though the manner in which it has been achieved leaves us dangerous problems which ought never to have been created.

The second impediment is the organisation of a revolutionary International, parallel with the League International of Sovereign States. This second impediment was more subtle, but it is forced to the surface by the Nuremberg outburst against Bolshevism. The League was intended to be a gathering of Sovereign States who would work out methods of joint action and proceed to modify sovereignty in process of time by consent, as the necessity for collective organisation required it. But from the time of the Russian revolution we have encountered an international movement running side by side and beneath the international movement of the League of Sovereign States. The Russian Government, for many reasons, transitory and permanent, created across the frontiers of other nations a movement of revolutionary propaganda, sometimes even taking the form of a definite conspiracy, designed to undermine the sovereignty of the nations who were trying to work together at Geneva. So long as that parallel international movement, inspired by the Government of a State member of the League, continues, it must be destructive of confidence amongst the League Powers. It has, in fact, assisted in producing the present disintegration of Europe. If now we could eradicate inequality of status between the nations that compose the League, and also get rid of all these international movements that are inspired by Governments to undermine sovereignty, we might have a chance of at last establishing in Europe a real League of Nations. Then we should have the opportunity of setting up the long-delayed machinery for hearing grievances, revising treaties, promoting economic co-operation and guaranteeing the peace.

Nazism has laid stress upon national sovereignty for the purpose of regaining equality of rights within Germany's own frontiers; and although it has always hoped for an extension of German racial unity and culture beyond the Reich, it has not until quite recently taken definite steps to counter Communist revolutionary propaganda by external activities. Now the danger point has come. This clash between Nazism and Bolshevism has become politically urgent owing to the proposals now being made to organise security under a regional system. There seems no prospect of organising security under

a regional system. There seems no prospect of organising security in the East of Europe. Germany is prepared to join the League of Nations. Hitler made this offer in March of this year. Unfortunately, the reply that was addressed to him took the form of an examination paper of questions. The outburst at Nuremberg now gives us the opportunity of testing Germany's *bona fides* with regard to this subject of League membership and the organisation of security in the East. If Germany insists that she will not become a member in a League of sovereign Powers under the present Covenant, whilst one of her near neighbours is engaged in stimulating movements that might undermine the sovereignty of countries like France on her other frontier, then let us immediately take up this question, and arrive at some decision upon it.

The Locarno discussions provide the procedure through which the problem can be explored of how far the nations of the League may be involved in revolutionary propaganda across each other's frontiers. The Powers have often interchanged opinions in various groupings. The Stresa Group and the Locarno Group at Brussels are illustrations. In neither case was Germany present. I suggest that Germany, France and Britain should now interchange views on this German claim. If they are satisfied that Germany would join the League and would take an honest part in organising security in the East provided this propaganda were stopped, Russia could then be asked to join in a discussion whose object would be to remove this poison that is now hindering the success of the League and preventing its membership from becoming complete in Europe. In the Locarno discussions Britain and France could make perfectly clear to Germany that they had no intention of breaking their increasing friendship with Russia. They could, on the other hand, make equally clear to Russia that this revolutionary propaganda ought to stop, both for the sake of the League and also for the sake of the success of Russia's own internal development. There is, indeed, good reason to believe that Russia would, from her own point of view, not reject the suggestion.

It will, of course, be argued that no confidence could be placed in any decision arrived at on this point. I have little doubt that international machinery to supervise the agreement could be set up, which could ensure its validity, and that this supervision would now have to apply not only to

Russian Communist efforts, which date back nearly twenty years, but to the answering propaganda which has subsequently developed on the Right. If such an agreement could be reached, it might then be possible to complete the membership of the League, to organise the security of Western and Eastern Europe, to set up the necessary machinery to consider all grievances against the *status quo*, and ultimately to construct a new Peace Settlement to take the place of the Treaty of Versailles.

It is here that British initiative is vital. It is fatal that we should remain in doubt of the ultimate desire or intention of Germany: we must provide the opportunity for her to state her case. It may involve risks and cause anxieties amongst Germany's neighbours. But the risk of sitting on those grievances is greater than a definite effort to bring them into the daylight. British initiative could force an end to this dangerous obscurity and enable us to decide how we are to proceed in European affairs in order to safeguard the peace. Greater definition, too, must be given to Mr. Eden's tentative proposals at Geneva.

Close personal observation has satisfied me that, notwithstanding all the battle of words, neither Germany nor Russia desires war with the other, and that neither country is even as yet competent to wage a war in that area. If, by the procedure outlined above, the four outstanding Powers of the League in Europe could be brought together, most of our League difficulties might begin to diminish. Germany, as I could see clearly as we talked in Nuremberg, would infinitely prefer to be associated with Britain, France and Russia than be driven into the ambit of Italian influence. The devaluation of the French franc has also strengthened the area of Franco-British influence and has linked America to us. The action of the Credentials Committee at the Geneva Assembly has done something to re-establish the prestige of the League. The position, therefore, is by no means without hope, and if now the League of Nations system could be finally released from the two fundamental impediments which have so far hindered it, we could gradually rebuild the Peace of Europe once more upon a League basis, which is the only way of preventing war. To decline to explore this new line of procedure because of deep-rooted suspicion is to deprive ourselves of a means of testing the *bona fides* of all nations—including our own.

ALLEN OF HURTWOOD.

LABOUR'S DIVIDED MIND.

"THINGS are what they are and the consequences will be what they will be," was a saying quoted by Dr. Hugh Dalton in his speech during the Edinburgh Conference of the Labour Party at the beginning of last month. And this saying has been amply substantiated by the experience of His Majesty's Opposition since the last Labour Conference at Brighton a year ago. This latter Conference was held just before the General Election; and the Labour Party then found themselves manœuvred into a position where, on foreign affairs, they had apparently either to go to the country with much the same programme of Collective Security as the Government, or to abjure practical politics altogether in the pursuit of unilateral disarmament, or some unimaginable mass revolt of the workers. It was for many of them a disagreeable and disquieting Hobson's choice; but while electing for Collective Security as the result of the Conference, even to the extent of fighting for it if the need arose, they protested that it was not the Government who had given this policy to them, but they who had forced it on the Government; and if the Government were in any degree false to this great principle they would find themselves faced by the Labour Party as an implacable foe.

Things have evolved and their consequences have been manifested since this Brighton meeting. And, as an Edinburgh report of the National Executive bluntly put it, "the British Government betrayed the League of Nations and Abyssinia, and broke its pledges to the elector," and accordingly, as this report further declared, "the Labour Party can have no confidence in the Government's profession of loyalty to the League." So far, so good; and the immediate inference appeared to be that the National Executive would be compelled to come out before the Conference at Edinburgh as an out-and-out opponent of the National Government and of all its ways. But here comes in another complication. The trade unions, and especially the coming President of the T.U.C., Mr. Ernest Bevin, had been the most earnest supporters of the Covenant of the League even to the extent of fighting to enforce it, and when the Government adopted a policy which, in its later phases, seemed indistinguishable from a policy of competitive armaments, these trade union forces did not

feel themselves justified in wholly rejecting it. In the meantime the Fascist nations had waxed strong exceedingly. They were evidently working to establish a similar policy in Spain. As Mr. Bevin himself put it with telling force, it would be the trade unions that would first be exterminated if Fascism attacked a weak and unprotected Britain. So at Plymouth these same trade unions voted in a way which, also on the authority of Mr. Bevin, was meant to suggest such a re-orientation of Labour policy as would justify a resort to some kind of "unilateral rearmament."

People who did not understand the constitution of the Labour Party imagined that, as the result of the Plymouth meeting of the Trades Union Congress, the attitude of the Labour Party towards rearmament had been plainly and finally set forth. The Workers' representatives had repented of the past and were now going to support a National Government on an ambitious arms programme. Sir Samuel Hoare even complacently congratulated the Labour forces on this decision, and welcomed them as lost sheep returning to their rightful fold. If Sir Samuel had desired to cast discredit on the idea of Labour's support of the Government, he could not have chosen a more appropriate course. Mr. Herbert Morrison, the best and most brilliant representative of the constituency parties as distinct from the orthodox trade unions, immediately repudiated Sir Samuel's patronage with the utmost disdain, and spoke as if there were not the slightest probability of Labour's support of the Government's programme. When his remarks were taken in connection with the trade union speeches made at Plymouth, it was plain that there was something to clear up when the delegates met at Edinburgh. These Edinburgh delegates accordingly were doomed to meet from the first in a divided state of mind. It was not the old division which made itself conspicuous at last year's Conference in Brighton. Mr. George Lansbury was present at Edinburgh and was received with the same show of enthusiasm as in former days. But when he desired to impress the Assembly his success was not at all conspicuous. Dr. Salter seconded a reference back, but there was no evidence that his efforts resulted in an imposing array of converts. Sir Stafford Cripps had lost all his old provocative pugnacity and this year he confined himself to suggesting amendments, sometimes successfully, with a large degree of

force and plausibility. The advocates of Collective Security now plainly held the floor, and the division was between those who still regarded Collective Security as a sufficient hope for the future, and those who held that, in presence of the new Nazi and Fascist influences in Europe and the evident powerlessness of Collective Security to make headway against them, each individual nation was bound to consider very seriously some increased provision for its own safety.

Roughly, then, and as in past years, the division chiefly showed itself, with many notable exceptions, between the trade unions who possessed the potent instrument of the "block vote," and the constituency Labour parties. But it was most unfortunate, in the interests of a successful inauguration of the Conference, that the first great question to be discussed, that of intervention or non-intervention in Spain, simply reversed the relation between the two parties. The leaders of the great trade unions were realists. They felt that on this question they had to go in with the majority of nations; and if the result was to leave the Spanish Government to its fate, then this disagreeable pill must perforce be swallowed. The other party could not by distinct and definite resolution dispute this decision. But they loathed it, were ashamed of it, and, in default of concrete suggestions, they delivered speeches in unmeasured language, yearning for action they knew not how or what. Sir Charles Trevelyan spoke in unrestrained and strident tones which must have been a revelation to those who knew the deliberate and more responsible Sir Charles of the Liberal and Labour Ministries. The truth was that each side felt thoroughly uneasy about its own position; Mr. Bevin on this question delivered his worst speech in the Conference, holding up for reprobation the French as villains in the struggle for collective action and elaborating vague generalities about the Treaty of Versailles. The result was that, though later they to some extent retrieved their reputation, the delegates had a thoroughly bad start. They did not appear like candidates for place and power in an all-conquering Labour Government of the future.

It was in this perplexed and somewhat puzzled mood that the Conference met on its second day's sitting to consider what was expected to be the major question before the Conference—the Government's policy of Rearmament. Dr. Dalton, who is rapidly becoming the Labour Party's chief

expert on foreign affairs, opened the discussion with a speech which, if not specially inspiring and occasionally marred by his rooted determination to describe his opponents as either knaves or fools, was at any rate a masterly and adequate characterisation of the existing situation. He described how Europe had gone back since 1931, gave an alarming survey of the growth of Germany's armaments, and the conclusion appeared to be, although, as Mr. Lansbury later said, it was only an inference, that the Labour Party must in Parliament support, for the sake of safeguarding the safety of the country, a policy of rearmament though brought forward by a Government whose general policy, even on this question, was profoundly detested by the whole Labour Party. But then Dr. Dalton did not directly say so. He only presented as the conclusion of his whole argument the deduction that a Labour Government, faced with the present situation, "would, I judge, be compelled to provide an increase in British armaments," though he had somewhat magnified the urgency of this prospective increase by a previous statement that, "he could not exclude from his mind the idea of a possible direct attack upon this country." Still, there can be no doubt that Mr. Lansbury was right in the main and that the doctor did not directly give any clear and explicit guidance for the present actual situation; and this dubiety of mind was certainly reflected, as Sir Stafford Cripps persuasively showed, in the actual resolution, which was put forward by the Executive to deal with such a strained international situation. It accused the Government of unfaithfulness to the League of Nations and then said, "the armed strength of the country, loyal to the League of Nations, must be conditioned by the armed strength of the potential aggressor." That is to say, the Labour Party's test for deciding as to the real necessity for rearmament was not applicable to the present situation where this country, as represented by its National Government was, in the opinion of the Labour Executive, not "loyal to the League of Nations." What practical advice then was the Conference to give to the Labour Party when it was a question, in the House of Commons, of determining on which side its vote should be cast? All that the resolution plainly said was that "having regard to the deplorable record of the Government the Labour Party declines to accept responsibility for a purely competitive armament policy," and that

"it reserves full liberty to criticise the rearmament programme of the present Government."

Full liberty to criticise! But then the majority of the Conference was interested not in how the representatives were going to criticise, but in how they were going to vote. And Mr. Herbert Morrison, who has the real Parliamentary flair for getting immediately to the innermost core of a difficult situation, sprang into the breach and supplied an answer. Mr. Morrison began by the somewhat dubious device of "blaming the reporter," but when he got to the heart of his subject he indicated, in no uncertain tones, that the Labour representatives could not be expected to vote for the Government on the direct issue of rearmament. All that they might do was in committee and that for strategical reasons, when certain matters of detail came up for discussion on token votes and other technical occasions, to return their vote as aye instead of no. But that, as has already been pointed out, was not how the trade unions understood the situation; and Mr. Ernest Bevin soon mounted the rostrum to say so. He began gravely by declaring that he did not want to precipitate a conflict between the trade unions and the Conference, but Mr. Morrison's speech was inconsistent with that of Dr. Dalton, was an exhibition of tight-rope dancing, and did not give that plain direction for a new action on rearmament in the House of Commons which the Trades Union Congress expected. This situation, as between the trade unions and the Parliamentary Party, was rendered much more grave when Mr. Attlee, in a rather cold speech which betrayed a mind somewhat obstinately uninfluenced by the course of the discussion, appeared directly to deny that the Conference could give explicit direction binding the Parliamentary Party on a question of Parliamentary action. This put the Conference in something of a quandary, and Mr. Bevin asked for time and an adjournment to enable the trade unions to reconsider their vote. This was refused by a small majority and the Conference proceeded to record the decision; but no words can convey an idea of the hesitation, confusion, and uncertainty of mind as to the result which prevailed whilst the vote was being taken and whilst the Conference was breaking up for the day.

So virtually passed away the Edinburgh Conference of the Labour Party, for the remaining two days were for the most part a mere marking of time. The old subjects were discussed,

Unemployment, Insurance, the Popular Front, the affiliation of the Communist Party, and the League of Youth, and the old discussions were again registered; but hardly ever a spark of vital flame lit up the discussion. One of the notable Nationalisation of Industry schemes which have evoked such discussion in preceding Congresses—that dealing with the miners—was down for discussion on Friday, but as it was much less bureaucratic than some of its predecessors and envisaged a certain amount of "Workers' Control," it evoked no opposition. When the two Spanish delegates appeared before the Conference they called forth unbounded enthusiasm and they told a remarkable and serious tale. Then came the dramatic dash of Mr. Attlee and Mr. Greenwood to London, and their report to the Friday's meeting of the Conference. The delegates woke up then to a touch of the old victorious energy which has won the Labour Party so many triumphs in the past. The divided minds in the Assembly for the moment resolved their differences and the Conference registered a unanimous decision. But even in this triumphant moment there was a sense of impotence. What could they really do?

The divided mind of the Edinburgh Conference has left a large number of unsettled antinomies to vex Labour in the future. Fortunately Dr. Dalton is the Chairman for the ensuing year, and there was evidence from some of his statements at Edinburgh that he both knows and appreciates their importance. There is the question of the relation between the trade unions and the constituency parties—a very pressing problem. On the one hand it is clear that the Labour Party must ever find the organised centre of its influence in the trade unions. On the other hand, the constituency Labour Party represents certain other elements which must be given their proper recognition and share of influence if Labour is ever to gain a real working majority in Parliament. For the time being the constituency parties are weak relatively to the union; and their obvious immediate task is to recruit their ranks and thus constitute themselves a more formidable numerical and financial power than they have been in the past. Secondly, there is the question of the relation of the trade unions and the Conference which they dominate to the action of the Party in Parliament. It was always the complaint, during the Parliamentary leadership of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, that the trade unions did not receive

their proper share of recognition in the determination of parliamentary strategy, and at the first Labour Conference which met after the formation of the National Government, Mr. Arthur Henderson, obviously then the new leader, pointed out that he himself had emerged from the trade union side and that from henceforward the trade union forces would come into their own. Obviously, if Labour is to carry through in Parliament any complicated schemes of industrial reconstruction, such schemes must all have been evolved outside and Parliament must for the most part be a registering machine; but here at Edinburgh Mr. Attlee was quite obstinately proclaiming a certain liberty in decision for the Parliamentary Party as to the application of a Conference resolution. Thirdly, there was the relation between Labour and the Co-operatives. This had a fairly successful discussion at Edinburgh and some progress on a thorny problem was made; but there is still need of much tact and vision and a spirit of give and take. Fourthly, there was the very serious question of the place of youth in the Labour Movement. At present the Communists seemed more successful with the younger generation, and when the question of the Labour League of Youth and its alleged disturbing activity was announced as down for discussion at the Conference, the League of Young Liberals announced that it had no similar difficulties with its adult section and that it was in fact allowed to take a due share in the suggestion of Liberal policy. All this gives room in the Labour Party for much heart searching and thought; and assuredly at Edinburgh not the last word was said on a matter which so certainly concerns the fortunes of the future.

The Labour Party is going to take its own lone path, and that there can be no Popular Front who can doubt after the discussion of the subject at Edinburgh? The Party has many elements of goodness in it which warrant great hope for the future, but it sadly needs leadership. This could not fail to be abundantly evident to the delegates who, amid painful hours of indecision at Edinburgh, must often have meditated in their hearts, "Oh, for an hour of Arthur Henderson!" Carlyle's *Heroes and Hero Worship* still carries within it a gospel for our times. Labour needs not a Duce or a Führer but—a Hero.

J. H. HARLEY.

AUSTRIA AFTER THE COMPROMISE.

KING EDWARD'S recent visit to Vienna left a deep mark in the hearts of Austrians. For the third time within a relatively short period he came to this country privately, in the course of a holiday. More than anything else the unofficial character of the visit endeared him to the population. The Austrian has much sympathy for quiet dignity, for unconstrained amiability, and he particularly appreciates that kind of natural distinction which requires no ceremony to enhance the impression it is sure to create. In this respect, and with his open eyes for realities, Edward VIII recalls the Emperor Joseph II, who always travelled under the name of Count of Falkenstein. Like this still unforgotten monarch, King Edward has never held himself aloof from the economically depressed classes; he is familiar with all that is being done or planned for the homeless and the slum dwellers. Also in his philosophy of life the King is akin to Austrians in that the responsibilities of his great office have not bereft him of a natural gift for appreciating the pleasant sides of existence.

The situation created by the reconciliation between Austria and Germany has been thus described by a clever diplomat: "All depends upon whether Austria is able to defend herself with the same energy against a friend as she did against an enemy." This, in fact, is the problem which Dr. Schuschnigg has to solve. At first it appeared as if his daring step were not without grave risks. So much had the tension between Germany and Austria become an element in the calculations of European chancelleries that the sudden disappearance of this feud was bound to create a feeling of uneasy surprise. Three circumstances have contributed to make Dr. Schuschnigg's task less difficult, and to keep at bay dangers which, however, have not yet disappeared entirely. In the first place an extraordinary amount of diplomatic adroitness was displayed in the preparatory stages of the work of reconciliation. Slowly and step by step did the negotiations progress, and the Chancellor took care to keep those Powers which might have felt misgivings, England and France, continually informed of the position. He therefore excluded in advance any suggestion of secrecy. Though the reference to Austria as the "second German State" may have given rise to misunderstandings in

some places, there were the Chancellor's repeated and categorical statements that the formation of a bloc was not contemplated, and that Austria's policy would run parallel with that of Germany only as long as the latter country's aims were peaceful.

The second circumstance which greatly assisted the Government was the extraordinary clumsiness of the Vienna Nazis. They knew that the Olympic games were held under the watchword of absolute political neutrality, and that racial policy had no place in that international contest of perfection in sports. Still, they could not resist the urge on the departure of the Austrian teams for Berlin to stage a demonstration which it was impossible to suppress forthwith, as stringent police measures would have caused a dreadful confusion and the Olympic celebrations would have ended in bloodshed. Immediately afterwards, however, just reprisals of the Government set in, the administrative amnesty was suspended, and numbers of Nazi leaders were taken into custody again. The Patriotic Front held an imposing rally, where the Chancellor affirmed his unalterable decision to pursue the political course followed so far, and categorically refused to accept systems conceived in a foreign spirit. The unequivocal nature of the speech caused the dense fogs of uncertainty to disappear. The childish Nazi demonstration, in the course of which the Federal President and particularly Prince Starhemberg were booed, thus had an effect diametrically opposed to the one its organisers had intended.

The third fact which has a calming influence on certain sections of the population is the disappointment caused here at the relatively small extent of foreign tourist traffic from Germany. Wherever in the years of the conflict with Germany one had a talk with innkeepers and other persons whose interests were connected with foreign tourist traffic, the absence of German customers owing to the 1,000-mark tax, imposed by the German Government as a punitive measure against Austria was invariably complained of. One could not help feeling that many such persons honestly believed that their economic salvation lay in the discontinuance of this state of things. Now, however, the 1,000-mark tax is abolished, the conflict with Germany is finished, and only rarely is a word of criticism against Nazi politics heard or read in Austria. Nevertheless, no important change has

taken place, and the hopes of increased prosperity through an influx of German customers have been cruelly disappointed, no largesse being possible under the foreign exchange situation existing in Germany. Instead of 500 marks per traveller a month as anticipated, 250 marks were allocated. It is reliably stated that in many cases even this modest amount is not allowed, and that ridiculously small sums are apportioned to would-be travellers to Austria.

In connection with the normalisation of Austro-German relations changes in the composition of the Government were frequently forecast, and busy rumour-mongers even spoke of an impending Cabinet crisis. The least that was expected was that Herr Glaise-Horstenau, who, as a representative of the pronouncedly nationalistic quarters, was given Cabinet rank, would be placed in charge of a Ministry and that some of his political intimates would also join the Cabinet. This has not been the case and, as far as can be foreseen at present, is not likely to happen, for the Government is not inclined to comply with suggestions from abroad made in this respect. In coming to this decision they bore in mind that 50 per cent. of the Austrian population belong to the peasant class and about 40 per cent. are industrial workers with approximately 300,000 craftsmen. Only the balance of about 10 per cent. can be considered as a firm stock of effectively organised Nazis. This calculation may be rather optimistic. But assuredly neither the industrial workers nor the peasant population, with few exceptions, show the slightest inclination towards the German system, and the Government is about to take care that these political sentiments receive a greater amount of publicity. Within the next few weeks the elective principle will come into its own again in Austria after having been relinquished when Dr. Dollfuss parted company with the Parliamentary form of Government and gave up democracy in favour of a corporative system. The peasantry will elect corporative committees for the whole territory of the Republic and, more important still, industrial workers are to receive new labour councils, electing the men of their confidence. While hitherto the authoritarian principle had been given a continuously increasing scope, autonomy on a corporative basis will now receive some recognition again in the case of two sections of the population who, on the right and left of the political scene, have a large stake in the

preservation of Austrian independence. Neither the peasantry nor the industrial workers hanker after Nazism or Communism. Both groups can but wish for the maintenance of continuity and of the modest recovery now visible in Austria. Neither the Communists nor the Nazis possess a leader capable of inspiring the masses with fanaticism and firing their imagination. This even applies to the Socialists, the old leaders of the party having spent their usefulness and no fresh personages with new ideas and the capacity to exercise an active influence being discernible in their ranks.

It is curious to observe the extraordinary rapidity with which certain constellations, which a relatively short time ago presented a definite and clearly outlined aspect, suffer a partial eclipse. The important rôle which the Heimatschutz has played in the political development of the last years is not open to doubt. The approximation to Fascism, the refusal to accept any kind of co-operation with the Social-Democrats and the adoption of the corporative system were ideas which indisputably originated with the Heimatschutz. A general experience, frequently met with in the political field, shows, however, that the culmination of a successful career often coincides with the point whence a rapid decline sets in. Psychologically this is easily explainable. A satisfied and saturated movement loses its initial aggressiveness and ceases to be an object of interest to the masses, to whom the remembrance of past services rendered to them soon becomes tedious. The Heimwehr element, for the time being at any rate, has lost all importance in Austria, and this group, regarded with considerable awe until a short time ago, is now powerless. Prince Starhemberg has not been in the public eye recently, and the sense of a lack of real leadership in the movement became so strong that at a meeting of the Vienna Heimatschutz Major Fey, whom the Starhemberg group had almost violently ousted from the Government, could make his reappearance on the scene with a view to assuming a leading rôle again.

Other circumstances which helped to relegate the Heimwehr to the background were the introduction of conscription and the activity of the Voluntary Militia. The effects of these measures are twofold. In the first place the Austrian defence position is improved to the full extent which the material resources of the country allow. The second effect is of even

greater importance measured in terms of the present political needs. The Austrian problem is largely a problem of the young generation. Thousands of young men live in enforced idleness and fall an easy prey to the catchwords of demagogues, being attracted by all kinds of political romanticism. The army, acting like a large melting-pot, exercises a levelling influence free from party bias. Young men are keen on using their muscular strength, and in the army they can do so in the service of the State. They require to be disciplined, and it is obviously better that this should be done in a body from which every partisan spirit is excluded than under the whip of a political group dictator. During one year of their lives they are withdrawn from the influence of agitators, and in a decisive phase of their moral development they are removed from local conditions which frequently warp their minds. A larger Austrian outlook is fostered. The old Austro-Hungarian Army used to render important educational services of this kind. The army was of great help in the amalgamation, to the extent then possible, of the various nationalities. It owed and gave allegiance to the Emperor alone, not to any individual dominion of the Crown. Nor did the Austrian officers form themselves into a social class apart. The Austrian officer was never filled with the dreaded arrogance of the Junker spirit. He largely shared the life of the rank and file, and this circumstance increased the educational value of military service. It is to be hoped that the army of the new Austria will also contribute to the levelling of social and political differences. Austria is too poor and weak to be able to afford a sharp cleavage of the population on questions of *Weltanschauung* in place of the division on national grounds which existed in the old Empire. The independence of Austria could not be assured if the young generation were allowed to grow up under the influence of Right or Left sentiments, refusing recognition to the State because it neglected to look after their civic training.

Austria has been released from League control and has thereby entered upon a new phase. It was natural to discontinue financial supervision over a country which in many respects is now considerably better off than some of the supervising States. League action and League control were to a large extent a moral influence only, but the moral element, as is becoming increasingly evident, has been more

important than material help. Only a small fraction of the proceeds of the large International Loan of 1923 was used to meet budget deficits, the balance having been spent on investments of a productive character. During the last years the activity of the League delegate, Dr. Rost van Tonningen, was limited on the whole to registering the more important economic events, and to commenting with approval on the work of Ministers of Finance, particularly of Dr. Kienböck.

The estimates for 1937 are based on a revenue exceeding the budget of the current year by 59 million schillings, and the major part of the unavoidable increase for defence purposes can be met without borrowing. One might have wished, of course, that it had been possible to take advantage of the excellent financial results to reduce the burden of taxation, with a view to increasing the purchasing power and the ability of consumption of the population. The beer excise, for instance, has led to a diminution of consumption by 50 per cent., and the excise duty on petrol, amounting to two-thirds of the price of the final product, is hardly less baleful. The high duty on coffee not only restricts consumption very severely, but also causes a deficit in the dairy industry. All personal taxes, particularly the Corporation Tax, and the rates of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Administration are also excessively high. They date from the era of inflation; but in spite of their maintenance at uneconomic levels, a certain amount of progress has been made which partly compensates the effects of over-taxation.

How much the economic situation has improved since the reintroduction of League control in 1932 can be demonstrated by a few figures. The foreign trade balance then appeared hopelessly adverse, the import surplus having amounted to 1,000 million annually. In the eight months of the current year the deficit has dropped to somewhat over 170 million. The foreign currency assets of the National Bank four years ago consisted of two short-term credits totalling 150 million, which had been placed at the disposal of the country by the good grace of the Bank of England and the Bank for International Settlements respectively. At present the Austrian National Bank has a gold reserve of over 240 million and foreign exchange holdings amounting to over 130 million. No transfer moratorium is in existence in Austria, and the foreign exchange regulations, as far as they are still

in being, are entirely liberal. Austria pays her foreign debts. The confidence created thereby, the repatriation of capital, and foreign tourist traffic, whose favourable balance far exceeds the import surplus of visible trade, have enabled her to strengthen her foreign exchange situation and to maintain the position thus gained. This is the reason why Austria, despite the devaluations which have taken place in the Western States, has made no change in her currency system. An act of faith this decision doubtless is; but it is also perfectly understandable, considered objectively and from a purely Austrian point of view. After the crash of the Creditanstalt in 1931 Austria devalued her currency by about 27 per cent. in a manner which can be, and has been, held up as a model of skill and foresight. The devaluation was carried out without much discussion and without any abrupt changes. Up to this day the old monetary standard is still nominally in existence, and only a premium added to clearing rates denotes the change-over to the new system. This unobtrusive and slow rhythm prevented a panic and violent price movements. In this respect, it can be said, Austria has learnt from England. She thereby succeeded in maintaining intact the internal purchasing power of the schilling, and in avoiding a sudden adjustment of the costs of production to the change in the foreign exchange value of the schilling. As the bulk of Austrian capital has already returned to the country from Western Europe, the losses which Austrian economy suffers through devaluations abroad cannot be large. On the contrary, the gains are far in excess, and the reduction in the outstanding capital value of the Conversion Loan of 1934 alone amounts to considerably over 40 million schillings, with a yearly saving of more than 2 million on the interest payable on this issue. Similar conditions prevail in regard to other Government loans and to the issues of certain corporations.

There is no reason to believe that foreign tourist traffic is seriously threatened by possible changes in the Swiss price system, while economic relations with France are too insignificant for the French devaluation to produce far-reaching effects. Czechoslovakia, following the French example, has again reduced the gold content of her currency by 16 per cent. Even this event is not considered as dangerous enough to justify a fundamental change in the Austrian currency policy. As regards Italy, the machinery existing under the Rome

Agreements should make it possible to obviate grave dangers to mutual trade relations arising out of the devaluation of the lira and there is reason to believe that the volume of exports to Italy can be kept at the average level of the last years.

Under these circumstances the present system is not threatened seriously from any direction. Discontent there is, of course, in many quarters, but is there a country where the people have nothing to grumble about? Industrial interests are of opinion that their claims do not receive the attention they deserve. They do not quite approve of the release of goods traffic by motor vehicles from the limitations imposed on it in the interest of the railways. An understanding between work-givers and work-takers in industry in regard to their co-operation in the corporative system has also hung fire so far. Work-givers in commerce and in the crafts have already agreed to the principle that in questions concerning the work-takers they will deal with a single representation of the latter; but industrial interests have been holding back, probably from excessive precaution. However, it should not be overlooked that it took Italy twelve years to complete the structure of the corporative State, while Austria has had two years only to try her hands at this complicated problem. Craftsmen are of the opinion that there is too much centralisation in Austria, and that it is an unnatural state of things if, for instance, a painter-journeyman required for the Tyrol must be sent for from Vienna because the Central Organisation of the Crafts so wills it. In some sections there is a certain amount of ill-feeling against the existing cartels, and a reduction of their prices is insistently demanded. The man on the street often still lacks the benefits of the improved situation, which in many cases have not yet reached the very important capillary vessels of the body economic. It would be highly desirable if the *rapprochement* of the countries of the Rome Agreements and of the Little Entente advocated by the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Dr. Hodža, were to take shape; but there cannot be much hope of this while the tension which exists between Hungary and her neighbours prevails. In the meantime Austria must make the best of the existing state of things. In a period of tremendous cataclysms she has been able to maintain stability, and this in itself is no mean achievement.

Vienna.

ERNST BENEDIKT.

SPAIN AND HUMANITY.

I

TWO tragedies this year have darkened the prospect of the slow revival of peace and prosperity in the world in which our country was taking a leading part. They weigh heavily upon us all, and it is hard yet to say which is the greater misfortune for mankind. In the Abyssinian war the plighted word of one of the leading Western Powers was broken, the authority of the League of Nations was weakened, and a weak and less advanced people were suppressed by violence instead of being led forward on the path of civilisation by the common goodwill of the stronger. These were all deep wounds to the growing conscience of humanity, but the actual horrors and potential dangers of the war in Spain put them for the moment into the shade. Here, under the eyes of the four nearest members of the Western community of nations, a well-loved and ancient people of Europe is committing suicide with the utmost ferocity and determination, and none seems able or willing to stir a hand to stay them. It would be hard indeed to find a parallel in history to the poignancy of the actual and the hopelessness of the future which are being unrolled before our eyes in Spain. The less responsible and more embittered critics in other countries have been hounding on the opposing factions with the shrillest cries, while cynics here and there are found to say "*Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*" Spain was always a land of internecine strife. Let them "dree their weird."

Such cannot be the thoughts of those who know and love Spain nor of those who cling to the belief which inspired the League of Nations, that the welfare of every member of the body corporate concerns the welfare of every other and that it is the business of all mankind to conserve the good which has been achieved in the world. Spain has achieved much and it adds, if that were possible, another pang to the grief which overwhelms us to reflect that the catastrophe has fallen at the time when Spain was regaining on the spiritual plane that ascendancy and attachment with the New World which she had once acquired by priority of discovery and by force. The New Spain was becoming a lively reality when Old Spain took these suicidal weapons in hand.

It may be that Spain has in the course of her history been more persistent and fiercer in her internal conflicts. But if so the cause is to be found in history itself and in her geographical position. She is more isolated from the mainland mass of the Continent than even our own country, being in the south entirely African in character and more clearly divided from France in the north than Italy is from Germany. Hence it came about that while Spain shared in the movements and conflicts of the rest of Europe, they always assumed with her a special and generally a darker colour. Thus the contest between Christian and Musulman, which was European if not mondial, became for her an age-long, internal strife which in the end drained much of her best lifeblood. Then the fight of the rival faiths in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which concluded in Germany and England and finally in France with a tolerable peace, was brought to a disastrous end in Spain by the Inquisition, which further exhausted her intellectual strength. The present conflict is in many ways more terrible, and it has arisen in a world which, nominally and in theory, is organised to prevent such calamities.

There can be no doubt either of the connection of the Spanish civil war with general European movements or of the admitted right of other nations to take such action as they think best fitted to put an end to it. As the latter point may seem most doubtful, and is also most important in the practical aspect, it will be best to take it first.

Article II of the Covenant of the League of Nations declares that

any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. . . . It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

The two clauses of the article together cover any possible interpretation which might be put upon the international bearing of the Spanish war. For if it is said that, being a "civil" or internal conflict, it cannot be considered as affecting

any other member of the League beside Spain herself, the second clause provides the safeguard, for no one can question that it is a "circumstance threatening to disturb international peace" and, still more, the "good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." The authority, involving the duty, is there, in a document to which over fifty nations including ourselves have set their seal. The case is terrible and urgent, perhaps the gravest crime against humanity since the League was formed. Have we the will, the courage or the competence to put our hands to the task?

The methods of action would not be difficult to define, if the general will to take them were present. This is not the place to enter into details, some of which had been already tried before this was written. They fall naturally into the two great classes of (1) cutting off all external means of prosecuting the internecine strife, (2) promoting in every possible way humane intercourse and conciliation between the combatants. The plain duty of all other countries to do their utmost in both directions was at last recognised by the too tardy constitution of the London Committee, on the initiative of France and Great Britain. This is a slower and less well-organised way of attaining the same object which is contemplated in Article II of the Covenant of the League. Had the League been the complete and efficient thing which it was intended to be, the action now being supervised by the London Committee would have been taken weeks before and more thoroughly. For, as Mr. J. A. Spender pointed out in his broadcast address on August 17th, such a Committee, beginning with the obvious task of cutting off all war-like supplies, would inevitably go on to promoting peace. They would do so of their motion, if not restricted by too narrow terms of reference. Instead of receiving any such restricting terms, they should rather be encouraged to proceed on the paths of conciliation. Such was the spirit in which the great majority of the nations of the world signed the Covenant in 1920; this extemporised London Committee is only attempting to do, as best it may, what would have been done promptly and automatically had the League already realised the ideals of its founders.

But the Spanish war as a human tragedy must suggest other and more far-reaching thoughts to students of history and to workers for the harmonious progress of mankind. It has been said that we may see in Spain as in a distorted mirror

a reflection of the general movements in the European world. The truth of this epigram was illustrated above by one or two of the largest events in medieval and modern history. It will point the moral nearer home if we apply the same thought to more recent times. Spain felt the repercussions of the French Revolution, but she was not modernised by it, as France and England became in the nineteenth century. Above all, she never acquired a strong representative government, and the Church retained many privileges and a quite undue preponderance in the life, education and property of the country. Liberty of conscience, which had been a commonplace for many years in most other Western States, was only recognised by law in Spain in 1869, and even then only the minimum toleration for non-Catholic worship and education was accorded, and none at all for propaganda or outward signs of dissident faith. It is not surprising that this frame of mind left the mass of the population less well educated and more at the mercy of the Church and the large landowners than in any other of the great Western States. Italy, the nearest parallel to the Iberian peninsula, equally poor and in many parts equally ill-educated, had behind it the great tradition of renaissance science and was being steadily incorporated by the liberal power of Savoy, firmly seated in the north, while Spain was still being torn by the futile internal conflicts of clericals, constitutionalists, Carlists, Catalans, and the rest.

The obvious ideal would have been a federal union of the whole peninsula, in which Portugal as well as Catalonia would have taken their place, with as much freedom for local usages and language as they might desire, but united as a whole for general defence and the consolidation of interest. A great sovereign, a man similar, though even less powerful or statesmanlike than Louis XI, or Bismarck or Cavour, might have achieved this in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. Instead of this the sovereigns of that time—the emperor Charles V (Charles I of Spain) and his successors—were absorbed in foreign politics and adventure. Flanders and the New World were their bane, and an impoverished and distracted Spain in the twentieth century is their legacy.

There was a time when, dazzled by the territorial expanse of the Spanish sovereigns and the temporary flush of their New World gold, the rest of Europe feared and contested the hegemony of Spain. But the giant had feet of clay. When

once struck down, there was no recovery. For many years the foreigner has treated Spain always with interest and affection, often for exploitation, never with respectful attention and support.

The exploitation—not necessarily in an evil sense—introduced a large amount of foreign capital. Spanish mines have been worked largely under foreign direction and with foreign experts. Foreign workers followed, especially in Barcelona and some districts of the north. This new leaven was very susceptible to the revolutionary impulse from abroad which has been applied freely and persistently since the Bolsheviks came into power in Russia. Borrow selling his Bibles in Spain had but small effect. Communists and Anarchists, aiming not at good will but at subversion and class-war, have been the most active force in producing the present convulsion. The country called for wide reforms, and there was no reforming middle class strong enough to put them through over the heads of both vested interests and revolutionists, alike intractable.

It is not intended here, and it would be fruitless, to discuss whether a dictatorship is the best solution now. Primo de Rivera, who established himself in 1923, did not succeed in establishing the régime. In fact, his action at that time was a strong contributory cause of the present crisis. By superseding a would-be constitutional monarch, without the necessary strength or support for an autocratic rule, forces of disorder and disunion were encouraged. King Log had fallen, but King Stork had neither claws nor beak for the task. What the future will bring forth is still unknown, and the natural hope that a peaceful order with a free and united government may soon follow must be faint, however sincerely we may feel it. But of some things one may be sure, and our country should speak firmly on them, it is to be hoped with the hearty support of France and the large majority of other States, both in Europe and in the League of Nations as a whole.

When, either through fighting to a standstill or, better, through a negotiated truce, the present horrors come to an end, the united counsels of the nations should be bent towards preserving and consolidating that peace. To give strength to any provisional government which might arise, representing the mass of the Spanish people, it would be well worth while, or rather it would be a bounden duty, for us and for others to

make any sacrifice consistent with general security and peace. Could not some position of equivalent security be found for us on the African coast which would enable Gibraltar to be returned to a regenerated and united Spain? Every patriotic Spaniard has claimed it in his heart since first it was taken from them. No act possible on our part would do more to put courage and a new spirit into a restored Spain. Nothing, moreover, could do as much to win us the goodwill of that country and bind it to us in friendly and sympathetic union. And is it too much to say that something of the English spirit of compromise and general goodwill is what is most needed to heal her gaping wounds? If that could be infused, we should have deserved well, not only of Spain but of Europe and the world.

While the future is obscure, on another side of the question one may speak with more assurance. A most arresting object-lesson has been given to the world which can hardly fail of its effect in any country, even where passions of class or race or nationality are lashing men to blind fury, as, we will say, to-day in Palestine and yesterday in Jugoslavia. There is no such case where the differences could not be settled without bloodshed and to the general advantage, if the lesson of Spain were taken to heart. There, in the distorted and now broken mirror, men may see the tragic and hopeless issue of refusing to see the point of view of others, of exalting a narrow ideal above the common good and yielding to hatred as a motive force in place of the common human bonds which unite us all. The burden is heavy on those who for years have been busy injecting the poison of class-war into their veins, heavy also on those who have obstructed remedial measures which might have made the whole body politic more healthy.

Outside Spain, the clearest offenders in recent years have been Russia and Germany. In the former case, after an immeasurable tale of loss and agony, the Communist Power of the world seems now turning to ways of greater conciliation without and more personal freedom within. One hopes it may be so and that a more human ideal may prevail. In Germany, where the class-war was never allowed to gain the upper hand, another form of the persecution mania was deliberately cultivated in order to infuse into the depressed and distracted majority the enthusiasm thought necessary as a national force. It has been created, and Europe has now the danger

of a strongly and narrowly organised national multitude, encouraged to look round the world for enemies on whom to flesh their sword.

The tragedy of Spain would not be thrown away if it became to all of us a warning and a subject for compassionate and careful healing rather than another battlefield. Spain at least is no danger as an aggressive foe. She is an ancient and now deeply suffering member of the European family. She has suffered, largely from the selfish actions of her neighbours as well as from her own internal faults. But Europe needs her, the closest link we have with all the central and southern mass of the New World, which needs her also. The problem, therefore, of her restoration to a new strength and sanity is much more than merely Spanish or even European. It is a human problem in the fullest sense. Her history, going back to the remotest times and rich with the remains of pre-history, is one of the most varied and instructive in human annals. Her language is probably still the second most widely diffused in the world. Her children across the Atlantic are at the moment holding their own on terms of greater amity and equality with the Anglo-Saxons of the north than ever before. Humanity calls aloud for a free and peaceful Spain, playing her part worthily in the fellowship of mankind.

F. S. MARVIN.

II

The daily news of slaughter and devastation in the Peninsula comes home with special poignancy to those who have recently visited it, whose memories are still haunted by the strange beauty of the Andalusian landscape, the luxuriance of the "Costa Brava" and of the Balearic Isles, the picturesque attractiveness of the Basque country in the north, the stark but colourful severity of Castile and Aragon, by the glories of the Prado, the peaceful beauty of Aranjuez and the grim, titanic dignity of the Alcazar of Toledo.

But when your work lies there, and the place-names that figure so prominently in the papers are knit up with recent human and spiritual associations, the sense of tragedy is deepened.

Since the beginning of this year it has been my lot to visit Burgos and Bilbao, to pay homage, incidentally, to the relic of the famous Oak of Guernica, where the first President of the new-made Basque Republic has just been installed; to visit from Madrid Toledo and the Escorial at the foot of the much-named Guadarrama range; to travel by motor-bus from Gibraltar to Algeciras, and through San Roque and Estepona to Malaga; from Malaga along the wonderful coast road—a “Corniche” without its vulgarity—to Almeria, and thence through a tawny wilderness to Cartagena; from Cartagena, by Guardamare and Elche, to Alicante, and from Alicante through vast orange groves to Valencia; and finally, in May, to visit Barcelona and drive thence on a spiritual mission 150 miles into the foothills of the Pyrenees, where are scattered, under British management, the multiple sources of the hydro-electric power by which industrial Cataluña lives. Jeréz, too, was visited, where, owing to what they count good fortune in the early dominance of the “Junta” forces, our English group can still carry on its sherry business without interruption; and Seville, where one of our diocesan workers, cooped in a wandering rescue boat on the Guadalquivir, found himself subjected to the cross-fire of the two contending parties.

The wanton destruction of treasures of art and architecture fills one with desolation, and one hopes against hope that the accounts will prove exaggerated. Is the famous Bridge of Cordova ruined? Does the Giralda Tower no longer rise in calm majesty above its orange grove? Will the Prado go up in smoke? Is Malaga a mere heap of shapeless ruins? What of Granada, where Moorish eyes will again look on the Alhambra?

Already at Easter time, before the Civil War had begun, the ruins of burnt-out churches thrust themselves upon the eye in most of the larger towns along the Andalusian coast. When our people left Malaga as refugees, there was reason to believe that our little Anglican churches were practically the only places of worship left intact. What will happen to Barcelona—surely in some ways the most beautiful city in the Peninsula, if not on the whole Mediterranean seaboard—if the war penetrates so far? The wrangling forces that now hold it, and have made it a shambles, threaten, we are told, to blow it up completely if it is besieged.

Signs of unrest were already abundant in May last. The populace was getting out of hand. There were many stories of irresponsible shootings. One was warned to travel without a clerical collar, though as yet not everyone who wore a collar of any sort was marked down for destruction. Our people engaged in business undertakings found their employees, at the instigation of agitators, making more and more impossible demands. But the big trouble that was expected at Easter was deferred with the postponement of the municipal elections, and our journeys were only hampered by an occasional General Strike. Some say that a nation-wide “St. Bartholomew” was planned for July 29th, and that the Insurgent offensive earlier in the month was an anticipatory act of self-defence. Be that as it may, I left Barcelona by aeroplane on May 14th with the conviction that things had to get worse before they could be better, but with no idea of the horrors that were to be let loose so soon.

Our British colonies, with whom my business lay, were carrying on bravely in face of incredible difficulties. They handled the situation with extraordinary patience and fair-mindedness, sympathising, as always, with their workpeople, and convinced of the very real grievances of the proletarian population: yet convinced at the same time that the way along which they were being herded was not the way of salvation. Our people, in fact, were filling the rôle which we of the Diocese of Gibraltar believe to have been allotted by a kind Providence to our British *Diaspora* in Mediterranean lands: that of a kindly, steadying influence, and a force for peace and for international friendship. Conspicuously was this noticeable in the mines: in Bilbao in the north, at Centenillo in Don Quixote's country, at Rio Tinto and Tharsis in the south. Nor was it wanting in Valencia, with the Lecrin Co. at Almeria, with the Water Co. at Cartagena, and in the great hydro-electric concern at Barcelona. “To do justice and to love mercy”—with all modesty be it said—is somehow in the blood of our people. And though their influence is temporarily withdrawn, one cannot but feel that its reactions will be working again as soon as Spain becomes once more a land fit for Britons to live in.

When will that be? And how can victor and vanquished—whichever side wins—settle down to co-operate when the struggle is over? There is much to deplore on both sides, but

there is also much to admire : the appalling bloodshed and the amazing idealistic heroism ; the pathetic failure of a well-meaning President, a gentle litterateur enamoured of his country, in face of the overwhelming onrush of anarchy ; the unspeakable atrocities unwillingly fathered by a convinced and selfless Communist leader ; the agony of the lovers of " Old Spain " at the massacre of their friends and relatives and the insults heaped on their religion, that has brought together Monarchist and Moderate Republicans, Alfonsists and Carlists to combat what is to them the negation of all they hold sacred. The fearless heroism of the untrained bands and of the Asturian miners on the one side and of the immortal defenders of the Alcazar on the other presents us with a spectacle worthy of Spain's greatest days. This is surely a good augury for the future ? And there is another. The Spaniard, if cruel and ruthless when his blood is up, is at bottom a kindly creature, and has not a long memory for vengeance. There is, therefore, no danger of a smouldering fire of vendetta for generations to come, which would drain the life of the country like an open sore. The Spaniard, as has been said, resembles his favourite *Toro* : dignified and harmless when unprovoked, but dangerous when he sees red. Both sides just now see red—or should we say " Red " ?—though they see it from different angles.

LONSDALE RAGG,
Archdeacon of Gibraltar.

THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD AND SOCIAL IDEALS.

THE inner meaning of a spiritual movement is revealed above all in its characteristic life. It is to be estimated by its governing ideals, by what it does, and what it seeks to become. Its originating cause, its final expression, and the process by which it advances to this fulfilment constitute the unity by which it is to be explained and valued. A great movement is interpreted, but not created, by its formal articles of belief and rules of conduct, for spiritual apprehension, urge and influence lie deeper and are more comprehensive than the intellectual formularies by which its adherents are educated and held together. Its spiritual apprehension and consequent conception of the meaning of life and reality alone reach to the inmost springs of activity, inspiring, fashioning and directing its endeavours. Hence, the Christian Faith, and indeed all religions, must be estimated and judged by their history, by the place they hold in the revelation of Truth and the development of mankind.

At every stage of human development—whether primitive or advanced—Religion and the Humanities have acted and reacted upon one another. But Religion, just because it has arisen out of the depths of human nature, has been in the past the more active and constraining force, whether impelling or inhibiting, whether exerting a personal influence or providing a social bond.

Our modern civilisation has been reared upon the slowly growing sense of the value of human personalities, of the worth of human society, and of these as vitally bound up together. Religious influences have played an immense part in bringing about this valuation and conjunction. In so far as they have done so, this result has only been possible because religious faith has become so deeply spiritual as to foster and fashion personality, so strictly moral as to reverence personal rights and interests, so rational as to provide collective guidance both immediately practical and reflective, in order that the meaning of the fundamental principles that should govern personal relations may be understood and their application to actual conditions may be growingly effected. It follows from all this that the Idea of God has of necessity been the key to all endeavours to bring a Christian civilisation

into being. A truly catholic Theism, of religion and thought, has been essential to comprehensiveness of progressive activity. It may be justly claimed that, despite all the disappointing features of its history, the Christian Faith has, by its very nature, been philanthropic. Its Founder "went about doing good." Its characteristic precept was "to do good and to communicate forget not; for with such sacrifices God is well pleased." Its greatest Apostle spoke of "the philanthropy of God," and reminded his hearers that our Lord had said, "It is more blessed to give than to receive." Its final theological statement was "God is love." Its typical description of the relationship of God to men was in terms of Fatherhood and Sonship. That this relationship involved universal brotherhood was set forth by its closely knit unity of Eucharist, fellowship, and preaching, for the proclamation of the Gospel was directed towards realising such unity of mankind in Christ as to bring all men into the intimacy of fellowship of which the Eucharist was the outstanding sign and seal. The standing order of the Church was, "Let us do good unto all men; and specially unto them that are of the household of faith," the prior claim of the latter being due, not to mere preference, but to intimacy of relationship, with its obligations and opportunities. The fundamental belief of the Christian Faith is that mankind is potentially one community, that this community is to have its earnest in the life of the Church, and that its universal realisation is to be brought about, not only on humanitarian grounds, but because, as St. Paul said, God is "the Father, from whom every family in heaven and earth is named," that is to say that the Fatherhood of God is the organic cause of consequent and corresponding family relationships of His creatures in Him.

The history of the Church, despite all the failures and betrayals by which its course has been disfigured, shows that whenever the meaning of the Christian Faith has been realised, its original spirit has revived. As the influence of Christianity increased, Christian leaders sought to modify Roman Law by humaner principles, created ministries of help and healing, amazed the pagan population by remaining at their posts in times of plague when others fled, in order to help the stricken. St. Ambrose withstood the Roman Emperor, Theodosius, and prevented him from entering the

cathedral Church of Milan until he had done public penance for his massacre of the Thessalonians. In subsequent ages the Religious Orders not only kept alive the torch of learning, but taught, healed and helped their neighbours, seeking to soften and transform the barbarous invaders of the Empire and to remedy the disorders that arose from their violence and from the chaos that ensued. The tragedy that marked even these priceless services lay in the fact that owing to the prevailing decay of faith and disorder of life, the essential duties of all Christians became the almost exclusive concern of Religious Orders instead of the social service of the whole body of the Church.

In view of these outstanding features of primitive and subsequent Christianity, it is essential that we should realise that the humane inspiration and achievements that have been due to the Christian Faith have been entirely dependent upon the Idea of God. To those who are the inheritors of the Christian tradition it may seem easy to say "God is love," whether this belief be held and acted upon or not. Its consequence in deepening the sense of the sacredness and possibilities of individual men and of human society may be lightly accepted and carelessly assumed. Yet both the belief that "God is love" and the acceptance of its humane implications are entirely dependent upon such an idea of God in Himself and in His relationship to the universe as enables this affirmation to be made with any adequate recognition of what is meant by and involved in love.

In respect of this necessary condition it is safe to affirm that the foundation of Christianity is to be found in the Old Testament, and that, of all the religions of the world, only that of Moses and the Prophets could supply the essential basis not only of Christian Faith but of its characteristic social service. From this special as well as from a more general standpoint, St. Augustine was amply justified in saying that "in the Old Testament the New lies hid," and that "in the New Testament the Old lies open." Christianity is the outcome of Hebrew and Jewish presuppositions, and without them the sense that the service of God and the service of man are indissolubly connected would never have come into being. The significance of human personality and its social consequences were realised in and through the idea of God as Supreme Personality, as adorable because of His

spiritual and ethical perfection, and as so creatively sovereign that He is at once the fatherly source and end, the law and the life of His creatures. Every stage of Old Testament revelation contributed to this result, as may be briefly shown.

1. It is the fashion to depreciate early Hebrew religion as mere tribalism, because God was set forth as "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob, the God of our fathers." That this conception was primitive and imperfect goes without saying. Yet the emphasis it laid upon the Personality both of God and of the patriarchs, upon His comradely leadership over them and their concerns, and upon the living bond that united Him and them under His directive and fostering Providence, laid the indispensable foundation of religious faith, not as cosmic explanation—the result of a primitive philosophy—but as living experience of a personal relationship, in which the Self-giving of God made Him not only supreme over, but "deeply interfused" with individual men and with their society, if only tribal. Their life as a tribal family was grounded in God, and the fathers stood in personal fellowship with Him. The inwardness and homeliness of this faith made it the indispensable foundation of all that followed in advancing revelation and spiritual consciousness.

2. The next movement of the development is to be found in Mosaism, the religion of the Covenant. This stage again emphasised the Personality of God, for it was in the exercise of His sovereign freedom that He chose Israel for a unique relationship to Himself. That relationship was morally conditioned by the Ten Commandments, which, in uniting the exclusive service of God with the duties of man, gave an indirect, but striking, suggestion of the character of God. The Personality of God in the exercise of His sovereign freedom thus displayed in the Covenant was extended to the doctrine of His Creatorship. "In the beginning God *created* the heavens and the earth." The Universe is not the emanation of His Being, but the effect of His purposive Will. Supreme and free personality is, therefore, the master fact of the universe, and is truly, though imperfectly, reflected by the development of personality in men.

3. It remained for the revelation and religion of the Old Testament to characterise the Personality of God, whose supremacy over His people sprang out of His creative

sovereignty of the universe. This was accomplished by the great prophetic succession of which Deuteronomy, Amos, Hosea and Isaiah are the outstanding and living monuments. In particular, the righteousness of God was proclaimed by Amos, His mercy, tenderness and patience by Hosea, and these were so combined in the great prophecies of Isaiah as to furnish the material for the sublime theism of Isaiah xl, in which the Old Testament doctrine of God—of His character, His creatorship, and His relationships to the universe and mankind—was summed up in the magnificent display of His glory as consisting in the free and unfailing Self-giving of His grace.

When Old Testament religion at its best proclaimed the Divine demand, "Be ye holy, for I am holy," it presented the full prophetic connotation of the fatherly sovereignty of God—His righteousness, mercy and humanity—as the moral and social standard for man and the lasting meaning of true religion. It was as the consummation and transcendent conservation of all this that our Lord, speaking out of His unique consciousness of Divine Sonship, gave to Mankind the Lord's Prayer, addressed to "our Father, which art in Heaven," and reaching its climax in the petition, "Thy kingdom come, as in heaven, so on earth." It was in the light of all this that St. Paul spoke of our Lord as "the Image of God." It was because of this revelation and fulfilment that the idea of God furnished to Christianity its ideals of social service, its standards and its aims. They could be drawn from no other religious source, sustained by no other faith, and inspired by no lower or lesser meaning. Polytheism, however brilliant it became in the literature rather than the religion of ancient Greece, could give no such guidance and inspiration to social development, because the gods were overshadowed by impersonal Destiny, because, at the best, they were imperfectly ethicised, because of the limitations of their respective spheres, and because of their conflicting characteristics. Even the growing ascendancy of Zeus was, in this respect, unavailing; for he never completely transcended the naturalism of his origin, which stood in the way of his ever becoming a supremely spiritual and ethical ideal.

Similarly, Indian religious philosophy, however mystical, and neo-Platonism, however profound, could supply no such social inspiration, because the impersonality of supreme

Deity was incompatible with any adequate realisation of the reality, meaning and worth either of human personalities, or, therefore, of the possibilities of their society.

All these defects have stood in the way of social progress, instead of furthering it, since the lack of ethical content in theology and religion must always hinder the due recognition alike of the claims of human personality, wherever and however imperfectly it exists, and of the nature of human society, as the ever-growing fellowship of free personalities. Only the faith of the sovereign Personality of God and of His free Self-giving as the source and the significance of human personality can avail to give the ideal of social service. It is just the emphasis so laid by Hebrew religion, as fulfilled in the Christian Faith, that has made the ideal of a truly Christian civilisation the foundation upon which religion and citizenship can go hand in hand, and upon which they can securely rest. Christian ethics, if their principles be fully embraced and their essential presuppositions be accepted, are the only means of social safety, stability, and progress. They are so deeply founded in reason and reality that, instead of ossifying past traditions, they call men to the adventurous reflection that will guide and stimulate courageous endeavours to transform an imperfect and unsatisfactory civilisation in their light.

It is impossible, within the limits of this article, to trace the consequences of the Christian inheritance throughout the chequered course of history. It must suffice briefly to indicate what influence it has exercised in the social development of England in recent times. Three stages are particularly noteworthy.

1. It has been a commonplace, not only of religious but of social historians, to attribute the rise of our modern philanthropy as being largely due to the influence of the Methodist and Evangelical Revival during the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century. Throughout that period the callousness and hardness of preceding centuries, with their shocking consequences, were only slowly giving way to the rising temper of humanitarian sympathy and remedial beneficence. The social significance of Methodism arose from the fact that the spiritual transformation of John and Charles Wesley, with their fresh vision of the grace of God, manifested in the Cross of Christ, tended steadily and surely to substitute

the supremacy of Divine and universal love for the austere conception of the sovereignty of God, as magnifying His inscrutable will and the external authority of His law. The supremacy of universal love was the dominant note of Charles Wesley's greatest hymns, and accounted for the breadth and downrightness of John Wesley's precept, "Do all the good that you can, in all the ways that you can, to all the people that you can." The main stress was laid upon the Cross of Christ, as displaying the merciful and costly pity of God and His "will that all men should be saved." Hence the ignorant, the depraved and the outcast were brought into the forefront of remedial efforts, which were not only spiritual and moral, but humane. It followed from this emphasis on Divine mercy that the chief activities of evangelical philanthropy were directed to the remedy of obvious evils, and were palliative rather than reconstructive.

This drawback has been pointed out and severely criticised by recent historians, notably by Mr. and Mrs. J. L. Hammond. Yet certain qualifying considerations should be borne in mind. At the time of the Evangelical Revival, physical science and its practical applications were in their infancy; social science was non-existent. Democracy was unborn, and the organisation of government, both national and local, was comparatively primitive. It was under these disabilities that the Industrial Revolution came about, unprecedented, un-ordered, individualist and unmanageable. Individual enterprise reigned supreme, uninformed by knowledge and uncontrolled by the nascent, and as yet powerless, sense of community. The inherited love of liberty and intolerance of governmental interference affected all classes of society. Amid all these disabilities only palliative action was possible, only voluntary and spasmodic action was practicable. What the Revival supplied was a new and widely diffused motive and momentum, as an incentive, together with limited practical efforts as an example. These initiating influences prepared the way for the epoch-making work of the great Lord Shaftesbury, who, himself an evangelical, carried over the humane influences of the Revival with its voluntary efforts into the realm of Parliamentary discussion and national legislation. This fuller, though imperfect, recognition of the responsibility of the State for the condition of the people was growingly promoted by the advent of democracy, the reform of Parliament,

the rise of popular local government, backed by the advance both of physical and of social science.

2. Then, in the middle of the nineteenth century, came Maurice, Kingsley and the Christian Socialists. They transferred the main emphasis from the Cross to the Incarnation of Christ. This they interpreted, in the light of St. Paul's teaching, as meaning that the eternal Son of God is the root and ground of the community of mankind which has been spiritually constituted in and unto Him. Universal brotherhood was based upon the Divine sonship of mankind, as constitutive of a universal commonwealth, to be progressively realised throughout the entire realm of human life. Hence the essential values of individuals in the fellowship of society were to be realised by reconstructive effort, embracing all the concerns of human nature in due proportion, and substituting co-operation for competition, sharing for dividing, in every sphere of life. And all this, because the pattern of the earthly commonwealth was "laid up in heaven."

3. Lastly, and as the result of both these spiritual movements, came the ascendancy of the doctrine of the universal Fatherhood of God with all its social and world-wide implications. In passing, it should be observed that this doctrine, if taken in the shallow sense of popular impressions, bristles with difficulties in view of the hard fact of human life. It is only when the Fatherhood of God is conceived in the fullness of its New Testament setting that even the hard facts of the human situation can be interpreted in the light of far-reaching and profound, though austere, spiritual and moral considerations. When thus apprehended, however, the doctrine at once emphasises the sanctity, the rights and the responsibilities of each, together with the family relationship of all mankind. Were this realised and fully applied, selfishness, whether of individual, national or international life would be banished, with the consequent establishment of righteousness, self-giving, and, therefore, peaceful co-operation throughout the entire range of human interests and needs.

Thus the historic order of development should now be reversed. The Fatherhood of God with the sonship and brotherhood of mankind should be foremost. This root fact should be interpreted in the clear light of its full revelation in Christ. His Cross should be the example and inspiration of a sacrificial self-giving, the prevalence of which is the costly

but only remedy of the emergencies of life, whether individual or collective. These can become universally beneficent, in so far as they call out the remedial services of brotherhood, and also minister to the substitution of the pursuit of the highest values for the easy-going materialism which prefers animal comfort to the pursuit and attainment of Eternal Life.

This last consideration should be the incentive to a new Christian endeavour. The present situation tends to create a mistaken demand for the omnipotence of the State, and for the transformation of human life by external and mechanical applications of remedies from without. Personality is the supreme fact and should be the supreme consideration of all social service, whether of the State or of voluntary effort. Personality must be evoked, stimulated and sustained if social salvation is to be wrought out. Even the most helpless and forlorn of men must become "fellow-workers" with God, and then with the State and one another, if mankind is not to be destroyed by the very process of delivering it. It remains true that "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even your faith." The conservation and fulfilment of human personality, and therefore of human society, is dependent upon the Sovereign Personality of God our Father, and therefore of our founding and finding ourselves and our brethren in Him.

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

THE BREAKING-POINT FOR NANKING.

EVER since I first came to the Far East, now sixteen summers ago, there has been conflict of varying nature between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China, and at no time has the threat of war between the two entirely disappeared from the horizon. During most of this period serious warfare in the modern sense would have been impossible, so unequally matched would disorganised, disrupted and largely corrupt China have been against the highly efficient military unit and cohesive nation that is Japan. The outbreak of hostilities would have meant no more than a Japanese punitive military expedition to the continent, which would have moved through whatever opposition China might have offered as easily as a modern mowing-machine cuts through a field of ripened wheat. This fact was well demonstrated, I believe, by the ease with which the Japanese armies poured through the length and breadth of Manchuria in 1931 and 1932 and on down to the Great Wall and almost to the gates of old Peking, where they voluntarily called a halt.

That situation has changed, a truth perceptible to anyone who visits the China of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to-day, particularly if he was intimately familiar with the China of the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin and the China of Marshal Wu Pei-fu a decade and more ago. It is difficult to set a definite date for the beginning of this change, but perhaps as good a starting-point for it as any was the victorious northward march of the forces of the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek in 1926 and 1927 and on into 1928 and 1929 when Peking fell to the then Southerners, and the life of the formidable War Lord of Manchuria went out as his train was bombed in a still unexplained catastrophe just as it was about to enter the safety of Mukden. To this date must certainly be added at least two more, one of them being Chiang Kai-shek's decided and almost irrevocable break with his Communist advisers and allies in the spring of 1927, and the other being September 18th, 1931, the night on which was launched the continental policy Japan has since pursued.

A striking demonstration of this change on the part of China and the Chinese while still in its early stages and long before it had reached its present proportions was afforded by what is euphoniously dubbed the Shanghai Incident of 1932.

The world at large, and probably Japan, too, and most certainly the Government of China, expected as easy and decisive a victory for the arms of Japan at Shanghai once the die had been cast as had been achieved by the soldiers of Nippon on the plains and in the mountains of Manchuria. The stubborn and effective resistance offered by the Nineteenth Route Army of China came as a complete surprise to everyone who thought that he knew China, including most of the Chinese themselves. If Chiang Kai-shek had expected Chinese soldiers to make so good a showing he would certainly have supported the Nineteenth Route Army in some manner and so have come in for a share of its glory. The Shanghai Incident was liquidated after weeks of comparatively indecisive fighting and without adding greatly to the lustre of the Japanese Army, although technically the palm of victory went to Tokyo. To borrow terms from the sporting world, Japan may be said to have secured a technical knockout at Shanghai.

There can be little question that the stand made at Shanghai against the Japanese did more to put heart into the Chinese millions than any event which had taken place since the humiliating defeat of the Boxer rising more than three decades previously cowed even the fiery old Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi. Coupled with this have come other factors which to-day make China a potentially formidable foe which Japan has to take into consideration in formulating its China policy.

I have scant use for war mongers nor do I care to join their ranks, primarily because I see no approaching war between Japan and China—or between Japan and any other Power—as an inevitable development of the immediate or the distant future. But it seems to me that I do see two things clearly: the very real possibility of such a war if present trends continue, and the fact that a Sino-Japanese war now would be, roughly, a repetition of the Shanghai Incident on a grand scale. It would result in a victory for Japan, of course, but a victory which would bring no real gain, would destroy what Japan needs most in its relations with China, and would prove so costly to the Empire economically and otherwise that it would require years for Japan to regain the ground lost by so drastic a setback.

With Japan's avowed ultimate objective in China, that of genuine friendship and co-operation in all phases of

Sino-Japanese relationships, there can be only the profoundest sympathy on the part of any decent human being, be he Japanese, Chinese, American, or of any other nationality. It is some of the methods that Japan is utilising in the application of its China policy, perhaps most of them at this particular moment, that arouse apprehension regarding the possibility of war. They are such that they seem destined to defeat their own end. They are such that, unless modified, the Nanking Government will reach the breaking-point and war will be the only alternative that the Central Government there can envisage. The Nanking breaking-point, not in the words used by any Chinese leader but in its simplest form is this: "When Japanese pressure becomes so great, or Japanese demands become so exorbitant that to yield to them means that the present Government of China will be forced out of office by the power of Chinese domestic opinion, then the Nanking Government will resist Japan, even if it means war." Better to go down fighting than to go down ingloriously any way, they reason.

The Nanking breaking-point being ascertained, the dual question arises as to what forces are driving Nanking toward that point and whether they will succeed in doing so, with which is coupled the interesting problem of what preparation China may be making for such an eventuality. There is a constantly reiterated demand in Japan for the "establishment" of a fundamental China policy which can be adhered to if not for a century at least for a considerable period of years. This can only mean that no such policy at present exists. As a matter of fact, Japan has not one but a half-dozen or so China policies, and at this moment one is in the saddle while at the next moment still another is directing Japanese activity on the continent. There is the policy of the extreme militarists—and let it be said here that this is not the policy of the entire Army by any means, nor are all of those advocating it wearing a military uniform. This is the policy which is most offensive to China, and quite rightly so, for it rides roughshod over all considerations save that of subjecting China to Japan's will. It is ill-considered and it is blindly unthinking. It bears within itself the seeds of its own death, for it cannot possibly achieve its objective. Neither Japan nor any other nation could do in China what the advocates of this policy seek to do, and certainly not by the methods they

champion and actually put into practice except when restrained by some other of Japan's semi-conflicting China policies.

There is the China policy of what, for want of a better term, may be called the moderate militarists. Its formulators and chief advocates are Japanese Army men, but they find many supporters in the foreign service and other walks of life. They are obsessed, as all good professional military men in every country must be, with the dominating idea of making the defences of their country so impregnable that no foreign foe need be feared. Consequently, they look upon China primarily from the strategic point of view, but they are broad-minded and intelligent enough to realise that this must take into consideration economic factors, the friendliness or antagonism of the resident population and other factors which enter into a military situation quite as much as do possession of soil and armaments.

When it comes to the China policy of Japan's business world, not one but two schools of thought are found. One is for genuine economic co-operation, for a side-by-side working partnership in developing the economic resources and markets of China, in increasing that country's productive and purchasing power in a manner which will prove beneficial to both Japan and China. The opposite school of thought sees in the economic development of China, particularly in that nation's industrialisation, the death knell to Japan's industrial future as a world Power. With an industrialised China, they sincerely believe, Japan would be in a far worse plight than any other nation has been placed in through Japan's own industrialisation. Consequently they are ruthless in their methods to stifle Chinese industrialisation at its birth, to hold China in economic bondage to Japan at any cost. It is this school of thought and action, coupled with that of the extreme militarists, that the bitterest critics of China mean when they attack Japan's China policy. They entirely neglect all the other China policies which are struggling for supremacy within Japan (and there are still other policies than those here briefly outlined).

And yet it is not one or any of these China policies in itself which will bring on a Sino-Japanese war if such a war comes at all. It is the methods its practitioners apply in striving to reach their end that will drive the Nanking Government to

the breaking-point unless both policy and method are modified, a task which a considerable section of Japan is striving mightily to accomplish. It would be as foolish to predict that the China policy of the extremists will continue and win out now as it would have been foolish to predict that the friendly China policy enunciated and put into practice by Baron K. Shidehara some ten years ago would never be altered.

Some of the concrete actions that are so irritating to China are worthy of mention. Chief among them is insistence that the Nanking Government officially recognise the independence of Manchoukuo. Nanking knows that Manchoukuo is lost to it for many years to come if not forever, but the Chinese public would never tolerate the admission of this clear fact by its Government. Any Government so foolish as to extend diplomatic recognition to Hsinking would find itself out of office by nightfall, literally kicked and booted out of the Government buildings by an inflamed mob if no other method availed. This would, of course, defeat its own end, for the ensuing Government would immediately repudiate such recognition.

The personal conduct of some of the Japanese soldiers is a far more serious matter. Not all of them, not a majority perhaps, but still enough to colour the whole Japanese army in the eyes of the Chinese adopt an arrogant attitude, and commit minor atrocities that to the Chinese are neither excusable nor forgivable. Certain Japanese and Korean civilians, known as China *Ronin*, are much greater offenders than are the Japanese military, but the military are prone to give protection to their unwarranted activities and so receive their due share of Chinese hatred. Now and again a Japanese is murdered somewhere in China, and at once Japan makes it an international incident and an affront to the entire Japanese Empire. The whole force, potentially, of the Japanese army and the Japanese navy is put behind this one minor victim until one would think that a capital ship had been blown up at the least. What possible reaction to this other than an increased hatred and contempt of Japan can the Chinese people have? Ordinary murder cases are to be dealt with by civilian courts of justice, not by navies.

Still more serious harm is being caused by the extensive smuggling activities being carried on in China, not with the connivance of the Japanese Government but certainly with no attempt being made by Tokyo to put a stop to them. This

smuggling, by paying the reduced tariff duties of the small-scale East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government with headquarters at Tungchow which is in open rebellion against Nanking, may be called "special trade," as it is called by its apologists, but the name used does not alter the fact that through it the Chinese import business is being ruined and the Nanking Government is being confronted with an increasingly difficult financial problem. The methods resorted to by the smugglers and the way in which the Chinese authorities are prevented in dealing with them by force greatly enhance the bitterness and hatred created. The present smuggling is doing more to breed deep-seated and implacable hatred of Japan among Chinese of all classes and in all parts of the country than anything else that has occurred there, including armed invasion. It touches them in two very vital spots—the pocket-book and loss of "face." "This," they say, "is not a dignified insult," and the whole world knows the Chinese sees red at loss of dignity.

Japan's most frequently stated defence of those parts of its China policy which evoke criticism and condemnation is that the Chinese are "insincere," and that there is no hope of a moderation as long as anti-Japanese sentiment and anti-Japanese movements are rampant in China, as they unquestionably are. What, apparently, Japan either fails to see, or refuses to acknowledge if it is perceived, is that this anti-Japanese sentiment, these various anti-Japanese movements are directly traceable to concrete Japanese action which has provoked them. There is no fine point here of whether the chick or the egg came first; in every case an anti-Japanese movement has followed directly upon some Japanese activity which, in Chinese eyes, could only be regarded as an aggressive encroachment upon China's natural and inalienable rights. This can be traced step by step from the early and violent student outbursts against Japan when the Tokyo Government sought to retain as its own the special privileges in Shantung that Germany had extorted from Imperial China by threat of force, and which Japan had in turn wrested from Germany at the point of the bayonet during the early years of the World War, on down through every anti-Japanese demonstration in China to the latest one that the cables have reported.

The only way in which anti-Japanese sentiment can be

cured and anti-Japanese movements in China effectively stopped is by the removal of the causes provoking them. This would necessitate certain changes in Japan's China policy and the abandonment of certain methods in its application. Instead of adopting this course, Tokyo insists that the Nanking Government suppress all anti-Japanese movements. Suppressed they can be—by force, if the Nanking Government has sufficient power—but it will only be suppression and not cure. Enough bayonets and police clubs can force anti-Japanese feeling beneath the surface and prevent any overt display of it, but it emphatically cannot be killed thus, merely stilled. The only way in which it can be actually ended is by the eradication of incidents upon which it feeds, by the stoppage of the causes which provoke it into activity. Genuine friendship in practice rather than merely in speech will have to be substituted for those acts which inspire Chinese enmity toward Japan if that enmity is to be actually eliminated.

There is no certainty that Tokyo will not moderate its methods in China and that Nanking will ever be pushed to the breaking-point, but from Nanking's standpoint it must take into consideration the possibility that war will become inevitable, and it is unquestionably so doing. While striving to meet Japan's wishes so far as is compatible with its own internal policy, it is likewise taking every step possible in preparation for an eventual armed struggle. Something of what is being done and of what Chinese strategy would be was revealed to me in Nanking with no other injunction than that the sources were not to be quoted. They are, however, unimpeachable sources of information.

Japan is fully conscious—quite as conscious as China wishes her to be—of how China is building up its air force. The Japanese Empire is more timid of the air at present than the United Kingdom is of submarines, and China is taking full advantage of this fact. Some of the younger and hotter bloods in China cherish the illusion that a war with Japan would be fought and won in the air. That is sheer nonsense, and the older heads, those who would be directing military policy, hold no such fallacious views. They do realise that an air raid or so on Japanese cities might have tremendous psychological effect that would be advantageous to them, and they think it possible they might thus do some minor damage not so much to the cities as to power-generating plants and sources of

water supply. Apart from these comparatively trivial gains, they realise that the chief use of the air service would be psychological, as scout-observers and in sinking Japanese naval shipping in China waters. Nanking concedes, however, that Japan could and would effectively blockade the China coast. This would be given up without any more of a struggle than would be necessary to maintain Chinese morale. The capital would be withdrawn to some undisclosed point in the interior, and if necessary withdrawn again and again. China possesses a continent into which its capital can retreat in the future as it has done in the past in time of trouble.

Because the coastal ports would be closed and contact with the outside world as at present maintained be terminated, the Nanking Government is literally working day and night to develop means of communication with other Powers by land routes. This is being done north-westward through Outer Mongolia with Soviet Russia, south-eastward through the French colonial possessions with the sea coast, and south-westward through Burmah, again to the sea. The ambition that Great Britain has long cherished to secure a concession for building a railway from the Burmese border into China, one branch running to Hankow and the other to the head of summer navigation on the Yangtze at Chungking, would probably be realised in a moment now if Nanking dared grant such a concession. It does not dare because it knows that to do so would bring such pressure from Japan against the concession as to precipitate the breaking-point immediately, and not only is Nanking not ready for armed warfare but it hopes that it may never come.

Not all of the measures that the Nanking Government is taking in preparation are military in nature by any means. Through means of the radio, for the first time in all history, the people of all China can be reached by the Government. A receiving set and loud-speaker is being installed in every village and hamlet under Nanking's control, and that is now virtually the whole of China south of the Yellow River. A single speech given in the necessary number of dialects, and the people of all China can be roused. They are now being roused. The Japanese public may be ignorant of what Japan is doing on the continent, but not so the Chinese public. Every Japanese encroachment or objectionable act is being made the most of, and the result is that a very genuine,

deep-seated and universal anti-Japanese spirit exists among the Chinese of all classes, even down to the coolies and peasants. This means, of course, that as the superior Japanese armies pursued the retreating Chinese forces farther and farther into the interior in a sort of guerilla warfare they would be passing through a densely settled country with a hostile populace that knows well how to harass a foe without going to sufficient lengths to be hanged therefor. A Japanese advance up the Yangtze Valley, for instance, would not resemble the march into Northern Manchuria nearly five years ago by any means.

So far as actual armed force is concerned, report has it that about two million Chinese are under arms. Of these, many are not controlled by the Nanking Government, although the recent defeat of the Provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi has materially strengthened the Central Government's army. According to the best efforts I could make, I found General Chiang Kai-shek has roughly 400,000 well-equipped and comparatively well-drilled and disciplined men on whose unwavering loyalty he can depend under all conditions. To them must be added approximately the same number of provincial troops, neither quite so well armed nor trained, who would in all probability stick by him through thick and thin if the foe in sight were Japan. The air corps is in addition to these 800,000 men. That is a by no means inconsiderable army.

In the field of constructive enterprise the progress made by the Nanking Government during the past five years approaches the unbelievable. Despite disbelievers to the contrary, there is a genuine, ardent and very effective spirit of patriotism throughout large masses of the Chinese people. This is attributable to several causes, chief among which are united opposition to the worst phases of Japan's China policy, to the utilisation of the radio by the Government and to the very concrete improvements the Government has brought about in the lives of the masses. These include a spread of education, the promotion of public health and similar modern practices. Another of the almost incredible accomplishments of the Nanking Government has been the reform and stabilisation of the currency.

There is a growing conviction within Japan that Nanking, in anticipation of war, is making a series of alliances and semi-alliances with Western Powers. The rumour of a secret Soviet-Chinese military alliance is an old and persistent one and may

be correct. It seems no more reasonable, because no more necessary, than the equally prevalent rumour of a secret German-Japanese alliance. Why should either Moscow or Nanking bind itself in advance to come to the aid of the other in the event of armed conflict with Tokyo when it could always take this action or not in accordance with its own best interests of the moment once war did break out? Moscow and Nanking should be given credit for seeing this as plainly as anyone else.

Where the danger lies, then, is that in the application of a China policy dictated by the extremist school of thought by Japan, Nanking will be driven unwillingly to this breaking-point where the Government sees no feasible alternative other than war. If this comes about, war is certain to follow. In that war Japan could not be defeated by China; it would inevitably emerge with the victory in its clasp. But the price of that victory would in all probability be so great as to mean Japan's defeat, not at the hands of China but of itself, the defeat for years to come of the place in the world which the Japanese Empire wishes to achieve. And it would mean the absolute defeat for generations of the true objective of Japan's China policy—the friendly co-operation of the two peoples.

FRANK H. HEDGES.

Tokyo.

BROBDINGNAG IN THE WEST.

THE Newspaper Man gave a kick at the great log burning on the open hearth. "All right," he grinned, "you think I'm just boosting my city. But I'm telling you, whether or not Vancouver is to outgrow the great cities to the south, there is one thing you people across the world should recognise—and don't. It is that the twentieth century will belong to the Pacific, just as the nineteenth did to the Atlantic."

It is a salutary thing to see one's own part of the world as others see it. From a great distance the details get lost; one is partly given, partly forced, to form a new perspective. It is like looking at a group of people through the wrong end of a telescope. The girl in the red jumper may have been beautiful at the tea table, but discovered anew in this manner it is the grace or otherwise of her movements which attract the eye. And so it is with events which are happening on the other side of the world. To the Westerner it often seems as though old Europe is either about to blow itself up by means of a large-scale "civil war," or else that it will peter out in endless bickerings, lose its dominance, fade gradually into the background. And that fits in with the buoyant optimism of the Westerners regarding their own destiny. They see themselves on the rising end of the seesaw and the prospect excites them. It is not that they are indifferent, much less that they are heartless, it is just that they live far from Europe.

Man's sympathies are not elastic in radius. A railway smash in the next county will always arouse more emotion than a famine in China. To the native-born inhabitants of the Far West a European war is—just another war. And on the whole not more fraught with danger for themselves than the situation in Manchuria. It is the simple facts of geography which we are apt to forget or not to realise. That British Columbia, for example, is four times the size of the whole British Isles. Or that the State of Montana is much larger than Italy and almost three times as large as England.

In little cubby-holes and backwaters up and down the Coast there are pockets of people to be found who would perhaps deny these views. If in Canada they are usually from the Old Country. If from the east of the United States they retain that intense interest in European affairs which

is largely confined to the Atlantic seaboard of their vast country. In either case they are people who have retired from the rigours of life and climate in their own countries. There are such pockets on Vancouver Island, lovely havens for the retired naval or military man. Such miniature Cheltenhams are more English than the English. And by just that much are they unlike the West. The Pacific Coast is the periphery of the Western world. I realised that one day when talking to an old trapper in a tiny place in Western Canada, "at the end of the steel" beyond which no railway runs. "Well, good journey to you," said the old man as he rose to leave. And then with a grin, "You will have to travel east now, you know, whichever way you go home."

I have purposely mixed up British Columbia with the adjacent West of its big neighbour. The wife of the retired admiral would perhaps resent it; so also might the potato grower ruined by importations of the earlier Californian crops. So would the lumberman in Oregon across the border, who swears he will "brand" the Canadian lumber which the Reciprocity Treaty now allows imported free of duty to the United States. But the lumberman's boss would not join the chorus, because he and other Americans own all the best lumber and the largest sawmills in Canada. And the same applies to mining, to the furniture trade and to other things. The heart of Canada, or some of it, may lie in the Old Country, but her economic interests lie chiefly south of her border. The U.S.A. has twice as much money invested in the Dominion as has Great Britain. Canada is the chief source of supply for the United States and is herself the best foreign market for American produce.

"And so," said my friend the Newspaper Man, who knew the other corners of the world as well as his own, "you should see more of the country while you are here. There is plenty of it." And by "the country" he meant the West. A few days later I had begun to take his advice and was headed south down the first link of that amazing chain of roads which now skirts the Pacific from Canada to Mexico.

There are, of course, the usual formalities when crossing the famous "four thousand miles of undefended frontier." But it is the sudden rush of informalities which proclaims most insistently that you have crossed the border. Canadians are inclined to be inarticulate and are little disposed to

unburden themselves to strangers. Americans as a rule are not afflicted with shyness. Above all Canadian women mostly speak when they are spoken to. Their American sisters prefer to give the cue themselves. But I had been so long in Canada that it was with a little shock of surprise that I found myself deep in conversation with the young woman who had boarded the bus just across the frontier. My European origin had been disclosed, I feel sure, before the last Canadian mountain had disappeared from sight behind us. Certainly I had been informed of the high spots of my companion's own career long before we reached Seattle. As the State of Washington unrolled itself before our eyes she commented vividly upon its beauty and its countless advantages, so discouraging to outside travel by its favoured inhabitants. Perhaps it was inevitable that in a winter of such climatic discontent elsewhere the negative qualities should have been stressed most strongly. As my fair companion pointed out, Washington had no cyclones and earthquakes were unknown. Now in Florida and California—well! lots of things happened in those places which they did not care to talk about. Washington was a blessed place to live in if ever there was one. My companion had lived there all her life and knew.

And it is delightful with its mountains and lakes, its forests and sea coast and miles of sheltered water along Puget Sound. Its neighbour State of Oregon, also, with even greater variety. One thinks of miles of well-kept orchard country sloping to a vista of distant snow peaks; or of Portland, "city of roses"—and of bridges; or of its four hundred miles of rugged coastline, along every mile of which lie great trees uprooted by storms from the forests which often run down to the water's edge. There is enough driftwood piled along the Oregon coast to warm half the homes in Britain for a winter. A Highway skirts this beautiful coast, a magnificently engineered road which follows all the coastal indentations, now by the rocks at sea level, now clinging to the cliff far up above. It runs past lagoons alive with wildfowl and surveyed by eagles, and it twists and winds its way from deep ravine to mountain top through scenery which is superb. It was along this Highway that the female member of the party had a whim, which proved to have been an inspiration. We were already accustomed to views which elsewhere would have halted the most blasé of tourists to

puff their amazement. Even so Heceta Head could not be passed.

It was not the milk-white lighthouse or the bright red roofs of its clustered cottages contrasting so prettily with the blue sea at their foot. Nor was it the vista of rocky coastline stretching southwards to where the spray and the sunshine mingled into haze. Far below us lay a cave. It was that we had to visit. Gingerly we followed a slippery winding path down the cliff face. Where the cliff fell sheer we found a wooden tower with a stairway. At the bottom we were in darkness and groped our way forward a foot at a time until halted by a rock which formed a wall. Over this rock we peered—and held our breath. We were in a natural gallery, looking across and down into such a cave as might have sheltered Prospero. The open sea could not be seen, for our gallery lay far back in a kind of funnel. Somebody whispered in our ears to make no noise, and above all not to smoke. The advice seemed unnecessary for a storm was raging and the thunder of the waves on the rocks below was deafening. It reverberated from the jagged roof, and as the waves withdrew to form again a natural sluice another cave beyond became uncovered. Through this sluice at first spray was blown thirty feet across the cave, with a sucking roar as though an angry giant were imprisoned in the rock. Then out gushed a stream of water, to be buried quickly by the next incoming wave.

But it was not this pandemonium, or its accompaniment of eerie flickering light, which had made us gasp. There are roars more thrilling even than those of the great Pacific. For, appearing in the water and plunging into it, on the rocks and along the ledges bellowing defiance at the storm, were more than a hundred sea lions. The great creatures were at home and thought themselves unobserved, for in our gallery we were to leeward of them. Some slept high up on shelves above the water, but most of them seemed excited by the turmoil around and swung their heads and roared. Others plunged in and disappeared, swimming under water till out at sea and away from the surface whirlpools.

Of all the natural sights I have ever seen the Sea Lions' Cave at Heceta Head is the most impressive. The most Wagneresque fantasies of the most imaginative of painters could not surpass it as it was that day. Once, as we watched,

a young bull gave a signal and dived into the surging water, followed by twenty or thirty of his herd. We saw their black heads later, far out at sea, as we climbed up the cliff again. Though it is the only known breeding place of sea lions on any mainland, the cave seems never to have been heard of even a few miles away. Quite early in the trip we gave up consulting local residents about the road or stopping places. Even filling station men have rarely been the half of one's next day's run. We became discouraged from asking advice at filling stations when one of them wanted to send us, on a wet night, over a hundred and fifty miles of winding coast road to the "next decent stop."

At the Californian State Line cars are halted and baggage inspected, almost as diligently as the Belgians hunt for tobacco. That is not what the State troopers are looking for, but almost any other weed would make a killing. California depends largely on her citrus fruit crop and one may not import a seed or a leaf or a twig, for fear there be upon it some bug which might bite their oranges and lemons.

And then we came to Crescent City, with the pleasant name of which we had become increasingly familiar for the past three hundred miles. An American "city" need not, of course, enshrine a cathedral. In fact I have several times run through a city without knowing it, not having recognised the dignity to which a gas station and a drug store can attain in sparsely populated parts. I have nothing against such pretty conceits, except that it confuses one's map reading. Crescent City was a disappointment however; the site lived up to its name but the place was an abomination. It should be rechristened Junction Shacks. But Crescent City was soon forgotten for we were quickly in the Redwoods. The Highway through the famous forest is older than the Oregon coast road, also it is in California, which makes two reasons for being better known. It is none the less awe-inspiring for that.

Vaguely one has heard about the giant trees of California, the *Sequoia sempervirens*. One remembers seeing photographs of smiling gentlemen proudly driving a carriage through the middle of one of them, a strange ambition which almost every visitor to the Golden State seems to fulfil. There is nothing new to be said about them. Like so much else in the West, they must be seen to be believed. Most of them are between two and four thousand years old and stand

about three hundred feet high. They are the oldest living things and they never die. When they fall their offspring grow straight from their trunks; there are some with five or six new trees springing from their prostrate forms. One at least of these fallen giants which I saw was acting as host to a stranger. The redwood tree itself was believed to have fallen a thousand years ago. Erect on its trunk and towering to a height of 300 feet was the largest spruce I have ever seen, ten feet in diameter. The redwood forest stretches, with short breaks, for over one hundred and fifty miles. Often the trees are so thick that the foliage joins far above the road, obscuring the sky. It is like driving down the endless aisle of a cathedral more majestic than any conceived by man. Incidentally, fortunes are being made from these ancient trees, or rather from the cheap furniture into which they are being transformed.

If San Francisco is beautiful, the approaches to it are enchanting. In "approaches" I am using the scale of the country and mean, say, the last hundred miles or so. You wind down from the mountains at last through a canyon, after many miles of forest trees which are not redwoods. In an hour or less you pass from the untamed wilderness to what seems like Italy. The canyons of Eel River, the fantastic trees of the Redwood Empire, the endless miles of foaming rock-bound coast and grim mountains, all have gone and in their place is a smiling southern land. In Sonoma County copies of Italian mansions perch on knolls inside a ring of eucalyptus, looking out over the vines of "the Italian Swiss Colony." There are olive groves, and oranges hang thickly on their trees and green myrtles straggle up the gentle hills which border the fertile valley. Farther on one comes to pink-washed houses in Spanish style, in which are served delicious hot chicken tomas wrapped in corn husk, and other dishes remembered with delight, but not their names.

We crossed from Sausalito on a glorious evening as the sun sank beyond the Golden Gate. What appeared to be two giant poles connected by a sagging rope formed a frame within a frame for the setting sun. It was our first glimpse of the Golden Gate Bridge. From time to time articles appear in the American Press about the bridges under construction on the Pacific Coast. Having read the articles before I saw the works I can only assume the writers were discouraged in

advance by the inadequacy of their medium. With that I can sympathise. We had already seen four great rivers being bridged as we came down the Oregon Coast Highway. Beneath one of them the ferry by which road traffic still passes was a fifteen-minute cruise. That one was an airy structure the main concrete arch of which alone will be five hundred feet long. But all pale to insignificance beside the three giant bridges of San Francisco Bay.

Figures convey little, for the setting is lacking. One cannot see the Golden Gate Bridge by merely reading that it will be ninety feet wide, with six traffic lanes and two ten-foot pavements; that its towers are 746 feet high; that its minimum vertical clearance above mean high water will be 220 feet or that its main structure will be 8,940 feet long. Perhaps one does a little better by saying that its suspension cables on one side of the channel pass clear over a cliff nearly 200 feet high, to be anchored in the rock far beyond it. Nor can words do any better with the 8½-mile bridge now spreading across to Oakland. That mighty work is in three sections. First, on the San Francisco side, a two-span suspension bridge across the deep water channel, each span over half a mile long. Then a plunge through Yerba Buena Island by means of a two-storied tunnel. Finally the last stretch to the mainland over seven miles of cantilever type.

Down on the water front one day I talked to an unemployed iron moulder who appeared to have spent much time gazing up at the bridges. He said they were too big to comprehend anyway, and pointed to the concrete support which marks the centre of the channel. "There is more of that under water than you see above," he said. "When it was half built I went over and stood on it. It is as big as a ball park." I began to believe him when I, in my turn, pointed to a workman walking on the catwalk of the upper suspension cable at the point nearest to us, and found that nobody else around could distinguish the man.

Bridges that are miles long and tall as Eiffel Towers. Trees through which run roads and in which shops are built. It all smacks of Brobdingnag. One feels the scale of measurement should be in "glomglungs," for otherwise, as Gulliver has said, "a severe critic would be apt to think I enlarged a little, as travellers are often suspected to do."

HARRISON BROWN.

NATIONAL SOCIALIST PROPAGANDA ON THE DANISH FRONTIER.

THE southern frontier province of Denmark bears two names. When one comes from the north it is called South Jutland; if reached from the south, coming from Germany, it is styled North Schleswig. This points to a land hotly disputed during the course of history, and it has been so because upon this ground two peoples, Danes and Germans, confront one another. The latest legal provision regarding the nationality of these parts dates from the year 1920, and rests upon a plebiscite which allowed all the inhabitants freely to express their wishes. This plebiscite led to a division or, speaking more accurately, a cleavage in the population of the Duchy of Schleswig: the southern portion decided for Germany, the northern claimed restoration to Denmark.

In Southern Jutland the plebiscite of 1920 gave 75 per cent. of votes to Denmark, 25 per cent. to Germany. The number of votes for Germany was greater than the number of inhabitants to-day belonging to the German minority because a number of persons were allowed to share in the plebiscite who had merely been born in the land, leaving it later. These voters had no bonds attaching them to the soil of their birth and consequently nothing further has been heard of them. Later, when the families of German officials left, the German minority sank to 13·2 per cent.—a proportion which has not changed since. The census of inhabitants with German leanings is given from the results of the elections to the Danish Lower House. No other method of calculation exists, for speech does not discriminate. It is strange, indeed, to say that in South Jutland both the Danish majority and the German minority speak Danish. In South Jutland one never talks, if desiring to be accurate, of Danes or Germans, but of Danish or German "sympathisers." A third of the minority at the most speak German. The descendants of immigrants originally come from Russia are mostly adherents of the Danish Social-Democratic party and, although speaking German among themselves, do not vote "German."

The racial frontier often separates members of one family; nationality may alter from one generation to another; still oftener the same individual changes his outlook in the course

of his life. On the whole, however, the number of adherents to the German minority remains unchanged.

After the establishment of the National-Socialists in the Reich a German revisionist campaign was inaugurated by speeches by two German representatives on April 5th, 1933, at Eckernförde: by Pastor Peperkorn, of Viöl, and by Burgomaster Dr. Sievers, of Eckernförde. These two propagandists demanded outright the reunion of South Jutland with Germany. Despite the fact that the whole southern district, down to the Kiel Canal, was not Germanised—from a linguistic viewpoint—until a relatively recent date, the northern part, which in 1920 had distinctly declared itself Danish, was described in these speeches as a land which, having belonged to Germany from the remotest times, had later been violently wrested from the Fatherland. Pastor Peperkorn stated that a force of about eighty units of the German National-Socialist party and some Storm Sections ought to throw a closely woven net over the land. The irruption of these irregular forces into Danish territory and the spontaneous rising of the German population of the district were to produce a *fait accompli*.

Events turned out differently. All the Scandinavian countries were roused by the situation, particularly Sweden, whose good will Goering eagerly sought. A vehement protest was sent out: "The frontier of Denmark is the southern frontier of Scandinavia." Berlin feigned surprise and whistled in its turbulent hounds. "The foreign policy of the Reich is made at Berlin and not at Eckernförde," said German official circles, and the matter of the German-Danish frontier was relegated to the background. The Copenhagen Government was pacified by the statement, uttered without shame, that *the question was not urgent*. Calm seemed re-established. But presently came news which could not but create surprise. The German orators who had been called to order by their Government had been promoted. Dr. Sievers was made a Burgomaster of the First Class. He was not sent to a German town distant from the Danish frontier, but to Flensburg, in the very frontier zone. He was further appointed "Chief of the Province and Director of Affairs to the National Socialist party for North Schleswig." Herr Peperkorn, the humble pastor, was raised to the rank of a Councillor of the Berlin Consistory, and placed in charge of propaganda in North

Schleswig; afterwards he spent some time at Berlin and returned, as Chief of Propaganda, to South Tondern, on the borders of Denmark and of the district where Dr. Sievers carried out like functions. The Danish Press of South Jutland has asked on several occasions how it is possible to reconcile the contradiction between the pacifying words of Berlin and the disquieting happenings on the frontier. Berlin, usually very loquacious, has never replied.

Herr Rosenberg, inspirer of German foreign policy, made on October 11th, 1933, at Flensburg, an awkward attempt towards appeasement. He thought that the position, difficult at that time, would lead the two countries to negotiate and that there would result a remapping of the frontier involving considerable concessions on both sides. This was an avowal that the German Minister recognised the impossibility of regaining all the province—German before the War—but that he hoped to appropriate at least a part. If Rosenberg expressed himself in somewhat vague and ambiguous terms, none the less his speech betrayed serious intentions. The German revisionist propaganda willingly employs a *cliché* which it believes effective; it assumes that Germany, whose economy is thriving, will exert over North Schleswig, neglected from the economic point of view by Denmark, such an attraction that "the province of North Schleswig will compel Copenhagen to enter into discussion with Germany for the restitution of the territory submitted to plebiscite."

The German offensive, political and cultural, against the integrity of Denmark is on a wide front. It raises four problems which must in the end create a European "question": (1) The whole German minority of North Schleswig will be incorporated in the Nazi party and subjected to directing organisations of the Reich. (2) By means of pecuniary aid from Germany there will be stimulated in South Jutland an "inflation of private schools" to create a belief in the attachment of the people to the Reich. (3) Danish properties will be systematically purchased by Germans. (4) In the Reich itself the belief will be spread—especially among the young—that South Jutland *is* German and, in spite of the plebiscite of 1920, it will be declared that these territories were forcibly seized from Germany.

The incorporation of Germans in the Nazi party takes place through the formation of a National Socialist party in the

country itself. The Burgomaster of Flensburg, Dr. Sievers, nominates the Nazi leader for North Schleswig. The Germans have organised a parliamentary political party for the elections to the Copenhagen Parliament, and as this party is now completely in vassalage to the Nazis we are faced by an anomaly unique in Europe: a political party constituted under the official direction of a neighbour State. It is needless to point out that in North Schleswig there exist Storm Sections—S.A.—but these German Nazis must not be confounded with the Danish Nazis. These two sorts of Nazis are enemy brothers; on occasion they exchange blows which are anything but fraternal. The S.A. of South Jutland carries on an underground existence. It is on account of incidents which have occurred in this district that the Danish Government has forbidden the wearing of uniforms and political badges; the prohibition has been extended subsequently to the other provinces and has spared Denmark an embryonic civil war such as has been seen in Germany.

In December, 1933, the Danish Press was startled to learn that in South Jutland a Motor Storm Troop Company had been formed. German owners of motor-cars and motor-bicycles had placed these at the disposal of a Nazi formation, and the owners of motor-boats in the coast towns of Graasten and Sønderborg, facing the German shore, had followed this example. The vehicles were under the command of the Motor Storm Troop Company of Flensburg, the boats being attached to the Storm Flotilla of the same German town. It was also claimed in the Press—and the statement has not been denied—that the German minority might at any moment concentrate a thousand men in any place in the province. Before the general public in Denmark could protest, and before the Government could intervene, instructions came from Germany ordering the organisations to dissolve these illegal detachments. The Nazi leader himself published a "command" in the German newspaper *Nord-Schleswigsche Zeitung* of Aabenraa. This order for dissolution bore, instead of signature, the words "Heil Hitler." In the same paper appeared a second order enjoining members of the Storm Corps to remain banded in the special body "*Nord-Schleswigsche Kameradschaft*." The exact nature of this new association has never been known, but it appears to have fallen into lethargy.

Another example is afforded by the way in which German

master craftsmen in South Jutland are brought into the Nazi party. They withdraw from the Danish professional organisations, but do not form, as would be supposed, German societies in Danish territory. They become direct members of the professional centre of Flensburg. Not only have centres of support for German National-Socialists been thus created, but there is further indirect action upon parents owing to the organisation of apprenticeship; youth is educated in German sentiments, German speech and German political ideas.

We see here the political struggle on the field of culture. Mention has already been made of the influx of German schools. The facts can only be understood by a rapid glance at Danish legislation regarding the education of minorities. There are in South Jutland side by side with Danish schools German public elementary schools. These latter enjoy the same rights as the Danish and only differ in the use and teaching of the German language, this having to be first learnt by the great majority of the so-called German children. The right to establish private schools belongs to the German minority, not as recompense for political loyalty, but by virtue of paragraph 83 of the Danish Constitution, according to which no one is compelled to send his child to State or Communal schools. It is sufficient to collect *twelve children* to be allowed to establish a private school. Those who, in South Jutland, desire instruction in the German tongue and a German bias do not fail to invoke this paragraph. Like all private schools the German schools receive an annual subsidy of fifty Danish crowns per child. Control is exercised only over statistics and is intended to make sure that the number of pupils does not fall below twelve. The German National Union for German Culture Abroad has seized upon this paragraph. Since 1933 fifty-four private German schools have been opened in South Jutland; the teachers are in most cases Germans from the Reich. Rarely does one of them commit the folly of showing himself hostile to the State and presenting German patriotism to his pupils in such a fashion that it is possible to prosecute him for direct propaganda in favour of an alteration of the frontier. In cases, however, where such does arise, the culprit's permit of residence is not renewed.

Financial support for these schools comes freely from the Reich and propaganda for the German schools is contrived by granting them material advantages. It often happens that

change in the nationality of a scholar is obtained through the gift of a bicycle to the child's family. H. P. Hanssen's publication, *Jahresübersicht*, says in its annual report for 1933-4:

Frequently the establishing of a private school arises in the following manner: A German buys a landed estate and places on it a manager with several children of school age. This was the case at Stubbak. Then several children of a Russian, who had immigrated during the War and who had already on several occasions had relief from the Charity Board, were sought out. In addition, there were found the four children of an unfortunate fisherman in great poverty; this fisherman, like his father, was Danish, and in the family only Danish was spoken. The children until then had attended the Danish school, situated five minutes from their home. To-day these children, on the books of the German school, must walk $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the private German school and $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to return home. Instruction is given to them by an immigrant who can neither speak, write, nor understand Danish. But the family has received assistance of several kinds and the children are newly clad. "You are fine in your new suit," said a neighbour to one of the children. "Yes, it's the suit Uncle Hitler gave me," proudly answered the urchin, stroking his coat with a satisfied air. The new owner of an agricultural holding which had been sold by auction asked the farmer if he would like to remain in his situation. "I should not ask better," replied the man, "but I should much like to be able to withdraw my children from the private school." The preceding owner had stipulated, when taking the man into his service, that his children should enter the German private school.

Similar cases are numerous. At Tinglev, Director Koopman receives appointment from Germany and directs the entire organisation of the private schools of North Schleswig. Invited by the newspaper *Hejmdal*, of Aabenraa, to prove that the German private schools subsisted thanks to the fees of German parents, and not thanks to other resources, the Director has not replied up to now save in an evasive manner.

The economic struggle regarding land is still more important. After the severance of South Jutland, the Danish Government, legal successor to Prussia, renounced its right of pre-emption over more than 300 properties styled *Rentengüte*. These are colonies founded by the Prussian State in the Polish and Danish provinces which belonged before the War to Prussia. If contest continues about this territory, it is Germany which is responsible. The Vogelgesang Credit Bank,

a German establishment of Haderslev, has granted during 1934 to landowners 282,000 crowns, representing ninety-three mortgages. Most of these advances have been allowed to proprietors living quite near the frontier. The subsidiary of the Vogelgesang Bank, the *Höfeverwaltungsgesellschaft*, has taken under its charge eighty-one estates, of which seventy-three are in immediate proximity to the frontier. In eight years—from 1927 to 1934—the Vogelgesang Company has agreed to 1,007 mortgages to the total value of 5,512,633 crowns. The most curious aspect of this matter is that Mr. Vogelgesang, who is not a native of North Schleswig—he was born in Brandenburg—has not placed Germans in the debt-encumbered properties purchased at public auctions; these lands are left unoccupied. The *Höfeverwaltungsgesellschaft* is concerned with the management and these lands are not to be entrusted to farmers save when there are enough Germans at its disposal to people them. Mr. Vogelgesang seeks above all for large families. The *Höfeverwaltungsgesellschaft*—this Society for Property Administration of Haderslev—is partly financed by the Land-Credit Bank at Kiel, the principal shareholder in which is the German Government.

Herr Vogelgesang pursues his work without anxiety, in spite of considerable monetary losses. At the general meeting in the summer of 1934, the capital of the Company fell from 495,000 crowns to 49,000 crowns, a reduction of 90 per cent. But immediately after this general meeting, owing to the contribution of new capital, the Society had completely re-established its affairs and the capital at its disposal amounted again to nearly 500,000 crowns. The management made it known that it was through wealthy Germans living abroad that the capital had been restored. The 495,000 crowns of capital of the Vogelgesang Land-Credit Bank proceeded from 450,000 crowns of subsidies from the German State, and it was the same with the capital of the Society for the Administration of Landed Properties, of which 150,000 crowns had been provided by the German State. Herr Vogelgesang is the head of both societies. That Herr Vogelgesang's work is much appreciated in Germany is made clear by a speech of Dr. Sievers in 1933 at Läk. He said that the German National-Socialists did not seek to germanise other peoples, but to germanise the soil. In Germany, pupils learn the history of these lands in a special manner; they are taught that North

Schleswig is essentially German, needless to say, by falsifying facts and statistics in the most arbitrary fashion.

For the present no one in Denmark fears an armed intervention by Germany in South Jutland. That would be a too flagrant provocation: the German National-Socialists would not incur such a risk for so little. The Danes, on the other hand, believe themselves able to repulse a sudden attack by irregular troops with the police forces at their command. But what is not realised in Denmark—save in South Jutland—is the importance of the “cultural” struggle which is being waged between Germans and Danes. It is needful to awaken the attention of the Danes and to make them understand the necessity for resisting German influence; that is the chief task of the movement for Danish defence, at the head of which is Mr. H. P. Hanssen, former Danish representative to the German Reichstag. The aim of German activity in South Jutland is to germanise the whole district, or, failing that, to make Europe believe that these territories are German. They hope to be able to draw attention to these districts when, in the course of revision of the Treaty of Versailles, territorial matters are being dealt with. It is necessary to recall in this connection that the plebiscite in South Jutland does not derive only from the Treaty of Versailles, but primarily from the Treaty of Prague, concluded in 1866 between Prussia and Austria. Paragraph 5 of this Treaty foreshadowed the plebiscite, and the Danish deputies to the German Reichstag and to the Landtag of Prussia were, without interruption, until 1918 the living symbols of this paragraph 5. In 1920 the question of nationality was finally settled between Germany and Denmark, and the decision then made is without appeal.

As for the German minority in Denmark, this State is in no wise bound to safeguard it according to international agreements. From the point of view of international law the agreements concerning the protection of minorities speak of “minorities of race, of language and of religion.” None of these definitions can be applied to the Germans of Denmark, at least not to the 13·2 per cent. of “political” Germans, but at the utmost to 3 or 4 per cent. of German-speaking citizens. The ethical and political conception of Denmark regarding this minority is far higher than present European ideas.

LUDWIG STEPHASIUS.

BALEARIC RELICS OF THE PAST.*

WHILE the popularity of the Balearic Islands has been due chiefly to the beauty of the archipelago, to the salubrity of its climate, and the placid tempo of its life, for the more serious-minded visitor there has been also the unending interest of its archæology and architecture. But it is not only in the outstanding relics of their past that these islands offer scope for study. Interwoven into the very warp and woof of modern Majorca, Minorca and Iviza will be found here a thread, there a colour shade, sometimes clearly visible, often only faintly seen—these are the heritage left by the various races who have come and gone in the Balearics.

So generally known is the Moorish occupation of the Balearic Islands, so vivid the leading events of the reconquest, and so obvious the Roman bridge and theatre of Majorca, set as they are in the most tourist-trodden section of the island, that the casual visitor is likely to carry away the impression that these three periods comprise the archipelago's earlier history and that the Roman occupation was the earliest Balearic civilisation, with beyond it only the shadows of oblivion. On the contrary a tremendous amount of Mediterranean water had washed Balearic shores before the Romans came, and on the plains and mountain slopes of these islands man has lived and wrought and passed since immemorial time, and the marks of his presence are still visible from the Bronze Age era onward. The tracing of these evidences of many races and civilisations—sometimes obvious, sometimes vague and indirect—is one of the great attractions of the Balearics to even amateur historians and archæologists. While discounting the various legends which ascribe the earliest settlement of the islands to a post-Flood or a post-Trojan War invasion with the ever-useful *Quién sabe?* there seems little doubt that the archipelago's earliest-known civilisation belongs to the Bronze Age period. There does not appear to be any tangible evidence of the presence of man of either the Old or New Stone Age—certainly any such relics seen in the islands' museums are admittedly imported. However, on one very interesting occasion we met a Majorcan archæologist who said that he had found some fragments which in his opinion bear some signs of the Stone Age.

* This article was written before the Civil War.

The Bronze Age in the Balearics is divided by native archæologists into two periods and dated, approximately, about 2000 B.C. To the earlier one are said to belong possibly the caves, as well as the articles retrieved from them, many of which may be seen in the various museums, while the most accessible of the caves are the series at Cala San Vicente in Majorca and at Calas Covas in Minorca. The second Bronze Age period is thought to be either a development of the first or due to a new wave of invasion; to it belong the megalithic monuments of the islands, the towns as at Cap-i-Corp and Artá, the *talayots*, and the more extensive and varied megaliths, especially the *taula* and the *nau*, of the island of Minorca. Among the articles found in the caves and *talayots* are primitive pottery with an odd pierced beading below the rim, bronze implements, and ornaments of shell and bone. A heavy collar of four strands in the museum of Artá is of great interest because, except that it is of bronze, it is so similar to the gold neckwear of the Irish Bronze Age period.

These relics are all of enormous interest because they belong to the very dawn of Balearic civilisation. Whether Stone Age man preceded them or not, this at least is sure, that long before even Phœnician or Carthaginian came these people were here, and their caves and their "Great Stone" buildings, together with their contents, are the genesis of Balearic architecture and culture. Whether or not the race who occupied these islands in the dawn of their known history were the descendants or the successors of the Bronze Age peoples, this about them at least is certain—the relic they left behind is even more imperishable than the megalithic monuments of their predecessors or the rock-hewn survivals of two later peoples. For they left forever to posterity their fame as wielders of the sling, and the archipelago's name of "Islas Baleares," or Islands of the expert Stone Slingers, is their enduring monument. This skill of theirs is perpetuated indirectly as well in some of the sculptures on Trajan's Column in Rome, where those ancient warriors of the islands are depicted armed for action. Roman history also made a record of their prowess, and it is with great interest one reads that Balearic slingers formed part of the army with which Cæsar invaded Britain.

However, while the archipelago's name is due peculiarly to the islanders' own skill, the actual coining of the term is

attributed to either the Phœnicians or the Greeks. For these were the next among the many peoples who throughout the ages have looked upon Iberia and found her to their liking. Tradition rather than actual history or relic places the Greeks among the earliest of the peoples of antiquity who formed settlements upon Majorca's shores—even the Argonauts are supposed to have come here in their search for the Golden Fleece, while a few place names, Artá and Andraitx among them, are supposed to be Greek in origin. Some of the museums show Greek objects among their exhibits but whether brought by the Greeks themselves or by the later Romans, who can say? The same doubt applies to one of the picturesque features of native life to-day—the water jar seen in every house, in every field and at every fountain. That this vessel of red earthenware is a Greek amphora is accepted, but was its importation direct or indirect via Rome? It is said, and it is interesting if true, that in this land of water jars which is Spain even to-day only Majorca and Valencia use this particular type.

Even if the Greeks did give the name to the islands, instead of the Phœnicians, there is no doubt the Semitic traders were here too, especially in Iviza. In that island, hewn in the rock of the hillside, there are numberless Phœnician graves. More legendary, perhaps, but certainly a much more living memorial of their stay, if the story be true, is the peculiar type of dog so common in Iviza, and to a lesser extent in Majorca as well. Long, lean shadows of dogs they are, the thinnest dogs possible—an Egyptian hunting breed imported by the Phœnicians.

With the Carthaginians the Balearics begin their recorded history; and Carthage, too, has managed to leave very tangible mementoes of its occupation, especially in Minorca and Iviza. Three of the "Lesser Island's" towns were founded by this people and Port Mahón's name (formerly Portus Magonis) is a lasting memorial to Hannibal's brother, Mago, while the capital city of Iviza has no greater attraction than the little museum with its relics of the Carthaginian town.

Rome's impression, here as everywhere, is both direct and indirect. Her gifts to the tourist "sights" of the islands are, of course, the theatre and the bridge in Majorca, and the great headless statues which guard the entrance portal to Iviza's upper town behind the walls. These walls and the great gate are often called "Roman," and doubtless in their origin

and foundations they are, although obviously rebuilt in much later ages. Some writers very familiar with the native life of the islands profess to see, especially in the people of Majorca's eastern plain, characteristic Roman features even yet. This may be true; as may be the opinion of some that olive cultivation, irrigation, and the terracing system of the mountain slopes were introduced by Rome rather than by the Moors.

There seems to be no direct heritage from the Vandal and the Visigoth, who undoubtedly held these islands for a time, unless one writer's idea that a certain tall, fair Majorcan type suggests the Visigothic strain be correct. The entire period from the middle fifth to the end of the eighth century is shrouded in obscurity with a few brief liftings of the curtain only—one of which is the record that at the Council of Toledo late in the seventh century the Church of the Balearic Islands was represented. It would be interesting to know whether or not the islands were then under Visigothic sway or under the Byzantine Empire, to the period of which reoccupation (beginning A.D. 534) the relics of the Christian basilica in Manacor museum have been said to belong.

Then the Arab came, stayed his appointed time, and departed, leaving behind him forever an indelible imprint on the islands he had ruled five hundred years. The agricultural methods in use to-day are largely his, the reservoir and irrigating system, also the ubiquitous and picturesque *noria*, the mule-propelled water wheel which is the connecting link between the periods. Popular opinion has it that he introduced the cultivation of the olive as well, and that many of the time-twisted trunks seen to-day were actually planted by him one thousand years ago. Other opinions, however, attribute the earliest cultivation here of the olive to the Romans, or to the Catalans in the post-Conquest period. Then there is that direct, unquestioned relic, *in situ* and practically unchanged, the Moorish bath in Palma. There is the Almudaina, which, rebuilt though it has been, can still show remnants of what was once "El Medinah," the Alcazar of Moorish emirs. There is Alfabia, the seat of Arab chieftains, which traces its lineage clearly and without question back to Benahabet, to whose support of the Christian army the Conquest may have been no little due. These are the tangible relics of Majorca's Moorish past; besides them there is its subtle, all-pervading influence on architecture, on the general characteristics of the

people, and on the language, for many of the modern words and names have their origin in the Saracenic past.

Unquestionably of all the races who conquered and held these islands temporarily the impress of the Moor has been the deepest and most lasting. This is especially true of Iviza, for here the Arab, gone these seven hundred years, "yet speaketh." Even though there is not one tangible relic of his occupation, Iviza is still essentially Moorish—her white towns belong to Africa; her strange allure is of the East. Some of the Minorcan towns too, even more than those of Majorca, show the Moorish strain, Alayor especially, with its irregular white mass of flat-topped buildings, its narrow, dim streets, and its palm trees. But Minorca, in so many ways unlike the other islands, has threads in its racial pattern that are unique compared with the general fabric of the archipelago. For Minorca alone of the Balearics has known two foreign allegiances since King Jaime's conquest reunited the islands to Spain. Both France and England have held Minorca—France long enough to have left at least one town, San Luis, as memento of its stay; while England had three periods of occupation lasting in all about seventy years.

Like all other passers-by, England too has made her contribution to the Minorca and the Minorcans of to-day. It is both direct and indirect. First of all there is Mahón itself, the old Carthaginian town—to-day its Punic characteristics, like its Roman ones, have long been lost and the old city is a compound of Africa, Spain, and England. In *What Price Mallorca?* Mr. Percy Waxman, one of the latest writers on the Balearics, says that Mahón "looks like a miniature Plymouth." And, indeed, once the upper level and the principal *plazas* are reached it is so, for sashed windows, bow windows, muslin curtains, and an almost total absence of the upper balconies so characteristic of all Spanish towns proclaim the English tradition, while glimpses into open doorways reveal, instead of the customary *patios*, interiors which in their befrilled and becushioned cosiness are more than a little suggestive of Anglo-Saxon homes.

Incidentally, Mahón directly owes its importance as capital of the island to the English régime, for Ciudadela, the ancient seat of government, was found to be too far from the Castle of San Felipe and the military station near it to be convenient for the new governing power. Even on the

Minorcan dialect too the English occupation has left its mark, and a considerable number of English words will be found in present use. Because the British sphere of influence centred chiefly in the neighbourhood of Port Mahón's fjord-like bay, it is this region naturally which has received the strongest English impress. On the shore of the harbour below the town the "Golden Farm" claims connection with Lord Nelson, for here he is said to have lived during a part of his period in these waters. The point is highly controversial, however, and much ink has been spilt upon it of late; even more problematical is the assertion that Lady Hamilton stayed with him here. *Quién sabe?* Just beyond Lord Nelson's Farm is another relic of Britain, called by the natives the "English Cemetery." Here, too, many seamen from the United States rest with their British colleagues in last harbourage beside Port Mahón's quiet waters.

Opposite the "Golden Farm" is another relic of England of which there is no doubt. This is the town of San Carlos, which may have, as asserted by some, existed as a hamlet before the English occupation. However, whether as a new community or a development of an earlier fishing village, on this spot grew up a typical English garrison town of barrack buildings, of dull straight streets, and wide squares and quadrangles. And even though the village calls itself San Carlos, as it has done now for over one hundred years, it is a poor disguise, for it is still, to outward appearance at least, the "Georgetown" of eighteenth-century England. *Fiesta* day in San Carlos is said to be of rare interest. Just as in Majorca the natives often revert to their earlier costumes and dances for the celebration, so too, apparently, do the people of San Carlos. Only whereas in Majorca the costumes and dances are Mallorquin, the once-Georgetown natives wear the Scottish kilt and dance the Scottish reel to the music of Scotland's national instrument. We have not been lucky enough to be there for the event, but other writers so describe it.

The Balearic relics of their past—in them may be read nearly all the chapters of the islands' story. Some are legible, some are dimmed and blurred—rubbed almost to obliteration by the remorseless tread of the centuries. But all are there, for those who care to seek, from the cave sepulchres of the archipelago's earliest civilisation to the "forever England" of the graveyard by the Minorcan sea.

ETHEL BREWER.

DESPRÉAUX BOILEAU, 1636-1711.

BOILEAU seems a far cry from our day: our interest in him is faint, and, perhaps, apart from the occurrence of his tercentenary this year, he would scarcely have been brought to mind at all in this country. His use of the medium of the rhymed couplet, so dear to the polished art of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and so much in keeping with the shining floors and gilded mirrors of Versailles, seems formal and unreal to a generation that has adopted our "write as you please" style of self-expression. And yet, when we come to study this great writer more closely, we shall find it was precisely all the pretentious tinsel and buckram of his age that he criticised and found fault with, and that he was the most stirring advocate in his own day of all that was simple, natural and true. The French Court, at the time he came in touch with it, was a sink of depravity, and afforded Boileau full scope for the biting *Satires* in which he derided the servility and venality of French society during this period. His lashing of the clergy for their incompetence and worldliness was equally severe.

Though descended from a family that for three hundred years had practised with distinction at the Bar, and which claimed the *noblesse de robe*, Boileau was primarily destined for the Church, but, feeling that he lacked vocation, he applied himself to the Law, and in 1656, at the age of twenty, qualified as an advocate. Upon his father's death in the following year, he abandoned his profession and devoted himself to literature. Like all the young literary aspirants of the town, he frequented the famous cafés of the day—the *Pomme de Pin*, the *Mouton Blanc*, where he met and consorted with Molière, Racine, La Fontaine and other brilliant friends, and he doubtless contributed his share to the sparkling conversation and jollity of that gay company. He adored Molière, and was in advance of his age in foreseeing the immortal greatness of that unrivalled comedian. He addressed a sonnet to him, and besought him to pay no heed to those who decried him in his own day, since he would from age to age continue to divert posterity. It will be remembered also that after Molière's death he wrote a splendid memorial Ode to his memory. On another occasion, when Louis XIV asked him what writer had done most honour to

his reign, Boileau flashed the reply: "Sire, c'est Molière."

It was not till the publication of his *Fourth Satire* that Boileau came into notice, but in this poem he ridiculed the devotees of the famous Hôtel de Rambouillet, and in particular their idol, the poet Chapelain, and thus he brought a hornets' nest about his ears. The daring of his feat was only equalled by its rashness, for in denouncing the most important Academician of the day, he was committing literary suicide as far as recognition by that august body was concerned. Indeed, it is to be noted that in later years, when his fame was fully established, it was by the King's personal order that Boileau was elected to the Academy. Having roused all the partisans of Chapelain and Scudéry against him, Boileau thought it well to look for shelter. He had never been a courtier, but an Ode to the King could not come amiss. He wrote it in the most modest and tentative vein, and it is one of the most charming things that ever came from his pen. He explains that if he has hitherto refrained from eulogy, it has only been because he feared his clumsy efforts to enhance his Royal Master's glory might merely result in tarnishing it:

... et ma muse tremblante
Fuit d'un si grand fardeau la charge trop pesante,
Et, dans ce haut éclat où tu te viens offrir,
Touchant à tes lauriers, craindrait de les flétrir.

Louis XIV proved a true and valuable friend to Boileau. There was a frank uprightness of bearing about the poet, and, despite a certain blunt outspokenness, a noble courtesy of manner far removed from that crawling servility affected by so many of his courtiers, that seems to have appealed to the King. There are many instances left on record of the open freedom of address which the poet maintained in his conversations with the monarch and his entourage. Once, when the King had made some rhymed verses and wished Boileau's opinion of them, the latter, after reading them, replied: "Sire, nothing is impossible to Your Majesty: you wished to make some bad verses, and you have succeeded." On another occasion, a courtier admiring a bad sonnet supported his opinion by remarking that the King and Madame la Dauphine thought well of it. To this Boileau smilingly replied: "The King is experienced in taking cities, and Madame la Dauphine is an accomplished Princess, but I venture to think I know

more about verse than they do." The courtier hastened to report this disconcerting reply to Louis XIV, who merely remarked: "Well, as far as that goes, Boileau is quite right."

In 1677 Boileau and his friend Racine were appointed joint historians to the King, and were directed to follow the monarch in his Flemish campaign, and, conjointly, they became a target for much merriment among their friends in their zealous but ineffectual endeavours to join up with the army in the field. Neither of them was an expert horseman, nor had they the remotest acquaintance with military matters, and they were so long in getting their equipment together that the King had returned to Paris before they had so much as contrived to start! Racine, however, had the wit to get them out of their awkward predicament by representing to the King that owing to the remarkable speed with which His Majesty had captured the towns of the enemy, they had not been able to keep pace with him: a well-turned compliment that saved the situation. We know that Boileau was present at the siege and fall of Namur, and that he wrote an Ode upon it. When the King inquired if he had not been nervous at being in the firing-line, and if he was not afraid, he replied: "Yes, Sire; I trembled much for Your Majesty, and still more for myself." When a bullet passed within seven yards of the King, Boileau, in his capacity as His Majesty's historian, begged him not to cause him to "finish my history so soon"! The amusing aspect of which remark being that this famous history was not so much ended as never begun, neither of these great men having left any account whatever of the campaign they were engaged to describe!

Boileau's fame rests indeed not on his historiographical achievements, but on his critical pronouncements, in which he stands, in his own generation, supreme. He came to be regarded as the literary dictator not merely of France, but of Europe, chiefly by virtue of the laws he laid down in his great work *L'Art Poétique*, a poem in four cantos, based, as everybody knows, on Horace's famous *Epistle*. The poem brought him fame: it was talked of everywhere, the King was much impressed with it and made Boileau read it to him, and Voltaire pronounces the writing of this work to be Boileau's strongest title to greatness. To us moderns it makes no appeal. What does appeal to us, on the contrary, is the greatness of mind, the broad outlook, displayed by the poet in

parts of his later *Satires*, especially in his *Twelfth* and last one, that upon *Equivocation*. Here he lets himself go, and gives a history of all the evils that have sprung from the art of Deceit from the time of Eve's temptation to his own day. He passes in review all the lies and impostures that have prevailed since the beginning of the world. The coming of Christianity afforded fresh scope in the opportunity it gave for the starting of heresies and religious persecution. One of his greatest passages is that in which he boldly condemns the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew, and, indeed, *all* religious persecution :

L'Europe fut un champ de massacre et d'horreur,
Et l'orthodox même, aveugle en sa fureur,
De tes dogmes trompeurs nourrissant son idée,
Oublia la douceur aux chrétiens commandée,
Et crut, pour venger Dieu de ses fiers ennemis,
Tout ce que Dieu défend légitime et permis.
Au signal tout à coup donné pour le carnage

Cent mille faux zélés, le fer en main, courants,
Allèrent attaquer leurs amis, leurs parents,
Et, sans distinction, dans tout sein hérétique
Pleins de joie, enfoncer un poignard catholique :
Car quel lion, quel tigre égale en cruauté,
Une injuste fureur qu'arme la piété ?

Although this *Satire* was not issued till 1705, one can imagine with what indignation and disgust Boileau must have viewed the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the brutal persecution of the French Huguenots that followed.

The King's consistent friendship for Boileau is the more remarkable when we study the poet's decided Jansenist leanings. Strong support of Pascal's *Provincial Letters* is evident in many of his writings, but especially so in the *Tenth*. His close attachment to the "great Arnauld" is everywhere manifest, and he always made it a condition of the reception of his two great Jesuit friends, Rapin and Bourdaloue, at his house at Auteuil, that they should suffer him to praise the Jansenist leader as much as he liked. "I often abuse this permission," he writes to his friend, "and the walls . . . have more than once re-echoed with my arguments about you." It seems that other people's walls occasionally echoed too, as we learn from an amusing account given to Madame de Sévigné, of a meeting between Boileau and some Jesuits,

where the conversation happened to run upon the respective merits of the Ancient and Modern writers. In supporting the claims of the former, Boileau made one exception, and after being pressed by one of the Jesuits to disclose the name of this writer, he seized him by the arm and shouted :

"My good Father, are you determined to have it? Morbleu, it is Pascal!" "Pascal!" says the Jesuit, red as fire, "Pascal is as good as anything false can be." "False," answers Despréaux, "false! Know that he is as true as he is inimitable, and has been translated into three languages." "He's not any more true for all that," replies the Jesuit. Boileau got very excited at this, and, shouting like a madman, cries: "What! Father, do you deny that one of your people has printed in one of their books that a *Christian is not obliged to love God*? Dare you say that is false?" "Monsieur," says the Father in a fury, "it is necessary to make distinctions." "To make distinctions," cries Despréaux, "distinctions, morbleu, to make distinctions whether we are to love God!" And, taking his friend Corbinelli by the arm, he rushed to the other end of the room, and joined the rest of the company in the salon.

It will be gathered from this highly amusing description that Boileau was a somewhat irascible gentleman. It may, however, be added that he was invariably a generous adversary. This is amply proved by his treatment of Perrault in the famous literary quarrel on the subject of the "Ancients and Moderns," in which their mutual friend Dr. Arnauld so happily intervened. Having received his erstwhile opponent's apologies, Boileau at once wrote Perrault one of the most courteous letters imaginable, and the breach was completely healed between them.

It is pleasant to turn from his sterner controversies to the humorous side of Boileau. His one and only composition in this lighter vein was his amusing poem *Le Lutrin*, or *The Reading Desk*. He explains its origin as follows :

Not long ago, when I was in some company, the conversation turned upon the heroic poem. . . . I maintained what I had argued in my *Art of Poetry*, that an heroic poem to be really excellent ought not to be laden with too much material, and that it rested with the author's ingenuity to sustain and extend the subject. . . . We moralised upon the folly of people who made a great matter out of small occurrences. A propos of this, a provincial gentleman related a famous squabble that had occurred formerly in a little

church near him, between the Treasurer and the Cantor, as to whether a reading desk should be placed on one side of the chancel or the other. Following this, one of the scholars of the company asked me . . . if I would undertake to make an heroic poem out of a dispute so lightly charged with incident as this? . . . In the evening, thinking the subject would prove amusing, I composed twenty verses, . . . and went on making them.

The adaptation of this story by Boileau is very humorous. He represents the Spirit of Discord as hovering over a certain church, where hitherto nothing but peace had reigned. Deciding to make a determined assault, Discord descends and hatches out a quarrel of precedence between the Treasurer and the Cantor. Disguised as an aged ecclesiastic, she rouses the fat sleeping Treasurer from his bed, and inflames him against his colleague, who, taking his Superior's place, is chanting the service, and leading processions. To crush this presumptuous Cantor, an old reading desk, long out of use, is dragged by night in front of the Cantor's stall, so that in future he will be effectually concealed both from the choir and the congregation. The discovery of it next day by the horrified Cantor, and the retaliatory measures proposed, are all detailed by Boileau with the utmost spirit and humour, and the whole affair is very cleverly wound up with a veritable "Battle of the Books," in which the respective antagonists and their supporters take possession of a large bookseller's emporium, and hurl volumes at each other in the most ferocious manner. Here—as in many other places in his *Satires*—the poet cannot resist having a little fun at the expense of poor Mademoiselle de Scudéry, whose voluminous works *Cyrus* and *Clélie* are represented as proving the most fatal of all the missiles in this extraordinary conflict.

But apart from all this laughable drollery, we note a subtle vein of irony running through this poem of *The Reading Desk*, directed against the self-indulgence and the hardened indifference that characterised the ecclesiastics of the day. One of the most biting of these lines is put in the mouth of the old Almoner when he seeks to restrain the indignant Treasurer from rushing out without his dinner :

Quelle fureur . . . quel aveugle caprice
Quand le dîner est prêt, vous appelez à l'Office ?
De votre dignité soutenez mieux l'éclat ;
Est ce pour travailler que vous êtes prélat ?

In a final estimate of Boileau, although it must be conceded that he displayed no original genius of the highest order, such as that possessed by Molière, yet in his own line of literary criticism, broad humorous observation, and fine moral discernment he was supreme. Although he admittedly based much of his work on the classic models of Greece and Rome, in particular on the *Satires* and *Odes* of Horace and Juvenal, the whole of the imposing structure he built upon these foundations was his own. He became in his day the absolute literary dictator of Europe, and he was undoubtedly the founder of that French classicism which during the whole of the eighteenth century dominated our most notable English writers. Pope and Addison were certainly inspired by him : the former—alike in his *Essay on Man*, as in his *Essay on Criticism*, relied much on Boileau, and the latter was probably prompted to his *Blenheim Ode* in emulation of his great predecessor's *Ode On the Taking of Namur*. Swift's *Battle of the Books* owes something to *Le Lutrin*, though, strangely enough, he makes the extraordinary blunder in that literary conflict of putting the great advocate of the Ancients on the wrong side! A hint for his Yahoo theory may likewise have been borrowed by Swift from Boileau's *Satire on Man*.

All the writings and controversies of Boileau are now dead and only read as curiosities, but something vital and arresting will always remain in recalling his personality. We remember his breadth of outlook on every question, his fine stand for religious freedom, his sturdy maintenance of his own opinion in an age of sycophancy. Something of all this seems reflected in the fine open nobility of his countenance as represented in the portraits that have come down to us. The dominating suggestion of intellect is mellowed by a humorous smile that plays about the mouth, as if to indicate that, despite the vehemence of his opinions, there was no malice in his nature. That there was an undeniable grandeur about Boileau seems indicated by the deference paid to him by that otherwise arrogant monarch, Louis XIV, who undoubtedly valued and admired him. Possibly he felt about this strong, upstanding personality as his successor Napoleon felt about Goethe—that here at any rate was "a Man."

ALICE LAW.

A NEW TYPE OF SCIENCE TEACHING.

IT is not sufficiently realised, either by teachers or by the general public, how artificial, and how remote from all phases of adult life, is our modern secondary education. When the child has learnt to read, write, and add up his accounts, and knows sufficient of our complicated system of weights and measures for practical use, a new contact has been made with the world of everyday experience. The knowledge and skill is of definite practical use. But this knowledge is acquired at a very early stage. Very little that is taught in secondary education has a similar bearing on adult life. We hear much of the benefits of modern education, and of the importance of raising the legal school-leaving age. We are inclined to take the benefits for granted; but we do not give sufficient attention to the problem of what we really wish to teach—how the time devoted to education can best be spent. How *do* we wish to spend the time of the pupil between the ages of ten and sixteen years? Do we really wish to teach anything?

This question may sound absurd; but there is a school of educational thought which implicitly answers it in the negative. Educationists of this type emphasise mental training. Their view is that it makes very little difference what you teach, so long as you keep the mind actively working, and inculcate habits of industry. One prominent schoolmaster is reported to have expressed this view crudely and bluntly by saying that it did not much matter what you taught a boy so long as he did not like it. Though not usually expressed so crudely, this view is widely held. It is doubtful, for example, whether the teaching of Latin and Greek to those who leave school at sixteen can be defended on any other grounds. Nor, in the average course of instruction in the ordinary modernised secondary school, can we find very much which has appreciable value considered from any other point of view. The "subjects" are so conventionalised that very little contact is made with life, thought, or civilisation. If those of mature years will consider what part of the instruction they received at school means anything to them, I think they will agree that this estimate is not far wrong.

Is this point of view the right one? Can we not obtain the necessary mental training in acquiring the information

which is, on other grounds, desirable? Is there really nothing which the average man and woman in our modern civilisation ought to know? Until we have made up our minds on these points, we cannot hope to find reality and vitality in our education. A school of modern thought, first expressed in systematic form in Herbert Spencer's famous little book on education, answers these questions in the affirmative. The answer is that modern man and woman should be acquainted with science. The movement started in those early days has not been altogether ineffective. Science teaching *has* entered the schools. Indeed I think we may say that no modern and efficient school is without science teaching of some sort. But the experience of many years has convinced me, and some others, that the problem is not solved. Somehow or other the modern science teaching has proved to be as dead, and nearly as much divorced from modern life and thought, as the old classical teaching. Something is lacking.

In the ordinary school curriculum, to the majority of pupils, one science is taught. It may be chemistry, heat, light and sound, magnetism and electricity, biology, or, very occasionally, geology. To the minority, two sciences are usually taught. In either case it is very doubtful whether the child who passes the School Certificate examination at the age of sixteen or seventeen has a real grasp of scientific thought and method. If he is taught chemistry he learns a number of isolated facts like the preparation of oxygen, the extraction of sulphur from its earth, the manufacture of sulphuric acid, the reduction of iron from its ores by heating with coke and limestone. He also learns to express these changes by chemical equations, and to calculate the quantities used. But somehow or other the vital principles are overlaid with a mass of detail interesting only to the chemical specialist. There are a few contacts with common life, such as the knowledge of what is happening when a candle burns, but they are far too few. Nor do we get much better results if we choose some other science. Much of what is taught is as far removed from what the average man wants to know, and ought to know, as the old dreary grind of Latin and Greek. The problem to be solved is: can we teach what ought to be known?

There is a movement at the present time, called *general science*, which is an attempt to solve this problem. A number

of teachers and educationists, both in this country and in America, have been busy devising schemes by means of which it is hoped to give some vitality to education in science, and to teach those things which the average man should know. There are considerable difficulties in formulating a practicable scheme. Consequently the advocates of general science, though they agree that the science course must include elementary facts and theories from different branches of science, disagree about nearly everything else. It will be of some interest to summarise what has been, and is being, done.

One type of general science has been taught for many years in the United States, and, to a lesser extent, in Canada. As early as 1908, general science courses have been known in American high schools, and, to-day, in some of the States, general science appears in the curriculum as often as the old type of science teaching. A good idea of the methods adopted can be gathered from the syllabus of one of many courses, which divides the instruction into ten units. The first two are:—"The Homes we Live in" and "The Clothing we Wear." The last one is "The Work of Continuing the Species." This journal is not the place to give a detailed criticism of this method of approach. But it is fairly clear at the first glance that the idea of "mental training" has been abandoned entirely, and that the study of the principles of science is not apparent. It will be sufficient to say that this type of general science has not crossed the Atlantic, and that English teachers and educationists are proceeding on different lines.*

In England, the teaching of general science in secondary schools is sporadic and rare. A syllabus may be worked in one school, and, under the guidance of the teacher who originated it, may not be too unsuccessful. But it does not spread. Occasionally such a syllabus may be published, but it is usually ignored or, when not ignored, it is riddled with adverse criticism. There have been, however, one or two attempts to formulate a syllabus for general use. The first authoritative statement of the desirability of generalising the school work in science came from an important committee of which Sir J. J. Thomson was the chairman. The

* Anyone interested in the American development will find a good account in *How to Teach General Science*, by J. O. Frank. Blakiston.

report entitled *Natural Science in Education* was first published in 1918, and contains many valuable recommendations, by no means all of which have been carried out, which do not concern us here. There were, however, three recommendations which are relevant to our subject.

8. That in all secondary schools for boys the time given to Science should not be less than four periods in the first year of the course from 12 to 16, and not less than six periods in the three succeeding years.

17. That the science work for pupils under 16 should be planned as a self-contained course, and should include, besides chemistry and physics, some study of plant and animal life.

18. That more attention should be directed to those aspects of the sciences which bear directly on the objects and experiences of everyday life.

During the twenty years that have elapsed since that report was issued, practically nothing has been done. Occasionally a syllabus has been issued. A summary of a syllabus will be found in the recent (1932) report of the Secondary Schools Examination Council. Another one comes from a committee of the Science Masters' Association. But these attempts are vitiated by two serious defects. The first is the ignoring of Sir J. J. Thomson's essential recommendation concerning the *minimum* time. The second is that the syllabuses are merely summaries of very elementary chemistry, physics and biology, drawn up as if they were subjects to be taught on the ordinary specialist lines. There is no attempt to co-ordinate the teaching into a coherent whole, or to make the course self-contained. The results so far have been negligible.

When committees fail, when criticism is of no avail except to lead to the appointment of other committees, who thereupon ignore the criticisms and repeat the same old errors, it remains for private individuals to attempt the task. It appears to me that the following are absolutely essential features of a properly arranged science course for secondary schools:

1. That the time be not less than that recommended by Sir J. J. Thomson's committee.
2. That the details of the science syllabus should be chosen on account of their fundamental scientific importance, and because of their bearing on practical life, and that, in the choosing of the

details, no notice whatever should be taken of the particular branch of science in which they are usually included.

3. That the course of instruction should be a unity, and that, so far as possible, the divisions between the specialist sciences should be ignored.

4. When differences, such as that between living and non-living, preclude absolute unity, every effort should be made to co-ordinate the teaching in the sections.

5. That the teaching of science should be linked with that of other subjects, particularly mathematics, which is continually used in science work, and geography.

The last four may be summarised by saying that there is all the difference in the world between teaching elementary science and teaching chemistry, physics and biology. Considered from this aspect, there is something to be said for the American methods. Although the courses are discursive, and too much popularised, and the essential element of teaching the principles of science seems to have been overlooked, something may be learned from their method of approach. They do not treat the science as subjects, but deal with topics, and, in the treatment of those topics, they include such scientific facts and theories as are relevant. This method, in principle, appears to me to be sound. Everything depends on the choice of the topics, and on the matter included under each. Is it possible to choose your topics in such a manner as to include the scientific knowledge with which all should be acquainted?

This brings me to a difficult part of the discussion. I have to try to give an unbiased account of my own work, and it is not easy. Obviously it would be unfitting for me to praise it, but it may be allowable for me to indicate the lines on which I have attempted to solve the problem.* Whether the attempt be successful or not, (and I am quite sure that it is open to criticism in detail) it is, so far as I am aware, the only one which recognises the principles I have just laid down, or proceeds on any definite principles, clearly expressed and worked out in detail.

It seems to me essential, in arranging the principles of science in topics, that the topics should be simple. The difficulties of "the House we Live in" as a first topic are

* The syllabus was published as a supplement to the *Schoolmaster* for November 7th, 1935.

obvious. The simplest requirements of the building of houses involve scientific principles beyond the powers of the beginner. For example, the elementary requirement that walls must be built which will neither allow moisture to penetrate from outside nor permit condensation from inside raises complicated scientific problems. If treated at all, it should be considered at a later stage. For the beginner we must have simple topics, so for the first two I have chosen water and air. Even then I have found some of the problems arising out of the study of water too difficult for the beginner, and have thought it necessary to return to the topic later on.

In the early stages, therefore, for simplicity, I have chosen simple everyday substances as my topics, and in their treatment have considered both chemical and physical properties. Under air we can study both its chemical composition, including the everyday phenomenon of burning, and the physical properties including pressure, which leads to the study of the barometer. Under iron, a simple study of magnetism is also relevant. Metals generally, amongst other physical properties, are the only efficient reflectors of light, so the laws of reflection can come under this heading. The whole object is to include in a natural manner the principal facts of elementary science which should be known. In the later stages of the course questions can be considered which do not obviously arise out of the study of simple substances, and so I have included among the later topics: Gravitation and the solar system, Machines, Wave-motion and Evolution.

There is no space to give further details, which those interested will find in the complete syllabus, but a few words are needed on the last-named topic. The main idea of the movement towards general science is to give vitality to science teaching, and to include in the course the main outlines of modern scientific thought. With this object in view, it would be a serious omission not to include evolution, which is the main co-ordinating principle of modern biology. I sincerely hope that those interested in education will not regard this as controversial. While it is not possible here to give a full discussion of this point, I wish to urge that, when an explanation of the origin of the multitudinous forms of life has been generally accepted by competent men of science for many years, and when no alternative hypothesis from

the scientific point of view has been put forward, and when no serious scientific objections have been urged, a course of* science teaching is incomplete without it. Nor have I been able to discover that reasonable objections can be urged on religious grounds. Call it a hypothesis if you wish—it does not matter much what you call it—but with this hypothesis biology is a living thing; without it it is an unco-ordinated mass of detail. Of course the general scheme of teaching science in topics can be implemented without it, but it seems to me that, if you really are going to give vitality to science teaching, and to educate the future citizen in the knowledge of the material world disclosed by scientific thought, it is a serious omission to leave out the main co-ordinating principle of our knowledge of living things.

It is hoped that the movement for the teaching of a form of science which has reality and vitality will spread. Too long has secondary education been a formalised course of instruction in “subjects,” which the pupil on leaving school proceeds to forget as soon as possible. The ignorance of the average man of the common facts of the world and of life is too appalling. Something should be done to teach the things that ought to be known. So far as education in science is concerned, I am convinced that the generalising of the instruction is the solution we are seeking, and, with all due modesty, I venture to hope that my own suggestion of including this generalised science in a number of comparatively simple topics, and ignoring the arbitrary divisions between the specialist sciences, is the means by which this can best be done. Should these suggestions be generally adopted, and this reform in teaching come into general use, the many unprofitable years I have spent teaching science on the old lines, and enabling pupils to pass examinations, will not have been altogether wasted.

H. S. SHELTON.

* It is just as well to say that I have read Mr. Douglas Dewar's book, also that of Sir Ambrose Fleming, but this is not the place to criticise them.

MEMOIRS OF A POLISH NOBLEMAN.

FIVE years ago, Count Bogdan de Hutten-Czapski, one of the great Polish landowners, formerly attached to the German Embassy in Paris and aide-de-camp to the erstwhile Imperial German Statthalter of Alsace-Lorraine, made a truly princely donation to the University and the Polytechnical Academy at Warsaw. The donation in question consisted in the transfer to those institutions of 2,684 hectares (about 6,710 acres) of his estate at Smogulec, in the province of Poznan. Festivities on a large scale were organised at the time by Warsaw University to celebrate this event, festivities to which the Sovereign Order of the Knights of Malta, one of whose high dignitaries Count Hutten-Czapski had long been, delegated M. Alfred de Chlapowski, Polish Ambassador in Paris, as its representative. Count Hutten-Czapski was at that date already eighty years old. Since then this amazingly active “Grand Old Man” has worked, with an indefatigable assiduity well calculated to excite the admiring envy of any normal man fifty years his junior, at the compilation of his Memoirs. These were published at the beginning of 1936 by the firm of E. S. Mittler in Berlin under the title *Sechszig Jahre Politik und Gesellschaft* in two impressively bulky volumes of some 600 pages each, the study of which may be recommended, not only to professional historians, but to all those still capable of retaining an interest in a relatively recent past that—however much the younger generation of to-day may ignore the fact—has overwhelmingly contributed to shape the present.

Of the author it may be said that he played a part *sui generis* in the chequered and frequently somewhat complicated relations between Prussia and the latter's Polish territory prior to the Great War, which ended in the definite liberation of Poland from the threefold yoke of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and in her re-establishment as an independent State. As a matter of fact, Count Hutten-Czapski was the only great landowner among the Polish aristocracy, who, during half a century preceding the outbreak of the Great War, consented to enter the service of Germany. But over and beyond his political rôle, Count Hutten-Czapski is pre-eminently a personification of that exquisite courtesy and never-failing *bonhomie*, of that perfect aristocracy of demeanour

mingled with vast experience of the world, of that rare moderation of views, of that impeccable taste, of that dignified bearing, of that intellectually and æsthetically and politically cosmopolitan outlook on life—in a word, of that elegant *savoir vivre*—of a European society impregnated to its roots by French eighteenth-century tradition. Qualities undoubtedly unknown to revolutionary periods, and withal absolutely inconceivable in contemporary troubled times!

“Aristocratic lineage, Polish nationality, Prussian citizenship, the Catholic faith, Liberal political convictions, economic independence, cosmopolitan education, joy of life, thirst for knowledge, love of work and travel”—these, writes Count Hutten-Czapski, have invariably constituted the determining factors of his long life. Truly an admirable *apologia pro vita sua*, which—*mutatis mutandis* as regards the first four factors enumerated—will awaken a sympathetic echo in the hearts of a great number.

Born in 1851 as the son of Count Joseph Napoleon de Czapski and his wife, *née* Countess Mielzynska, Bogdan de Hutten-Czapski, from his cradle onwards, was richly endowed with those personal connections which are invariably an important factor of success in life. His father, who had fought in the Polish war of liberation against Russia in 1830-1 and had subsequently been compelled to flee to London, where he lived in exile some fifteen years, during which he apparently worked for the Irish national movement and also co-operated with the future Napoleon III and Mazzini, favoured collaboration between the Polish citizens of Prussia and the Prussian authorities. This standpoint was certainly attributable to his ineradicable hatred of Russia. Joseph Napoleon de Czapski died before his son Bogdan had celebrated a second birthday, but the son manifestly inherited the paternal anti-Russian complex, since Bogdan after the death of his remarkably capable mother in 1875—he being then aged twenty-four—decided to enter the service of the Prussian State. Henceforth, for over forty years, Count Bogdan de Hutten-Czapski was the only big landowner appertaining to the Polish aristocracy to be found in such a position. His absolute isolation probably weighed on him, to judge by his admission that “his convictions had clashed with those of persons near and dear to him,” which he publicly made on the occasion of the Warsaw University

festivities already mentioned. But what should particularly endear the venerable Count to all his readers, whatever their own political views may be, is his further admission, in the introduction to his Memoirs, that never will he renounce or repudiate his political past. To emphasise this to-day, on the part of someone who served in conspicuous places under three Kaisers in Imperial Germany, requires courage of no mean order.

In these fascinating Memoirs, the Count tells his readers that the two dominating ideals of his life were : 1, to improve the relations between the Papacy and the secular Powers ; 2, to reconcile Poland and Prussia. For it must be borne in mind that Count Hutten-Czapski is not only a sincere Polish patriot, but also an ardent Catholic.

His intimate relations with the Holy See, according to his own version, commenced when he was a youngster of nineteen, precisely between the memorable day when the Vatican Council proclaimed *urbi et orbi* the dogma of Papal Infallibility in matters of faith and morals, and the not less memorable Venti Settembre, when the Italian troops entered the Eternal City through the Porta Pia, and the Infallible Inmate of the Vatican retired behind the Portone di Bronzo into dignified and voluntary captivity. It may sound strange that Pio Nono's famous Secretary of State, Cardinal Antonelli, should have requested a boy of nineteen, immediately after the latter's arrival in Rome, to come and see him in order to obtain a detailed account of the latest occurrences in Germany and Austria. Almost stranger, that as soon as the youth had finished his *exposé* the Cardinal should have taken him, then and there, to the Pope in order to enable him to repeat it for the Holy Father's benefit. True, the youth had been furnished with a letter of introduction to the Papal Secretary of State by the Apostolic Nuncio in Vienna ; and his mother was on cordial terms with various influential ecclesiastical personages. Nevertheless, the Curia is generally reputed to be possessed of other, more reliable, and less fortuitous sources of information.

This part of the Memoirs need not, of course, be taken too seriously. It may well be that Count Hutten-Czapski's memory, at the age of eighty, was not wholly accurate in regard to events that took place sixty years previously. This suspicion is confirmed by the fact that the Count himself

admits that "with the lightheartedness of youth" he took no notes of any of his conversations with Pius IX at that momentous time. And it is the merest commonplace that, with advancing age, everyone is prone involuntarily to exaggerate the importance of actions performed, or parts played, by him in his youth. Such criticism should not, however, be interpreted as implying that Count Hutten-Czapski's reminiscences of his experiences in Rome in those critical days are devoid either of interest or importance. Far from it. His account of Pius IX, scion of the noble House of the Counts of Mastai-Ferretti and withal one of the most illustrious successors of St. Peter, tallies with everything hitherto known about the great Pope of the Immaculate Conception and the Infallibility, of the Syllabus and the Vatican Council—about his extraordinary personal charm and fascinating affability, combined with the rigid austerity of an ecclesiastic and the uncompromisingly dogmatic authoritativeness of a Supreme Pontiff.

Count Hutten-Czapski has lived to see the first of his above-mentioned ideals fully realised. At the outset of the Count's career, sixty-five years ago, the Holy See was at war with the newly founded Kingdom of United Italy, which had ruthlessly annexed the Papal State; and with the equally new German Empire, where Bismarck, following in the footsteps of the Hohenstaufens, had set himself the task of subjugating the Catholic Church to the Protestant House of Hohenzollern. Relations between the Vatican and the Third French Republic born of the catastrophe of Sedan were strained, those between the Vatican and the British Government frigid. It was the heyday of aggressive anticlericalism. To-day the vexed "Roman question," Cavour's nightmare, has been solved to the mutual satisfaction of both the parties concerned; and the relations of the Church with most countries are on a more secure footing than had been the case for centuries. The Great War altered the whole aspect of Europe and of the globe. New frontiers have been mapped out, new States called into existence, new economic conditions created, new political systems invented, new ethical creeds evolved. The cataclysm changed everything all around. Only the unchangeable Church—to borrow Macaulay's immortal phrase—is still there. Nay, she alone has emerged from the terrible ordeal with enhanced power and prestige.

But Count Hutten-Czapski has not been privileged to witness the accomplishment of his second ideal—or, at any rate, not in the form in which he conceived it. In this case, concrete achievements have immeasurably exceeded his dreams. The Great War, by restoring to Poland her independence and her unity, fundamentally transformed the aspect of her relations with Russia, Germany, and Austria. The three formerly so powerful Monarchies, essential factors of the European equilibrium and guarantors of peace, have been submerged by the tidal wave. And independent, united Poland must henceforth thread her way as best she can along a thorny path.

In the opening chapter, Count Czapski recalls his school-days in Paris, when he was a pupil at the celebrated Lycée Bonaparte, among his schoolmates being the future President of the French Republic, Casimir-Périer, who succeeded Carnot after the latter's assassination in 1894, but resigned after exactly two hundred and two days; and the future famous historian, Albert Vandal. It was towards the close of the scintillating era of the Second Empire, and Count Czapski's mother played a leading rôle in the brilliant social life of the French capital, the guests at her house including Countess Stéphanie Tacher de la Pagerie, a niece of Empress Joséphine, and such distinguished personages as Marshal MacMahon; Emile Ollivier, the last Prime Minister of Napoleon III, son-in-law of Liszt and brother-in-law of Cosima Wagner; and the eminent historian and statesman, Adolphe Thiers. On July 2nd, 1870, Bogdan de Hutten-Czapski, then aged nineteen, passed the examination for the diploma of *bachelier*, which qualifies its holder to study at a university. Three weeks later he was present as a spectator at the historic sitting of the *Corps législatif*, in which Emile Ollivier made his famous declaration that it was with a "light heart" that France declared war on Germany.

Having entered the service of the Prussian State as a Crown jurist in the Department of Justice in 1875, Bogdan de Hutten-Czapski, finding the work assigned him uncongenial, exchanged two years later a legal career for a military, more suited to his aptitudes. In either case the professional duties imposed on him would appear to have been much less exacting than the social obligations of a young man in his position. This position, created *volens volens* by family ties and a large

fortune, afforded the young Count unexampled opportunities of observing Court and other life in Berlin during the early years of the German Empire welded into shape by the genius of Bismarck. One of the author's numerous observations made during his sojourn in Berlin at the end of the 'seventies may be noted. Among his patrons was the Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry, Hermann von Thile, who had married a schoolmate and lifelong friend of Bogdan's mother. Hermann von Thile, a perfect specimen of the European statesmen of those halcyon days, was both a Greek and an Italian scholar of ripe learning and exquisite taste. He was wont to assemble once a week, in a house that was a veritable miniature museum of the choicest art treasures, a small but select society of admirers of Dante. But these admirers were by no means mere amateurs, they were all of them experts in their domain. After a modest supper, so Count Hutten-Czapski tells us, one of the guests delivered a carefully prepared lecture on the subject of one-half of a canto of the *Divina Commedia*, whereby the original text was minutely translated and all subsequent variations critically analysed.

Commandeered, at his own request, by the German Embassy in Paris in 1882, in the capacity of a sort of supernumerary attaché, semi-military and semi-civilian, Count Hutten-Czapski took, most legitimately, full advantage of his numerous society connections in the French capital. He was thus able to make the acquaintance of Gambetta, who on various occasions assured him of the necessity of satisfactory relations between France and Germany. One of his reports on Gambetta earned for its author an altogether unusual encomium on the part of Bismarck: "excellent report; this young man has really good connections." During his stay in Paris, Count Hutten-Czapski became friends with Count (later Prince) Henckel von Donnersmarck, at whose hospitable house he frequently met Gambetta and also the illustrious literary critic Sainte-Beuve. Among many other acquaintances he made, either there or elsewhere, not the least interesting, assuredly, was that of the great Catholic journalist, Louis Veuillot, founder and editor of the militant Catholic political organ *l'Univers*, to whom Jules Lemaitre paid so remarkable a tribute in the sixth series of *Les Contemporains*.

The German Ambassador in Paris at that time (1882) was

Prince Clovis Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, of ancient South German lineage, an erstwhile fellow-student of Queen Victoria's consort at Göttingen, and later on, from 1894 till October 1900, an amiable and by no means incompetent Chancellor of the German Empire, in which difficult post he succeeded Caprivi and preceded Bülow. By a notable coincidence, the latter was in 1882 fulfilling the functions of Second Secretary to the Embassy, and an instructive book of reminiscences by Count Harry Kessler* shows us the dandyish Bülow assiduously engaged, outside his none too onerous official duties, on the congenial task of endeavouring to seduce Count Kessler's beautiful and brilliant mother, an Irish lady who had married the Hamburg banker Kessler, and whose *salon*, thanks mainly to the fascinating charm and intellectual superiority of its hostess, had developed into a centre of social life in Paris. Although Bülow characteristically took advantage of the temporary absence of Countess Kessler's husband in the United States, his advances met with no success, despite the fact that with his customary self-sufficiency he assured the lady that he "would open for her the gates of paradise" if only she accepted them. With her gift of psychological penetration, Countess Kessler, from the outset, had seen through Bülow. "I have never," she wrote, "known a worse *arriviste* than he is. He admits, moreover, that he would have walked over corpses to attain his ends. He had neither heart nor scruples. Certainly he was intelligent, but not excessively so, and, when all is said, he was antipathetic, because at the very beginning one discovered his boundless egotism." Bülow could not digest the beautiful Countess's rebuff. In his notorious *Denkwürdigkeiten*, which have been aptly compared to the venomous diary of a discharged chambermaid, the ex-Chancellor took a coward's revenge on the lady by shooting what he doubtless supposed to be a poisoned arrow against a dead and defenceless person. But this arrow, like so many others, has proved fatal to the archer who shot it. Bülow was a gifted and versatile man. Count Hutten-Czapski, however, sums up the universal verdict concerning him and his posthumously published *Denkwürdigkeiten* when he cites approvingly the words of another competent judge that "Bülow is the only person who committed suicide after his death."

* *Geschichten und Zeiten*. Berlin: S. Fischer, 1935.

After leaving the German Army at the end of 1896 with the rank of Major, Count Hutten-Czapski never occupied any official post of any sort, military or civilian. His nomination by the Prussian Crown as a member of the *Herrenhaus*, the non-elective Upper House of the former Prussia Diet, cannot in any case be regarded as an appointment to official duties. Yet the political influence of this Polish nobleman of Prussian citizenship was well-nigh unbounded. Standing above, and aloof from, the intrigues of Court *camarillas* and political factions, Hutten-Czapski was henceforth the confidential friend and valued counsellor of three Chancellors: Hohenlohe, Bülow, Bethmann-Hollweg. He even succeeded in gaining something approaching the confidence and friendship of that most whimsical of individuals, the *éminence grise* of post-Bismarckian Germany, Friedrich von Holstein, whose policy—as he admits—proved so fatal to Germany.

The extreme benevolence, charitableness, and good taste of this venerable Polish aristocrat's judgment on the numerous highly placed personages with whom he came into contact, and with many of whom he was on terms of intimate friendship, is all the more comforting when it is compared with the acid malignity and monstrous partiality, only too evidently born of wounded pride, frequently displayed by certain German writers of reminiscences since the Great War.

Count Hutten-Czapski has the courage to admit that the outcome of the War in nowise modified his previously courteous, although never intimate, relations with the Kaiser—with whose grandmother, Empress Augusta, he had entertained particularly cordial relations, a fact which earned for him the malevolent suspicion of Bismarck. The Count's tributes to the much-maligned Holstein and to Bethmann-Hollweg are moving in their manifest sincerity.

Eminently worthy of record is the fact that this "Grand Old Man" of German and European politics prides himself on going every year, in his 'eighties, to Rome, to implore the blessing of the Vicar of Christ. In his youth, under the Pontificate of Pío Nono, he first ascended the Scala Sancta; and to-day, in his old age, he feels, so he tells us, the need of travelling annually, at the time of the Holy Week and Easter, to the Primatial See of Christendom.

GEORGES CHATTERTON-HILL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

EFFECT OF SPAIN ON EUROPE.

THERE were those in Europe who took the view up to the summer of this year that the very rottenness of the general situation might save the situation from war. It is obviously possible for a thing to be too bad to be taken seriously, and therefore too bad to be serious. When no one knows who is going to fight, or on which side, the danger of war is clearly smaller than if the camps be irrevocably marked out. On that argument the danger becomes still smaller if the kaleidoscope changes, as it has changed in Europe, with bewildering rapidity. None the less, up to the night of July 17th to 18th last, when a military revolt broke out in Morocco against the Republican Government of Spain, there did hang over Europe the general nightmare, blurred as it might be, of a repetition of the sort of war that began in 1914. The antagonisms, fears, bad temper were being canalised along the humdrum nationalistic patriotic lines; that is to say, Germany was gaining daily strength as a strong nation actuated by the united patriotic feelings of all classes in Germany. French and British opinion was reacting in the like spirit of united nationalism.

But when the Spanish civil war broke out a new factor was introduced into the European maelstrom. There are those who regard civil war as something more deplorable than international war; but it is not obvious to many people why the mutual murder of strangers belonging to the same race or nation should be any worse than the murder of strangers belonging to another race or nation. It even seems arguable that a civil war is less fearsome than international war because it is more localised and likely to involve a smaller sum of general damage. In the case of Spain, however, the latest civil war has had much more in it than met the eye. It happens that the several European dictatorships are characteristically labelled, not only by nationalist, but by social labels. The bolshevik dictatorship of Russia has for nearly twenty years boasted of its proletarian bias. The middle and upper classes in the Russian system are in principle the dispossessed classes, and the so-called "working class" is featured as the dominant ruling class. Both the

Italian and German dictatorships have an answering bias in the opposite sense. Mussolini and Hitler alike have consistently claimed that they are a bulwark against communism, that at any rate they safeguard their own country from communism.

There thus operates on the international scene what may be called a horizontal or class division as well as a vertical or national division. The duality of antagonisms has been a feature of the post-war years. Now no Russian would deny, at any rate openly, that the "world revolution" remains to-day as dear a cause to bolshevik hearts as it ever was during the past nineteen years. Russian propaganda has never waned during those years, its frank object being to stir up the working class of countries outside Russia to do what Lenin did, or pretended to do, for the Russian working class. It is a remarkable thing that a body of men such as those who have ruled Russia for a generation should have maintained a revolutionary fervour for nearly a generation and not got tired of it, or nauseated with it. Being actuated by so negative and destructive a cause—destructive primarily of personal liberty—it is not surprising that they have had their own nemeses and difficulties. *La révolution dévore ses enfants*. Former stalwarts of the bolshevik cause have been destroyed in the very fury of destruction they themselves let loose; and each new body of leaders is obsessed with fear that the next wave may submerge them in their turn. It has therefore been a feature of Russian political life since the October revolution of 1917 that the successive leaders had at all costs to win new prestige.

All dictatorships and all revolutions in their varying degrees are subject to such a condition. Herr Hitler must go on startling the world if he is to maintain his heroic fiction at home. If he is not tearing up the Versailles Treaty, he must be tearing up the Locarno Treaty, or quitting the League of Nations, or recovering the Saar. By the same sort of urge the bolshevik leaders have never given up hope, or at least never admitted defeat, in their self-imposed rôle of disrupting the social order in every other country as they did in their own. The French stay-in strikes that began last May when M. Blum by his electoral victory was destined to become the first Socialist Prime Minister of the Third Republic, bore the unmistakable hall-mark of Russian coaching. The French situation was a close thing for the bolshevik cause. No effort was spared in

Moscow to ensure a communist revolution in France. In Spain, meanwhile, a Government of the Popular Front had been produced by the February election. Spain had ever since been thrown into the vortex of social unrest, in its turn helped and encouraged by Moscow. When the Spanish fascists hoisted their standard in Morocco and determined to contest the fate of Spain, a definite challenge was thrown down to Moscow. We at once witnessed the European spectacle of a new or clearer horizontal split. Russian prestige was clearly engaged in the insurgents' defeat. German and Italian prestige was equally engaged in the insurgents' victory. It was obvious to Moscow as to every other European camp that a decisive issue had been joined. If Spain went red, it was a virtual certainty that France would go red. If the Spanish insurgents won their cause, bolshevism in Western Europe was doomed. From the beginning the Portuguese Government refused to be "neutral." It took and announced the view that communism was a menace to Portugal's own security. *Nam sua res agitur*. Neither Russia nor Germany nor Italy ever felt neutral from the first moment the war started. How could they? Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini were closely concerned in the outcome.

M. Blum was thereby placed in a difficulty. He had assumed office only on June 4th to the accompaniment of rapidly spreading strikes such as raised the very issue of democracy versus dictatorship. Could the democratic system survive in France? If not, was it to be a fascist or a communist dictatorship? Belgium, too, was passing through the like emergency. M. van Zeeland had to meet as severe a trial as M. Blum had to face. There was little doubt that the Belgian strikes of June last were inspired and modelled on the French strikes. They began in Liège and Mons, which were nearest to the French industrial areas. The strikers' demands were similar to those of the French: a forty-hour week, holidays with full pay, trade union bargaining and higher wages. Like M. Blum, M. van Zeeland began by conceding the strikers' demands, and thereby merely begged the question to gain time.

While no less grave a question was being raised in France and in Belgium than whether the democratic system could be safeguarded, the very same question was raised in Spain with far more dramatic precision and urgency. In Spain it soon

became obvious that the democratic system was at an end, and that the real question to be decided was whether the alternative dictatorship was to be communist or fascist. It was in the early hours of July 18th that the Spanish army in Morocco began seizing Government buildings. Within twenty-four hours the insurgents were in control of the whole of Spanish Morocco, and Spain itself was split into its two camps. The Government in Madrid resigned as soon as the first news of the revolt was received. The new Government resigned within a few hours, and was replaced by a third. Such was the death agony of democracy in Spain. Within one week the whole of Spain was plunged into the bitterest civil war, the suddenness and violence of which proved how dry had been the tinder. It was only five months before that the so-called "Popular Front," helped by economic distress, unemployment and Russian coaching, was returned to power at the election. At once the violent tendency of the Left-wing agitators raced ahead of the Government they had themselves produced. Señor Azana and Señor Quiroga were given the same sort of paradoxical reception as M. Blum was given later in France. Nerves became increasingly raw. When Señor Quiroga dismissed from their posts a batch of officers who had been prominently concerned in the suppression of the 1934 revolt, the tension was near to breaking point. The assassination on July 13th of Señor Sotelo by Government police made the war certain. It came within four days of that event.

At once it became obvious that the tinder was dry elsewhere than in Spain. The clear danger emerged, unless outside folly could be restrained, of a European conflict of communism *versus* anti-communism, whether the anti-communist forces be called nazis, fascists or nationalists. Pressure was put upon M. Blum by his own extremists that he should support the so-called "popular" side in Spain. M. Blum fortunately recognised that if he allowed himself to be driven into intervention, physical or moral, Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini would at once intervene on the other side. With prompt good sense therefore M. Blum on August 1st appealed to the British and Italian Governments for "the rapid adoption and immediate observance of an agreed arrangement for non-intervention in Spain." He appealed in the first instance to the Mediterranean Powers closely affected by the war, but

within a few days the scope was widened and a similar appeal was made to Portugal, Germany, Russia, and Belgium.

While on French initiative the negotiations were proceeding for the organisation of non-intervention, something else was proceeding which showed how unlikely it was that any effective agreement on non-intervention could be achieved. The outbreak in Spain seemed to break down the last vestige of reserve in the two capitals upon whom European peace in the first instance seemed to depend. Berlin and Moscow let loose a campaign of virulent abuse of each other. It was obvious that Herr Hitler and Mr. Stalin regarded the Spanish war as an incentive and a challenge to their own ideologies which stood for the like antithesis. On August 11th Mr. Stalin issued a decree whereby the age for military service in Russia was reduced from 21 to 19. His context left no doubt in any mind of his motive. Already a forced levy had been made upon the Russian worker to provide funds for the communist side in the Spanish war. In the first week of August a three-day campaign led to the equivalent of half a million sterling being collected in Russia for Madrid. At a later date it was given out from Moscow that the "Government" had stopped that money from actually being sent to Madrid. In the last week of August a Russian Ambassador arrived secretly in Madrid. The entire machinery of opinion in Russia propagated a violent sympathy for the Spanish Left. By the same token it propagated a violent hatred of those who sympathised with the Spanish Right, in particular of the German nazis. As for Herr Hitler, there was no evidence as yet that he had made any contribution in cash or in arms to the cause of the Spanish insurgents. Yet there was no doubt where his sympathies lay. On August 24th he countered the Stalin edict of August 11th by decreeing laconically that "the period of active compulsory service in the three branches of the armed forces" in Germany be doubled from one to two years. The mathematical effect of the two decrees was perhaps less important than their psychological effect. Germany's peace strength was increased from, say, 500,000 to 650,000 in the case of the army, Russia's from 1,300,000 to 1,500,000; probably not much more. But what did result was an increased state of tension between Berlin and Moscow, between the two ideas for which they stood. What if war broke out between Germany and Russia? There were those

who wondered. The Baltic countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia would inevitably be involved. There might result a European division between Germany, Italy and the Spanish Right on the one side, and Russia, France and the Spanish Left on the other. Not only was France bound to Russia by a diplomatic bond, but M. Blum was a Socialist. Just when it was most needed, M. Blum exhibited a courageous originality of character. By triumphing over his own extreme Left he saved Europe from the most pressing of the dangers. As an aspiration non-intervention in Spain did much good in Europe, even though it could not amount to much in practice. If even an academic agreement could be reached by the European Powers not to intervene in Spain, the fact might encourage the further and more substantial possibility of an agreement between the five "Locarno" Powers, who were vaguely due to meet in October. In its turn such an agreement might lead to the wider conference, inclusive of Russia, at which general European peace might be discussed.

What then was the actual progress of the non-interventionist cause? M. Blum made his proposal on August 1st. The British Government, on August 4th, accepted it and suggested that Germany and Portugal should be invited to take part in the negotiations. Belgium accepted the proposal on August 5th. On that day the proposal was extended generally to the European governments and was elaborated in greater detail. Also on the same day Russia accepted the proposal in principle, but made her acceptance conditional on two contingencies, namely, that Portugal be a party to the agreement and that the "assistance" alleged by Moscow to have been given "by certain States" to the "rebels" should forthwith be discontinued. Russian diplomacy at the very outset therefore struck a militant note. Everybody knew that she herself was helping the communist side in the war. By stipulating as a precedent condition to agreed general neutrality that intervention on the other side should cease, she merely anticipated the business of the negotiations themselves. But as Russia's slate was less clean than either Germany's or Italy's in the matter, she merely introduced an embittered element in the negotiations before they started.

On August 7th the French Ambassador in Rome was told verbally that Italy would agree in principle to non-intervention, but wanted to be enlightened on certain aspects of

the French proposal. The request for enlightenment was not made a condition to Italy's agreement with the proposal. The questions put were, however, highly relevant to the matter in hand. Was not the moral support of one side or the other in Spain, whether by Press campaigns or public demonstrations, a form of intervention? Still more, was not the collecting of public subscriptions in cash for one side or the other a material form of intervention? Was the undertaking not to intervene to be made effective upon the conduct of private persons as well as upon governments? And how was intervention to be supervised? Those were the main Italian questions. On August 8th the German Government sent its answer through the Embassy in London to the British Government. It refrained from promising Germany's agreement to the proposal for non-intervention, but stated that no war material of any kind had in fact been sent by the Government or by private individuals to the insurgent side. On August 9th Portugal with the most delicate finesse made it known that she would accept in principle the proposal of non-interference, but on the lively condition that France and Great Britain should jointly guarantee the inviolability and integrity of Portuguese territory, and that Russia should undertake to abstain from any kind of intervention. Diplomacy is an exasperating form of exercise. Even the acceptances of a proposal for non-intervention were made into a form of verbal warfare between the accepting Powers and were even designed as a form of intervention themselves.

It was not indeed obvious which governments had really accepted the French proposal of August 1st. But certain governments took the step of prohibiting the export to Spain of certain war material, including aircraft of all kinds: namely, the French on August 8th; the Belgian on August 18th; the British on August 19th; the German on August 24th; the Portuguese on August 28th. On August 21st the Italian Government gave a written promise to France "to prevent as far as it is concerned the direct or indirect exportation and re-exportation, or the transportation to Spain or the Spanish zone of Morocco, of arms, munitions and war material, as well as aeroplanes, assembled or in parts, and that of war-ships; to apply such embargo to all contracts in course of execution; to keep in contact with the other interested governments for reciprocal communication on all measures

taken to give effect to such a declaration." But the condition was added that such a declaration would not be put into operation by Italy until the French, British, Portuguese, German and Russian Governments had subscribed to it. The Italian Government further reiterated its former postulate that indirect intervention in the form of public subscriptions, the enrolment of volunteers and the like should be excluded.

At the beginning of September the position was that of the Powers upon whose agreement depended the possibility of effective neutrality, Britain and France had agreed unconditionally, Italy and Germany had agreed on conditions which seemed to be intended to be businesslike. Russia had agreed "in principle," but on conditions which left it uncertain whether she wanted non-intervention to succeed or not. Portugal (August 15th) in a long document accepted non-intervention "in principle," but declared that if and when the non-intervention pact were signed a public joint declaration should be made condemning the "régime of terror" and the "mass killings" indulged in by the "communist and anarchist militias." She added that Portugal's geographical position exposed her to a peculiar danger and that she must therefore "reserve her right to take whatever steps she may consider necessary in order to safeguard the peace, lives and liberty of her citizens, as well as national independence and integrity." Finally on August 11th the United States, through the medium of instructions sent by Mr. William Phillips, Under-Secretary of State, to America's diplomatic and consular representatives in Spain, announced her intention, while not participating in any pact, of "scrupulously refraining from any interference whatsoever in the unfortunate Spanish situation." Did those formulæ amount to an agreement? The question was a conundrum. What could be decided was whether the various governments would send representatives to an actual meeting for the purpose of discussing the matter. Twenty-six governments (the British, French, German and Italian among them) said yes. Portugal said yes-no in a long, complicated and ambiguous document which no one understood. Germany stipulated that the committee's competence should be strictly limited to exclude all danger of attempted mediation in the war itself—a condition which France and Britain promptly accepted.

The committee duly met in London on September 9th.

The twenty-six governments aforesaid were represented; but not Portugal. They called themselves the International Committee for the Application of the Agreement regarding Non-Intervention in Spain. It was a good name because symbolical. It symbolised the general clumsiness and lameness of an enterprise organised to apply a wholly fictitious agreement. The circumstances were indeed those of pantomime. The diplomatic corps on the French side of the Spanish frontier had been engaged in an attempt to induce both sides in the war to "humanise" the war. It was an absurd if well-intentioned enterprise. The only way to humanise any war is to stop it. The diplomatic attempt aforesaid was dropped, and not bewailed by realist people. It is even arguable that the so-called conventions about the palliation of war, the "humanising" of it, the "rules" of "civilised warfare," is itself a stupidity, for its only effect (if effect it could ever have) would be to prolong war. The naked atrocity of war is perhaps the best deterrent of war. Some years ago we had the equally absurd spectacle of successive naval conferences solemnly discussing the "humanising" of submarines—the only discoverable purpose of submarines being the sinking of ships at sea. When the non-intervention committee met on September 9th, it did no business, but issued a *communiqué*. The *communiqué* revealed the fact that the committee had met, and had adjourned, the various delegates having undertaken to find out what their several governments had actually done, by legislation or otherwise, about non-intervention, and to report their findings at a subsequent meeting of the committee.

In the meantime events at Geneva and in Madrid had crystallised the true nature of what was taking place in Spain. On September 4th the Spanish Government which had derived its mandate from the elections of last February resigned, and was replaced by a virtually communist government which had no such mandate. The new Prime Minister, Señor Caballero, and his Foreign Minister, Señor del Vayo, belonged to the Socialist Party, but did not hide their communist sympathies. Two other Ministers were titular communists. The Cabinet as a whole was frankly communist in its purpose.

At Geneva the Seventeenth Assembly was in session. The scenes therein enacted bore witness to the appalling entanglement of European affairs. There was the question of League reform, of the projected "Locarno" conversations, of the

ex-Emperor Negus Tafari's status at Geneva: all of them inextricably involved with the diplomatic effects of the Spanish war. It was plain to see that Mr. Litvinov's support of the Negus Tafari's competence to attend the Assembly was largely based upon his antagonism to Italian fascism, German nazism, Spanish nationalism and his support of the Spanish communists. The Assembly of the League of Nations was in effect being made into an instrument of belligerent partisanship. Next it was obvious that the questions of League reform and of the Locarno meeting were especially interdependent. The League could not be reformed unless Germany and Italy were parties to the reformation. It was even arguable that League reform was impossible without the participation of the United States and Japan. But not even the beginning of the consideration of League reform was possible without Germany and Italy. The Locarno meeting had for its main object the recapture of Italian and German participation in the general work of European understanding and pacification. Obviously the League Assembly, meeting in advance of the Locarno talks, could hope for success in discussing League reform only if it accommodated its discussions to the prospective Locarno discussions; in other words, if it postponed any precise proposals until the Locarno talks had had a chance of recapturing German and Italian co-operation. But what happened? Mr. Litvinoff, after first espousing the cause of the Negus Tafari and annoying Italy—whether he was right or wrong on any abstract principle of justice is beside the point—went on next to urge that the question of League reform be not postponed (September 28th). The whole virtual and obvious purpose of his plea was to keep both Germany and Italy out of the League, in short to confine the League, if possible, to those Powers which were most in sympathy with the dogmas of Moscow. One can understand Mr. Litvinov's personal need. He represented a government whose main object in its foreign policy is the furtherance of the communist cause abroad. His first allegiance was to satisfy his government. But on more general grounds it was at least disturbing that one of the three great Powers taking active part in Geneva's work should have had for its main motive an object which had nothing to do with the true object of a League of Nations, indeed was diametrically opposed to such an object. The simple basic object of the League of

Nations is to organise peace by organising a collective sanction against war. That object can be achieved only if and when the seven Great Powers contribute to the sanction. Mr. Litvinov's purpose was to prevent two Great Powers from taking part in the League, and secondly to use the existing League, such as it was, not as an instrument of peace, but as an instrument of the communist cause as exemplified in the Spanish war.

Moreover, Mr. Litvinov took the occasion of his presence and that of M. Delbos, the Foreign Minister of France, to urge the immediate fulfilment of that provision of the Franco-Russian Pact which promised that Franco-Russian general staff consultations should take place to co-ordinate military plans in conformity with the pact. Such a thing at such a moment would have been intensely mischievous. M. Blum went to Geneva to support M. Delbos in resisting Mr. Litvinov's pressure. To her credit France refused to commit herself to any definite date for instituting such talks; what was thereby gained was the avoidance of a gratuitous provocation of Germany, such as was vicariously desired by Russia. In the early days of October it became clear that the Spanish communists were not likely to be victorious in a military sense. The nationalist forces grouped under General Franco were concentrated round Madrid for the final attack. What was the effect upon Moscow? On October 8th the Russian Government took diplomatic action. Lord Plymouth, acting chairman of the international committee on non-intervention, was informed that, unless other alleged infringements of the agreement about non-intervention were promptly stopped, Russia would herself break away from the agreement. In other words, Russia threatened to intervene on the side of the Spanish communists. Inasmuch as no attempt had been made from the beginning to disguise Russia's sympathy with one side in the Spanish war, the very thesis of non-intervention was in effect exploded. None the less the committee had to stage the comedy of a formal meeting to consider Russia's ultimatum. It met in the Locarno Room of the British Foreign Office—the name Locarno having been somewhat deflated of its 1925 meaning—on October 9th. For seven acrimonious hours the meeting persisted. It degenerated into a battle of recrimination between Mr. Kagan (Russia) on the one part and Signor Grandi (Italy), Prince von Bismarck (Germany) and Senhor de Calheiros (Portugal) on the other.

As a truthful microcosm of Europe as we know it that meeting left little to be desired. As an organisation for applying an alleged agreement not to intervene in the Spanish war it completely belied its name.

It was indeed better that the European war of communists versus anti-communists should be waged by words within the Locarno Room of the British Foreign Office than by bombs within the jungle that is Europe. One of the difficulties of the meeting, the only real business discussed, was how to word the inevitable *communiqué* that would have to be issued at the end of it. The truth was undesirable. Imagine a startled public the next morning reading an official description of what had taken place in the august council of twenty-seven civilised countries, meeting to affirm their pacific neutrality, and learning therefrom that Mr. Kagan had accused Germany and Italy of having turned their signature into a screen for shielding the military help they were giving to the Spanish nationalists, that Signor Grandi had described the accusation as "fantastic," that Prince von Bismarck and Senhor de Calheiros, the latter with greater violence than the former, had joined battle against Mr. Kagan's accusation. Such truth was not possible in a public diplomatic document. All that the public learned was that the Russian complaint would be transmitted to Lisbon.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

October 15th, 1936.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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PEACE AS AN ADVENTURE.*

One of the many interesting things about Mr. Wickham Steed is that he never loses his resilience. There is not one single living person in the world who since the turn of the century has concentrated more actively or more exclusively than he upon the study of diplomatic affairs. He has studied continuously at first hand. He has been in constant personal contact with all the leading politicians and diplomatists of all the main relevant countries during the nightmarish first quarter of the present century. His knowledge, his memory, his clear marshalling of fact are in themselves a striking achievement of the human mind. He has experienced all these things: the pre-war rumblings, the war itself, the post-war demoralisation; and yet can write with all the freshness we had from him a generation ago. Is he then irrevocably beyond the saving touch of cynicism? To have been through what he has been through and at the end of it to write a book on peace as an adventure is a fact that throws far more interesting light upon the character of the man himself than upon his subject.

* *Vital Peace: A Study of Risks.* By Henry Wickham Steed. Constable. 10s. net.
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The book sketches the main landmarks in the history of the war and of the after-war period and does so with the learned array of evidence, shot through with the vivid personal element, that we always expect from Mr. Wickham Steed. And through it all he weaves what perhaps may be called his mature philosophy. How, he asks himself, can we best ensure peace and pursue it? Not, he answers, by the negative "pacifism" which simply demands that there shall be no war; but by making peace an even more "thrilling" adventure than war. "Soon or late men will turn their minds from murderous folly towards creative risk and will find the upward path."

In one sense it is an exasperating book. Would that heaven had endowed our Wickham Steed with some small leaven of cynicism. He always knows exactly why things happened in the way they happened. He gives chapter and verse, has read everything in most languages, and is formidable in argument. Yet he is so unaware that most things in life, especially in international life, are the result of sheer disconnected muddle, and not of demonstrable cause and effect, that he is capable of sinking to a quite unrealist level of thought. He can write (page 318): "If so much 'peace propaganda' has fallen flat it is because its psychology has been wrong. The ideal of a fat, riskless existence, in safety from outside attack, warms nobody's blood." Does Mr. Wickham Steed really believe that life would be "fat, riskless" without war? The very thesis of his book argues the opposite. And there are millions of people who will probably protest that, if they really could feel "safe" from the next war, their blood would indeed be warmed.

On page 244 the author asks: "can nations organise the world against war while they cling to 'neutral rights'?" and himself answers "I think they cannot." He even thinks that the League of Nations implies the overriding of national sovereignty. Yet he believes in the League of Nations. In other words he is not yet convinced, despite all the evidence, that it is impossible to organise an agreed policy between the nations on any subject whatsoever. Against the consistent, unbroken evidence that has accumulated since 1920, he believes in the possibility of American collaboration in the League of Nations. He writes (page 243) that if in November 1935 France and Great Britain had been "steadfast" in

"enforcing a League policy" they would have received "very definite encouragement" from the United States. Such poor stuff appears in this book side by side with good stuff.

"Vital Peace" is an attractive idea, expounded with all Mr. Wickham Steed's well-known qualities of erudition and generous feeling. But to many people it is not obvious that the first step can be taken towards any peace on earth, whether "vital" or "fat and riskless," until the heroic nonsense about war is exploded. Common sense, which is the faculty of recognising things as they are, without the morbid or emotional twists such as "patriotism" gives to them, is the only explosive.

G. G.

THE RISE OF LIBERALISM.*

Professor Laski's latest work is packed with knowledge and reflection. No British scholar possesses such a wide acquaintance with the history of political ideas in France and England from the sixteenth century onwards, and no one has meditated more deeply on their derivation and significance. His sub-title is *An Essay in Interpretation*, and not all his readers will accept in its entirety his rigid correlation of political ideas with the shift of economic power. But it is very valuable to have the economic key applied to modern political thinking with such power and skill by one who is so profoundly convinced of its sufficiency.

The volume, which is based on lectures, consists of three massive chapters on the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with a briefer sketch of subsequent times. The first describes the laying of the foundations of the liberal doctrine, rationalist and utilitarian in character, by the *bourgeoisie* in its struggles against the limitations imposed by the nobility and the Church. Seen in this large perspective the Reformation appears less as a theological revolution than as one of several parallel endeavours towards a wider, freer and more prosperous life. In the seventeenth century the lead is taken by England. "The victory is for utilitarianism in morals, for toleration in religion, for constitutional

* *The Rise of Liberalism*. By Professor Laski. Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.

government in the sphere of politics. In the economic realm the state becomes the handmaid of commerce ; its habits are modified to the new medium this has come to require. Even its wars are for markets. . . . The incidence of wealth has definitely shifted from the countryside to the town." With the eighteenth century the lead in liberal thought passes to France, where the need for fundamental change was more urgent than in England. Yet the *Philosophes* for the most part were not nearly so radical as they seemed. "They were unable to discern behind the Third Estate a Fourth with claims as wide as, and interests different from, those of the *bourgeoisie*." Not till the middle of the nineteenth century did the manual worker begin effectively to demand his rights.

Professor Laski gratefully recognises the immense work of emancipation performed by the liberal spirit from the close of the Middle Ages, but he censures the middle class for attributing finality to the revolution which they had carried through in their own interest. Hence the necessity of Socialism, he argues, for carrying the cause of social justice a stage farther by adding economic to political democracy. "Liberalism," he declares, "has always been affected by its tendency to regard the poor as men who have failed through their own fault. It has always suffered from its inability to realise that great possessions mean power over men and women as well as over things." These sweeping statements are surely exaggerated. The word "always" should be used with extreme caution. There are varieties of Liberalism as there are of Socialism. The philosophy of the Liberal Summer Schools of the post-war era would have made Gladstone, that sturdy individualist, turn in his grave. No party possesses a monopoly of zeal for social justice or a monopoly of political or economic wisdom. One need not be a member of the Labour Party to believe that equality of opportunity is the thing most worth striving for in the field of domestic politics. These fascinating pages record a story of steady advance towards the glittering ideal of "the good life" for all. Unless the orderly processes of civilisation go down in the welter of war, there is every reason to hope that the contribution of the twentieth century will be not less than that of its four predecessors.

G. P. G.

SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS: AUTHOR.*

There is always a special interest in considering the secondary pursuits of a genius outside his own field, whether one thinks of Milton at his organ or of Darwin in the National Gallery, and whether or no Dante's illuminated angel and Rafael's sonnet were all that Browning imagined them. Some lines from his poem in question are appropriately set by Professor Hilles on the title page of this fascinating book. The editor of Sir Joshua's *Letters* knows his subject through and through, he has studied all the available sources, including the MSS. preserved at the Royal Academy and others in his own possession : many extracts from the great painter's notebooks are here printed for the first time, or as freed from the inaccuracies of earlier editing ; it is his literary aspect only, his life outside the studio, that is under consideration.

The series of *Discourses* to Royal Academy students have, of course, found constant readers from Sir Joshua's own day—when they were translated into French, Italian and German—to this, but perhaps comparatively few will be aware that their author was also a discerning and enthusiastic critic of Shakespeare ; kept a commonplace book ; made notes of pictures seen and books read, and compiled obituary notices and character sketches. Of his travel letters, three were addressed to Burke from Holland ; one of these has not been printed previously. Sir Joshua's literary output cannot, in fact, be better described than by the Professor in his introduction : "He is said to have left at his death at least two thousand manuscript pages—essays for periodicals, criticism on art for his *Discourses*, notes on Shakespeare for his friends, Johnson, Malone or Steevens, a *jeu d'esprit* illustrating with all Boswell's skill Dr. Johnson's powers of conversation, a sort of *Apologia pro Vita sua* occasioned by his quarrel with the Academy, fragmentary thoughts on the French Revolution, and biographical sketches of some of his friends." The *Apologia* referred to is given in the third appendix ; in it, Sir Joshua states in a dignified manner his position in the dispute, which arose over the appointment of a professor, and his reasons for resigning office.

That the painter's aspiration to be seriously considered a

* *The Literary Career of Sir Joshua Reynolds*. By Professor F. W. Hilles. Cambridge University Press. 1936. 15s.

literary man by his literary friends was gratified is proved by the laudatory references of Dr. Johnson himself, of Goldsmith, Boswell, Malone, Hannah More and others. Mrs. Thrale, indeed, thought that he was "sufficiently puffed up with the Credit he has acquired for his written Discourses, a Praise he is more pleased with than that he obtains by his Profession, besides that he seems to set up as a Sort of Patron to Literature." (In this connection, it is instructive to be reminded that he called painting "this literate and liberal profession.") Professor Hilles considers that Reynolds was cultured rather than scholarly, many of his Latin quotations are second-hand. The affectionate esteem subsisting mutually between the greatest artist and greatest author in England at that day is pleasant to contemplate: when a collected edition of the *Discourses* appeared in 1777 it was submitted to Johnson, who made certain slight emendations, some of which are shown in a facsimile of a MS. page. The MSS., printed and described in Appendix II, prove that Sir Joshua wrote and rewrote passages of the *Discourses*, but Malone, his literary executor, convincingly refutes a gossiping suggestion that either Johnson or Burke really composed them. The chapter headed Johnsoniana is one that will be turned to with keen anticipation; it includes the rough draft of a character sketch of the Doctor, probably destined to help Boswell. Appendix IV contains a valuable bibliography of Sir Joshua's writings. This book cannot fail to delight all lovers of the "two Arts," of which a contemporary poet considers its hero to have "attain'd the lawrel'd Heights."

E. G. S.

THE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA.*

The new volume on South Africa in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* is an authoritative work of the utmost value. It deals with the history of the whole of Africa to the south of the Zambesi and is singularly complete for a single volume. In its compilation, the editors have secured the contributions and collaboration of a wide circle of scholars, among whom all the South African universities are represented. While some of the chapters are complete papers on

* *Cambridge History of the British Empire*. Vol. VIII, *South Africa*. Cambridge University Press. 42s. net.

particular issues or topics, there runs a steady thread of continuity in the political narrative from the earliest settlers through the growing complications and ferment of internal development to the eventual realisation of federal union and autonomy. The volume concludes with the Imperial Conference of 1921, which, says Professor Eric A. Walker, "marked the end of the British Empire that had grown up since 1783." A more strictly accurate date would be the Declaration of 1926.

Considerable attention is given to the period prior to the first British occupation of the Cape in 1795. In a most interesting contribution, Professor E. H. Warmington discusses what is known of African exploration in ancient and medieval times. The south remained unknown until the Portuguese attempts at penetration, and the "depressing story" of their failure forms the subject of a contribution by Professor Edgar Prestage and Professor A. P. Newton. More directly relevant to the later history of South Africa is the long period of Dutch colonisation at the Cape, during which, as Professor Leo Fouché and Dr. S. F. N. Gie make apparent in their chapters, some of the great problems of expansion and native policy began to emerge. The infiltration of social and political conceptions from Great Britain after the British occupations speedily brought these problems to an issue. The early years of British control marked, as Dr. Vincent T. Harlow says, a "great divide" in South African development; it made the Great Trek of 1834 inevitable. It is now generally recognised that the inadequate compensation for the abolition of slavery was not the determining cause, as Professor A. F. Hattersby shows in his article on slavery between 1652-1838. On the other hand, the emancipation of the Hottentots was directly opposed to the Boer belief in the natural inferiority of colour. "It was primarily," says Professor Walker, "land hunger and a determination to uphold white privilege that drove the Trekkers out of the colony." It was, indeed, the culmination of years of discontent.

Professor Walker deals lucidly with the complicated events leading to the emergence of the Boer States and the reactions of British policy up to the Bloemfontein Convention in 1854. The next half-century was "to be a confused and, at times, bloodthirsty commentary on the schism." British

passivity and restraint in the face of the Boer expansion ended in 1871 with the annexation of Griqualand West. The late Mr. Cecil Headlam has dealt with the succeeding period, when the weakness of British policy led to Majuba and the Pretoria Convention. He questions not so much the wisdom of the peace as the failure of the British Government to establish confederation. "Twice, in little over a year, British statesmen had the opportunity of recognising the Transvaal as a self-governing State under the effective paramountcy of the Imperial Government" and "twice it threw away that golden opportunity of uniting British and Afrikaners alike . . . in loyal devotion to an Empire State."

Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr and the late Mr. Headlam deal with the race for the interior, the ascendancy and rivalry of Kruger and Rhodes, with their conflicting conceptions of a united South Africa, and German aims leading to the climax of the Jameson raid. Mr. Headlam's account of the raid "is based on the statements of some of those most intimately concerned, whose evidence is yet unpublished." The High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, well knew the object of the force assembled on the strip of Bechuanaland which Chamberlain had recently conceded to Rhodes. As for the former's ignorance, Mr. Headlam is sceptical that he did not appreciate the ultimate significance of this strip of territory. But at all events, "it is not credible that either he or Rhodes can have contemplated that a raid should take place before a rising. It was Jameson who, as Rhodes exclaimed, 'took the bit between his teeth' and 'upset the apple cart.'" The struggle is carefully outlined by Professor Walker. He treats Milner as intent upon British paramountcy and determined upon reform in the Transvaal, if possible by peaceful pressure. Exasperated by Kruger, he was ready to force matters to an issue after the President's dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze in February 1898, but was continually restrained by the patience and forbearance of Chamberlain. When in June 1899 at the Bloemfontein Conference Milner broke off the discussions before the arrival of Chamberlain's instructions, "the prospect of war came clearly over the public's horizon for the first time." The writer's short account of the actual war might have been expanded in view of the military importance of the campaign.

The creation of the Union in 1909, the political scene up to

1921 and the part played by the Dominion in the Great War form the subject of valuable contributions by Mr. Hugh A. Wyndham, Senator F. S. Malan and the late Professor J. Ewing. Among other articles may be mentioned Mr. H. J. Mandelbrote's analysis of the constitution, with its unique quasi-federal structure, and the short survey of South African private law by Mr. Justice Watermeyer. The importance of the native question in South African history is reflected in Professor Schapera's paper on early tribal culture and organisation. Mr. W. M. Macmillan discusses the treatment of Hottentots and Bushmen during the early years of British rule, including the famous Black Circuit of 1812; while a valuable impression of the "continuous depression and disintegration" of native life in the nineteenth century is contributed by Dr. C. W. de Kiewiet. Professor Arnold Plant is responsible for a useful, informative sketch of economic development during the whole period of British rule. Space forbids mention of other writers whose contributions well maintain the high standard of the work. Finally, the student will be particularly grateful for the exhaustive bibliography.

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A NEW LIFE OF HERZL.*

Theodor Herzl first publicly explained that charity and education were not sufficient for the successful solution of the Jewish problem. He therefore became the founder of the political Zionism which led to the Balfour Declaration and thus to the foundation of a new rallying point for this ancient people. Since his premature death there have been many attempts to explain his course, narrate his life and appreciate his achievement. But until now, there has been no scientific biography which has methodically utilised all the available material, published and unpublished. This has been attempted with good success by the comprehensive work of the German-Jewish historian, Alex Bein (formerly of the *Reichsarchiv* in Potsdam and now in Palestine), which has recently been published.

Bein has been able to use not only the original unabridged version of Herzl's famous diaries, his letters to Bodenheimer

* Fiba-Verlag, Vienna.

and Professor Warburg, his correspondence with Walter Rathenau and Arthur Schnitzler, but also the documents of the Foreign Office in Berlin and the records of the *Neue Freie Presse* at Vienna, of which Herzl was editor until his death. He has treated the pre-Zionist period more thoroughly than his predecessors—the years in which the brilliant journalist strove with eager ambition for external success and exerted himself particularly to become a famous dramatist. The portrayal of these years, which were also the years of Herzl's political apprenticeship, would have carried even more weight if the author had described more graphically the rise of anti-Semitism in Austria and the France of the Panama scandal and the "affaire Dreyfus"—things which had so great an influence on the future leader of Zionism. The most arresting chapters are those which enable the reader to realise how this entirely West-European Jew first sighted his goal and was gripped by his mission. His personality is seen to grow, to purify itself and to deepen for his great task. In the foreword the author explains that it is no "portrait of a hero" that he wishes to paint; but this does not prevent him from being devotedly absorbed in the man and placing him with all his gifts clearly before us. A motto for Herzl's life could be found in a sentence from his novel, *Alt Neuland*. "Dreams are not so far from reality as many people think." Just at the crisis which will decide that Herzl's work was not only a dream but a reality, this biography ought to find a large number of readers.

GUSTAV MAYER.

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THE SOUTHERN GATES OF ARABIA.*

Miss Freya Stark is a born traveller. Her human touch, her endurance, her sense of humour, her perception of little things and her power of putting herself on a level, endear her to the people amongst whom she travels, so that they give her their confidence and any knowledge they possess. In this case the only way with Arabs and Beduin, with rich and poor, chiefs and slaves, was trust, sincerity and sharing. It implies a great deal of courage.

* *The Southern Gates of Arabia: A Journey in the Hadhramaut.* By Freya Stark. John Murray. 16s. net.

The occasion of Miss Stark's journey was to trace the ancient trade routes for frankincense and myrrh across Southern Arabia. As much less incense is used in these modern days, the trade has mostly disappeared. What there is, and there are still incense trees in these remote wadis, goes round by sea; the old highways up the Arabian deserts await rediscovery. The country is full of ruins of ancient cities, hidden in the sands. The incense routes, however, are here discussed with much learning, in an Appendix, referring back in some cases to names mentioned in very early accounts. There are many quotations from Pliny. The Wadi Hadhramaut is associated with Hazarmaveth in the Book of Genesis, where also occurs Sabta, now called Shabwa, which was the headquarters of the trade. It was to Shabwa that Miss Stark made up her mind to go. Unfortunately illness prevented that final journey. But her delightful account of all the people she travelled with on the way, the camping-out in the high desert (the Jöl), the fortresses and walled cities she stayed in, the friendships with sultans, the conversations with the women in the harems, lead one to read on with fear to miss a word.

A very interesting chapter is on Sewun, "the most delightful of towns," with carved windows and doorways and "every variety of delicate lace-work." Here, as in many other places, is a considerable admixture of races. The young chemist has "a Malay cast of face, common from the mixed marriages of the Hadhramis abroad. He had spent his boyhood at Port Darwin, in Australia, and now," it was explained, "he has been made to come back so that his religion may not be spoiled." Women are found dressed in the "Java fashion." And, indeed, there is considerable coming and going between Java, Batavia, Singapore and South Arabia, not to speak of India. The women are all strictly veiled and secluded, and do not travel. But the men go out on trading ventures and bring back many customs, styles of building and of dress. There are many references to negro slaves, who have been taken from Abyssinia. All these racial features and characteristics are noted by Miss Stark with vivid description.

The Sayyids, descended from the Prophet, are the old aristocracy, who observe a rule that no Sayyid shall go armed. Two brothers sat and talked about books: "they were friendly and charming, and in looks like some Van Dyck picture, noblemen with long and delicate faces and slender

hands. . . . In the Wadi 'Amd this family remained, and gathered in their hands and guarded through many vicissitudes all civilisation that the valley contained. . . . There are two impulses stronger than desire, deeper than love of man or woman, and independent of it—the human hunger for truth and liberty . . . against them nothing can prevail.”

Reading the *Morte d'Arthur*, Miss Stark “found it harmonised strangely with the life of the wadi; its sudden contrasts, the splendour of its castles, the general uncertainty of things round them, the delightful feeling that anything might happen anywhere and not be surprising . . . a stranger under a tree has the same lively possibilities in him—a suitable object for either a fight or a feast”—“as did Malory’s knights on the marches of Cornwall and Wales.”

E. M. B.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

India and the World,* essays by Jawaharlal Nehru, is a clever book, but not very convincing. As President of the Indian National Congress for 1936 this young man (he is under 50) rises for the second time to his place as one of the more significant leaders of Indian thought. Yet he is a Socialist and is out for the complete independence of his country, social and economic as well as national. He has been in prison already seven times, and some of these essays are written from prison and with all the bitterness against the British Government that such an experience can engender in a man who has been educated at Harrow and Cambridge and has known what freedom is.

Mr. Nehru rejects the new Constitution about to be imposed on India, not because he thinks complete self-government can come without intermediate steps, but because the British Government ought not to be there. In an analysis of two European revolutions, the French is one of the bourgeoisie, the Russian one of the masses. It is to the Russian model he is inclined to turn, and proposes to devote the attention of the Congress to “the masses,” with whom “organisationally we have lost that intimate touch that we had.” Mr. Nehru puts aside questions of religion and communalism as essentially of the middle and upper classes in India. What is wanted is the economic development of the poorest land workers and the lower middle classes, to organise them as producers. In this we can only wish “all power to his elbow.” “The masses” afford a vast field. Meanwhile Lord Linlithgow is giving *some* practical effect to the same ideal. Why cannot they act together?

* Allen & Unwin. 5s. net.

Mr. Ladislas Farago, who is remembered for his remarkable *Abyssinia on the Eve*, visited Palestine last June and has now published in a volume, rather ominously entitled *Palestine on the Eve*,* his impressions gained in the course of a short but comprehensive tour of the country. He writes with strict impartiality and refrains from drawing any general conclusions. His book serves well to impart the atmosphere and tension which has existed and to expose through a neutral observer on the spot some of the conditions upon which Jew and Arab base their claims. Incidentally, Mr. Farago notes the advantages enjoyed by the former in exerting influence and in spreading propaganda. Apart from having interviews with leaders on either side, he visited Arab villages, was shown over the Jewish colonies and made acquainted with their economic progress. Arguments upon either side were pressed upon him; he was assured, for example, that the Jews only possessed twelve per cent. of fertile land in the country. On the other hand, sale of land by Arabs, with no business sense, has caused a substantial degree of destitution. It is easy to appreciate from Mr. Farago’s account that the Arab has a very real fear of being swamped by the superior economic resources and capacity of the Jewish population. Mr. Farago also followed closely police methods; he was present when old Jaffa was blown up; he travelled on armed lorries and witnessed the imposition of a collective fine on an Arab village. “The majority of the bandit bands,” he declares, “are composed of men who have fled into the hills from collective fines.” On the other hand he seems to accept a Jewish complaint, more frequently an Arab grievance, that Jews are punished more severely for similar offences. Mr. Farago draws attention to many other points which will be appreciated by the observer of events in Palestine. There are some excellent illustrations and maps in the end-papers.

* Putnam. 10s. 6d. net.

A question of the utmost importance is discussed by a distinguished judge of the Australian High Court, Mr. Justice Evatt, in *The King and his Dominion Governors*.† The exercise of the reserve powers of the Crown in relation to the electorate, legislature and executive has caused from time to time acute controversy, particularly in the Dominions, and the learned author makes out a forceful case for their legislative definition and judicial enforcement. The powers of the Crown or its representatives are deemed to be governed by constitutional conventions. But the latter, apart from their lack of legal sanction, fail to cover every contingency and have been variously interpreted. The danger exists that the use of these powers may be prompted by partisan considerations or run counter to democratic government. The refusal of Lord Byng to grant a dissolution of the Canadian Parliament in 1926 and the more recent dismissal in 1932 by the

* Putnam. 10s. 6d. net.

† Oxford University Press. 15s. net.

Governor of New South Wales of the Cabinet, while it retained the confidence of the popular Assembly, are well-known instances in point. Mr. Justice Evatt discusses these and other cases, while dealing at length with the theory of the reserve powers. He concludes that "in the interest both of the Monarch and of his people, the correct relationship between the Crown and its Ministers should be determined by definite rules which will make it impossible to impute the slightest unfairness or favouritism to the exercise of any legal prerogative." To the objection that elasticity is the essence of British constitutional theory, the author replies that legislative definition can well contain "suitable provision for adaptability and amendment." In this valuable and erudite work, Mr. Justice Evatt has raised an issue which deserves profound consideration.

English Downland,* by H. J. Massingham, reveals the essence and the secret of the chalk downs whose charm lies in simplicity of feature and purity of outline. "In the composure and austerity of the chalk uplands, the very thought of more spectacular country is a weariness." There is a serenity, a breadth of outlook, a texture entirely absent in mountainous country. Superior in form to mountains, they give the spiritual release a mountain gives despite their lower elevation. They do not require "height and craginess, giddy falls and savage desolation" to achieve the illusion of infinite space. Towering above the tangle of marsh and forest in primeval England, the chalk hills were for twenty centuries the home of prehistoric man. The rounded forms of his barrows and earthworks are still numerous. Amongst these, and along a maze of ancient trackways, the reader is conducted, learning much of "the first farmers of England, four thousand years ago." The downs to-day are threatened by the military, the speculative builder and the withdrawal of multitudes of sheep. If the latter are not returned to the hills, the herbage of the chalk will grow up, to "clog the foot and weary the eye with its wilderness." Mr. Massingham's style and outlook fit his subject. The book is illustrated by many excellent photographs.

The particular importance of local history lies in its interdependence with external or national development. It is to this close relationship that Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw gives especial prominence in his admirable little book containing the substance of lectures on *The Place of Surrey in the History of England*.† He makes no extravagant claims for Surrey's influence. He traces the county's history from the earliest times; and after the unification of the kingdom his account deals mainly with the reactions of Surrey to the impress of national policy and events. The volume makes no pretence at original research, but bears all the authority of its author upon national history. Its

* Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

† Macmillan. 4s. 6d. net.

"modest purpose has been to display . . . the highest common factor" of English and Surrey development. Apart from documentary history, Professor Hearnshaw can point to the numerous Surrey memorials which induce a most vivid contact with the past. The volume is profusely illustrated by Miss Elizabeth S. Hearnshaw and also contains a large map of the county.

Mr. T. Pellatt's autobiography entitled *Boys in the Making** will interest educationists as well as his many friends and "Old Boys." School life from the viewpoints of boy and master at Lancing; Oxford, a History first and a soccer blue; India, Marlborough, and then his life-work, Durnford School. Perhaps one secret of the immediate and continued success of this fine preparatory school was his treatment of the boys as individuals and the atmosphere of disciplined freedom. Mr. Pellatt's views on education may not be entirely orthodox, but there seems no doubt that they have proved excellent in practice. He specialised in preparing boys for Eton, a school for which he has the greatest admiration, and considers their methods the best in the country. The book is full of stories of well-known people, and contains also many good schoolboy howlers.

South Africa To-day and To-morrow,† by Mr. R. J. M. Goold-Adams, with a preface by the Earl of Selborne, is a very readable summary of the problems immediate and future of this great southern continent. The questions of an increasing Dutch population largely in opposition to the British, of the black man *versus* the white man, and of the farming outlook as compared with the gold of the Rand, are lucidly discussed. The relative positions of North and South Rhodesia and their future development are taken fully into account, and the probabilities of Southern Rhodesia joining the Union of South Africa are considered. Possibly the forecasts are difficult to follow. There is a fine chapter on the gold-mining boom, entitled "Haze over Johannesburg."

Locarno,‡ edited by Dr. Berber, is a collection of documents of the highest value to students of European politics. Though it contains only material already published, much of it is difficult for the general reader to find. No comments are made, except for a brief controversial Foreword by Herr von Ribbentrop, which might well have been spared. The series opens with the year 1919 and closes with the British *Questionnaire* of May 6th, 1936. This substantial volume, a translation from the German original, is an indispensable companion to the Blue book (Miscellaneous, No. 3, 1936) issued in the spring and relating to recent discussions on an European settlement.

* Methuen. 10s. 6d. net.

† John Murray. 6s.

‡ William Hodge & Co. 1936. 12s. 6d.

With the recent publication of the third volume of his work upon *The Fear of the Dead in Primitive Religion*,* Sir James Fraser concludes his study of "some of the answers which primitive man has given to the great enigma of death." In this volume Sir James discusses the practices of primitive people to ward off the spirits of the dead. A great part of the book is devoted to the particularly dangerous ghosts, such as the spirits of suicides and persons violently killed, of women dying in childbirth, of dead spouses, of persons dying unmarried or childless and of those left unburied, and precautions taken to appease their wrath.

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The Columbia Encyclopedia† is a general work of reference for everyday use, compiled and edited at Columbia University under the chief editorship of Mr. Clarke F. Ansley. More than fifty thousand references are included in one huge three-column volume of nearly two thousand pages. The aim has been to provide as much information of a general and useful character as space allows. Maps and illustrations have been omitted. The work makes no attempt at including expert articles on specialist subjects except to give, on such matters, "reliable elementary information in language as intelligible as that of a newspaper." The bibliographies are also of the same "first-aid nature," simply naming "good books for first reading in their subjects." Every article has been checked and the whole book is "a coördinated and reliable reference work," backed by members of a great university. While intended primarily for American use, it will prove of great service to all English-speaking people.

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Few cartoonists enjoy a greater influence over public opinion than Mr. David Low, whose drawings are more expressive, penetrating and interpretative of a situation than many leading articles. Satirical, often caustic and scathing, though imbued with a sense of idealism, his cartoons linger long in the mind, and the readers of *Political Parade with Colonel Blimp*‡ will remember many of the cartoons published during the last few years in *The Evening Standard*. Mr. Low is radically minded and in his characterisation of obstinate and ubiquitous "Colonel Blimp" who "inclines to the *status quo ante*-almost-everything" he uses a medium to ridicule the reactionary and disruptive forces of the world. This selection has been well made; few of the cartoons are out-dated, so that most retain their piquancy at the present time.

* Macmillan. 10s. 6d. net.

† Harrap. 63s. net.

‡ The Cresset Press. 6s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

DECEMBER 1936.

KEEPING THE PEACE.

THE end of the year finds clouds of anxiety hanging over Europe. Threats and rumours of war are rife—so rife, indeed, that one is tempted to discount them. The bitter struggle in the Peninsular still offers irresistible opportunities for violent partisanship. No definite settlement of international misunderstandings is in sight. Responsible men are less and less inclined to rely on pacts or on alliances, which may either lead to nothing or threaten consequences wholly unforeseen. And all the while it is impossible to doubt that the paramount aim of the great free nations, of France, the United States and the British Commonwealth pre-eminently, and, for that matter, were they able to express their feelings, of the great unfree nations too, continues to be the preservation of peace.

The most significant events of the year, apart from the breakdown of the League of Nations, have been the formidable self-assertion of Germany and the growing animosity between Moscow and Berlin. German policy is a puzzle which few can understand. It is tempting to take Herr Hitler's professions of good will at their face value. All Englishmen want peace with Germany. There is a natural friendliness between young England and young Germany whenever the narrow and brutal aspects of the Nazi doctrines are kept out of sight. There is sympathy here with the German demand for equality and fair play, with the spirit and grit and readiness for sacrifice shown by the German people. But no sooner do we begin to show these feelings than we are pulled up by some incredible outburst of the Nazi chiefs, by General Göring's or Dr. Goebbels' sinister rodomontade, by cruel acts of fanatical intolerance, by the unceasing and menacing renewal of the forces which were let loose to dominate Europe in 1914. In Russia the veil of uncertainty is thicker, and we have no direct concern with what goes on behind it, whether it be regarded as a glorious seed-time for democratic progress or as a merciless tyranny based on the negation of freedom. But when Russia gathers behind her screen enormous armies, and some of her

leaders insist upon her right to stir up strife elsewhere, her action cannot but deeply affect the safety and the recovery of Europe.

With France the position is easier to understand. M. Laval's Government has passed, and we are not perhaps particularly well qualified to dwell on its defects. But the fresh alliance between Paris and Moscow is a significant fact, and was inevitably regarded by Germany as a new challenge. High qualities of statesmanship will be needed to prevent its dividing Europe again into two hostile camps. M. Blum, in a still more difficult position, and with demands made on him by his followers which can hardly fail to add to his embarrassments, has shown himself so far a loyal ally and a wise friend of appeasement in Europe. Our close relations with France stand. Our obligations to her will not be forgotten. But it is right to be chary about creating more. We, too, have a right to independence, and responsibilities towards others which cannot be overlooked. Incidentally one small point may be worth remembering, because distinguished men have slipped into surprising statements on the subject. It is an illusion to suppose that we ever before the present century thought it specially our duty to defend the frontiers of France. With Belgium, of course, the case is different: we have frequently tried to defend her, generally against French aggression. But for centuries a principal object of English policy was not to defend, but to break through, the frontiers of France. That obviously cannot weaken any pledges we have given now. But it is better not to base our present policy on historical theories which have no foundation in fact.

Other States in Europe inevitably share in the general unrest. Italy, triumphant in an act of violent aggression, which no lover of justice can pardon but which, in the conditions obtaining in Europe, no genuine lover of peace could prevent, is now trying to regain the respect she has forfeited by mingling threats with overtures for friendship. Nemesis is often slow-footed, and bitterness in such circumstances is natural enough. But there will be no movement towards peace in Europe so long as we give our bitterness against Italy vent. Hungary and Austria look alternately and anxiously to Italy or to Germany for support. Spain, her strength and spirit numbed by centuries of political and ecclesiastical oppression, is torn by feuds the rights and wrongs of which no

fair-minded man will hastily decide, and any overt attempt to take part in them might well set Europe in a flame. Scandinavia, more fortunate, knows of no enemies, and shows no sign of abandoning her freedom. But Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Balkan kingdoms have problems which bristle with opportunities of conflict. Can they preserve what they won in the War? Can they consent to surrender any part of it? Can they rely on the League of Nations to protect them, or on any alliance to give them security? Is it any wonder that the smaller States should cling to their neutrality, or that Belgium should ask herself why she should not escape from all these dangerous entanglements and be content to seek peace for her own people?

There are some, not wholly destitute of reason, who would have Great Britain do the same. Looking round the world to-day, our liabilities and obligations may well seem startling to those who seek security for the vast Empire we possess. With a navy which no longer aims at any overwhelming superiority to its rivals, an air force still largely in the making, and an army which by Continental standards is phenomenally small, we stand at almost every point astride the world. Wherever other nations seek expansion, the shadow of the British Commonwealth falls across their path. Is it unnatural that the Mediterranean nations should ask why an island in North-Western Europe should rule in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, Palestine? Is it unnatural that Japan, with her overcrowded millions highly armed, should look enviously at Australia and Canada, with their limitless, sparsely populated spaces and their long lines of exposed sea-coast? The duty of defending all our territories in every continent may one day be overwhelming. At the moment we need an army of 30,000 men to defend one corner in Palestine alone. And, lest these charges should not be enough to occupy our strength and our resources, we have gallant spirits demanding in *The Times* that we should show ourselves more virile and courageous, and undertake, whatever the consequences, to establish the rule of law in all the world as well. Is it not time to call a halt and ask ourselves whether we must not set some limit to the burdens which the weary Titan already has to bear?

It is needless to dwell on the misfortunes of the League. It courted failure, by attempting in its generous ambitions far more than it had the strength to perform, by holding out

hopes which it was found impossible to realise, and by using threats which most of those who made them never meant to go too far. Sanctions without force are useless, but forcible coercion is not always the best way to peace. The meeting of the Assembly at Geneva in the summer proved as disappointing as the episodes which had gone before. The representative of Great Britain did indeed ask it to recognise realities. But the representatives of France and Russia contented themselves with rhetorical statements which led to nothing, and nothing has since emerged to clarify or strengthen the position. The Assembly's final resolution was as inconclusive as any resolution could well be. Yet it is clear that no one wishes to repeat the mistakes of the last fifteen months, and that no one can fail to see the obvious disunity of interest, the delays and weaknesses inherent in any attempt to drive in harness fifty nations more or less reluctant to be driven. One cannot read without a painful smile the statements that Afghanistan and Uruguay finally agreed to impose sanctions against Italy, but that Mexico and Venezuela—alone among American States—were enthusiastic for making them effective. "We seek peace," Mr. Churchill has said. "We submit ourselves proudly to the League of Nations." But what exactly, when we look below the phrases, does this pride and this submission mean?

It will be agreed that, as matters stand, the fifty nations cannot be relied on to act with unanimity and promptness against any great State which defies the League. If that is so, no remodelling of the Covenant, no obligatory sanctions, no precise military commitments to provide contingents in circumstances which cannot be foreseen, will give them the confidence and cohesion which they lack. But if the present confusion is not to continue, two definite alternatives remain. One is to equip the League with a great permanent army strong enough to impose its orders even on powerful offenders; a very powerful army would be required. The other is to abandon the idea of coercing and punishing offenders, and to limit the functions of the League to definitely peaceful purposes, to consultation and conciliation, mediation and advice. Between these alternatives, sooner or later, the League, if it continues, will have to choose.

There is a disposition at the moment, due to anger against Italy and disappointment over the failure of sanctions, to dismiss the more modest of these proposals with contempt.

If the League, it is said, is to be nothing but a "talking-shop," with no power to impose its judgments or to chastise offenders who defy them, it is not worth preserving at all. I submit that this view is a mistake. Men who set out on the tremendous task of persuading the world to substitute peace and justice for the violence of war, need to be armed with unconquerable patience in the face of innumerable and inevitable rebuffs. They can expect nothing else; but they must persevere. No practical way of converting the League into a highly armed punitive machine has been discovered or seems likely to be found. Is it conceivable that the nations as we know them should agree to hand over their armies in any shape or form to be controlled by an international authority at Geneva or elsewhere, and to be used as that international authority may decide? Could it be done without handing over to the League the control of their foreign policy as well? Can any practical statesman envisage, at any date we can foresee, the spectacle of fifty nations sitting quietly disarmed at home, while the forces which they have handed over to the international authority fight their battles and settle their fate? To spend time in discussing such possibilities seems to some of us to be beating the air. To attempt to enforce such a system would break up the League. The best answer to these suggestions is to be found in some words used by General Smuts, when told that the League would fail if it could not restrain Japan's Manchurian ambitions:

I cannot visualise the League as a military machine. It was not conceived or built for that purpose; it is not equipped for such functions. And if the attempt were now made to transform it into a military machine, into a system to carry on war for the purpose of preventing or ending war, I think its fate is sealed. I cannot conceive the Dominions remaining in such a League, and pledging themselves to fight the wars of the Old World; and if the Dominions leave it, Great Britain is bound to follow.

Mr. Mackenzie King from Canada has recently pleaded at Geneva for a League of mediation and not of aggression. Mr. Bruce, from Australia, has warned us that for a non-universal League to enforce the Covenant in full might ruin the purpose for which the League was formed. Is it reasonable to ask our Dominions to involve themselves in European questions like the government of Dantzic or the future of Hungary, or even

the frontiers of Belgium and France, instead of concentrating their minds and strength upon the problem of securing prosperity and peace for their own people?

But if at Geneva we decide to go slow and refuse to make the League an instrument of warfare, is there not still ample work for British statesmen? To watch events closely, to limit our risks, to decline to be satisfied with vague, imposing phrases about collective security and the rule of law and working within the framework of the Covenant, to eschew additional entanglements, and yet to remain essentially good neighbours and good friends to every Government which will walk with us along the road to peace—are not these aims worth consideration? Our first duty is to our own people, to protect them from the ruin and iniquity of war. Our next is to stand by our Dominions and to guard the possessions and traditions which are common to us both. But no one will deny that it is our duty also to do our utmost, without bitterness towards old enemies or disloyalty to old allies, to reconsider the grievances and soften the animosities of Europe. That cannot be done by force. It is here that a League of Nations concentrating upon methods of mediation and conciliation might render greater service than it has ever rendered yet. Is it, in the first place, impossible for the leaders of European opinion—we need not call in Afghanistan or Mexico or Venezuela here—to be brought together to consider, with cool heads and in a spirit of accommodation, some of the grievances left in Europe by the Treaty of Versailles—Polish, Hungarian, Austrian, Roumanian problems? One hesitates to name them all. Even the suggestion conjures up a host of difficulties. And yet we know that, if we turn our backs upon these difficulties, they will go on fermenting till they end in war. Was it not largely for this purpose that the League of Nations was created? Could it do more valuable or necessary work?

In the second place, is it impossible to bring to the council table at Geneva the question of colonies and colonial mandates, and the problem of access to raw materials sometimes supposed to be bound up with that? Do we really want to keep or to administer all the new territories which the War has placed in our hands? We did not go to war to win more colonies: Heaven knows we had enough to defend before. We could not obviously hand back those which have been absorbed by our Dominions without the assent of the

Dominions, which we might well be unwilling to ask. But we could do something to make concessions in other quarters, and to share or surrender some of our mandates, in order to lessen the sense of injury which the loss of colonies has left. The talk of stolen colonies is not quite so fanciful as the talk of stolen gold. It is true that the actual grievance, when looked into, is rather a mirage. There is little room for European colonists in tropical Africa. There is little substance in the plea that Germany or Italy, or anybody else, is shut out from supplies of raw materials now. Italy already has African possessions several times the size of the Italian kingdom. Germany never sent many settlers to Africa, and even her trade there is limited—the Ottawa Agreements do not apply to mandated territories—more by her own economic regulations than by ours.

But, true as all this is, and certain as it is that any proposal to surrender anything we hold will produce an outcry in Parliament, there are still strong grounds for considering the subject freely in any Council of Nations working for peace. Did not the famous Fourteen Points promise “free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustments of all colonial claims”? Can it be fairly contended that Germans are unfitted to govern and administer colonies? Their record does not bear out the charge. Might we not agree to discuss and consider the position of Togoland, of Tanganyika, of the Cameroons? Might we not even invite the French to consider and discuss it with us? An offer of that kind made at this juncture might conceivably do more than anything else to appease resentments which have some foundation and to prove that we are not merely out for our own ends.

In the third place, have any of the rulers of Europe sufficient strength of mind and purpose to insist that the economic issue shall be no longer shirked? Here again a League of conciliation might do invaluable work. Economics matter even more than politics or frontiers. Poverty is the real root of the world's distress. Armament booms and building booms will not re-establish international trade. There are signs that European rulers, even autocrats, realise the follies that are going on. While Bolshevik and Nazi chiefs exchange abuse with each other, Russia is trying to draw German ships into her harbours, and German financiers are trying to place long-term credits at the disposal of Russia for the purchase of

German goods. Conservative politicians here are beginning to discover that a country dependent on foreign trade cannot thrive on quotas and embargoes. The International Chamber of Commerce declares that the time is ripe for a progressive abolition of trade restrictions. Our Government officially admits that "a signal opportunity for clearing away obstacles" has arisen. Will Ministers have the steadiness to adhere to this, and to face the clamour, the "blind mouths," which Protection invariably creates? If not, the world may go on drifting through increasing impoverishment to financial disaster.

We ought to remember that the Budget of almost every great nation is to-day a danger-signal, to which its Government obstinately turns a blind eye. France, with an "ordinary" deficit of £35,000,000 and an "extraordinary" deficit estimated at an amount little short of £143,000,000, is crippling her finances to meet armament expenditure and Labour demands. Italy, with even more threatening deficits, is squeezing her unfortunate people to pay for swollen schemes of expansion and aggression. Germany sends Dr. Schacht round Europe, while she spends all her resources on armaments, and General Göring calls on the Nazis to manufacture the raw materials which they cannot afford to buy. Our own Socialist friends, while protesting against armaments, would run grave risks of war in order to impose collective security on other people, and go far in demanding that every man, woman and child who desires it should be entitled to draw money from the State. On all sides expenditure, taxes and deficits go up. Sober proposals to regulate spending, to diminish burdens, to revive international trade, find it much more difficult to obtain a hearing to-day.

But here at least we can call in the League and listen to its economic experts, for on the broad issue they are all agreed. There is no more urgent task for rulers honestly seeking to appease animosities and unrest. There is, in fact, no other road to international prosperity, and without prosperity which all can share in there can be no lasting hope of peace.

CHARLES MALLET.

ROOSEVELT'S TRIUMPH.

TO those, and they are many, for whom an election is a sporting event, Roosevelt's triumphant return counts as an amazing "record." Out of the forty-eight States voting for members of the Electoral College, no fewer than forty-six have registered a majority for him, including most of the New England States, which have been counted safe Republicans, and Pennsylvania, which has never deserted the "Grand Old Party" since its birth in 1856. Landon has only eight votes out of the five hundred and thirty-one in the Electoral College. Such figures sound almost incredible, until account is taken of the fact that any majority, however small, in any State determines the whole representation of that State in the College. In point of fact, the popular vote throughout the country gave Roosevelt a majority of something over one-third over Landon. Large as this is, and, what is significant, some four millions larger than his majority in 1932, it does not involve the complete collapse of a party still holding the adherence of some twenty million voters and containing the great majority of the wealthiest and most "respectable" classes. A temporary submergence, no doubt, but not a final submission to a new governmental policy conceived as an attempt to make federal activities supreme in the field of industry and commerce, and to invade the rights of private property and individual enterprise which have hitherto stood unimpaired in America!

Of the two questions "What are the causes of Roosevelt's great success?" and "What will be the consequences of his new lease of power, supported by a complete control in both houses of Congress?" the first is less difficult to answer than the second. While Roosevelt's bright and forceful personality, with his sincere sympathy with "the common man" and his gift of popular appeal has contributed not a little to his victory over a man of mediocre capacity and no popular prestige, hoisted into electioneering prominence because it was thought he could win over Middle Western States to the Republican Party, too much stress must not be laid upon the personal factor. Hoover's failure in 1932 was manifestly due to his do-nothing policy in a period of intense and prolonged economic depression. Roosevelt's present success must be attributed largely to the revival of business prosperity.

Even those who are not convinced that Roosevelt's activities are the cause of this revival, but rather impute it to a "natural" process of recovery, would hesitate to "swop horses" at such a time. But the mind of "the common man" would take a more positive view of the merits of the Presidential policy. He would believe that the New Deal, with its bold policy of public expenditure and its subsidies and reliefs to the weaker farm and town workers, had done much to allay poverty and to promote recovery, and would have done much more had not the Federal Court been invoked by the money-power and the big industrialists to impair the potency of Roosevelt's liberal policy. This immense voting rally against Republicanism is the direct reply of the workers and farmers to the emasculation of the National Recovery Administration and the National Labour Relations Board. The collision between Federal control of industry and the Constitution is an event of novel and tremendous significance in the future history of America, but at present it is kept in the background and can hardly be said to have figured in the rhetoric of electioneering.

Two other features of the election deserve attention. One is the feeble influence of the Press. At least eighty per cent. of the important newspapers in all parts of the country were vigorous in their support of Landon, and many of them, including all the Hearst Press, were exceedingly unscrupulous in their misrepresentation of Roosevelt. Yet the mass of the voters appear to have been indifferent to this violent partizanship. Again, the failure of the socialist, currency, and communist candidates to win the votes of any large proportion of the more radical sections of the people is a testimony to a certain pervasive realism which does not like to waste its vote. Norman Thomas is a man of unusual ability and personal appeal, his socialism is not of an extreme or inflammatory order, but is attuned to the not unreasonable probabilities of an American constructive policy that has already broken away from the old *laissez faire* individualism. Yet his total votes do not reach a hundred thousand, a decided reduction on his 1932 figure. Lenke's wide radio campaign, with its tempting currency appeal, brought him the support of nearly three-quarters of a million votes, while the Communist, Brunker, only reached the derisory level of fifty-seven thousand. The real significance of these minority candidatures

is to prove the weakness of anything that can be termed extremism in American politics.

One other point deserves notice, the large addition to the total vote record, attributable not to the growth of the population but to the fact that some ten millions who in 1932 were so indifferent to politics that they failed to record their vote, on this occasion came to the poll. This shows a growing sense of the important part which politics is bound to play henceforth in the life of the ordinary citizen. Until recently the "best people" considered politics a disreputable art and kept out of active participation in it, while large sections of the middle and working classes were with difficulty got into the polling booths. Now it is evident that politics has come to have a substantial meaning for both orders of former indifferents. The well-to-do are seriously disturbed by threats and realities of taxation and other encroachments upon sources of wealth, while the poor for the first time envisage the State as a charitable friend.

Thus has come about this immensely impressive support of the declared man of action and constructive policy as against the conservative "let things right themselves." But when one asks what is Roosevelt's future constructive policy, no clear answer is forthcoming. Indeed, it is evident that he has no wide general constructive policy, no desire to interfere more than he is compelled with the free play of capitalist enterprise, or with the ordinary market processes by which the production and distribution of wealth are regulated. Whether his new term of office is likely to be one of turmoil and conflict, economic and political, depends chiefly upon the further development of the business recovery now already discernible in American industry. If this recovery advances into a period of prosperity comparable with that which broke in 1929, his immediate tasks will be greatly facilitated. For some time past the revival of the basic industries, including the great building trade and its subsidiaries, has brought higher prices and reduced unemployment. Thus profits, and, to a less extent, wages have risen, and increased consumption with increased creation of capital goods, the two related indices of prosperity, have taken place. The general recognition of this improvement in the economic situation has restored confidence and that favourable supply of credit which comes from confidence.

Thus, at the moment of the Roosevelt re-election, all the factors making for prosperity are in operation. This explains why the stock and share market for all sorts of investments (except public utilities) rose instead of falling when the result of the election was known. Had Landon been elected it would probably have risen more, but investors and financiers were evidently less alarmed than they pretended to be by the success of the "radical." For those who best know Roosevelt have never regarded him as a "radical," much less as a revolutionary. Nor has he ever posed as such. His New Deal consisted of a variety of opportunist measures designed to deal with the particular hardships of the depression. If they took special shape in pecuniary supports to the poverty-stricken workers and farmers, through schemes for raising wages, and subsidies for restricting outputs, they were accompanied by efforts to restore profit to capital by cheaper credits and higher prices. As was inevitable there was inconsistency and a good deal of waste in these patchwork remedies. It is even arguable that some of the experiments under the National Recovery Act impeded the "natural recovery" that was on its way. But taken as a whole, the large public expenditure upon personal and trade relief must have helped not only to tide over the unprecedented distress but, by maintaining the level of popular consumption, to stop the collapse of industry from going to its lowest depths. Mr. Roosevelt's declared immediate objective is to balance his budget, so as to stop further enlargement of the national debt and its volume of interest. This he may hope to do, not by raising further the rates of taxation, but by using the larger returns upon current income and other taxes which "prosperity" will yield in meeting the smaller charges for reliefs and subsidies which should come from reduced unemployment of labour and improved farm conditions.

One problem of supreme importance is not, however, fully realised. How far can "recovery" and "prosperity" go without a definite revival of international trade? It is unlikely that the rise in volume of production in America's staple trades, including agriculture, enhanced as it is by continual technological improvements, can go on for long without encountering the insufficiency of the home market, or, put otherwise, the necessity of enlarged foreign sales. The pre-1929 period of prosperity was made possible by

enormous loans to Germany and other European countries and to South America, and the stoppage of further lending was the direct cause of the 1930 slump. It is exceedingly unlikely that the American consumer market will be able to take off the full production of her industry. For this would imply a redistribution of the national income in favour of the spending power of the workers far more drastic than falls within the scope of a New Deal as at present envisaged.

As is shown in the elaborate statistical survey made by the Brookings' Institute of Washington, prosperity in American industry, though attended by higher money wages among a larger number of employees, increases the proportion of the national income that goes into profits and thence into savings and investments. So long as these investments materialise in more plants and materials, all goes well. But from the very nature of the situation this process of making more capital without a proportionate increase of wages and consumption cannot continue. While it seems possible that this lesson may have been learnt by the more thoughtful employers who are voluntarily increasing wage-rates in order to prevent strikes and lockouts from blocking further progress, it is unlikely that so intelligent a policy will become general. Business men are normally concerned to keep down their costs, and are not able to engage in a concerted effort with other business men in the national system of industry to realise the larger markets which all would share if a larger proportion of the general industrial income went to worker-consumers. Such a consideration lies outside the normal purview of a business man, though it is highly relevant to his long-range interest.

It may thus be taken as pretty certain that no attempt will be made to extend the New Deal so as to meet the full requirements of this recurrent situation. For there is no evidence that Mr. Roosevelt or his intimate advisers are preparing to tackle the large and numerous governmental interferences required for any general "planning" policy. Apart from the unwillingness to extend the domain of public policy in the economic field, the constitutional disabilities even of a continuance of the milder reforms of the New Deal remain to be confronted. It is, however, not improbable that the next few years may witness a new alignment of political forces, if Mr. Lewis, the able and forceful leader of the

Labour movement along the lines of industrial unionism can break the obstructive narrowness of the older American Federation and bring the movement into a shape which will make it the backbone of a new political party capable of working with the farmers and the black-coated city employees in a progressive front.

For one result of Roosevelt's New Deal is certain. It will no longer be practicable for an American government to revert to the old *laissez faire* attitude towards industry, qualified only by a protective tariff. The despotic capitalism of the United States was based, partly upon the competitive "disunion" of the States in economic life, partly upon the constant tide of immigration which fed industry with unskilled, low-waged, and unorganised labour, and partly upon the great opportunities for rapid profiteering presented by the early development of the Middle and Far West. All these conditions have now disappeared, with the partial exception of the first. It seems, therefore, likely that the political-economic struggle will turn upon the efforts of some such progressive front as we have indicated to bring business into line with the policy of partial socialism that is taking shape in most European countries, whether under despotism or democracy. This shape consists in the public ownership and administration of national monopolies and key industries, social services for aids to unemployment, old age, poverty and other working-class disablements, for education on a liberal scale and for amenities of social life, and the public finance required for these services coupled with the needs of national defence.

The New Deal has made a beginning in this process and there can be no turning back. For a temporary return of industrial prosperity will not absorb the unemployed, nor will real wages rise to a level that will redress mal-distribution and afford contentment to the masses. No doubt capitalism will attempt to maintain its dominance and may seek to recapture a larger foreign market for its surplus goods and investable capital. Should recovery take place upon a sufficient scale throughout the world, this policy might for a time satisfy the urgent needs of American capitalism. But not for long. The rapid technological advances in production now common to all capitalistic countries will not enable America to get a share of foreign trade sufficient to her needs,

unless she virtually abolished her tariff and entered upon a policy of complete free trade which would secure a full market for all her natural resources and human powers of production. But this implies a world reduction of tariff and other barriers, a complete reversal of the post-war world economy.

But if, as we have contemplated, Roosevelt will be drawn into a larger and more constructive social-economic Deal, the constitutional obstacle will have to be overcome. This, it is sometimes suggested, can be done without any direct challenge, by the appointment of a few new judges known to favour a liberal interpretation of the Inter-state Commerce Clause. But this is a dubious and a not quite honest way of meeting a substantial difficulty. For the current Constitution, however liberally interpreted, cannot adequately meet the new economic needs. Its makers and amenders never foresaw the requirements of present-day industry and commerce. The reasonable course would seem to require, first, an amendment of the amending clauses in the Constitution, so as to overcome the difficulty of obtaining the consent of three-quarters of the States, and then the provision of sufficient power to a Congress majority for passing laws required to enable the people of the United States to conduct their business in accordance with their own will and welfare. This issue may absorb the political attention of America for some time to come, when it is fairly launched.

If this speculative interpretation is correct, it renders unlikely any substantial change in the isolationist attitude which America has adopted with increased intensity as the years have disclosed the crimes and follies of the Great War and the Bad Peace. Though Roosevelt may privately entertain desires for political co-operation with Great Britain and other democratic countries, and might even be disposed to bring America into the League, the Wilson disillusionment and the revived fears of "entangling alliances" will probably keep him out of political as distinct from commercial and financial co-operation with the world that lies outside the ambit of the Monroe Doctrine.

J. A. HOBSON.

THE SPANISH IMBROGLIO.

IF ever that expressive—though Italianate—word “imbroglio” applied it is in the case of the present blood-sacrifice in Spain. I am not thinking for the moment of the extraneous complications, the very material aid lent to General Franco and his mercenaries by the two anti-democratic Great Powers and the perversion of all international law and morality which it has brought in its train. Two features of this international extension, nevertheless, deserve to be emphasised: (1) that Germany and Italy have been prodigal in their assistance to the Spanish Right not so much *quâ* “fascist” nations as because they are expansionist Powers prepared to go to any lengths to further their national interests and shift the weight of the balance of power in the Mediterranean to their side. There is no evidence for the allegation that Russia supplied arms to further her communist interests—until the declaration by her spokesman at the Committee in London that henceforth she would observe the Pact in the same degree as certain other Powers. (2) That the “device” (Mr. Eden’s word) of non-intervention, whatever the motives of its authors, has had the effect of extending a military insurrection *which had failed* into the present protracted and ghastly civil war.

This affirmation requires perhaps a token of proof. The evidence is that in Madrid and Barcelona, not to speak of smaller capitals, the sally of the military was frustrated after less than three days’ fierce fighting by the reckless heroism of the populace, and that the loyalist forces, comprising barely 10 per cent. of the officers of the army, recaptured in the first two weeks whole provinces like Guadalajara, Toledo, Vizcaya—above all, Albacete, thus ensuring their supplies from the coast. Again, only four of the aviation centres, Seville, Leon, Logroño, and Avila, were in the hands of the rebels, whereas, in marked contrast with the conduct of the army caste, some 70 per cent. of the air force remained loyal to the Government. Thus, as Don Indalecio Prieto observed in a conversation I had with him on September 25th, the Government had at the beginning unquestioned control of the air, a situation converted in the first few weeks of the military operations into a superiority on the part of the insurgents of twelve to one. In their rabbit scurry to avoid

an all-in struggle on the Spanish *terrain*, moreover, the British and French Governments took it upon themselves to impose a rigid embargo on the export of arms to Spain without waiting for the adherence of other Powers to the projected “non-intervention pact.” The clause relating to the sale of French arms inserted—upon French insistence—in the Franco-Spanish commercial treaty of 1935 thus went for nothing, and just at the time when a relatively small supply of up-to-date aeroplanes, heavy artillery and machine-guns would have enabled the Madrid Government to complete the discomfiture of the mutinous officers, it was bunkered by an international expedient that could not have been foreseen.

No wonder that even a great gentleman and democrat like Don Manuel Azaña (*cf.* an interview of the Special Correspondent of *The Times*, October 16th) was moved to complain that the non-intervention project was tantamount to “a policy of sanctions against the legitimate Spanish Government.” It is important, I think, that people in England should realise how sore—and justifiably so—democratic Spain (which ranges from conservatives and Catholics like the Basques or Señor Ossorio y Gallardo to communists and anarchists) is feeling about the way in which she has been let down by the seniors of democracy: the Note drafted by the Spanish Foreign Minister in reply to London’s tardy request for “exchange of hostages”—which reflected that bitterness—deserved far more careful attention from the Press here than it received.

But, as I said, I do not wish to add here any contribution of mine to the stream of comment that has engulfed the non-intervention policy and the proceedings of the wretched Committee of Control: the verdict of the French barber at Cerbère with whom I discussed it while he shaved me—“*c’est de la blague*”—can scarcely be improved upon. What seems so necessary to combat in England is the over-simplification of the issues in the Spanish conflict *as a Spanish affair*. The general line of demarcation is, of course, clear enough. On the one side are ranged the champions of oligarchy intent on restoring the Spain that the world knew before the democratic flood, a Spain in which the Roman Catholic Church was the fount of power, political and social, and political figures were in the main mere feudatories of the land-owning class, while the army lived up to its traditional rôle of guarding the

cherished values of authority, order and discipline. These are the elements which must necessarily be antagonistic to the aspirations of the Republic of 1931. But in the present clash they are reinforced by a fair percentage of the traditionally invertebrate Spanish bourgeoisie* who discover that they don't like this thing called popular government at all when it becomes an actuality! So, in England, not only members of the governing class but any number of liberal-minded citizens fight shy of attesting their support for a *pot pourri* of democratic forces in which, it seems, socialists and syndicalists are only too likely to dominate.

Yet the claim of the forces supporting the People's Front is incontestable: they are battling on behalf of the many against the privileged few. That is democracy, though it may not be Liberalism—it is high time that that nineteenth-century marriage was dissolved. The fact remains that, because Spain has never passed through the phase of the industrial revolution which Britain and France have known, the clash of ideals is bound to assume a different class-form. Industrial capitalists in the Basque provinces, the business classes in Catalonia and Valencia, are found now sincerely championing the Government's cause—over against the "rural feudalism" (the phrase is taken from the Republican Committee's manifesto when the result of the polling in the chief towns on April 12th, 1931, was known) which has acclaimed General Franco. And the *petite bourgeoisie* and shopkeeper class, which in Germany and Italy were ripe for fascist agitation, in Spain are everywhere ranged with the forces of the Left. Those Spaniards most to be pitied in the present imbroglio are, of course, the Liberals of an older generation, including some of the finest minds that ever denounced the monarchy and the dictatorship—men like Señor Madariaga and Professor Castillejo—who have remained cut off from the social impetus of the past five years.

The present riven Spain, then, is a far more complex phenomenon than is usually appreciated. At least a third of the population regards with agonised feelings the prospect of domination by the assembled standard-bearers of Right or Left. But this neutral mass is by no means widely distributed: it will be found to have specific associations with certain well-defined regions. The people of Galicia, for

* Cf. *España Invertebrada*. By Ortega y Gasset. 1922.

example, where the climate and soil resemble that of this country, have a natural distaste for extremes. And there where the land is partitioned to excess, one can hardly expect the same economic and social preoccupations as, for instance, in Andalusia or Extremadura. On the other hand, Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia and Malaga, those fertile provinces where the land slopes down from the great central plateau to the Mediterranean, had really sloughed the skin of the traditional bourgeois State long before their own fiercely democratic integument was uncovered by the civil war. In other provinces such as Old Castile, Salamanca and Burgos, there was no such impulse, the people were living, so to speak, in a different century. Here is a fundamental divergence which has its direct bearing upon the political situation to-day. For let no one imagine that the occupation of Madrid by the insurgent forces spells *finis* to the war. On the contrary, Government spokesmen are entirely justified in affirming that the fight of Spanish democracy against the relics of the old monarchist State is only now beginning.

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I may perhaps illustrate the above reflections by a commentary on my recent visit to the regions where Spanish democracy is rooted in history and geography and in the character of the people. On the wall of the station at Port-Bou the first of the many hortatory placards to catch my eye read: "Refrain from looting, or you disgrace our triumph. . . . U.G.T." These admirable intentions, I soon discovered, were not peculiar to the more moderate of the two all-important trade union organisations known everywhere in Spain by their initials. In Barcelona a few days afterwards I saw a similar poster in the name of the C.N.T. (anarcho-syndicalist) which bore the stern admonition: "Anyone entering a house or carrying out a night search without written authority from the anti-fascist militia will be shot without trial. . . ." (The Central Committee of the anti-fascist militia, I should perhaps explain, was the composite body drawn from the various elements of the People's Front which took over the routine functions of government, especially policing and transport control, when the rebellion deprived the Government of the majority of the regular officials. This was done with the full approval of the *petit*

bourgeois Council of the *Generalitat* of the time under Joan Casanovas, formerly Speaker of the Catalan parliament, it was no case of usurpation of authority. With the formation of the present Council comprising representatives of all the co-operating forces the Central Committee has ceased to exist.)

It was not so much the effort to control the extra-legal elements of certain shady elements enrolled in the anarchist or socialist ranks which impressed me. The astonishing thing was the assumption of a victory already won—at a time when General Franco and his four columns were already converging upon Madrid from north, west, south-west and south, and skirmishes were continuing on at least four other fronts. When one hears eye-witness accounts of the three days of fierce fighting, one can easily understand the note of triumph and exultation. That it should have lasted to this day is the unexpected feature—unexpected until one recollects that the rhythm of life in Catalonia is all its own, independent of events in the rest of the peninsula. In November 1933, for instance, when the elections in the rest of Spain registered a check to the Republican's revolutionary impetus, the *Esquerra* or Left coalition there maintained its position.

The jostling crowds on the Ramblas were buying their newspapers, were gossiping about the latest passionate appeal to the people in far-away Madrid to stand fast, and listening to the stories of eager militiamen back from the Aragon front and the protracted storming of Huesca. Loud-speakers were screeching forth the colourless official *communiqués* from the various battle-zones. But the Catalans were much more interested in what they called their "revolution," or, as one of the newspaper writers delicately described it, the "social transformation consequent upon the mutiny of the army," than in the war. They saw themselves engrossed in the exhilarating task of building up and organising the Workers' State, as if the bloody reckoning were taking place in another corner of Europe. Actually, the transformation is more apparent than real. The measures of requisitioning and control which have intruded on the ordinary processes of capitalism are essentially war measures. The only notable change, in itself little more revolutionary than the notion of workers' control which figures in the British Labour Party's programme, is the institution in every industrial

concern of a supervisory workers' committee. In the banks control is exercised by a delegate of the Catalan Government itself. I must say that the wheels of the new industrial administration are running very smoothly. And in the civilian supply services no less than the actual military tasks the constructive capacities revealed by the anarchists who hitherto boasted only of their "organisation of indiscipline . . ." (!) compel one's admiration. Apart from a compulsory 15 per cent. increase of wages decreed at the beginning of August, wages and prices have remained constant, and any pressure for higher rates of pay is promptly discountenanced by the directive elements of the trade unions. (That 15 per cent. increase, by the way, is paid in straightaway by the individual workers to their union headquarters to be used for the war-chest.) While the owners of industrial plant have in many cases "gone abroad" and failed to return by the date scheduled, managing staffs have mostly stayed on, even at a reduced salary—as demanded in the name of social justice by the workers' committees. Technical experts, indeed the bulk of the professional classes, have found no difficulty in adapting themselves to the new times.

Not even the reports of a large enemy contingent with 150 Italian-officered aeroplanes in Majorca, less than 200 miles away, have damped the ardour of these self-centred Catalans. The only evidence of what was in the mind of the authorities was the call for 3,000 sappers and engineers to construct a Maginot line of triple-steel fortifications along the frontier of Catalonia with the rest of Spain.

The above might seem to be indicative of separatist ambitions. Is not Spain's danger Catalonia's opportunity, it will be said? Not at all. For, as Professor Allison Peers observes in his recent chronicle of the past six years,* "it is a popular but mistaken belief that the Catalonian people are anxious for complete separation from the rest of Spain. . . ." The "Sinn Fein" section of Catalanists with their lone star emblem is an insignificant minority. The *Esquerra* or Left alliance which has been in the ascendant since the beginning of the Republic is nationalist and federalist, but *not* separatist. This was made clear in the proclamation on October 6th, 1934, of the "Catalan State of the Federal Republic" by President Companys. The actual Statute of Autonomy from which

* *The Spanish Tragedy*. By E. Allison Peers. Methuen.

present powers are derived does not, of course, go so far. Catalonia has her own Executive Council, described by the term *Generalitat*, recalling mediæval traditions, its President being at the same time the representative of the Central Government (Madrid). She has her own miniature Parliament (*Corts*) of some eighty members. Besides ample administrative, cultural and fiscal autonomy, the Region enjoys certain prerogatives in respect of education and civil law; the married woman, for instance, in Catalonia—but not in the rest of Spain—can have her own banking account and her own passport without special authorisation from her husband. Catalan is the language of the primary schools and of the law courts, though Spanish is, of course, tolerated; and, by a recent decree, the university has become autonomous. Social, penal and commercial legislation is laid down by Madrid but operated by the *Generalitat*. But the framework of the Spanish State remains a unitary one, and Article XIII expressly forbids the “federation of autonomous regions.” It is here that a cleavage of opinion manifests itself. The young men who see visions have always looked forward to re-moulding the peninsula as a thoroughgoing federal State. And, as a step towards this dream of the future, they have actively fostered the other nationalist movements in the Basque Provinces and in Galicia. The ultimate structure, it is assumed, would embrace Portugal—but not in our generation.

Opposition to this federalist ideal came from two popular camps, apart from the resistance of the irreconcilable epigones of the monarchist State. The anarcho-syndicalists saw in Catalanism a bourgeois diversion which would have the effect of weaning the workers from the stern business of overcoming capitalism. Socialists and communists, on the other hand, perceived in it a serious obstacle to their plans for the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” But the merging of disparate elements of the Left in the People’s Front at the end of 1935 began the process of dissipating mutual mistrust. The present civil war, as a basic challenge on the part of the old order of Catalanism and Labour, has completed it. To-day there are no more loyal supporters of the “anti-fascist” cause than the Catalan *petite bourgeoisie*.

The talk of Catalonia carrying on with the war after the fall of Madrid, therefore, does not mean a turning away from Spain towards France, for example. An “independent

Catalonia” only describes a self-administering entity, co-ordinated with similar small democracies in other areas of the eastern littoral—Valencia, Malaga, etc., one and all maintaining their allegiance to the régime symbolised in President Azaña, now established in quarters at the Presidential Palace in Barcelona, pending a legal elaboration of federalism. In each case you have a community of Spaniards of a distinctive Mediterranean type actively practising that local autarchy which corresponds to the peculiar genius of the people.

There have been no doubt far too many instances of lawlessness and violence, which our Press has fastened upon to show that the writ of the central Government does not run—though the critics should not ignore the extenuating circumstances of civil war *plus* social upheaval: it would be as well, too, that those who are indignant about such manifestations of anarchy should verify their references. I would affirm, however, that municipal self-government, the fetish of the anarchists, has achieved in practice an impressive amount of success: in Spain, remember, every village is as self-sufficing, morally, as the Greek city-State. (Communism of the Moscow genus has, of course, conspicuously few adherents in Catalonia. Stalin and the Comintern have no more bitter detractors than the P.O.U.M., the group akin to our I.L.P., which makes the “communist” running there. Throughout the part of Spain bordering on the Mediterranean the Spanish surge takes the very different form of anarcho-syndicalism: and to these anarchists the bureaucratic and authoritarian features of Marxism are anathema.) In economic matters, for the time being, all doctrines have had to go by the board, the only aim is the most effective mobilisation of the considerable resources of that portion of Spanish territory still under loyalist control. But an interesting trend, in line with the river confederation projects which Señor Prieto has always hoped to realise from the heritage of General Primo de Rivera, is indicated in the expressed purpose of the Regional Economic Council “to defend federal principles and the geo-economic characteristics which give personality to each region.”

If nothing else, Spain’s essential localism has been vindicated by the experience of the past few months. And, whatever may be the immediate prospect, by approval of the Bill according “home rule” to the Basque Provinces at the

Parliamentary session in Madrid on October 1st, the People's Front Government drove in another pile of the only foundations on which a durable political structure can be reared. The quintessential Castilian may shake his head at the signs and portents of "disintegration." Spokesmen of the insurgents will, naturally, scream about "dismemberment of the country." Historians hundreds of miles away will murmur warnings about the cantonalism that destroyed the First Republic. Yet to anyone who has participated in any way in the upsurge of the national life since the turn of the century, the federal trend is unmistakable. Some, like Professor Castillejo, by nature and training opposed to it, have been shocked by the present holocaust into hailing a United States of Spain as the one solution, with, perhaps, an elaboration of the technique of exchange of populations which has proved so successful in appeasing the age-old feud of Greeks and Turks.

At any rate, no political régime, one would think, can survive in Spain which does not take its cue from those "violent regional dissimilarities in the temperament of the Spanish people" to which Professor Allison Peers pays due acknowledgment. Yet the military leaders seem to have no conception of this unity in diversity. And Englishmen of all classes and shades of opinion have been bamboozled into appraising the Spanish problem in terms of fascism and communism, both implying a centralisation of power which is utterly alien to the Spanish reality. No facile formulæ, in any case, can hit off the formidable clash of ideals which is devastating one corner of Europe. But, for heaven's sake, let us not meekly fall for that "war of doctrines"—of which the Spanish blood-letting should be the first engagement—which that super-salesman, Herr Hitler, is engaged in "selling" to the rest of Europe. As that wise Liberal Professor Guglielmo Ferrero reminds us (*The Spectator*, October 23rd), there is only one Government, that of Moscow, based on a doctrine—and every day less so—whereas Italian fascism and German national socialism are but "mystifications created to cloak and justify grossly arbitrary and tyrannical régimes." The first essential in regard to the grim peninsular war of to-day is to cut away the overgrowth—to replace the message of Madrid in its own Spanish context.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

GERMANY AND RUSSIA.

THE striking thing about Hitler's recent anti-Russian outburst at Nuremberg is not its unprecedented violence. That, after all, is merely a detail, since there have been many similar outbursts before, and the world accepts calmly the peculiar code of behaviour that Hitler and his men have worked out for themselves. The striking thing is that, while the speech received the widest possible international publicity, two facts of the utmost importance, a knowledge of which would have revealed the true value of the anti-Russian outburst, were almost completely hushed up. The first is that, almost simultaneously with the Nuremberg Congress, the twenty-fourth "Eastern Trade Fair" was opened in Königsberg, its main object being to develop trade between Germany and Soviet Russia. The second particularly significant fact is that the very same Hitler who was shouting himself hoarse in cursing the Soviets at Nuremberg was at that identical time offering the very same Soviets 300 million marks' worth of new German credits. About 40 per cent. of that money, if the Soviets were to agree and borrow it, was to be spent on military equipment with which the "Anti-Soviet Crusader" was not only willing but anxious to supply his would-be enemies. What is even more remarkable, and proves that this extraordinary contradiction is part of a carefully thought-out scheme, is the fact that it is the exact repetition of something that happened earlier this year. The similarity is complete.

"Herald in the Battle against Bolshevism"—that is how Hitler was announced by Herr Wagner, Nazi Governor of Bavaria, at a meeting in Munich on Saturday, March 14th. In his own speech that followed Hitler denounced as usual the Franco-Soviet Pact. Yet scarcely a fortnight prior to this Munich meeting, he was offering the Soviet Government a new credit of 500 million marks, while an important German paper was pleading for better relations with the Bolsheviks. All this sounds staggering, but the fact remains that Hitler, who never misses a chance of telling the world that he saved it from Communism, has throughout his time of office been going out of the way to do business with the Bolsheviks. Incredible though it may seem, one of his first actions was to grant the Soviets 200 million marks of credit. This was in March 1933, *i.e.* almost immediately after the Reichstag fire

and the beginning of his alleged anti-Communist crusade. On August 20th of the same year, 1933, the "Eastern Trade Fair" opened at Königsberg in the presence of the notorious anti-Bolshevik Alfred Rosenberg and other Nazi high officials and Ministers. Soviet Russia was the leading exhibitor and the principal guest of honour, neither Stalin nor Hitler apparently having any objection to this peculiarly inappropriate manifestation. The proceedings were opened by the Soviet delegate, and enthusiastic speeches were made on both sides.

In 1934 the earlier German credits granted to the Soviets by Hitler's predecessors became repayable, and the Bolsheviks duly reimbursed 600 million marks in gold and foreign currency. Hitler's Government thereupon hastened to offer new credits to its alleged enemies, and on April 9th, 1935, a fresh agreement was signed in Berlin. This time the terms granted by the "Anti-Communist Crusader" to the Bolsheviks were even more advantageous to them than in the previous deal. But the matter did not end there. A further offer of yet another 500 millions was made for no less a period than ten years. Molotov referred to it in his speech at the last Soviet congress in January 1936, and his statement has been neither challenged nor denied. On February 24th it was announced that Germany was again offering the same huge sum and that she was most anxious to persuade the Soviets to accept it. She was prepared to go a long way to give them still better terms, and on April 29th, 1936, a 5 years' credit of 200 million marks was duly arranged. Finally 300 millions have been offered now. Thus, it will be seen that Hitler's anxiety to maintain and build up business relations with the Soviets has manifested itself throughout these years, despite his professed hatred. Will anybody in his right senses believe that if he genuinely wishes the destruction of the Soviet Government, he would be so ardently and systematically loaning money to it? Or, that if he really feared a Russian attack, he would be helping the Soviets to equip their war industries by putting many hundreds of millions' worth of machinery at their disposal? The suggestion is too ridiculous for words.

But business is business, it may be argued, and politically Hitler really is an Anti-Communist Crusader—even if he is prepared to bolster up the Russian Communists with Nazi German credits. Here, too, however, the contradiction of

verbose outbursts and actual facts is staggering. So far not one of the most peculiar treaties binding Soviet Russia and Germany in a more than friendly union has been denounced by Hitler. Between 1921 and 1929 alone eight such political treaties of the highest international importance were signed, not counting the many commercial or minor political ones. The sinister collaboration between the Soviets and Berlin, which began when Ludendorff helped Lenin in 1917 to get to Russia, and found its sublime expression in the Treaty of Rapallo five years later, is too well known to require comment. This intimate friendship became by virtue of the 1926 Treaty of Berlin a real alliance. On May 5th, 1933, Hitler ratified the extension of this Treaty, which is in many ways reminiscent of the Franco-Soviet Pact he now denounces so bitterly. It is worth mentioning that the Berlin 1926 Treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany needed renewing in 1931, but that Brüning, Papen and Schleicher were continuously postponing ratification because they were considering the possibility of dropping their Soviet ally in order to pave the way to better relations with France—which was strongly anti-Bolshevik in those days. Hitler, on the other hand, promptly agreed to ratifying it and, as will be seen in a moment, undertook on Germany's behalf not to participate in any "International Crusade against the World Revolution," and even to abstain from any attempted economic crusade against it.

It is a curious fact that in the first declaration of policy issued by Hitler on the day he took power, on February 1st, 1933, Soviet Russia is not mentioned at all. A week later, on February 7th, in an interview with the *Sunday Express*, the German text of which was published in Berlin as an official statement on foreign policy, he strongly attacked Versailles and France, complained about the Polish corridor, and again said nothing against Soviet Russia. Indeed, he remarked that Communism was an internal German political problem, and that in that respect he was not concerned with any foreign State. His oration at the opening of the Reichstag on March 21st, however, is quite outspoken on the subject of relations with Soviet Russia. After again haranguing France and cursing Versailles, he said: "As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the German Government is anxious to maintain friendly and mutually profitable relations. The Government of the National Revolution is particularly well placed for such

a positive policy towards Soviet Russia. **The struggle against Communism is our internal business, in which we will never put up with interference from outside. But the political relations of the State with other Powers, with whom we are tied by mutual interests, will not be affected by this.**" A more friendly declaration would be hard to find. Thus the man who now claims to have saved the world from Bolshevism was at the very outset of his ministerial career proclaiming his desire to maintain friendly relations with the Bolsheviks.

Five weeks later he received the Soviet Ambassador Chintchuk and had a long and most friendly talk with this diplomat, who is both a Communist and a Jew—two things Hitler pretends to abhor most. A week after this momentous talk, on May 5th, he ratified the extension of the Berlin Treaty, and the text of this document is so striking that it deserves to be quoted in full :

The German Government and the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, being animated by the desire to do everything that can contribute to the maintaining of general peace, and convinced that the interests of the German people and the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics demand a continued confidential collaboration, have agreed to consolidate their existing friendly relations through a special Treaty and for that purpose they have nominated as plenipotentiaries Stresemann and Krestinsky who have laid down the following heads of agreement :

Article 1. The basis of the relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. remains the Treaty of Rapallo. The German Government and the Governments of the U.S.S.R. will remain in friendly contact with each other in order to bring about an understanding in the problems of political and economic nature that are of mutual interest.

Article 2. If one of the contracting parties were—despite its peaceful behaviour—attacked by a third Power or several Powers, the other contracting party must observe neutrality during the whole duration of the conflict.

Article 3. If, as a result of a conflict whose nature is indicated in article 2, or else at a time when neither of the contracting parties is involved in military complications, a coalition were to be formed by third Powers for the purpose of conducting an economic or financial boycott of one of the contracting Powers, the other contracting Power shall not join such a coalition.

Article 4. This agreement must be ratified and the ratification documents must be exchanged in Berlin. The agreement comes into force on exchange of the ratification documents and is valid for five years. The two contracting parties shall consider the future course of their political relations a reasonable time before the agreement has elapsed.

This agreement remains in force to the present day and forms the legal basis of German-Soviet relations. It is true, of course, that soon after it was signed there began a series of "anti-Marxist" outbursts in various speeches by Hitler and his entourage. The Soviet Press invariably answered them by rather pointed comments or a series of leading questions. But all this did not seem ever to affect the fundamental issue of "friendly relations," which continued very largely as before. France was in those days the principal target of regular Nazi outbursts, and Germany's rearmament was claimed to be due to the necessity of seeking to counteract the superior military strength of the French. The Russian bogey was not as yet put up as a justification for undisguised militarism.

Then came in rapid succession the crude indiscretions, first of Rosenberg—then—at the London Conference—of Hugenberg, who quite cynically spoke of colonising Russia. The impression this produced was so lamentable that it cost Hugenberg his job, and he had to resign from the Hitler Government, while Rosenberg for a time fell into disgrace and was no longer entrusted with secret missions like the one which had brought him to London. That the Soviet Press and that leading Bolsheviks should have replied to those open threats in very strong language goes without saying. But the tension was still further increased when the German Government suddenly refused to admit Soviet newspaper correspondents to the Reichstag fire trial, to which the Bolsheviks replied by interfering with German correspondents in Russia. There was a great deal of mutual abuse and recrimination ; yet even then relations between the two countries remained fundamentally unchanged.

On October 30th an official *communiqué* was issued to the effect that the newspaper conflict was over, and that the Soviet Press representatives would be admitted to the Leipzig trial. Hitler's Foreign Minister and Stalin's Ambassador—the Communist Jew Chintchuk—had once again had a long talk, and had come to a most friendly understanding that

"relations between the two countries must not be affected by the difference of their political systems." Hitler's first year of office thus ended, just as it began, with a declaration of friendship for the Soviets—notwithstanding the political creed and the race of some of their leaders or diplomats and despite the occasional Nazi outbursts.

He had taken office on February 1st, 1933. Exactly twelve months later, on January 30th, 1934, the "Anti-Communist Crusader" made a speech in the Reichstag in which he again expressed his friendly feelings for Soviet Russia in a most emphatic way. The reason of this statement was that throughout that month leading Soviet officials, Stalin, Molotov and Litvinov (whom Hitler now abuses personally in a way unprecedented in international diplomatic history) had, at the Conference of the Central Executive Committee, expressed great apprehension about the further policy of their old Rapallo ally.

This is what Hitler said :

It was comprehensible and possible that, despite the great difference between the two respective outlooks on life, the German Reich had endeavoured to look after its friendly relations with Russia also that year. If Herr Stalin in his latest great speech expressed apprehension lest forces inimical to the Soviets be at work in Germany, I must correct this opinion here. Just as in Soviet Russia a German Nationalist Socialist tendency would not be admitted, Germany will not admit a Communist tendency or even propaganda. The more clearly and definitely this fact is understood, the more it is respected by both States, the more naturally the two countries can look after the interests they have in common. That is why we welcome the desire for a stabilisation in the East through a system of pacts, especially if the guiding considerations in this are less of a tactical and political nature and more of a nature to consolidate peace.

The Soviets, however, were not much impressed. After all, *Mein Kampf*—that Bible of Nazi Germany—stated Hitler's anti-Russian intentions so forcibly that his friendly declarations sounded somewhat unconvincing. Moreover, the whole trend of German foreign policy and the tempo of her military preparations made the Revisionist game, which Russia and Germany had played together so adroitly all those years, appear full of threatening possibilities. In an article that attracted widespread attention Radek put the Bolshevik

point of view in a nutshell when he said that the Treaty of Versailles may be "imperialistic" and bad, but to fight for its revision under the auspices of Fascist governments—the main pillars of Revisionism—would merely result in an even more "imperialistic" settlement. Not only did the Soviets no longer wish to alter so much as an iota in the Versailles Treaty, but their *rapprochement* with France was proceeding at a singularly rapid pace. Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was being more than usually active, and at Geneva, as well as in most of the leading capitals, he was laying the foundations for an entirely new set of Soviet alliances and semi-alliances. Economic difficulties and acute tension in the Far East rendered Moscow's position extremely precarious. She simply could not afford the risk of any sort of adventure. As Professor Miliukov remarks in his brilliant new book, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviets*, recently published in Paris (a true masterpiece of lucid exposition and analysis of Russia's foreign relations from 1917 to the present day), the Soviets' most urgent need of peace coincided with Europe's need of the Soviets. This was very largely due to the complete re-orientation of international relations as the result of Hitler's advent to power, as well as to a number of local political and economic considerations which do not come within the scope of this article.

While pursuing a "peace at any price" policy Moscow was making an almost superhuman effort to prepare for the contingency of war. Before long the Soviets, whose methods and mentality bear a striking resemblance to Nazi Germany, began to brag in accustomed fashion about the degree of their military preparedness. News reels were released and shown throughout the world picturing the most impressive tank parades or the Red Army marching through the squares of Moscow. And Voroshilov, the Soviet Commissar for War, enumerated the achievements and the scope of Russia's re-militarisation in a speech which could leave no doubt as to the ears for whom his words were meant. But Hitler pretended not to hear. Throughout 1934 the "Anti-Communist Crusader" seemed to have no objections whatsoever to Moscow's growing military strength—admitted or even broadcast by the Soviets—and in pleading Germany's claim for armaments he never so much as hinted the possibility of a Soviet menace. A perusal of the official documents dealing

with Germany's rearmament at the time will show that neither Soviet Russia nor the Red Army, now purported to be threatening Germany, is mentioned by Hitler at all. At the same time it is worth recalling that in a sensational interview with Mr. Ward Price, the text of which was officially released in Berlin on February 17th, 1934, Hitler derided the very suggestion of a possible attack on Russia. He assured Mr. Price that there was no need for Germany to expand her territory, since the increase of her population had stopped. "Was! Wir sollen Gebiet von Russland nehmen? Lächerlich!" he exclaimed.

There followed the episode with the acceptance in principle and the rejection in practice of the Bolshevik offer to sign a pact guaranteeing the neutrality of the Baltic countries. In a statement issued on April 26th, 1934, we find:

We can of course only welcome with satisfaction the Soviet Government's present desire to do something definite to restore confidential relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. The German Government has always unequivocally emphasised its desire in that direction at every suitable opportunity.

But, the statement continued, there was no need to enter into any sort of agreement guaranteeing Baltic neutrality because, in Hitler's opinion, there was no reason to assume that these countries were in any danger of being attacked . . . by the Soviet Union! At any rate Germany was not prepared to sign anything suggested by the Soviets.

The German Government believes that the Treaty of Berlin which it ratified the previous year contains all the elements for the preservation and shaping of their mutual relations.

Two things are especially worth noting in this document. In the first place, the "Herald in the Battle against Bolshevism" proclaims that he has used every opportunity to emphasise unequivocally his desire for friendly relations with the Soviets, and, in the second place, the Berlin Treaty of friendship is still considered as the proper basis for Germano-Russian relations. Further, it is not devoid of interest that Hitler certifies that he does not expect the Bolsheviks to attack their weak little Baltic neighbours; what, then, it may be asked, of Germany—a country that is big and strong, and moreover separated from Russia by a chain of buffer States?

On the occasion of the retirement of Ambassador Nadolny—a past master of wire-pulling—and the appointment of Count Schulenburg as his successor in Moscow, an official *communiqué* issued in Berlin on June 21st, 1934, states that no change of German policy towards Soviet Russia is anticipated and that friendly relations are to continue.

All these declarations, of course, do not prevent Hitler and his henchmen from indulging in regular diatribes against the Soviets—"those deadly enemies of European culture." Nor do the Bolsheviks feel called upon to show their earlier restraint, and now they answer back in the same kind of language. Yet, up to July 1934, protestations of friendship are made and accepted with astonishing regularity. Then the Franco-Soviet Pact begins to take shape, and Hitler goes completely off the deep end. He pours scorn and abuse on the Soviets in a way unprecedented even for him. What infuriates him is not that France has come to an arrangement with the Soviets, but that the latter—Germany's satellites for over seventeen years—have now abandoned Germany for France. "Sour grapes" is by far too mild an expression to describe Germany's feelings. All of a sudden the Soviet Government, which Germany did so much to establish and to maintain, which it helped to overcome its main difficulties and with which it had the most far-reaching "anti-European" arrangements, suddenly becomes a world danger. The Germans warn France and the civilised world against the Bolshevik scourge. They pretend to see in the Red Army, which they had hitherto deliberately ignored (and incidentally helped to train), a danger to their own and the world's peace. Those very Germans whose connection with Soviet Russia was most intimate and whose activities there were most sinister cry out loudest. One need only mention the former Secretary of State, Herr Von Kuehlmann, one of the authors of Brest-Litovsk; or Herr Paul Scheffer, of the *Berliner Tageblatt*.

When people like that, with a record that is not yet forgotten, start moralising about relations with the Soviets—whether of a business or a political nature—opportunism defeats its own purpose. It is not for the Germans to teach France, or indeed any other country, how to deal with the Bolsheviks. Whatever the world may think of Bolshevism, it knows the value of these lessons. A few decrepit dowagers

or a few short-sighted financiers may be taken in by the assertion that Hitler has saved them from Bolshevism. What Hitler wants is the isolation of France, not the destruction of Bolshevism. If he could drive a wedge between the two, he would probably be quite willing to renew his declarations of friendship to Moscow and even enter into an agreement with the Soviets—not unlike the one he made with Poland. And that the Soviets, whose opportunism in foreign relations is unsurpassed, might consider such an eventuality, if France lets them down, is not beyond the realms of possibility either.

These are developments of the future and depend on many as yet unknown factors. When Dr. Schacht, who is trying to lend money to the Soviets, came to Paris for the purpose of blowing up the Franco-Soviet agreement, he met with the reception he deserved. It does not look as if France were willing to commit national suicide by listening to Hitler and dropping her Russian allies. We shall therefore witness many more anti-Russian outbursts by the "Herald in the Battle against Bolshevism." But the Treaties of Rapallo and Berlin remain in force. Among those who listened at Nuremberg to Hitler's diatribe against, and vulgar personal abuse of, Russia's principal Ministers, was the Soviet military attaché, who had a place of honour among the foreign diplomats. The Soviet officials in Germany are still much sought after by bankers and industrialists. One does not lend large sums of money to those whom one professes to have the intention of destroying, or whose attack one claims to anticipate. And 300 million marks are even now being offered by "the man who saved the world from Bolshevism" to his alleged enemies—the "98 per cent. Jewish" Bolshevik Government in Moscow. It is high time that Hitler's anti-Soviet bluff were called, for a more gigantic piece of political fraud it would be hard to find.

GEORGE SOLOVEYITCHIK.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE.

THE Great War was in one sense a revolt against the racial intolerance of the Magyars which was persistently intensified in the years following the *Ausgleich* of 1867. After the war, the Czechoslovaks, the Roumanians and the Yugoslavs were drawn together by a common, and perhaps too rigid, determination to listen to no propositions which could possibly re-subject their newly emancipated nationals to the detested yoke of Budapest. Here was the basis of the anti-revisionist Little Entente.

Essentially the revisionist challenge to the Peace Treaties was implemented by the years of acute depression which crowded upon one another after 1929. For out of the slump was born the Nazi régime in Germany, and out of the slump from which the Fascist dictatorship could not shield Italy came her appetite for a new Abyssinian adventure, whose European consequence is an Italo-German *rapprochement* hostile to Geneva. The slump had also increased the already dangerous caution of France, upon whom, together with the League of Nations, the Little Entente had relied. The summer of 1936 found the League disastrously discredited. M. Titulescu, protagonist of both League and Little Entente, fell from power in August. In October Belgium wavered in her allegiance to the *status quo* and repercussions were felt in all the small States. Everywhere the question was heard, "Will the Little Entente break or bend—or can it stand firm?"

At first sight the interests of the members of the Little Entente appear to diverge as soon as the ambitions of Hungary are forgotten, since each partner has its own great neighbour to fear; and, as their enemies have long been aware, Czechoslovakia stands farther away from Yugoslavia and Roumania than they do from one another. This is not merely a question of the simplest geography. Yugoslavia and Roumania have the same peasant preponderance, the same low standard of living and literacy, the same rather arbitrary government and nearly the same dynastic influences. All these things tend to make them afraid of the U.S.S.R., though even the Slovenian "proletariat" is unalarmingly small. Pan-Slav sentiment among the Serb peasants makes the Belgrade Government perhaps just as nervous as the Bucarest

authorities are rendered by the immediate proximity of Russia and by the Bessarabian controversy. It is obviously more difficult for King Carol or Prince Paul to forget the fate of the Romanoffs than it is for an old revolutionary like President Beneš.

Nothing, on the other hand, is more unfounded than the cry—which has become more shrill since propagandists have had the Spanish crisis to play with—that Czechoslovakia forms a Bolshevik corridor into the heart of Europe, threatening the age-old culture of adjacent Bavaria. The history of Czechoslovakia has been the history of a stable and genuinely democratic State. The conservative Agrarian Party has all along exercised a dominant influence in a wide coalition government, and to-day the only important political parties* which are unrepresented in the Cabinet are precisely those which stand for dictatorial and revolutionary methods, viz., the Communists and their bitter antagonists, the Sudeten Germans, whose ideology is almost purely Hitlerist.

As in the case of the Serbs and Bulgars, the Czechs have always harboured a Slavonic sentiment in favour of Russia, both in Tsarist and in Soviet days. But the 1935 treaty between Prague and Moscow, to which Berlin takes such violent exception, was the direct result of the transformation of Germany in 1933. Against a rearmed Germany which seemed to encourage the Henlein movement to create all possible difficulties for the government of Czechoslovakia, and which itself denounced the Czechoslovak régime precisely because it was democratic, Czechoslovakia was bound to take steps. In those days she still hoped a great deal from the League of Nations, and she could not be expected to ignore the fact that Germany had ostentatiously withdrawn from Geneva. It was only after the U.S.S.R. had entered the League that Czechoslovakia arranged, within the framework of the Covenant, to append herself to the Franco-Soviet Treaty. Thus Czechoslovakia in this instance forms a diplomatic unit with France—she is only bound to assist Russia, when attacked, if France has also decided to do so. The talk about Russian aerodromes in Czechoslovakia is based by the Nazi Press upon the publication of a map of Czechoslovakia in the Moscow paper *Na straže* on February 8th this year. The map was headed “*New aerodromes in Czechoslovakia*,” but was

* The Slovak Autonomists may come into the Government at any moment.

rendered in the German Press as “*Our aerodromes in Czechoslovakia*.” The *Prager Presse* has twice drawn attention to this misrepresentation, but although the ties of the Little Entente had been ostensibly strengthened by the Statute of February 16th, 1933, the Germans had begun to devote their expanding activities to the task of isolating Czechoslovakia, and the Czech-Russian alliance was richly exploited to this end. It would be foolish to deny that the exacerbation of Russo-German relations, reaching a climax in the Nürnberg speeches this year, has seriously strained the relations of Prague with Bucarest and Belgrade.

It has long been a cardinal tenet with Germans, and especially with Pan-Germans, that Germany should expand south-eastwards in order to control the whole valley of the Danube and all the natural resources of the Balkan peninsula. After penetrating this area economically, it may be convenient, with the aid of the various German minorities, to assert some kind of political domination, more especially since Hitler has equipped the Germans with the anti-Marxist political mission. In this general programme Czechoslovakia appears to be neglected, perhaps because she is too highly industrialised to become a market for German manufactures; it is also very generally presumed in Germany that her strategically exposed position will cause her political life to be short. Since her principles, which include the democratic assumption that she is willing to shelter political refugees of various kinds, make her deaf to National Socialist propaganda, no German efforts are made to conciliate her rulers, and tremendous energy is expended in condemning her behaviour towards her German minority.

Though the Roumanians and Yugoslavs certainly treat their German minorities no better, their favours have been steadily sought, and the Balkan mentality of their politicians made the neo-Balkan ideology of National Socialism more acceptable in Bucarest and Belgrade than in Prague. Meanwhile the economic background had been sedulously prepared. In Weimar days and until the collapse of 1931, Germany had expanded her Balkan markets tremendously; to-day every newspaper reader must be familiar with the outlines of the policy associated with Schacht, according to which Germany has run up big debts, and subsequently forced her Balkan creditors to accept large quantities of German manufactures

by way of payment—the British or French exporter often losing his Balkan markets in consequence.

Signs of the German drive, both political and economic, became conspicuous in Roumania and Yugoslavia from 1934, and exports to Germany, especially from Yugoslavia, steeply increased. At the same time one heard complaints against the unhelpful tutelage of France repeated with such regularity that one could but suppose that some common inspiration lay behind them. Large numbers of extreme Nazi newspapers, especially the *Völkischer Beobachter*, appeared in the Roumanian and Yugoslav towns, and Roumania's indigenous anti-Semitism created a splendid market for the *Stürmer*. This year large numbers of Roumanians and Yugoslavs were invited to Berlin for the Olympic Games, and to Nürnberg for the Party rally. A subtle appeal to the have-nots is also being made. A Bucarest taxi-driver, in answer to a question, said to me rather scornfully, "Oh yes, the grand people like to talk French, but we common men only know German"; an incident of this kind is typical.

Although ready-made anti-Semitism, combined with the wild hostility of the nominally suppressed Iron Guard* and other groups on the Right to both Russia and Communism, have given German influence magnificent opportunities, Roumania has not become so economically entangled with Germany as has Yugoslavia, and it is often forgotten that Dr. Schacht's Balkan journey did not take him to Bucarest. A certain amount of interest attaches to the fact that a nephew of his works in an important Bucarest bank, and again to the recent establishment in Roumania of a soya bean factory by the German *I.G. Farben Industrie*. The money invested in the Roumanian oilfields by the *Deutsche Bank* in pre-war days has been mostly inherited by British and French capitalists, who, however, have plenty to do with Krupps. During the first six months of 1936 Roumania imported very much more from Germany than she exported to her, in spite of Germany's military oil-hunger; in other words, steps had already been taken to reduce Roumania's balance in Germany, and the February Agreement with France diverted some of the oil to the west. In spite of the anti-Russian tradition, M. Titulescu had at last succeeded in opening the Dniester

* Suppressed and refounded as the "All for the Fatherland" movement in 1934, but everyone still speaks of the Iron Guard.

frontier between Roumania and Russia in 1935, and although his fall prevents any further developments, communications at least can now be developed.

In Yugoslavia the German drive was immensely successful up to the summer of 1936, and the Nazi propagandists deserve to be congratulated upon their agility in pleasing both Serbs and Croats; while playing upon the anti-Semitic feelings of Zagreb, in Belgrade—where one of their most active agents is said to be Herr Neuhausen of the German Travel Bureau—they harped upon themes abhorrent to Croatia. Krupps was established in the Zenica ironworks, while the quantity of Yugoslavia's German imports crowded the chemists' shop-windows of Belgrade with *I.G. aspirin*. There were German plans, too, for refining crude oil and metals in Yugoslavia, and for replacing French control of the copper refinery at Bor.

In September 1934 the three Powers of the Little Entente had agreed to work more closely together in economic affairs with regard, for instance, to tariff questions, and in countering the Danubian activities of the Vienna Pool, i.e. the Austro-Hungarian-German Danubian shipping interests. The Czechs are business-like people. Ironically enough the Roumanians and Yugoslavs rather dislike them because they regard them as "Les slaves trop germanisés." At any rate, in answer to the German challenge, the Czechs decided to take a leaf out of the German book, and to utilise the hitherto rather vague plans for the closer economic co-operation of the Little Entente in order to begin a counter-drive in Roumania and Yugoslavia. There were many critics who said the attempt was hopeless, since Czechoslovakia, being self-sufficient herself, could do nothing to absorb the produce of two 80 per cent. peasant countries like Yugoslavia and Roumania; any possibility, it was thought, was ruled out by the opposition of the powerful Czech Agrarians and the need for agricultural prices in Slovakia to be kept up.

The most active influences in Czechoslovakia were nevertheless undeterred. Having collected an unexpectedly large sum of capital through the Czechoslovak Defence Loan, they mobilised the two most powerful corporations in the country, the Škoda armament people and the Živnostenska Bank, and prepared for the Bratislava Conference of the Little Entente which took place in September this year. Their own rearmament, which had been speeded up during the year, made them

able to increase their consumption of Roumanian oil and Yugoslav copper. They offered the Roumanians to convert some of the Czech assets frozen in Roumania into an armaments loan, and some of the Czech Defence Loan, it was intimated, could be put at the disposal of the Roumanians for the purpose of completing the railway which is to connect Kiev via Czernowitz with Košice in Slovakia, a connection upon which Czechoslovakia's existence may one day depend. At the same time closer co-operation between Yugoslavia and Roumania was pressed, and Czechoslovakia, where Agrarian opposition was overcome partly by the Agrarian Premier, Dr. Hodža himself,* offered to buy more maize and to undertake certain middleman operations for her allies.

Now Roumania and Yugoslavia may secretly feel that a German attack upon Czechoslovakia would not materially affect them; in the last case they may even feel, "Better Germany than Russia." But at any rate they are genuinely and naturally eager to avoid the domination of any great Power if they can, and, through the Balkan Entente, to keep the peninsula for its own peoples. To achieve only this, however, they require to increase their military strength—Roumania, in particular, requires most kinds of equipment—and, incidentally, to improve their imperfect communications. If Czechoslovakia makes favourable offers, it is highly convenient, and there is no ground, in her case, for fear of domination. It is very satisfactory for Roumania to be helped with her railway system, and the Turnu Severin bridge now to be built over the Danube is long overdue. The Yugoslav military authorities are strongly in favour of the plan for a Yugoslav oil *terrain* in Roumania which will, in fact, obviate the need for a German refinery. It is still rather obscure as to how Yugoslavia will be able to finance her share in this bargain. It seems that the Yugoslavs have shown interest in the oil of Roumania before now, and the acquisition of the *terrain* will only necessitate adjustments, but the pipe-line for the transmission of the refined oil into Yugoslavia itself will be extremely expensive though there will be a saving on storage expenses, since refined takes up very much less room than crude oil.

* Dr. Hodža, who is a distinguished economist, would, according to the *Hodža Plan*, like to see the agricultural countries pool their produce in order to distribute it in the most satisfactory way.

The Bratislava Conference was helped, not only by considerations relating to Balkan interests, but also by a temporary breach in Yugoslav-German relations. For the Yugoslavs, some of whom were previously showing nervousness as to the further development of German policy, had been thoroughly annoyed by the discovery that Germany had resold Yugoslav goods acquired, according to the Clearing Agreement, against German goods, and had thereby acquired foreign exchange in England and Holland. The Yugoslavs had therefore demanded that Germany should actually buy, by the transfer of free exchange, their hemp, lead, zinc, maize and wheat, as had all along been the case with copper. The Germans had already cut off their tourist traffic, and late in September they replied by actually stopping permits for the import of Yugoslav goods. In the middle of October, the economic representatives of the Little Entente met at Bucarest, and there agreed that the Czernowitz railway should have four lines, that visas between their countries should be abolished and postal and freight charges reduced. About the same time the Yugoslav met the German delegates at Dresden. At first there was deadlock. With world prices rising and the general stimulus provided by the French devaluation, the Yugoslavs felt they might do better on the open market if they disengaged the dinar from its close relation to the mark. These possibilities and the Bucarest decisions appear to have had repercussions in Germany, and by the end of October the Germans had allotted a six million mark annual credit for tourists and everything else the Yugoslavs could want, so that the value of Yugoslav exports to Germany is to increase up to the value of one milliard dinars per annum. At the same time the Yugoslav government has arranged to wipe out its balance in Germany by buying the Zenica ironworks and a quantity of railway and bridge material from Germany.

In the Czech view this agreement is not altogether to be deplored, though it helps Germany to aggravate the Sudeten German problem, for it will increase the supply of porcelain goods from Germany to Yugoslavia at the expense of the distressed areas of Northern Bohemia. But Prague welcomes the greater independence Yugoslavia will gain by the liquidation of her assets in Germany; a State-owned Zenica, moreover, may give openings to Skoda's. Skoda activities are

undoubtedly increasing in Yugoslavia and Roumania, and similarity of equipment makes for co-operation in war. In Roumania, Škoda representatives were implicated some years ago in a big corruption scandal which also involved a nephew of Maniu, the National Peasant leader. But though this affair is still exploited by the Right, it is ceasing to build a serious obstacle; after all, scandals of the kind are not rare in Roumania. Late in October, King Carol of Roumania visited Prague to join in the celebration of the eighteenth anniversary of Czechoslovakia's emancipation. His conversation with M. Beneš was satisfactory; the King showed no anti-Soviet intransigence, and correct and not insincere statements were made in favour of economic co-operation with Germany and the Rome Protocol Powers, Italy, Austria and Hungary.

The Iron Guard was promptly provoked—or incited by Germany—to a violent outburst against Russia, which may not be without its effect upon the King. But the really important sequel to the meeting at Prague was Mussolini's brusque reply in his speech at Milan on November 1st. Referring to four million* Hungarians who live outside Hungary, he seemed to say to the Yugoslavs, "Come to the arms of Italy and Germany and leave the Czechs and Roumanians to pay the Hungarian bill; after all, what you owe is a mere bagatelle." Now the Yugoslavs have recently received astonishing commercial favours from Italy, so that, while they increased their exports to Germany when sanctions destroyed their Italian markets, they have now increased their trade with Germany and recovered that with Italy. At a moment when a bumper harvest has to be disposed of, M. Stoyadinović, the Yugoslav Premier, is particularly proud of the favourable agreements he has made, and is anxious that nothing disturbing should occur. But can he cajole his country into forgetfulness? Italy is Yugoslavia's traditional enemy, and in hatred of Hungary Yugoslavia has never lagged behind. After all, she suspected Hungary of instigating the murder of King Alexander, and she particularly dislikes the Hungarian Foreign Minister, M. de Kanya, who was involved in Ballhausplatz defamations of Serbia in the old days. And it now appears that Italy means to offer Hungary further

* This figure is quite unjustifiable; there are actually about two and a half or, at most, three million Hungarians outside Hungary.

privileges at Fiume which Yugoslavs, with much justification, believe should be theirs. In Roumania the Duce's speech is a confusing blow to the Right, which is faced at last with the choice between its Italian and German friends, and its uncompromising objections to all Hungarian claims. The holding of the Roumanian manoeuvres around Timișoara, near the Hungarian frontier, this autumn was, incidentally, regarded as something of an official demonstration against Magyar claims. In revising the Hungarian question, Mussolini has shaken the Little Entente to its anti-Magyar foundations, and the statesmen of Prague must be holding their breath as they wait for less superficial reactions of Belgrade to the latest audacity of the fascist revisionist Italo-German bloc. Mussolini has either breathed new life into the Little Entente, or, if he has not, all the economic projects of the Czechs will be unable to resuscitate a lifeless corpse.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

EDUCATION IN INDIA.

THE public service of education is traditionally regarded as one of the chief, if not the chief, "nation-building" services, though at the present time its mild supremacy is threatened in some countries by other forces. By its transplantation of the British political philosophy of representative institutions and self-government into Indian soil, it is without doubt largely responsible for the series of "Reforms" culminating in the Act of last year. The importance of "education and its organisation in relation to political and constitutional conditions and potentialities of progress" was recognised by special mention in the terms of reference to the Simon Commission, and in 1928 by the Commission's appointment of an Auxiliary Committee to investigate the subject. There is good reason to believe that the stability and fruitfulness of the new Constitution for the welfare and happiness of the Indian peoples will greatly depend on increasing the efficacy of the system of public education for the development of intelligence in the electorate, and for the formation of those qualities of practical ability, good judgment and character, which are essential to the governing classes, and also on its more careful adjustment to the social and economic structure of the nation. Education is not, as some would have us believe, a panacea, and still less a quick-acting panacea for all ailments and weaknesses in the body politic, but it is a vital contributory to the health and strength of a nation. On the other hand, its unskilful, inconsiderate and inappropriate use may not only retard progress but defeat its own purpose by giving rise to serious maladies, social, economic and political.

The ineffectiveness and maladjustment of the system of Indian education has been for many years pointed out and deplored by numerous critics, Indian as well as British, by commissions and committees, official and unofficial. Those actually engaged in its direction, administration and conduct as Ministers, Vice-Chancellors of universities and officials, have not been least emphatic in its condemnation. The reviews contained in the reports of the Simon Commission and its Auxiliary Committee leave no doubt as to the facts, their implications and causes. The subsequent quinquennial and annual reports of the Commissioner for Education with the Indian Government and of the Directors of Public

Instruction in the Provinces are very candid in their presentation of hard facts which demonstrate a lamentable amount of waste, futility, and maladjustment—the result of drift, accelerated by waves of enthusiasm along paths of least resistance, paved with tradition and fenced by formidable vested interests.

In the last seven years some plans have been proposed and some attempts made by provincial Governments to mitigate the evils, but they have been embarrassed by political unrest and financial stringency and have fallen far short of the drastic and radical measures of reform which are admittedly necessary.

There is almost universal agreement as to the vices and defects of the existing system. In primary education there is the casual multiplication of small, inefficient and often ephemeral schools—in one province 1,557 additional schools were established in 1932-3, though the Education Department declared that there were already twice as many as were necessary. In Bengal the Government now aims at reducing the number of primary schools from 60,000 to 16,000! There is absurd and unedifying competition between rival, redundant schools for the enlistment of pupils. The "stagnation" and "wastage" of pupils is fantastic. More than half the pupils entering do not reach the second class and four-fifths never reach the fourth class. Without at least four years regular progress, children cannot possibly become "literate." Literacy may or may not be regarded as a prerequisite of an intelligent electorate and enlightened democracy, but judged as an agency for developing a literate population, the existing mass system of primary education is futile.

In secondary schools there is widespread admission, retention and promotion of pupils unfit to profit by the courses of instruction. Over-age pupils hanging on to try or try again to pass University examinations are numerous. The curriculum and the ambitions of pupils are dominated by the entrance examinations of the universities and the hope of advancement consequent on graduation. There are hardly any "wayside halts" or branch lines offering conveyance for passengers to termini other than academic. The universities are crowded with students unfit to profit by higher literary or scientific studies and many fail to obtain even the B.A. degree. In 1931-2, 59 per cent. failed in one province, in

another 40 per cent., and in another it is stated that 70 per cent. of the students who join a college fail to obtain a first degree. The wholesale admission of students who cannot, with ordinary health and industry, complete their courses successfully, is grossly unfair to them—"taking their money under false pretences" as the Auxiliary Committee said. The crowding of the universities with unfit students, lowers their standards and prejudices the education of those who are really fitted for advanced studies. The output of the universities bears no relation to the absorptive capacity of industry, commerce, the public services, and the professions, and the result is widespread middle-class unemployment, discontent and unrest. Lord Willingdon, in his address to the Inter-University Conference of 1934, referred to the "heart-rending position of many young men who had climbed the educational ladder and yet were unable to find means of maintaining themselves or serving their fellow men." The Minister for Education in Bengal speaks of the "gloom and despair" in which terrorism finds "ready disciples." Under the present system, if it can be called a system, the universities are producing not only unemployed, but unemployables.

This is a very summary presentation of the case, which might easily be amplified on the unfavourable side while fairness requires its qualification by reference to various fruitful efforts of improvement and meritorious features in certain provinces, such as the Punjab, United Provinces and Madras. But broadly speaking, it represents the substance of a mass of indisputable documentary material provided by those who are responsible for educational administration, and supported by the authoritative pronouncements of eminent Indians.

In the face of so large a problem as the Indian system of public education (or want of system) presents, it has naturally not been easy to decide how it could best be tackled or who should lead off. Should reform start at the top with the universities, or at the bottom with primary education, or in the middle with secondary education, or should some effort be spread over the whole field at once? A strong strategy of attack, taking into account the whole field of operation, is called for, but tactics (and to some extent they will have to be "shock tactics") must be determined by circumstances, and no outsider could venture to say how the attack should be launched

on positions strongly fortified by custom and vested interest. At last, however, an authoritative lead has been given in India. The "Central Advisory Board" recently reconstituted by the Government of India has considered how practical measures of reform should be planned, started and operated, and its pronouncements, reflecting the best opinion of provincial Governments and of persons in authority in the service of education, have been endorsed by the Government of India in a circular letter of April 1936. The conclusions follow those of the Inquiry into the Punjab University in 1932-3, the Universities Conference held in Delhi in 1934, the pronouncements of the Government of the United Provinces in 1934, and of the Government of Bengal in 1935.

A detached observer, untroubled by political repercussions, might urge that the futility, waste and ineffectiveness in the field of primary education is so glaring, so discreditable and so inconsistent with anything deserving the name of democracy, or representative government, that endeavour to abate it should take precedence of everything else. On the other hand the practical reformer looking for the greatest measure of popular support for his first step may feel that, however lamentable the waste and ineffectiveness in this field may be, it is not a cause of active discontent or resentment on the part of those who are being, or not being educated, in primary schools. It is not leading to unemployment, and those who fail to benefit do not know what they are missing. Though it is not yielding value for money, those who are sensitive to the evils of wasteful expenditure are not numerous, and their voices are drowned by those of unpractical enthusiasts. Measures of real economy are often denounced as reactionary. And in this field, the difficulties of effective direction, control and administration, to which I refer presently, are so great, the vested interests are so vast, and the complications of religion, caste, sex and social structure are so embarrassing that effective action on a large scale involves something like a revolution for which political and legislative support is essential, but not easily obtainable. Governments are doing what they can to promote improvement, but are very far indeed from realising such an ideal as schools with thirty children in a class and a teacher to each class. It is probable that the special attention now being given to rural conditions

and the desire to create indigenous agencies for their improvement will lead to the revival and extension of "middle vernacular" or other types of schools which may check the drift to the towns.

In India at the present time it is the unemployment or unemployability of those partially or inappropriately educated in the universities which is most vexatious to Governments and most fraught with painful and embarrassing consequences. Direct action by raising standards of admission and excluding unfit students, does not at present find favour. On grounds of principle there is ample justification for it. It would not be cruelty but kindness, as it would save many young men from waste of scanty resources and from much greater disappointment at a later age when they would be less adaptable and have less opportunity of finding congenial occupation. The University of Bombay recently did take the initiative in this direction and ploughed 71 per cent. of the candidates for matriculation instead of the usual 56 per cent. This led to a demonstration by the students, who invaded the Senate House, threw stones and broke windows in protest against this "matriculation slaughter." Due notice would have to be given of such action, because long-established avenues of ambition, however illusory, cannot suddenly be closed for a whole generation of students without causing acute grievance. The practical man of affairs recognises that when he takes something away on which affections have long been placed, his success is imperilled unless he counteracts resentment by a promise of better things. And in the universities and schools the thicket of vested interests which would be affected by a great reduction in the number of students is always an obstacle which the practical politician cannot afford to ignore.

The Governments and universities are accordingly practically unanimous in seeking a first remedy for university diseases and their consequences in a "radical reconstruction" of the system of secondary schools which feed them, which will check the drift of unfit students to higher studies and its resulting disappointment, discontent and unrest. The main feature of this "reconstruction" is the introduction of "halts" at appropriate stages in the secondary schools and the provision of new "branch lines" with alternative routes leading to useful occupations. The secondary school course is

to be divided into two stages, upper and lower, the lower ending at about the age of fifteen and providing a self-contained course of general education (vernacular, with English as only a "linguistic" subject) which for those who do not then enter occupations would form a suitable foundation either for higher academic studies, if they are fit for them, or for specialised practical courses. The Government of India is ready to defray the cost of expert advice in the planning of vocational training, preferably in separate institutions, and the hope is that the attractions of these courses will divert a good many students from fruitless academic study and check the drift to the universities. How far this scheme is likely to succeed I am not competent to judge. Vocational training is difficult to organise, cannot be quickly improvised, and does not create vocational jobs, but there are many posts, rural as well as urban, which youths who have received a respectable general education and possibly some specialised instruction can better fill than those who are uneducated or have struggled unprofitably through prolonged courses of academic education.

A great deal more will have to be done and sooner or later the necessity of "direct action" by way of legislation or resolute administrative pressure will have to be faced in all fields. Important as the present movement is, a policy of mere "wait and see" would be most unfortunate. The Universities must be urged to use the breathing space afforded by gradual reconstruction of the secondary school system to put their own houses in order. Few of the recommendations of the Calcutta University Commission of 1917 have been carried out and the last Bengal quinquennial Report says that "its bulk has become so heavy and unwieldy that no ordinary force can shake its pyramidal immobility." The secondary high schools must be urged to raise their standards of admission and retention. A great extension of "vernacular middle schools" is essential for rural betterment and to check the drift to the towns. In primary education closer and more effective control of the distribution of schools is essential, and money and effort must be concentrated on those whose pupils can be induced or compelled to stay at school long enough to become, however modestly, literate, and on staffing them properly. The trade of pretending to teach children what they never learn must be ruthlessly extinguished.

Looking to the future, however, and the huge dimensions of the problem of using education as a nation-building service, and assuming that those in authority know what they want to do and by what steps and in what order, the question is, how can they actually get it done?

The Simon Commission and its Auxiliary Committee did not hesitate to attribute the defects and vices of the whole system, its waste and futility, mainly to "ineffective control, direction and administration." The precipitate and excessive devolution of control on local bodies not qualified to shoulder such responsibilities, has rendered some Governments almost impotent to prevent abuse, much less secure reform, especially in the field of primary education. In England with a fully developed and efficient system of Local Government commanding the devoted service of many men and women of ability, integrity and public spirit, the Education Department holds and uses far more power of direction than any provincial Government in India, and the partnership between it and local authorities is close and real. The Government of India has no controlling power, and can only influence Provincial Governments indirectly, by collecting and distributing information and organising consultation or offering advice. Its recent re-establishment of a "Central Advisory Board" may be of great assistance. Provincial Governments hold the power of the purse, but are, to a large extent, unable or reluctant to use it. The ultimate control of secondary education is usually, to some extent, divided between provincial Governments and universities, especially in respect of examinations. Even in England, the dominance of the university outlook in school examinations is causing some uneasiness. Complete academic freedom is the watchword of all Universities and Governments are rightly very chary of interfering with their administration, though in England, Royal Commissions on Universities have led to extensive reforms and the influence of the Central University Grants Committee is by no means negligible.

Educational reform in India, therefore, depends on administrative reform, and the question of administrative reform is in the last resort a political one. Will provincial Governments and Ministers responsible for education be allowed by the political forces behind them to resume and exercise real power of control and to furnish themselves with a staff and

machinery adequate to carry out their directions, and force their way through the nettles and thorns which impede the path of reform? In this field the influence and backing of Governors of Provinces may count for a great deal; some of them, notably Sir Malcolm Hailey in the United Provinces, have done much to get things moving.

Conditions certainly have been, and are still, unfavourable to the formation and execution of any "strong" policy of reform, which, by clashing with vested interests, is likely to be unpopular, and unless they can be changed the prospect is not cheerful. The educational service has been handicapped by instability and frequent change of Ministers—in one province six Ministers of Education in eight years and in other provinces four and three Ministers in five years are not conducive to continuity. Ministers unsupported by Cabinet solidarity are easily upset by adverse votes, and resolute action is perilous. On the administrative side, the Government Secretary for Education who issues the "orders" of Government and who passes on, and often duplicates, educational business from the Director of Public Instruction to the Minister, is also a very changeable unit. Nine, or seven, or five secretaries in eight years do not make for quick and easy transaction of business. The Provincial Director of Public Instruction is a more stable unit, but, as the Auxiliary Committee found, he is handicapped by "lamentable inadequacy" of the headquarters staff. The All-India educational service has become a closed service and officers can no longer be recruited through it to fill the higher provincial posts, while the substitution of provincial services has been slow and far from satisfactory. The inspectorate is dwindling and becoming weaker, while the position of inspectors as between the Education Department and local authorities is ambiguous. They have often to serve two masters and are unable to serve either effectively. The action of Governments in depriving themselves of the authority exercisable through effective inspection, which in England is quite as real as that derived from the "power of the purse," is one of the most unfortunate features of the devolution policy.

In recent years financial difficulties have too often been met by the crude method of "cutting" rather than by attacking waste and eliminating the sources of waste. "New money" is usually required to ease transition from an old to

a new system ; but in India, so much " old money " is yielding no return at all that there is a large reserve available for application to new and more profitable purposes.

The views which I have ventured to express may, indeed, be discounted as those of an outsider, though since I served on the Auxiliary Committee I have done my best to keep myself informed as to what is happening or not happening in the administration of the Indian system of education. Administration is to most people a humdrum affair, and in the turmoil of great constitutional and political issues its problems are little thought of, and at the present time the arrangement of this great political " change-over " is naturally engrossing attention. But in India, with its enormous distances and its religions, social and economic peculiarities, good administration counts for more than in most countries for national welfare and progress. I have ventured to call attention to one of the fields in which a much better system of administration is necessary if the results looked for from the satisfaction of political aspirations are to be achieved.

L. A. SELBY-BIGGE.

THE SPECIAL AREAS.

THE other day a friend of mine put up to a leading business man a scheme for giving work to unemployed men in the distressed areas. He received the curt reply that in the experience of his correspondent there was no unemployment worth speaking of, and that therefore nothing need be done about it.

In most parts of the country to-day there is a remarkable and evident revival of prosperity. In a good many districts real boom conditions prevail, and unemployment has been reduced to a minimum figure of people who owing to age or unfitness will probably never work again. If you go, for example, to the Rugby Employment Exchange on dole day, you will only find about 200 elderly people out of a population of 35,000. In other prosperous districts the proportion may be higher, but a good many of those on the register will merely be there for short periods while passing from one job to another.

It is precisely the contrast with this situation which makes the plight of most of the Special Areas and of some other distressed districts stand out so vividly. South Wales, West Cumberland, parts of Durham and Tyneside, of Lanarkshire and the Clyde, as well as non-scheduled areas like the weaving towns of North-East Lancashire, have all been left practically untouched by the wave of prosperity. Here the unemployed at the exchanges have very different stories to tell—stories of years with little or no work during which excellent workers have felt their skill gradually slipping from them ; stories of boys and young men who have little or no conception that a man's occupation should be such as will provide the means of subsistence for himself and for his family. Although the population of these districts is a comparatively small proportion of the total population of Great Britain, it includes the greater part of the " hard core " of severe and prolonged unemployment which constitutes by common consent the most tragic and intractable aspect of the problem.

Two years ago the Government recognised the urgency of the situation in these districts, and after a comprehensive investigation by a number of independent public men the Special Areas were definitely scheduled and Commissions set up to deal with them. At the end of the financial year the

Act under which the Commissioners have their powers, the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act, is due to expire, and although the Government by putting it in the Continuation Bill apparently wishes to avoid discussion of its details and the possibility of modification, this is obviously the proper juncture at which to consider the lessons to be learnt from its working.

According to the Ministry of Labour figures, the unemployed men, women and juveniles in the Special Areas of England and Wales in November 1934, just before the Commissioners took office, totalled 347,000. By September 1936 that figure had been reduced to 283,000, an improvement of 64,000. There are two important things to note about these figures. The first is that the reduced figure of 283,000 still constitutes a percentage of unemployment of 29·1, or about $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the average for the whole country. The second is that transfer and not local business improvement has been responsible for by far the greater part of the reduction. During the period in question about 40,000 unemployed persons have been transferred under official schemes out of the areas, and on a rough estimate another 20,000 probably left on their own.

Now while transfer is undoubtedly a cure of sorts, it is exceedingly unpopular within the areas, which resent the loss of potential capacity represented by their best men. And the great part which it has played certainly seems to show that the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act has had little effect in developing and improving the areas from an economic point of view. Moreover, in order to get the picture quite complete, it is really necessary to look at the figures for the Areas separately. During the past year there has been a very considerable improvement in Durham and Tyneside, where the percentage of unemployment has dropped from about 33 to 25, mainly as a result of the shipbuilding recovery and rearmament. There has also been a certain improvement in the Scottish Area. But in South Wales, South-west Durham and West Cumberland, although the figures have fallen slightly the real economic position has probably deteriorated. In one other particularly important matter—juvenile unemployment—there has been a serious setback, the number of wholly unemployed juveniles having increased from 21,000 in 1934 to 25,000 last September. About

half the unemployed juveniles in Great Britain are in the Special Areas, and as the retiring Commissioner, Mr. Malcolm Stewart, has pointed out, the condition of these young people as well as of the vitally important age-groups from 18 to 21 constitutes one of the most serious aspects of the whole problem, and "one fraught with great danger to the State."

Thus such improvement as has taken place has been due to economic causes practically independent of the Commissioners, and where those causes are not operative the position is as hopeless as ever. The Commissioners have, it is true, spent between five and six million pounds on social service and other schemes of social amelioration. They have helped in labour transference and have settled a few hundred families on the land. In fact, as *The Times* forcibly pointed out in a recent leading article, their action has largely been confined to benevolent palliatives; they have been able to do very little towards meeting the real need of the Areas, productive employment.

Nothing could be more unfair than to blame the Commissioners and their staffs for these meagre results. It is only necessary to read the Reports of Mr. Malcolm Stewart to realise the inadequacy of the means at the Commissioners' disposal. In his first Report, published not long after his appointment, Mr. Stewart contrasted a number of striking statements made by Members of the Government at the time of the passing of the Act with the realities of his position. These statements had referred to the "very wide discretion" which was going to be given to the Commissioners, to the necessity of "going behind red tape" and "avoiding the elaborate procedure of Government Departments," to the need to make experiments of every sort and kind, to the "wide powers which the Commissioners could freely exercise"; while Mr. Ramsay MacDonald spoke of the sum of £2,000,000 mentioned in the Act as a mere token vote to give the Commissioners a start, and went on to refer to amounts of £50,000,000 and more.

In the light of these statements it might have been assumed that the Commissioners had been given a job to do and told to get on with it, as Sir John Reith, for example, gets on with the work of the B.B.C. In fact, however, Mr. Malcolm Stewart pointed out that he was tied hand and foot. He is just as much subject to orthodox financial control as any Government

Department, and he cannot even appoint an office-boy without the consent of the Ministry of Labour and the Treasury. Even more serious are a number of specific limitations of his powers. With a minor exception he cannot make grants in cases where grants are "payable" by Government Departments, so that, for example, he can do nothing to help schemes of road development for industrial or other purposes because the Ministry of Transport is able to make grants. Nor can he help to construct bridges, tunnels, canals or quays, or to develop any education service. All he can do is to make representations to the appropriate Departments, but as they are bound by their "general standards" they usually find it impossible to accede to his request for special treatment. This difficulty is due to a legal interpretation of the word "payable." The lawyers have also insisted that the Act does not allow the Commissioner to do or assist anything outside Great Britain, so that he can neither promote emigration nor even help the Development Councils to advertise their Areas abroad. Yet another legal opinion has prevented the provision of hostels or other accommodation for people transferred from the Special Areas because they would not of themselves "afford employment or occupation."

Whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the case, whatever the reasons for these obviously hampering restrictions, it is surely vital that before the Special Areas Act is renewed and goes back into its pigeon-hole they should be properly discussed in Parliament. Moreover, the restrictions have an important indirect effect. Without the wide powers which they were promised, and as long as they are so greatly dependent on the decisions of the various Departments, the Commissioners' influence on the local government and other bodies through which they have to work is very seriously affected. Ever since their appointment the lives of the Commissioners and their staffs must have been a perpetual consideration of who was competent for what and how best to persuade them to act. Indeed, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the major tragedy of the Special Areas finds its parallel in the minor tragedy of the frustration of the able and devoted men who have been appointed to tackle the problem.

But although to amend the Act in the directions suggested by Mr. Stewart would be a step in the right direction, it would

not really touch the root of the matter. Mr. Stewart has declared that he agrees, though with obvious reluctance, to the principal limitation of his powers—that the Commissioners should neither start nor give pecuniary assistance to "enterprises for purposes of gain." Yet after all, only "enterprises for purposes of gain" can save the Special Areas.

The real problem of the Areas is how to stimulate existing industries and, above all, to attract new ones. Up to now this has been attempted in three ways. The Commissioners have given limited financial assistance to the Development Councils, whose principal functions are industrial research and publicity; while more recently industrial trading, or rather manufacturing estates, have been established, and the Special Areas Reconstruction Association has been set up with a partial Government guarantee to make loans to enterprises in the Areas. But as far as can be foreseen at present these methods are most unlikely to prove adequate except perhaps in the districts where recovery is already developing. More drastic and less orthodox measures are badly needed.

The stimulation of private enterprise by State action is nothing new. We impose tariffs for the benefit of manufacturers; we subsidize agriculture to the tune of over £33,000,000 annually and give £2,000,000 to tramp shipping; why should we not subsidize enterprise, or at any rate new enterprise, when it is so urgently required? Such a subsidy might take various forms, but the best suggestion is probably that made by Sir Harry McGowan—a cash contribution towards the initial capital expenditure of enterprises starting up in the Areas. The great advantage of this would be the giving of a definite incentive to manufacturers to go to the Areas rather than elsewhere, and it could be reinforced in various ways. For example, a Marketing Board for Special Area products would prove a considerable attraction by mobilising the goodwill universally felt for the Area for the benefit of those ready to give employment there; we have had Buy Empire and Buy British campaigns, why not for a time a Buy Special Area Goods Campaign? Then again, the Government can exert a paramount influence in the armament industry, and there are few places strategically more suitable for its development than some of the Areas, notably West Cumberland and South Wales. And as Sir Harry McGowan has also suggested, more adequate assistance for organised research and industrial

development might well be given to the Development Councils.

Here are a few possible ways of stimulating enterprise. They are neither original nor exhaustive—many others will occur to any intelligent business man who gives his attention to the subject. One objection which will probably be advanced against them is that they might be regarded as unfair competition by industrialists elsewhere. But surely this applies in some degree to all special assistance to the Areas. If the Government are to do anything at all they must be prepared to face this accusation. To stimulate competition with existing industries from within the Special Areas is a vital feature of any programme for their rehabilitation.

The only really valid argument against encouraging enterprise in the Special Areas would be that the enterprise was not an economic proposition. If industries there were likely to batten perpetually on the taxpayer like sugar beet, for example, then we might think again. But that does not seem to be the case. As Mr. Malcolm Stewart has said, there does not seem to be any "well-defined and insurmountable obstacle standing in the way (of enterprise within the Areas), but rather a variety of vaguely defined and probably vaguely felt prejudices which may be overcome if the right means to combat them can be discovered."

Indeed, in many ways the Special Areas are areas of business opportunity. Ample labour is available, whereas in many of the prosperous districts a serious shortage is developing. Land and buildings are cheap. As recovery gets going and the dole gives place to wages, rapidly expanding markets will be available, and indeed this feature is already noticeable on the north-east coast. Once the ball is set rolling prosperity may well return more rapidly than it is growing elsewhere.

But it must be set rolling first. Are we prepared to influence economic development within our capitalist system in directions which are socially desirable? That is a question which lies at the core of our economic and political struggles. Upon the answer which we give to it the whole future of our industrial civilisation may well depend, and in this sense, too, the Special Areas offer a great opportunity.

H. POWYS GREENWOOD.

BRITAIN'S GREATEST AFRICAN PROBLEM.

Let us make one big South Africa and do our best as wise and prudent sons of South Africa to start a union here and to rule the country from Table Bay to the Congo and even beyond that. Let us be the inventors of a great South Africa.—GENERAL SMUTS.

THE British Government and people are about to be faced with a problem in South East Africa which will tax their national capacity to the uttermost. From Nyasaland in the north to Table Bay, the whole position of the natives is drifting into a chaos from which the natives, but not the natives alone, are the sufferers. There is first General Hertzog's insistent demand for political control; there are now authentic reports that an "economic blizzard" has overtaken each of the native territories. But over and above all is the relentless process of driving the native ever lower down the scale of human existence, until he is becoming a veritable outcast from the society of man and a degraded helot in the development of his own soil.

The total number of natives under British control from Nyasaland to Cape Town is now almost 10,000,000. At this figure they are comparable by historic contact with white races, numerically, racially and politically with the 12,000,000 negroes in the United States. But, alas, comparison stops short at progress. None deny to-day that for the most part the natives south of the equator are impoverished relatively as never before in native history; none with intimate knowledge would deny that they are almost broken in spirit, and that their native institutions have been largely destroyed.

It is true that the negroes of the Southern States are subjected to race prejudice and are often the victims of acts of great cruelty, but since 1870 they have enjoyed legal equality in civic status, whereas more than 5,000,000 British coloured subjects south of the equator have been definitely placed for all time outside the pale of equal citizenship. The U.S.A. negro now owns over 1,000,000 farms, and the estimated total wealth of these 12,000,000 negroes is nearly £500,000,000. The negroes of the Southern States conduct over 60,000 businesses, many of them absorbing thousands of white and coloured employees and capital of several million pounds. It is doubtful whether the natives of South Africa own a

hundred substantial businesses. Finally, the 12,000,000 negroes have produced 45,000 teachers, whilst the South African natives cannot have produced 5,000. These figures appear almost incredible when compared with the poverty of the South-East African native. These are facts which every British subject should ponder as he considers the full story of the plight of British natives south of the equator.

It is a mere truism to say that every section of the community is dissatisfied with the present position of the natives—politicians in South Africa, the Churches and the missionary societies, mine-owners on the Rand equally with the mine-owners of Northern Rhodesia. Happily there is a growing body of opinion amongst the white races which is beginning to realise that something both fundamental and far-reaching must be attempted to give a "square deal" to the natives.

The *malaise* affecting the natives has probably reached its most menacing dimensions in Nyasaland, away in the north. In this elongated strip of African territory striding from Tanganyika in the north down to the banks of the Zambesi in the south, there are over 1,500,000 Africans under the protection of Great Britain. Two forces are at work in this territory, which, to quote a Government Commission,* are combining to bring "misery and poverty to hundreds of thousands of families," whilst the "waste of life, happiness, health and wealth are colossal." The first of these forces is the lack of development in Nyasaland. The recent Commission in its report points out that the most urgent need is scientific investigation into the mineral and agricultural resources of the country. The second of these forces arises from the first, namely, the impoverishment of the people, who are groaning under taxation which they cannot pay, and which compels over 50 per cent. of the able-bodied men to seek a livelihood in the relatively unhealthy mining centres far from their homes.

The Bechuanaland Protectorate, nearly the size of France and Italy combined, is surrounded on north, south and east by a virile white community, watching with intense avidity for the opportunity to relieve Great Britain of her trusteeship. This huge territory is so sparsely occupied that its density is less than one person to the square mile. But Bechuanaland,

* Report of the Committee appointed by His Excellency the Governor to inquire into Emigrant Labour, 1935. (Nyasaland Protectorate.)

like Nyasaland, is suffering from lack of means for its development. Thus, again, as Sir Alan Pim points out, the younger men have nothing before them but the "sale of their labour . . . outside the Protectorate," although proportionately the migration from Bechuanaland is less than from any other Protectorate. The deplorable economic conditions are fully set forth by Sir Alan Pim and are mainly due to "the catastrophic fall in the value of their main capital in the shape of livestock, and of the growing difficulty of realising this capital." ". . . The economic life of the whole Protectorate is at a very low ebb," the main cause being "the deterioration in the quality of the cattle, largely due to insufficient water supplies."

The crying need of Bechuanaland is again a scientific inquiry into its resources with assistance in the development of them. Great Britain has not been ungenerous. This is fully recognised by that brilliant young ruler, Tshekedi Khama, who, in his appeal to the British Parliament and people, says: "One thing is clear, and that is, the amount of money voted from year to year by the Home Government cannot continue indefinitely . . ." and even "this liberal support received from the Home Government is only sufficient for the requirements of the Administration while the economic outlook of the inhabitants gets worse every day." But what is a few hundred thousand pounds for developing a country larger than France and Great Britain combined, a country needing above all wells and irrigation works in order to produce high-grade dairy and kindred produce, for which there is so good a demand, and for which the natives possess unique aptitude?

Before the war, Basutoland, the "Switzerland of South Africa," was one of the half-dozen "show" territories of the British Empire. Surrounded on all sides by the Union Government of South Africa, this little country is approximately the size of Belgium. Its fertile valleys and high mountain ranges have given the virile Basutos advantages never enjoyed by other African tribes; their cattle, their hardy Basuto ponies and mules, and above all their ever-increasing output of wool and mohair, had placed Basutoland for half a century in an envious economic position. Before the Great War, the exports of wool and mohair had reached a total of 8,416,618 lbs.,* worth locally over £350,000. The budget surpluses of Basutoland permitted the highest African rate of expenditure per

* Cmd. 4907. (Sir Alan Pim's Report.)

head on education, substantial loans to other native governments, and generous internal development, illustrated by the fact that the whole territory is covered by telephones and telegraphs.* During the war, the Basutos sent £50,000 to various war funds and £40,000 "to purchase twenty aeroplanes."

Alas, Sir Alan Pim's report by comparison makes to-day melancholy reading. Germany, the sole purchaser of Basuto wool, is no longer able to buy very much of this product, and the export has dropped from the peak figure of £513,644 in 1923 to less than £100,000 (estimated) in 1936, and the budgets no longer balance without the help of a large number of hidden and other reserves. Basutos have always sought employment beyond their own borders, but now, as in other native territories, they are being compelled to go out and sell their labour. Sir Alan Pim says: "Economic pressure is, however, the main factor." Taxation, too, plays a part, for a tax of 28s. a head, which at one time could have been borne with ease, is now impossible, for, as Sir Alan Pim points out, the average collection has often been below 20s. It is probable that prosperity could be restored to Basutoland at a far lower cost than to any other native area, but to carry out even the modest programme suggested by Sir Alan Pim will cost somebody substantial sums of money.

In many respects, Swaziland is relatively a minor problem, although its economic conditions to-day in their measure appear to be quite as unhappy as those of any other native territory. This little country, almost the size of Wales, was brought under British influence in 1886. Swaziland is one of the most beautiful countries in Africa, it possesses a great variety of climate and soil, half mountain and half veld, and gives promise of agricultural development. The relation of the Swazis to the white races has been one of the most disgraceful chapters in African history. By every species of fraud and misrepresentation, concession hunters of all nations, in conjunction with the corruptible ruler Umbandine, obtained possession of all land of the Swazis, all the values above and below the land, and one bright concessionnaire, who, it was alleged, had arrived too late, hit upon the plan of securing a sweeping concession for anything of value not contained in any other concession! To Lord Selborne and George Grey belongs the everlasting honour of finding a way to quash many

* Sir Herbert Sloley.

of these concessions and thereby secure a return to the natives of at least a large proportion of their land. But, as Sir Alan Pim so truly says: "One heritage from this period will long remain a factor of importance in any endeavour to raise the standards of native life—the distrust of the European." In one respect, Swaziland is extremely fortunate, namely, in the variety of its economic possibilities. Cotton, tobacco, gold and tin can all be produced at a profit. One interesting fact is that in connection with tin, its production is all in the hands of producers other than British! Until the end of the war Swaziland revenue exceeded expenditure, thereafter the era of unbalanced budgets began, and has continued until to-day. The figures at the time of the Pim report were an expenditure of £115,391, and a revenue (without grants-in-aid) of only £89,000.

The economic tragedy of Africa is the amazing superabundance of water and the terrible lack of water. Millions of tons of water gush forth to waste every minute of the hour from the Nile, the Niger, the Congo, the Zambesi, and other rivers—if only a few hundred millions could be diverted to the arid plains and deserts, what vast areas could be made habitable for millions of human beings! Water is Swaziland's trouble—works of irrigation are an urgent necessity. Sir Alan Pim gives one example—the Big Bend area, where an irrigation scheme only requires 36 *cusecs* to bring into cultivation 2,400 acres at the trivial capital cost of £24,000. In complement to this picture is the starved condition of the medical service. In 1931 a Government hospital was opened at Mbabane at a cost of £5,250. It was staffed with four nurses, and the doctor "attached" to it was stationed at Bremersdorp, some miles away. Sir Alan Pim comments: "He died a few months after his arrival, and the post has not been filled owing to financial stringency!"

Whilst the purely native territories suffer predominantly from economic depression and the consequent lack of development, the submerged natives of the white controlled areas suffer primarily from political suppression and the consequent economic depression. In this respect there is at present very little ground for the complacency of Southern Rhodesia. It is true that in law the 1,055,000 natives of Southern Rhodesia have the franchise, but up to the year 1910 only fifty had been included in the electoral roll. Instead of this number rapidly

increasing, it has in fact diminished, for in 1932 there were only forty-two natives on the electoral roll. It is true again that under the Rhodesian Constitution nearly the whole of native legislation is reserved for the final approval of the Crown, but that fact has not prevented the passing of the most reactionary native measures. The native of Southern Rhodesia must, like his colleague south of the Limpopo, carry passes, without which he can neither walk about in his own country and village, seek work, nor even go to sleep and rise again—and now he cannot without a permit give ordinary hospitality in his own home to his friends and relatives!

These eloquent facts illustrate at once the absurdity and the hardship of this hateful pass system. The latest form of this legislation which has just been passed into law is altogether beyond the comprehension of any ordinary European; the circumlocution and cross references of this Act alone are bewildering to the white student, how much more so to the simple Mashona or Matabele. In the second place, those responsible for this measure recommended that the passes, certificates, etc., which the native must now carry, should be issued in "book" form—presumably with a foreword—preface—index! The third feature is to be found in prosecutions for offences under these pass laws; the progression of convictions is damning:

1925	...	convictions	11,048
1930	...	"	13,565
1935	...	"	19,773

The prosecutions were, of course, much larger.

Within the Union territories there are nearly 6,000,000 natives and coloured people living in Natal, Orange Free State, Transvaal and Cape Colony. The fact which should never be overlooked is that these natives are in *their own* country and they cannot go elsewhere. For the most part they come under the British flag upon specific agreements, many of which have been flagrantly broken. The land area of the Union originally belonging to the natives totals 300,000,000 acres. As the years have gone by, they have been forced off most of the best land, until the 2,000,000 white races hold 86 per cent. and the 6,000,000 natives have been crowded into 14 per cent.

Industrially the colour bar operates everywhere, and legislation passed at the demand of the South African Labour Party restricts the native to low-level unskilled tasks. The method adopted is the exclusion of all natives and half-castes from any employment in which machinery is used. The resultant effect is a very low wage for 200,000 workers, who are thus denied the opportunity of family emigration, which in turn involves keeping these 200,000 workers confined in compounds.

The struggle for the absorption of the Protectorates is entering a new stage. It will be remembered that under the Act of Union of 1909, the Union Government of South Africa could under certain conditions absorb these territories. The conditions were as follows. First, as Lord Oxford pointed out, "you cannot bring any one of these Protectorates or Territories into a state of subordination to the Union Government or Parliament, as Clause 151 shows, unless the King with the advice of the Privy Council, that is, of the Cabinet here, agrees." Secondly, any transfer must include an acceptance of the "Selborne schedule" of twenty-five articles; these include the veto of the Crown, protection of native assemblies, native revenue, government by Commissions, and so forth.

But two factors have profoundly affected the whole situation. When the Constitution was granted to South Africa, the franchise of the natives of Cape Colony was safeguarded, and there was a gentleman's agreement that in due course extension of the franchise should be made in the other Provinces. Not only has this gentleman's agreement been broken, but even the franchise has been withdrawn from the natives of Cape Colony. The second factor is the Statute of Westminster, which has had a profound effect on all the provisions of the schedule. Henceforth the Parliament of the Union of South Africa may repeal or make any amendment it chooses of the section, and articles of the Schedule, of the South Africa Act, 1909, and neither His Majesty's Government nor the Parliament at Westminster will have any constitutional status for expressing any opinion on the subject.

This then was the position when a conference took place last year between Mr. J. H. Thomas and General Hertzog upon the subject, and it was agreed between them that the following were the main considerations governing any question of transfer: (i) Pledges given by or on behalf of successive

Secretaries of State to—(a) Parliament; (b) the inhabitants of the Territories; (ii) The conditions prescribed in the Schedule to the South Africa Act, 1909; (iii) The wishes of the inhabitants.

The general purport of the Thomas-Hertzog conversation was that the natives of the Protectorates should be consulted prior to any parliamentary decision, and it was generally understood that the South African Government would not press for incorporation until native sentiment had been brought to view transfer favourably. But Mr. Grobler, in a recent speech at Rustenburg, threatened the Bechuanaland Protectorate that unless the people agreed to come into the Union "within a reasonable time, certain steps would have to be taken"! But in spite of this and similar threats, the ultimate decision lies with the people of Great Britain and the natives primarily of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. There are three main conditions which must be fulfilled prior to transfer. Assuredly the first condition must be the consent, and not merely the consultation, of those most concerned—the inhabitants. But in the second place, the British Parliament ought not to be asked to consent until the members have been told what native policy will be adopted, and their assent should only be given when the following have been guaranteed: (a) that the natives shall be British subjects so long as they desire it, (b) that no colour bar to civic status, industry or religion will be imposed, (c) that the Selborne Schedule will be applied. Finally, that if and when Britain surrenders her administrative responsibility, she must not be asked to abandon her written obligation of trusteeship.

JOHN HARRIS.

THE NATIONAL CHURCH AND THE "GATHERED" CHURCH.

AT no previous period in the history of the Christian Church was there so widespread an interest in, or so much discussion of the nature and the functions of the Church; and at no time for several generations back was there as much repression of the Church by the State.

I. The Lausanne Conference in 1927 on Faith and Order initiated an œcumenical movement, from any share in which only the Roman Catholic Church *more suo* holds aloof, of study and local conferences in preparation for another world-wide Conference in Edinburgh in 1937. Four obstacles are in the discussion presenting themselves, which may here be briefly mentioned. To the surprise of all present the Report on the Church's Message to the World was at Lausanne received with enthusiasm, and the conclusion was drawn that there would be less difficulty about *faith* than *order*. But the explanation may be offered that the Lutheran delegates did not pull their full weight. Since then there has been on the Continent—in Calvinism as well as Lutheranism—a dogmatic revival; and the demand is now made that to the two œcumenical creeds already recognised as a condition of union there must be added a Confession, expressing the contribution of the Reformation to the interpretation of the Gospel. That the subject of Orders was so much more prominent was no doubt due to the predominant influence of Anglicans (British and American), and the discussions on this subject since the Lambeth Conference of 1920. The rigid attitude of the Anglo-Catholics on order had for the sake of Anglican unity the support, or at least acquiescence, of other sections as well as of the "Orthodox" Churches. The English Free Churches, and most of the American Churches, were not then, and are not now, prepared to yield to this contention. Although they have much in common, these two sections differ partially; the British Free Churches have by the Conversations at Lambeth of Anglicans and Free Churchmen more interest in questions on order, and the American, owing to the multiplicity of sects in America, in the practical measures to end these divisions.

2. The Conversations in Lambeth are still going on ; the theoretical questions of Apostolic Succession, Historic Episcopate, Valid Sacraments, and Regular Ministry, have somewhat receded into the background, for on these there is general agreement to allow difference ; but there are two practical issues, applications of theory, which still divide, and on which no way out has been discovered—the ordination by a bishop of already non-episcopally ordained ministers, and the inter-celebration of the Lord's Supper. But the exchange of views is still going on hopefully. In a recent discussion of the historical causes of the antagonism of Anglicans and Non-conformists in the past, the subject of the contrast between the Anglican conception of the *national* Church and that held by some of the Free Churches explicitly and by all others more or less implicitly of the “gathered” Church, presented itself as one deserving further consideration. What at once suggested itself to my mind as one aspect of any such consideration was the similarity of the problem to the controversy now going on in Germany about the *Volkskirche*, and the relation of the Church to the State.

3. I think it may without any injustice be said that on the Continent, especially in Germany, there was no great or wide theological interest in the conception of the Church. As one of the leaders put the matter : till 1918 there were parishes under the control of a department of the State ; now the severance of the Church from the State gave the opportunity for a Christian Church in Germany. How could this Church win back the nation, remaining a *national* Church, even if it had ceased to be a *State* Church ? As far back as the 'eighties of last century Adolf Stoecker, the centenary of whose birth last year has again directed attention to him, contended for the *Volkskirche* as distinguished from the *Staatskirche*, a Church religiously responsible for the whole nation, having intimate relations to the State, but not subjugated to it. The “German Christians” even as the “Confessional Synod” accept that distinction to-day ; and even the German Government professes its desire to recognise the independence of the Church and to restore its self-government, so soon as controversy is ended and unity within is restored. This essay aims at exploring the contrast in its title on the background of this general survey.

I

Is the distinction between a State Church (*Staatskirche*) and a national Church (*Volkskirche*) tenable ? 1. The possibility is assumed in the Scottish *National* Church, which has now no connection with the State except in the way of mutual courtesies, continuing *in form* the ancient substantial control of the Church by the State. The Scottish Church had, and always claimed a measure of self-government in things spiritual which, as far as I am aware, no other Established Church has enjoyed. With the abolition of patronage, and the provision for the election of the minister by the people, it had secured virtual self-government ; and the occasion for most of the secessions had been removed. The Scottish Church embraces in its membership so preponderating a majority of the nation that it is not arrogant in claiming the title *national* : it does not in any way depreciate the standing of the Churches which remain outside of it, and its best men regard the name not as the symbol of any exclusive claim, but rather of a special responsibility, owing to its history, resources, and numbers, for the religious condition of the people. Personally I regret that this Church calls itself *national*, as that term leads to misunderstanding as to its freedom from State control and contradicts Christian universalism.

2. In the just published report of the Church of England on the relations of Church and State, the claim is put forward for a larger measure of self-government, although disestablishment is rejected as a solution of the problem. The intervention of Parliament is set aside, but the authority of the Crown is still recognised. A Free Churchman must sympathise with the desire for the freedom of the Church. In the controversy about the Revised Prayer Book I deprecated any action by the Free Churches to secure the rejection of the Measure, but I respected the motive of their action ; they did it not merely to inflict a humiliation on a sister-Church, or to assert their rights as citizens, but for the preservation of a national inheritance to which they attached such value that they were prepared to expose themselves to misconception ; that inheritance from the Reformation is the Protestantism to which I believe the majority of the nation is still attached. I cannot but respect that motive, although I could not myself approve the method of action. As long as the Church of England clings

to its possessions and privileges as established, it must not complain if the nation continues to claim some control over its worship ; and much as I respect many of the bishops, I cannot justify to my own conscience their action in allowing the use of the Revised Prayer Book in defiance of the decision of Parliament. While in the interests of religion, and the friendly co-operation of the Churches in its advancement I should deprecate a disestablishment agitation in the Free Churches, the Church of England itself would command more respect and exercise more influence if it itself were willing to pay the great price of its freedom. It must in frankness be added that the connection of the Church of England with the State and the advantages it thus enjoys are so much greater than those in Scotland, that it does not seem to me possible that it should secure disestablishment and disendowment on as easy terms as the Scottish settlement, nor can it claim to represent as large a majority of the nation.

3. Returning to the German situation, while both sides disown any intention of control of the Church by the State, yet what the opposition is dreading and resisting is that, with the appearance of self-government, not only would the organisation of the Church be too closely conformed to that of the State, but the Church would be used in support of the policy of the State, which appears paganising.

II

Apart from the problem of the connection with the State the conception of the *National Church* (*Volkskirche*) deserves further consideration. 1. The revolution of 1918 in Germany was welcomed by many of the leaders of the Church as placing the Churches freed from State control in a more advantageous position to deliver their message and discharge their mission to the people as a whole. The intention was to remain the *Volkskirche* and Freechurchism (*Freikirchentum*) was vigorously repudiated. What is meant here by *Volkskirche*? A Lutheran theologian or ecclesiastic is unhappy unless he can quote Luther in sanction of his opinion or proposal. Accordingly Luther is held to have rejected the idea of a free Church, that is a voluntary community of men and women who had adopted the principles of the Reformation, and could be charged with the duty of preserving and propagating them.

He did not form a new Church ; he was not the founder of a new Church. He claimed to be in the unity of and in continuity with the Church, the Catholic Church, which the Roman Church had corrupted and perverted, for wherever the Gospel is truly preached, and the sacraments duly administered there is the Church. Hence the importance of the Confession. From the Christian people he turned to the "godly" princes, to secure an organisation of the Church in their territory which would fulfil these ends. Where the prince remained Roman, his dominions so remained ; where he professed Protestantism, his people were assumed to become Protestant. All citizens, unless they formally exclude themselves, are assumed to be in the *Volkskirche*, entitled to the ordinances, baptism, confirmation, marriage, burial by its ministers. Ritschl in one place describes insistence on conversion as a condition of Church membership as *Methodismus*.

2. Some of the more earnest of the leaders, however, recognised that there were large numbers nominally in the *Volkskirche* not only indifferent, but even hostile to the Gospel. Disowning any leanings to *Freechurchism*, one leader proposed that within each parish the genuine believers should form an "inner circle" with the pastor as centre, to be the organ of the evangelising activity among the masses lapsed from any reality of religion. In Scotland, though in many parishes there was considerable laxity about admission to membership, such laxity that Baptist and Independent Churches were not prepared to accept a transfer without a personal confession of Christian faith, and they must not be blamed for Pharisaism in so doing, yet residence did not mean membership. There was preparation for admission, a confession of faith on admission, a solemn service prior to the communion service at which admission took place ; there was an exercise of discipline among the members, and the "tokens" (pieces of metal like a coin usually with a text), or later the cards of access to the Table were distributed by the elders, and might in the exercise of discipline be withheld. Doubtless the practice fell short of the profession, but the Church of Scotland, and still more the Dissenting Churches had so far the idea of the "gathered" Church. In some of the Churches baptism was administered only to the children of members of the Church ; some ministers, not through laxity, but because of their view of baptism as declaratory of the

universal grace of God available for all, after due exhortation of the parents, baptised any child brought to them.

3. The Church of England, of which I speak with becoming diffidence, can scarcely now claim that it is the nation on its religious side or that all citizens are in its membership. The condition of registration as an elector for the parish council rests on the conception of the *Volkskirche*, for all baptised residents who are not in the membership of another church or in habitual attendance are included. Most clergymen regard themselves as still responsible for the religious condition of the whole parish. I do not think that Nonconformists should resent a visit from the clergyman, as he is only discharging the duty which his privileged position imposes; to use the visit as an opportunity for proselytism is an offence against the other Churches. Existing conditions demand that without giving up this sense of responsibility he should be prepared to share it with other ministers, and that they also, recognising a responsibility beyond the group of the members and adherents of the Churches to which they minister, should be prepared to co-operate with him in evangelisation, and all other methods of advancing the Kingdom of God in their neighbourhood.

3. Much as I respect the Church of England, I cannot but deplore what seems to me its sectarian policy. It claims to be comprehensive, and it does include High, Broad, Low, or as the Anglican wit described them cruelly: attitudinarian, latitudinarian, platitudinarian; but the tendency of its policy has been to allow the Anglo-Catholic section to acquire a dominance to which its numbers do not entitle it. I admire the devoutness, zeal and labours of many who belong to this section, but I must regard their influence as reactionary and not progressive. A Church which claims to be *national*, to justify that claim, should not exclude from the Lord's Table any who believe in Him as Saviour and serve Him as Lord, but should have a welcome for all.

III

1. The Baptists are maintaining the conception of the "gathered" Church, the membership of which is confined to believers separated from the world, and seem to be logically more consistent in insisting on believers' baptism, than Independents, who adhere to infant baptism. For the

Baptists, believers' baptism is the sign and seal of conversion, of a confession of faith in Christ as Saviour and Lord, of a resolve for a changed life in His grace. For their historical witness in this respect I am profoundly grateful, but to the mode of baptism I attach no importance, admitting that immersion is the more impressive symbol. The early Independents were Calvinists, and they as well as the Presbyterians retained infant baptism, because they held that the children of believers were also in the covenant of grace, and with that position, though I express it differently, I am in agreement. I do not commit myself to the conviction, as the evidence is not conclusive; but there are New Testament scholars who hold that "households" included children and infants, for in the thought current in the Apostolic Age, the solidarity of the family was recognised as our individualism fails to do. A missionary from India has assured me that his experience there has led him to accept this conclusion.

2. I do not press it, as I can offer what to me is a more valid reason. In the thought of the Apostolic Age there were two contrasted realms, the world (Jewish or pagan) outside, and the community of believers—the Church, the new *ekklesia* which had displaced Israel. Baptism meant passing from the one realm to the other, and believers took their children with them into the new society, where divine grace reigned and no longer human sin; the nurture and admonition of the Lord by the parents and the Church made that grace available for the children. I hold this conception to be permanently true; there is the realm dominated by sin; there is the realm where grace reigns, a community in which redemption is a reality. Baptism declares that difference, welcomes the child into the realm of grace; Church and parents alike pledge themselves to do what lies with them to make grace effective in the child's life. Believers' baptism is a historical symbol, signifying what has been and is; infants' baptism is prophetic, indicating what may be and ought to be. Are not the two convictions tenable in one Church?

3. I shall not attempt to expound the doctrine of *baptismal regeneration* in any form which assumes that the due performance of the rite brings about some inward change in the child, "christens" him, makes him a Christian, and so saves him. Any attempt to "rationalise" this view by appealing to the teaching of the new psychology about the subconscious

or unconscious and its influence on conscious life seems to me futile. I cannot explain such a change as miracle or mystery, but must with regret dismiss such a conception as magical. I am rash enough to suppose that some Anglicans who cannot accept this doctrine would accept the view which I hold to be tenable.

4. It seems to me that "Confirmation," some equivalent of which I should welcome in the Free Churches, negates the extreme conception of baptismal regeneration. Whatever baptism may mean, the need of Christian teaching and training, of growth in grace, and in the knowledge and the love of the Lord Jesus Christ, in personal decision and dedication must be insisted on; and baptism may be regarded as introducing into a society which has this for its "cure." The "national" Church of baptised residents can find its completion only in the "gathered" Church of convinced believers; and the one can be within the other.

IV

This discussion leads us to a much deeper consideration. Accepting the formula of the Reformation, *sola gratia sola fide*, there may be divergence of emphasis on the *gratia* or the *fides*. In the conception of the national Church (*Volkskirche*) the emphasis is on the *gratia* without excluding the *fides*; in the conception of the "gathered" Church, while the *gratia* is recognised, the stress is laid on the *fides*. 1. Anglicans in their conversations with Nonconformists often insist that in their "Catholic" view they are doing justice to the "givenness" of all God's dealings with men. Apostolic succession, historic episcopate, valid sacraments, regular ministry, all assert that in the Church all is of God, given, objective. Hence authority is exalted over liberty, the universal tradition and custom over individual reason and conscience. When the efficiency of sacraments is conceived as purely objective, *ex opere operato*, there is an extreme application of this principle. In Lutheranism there is the same tendency; the Church is wherever the Gospel is truly preached and the sacraments are duly administered. Where the Church is present in these activities in any nation, there is the *Volkskirche*, and its ordinances should be available for all who seek them.

2. German Pietism shows the tendency which has to be

recognised in the "gathered" Church. Here there is the emphasis on *faith*, and to the *objectivity* of the Church, doctrine and ordinances, there is opposed the *subjectivity* of the individual reason and conscience of the believer; it is true that the recognition of the authority of the Scriptures was some check on this subjectivity, but as the right of private judgment came to be recognised, there could be a bewildering multitude of interpretations. Luther and Calvin accepted the "Catholic" creeds, and in their Confessions claimed to be in the true sense still "Catholic" though not Roman. The Separatists were called out to depart not from the wicked world, but from the Church of the nation, the reform of which by queen and bishops went too slowly, and they were to undertake "reform without tarrying for any." Since the authority of the Scriptures has been so much altered in its character by literary and historical criticism, even this check has been partly removed, and subjectivity can run riot in Protestantism, although God by the objectivity of His grace does restrain. A man may believe what his reason accepts, and do whatever his conscience allows. This is a caricature of this subjectivity which sometimes becomes actual.

3. In this judgment there is always danger in thesis and antithesis; safety lies in synthesis. What God *gives* must be *taken* to be used and enjoyed, and the objectivity of grace is ineffective without the subjectivity of faith; and the subjectivity of faith is licence and not liberty without the authority of grace. If the "Catholic" tendency is exposed to the first danger, the "Protestant" runs the risk of the second. If Anglicanism tends to a rigidity which excludes liberty, the Free Churches tend to a fluidity which escapes authority; and authority without liberty is tyranny, and liberty without authority is anarchy. As a Nonconformist I am not disloyal in saying to the Free Churches: we have much to learn from Anglicanism, and not audacious in saying to Anglicans: you have much to learn from the Free Churches; and in mutual learning, God by His Spirit will teach us both. The *sola gratia*, "the giving," and the *sola fides*, "the taking," will be perfected in oneness and wholeness.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

THE JEWS IN POLAND.

THE calamity that has overtaken the Jews in Germany has served to divert attention from their sufferings in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but the campaign of terrorism in Poland to which they have been subjected during the last seven or eight months has now assumed as alarming a character as the Nazi persecution itself. Week after week, and almost day after day, since last September, brutal attacks have been made upon the Jews in some part or other of Poland, in which many have been killed and still more injured. In outward character they are reminiscent of the outrages committed by the Nazis against the Jews for some years before Hitler came into power: Jews whose only offence consists in being Jews are assailed with clubs, knives, and pistols; their houses and shops are raided and demolished, their synagogues are stoned and even bombed.

The lawlessness of which the Jews have become such helpless victims recalls the outburst of anti-Jewish hostility that marked the birth of the Polish Republic. It was because of that outbreak of anti-Semitic savagery which lasted from the end of the war until the middle of 1929, that the Allied Powers insisted upon Poland signing a Minorities Treaty that would safeguard the lives and rights of her Jewish subjects as well as those of her other racial or national minorities. Now that seventeen years have passed, it is depressing to have to record that the Treaty has been hallowed more in the breach than in the observance, and to note that its systematic infraction has served as a prelude to the present epidemic of Jew-baiting. A survey of the wrongs that the Jews have long suffered in the political, economic, and intellectual spheres will make it possible to appreciate all the more deeply the culminating tragedy that has now befallen them.

Their fundamental grievance consists in their distressing and increasing impoverishment, for which they hold the Government largely responsible. According to the letter of the law there is no discrimination against them whatsoever. But unfortunately the facts of the situation show that the wretched position of the Jew is largely due to enactments deliberately though not avowedly aimed at them and to discrimination exercised by every branch of the administration. They form only a tenth of the total population,

numbering about 3,250,000, but in consequence of Poland's fiscal system, they provide about 20 per cent. of the revenue; for the urban population, although only a fourth of the total population, furnish over half of the revenue, and the Jews, who form a third of the urban population, are invariably assessed at a higher rate than their Gentile neighbours.

Wherever the Government is able to interfere in economic life, it exercises its influence to the advantage of the Polish element. The Jews have been systematically driven out of the various State monopolies, such as tobacco, salt and matches, in which very large numbers of them were formerly employed. Before the war about 95 per cent. of the tobacco workers in Bialystok, Grodno, Vilna and Warsaw were Jews; but to-day all the factories are under Government control and Jews are excluded. They are discriminated against in regard to the grant of concessions and licences, and the few Jewish concerns that have been fortunate enough to have dealings with the Government are afraid to employ Jews lest their Jewishness become pronounced and prove a liability. Those who need credit for business purposes are unable to obtain it, or only to an insignificant extent, from the two Government banks, which follow a much more generous policy in regard to the applications of non-Jewish individuals and co-operatives. In the industrial sphere the position of the Jew has been seriously handicapped by a law that requires master artisans, who are alone able to take apprentices, to pass examinations not only in their trade but also in Polish history, literature, and geography, and to travel to a particular centre for the purpose of the ordeal—an enactment which presses heavily even upon the most expert Jewish craftsman of many years' standing and diminishes the opportunities of the younger generation to engage in manual occupations. Training for manual vocations in technical schools is also rendered difficult by official restrictions. In the Government technical schools Jews form only 5 per cent. of the pupils, and in the municipal establishments as few as 2 per cent. The Jews have therefore been obliged to establish their own technical schools, of which they have thirty-four, but they receive only about 1 per cent. of the grants given by the Government to such institutions, although the fund from which the grants are allotted is largely derived from a supplementary tax paid by Jews in addition to their trade licences.

A similar policy of discrimination prevails in all the Universities, where a *numerus clausus* is enforced against them, although it is not officially admitted. The limitation is imposed most rigorously at the medical faculties, which Jewish students are most eager to enter in order to acquire a profession that may provide them with a livelihood; they are less keen about entering the faculties for arts and philosophy, where civil servants and teachers are trained, as they are excluded from all branches of Government employment, including the schools. In the legal profession, too, their path is obstructed, as a student before qualification must have three years' practice in a clerical capacity in a law court, positions to which few Jews are appointed. The result is that a very large number of Jewish students are compelled to wander forth into other lands in search of higher education at more hospitable universities. The number of such exiles is estimated at 10,000, and they are dispersed in France, Belgium, Italy, Czechoslovakia and other countries. Most of them are students of medicine, but when they return home with their degrees they are obliged to sit for fresh examinations before being allowed to practise.

Whatever explanations the Government may offer in extenuation of the anti-Jewish policy pursued in the aforementioned spheres of activity, it can hardly plead freedom from responsibility for excluding Jews from its own employment. When Galicia belonged to Austria, Jews in the railway service formed 8 to 9 per cent., in the postal service 7 to 8 per cent., and in the State schools, as teachers, 4 to 5 per cent. But now, in all these branches, they hardly make up 1 per cent., and even this consists of survivals of former times. No Jewish teacher can obtain a post in a Polish school, and Polish teachers' seminaries have for some years refused to admit Jewish students. In the administrative departments of the Government there is hardly a single Jew, and no new Jewish officials are appointed. There are 10,000 Post Office savings banks in the country, which derive 60 per cent. of their deposits from Jews, but there is not a single Jewish official among them all.

According to the Minorities Treaty the Jews are to receive "an equitable share" of the State funds available for educational, religious, and charitable purposes. But, although they form a tenth of the population, the total amount which they

receive for all purposes is only 200,000 *zloty* out of a budget of three milliard *zloty*. On the other hand, the position of the Jews in various municipalities has been weakened through the inclusion of suburban areas: they cannot obtain employment in the municipal service nor are they granted contracts. Their numbers in the Sejm have been reduced to insignificance. Once they had thirty-six members in the Polish Parliament, but now, in consequence of the electoral reform, they are limited to five. Their diminished representation is a reflection of their political impotence, and this is even surpassed by their economic misery.

Their poverty is due not only to the variety of causes already described, but also to other important factors. The spread of consumers' co-operative societies, especially among the Ukrainians in Galicia, has had a ruinous effect upon thousands of Jewish tradespeople; and equally disastrous will be the consequence of the recent passing of a law that has limited the slaughtering of cattle by the Jewish ritual method to the actual requirements of the Jewish population. Previously that method was regularly practised for the slaying of all cattle in a large number of towns, and it provided a source of livelihood for some 40,000 Jews (slaughterers, butchers and assistants), but now more than half of them will be thrown out of employment. And to add to their distress and their galling provocation, Jews engaged in any form of trade are the victims of recurring boycotts.

Even ten years ago it was estimated that there were 1,000,000 Jews too many in Poland, owing to the numerous economic handicaps to which they are subjected. It is commonly accepted that one-third of the Jewish population is on the verge of starvation, one-third can just eke out a bare existence, and the rest have little but the minimum comfort. About 150,000 families are dependent on loans from the Jewish communal loan funds (largely created by means of relief funds supplied by Jewish philanthropic bodies of America and Great Britain), but although the amounts granted to each individual do not average more than a few shillings they are nevertheless applied for by one-half of the Jews in Warsaw, Lodz, and Bialystok, by over two-thirds in Vilna, and by similar large proportions in hundreds of other centres. Unfortunately the Jews do not receive any benefit from the Government fund for the unemployed, as the law

does not provide for the relief of small artisans and traders. But helpful as the loan funds are, their resources are utterly inadequate to the tremendous needs. The result is that beggary is rampant throughout the country, suicide has spread among all classes, and many of the younger generation are driven by despair rather than conviction to the allurements of Communism. Before the war and in the first few years after the Peace, emigration provided an outlet for the natural increase, which amounted to 50,000 a year. But now, owing to the anti-immigration restrictions of most countries, only about one-seventh of that number are able to leave each year in quest of a new home, and the great majority seek it in Palestine.

It is against this sombre background of cumulative misery and despair that there is now raging a violent campaign of the most brutal Jew-baiting. The present outbreak has been almost continuous since last September, but there were several outrages also during the early part of last year. It is generally acknowledged that those mainly responsible are the members of the two political parties, the *Endeks* (National Democrats) and the *Naras* (National Radicals), who constantly boast of their determination to drive the Jews out of Poland. That they have been incited by the example of Nazi Germany is unashamedly admitted. "Germany's success," wrote the *Gazeta Warszawska* (April 19th, 1935), "teaches us in Poland to adopt the same policy, which will force the Jews to organise their own mass emigration. We can do that only by making the Jews realise once and for all that there will be no stopping until not a single Jew is left in Poland." And in pursuance of this barbarous policy the same crude and savage methods have been adopted that were applied by Hitler and his henchmen for some years and enabled them to rise to power. The *Endeks* and the *Naras* are likewise striking at the Jews in order to discredit the Government and to replace it, and the unequal fight is such as to make one despair of civilisation. The campaign is fomented not only by the anti-Semitic newspapers previously in existence, but also by a large number of new journals that have been started in many towns, obviously with the help of foreign money, and all devoted to the propagation of the boycott and the pogrom.

As long as Marshal Pilsudski was alive any violent manifestation of anti-Semitism was promptly and vigorously

suppressed, for he understood full well that such exhibitions of barbarism, besides being reprehensible in themselves, did serious damage to Poland's prestige abroad. But since the death of the dictator, the enemies of the Government have displayed increasing audacity and a ruthless determination to make life for the Jews in Poland impossible. To enumerate all the acts of violence that they have committed in recent months would entail a long and appalling record of savagery, which has broken out in nearly all parts of the Republic and is directed indiscriminately against all Jews, irrespective of age or sex. Knives and pistols, stones and clubs, iron bars and bombs, are the weapons that are commonly used in these attacks, which are aimed not only against Jewish lives and property, but also against synagogues and even cemeteries—exactly after the Nazi model. A selection of some typical incidents during the past twelve months, in chronological order, should suffice to illustrate the general character of this campaign of terrorism.

In Vilna a bomb was exploded beneath a synagogue. At Radomsk a Jew was stabbed to death. In Grodno there were repeated assaults upon Jews in the streets, from which three died. At Sokoly, near Bialystok, a Jewish funeral party was stoned. At Chorzow (Polish Upper Silesia), eleven Jews were seriously injured by hydrochloric acid thrown upon them in a theatre. At Czenstochowa Jews were brutally beaten, and the windows of Jewish houses and shops were smashed. At Widzew, near Lodz, uniformed anti-Semites attacked Jewish shops and poured carbolic acid upon foodstuffs. At Rybnik Jewish shops were defaced with abusive inscriptions. At Pogon, near Sosnowice, a bomb was exploded near a synagogue, and a Jewish boy was killed. In Posen and Torun Jews were forcibly ejected from cafés. At Wongrowiec riots culminated in the burning down of the house of the president of the Jewish community. At Dabrowa, near Sosnowice, the synagogue was broken into by miscreants who desecrated the Ark of the Law, tore up the sacred scrolls, and carried off the silver ornaments. At Opoczno, Odrzywole, and Przysucha, near Kielee, anti-Jewish riots raged for two days, entailing police intervention, and resulting in forty Jews being injured by looting peasants, nine of whom were shot dead by the police. In Posen the Association of Restaurant Proprietors were compelled to sign an agreement with the *Endek* students

to buy only from "Aryans" in order to ensure that the students would not smash their windows. Bombs were thrown into Jewish cafés in Kielec, into the courtyard and synagogue in Kattowitz and into a synagogue at Sosnowice, into Jewish houses at Lipiny and Hrubaczow, and into Jewish shops at Yusefow and Vilna. In Bialystok a young Jew was beaten by *Endeks* and had both his hands broken; in Lodz a Jew was burnt with acid, and in Kozienice two Jewish pedlars were murdered.

This is but a very brief and typical selection of the outrages of recent months, the victims of which so far number eighty Jews killed and about 500 injured. Probably the worst case of vandalism was the pogrom on March 9th at Przytik (Radom district), where a carefully planned assault was made upon the small Jewish community: four Jews were killed or died of injuries and over fifty were seriously injured, and twenty-two persons were arrested, including five Jews accused of illegally organising their self-defence! At the trial, which took place in June, of forty-three Poles, eighteen, including those accused of murder, were acquitted, while the rest received sentences of imprisonment ranging from six to twelve months; on the other hand, of the Jews, who were guilty of nothing worse than self-defence, three were sentenced to terms of penal servitude ranging from five to eight years and eight to imprisonment from six to ten months. Comment upon this parody of justice is superfluous.

Throughout this period of terror the Polish students at the Universities have distinguished themselves by their savage attacks upon their Jewish fellow-students, whom they wish to drive away from the seats of learning. At Posen over twenty Jewish students have been injured. At the University in Lemberg one-tenth of the 2,200 Jewish students had been assaulted between last October and February, and of the 380 Jews at the Polytechnic over sixty had been seriously injured. Instead of punishing the culprits the Polytechnic authorities ordered the expulsion of seven Jews for signing a protest against the attacks and reproaching the authorities with failure to act, and although the expulsion was subsequently annulled the students were suspended for three terms. At the University of Cracow there have been similar rowdy scenes, and at the University and the Polytechnic in Warsaw the scandal has been so disgraceful as to necessitate the temporary closing of these institutions.

The Government have certainly been active in their attempts to suppress the reign of terror, but this is now so widespread as to baffle their efforts. The *Endek* party has been repeatedly dissolved in various districts, and raids have been made upon its offices in Warsaw, Lodz and Cracow, where inflammatory literature and even bombs have been seized. Nevertheless, these Polish Nazis, after poisoning the population of Western and Central Poland, have spread their agitation to Volhynia, Polesia, and other localities in Eastern Poland, inciting the White Russian peasants, and offering prizes of Anti-Semitic calendars and books for every ten members who join their movement. Hundreds of the perpetrators of the outrages have been arrested and tried, but unfortunately they form but a fraction of the large number who are guilty, and the sentences imposed are not drastic enough to have a deterrent effect.

The members of the Government are fully conscious both of the real motives of the Jew-baiters and of the disgrace they are bringing upon their country. M. Raczkiewicz, Minister of the Interior, speaking in the Sejm on March 6th, made a vigorous attack upon the *Endeks*, asserting that "Anti-Semitism is only a means in the hands of the *Endeks*, through which they desire to obtain power in the country." A fortnight later, after the pogrom at Przytik, Prince Radziwill, speaking in the Senate, declared that both as a politician and a Christian he must denounce the *Endek* activity and their Jew-baiting, and Count Rostworowski appealed particularly to the Catholic clergy "to use their influence and authority and try to quell the wave of hatred and strife that is sapping the life of the nation." It would be futile for the Jews to appeal to the League of Nations, for Poland has officially repudiated its right to intervene. They can but hope that the Polish Government will summon sufficient courage to adopt still more rigorous measures to stamp out an evil that is quickly degrading their country to the cultural level of that of their Nazi neighbours. And the persistent gravity of their position serves but to emphasise the necessity of widening for them the portals of the only land where they have been officially declared to be "as of right, and not on sufferance"—the land of the Jewish National Home.

ISRAEL COHEN.

FERDINAND RAIMUND.

VIENNA a hundred years ago had just passed from the High Baroque, that ornate, ponderous, fantastic and grandiloquent epoch, to the repressed elegance, the light grace and somewhat jejune gentility of the *Biedermeier*. That the pendulum should thus swing from one extreme to the other was not remarkable. But that a writer should compass, without conscious effort, a harmonious blending of the outgoing and the incoming spirits of the time is a rare phenomenon, and it was achieved by Ferdinand Raimund because his own nature was a perfect product of his home soil and his own time, full of the contradictions that go to make the charm of that eclectic city Vienna to this day.

In September the International Theatre Congress took place in Vienna, initiated by a French association. In connection with this meeting the learned Viennese theatrical critics, together with the librarians, arranged what was probably the most complete and instructive collection of its kind, an exhibition of everything connected with the theatre, containing more than a million objects. It included old handbills and portraits, documents and accounts, costume figurines and costumes themselves, hundreds of models showing famous or interesting productions. And as the time coincided with the centenary of the death of Ferdinand Raimund, actor and playwright, his memory was well represented. Thus Western visitors will have had the opportunity to learn something of this little-known Austrian specialty and perhaps to wonder why, at a time when managers are groaning at the lack of good popular plays, no English producer should try his hand at one of his comedies, and why the screen should take no notice of them.

Raimund is often called "the Viennese Shakespeare" in Austria, but the comparison does not take us very far. The likeness is striking, it is true, as regards the outward circumstances of his life, the more so as two hundred years lie between the two. He was a tradesman's son and began as a tradesman's apprentice, without much opportunity to acquire book knowledge and culture; he escaped to the stage early in life, and his first dramatic works were merely adaptations of existing plays for the immediate need of his theatre; he acted the character parts in his own comedies; was successful

and made money early in his career; bought a country house and retired to it at the height of his popularity. There is also something that will bear comparison in his work: the fairy world used by Shakespeare in *Midsummer Night's Dream*, the rapid transition from tragedy to comedy, the peculiar use of the fool, the presentment of problematic characters, and some minor peculiarities. But there are so many fundamental divergencies, and the whole character of the man was so different, that there is little object in tracing what likeness there is. In fact Raimund stands very much alone, a lovable and pathetic figure, without forerunners of any merit whatever—though he found the rough form of his peculiar fairy play ready to his use—and without successors. His plays are partly written in the vernacular, and emphatically Viennese. Yet they delight audiences in the Reich to-day as they did when he himself toured with them from Hamburg to Munich, and many are the illustrious names among German actors, not to speak of Austrians, who are eager to act in them. They belong to the iron ration of the Vienna repertory theatres, and Reinhardt, who for long has dreamed of producing them, is going to bring out one soon.

Ferdinand Raimund (*recte* Raimann) was born in Vienna in 1790 as the son of a respectable turner. He lost his parents when only fourteen and was apprenticed to a confectioner by his eldest sister. As such, it was his welcome duty to hand round sweets and cakes among the audience of the Hofburgtheater, and thus for four years he had the opportunity to watch some very good acting, and to develop that passion for the stage which is inherent in so many Viennese. He spent his free evenings mouthing before the glass, frantically trying to achieve the facial contortions of some of his idols in tragic parts, notably those of Ochsenhauser as Franz Moor. The yearning to act in tragedies and to write them remained the peak of his ambition, and that it was never fulfilled was the bane of his existence. The transition from the bakery to the stage was not particularly hard. He made his way by the usual provincial stages first to a second-rate Vienna theatre, then, at the age of twenty-seven, to the most brilliant and popular stage then in existence, the Leopoldstaedter Theater. The Olympus of Raimund's dreams, the Imperial Hofburgtheater, was refined and classical, but not popular. It was the Leopoldstaedter Theater where the

famous Hanswurst, the fool of the past period, had flourished until shortly before. This Hanswurst, the favourite of the Viennese, was an anachronism against whom the literary circles had initiated a campaign which in the end had been successful. In Vienna the figure had lived on longer than elsewhere, thanks to two successive brilliant representatives, Stranizky and Prehauser. The specialty of the Hanswurst was improvisation. The public never knew what he would do or say next, even when the play was old and familiar, and neither did the unlucky co-actors. That these favourites of the public drove the authors of the plays to despair and made their fellow-actors frantic can easily be imagined. They were allowed to do anything, and, indeed, "anything for a laugh" was their motto.

When Raimund came to this theatre, the Hanswurst had already been interred, but the "figure of fun," his successor, was still rampant. Every author was obliged to introduce some such part, generally a country lout, Kaspar, and though the actor entrusted with it was not allowed to improvise, heavy fines being imposed on those who still sinned in that respect, yet he did what he could in "business." Raimund glorified this "figure of fun." In his plays its part is generally taken by a faithful servant, lovable and only slightly funny, such as Florian, the gawky valet in *The Elf King's Diamond*, or that famous incarnation of faith and loyalty, the joiner Valentine in *The Wastrel*, meek and henpecked as a rule, but rising to heroic heights when his master's plight demands it.

Raimund's plays are all *Zaubermaerchen*, quaint comedies in which the humdrum world of every day, depicted with the realism of the Dutch painters, is invaded by a droll Olympus of magicians and fairies who bring about the required complications and solutions. In the course of Raimund's development the part played by this fairy world, however, is gradually reduced. If he had lived longer, he would probably have been able to do without it. The singular charm of the comedies lies in the extraordinary insight into character and the lifelike portraiture, the sweetness and kindliness of the humorous admixture, the lyric and melodious simplicity of the songs, most of which were composed by himself. Many have become popular to the extent that their author is unknown to the singers. The comedies are emphatically an actor's work, written for the stage, and they do not make very good

reading—except for children, who delight in them. But they are impressive on the stage, where the somewhat bombastic diction of the fairy characters is not felt to such disadvantage. The best known are *The Elf King's Diamond*, *The Peasant as Millionaire*, *The Alp King and the Misanthrope* and *The Wastrel*. A brief analysis of the last but one, usually considered his best, will give some idea of the species. It will be seen that in spite of analogies to Shakespeare's *Timon* and Molière's *Misanthrope*, the central figure as well as the plot is original. In fact, so far as I know, this comedy is the first attempt in literature to treat the problem of the dual personality, used so often since, most brilliantly by R. L. Stevenson.

A somewhat morose and suspicious man, Rappelkopf, is driven into raging misanthropy by the ingratitude of a friend and business reverses. He is still rich enough to retire into the country, where he has plenty of time to hug his imagined misfortunes and to maltreat his household, who go in mortal fear of him. His daughter is not allowed to marry the man of her choice. The Alp King, hunting in those regions, overhears the unhappy lovers and promises his help. Rappelkopf, goaded to frenzy by an absurd misunderstanding—he thinks that a silly domestic, sent to the vegetable garden with a kitchen knife, has been paid by his wife to murder him—storms out of the house into the forest. The scene with the servant, apart from being excruciatingly funny, most ingeniously shows how the very fear which his senseless rage inspires in the trembling wretch reacts again on himself. Rappelkopf finds a charcoal burner's hut in the woods and buys him out. The episode is charming, showing how the poor harassed wife is blinded by the gold offered, while the young people beg her not to give up the home and at last depart in deep dejection. In the solitude of the forest the Alp King now takes Rappelkopf in hand, frightening him by the ghosts of his late wives—he has brought three to the grave!—by fire and water, till at last he is cowed so far as to promise that, if he can be made to see his faults, he will reform. For this purpose the Alp King takes the form of the misanthrope and acts his part, while Rappelkopf himself is changed into his wife's brother, who is expected to visit the family. This is merely an outward guise, however; Rappelkopf keeps his own soul and mind, nay more, he only has one life together with his other self. As his own brother-in-law he is made the

confidant of his wife and family, finds out their good and honest intentions towards him, and, most important of all, is made to see himself in his true light. The Alp King plays his part so admirably that Rappelkopf at first delightedly recognises himself and his vagaries, but by degrees as unwilling spectator he sees the gross unreasonableness and at last the wickedness of his behaviour. This conversion makes a scene of unsurpassed fun and a masterly study in psychology.

Raimund's professional career was all that could be desired. He was a first-rate actor and deservedly popular. Contemporaries whose word carries weight—such as Grillparzer—say that they felt cold when he shivered on the stage, and that he could move to tears as easily as to laughter. There were the unavoidable intrigues and jealousies of the stage world, of course, and the pathetic yearning for tragic parts, mentioned before. He was unsuited for them physically, as the public of the time demanded a commanding presence from its heroes, and Raimund was slightly built. Since then several German actors have achieved eminence in spite of this disadvantage, among them the greatest tragic actor of the last decades, Raimund's compatriot Josef Kainz, who, indeed, resembled him both in build and features. But on the whole his career on the stage was a long success of triumphs both as actor and playwright, often indistinguishable one from the other. Except for one notable and quite undeserved failure in Hamburg at the end of his life, and some too warm receptions when the Vienna public presumed to censure his private life—which sometimes, alas, was not all it should have been—he was always acclaimed as the best-loved favourite of his time. He made an excellent income, and at forty could retire with a considerable fortune, after having for some time been not only the chief actor and playwright, but also the manager of his theatre. He still went on tour and had triumphal successes both in his old theatre in Vienna and in Germany. As long as he lived his name remained one to conjure with for managers.

His private life, however, was miserable from beginning to end. His volatile temperament, amounting almost to hysteria, perhaps even to insanity at times, with the attendant heart-searchings and black moods, would have made him an unhappy man in most surroundings. Given the highly temperamental atmosphere of the theatre, the result could

not be other than tragic. His love life was singularly unlucky. After several Bohemian interludes of a highly coloured character, generally with ladies of the stage, he attached himself to a good and charming girl, simple and serious, who returned his passion wholeheartedly. Her parents would not hear of a marriage with a player, however, and in the rebound Raimund was caught, and even trapped into marriage, by the pretty and absolutely worthless Demoiselle Gleich, a little actress without heart or conscience, who pretended that she was with child by him. She was a pitiable thing, the victim of her father, Raimund's first chief, a theatre manager and writer of burlesques, and an out-and-out villain who sold the precocious girl to Count Kaunitz when she was only fourteen, the sale to be taken quite literally. Raimund at the first attempt had let his bride and the aristocratic company wait in vain at the church door, and was only later forced to go through the ceremony by public opinion and by the pressure of the Imperial Court. He got a separation two years later, but could not be divorced, because both were Catholics. Toni Wagner, his true love, came to him in his period of despair after the marriage, and saved him from himself. The two devout souls entered into a romantic marriage of conscience, binding themselves by a solemn ceremony, performed in solitude before a shrine of the Virgin Mary. Strange to say, the parents who had refused their blessing to a legitimate union were persuaded to recognise this tie. Raimund made Toni miserable enough by his storms of feeling, his erratic behaviour, his bouts of melancholy. He writes to her in this style as a rule: "I feel it in the depth of my heart—peace and happiness are not for me on this earth. I am born to torture myself and those whom fate has placed near me. Where shall I hide—hide from myself, from the vengeance I must take on myself?" He developed hypochondriac tendencies too, notably a fear of hydrophobia. When staying in the charming country house he had bought for Toni and himself some years before, he was slightly bitten by his own dog. He believed, without a vestige of reason for it, that the dog had been mad, and shot himself in his fear. For ten days his faithful Toni nursed him day and night, while he suffered agonies, but in the end he died, only forty-six years old.

PAULA ARNOLD.

TELEPATHY IN BIRDS.

MANY observers must have pondered at one time or another over an everyday phenomenon of Nature: the perfect synchronism of mass-movement among a group of animals. This simultaneousness of action is illustrated in every phase of animal creation: a swarm of many thousand bees weaving aerial figures-of-eight with such collective exactitude that no individual breaks the fluid outline of the swaying mass; a shoal of minnows darting suddenly at an angle with swift caudal flickerings, when a shadow falls athwart the waving weeds of a sun-lit stream; a bunch of rabbits skeltering at a single impulse to the shelter of their burrows; a herd of red deer away with one accord, when the danger-scent reaches them on a down-breeze, and a thousand other instances, all show in varying degrees of spontaneous unanimity this synchronism of movement. But none are as impressive as the concerted flight-movements of certain species of birds, even if some, such as a swarming of bees or a darting of minnows, are executed with an equal precision of unity. No doubt that some sixth sense, almost forgotten of man, is the instrument making possible the concurrence of action in every case, though the special make-up of a bird is particularly suited to such movements.

Broadly speaking, the higher we advance in the scale of evolution, the less efficient is the unanimity and spontaneity of these composite manœuvres, in proportion as the slower-working processes of vague powers of reasoning replace the unthinking celerity of instinct. Even amongst the most primitive, uncivilised peoples there is nothing comparable to these instances of concordant action. Translated into human terms, the most apt illustration of synchronal movement is afforded by a well-trained chorus of dancing-girls, who, by dint of much previous rehearsing, are able to perform intricate movements, perfectly timed, without spoken command; but the parallel is but a half-one, for there is no spontaneity in their evolution.

Some of the many instances of simultaneous movement among birds must be familiar to everyone: the sudden flutter of a little party of starlings feeding on the lawn, the precise flight-movements of a flock of homing-pigeons circling above the house, or again, the regular ranks of the great flights of

starlings, swooping down in their hundreds upon their communal roost on winter evenings, and in the country the flight-movements of lapwings and wood-pigeons. Less familiar are those of the small waders—knots, little stints, dunlins—in whom these flight-exercises reach their acme of spontaneous unanimity. To a much lesser extent, this same co-ordination of movement is shown by a covey of partridges or even a charm of goldfinches. But the flight-movements of a flock of dunlins are as superior to those of a charm of goldfinches as the joy-flight of the lark is to that of the meadow-pipit. Swift and complicated evolutions and incredibly sharp turns and stoops are executed simultaneously at perhaps fifty miles an hour, with the exactitude of a Guards' regiment on parade. At one second the birds shine separately silver, and at the next appear as a black cloud, as first their light under-sides and then their dark backs catch the rays of the sun. No bird is left behind, or loses its place in the ranks.

How do these flocks perform their evolutions with such perfect uniformity? Are we to imagine that the flock is a well-drilled company, moving in line or column at command? If so, who gives the command? Can we treat this company of birds from human standpoint? Hardly, I think. It is impossible to believe that any one bird has enough intelligence, or "personality," to convey its commands to several hundred other birds, with such speed that on the hypothetical order, wheel to the right, the outer ranks turn at the same instant as the inner. Again, those great flights of homing starlings, by the time they arrive at the roost, are made up of numerous large and small bands that have come together while *en route* from the feeding grounds: a fact that rather destroys the conception of a flock-leader. Continuing to think along these lines, could every bird decide spontaneously to execute the same movement at the same moment? It is clear that such concerted thought could never occur in a flock numbering more than two or three birds. Yet this co-ordination of movement is the invariable practice of some species.

We can, however, approach this problem from another standpoint, and treat it as partly a form of thought-transference, and partly a sensitive alertness of one bird to the actions of another, interpreted with a celerity beyond human emulation, but in keeping with what we know of the hyper-sensitive nervous and physical reactions of a bird. One has

only to watch a bird for a few moments, more especially one of the smaller species, to be impressed by its vivacity, mobility and swift reactions to external stimuli. It is not then surprising to learn that the normal temperature of a bird's body varies, according to its species, between 100 deg. F. and 112 deg. F., and that the blood-stream is maintained at this human fever-point by a respiration more intense than that of any other organised body. It is thus possible to appreciate that a bird is an entity whose whole life is governed by nervous reactions of an acuteness and a rapidity that are perhaps beyond our true conception.

It is generally realised that the animal creation possesses certain senses that man has lost in the process of evolution. The best-known example are the hyperaccurate powers of orientation of most animals: supreme in the migrating bird, that returns year after year, several thousand miles to the very tree in which it had nested the previous year; and especially in those birds of the year, such as the young cuckoos, that set out from the British Isles, many weeks after the adults, on a southerly voyage over unknown territories to their winter home in Africa; supreme also in the salmon that returns from the sea to the spawning-beds in the highest reaches of the moorland stream in which it was born, itself to spawn; or in the three-quarter-inch elver that wriggles its way from the deeps of its breeding grounds off the West Indies three and a half thousand miles across the Atlantic to the estuaries of the British Isles, and returns to its birth-place some seven years later to spawn and to die.

This is not the only sixth sense that we do not possess or understand. Experiments with bats, whose organs of sight, smell and hearing, had been removed, proved that they could thread their way at full speed in and out of an intricate mesh of wires in a room without coming into contact with them. They appeared to be guided by the sensitive whiskers around the muzzle, and by the delicate membranes constituting the wings and the external ears. A different power is found among the *lepidoptera*. When a female butterfly is pupating, several males of her sort will make their appearance at the barken crevice where she had lain as a chrysalis, though none have previously been seen in the district. Captive females appear to communicate with the males by vibrations of their wings. But in this particular case of synchronal flight-movements,

the reactions of a bird being so quick-working, it is conceivable that an unusual rapidity of visual perception enables the members of a flight to respond so swiftly to each other's alterations in direction, that the manœuvre appears concerted to the human eye.

One might expect that in a flock of, say, fifty birds it would often happen that more than one bird would change direction at the same instant. When the lapwing indulges in aerial exercises, the flock quite frequently splits into two or more sections, presumably from this cause. But in the swifter, more complex evolutions of the tiny waders, such division is unusual. The reactions of small birds are so rapid, their immediate response to one another's actions so unquestioningly faithful, and their perception of time so acute, that coincidental directional changes by individual members of a flight are almost impossible. To a bird, perhaps a second, as we know it, might represent sixty well-marked divisions of time, so that, to all intents and purposes, one individual's change in direction must always precede another's by some margin of time.

That a bird should always follow the lead of another with implicit regularity is to be expected, for in Nature an animal pays strict heed to the actions of its fellows. If a bird observes, or senses, that another is changing direction instinct bids him do the same. Generations of mutual reliance have bred in the bird the instinct to imitate its fellows without hesitation. On such unthinking obedience depends the safety both of the individual and of the species. Nature does not permit second thoughts. The bird's life is almost solely governed by instinct from the time that it develops from the yolk into its component parts, chipping its way through the shell with the egg-tooth, until its extinction.

But it is probable that there is also an element of thought-transference present in these flight-movements. Even among the members of the more sluggish-natured human race, particularly in primitive peoples and in those, such as the Yogi, who subordinate body to mind, telepathy exists. The lapwing is a wary bird: observe him when he takes off into flight from the ground. Before mounting into the air, he runs a few feet with great wings outspread. Those nearest to him do the same, and the movement spreads outwards very rapidly, so that the actual take-off of the flock impresses one

as being simultaneous. Yet so swift is the adoption of the first bird's action that, when the flock takes the air, those birds furthest away from the observer when on the ground, are still furthest away when in flight—for the birds naturally move away from the watcher—but now form the van. It is on these principles, I think, that perfect co-ordination of flight-movement is attained; but, since the birds have a flying speed of at least twenty-five miles per hour, in the case of the slowest species mentioned, the starling, the slight difference in the timing of individuals is imperceptible to the comparatively slow-registering human eye. Thus in these united evolutions on the wing, a bird turns, and the movement is anticipated by those birds nearest to it. It is not uncommon for a human being to anticipate the movement of an adversary, or colleague, in any game, though it is not anticipation in the literal meaning of the word. In a first-class ball-game player this anticipation is so spontaneous and accurate that one is led to believe that it must be partly a telepathic intuition, and not solely a reasoned, positional anticipation of the brain.

The particular evolution is adopted by the rest of the flock, who sense, rather than follow, the direction of the turn with a swiftness that deludes the human eye into interpreting the whole movement as one concerted action, which indeed it is, according to our measurement of time. It is, I feel, above all this quick sensing of another bird's slightest alteration in direction that is responsible for the apparent spontaneity of a wheel or stoop. It is not possible to define such powers, but our knowledge of the great influence in human affairs of the subconscious, which we may consider the complement of an animal's instinct, allows us to credit the probability of telepathic senses existing among animals.

In these flight-movements, then, there may be a thought-transference from one bird to a hundred others, but without the slightest consciousness on the part of the originator of the particular movement that the remainder of the flock will be influenced by this change of direction. In the really large flocks of starlings, containing a thousand or more birds, we can see how the thought, or sensing, spreads. As the first hundred or so approach the roost, they swoop down upon the trees, followed in their turn by the remaining sections of the flock, when they reach that position where the first section had gone

down, so that there is one continuous swooping on to the trees that, for the moment, deludes one into thinking that all the birds swooped at the same time.

This large-scale performance of the starling holds the secrets, I think, of those perfectly executed flight-movements of the ten, twenty or five hundred dunlin, whose swifter flights and more skilful manoeuvres are too rapid and precise for the human eye to follow the evolving of the figure, as it can with the larger flocks of starlings. But if the observer chooses to concentrate on the mechanics of a flight-movement, and does not allow his æsthetic appreciation to distract his attention to detail, he will note that all the birds do not dip at the same instant, as his eye for beauty bids him believe. In precisely the manner of the flight of starlings stooping down on the roost, there is that same pouring down and swooping up of the dunlin. If it were possible to fix the flight of waders, when those in the van had reached the culminating point of their upward movement, we should find that the rear units of the flight were about to begin their downward movements. The column of birds would represent a concave flight, with individuals stationed at all points of the arc. There is a drug that accelerates the perceptive powers of the mind. It would not need to be speeded up very greatly to enable it to follow the individual movements of a flight of knots. A slow-motion film of an actual evolution should show the slightly different positions of the units of a flight.

This mass-sensitiveness, found in divers animals, has been responsible, no doubt, for the superior intelligence ascribed to many of them in their possession of leaders. Certain of the larger and clever birds, such as geese, do seem to appoint definite watch-birds at their feeding grounds. Many observers claim that the older and wiser ganders form the spear-heads of their flight-chevrons. While not denying that possibility, it has always seemed to me more probable that, in the course of time, the goose has found that it is easier to fly to leeward of a companion, where there is less wind-resistance, so that naturally the stronger flyers tend to get pushed forward into the van of the flight. Observation of the flying formations of geese, ducks and swans, lapwings, gulls and starlings, shows the spear-head of the chevrons and flights to be in a constant state of flux, as first one leader and then another drops back into the shelter of the flock, isolating another bird in the van.

With the smaller birds, certainly, the conception of organised leaders can be ruled out: their incredibly swift flight-movements are controlled by a mass-sensitiveness of perception, drilled into a remarkable cohesion of flight-order by ages of immediate obedience to flock laws, with some element of telepathy. Man at his best is essentially individualistic, at his dullest he looks to his neighbour and does as the mass does. At his worst, his reasoning powers are greatly superior to those of raven or goose. Is it necessary, or even desirable, to ascribe human qualities to a bird in order to appreciate its beauty, or to find pleasure in its company? The bird, as a bird, represents the final achievement of one branch of evolution; man is but half-way towards his goal of perfection, perhaps not even thus far. The advantages we have gained by the development of reasoning powers have frequently been nullified by the necessity of having to think before we perform some act that should be instinctive, and is so to the less intelligent but more natural birds and beasts.

RICHARD PERRY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

A CURRENCY AGREEMENT.

THE morning newspapers of September 27th startled the world by announcing that three of the world's governments had reached an agreement on an important matter. The three governments were none other than the British, French and American. It is a rare pleasure to be able to ponder something good in international affairs, something based upon a desire for co-operation in a common interest rather than upon a desire for the competitive destruction of every common interest.

The announcement was of a monetary agreement between the three countries. It resulted from three months of excellent diplomacy. Soon after M. Blum became Prime Minister in June a high official of the French Treasury went to New York and sounded Mr. Morgenthau, Secretary of the United States Treasury, about the possibility of an American commitment to refrain from further devaluation of the dollar in the event of a devaluation of the franc. He received the assurance he asked for. In July, M. Blum took the occasion of the Three-Power London "Locarno" talks to sound Mr. Neville Chamberlain in the like sense. In her turn Great Britain gave an assurance about sterling. An agreement in principle having thus been reached, it was left to the French Government to say when the appropriate occasion should arise for translating it into fact. The signal was given on September 21st, when the French Treasury diagnosed the renewed weakness of the franc as an opportunity not to be lost. Thereupon there began a five-days' incessant communication by telephone between New York, London and Paris. On September 21st the French Embassy in London had a special telephone line to Paris installed so that uninterrupted conversation could be carried on simultaneously with officials of the British and French Treasuries. Sir Frederick Leith-Ross went to Paris to be in personal touch with the French officials. Mr. Waley was the connecting link with the French Embassy in London and Mr. Morgenthau in New York.

The decisive work was done on September 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, and, on the 25th, the great announcement was drafted. It really was a great achievement. It was announced

simultaneously in London and New York. It started by a preamble in which the French, British and American Governments affirmed "a common desire to foster those conditions which will safeguard peace and which will best contribute to the restoration of order in international economic relations, and to pursue a policy which will tend to promote prosperity in the world, and to improve the standard of living." To that end they had decided to "take into full account the requirements of internal prosperity" in the three countries and to maintain "the greatest possible equilibrium in the system of international exchanges" and to "avoid to the utmost extent the creation of any disturbance to the system by American or British monetary action."

The British and American Governments welcomed the decision of the French Government (announced at the same time) to "readjust" (i.e. devalue) the franc, and the three governments together declared their intention "to continue to use the appropriate available resources so as to avoid as far as possible any disturbance of the basis of international exchanges resulting from the proposed readjustment." They expressed a common aspiration that action would be taken without delay "to relax progressively the present system of quotas and exchange controls with a view to their abolition." They ended with a general invitation to other countries to co-operate in the policy thus advocated and with an appeal to other countries not to "attempt to obtain an unreasonably competitive exchange advantage and thereby hamper the effort to restore more stable economic relations which it is the aim of the three Governments to promote."

The simple excellent fact was that France had at last been forced to devalue her currency and thus to "align" herself (to use the official expression) with those countries which had left the Gold Standard during the preceding few years. M. Paul Reynaud, sometime Finance Minister in a pre-Socialist French Cabinet, and hitherto a firm apostle of the Poincaré tradition, arrived in Paris from the United States just when the three-cornered telephonic negotiations were about to start. He had conversed at length with Mr. Roosevelt. Concurrently the League of Nations Finance Committee published a report on currency depreciation in Britain, the United States, Czechoslovakia and Belgium as a proved successful means of escape from the financial and economic calamity that

befell the world in 1929. To join those ranks France needed an assurance against further competitive devaluation by Britain and America. The fact that she duly received such an assurance was one of the rare good things we have experienced in the past eight years. M. Blum, on announcing the devaluation of the franc, described it as the first step in a new era of economic relations. Nor was that view extravagant. Britain left gold in 1931, America in 1933. France was the main pillar of the remaining gold bloc. When she devalued, the process was virtually complete. Within twenty-four hours Switzerland devalued. Within three days Holland devalued, and Greece, Latvia and Turkey announced that their currency would henceforth be based on sterling. The achievement was not made without its anxious moments. The anxious and decisive thing was the passage of the measure through the French parliament. The support of Britain and the United States had made success probable, but not certain. The Chamber began discussing the Blum Bill on September 28th. In its original form the Bill contained in the one part the provision for devaluation, in the other a compensatory allocation of the supposed proceeds to the supposed benefit of the working class. M. Blum is a Socialist. On September 30th the Senate passed the Bill only when M. Blum had reluctantly agreed to remove the Socialist provisions. On the following day the Chamber in its turn rejected the Senate's amendments, but a "compromise" was reached which enshrined the Senate's essential points. The sterling rate of the new franc opened at 105.76 (as against 77.62). There opened with it a real prospect that international trade, which had been almost wholly dislocated since 1929, might be restarted. The best commentary on what had taken place was given by the London Stock Exchange in the week following the franc devaluation. In theory the cheaper franc was a blow aimed at British exports. Yet the overwhelmingly greater fact that no country in the world can prosper without adding to the prosperity of every other country in the world was responsible for one of the most cheerful weeks experienced in the City of London and one of the most buoyant weeks experienced in the Stock Exchange since 1929. Frozen credits almost visibly thawed. The barriers offered by tariffs, quotas and the like against the common interests of all countries at once assumed a less permanent aspect. Tariffs are the

political cry of political Conservatives who know nothing of economics and finance. The true Conservatives of the City of London are all free traders. That fact would not surprise any schoolboy whose judgment had not been clouded by pure politics. Trade is so obviously a reciprocal affair that none but a pure politician could fail to recognise the fact. How can there be a seller unless there be a buyer, and how can there be a buyer unless he in his turn be a seller of something else? So elementary a truth has been wantonly defied by the political tariff-mongers and so-called economic nationalists of the past eight years.

The currency agreement gave to Germany an opportunity of translating into practice her oft-repeated protestation that her only object is peace and international goodwill. The opportunity was not taken in any hurry, nor at all up to the time when this paper was written. Instead, General Göring and Dr. Goebbels at the end of October made speeches which were designed, after their normal practice, to excite domestic Nazi enthusiasm for the excellencies of the Nazi Government. It happened that Herr von Ribbentrop came to London as the new Ambassador two days before General Göring spoke, with the particular mission, so it was understood and so Herr von Ribbentrop himself encourages us to believe, of cultivating Anglo-German friendship. But neither General Göring nor Dr. Goebbels were concerned with Herr von Ribbentrop's mission, nor apparently cared much about Nazi team-work except within the frontiers of Germany. Their own transparent concern was to raise the loudest possible volume of cheers from a German audience with the especial object of impressing Herr Hitler. It is one of the curious aspects of contemporary German politics that the overwhelmingly dominant object of the Nazi protagonists is to impress Herr Hitler with their zeal in his cause. There could be no surer measure of Herr Hitler's personal ascendancy in Germany at the present time.

General Göring spoke in the Berlin Sportpalast on October 23rd in the robust style and stentorian tone one normally expects from him. His oratorical theme was of a long-suffering, hard-working, orderly, noble German nation, and of a contrastingly unjust, vindictive, dishonest world outside, the chief villain of the outside world being Great Britain. He accused Great Britain of "stealing" Germany's colonies and "bleeding" Germany of her gold. He said:

"We possess no colonies. They were stolen from us after an unfortunate war. We are told to buy raw materials with gold. We would be ready to do so if all our gold had not been stolen from us. First Germany is overpowered, then robbed and bled for reparations, and then come the chosen people and plunder Germany with the inflation."

Only two days before (October 26th) Herr von Ribbentrop on arriving in London made this public statement:

"The Führer is convinced that there is only one real danger to Europe and to the British Empire as well, that is, the further spreading of Communism, this most terrible of all diseases—terrible because people generally seem to realise its danger only when it is too late. A closer collaboration in this sense between our two countries is not only important, but a vital necessity in the common struggle for the upholding of our civilisation and our culture."

Within forty-eight hours of General Göring's speech, Dr. Goebbels (October 30th) returned to the attack on Great Britain. He announced roundly that "We will, of course, take up the fight against the world for our colonies," and referring to an English unofficial suggestion that Germany could buy whatever raw materials she needed, described it as "an impudent and insulting argument." The interesting thing was that while General Göring and Dr. Goebbels in Germany were attempting, successfully, to raise cheers for abuse of England, Herr von Ribbentrop was trying in England to raise enthusiasm for the cause of Anglo-German friendship: and both sets of Nazi exponents had their eyes mainly trained upon Herr Hitler.

Democracy is an almost hopeless political instrument. Dictatorship is a worse. The truth seems to be that politics are God's chosen means for the chastisement of the human race; presumably for their mysterious, or ultimate good.

General Göring and Dr. Goebbels had attacked England on the financial and economic score. They had made the attack *coram publico*. It has become a contemporary peculiarity that high diplomacy tends to desert the old diplomatic channels and to unfold itself openly in the form of oratorical dialectics across frontiers. When the British House of Commons re-assembled in the autumn Mr. Eden perforce had to answer the blast from across the North Sea. It was an easy answer. He need only quote a few simple well-established facts, and to

suggest that Germany should try co-operation instead of abuse.

"We alone (he said), without mentioning the United States of America, have lent to Germany in one way and another since the War an almost equivalent figure to the amount we have received from her by way of reparations. So far as our own trade relations with Germany are concerned the House will recall the important Anglo-German Payments Agreement of 1934, which still operates and which preserves a normal ratio between this country and Germany at the figure of 55 to 100; that is to say, we buy £100 worth of goods from Germany for every £55 worth of our goods that she buys, and we thus leave £45 at the disposal of Germany for the purpose of buying raw materials and foodstuffs, and for meeting her financial obligations. There is no other country with whom Germany has so favourable an agreement. The central problem which we have to face is the possibility of securing an increase in the volume of world trade which will involve an increase in Germany's exports as in those of everyone else. A hopeful line of approach was contained in the recent Three-Power Currency Declaration, and notably in the reference to the possibility of action being taken without delay to relax, and as soon as possible to abolish, the present system of quota and exchange control. The co-operation of other nations, including Germany, was specifically invited, and we should be only too glad if Germany saw fit to take her part in this programme."

FIVE GREAT POWERS.

Speaking in the House of Commons on November 5th, Mr. Anthony Eden made what he called "a general statement on the international situation and the Government's policy." He spoke of "present international circumstances, when the issues are so serious. . . ." Those who heard or read his speech were left with no doubt about the seriousness of the situation, as diagnosed by His Majesty's Government, but few could say, after the speech was finished, what exact cause had created the general sense of insecurity.

Men's minds are exercised by the vague possibility of war. That possibility necessarily depends upon the sum of psychological influences sent out from five European Great Powers:

Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Russia. Each of those Powers, except Great Britain, is heavily armed. It is known to be the case that on land alone Russia could put some 2,000,000 men into the field, Germany 1,250,000, France and Italy nearly 1,000,000 each. Germany is manufacturing aeroplanes at the rate of 300 a month. Great Britain is engaged in an intensive process of rearmament on land, on sea, in the air. Herr Hitler never misses an opportunity of announcing that all he wants is peace. Herr von Ribbentrop arrives in London on the specific mission of cultivating Anglo-German friendship. Everybody knows that France and Great Britain want nothing but peace on the existing terms, that Italy wants peace on the terms existing after the establishment of Italian East Africa, that Russia wants peace consistently with the undiminished prestige of communism abroad. There is no obvious immediate point of conflict in Europe. It is hardly conceivable that Germany would commit any aggression against French territory; it is certain that France would not commit any aggression against German territory; it is equally certain that Great Britain would not commit any aggression anywhere, and Italy has no intention of driving any Mediterranean issue with Great Britain to the point of war. What of Germany and Russia? Their spokesmen have openly abused each other. But what practical possibility is there of an armed conflict between them? They have no common frontier. Lithuania, Poland or Czechoslovakia would have to be the victim of an aggression by Germany or Russia before there could be war between Germany and Russia. That is why French and Czechoslovak commentators argue that the Franco-Soviet and the Czechoslovak-Soviet pacts can never operate until the League of Nations Covenant has first been violated. Is it conceivable that Germany would attempt to send her troops through the south of Czechoslovakia to join forces with Magyar revisionists at Bratislava? Or that Russia would send her aeroplanes over 600 miles of Czechoslovak territory—having first transgressed either Polish or Rumanian territory to reach the Carpathians—in order to drop bombs in flagrant aggression upon German territory? The first diplomatic principle of all countries, now as throughout history, is that the aggressor should first manœuvre his aggression so as to be arguably defensive. How could either Russia or Germany invade the other's territory

and at the same time argue that measure to be defensive, when there is a belt of solid neutral territory between them, and when the nearest points of contact between the two frontiers, as the aeroplane flies, are 250 miles apart? In short, how in practice could a European war actually be started? By a Hungarian invasion of Slovakia, bringing Russia to the defence of Czechoslovakia by virtue of the Czechoslovak-Russian Pact? Is it conceivable that German intrigue could drive the Magyar revisionists to such a point?

Such a line of speculation, unnecessary and even grotesque as it may appear, does in fact occupy the minds of serious people. Speaking at the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 9th, Mr. Baldwin, Prime Minister of one of the "Great" Five Powers, said these words:

"To-day, while we are still finding and burying the bodies of the men who fell in the war, the whole of Europe is arming. Could there be a more inconceivable folly for those of us who have the responsibility of governing the great countries in Europe? . . . And if the nations of Europe devote for too long their attention to arms, and forget the conditions of their people, there will grow discontent and despair, and indeed, if those armaments continue, I don't say they mean war, but they make war more likely. . . . And it means in the end anarchy and a world revolution, and we all know it."

When conditions are so apparently chaotic, realistic people are inclined to approach the problem with the question: in default of a generalised prospect of improving European relationships, is it possible to cultivate one corner at a time? The "Locarno" project, launched last summer from London, has made little headway. Is it possible to improve relations, say, between Great Britain and Italy as a particularised manifestation of good will? British popular opinion was much impressed by Italy's ignoring the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact, and other forms of the renunciation of war, in her conquest of Abyssinia. Italian public opinion was much impressed by the hostility of British opinion to a colonial project such as was only too familiar in British history. It is clearly right and wise to assume an equal sincerity to one's own in the opinion of those who differ from oneself. It is indeed the tragedy of politics that issues are seldom joined in which one side is clearly right and the other as clearly wrong. The tragedy is that both are right in their own opinion, and

there can be no higher over-riding authority to decide between them. Let it therefore be honestly conceded that Italian opinion genuinely regarded British opinion as hypocritical both about colonies and about the League of Nations. The League of Nations was regarded in Italy as a means of stereotyping the *status quo*. Those nations, therefore, such as Great Britain and France, which already possessed as many colonies as they wanted or could manage, supported the League of Nations. Those others, among them Italy, who regarded themselves as lacking their fair share of colonial spoils, did not support the League of Nations. On the subject of colonial conquest and the vindication of military prestige abroad many Italians quoted the north-west frontier of India, the Afghan wars, the Zulus, the Boers, Khartoum, Omdurman and mathematically calculated that many times more natives had been killed by British military conquests abroad than were ever gassed by Mussolini's famous mustard: and, they asked, is mustard gas a worse experience than a bayonet through one's stomach?

The present fact is that Abyssinia has been conquered and Italian East Africa proclaimed. What next? On November 1st Signor Mussolini made a speech at Milan. He said:

"Italy is an island which emerges from the Mediterranean. This sea is for Great Britain only a route, one of the many routes; I should say a short cut, by which she reaches more quickly her outlying territories. But . . . for Italy it is her very life. We have said it a thousand times, and I say it again to-day, that we do not mean to threaten this route and do not propose to interrupt it, but we maintain, on the other hand, that our rights and vital interests should be respected."

He faced the fact of Anglo-Italian tension resulting from the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, and declared that in his view only "a sincere, rapid and complete understanding on the basis of the recognition of mutual interests" could solve the Anglo-Italian problem in the Mediterranean. He added the warning that if such a thing were proved to be impossible, and if instead Italy were presented with "the idea of strangling the life of the Italian people in that sea, which is the sea of Rome," then "the whole people will immediately jump to its feet like one man, ready to fight with a decision which will have rare precedent in history." The bellicose style is the common instrument of dictators, dependent as they are for

their prestige at home upon the excitement of popular emotion. Mr. Eden spoke four days later (November 5th). What he said in answer to Signor Mussolini's suggestion of a "sincere, rapid and complete understanding" was this:

"It is necessary to recall that the deterioration in our relations with Italy was due to our endeavour to fulfil our obligations under the Covenant to which we had set our name. There never has been, so far as concerns this country, an Anglo-Italian quarrel. . . . It will be as well that I should say at once that the implication that that freedom to come and go in the Mediterranean is for this country a convenience rather than a vital interest is one which does not fully describe our interests. For us the Mediterranean is not a short cut but a main arterial road. We do not challenge Signor Mussolini's word that for Italy the Mediterranean is her very life, but we affirm that freedom of communication in these waters is also a vital interest in a full sense of the word to the British Commonwealth of nations. In years gone by the interests of the two countries in the Mediterranean have been complementary rather than divergent. On the part of His Majesty's Government there is every desire that those relations should be preserved in the future."

There was some patent irony and paradox in Mr. Eden's confession that the "deterioration" in Anglo-Italian relations had resulted from "our obligations under the Covenant." None the less there did arise in November an opportunity of remedying the damage. In the week following Mr. Eden's statement, Signor Grandi made contact with Sir Robert Vansittart at the Foreign Office with a view to preparing a *détente*.

An even small measure of success in such an enterprise might have an effect in the pacific sense upon general European relationships. It is difficult to discover much evidence of benevolent or imaginative common sense in any of the five "Great" capitals. Germany has done no single thing since Herr Hitler came into power to strengthen the peace of Europe. Russia in the last few months has shown more concern for the success of the communist cause in Spain than for general European peace. By her pact with Russia France has added grist to Herr Hitler's mill, and given him a standing excuse for all the mischief. Britain and Italy have engaged in a wholly unnecessary quarrel about each other's "security"

in the Mediterranean, when there is not the slightest discoverable danger to either party from the other.

While the Great Powers were thus bent upon proving their inability to lead the smaller Powers in the ways of peace, one of these small Powers showed in a dramatic way that her patience was exhausted. On October 14th King Leopold made a statement to his Cabinet in which he outlined a policy of reversal to Belgium's former state of independent neutrality. He said that in the future Belgium must be free of alliances with any other State, must see to her own military defence, must not lend her territory as a means of military action by any State against another, must therefore refuse to be a "guarantor" State in the sense of the Locarno Treaty, must, in short, be as independent and as truly neutral as Switzerland. There was a prompt outcry in the French Press, as promptly suppressed by official disapproval inspired from the Quai d'Orsay. The Belgian Ambassador in London on October 15th informed Mr. Eden that Belgium remained faithful to all her international obligations. As it was not at first glance obvious how King Leopold's statement could be made to harmonise with the League Covenant or with the Locarno Treaty, both the British and the French governments sought elucidatory explanations in Brussels. Such is the general obscurity, however, that in its turn it is not obvious that either the Locarno Treaty after the German repudiation or the League Covenant after the case of Abyssinia can be said themselves to have much value.

King Leopold's statement caused little surprise to informed people. As long ago as last March, when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland zone, M. van Zeeland gave full warning of the climax reached seven months later. Before the war, he said, Belgium had been "guaranteed" her neutrality. In 1914 that guarantee was proved valueless as a protection. After the war, in 1925, she was given another guarantee, that of the Locarno Treaty, which in its turn had been destroyed. Belgium, he somewhat bitterly commented, had no pact with Russia; yet in effect she lost the protection promised at Locarno because France had a pact with Russia. His logic was unanswerable.

How important in present European conditions is the new Belgian neutrality can be seen by a glance at the map. The essence of the Locarno principle, as of Article 16 of the League

Covenant, was that Belgian territory, and the air above it, would be placed at the disposal of those who were engaged in resisting an aggression. It is immensely important in a military sense if Belgium now refuses to allow a hypothetical Franco-British combination to move through Belgium in any future contingency, or to preconcert measures of defence against a hypothetical German aggression.

Undeterred by Belgian disillusion, the Great Powers incorrigibly persisted in their squabbles. On October 14th—the very day of King Leopold's statement—Mr. Maisky, the Russian Ambassador in London, called at the Foreign Office, saw Lord Plymouth, acting chairman of the Neutrality-Towards-Spain Committee and demanded nothing less than that Portugal's ports should be "controlled" by the British and French navies. As General Franco was about to launch his culminating attack on Madrid, the British and French navies in the sacred name of non-intervention were in effect to intervene. Yet an independent British inquiry had failed to discover any evidence of Portuguese intervention. But still another bizarre pantomime was staged by the committee. It met again on October 28th. For six hours the Locarno Room of the British Foreign Office was the scene of unrestrained, high-voiced, angry, vulgar abuse of one party by another, the balance of effect being that Russia was left in a minority of one as the party outstandingly guilty of violating the agreement not to intervene in Spain. And even after that meeting the Russian Government continued to draft still more notes to refute the charges made by Germany and Italy, but no answer was given to the British Government's evidence about the landing of arms, including tanks, munitions, food and personnel in Catalonia. The Great Powers of Europe are five in number, out of a world total of seven. Of the other two, Japan is engaged in quietly eating up China. Only the United States at the moment seems to stand outside the general welter of Great Power mischief. Wars are caused by the Great Powers. The fact that they have refused to take the collective opportunity afforded them since the war to constitute a true and effective League of Nations is only too true a symbol of their rôle as mischief-makers in chief.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

November 15th, 1936.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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LORD GLADSTONE OF HAWARDEN.*

Henry Neville Gladstone, the third son of the great statesman, was born in London in 1852, and eighty years later was raised to the Peerage as Lord Gladstone of Hawarden. After a happy boyhood, marked by a preference for sports over books, he passed from Eton by his own choice into business, leaving Oxford and politics to his younger brother Herbert. From an office in Liverpool he was sent at twenty-two to Calcutta. There he had a short spell of ill-luck, but soon found his feet in the Calcutta house of Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co.—known in London as Ogilvy, Gillanders & Co. It was a comparatively small and slow-going family firm when Henry Gladstone joined it; but it developed with astonishing rapidity when he threw himself with youthful energy and enterprise into the business. His industry was, indeed, extraordinary. In the first three years of his connection with Gillanders he spent only three weekdays away from the office. In five years he became a partner, and when in 1930 he retired in favour of his nephew Albert Gladstone, he had spent fifty-five years with the firm and thirty years as its head. He made

* *Gladstone of Hawarden.* By Ivor Thomas. John Murray, London, 1936. 7s. 6d.

its fortune and his own ; he was a model employer, and was idolised by the staff. From his father and grandfather he inherited a wonderful gift for business and finance. Sagacity, foresight, enterprise and industry were the secrets of his success. He knew the value of money, but the making of a handsome fortune left unspoilt the virtues of a truly noble and generous character.

A large circle of relatives, friends and neighbours who knew and loved him will be grateful for a Memoir which contains not only a faithful record of his life, but many delightful letters and fragments of autobiography. Those of us who enjoyed his friendship at Hawarden, recalling his lively table talk, his merry laugh, his fund of humour, his well-told stories of bygone times in India, of queer people and great people, of critical moments in business and politics, of the Hawarden estate, of his Lord-Lieutenancy in Flintshire, of the University of Wales, of St. Deiniol's and the Gladstone Trusts, will scan these pages with intense interest ; and a wider public will find inspiration in the biography of a good man who, in prosperity and adversity, was always faithful to his ideals and loyal to his principles, who never doubted that clouds would break, and never believed that wrong would triumph. No regard for fashion or self-interest deterred him from saying or doing what he thought to be right. The spectacle of such a life invites imitation and admiration. Providence and Fortune in this case were in attendance on merit. His was a career which may well fill young men of talent, character and aspiration with legitimate ambitions and high hopes of honourable success.

Perhaps the strongest impulse of his nature was a feeling amounting to veneration for his father. After returning from India, Henry watched over his health, and seconded all his undertakings at Hawarden and elsewhere. After Mr. Gladstone's death he made the arrangements with Macmillans and Morley for the famous Life, and devoted himself to perpetuating the Gladstonian tradition. This was a purpose of the Gladstone Trust. In 1927, after consultation with his brother Herbert, he greatly enlarged the endowment.

" Since then," he wrote (in a Memorandum dated August 1934), " the course of events at home and abroad has strengthened my conviction that Mr. Gladstone's principles, his public spirit, his zeal for peace and liberty and economic freedom, his strict attention

to economy in all branches of public Administration, and the rules by which he established Treasury control over departmental expenditure, are more than ever essential if the strength and welfare of the country are to be preserved, and if the progress of the nation—moral, intellectual and material—is to continue or to resume the marvellous advance which it made during the half century that signalised his career as a responsible Minister, as Premier, and as Leader of the Liberal Party. It seems to me that the Gladstone Trust, by promoting a study of his character, policy and measures, may help to imbue rising generations with that passionate love of liberty and justice, and that undeviating devotion to the public service and to Christian principles, alike in national and international affairs, of which my father's life and public career are a shining example."

In Chapter XXI of Mr. Thomas' *Memoir*, which is well entitled "A Liberal without Prefix," Henry Gladstone's efforts on behalf of independent Liberalism are faithfully recorded. The prospect of being in a minority did not daunt him. Nay, he redoubled his efforts when the great tariff reform attack upon the fiscal system built up by his father commenced after the election of October 1931. In that month he unveiled a tablet to Richard Cobden in the church at Heyshott, and at the Dunford House luncheon which followed he spoke out for the principles of free trade and economy. In 1932, at the jubilee of the National Liberal Club, of which he was President, he reminded his fellow members that his father had been their first president, and expressed his faith that " this bulwark of Liberalism will long remain an impregnable fortress of those imperishable principles—peace, goodwill among nations, public economy, freedom of trade and freedom of thought." A staunch supporter of the League of Nations Union, he looked to the ultimate triumph of the League of Nations, and to " the enthronement of public right as the governing idea of European policy." His interest in the St. Deiniol's Library led him to master, late in life, the technique of storing and cataloguing books. He shared with his devoted wife a love of music, and enjoyed with her the improvement of the house, the gardens, the Hawarden estate, and the provision of recreation grounds and playing-fields which served also to furnish work for the unemployed in the black years following 1930. Few men, we may be sure, have ever lived a happier or more useful life.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

THE SPANISH TRAGEDY.*

Whatever view we take of the terrible struggle which General Franco unleashed in July, we can all join in expressions of gratitude to Professor Allison Peers. His competence to speak on the subject is proved by his writings, and every page reveals not only the expert but the lover of Spain. For an understanding of the deeper causes of the conflict we must go to the works of Dr. Madariaga, Professor Trend and Sir George Young, to name only a few of our recent guides. But for a clear and balanced narrative of events from the end of Primo's dictatorship in 1930 to the middle of September 1936 we cannot do better than study the latest volume of the Professor of Spanish in the University of Liverpool.

The whole book is a story of lost opportunities. The soldier who seized power in 1923 meant well, but he was hopelessly unfitted to rule. "He had no conception of organising a country otherwise than as a species of army." Thus, despite his many excellent qualities, the King, the people, and the army tired of him, and he brought down the monarchy in his fall. "The achievements of the Dictatorship were numerous and in their way important, but, compared with its failures, superficial." He left confusion behind him, as dictators usually do. King Alfonso, who had welcomed the Dictatorship, found himself alone and was quickly expelled. He loved Spain too well to fight for his throne, and his farewell declaration is justly praised. In the words of our author, whose judgments are always mild, he had displayed more initiative and courage than insight, sensitiveness and prudence.

The life of the Republic up to the summer of 1936 falls into three chapters—two years of the Left, two years of the Centre-Right, and six months of the Left. The democratic Constitution took a long time to make and proved difficult to work. For democracy, more than any other régime, requires both public spirit and a readiness for compromise. Good men were available, but good men do not always agree. Zamora, the first Premier and afterwards the first President, was a Catholic and mildly conservative. The strong man of the Left, Azana, was a radical and an anti-clerical. The honeymoon which followed the departure of the King was

* *The Spanish Tragedy*. By E. Allison Peers. Methuen. 10s. 6d.

soon over, and a number of parties, both bourgeois and manual workers, strove for mastery. The best achievement of the Left was the settlement with Catalonia on the lines of a generous autonomy. Its most resounding failure was its ecclesiastical policy. The Church had enjoyed almost uncontested power for centuries, and had made many enemies. Now the pendulum swung too far in the other direction. Spanish radicalism, like its French model, regarding the Church as the foe of Republican Democracy, struck at the Catholic schools and the Orders, and pushed the attack too far.

The record of the Centre-Right, as the Professor calls it, was equally disappointing. "The two years of Left rule were years of high hopes and crushing disappointments, but the two years of Centre rule were years of monotonous depression." Lerroux, the outstanding figure of the coalition, was able and experienced, but he lacked constructive power. The anti-clerical campaign was called off, but a period of lethargy ensued. When the Government moved further towards the Right, Catalonia rebelled and lost its liberties, while a revolt of the Asturias miners in the north was suppressed with the aid of Moorish troops.

When the next election was held in February 1936 the country returned another Government of the Left. The eloquent Azana resumed control, but quickly exchanged the Premiership for the Presidency, from which Zamora was evicted by the Cortes. The country was seething with discontent, part of it caused by the holding up of the Agrarian law of 1932 by the Government of the Centre-Right. For the land question is as vital for the Spaniard as autonomy for the Catalan. Impatient peasants in the south, unwilling to await the alleviation of their sufferings by the new Government, seized the land as the Russian peasants had seized it in 1917. The Cortes and the Cabinet lost control of the situation, churches and secular buildings were burned, Fascism raised its head, and political assassinations occurred. "Unhappy Spain was rapidly moving towards a condition of complete chaos." The murder of Castillo, a lieutenant of the Shock Troops, was followed by the murder of Calvo Sotelo, who was widely spoken of as a future dictator. A few days later Franco raised the flag of revolt in Morocco, and a struggle recalling the savagery of the Carlist wars had begun.

The Second Republic, as Professor Peers remarks, is dead, slain by the passions of a deeply divided nation. It was a conflict to the death between Left and Right. "Men had to be on the one side or the other: there was no longer any centre." The fundamental weakness of the Republic, we are told, was the lack of a great leader. "Such a man must of necessity arise before Spain can be saved." If there was any prospect of finding him in any party or camp, the outlook for the Spanish people would be brighter. It is part of the unending tragedy of history that the sins of the fathers are visited on the children to the third and fourth generation.

G. P. G.

THE PRIVATE MANUFACTURE OF ARMAMENTS.*

It is the duty of the managing director and others responsible for running a business to secure for their shareholders as much profitable work as they can. With this end in view they advertise and canvass for lucrative jobs, and, in competing with other businesses, put their claims in the most favourable light. When business is created or given out by public offices, it is natural that political and private pressure should be exercised and that public opinion should be stimulated so as to encourage certain profitable forms of expenditure. But the private trade in armaments occupies a unique position. Its only clients are governments; the articles it supplies have no utility either for consumption or production. They are purely destructive of life and property, for though every government regards them as "defensive," that defence is only accomplished by destructive means. An armament firm supplies not only its own government, but that of other countries which in the next war may and do use these arms against the country whose labour supplied them. Some armament firms have productive plants in several countries and profit by the fears or aggressive aims which, leading one nation to increase its force, induce other nations to follow suit. This being so it is the profitable interest of arms-makers to stir up such fears in military circles, in governments and in popular opinion.

* *The Private Manufacture of Armaments*, Vol. I. By Philip Noel Baker, M.P. Gollancz. 18s. net.

The technique of this procedure forms the substance of Mr. Noel Baker's important work, of which the first of two volumes has now been published. It is a detailed statement of the documentary and other evidence showing the actual part played by armament-makers before and since the Great War in working up the race in armaments which ends in actual war. So essentially intricate and secretive is the business procedure, with its solicitation for orders, its bribery in certain countries, its employment of ex-officers and ex-civil servants, its ownership or control of newspapers, its utilisation of "patriotic" societies, that the extent and potency of this profiteering enterprise is hidden from the public eye. Even the extraordinary conduct of Mr. Mulliner of the Coventry Ordinance Works, in working up the pre-war anti-German naval scare, and the later operations of Mr. Shearer in Washington and Geneva have been treated rather as freak and exceptional cases than as dramatic instances of a procedure that is normal and continuous in the armaments trade. Mr. Noel Baker produces an overwhelming mass of evidence to support his main charges.

His summary of what happened in the ten years before the war deserves repetition, for it is happening to-day. "These vested interests were working in a hundred ways to create the conditions in which the 'sales resistance' of the governments would be less. To this end they solicited orders; they bribed Ministers, legislators and officials; they built up a powerful influence within the civil services, the War Departments and the armed forces of various states; they sold arms to potential enemies, thereby compelling their own governments to increase their orders in reply; they secured a widespread influence in the Press and used it to excite the fears of their own and other nations; they subsidised propaganda 'societies' to demand a greater expenditure on national defence; they 'played one government off against another'; they created scares and panics." Mr. Noel Baker does not unduly magnify the parts played by the Arms interest, first in preventing the disarmament promised under the Versailles Treaty, and more recently in preventing the new 'race,' but he rightly insists that "the vested interests worked with unrelenting persistence to exploit the difficulties that arose."

In a very valuable chapter he deals with the new Air Power and the "organised Air Interests" which have come into

existence. The moral and political case for the nationalisation of Armaments Industries must impress and convince every patient reader of this monumental treatise. But there still remains for treatment in a second volume the stubborn economic objection that the plasticity and adaptability of private industry for quick purposes of war emergency are qualities which are of literally vital importance.

J. A. HOBSON.

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A. E. HOUSMAN.*

Nous n'irons plus au bois, les lauriers sont coupés—

A. E. Housman prefaced his *Last Poems* (1922) with a lyric inspired by this line: now we are his debtors for the permission granted to his brother to select certain poems from his notebooks for publication after his death. Mr. Laurence Housman has exercised much care and judgment, and has consulted friends; in some cases they have had to choose between variant readings in words or phrases. Two complete versions (X and XI) of one lovely little poem have been preserved. It cannot, under the circumstances, be expected that all these poems should be on a level with those of the two previous volumes; some, both in technique and sentiment, seem echoes—at times, rather feeble echoes—of them and, as they mostly date from that earlier period, the poet may himself have recognised this and so excluded them. Frankly, the repeated note of disillusionment, of bitterness, tends to pall. But if only some four or five of these poems really compare with the perfection of "Bredon Hill," for example, or "Loveliest of trees" from *A Shropshire Lad*, or "Fancy's Knell" and the "Army of mercenaries" from *Last Poems*, the fact that there are four or five such makes the collection amply worth while. The beautiful lines to A. J. J. (XLII) give perfect expression to a feeling known to all who have lost a friend: the "Easter Hymn" (I) and "For my Funeral" (XLVII) are nobly impressive. Each reader will have his own preferences, but all would surely instance this (XXXVI):

Here dead lie we because we did not choose
To live and shame the land from which we sprung.
Life, to be sure, is nothing much to lose;
But young men think it is, and we were young.

* *More Poems*. By A. E. Housman. Jonathan Cape. 1936. 5s. net.

Austerely poignant, it dares comparison with Simonides. (A Greek version of it has, in fact, appeared in *The Times*.)

Mr. A. S. F. Gow's admirable sketch* of Housman tells all that can be told of a life outwardly uneventful, and a supremely remote, reticent personality. The account of his last twenty-five years of life at Cambridge, where, as Fellows of Trinity, the biographer and he were colleagues and friends, is written from intimate knowledge: it is, naturally, the aspect of Housman as scholar, critic and lecturer which predominates. Alike in his scholarship and his verse, his passion for truth and for excellence is emphasised; this sometimes made him an impatient or acrimonious critic of the work of other scholars, and severe on his own. Unapproachable as Housman usually was, it is pleasant to read of his unbending to younger men, or in some small circle of friends, and to know that he found "such happiness as he was capable of" in Cambridge life and in what he described as his "minute and pedantic studies." His ardent love of great poetry, as disclosed in his Leslie Stephen Lecture, is recalled here. The list of his writings and indexes to his classical papers which fill the second half of the book, should be invaluable to students, especially in view of Housman's veto on the reprinting of his contributions to periodicals. Both the *Poems* and the *Sketch* have as frontispiece a drawing of the poet by Francis Dodd, from St. John's College, Oxford, which his brother considers his best likeness.

E. G. S.

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GERMANY AND EAST EUROPE.†

Mr. Morrow's study is of the conditions now prevailing in the countries which before the war were the Prussian Provinces of East and West Prussia. He was commissioned to undertake it by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which has been enabled, by the financial help of the Rockefeller Foundation, to embark upon a series of such specialist investigations. It is an excellent thing that so competent a scholar and so thorough an observer as Mr. Morrow should be

* *A. E. Housman. A Sketch*, together with a List of his Writings and Indexes to his Classical Papers. By A. S. F. Gow. Cambridge University Press. 1936. 7s. 6d. net.

† *The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands*. By Jan F. D. Morrow, assisted by L. M. Sieveking. Oxford University Press. 25s.

thus given the time and the means to produce such a book as this. He paid two long visits to Germany and to Poland in 1932 and 1933, and was helped by Miss Sieveking in the compilation of the vast documentary material he thereby amassed.

It is a scholarly work, running to nearly 600 pages, complete with maps and full statistics, and giving a comprehensive picture of present conditions in Danzig, the Polish Corridor and Memel, with an estimate of Germany's present attitude to those territories. His matter is particularly valuable at a time when diplomatic speculation concentrates upon the probabilities of Herr Hitler's next move. Herr Hitler, like other dictators, is dependent for his position upon continuity in the shocks he gives to the world outside. He has left Geneva and the Disarmament Conference. He has rearmed and drilled the German people in defiance of the Versailles Powers. He has torn up not only the Versailles Treaty but the Locarno Treaty. He has got back the Saar. He has achieved the virtual *Anschluss* with Austria. What next? He has talked of colonies, but has it on excellent authority that the British Government, despite its post-war superiority complex, is not likely to go to the length of disgorging territory snatched from Germany.

It is not surprising that all eyes are on Eastern Europe. Already in the summer of the present year Herr Greiser cocked his snook at Geneva, because the fact was by then established that the League of Nations no longer controls Danzig. Yet it is clearly not as easy for Herr Hitler to cast his eye on Memel or Poland as on the Saar or Austria. Russia at once becomes involved, as probably does France through her relationship with both Russia and Poland. There is also the fact of the Polish army, of Poland's difficult problem as between a Russian, German and French orientation, and of Lithuania's true hold over Memel.

No work has been produced since the war which so thoroughly expounds the facts in their latest phase than Mr. Morrow's. The whole weakness of the juridical basis of three danger spots is frankly exposed. No aspect of the Versailles dispensation was more futile than that which divided East Prussia from the Reich and gave Lithuania "sovereignty" over Memel while maintaining Memel's "autonomy." Fortunately the Lithuanian Government has behaved with heroic correctitude, or the comic Memel Statute would by now have

produced something like chaos. Mr. Morrow has performed the gigantic task of unravelling and expounding the nightmarish thing that is East Europe. His book is comprehensive and well indexed and constitutes a full and invaluable guide to the facts of a situation now overwhelmingly important to the peace of Europe.

G. G.

EUROPE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.*

The volume on the eighteenth century in Methuen's *History of Medieval and Modern Europe* is a masterly contribution by Dr. W. F. Reddaway, whose authority upon the period is well known. The work opens with the Peace of Utrecht and progresses steadily towards the climax of the French Revolution and finally to the first abdication of Napoleon in 1814. Essentially this book is "a narrative of which collective Europe, not a group of separate nations, is the hero." By 1715 Christian Europe had become "a true society" of constituent members "however jealous and distrustful, . . . with common customs and common aims." Dr. Reddaway is at pains to draw the successive features and clashes of thought and outlook in this community as the great background to his account of politics and war, and his estimate of the outstanding figures of the century.

If the great religious wars were past, religion remained, as Dr. Reddaway constantly shows, at once a main integrating factor and an irritant in European life. "The classic epoch of rationalism was also an epoch of evangelism and mysticism—of many-sided revolt against indifference and stagnation in religion," exemplified equally by Voltaire and Wesley. The former's influence is made most manifest by Dr. Reddaway in his estimates of Frederick the Great and Catherine of Russia. He acknowledges Professor Mowat's view of Frederick as a man "really and wholly bad" who "deliberately . . . chooses evil." Yet subject to any conflict with his "Hohenzollern sense," his "Benevolent Despotism consisted in the strenuous application by the least benevolent of men of 'enlightened principles'." The author pays a high tribute to Catherine as "an Enlightened Despot at every turn."

* *A History of Europe, 1715-1814.* By W. F. Reddaway. Methuen. 16s. net.

Dr. Reddaway appreciates the close relationship, during the century, of commercial rivalry and colonial issues with the course of events in Europe. He stresses the influence of Rousseau who "did the American revolution the same service as Marx the Russian." He emphasises the outstanding importance of 1775 which "in political weight . . . surpassed every rival year." In 1789, "the lesson of America was to be applied to France, and through her to dominate for a quarter of a century the whole history of Europe."

For a survey of this momentous century within the limits of 550 pages, Dr. Reddaway's work is remarkably balanced and complete. He embodies a huge quantity of material without losing the main threads of development. A guide to further study is provided in the bibliographies which conclude each chapter.

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THE PERSONAL POWER OF THE CROWN.*

In his new work on *The King and the Imperial Crown*, Professor A. Berriedale Keith discusses at length the rights and duties attributable to the Crown and, in particular, the extent of the powers still left in the King's personal discretion. The position of the King rests, of course, upon a mixture of legal and conventional rules. Over a large area their nature is well defined. Professor Keith can deal lucidly and simply with such topics as the statutory basis of the monarchy and the law as to accession; he finds an opportunity for an account of the ceremony of coronation. The civil list and the legal status of the Royal Family also receive careful historical treatment. Similarly, the conventional right of ministers to exercise the prerogative is quite settled in many cases, such as the grant of pardons and patronage.

On certain vital constitutional matters, however, such as the dismissal of ministers and the dissolution of Parliament, the King's personal authority remains obscure. On these points Professor Keith's views are of great interest. His treatment is to discuss constitutional precedents from the accession of William IV. Such covering of well-worn ground is valuable without being decisive, for conventional precedent,

* *The King and the Imperial Crown*. By A. Berriedale Keith. Longmans. 21s. net.

by its very nature, is not legally binding. New situations may be the cause, or the excuse, for contracting or expanding the royal initiative. In Professor Keith's opinion the King has succeeded to the position formerly held by the House of Lords as a kind of constitutional guardian against sudden radical change. He envisages, for example, the return of a Socialist Government with a revolutionary mandate. Unless the majority was overwhelming, the King should refuse to swamp the Lords with Labour nominees, but dismiss the Cabinet and dissolve Parliament again, presumably on the advice of a new minority Government. Following an opinion of Dicey, the King can look beyond the legislature to the electorate, as an "independent authority which can measure the strength of public feeling by further considerations than those affecting the mere numerical strength of parties in the Commons." Professor Keith has in mind particularly the vagaries of our system of simple majority voting.

The dangers of leaving an undefined discretion in the hands of a constitutional Head have been pertinently argued by Mr. Justice Evatt in his work *The King and his Dominion Governors*, recently reviewed briefly in these columns. The possibility of a non-democratic exercise of the prerogative exists, along with the undoubted risk of drawing the Throne into the arena of partisan strife. The dismissal of the Lang Government in New South Wales in 1932 while it retained a majority in the Assembly has been widely attacked as unconstitutional, and the Governor himself both before and after his action was the subject of violent criticism by the contending parties in turn. The consequence in the Dominions, as Mr. Justice Evatt infers, may be that the Governor will become openly and simply a nominee of the ministry in office. In the United Kingdom where the Head is a hereditary monarch, it is fundamental, as Professor Keith appreciates, that his personal acts are and appear to be absolutely impartial. The application of democratic principles will be best ensured, and the impartial reputation of the King guaranteed, by the enactment of definite rules to be applied by him in potential constitutional crises of the future. That this is a practical solution of fears, existing both in the United Kingdom and the Dominions, is the view of Mr. Justice Evatt with all his authority and experience as a distinguished jurist and judge of the Australian High Court.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Mr. Claude G. Montefiore has recently written a Devotional Introduction to the Hebrew Bible.* It is intended primarily for the use of Jews and Jewesses, but may be studied with great advantage by a much larger circle of readers. The author's services to biblical criticism and exposition are well known. He combines in a remarkable degree scholarship with breadth of view, a devotional spirit and a delightfully lucid style. In this little volume he traces the progressive revelation of the Old Testament throughout its stages and in the diverse literatures of Old Testament religion—the Prophets, the Law, the Books of Wisdom and the Psalms. Mr. Montefiore explains in a very striking way the development of ethical monotheism as exhibited in all these branches of Old Testament literature, and his account is deeply impressive and illuminating to all those who are interested in the unique contribution that has been made by the Old Testament to the religious faith of mankind. We can heartily recommend this excellent contribution to the study of the Scriptures.

J. S. L.

Mr. C. H. Warren admits that he has no new biographical facts to bring forward in his *Sir Philip Sidney*†; he claims, however, that Sir Philip has not been sufficiently considered as first and foremost a poet, and a poet of a very high order, and it is on this aspect that he lays stress. He retells in an interesting fashion, and with the enthusiasm that its subject must always evoke, the incidents of Sidney's career—as lover, courtier and diplomat; his family relationships and friendships, his heroic death. Though his famous words to the dying soldier rest on no contemporary evidence, they are in complete harmony with his character. Mr. Warren's study of Sir Philip's writings, of the Sonnets in particular, is one of the best things in the book: on the latter, one recalls Lamb's Essay. But we much doubt the truth of the publisher's suggestion (it is not made by the author) that Sidney would have chosen "a life of study and retirement"; there are various indications that he hankered after adventure, as with Frobisher or Gilbert, and chafed at being given no chance by Elizabeth of distinguishing himself. The Queen's persistent attitude of coldness and suspicion towards both Sir Henry Sidney and his son is hard to explain or justify, but the charge of nigardliness repeatedly brought against her by Mr. Warren has been effectively disproved by Professor Neale in his *Queen Elizabeth*; he there showed that she rarely had the requisite money at her command.

* *A Short Devotional Introduction to the Hebrew Bible.* By Claude G. Montefiore. Macmillan. 3s. 6d. net.

† Nelson. 1936. 7s. 6d.

The Mesolithic Settlement of Northern Europe,* by Dr. J. G. D. Clark, is an erudite and stimulating study of the food-gathering peoples of Northern Europe during the early post-glacial age. The work is the product of an acute analytical mind which is closely acquainted with archaeological material in the Low Countries, Germany, Scandinavia and the British Isles, and which is also appreciative of the labours of fellow-workers on the period. This book, indeed, is an important example of what can be achieved through the correlation of research in geology, palæo-botany, anthropology and archaeology. The six millennia, dating roughly from 8300 B.C., which Dr. Clark ascribes to the Mesolithic period in North Europe, represent a progressive change in physical environment following the glacial retreat. Dr. Clark first discusses this natural history, including the land and sea movements, the increase in temperature and the growth of forests. Thereafter, in close correlation with this physical change, he presents the evidence for the evolution and contacts of the three great cultures of the period; namely, the survival of the tanged-point cultures, the axe cultures consequent upon forest development and the microlithic peoples drawn from the overflow of Tardenoisian civilisation in Africa. The volume is fully illustrated; and experts will examine closely the conclusions of one of the most brilliant of our younger pre-historians.

A valuable addition to the English Heritage series is a volume on *The Law*,† by Lord Justice Slesser. General ignorance of our system of jurisprudence is so widespread that this short lucid appreciation by a high authority must serve a useful purpose. Sir Henry outlines the growth and principles of the whole field of private and public law, apart from the law of the constitution which has already been dealt with by Sir Maurice Amos in a separate volume. His method of treating some topics, such as the law of torts, will interest professional lawyers. Unfortunately, this little book has suffered from inadequate revision on a number of points. For example, his assertion that "the failure of the defendant in a criminal case to give evidence may not be commented upon" applies only to the prosecution; comment from the bench being quite usual. Again, when describing "the right of a peer to be tried before the Court of the Lord High Steward for felony," Sir Henry omits to add that, when the House of Lords is in session, the court of trial is the Upper House, with all the peers as judges of law and fact, as in the recent case of Lord de Clifford. This privilege is now in process of being abolished. As a short general introduction to our legal system, Sir Henry's little volume will be widely appreciated; and those who have completed it may well pass on to that larger and more detailed survey, *The Book of English Law*,‡ by Professor Edward Jenks, which

* Cambridge University Press. 25s. net.

† Longmans. 3s. 6d. net.

‡ John Murray. 12s. net.

has just been published in a fourth English edition. This admirable book has been revised to include the law down to the end of 1935.

France: A Handbook for Beginners in French, by Dr. Cloudesley Brereton,* contains a great deal of knowledge and observation in its forty-seven pages. No living Englishman knows the country better. The three wireless lectures which compose the little book deal briefly but vividly with the history, the economic geography, the institutions, the education, literature, the arts, the social life and the national characteristics of our nearest neighbour. Dr. Brereton describes the French as an interesting, alert, witty people, more logical, more vivacious and more excitable than ourselves. These differences add to the charm of travel and study. Though our author writes for beginners his sparkling pages may be read with pleasure and profit by people who have known France all their lives.

Mr. Rodney Gallop has written a delightful as well as instructive work on *Portugal: A Book of Folk-ways*.† Portugal is perhaps one of the less-known European countries which probably accounts for the fact that no book has been written before on this subject. Yet Portugal is particularly rich in folk-lore, as Mr. Gallop shows in this general survey, and as might be expected in a country so predominantly agricultural and pastoral. He divides his book into three parts, the first vividly describes a tour of the country and forms an introduction to the main work; Part II records and discusses "Traditional beliefs and customs" and Part III deals with "Folk-music and Literature." Mr. Gallop has made a valuable contribution to Portuguese social history by recording these ancient customs before they are swept away in the course of progress. The book has a good bibliography and is fully illustrated with delightful photography and sketches.

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Welcome must be given to the revised and expanded edition of Professor A. S. Turberville's admirable little volume on *Commonwealth and Restoration*.‡ It contains a well-balanced, comprehensive and equitable introduction to the study of forty momentous years which will give rise to controversy in interpretation. This short account serves well its purpose "to stimulate interest, and to serve as a guide to the sources of fuller information on the era and to more appreciation of it." It may also be noted here, with appreciation, that the three volumes of Professor G. M. Trevelyan's trilogy, *England under Queen Anne*,§ have now been re-issued in a cheap edition.

* Heffer & Sons, Cambridge. 1s.

† Nelson. 7s. 6d. net.

‡ Cambridge University Press. 15s. net.

§ Longmans. 10s. 6d. net each volume.